Eric Zuesse – US General Accounting Office finds Failure is the Norm in US Military Aircrafts: 26 of the 49 Types of US Military Aircrafts fail All Performance Goals

Governement Accountability Office (foto

Governement Accountability Office (foto

Governement Accountability Office (foto

Seal Governement Accountability Office (foto

U.S. GAO finds Failure is the Norm in U.S. Military Aircrafts: 26 of the 49 Types of U.S. Military Airfts fail All Performance Goals

Here is from the opening of the 10 November 2022 U.S. General Accounting Office study, “Weapon System Sustainment: Aircraft Mission Capable Goals Were Generally Not Met and Sustainment Costs Varied by Aircraft”, report # GAO-23-106217:

We looked at 49 types of military aircraft and found that only 4 types met their annual mission readiness goals from FY 2011 through FY 2021 — an overall decline over time. Program officials gave us various reasons for these results, including aging aircraft, maintenance challenges, and issues with getting parts and supplies. …

As shown below, 26 aircraft did not meet their annual mission capable goal in any fiscal year [it scored 0 in each and every goal in each and every year]. The mission capable rate — the percentage of total time when the aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission — is used to assess the health and readiness of an aircraft fleet.

[Note that “*For this aircraft [7 aircrafts], the military department did not provide a mission capable goal for all eleven years.” The study also says “The mission capable rate — the percentage of total time when the aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission — is used to assess the health and readiness of an aircraft fleet.” For those 7 aircraft-types, the U.S. Department of Defense refused to provide data to calculate “the percentage of total time when the aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission.” Only 3 of those 7 aircraft-types showed more than 0 years in which some years’ data (2 years in each instance) when “Their Annual Mission Capable Goal” had been met: the P-8A Anti-submarine, and the F-35C and F-35A Fighters; but the F-35B Fighter was instead among the 26 aircraft types that constantly failed its “Annual Mission Capable Goal.”]

Comparing fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2021, the average mission capable rate for the selected aircraft has fallen for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, to varying degrees. The average mission capable rate for the selected Army aircraft has risen.

For fiscal year 2021, GAO found that only two of the 49 aircraft examined met the service-established mission capable goal. More specifically, for fiscal year 2021, 30 aircraft were more than 10 percentage points below the mission capable goal in fiscal year 2021; and 17 aircraft were 10 percentage points or less below the mission capable goal in fiscal year 2021.

Many of the selected aircraft are facing one or more sustainment challenges, as shown below. According to program officials, these challenges have an effect on mission capable rates.

Sustainment Challenges Affecting Some of the Selected Department of Defense Aircraft

Operating and support (O&S) costs totaled about $54 billion in fiscal year 2020 for the reviewed aircraft—a decrease of about $2.9 billion since fiscal year 2011 after factoring in inflation using constant fiscal year 2020 dollars. Maintenance costs became a larger portion of O&S costs—increasing by $1.2 billion since fiscal year 2011. Air Force and Army O&S costs have decreased, while Navy and Marine Corps O&S costs have increased. Based on our analysis and information provided by the program offices, these trends have largely been driven by changes in the size of aircraft inventory and reduced flying hours. Additionally, O&S costs have varied widely across aircraft fleets. For example, the total fiscal year 2020 O&S costs for the systems we reviewed ranged from [a low of] about $97 million for the KC-130T fleet (Navy and Marine Corps) to a high of about $4.3 billion for the F-16 fleet (Air Force). Based on our analysis and information provided by the system program offices, cost variances were based on aircraft type and factors such as age of the fleet, the number of aircraft included in the inventory, and the number of flying hours flown by a fleet.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends tens of billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems in an effort to ensure that these systems are available to simultaneously support today’s military operations and maintain the capability to meet future defense requirements. This report provides observations on mission capable rates and costs to operate and sustain 49 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

GAO initiated this work in response to continuing interest in the operational availability and O&S costs for major weapon systems. We also initiated this work as part of our response to a provision in section 802 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 for GAO to report on sustainment reviews conducted by the military services, with a specific focus on O&S cost growth. In addition to this report, GAO plans to issue additional reports in response to the provision. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed program office officials to identify reasons for the trends in mission capability rates and O&S costs as well as any challenges in sustaining the aircraft.


The U.S. Government spends about half of the total world’s military expenditures (some portions of it outside of the Defense Department so as to hide from the public the total and deceive about comparisons with other countries’ military expenditures).

Though the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that only around 36% of global military spending is by the U.S. Government, that is including only the U.S. Defense Department’s military spending, and so it excludes the military expenditures that are in other Departments, such as the U.S. Treasury Department.

Furthermore: trillions of dollars in U.S. military spending are unaccounted for, and the U.S. Department of Defense is the ONLY part of the U.S. Government that has never been audited, because it is so corrupt that it cannot be audited.

Americans have higher confidence in the U.S. military than in any other “Institution” in the U.S., according to polling which goes all the way back to the 1970s. No other U.S. institution comes even close, except “Small business.” Other than “The military,” all other parts of the U.S. Government, and all news-media, score very low in the public’s confidence.

Furthermore, whereas prior to the formation of the U.S. Department of Defense in 1947 (which had been preceded by the U.S. Department of War), the majority of U.S. military expenditures were for soldiers (“Personnel”), that changed radically, and at least since 2004 less than 25% of it is, and the main costs are instead going to “Defense Contractors” such as Lockheed Martin, whose private owners (who also include owners of the media) profit from wars and from America’s vast and ever-increasing military spending. So, whereas “The military” was formerly referring mainly to soldiers, it now and increasingly refers instead to corporations such as Northrop Grumman, whose business is to sell to the U.S. Department of Defense and to nations that are ‘allied with’ (vassals of) the U.S. Consequently, Americans who express high confidence in “The military” are mainly expressing high confidence in the producers of those military aircrafts that predominantly fail all of their performance-objectives. 

Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s new book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.

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