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Why No One Could Find Mengele: Allen Dulles and the German SS

Peter Dale Scott

BY JULY 1945 Josef Mengele had been captured and identified at an allied prisoner-of-war camp. An eyewitness has just told a Congressional Committee that not only the prisoner's name was known, but also the general nature of his crimes as doctor, experimenter, and executioner at Auschwitz. Yet like so many of his fellow members of the SS, Mengele was somehow allowed to disappear, to re-emerge ten years later in Latin America.

Twenty years ago few would have believed that the victorious allies in the so-called "Good War" could have deliberately allowed a sadistic mass murderer like Mengele to go free. From the revelations since the Eichmann trial, however, it has become only too obvious that OSS, the wartime precursor of today's CIA, arranged for numbers of wanted criminals to "escape" from camps, and when necessary supplied them with new identities to protect them from justice. Murderers, far from being exempted from such protection, seem to have been among those most likely to obtain it.

This is particularly true of those SS veterans whose careers have been most closely linked to Mengele's in Latin America: Klaus Barbie, the Butcher of Lyon, in Bolivia; Walter Rauff, supervisor of the SS mobile gas chambers, in Chile; and Friedrich Schwend, yet another wanted murderer, in Peru. Like Mengele, all three of these men developed links with neo-fascist elements in the military and/or interior ministries of their new countries. All collaborated in repressive operations against the left, particularly at the time of the CIA-assisted overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. Barbie and Schwend at least have acted in this capacity through arms deals with the German firm Merex AG, a proprietary firm of the German BND intelligence service, itself a descendant of the Gehlen intelligence network which in 1945 passed from the leadership of the Nazi SS to that of American intelligence and eventually the CIA.

AFTER World War II, while the CIA and the Gehlen Org were being slowly organized on the United States payroll, both Barbie and Schwend worked for United States Army Counterintelligence (CIC), and at this time Schwend was working on setting up the secret SS escape routes to Latin America by which both men would eventually re-establish themselves. It has been charged that Rauff played an even more prominent role in setting up this escape route, while also on the American payroll; and that he did so with an immunity granted to him by Allen Dulles of OSS after the SS-OSS secret (and sometimes unauthorized) negotiations in North Italy, in which, unquestionably, both Dulles and Rauff participated.

The primary purpose of these secret talks was to secure a separate Nazi and

fascist surrender in North Italy, and at least partly to prevent a de facto seizure of power by Italian communist partisans behind the Nazi lines. But even the intense fixation which OSS and SS shared about reducing the inevitable communist role in postwar Europe does not appear to diplomatic historians to explain the zealous intensity with which Dulles, at times in direct contravention of written orders, pursued negotiations for a surrender which preceded that of V-E Day by just six days.

With the same excessive zeal, future CIA personnel protected the convicted war criminal Barbie and concealed him from the French authorities who knew very well that American intelligence was hiding him from them. A recent Justice Department report on the United States handling of the Barbie case is clearly an essay in damage limitation, while suppressing the rather obvious connections to the Gehlen Org and its then employers, the CIA. The role of Schwend (and almost certainly Rauff) in exfiltrating whole cadres of wanted SS criminals while on the American payroll only confirms recent speculations that the SS networks were being preserved for postwar anticommunist activities, as the result of an arrangement negotiated with Dulles and his OSS superiors.

Could Mengele—not a political policeman like Rauff and Barbie, but a doctor with a penchant for lethal experiments on human guinea pigs—could even Mengele have been saved as the result of a secret deal between Dulles and the SS? Such a hypothesis would once have been almost unthinkable. But we have since learned that his colleague in the Auschwitz human experiments, Walter Schreiber, was shielded by the Americans from a Polish conviction *in absentia*, so that he could help guide the post-war researches of the United States Air Force in bacteriological warfare. In 1952 Schreiber was helped by American officials to re-establish himself, via Argentina, in Paraguay. 1952 is the year that Mengele himself appeared in Argentina, moving to Paraguay two years later.

DESPITE the books, articles, and TV programs about Mengele, the "Angel of Death" at Auschwitz, less is known for certain about his post-war activities than those of any comparable war criminal. Apart from his extended residence in Paraguay, where he gained citizenship in 1957 and was stripped of it in 1979, little has been documented. But in one of the best books to appear about the post-war network of Rauff, Schwend, and Mengele, the so-called Kameradenwerk, the career of Mengele is closely implicated.

The book is *The Bormann Brotherhood* by William Stevenson, himself a wartime intelligence operative with access to intelligence sources, including the records of Donovan and their mutual friend, Sir William Stephenson

of the British SOE. According to Stevenson, Mengele had worked in a restricted military zone of Paraguay with the war-time Croatian dictator Ante Pavelic, whose Croatian Catholic connections undoubtedly played central roles in the escapes of Rauff, Schwend, and Barbie. Pavelic had initially made contact with the Latin American Nazi Kameradenwerk through Rauff.

With respect to Mengele's finances, Stevenson mentions the Kameradenwerk representative in Ecuador,

Alfons Sassen, the representative of the Brotherhood [Kameradenwerk] business enterprise known as "Estrella." It is said too that Sassen is financed by Dr. Josef Mengele, who controls now such funds as remain liquid from the sale of European loot.

This is important, since post-war SS funds had earlier been administered by Friedrich Schwend, who had used them (apparently with United States connivance and support) for the exfiltration of himself and other top SS members. Schwend apparently ceased to play this role after he, and a band of Croats under his control, were exposed in a 1972 Peruvian murder scandal in which Mengele was a suspect. (Sassen, a Dutch SS officer and convicted war criminal, is chiefly remembered for his extended record of Eichmann's revelations to him in 1957, which formed a major exhibit in the Eichmann trial.)

Stevenson elsewhere names this Estrella company as the subsidiary of a financial consortium controlled from Bolivia by Schwend's business partner Klaus Barbie. In the early 1960s Barbie

set up a company called Estrella, ostensibly dealing in quinquina bark. Although no records exist in the public registry in La Paz, at least one Bolivian arms dealer still remembers it as a weapons trading company.

It appears that Barbie and Estrella did export quinquina bark as agents for the German drug firm Boehringer, which grew rich on quinine contracts to the United States Army during the Vietnam War. But the primary business of Barbie and Schwend was arms trafficking,

carried on through two German-based firms, Merex and Gemetex. The two Nazis acted as agents, negotiating purchases not only on behalf of the Bolivian and Peruvian governments but, through their friendship with the Nazi Hans Rudel, sales to Paraguay and Chile and, through Otto Skorzeny in Spain, further deals in Madrid.

Merex AG, itself set up in 1963, was an arms company owned and controlled by the Gehlen BND, while Skorzeny was one of the top go-betweens in the post-war deals between Gehlen, the SS, and the CIA.

Barbie's arms deals, concerted in this way with western intelligence, were politically influential as well as economically lucrative. They involved him, according to French sources, in the drug trafficking business of Auguste Ricord, a Corsican Nazi collaborator who like Mengele was established with high-level connections in Paraguay. And it was apparently the Nixon administration's determination to break the Ricord ring which first made the CIA begin reporting on

Mengele's own involvement in the drug traffic.

A BRIEF glance at the post-war career of Klaus Barbie shows how relatively small a role in his prosperity was played by post-war Nazi cabals such as the well publicized ODESSA or "Die Spinne". Condemned to death by the French for genocidal murders in Lyon, Barbie was concealed and protected for four years in Germany by the United States Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), who were using him as an informant to spy on—ironically—the French. After the Communists were dropped from General de Gaulle's Cabinet, the Nazi Barbie was reassigned to spy on the "America Houses" set up by the State Department, which were, according to Barbie's American handler, "stocked with all kinds of left-wing literature." Barbie's reports may thus have helped fuel the attack on this program five years later by Joe McCarthy, whose charges against the state Department were based on documents leaked to him by a source in Army Intelligence.

Finally, one can hardly ignore the fact that the protection and exfiltration of Barbie were handled, at the top and at the bottom of the American hierarchy, by men with OSS/OPC/CIA connections. George Neagoy, the Austrian CIC agent who secured Barbie's false documentation and would personally deliver him through Austria to Father Draganovic in Genoa, was himself about to enter the CIA. At HICOG the preparation of misleading reassurances to the French was being handled by John Bross, a veteran of OSS paramilitary operations who in April 1951 would join the Eastern European Division of OPC (working closely with the Gehlen Org.)

A resolution of what "other agency" picked up Barbie in 1951 would be of great help in understanding the post-war career of Josef Mengele. For there is no doubt at all that in Latin America Barbie became part of an international intelligence network working directly with proprietaries of Gehlen's BND, and little doubt that Mengele was intimately connected to this network also.

The unlikely possibility that Barbie, with his store of embarrassing secrets, was left to start a new future on his own has been refuted by Barbie himself. Though Allan A. Ryan, in a 1983 Justice Department investigation, asserts that Barbie was the only Nazi to be exfiltrated by CIC down the Rat Line, Barbie recalls that the other occupants in his Genoa hotel "were all Nazi fugitives—among them Eichmann himself." According to Barbie, Draganovic told him his reasons

were purely humanitarian. He helped both Catholics and Protestants, but mostly they were SS officers, about two hundred in all. Anti-communists. He said to me, "We've got to keep a sort of reserve on which we can draw in the future." I think that was the Vatican's motive as well.

Indeed the Vatican did have a program underway for the exfiltration of anti-Communists. This was the work of Bishop Alois Hudal of the Collegium Teutonicum, a priest close both to Pius XII and the future Paul VI as well as a public admirer of the Third Reich. After an interview in Rome with

former Gestapo Chief Heinrich Muller, Hudal had begun the work of supplying Vatican documentation for such prominent fugitives as Muller, Eichmann, and perhaps Martin Bormann. It was Hudal who gave Father Draganovic the necessary introductions to the International Red Cross and other "officials who, for a bribe, could smooth the fugitive's path."

Between them, Hudal and Draganovic helped hundreds of Nazis to escape, and perhaps thousands of Croatian Ustase. Chief of these was the former Croatian dictator Ante Pavelic. According to William Stevenson, however,

Pavelic had since withdrawn into an armed camp in Paraguay shared with German settlers in the restricted military zone northeast of Asuncion. There he worked with Dr. Josef Mengele, the death-camp experimenter, and [Walter] Rauff. . . who designed and built mass gassing chambers for Auschwitz.

The most prominent Nazis known to have escaped by this route established a

German multinationals abroad after the impending collapse of Hitler. Soon after the war OSS found the extensive documentation of a meeting in Strasbourg on August 10, 1944 (the purpose of which was to establish this fund) between representatives of the party and of firms like Krupp, Volkswagen, and Messerschmidt.

But as the Cold War encouraged the United States to see the German corporate presence in Latin America in a more friendly light, the role of these firms in providing new careers for war criminals abroad was ignored. In fact it was the key to the postwar status of the Kameraden. Otto Skorzeny (acquitted of his criminal charges by the intervention of western intelligence) became a sales representative of Krupp. Hans Ulrich Rudel (never charged, but an unrepentant Nazi ideologue in the post-war era) became a sales representative of Siemens. Walter Rauff (designer of the gas ovens at Auschwitz) found his first employment in Latin America with a subsidiary of I. G. Farben (an employer of slave labor

Schwend's chauffeured Mercedes from Merano, North Italy, to Rome, where he was deposited at a Croatian seminary and made his historic contact with Bishop Hudal. From documents found in Schwend's possession in 1972, he reports that

the bulk of the money the bishop [Hudal] needed was placed at his disposal by . . . a financier named Friedrich "Freddy" Merse, partner of Friedrich Schwend in Operation Bernhard. The money came from the hoard Schwend had amassed in Swiss accounts . . . by the exchange of counterfeit pounds for hard currency.

What you will not learn from Farago's and Stevenson's accounts is that in 1945-46, when Schwend was playing this crucial role in setting up the Rat Line, Schwend was working for American intelligence:

US documents reveal that after passing into the hands of the 44th CIC Detachment he was used as an informant by American intelligence agencies in Austria, the Austrian Tyrol and Meran, North Italy.

outcome of the war than on the survival of the cadres of the SS. One of the principal SS participants in the negotiation was Milan SS Chief Walter Rauff, soon to be a fugitive organizer of the Kameradenwerk.

On April 27, 1945, after being visited by Dulles's OSS agent Emilio Daddario in Milan, Rauff surrendered to Army CIC. According to recently declassified American intelligence documents seen by Loftus,

He told Army CIC that he had made "arrangements" for his surrender "in order to avoid further bloodshed in Milan" . . . The arrangements could be confirmed "by Hussman [i.e. Max Husmann, a Swiss participant in Sunrise] and Mr. Dulles, allied agents in Switzerland."

Later Rauff told his interrogators how


he himself had been the go-between in negotiating the secret surrender of the SS armies in Italy. He described [how he] went to Lugano in March 1945, to arrange the release of allied prisoners in Rauff's custody as a sign of good faith. In return for the surrender of all SS forces, Dulles promised that none of the negotiators would ever be prosecuted as war criminals.

Loftus then confirms the claim of Beata Klarsfeld that Rauff began to work for Dulles, and to exfiltrate Nazis through Catholic monasteries, while on the OSS payroll:

Despite the Army interrogators' pleas that Rauff "is considered a menace if ever set free, and failing actual elimination, is recommended for life-long internment," Dulles kept his bargain and Rauff was released. According to usually reliable intelligence sources, Dulles then employed Rauff on anti-Communist operations in Italy, which was Rauff's specialty under the Nazis. Dulles asked the Vatican to continue his wartime arrangement of using Catholic monasteries and convents to hide OSS agents. After the war, Dulles explained, these safe houses were still needed to smuggle out anti-Communist refugees. The Vatican's involvement with Dulles's program was minimal. The church provided food, shelter, and identity cards, as it did to all refugees. It was Dulles's contacts, not the Vatican, who handled the smuggling of Nazis. According to top secret State Department documents, the Italian police provided the false passports for allied agents; the visas came from the Argentine consulate in the allied intelligence unit based at Trieste; and the embarkation paperwork was handled by a US State Department officer in Genoa. Genoa, incidentally, was Rauff's area of jurisdiction. All of them worked for Dulles, who set up the unwitting Vatican to be the scapegoat if it were ever discovered that Dulles's anti-Communist refugees were really SS intelligence agents. To be sure, there were a few priests, and even one bishop, who smuggled a few of their own Nazi countrymen through Italy [this must allude to the Croats], but that was at extremely low levels of the Vatican, and was quietly squelched after the exposure in the Italian press in 1948. The higher-level connection between the Vatican and Dulles is still classified by the government.

Loftus' remarkable charges against Dulles are corroborated by scraps of the public record. In his semi-authorized history of OSS, R. Harris Smith notes that the leading Italian go-between in the negotiations, the industrialist, baron, and Papal Chamberlain Luigi Parrilli, was in 1948

reportedly involved in a CIA operation to



Death of an Ant

network in Latin America, often in alliance with Croatian cohorts, somewhat as follows: Bolivia—Klaus Barbie (with Croats); Peru—Friedrich Schwend (with Croats); Chile—Walter Rauff (with Croats); Ecuador—Alfons Sassen; Argentina—Otto Skorzeny, Hans-Ulrich Rudel, and more recently Heinrich Muller. This network, the so-called Kameradenwerk, has maintained close political, social, and business ties. By most accounts Josef Mengele was its leading representative in Paraguay.

Two North American authors with wartime intelligence experience, William Stevenson and Ladislav Farago, have pointed to the role of the extensive post-war assets collected or plundered by the SS and Martin Bormann. This came from three sources: the proceeds from the SS forgery of British pound notes ("Operation Bernhard"), the looting of Jews and other Nazi victims, and, most significantly, the corporate contributions to a special fund set up to guarantee the survival of

at Auschwitz). Franz Paul Stangl, chief of the Treblinka extermination camp, found post-war employment in Latin America with Volkswagen, as did Eichmann with Mercedes-Benz. And so on.

But American intelligence may have played a more direct role in the exfiltration of Nazis with the proceeds of Operation Bernhard, the SS forgery of British pound notes. Here again western intelligence knew enough about Operation Bernhard to protect the post-war pound, by a timely issue of new notes and recall of the old. But by this time much of the SS profits, an estimated \$300 million worth, had been converted to genuine currency. Most of this money has never been traced.

The man in charge of laundering the forged banknotes was Friedrich Schwend, who in 1945-46, in North Italy, became an important link in setting up the SS escape route to the Vatican. Farago narrates in detail how Heinrich Muller was driven in

THESE long-suppressed details about the post-war American sponsorship of the wanted war criminals Barbie and Schwend confirm the recent accusations of John Loftus that the SS Kameraden were exfiltrated as a result of Operation Sunrise, the secret agreement, shortly before V-E day, between Allen Dulles of OSS Bern and SS General Karl Wolff. As recorded in Dulles's and other official accounts, Operation Sunrise concerned the surrender of German troops in Italy, to prevent the needless destruction of civilian property and help forestall a takeover of North Italy by the Communist partisans in the area. More recently revisionist historians have focused on the degree to which Dulles and Wolff, the principal negotiators, exceeded their authorization to negotiate, and in so doing created a major political rift between Stalin and Churchill.

Inasmuch as the armistice in North Italy only preceded that in the rest of Europe by one week, Operation Sunrise may have had less impact on the

prevent a leftist victory in the Italian general elections. It was also rumored that he had concocted a plan to transport ex-Nazis from Germany to Paraguay.

As a Knight of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM), which issued its own diplomatic passports, Parrilli was a member of an international Catholic network well equipped to handle exfiltration. The leading Bavarian Knight of Malta, Baron Erwein von Aretin, was said to have arranged travel "for no small number of ex-Nazis" after the war.

Giovanni Battista Montini (the future Pope Paul VI), the OSS contact at the Vatican, became the patron of Bishop Hudal's exfiltration efforts:

Montini had under his supervision the Vatican bureau that issued the refugee travel documents and the Caritas Internationalis, the Church's international welfare organization, which was at this time (and for some years after the war) one of the main charitable institutions aiding the fugitive Nazis.

Like Parrilli, Montini was later deeply involved in the CIA's first major post-war covert operation, the efforts to block a Communist victory in the 1948 Italian election.

THIS essay, because of its limited scope, cannot go into detail about the intricate contacts established throughout the war between Nazis and the Papacy, the Papacy and the United States, the United States and Germany. Suffice to say that the common denominator in such informal contacts increasingly became the post-war future of Europe, and possible joint steps to exclude the Soviet Union from it. This was especially true after Churchill and Roosevelt had proclaimed the policy of unconditional surrender at Casablanca, a policy which not only dismayed Allen Dulles but threatened the propriety of his continued contacts with members of the German opposition. Yet even after the failure of the July 1944 plot against Hitler, OSS continued its increasingly questionable contacts, now chiefly with representatives of SS leaders Himmler and Schellenberg.

One motive for these contacts was clearly to limit the post-war influence in Western Europe of Soviet power, Communist resistance forces, and the civilian communist parties. Another, however, appears to have been to prevent the post-war breakup of German and American intelligence assets, most particularly the Gehlen networks in eastern and central Europe (which by 1945 were under the control of Skorzeny and the SS), and OSS itself, which by 1945 was facing increasingly public attack inspired by United States military intelligence and the FBI.

It is interesting that Gehlen knew of Karl Wolff's contacts with Dulles as early as January 1945, the month in which they were initiated. From this same period he began to consolidate his networks for survival after Hitler's downfall, which is to say he already expected to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Americans. In April 1945, one month before the war ended, Dulles asked Frank Wisner to begin talks with Gehlen, who was not taken into American custody until May 20. On the Gehlen side, a plan "to gain contact

with the Americans" was approved on April 4, and continued without interruption even after Hitler dismissed Gehlen on April 9.

Curiously, the Operation Sunrise contacts between Wolff and Dulles became most intense in the second half of April 1945, even though at that time both Wolff and Dulles knew they had no authority to negotiate a surrender. On April 17 Wolff visited Berlin (where Gehlen and his HQ were still located), to be told by Hitler personally that he should "temporize in his talks with Dulles because it was still too early to consider a surrender, or even serious negotiation." On the same day Dulles returned to his Berne HQ from the OSS European Theater HQ in Paris, to receive, on April 21, an April 17 order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff "to liquidate Operation Sunrise by cutting all contact with Karl Wolff."

this "frenzied pursuit of Sunrise" by Dulles "a mere reflex action," the result of failure to realize that Allied victory was imminent in any case. In fact Dulles and Donovan *had* to mislead their superiors, if their plans for the post-war use of the SS were to succeed. As R. Harris Smith, a former CIA officer, reports, dead-pan,

Only Wolff's sudden and unexpected offer to sign an unconditional surrender on April 22 convinced the State Department to reverse its earlier order and to allow SUNRISE to proceed.

But no such offer had been made by Wolff; it was merely an illusion from Dulles's unjustified commentaries, which "ran roughshod over the minimal rules of caution and good sense."

The OSS policy of rescuing key

The history of OSS, which is indistinguishable from the secret political history of the war, is marked by a preoccupation with Communism almost as intense as its commitment to victory against Germany.

At least some of the SS men who in the last weeks of the war negotiated with OSS were treated thereafter as allies. Wilhelm Hoettl, for example, who had transmitted an offer from SS Deputy Head Kaltenbrunner, worked after the war like his former subordinate Schwend as an informant for the CIC in Austria.

Walter Rauff, who had negotiated in Milan with Dulles's aide Daddario, was also spared despite having directed the mobile gas chambers in Nazi-occupied Russia. By his own account, which has been reported as fact in the American press, Rauff "escaped" after his arrest by United States troops, to move with Vatican help first to Vatican City and then Syria. British and French sources agree, however, that Rauff, by as early as June 1945, had established himself in Genoa. There, with the aid of Cardinal Siri, Bishop of Genoa, Rauff organized a transit camp where as many as 5000 fleeing Nazis were sheltered before their departure to Argentina, Syria, or Egypt. The French Nazi-hunter Beata Klarsfeld claims that, like his Kameradenwerk ally Schwend, Rauff too was working with American intelligence before escaping to Chile.

This seems probable, inasmuch as Schwend was working for the Austrian CIC while setting up the Merano station of what became known as the Rat Line. At some point, moreover, certainly by the early 1950s, the CIA and the Gehlen-Org were working together to move Gehlen agents (headed by Skorzeny) to Egypt. Long before these officially authorized movement, Donovan and Dulles must have seen that, with a global network of its V-Men already in place, the Gehlen Org would be an even more impressive asset in their case for a post-war CIA.

The arrangements by Donovan and Dulles for an OSS-SS deal do not appear to have been approved at the time at any higher level. Indeed as late as December 1945 the War Department refused United States intelligence officers permission to collaborate with even the Gehlen Organization, whose pre-war origins lay not in the Nazi SS but the eventually decapitated Abwehr or German military intelligence. More importantly, Roosevelt had already tabled, as too controversial, the memo from OSS chief William J. Donovan (which Allen Dulles had drafted), for converting the wartime OSS into a permanent CIA.

In dealing with the SS, Dulles and Donovan knew that this risky operation could easily backfire against OSS, whose organizational future had already been challenged by J. Edgar Hoover and traditionalists in American military intelligence. But they also knew that, just as the OSS was the best hope for the survival of the SS cadres, so in a sense these SS cadres were their highest trump card in the impending contest for OSS's own institutional survival. What ultimately persuaded Truman in 1947-48 to authorize an operational CIA was in fact partly the need to find an institutional home for the post-war Gehlen Org.□

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Undaunted by such restrictions, both men continued to negotiate. Accompanied for the first time by an army representative (Colonel von Schweinitz), Wolff came to Switzerland counting on

his "personal reputation with the Anglo-Americans" to extract guarantees from Dulles that the "idealistic" and "decent" men of the army, party, and SS would be able to play "an active part in the reconstruction."

Dulles on his part misrepresented von Schweinitz's explicitly limited instructions as a "full power" to negotiate. Later, after Wolff had returned to Italy and found himself facing capture by Allied partisans, Dulles allowed an OSS team to participate (together with two SS men!) in the successful rescue and extrication of Wolff to Switzerland.

The historian Bradley Smith calls

fascist leaders appears, moreover, to have been systematic. The next day, on April 28, Dulles's aide Daddario risked his life in Milan to save the fascist Marshal Rodolfo Graziani from vengeful Socialist partisans. On April 29, in Rome, OSS officer James Angleton would similarly rescue Prince Valerio Borghese, by disguising him as a United States Army officer. After the war Graziani and Borghese became leaders of the neo-fascist MSI Party, while their wartime cadres were apparently helped to new anti-communist careers with the support of the Vatican and ultimately the United States. In the months after the war Angleton helped other fascists and Nazis to "escape" from prison camps, supplying them when necessary with new identities.

There seems no question that by April 1945 OSS was recruiting Nazis and fascists to help mobilize against post-war Communism. As a recent historian has observed,