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Autobiography of a Man
and a Movement

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS NEW YORK

To

*Ida and Erica Coudenhove-Kalergi,
dear companions in bright
and dark days*

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Part One

CITIZEN OF THE WORLD

CHAPTER ONE *The Mirage of Peace*

NOVEMBER 11, 1918, at 10:55 A.M., Lloyd George, smiling and excited, appeared on the doorstep of 10 Downing Street and told the waiting crowds that fighting on all fronts was to cease.

Some hours later, in Washington, President Woodrow Wilson, pale with emotion and weary from the strain of the past weeks, read his Armistice message to the Congress in the House Chamber on Capitol Hill.

On the evening of this memorable day Paris, after years of blackout and permanent threat of invasion, celebrated one of the greatest days of its proud history in an ocean of light and joy. On the Champs Elysées strangers fell into each other's arms, overwhelmed by emotion and happiness.

The world seemed to awaken suddenly from a ghastly nightmare. After four terrible years of war, fighting had definitely ceased. The tide of war had turned with miraculous speed. Only six months ago it had looked as if the German armies, after having crushed Russia, would be able to break through the western front and win the war. But now it was Germany that collapsed and surrendered. It was at the mercy of the triumphant Allies.

No wonder that the wild cheerings of London, Washington, and Paris reverberated around the globe, when all bells announced that the war was over and that the world stood at the threshold of an era without precedent—combining the promise of lasting peace and of liberty for all.

I spent that day in the little town of Linz on the Danube, the old capital of Upper Austria. In the morning, news had come of the impending armistice; later in the day an imperial manifesto told us that the Austrian emperor had resigned his rights in the conduct of the state and had dissolved the imperial government. Thus the Austrian

republic was born, under the presidency of the popular labor leader Karl Seitz.

The preceding days had seen world-shaking events: The German Kaiser had fled to Holland; General Ludendorff, the idol and symbol of German militarism, to Sweden. Germany had been transformed into a democratic republic with Fritz Ebert, a Socialist, as its president. Czechoslovakia and Hungary too had been transformed into democratic republics, while Turkey and Bulgaria had surrendered to the victorious Allies. Austria had been dismembered and some days earlier had concluded its armistice with Italy.

But today was World Armistice Day. Linz reeled with the celebration of this day of peace and of liberty. Close-packed crowds of soldiers and civilians surged through the streets, singing and shouting, the faces of women and men relieved and jubilant. True, their clothes were torn and worn thin, their uniforms ragged, faces peaked and pale from hunger—but there was no feeling of defeat or depression in the crowd, the people were not angry and resentful. For they were celebrating today their victory over war and militarism, over feudalism and reaction, over monarchy and plutocracy. The Austro-Hungarian empire was dead—the war was over. The people were not looking back, but ahead, toward a new and brighter world of liberty and of peace, of social equality and fair opportunities for all. They all believed that a new era of history was starting, the era of the people, the era of democracy and of socialism.

Of one thing these crowds were sure: Fighting was over. No power on earth could send them back to the trenches. No peace could ever be so bad as the war had been. And, indeed, never before had peace held out greater promise to the victors and to the vanquished.

I shared these feelings of hope and emotion. I was ready to join in the great task that started that day: the work of reconstructing Europe and the world on the principles of democracy and of international co-operation. To fight for the future against the past, for peace against war, for liberty against oppression, for equality against feudalism.

There was every reason for hope: Europe stood joined in a common movement and experience. The three European empires of the Romans, the Habsburgs, and the Hohenzollerns had crumbled and were now replaced by republics. After a struggle of one hundred thirty years the ideas of the French Revolution had finally triumphed. Within the last week two dozen European thrones, some of them reaching back a thousand years, had collapsed. From the icefields of Finland to the deserts of Arabia, old and young nations, oppressed for centuries, were

awakening to new liberty and constituting new independent states. Rumanians and Yugoslavs achieved at last their old dream of national unity. Finest symbol of this new Europe was Poland: disfranchised, dismembered, and oppressed for generations, it had now been united and restored as a free and powerful republic.

It was commonly understood that since the end of the religious wars dynastic rivalry and national oppression had provoked most wars of the last centuries. These two main sources of wars now seemed definitely eliminated by the fall of the dynasties and the liberation of the nations. A long period of European peace, security, and collaboration seemed at last possible. A new Holy Alliance was to be created. But this new Holy Alliance against wars was to be a league of nations and not of kings; a league for progress and democracy and not for oppression and reaction. The prophet of this League of Nations was the great President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.

When, on December 13, President Wilson arrived on the battleship *George Washington* at the French port of Brest, Europe hailed him as the man of destiny, who had come from the New World to bring the American ideals of liberty to the oppressed people of Europe. His Fourteen Points had been accepted by victors and vanquished as the basis for the coming peace and world order. This detailed program promised to bring reason, reconciliation, and reconstruction—a new era divorced from conquest, imperialism, and revenge. It promised fairness toward all, the reduction of trade barriers, the end of colonial imperialism, the abolition of secret diplomacy, world-wide reduction of armaments; protection of national and religious minorities, and the establishment of a world-embracing alliance against new attempts at oppression, domination, and aggression.

This great peace message, the Fourteen Points, had been read by its author to the Congress of the United States, on January 8, 1918. From that day millions of people all over the world—even within central Europe—began to turn enthusiastically to Wilson's leadership and to regard him as the political savior of the human race. I had shared, with most young men and women of Europe, this hope in Wilson and his ideals. We all felt that the old crumbling world of imperialism and semifeudalism was linked to the old generation, responsible for the terrible war—and that it was now up to our own generation to build a new and brighter world on sounder and more moral principles.

During this memorable winter of 1918-1919 I was obsessed by the idea that our generation had been called by destiny to accomplish this

gigantic work of world reconciliation and reconstruction. That it was up to us to build a new and better Europe on the ruins of the old. I distrusted deeply Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and all other representatives of European nationalism, and considered the struggle between them and Wilson a struggle between the past and the future, between the evil and the good, between eternal war and lasting peace.

The more I read and heard about the progress of the peace conference, the more I became disappointed and disillusioned. And I was terrified when I realized that Wilson had been defeated. After the future had vanquished the past on the battlefields of Europe, this past now took its revenge by defeating the future at the peace table! For Wilson had obviously sacrificed his program of a fair and generous peace, in exchange for the vague promise that his dream of a League of Nations would become a reality.

But shortly after the Fourteen Points had been killed in Paris, the League of Nations, as a world-embracing institution, was killed in Washington. The American isolationists completed the work of the European nationalists: they definitely defeated Wilson and his plans for a lasting peace—plans that might have saved the world and prevented the disasters that followed.

During this decisive year the seeds were sown that twenty years later ripened in the Second World War. The men who defeated Wilson share the responsibility for Hitler's rise and for the tragedies of our days. The peace treaties of 1919 did not end the World War but only interrupted it. The shortsighted Allied statesmen missed both the great alternatives: they neither smashed their enemy by dismembering the Reich nor reconciled him by fairness and generosity. Germany remained sovereign, united, centralized, and hostile, determined to achieve the revision of Versailles either by negotiation or by a second war.

This second war appeared on the horizon of Europe at the very moment the Peace Treaty was being signed. Evidence of this fact can be found in the remarkable book by the French historian, Jacques Bainville, *The Political Consequences of the Peace*; for in this book Bainville predicts clearly as early as 1920 the series of events that later led to the Second World War and explains them as the logical consequence of the unsound peace settlement.

During these crucial months I could watch from Vienna the disastrous consequences of the economic dismemberment of Central Europe. The blockade was still on. Austria's population was living, for the most

part, on what was left of army supplies. No coal came from Czechoslovakia, no oil from Rumania. Transportation broke down. One hour to the north and one hour to the east of Vienna new customs barriers were erected by Czechs and Hungarians, separating producers from consumers, raw materials from factories, agricultural from industrial areas. The old monetary union of Austro-Hungary had been disrupted and replaced by half a dozen new and unstable currencies, with a general tendency toward devaluation in spite of desperate attempts to check inflation.

Mass misery was the consequence. Vienna with its population of two million souls saw its natural market suddenly reduced from fifty-three to less than five millions. Hundreds of thousands of children were starving or undernourished in Vienna alone. Streets and squares were full of beggars and begging children. Cold, hunger, disease, vice, and crime increased; so did apathy, bitterness, despair, and disillusion. Was this the start of the golden age we had all hoped for when the war was over? Was this the promised reduction of trade barriers, pledged by the Fourteen Points? Was this the basis of the new European order that had inspired our hopes and expectations on Armistice day?

Wilson had been defeated, but his ideals survived. They remained a challenge to imperialism, to nationalism, and to all forms of autocracy.

In spite of Wilson's defeat I remained passionately Wilsonian. The methods and plans he had suggested had to be altered or dropped according to changing circumstances—but his ideals remained the only hope for distressed humanity. To serve these ideals seemed to me the greatest task of our generation.

Life lay ahead of me. I decided to devote it to the cause of international peace and of human liberty. Only after I realized that the establishment of a United States of the World had become impossible did my ideas crystallize around the conception of a United States of Europe, as a regional part of a more elastic commonwealth of the world.

So I started to crusade for this goal.

After years of tragedy, war, and unrest the world has reached a new crossroad of history. At the coming peace conference Wilson's ideals will again have to face the forces of nationalism.

For the second time within one generation Americans and Europeans will have the opportunity to establish a new world in a new spirit; they will be able to repair the mistakes of 1919 by a policy of vision and of courage.

Two cruel world wars, separated by a period of unrest and distress,

seem more than one generation can stand. Still this tragic fate we have gone through may become a blessing for many coming generations, if only we are ready to learn from our experiences, to acknowledge our failures, and to start, in a new spirit, a new page of international life.

This book recalls the story of our generation with an outlook on the days to come. It attempts to interpret the past for the sake of preparing the future.

All history is but a mosaic, composed by myriads of individual lives, each a symbol of its time and civilization. For the story of mankind is but the story of human individuals, of their lives, their struggles and their dreams—and every biography is a living key to history.

This book starts with the story of a life, a dream, and a fight. A life, born and educated for internationalism, in the face of an era of frantic nationalism; a dream of the United States of Europe, and its fight against the rising tide of Hitlerism.

This single life, this dream, this fight are inextricably interwoven, for our actions emerge from our dreams—as our dreams from the depth of our souls.

All of this book aims at the future, even where it seems to deal with the past. And its main subject is the destiny of the human race, even though it starts with the personal story of an international life.

CHAPTER TWO *From Asia to Europe*

ONE day in the early spring of 1896 a curious caravan traveled along a highway in western Bohemia. Starting from the railway station of the historic Czech town of Domažlice, it wound its way northward toward the little town of Ronsperg and its old castle. From time to time, as the caravan mounted the crest of the hills on the highway, the castle rose visible in the distance, for it, too, stood on a hill, surveying the plain as far as the distant green mountain chain in the west, the Bohemian Forest, which marked the frontier of Bavaria.

The little town of Ronsperg, with its two thousand German-speaking inhabitants, served as the unofficial capital of the estate, but the major part of the domain spread west of Ronsperg toward the hills of the forest, covered with straight, dark fir trees. Here stags and deer, roe and Corsican mountain sheep, foxes and hares were at home in the thick underbrush.

The plain of the estate embraced farms and herds of sheep and Swiss cattle which wandered over the wide fields and meadows.

Over all this Ronsperg Castle stood broad and solid on its hill, white walls covered with ivy, high roof of tiles black from the continuous smoke of chimneys. Its stone walls, ten feet thick, had withstood many sieges. Like an old tree, the castle had grown throughout the centuries, stretching its branches in all directions. In different generations new wings had been added, so that it had become irregular and unbalanced on its various sides. Like smaller trees around a large one, a number of smaller buildings gathered around the castle—the houses of officers of the estate, of coachmen and gardeners, the stables filled with carriages and sledges, the greenhouse, and the other buildings. Linked to the castle by a suspended wooden gallery was a second long building, built much later than the main castle, with apartments for guests on the upper floors and offices for the administration of the estate below. Around the castle was a large park with century-old trees and flower beds, all surrounded by a high wall of rough stones that separated the

little world within from the great world without. . . . And the little world within was full of life today, preparing to welcome home for the first time the children of the master of the castle, who had come all the way from the opposite side of the globe.

The caravan followed the winding highway, with its border of apple and plum trees, through the quiet fields and colorful villages. It comprised three carriages, each drawn by two horses decorated with yellow and red, the colors of the Coudenhoves. The second carriage was occupied by men who were plainly high officials, and the last was overloaded with trunks and parcels. But the first carriage was occupied by a group of passengers such as had never before been seen in this remote county of Bohemia, in the very heart of Europe.

Next to the driver sat an elderly man who was a contrast to the coachman and his fine attire. This second figure looked fierce and vigorous, dressed in the native costume of the Caucasian mountaineer; an oriental dagger hung from his broad cartridge belt; his eyes were black and sparkling, and a powerful nose hung over a huge gray moustache. On his head was a bright red fez, with a black tassel.

Inside the carriage sat two smiling Japanese women, wearing the colorful costume of their country. In each lap rode a little boy, two years and one year old, dressed in Japanese baby costumes.

For two hours the caravan moved toward Ronsperg, where the townsfolk had gathered in the street to see the carriage when it rolled through the broad gate of the park toward the entrance of the Ronsperg Castle.

This castle, where the caravan finally found its destination, was the home of the Coudenhove-Kalergi family.

The Coudenhoves had always been conservatives, following their dukes, kings, and emperors blindly through reform and revolution from the Netherlands to Belgium and again from Belgium to Austria. The Kalergis, on the other hand, had been traditional revolutionaries, fighting and dying again and again for the liberty of their native isle of Crete, first against its Venetian masters and then against its Turkish oppressors. Both of these families had been compelled by political events to emigrate from their countries of origin to distant lands, thus growing more European than national as they intermarried with daughters of different nations. Finally these two families from far sections of Europe became united when Count Franz Coudenhove, a junior member of the Austrian embassy, married his young cousin

Marie Kalergi, the heiress of the Kalergi fortune, in Paris, in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Coudenhove line reaches back to the eleventh century, when two brothers Coudenhove joined the first Crusade in 1099, when Jerusalem was conquered for the first time by the united armies of the Christian knights of Europe. They had belonged to the oldest nobility of Northern Brabant, now a part of the Netherlands. At the end of the eighteenth century the Coudenhoves had been made counts of the Holy Roman Empire. But, when the French Revolution swept over Belgium, the first Count Coudenhove left his native country. His son became an Austrian general and married a Baltic baroness. One of the sons of this international couple followed his father's career, and saved, by the greatest cavalry charge in modern history, the retreating Austrian army in the Battle of Koeniggraetz, after it had been defeated by the Prussians. His brother chose a diplomatic career and founded the line of the Coudenhove-Kalergis by marrying the Kalergi heiress.

The story of the Kalergi family centers in Crete. In the tenth century, after Crete had been reconquered from the Arabs by the great Greek emperor Nikophor Phokas, a branch of his family settled down in this strategic outpost of the Byzantine Empire. When, three hundred years later, Venice became the dominant power of the Mediterranean, Alexios Kalergis signed the treaty with Venice that transformed Crete into a dominion of Venice. A chronicle recalls that on that occasion the Phokas' of Crete changed their name into Kalergis "because of the beautiful action of peace," the name of Kalergis being composed of the Greek words *kálon*, meaning beautiful, and *ergon*, meaning action.

But this peace did not last. Thirty years later we see three brothers Kalergis at the head of a national revolution against Venice. Although they paid for their defeat with their lives, their family remained through the following centuries the first on their island. And in Venice one of the most beautiful palaces, white marble worked like lace, the house where Richard Wagner lived and died, stands as a monument of their name: the Palazzo Vendramin-Calergi.

After Greece had recovered its freedom the Kalergis continued their historic rôle. It was again a General Kalergis who overthrew the first King of Greece, Otto I, and his Wittelsbach dynasty; and the present premier of Greece, Emmanuel Tsouderos, is also a member of the Kalergis family.

In the eighteenth century one of the Kalergis, involved in a conspiracy against the Turkish rule, fled to Russia and became a general

of the Czarina Catherine II. He married a Norwegian girl and acquired a great fortune.

Their only son, Johannes Kalergis, married the beautiful young Marie Nesselrode, the niece of Russia's powerful chancellor, Count Karl Nesselrode. Their marriage was unhappy from the very start. While he went to London and became a British subject (dropping the "s" of his name), she went to Paris and started an amazing social career. By a unique combination of beauty, wealth, spirit, virtue, generosity, charm, and musical talent, she fascinated everyone she met: emperors and kings, statesmen and artists; men like Richard Wagner and Franz Liszt, Napoleon III and Bismarck, Chopin and Heinrich Heine, who, in one of his poems, calls her a "Cathedral of Love."

This tall, fair, and lovely lady, free from all national prejudice, devoted her life to a better understanding between the nations of Europe she knew and loved. But more than all other nations she loved the Polish nation of her mother.

Her only child, named Marie Kalergis like herself, grew up in a Catholic convent in Paris, to be still more international than her mother, combining Russian nationality with the Greco-Scandinavian blood of her father and the German-Polish origin of her mother. By education she had become a French lady; through her early marriage to Franz Coudenhove she became a member of the Austrian aristocracy.

After Johannes Kalergi's death, this couple bought three estates: the Castle of Ottensheim in Upper Austria, one of the most romantic places in the lovely valley of the Danube; the big estate of Zamuto in the wild mountains of the Hungarian Carpathians, the richest hunting grounds of Europe (on it were Hungarian stags, bears, lynxes, wolves, and wild boars), and finally, the Castle and estate of Ronsperg in Bohemia. He gave up his diplomatic career to devote himself to the management of these domains, while the Austrian emperor named him a member of the Austrian House of Lords, the "Herrenhaus," and he joined the Conservatives.

But the happy years of Franz Coudenhove were few. His beloved wife died at thirty-six, leaving him alone with six little children. Faithful to the memory of his wife, he never remarried, but became as hard and despotic as he was unhappy, misunderstanding his children and misunderstood by them.

Two of his sons were remarkable—Heinrich and his younger brother Hans. Hans Coudenhove's unusual destiny took him from Ronsperg Castle to a life in the wilderness of Africa. After his father's death he

gave up his diplomatic career, left Europe, disgusted with Western civilization and its hypocrisy, and established himself in the African jungles. All efforts of his friends and relatives to bring him back to Europe failed. He had fallen in love with the Dark Continent and its overwhelming nature. In his book *My African Neighbors: Man, Bird and Beast in Nyasaland*, which appeared just before his death in 1925, he confesses that he never saw an airplane, nor a taxicab, nor a radio, nor a picture of Einstein, nor a Bolshevik. His only love and study were animals. Surrounded with African pets and natives, he lived his long life as a hermit, in absolute independence, far from Europe, from cities, and from civilization.

Heinrich Coudenhove shared his brother's love for nature and for distant lands. But his life took a very different course. Born in Vienna in 1859, he had been educated by the Jesuits. After having studied law he took up a diplomatic career. His first post was Athens, his second Rio de Janeiro. In the jungles of Matto Grosso he shot two huge silver lions and two jaguars, the largest ever shot by a white man. Years later he was proud to show us his name and still-unbroken world record registered in *The Sportsman's Handbook*.

From Rio his career shifted to Constantinople, the capital of the bloody despot of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, whom Heinrich despised because of his methods of government, based on corruption and cruelty. But in spite of his horror of Abdul Hamid and his politics my father loved Constantinople, where he spent three happy years in the Austro-Hungarian embassy. Here he learned Turkish, Arabic, and Hebrew, and plunged into the history, philosophy, and civilization of Islam. Here at last his early interest in the Orient could be satisfied, and in many respects he came to prefer the Oriental to the Western way of life: it was, he thought, nearer nature and nearer God; he liked a civilization which seemed penetrated by religion and free from Western materialism. Later he emphasized how, during the Dark Ages, Arabic civilization had been superior to that of Germanic Europe, and his sympathies in the matter of the Crusades were definitely on the side of the Arabs and not of the Christians, who seemed to him little more than barbaric invaders of Syria and Palestine. The only Christian emperor of that period Heinrich admired was Frederic II of Sicily, who had been brought up in the midst of Arabic culture and whose successful Crusade was accomplished without bloodshed. My father often quoted an Arabic author who declared that three times in history the ways of civilization had been interrupted: the first time when the Per-

sians were defeated by the Greeks at Salamis; the second time when the Arabs were defeated by the Franks between Tours and Poitiers; and the third time when the Turks were defeated by Austrians and Poles beneath the walls of Vienna. Heinrich did not quite share this point of view, but he considered it defensible.

Next there came a brief mission to Buenos Aires, and then my father's dreams materialized. He was sent to the Far East, to Tokyo. As there was no Austrian Resident in Tokyo, and he was at that time the highest official of the legation, Heinrich became chargé d'affaires and was for two years at the head of the Austrian legation, in spite of his youth and his brief career. Promptly he set about learning Japanese and studying Buddhism, the religion that had attracted him since he first admired Schopenhauer's philosophy based on Buddhist ideas.

Heinrich devoted much thought to Japanese problems, until he became convinced that this little group of islands would one day play a decisive rôle in the history of our planet. Many years later he reread his reports from Tokyo in the files of the foreign office in Vienna and was proud to state that his political predictions had been fulfilled: the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's victory over Russia, and Japan's rise to the rank of a great power. He also became a scholar of Japanese culture and sought out a number of Japanese statesmen, first of them Prince Ito, the real founder of the modern Japanese empire and one of the outstanding statesmen of his period.

From all his diplomatic posts my father made long trips to see as much as possible of the world, and especially of the world he loved, the Orient. Some time was spent with his relatives in Russia. He visited China, Korea, and India, where he learned Hindustani and had a young elephant as pet. He made a trip through the Caucasus and almost drowned at Bangkok, where one pitch-dark night he fell into the Menan River. As a result of these voyages he finally spoke sixteen languages. French and English he spoke as well as his mother tongue, and he could read aloud any book written in one of these three languages in one of the two others, without its being apparent that he was translating.

As was natural for a man of his mental abilities, Heinrich acquired during his voyages an amazing knowledge of the world and its cultural and political problems. Naturally inquisitive and interested in knowing and learning everything, he wasted no time as he traveled, but used to work from the early morning till late at night. Always he tried to see the problems surrounding him not from the Austrian or even European point of view, but from that of the native population.

By the time he was thirty-three Heinrich Coudenhove had become a citizen of the world, a true cosmopolitan. He used to say that traveling was the best way to prolong one's life; for, he said, time spent on a trip seems much longer than the same time spent at home. Therefore a life filled with travels was practically much longer than a life spent in a single place. And indeed, his short life was so filled with voyages, studies, ideas, action, love, emotion, and accomplishment that it was infinitely richer than most other lives long with empty years.

When in 1892 my father met my mother in Tokyo, they were as different as two creatures fallen from different planets. For thousands of years there had been no contact between their ancestors. They had been educated in completely different schools. He was a Catholic, she a Buddhist. He had just started to learn Japanese, while she hardly spoke any European language. She had never worn European dress, never dined in a European house, never had contact with European men or women. The young European with the skin like white marble and eyes like steel must have attracted and terrified her, while he took a step into the unknown when he decided to marry this smiling piece of ivory which was but a screen for a passionate soul trained to Oriental self-control.

Mitsuko Aoyama was born in Tokyo in 1874, only six years after the revolution that began to transform the Empire of the Rising Sun from a feudal state with a medieval life and civilization into a modern power.

Mitsuko's education was hardly affected by this political change. As a young girl she received a purely Japanese education, learned to read and to write some thousands of Chinese characters, and to paint them in beautiful calligraphy, to count with the old Japanese counting machine of wood, to learn how Japan was created by the Goddess of the Sun, the ancestor of the Emperor, and how Japan evolved throughout the centuries. Her parents were Buddhists, and she learned the principles of this Indian religion, together with the moral teachings of the Chinese sage, Confucius. Beside this she learned about the innumerable Japanese gods and goddesses, with all their mythology, charming fairy tales which inspired her lucid imagination. She was taught to worship the shrines of her ancestors and to adore the memory of emperors and heroes. She learned to express feelings and emotions in short poems, to sing with her melodious voice old Japanese songs and to accompany them with two Japanese instruments, one a kind of guitar and the other like a mandolin.

When little Mitsuko walked to school, her hands were packed in two

little sacks full of dry peas, to give her fingers exercise and make them elastic and gracious—they became so elastic that she later used to play ball with the back of her hand. She also learned the graceful ceremonies of the tea and to make flower arrangements according to old symbolic tradition. As politeness is a cardinal virtue in the Far East, she was also trained to perfect courtesy in speech and gesture, in the art of dressing, of bowing, and of smiling. She learned to suppress her emotions and to hide their expression, to respect her elders, to be gentle and kind. And she learned that a Japanese woman must obey and devote her life first to her father, then to her husband, and finally to her eldest son. Beside this purely national education she learned some words of English, the great idiom of the West.

Mitsuko was eighteen when she met my father, who then was thirty-three. From her pictures at that age one cannot wonder that the young Austrian diplomat was fascinated by her beauty, her Oriental grace, and her charm, for she was really beautiful. Taller than the average Japanese, extremely slender and well proportioned, her face was pure oval, her cheekbones no more pronounced than those of Europeans, her lips full, her nose small and delicate, her forehead round, her hair black with bluish shadows. Her eyes, hidden behind long lashes and usually only half-open, were lively and intelligent, in striking contrast to her general calm. Her complexion was neither white nor yellow, but ivory. Many Japanese who saw her refused to believe that she was of pure Japanese stock; for a Japanese she looked European—just as certain types among pure Europeans look Japanese. Her hands were beautiful, admired by all painters and sculptors who saw them, while the long, slender fingers combined harmony with strength. In them anyone who understood hands could see that the weakness of her appearance hid a strong personality. Heinrich seemed to have known this: he used to compare her, not with a lamb or a deer, but with a black leopard. And I believe he knew my mother better than anybody else.

Heinrich loved this ivory figure with all his passion, and she loved him as man loves destiny or as a hero embraces adventure. It flattered her that a "daimio" from the fairyland of the distant West, representing a great empire, had fallen in love with her and asked her hand. According to the Japanese tradition, it was not she who could decide if she would marry this mysterious stranger, but her father. It was for Kihatchi Aoyama to give his consent, and finally he gave it. Mitsuko obeyed her father, just as she would, from now on, obey her husband. But this act of obedience was done with secret pride, with hope and

curiosity—and almost with love for the strange man who had become her destiny.

For Heinrich the marriage was more complicated than for Mitsuko. Never before had a member of the European diplomatic corps married a Japanese. Could he imagine Mitsuko as the hostess of an Austrian embassy, in London, or in Washington, Petersburg, or Paris? It was still his ambition one day to become ambassador, or even the foreign minister of his country, a successor to Prince Metternich.

But now he loved Mitsuko more than he loved his career—he could well imagine a life without a career, but not life without her. First he planned to resign, to give up his rights as the heir of his estates in favor of his younger brother, and to settle in Sumatra on a rubber plantation. But meanwhile his father had died and Mitsuko bore a son, who was baptized Hans. This son Heinrich wished to be his heir; he gave up his plans to go to Sumatra and decided to ask to have his marriage recognized by Emperor Franz Joseph, by the Church, and by the Mikado. With his boundless energy he overcame the innumerable obstacles set by his superiors, by tradition and convention, by social and by racial prejudice. Mitsuko was baptized with great pomp by the archbishop of Tokyo in the cathedral of that city and received by the Japanese empress as wife of Austria's diplomatic representative. Family jewels were sent from Ronsperg to Tokyo to decorate the neck of the new Countess Coudenhove, christened Maria Thecla, but called by her husband and her friends all her life "Mitsu," an intermediate between her Japanese name and the Austrian nickname for Mary, "Mizzi."

To make sure Mitsu would have a social position corresponding to her new official position, Heinrich informed the diplomatic corps and the leaders of the European colony that he stood ready to challenge to a duel anyone who did not give his wife the same respect as if she were of purest European blood. Heinrich never was obliged to carry out this threat, for whoever met Mitsu was attracted and touched by her beauty and her modesty, and the European colony was always glad to be entertained by this charming hostess.

I was born the second son of this unusual couple, on the sixteenth of November, 1894.

One year later my father decided to make a trip to Europe to show his home to his young wife and to introduce her to his family.

After we had arrived in Suez, my brother and I were sent ahead to Ronsperg, accompanied by our two Japanese nurses and by my

father's Armenian butler, who served as their guide and interpreter. Meanwhile my parents went to see Egypt, Palestine, and Italy. My father wished to show to my mother the splendors of the Mediterranean and to present her to Pope Leo XIII and to Emperor Franz Joseph.

So it came that my brother and I arrived, ahead of our parents, after a trip of four weeks across the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, at our new home, the old Castle of Ronsperg.

CHAPTER THREE *Boyhood in Bohemia*

BOYHOOD in Ronsperg was as calm and carefree as a beautiful dream. Guided and protected by a strong and brilliant father and blessed by a lovely mother, my childhood was a succession of serene and happy days. The Castle, with its vast grounds and its park, was an island of peace which the world never penetrated. From time to time talk was heard of distant wars and revolutions, but we seemed to live on another planet, far removed from all such misery, grief, and sorrow. First a nun from a convent near-by instructed us, then a tutor came to give us private lessons. Twice a year the teachers of the town came to the Castle, examined us, and reported to my father on the results.

During these early years I had only one friend—my older brother Hans, who had been born the year before me. We were educated like twins, always sharing the same room and the same interests.

With Hans I played away the years of early childhood, in and out of the Castle. One of our favorite playgrounds was the little courtyard leading, on the right, to the large kitchens and the wine cellars and, on the left, to a little chapel. Here every Saturday a mass was celebrated for us, for which we acted as ministrants looking like little priests. Inside the Castle our play branched out from our schoolroom on the first floor to the billiard room and the theater hall, with its ever-fascinating stage, decorations, lights, costumes, and curtains. Up the main staircase, adorned with my father's exotic trophies, we found on the second floor the dining room decorated with forbidding pictures of our ancestors. Here also were the bedrooms, ours and our parents', and here, too, was the real center of the Castle, its most beautiful room. This was my father's study, high walls covered with the thousands of books he had collected, and in the middle his enormous writing desk, on which sat a beautiful Japanese Buddha surrounded by little busts of Goethe, Schiller, Napoleon, and Homer. On wooden columns around the room there stood other busts—Socrates, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Kant, Schopenhauer—and in the midst of them Jesus Christ, and beside Him a

reproduction of Michelangelo's "Moses." Above the study door was a rare picture of the great founder of the Persian religion, Zoroaster, and in the niches of the windows were Arabian calligraphs with quotations from the Koran, and, on the huge safe, a marble statue of the Indian God of Wealth, with an elephant's trunk instead of a nose.

Here in this room I liked to sit, as a little boy, motionless, watching my father reading or writing at his desk. When I grew older I would stare at my father's big globe, turning it over and over again, following with my fingers the route I had taken as a child from Tokyo to Ronsperg. When I looked at the Japanese islands, I saw my grandparents, Kihatchi and Yonne, sitting in their Japanese dress in their little garden, and dreaming of their daughter and grandchildren beyond the seas. Then I looked at the vast green spot which separated Austria from Japan, my father's land from my mother's land, and I remembered that this Russian empire had been governed two generations ago by our uncle Nesselrode. Austria, of course, was familiar to me, and Bohemia and Hungary; so also was Germany, whose frontiers I so often had crossed on walks and excursions. In the Netherlands I recognized the cradle of our family and in Belgium the country where we had lived for centuries. When I looked at France I recalled that my grandfather's grandfather, who still bore the half-French name of Coudenhove de la Fretture, had passed his youth as a page of Queen Marie Antoinette at Versailles. And it was to Spain that Jaques de Coudenhove had hurried from Rome to bring to his sovereign, Charles V, the amazing news that his army had stormed and plundered Rome and was besieging the Pope. In the Mediterranean my eyes fell on Crete, the cradle of the Kalergis; then on Greece, their nation and country; and on Italy, where their name has become a part of the fame of Venice; on Jerusalem, where the first Coudenhoves had fought to reconquer the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels. And when I looked at England I thought of my great-grandfather Kalergi, that strange misanthrope and lonely millionaire, while Scandinavia recalled to me his mother, who had come from the distant city of Bergen.

When my eyes left Europe and turned to Africa, I imagined my uncle living with his black servants and animal pets, far away from any civilization; and across the Atlantic, in the middle of South America, I dreamed of the Brazilian jungles where Father had shot the jaguars whose skulls now hung as trophies over his fireplace.

The whole globe seemed to me connected with my life and family. And when I looked at the other globe of the sky, standing opposite the globe of the earth, the tiny little ball of our planet seemed to me like

a boat, sailing with me and my far-flung family, across an ocean of stars, from a dark and unknown past to a dark and unknown future. I loved to gaze at the stars, when on clear winter nights our sleds carried us, wrapped up in furs, through snowy plains and hills home to the Castle. I realized with amazement the infinity of space and time, and never ceased to think about it. But at the same time I had made another boyhood discovery that seemed to me just as startling: that nothing was certain and that everything was possible. These two notions were the start of my thinking.

The two borders which limited our estate—the customs boundary toward Germany and the national boundary toward the Czechs—gave me a realistic impression of the futility of nationalism.

From my earliest youth I could sense the nuisance of economic frontiers, cutting a natural landscape and dividing people speaking the same language into strictly separated units. When I took a walk or a drive to the next village in Bavaria, I was cross-examined by the Austrian and by the German frontier guards. Again and again I heard stories and rumors of smugglers who had crossed the border by night and who had been arrested or shot. I was told that all this was necessary to protect the national market, but in spite of these explanations I made no sense of all that and used to consider all these precautions a nuisance. One day my father showed me the passport he had needed for a trip to Russia and explained that such uncivilized countries as Russia and Turkey had introduced these papers to control aliens. We never would have believed then that one day we should need similar documents to cross the frontiers of Germany, Italy, England, France, and all other Western nations.

The other frontier we could see from the windows of the Castle was still more interesting—the linguistic frontier separating Czechs from Sudetes. I soon realized that there was a deep conflict and a mutual contempt between these two nations and that the main reason for this was nothing but the fact that they spoke different languages. Although I did not speak Czech I had no prejudice whatever against the Czechs, for I found the few Czechs I knew just as nice, kind, and intelligent as the Germans. So all this national hatred seemed to me the ridiculous consequence of ignorance and poor education.

In striking contrast to the national hatred that surrounded it, our castle was an oasis of international spirit. My mother was not the only Oriental in our house. She represented the Far East; the Near East was represented by Babik Kaligian, the Armenian butler who stood at

the head of the household. When my father served at the legation at Constantinople he had saved Babik's life from the Armenian massacres of Sultan Abdul Hamid. From then on Babik followed him through the world, a faithful servant whose extraordinary physical strength and courage made him a perfect bodyguard and whose natural intelligence and loyalty made him a good companion. Babik spoke Turkish to my father, Japanese to my mother, and a broken German to us children. He was old. When asked how old, he replied, "Sixty-five or seventy-five—I not know." In his youth no one had cared to register his date of birth.

On his deathbed Babik was informed that he had not reckoned with the forces of religious prejudice. As he was an Armenian Christian and the churchyard was Catholic, he could not be buried near his master unless he became Catholic. Babik's highest religion had been his devotion to my father; so he became Catholic on his deathbed to be buried, far away from his native land, near his beloved and admired master. We had every reason to respect this faithful Oriental, Babik Kaligian.

I also remember a distinguished Hindu scholar who spent six months at our Castle, Abdullah Mahmum Suhraworthy—a descendant of the Caliph Abu Bekr and an extremely religious Mohammedan, who had come to study German with my father while he was reading Hindustani and Arabic texts with him. Before his arrival from London, where he had studied law, we found out the exact direction of Mecca and marked it in his room, so that Suhraworthy would know in what direction to make his daily prayers. Whenever we ate pork or hare, he was served veal; and when we drank wine or champagne, we offered him lemonade. We watched him during his prayers and questioned him much about Mohammedanism, its history and origin. We liked to walk with him in the park and to learn about that distant and fascinating world of India and its mysteries. My brother and I were extremely fond of this charming, gay, and wise Indian, with his fine features, his dark complexion, his slender figure, and his enormous, bright, gentle, and unforgettably expressive eyes. And we would have laughed at any one who would have dared to consider this Indian scholar a member of an inferior race. For he was superior to most of the Europeans whom we knew.

Suhraworthy was strongly anti-British and had many arguments about the Indian question with my father, who believed that the advantages of the British rule for India largely overshadowed its drawbacks. But Suhraworthy seems later to have made his peace with the

British, for he died in 1935 in Bombay as Sir Abdullah-el-Mamun al Suhrawardy, after a brilliant career.

I believe that my father inspired young Suhraworthy to go as a Mohammedan missionary to Tokyo, because he believed that this religion corresponded better to the Japanese character than Christianity. And it also was my father who advised him to publish a book, selected quotations from Mohammed. This book, *The Sayings of Mohammed*, was later republished with a preface by Gandhi; and, curiously enough, it was this little book that was found in the pocket of Leo Tolstoy's cloak the day he fled from his castle to his lonely death.

Soon after having left Ronsperg, Suhraworthy founded in London the Pan-Islamic Society and became its first secretary. Its aim was to establish a closer cultural and political union between the three hundred millions of Mohammedans, from the Dutch East Indies to Morocco, if possible under a single caliph. As he hated Sultan Abdul Hamid, he suggested as caliph the Sultan of Morocco, a descendant of the Prophet.

Thus, listening to Suhraworthy when he developed his favorite idea of Pan-Islam, I learned for the first time the conception of a Pan-movement, of a group of divergent countries and people banding together in common cause to defeat the barriers the world had placed around their existence. From then on I saw the world problems through different eyes.

Another Oriental who spent some summer weeks every year in Ronsperg was my father's Turkish teacher, Saad-ed-Din, professor at the Viennese Consular Academy, a modern and reformist Turk of Albanian stock, who spoke much about the complicated problems of the Balkans and the Near East.

I also recall Doctor Poznansky, the learned rabbi of Pilsen, who assisted my father in his studies of Hebrew and of the Talmud. When he came to see us he also respected his ritual rules, receiving trout in place of the meat that was served to the others. We came to regard these different religious diets as quite natural, because we also respected strictly the ritual rules of our Catholic religion and would have found it very shocking if one of us had dared to eat a bit of meat on a Friday.

The first American I ever met was an American officer, an ex-service-man who had taken part in the occupation of the Philippines. After my father had learned that he had arrived at our inn on a shooting trip, he immediately invited him to exchange the inn for the Castle and to spend some days as his guest. I remember a tall, good-looking, and strong man, speaking of the Philippine campaign and of President Roosevelt,

for whom my father had a high esteem, just as he profoundly admired President Lincoln and considered his war for the liberation of the slaves as one of the greatest events of history.

Another guest was the Catholic bishop of Hakodate, a French missionary who had gone in his youth to Japan and there had met my parents. Now he was back in Europe, for the first time in thirty years. My father had invited the learned parson of our little town to dinner to meet him, and as this priest spoke no French and the Bishop no German, we listened to their fluent conversation in Latin, the Esperanto of the Catholic church. When they spoke about the railway, they simply invented a Latin word by translating its elements *via ferrata*—and understood each other perfectly. This was my first practical experience with an international language, and again my horizon was broadened.

Not only our exotic guests but also the ordinary members of our household presented an international group. We always had an English and a French governess, and our English governess was always a Protestant. My mother had a Hungarian companion, my father a Bavarian secretary and a Czech manager of his estates. Our tutor was Austrian, while among the servants who attended our meals one was Armenian, the second a Czech, and the third a Sudete. It is evident that in such a society no word could be uttered that might have offended any national, religious, or racial feelings, and that only a spirit of broadmindedness and absolute tolerance could preserve the harmonious life in the Castle. And because of the many contacts we had with the East, we were conscious of the fact that Europe represented, above all national dissensions, a single branch of humanity. Europe seemed to be anything but a union from the mere European point of view. Only on a world-wide background did this unity manifest itself.

Our own life was permanently confronted with that background, with the contrasts between the East and West. Our father represented Europe, our mother Asia. These continents were no abstractions for us boys, but realities. Among ourselves, we always chatted about the two different worlds that surrounded and penetrated us—"The Japanese" and "The Europeans." Germans, French, English, Czechs, Hungarians—all belonged to the one great paternal class of Europeans, children of a single race, a single continent, a single civilization, and a single destiny. Their quarrels seemed stupid and ridiculous. On the other hand, we always considered the Chinese as some kind of cousins and read with pride the history of the Mongol conquerors and of the great civilizations they had created throughout Asia. We were conscious that

they too belonged to the same great race as our mother—by no means inferior, but very different from white humanity.

If, at that time, I had heard anyone propose a United States of Europe, I would have considered such a union as the most reasonable and natural thing in the world—ininitely more natural than the stupid threats and struggles between the various members of the great European family of nations.

It is evident that our feelings during all these years were as international as our surroundings and education. Still I remember having—for the only time in my life—a distinct fit of nationalism. One day our father explained to us that, while our eldest brother would inherit one day our Bohemian estates and had to learn Czech, my younger brother, Gerolf, and I would be heirs to our estate in Hungary. Therefore he started to teach us Hungarian and promised us Hungarian nationality as soon as we were eighteen. The result was that Gerolf and I determined to become Hungarian nationalists, intensely interested in Hungarian history and in everything that was going on in the Hungarian parliament. We made a Hungarian flag and waved it proudly on every occasion. We founded a "Hungarian League," with only two members, for mutual assistance against common "enemies." This enemy "foreigner" was our brother Hans, the "Austrian," against whom we fought "national" battles in the swimming-pool and on the playgrounds. We soon considered ourselves genuine Hungarian patriots, without ever having been in Hungary.

When my father died our Hungarian lessons stopped, our Hungarian estate was sold, and our Hungarian flag forgotten. But many of the exhibitions of nationalism I saw in later years seemed to me as sensible as this pointless youthful outburst.

CHAPTER FOUR *My European Father*

I WAS sure, as most children are, that I had the best parents in the world. My affection for both of them was based on respect. I loved them both, but I admired them still more. All the years of my childhood were dominated by my father, and today, after I have met great men of all nations, he lives in my memory as one of the most remarkable personalities of them all. Even as a child I knew that he represented my ideal of a man—strong and kind, with a generous heart and perfect manners, bold by nature and peaceful by inclination, never lazy and never vulgar. As a devout Catholic he was deeply religious, but still extremely tolerant. A cosmopolitan by nature, he was wise as a sage, the friend of every evolution and of social progress and the implacable enemy of any brand of demogogy or fanaticism. . . .

My father, Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi, inspired my life from its very beginning. I cannot remember when I did not want to resemble him, and from earliest childhood I found him a model and an ideal. I still see him before me, tall and slender, with his quick and graceful movements, combining energy with harmony. I see his big, gray-blue eyes under a beautiful and high forehead over an aquiline nose. When he traveled, everybody took him for an Englishman; not only because his type was definitely English, but also much of his character and his attitude toward life.

Returning to Ronsperg in 1896, my father quickly became aware that sound administration of the family estates was impossible without his personal direction. This was the excuse for which he had been looking, and, although he was offered the post of minister to Siam, he gave up the diplomatic career which his marriage had made so difficult to continue. This decision was of vital importance to us children. Our Japanese nurses, with whom we had exchanged our first words, were sent home; for, with his decision, my father had made up his mind that his children should not become cultural and intellectual hybrids, but should be given a purely European education. So we did not learn any

Japanese, but instead German, English, and French. I often wonder what would have become of me if my father had not so decided, or if he had died before we came to Europe. Then I might have grown up a Japanese child, educated in Japanese schools to be a Japanese patriot; and not only my mind and soul would have evolved differently, but my features as well. For every living being adapts itself unconsciously to its surroundings, and many Europeans who spend their lives in the Far East acquire Oriental features. . . . So not nature but destiny made a European of me—a fact which, I feel, prevented me from becoming a European isolationist, for it makes me ever conscious that even Europe is but a branch of the wider brotherhood of man which I have always considered my true nation and fatherland.

Within this wider world, which stretches beyond religions, races, and continents, my father began to educate us deliberately as Austrians, Christians, and Europeans. From our early childhood he spent hours and hours with us children, acting as gay and natural as a child himself, personally giving us lessons in Russian and Hungarian and supervising our entire education. We lunched and dined with him and his guests, listening silently to their cultural and political conversations. Almost every day, even in rain and storm, he walked with us as he answered our childish questions about state and laws, life and religion. All his words impressed themselves deeply in my mind and later ripened to thoughts and actions, but more important than all this intellectual influence was his unforgettable example of a noble nature and strong character, of a genuine gentleman, which provided me with basic values for all my future life.

My father's pedagogic principles were sound. Although he was thinking and writing about sainthood, he did not dream of educating us to be saints. All he asked was to make of us perfect gentlemen, and although his favorite book was the *Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis, he gave us Jules Verne's *Around the World in 80 Days* and recommended us to choose its hero, the English gentleman Phileas Fogg, as our model. He wished us to be such good shots and fencers that nobody should dare challenge us to duels. Despising soft and effeminate men, he wished to give us a Spartan education, with mattresses of straw, cold baths and open windows at all seasons of the year, and long daily walks in all weather. He himself was an example of this way of living; and he put great stress on our physical education. When a noted acrobat performed in Ronsperg he tried to hire him for the supervision of our physical culture.

My father was against corporal punishment in principle, for he had suffered much of it in his youth; but he was such a passionate lover of truth that he still introduced "capital" punishment for three major crimes: for cruelty to animals, for theft, and for lying. Altogether my father believed more in the capitalistic principle of rewards than in the primitive methods of punishments. He gave us books of poems in Greek and Latin, German, English, and French; and for every poem we learned by heart he promised a specific sum of money, so that we could always earn money by learning poetry. Another way of earning money was—to eat. As we were delicate children he wished us to put on weight, but without forcing us to eat beyond our appetities. He weighed us every Saturday, and if we had lost a pound we had to pay him from our modest pocket money the equivalent of one dime; but for every pound we gained we received the same amount. As we were growing, the advantage was definitely on our side; but we had every reason not to eat too much, because an upset stomach meant a loss of weight and consequently a fine. Usually, when in want of money, I preferred to earn it by eating rather than by learning. But from this double method I retained good health and the memory of poems that still give me great pleasure.

In spite of our youth Father began to educate us in money matters. We had to note every penny we spent. He warned us never to gamble, because his great-grandfather had gambled away his vast estates in the Netherlands and he was afraid that one of us might have inherited this disastrous passion. He taught us never to touch the principal, with the one exception of spending it on the education of one's children, for education was but another form of capital. He said he would ask us to give him our word of honor before we were of age that we would never give a financial guarantee to any one, for then we would always have a respectable and legitimate excuse to refuse if we were asked by friends to do so. He also said that we ought to lend money to friends in need, but never more than we were ready to lose, and to consider it a happy surprise if we ever saw the money again. He also had us attend his weekly conferences with his managers, when he discussed the running of his estates, his woods, farms, and industries.

It is impossible to describe all the splendors of country life of an Austrian nobleman, living in his castle on a large estate in Franz Joseph's empire. Such a life united health with security, dignity, wealth, leisure, and independence, giving ample opportunity to do much good to a whole region and, at the same time, govern a tiny kingdom of one's

own without political responsibilities. Close contact with nature, its plants and animals, combined with all elements of real culture to make a beautiful, artistic, and easy form of life. This was the life for which my father exchanged his diplomatic career. And I believe that he never regretted replacing his ambition with independence, his eternal wanderings with the stability of a farmer.

After he had seen most of the world, he suddenly, at thirty-six, had enough of traveling and began to feel that he had been losing the roots of his life in the wide world. Now he sought to find them again in his homeland, and this restless man was transformed into a stable gentleman farmer, loving his Castle of Ronsperg, every tree of its park, every hill of its forest. And he who had been a bachelor for so many years now became an ideal husband and father who considered every day spent away from his home and his family a day lost. Indeed, when he had to be away from Ronsperg for only a few days, to visit Prague, Vienna, or Budapest, he gave orders to the governess to wire him daily reports on the children's health. Knowing how easy it was merely to wire "All children are well," he ordered that the text of these daily telegrams had to mention each child—"Hansy is well, Dicky is well, Rolfy is well," and so on in detail—for he knew that this would make it much more difficult to mislead him.

During the years he had been away from Europe Heinrich had developed the utmost contempt for European society—for the ladies who were too fashionable to have children, who lived for social gossip and forgot that they were women who had to accomplish the natural duties of their sex. He hated the young men who thought of nothing but of racing and gambling and considered themselves superior to the other human beings who worked hard to earn their living. For political demagogues with their narrow-minded and empty party slogans he cared still less. Leo Tolstoy was the only aristocrat for whom he had an intense and profound admiration. Like Tolstoy he wished to use his wealth, his independence, and his knowledge to serve the human race and human progress.

He jealously defended his independence after he had left the diplomatic service, refusing any suggestion to run for Parliament or to gain his father's seat in the House of Lords. He even gave up his rank as captain in the Austro-Hungarian army when he decided to fight against the medieval custom of dueling. Always he wished to be entirely free to express unhampered his ideas and convictions.

But my father could not be a private citizen, though he would have liked it. Bohemia before the First World War was legally a province of

a democratic empire; but socially the traditions of feudalism were alive throughout the country. Even without rank or function my father was the first man of his district, with all responsibilities and prerogatives attached to this position. Only sixty years before, the peasants around had still been serfs, and the Count had the right to condemn them to be flogged. Now all citizens were equal before the law—in theory, but not in practice.

It was beyond any stretch of imagination to us children that the policeman who used to stand in our little town would one day venture to arrest us. Or that we could be forced to appear before the court and be condemned to prison. . . . As children we had the feeling that our only authority was our father; above him stood the governor of Bohemia, who happened to be his close friend and cousin, Count Karl Coudenhove; and above him only the emperor. All other authorities seemed not to concern us—neither police, nor judges, nor mayors. This may have been childish, but it was only a natural reaction to the fact that at the Corpus Christi procession our father followed immediately after the priest and that we followed him and behind us came all authorities of the city and of the district. We alone had a balcony in church; my father had the right to choose the priests for six of our neighboring parishes, for he contributed the funds for their churches. He also financed the convent, where nuns educated the young girls of the town, and several times a year he invited the authorities of the town, the priests, the judges, the teachers to dinner—invitations that were never reciprocated. When the bishop came to Ronsperg for confirmation, he stayed at the Castle. There was no doubt that my father, although a private citizen, was the first man of his region.

And my father liked it. Following out the celebrated quotation of Caesar, he preferred being first in importance in Ronsperg to being even second in Vienna. He was aware of his responsibilities, and he exercised his authority in the most human and patriarchal way. Everybody who was in need came to him to ask for help; and where he could, he gave. He found it natural to spend a great part of his income for the poor of the district—in the same spirit as an aunt of his was delighted every year to pay her taxes, for then she had an opportunity to show her gratitude to the state for everything it had done for her during the year.

But these social obligations filled only a little part of my father's activities. The main part of his time was devoted to the management of his estates, to his work as scholar and author, and to the education of his children.

Judaism had been nothing but the result of religious fanaticism and intolerance. He hails the extraordinary and incomparable heroism the Jews have demonstrated in this long series of persecutions, and sets forth a two-fold solution of the Jewish problem: settling the Eastern Jews in a proper national home; and completing the assimilation of the Western Jews as members of their respective nations, without sacrifice of their traditional religion. He warned that if Europe ignored this fair solution and if anti-Semitism would go on as an instrument of fanaticism and demagoguery, all Western civilization would one day be endangered by the results.

My father saw clearly the dangers of anti-Semitic demagoguery, for at that very moment two large political parties in Austria were using anti-Semitic slogans—the Christian Socialists and the Pan-Germanists. As Hitler confesses in *Mein Kampf*, the leaders of these two parties inspired him to his future anti-Semitic campaign. So my father fought the very roots of future National Socialism, and thus brought me as a child in radical opposition to the ideas Hitler now stands for.

The last volume he published compared Catholicism and Protestantism in their tendencies and results. He believed that Protestantism had been more successful in all worldly matters, while the failure of Catholicism was due to its negative attitude toward worldly progress, adopting the attitude of Mary compared to that of Martha. This volume was but a chapter of a vast work he was preparing, and for which he collected material all his life. This work he considered as the essence of his life; it was to be named *The Realm of Abnegation*, and it was to deal with the common element of all religions, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and pre-Spanish America: abnegation of the will and self-sacrifice. He followed closely the basic conceptions of Schopenhauer and believed that those who had overcome the egoistic will within themselves were able to produce miracles by dominating forces of nature.

For this work my father had studied the lives of saints of all religions, nations, and times and had recognized their striking similarity. And while he studied the problem of sainthood, his character turned always more toward this ideal. All his nature and instincts were heroic, and his natural religion was hero worship. Now the influence of Oriental thought had become increasingly strong and directed him toward that ideal of the saint.

In the last years of his life, when he visited a town, he paid at least one visit to the home for incurables, to speak with them, encourage them, and, so far as he could, to help. A Polish ambassador who had been his friend told me that, when he met my father for the last time

in Munich, they dined at one of the big hotels, and soon became aware that their waiter was inattentive; but instead of complaining my father asked what made him take his mind off his service. The waiter answered that his mother was very ill. After verifying the matter my father sent her medicines and money.

Some weeks before his death Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote the preface for his last pamphlet on the main problems of Christianity, in which he gives us a short sketch of his life in Ronsperg and of its essential character:

Although I am now an old boy, not very far from my fiftieth birthday, I have remained what I always have been—a student. Only four years ago I passed my thirty-fourth examination, although I had meanwhile served the State eleven years, had myself partly instructed my children and personally administered large estates in Bohemia and in Hungary. But I always have studied and shall do so as long as I live. Dependent on nobody, blessed with earthly goods—nay, overwhelmed with them—I am able to indulge in the pleasure of literary activity for the sole purpose of serving the truth. I consider myself as a servant of those who seek the truth with unbiased and unprejudiced minds.

MAY had never seemed so beautiful as in the year my father died. It was 1906. The days were cloudless, the country a riot of color and fragrance.

Word came from my uncle Richard Coudenhove that he and his bride would stop off at Ronsperg for a short visit. The couple had just been married and were on their way to Africa, where my uncle expected to visit his brother and do some lion-shooting himself.

They arrived on a Friday and spent three gay days with us. Sunday evening climaxed the belated wedding celebration with a big dinner, a great deal of animated conversation, laughter, and music. I had rarely seen my father so happy. He sang Wagner; his laughter reverberated from the Castle walls. For long weeks the echo of his voice re-echoed in my ears.

Next morning at six Hans and I were summoned urgently to his room. We scrambled across the hall half asleep. Everybody else seemed to be there already. Frightened, we stopped on the threshold until somebody took us by the hand and led us up to his bed. He lay there motionless, his face very white. I saw my mother kneeling at the foot of the bed; next to her stood my uncle and his bride, both very pale and serious. I saw that many of the servants were quietly weeping.

That morning he had risen at five and made his usual run through the park, but on his return had felt the pains that presaged a heart attack.

"Shall I awaken the Countess?" asked the valet.

"No, don't disturb her."

"Shall I fetch the doctor?"

"No, the priest."

When the priest arrived Heinrich Coudenhove could no longer speak. His last gesture was to kiss the little medal he had always worn around his neck. It contained a lock of his mother's hair.

Babik burned my father's papers later in the day. He had built a huge fire in the courtyard and the flame consumed the record of a lifetime—forty volumes of diary covering forty years of action and thought, of passion and meditation, tragedy and comedy. My father started this diary at seven, taking time every day in order to add a few pages to this mirror and confession of his searching soul. He did not wish to mar the record by any side glances at posthumous fame. He decreed that Babik was to burn it immediately after his death. No one had ever seen it, not even his wife. He kept it in the safe with his most treasured papers. As the flame grew smaller my father's whole life seemed to dwindle down to a bit of ashes. All that was left would be a fleeting memory, I thought, growing dimmer through the years. I did not know then that it is the living that are lost to us so often. The dead stay with us always. For strangely enough, the profound influence of my father on my further evolution was partly due to his early death. I remember his saying to me with regard to his feelings toward his own father: "Every son has four phases in his attitude towards his father. First, when he is very young, he considers his father a half-god; but he soon discovers that his father has quite a number of faults and is very far from being perfect; the third phase can usually be summed up in the statement that Father is an old-fashioned idiot and does not understand his modern children; and only after many years, when Father is old or dead, a fourth judgment rectifies this harsh statement, acknowledging that Father was, or is, after all, quite a fine fellow."

This natural evolution had been interrupted by my father's early death. Because I had not had enough of my father I missed him all my life and never overcame my regret at losing him too soon. In the depth of my heart I wished to continue his fragmentary life and to complete it as well as I could. At every major decision I asked myself what he might have said or done, and I learned to identify myself with him, as if a part of his soul had penetrated my own. Thus my father's influence on my education and evolution became even stronger after his death than it had been before.

When my father's will was read it revealed that, while our eldest brother was the heir of Ronsperg, the rest of our father's property was to go to our mother, who would have custody over her children. This my father's family considered testimony to the eccentric love my father had for his wife; they could not conceive of the family fortune and the education of the children being placed in the hands of a woman who knew nothing of European business nor of European pedagogy. Their

chief fear was that our mother would one day embark with her children for Japan, or that she would fall in love with some unworthy man who would swindle away her fortune. So they tried to convince her that she should renounce the custody of her children and accept a control over her fortune.

But to everyone's surprise my mother, who had until now lived like an eighth child in her home, refused. Not for a moment would she think of giving up her children. She took up the challenge and fought for her rights. Engaging the best lawyers, she won her case in the courts, and during this struggle for her children, her character seemed to change completely. Although she still looked like a girl, graceful and charming, she suddenly manifested a will of iron and a strong mind. Conferring for hours with lawyers, bookkeepers, businessmen, and bankers, her will power and natural intelligence first astonished them and finally compelled them to admire this strange and incomprehensible young woman who administered the estates as well as her dead husband had done and brought up her seven children not as Japanese but, according to her husband's will, as good Austrians, Catholics, and Europeans.

Nothing in my mother's early years in Ronsperg had prepared us for these hidden depths. We had loved her greatly, it is true, but much as one loves a gentle being, one too good for this earth. We loved our mother more than we ever loved our father, for while he personified the principle of justice, she was the principle of mercy. We would have much preferred to make him angry than to make her sad.

One main reason for our love was certainly her beauty. The aesthetic instinct is strong in every child, much stronger and also more natural than the moral instincts, in spite of the fact that these moral instincts are backed by education, while the aesthetic instincts are usually suppressed or at least neglected. Beauty opens the heart of a child as the sun opens the blossom of a flower, so we loved and were proud of our mother's beauty, and she seemed to us the most wonderful creature or earth.

It was not only our mother's physical beauty that impressed us, but her enigmatic charm as well, so utterly different was it from everything else we knew. Two long knots, each thicker than an arm, crowned his little head. To relieve this pressure, I remember her sitting for hour and hours at her dressing table, her hair being brushed by her maid while she indefatigably polished her beautiful nails, which she loved as other women love their jewels. My mother could be merry and gay

and like a child she seemed to forget all sorrow when she could laugh at a good joke.

Within the decade between her twentieth and thirtieth years my mother gave life to seven bright, lively, and healthy children, four boys and three girls. After the birth of her seventh child she weighed but a hundred pounds and could still span her waist with her two hands.

During these years in Ronsperg my mother lived in the Castle more like a child than like a mother, learning English, German, and French, mathematics, history, and geography, like a schoolgirl. Brought up in the old Japanese tradition, she had to be completely re-educated in Europe, learning to sit, to move, to eat, to speak, and to live like a European. She told us later how disgusted she felt when she ate in a Western restaurant for the first time and had to use forks and spoons which some minutes before had been withdrawn from other people's mouths. She was especially attracted to Greek mythology, which reminded her of the mythology she had learned in her childhood. She wrote Japanese poetry and loved painting—all her pictures are strong and characteristic, far different from European pictures. Her artistic strain was much stronger than that of my father who, beside his love for music, had little interest in art. My mother loved beauty in all its forms; but her main instrument for cherishing beauty was her eyes, not her ears—a disposition that I have inherited.

My father not only loved but adored his Japanese wife; while she admired, respected, obeyed, and was fond of him. In some respects she considered him a father, in others a child. But during all these years of wifehood her soul was devoured by homesickness, by nostalgia for her lost country. Lying on her sofa she dreamed with open eyes of her home in Tokyo, her dear parents, and the woods and temples of the beautiful province of Sana, where her family had lived for centuries. She dreamed of a world where everyone spoke Japanese, and in those moments she must have felt like a prisoner, with all the wealth that surrounded her a heavy golden chain, binding her to this cold continent of Europe, to this curious husband she never could understand, to these children with whom she could not even speak the language of her heart. The thick walls of her castle must have seemed to her like prison walls, as she dreamed of the paper screens of her Japanese home, which were pushed away when the sun shone over her garden.

My mother seldom wore her Japanese costumes, but we were delighted each time she did so, for then she looked like one of our dear Japanese dolls in their little wooden boxes under glass covers. We often watched her sitting on the carpet of her room, writing, with her India

inkbrush, long, long letters to her distant parents about the miraculous life she was leading in the far West. Each letter was written on endless paper rolls and posted in a wooden box. She explained to us the pictures in the Japanese books we frequently received from our grandparents—stories of the peach-born hero Momotaro, of the fox Kitsune and the badger Tanuki, transformed into human beings, of gods and nymphs and ghosts and souls, of all this strange world where human life is interwoven in a greater pattern of beasts and trees and flowers and stars.

She was animated by an extreme sense of duty and of honor. She admired my father without understanding him; her womanly instinct told her that he was an extraordinary human being; but she also knew well that she had much more common sense than he had. I am sure that she never understood why he married her instead of taking for a wife one of the beautiful Western girls with golden hair, the beauty of which she never ceased to admire.

By no means did she share her husband's intellectual life, since she was not interested in philosophy, nor in religions, history, politics, or business. While my father lived she had nothing to do with the administration of our estate, and even our household was virtually run by Father, although she discussed the menu of the day every morning with the cook. Our education and upbringing naturally lay in our father's hands, although he discussed all these questions with our mother and often accepted her reasonable advice.

In fact my parents had, beside each other and their children, no common interests. They dreamed different dreams in different worlds, as distant from each other as the moon from Sirius. She could neither understand nor appreciate his books, preferring Japanese and especially English novels which she read constantly, fascinated by these curious Western love stories with their accounts of free and bold Western women who gave their hearts and lives to men of their own choice and dared to live and to love beyond the strict limits of morals, tradition, and convention. Certainly she envied these women in the depth of her heart and compared them to the Japanese women who had to remain all their lives the slaves and tools of men. My father, on the contrary, never touched a novel and did not like us to read them, for he believed that they painted life as it was not and that they might nourish our imagination with false illusions.

I do not know whether my father or my mother was the more responsible for their total lack of intellectual communion. Had my father

attempted to interest his wife in his books and ideas he might perhaps have succeeded, but he never made that attempt, for he, too, had rather an Oriental conception of relations between the sexes and disliked profoundly the notion of emancipated women. The mere idea that his wife might have tried to influence the current of his philosophical speculations would have driven him mad. He wished to combine the advantages of celibacy with those of marriage, so he remained all his life an intellectual bachelor. Nobody was allowed to influence his ideas, and had my mother ever tried to do so, their marriage would soon have proved impossible. My father was always reluctant to force my mother to give up her childlike life by involving her in unnecessary and complicated problems. He was well aware that he had complicated her life enough.

This lack of intellectual contact, together with a strong emotional attraction, was one of the reasons for the admirable and harmonious relations between my parents. Children are keen observers, and we watched our parents closely. We could never see the slightest tension between them, never the shadow of a conflict or dissension. Their harmony seemed perfect. They treated each other with the utmost attention, love, kindness, and regard. We never heard a harsh word between them or saw an unfriendly glance or gesture. They gave the impression of being eternal lovers, each aiming primarily at the happiness of the other.

But, in spite of this harmony, my mother was virtually a prisoner; without relatives, friends, or fortune, she felt herself completely at her husband's mercy, a slave in the house where she was mistress, my father's queen and slave at the same time. The cage in which she lived was golden—but nevertheless it was a cage. Jealousy was one of the strongest elements of my father's character, and jealousy was certainly one of the reasons for his seclusion in his lonely castle. His fortune would easily have permitted him to spend part of each year in Vienna or in Paris, but he was convinced that my mother was the jewel of womanhood and that every man was bound to fall blindly in love with her just as he had. He was haunted by the fear that one day she might reciprocate such a love and smash the harmony of his family and his life. But his fairness impelled him to be just as jealous for her as he was for himself. When he once saw that my brother and I loved our charming young English governess, he threatened to dismiss her instantly if we gave the impression of loving her more than our mother. For we must love our mother more than any other human being in

the world, until the day came when a wife would take this privileged place in our hearts.

My father, aware of my mother's profound nostalgia, certainly feared that this feeling might one day overwhelm her love for him and her children and that she would try to get home to Japan. Several times he planned to make a short trip to Tokyo with her to visit her parents, but always a new baby forced them to postpone this journey. It was difficult for my old grandparents to visit Europe, because they spoke only Japanese; so my mother, trained in Asiatic self-control and sacrifice, continued to suffer from never-ceasing nostalgia, to hide the tears of her heart behind the smiles of her lips, to do her duty toward her husband and her children, and to accept her destiny humbly.

The sudden change in my mother's character after my father's death was accentuated by her Japanese background; indeed it might be compared to the transformation of her native land during the second half of the last century which turned Japan from an Oriental land of dreams into an imperialistic world power—from the most peaceful into the most aggressive nation on earth.

On the practical side it had drawbacks. My mother's nature grew more and more despotic, distrustful, too, even of her own immediate environment. Children, servants, and employees grew to fear her and rushed to satisfy her wishes. She was particularly severe toward her daughters, for she believed that a girl ought to be taught complete self-control and obedience. She disliked signs of weakness or lack of discipline in any of us. Our father had never allowed us to admit fear or fatigue, but our mother, once she could make her mind felt, showed a far deeper contempt for cowardice or weakness than even he had known.

I have often asked myself how a change as radical as hers was possible, and found the following explanation. An individual character is far from being a homogeneous unit. It is a composite being which may be compared to a parliament where many individuals and factions strive for power but end by expressing the will of the majority. The human character too is split into divergent factions ruled by impulses that originate in various individual and background elements. These factions, like those of a parliament, are held in check by a majority will which remains in charge as long as conditions are normal. However, a shock or an important event may call into play certain minor aspects which under the stress of the moment assume a major role. The former majority then becomes a minority with the former "opposition" now in

full charge. The character seems changed only because its elements have changed their rôles.

Slowly we settled back into our routine of study and play. Mother, as I said, was very intelligent and practical, anything but intellectual. We missed Father's conversations about the past and future of the human race, about philosophies and politics and current events. The door to the world of ideas seemed closed and all intellectual stimulation stopped. Then all of a sudden new sources of inspiration opened up.

I had never been a great reader, but after my father's death I overcame my aversion to "book knowledge" and steeped myself in the literature of the world. My father's library had remained untouched, and here Hans and I spent most of our free time now, climbing zealously up and down the library ladders, in breathless quest for more knowledge. Day after day I sat on the floor surrounded by volumes on the life of Buddha and the teachings of Confucius while Hans was tracking down information on art and literature. I think that, in the years that followed, I read as much as is humanly possible, storing up intellectual capital for years to come.

I was fourteen when the question came up as to what boys' school I should attend. My mother, more than anyone of us, was conscious that our quiet and cloistered life of learning could not continue. I understood and approved her argument, but did not find it more attractive for that reason. I hated to leave Ronsperg, and the prospect of living among a large number of unknown boys was very unpleasant to me.

It took some time before a choice was made. Eton? No, that was too far away. The Jesuit college of Kalksburg? My mother remembered that our father had spent very unhappy schooldays there. Finally the Theresianum Academy in Vienna was agreed upon by all concerned. I accepted the decision as a calamity that could not be avoided. The only thing to console me was the thought that at the end of a black tunnel of five years of school, life itself with all its joys and splendors and an unlimited amount of private liberty was awaiting me.

The Theresianum was to the old Austrian empire what Eton is to Britain. Founded by the Empress Maria Theresa, and housed in the old palace of her father Charles VI, it had only one aim: to perpetuate within its pupils the traditional ideals of the Austrian monarchy. Many leading statesmen had been trained here; in my time nearly all students were members of the titled nobility and many of them were sons

of famous pupils, getting their instruction from the same teachers who had taught their fathers.

From a purely pedagogical point of view the Theresianum was rather satisfactory. The boys more or less disciplined themselves. Every group of boys had a "prefect," but he was only a supervisor who had to enforce house regulations and see to it that students got up on time, followed the school schedule, and kept order. He had no moral control over the students, nor did he make an attempt to form their character. The boys did their own educating, watched one another eagerly so that the two unwritten laws should not be broken—fair behavior and a sense of solidarity—and I may say that the system worked. The majority of the students who were to graduate from the Academy became decent and honorable men—successful ones, too, in whatever career they had chosen.

Sundays saw us off on a few hours' furlough to Vienna, where we paraded our handsome uniforms with pride: dark blue jacket with shining brass buttons, high red collar with golden stripes, gray trousers, and a stiff black cap—the latter an exact copy of the regulation caps of our army officers. What thrilled us most was our sword—a slender bit of steel sheathed in black leather.

Whatever objections I might have had in the first place to losing my "privacy" among a lot of strange boys, this group life which forced me to adjust myself to a number of varied characters and temperaments did me much good and in a way proved more important to me than all my Latin and Greek. Taken together my fellow students represented a very international bundle of reactions, resentments, prejudices, emotions, instincts, and ideals which was in no way different from that of any other international group of human beings elsewhere in the world and gave me an excellent chance of studying human nature at first hand and not from books. We had boys from all over Europe and some from Asia. There was a normal amount of strife, of course, but no more than if we had come from the same country. We formed no national groups, and friendships were based on sympathies and common interests. On the whole, life at the Theresianum reaffirmed what life at Ronsperg had taught me—nationalism was not a problem of blood or race but of education. I was delighted when I found in the library a quotation from Confucius which said: "There are no racial antagonisms among really educated people."

I am afraid that intellectually the Theresianum made no particular inroads on my ways of thinking. My sedentary habits continued. I would rather sit at my desk and read than be out fencing or riding

with my fellow students. The things that stirred me in Ronsperg stirred me now: the moral powers that determine our lives. What are they? Where do they come from? Whence hails the secret dynamism which has animated the religions and philosophies of the world?

I read the Indian and Greek philosophers; I steeped myself in the Stoics, particularly Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, and from there turned to the scholastics, then to the modern philosophers: Descartes, Bacon, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. The plan of a book took form where I would reason that the only principle upon which to renew the morality of the West was to be found in the principle of beauty which had inspired the moral conceptions of the ancient Greeks. This principle had also been for twenty-five centuries the basis of Chinese ethics, that was not based on dogma or creed but on nature's most natural instinct toward greater perfection.

My studies and readings gave my life at the Theresianum a new stimulus and a purpose which the school curriculum did not contain. When, in 1913, I was graduated and had to set down what profession I would follow later on, I wrote: professor of philosophy.

IMPERIAL VIENNA lived in a style of luxury and gaiety that had seldom before been equaled, and Vienna rivaled Paris and London as a center of Western civilization, as was befitting the capital of a great power which was, after Russia, the largest country in Europe. From Mozart and Beethoven an unbroken chain of great musicians led to Brahms and Gustav Mahler to make Vienna the world center of music—and to typify the gay spirit of the city and its life there were the Strauss waltzes which one heard everywhere.

Music is the very soul of Vienna. When Goethe called architecture “frozen music,” he might have thought of Vienna with its lofty churches and palaces built in the half Italian Baroque style—seeming to link an aristocratic earth with beautiful cloud-lines to a Catholic heaven.

Musical too is the lovely rhythm of mountains and woods, of vineyards and meadows surrounding Vienna with an indescribable charm. Music was the soul not only of the aristocratic society of this imperial city with its unique opera and concerts, its operettas and orchestras. The entire population grew up in an atmosphere of music, of art and of beauty. After a week of hard labor one saw on bright Sunday evenings in spring good-looking young girls and boys of the working class coming home from long walks through the neighboring woods and meadows, carrying bunches of flowers, singing gay songs with their clear voices, and walking with the rhythm of dancers. And when the summer nights fell, all the little inn gardens in the charming suburbs of Vienna were crowded with lovers, drinking young white wine, singing, joking, and laughing. . . .

Vienna's intellectual life had its center in the numerous coffeehouses where, behind clouds of smoke, social, political, religious, and philosophical issues were discussed during long winter evenings and nights, between tables of gamblers and of chess players. Life was easy indeed in imperial Vienna, at least it was taken easily. For the average Vien-

nese was kind, good-natured, and gentle. "Live and let live!" was the motto of his life. It meant that he wished to be left in peace, as he wanted to leave the rest of the world in peace. His attitude was more contemplative than active, more inclined toward pleasure than toward heroism, more toward art than toward science.

Vienna's artistic life culminated in two imperial institutions, the Opera and the Burgtheater. On them the Emperor was spending millions, with the result that for generations they represented the best opera and the first theater in the world. Their stars received higher salaries than the highest officials of the empire and enjoyed an incomparable popularity.

When I was at the Theresianum, we were regularly sent to attend performances at the Opera and the Burgtheater. These classical performances were considered an important element of education, and indeed, the tragedies of Shakespeare and of Schiller had a deep influence on my moral evolution.

Between the society of imperial Vienna and French society before the Revolution there was a great resemblance. Here was great culture linked to decadence and frivolity; a society that would not face, but only postpone, decisions; an upper class which considered life a comedy to be acted out against a background of luxury and indulgence, a class which shut its eyes to social problems and spent its energies on love and gossip, gambling and racing, art and amusement. There were exceptions among them, just as my father was an exception. But such men and women remained away from Vienna, working out their disgust in the affairs of their country estates.

This arrogant society had its virtues, of course; hospitality, generosity, and a keen sense of honor, fairness, and loyalty. What sport and racing were for the English aristocracy, art was to the Viennese, who were proud of their artistic and cultural background and worshiped all genuine artists. Great musicians, painters, actors, and singers had social positions superior to those of millionaires, and the Viennese society was proud to have them as its guests of honor. An accomplished artist was always considered an aristocrat and an equal.

And beneath this surface frivolity there was serious activity, for those who would look for it. Trotsky, Masaryk, and Josef Pilsudski had lived in Vienna; from all parts of the world men and women came to Vienna's medical schools, to consult the great doctors and surgeons there; and from Vienna the theories of Sigmund Freud had begun to influence the minds of those the world over who pondered the problem

of human nature. Zionism had started from Vienna, under the leadership of a brilliant Austrian journalist, Theodor Herzl.

On graduation from the Theresianum Academy, I found myself in still a third kind of cosmopolitan society—imperial Vienna. Though I did not often join in the constant round of balls and operettas that immediately engaged the attention of the others who graduated—my father's teachings had broadened my horizons too much for that—I nevertheless became sufficiently familiar with Viennese society and its foundations to know that Vienna was unique in Europe. While all other great cities of the Continent were national centers, Vienna alone was international, capital of the only international empire. This vast empire had a population of fifty-five millions, split into nineteen different nationalities. But together they formed a natural geographic and economic unit. It was a beautiful country, from the plains of Hungary and Bohemia to the Alps and the Carpathians; from the woods of Transylvania to the coasts and islands of Dalmatia. But this empire, with all its natural resources, which might have made its inhabitants wealthy and happy, suffered from a mortal disease—nationalism. Their old loyalty to the Habsburg crown had been overshadowed by the new creed that every nation had the right to form its own and independent country. The young generation was growing up in rising opposition to Vienna. And Vienna hardly reacted against this dangerous movement, either by reforms or by suppression. Emperor Franz Joseph, who had reigned since 1848, was old and tired, opposed to any dangerous and radical reform that might have changed the constitution of his empire. This constitution had been based, since 1867, on dualism, which meant that the empire consisted of two equal and sovereign parts, of Austria and of Hungary, linked by a common military, foreign, economic, and monetary policy. It was understood that in Austria the Germanic element was predominant, in Hungary the Magyars. And still neither Germans nor Magyars formed the majority of the Austro-Hungarian population, but the Slavs with their different branches: Czechs and Slovaks, Croatians, Serbs and Slovenians, Poles and Ukrainians. Naturally these Slavs, like the Rumanians in Transylvania and the Italians in the southern Tyrol, desired to break that German-Magyar supremacy and to transform Austria-Hungary into a federation of equal national groups.

Viennese society centered on a dynasty of international origin and an aristocracy which merged all branches of blood and civilization.

Both army and bureaucracy were equally mixed, and were united only by common tradition and common loyalty to the old Emperor Franz Joseph. This cosmopolite and polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire was an anomaly and anachronism in Europe that had for a century grown more and more nationalistic, and it was inevitable that nationalistic movements were finding their way to Austria and even now were working to dismember the empire by war, revolution, or reform into national units. But the government of Vienna, determined to remain supernatural and to fight the nationalisms of its citizens, would not yield to these currents.

Vienna, I saw, was definitely international only at its top and its base. Its society was not only formed by its cosmopolitan aristocracy, but also by the refined Jewish intelligentsia with an international education and outlook which played a leading part in arts and science, literature and journalism, theater and sport, finance, commerce, and industry. On the other hand, the industrial population of Vienna also thought in international terms, not only because of the permanent influx of different nationalities from all parts of the vast empire, but because its great majority was merged into the Social Democratic party, which had an international outlook.

Between these two international elements the Viennese middle classes were an ideal hunting ground for nationalism. German nationalism was inspired by Austrians coming from Bohemia, by "Sudetes," accustomed to regard their struggle against the Czechs as the greatest political issue and the highest task of the world. This Sudete nationalism, which one generation later led to the Munich tragedy, was paralleled by an equally fanatic movement of Czech nationalism and by other nationalistic movements throughout the empire.

Of all these, the German nationalists were the most aggressive. They were Pan-Germanists, all of them—forerunners of a mighty movement to come—and their admiration for Bismarck's Reich was only surpassed in later years by their devotion to the Reich of another leader. These Germans in 1913 advocated the dismemberment of Austria, followed by the Anschluss of all its German-speaking provinces, or the hegemony of Austrian Pan-Germanists over the entire monarchy, with the help of their German brothers beyond the northwestern borders. But whatever ends it was seeking, this Pan-Germanism was closely linked with anti-Semitism, for these fanatical Germans considered the Jews the pioneers of internationalism and consequently their worst enemies.

Three men were representative of this anti-Semitic movement—

three men who are not important in themselves but who rise to mammoth importance because of the influence of their ideologies on a then obscure young Austrian, Adolf Hitler, to whom Vienna had meant the bitterness of misery and humiliation. Carl Lueger was the first of these men; Lueger, leader of the Austrian Christian Socialists and Mayor of Vienna, a great orator who used anti-Semitism to stir up the envies and jealousies of the middle classes against Jewish competition. And beside Lueger stand Von Schoenerer, leader of the Pan-Germanists, and the renegade Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

Von Schoenerer, a member of parliament like Lueger, was an exponent of a racism which combined brutal anti-Semitism with narrow-minded Pan-Germanism. Perhaps because of the brutality of his ideas Schoenerer never gained great influence in Austrian politics, but twenty years later it became plain that some of his listeners—and one, especially—had listened seriously and learned.

Of these three, the Englishman, Chamberlain, had the most influence on events to come, for he was no politician like Lueger and Schoenerer, but a scholar and author. While they were inciting crowds with words, Chamberlain was writing a best seller which further poisoned the minds of the half-educated millions who formed the audience for Lueger and others like him. Not anti-Semitism, but worship of his own Nordic race motivated Houston Stewart Chamberlain. He had nothing in common with the vulgar anti-Semites who borrowed his theories, but believed, rather, that England had failed in its racial mission and should be displaced by Germany as the leading nation on the globe. In this conception of racism he was a disciple of another non-German prophet of Germanism, the French Count de Gobineau, who may be considered the real "discoverer" of the racial idea and theory. Houston Stewart Chamberlain married a daughter of Richard Wagner; Gobineau was a great friend of Wagner, who thus has the dubious distinction of being a link in this chain of pre-Hitlerite Nazism.

The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, Chamberlain's book, which became the bible of racism, undertook to interpret history from the racial point of view and tried to prove that all the great accomplishments of history were due to a superior race of "Aryans," a heroic and genial race currently represented by the Germanics. By uniting vision with a total lack of critical sense, Chamberlain created a volume which flattered every German and appealed enormously to the vanity of the nation as a whole. For this he became famous throughout Germany and Austria and was honored by the Kaiser, who was much influenced by his ideas. Needless to say, the book also had a decisive influence on

a whole generation of young Germans and inspired the entire Nazi literature, from Hitler to Rosenberg.

Hitler, too, was in Vienna, but as a silent spectator only. Born in Braunau not far from my grandfather's estate, Ottensheim, he had come to Vienna with the burning ambition to become an artist and rise in the world. When his talents failed him he lived the life of an unemployed outcast, cursing the international aristocracy, the Jewish plutocracy, and the life of ease, tolerance, and humor around him. He would not join the party of the Austrian Socialists because it was run by a brilliant and idealistic Jew, Victor Adler, so he became a passionate Pan-Germanist, a violent anti-Semite, turning his thoughts to Germany and Prussia, which he considered the antipodes of Vienna. When he moved to Munich in 1912 his education was completed. Like so many of his Austrian countrymen he already was an accomplished Nazi—made in Vienna.

While the stage was set, first for war and revolution, then for Nazism, Vienna, ignorant of its tragic future, was never gayer, more frivolous, more extravagant, enjoying an eternal round of balls and dinners, receptions, theater and opera parties, exhibitions and races. I could not escape certain social obligations, but did not enjoy them. Vienna's society remained strange to me; I did not share the political and social prejudices of the people I met; I did not gamble or smoke. After an evening in society I felt I had gained nothing, only lost a few hours of sleep and study.

Whenever I had a free week I preferred to go home to Ronsperg and spend my time there at our hunting box, Dianahof. Hans and I always found a group of old friends there—the foresters and gamekeepers of the estate, simple, straightforward men, who had a good deal of natural intelligence and common sense. They knew how to enjoy their life too. Many a party took place at the end of a long hunting day. Big tables were constructed of boards and barrels in the hall or out under the trees; a tremendous amount of sausages were served with bread, butter, and cheese, and beer streamed endlessly from great barrels. At a late hour we all burst into song:

Deep in the Bohemian Forest
My cradle stood
It's so long ago
Since I left this wood.

In Vienna I lived with my mother at her apartment on the Maxingstrasse. One day my mother told me that she and my brother had been invited to a performance of a dramatized version of Dostoevsky's *The Idiot* and to a dinner with Ida Roland, who was the star of the play. My brother had been called to Bohemia, making it necessary for me to take his place. Everyone in Vienna was speaking of Ida Roland, for this young and brilliant star had only recently conquered the hearts of both critics and public alike. In Vienna's theater history, it seemed, only two women had aroused equal enthusiasm: they were the great Bernhardt and the great Duse; but the new star who had suddenly risen to such great fame was no foreigner, but a native Viennese.

I had seen Ida Roland a few weeks before, in the rôle of Czarina Catherine II, and had found her a striking personality, comparable in charm and vitality to no one I had ever seen, on the stage or in private life. Her very appearance seemed to fascinate the audience, which sat as though hypnotized by a combination of grace and the power of personality. She was fair, with eyes of light blue and an almost transparent complexion. Although of middle size, and slender, she gave the impression of tallness, and her voice was warm and controlled. Ida Roland that night did not look like Catherine II, but like a combination of feminine charm, majesty, nobleness, and beauty, in whose soul there burned a flame which made everyone compared with her seem dull and lifeless. Nobody, indeed, found a better symbol for her strange and creative nature than Rainer Maria Rilke, Austria's greatest poet, who calls her in one of his letters, published after his death, "a fountain," expressing his amazement and admiration for the constant stream of life, imagination, and emotion emanating from her play.

Seeing Ida Roland again only strengthened these impressions, and it was with great pleasure throughout the performance that I looked forward to the dinner party. At this little supper we were seated next to each other and to my surprise I heard myself abandoning the usual table talk to speak to her of my childhood and of my father. Finding her an intelligent and charming listener, I spoke also of my ideas and my theories, and how strange I felt in the conventional life of Vienna's society. And though the city of Vienna tonight lay at her feet, she too had found it artificial and narrow and backward in its prejudices.

From this meeting came others, until during the last spring of a peaceful Europe we saw one another almost daily, driving in a carriage through the lovely Viennese suburbs and visiting the beautiful lakes near-by in the Austrian and Bavarian Alps.

When first we met, Ida Roland was not interested in politics. But

she hated war and was, by sentiment, a pacifist whose heart revolted against social injustice, feeling for the poor more than for the rich. In view of this it was not difficult for me to arouse her interest in the strange art of politics, this art of dealing with men and events, and often her strong and very feminine instinct was able to foresee coming events more clearly than all my logical arguments and rational combinations.

I took an interest in her art, as she did in mine. Sitting in a dark corner of the theater, I watched innumerable rehearsals and admired the new ideas, impulses, and gestures that shaped her rôle successively toward perfection. After these rehearsals we exchanged our impressions and suggestions and discussed details of the play for hours, and then we read together the manuscripts that were submitted to her. Her further career was a chain of uninterrupted successes in classics like Shakespeare's tragedies, as well as in comedies, like Somerset Maugham's modern plays.

She, for her part, helped and assisted me in all my work. There was no matter we did not discuss, no step we did not take in common. Her gift of diving into human souls, one of the keys of her art, was of extraordinary help to my political work, because she hardly ever failed in her judgment of a character at the very first sight.

Although the main outlines of my philosophy and of my political orientation were established before we met and married, she was of inestimable help in all practical questions concerning their execution. In my work as a writer she helped me, by her sound critical sense, to develop my style, and in my propaganda work and organization she always remained my closest and most reliable collaborator. This love, friendship, and collaboration remained essential in all my work, that certainly would have evolved very differently without her permanent help, enthusiasm, and inspiration.

THE Austrian crisis which had smoldered for years exploded very suddenly when on June 28, 1914, the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was murdered with his wife at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The assassin was a young Serbian nationalist, one of a group of Austrian Serbs, who had conspired against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy—this, however, without the knowledge and consent of the Serbian government.

Franz Ferdinand had never been popular, and still he had been the hope of all Austrian patriots who believed that the regeneration and reform of Austria could be accomplished without war. It was evident that the system of ruling the monarchy against the sentiments of its Slav majority could not be indefinitely maintained and that the empire would only survive if complete equality between all its national groups could be achieved. Without Hungarian consent a reorganization of the monarchy on the basis of national equality was unconstitutional, and Emperor Franz Joseph would not think of violating the Hungarian constitution he had sworn to maintain, when, in 1867, he was crowned king of Hungary. However, it was an open secret that, as soon as he should die, his nephew and successor Franz Ferdinand would undertake the reform against the will of the Magyars—before taking an oath on the constitution. This was expected any day, for the Emperor's strength was failing steadily. He was eighty-five years old.

Why then did the Sarajevo murder happen? The Serbian nationalists, within and outside the Habsburg monarchy, did not believe in a reformed Austro-Hungarian empire, but were working for the establishment of an independent national state of their own, uniting all Serbs, Croats, Slovenians under their national dynasty of the Kara-georgevich. The state was to be Yugoslavia. It had a chance to live only if the empire fell. Serbian patriots eyed a vigorous successor to the Habsburg throne with anxiety. They knew that he imperiled their dream of a Yugoslav kingdom. They conspired to kill him.

For several weeks after the blow fell, the fate of the world remained in balance.

Ida Roland and I were in Bayreuth, attending the Wagner festival. The crowd there was as brilliantly cosmopolitan as ever, composed of Germans and Austrians, Hungarians and Italians, Russians and Poles, of British and French people, many of them linked by ties of blood and friendship. The war hung poised over our heads like the sword of Damocles, but we sat day after day peacefully united under the huge dome of the Opera House.

At the Villa Wahnfried the Wagners gave their usual big reception for the more distinguished of Bayreuth's visitors. Cosima Wagner and her son Siegfried received us very kindly, for my family had held friendly relations with their family since the day my great-grandmother Marie Kalergis had known and sponsored Richard Wagner in Paris. I was shown an armchair which she had personally embroidered for the Maestro, who had been generous enough to compliment her on her musical accomplishments. We had a good many friends among the guests at Wahnfried; half of Vienna's society seemed to be present, and everybody was lost in long discussions about the merits of the festival performances. The air hung with more or less subtle evaluations of the singers, the settings, and the Maestro himself—eternal conjurer of all this legendary and subterranean Germanic splendor.

Suddenly I saw my aunt Marietta Coudenhove coming toward me in company with an elderly man—well dressed, kindly looking, with an enormous forehead and distinguished features.

"Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain," my aunt said simply. We sat down together. I do not recall what we talked about—Siegfried Wagner had settled down to play, and our attention was naturally divided—but I remember that he was a suave talker and a good listener too. I had leisure enough to observe him carefully, and the thought struck me that this man who had so ingeniously sharpened the weapons of super-racism had about him nothing of the anthropologist, everything of the poet. He would have served the world much better had he written his epic of the Nordic man in verse rather than in prose. At least he would have lived up to his true vocation of spinning dreams rather than of preparing bloody fratricide.

The news of the Austrian ultimatum hit Bayreuth like a bombshell. The date was July 26, and within a day or two Bayreuth was empty of all foreigners, who were anxious to leave Germany before the borders were closed.

Peace might have been saved even then had the Czar and the Kaiser willed it so. It was obvious that the Czar had the power to restrain Serbia and the Kaiser to restrain Austria. But in St. Petersburg and Berlin nationalists and warmongers had gained the upper hand. Serbia, backed by Russia, refused to accept certain points of the Austrian ultimatum, and Austria, backed by Germany, declared war on Serbia. Russia entered the war as Serbia's ally, Germany as the ally of Austria, and France as the ally of Russia. Several days later Germany broke its pledge to Belgium and violated its neutrality. Britain, faithful to its pledge to Belgium, thereupon joined the Franco-Russian alliance. Italy, although an ally of Austria, remained neutral, because Austria had failed to inform the kingdom of Vittorio Emmanuele of the impending ultimatum to Serbia. Austria thus had violated its pact with Italy, and the Italians were no doubt glad of it.

True, the immediate reason for war had lain only in a local conflict between Austro-Hungary and Serbia, but behind it stood the major conflict between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. Both were aiming at European domination. Germany hoped to base its hegemony on the control not only of Austria but also of Turkey, while Russia hoped to become leader of all Slavs in the Danubian region, to control the Dardanelles, and to open the Mediterranean to its fleet. The two plans clashed: Germany wished to have Austria as vassal; Russia wished to dismember it, and to transform into vassals, if not all, at least most of its successor states. Both Russia and Germany needed the Danubian basin as a springboard to European hegemony.

Almost from the very first, chauvinistic ideas began to color all the issues of the day. What perturbed me more, however, were the first threatening signs of racist complex within the German mind. From Ronsperg I wrote, in August, 1914, to Ida Roland, who was then at her house in Nymphenburg, a residential suburb of Munich:

I do not consider the terrible murders and cruelties now raging in all parts of the world the most tragic elements of the World War. What is more terrifying than anything, perhaps for centuries to come, is the awakening of the aggressive tendency of nationalism which is nothing but the apparently vanishing religious fanaticism, reappearing under a new form. This nationalism was on the defensive in the last century; the nations were only seeking liberty (Italy). Today this is changed. Responsible for the change are first of all Chamberlain and his group, who, with dubious arguments, try to transform the nation into an artificial unit and then supplant this unit by an idea. The three steps are: first, predominance of the Aryans among the races, then the predominance of the Germanics among the

Aryans, and finally the predominance of the Germans among the Germans. . . .

The prelude to this national struggle was the so-called racial anti-Semitism. . . . I am afraid there are no more cosmopolitans left in Europe. This hatred is growing automatically—just as religious hatred did in the past thousand years. It is the duty of all objective-minded people of all countries to fight this hatred, this lie and this blindness with full force. I, too, shall participate in this task and you, too, will do so; else this war is not an end but only a beginning of more slaughters. And the guilt for all this lies with scholars like Gobineau and Chamberlain rather than with war-minded statesmen. My father must have foreseen all this when, in conscious opposition to Chamberlain, he fought anti-Semitism. I wish to continue his work on a vaster scale. . . .

Going back and forth between Vienna and Munich I had an excellent chance to compare national attitudes in Germany and Austria during the initial months of the war. Germany was in a state of exaltation. More or less every German was convinced that his nation was a victim of a world-wide conspiracy and entirely on the defensive. Their country, their civilization and their liberty were at stake. They believed themselves to be living in the greatest hour of history and to be accomplishing the greatest deeds ever on record in the realm of militarism. They were convinced of their final triumph and in the meantime heard of nothing but victories. They ignored the significance of the battle of the Marne, and, after the battle of Tannenberg, which saved Eastern Prussia from Russian invasion, their attention crystallized on two names of tremendous popularity: Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Curiously enough there was little hatred against Russians and Frenchmen. All hatred centered on the British, who, so the average German believed, begrudged Germany its trade and navy and tried to crush it by a war of coalition which had been prepared long in advance.

The Austrian attitude was different. The Austrians felt no hatred or resentment against any of their enemies and in consequence had little enthusiasm for fighting. They held a certain animosity against the Serbs, whom they accused of having started the war by killing the Archduke, and they heartily disliked the Italians, first because they remained neutral, later because they had turned against their former allies. With mixed feelings they looked upon the Germans, whom they continued to call the Prussians. They admired them for their efficient pursuit of the war, which they were unable to emulate. They disliked them because the German officers and soldiers who came to Austria treated them as their inferiors, constantly offending them by their arrogance, their lack

of tact, and their clipped, stiff, and unmusical way of handling the common mother tongue. Lack of war enthusiasm accounted for the fact that the Austrian mood so quickly gave way to resignation, pessimism, and fatalism. Austrians knew that in one way or the other the war was a calamity; defeat would bring dismemberment of their country, victory would lead to German hegemony in Europe. Austria would at best be transformed into a Prussian protectorate. The only hope was that the war would soon be over—a hope which I shared with all my heart.

I was exempt from military service because of a lung affliction and thanked God that I was not obliged to fight a war which, from the first, I considered a crime and a folly. The nationalistic slogans failed to impress me; they did not lessen my sympathies for France and England nor my antipathies against Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.

I continued my philosophic and historic studies at the University of Vienna until the summer of 1917, when I emerged as a full-fledged doctor of philosophy. I was writing a book on ethics when two events took place which transformed my negative attitude toward the war into a passionately interested one: the fall of Czarism and the entry of the United States into the war.

When Czarism was overthrown, I felt that the Russian people had vindicated themselves and their war aims. Their war cry that the Allies were fighting for democracy had not sounded very convincing as long as Czarist power remained the most reactionary in the world. After the fall of Czarism the central powers were surrounded on all sides by democratic and progressive nations. Now, at last, the threat of Russian despotism was removed, and if German imperialism too was crushed there was hope for a better world order. The war was no longer a clash between Russian and German imperialism, but a revolution of the world against the threat of German imperialism and militarism.

This evolution was underlined by the fact that the United States had entered the war. Woodrow Wilson's attitude from the first gave it an ideological slant. I became passionately Wilsonian, though Wilson was fighting on the other side of the fence. But I shared this enthusiasm for Wilson and his ideas with most Austrians, including their young Emperor Charles, who had succeeded in December, 1916, to his grand-uncle Franz Joseph. From the first day of his reign he did his best to assure a negotiated peace on Wilson's principles—against those of Ludendorff, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. But the events were stronger than his good will.

The issues of the war had boiled down to simple black-and-white

terms, when in the East a second political leader emerged whose new ideals and aims made a reshuffling of all economic and political values necessary, at least within central Europe, which came very close to the new ideological radius of Soviet Russia.

Lenin will survive in history as a man of gigantic proportions and one who is much closer to being a religious than a political leader. From the first, Bolshevism seemed to me no mere political system but rather a new religion like Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism. Lenin was very much like a Mohammed of the North, inspiring his people with a new creed and new ideals just as Mohammed had inspired the Arabs. Personally I was anti-Bolshevist, because liberty was my highest ideal, but I understood the generous impulses of his doctrine which attempted to rebuild on the ruins of an old world a new one of social equality and fair opportunity for everyone. It was a very dynamic doctrine too. I was aware of a good many dark points within our own capitalistic system, but believed that the democratic system of the west still was capable of social evolution. Was Soviet Russia a threat to Europe? Would it hamper the further evolution of Europe? It was difficult to gauge the expansive urge and power of our Russian neighbor. I was convinced that only a quick peace based on the principles of Woodrow Wilson would strengthen the democratic principles within central Europe and forestall the threat of civil war.

Another man in central Europe backed me in my admiration for Woodrow Wilson's new world—Maximilian Harden. Harden was Germany's most brilliant publicist, combining knowledge with boldness and vision with a ruthless satirical pen. He had always admired Bismarck and always hated William II. He was the Emperor's most dangerous, most incorruptible and most irreconcilable enemy. Now he was the mouthpiece, in Germany, of President Woodrow Wilson, rather an incredible situation considering the fact that the country was at war with the United States. The German military leaders never checked his pro-Wilson propaganda, considering it insignificant. It was their mistake. Harden's pen did much to shape a large portion of German public opinion, because he had considerable influence on the German intelligentsia. To wean the Germans away from Ludendorff and toward the new political savior across the Atlantic, was the result of his amazing and successful campaign. The record of it may be found in the pages of his weekly, *Die Zukunft*, as far as they cover the last months of the war.

The year of 1918 was disastrous for Austria. It had entered the stage of organized famine. Black flour had replaced white, and almost the

only foods available were turnips and potatoes. We were living near Linz in Upper Austria, in a lovely cottage which belonged to one of my aunts. Only a few miles away from Ottensheim, it overlooked the Danube and commanded a grand view over the plain to the snow-capped mountains in the south. And within this rich agricultural land conditions were still somewhat better than in Vienna.

As the summer days grew shorter the end seemed to approach. The Allies were progressing on all fronts, in France, in the Balkans, and in Syria. The hope of the German leaders to end the war by a decisive victory had vanished when their last offensive had failed.

In October the decision fell: Germany asked President Wilson for an armistice; it was ready to conclude a peace based on the Fourteen Points.

I was full of hope and expectation, living from one newspaper edition to the next. I followed with passionate interest the exchange of messages between Washington, Berlin, and Vienna; I watched how Wilson with a few short cables overthrew the Hohenzollern dynasty and dismembered Austria. Toward the end of October, Czechoslovakia declared its independence; Hungary followed; Galicia joined Poland; Bucovina and Transylvania joined Rumania; Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina joined Serbia; and the Trentino, Istria and Trieste joined Italy. The Austro-Hungarian Empire that had taken centuries to rise, crumbled within three weeks.

One morning early in November a friend telephoned from Linz that the revolution was spreading through the rural and urban districts of Upper Austria. Would we come to share his house in Linz? Our lonely cottage was unsafe, he thought, as several farmer-families had been murdered by a gang of escaped prisoners. We accepted his invitation and spent the next historic days at Linz—only some blocks away from the balcony from which, twenty years later, Adolf Hitler should proclaim the annexation of Austria by the Third Reich.

During this week a world crumbled and a world was born: Germany accepted the hard terms of the Armistice, that practically meant surrender.

The war was over. Wilson had triumphed over the Kaiser—the New World over the old one.

The world in which I had lived since my childhood vanished like a dream. My fatherland disappeared. The dynasty, to which my an

cestors had been loyal for centuries, was overthrown and forced into exile.

On the ruins of this old world a new world seemed to rise: democratic, republican, socialist and pacifist.

Beyond the disaster of these tragic days my thoughts were fixed on this new world, on the glorious vision of a League of Nations, uniting all nations and continents of the world in peaceful collaboration. A League that would replace international anarchy by order, arms by arguments, aggression by justice, revenge by understanding. Could anything more beautiful be imagined?

This was the world for which I had been born and educated. A world uniting my far-flung family, my relatives living in all parts of the globe, into a single community.

My political education was accomplished. I had broken with the prejudices of my class, with all national imperialisms and with the narrow outlook of capitalism. I was striving toward international peace, personal liberty, national equality, and social justice, impelled by my international blood and education.

When the war ended, only five days separated me from my twenty-fourth birthday, when I should be of age and a full-fledged citizen. But citizen of what state? That I ignored. Would I become a citizen of the little Austrian republic in which I was now living? Or would Austria join the German republic and transform me into a German citizen? Or would I become a Czechoslovak citizen, because Ronsperg had become a part of that new republic?

These questions did not worry me at the moment. I had practically no nationality and no citizenship until the conclusion of the peace. But I had acquired a wider and greater citizenship: I was conscious of being a citizen of the world, determined to live and to work not for one country, but for the brotherhood of man.

I was grateful to my destiny for having been born in the era of the League, in the era of Woodrow Wilson, in the era of the rebirth of the world under the impulse of new and generous ideals.

I was happy to be young, happy to be able to participate in that gigantic task of reconciliation and of reconstruction. And I gave up my plans for living the contemplative life of a philosopher, and pledged myself to devote my future action to the new world emerging from the ruins of the war.

Part Two

THE PAN-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

CHAPTER EIGHT *Dismembered Europe*

WHILE the battle for Europe was raging in Paris behind the closed doors of the Hotel Crillon, all hopes of the young generation in central Europe were fixed on President Wilson and his generous principles.

Wilson might, perhaps, have broken the resistance of his nationalistic colleagues, had he used his immense popularity among the people of Europe, who wanted lasting peace and bread instead of nationalistic phrases and revenge—among the hard-working people of Europe's cities and villages, plains and mountains, the people who had really fought, who had sacrificed their health and risked their lives for a war to end all wars.

Had Wilson raised his voice over the heads of the peace conference to address those anonymous crowds in Britain and France, in Germany and Austria, in Italy and Poland—those starving and hoping crowds who saw in him the new Messiah—the response would have been tremendous. Wilson would have been backed by the young generation that wished never again to be sent to the trenches, by all the mothers of Europe, by almost all idealists, and by the bulk of the European intelligentsia. One such address, denouncing aggressive nationalism, demonstrating its perils and threatening its leaders, might have restored his lost authority at the peace conference and saved his great vision.

Every day I hoped that Wilson would turn away from the conference table to the people of Europe, to appeal to the millions of his followers; I hoped he would threaten the conference with a strong popular movement throughout Europe. But Wilson remained silent, leaving the door to public opinion wide open to his adversaries, who used this opportunity to the full. So the period between armistice and peace became no cooling-off, but a boiling-up period. While nationalism, pessimism, and hate were rising among all nations, Wilson was forced to make one concession after another to nationalism, till the

peace draft became a caricature of his program rather than an interpretation.

The reasons for this change in public opinion were manifold. First of all, the victorious nationalists in all nations stimulated nationalism to strengthen their own situation at home. Everyone who dared to say a word in favor of the enemy was considered a traitor. Thus the adherents of a generous peace were condemned to silence, and the field of propaganda was open only to the extreme nationalists.

Still another reason was the fact that the enthusiasm for the new world order, like every enthusiasm, cooled off very quickly and everyone began thinking of himself and of his personal future. It was only natural that everyone should be in favor of milking Germany as thoroughly as possible because each believed this would save taxes and increase his own prosperity. It also is a psychological fact that most people would rather kick a fallen enemy than one who is on his feet; thus the very impotence of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey induced the Allies to raise their demands for punishment and vengeance. All these elements co-operated to work against Wilson and for his enemies. A preliminary peace concluded in November, instead of the Armistice, would undoubtedly have been fairer, more intelligent and more lasting. But Wilson wasted his time in Paris with negotiations, until he had lost the conference.

During this crucial winter I started several times to write from Vienna a letter to President Wilson, imploring him to trust his supporters all over Europe and to defend his noble principles against all nationalistic assaults. But I laid down my pen, for I knew that such a letter from an unknown citizen of political No Man's Land in central Europe would land in some wastepaper basket or, in the most optimistic case, in some file of some secretary of some office. . . .

I realized that it was impossible for me to help humanity, to accomplish my vows and my hopes, and to work effectively for a better world without having made a name for myself. Instead of writing a letter for Wilson's wastepaper basket, I wrote articles for the leading Austrian and German papers and magazines. I published my first book on the aesthetic foundations of ethics, *Ethics and Hyper-Ethics*. Within a few months my name was known among all German and Austrian intellectuals.

Meanwhile, in March, 1919, Count Michel Karolyi, who had headed the Hungarian government, left the power in the hands of the Com-

munists led by Bela Kun. The Communist movement spread to Austria, fed by thousands of unemployed and idle soldiers who had nowhere to turn during this time of complete economic collapse. While General Smuts, at the request of the Allied authorities in Paris, went to Budapest to come to terms with the Red leader, Munich raised the flag of a soviet republic over the city hall.

The Munich revolution was five months old at that time. It had been started by an elderly Prussian revolutionary of Jewish origin, Kurt Eisner, a more or less unpolitical idealist who had maintained himself as Bavarian ruler and prime minister until then. In February, 1919, Count Arco, a young Bavarian aristocrat, shot him.

We had come to Munich a few weeks later because Ida Roland was scheduled to appear in Artsibashev's *Jealousy*. Since the murder, political tension in the city reached a new high pitch; then one morning posters told us that Bavaria had become a soviet republic.

For a fortnight nothing happened. As in Vienna, people went about dejected and ill-dressed exhibiting pinched greenish faces.

Then one morning the Social Democrats in the soviet government were overthrown by a coup d'état and replaced by radical leftists and Communists. Hundreds of arrests were made by irregulars and terrorist groups. Plundering and assault started.

In the middle of the night a group of armed sailors pounded at our doors at the Park Hotel.

"Open! State Police."

They questioned my wife first. "Who are you?"

"Ida Roland," she answered.

"Oh, so you are the actress? Don't bother, just give us your passport."

After a glance at the document, the guard exclaimed: "What, you are a countess?"

"Yes, my husband is a count."

"Where is he?"

"In the next room."

They came in, scowling at me in a disheartening manner.

"You are a count? You'll have to dress and come with us!"

I dressed slowly, while the guards searched the room for arms or counterrevolutionary literature. Meanwhile my wife had started to talk to the leader of the group:

"Why should you get upset at his being a count? After all, Tolstoy was a count, too."

The Red sailor looked at her in astonishment: "Why, yes," he said.

He knew all about Tolstoy because the Munich press at this moment was hailing Tolstoy as a predecessor of Lenin.

Ida Roland then handed him an article of mine, *Plato's State and Our Time*, which had just been published in a leftist weekly—*Die Erde*. It explained Plato's main idea that the ideal state must rest on intellectual aristocracy, but that economically it must be based on socialism. The guard started to read it but gave it up as too complicated. He had been impressed, however, by the fact that I had been published in a leftist pamphlet and that my name was printed on the cover without title.

"I shall take this to our commander," he said and left. After some time—it was three in the morning—he came back and said kindly, in his Bavarian dialect: "Go to bed. Good night."

Our neighbor, Prince Thurn and Taxis, was less lucky that night. He was arrested, released, rearrested, and, during the next few days, while the Bavarian soviet republic agonized, was shot with a group of other innocent hostages.

The soviet republic in Munich was short-lived. Within a week the Bavarian army, commanded by General von Epp, now a leading Nazi, attacked Red Munich. We watched the decisive battle on the Maximilianplatz from the windows of our hotel. There was artillery and gunfire. Both sides fought with great courage. Men were killed and wounded before our eyes; volunteers wore white or red badges according to their political belief. However, when the luck of the battle turned, we saw a group of young men throwing away their red badges and replacing them with white handkerchiefs, transforming themselves from enemies to auxiliaries of the victorious armies.

The counterrevolution that followed was bloody enough. From its seeds sprang Nazism spreading first over Bavaria, then over Germany, then over Europe, until it flooded the world with terror and blood. Yet for the moment the short interlude of Bavarian Bolshevism had gathered all Bavaria into an anti-Communist camp. Aristocracy and church, army and peasants became fiercely anti-Marxist, ready to join anybody who would crusade against Bolshevism; and anti-Bolshevism became at once identical with anti-Semitism, because most of the leaders of this Bavarian soviet republic happened to be foreign Jews. Never before had this artistic and cosmopolitan city with its small and cultured Jewish minority been a stronghold of anti-Semitism; but now it had become its center.

During our next visit to Munich I saw a large poster announcing a public meeting. At the end I read printed in bold letters: "Entrance

free to war invalids. Jews are not admitted." I had never seen anything like this before and was considerably startled. When I looked more closely at the name of the man who was to be the speaker, I read a signature I had never seen or heard of before—"Adolf Hitler."

A new Europe had emerged from the peace conference. This new Europe had no resemblance to the lofty dreams that had nourished my hopes and aroused my enthusiasm in the days of the Armistice.

Instead of the one Alsace-Lorraine that had been returned to its French motherland, more than a dozen new Alsace-Lorraines had been artificially created in eastern Europe, nourishing national hatreds and preparing new wars. The problems of the so-called Corridor, of Wilna, of the Russo-Polish and of the Czecho-Polish frontiers, the unjust frontiers of mutilated Hungary, the Italian annexation of German-speaking parts of Tyrol, Fiume, Bessarabia, the Dobruja, Macedonia, western Thrace, the frontiers between Turkey and Greece—all these problems were to lead either to immediate wars or to psychological preparation for future wars.

Meanwhile western Europe was poisoned not by territorial problems but by the financial and economic problem of reparations. This problem stood like a wall between the French and German republics, preventing any reconciliation.

Europe was more torn, more dismembered, more divided by hate than ever. Nationalism grew stronger than even before or during the War. Minorities were shamelessly oppressed and new tariff walls artificially separated producers from consumers, raw materials from factories, agrarian from industrial regions.

It had become evident that the peace treaties had failed to establish a new order in Europe. They had created a new and dangerous disorder. Before the war there had been six great powers in Europe, organized into two groups, the Entente and the Triple Alliance. These two groups had balanced each other and were able to assure peace for as long a period as they desired.

Compared to this European Concert, as it was called, new Europe was a chaos. There was no clear distinction between great powers and minor powers. Poland, for instance, had received practically the rôle of a great power, while disarmed Germany was only theoretically equal to France and to Italy. The European continent west of Russia was torn into twenty-six states, without counting dwarf-states like Monaco and Liechtenstein. Between these twenty-six states there was no other link than the powerless League of Nations.

The first great failure of the League had been its incapacity to stop the two wars between Poland and Russia and between Greece and Turkey. Europe proved its entire lack of solidarity when the Red armies were besieging Warsaw, and Poland saw itself abandoned by its neighbors and allies. But the great counterrevolution against the treaties of Paris started when General Mustapha Kemal refused to recognize the Treaty of Sèvres, imposed upon Turkey by the Allies. From his headquarters in Ankara he carried on the war against the victorious Allies, represented by the armies of Greece. After having defeated these armies, he crossed the straits to Europe and reconquered Thrace. Finally the Allies were forced to accept the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Turkish Versailles, and to recognize Turkey's sovereignty over all reconquered lands.

This humiliating defeat of the Allies at the end of the victorious war demonstrated that no era of peace had started—that military power and a heroic mind had proved to be stronger than all diplomatic action. So this victory of Kemal inspired the nationalists in Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria with new hope. What had been possible in Turkey could not be impossible in other parts of Europe. Revisionism became the dominating slogan of Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. This claim for a revision of the treaties of Paris was accompanied from the very beginning by the threat that, if it was not granted peacefully, it would be enforced sooner or later à la Kemal.

So Europe was divided between states that claimed a revision of the treaties of Paris and others that were ready to defend these treaties at all cost. Germany led the first group; France the latter. This division of Europe became alarming since Russia's sympathies were openly for revision and since Italy was shifting from the anti-revisionist camp toward revisionism. I was haunted by the nightmare of an alliance between Germany and Russia, possibly with the assistance of Italy, against France, Poland, and their allies to overthrow the new system of peace by a new war. And I was afraid that the result of such a war would not be better organization of our continent, but rather the destruction of Western civilization.

This growing danger of a total collapse of Europe was more evident in Vienna, where I was living, than in any other of the great cities of Europe. Vienna was in a state of misery and despair. Men and women who had represented one of the most refined civilizations of Europe were now starving and freezing in their poor and unheated homes. Morale deteriorated and gave way to general despair. Public opinion was convinced that Austria could not live within its new and artificial

boundaries and that Vienna was condemned to lasting misery and total ruin. A large section of the young Austrian intelligentsia saw the only hope in Bolshevism.

The desperate state of Vienna impressed me as a symptom of the desperate state of Europe. During these tragic months and years I did what I could to warn against these three imminent dangers: the danger of a European war, due to the unsettled problems pending between Germany and the Allies and the growing revengeful nationalism within the German youth; the danger of a terrible economic collapse, due to the economic dismemberment of Europe, and to a chaotic inflation of the numerous and disconnected national currencies; the danger of Bolshevism, closely connected with the two previously mentioned perils, owing to the incapacity of a capitalistic and democratic Europe to settle the problems set by the peace treaties.

I had never lost the habit of turning my globe, and it had taught me that the world had passed the stage of local nationalism, but had not yet reached the uniformity indispensable for any form of world government.

I realized that this intermediary stage, that might last for generations, was tending toward the establishment of huge continental or super-continental federations.

Three such growing federations now surrounded Europe: the Soviet Union combining numerous nations, languages, traditions, religions and states into the largest coherent federation on earth; the British Empire, a great power in all five continents, uniting almost a quarter of the human race on a quarter of the inhabited globe into the greatest federation of all times; Pan-America, an organization working towards union and solidarity among all republics of the New World, from Alaska to Cape Horn. Beyond the Pacific I was aware of the growing organization of another great federation, with a population even greater than that of Europe—the young republic of China.

Between these four gigantic parts of the world lay Europe, divided into thirty sovereign states, following, in their international and economic policy, the laws of the jungle, arming against one another, invading one another, blackmailing one another, ruining one another, and arousing artificial national hatreds against one another. South of this disorganized and anarchistic Europe, separated only by the narrow Mediterranean, was Africa, with its western half formed by colonies of Continental nations and its eastern half British. This European section of Africa, from Morocco to Katanga, was but the natural political,

geographic, and economic continuation of Europe to the south—but also torn by political rivalries and economic jealousies and consequently inadequately developed.

The solution of the puzzle seemed obvious: War, revolution and misery could only be avoided by a federation of all continental states of Europe, including their colonies, in close association with the British Commonwealth of Nations and with the American republics.

The League of Nations Covenant opened the doors to such a reform in the spirit of regionalism by recognizing, in its Article 21, the American Monroe Doctrine, thus establishing a precedent for an analogous continental solidarity of Europe. I hoped that by a peaceful organization of Europe the resistance of the United States against collaboration with the Eastern Hemisphere would vanish and that the Pan-American and the Pan-European unions would then act as regional sections of a new and world-embracing League of Nations. And I was convinced that even the Soviet Union would join this decentralized League as a separate federation, as soon as it was sure that the other regions of the League would have no pretext to interfere with its federal system of sovietism. And only if Washington and Moscow were ready to join the League would it have the authority to speak in the name of mankind. A further striking argument for European union I saw in the development of aviation, because it was obvious that it would become impossible to maintain the inter-European tariff boundaries against flying smugglers and the national defenses against flying armies, as soon as the development of the plane had followed up the mass production of the motor car.

What if Europe failed to reorganize? It was not necessary to be a prophet to realize whither this European anarchy was bound to lead us. Anyone who knew the dangers behind the scenes of European policy, of European intrigues, conflicts of interest and opposing forces, could foresee the second European war. Too much inflammable material was lying about in every corner of Europe, and too much reckless leadership was to be found in high places. If that war was constantly postponed, it was because these politicians shrank again and again from taking the last step, fearful lest they too might perish in the fire.

I made no rash decision. I first studied the European problem from every angle, political, economic, legal, historic, and geographical. . . . I was inspired by the early evolution of the United States of America, by the revolution for Italian unity, by the German Zollverein, and by the example of Switzerland. I also studied the story of the Pan-American

movement from its beginnings under Simon Bolivar and its revival by James G. Blaine and Andrew Carnegie.

Then I cast about for an organization which might have studied or promoted a Pan-European union at an earlier date. There was none. This lack of any organization for a closer union of Europe was still more amazing in view of the fact that for centuries outstanding Europeans had suggested a European union. This was done by men like Pierre Dubois in the early fourteenth century, Sully, the chancellor of the French King Henry IV, or the Quaker William Penn, who had not only conceived the idea of a United States of America but given years of his life to the idea of a United States of Europe.

Nobody thought of such a Europe now, because all those who might have backed it under other circumstances, the pacifists and free-traders, were collaborating with the League of Nations which considered any continental movement a dangerous heresy against its claim of universality.

However, I myself could confront all arguments for Pan-Europe with counterarguments, and only after an impassioned debate with myself did I decide to devote my energies and life to the establishment of a European federation. I discussed the matter with my wife, who with her bold heart and lucid mind was ready to assist me in the long and hard struggle against prejudice, nationalism, and conservatism which was sure to ensue.

I knew one thing to be certain. A new current of public opinion had to be started if the Pan-European idea was to live and to grow. But the movement could not be associated with any existing organization; nor could it be backed by any government, party, group, or capitalist, paper, or periodical. At that time I did not wish to lead the Pan-European movement. I only wished to start it. Meanwhile I was seeking an outstanding personality—a man who combined vision with authority—to launch the Pan-European idea as Wilson had launched the idea of the League.

For a moment I thought of appealing to Walter Rathenau; but he would have been unacceptable to the Allies, who would never forgive him the fact that he was a German—unacceptable also to the Germans who would never forgive him that he was a Jew. I also thought of Joseph Caillaux, the brilliant and courageous statesman who had fought Clemenceau and had been imprisoned by him. But Caillaux was still banished and in political disgrace.

I turned my hopes toward another man of high moral authority, a man famous for his integrity, his liberalism, and cosmopolitan outlook

—Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, founder and president of the Czechoslovak republic.

He, a unique combination of wisdom, courage, energy, high morality and intuition, a great scholar and a great leader, was the personification of the genuine European spirit, rooted, but not imprisoned in loyalty to his nation.

I hoped to persuade Masaryk to take the lead in the movement toward European unity, and wished only to serve him in this campaign.

CHAPTER NINE *President Masaryk*

WITHOUT Masaryk, the Czechoslovak republic might never have been born. He was the miracle that happened when his country needed him most.

At the outbreak of the war he was professor of sociology and history at the University of Prague, a man respected by everyone and known for his moral rather than for his political leadership. He was contemptuous of nationalist slogans and preached tolerance in both the religious and national fields. He did not wish to dismember Austria-Hungary, only to transform it into a modern federation of national and democratic units. He was the leader of a faction within the Austrian Parliament, but his party was small and insignificant.

Twice he became involved in a nation-wide controversy. The first had to do with the mysteriously discovered national epic of the Czechs, the manuscript of *Koeniginhof*. Masaryk, who had analyzed the document, proved it to be a forgery. His truthfulness won out over his patriotism, but did not gain him many friends.

The second controversy arose over a poor Moravian Jew by the name of Hilsner, who had been accused of murdering a Christian child and had been condemned to death. Again Masaryk rose in the service of truth, pleading for Hilsner's acquittal, as Zola had pleaded for Dreyfus. He saved innocent Hilsner from the executioner, yet this time the ire of the country's nationalists and reactionaries was definitely aroused, and for a while at least the crusade cost him his popularity.

Masaryk, although he loved the Czech nation, had always been a loyal citizen of Austria. Nor did he hold any particular brief for his country's Pan-Slavic tendencies. Above all he was a democrat, desirous of strengthening his nation's ties with the Western democracies rather than with Russian despotism.

But the outbreak of the war forced him to make a crucial decision. The war was very unpopular with the Czech nation, unwilling to fight its Slavic brothers in Russia and Serbia at the behest of Austria. The

time was ripe for secession. The majority of the leading Czech politicians were conspiring against Vienna and Berlin, many with the backing and support of Russia. Masaryk too decided to fight for the liberation of Czechoslovakia, but it was characteristic of him that he preferred to make Paris, not St. Petersburg, the center of the new Czech revolutionary movement.

Exile meant great hardship for Masaryk. His life was rooted in Prague; his family, his career, his personal interests were there. He was sixty-five years of age and not robust in health; yet Masaryk, who let conscience alone be his guide, had not a moment's hesitation. He went to Geneva and then to Paris, where he chanced to find the ready assistance of two brilliant young countrymen—the Slovak astronomer Stefanik and the Czech professor Benes. The three men settled down to organize the Czech war effort—its government in exile and its legions of fighting Czechoslovaks, recruited mainly among the prisoners of war in Russian camps. Their activity put Czechoslovakia on the map as a country fighting for its political freedom. It won them the collaboration of the Allied powers. But Masaryk was not satisfied. From Paris he went to St. Petersburg and thence to Washington to assure active support for his claims in all Allied circles. President Wilson gave him his friendship and confidence at once, recognizing in Masaryk a personality of deep moral and religious convictions.

At the end of the war Masaryk, almost seventy, was the unrivaled moral and political leader of his nation. His entry into the Hradschin, the royal palace of Prague, became his moment of highest triumph. Greeted as a conqueror and a hero, he drove in Emperor Franz Joseph's golden carriage past Prague's cheering crowds uphill to his new residence, towering as powerfully as ever over the many-spired town and the banks of the blue Moldau. The Czech national assembly had unanimously elected Masaryk president of the young Czechoslovak republic.

My first meeting with the great Czech leader took place in 1921. I had sent him copies of various articles of mine on political and moral topics. He had taken the trouble to read them, and suggested to the staff of the newly organized government daily, the *Prager Presse*, that I write an article for its forthcoming first issue.

I am sorry to say my article was never published. It was buried in the files of the foreign office in Prague because it was too revolutionary for an official organ of the Czechoslovak government; but, what proved to be far more important, Thomas Masaryk had read the manu-

script and approved its spirit. When I came back to Prague he agreed to receive me. I shall never forget the mood in which I drove through the gates of the Hradschin. My spirits soared. It was my first interview with a political leader, a leader who was also the president of my new fatherland.

Before I reached his room I had to pass through huge halls decorated with the portraits of the Habsburg kings of Bohemia. They looked impressive enough in their ornate clothes, their crowns and cloaks of ermine. When I came face to face with the first president of the new Czechoslovak republic I saw no contrast between him and his royal predecessors. He might have worn the old crown of St. Wenceslaus with the same dignity as any of them. And I still see him standing by his desk, a straight, slender figure, a noble head crowned with a faint halo of white hair, eyes that were kind and wise, lips that curled readily into a charming and lightly skeptical smile.

I bowed and said somewhat stiffly: "Excellency, I am very happy indeed to meet the European statesman I admire most, and to be a citizen of the only republic in Europe which has chosen its greatest man as its leader."

He smiled and quickly put me at ease with a few welcoming words. He asked that I explain my plan. His voice was soft, colored by an unmistakable Slav accent. His manner was extremely easy and pleasant. He had nothing of the fanatic, nothing of the demagogue. He was sincere to the core, not desirous of creating an impression. He did not object to criticism, and he was inclined toward asking questions rather than to imposing his own opinions. I found him exactly as I had hoped to find him. Most men magnified by world-wide fame lose in stature when viewed at close range. Not so Masaryk. His greatness was genuine.

I began to explain my plans of a European union, asking him whether he would consider backing it. He listened carefully, informed himself as to the scope of Pan-Europe, and encouraged me to go ahead with my work. But he could not pledge any personal co-operation, he told me. He thought it impossible for him, as head of a state, to take the lead in such a crusade without engaging or perhaps compromising his government.

"I don't think the time for a Pan-Europe is ripe," he added. Then he recounted how, together with the Greek premier, Venizelos, and Take Jonsescu, the Rumanian minister of foreign affairs, he had tried to organize a "United States of Eastern Europe." This federation was designed to unite thirteen states, situated between Russia and Germany,

reaching from Finland to Greece, and forming a nucleus of a future United States of Europe. Masaryk was certain that it would assure the national independence of all member states and inaugurate an era of economic recovery. He had submitted his plan to the men of the peace conference but had been unable to secure collaboration. He doubted that Pan-Europe would find a readier welcome.

I regretted his refusal to head the movement, but we parted on excellent terms.

"Come and report on your progress when you are back in Prague," he told me gently.

He did not have to urge me twice. Whenever I revisited the beautiful Czech capital I went to see him, and never did he fail to fascinate and impress me. His heart was open to everybody, especially to struggling authors. Three times I asked him for money for needy Austrian and German writers, once for the widow of an Austrian philosopher. Each time he accorded his help immediately and generously, but he insisted on remaining an anonymous donor. He did not wish to play up to the sympathies of either Germans or Austrians.

He had Pan-Europe on his mind until his death. As late as 1935 he told an interviewing journalist: "If I were thirty-five now, I would devote my entire energy to the realization of the United States of Europe." "If I were thirty-five . . .!" He was eighty-five and could no longer hope to see the dream come true. His creative forces had been exhausted in the task of bringing liberty to his own people.

My interview with Masaryk made me realize one thing: The spade work for a European union had to be carried on by myself.

The first step seemed easy enough. Early in the summer of 1922 I published a draft of my program in two leading European papers, the *Neue Freie Presse*, of Vienna, and the *Vossische Zeitung*, of Berlin. A few days later these same papers carried a short notice inviting all those interested in my program to help form the nucleus of a Pan-European movement. I had added my private address in Vienna and asked for an answer.

Within a week my wife and I could register the first fifty-one members of our future organization. It was not a very brilliant start, and I decided that for a while I would confine myself to writing articles on European union rather than organizing a membership drive. I had acquired a certain reputation as a writer on philosophical and political themes, especially after two new books of mine had been published in Leipzig earlier in the year—a philosophical essay, *Aristocracy*, dealing

with the leadership of an aristocracy of brains based on democratic control, and *Apology for Technology*, which examined the relations between moral and industrial progress and the vital importance of technology for a fair solution of the social problem.

Meanwhile conditions in central Europe were not improving. Berlin had had its first rightist uprising—the “Kapp Putsch”—in which the president of the Berlin police, Von Jagow, had been involved. Political murders became the fashion. In the summer of 1921 Minister Erzberger, who had signed the Armistice, was shot by two members of the secret organization “Consul.”

In January, 1922, Rathenau was German foreign minister. The Reich was given a short reprieve in the payment of war debts. The dollar, nevertheless, stood at 168 marks on January 6. The chances of an improved relationship between France and Germany grew dimmer when Poincaré ousted Briand, who had started a policy of European reconciliation.

Strikes, revolts, and sabotage continued in Germany. Nationalist organizations were trying to undermine confidence in the government. On June 24, 1922, Rathenau was murdered on the way to his office. Again the organization “Consul” was back of the crime. The dollar soared to 528 marks.

Rathenau's death was a great shock to me, who admired him as a truly European and democratic leader. Shortly before his death he had congratulated me by letter on one of my books, and I had had great hopes of meeting him and winning him to the cause of Pan-Europe.

I lost another German friend that year, Maximilian Harden, who also fell victim to the attacks of a nationalist gang. A steel rod had fractured his skull. He retired to Switzerland, the first among innumerable Germans to turn their backs upon their ungrateful “fatherland” and to die in exile. Before leaving Berlin and his political activities, Harden had asked me to carry on his weekly *Die Zukunft*. I declined, however, not wishing to be involved in the internal politics of any single nation.

A new and graver international crisis developed in the very first days of the new year.

On January 11, 1923, France invaded Germany's industrial center in the Ruhr Valley. Germany answered with passive resistance. Britain neither helped nor encouraged France, but withdrew steadily from the Continent, devoting itself to the more urgent problems of its vast empire. Had it been possible to gain France for the idea of Pan-Europe, union might have been brought about now, because France with her

allies and her huge army controlled the Continent. But Poincaré was not interested in Pan-Europe.

However, the balance of power had slightly shifted in Europe. Italy had had a revolution, and Benito Mussolini, turbulent young leader of the Fascist party, had become Italy's prime minister. Nobody knew exactly what his foreign policy would be, probably not even he himself. He remained neutral in the Franco-German conflict and the occupation of the Ruhr Valley, seeking the rôle of an arbiter rather than that of an avenger, thus without risks increasing Italy's national prestige.

Fascism at that time had not yet broken with parliamentarism and democracy. The new Italian government was a government of coalition; it respected the principle of constitutional monarchy, pretending only to give it new vigor and authority. It appealed to the heroic instincts of youth, to the spirit of sacrifice and of idealism. It tried to restore the respect for religious values and the glorious traditions of ancient Rome. It hailed the memory of Mazzini as a forerunner of Fascism.

Matteotti and Amendola were still alive, Count Sforza was still an active member of the Italian Senate. Mussolini had an entirely free hand in foreign policy. He had no part in the Treaty of Versailles, nor was he compromised by the negotiations of the peace conference. He might well have renewed the traditional rôle of Rome as center of Western civilization, by restoring peace in Europe and binding the Continent by a federation fighting revolution and anarchy. Mussolini's career had never been a very consistent one. The former Socialist had become the most violent enemy of socialism, the former pacifist had turned into an arch-imperialist. Nobody could know in what direction his dynamic ambition would lead. It seemed a happy coincidence that this ruthless man had not become the head of a ruthless, power-greedy nation, but of one of the most peaceful, gentle, and civilized peoples of Europe. It was evident that, with Italy back of him, Mussolini could never dream of establishing his hegemony over Europe. To raise the prestige of his nation and his own, he had to achieve diplomatic rather than military victories. What greater triumph could there be for him than to bring about European federation and to make of Rome the Washington of the Old World?

I hoped that Mussolini's vision and ambition might be tempted by this unique chance.

On February 22, 1923, I sent him an open letter which I published in Vienna's leading liberal paper, the *Neue Freie Presse*.

In the name of Europe's youth, I appeal to you: save Europe!

Germany and France, two of the three great nations that have emerged from Charlemagne's empire, have been fighting each other for ten centuries. Italy, united and powerful, has the mission to be arbiter in this hereditary conflict of its two sister nations and to lay the foundation for Europe's recovery, union, and rebirth.

You love Italy and wish its life and prosperity. But no European nation can live and prosper while the continent dies; Italy can flourish only in a sane Europe—in an insane Europe it must fade. Whoever now loves his nation is bound to love Europe: as a good Italian you must be a good European, just as the best Italian of the last century was also its best European—Giuseppe Mazzini.

Look across the ocean: while Europe mutilates itself from the Rhine to Thrace, while its prosperity is declining, its misery, its hatred and its debts are rising, on the other hemisphere a whole continent will meet within some weeks to reinforce the Pan-American Union—in a spirit of confidence and of hope, for the sake of peace and progress.

The Pan-American idea, professed a century ago by Bolivar, has now become a cornerstone of world evolution. The United States is marching ahead of the world while dismembered Europe is bleeding to death from its internal wounds.

Do no longer tolerate so disgraceful a situation! While Pan-America meets at Santiago di Chile, convoke the first Pan-European conference in Rome! Let Rome—the old capital of Europe from the Caesars to the Popes—become the starting point of a new Europe! By transforming their organizations, Britain has evolved from a European to an intercontinental empire, Russia to an Eurasiatic empire. Both have outgrown Europe and could survive its fall; the other nations have become a community of fate, facing the alternative of union or death.

Assemble, together with all governments conscious of their responsibilities for the future of their continent, its democracies, to find a just solution of the Franco-German conflict and to constitute the Pan-European union!

A century after America, Europe ought to proclaim its Monroe Doctrine: "Europe for the Europeans."

Pan-Europe's future demands the closest understanding with its British neighbor; obligatory arbitration and disarmament of submarines and fighting planes would not be too high a price for its consent and friendship. . . .

If Russia, by some good harvests, recovers from its economic collapse before Europe unites, it might happen that within one generation red or white Cossacks will bathe their horses in the Adriatic and that Latin civilization will again become a victim of barbarian invasions.

You, the successor of Marius and Caesar, have the power to postpone for centuries such a new invasion; it depends on you whether the Dniester

and the Rokitno swamps shall mark the frontier of Europe towards Eurasia, or the Rhine and the Alps.

Greece has perished because it awoke too late to Pan-Hellenism. Save Europe from its fate! Interfere boldly into its chaos to lay the foundations for the United States of Europe!

Then your memory shall be blessed and your name immortal!

This open letter, although reproduced in the Italian press, remained unanswered. Instead of convoking a Pan-European congress, Mussolini soon attacked Corfu, murdered Matteotti, and went the path of national imperialism that subsequently led him across temporary glory to his present disaster. My attempt to induce Mussolini to take the initiative toward Pan-Europe had been just as unsuccessful as my suggestion to Masaryk.

I decided to lose no further time with leading statesmen and to organize the movement alone, without any official backing.

IN THE spring of 1923 I wrote my book *Pan-Europe*, dedicated to the young generation of Europe. It explained the idea, doctrine, and program of European federalism and began with the following words:

This book intends to bring to life a great political idea which has been dormant in the nations of Europe. Many dream of a united Europe but few are resolved to create it. As an object of nostalgia it remains barren; as an object of will it becomes effective. The only force than can achieve Pan-Europe is the will of Europeans. Every European holds in his hand a share of the destiny of the world.

Whether an idea remains a utopia or is transformed into a reality usually depends on the number and vigor of its supporters. As long as thousands believe in Pan-Europe, it remains a utopia; as soon as millions believe in it, it becomes a program; but once a hundred millions believe in it, it is a reality.

The book was not published until half a year later. The bottom had fallen out of the German mark, and the total payment for one of my former manuscripts, published in Leipzig, had been balanced with five free copies. My Leipzig publisher later became a brilliant minister of finance, but I did not wish to remain a further object of his financial skill. Although he had accepted the manuscript of *Pan-Europe*, I withdrew it and had it printed at my own expense in Vienna. It became the first of a series of *Pan-Europe Editions* which in turn were to prove the cornerstone of all Pan-European propaganda.

The book appeared in the first days of October and every copy contained a postcard with my address and the pledge: "I join the Pan-European Union." The text of the card indicated that membership did not imply financial sacrifices, that it aimed merely at uniting all those who were ready to work for a United States of Europe. I sent several thousand free copies to leading statesmen, editors, educators, industrialists, bankers, and leaders of public opinion throughout Europe.

The following weeks kept us extremely busy with thousands of signed pledges coming in daily from men and women of all nations, parties, and professions. Letters came too, containing approval but criticizing one or another detail. Editorials, articles, criticisms, and comments in all leading newspapers in central Europe gave further proof of the wide response to the book, its idea and its program. Except on the part of the nationalistic or Communist press, which treated my plan as an utopian idea, there was much enthusiastic comment.

The book had at first appeared in German, but, as I distributed it wherever I believed German might be understood, including Switzerland, Scandinavia, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Balkan states, its ideas spread quickly over the Continent. Before long I had offers from leading publishers of all nations, asking for translation and copyrights. I granted them under two conditions, that the membership pledge be included in every copy and that a number of free copies be reserved and sent to the leading personalities, papers, and magazines of the respective nations. Within a very short time *Pan-Europe* was published not only in almost all European languages, but even in Japanese and Esperanto.

But to gain public recognition of my plan was only part of my program. It was necessary as a prelude to political action. I still wished to find the leading statesman who, backed by common acclaim and consent, would call a conference of representatives of European nations to establish the legal framework for a European federation.

Again I consulted the map of Europe. In January, 1924, when the Pan-European movement first listed a decisive success, France was by far the most powerful nation on the Continent. Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania were her allies. This solid bloc united approximately 120 millions of Europeans. It might have been a strong nucleus of European union, if only it had become a geographic unit by accepting the German republic as a partner.

Had Caillaux or Briand been at the head of the French government, I would certainly have tried to start the movement for European union in Paris. But Caillaux was in exile, and Briand in opposition. The undisputed head of the French nation was Raymond Poincaré. He was prime minister, with great authority, backed by a strong majority of the Chamber of Deputies; but he was a jurist, not a philosopher; symbol of French nationalism, not of French generosity. The invasion of the Ruhr Valley had been his brain child. He would never have considered any attempt to reconcile Germany or to accept it on equal terms. His aim was to secure peace only on the basis of the Treaty of

Versailles. It was inconceivable that this man could be won for Pan-Europe. I had to look elsewhere in order to start political action. "Elsewhere" before long meant the region of the Danube.

Five states had replaced the former Habsburg empire: Austria with less than seven million inhabitants; Hungary with eight million; Czechoslovakia with thirteen million; Yugoslavia with fourteen million; and Rumania with eighteen million. The three latter states had concluded the "Little Entente," an alliance which aimed at assuring and, if necessary, at enforcing respect for the peace treaties of St. Germain and Trianon. The "Little Entente" opposed German-Austrian Anschluss; it likewise opposed a restoration of the Habsburg dynasty. But the spearhead of its defensive action was directed against Hungary—Hungary which claimed revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Hungarian nationalists went further: they claimed for their country its ancient historic and geographic boundaries, including Slovakia, Croatia, and Transylvania, vital and highly productive regions now belonging to the three states of the Little Entente.

The Little Entente had designs of its own as far as federation was concerned. It had tried its hand at various schemes of unification and pacification among the Danubian states, hoping to find a basis from which to launch a wide reconstruction project for all southeastern Europe. But these plans had miscarried in the face of Hungarian resistance. Hungary wanted revision before talking of co-operation. The Little Entente demanded co-operation first. Hungary was adamant, and the deadlock persisted, for without Hungary's consent Danubian federation was impossible. Hungary lay in the very center of the Little Entente, industrial Czechoslovakia touching its northern borders, agrarian Rumania and Yugoslavia spreading to the south. Between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia there existed no direct communication, and Czechoslovakia and Rumania were linked only by a very narrow mountainous corridor.

In this hopeless situation Austria was the natural mediator. Its relations with Hungary had remained friendly, and no territorial claims separated it from the members of the Little Entente.

All its economic interests demanded close co-operation with the regions that once had been part of its former empire. Vienna had been the center of that market; it still retained a number of links with Budapest, Prague, and other regions belonging now to the Little Entente. It had remained the banking center of the Danubian sphere.

But if understanding with the Danubian states was a vital necessity

for Austria, so was understanding among the Danubian states. Its endeavor to secure peace in southeastern Europe ran parallel with the dearest wishes of Prague; for Czechoslovakia, which had inherited the bulk of the industries of the old Habsburg monarchy, also must aim at economic unity in that region.

Austria and Czechoslovakia were, therefore, the two states most vitally interested in an economic union of southeastern Europe. Once this union was established there were chances that it might spread to the north, including Poland and the Baltic states; to the south, including all the Balkans. It is obvious that such close collaboration among the five Danubian states would remain among my main political objectives during the years following, for a United States of Eastern Europe might well become the prelude to a United States of Europe. I considered it no less important than the collaboration between France and Germany in the west.

Personally I was on good terms with the Austrian and the Czechoslovakian governments, and it was easy for me to work toward a better understanding between Vienna and Prague. After 1918, part of my family had acquired Czechoslovakian citizenship. Part of it was still Austrian. Politically I had become a Czechoslovak citizen by the St. Germain treaty, yet I remained emotionally attached to Austria. Most Austrians considered me a compatriot, so did the Czech authorities, who never doubted my loyalty toward my new country. This strange situation made it easy for me to start political action in 1924 both from Vienna and from Prague. I might add that both capitals met me half way. Two outstanding personalities were ready in Vienna and Prague to back my efforts: the Austrian chancellor, Dr. Ignaz Seipel, and the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Dr. Eduard Benes.

In 1923 Seipel was the undisputed leader of Austria. Priest and dignitary of the Roman Church, professor of moral theology at the University of Vienna, leader of the Christian Socialist party and, since 1922, chancellor of the republic, Seipel carried a moral and political authority far beyond the limits of his state. Leading the irreproachable life of an ascetic, living almost in poverty, he was, after the Pope, the most interesting and remarkable priest in Europe. As head of Austria's Catholic party, he ruled Austria almost as a proconsul of the Church. He was a fervent Austrian patriot, but his loyalty toward the Church was greater. His main fight was directed not against other nations but against the influence of the Social Democratic party in Austria. He fought it not because it was anti-capitalist but because it was agnostic

and anti-religious. His struggle, which was to have grave consequences after his death, was carried on with the conviction of a crusader and with the determination of a strong-willed and shrewd politician.

I saw Seipel first when he was at the climax of his life, health, and power. He received me in his study at the Chancellery—the same room that had been Prince Metternich's study when he was ruler of almost all Europe seventy-five years ago; the same room, too, where my father used to report to his superior in the foreign office, Count Goluchowski.

Seipel was one of the most impressive men of his era. His head was shaped like that of a Roman emperor; his profile was bold and clear-cut; his intelligent, energetic features radiated dignity and inner nobility. It took a second and sharper glance to notice how cold were his eyes and how thin his lips. Had he lived centuries ago he might well have been a great pope or grand inquisitor, implacable toward the enemies of the Church.

Dr. Seipel was astonishingly well informed about my plan for European union and was convinced of its need even before we met.

He had studied my book, and its international spirit had appealed to his own supranational mind. He did not consider Pan-Europe as utopian, but as a very practical remedy for a number of political evils of Europe. When I asked him to back Pan-Europe publicly, he promised to do so. I offered him the presidency of the Austrian branch of the Pan-European Union, and he accepted without hesitation. He also gave me an office in the former imperial palace of Vienna, the Hofburg. This palace remained the headquarters of our movement up to March 11, 1938, the day Hitler invaded Austria.

With Seipel I had at last found the head of a European government who dared publicly to subscribe to my movement. And as Seipel was known all over Europe as a political realist, this mere fact induced many of his colleagues in other capitals to take the matter seriously and to study the Pan-European problem.

Seipel's support was a priceless asset for our movement, and still it might have become a liability, had it provoked the opposition of Seipel's political enemies, the Socialists. Such an opposition might have given to the movement a Catholic, conservative, and even reactionary color that it certainly did not have. It therefore was necessary to assure some support from the Socialist opposition, representing almost half of Austria's population.

While the Catholic party, led to a great extent by the clergy and backed by the peasants and the combined conservative, monarchic, and

reactionary elements, represented the parliamentary Right, the Social Democratic party represented the Left.

Its leadership was in the hands of a powerful triumvirate: Karl Seitz, first president of the Austrian republic and later mayor of Vienna; Dr. Karl Renner, first chancellor of the Austrian republic and main leader of the Austrian peace delegation; and Dr. Otto Bauer, Austria's first republican foreign minister.

Seitz, good-looking, sincere, radiating good humor and common sense, was adored by the crowds, liked by his friends, and respected by his enemies, but so was Renner, a dignified personality with a long beard, who looked half prophet and half German professor. Renner was respected for much scholarly knowledge and rare integrity, but he had strong sentimental leanings toward Pan-Germanism. The brain trustee and political conscience of the party was really Otto Bauer. A genuine internationalist, he aimed at the reconciliation between socialism and communism within a single Marxist International; this he believed to be the mission of the Austrian Socialists, who were more radical than most other socialist groups in Europe.

Directed by these three leaders and by a number of other brilliant personalities, the Social Democratic party of Austria had attained a world-wide reputation; its views and ideas were considered by all socialist groups and parties of Europe. The socialist administration of the city of Vienna was a model for all municipal governments of Europe. In spite of the nation's ruinous postwar financial situation, Vienna had succeeded in building up a number of first-rate institutions, aiming to raise the standard of living, of health, and of education of all the Austrian working classes. I am convinced that it was neither Hitler nor Mussolini who, as they so often boasted, saved Europe from Bolshevism, but the loyalty of the Austrian Socialist leaders who maintained their democratic convictions in the face of the greatest odds, when Bolshevik governments were established in Munich and in Budapest.

Although I was technically an alien in Austria and did not wish to meddle in its party politics, my sympathies were definitely with Austrian Socialism, thanks to its broadminded social policy.

I hoped to induce the Austrian Socialists to adopt my Pan-European program, because it seemed to me to correspond with their international outlook as well as with Austria's national interests. I realized that should the Austrian Socialists adopt the program of European unity there were good chances that all other socialists of the Continent would follow their example.

Seitz was approached first. He received me in his usual amiable manner and let me explain my plans. Then he began with rather discouraging counterarguments. He thought my Pan-European plans praiseworthy for their idealism but difficult to put into practice. He did not doubt the desirability of European union, but doubted whether it would be feasible. No, he did not think that Europe was ready for it.

I realized that Seitz himself was not ready for it and left him with a feeling of sincere disappointment. However, the impression was soon forgotten, and although Seitz never became a convinced follower of the Pan-European movement, we maintained excellent personal relations throughout the years up to that tragic day when Austria fell a victim to Hitler's invasion.

I had several interesting and animated talks with Otto Bauer, who certainly possessed one of the outstanding political minds of Europe between the two wars. Bauer was opposed to the Pan-European program, because his mind was fixed on London and Moscow. In London he saw the rising tide of the Labor party; in Moscow the rising power of Marxist Russia. As he wished to find a compromise and establish co-operation between these two branches of socialism, he was against any policy that might have weakened the influence both of Moscow and of London on Europe.

The last of the leaders of Austrian Socialism I was to approach was Renner. I did not expect to find him more sympathetic than his colleagues, recalling his nostalgic attachment to the idea of Pan-Germany, but to my great surprise he agreed to join the Union. I think I convinced him with the formula that Pan-Europe meant for Austria "Anschluss all round," not only with the German republic, but also with the Danubian states.

After Renner had joined Pan-Europe, his party remained split on the issue of European union. Many Austrian Socialists of the younger generation joined enthusiastically the Pan-European Union; my staff of close collaborators in my Vienna headquarters consisted, almost entirely, of young Socialists. Although the party had not adopted Pan-Europe as part of its program, it had given its members the go-ahead sign in matters of Pan-European Union and organization. Whoever wanted to join privately could do so.

The reason why I failed to convert the party, as such, to European union lay in its nationalism and in its internationalism. The party's foreign policy program promoted "Anschluss with Germany." The entire leadership of the party was Pan-Germanist, willing to see Austria

as an autonomous part of the greater sister republic, no more independent than Bavaria or Saxony. When years later I asked Dr. Renner, then president of the Austrian Parliament, what his reaction would be in case Briand recommended European union, if he happened to be Austrian foreign minister, he answered frankly that he would act in unison with his German colleague only.

The result of my contact with the party was, however, not wholly negative. Renner at least was to sponsor my program and this, together with the moral support lent by Dr. Seipel, gave the movement an excellent start. I have no doubt that Renner's and Seipel's initial backing accounted much for the movement's strong repercussion all over Europe and helped toward its rapid rise in the next few years.

Vienna, which had been the cradle of the movement, soon became its Mecca. The Viennese had always prided themselves on their international point of view and were flattered to see their city the center of a Pan-European movement. Many hoped that, while Geneva was to remain the seat of the League of Nations, Vienna might become one day the Washington of the United States of Europe. The idea of a free, united, and prosperous Europe rose like a tempting mirage on the drab background of Austria's present despair and misery. No wonder it was acclaimed by so many divergent elements of the population.

Curiously enough the Pan-European idea provoked little opposition. Those who did not believe in it simply ignored it. There was no danger of my arousing personal antagonism, because I kept strictly aloof from any party politics and business activities. My name was well known through my books before the movement started, and there was another very personal link with Vienna: My wife was the beloved star of the Burgtheater, Vienna's national stage, that had remained, despite war, revolution, and national despair, the pride of all Austrians.

Meanwhile, the membership of the movement continued to increase with every day in both Austria and Germany. In Vienna within a few months the symbol of Pan-Europe—a red cross on a golden sun—decorated many buttonholes. Such rapidly growing popularity in central Europe involved a certain danger. In the Allied capitals suspicion toward everything coming from Vienna and Berlin was still strong. Nothing was more important for Pan-Europe than to secure from the very start the backing of an Allied statesman or political leader.

The most obvious thing for me to do was to seek such support among my own countrymen, the Czechoslovaks. Masaryk had refused to identify himself with the Pan-European movement, but there was a

possibility that Dr. Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, might. After Masaryk, Benes was Czechoslovakia's most powerful public leader, a man who was to influence his country's foreign policy decisively for twenty years. During that time he was either foreign minister, prime minister, or president. He owed this unique position to three main facts: Together with Masaryk and Stefanik—the latter had died in an accident—he had been the founder of the Czechoslovak republic; he had Masaryk's friendship and confidence; next to Masaryk he was the only Czech politician of international authority and renown. Benes, who was unpopular with the Czech nationalists who suspected his internationalism, was nevertheless a fervent Czech nationalist himself. However, his love of country did not blind him to the fact that his little nation, lying in the center of Europe, would fare better if it were backed by a strong international organization. He therefore supported the League of Nations, promoted the Little Entente, and sponsored close collaboration between his nation and France.

Recommended by Masaryk, I called on Benes at the Hradshin, where he had his office next to Masaryk's. I was struck by the youth, vigor, and dynamism of our foreign minister. A slight man of medium height, his most striking characteristic was his eyes—keen, piercing eyes overshadowed by a high and well-shaped forehead. He knew all about Pan-Europe, for he had read my book before discussing it with me. As I spoke no Czech, we discoursed in French, which he spoke fluently and preferred to German.

He certainly was in agreement with Pan-Europe but . . . did not consider it an object of immediate practical policy. He favored it as a beautiful idea which would and should one day be realized. He sponsored it as a helpful item in people's political education. However, he considered the future and not the present as the realm of Pan-Europe. For the present he preferred to have to do with a strong Czechoslovak republic, dominated by its Czech element, and with a strong Little Entente, checking any Hungarian attempt toward revision and any Austrian attempt toward Anschluss with Germany or restoration of the Habsburgs. He wished for a strong France and a close Franco-British collaboration to keep down Germany and to assure the peace of Europe. He wished to see the League of Nations a strong instrument of collective security—but not strong enough to protect national minorities. Within Czechoslovakia he was for a national and social policy, against federalism and regional self-government, against the Swiss example of equality for the members of all linguistic and

ethnic groups. While Germany was still weakened from its defeat he wished to strengthen Czech predominance within all regions of his republic, including those inhabited by German majorities. He backed the idea of Pan-Europe as far as it proposed a defensive alliance between the European states—but he opposed its demand for an effective protection of all national minorities within Europe.

He did not tell me all this at our first interview, but I deduced much of it in the course of further conversations that took place in Prague, Geneva, and Paris. Benes sponsored the Pan-European movement, but never whole-heartedly. He rather respected it, but feared its premature realization. He wished to abolish the tariffs in eastern Europe and open up this part of the world to the export of Czechoslovak industrial goods, but he wished to maintain the tariffs on the German border, because he feared German competition. Altogether he wished to secure the benefit of all advantages Pan-Europe would assure his state and nation, but he was not ready to make any national sacrifices on its behalf. His attitude was not exceptional: most of the national statesmen and leaders of Europe shared it. Nevertheless the moral support Benes gave the young movement was generous enough. He wrote a preface to the Czech translation of my book and helped establish a Czechoslovak branch of the movement, sponsored by leading Czechs, Slovaks, and Sudetes. He accepted the honorary presidency of this group. The fact that he held a positive attitude toward Pan-Europe made the movement popular also in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

He also made traveling easy for me, furnishing me with a diplomatic passport—a rare privilege for a non-official Czechoslovak. Backed by the authorities of my country I could now carry the movement for European union into the wide world.

CHAPTER ELEVEN *The Movement Spreads*

WHILE the first copies of my book *Pan-Europe* were being distributed, the world was startled one day by the news that Europe had narrowly escaped the outbreak of a new war.

An Austrian agitator, who looked like Charlie Chaplin and had acquired local celebrity in Munich by the record-breaking violence of his anti-Semitic speeches, had attempted to overthrow the German Republic and to establish his national dictatorship. He had been backed and assisted in this enterprise by the old German war lord, General Ludendorff. After having kidnaped and threatened the Bavarian prime minister, von Kahr, Adolf Hitler and Ludendorff attempted to march from Munich on Berlin and to seize all power over Germany. But this local upheaval, badly organized and poorly led, failed at its very start. On the morning of November 8, 1923, this group of armed conspirators met the first troops. After a few seconds of shooting the entire movement collapsed, General Ludendorff was captured, while the Austrian agitator deserted his comrades and fled to a hiding place in the Bavarian mountains where he was soon arrested.

It is now futile to think about what might have happened if this unequal pair of conspirators had succeeded. Probably Poincaré would have sent his armies to Berlin and the German Reich might have been disrupted, at least for some time. Hitler would never again have come to power and Europe might have enjoyed a longer period of peace. But it also might have happened that such a clash would have been followed by a communist revolution, after most of the German middle class had been expropriated by the inflation. It is therefore pure nonsense to repeat the Nazi slogan that Hitler attempted to save Germany from Bolshevism, instead of realizing that it was he who pushed in 1923 Germany to the verge of this peril.

The inglorious collapse of Hitler's revolution was a decisive step toward the consolidation of the German republic. The great majority of Germans, at that moment, considered Hitler not only a ridiculous

fool, but also a grandiloquent coward, who had fled after the first salvo. But for a small group of nationalistic fanatics throughout Germany Hitler rose to the rank of a national hero, martyr, and—hope.

Up to that day this former house painter with an obscure past had been but the recognized leader of the extreme nationalists in Bavaria, without any wider popularity in Prussia. His dramatic failure had suddenly given him nation-wide and even world-wide publicity. So his disaster laid the foundations of his future success. And his pleasant imprisonment in the Bavarian fortress of Landsberg gave to this restless and unbalanced man the leisure to write a monstrous book that flattered tremendously the racial pride of the Germans and that one day would conquer Germany—*Mein Kampf*.

When I came back to Germany in 1924, the Hitler chapter seemed definitely closed. In political discussions I hardly heard his name mentioned, and if it fell, it was accompanied by a smile of contempt. It seemed that this funny conspirator belonged exclusively to the past and not to the future. Germany at that time had other thoughts and other troubles.

The collapse of the old and the stabilization of the new mark overshadowed all other national problems. This transition was accomplished in an admirable way by the new president of the Reichsbank, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht.

With the advent of a stabilized currency Germany was forced to reorient itself in matters of foreign policy. It was no longer possible to circumvent the obligations it had assumed under the peace treaty. Germany was definitely up against life's harsh realities. A bid for closer collaboration with France and all of its other neighbors was called for.

It was a happy coincidence that I was to start my campaign in Germany on that very date. The country's political leaders were astride the fence, not yet decided whether to face east or west. The communists and the majority of the extreme nationalists had set their hopes on Russia. They considered a Russo-German alliance a most effective barricade against any pretensions of Poland, the Western powers, or the League of Nations. The democratic parties held a different opinion. They hoped for a compromise between Germany and France and, obviously enough, were happy to find in Pan-Europe an ideological basis for their new and more realistic policy. My status as a foreigner rather helped my cause in Germany. I wrote and published in German, but I held no German citizenship—a fact which spared me the epithet

of national traitor which inevitably would have fallen to my lot had I been considered a German. Even fanatic nationalists welcomed me in a spirit of leniency—as a foreigner who was a fair friend of the German people, although unable to share or to understand Germany's national sentiments and aspirations.

Berlin was very hospitable to my wife and me when we came to stay at the Hotel Kaiserhof for the autumn of 1924. We were overwhelmed with kindness and attention from the most unexpected quarters. Our German friends were willing to show us their best and most European sides; they were willing to help our cause. Contacts with political leaders, with writers, journalists, educators, and businessmen were quickly established. Within a month I could constitute a German group of the Pan-European Union. But again, as in Vienna and Prague, I cast about for a representative political personality to give my plans a wider scope and greater authority. In the Germany of 1924 I thought I found that personality in Gustav Stresemann.

Stresemann was the new minister of foreign affairs, scheduled to navigate Germany's political ship on its dangerous new collaborationist course. Leader of the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, a Reichstag faction representative of Germany's big business, he differed from the average German nationalist in his methods rather than his aims. He was the enlightened kind of nationalist to which Dr. Benes in Prague offered a parallel on the Czech side. Stresemann realized that he would serve Germany's ambitions better if he spoke Rathenau's rather than Hitler's language. He hoped with the help of the British to bend the Treaty of Versailles to his purpose, not to break it with the help of Soviet Russia. Still he did not wish to close the door to the East, knowing well that a Russo-German alliance was the nightmare that troubled many a Western politician's sleep and was Germany's best bargaining instrument.

When I called on Stresemann for the first time, he received me very cordially, sitting at Bismarck's desk in his office at the Wilhelmstrasse. With his round skull, his pale complexion, and his closely cropped hair he looked the typical German. In his manner of speaking and thinking he seemed more like the head of a large industrial corporation than a diplomat or a statesman. In his conversation he was direct and frank. He questioned me about the progress of the Pan-European movement abroad and what chances there were of its having results. Yes, he had genuine sympathy for the idea, he told me, yet could not join in the Pan-European Union, because his office made it undesirable for him

to commit himself. He appreciated the fact that Pan-Europe tended to bring about a better understanding between Germany and France, words that I felt were sincere. Then we spoke about the relations between Germany and Poland. "Do you intend to claim the Corridor or Danzig?" I asked him. His answer was couched in cautious terms: "We can wait; we shall not attack nor invade Poland, but, when one day Poland will be attacked by Russia, then we shall present our bill."

That evening Stresemann noted in his diary: "Mr. Coudenhove-Kalergi called on me today. His Pan-European ideas are making great progress. Whatever one may think of him, in any case he is a man of extraordinary knowledge and great energy. I am convinced that he is going to play a great rôle."

Again, as in the case of Benes, Stresemann's support, although unofficial, was invaluable. Without his support it would have been very difficult to win large portions of German public opinion to my cause. The word "Europe" now always appeared in his speeches and declarations. He realized that in the matter of Franco-German collaboration the Pan-European idea was the only face-saving platform for Germany; for the League of Nations was always unpopular with the German people, and it was easier to tell them that Germany was making sacrifices on the altar of Europe than to admit that it was acting under pressure from France and its allies.

He never visualized European union in a genuine European spirit, however. Many years later when Stresemann had died and his diaries were published, many of his friends abroad were shocked by his nationalist point of view, because they had believed him such a genuine European. I never shared this illusion. He was a European as far as he thought that Pan-Europe might serve Germany's national interest. He was hostile to any European arrangement that would prove a liability, such as the recognition of the German-Polish boundaries. He was sincere in his desire to come to terms with France and England. If he was ready for a European federation on the basis of equality, his attitude was determined not by love of Europe but by love of the fatherland.

Head and official chairman of my German group of the Pan-European Union was to be Paul Loebe, Social Democrat and president of the German Reichstag.

Loebe had served his party for many years. He was well known to the German public at large as a man of integrity, fine mental equilibrium, and a good deal of common sense. His influence with his party

colleagues made it possible that the idea of a European federation should become part of the official party program. This decision at once attached the Social Democratic papers throughout the Reich. At the same time another German party was to give me its official backing: the German Democratic party, which was smaller than the German Social Democratic party but which represented the bulk of Germany's intelligentsia. In its wake came the liberal press, headed by the *Vossische Zeitung*, whose brilliant editor, George Bernhard, was one of Pan-Europe's most ardent supporters. I fed this generous stream of free publicity with contributions of my own articles that went to many German papers and magazines. Before long another avenue of propaganda opened up. I was flooded with offers to lecture to the most diverse organizations, societies, and institutions.

Two other brilliant German personalities were at this time converted to the Pan-European movement. The first was Hjalmar Schacht. His vivid mind was fascinated by the prospect of a European currency and federal banking system, and hopeful of the idea of equality among the competing European nations on the African continent. When the German branch of the Pan-European Union held its first meeting in the assembly hall of the Reichstag, it was Schacht who was the principal orator in favor of Pan-Europe. His protean temperament was to lead him into many camps in the years to come, but at the time he was a leading member of the Democratic party. The idea of backing Hitler's ambitious scheme for conquests and revolution would, at the time, have seemed utterly ridiculous to him.

Another important German sympathizer was the chancellor, Hans Luther, a man of great energy and efficiency and, like Stresemann, a nationalist of the moderate variety. When we discussed the problem of a European federation he startled me with the following argument:

"You are right," he said, "when you tell me that a European federation is the only way to save our peace and civilization; yet I do not believe in it, because no nation is powerful enough to take the lead within such a union. Germany, France, and Italy are too weak; the British will refuse to be involved, and Russia is basically non-European."

No, Luther, impressed by the example of Prussia's hegemony over Germany, could not visualize a European federation organized along democratic principles, securing equal rights for all of its member states. He would rather accept British leadership than have no leadership at all. Yet it was Luther who, together with Stresemann, concluded the

Pact of Locarno and brought about the only agreement of that era born of a true spirit of European collaboration.

Other Germans in sympathy with the Pan-European movement were the chancellors Marx and Wirth, both leaders of the powerful Catholic party, and the president of the Supreme Court, Dr. Walter Simons. I also had some conversations with the leader and creator of the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt, one of Germany's most remarkable personalities. We discussed among other things the problem of a federal army of Europe, but I never found out whether he believed in Pan-Europe or not. He was a master in concealing his aims and designs. But, in any case, he was the man who had crushed Hitler's first revolution and who later fought the advent of the Third Reich. He certainly was a great soldier and a great German.

After three months of intense propaganda work in Berlin, my wife and I crossed the border into France on New Year's Day, 1925. The political situation there was favorable to our aims. Edouard Herriot had been the head of the French government since the elections of May, 1924. At that time I had written an open letter inviting all members of the new French Chamber to work toward European union by adopting a policy of generosity, justice, and collaboration.

This appeal to the new leadership of France helped to revive the old French tradition of European union at a moment when, after Poincaré's defeat, the new leftist government was looking for new slogans to replace the nationalistic sentiments of revenge and resentment.

However, I had to be cautious when it came to starting our movement in France, owing to the deep French distrust of anything coming from the other side of the Rhine. The mere fact that Germany's public opinion was favorable to Pan-Europe might easily have destroyed France's confidence in it. I knew that letters of recommendation written in Berlin and Vienna had no value in Paris. I needed the backing of Allied statesmen in preference to German or Austrian ones.

Again I turned to Benes, who, with his usual generosity, was willing to lend a helping hand. He supplied me with four cordial introductions to close friends of his: Henri de Jouvenel, Louis Loucheur, Paul Painlevé, and Aristide Briand. These letters were like so many magic passwords.

Henri de Jouvenel, chief editor of one of France's leading dailies *Le Matin*, was ready at once to back my cause and, what was even more valuable, to give it all necessary publicity in his paper. Nor was it difficult to win Loucheur for European union. He was accustomed to

think in economic terms, and to him Pan-Europe was like a powerful trust that should have been established long ago. I remember our first interview with extraordinary pleasure. Never had I met a man with a quicker grasp of essentials. He understood in five minutes what others had taken hours to comprehend, and from the very first he became one of my most active and most useful collaborators. He had the means to be helpful, being a leader in both politics and business and proprietor of *Le Petit Journal*.

Paul Painlevé was very different from both Loucheur and de Jouvenel. A great scholar of world-wide reputation, he had served his nation as prime minister during a critical period of the First World War. His integrity and idealism were matched by his intelligence. His personal modesty, tact, and charm compelled everyone to admiration. He was no nationalist. His mind was genuinely cosmopolitan and representative of a type of great scholars, rooted in his country's tradition and ideals, but not limited by them. It was Painlevé who had conceived the idea of the Maginot Line, which would have been named after him had he been less modest. However, his personal fame meant very little to him; the security of France, everything.

As far as Pan-Europe was concerned I had no need to convince him. He was convinced already. All three men—Jouvenel, Loucheur and Painlevé—joined the Pan-European Union, giving it their wholehearted support. They did more. When the time came, they helped and encouraged Briand in his attempt to achieve European union.

Briand was not available at the moment. He was absent from Paris. He had taken leave of his official duties and spent the time in Cocherel on the Atlantic coast, sailing, fishing, gardening, reading detective stories, and planning future political campaigns.

In Briand's stead I met another statesman of European stature—a man whose personality had ever fascinated me and who had just been called back to office after years of exile—Joseph Caillaux. I had always felt deep admiration for this outstanding man whose small frail body housed such a brilliant and energetic brain. Caillaux's life had been a series of dramatic events. He had entered politics at a very early age and was already prime minister at the time of the Morocco crisis. It was Caillaux's policy of compromise which prevented the outbreak of a European war at that date. When, in 1914, he was at the height of his career, his wife shot and killed the chief editor of *Le Figaro*, who had tried to blackmail Caillaux. Madame Caillaux was tried in court during the crucial days that preceded the outbreak of the war, and owing to

her husband's brilliant defense and the wave of national unity that was sweeping the country, was acquitted. Unfortunately the scandal had cost her husband his political career just when his nation needed his skill and foresight most.

Caillaux again was the central figure of a scandal in 1917, when Clemenceau, then prime minister, had him arrested for high treason because Caillaux had allegedly worked for a negotiated peace. After years of prison he was acquitted; but Clemenceau, who was determined to break him, saw to it that he was sent into exile for minor political crimes he had never committed. Clemenceau's hatred of Caillaux was implacable, mainly because Caillaux was a genuine European and had the courage of his convictions; but after the elections of 1924 neither he nor Poincaré could prevent Caillaux from returning to Paris and from continuing his brilliant career. Again he became minister of finance and prime minister, and later was elected permanent chairman of the Finance Committee of the Senate. By that time France had learned to look upon him as one of her most respected elder statesmen.

Caillaux, who had many virtues, had one vice, arrogance. He had the pride of a Coriolanus, who would provoke rather than flatter public opinion. Too wise to be a nationalist, he was too undiplomatic to pretend to be one. He said a crude truth as crudely as possible. He had few friends, preferring to be respected and feared rather than loved. It is a pity for Europe and the world that the difficulties of his character prevented him from becoming the enlightened and strong leader that France needed after her victory. However, he had this to his credit: he continued in speech and writing to work for a policy, not of oppression and provocation, but of reconciliation and co-operation, insisting over and over again that only thus could peace and prosperity be assured for France and Europe. It was a deep joy for me when Caillaux accepted the honorary presidency of the French branch of the Pan-European Union. He agreed with me that speed was necessary if our plans were to have any practical results. He himself decided to campaign for Pan-Europe, doing his utmost to spread the gospel to the farthest corners of France. His very name was a pledge of political tolerance and was sure to attract all men of good will.

I had not forgotten, however, what broad co-operation I had gained from the socialists of central Europe, and it was natural for me to approach the French socialists as well. I asked for an interview with Léon Blum, who was their acknowledged political, intellectual, and moral leader. He impressed me at once with the brilliancy of his mind

and his great personal charm. He delighted me by his enthusiasm; when I showed him a map indicating the world's regional groups, he exclaimed: "Yes, this is the solution." What convinced him most, however, was that unbroken "transcontinental bloc" of Pan-Europe—reaching from Scandinavia to Angola and representing all of Europe and its main colonial empire.

Another leader of French socialism to give me his warm and whole-hearted approval was Paul Boncour. I may say now that throughout his career, even as foreign minister and prime minister, he remained devoted to the cause of European union and was a strong supporter of Briand when the latter launched his Pan-European campaign. In fact, with the exception of the communists, all of the left supported the idea of European union, last but not least Léon Jouhaux, head of the French trade unions, with whom I remained in permanent contact and who favored all the steps leading to European union. Jouhaux also backed Loucheur's plans for the organization of a European market.

But neither the socialists, nor Caillaux, nor Painlevé, de Jouvenel, or Loucheur brought about a change of the ideological front at the French foreign office. The credit for that is due solely to Edouard Herriot, then French prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.

Herriot received me while dressing for dinner in his suite at the ministry of foreign affairs. He told me at once that I had no need to explain my plans. He had been fully informed by his secretary, R. R. Lambert, who had served with the army of occupation in the Rhineland, had read my book *Pan-Europe*, and had even become a member of the Pan-European Union. Herriot had been strongly attracted by my ideas, sensing that they more or less corresponded to his own.

Five years later, after Briand's Initiative, he wrote in his brilliant book on *The United States of Europe*:

A whole élite of European youth puts itself forward to achieve the lofty teachings of Kant. At the head of this intellectual group it is only fair to put Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, the man who has certainly done most in recent years for European federation.

Count Coudenhove has developed these ideas in a series of works which are the best existing manual for the Pan-European workers; it is impossible to praise too highly their precision and lucidity. . . .

Edouard Herriot represents the noblest traditions of the French Revolution of 1789. Liberty, equality, and fraternity are no empty

catchwords with him, as for most of his colleagues, but express his deepest convictions.

The man Herriot is greater than the statesman. Endowed with profound knowledge of history, literature, music, and art, he is the personification of French culture and intelligence. A gifted orator and writer, he is more: he is essentially human. Quite possibly it was his nobility of heart and soul which accounted for the fact that he was rather a failure in politics. It was hard for a man of his moral and mental standing to descend to the level of partisanship and deceitful intrigue so characteristic of the parliamentary life of the Third Republic. He excelled as mayor of Lyons, where he could exercise to the full his personal and administrative gifts.

Herriot's sympathies for Pan-Europe were translated into action almost immediately. His speech delivered to the Chamber of Deputies on January 29, 1925, contained this extraordinary passage:

Europe is hardly more than a little province of the world. Would that it could restrain its conceit a little! Far off on the shores of the Pacific problems are arising that will eventually demand concentrated action on the part of the United States of Europe. Europe will then have its chance to apply the combined results of its labor, force, science, industry, and experience to bring reason to a part of the world which is still dominated by instincts.

My greatest wish is to see one day the United States of Europe become a reality. And if I have been working with so much courage—I am entitled to say so,—for the League of Nations, I have done so because I considered this great institution a first rough draft of the United States of Europe.

I remember reading this message over and over when it appeared in print the next day. For days I studied the leading newspapers in France and abroad to discover the public's reaction to Herriot's address. The French parliament and a great part of the French public opinion gave it enthusiastic acclaim. However, I expected some definite answer from Berlin.

There was none. The German government frankly ignored Herriot's suggestive words. I decided to rush to Berlin, to call on Chancellor Marx and explain to him the great opportunity Germany was missing. Marx understood and sent me to see Von Maltzahn, who was secretary of state for foreign affairs. Maltzahn, who later became ambassador to Washington, was a clever diplomat, bright, shrewd and quick of reaction. He promised action, and some days later the *Frankfurter Generalanzeiger* brought out an article, signed by Foreign Minister Stresemann, which backed Herriot's plea for a United States of Europe.

The rest of the German press made only a perfunctory bow in the

direction of Herriot's address. Nor did that first short dialogue between Berlin and Paris continue much further—momentarily. The tide of French inflation swept Herriot out of office, ushering in Poincaré. His government, which retained Herriot in a minor position, stabilized the franc. For a moment there was silence between Germany and France, then Aristide Briand, who had become minister of foreign affairs, made it understood that in matters of foreign policy he intended to continue Herriot's rather than Poincaré's course.

After Berlin and Paris we decided to visit Rome, then the third in power among the capitals of the Continent.

I had no illusions about winning Mussolini to the cause of Europe. He had embarked on a course of total nationalism, but I hoped for an early restoration of Italian democracy which would be certain to prove a decisive factor in the struggle for European union. I regarded then, and I still regard, the lovable Italian nation as one of the most civilized on the Continent, much more European in spirit than its French and German sister nations.

There is a spirit of humanism in Italy's culture and greatness which even Fascism could not destroy. The Italy of 1925 still sheltered a number of great Italian personalities. It was a privilege for me to call on Benedetto Croce in Naples and discuss with this great philosopher Europe's dark present and its brighter future. In Florence we became friends with the great historian Guglielmo Ferrero and his congenial wife and son. Both Croce and Ferrero were genuine Europeans, more concerned with the future of the Continent than with the fate of their country, much as they loved it. Ferrero before his death published a magnificent book on European reconstruction after the Napoleonic Wars, indicating in a Pan-European spirit the way toward reconstruction after the fall of Hitler.

In Rome I made a courtesy call at the ministry of foreign affairs and talked to the secretary of state, Contarini, although I knew that our conversation would be without results owing to Mussolini's political attitude. I also met the leaders of the opposition: Giolitti, former prime minister, who was over eighty years old but bore the ruin of his liberal ideals with grace and fortitude; Amendola, a noble character, soon to become a victim of Fascist murderers; and Gaetano Salvemini, the great scholar and anti-Fascist, who now works in exile for the liberation of his country.

However, the most impressive personality among the leaders of anti-Fascism was Count Carlo Sforza, Italy's former foreign minister, who

combined nobility of character with charm of manner and an indomitable will. At the moment Sforza was still senator of the kingdom, bravely facing an almost daily threat of assassination.

From the very first I found him in full sympathy with the principles of European federation—a sympathy which was to remain alive throughout the vicissitudes of the following years, for he, too, went into exile, to continue the struggle for Italy's freedom outside of Mussolini's sphere of power.

Sforza invited me to attend a meeting of the Senate that I might have an opportunity to observe Mussolini at close range. I was struck at once by the strong contrast between Mussolini's pictures, giving the illusion of a modern imperator with features of bronze, and the actual man, who was nothing more than a vivid Italian, continuously fidgeting in his seat, visibly bored by long speeches, impatient, restless, nervous. This overexcited and obviously overworked man who rolled his black eyes in an exaggerated manner, seemed utterly without balance, almost on the verge of insanity, driven by God only knew what internal furies. When I saw him I understood why my open letter had been ignored. By his very nature this man was seeking not rest but movement, not peace but war.

Before leaving Rome my wife and I were received at the Vatican and given the benediction of Pope Pius XI. I shall never forget the face of His Holiness which shone with so much genuine goodness and steady energy. After the audience I had a long conversation with the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Gasparri. He showed interest in my ideas but would not commit himself. When I asked his opinion on Pan-Europe he changed the subject abruptly and began to talk of South America. I had only indirect evidence of the Vatican's approval. Its official mouthpiece, the *Osservatore Romano*, from now on took a positive stand in matters of European union.

Several other capitals, among them Warsaw, Budapest, and Brussels, were visited during our pilgrimage that year. The Pan-European movement was growing steadily. The mail brought mountains of newspaper clippings every day, discussing the problem of European federation from every angle. Fair criticisms I answered with arguments and explanations. I also continued to send books, pamphlets, and copies of my review to influential persons. On most of my lecturing trips my wife came with me and with her wonderful enthusiasm for the cause of Europe proved a source of inspiration that never failed.

Within two years a number of leading European statesmen and most

of Europe's moral and intellectual leaders were committed to the Pan-European ideal. Nathan Soederblom, the great Archbishop of Upsala in Sweden, who created and led the World Union of Christian Churches, joined the movement, as did his compatriot Selma Lagerloef, holder of the Nobel prize for literature. Fritjof Nansen became the first president of our Norwegian group. Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein were members, and so were Paul Claudel, Paul Valery, Jules Romains, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Gerhart Hauptmann, Emil Ludwig, Arthur Schnitzler, Stefan Zweig, and Franz Werfel. Among philosophers the Spaniards Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset joined. Max Reinhardt, the famous producer, also became a Pan-European. Of musicians, it was first of all Bronislav Huberman who devoted himself enthusiastically to the cause of Pan-Europe. But also Bruno Walter, Richard Strauss, Fritz Kreisler, and Adolf Busch became members. All these citizens of Europe were so many effective pioneers of the movement and contributed generously to its rapid rise and expansion.

THE quicker the Pan-European movement spread over the map of the Continent, as a bottle of ink spreads on a blotting-paper, the more I was preoccupied with the problem of how to translate this dream of millions into the sphere of political reality. The lack of official response to Herriot's first Pan-European message was rather discouraging. Although many individual members of governments had joined our movement and union, the governments, as such, continued to ignore it. After Poincaré's victory over Herriot I again buried the hope that France might convoke a Pan-European conference after the model of the Pan-American conferences, to establish a nucleus of Continental federation. Now I had to seek another instrument that might bring about European union. So I went to Geneva, which had become the Mecca of internationalism. In Geneva the representatives of almost all European states used to meet. If it were possible to interest the League in my plans, Geneva might become the natural cradle of European union.

But the outlook of the League was global and not European. It was only possible to interest it in the regional problem of European union by stressing the fact that the principle of continental regionalism might bring about the entry of the United States and of the Soviet Union into the League and thus realize its highest aim of universalism.

The general secretary of the League, Sir Eric Drummond, received me very courteously at his headquarters in Geneva. But his answers were evasive. He stressed the principle of universality and the dangers of regionalism that might one day lead to conflicts between continents. I tried to explain to him that the very best way to prevent such a danger would be to organize Europe within the framework of the League of Nations, so as to co-ordinate the regional problems of Europe with the world-wide problems of humanity. Although Sir Eric listened politely and attentively and did not express any definite opinion, I realized that I had not succeeded in convincing him. And when, after a long discus-

sion, I left his room, my ears re-echoed his last words: "Please don't go too fast!"

I understood that I could not expect any support from that kind and fair gentleman, who had succeeded in transforming citizens of fifty different nations into a working organism, the League of Nations bureaucracy. But he did not succeed in inspiring this new body with a new soul, with an international patriotism. For although Sir Eric attempted to be the impartial head of an international body, he never was an internationalist, but remained British to the core. And he knew only too well that the British government did not wish to support anything that might weaken Britain's control over the Continent, anything that might promote a continental union of Europe.

After having seen Sir Eric I had a talk with Albert Thomas, the French socialist leader, director of the International Labor Office. He was just the contrary of Sir Eric—a powerful and inspiring personality, international in his feelings and outlook, and a great orator. When I saw him I deeply regretted that this strong personality had not been chosen general secretary of the League. For, if anybody could, he might have been able to inspire the League with his own idealism and his own generosity. But the work he did at the International Labor Office still assures him the gratitude of posterity. During the short period of its existence this International Labor Office has done most excellent work, and there is no doubt that this institution will survive the war and continue, with even larger scope, its world-wide activity.

Albert Thomas was one of the first French leaders to join the Pan-European Union. It needed courage for him to do so, owing to his position and to the rather negative attitude of the League toward Pan-Europe.

But Thomas never lacked moral courage. He became a strong supporter of Pan-Europe and remained so until his death.

After all, the League of Nations was but an agency of independent governments, thus incapable of taking any initiative. Such initiative could only be taken by the governments themselves and, practically, only by the governments of the great powers, while the League of Nations could do nothing but accept and register their acts. So the question was whether I would be able to interest its member states in my scheme, so that they might take the initiative toward regionalism at the Assembly of the League.

With this aim in mind, I submitted a memorandum to the League of Nations, suggesting its reorganization in a spirit of regionalism, as

an inevitable step toward universalism. I pointed out how the United States might be induced to join the League if the Pan-American Union could be transformed into a continental branch of this world-embracing organization. And how the Soviet Union would drop its hostility toward the League if it were recognized as an independent region, entitled to determine its domestic affairs according to its own doctrines, without foreign or international interference.

My scheme provided for the recognition of six regional and autonomous units within the League: the British Commonwealth; the Soviet Union; the Pan-American Union, a Pan-European union; China and Japan. The League Council would have to be transformed into a council of these regional groups. As all other regions already existed, my suggestion proposed the immediate establishment of a Pan-European group, dealing with all problems that were neither purely national nor world-embracing but specifically European.

Copies of this memorandum I sent to all the governments of the world and to the outstanding political leaders in Europe and abroad. Although this suggestion was widely discussed, it took four years until one of the member governments of the League at last took the initiative toward establishing a regional section of Europe within the worldwide organism of the League. But the one immediate benefit of my memorandum was that it brought me into contact with a great scholar of international law who was working, from the opposite side of the globe, for a similar reform of the League: the famous Chilean jurist Alessandro Alvarez. He had suggested a co-ordination of the League and of the Pan-American Union, destined to transform this union of all American republics into an autonomous and independent section of the League. Alvarez and I agreed on all problems concerning the League reform and world organization, he primarily concerned with Pan-America and I with Pan-Europe. Our collaboration was the first link between Pan-Americanism and Pan-Europeanism.

The more I studied the European problem the more I became convinced that, the Pan-European movement having been initiated, the decisive task was now to have it supported by Britain and the United States. For it was evident that no European union was feasible against the eventual opposition of London and of Washington. If, on the other hand, the British Empire should accept the principle of regionalism within the League, a Pan-European region would be the natural and immediate result. This result would also be achieved if the United

States should suggest the establishment of a new international organization, based on continentalism.

Had wishful thinking influenced my program, I should certainly have suggested a European union under British leadership, the king of England acting as hereditary president of the United States of Europe. But, alas, the problem was much more complicated than it seemed. In fact, the British question was the most difficult and delicate problem of all the complicated problems confronting Pan-Europe. This difficulty lay in the fact that, although Britain was a European power, the British Empire was by no means European, but intercontinental. A close union of Britain with the Continent threatened to shift Canada automatically toward Pan-America. Even Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa might feel more attracted by the English-speaking United States of America than by a polyglot European union. No British statesman could risk the danger of such a split within his empire for the sake of European federation.

Any step toward a union of the British Isles with the Continent was impossible in these days, because England was looking toward a new organization of its imperial unity, that it could not and would not imperil by any European entanglements. After all, Canada was American, South Africa African, Australia Australian, and India Asiatic. And together they formed, with Britain, the greatest empire of all history. This fact I had to recognize when I wished to face realities and not dreams.

Consequently I gave up the idea of including Britain, with or without its dominions, in the proposed European federation. But at the same time I proposed to establish close links between the British Commonwealth and the European continent, including, if possible, the Pan-American Union as a third partner. I believed that the League of Nations was the natural frame for such an Atlantic association, that could, better than anything else, assure the future of peace and of our common Western civilization.

It was difficult to maintain this point of view, not only with regard to the century-old British tradition that any union of the Continent must be prevented at all costs—but also with regard to the Continental feeling that Europe without Britain was but a torso—a feeling that I personally shared. Many Germans and many French did not wish to live in a continental federation, facing each other, without British mediation and even leadership. And many little states—Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and Greece—felt closer to Britain than to any of the Continental great powers.

To prevent a split within the Pan-European Union, its official program left the question of British participation open. This did not bring us one step nearer to the solution of the Anglo-European problem; it only shifted the answer to London.

But British public opinion had not been much concerned with the Pan-European problem. Following the principle of "wait and see," the few British who knew something about the movement neither backed nor opposed it. They were convinced that they would have ample time to study the matter when and if it should once enter the realm of political realization.

The first Englishman who was seriously interested in Pan-Europe was Henry Wickham Steed, the former chief editor of the *London Times*, who had played a decisive rôle during the last war. He knew Europe's problems well—better, in fact, than almost anyone in Britain. In the years preceding the war he had lived in Vienna, where he had known my mother and other members of my family socially. I had met him while a student at the Theresianum Academy. His looks recalled a seventeenth century courtier rather than a modern Englishman. Twentieth century clothes never seemed in keeping with his inner dignity and style.

Later, when my book *Pan-Europe* appeared, I sent him a copy. His interest was at once aroused. He was then editor of the *Review of Reviews* and offered to publish my "Memorandum to the League of Nations." "Pan-Europe," he told me, "will interest British public opinion only if presented as a world problem, not as a continental one."

His help was invaluable during my London stay. He brought me into touch with men like Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Reading, Lord Balfour, Sir Robert Horne, Professor Gilbert Murray, Philip Noel Baker, Percy Molteno, Sir Walter Layton, George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Philip Kerr (the future Lord Lothian), and Lionel Curtis. Many of these men sympathized with the idea of European union because it was associated with the ideas of peace, of armament reduction, and free trade, but as soon as they were up against the alternative—either to have Britain join the European federation and face its dangerous consequences for the future of the empire, or to allow the union to be organized along purely Continental lines, they preferred not to commit themselves. I had the same experience with the British public at large. Only one Englishman was at that time ready to accept the consequences of European union and to support my plan

wholeheartedly and effectively—the secretary of state for the dominions and colonies, L. S. Amery.

Amery is one of those men whose admirable qualities of character and mind make plausible why Britain became the world's leading nation in the nineteenth century. He represents the tradition of the great empire builders and should be regarded as a legitimate successor of Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain. His loyalty and patriotism are not so much attached to Great Britain as to the world-wide British Commonwealth. Born in India, a great traveler, sportsman, and alpinist, he speaks sixteen languages and is one of the few men of our time who really know our planet from the historical as well as the geographical angle. The services he has rendered his country are inestimable even though they are still waiting for their full recognition in history. It was Amery, primarily, who transformed the empire into a commonwealth of nations bound by loyalty to a single crown. It was he who, after Munich, led the campaign for military conscription which saved England and with England most likely all of our civilization. Again, after the fall of Norway, it was he who took the initiative in Parliament to oust Neville Chamberlain and put Churchill in his place as prime minister. Since then he has held one of the most difficult and important posts in the British Cabinet—the India Office.

When I met Amery in 1925 he was still head of the Colonial Office and working in speech and writing toward stronger political and economic unity within the empire. "You are one single nation, one common branch of humanity," he told his public in Great Britain and the dominions. He agreed with me that the British Empire was a single political continent, as separate from Pan-Europe as it was from Pan-America. Our ideas about world organization, about pacifism, about the League of Nations, and about the defense of Western civilization were almost identical. And he championed the cause of Pan-Europe in a very effective manner. It was primarily due to him that no distrust of Pan-Europe arose in England and that nobody interpreted the movement as an attempt to separate Britain from the Continent. All through the coming years he remained my closest British friend and advisor in all matters of European union.

It was in England that I conceived the plan to visit the United States. A number of American journalists were stationed in Vienna at the time and had sporadically supplied the American press with news about our movement, among them Dorothy Thompson, young, charming and

brilliant, who, throughout the following years of peace and war, remained faithful to the ideas of Pan-Europe, and Clarence Streit, who later started a similar movement for Anglo-American federation. But despite all articles and interviews about Pan-Europe, the American public remained only vaguely informed of our aims. I therefore decided that it might help the cause were I to plead it personally. However, the plan would not have matured so quickly without the good offices of my friend Max Warburg, famous Hamburg banker and one-time member of the German peace delegation at Versailles.

Max Warburg had been one of Pan-Europe's earliest proselytes. He had two brothers living in the United States, Paul, the economist, and Felix, the philanthropist. At their suggestion the American Foreign Policy Association, directed by James MacDonald, invited me to deliver a series of dinner speeches throughout the United States. I was to be assisted by Christian Lange, Norwegian pacifist and secretary of the International Peace Office. The plan was that I should open the discussion by explaining the aims of Pan-Europe and he was to oppose them from the point of view of the League of Nations.

My wife and I sailed in October, 1925, and while on board the *Berengaria* heard the encouraging news that Stresemann, Briand, and Sir Austen Chamberlain had signed the Locarno Treaty. Germany abandoned its claims to Alsace-Lorraine and asked for membership in the League. France promised to evacuate progressively the occupied German territory in the Rhineland. A new period seemed to open up for Europe. Peace and reconstruction were no longer empty slogans, and even the idea of European union seemed less utopian than before. It was an auspicious moment to arrive in the United States and plead the cause of Pan-Europe.

Summing up the impressions of my first stay on the American continent, I may say that what surprised me most was the fact that the idea of European union found such favorable reception everywhere. I had expected opposition or at least a certain amount of apprehension that a united Europe might one day become a rival of America. But there was none. America was too confident of its own future to begrudge Europe the benefits of federalism, and definitely welcomed the prospect that all domestic strife in Europe would be settled by the Europeans themselves and that never again would American boys have to cross the ocean to restore order in Europe.

Friends of the League of Nations, like Colonel House, favored Pan-Europe because they hoped that American acceptance of the principle

of regionalism or rather continentalism might facilitate America's participation in the League. Isolationists, like senators Borah, Capper, and Shipstead, with whom I discussed the matter, favored my idea because it provided a method by which Europe could live in peace and prosperity without requiring American assistance and intervention.

I found my most convinced supporters among the promoters of Pan-Americanism, because both ideas and movements are based on the common principle of continentalism. Every step gained by Pan-Americanism was a recommendation for Pan-Europe and vice versa.

We stayed three months in America and during that time were overwhelmed with kindness and hospitality everywhere.

We traveled from city to city, meeting old friends and making new ones, discussing the problems of war and peace, of Europe and America, of world organization and continentalism.

The lecture schedule planned by the Foreign Policy Association worked to perfection. Christian Lange proved an excellent companion, and it did not take long before we became good friends. His personality had already charmed me in Geneva where I visited him before sailing abroad. At that time I had taken great pains to explain to him the need for European union, but he had stopped me with a gesture of comic despair: "If you don't stop convincing me, I should have to cancel my trip to the United States!"

In New York I called on Mr. Frank Munsey, a publisher of nationwide influence. During a long and animated conversation Munsey repeated again and again that, judging from what he himself had seen of conditions abroad, Pan-Europe alone could save the European continent from another war and subsequent destruction, and that he was ready to back my efforts with all the means at his disposal. Half an hour after we had separated I met him again at a luncheon party given in our honor by Mr. and Mrs. Vincent Astor. I delivered a short address on Pan-Europe; and when I had finished, Munsey, who had been sitting next to my wife, rose to say: "I am convinced that Count Coudenhove's idea alone can save Europe, and I am ready to back him with my papers, my money, and my personal influence."

His short and unexpected declaration made a deep impression on all the luncheon guests, but I could not take him up on his pledge that day. My lecture schedule took me to Chicago, and I had to make a train. We fixed an appointment for the following week to discuss the details of his financial support. On the train back from the Middle West I read in the paper that he had been operated on for appendicitis.

A few days later he underwent another operation which proved fatal. In his testament, made five years before, he left his fortune of forty million dollars to the Metropolitan Museum, for which he never had shown any special interest.

I deeply regretted Frank Munsey's death. His serious and intelligent personality had made a profound impression on me. I also regretted that his death prevented him from giving his promised support. Had he backed the Pan-European movement as he intended, it might have been able to triumph over the intrigues of political parties and leaders and perhaps even over Nazism.

Other Americans with whom I discussed Pan-Europe were the secretary of state, Frank Kellogg, the secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, General Tasker H. Bliss, Bernard Baruch, Owen D. Young, Justice Hughes, Justice Brandeis, Jane Addams, Thomas Lamont, Director Rowe of the Pan-American Union, Raymond Fosdick, James Shotwell, Wilbur Thomas, James Brown Scott, Roscoe Pound, Edward A. Filene, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Robert Brookings, Manley Hudson, Frank Vanderlip, and Walter Lippmann, to name only a few of the many leaders of public opinion, of business and politics whom I approached in the matter. The majority were favorable to Pan-Europe but did not wish to commit themselves to a program that they regarded primarily as a matter for Europeans.

Before sailing home to Europe, however, I constituted an "American Co-operative Committee of the Pan-European Union" headed by Dr. Stephen Duggan, brilliant director of the Institute of International Education, and backed by a number of prominent personalities, among them General Henry Allen, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, Paul Cravath, Herbert Croly, John W. Davis, Frederick Delano, Felix Frankfurter, Julius Rosenwald, Norman Hapgood, William Hitz, Ferdinand Schevill, W. R. Sheperd, Clarence D. Owens, Mary Simkhovitch, Gerard Swope, Oscar S. Straus, Munro Smith, and Felix and Paul Warburg. The committee pledged itself to watch public opinion in the United States in regard to the Pan-European idea and to explain it if it was necessary.

I also arranged for an American edition of my book *Pan-Europe*, which appeared with a preface by President Nicholas Murray Butler. Dr. Butler was in full sympathy with the movement but unable to serve on our committee because his presidency of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace compelled him not to commit himself to special

peace programs. We remained friends throughout the following years of peace and war.

Sailing home from New York, we met in the mid-Atlantic the brilliant Rumanian statesman Nicola Titulescu, who was returning with his wife from a financial mission to Washington. We quickly became friends, and Titulescu remained all his life a convinced Pan-European. Indeed, he had to hide carefully the fact that he felt far more European than Rumanian, and had even to play the rôle of a Rumanian nationalist, to please his nationalistic colleagues in Bucharest and to assure his further career. But in his heart he was always a genuine European.

Back in Cherbourg in the middle of January, 1926, my wife and I felt as if we had been gone from Europe for years. Something had happened to us during our stay abroad. We knew what it was, when we saw the dark old farms of Normandy buried deep in winter snow. We felt that this earth was our earth, the earth of Europe, stretching to the distant steppes of Russia and the shores of the Black Sea. Europe, for which we had pleaded all these years, had become our new and beloved fatherland—not only intellectually but emotionally. We had become European patriots.

WHILE we were homeward bound aboard the *S. S. Majestic* my wife and I had decided to organize our first Pan-European congress, and back in Vienna we sat down to the task at once.

I sent personal invitations to all prominent Europeans known to favor our movement, whether they were members of our organization or not. I also sent questionnaires to European leaders of politics, business, and public opinion asking "Do you consider a United States of Europe a necessity? Do you consider it possible?" Many answers were affirmative and even enthusiastic, some skeptical, few negative. I published them in our review. They gave a picture of what progress our movement had made since its start and furnished me with a mailing list as far as individuals for the congress were concerned.

To give the congress authority I established an honorary board composed of six Pan-European statesmen: Benes, Caillaux, Loebe, Politis, Seipel, and Sforza. Nicola Politis, brilliant Greek statesman and international lawyer, permanently represented his country at the League of Nations and was considered one of the most intelligent and authoritative men within that organization. He had joined the Pan-European Union at its very start.

Before long twenty-four hundred Pan-Europeans, coming from twenty-four different states, announced their participation; so we chose the largest and most beautiful hall of Vienna, the Konzerthaus, as headquarters of our congress. The congress opened on October 3, 1926. That morning the boxes of the Konzerthaus were overcrowded with members of the Austrian government and the diplomatic corps and with relatives of the chief delegates. The heads of the national delegations were seated at a large table on the platform. Places were marked with tiny national flags, the flag of Europe decorating the space in front of my seat. Large flags of various European nations covered the walls, while back of our table hung the large portraits of great men

who had worked in the past for the union of Europe: Komensky, St. Pierre, Kant, Nietzsche, Mazzini, Napoleon, and Victor Hugo.

The first official act of the congress was the unfurling of a huge flag of Europe: on a blue background a golden sun with a red cross. Then Chancellor Seipel opened the session with a short speech. One by one the delegates followed with addresses of faith and hope, in their mother tongue. My own short address closed the morning session.

Three days of political, economic, and cultural conferences and discussions followed, while the leaders of the national delegations worked out a scheme for our organization, a central council composed of the presidents of all national groups sharing leadership with the president of the Union.

The meeting was representative enough to warrant such action. The majority of the national delegations were headed by former or future members of governments. Paul Loebe was accompanied by Germany's former chancellor and Catholic leader, Joseph Wirth. As his personal representative Briand had sent Yvon Delbos, who became his successor as foreign minister. The Polish dictator, Marshal Pilsudski, had charged his brilliant and generous countryman, Alexander Lednicki with the representation of the Polish group. Yugoslavia was represented by its future prime minister Korosec, and Esthonia by its former foreign minister Charles Pusta. The League of Nations had sent an observer, and even Alexander Kerensky, last democratic prime minister of Russia, had come to speak on the future relations between united Europe and its Russian neighbor. Frederick H. Allen addressed the congress in the name of our American committee and Harry D. Gideonse, now president of Brooklyn College, participated in the discussions.

For three days Vienna seemed the capital of Europe, with a number of brilliant social activities adding to the significance of the congress. The mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz, gave a reception at the City Hall. The ministers of France, Germany, and Czechoslovakia extended the hospitality of their legations. The Austrian government organized gala performances at the National Opera and at the Burgtheater, the latter showing Rostand's *L'Aiglon*, with Ida Roland in the leading rôle. A final festive gathering united the members of the congress, the diplomatic corps and many other guests at the city's loveliest imperial castle, Schoenbrunn, which never since the fall of the empire had opened its gates to the public.

The press also proved very helpful and co-operative. The international

echo was strong and far-reaching. Telegrams poured into Vienna from the four corners of the earth, expressing solidarity or approval. Newspapers of five continents reported on the movement's brilliant demonstration and surprising success.

At the end of the third day I was elected president of the Pan-European Union by unanimous vote, and the session closed with a Chopin waltz, played by Bronislav Huberman, the great European patriot, in his incomparable manner.

With this successful congress the first act of Pan-Europe was over and the second had begun: it was necessary now to turn the movement for European union into political action.

From his desk at the Quai d'Orsay an old man had watched the development of the Vienna congress and had studied attentively the confidential reports sent in by M. de Beaumarchais, his minister to Vienna. When the French delegation returned to Paris he received it at once to get supplementary facts. Satisfied with the information, he encouraged its members to go ahead with their campaign work in France.

The man was Aristide Briand. I had met him early that year in Paris while homeward bound from the United States. He was then continuing Herriot's foreign policy which had led him to the triumph of Locarno, and it seemed only logical that he should give Pan-Europe his official backing. When I met him in his elegant study at the Quai d'Orsay I had the immediate conviction that here was the man I had been seeking for years.

Watching him at his huge writing desk littered with innumerable papers, I found him to be a little man with a broad face and unusually shining eyes. His smile was charming and ingratiating. Unlike Herriot, who gave the impression of a powerful St. Bernard dog, Briand recalled a highbred Persian cat, graceful, keen, and shrewd.

He struck me as a unique combination of wise philosopher and smart politician. He knew how to play on the strings of human weaknesses and strength. He was master in the art of diplomacy. But he had nothing of the hypocrite, and behind his cynical mask he hid a fund of true idealism. He was no ascetic, and he looked like an artist rather than a statesman. He *was* an artist when it came to dealing with his fellow men or using his beautiful voice. The greatest orator of his time, he inevitably left his audiences with the impression that every one of his words had come from the depth of his generous soul.

He knew about my plans and activities, and I did not have much

explaining to do. He asked me how the United States had reacted toward my campaign. His manner was as simple and sincere as if we were old friends. When I left him he said, "Go ahead, quick, quick, quick!"

This evening we spent with Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Mann. My optimistic mood after this first meeting with Briand is described in Mann's diary of January 22, 1926, published in his pamphlet *Account from Paris*, as follows:

Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his wife Ida Roland (unforgettable, the Messalina-like majesty of her Zarina, commanding, with the star on her bosom, erect behind her imperial writing desk) await us in the hall. Coudenhove, half Japanese, half mixed from the breed of Europe's international nobility, really represents, as one knows, a Eurasian type of noble cosmopolite giving an average German the feeling of being somewhat provincial. . . . His personality and his words disclose unshakable faith in a political idea, that I do not consider without defects, but that he is spreading throughout the world and propagating by his pen and his person with clearest energy. He was coming from America and from England, where he had everywhere presented his ideas with strong moral success and just had here a detailed talk with Briand who had listened to him very attentively. He expressed confidence that things were getting on and that his vision would be realized within two years.

Since that day more than three-quarters of a year had passed. Soon after our congress I went back to Paris to organize the French section of the Pan-European Union. A number of prominent Frenchmen had already joined: Clementel, the president of the International Chamber of Commerce, De Monzie, cabinet member, Paul Boncour, Charles Rist, Lucien Romier, editor of the *Figaro*, and Francis Delaisi, who had attended our congress and was now writing his book *Les Deux Europes*, dealing with the problem of economic union between industrial and agrarian Europe.

I consulted Briand as to which of these men might be offered the leadership of the Pan-European Union in France. He suggested his close friend Louis Loucheur. So Loucheur became president of our new French committee; Caillaux was honorary president, while Léon Blum and the famous jurist Joseph Barthelémy accepted the vice-presidencies.

The Central Council of the Pan-European Union held its annual meeting in Paris in May, 1927. Briand, charming, talkative, and brilliant as ever, received its members at the Quai d'Orsay. In his friendly and sympathetic way he asked each delegate a rather tricky question: What future attitude do you expect your nation to take on the question of

European union? He congratulated us on the rapid progress of our work and expressed the conviction that only union could save our continent from war and extinction. "Yes," he added emphatically, "despite all obstacles, your movement will triumph sooner than the world believes possible."

Encouraged by his optimism, I offered him the honorary presidency of our Central Council and of the Pan-European Union, which he accepted without hesitation and retained until his death.

Agence Havas published the news of his acceptance the next day and suddenly the attention of the whole world was focused on the idea of European union, simply because one of the most powerful European statesmen had committed himself to it.

All of our members now expected Briand to take an initiative or at least to hail Pan-Europe publicly in a speech as Herriot had done. But, although he continued to encourage our work privately and promised action soon, nothing decisive happened.

I am convinced that his dilatory attitude was a capital mistake which was to have tragic consequences for our movement and for Europe. In 1927 the spirit of Locarno was still alive, and the idea of European union had become the great hope of the younger generation. Had Briand then taken up the idea boldly in collaboration with Stresemann, he might have triumphed over all his adversaries. But Briand the diplomat ignored Briand the statesman. He hesitated to make the concessions necessary to win full-fledged German co-operation: a generous compromise in the reparations problem and the immediate evacuation of the occupied Rhineland. Briand probably was ready for such a sacrifice, but he was unable to overcome the opposition of his cabinet and of Prime Minister Poincaré.

Meanwhile I found myself face to face with a certain amount of distrust and hostility on the part of the French nationalists. In order to reduce such distrust which might endanger our movement, I decided to see their leaders one by one. I had a long talk with Poincaré, who seemed to me a man of great intelligence but of little vision. He listened to me politely, neither approving nor disapproving my opinions. He was interested in Pan-Europe but did not believe its immediate realization possible. Another former president of the French republic, old Alexander Millerand, confessed frankly that the idea of European union had never entered his mind, while André Tardieu, brilliant leader of the Right and one of the authors of the Versailles Treaty, seemed friendly to the plan in spite of his skepticism. Only Paul

Etienne Flandin was as convinced of the necessity of Pan-Europe as Briand himself.

However, all these conversations seemed to be rather futile in the end. French opposition had its roots not in politics but in business. The major part of French industry and trade was hostile to making economic concessions to Germany because it feared the competition of the superior German industrial organization. The nationalist politicians were only so many instruments in the hands of French industrial leaders, who were also in control of the press. To convert France to Pan-Europe it was necessary to obtain the support of French big business. Briand knew this when he suggested Louis Loucheur for president of our French Committee.

Loucheur looked half bulldog, half Chinese. His personality was powerful, vigorous, and impressive. There was something dictatorial about him, but his aggressiveness was tempered by French courtesy and esprit. He was both businessman and politician. As businessman he was contemptuous of the corruption of parliamentary circles; as politician he abhorred the reactionary narrowmindedness of big business. As a politician he belonged to the Left, as a businessman to the Right. Although he was essentially a nationalist, he was intelligent enough to understand that in our era no nation can stand alone and that international collaboration is a mainspring of success in both politics and business. As a character he was not to be trusted, but the world could always rely on his brains. Last but not least he was one of Briand's closest friends, on whom the French foreign minister relied for both political and economic advice.

The very first thing Loucheur told me was that he considered our committee of French political and moral leaders utterly useless. Its members would meet at the obligatory annual conferences, if they cared to attend them at all, and then disperse without having accomplished anything. To achieve results and not mere talk, we would have to organize a second committee composed of influential businessmen. As proprietor of the *Petit Journal*, Loucheur knew better than anyone in France what close ties existed between business, politics, and public opinion and what a key position big business held under the Third Republic.

Within a few days Loucheur had constituted a Pan-European economic committee consisting of twenty members representative of the main branches of French industrial production, such as Theodore Laurent and Lambert Ribot (steel), De Peyerimhoff (coal), René Duche-

min (chemicals), Gabriel Cordier and Louis Marlio (aluminum), Gillet (silk), Dubrulle (wool), and Robert Hecker (electricity). With the help of this group Loucheur could pave the way for Briand's political action.

Conditions had never been more favorable to a Franco-German rapprochement. Both countries had as ministers of foreign affairs enlightened statesmen, intelligent enough to understand that Franco-German relations were the crux of the European problem and would lead either to European union or to war. Both were determined to prevent that war. Economic conditions also helped. In Germany a wave of prosperity had put an end to inflation, unemployment, and civil war. The country had reorganized its industry and established huge trusts that controlled large parts of its national economy. German exports, fostered by American loans, had expanded beyond expectation. The tension between capital and labor had eased.

France, too, had overcome the perils of inflation, and the general will to maintain peace was stronger than all imperialistic aspirations. Although Poincaré had a large following, the French nation as such gave distinct preference to Briand's generous policy.

Nevertheless, a problematic state of affairs continued below the smiling surface. Up to now French public opinion had considered Pan-Europe a beautiful dream, a promise for a distant future. Thanks to Loucheur's initiative the dream had become a program, but almost at once it began to meet opposition, suspicion, and hostility. The nationalists feared for the privileged position France now occupied in Europe in consequence of her victory; other Frenchmen, who had approved of Pan-Europe as long as it remained an object of toasts and dinner speeches, refused to face such practical issues as economic union, monetary union, colonial co-operation, a federal army, and a common foreign policy. They realized that European union was impossible without concessions on their part, but they were not willing to make these concessions as long as the Germans held plans of revenge.

The main difficulty was this: the more I discussed the Pan-European problem with German and French leaders, the more I realized the gap which separated their respective views. Genuine understanding existed only in the intellectual realm. Thomas Mann and Paul Valéry dreamed of the same kind of united Europe; but, alas, Briand's ideas on Europe differed distinctly from those of Stresemann, and the Pan-European

aims of the German industrialists were altogether at odds with those of their French colleagues.

The central problem of France was the problem of military security. Farseeing Frenchmen favored the idea of transforming the provisional system of security now in existence into a permanent one, by establishing a European federation before Germany had recovered from its present inferior military state.

Germany on the other hand was little concerned with the problem of security. It desired a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Its claim for "*Gleichberechtigung*" (equal rights), which meant the abolishment of all reparations and the restitution of its political rights as an equal within the family of nations, had grown louder every year. The Germans were ready to accept any suggestion that would put an end to their unilateral disarmament; they were ready to sacrifice large parts of their national sovereignty on the altar of Pan-Europe; they would even agree to a European federal army composed of equally strong national contingents—provided they were no longer discriminated against in the political and military field.

Another difference between the two nations arose from the fact that while France's problems were primarily political, Germany's main problem centered in its overpopulation, a problem complicated by its poor soil and its lack of raw materials. In order to live and produce, Germany had to import. In order to pay for its imports, it had to export. Unless imports and exports balanced each other on the national credit sheet, the country faced starvation and ruin.

As long as the old system of economic sovereignty prevailed in Europe, Germany always feared that its neighbors would raise their customs tariffs to a ruinous extent. What it needed was a safe market which could not be closed by high-handed or self-sufficient neighbors. Pan-Europe provided such a market, for it implied an economic and monetary union. It also implied free access to raw materials in tropical colonies.

France had none of Germany's economic problems. She had no surplus population. She had a rich colonial empire that she had only begun to exploit. Products of her industry were absorbed by the home markets; export was a luxury, not a vital need; in fact, the majority of the French industrialists were more occupied with defending their national markets against German, British, Belgian and American competition than with conquering new markets abroad. Postwar France was a protectionist country. She was well aware of Germany's superior

methods of production and thought it suicidal to give such dangerous competition a chance in her own market.

Briand and Stresemann reflected the attitudes of their respective nations. Briand was determined to put France's security first. This meant stabilization of European frontiers, especially in the east, where war could flare up at any time over the issue of the Corridor of Danzig. Stresemann refused to guarantee the German-Polish borders. He insisted that revision of those boundaries was a premise necessary to European peace. Nor was he ready to sacrifice his close relationship with Russia as long as the Corridor cut Germany in two.

Only a compromise, but of constructive character, could overcome such fundamental dissidence; and on both sides politics, business, and public opinion must combine for the task.

Loucheur suggested that I constitute a committee in Germany similar to the Pan-European committee of French industrial leaders. The committee must of course be representative of German industry and finance and willing to co-operate with the French group.

The committee was born without delay and included men like Carl Duisberg and Carl Bosch (chemistry), Voegler and Poensgen (steel), Silverberg (coal), Hermann Buecher (electricity), Robert Bosch (machines), Von Stauss (automobiles), Hermann Lange (textiles), Richard Heilner (linoleum), and Carl Melchior and Herbert Gutmann (finance).

This group fused with that of their French colleagues, and together they represented a European economic council designed to cover gradually all European production. As its membership increased, it gained for us the very valuable co-operation of Emil Mayrisch and Dannie Heineman.

Mayrisch was the head of the Luxembourg steel production and founder of the European steel trust. Within this trust the German and French steel magnates, enemies and competitors until then, suddenly had turned allies and collaborators. It was Mayrisch who had accomplished this miracle. As a native of Luxembourg, a bi-lingual country lying in the very paths of the two great powers, he was the born mediator between the hostile steel lords on both sides of the Rhine. And Mayrisch was an enthusiastic Pan-European. When my wife and I were guests at Colpach, his charming Luxembourg estate, I offered him the presidency of the Pan-European Committee of Luxembourg. He accepted at once, thus automatically joining our Central Council. It was understood that he should serve on the economic committee

where his powerful, dynamic, and broad-minded personality was of invaluable assistance.

Dannie Heineman, an American citizen, had created the "Sofina," a concern of leading electrical societies with headquarters in Brussels. A man of unflinching energy and great vision, he organized our Pan-European branch in Belgium, getting the country's leading socialists, Catholics, and democrats, men like Van de Vyvere, Van Cauwelaert, Jules Destrée, and Paul Emile Janson, to unite in the common cause of European union. As a matter of fact, I found that the heads of the electrical industry all over Europe were generally more broad-minded than most of their colleagues in other production branches. The first German industrialist to be actively interested in Pan-Europe was Felix Deutsch, head of the German General Electric Company, and after his death it was his successor, Herman Buecher, who became one of the strongest and most active of our German supporters. In France it was Ernest Mercier, head of the "Union Parisienne," who, after Loucheur's death, took over the lead of the French Pan-European committee. However, at this moment Loucheur still ruled our inter-European economic council with his usual authority, wisdom, and alacrity.

Aware that the German businessmen desired a European customs union, while his own countrymen believed in protected trade, he suggested replacing the old protectionist methods of maintaining high tariffs by something entirely different—the establishment of Inter-European cartels. The European steel trust gave evidence that the scheme was practical; Loucheur was convinced that other branches would find it equally desirable. It satisfied the German view that economic co-operation should precede political union; it satisfied the French desire that the national market be defended. The entire problem of European economic co-operation might thus be happily and effectively solved.

For justice's sake it must be pointed out that Loucheur was not only a representative of big business but a leftist liberal member of the French parliament. He knew how unpopular the notion of trusts was with the working classes, how easily the cartels might become instruments of exploitation unless held in check by some outside control which prevented raising of prices and lowering of wages. His plan was to organize a supernational institution, possibly within the frame of the League of Nations, which would assure democratic control of all European cartels and trusts. Many of his ideas he discussed informally at the recurrent meetings of our economic board in Paris, but he had

high hopes that his plans might mature before the decade came to an end. The atmosphere of mutual confidence and sympathy in which our conferences took place justified his optimism. It must not be forgotten that all these negotiations went forward upon the crest of the short wave of European economic prosperity. They were further inspired by the example of American prosperity, which seemed the striking result of a huge home market, rationalized production methods, low prices, high wages, and mass consumption, bringing in their wake an extremely high standard of living. The gospel of Ford became the hope of European business and furnished the strongest impulse toward an establishment of a European supermarket of three hundred million consumers.

However, the final results of Loucheur's mediatory rôle were disappointing. It was not altogether his fault, or that of his group, who saw the world from too specialized an angle. At the end of the decade the rising tide of a world-wide economic depression annihilated all individual efforts at reconstruction and altered the very basis of European business life. The beginning of the crisis almost coincided with Loucheur's death in 1930. But as early as 1927 the only definite result of the participation of big business in the Pan-European movement was this: a number of nationalist papers, in Germany and France, owned or controlled by industrial groups, suddenly favored the idea of Pan-European union; thus they paved the way towards Briand's political initiative which would have been impossible in the face of their combined opposition.

AS NOVEMBER, 1928, approached, a pall of inertia fell over my work. I found it hard to face the fact that Europe was celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Armistice without any real peace in sight.

To be sure, I had succeeded in turning an old dream into a young movement. I had succeeded in raising the flag of the United States of Europe. I had gained the support of many European leaders and a large section of Europe's intelligentsia. The movement had broadened and developed. From Spain to Norway and from Finland to Greece a chain of national committees for Pan-Europe had strengthened and spread the idea. Every morning I received piles of letters and articles approving my plans and expressing hope for their realization. But when I stopped perusing them and looked instead at the headlines of the morning papers, I realized at once what a tremendous gap separated the contents of my mail from the actualities of international politics; that the Pan-European Union was but a private organization, and I was working as a powerless individual, neither backed nor assisted by any European government. This lack of support assured my independence, impartiality, and moral authority—but limited my chances of success.

What then stood in the way of my plans? What stood in the way of Franco-German understanding? Briand and Stresemann both desired this understanding but had no power to enforce it. They were at the mercy of their parliaments, who could dismiss them any day. The deputies who represented these parliaments were not independent either; they were at the mercy of their electors who could refuse to re-elect them, ruining their political careers. And what influenced these electors? An anonymous public opinion inspired by a group of newspaper proprietors who, in feeding the nationalist tendencies and conceit of their readers, pursued only their private interests. This irresponsible but immensely powerful coterie made it impossible for any European government to pursue a policy of constructive compromise. Had Briand renounced a large part of the reparations demand in order to

reconcile Germany, "public opinion" would have driven him from office and denounced him as a national traitor. The same fate would have fallen to the lot of Stresemann, had he sacrificed the national claim for Danzig or the Corridor.

In Poland conditions were similar. Pilsudski was military dictator and national hero—but not powerful enough to relinquish the Corridor to Germany. In 1927 I suggested a compromise in the matter because I saw in it a probable source of war. I proposed that Poland should retain Gdynia and a free port at Danzig, while the city of Danzig and the Corridor should be returned to Germany. As a matter of compensation the century-old union between Poland and Lithuania should be re-established. This would strengthen Poland strategically and ultimately bring about greater co-operation between all of the Baltic states, but it presupposed that Poland return to its little neighbor its former national capital of Wilno. The Polish nationalists were outraged at this proposal. When I came back to Warsaw to lecture, Polish students staged a demonstration and interrupted my conference until the police came to arrest them.

There were difficulties also in central Europe where Hungary's co-operation could not be secured without some territorial concessions from its neighbor states. Masaryk, with whom I discussed the problem, offered to restore to Hungary a border-region of Slovakia, inhabited by half a million Magyars. Benes did not back this bid. He considered any cession of territory impossible for constitutional and psychological reasons. Had Masaryk tried to enforce it with a threat of resignation, the Czechoslovak Parliament would certainly have sacrificed Masaryk rather than a single acre of land.

The only bright spot in the dark picture of continued European strife was the reconciliation Greece and Turkey had effected after an indescribably cruel war, and after six centuries of hate and oppression. At the time peace was concluded between them, both countries were blessed with far-sighted and energetic statesmen—Kemal Ataturk; the Turkish dictator, and Eleutherios Venizelos, Greek premier. Both men were aware that Greece and Turkey must decide between periodic war and permanent peace. They chose peace. Venizelos went to Ankara and came to terms with Kemal. They concluded an alliance and created the nucleus of a Balkan union.

Later, when Venizelos passed through Vienna, I had an impassioned conversation with him on the problem of Turkey and Pan-Europe. He convinced me that Turkey under the rule of Kemal had become an

integral part of Western civilization and that whatever the future of Pan-Europe, Turkey must be made part of it. He assured me that Greece could only co-operate with our movement if Turkey also were included. He spoke with admiration of Kemal and the impressions he had received on his journey to Ankara.

Since then I had often thought of the inspiring example Greece and Turkey had given their sister nations by securing national peace and prosperity at the price of a generous compromise. I thought of them now. I compared their attitude with that of France and Germany. Somewhat bitterly I recalled Briand's vain promises for support of European union. Why had he never mentioned it in his speeches? Was he one of these numerous statesmen who privately insisted that Pan-Europe was the salvation of the Continent, but never dared say so in public? Somehow my hope was at its lowest ebb. I was afraid that my efforts on behalf of Pan-Europe had failed, that the movement was doomed, and that even if the time for action eventually came Briand would be ousted or dead.

However, the tide was soon to turn. When, some weeks later, I sat facing Briand again across the huge desk in his study on the Quai d'Orsay, his eyes seemed brighter than ever; his gentle smile persisted while he talked. He told me that he intended before long to submit to the League of Nations a suggestion concerning Pan-Europe. He expected to back this suggestion with his full political authority. He was certain that the coming year would witness at least a first rudimentary core of a European federation. He asked that I speed up my propaganda work and in the meantime keep silent and patient a little longer. Nobody knew of his plans except his closest friend and collaborator, Alexis Léger.

I promised discretion. I was happy that Léger was behind the initiative, for I considered him a friend who shared my political outlook, an outlook based on moral considerations.

Léger, who later was to become permanent secretary of state of foreign affairs, had a growing influence on Briand's foreign policy, first as his chef de cabinet, later as his undersecretary of state.

Born in Guadeloupe, he had a much wider outlook on world affairs than the Continental Frenchmen. Years before he had won literary fame by publishing a few volumes of finest poetry under an assumed name. His psychiatric studies had given him a keen eye for character evaluation, and a stay in the Far East had strengthened his philosophic and contemplative tendencies. He combines burning idealism with

cold calculating realism, vision with statesmanship. During all the following years he remained faithful to Briand's spirit, working always for European union. He never ceased to be a loyal friend, helping me to maintain good relations with all of Briand's successors from Pierre Laval to Paul Reynaud. Dismissed in May, 1940, on account of his pro-British policy, he now lives as an exile in the United States.

The months following my interview with Briand seemed endless. Every morning I hoped to find this headline: "Briand Proposes European Federation," four words that would turn my dream almost into a fact.

In March came the first sign. De Jouvenel reported in an article that Briand had sounded British and German diplomatic circles on the feasibility of a European economic union as a first step to political union in Europe. This meant that the idea was being planted in official circles and would soon be placed before the various government heads.

With this first step taken, others soon followed. In June, at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Madrid, Briand spoke privately about Pan-Europe with Stresemann and other foreign ministers, who approved his plan. A month later he took the decisive step; he called a press conference in the Quai d'Orsay and announced that he intended to suggest the establishment of a European union to the next Assembly of the League of Nations in September. Newspapers all over the world printed this sensational news in headlines the next day, and it exploded across Europe like a bomb. What most of the Europeans had hoped in their heart of hearts, but had not dared to believe, seemed to be coming true. True, the Pan-Europeans formed but a minority in Europe. Most people had been neither for nor against Pan-Europe, simply because they did not consider it an immediate possibility, nothing about which they would have to bother during the years to come. But, on the other hand, only a small section of Europeans was definitely opposed to Pan-Europe: the fanatic nationalists and the communists. All other men and women were potential Pan-Europeans; they were rather in sympathy with the idea, without taking any definite stand. Their final attitude would depend on the form of European federation, whether it were in agreement with their national ideas and aspirations or not. Among this large group of potential Pan-Europeans was a big section of the conservatives, most of the Social Democrats and Catholics, almost all liberals and large numbers of the agrarians. All these groups approved Briand's Initiative, that gave them hope: not so much for a united Europe—that had no strong emotional

attraction for them—as for an era of lasting peace and of increasing prosperity. The news that the leading statesman of Europe, Briand, was preparing a United States of Europe had, therefore, a tremendous response all over the Continent: in all families, in all inns, in all villages, at all markets, in all clubs, in all cafés, at all business meetings this sensational news was discussed, with interest, skepticism, or sympathy. Great hopes were raised among the nations that had suffered the hardships of the last war, from the Finnish lakes and woods to the coasts and islands of Greece; hopes for a new Europe, peaceful like Switzerland and prosperous like the United States of America. To millions of men and women on fields and in factories Briand appeared as the great prophet of peace, as the hero of European reconciliation. After fifteen hundred years of wars the beautiful vision of a united Europe seemed to approach accomplishment within our fortunate generation.

But this strong approval of Briand's promise was far from unanimous. Briand had many powerful enemies among the nationalists of his country, who began to ridicule him, declaring his aim not only impracticable but also dangerous to the security of France. But other French nationalists backed Briand, not because they were enthusiastic over his plan but because they were proud that it was the French government that had taken such decisive action before the eyes of the world. Briand knew how important this element of national prestige was for the popularity of his Initiative in France. That was the reason why he often mentioned my name privately, but never publicly in connection with his Initiative. He knew how unfavorably public opinion would react if he gave the impression of executing a plan "made in Vienna." And it was not one of his friends, but one of his most violent political enemies, Franklin Bouillon, who, from the tribune of parliament, reproached him for following my suggestions in his Initiative for Pan-Europe. I therefore canceled the preparations for a Pan-European congress in Paris and refrained from any publicity in France while Briand's own campaign was under way.

In Germany the situation was very different. The fact that France was crusading for Pan-Europe made the idea doubly suspect in the eyes of the German nationalists. Many newspapers, who had approved the plan as long as it seemed my own, derided it when Briand took it up. They tried to sow distrust between Briand and me, warning the German nation not to make new and dangerous concessions for the sake of a dubious political campaign. As usual the common man in

Germany thought far more broadly about Briand's Initiative and welcomed it with a sympathy amounting often to enthusiasm.

Italy proved a surprise. Mussolini declared himself in favor of Briand's plan provided that joint administration of all African colonies were considered.

The smaller Continental states all saw the plan from a purely national angle, welcoming it according to whatever it might bring them. I was glad to find Austria at least unanimously in favor of Briand's plan. Only Great Britain's reactions were definitely unfavorable. Prime Minister MacDonald in an interview to the *Daily Telegraph* declared the idea of a United States of Europe to be premature; at best, one might speak about it in ten years. This, in diplomatic language, meant a polite but definite rejection of Briand's proposal. Most of the British papers were either skeptical or noncommittal, although they credited Briand with courage and generosity.

In France Briand's popularity had meanwhile increased rather than decreased. He was elected prime minister retaining the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs. This in itself indicated wide support of his foreign policy. In his inauguration address before the Chamber he made his first public mention of Pan-Europe:

For four years the ambitious program suggested by the phrase "United States of Europe" has been in my thoughts without my being able to commit myself to the gigantic task. However, after a painstaking examination of the whole question I have come to the conclusion that Europe will never be pacified as long as certain problems remain unsolved, certain suspicions unallayed, and as long as the nations of Europe do not try to find ways and means of collaboration.

He added that he would now submit the matter to the Assembly of the League of Nations.

The speech swept the audience off its feet. The Chamber gave him a vote of confidence. Briand had won his first round. Now the Initiative was no longer his, but that of his nation.

Several days later he attended the conference at the Hague where the reparations problem was reconsidered on the basis of the Young Plan. During his opening address Stresemann congratulated Briand on his new European policy, declaring it an economic necessity.

The date of Briand's speech before the League of Nations Assembly was set for September 4, 1929. Geneva was never lovelier. The white

city, the blue lake and the gray-green mountains were steeped in brilliant sunlight. Quais and squares gaily displayed the flags of almost every nation in the world, among them, as a newcomer, the flag of Pan-Europe.

When Briand ascended the rostrum of the assembly hall of the League of Nations, he faced a galaxy of prime ministers and foreign ministers who had hurried there from the four corners of the world. Briand himself seemed young, hopeful, and vigorous. He stood there like another Columbus on his way to discover a new continent, sure of his goal although he was about to sail for unknown shores. My wife and I, who watched him from the diplomatic gallery, wished him all the luck in the world. Everybody who knew us congratulated us on the wonderful success of our cause.

The audience hushed as Briand started to speak. Stooping a little, he began slowly with a few indifferent sentences, then paused and suddenly stood erect. His voice was still low as he began to tell his audience how the movement for European union had captivated him when it seemed no more than a poetic vision. His voice rose a little as he spoke of the risk he took when he espoused the cause and turned it into a crusade. His strong, melodious voice resounded through the hall:

But I am convinced that some kind of union is necessary for nations who represent a geographic unit. Such nations should at least be able to associate in order to discuss their common interests, make common decisions and prove their solidarity in times of stress and tension. I want them to establish this sort of solidarity. True, the union which we plan to bring about will have to deal with urgent economic problems. I am sure that it will produce results in this field. However, the union should prove advantageous also from a political and social point of view and it should do so without endangering any nation's sovereign rights. I therefore beg those of my colleagues who are here as representatives of their respective nations to examine officially my proposal during the present session of the League so that the next session may bring us nearer its realization.

Again when he had ended, his magic had not failed him. The audience cheered and rose. It was now for other European representatives to take up the challenge.

Stresemann spoke four days later, on September 8. As he stood on the speaker's forum his face was drawn and white. Compared to Briand's brilliant peroration his delivery seemed dull. But he developed his theme logically and competently, although without apparent enthusiasm.

He dismissed the old-time objection that European union was a utopian concept. He touched on the grotesque state of European economy which had progressed backwards instead of forward. He pointed out that the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon had strengthened rather than diminished the tendency toward economic segregation. The distance Berlin-Tokyo was covered in twenty days, but in Europe a distance of twenty-five miles might demand half a day of travel if tedious customs examinations had to be undergone. All these absurdities were not only intolerable for Europeans but for the whole world. "Where, in Europe, is the European coin and European stamp?" he exclaimed. Yes, he added emphatically, he was ready to consider any suggestion that would result in a better and more reasonably organized Europe. He would gladly co-operate with such a Europe.

Eduard Benes spoke next. He welcomed Briand's proposal, but he also indicated some of the difficulties that stood in the way of its realization.

A short address followed, by the Italian delegate, Scialoja, who without committing himself merely complimented Briand on his generous suggestion.

We hoped to hear next from the British delegate, the laborite foreign minister, Arthur Henderson. But Henderson remained silent.

That day at Briand's suggestion the chief delegates of the European nations met for luncheon at Briand's headquarters, the Hotel des Bergues. Briand wished his guests to discuss his program informally and to suggest further practical steps. Henderson was present but rather as an observer than a partner. Again he kept a noncommittal attitude.

Nevertheless this first unofficial European council which had gathered around a white and not a green table came to important conclusions. It charged Briand to draft, in the name of his government, a first preliminary plan which should be submitted to other European governments. These would then offer their own suggestions, whereupon Briand was to draft a second and revised program, to be submitted to the next session of the Assembly of the League in September, 1930.

A few days after this tangible success for the Pan-European idea a blow fell which invalidated almost all of the momentary results.

Stresemann died suddenly on his return to Germany, exhausted by years of political struggle against demagogic nationalism. Even the death of Briand would have presented a lesser tragedy. Briand could have been replaced by Loucheur, Herriot, or de Jouvenel, who would have carried on his spirit. But no one in Germany could replace Strese

mann. He had been in office six years, directing his country's foreign policy in an authoritative and competent manner. He had just liberated German territory from the last of the armies of occupation. He, a nationalist himself, knew how to keep German nationalistic opposition in check. He might have fought even Hitler and become Hindenburg's successor in his stead. Now he was dead. A dangerous breach had opened in the ramparts of German democracy. Curtius, a weak politician, unable to stem the rising tide of nationalism, took his place.

For Briand, Stresemann's death was a disaster. He and Stresemann had been the two pillars which had supported the hopes of the new Europe. It was more than doubtful that Briand could bear the whole burden alone.

What about Germany's co-operation? What about Great Britain's? The latter was almost hostile to Pan-Europe, while Italy continued to be not hostile, but cool to the plan. If Germany were to veer away from Stresemann's political course the last hopes of achieving European union would fade.

I saw at once that Briand's Initiative needed considerable bolstering, particularly in central Europe. With the help of Herriot I organized a number of meetings in the European capitals. Herriot and I were to be the principal speakers. Throughout this campaign, which lasted through October, 1929, Herriot conquered all hearts and minds by the power of his speech and his enchanting personal charm. Vienna acclaimed him enthusiastically, and so did Berlin, where he spoke in the big hall of the Kroll Opera House. After the meeting my wife and I held a reception in his honor at the Hotel Kaiserhof, where he was introduced to the leading personalities of the German republic. But he did not forget to do honor to Stresemann's memory. His first visit in Berlin took him to the cemetery and Stresemann's grave.

Our reception in Prague was equally cordial, as Herriot was considered a very faithful friend of Czechoslovakia. The meeting became a highly polyglot affair. Benes made his address in Czech, Herriot in French, I in German.

It was evident, however, that in spite of Herriot's generous welcome everywhere, the movement for European union was rapidly losing ground in Germany. A new and stronger effort on its behalf had to be made at once. We decided to have a second Pan-European congress in Berlin on May 17, 1930.

The opening of the congress coincided with great news: Briand had chosen the day for the publication of his *Memorandum on European*

Union. Fifty copies were forwarded to us by diplomatic mail for distribution among the principal delegates. Briand thus wanted to stress his solidarity with the Pan-European movement.

At the conference Briand was represented by Loucheur, who was accompanied by Joseph Barthélémy and Daniel Serruys, one of the country's leading economists. Briand himself sent the following telegram:

"I am happy to send the congress my good wishes and to congratulate the Pan-European movement on the courageous part it played in preparing European public opinion for the tasks of European union."

There were other messages. Poincaré wired: "With vivid interest I follow the news of the Pan-European Congress and am delighted to observe how successful your aims are proving." Herriot: "I am sending you my ardent wishes for a successful demonstration." Painlevé: "Please communicate to your collaborators my good wishes for the result of your international work of reconciliation." Caillaux: "I wish with all my heart that your action may bear fruit and help establish a new basis for Europe and civilization." Paul Boncour: "I need not tell you that I follow your negotiations with passionate interest."

Our delegates representing the various Pan-European groups came from all over Europe. Joseph Wirth, German minister of the interior, addressed the Congress on behalf of his government. Thomas Mann spoke on European civilization, Robert Bosch on European economy. Among the numerous foreign delegates I recall the president of our Yugoslav group, Momshilo Nincic, who later became Yugoslav foreign minister in exile. However, our most sensational delegate had come from London and was L. S. Amery.

Amery declared himself to be in strongest sympathy with Briand's Initiative. He considered a European federation the only means of assuring peace and prosperity for the Continent. He assured his audience that England was vitally interested in the success of Briand's campaign because Europe's peace and welfare were as important to Great Britain as they were to the Continental nations. He added, however, and in a rather blunt manner, that Britain could never join the federation because its future was linked to the overseas dominions and its patriotism centered in its own vast intercontinental empire. He wished to make this clear because illusions concerning Britain's attitude might harm the realization of Pan-Europe, whose success he desired with all his heart.

Loucheur attempted to modify Amery's attitude to a certain extent, but Amery was armed with strong arguments in the matter. He in-

sisted, however, that Britain should further European union and back Briand's crusade to the fullest. His brilliant speech made a deep impression on his audience, all the more so as it was Great Britain's first clear reply to Briand's proposals, a reply which was supported by another leading member of the British opposition and Amery's personal friend—Winston Churchill.

The congress continued in a spirit of optimism however. It ended with a resolution unanimously backing Briand's plan. There were again numerous social affairs, among them a large official dinner for the leading delegates given by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning and his foreign minister, Curtius.

The congress as such still gave hope for further solidarity, although Briand's memorandum proved a disappointment. It was a long and detailed document, couched in vague and overcareful terms. Quite obviously it was the result of a compromise between Briand and his opponents within the French government. It rejected a European customs union and scrupulously respected the sovereignty of all nations involved. It avoided intruding upon the authority of the League of Nations. It aimed at no European federation, but at an ineffective European League of Nations. It was a substitute, not the real thing. The official reaction to this memorandum was still more disappointing. In essence the European governments agreed with the principle of Pan-European union, but they disagreed on all important details. Some governments wished to include Soviet Russia or Turkey, although both these states had as yet held aloof from the League of Nations. Others insisted that economics should take the lead over political action or vice versa. Many governments preferred the universalism of the League to the regionalism of European federation. Nevertheless the very fact that the European governments were discussing details of the union meant considerable progress in itself.

Of all the official answers to Briand's memorandum, Great Britain's was the most disastrous. It avoided making a clear issue of the matter as Amery had done. It neither approved nor opposed Briand's action. It was polite in form, negative in essence. It offered collaboration in such reserved terms that it spelled the complete ruin of Briand's Initiative.

By the time the League of Nations delegates assembled in September, 1930, the matter had by no means improved further. Briand struggled desperately to establish at least some kind of a European council which might prove the stepping-stone for a future European federation. But

British opposition prevented even this preliminary step. Briand had to resign himself to the establishment of a "European Office" which was to work within the framework of the League of Nations. In order to prevent friction between this office and the League of Nations, Great Britain insisted on appointing as its head Sir Eric Drummond, secretary of the League and one of the staunchest opponents of our cause.

Meanwhile developments within Germany helped increase the general distrust of Briand's plan. During the Geneva meeting of the League of Nations, Germany had elected a new Reichstag. The Nazi party, which up to now held only 12 seats, captured 107 seats in this election and was thus the second strongest party in parliament. Other developments in Germany gave cause for concern: the continued flight of its capital abroad, lack of employment, crumbling of national credits, continued revolutionary demonstrations of the extreme Right and Left.

As news of the Reichstag's elections poured into Geneva that day, the faces of the German delegates grew pale and worried, while Briand's enemies could hardly conceal their joy. France could no longer rely on Germany's good will for the future. Stresemann had given the world the illusion that German democracy was consolidated, but the wall had been rent, and the true facts stood revealed. More than ever France needed her national strength and England's full political and military collaboration. It was out of the question that she jeopardize Britain's good will by leaning to the side of her own enemies. The German elections defeated, in a definite manner, Briand and Pan-Europe.

The meeting of September, 1930, was a complete fiasco. Germany was headed for a violently nationalistic policy, a fact which became obvious only too soon. The German government, trying to consolidate its own weak prestige in the eyes of its people, proclaimed a customs union between Germany and Austria, without consulting the other powers. The answer was a furious outcry on the part of France not only against Germany but against Briand and Pan-Europe. After long and bitter negotiations Germany had to renounce its plan, without, however, eliminating the distrust it had aroused.

In May, 1931, Briand, advised by false friends, ran for the French presidency. He seems to have been ignorant of the loss of prestige he had suffered in the course of recent events. He was defeated, and emerged with a badly impaired personal authority. His career was broken. He was tolerated as foreign minister for a few more months until a last parliamentary intrigue forced him to resign.

To explain Briand's failure by the rise of Hitlerism would be too simple. The latter was but a welcome smoke-screen behind which the liquidation of Briand's Initiative could proceed without noise or unnecessary discussion. No, Briand's plan was defeated because the British government disapproved of it from the very beginning. The League of Nations was a Franco-British affair and could accomplish nothing when the two nations disagreed, and they profoundly disagreed on the question of European union.

Judged from a wider angle, however, the whole of Europe was responsible for Briand's failure. Almost every government concerned judged his Initiative from a petty nationalistic viewpoint. Mussolini had recommended it for the sake of gaining colonial advantages, Germany welcomed it for the sake of "*Gleichberechtigung*" and its economic interests, Hungary wanted it for the sake of revision. No nation was concerned with the welfare of all of Europe, only with its own immediate interests. But no union can be achieved unless individual interest is sacrificed on the altar of common welfare.

Briand was back in Geneva in September, 1931, representing his country for the last time at the League of Nations.

I called on him at the Hotel des Bergues and found him sad and tired, although not discouraged. I suggested that he and I undertake a propaganda campaign throughout Europe to revive the idea of Pan-Europe. He agreed in principle. As a parting gift from my wife I gave him a little pennant in the colors of Pan-Europe which he promised to attach to his fishing boat. The following day he sent my wife a beautiful bunch of red roses as a last greeting. I never saw him again. He died March 7, 1932, exhausted by years of political struggle, defeated by his enemies and betrayed by false friends.

The years of our mutual collaboration in the service of Pan-Europe remain among my most precious memories. I shall never forget the way he was slowly attracted to the cause until in the end he passionately espoused it. During all this time he was haunted by the prospect of another world war. Whoever looked into his amazing eyes could well believe that he was gifted with prophetic vision. He knew another world catastrophe was on the way, and he fought it with all his strength.

The years that have passed since Briand's death have justified his action more than any words could do. His failure was a tragedy. Had he succeeded, Hitler would never have become chancellor, and the course of European events would have headed in a very different di-

rection. Mankind owes this bold and generous man one of its greatest debts.

Soon after Briand's death, his glory faded. Forgotten were the days of Locarno, forgotten his struggle for European understanding. Among politicians he is now considered a dreamer and his policy a failure.

But millions and millions of the victims of this present terrible war still remember gratefully the man who tried to save the peace by European federation. They do not forget the man who began his career as a politician—and died almost as a prophet of human brotherhood and European reconciliation.

Though he failed to unite Europe he still prepared its future union by gigantic propaganda for the idea in 1929 and 1930. The seed he sowed is growing under the snow of war. And the day will come when another statesman will take up his Initiative and turn his failure into the greatest accomplishment and triumph of our century.

Then Briand's memory will appear in a new light. Then the world will consider him the most enlightened statesman in the dark period between the two wars. While all his successful actions will have passed away, from Locarno to the Young Plan and the Kellogg Pact, his biggest failure will one day be transformed into his greatest glory—his attempt to prevent the Second World War by a peaceful federation of Europe.

DURING these years of work and struggle my wife and I used to spend some days each September on the shores of the Lake of Geneva. At that time the foreign ministers of most European states, with their staffs and the leading journalists of their countries, met in Geneva to attend the Assembly of the League of Nations. But more important than the speeches held at the Assembly was the fact that the League had become somewhat like an international club of leading statesmen. In the beautiful and peaceful surrounding of the Swiss Alps these men could relax from their parliamentary troubles and discuss political problems with their colleagues from other countries at private lunches and dinner parties in an informal, human and neutral atmosphere.

These annual meetings gave me the opportunity to discuss European problems, within a few days and quite informally, with more statesmen than I could have reached during a trip of many weeks at their desks in foreign offices scattered over Europe. I remember, for instance, my first meeting with Poland's young and brilliant foreign minister, Count Alexander Skrzynski. When I called on him at his hotel he invited me to discuss Pan-Europe during a trip on the lake rather than in his plain hotel room. So, motoring across the beautiful lake on that bright autumn day, we could admire the incomparable scene while we analyzed the main problems of Europe's future. From that day Skrzynski was an enthusiastic friend of Pan-Europe. His early death in an auto crash was a severe blow for our movement.

These annual visits to Geneva brought us into contact with the country that became our new home—Switzerland. In this blessed island of peace we began to spend our summers. And soon we settled down in a lovely valley of the Bernese Alps, only a hundred miles from Geneva, on the little railway that links the lakes of Geneva and of Thun.

Our house is an old Swiss chalet, constructed in the eighteenth century in the Bernese style. It is built of strong pine logs on a stone

foundation. Its big, rather flat roof is covered with dark old tiles, and reaches far beyond the building on all sides to protect it against snow, rain, and storm. One side of the house is beautifully carved, the others are painted and decorated with old inscriptions. At the front two big open stairways of tuff stone lead to symmetrical entrances at the right and left. The rooms are low, with many little windows. The doors are decorated with old paintings or carvings.

Without altering the character and appearance of this old Bernese farmhouse, my wife managed to give it a new atmosphere. Her hobby had been to collect peasant art throughout Europe—carvings and embroideries, glass paintings and laces. Now she decorated our Swiss home with her collection, objects created by men and women of many different nations but living in a similar spirit and environment. And, surprisingly, they made a harmonious picture, as if they had been manufactured on purpose to complement each other in the framework of our Swiss chalet. A striking example of Europe's living genius in its marvelous diversity and still more marvelous unity.

In this old Swiss country home, situated at more than three thousand feet above sea level, we could, during the short intervals of our very active lives, spend happy, peaceful weeks among mountains and meadows, woods and flowers, peasants and cows. We loved to roam through the beautiful mountains and forests talking to our farmer neighbors and visiting them in their mountain lodges when in midsummer they had driven their herds to the high pastures. They were all interested in Pan-Europe and hoped it would be successful because, next to liberty, they loved peace and understood that European union alone could bring it. The minister of our parish had even fixed the symbol of Pan-Europe, with my initials, on the wall of the beautiful old church of Saanen.

During the happy summers we spent every year in our Swiss home, I had ample leisure to continue my philosophic work: In 1927 I published *Hero or Saint?*, in 1929 *Commandments of Life*, and in 1930 *Against Materialism*. From the heights of the Bernese mountains, I had the feeling of overlooking Europe's petty conflicts and visualizing the moral problems of our civilization.

This philosophic activity was closely connected with my political work; I, personally, could never separate them. For me united Europe was never an aim in itself, but only a framework for the future of European civilization. If Europe should turn barbaric, its union or disunion would no longer interest me. I strove to unite Europe to save its civilization, being convinced that a dismembered Europe would

face certain ruin and that union alone could save Europe in its greatest crisis since the fall of the Roman Empire.

When, interrupting my work, I looked from my studio to the south, I could gaze at the long chain of the Bernese Alps with its peaks ten thousand feet high, covered with eternal ice and snow. Beyond these mountains lies the valley of the Rhone in the beautiful canton of Wallis with its French-speaking population.

To the west, I looked out over the lovely valley of the Sarina, flowing through the Aar across Switzerland to the Rhine and the North Sea.

The first village I see, Saanen, lies in the canton of Bern. This little village is German in character, with a German-speaking population. But just a few miles farther on I can see another village, with entirely different traditions, where the people speak a different language. This village, Rougement, lies beyond the frontier of our state, in the French-speaking canton of Vaud. If you take a little walk, following the course of the Sarina through meadows and woods, you will suddenly notice that the poetic inscriptions on the romantic wooden houses you pass are no longer in German, but in French; that the children in the village streets no longer play and chat in German, but in French. But at the frontier between this German-speaking and this French-speaking part of Europe you will find no trenches, no soldiers, not even a policeman or customs officer to ask for a passport or for your money. No barrier will stop your car if you drive along the broad highway from Interlaken to Lausanne across the border of the two little neighbor republics, Bern and Vaud. And yet, from a cultural point of view, this border separates central Europe from western Europe, the Germanic from the Latin world.

If this invisible frontier were not a fact, it would seem a utopian myth. Europeans are too accustomed to look upon a political frontier between two neighboring states as a greater obstacle than the broadest river or the highest chain of mountains. Yet here we see that a frontier between two different states, two different languages, two different branches of the European race can be passed without even stopping, without even noticing it.

Between these two neighboring villages, which speak German and French, there is no hatred. There are many intermarriages and good neighborly relations, backed by a strong feeling of common Swiss patriotism. No German-speaking farmer would dream of forcing his French-speaking countryman to give up his mother tongue and send

his children to German schools. And every French-speaking villager considers it quite natural that he should speak French while his friend a few miles further east speaks German. Nobody thinks of changing this frontier, nobody dreams of national conquest or national oppression.

Most of our neighbors, German-speaking farmers, have spent some time as young men in the French-speaking part of Switzerland to learn French—without the slightest pressure or obligation—because they know that it is an advantage to be able to speak two languages and because they appreciate the opportunity to learn French.

Everything is natural and reasonable in the relations of these two neighbor republics with their invisible frontier and their common patriotism.

These amicable relations between the states of Bern and Vaud seem even more remarkable when we learn that the Vaud, with its capital in Lausanne, had been oppressed for centuries by the republic of Bern, and that only the French Revolution gave it liberty and equality.

But that is history. The boys and girls learn it in school, but their emotions are not roused. Lausanne dreams as little of revenge against Bern as does Bern of a reconquest of Lausanne. Even the fact that Bern is much larger than Vaud does not influence their relations, nor the fact that the federal government of Switzerland has its seat in Bern and the federal court in Lausanne. The two states are unequal, but their rights are equal, and their citizens are equals. So they are ready to collaborate for their common prosperity, and to defend in common their own peace and liberty.

If you follow the course of the Sarina for another ten miles, you come to a third and still smaller state, the canton of Fribourg. The people of this canton, and even of its beautiful old capital of Fribourg, speak part French and part German, and yet the two distinct sections of its population do not consider each other enemies, strangers, or rivals. Some of the shops of Fribourg have German inscriptions, others French; yet no German-speaking citizen of Fribourg would consider it a national offense if the French version of some official decree precedes its German translation.

This little state of Fribourg is devoutly Catholic, just as its neighbors Bern and Vaud are Protestant. But this religious difference splits the Swiss nation as little as does the difference of language. Catholics and Protestants, like the Jews in their synagogues, pray in their churches to

their common God for the liberty, peace, and prosperity of their common Swiss fatherland.

About a hundred miles east is another canton that speaks neither German nor French, but Italian—the beautiful canton of Ticino, with its capital in Lugano. This canton, separated from the rest of Switzerland by the St. Gotthard Alps, has an Italian landscape and character, but its inhabitants feel Swiss and do not consider themselves Italians. They love their Italian language and their local traditions, but they feel linked to all other parts of Switzerland by a common patriotism.

Each of the beautiful valleys of Switzerland has jealously preserved its own costumes, its own traditions, its own dialects. Their union in cantons and in the Swiss confederation has neither spoiled nor mixed nor abolished this regional individualism and traditional life.

This little commonwealth of twenty-five states in the very heart of Europe teaches a great lesson—that it is entirely possible for German, French, and Italian Europeans to live and work together peacefully, united by a feeling of brotherhood and a common loyalty, without wars or threat of war, without arming against each other, without economic rivalry or tariffs separating them, with a common market and a common currency, with common ideals, common symbols, and common leaders.

The Swiss example shows everyone who is not blind that the idea of a federated Europe is no utopia, because 90 per cent of all problems considered insoluble for united Europe have found sound and reasonable solutions in the Swiss constitution. It shows that national minorities need not be oppressed and can be as loyal to a loyal state as the majorities themselves.

To find peace and union, Europe would only have to copy large parts of the Swiss constitution and adapt a number of Swiss principles and institutions to its wider problems. For Switzerland has shown the way to make boundaries between states and even between national units invisible, to respect national and religious minorities, to find a sound compromise between the independence of federated states and the benefits of a political and economic union.

If critical spirits object that Switzerland has had such a federation for centuries, they may be answered that its last civil war took place as recently as 1847 and that its federal government did not exist before that date. There had been—between the Swiss states—some kind of League of Nations, with a common tradition and collaboration, but nothing like a federal state. The Swiss confederation, as it now exists

and functions, is just three generations old—a very short period in history. But the success of this federation is so great that it would be worth while for Europe to study and, in part, to copy it. It has assured Switzerland a period of undisturbed external and domestic peace, while all its neighbors suffered a series of wars and revolutions. During this century of peace Switzerland has been able to maintain the highest standard of personal liberty and of national and religious tolerance. It has built great prosperity, in spite of the fact that its soil is poor, that it has but few raw materials, no colonies, and no coasts. In spite of all that, the standard of living of the average Swiss was, before the war, higher than that of any other continental European, with the one exception of the Netherlands, with their huge and rich colonies.

When the twenty-five cantons decided, in 1848, to give part of their sovereignty to a federal government, Switzerland was relatively larger than Europe is today; in those days a trip from Zurich to Geneva by mail coach took longer than does a trip from Berlin to Lisbon today by airplane.

Had these Swiss cantons kept their unlimited sovereignty and refused to federate, fighting each other as the European states are doing now, Switzerland would unquestionably be one of the poorest and least civilized parts of the world—instead of being one of the wealthiest and most civilized spots on our planet.

Therefore I recommend that everyone who wants to study the problem of Europe and of European federation pass some time in Switzerland, and study the practical experience of a century of European federation and its brilliant results. After such a visit, many arguments against the possibility of a federation between the different states and ethnic groups of Europe will have vanished.

For me, it was certainly a great opportunity to have lived in that country and to have studied it thoroughly, to have seen all its cantons, and to have had personal contact with Swiss men and women of all classes, all ethnic groups and all religions. My intimate knowledge of Switzerland, more than anything else, gives me the conviction that a federated Europe is not only necessary but also possible.

The constitution of this model for a federated Europe begins by enumerating the cantons that form the federation. Then, in Article 2, it expresses the aims of the confederation:

The Confederation has the following aims: to protect the independence of the country against dangers from outside, to ensure peace and order

within, to protect the liberty and the rights of all Swiss and to promote their common welfare.

Article 3 states:

The cantons are sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal Constitution, and they exercise in consequence all rights that have not been transferred to the Federal Power.

I believe that both paragraphs might well be taken over by the future federal constitution of Europe.

The legislative body of the Swiss confederation is a copy of the American Congress. It consists of two assemblies, the Nationalrat and the Staenderat. The Nationalrat is elected by the whole Swiss nation, without consideration of its cantons, while the Staenderat is composed of two elected representatives from each canton, without considering its size or population.

Nationalrat and Staenderat together form the federal assembly which elects the executive branch, the Bundesrat, for four years. This Bundesrat, a body of seven men, has about the same authority as the American president. These seven men divide among themselves the seven most important functions of the federal government: foreign affairs, domestic affairs, military affairs, economy, finance, justice, and transportation.

Every year a different member of this board becomes its chairman, so that the tenure of the federal presidency is rotating, while the government is undoubtedly the most stable of Europe. For it has become traditional to re-elect the members of the Bundesrat until they retire because of old age.

To prevent any attempt at hegemony, the constitution states that Bundesraete must be citizens of different cantons, and that all ethnic groups should be duly represented. But it is an old tradition that the most important cantons, Bern, Zurich, and Vaud should always be represented on the executive board.

Every so-called canton is a real state, with its own government and parliament, its own laws and taxes, its own traditions and symbols, and its own local patriotism. The federation governs only foreign affairs, monetary affairs, foreign trade and duties, and ensures the constitutional rights of the individual and of the canton. Military affairs are partly cantonal and partly federal, as are transport and law, while all educational problems are cantonal.

Ethnic and linguistic differences never were a grave problem for Switzerland, because they were not considered problems of national

prestige but merely of technical understanding. French and German are used simultaneously, and Italian wherever it seems necessary. Some years ago a fourth idiom was declared a national language, with equal rights to German, French, and Italian. This fourth national language is Romansh, spoken by 1 per cent of the Swiss population in some valleys of the Grisons. This recognition has a symbolic character, showing that the right of the mother tongue is independent of the number of nationals. It is as if Britain should declare Welsh to be a second national language, equal to English.

By this marvelous national tolerance Switzerland has maintained its peace and its unity. More than two-thirds of the Swiss are ethnically Germans, but never have they made the slightest attempt to abuse their numerical superiority over their Latin countrymen for any kind of ethnic hegemony. For the Swiss do not think in terms of ethnic majorities or minorities. The greatest Swiss statesman of our century, who for almost twenty-five years ran the foreign policy of his country, was a member of the Italian minority—Giuseppe Motta. And the greater part of Swiss diplomacy originates from French-speaking cantons, mostly from Geneva. All this is possible only because the German-speaking Swiss are absolutely fair towards the other ethnic groups, and because they do not dream of dominating or running the federation, which is based on national peace and equality.

Such practical examples of national fairness seem to me even more important than the articles of the Swiss constitution, because they show in what spirit it works. One must have lived in Switzerland to understand that this grand example for European federation is not an experiment but an experience of three generations.

The longer I lived in Switzerland the more I admired the political genius of this grand little nation in the heart of Europe. Whenever I came back from disunited Europe, after endless discussions with people who argued that a peaceful federation between Europeans of different mother tongues and national temperaments was impossible, I gathered new hope and new inspiration. Never did I doubt the necessity of Pan-Europe; but sometimes, as after Briand's failure, I doubted the possibility of its fulfillment. I thought of the fate of ancient Greece that had led the civilization of its day but did not understand that it must unite if it wished to survive. So it became the victim of invasions, until its great civilization perished.

No books could reassure me—only the example of this federated Europe in miniature that we call Switzerland. I studied Switzerland

just as you read a book you love, again and again. My admiration for this admirable nation gradually was transformed into love.

Switzerland, that island of peace, example of democracy and model of federalism, became the living symbol of European unity and the promise of final triumph for our movement.

In the midst of our dismembered continent, protected by high mountains, stands this citadel of liberty. A lighthouse directing the course of Europe through the nights and storms of our era toward brighter shores and a peaceful future.

Part Three

PAN-EUROPE AGAINST PAN-GERMANY

LATE in the summer of 1929, while we were on our way from Bohemia to Geneva to attend the League of Nations Assembly where Briand was to make his first plea for Pan-Europe, we happened to pass through Nuremberg. Long before we came in sight of the city gates, we met hundreds of Swastika-adorned trucks crowded with agitated young men in brown uniforms and headed in our direction. The city itself was utterly transformed. Its medieval houses and towers seemed drowned in a sea of Swastika flags. The Nazi symbol was everywhere. It waved from every window and every rooftop. Even children proudly displayed little paper flags with the crooked cross in the center. The street crowds were strangely excited. They cheered as column after column of marching men poured into the city. They joined in the Nazi songs of hatred that reverberated in the narrow streets.

We stopped for a meal at one of the city's big beer cellars and inquired the meaning of all this excitement.

"Don't you know that the National Socialists are having their party rally here?" was the astonished counterquery.

However, this was more than an annual party celebration. The rally marked a new milestone in Hitler's career, his comeback into political power. The demonstration seemed unique. Thousands and thousands of Nazis had come not only from Germany, but from Austria, the Sudetenland, southern Tyrol and other German-speaking parts of Europe. Many important guests of honor had also arrived, among them Prince August Wilhelm, one of the Kaiser's sons.

Later when we were back on the open road, continuing our way toward Munich, the spectacle was always the same; truck after truck and car after car, crowded with men in Nazi uniforms raced past us in the direction of Nuremberg. Each time one of them passed our Daimler wild shouts went up: "Heil Hitler!"

The experience left me considerably wiser. I knew then that while

Briand and I had been struggling for European union, Hitler had resumed his revolution. After an eclipse of six years the Nazi army was on the march again. Pan-Europe had a new enemy, bolder, stronger and more dangerous than all previous ones, for nazism is the deadliest form of nationalism the world had as yet known.

The moment we arrived in Switzerland I got hold of a copy of *Mein Kampf* and began to study it. I was disgusted by its bad style and stupid contents, but I realized the danger of its impact on dissatisfied masses. There was need to act quickly and decisively on behalf of Franco-German understanding or else the world was sure to face the triumph of nazism and its inevitable consequence—war.

Hitler's war against Europe began with the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. It took him fourteen years to conquer Germany, five years to conquer Austria, one year to conquer Czechoslovakia and two years more to conquer most of the rest of the European continent west of Russia's border.

Hitler's revolution started as a reaction against two events—the Peace of Versailles and the Red uprising in Munich, or rather in protest against the work of two men—Clémenceau and Lenin. His struggle against Clémenceau gave him popularity; his struggle against Lenin provided him with the necessary funds. He triumphed first over Lenin in Germany, then over Clémenceau in Europe.

Hitler's amazing career cannot be separated from the Treaty of Versailles, just as Mustapha Kemal's career cannot be separated from the Treaty of Sèvres. After Sèvres Kemal started a national revolution, seized power, established his dictatorship, defeated Greece and enforced a new and fairer treaty—that of Lausanne. At his start Hitler had a similar program.

Hitler's rise to power was also closely linked to two economic calamities—the German inflation of the early twenties and the world depression that set in around 1929. In the intervening years of relative prosperity Hitler played a very insignificant political rôle. He rode back into power on the crest of a new wave of misery and unemployment. It was easy to make the German public believe that the depression was caused by the reparations—enormous sums of money payable under the Young Plan. If the National Socialist party demanded that these payments be stopped, it was only natural that millions of Germans, who otherwise disagreed with the Nazi party program, should vote for Hitler.

It is a fact that from 1919 to 1933 the entire German nation unanimously demanded a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, the end of the

reparations, and military equality. Differences of opinion existed only in regard to the methods that would achieve these demands. The democrats still believed in peaceful revision; the communists saw their salvation in a communist revolution and union with Soviet Russia; those who were convinced that only a national revolution could save Germany became Nazis.

The German government tried to achieve revision step by step. This method irritated France, for the chain of German demands was endless. It also irritated the German nationalists, who found the method much too slow and demanded immediate and radical revision.

After lengthy discussions with friends in Berlin and Paris I came to the conclusion that a bold step was necessary to stem the Nazi tide and prevent a Franco-German clash. Some ceiling to the German demands had to be provided. I therefore suggested that the French and German governments call a round-table conference and settle the problem of Franco-German relations on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Such a compromise had a fair chance of success, as Germany had voluntarily accepted in 1918 the Wilson program as a basis for peace.

What were the main points of dispute, then, and how should they be solved?

First of all, reconciliation demanded cancellation of the treaty paragraph which designated Germany as the sole party responsible for the war. Next, it demanded a compromise between Germany and Poland on the question of Danzig. I had worked out such a plan with the collaboration of two eminent Swiss engineers, Jules and Charles Jaeger. It assured Germany the city of Danzig, Poland the city of Gdynia and a new estuary of the Vistula. Germany would be allowed to re-establish direct communication with East Prussia by means of a dam or a tunnel.

Next, military equality between Germany and France should be made dependent upon a close Franco-German alliance and the organization of a single European air fleet.

Next, reparations should be limited to the real cost of reconstruction of the devastated areas in France and Belgium. France and Britain should meet their war debts by an inter-Allied arrangement, linked to territorial concessions in the Western Hemisphere or the Pacific.

Next, Germany's colonial claims should be met by allowing it free and equal access to raw materials in central Africa without permitting it to establish military or naval stations.

Next, the Anschluss movement in Austria might be overcome by an economic union between Austria and the Danubian states, while the

demands of the Sudeten-Germans could be satisfactorily met by granting the German minority local self-government.

None of these suggestions was impossible or utopian. Any such revision, conceded to Chancellor Bruening in 1931 or 1932, might still have saved German democracy; but France was slow in coming to any decision in the matter, and in the meantime the economic and political situation in Germany deteriorated rapidly.

Hitler, setting up a world record in demagogic expediency, promised everything to everybody without intending to keep any of his promises. Confidence in Bruening fell, as the figures of unemployment rose. Communism was on the increase again, and this fact helped Hitler to coax huge donations out of the capitalists.

Bruening, a noble, unselfish, and sincere type of German, hoped the world would help him in his fight against Hitler. But the world considered the conflict between the two men a local one.

Bruening, abandoned by Europe, fought his battle alone. He had one short moment of triumph when President Hoover proclaimed his moratorium on war debts. That day I cabled Hoover, whom I had met in the United States and found in sympathy with my ideas: "God bless you!"

But even the Hoover concession came too late. The tide of unemployment, discontent, deception, and demagoguery was still rising. Bruening, who for nearly three years had ruled with the full support of President Hindenburg, suddenly found himself the victim of a petty intrigue of his court camarilla—among them Hindenburg's son, Colonel Hindenburg. The camarilla saw to it that Bruening was dismissed as chancellor of the Reich and Von Papen put in his place.

Von Papen, smart, bold, and very ambitious, is a curious type of man. A perfect diplomat, but no statesman. Francophile and anti-Bolshevist, he sympathized for a while with the aims of the Pan-European Union. We had a last conversation on this matter at a luncheon in Lausanne in 1932, when he represented his country as Germany's chancellor at the reparations conference. Two years later, when he came to Vienna as Hitler's ambassador, I avoided him. I had not forgotten that his shortsighted intrigues were responsible for Germany's surrender to Hitler.

I never saw nor attempted to see Adolf Hitler or any other leader of his party. I met some ex-Nazis—Hermann Rauschnig in Paris and Otto Strasser in Switzerland. I also met some future Nazis, such as

Walter Funk, Schacht's successor as minister of economy and president of the Reichsbank, and General Haushofer, head of the Geopolitical Institute in Munich, before they joined Hitler's cause.

Dr. Walter Funk was at that time editor of the nationalist but anti-Nazi *Berliner Boersenzeitung*. Although we differed totally in our political point of view, he was interested in the economic aspects of Pan-Europe. We remained in personal contact until he joined the Nazi party. He now still advocates economic unity for Europe in all his speeches—not for Pan-Europe, of course, but against it.

However, a much more interesting figure was General-Professor Karl Haushofer. A man of rare knowledge and culture, he had nothing of the usual arrogance of a Prussian officer, everything of the polite and courteous type of a Bavarian gentleman.

Before the First World War he had been German military attaché in Tokyo, and from then on became Japan's greatest German admirer and friend. He wrote a standard work about the country and devoted all his energy to establishing close relations between Germany and Japan. When the peace treaty put an end to his military career, he became professor of geography at Munich University and published a monthly magazine, *Journal of Geopolitics*. The review contained sound information on South and Central America, Africa, India, Japan, China, the Pacific, and the Mohammedan world. It tended to give German youth a wider outlook in matters of world problems and to teach them a more realistic concept of power politics. Haushofer had little interest in geography as such, only as a basis for power-political views. He knew that any country planning global action must first learn to think in terms of space and distance, because both are decisive factors in war and peace.

He never gave the impression of an aggressive nationalist, however. He did not believe in a German conquest of Russia. He was a sincere admirer of Britain's empire-builders and always regretted the lack in his countrymen of political wisdom. He favored Bavarian autonomy and was loyal to its former ruling dynasty, the Wittelsbachs. Never did he utter a single phrase that made him suspect as a Nazi sympathizer.

He was keenly interested in my Pan-European ideas and wrote much about them in connection with Pan-Asiatic, Pan-Islamic, Pan-American, and Pan-Pacific plans. But his own point of view favored rather a continental chain of states which would reach from Europe to Japan and which was to counterbalance the world control exercised by the English-speaking nations as a result of their naval supremacy.

When I knew Haushofer, he criticized the Nazi movement very frankly. He was, however, a close personal friend of Rudolf Hess. Hess, who had participated in Hitler's Munich putsch in 1923, became a fugitive when the revolution miscarried, and sought shelter in Haushofer's home. Haushofer took him in as a former fellow officer in trouble. He grew to like and trust him. Hess in turn became his enthusiastic disciple. When Hess and Hitler were locked up in Landsberg and began to collaborate on the Nazi bible, *Mein Kampf*, Hess called in the general-professor for help and advice.

I am positive that Hitler's sympathy for Japan was inspired by Haushofer. The primitive racist ideology which Hitler favors lay originally alongside the path of Kaiser Wilhelm's anti-yellow-peril policy. Thanks to Haushofer Hitler accepted the paradoxical idea of an alliance with the only world power which is without a single "Aryan" strain.

Haushofer had sympathized with our movement for years. He even was a guest lecturer at one of our conferences. When, in 1929, I had organized a Pan-Europe meeting in Munich, he attended the Pan-Europe dinner afterwards. He sat at my wife's left, while Thomas Mann was at her right. Different though the two men were in outlook and temperament, they both toasted the future of Pan-Europe that day.

Haushofer, Schacht, and Funk did and probably still do everything to convince Hitler of the necessity of creating some kind of European federation under German hegemony. Hitler himself lacks any inclination in this direction. His aim is not federation, but domination. *Mein Kampf* makes no mention of a European union, and demands only an alliance with England and Italy to achieve the conquest of Russia. Hitler's limited thinking may be the consequence of his limited education. He speaks only German. To him Germany's linguistic borders are identical with the borders of civilization.

Goering had his own private opinion on European union. When a leading Swedish newspaper interviewed him on the matter in 1932, he said brusquely: "Yes, I am in favor of Pan-Europe but not of Coudenhove's Pan-Europe." He refrained from enlarging on his point of view. However, one of his prominent Nazi colleagues, Wilhelm Kube, later first chairman of the Prussian Diet, was less cryptic in his answer. When, in 1932, I inquired among the members of the French and German parliaments what point of view they held in regard to Pan-Europe, Wilhelm Kube came forth with a statement which seemed exaggerated at the time, but seems tame now in the light of events which were to follow. Here it is:

I consider a European federation desirable under the following conditions:

1. All obligations imposed on Germany by the shameful Treaty of Versailles are to be canceled.

2. The French gangster-state must be forced to pay reparations to Germany to compensate for the crimes its white and colored troops have committed in the Rhineland, the Ruhr District, Upper Silesia and so on.

3. The German minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Belgium, Italy and Yugoslavia shall obtain the right to rejoin Greater Germany by means of plebiscites.

4. German-Austria, Alsace-Lorraine, Germanic Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Danzig and the so-called Memelland are to be reunited with Germany, for their population is primarily German.

5. The lower-German Flanders shall be separated from the romanic Walonia and be given the right to join the Netherlands.

6. The chairmanship within this European federation is to be taken over by Germany as the only nation entitled to it owing to its size, history and culture.

7. The Dawes plan shall be canceled immediately and the sums that were extorted from Germany by the so-called victory states (better called gangster states) shall be restored to Germany.

I published Kube's program in my review *Pan-Europe* on the eve of the third Pan-Europe congress. This congress, which met on the fairgrounds of Basle in October, 1932, opened up the fight between the Pan-European movement and nazism. Referring to Kube's demands, which were the official demands of the Nazi party, I stated that any attempt to enforce them would result in war and that therefore our movement would fight them with all its power together with everything else Hitler stood for.

The congress was well attended, especially by all minor states of eastern Europe where the idea of Pan-Europe had grown popular thanks to Briand's Initiative. All these smaller nations were by then victims of the world depression and bitterly opposed to anything that might entangle them in a war arising from the French-German conflict.

There were a number of faithful old friends who came to Basle to speak on behalf of Pan-Europe. Amery came from England and Momshilo Nincic from Yugoslavia. However, our most brilliant orator of the day was the young Rumanian delegate Mihail Manolescu, who later joined the Rumanian fascists and, as foreign minister, signed away half of Transylvania to Hungary.

Germany in the late fall of 1932 had become a tense and noisy place

to live in. All through December considerable rioting went on in all the larger German cities.

Some time during December, 1932, the S.S.S. Club in Berlin invited me to talk to its members on Germany's European mission. The place and date were set for the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin on January 30, 1933. The S.S.S. Club derived its laconic epithet from its three prominent founders whose names started with the letter S: Walter Simons, president of the supreme court and former foreign minister; General von Seeckt, who as chief of Marshal Mackensen's general staff had conquered eastern Europe, and who later created and commanded the Reichswehr; Wilhelm Solf, who had been successively governor of Samoa, foreign minister, and ambassador. This group united influential men of all parties and professions and was at that time Germany's most important political club.

The Hotel Kaiserhof, where I had been invited to speak, had been our Berlin residence and personal headquarters for ten years. All our receptions and press conferences, all our dinners on behalf of Pan-Europe had taken place there. But the Kaiserhof was also Hitler's headquarters, and since the recent comeback of Nazism the place was so crowded with brown uniforms that we preferred to stop at another hotel, the Esplanade.

Coming up from Switzerland by car, we had passed through Bavaria and been surprised to see so very few Swastika flags in that old stronghold of Nazism. The movement seemed definitely on the decline there. Up in Berlin some of our friends were of the same opinion. The financial situation of the party was said to be desperate.

But Hjalmar Schacht was of a different opinion. "Within three months Hitler will be German chancellor," he told me, and added with his usual vivacity, "but don't be afraid of such a development. Hitler is the only man able to reconcile Germany with the Western powers. He'll bring about Pan-Europe, you'll see." I denied this, but he smiled and said: "Hitler will succeed because he has no opposition from the Right. Stresemann and Bruening failed because they lacked co-operation from that quarter. Hitler alone need not fear the Right and is certain to secure peace and collaboration in Europe." I had not the slightest chance to convert him to a different point of view. He stuck to his own opinion. It was the last time that we met.

A few days later alarming news reached Berlin. Hitler and Von Papen had met at the house of a Cologne banker, Von Schroeder. Rumor had it that they had come to terms and were conspiring against the new chancellor, General von Schleicher.

On January 29, Hindenburg suddenly dismissed Von Schleicher and asked Hitler to form a new government. Papen was to be vice-chancellor in order to secure the co-operation of the conservatives and the right wing of the Catholics.

Thanks to Papen the new cabinet was constituted the very next day. Hitler was, at last, chancellor. Papen's intrigue achieved what neither the demagoguery of Goebbels nor Roehm's brown army had been able to bring about—the conquest of Germany by the Nazis.

I had been warned by telephone to cancel my evening lecture, but when I called up the Hotel Kaiserhof I was informed that, if I agreed, the meeting of the S.S.S. Club would take place under any circumstances. I was advised to use the back entrance as the front entrance was reserved for the new government.

The Kaiserhof seemed a veritable fortress that evening. Within a few hours it had become the center and heart of Germany. Although the doors were strongly guarded, it looked much like a beehive with innumerable brown bees swarming in and out. It was difficult for me to enter even through the back door. When I reached the conference hall I was surprised at the size of the audience. The membership seemed to have gathered in toto. Simons, Seeckt, and Solf were present, as well as many other prominent Germans. Everybody was tense and aware of the tremendous significance of the moment. They knew that a new page in Germany's history had been turned, but what the page was to contain no one could tell.

During the discussion which followed my lecture I heard considerable criticism of nazism, and I tried to press the point that aggressive nationalism could still be overcome by a triumphant Pan-Europe. But under the same roof meanwhile Hitler and his new cabinet were holding their first government council. The foundation of the Third Reich was being laid and the fate of Germany decided. Pan-Europe had very little chance that day.

The town was transformed when that evening I left the Kaiserhof. A new Berlin and a new Germany had been born. The streets resounded with the marching steps of thousands of Nazi boots. Long brown columns wound in and out of the Wilhelmstrasse, their burning torches casting eerie shadows on the walls. There were ovations in front of the Hindenburg palace and the Chancellery. The torch procession of Hitler's storm troopers was a march of triumph, a symbol of victory.

On the evening of January 30 the peace of Europe was doomed.

The Nazi torches that were burning that night soon would set the Reichstag afire, then Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then Europe.

In his first round Hitler had triumphed over Pan-Europe. The battle for Germany had been decided in his favor.

Three weeks later, when we left Berlin, the wave of terrorism began and steadily transformed Germany into a prison and a lunatic asylum.

HITLER'S triumph in Germany was a terrible blow for Pan-Europe, as it marked the beginning of a war between Germany and the rest of Europe.

The Pan-European Union in Germany was, of course, dissolved, my books were forbidden, and all further activity on behalf of Pan-Europe within the country became impossible. Thereupon many of our followers in France and elsewhere concluded that the movement, as such, was doomed and a Pan-European federation could no more be achieved. I did not share this pessimism. I was convinced that the new German regime would not last. Nazism would either be overthrown from within by a revolution or from without by a war. During the ensuing political crisis European federation was likely to become a first choice, if not altogether a necessity.

The decisive question now was: What should Europe do?

The answer seemed simple. Europe must unite not *with* Nazi Germany but *against* it. A strong military, political, and economic alliance of all threatened European nations, including Great Britain, was a primary necessity. Hitler would not dare to challenge such a bloc—and if he did it would mean national suicide.

I spent the entire year of 1933 reorganizing my activities on this basis. From now on I had one primary aim—the liquidation of Hitler and what he stood for, for the man personified everything I had been fighting all my life.

It was obvious that Austria would be Hitler's next victim. He had been Austrian himself, and had always considered this country part of Greater Germany. Also, if Austria were incorporated into the Reich, no one could consider him a foreigner, should a revolutionary crisis come about in Germany.

He knew that Austria, on account of its geographic situation, was the key to Europe and could bar or open up his road of conquest. Once

Austria was conquered, Czechoslovakia was at his mercy and the way to the Balkans and the Orient free. If Austria remained free, it remained a latent threat. It was Italy's natural protection against any German aggression. It could enter into an alliance with France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and other states and become a spearhead of an allied attack.

Evidently Hitler was determined to conquer Austria; and as he was not yet strong enough to attempt invasion, he started by "peaceful penetration."

A new man had become Austrian chancellor in 1933, a man I had not yet met and on whose decision it depended whether Pan-Europe would weather this crisis or not: Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss.

Friends had advised me to move the headquarters of the Pan-European Union from Vienna to Basle, where our third congress had met with general sympathy. They believed that our movement could be more active from a neutral base, where it would remain free of national complications and could more easily work for reconciliation between Germany and the democracies, once the revolutionary phases of nazism should have passed. My wife and I, however, had decided not to desert our post, well aware that Austria would probably be the main battleground of Europe for the years to come. Vienna was Europe's first trench line against the Nazi tide, and it was necessary to hold this line as long as possible.

On our return from Switzerland I tried to see Dollfuss at once. I called on him at the Chancellery on the Ballhausplatz and met a fair-haired, slight young man with a high, obstinate forehead and large, expressive blue eyes. His manners were natural and simple, his words seemed sincere. He was quick, but not nervous, in his motions. He gave the impression of a man who has a great deal to do and too little time to do it in, but there was a boyish quality to his vigor and energy, and like all Austrians he had a great deal of gaiety. He was optimistic and positive in his decisions, and, all in all, impressed one as a genuine son of that charming land of Lower Austria that draws a cordon of lowly hills and meadows around the Austrian capital. The Austrian peasants adored him because they felt that his soul was still that of a peasant even though his intelligence was urban.

We became friends at our first meeting and understood each other perfectly. Dollfuss knew that Pan-Europe would serve and not harm Austria's cause, and I was grateful for the collaboration of his government in this critical hour. Dollfuss accepted the honorary presidency of our Austrian committee and gave our movement wholehearted

support. For the first time since Briand's death a European statesman was ready again to adapt his foreign course to the program of European union.

Meanwhile a first skirmish had taken place between Hitler and Dollfuss. Hitler had directed Frank, minister of the German government, to go to Austria and spread Nazi propaganda. As Frank's visit had not been announced through diplomatic channels, Dollfuss sent a police officer to the Vienna airport to tell the arriving Nazi minister that his presence was undesirable in Austria. Dollfuss knew that he was challenging Hitler, but preferred an open fight to underground methods of intrigue.

Presently a guerrilla war spread all over Austria. Nazi organizations developed in every town and every village, and they seemed to have espoused the combined slogans of Pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevism and anti-democracy. Naturally these slogans were highly explosive material for Austria's emotional, uncritical, and impoverished youth. Thousands of Austrian boys and girls acquired a new vision of power, inspired by the example of the Nazi party on the other side of the border. Hitler fed their ambition by sending them millions of propaganda leaflets. He also sent them money, knives, brass knuckles, bombs, and rifles.

A tide of terrorism arose. Bombs were thrown, bridges blown up, and people murdered. But Hitler had still other and smoother weapons: he promised employment and higher living standards; he promised personal rewards; he bribed people with money and with threats; he appealed to their idealism, their heroism, their cowardice, or their fear. His first aim was to achieve a majority vote for the Nazi party at the forthcoming Austrian elections. He hoped to attain his aim by wholesale intimidation and corruption.

Dollfuss was ready for effective counteraction. He outlawed the Nazi party and all Nazi organizations. He refused to permit new general elections. He dismissed the parliament and proclaimed a new corporative constitution. But the blow he dealt Austrian democracy in order to maintain Austria's independence infuriated the Social Democrats who had hoped to triumph over nazism by legal and parliamentary means. Unable to understand that Austria had only the tragic choice between Hitler and Dollfuss, they attacked the Chancellor's internal policy and denounced him as an Austrian Mussolini.

Dollfuss himself was in a difficult position. In disarmed Austria

three armed groups of civilians existed side by side: the brown army of the Nazis, the red army of the Socialists, and the green army of the Austrian "*Heimwehren*." The latter, led by young Prince Starhemberg, was known for its fascist tendencies. Dollfuss's own political group, the Christian Socialists, although the strongest parliamentary group in Austria, were unsupported by any major military formations within their ranks. They were forced to seek the co-operation of one of the three armed groups, each of which had outside affiliations: the Nazis were backed by Germany; the Socialists by Czechoslovakia; and the *Heimwehren* by Italy. Dollfuss chose to ally himself with the *Heimwehren* because at that moment Mussolini was the only man willing to risk a war in order to prevent the conquest of Austria by Germany.

Of course neither Dollfuss nor the Socialists wished to wage war on each other. When I urged Dollfuss to come to terms with his opponents, he smiled bitterly. "Do you really think me so stupid as to choose a war on two fronts if I could avoid it?" Karl Seitz, Socialist mayor of Vienna, assured me that the Socialists were equally averse to civil war. He feared, however, that both sides would be forced into it by their impatient and emotional followers.

During these months I did all I could to assure a compromise between Dollfuss and the Socialists for the sake of a united front against Hitler. But while these negotiations were under way, some minor incident led to the tragic clash between the government and the armed Socialists. The civil war of February, 1934, was not only a disaster for Austria but also a personal tragedy for Dollfuss, who was aware that the Austrian Socialists were fighting for their constitution and liberty while he was fighting for his country's independence. Despite Dollfuss's rapid victory, which prevented the intervention of Nazi Germany, this civil war weakened Austria's power of resistance, because it set the embittered working classes against the government when Austria needed unity more than ever.

We had friends and collaborators in both camps and we suffered greatly from their tragedy, but as a Czechoslovak citizen and a guest of Austria I wished to remain aloof from an internal political conflict. I continued to back Dollfuss's international policy, however, because his fight for Austria's independence against Hitler and Pan-Germanism was a matter concerning the whole of Europe.

Dollfuss wanted France, Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia to guarantee Austria's independence collectively. I gave him

all possible help in the matter. Dollfuss had better relations with Rome and Budapest; my relations were closer with Prague and Paris.

Hitler meanwhile tried to unseat Dollfuss by economic pressure. The country was largely dependent on the tourist industry and welcomed the large yearly influx of German guests. Hitler introduced a protective tax of one thousand marks for every German desirous of crossing the border into Austria. Dollfuss thereupon turned to the Western democracies, asking them to send their tourists to Austria.

The appeal was successful. The Prince of Wales gave the signal by visiting Austria. Thousands of British, French, and American tourists followed. For a few years Austria became as international a tourist place as Switzerland and made a good deal of money. With a smile on his boyish face Dollfuss confessed to me one day that the thousand-mark tax was a very happy occurrence for Austria. At least it made it easy to detect the incoming Nazi agents, who usually crossed the border "free of charge."

Dollfuss and his minister of education, Schuschnigg, aimed at more than successful tourist propaganda, however. They wished to make Vienna into a new center of European culture. Austria was worth a visit in those years, not only for the sake of its beautiful lakes, woods, and mountains, but also for the glamor of its theater and concert stage. Many a great exiled artist had sought shelter in the country and put his genius at the service of the nation. Names like Toscanini, Bruno Walter, Bronislaw Huberman, and Adolf Busch appeared regularly on Vienna's musical programs. Max Reinhardt continued to direct the Salzburg Festivals. Performances at the Opera and the Burgtheater, where Ida Roland was playing Cleopatra and Lady Macbeth, had acquired a glamor that recalled the country's most brilliant cultural past.

Dollfuss's statecraft, however, was up against a task of another kind—a very hard task in which he stood alone. He was trying to build a new state, based primarily on the social and political ideas approved by the Vatican. It was to rest politically on an authoritarian executive and a corporative legislature, and morally on Christian principles with due regard for the rights of man without racial and religious discriminations.

The corporative ideas of Dollfuss dated back to the time when he had organized the agricultural co-operatives of Austria and made a success of them. He hoped to organize now all of the country's economic branches along these lines and replace the old political parties by such professional groups.

His vast new enterprise absorbed much of his time and energy, for he gave it all his creative effort. However, he remained closely attached to the work of the Pan-European Union, and with his active help we built up a network of economic research stations all over Europe with headquarters in Vienna, where the various national statistics were coordinated to form a first general survey of European economics. This center of economic research organized several international conferences at which Dollfuss was present. He was also responsible for Pan-Europe's impressive new headquarters—his own official residence in the Imperial Palace—a luxurious apartment which was not at all to his taste. He preferred his own simple little flat to live in.

He was present on Pan-Europe Day, May 17, 1934, when a great Pan-European demonstration took place in the assembly hall of the former Austrian parliament. The huge building flew the Austrian and the Pan-European banners. As usual a number of foreign guests were present, among them the former French minister of agriculture, Ricard. However, our most honored speakers that day were Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. Dollfuss gave exhaustive praise to the Pan-Europe movement and expressed full faith in its work and future. Schuschnigg spoke about his favorite theme—the European spirit. He touched upon the cultural mission of Austria in a very noble and persuasive manner, and spoke not like a politician but like a distinguished author. My wife closed the meeting by reciting Victor Hugo's immortal peace speech of 1849 with these prophetic words:

The day will come when these two great unions, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, will face and greet each other across the ocean, exchanging their goods, their commerce, their industry, their art, their genius, civilizing the planet, colonizing deserts, improving creation under the eyes of the Creator, to provide the greatest benefit for all, by combining these two infinite forces: the brotherhood of man and the power of God!

The evening of that day saw a small party of our guests united at a little inn in Grinzing in the city suburbs. Dollfuss was with us. He was gay as a child. The meeting and the obvious progress of the Pan-European idea had made him very happy. Together with Ricard he tasted the different Austrian wines and was pleased when the Frenchman praised them. Dollfuss considered himself personally responsible for the improvement of recent Austrian vintages. After a while he asked his young secretary to sing Austrian folksongs. We listened, then talked a little while longer until one of Dollfuss's detectives came into the

room, reminding us that we were sitting in a brightly lighted glass lobby in the middle of a dark garden. Rumor had spread among the other guests that the Chancellor was present. There was always the chance that an attack on his life might be attempted. Dollfuss was obviously bored by the warning and refused to break up the party. In fact none of us wanted to go home. We all wanted to remain a little longer within the magic radius of this unforgettable man, who was so simple, so human, and at this moment so happy. We stayed and talked and listened to the music around us and watched young Vienna laugh and dance.

Dollfuss was a very courageous, highly individualistic man who hated to be led and watched by detectives. Besides, he was convinced of his lucky star. Some months before a young Nazi had made an attempt on his life and the bullet had barely grazed him.

I met Dollfuss for the very last time in June, 1934, at a tea in the home of one of his ministers. In the course of our conversation he told me that he planned to take his family to Italy during his vacation and that he would spend some time in Riccione with Mussolini. He expected personally to take up the Pan-European question with Mussolini and hoped to get him to take action. He seemed radiantly optimistic, promising an increasingly active co-operation on behalf of Pan-Europe for the near future. I told him that before anything else he should consider his safety. I chided him for taking so many risks and walking around unguarded. By a strange coincidence in another corner of the room my wife was talking to Mrs. Dollfuss on the very same subject. Suddenly a detonation was heard in the street. Everybody jumped from his seat, believing that a bomb had been thrown. It was only the blowout of a tire, but the general nervousness well illustrated the situation in Vienna in 1934.

A few days later we left for Switzerland, to spend the summer in our chalet in the Bernese mountains.

In the afternoon of July 25 I was working in my study. It was a very hot day. Suddenly I heard a low moan. I went into the next room to ask my wife if she felt ill. "Why no, not at all," she told me rather surprised. I went in search of my brother-in-law, Arthur, who was working on one of his fine paintings on the same floor. He had no complaints to make; he had heard nothing.

That same evening the terrible news came over the radio: Dollfuss had been assassinated by a group of Austrian Nazis who had penetrated into the Federal Palace disguised as Austrian officers and police-

men. They had wounded Dollfuss with two shots. While he lay dying they told him that the country had risen in revolt against him and demanded a National Socialist government. To put an end to the civil war they asked that he resign from power. Dollfuss, surrounded only by his murderers, alone, wounded, and dying, resisted. With a faint voice he asked for a doctor and a priest. Both were refused. He bled to death after a long and terrible agony.

The news was a frightful shock to us; Dollfuss was a very dear friend, and I often wondered whether this afternoon a last message from him had not perhaps reached me through the ether.

In the great battle for Austria and Europe Dollfuss died as a hero at the head of his army. But during the two short years of his leadership Austria was so far consolidated that its independence could survive his death for years. His spirit triumphed in the days that followed his assassination. The Nazi revolt was drowned in an outburst of public indignation and a new wave of patriotism.

Hitler at that time did not dare to back the Nazi revolt in Austria with German troops. Mussolini stood ready to cross the Brenner and to assist the Austrian nation at a moment's notice. Not France, nor Britain, nor Russia, nor Czechoslovakia—Italy alone saved, during these critical days, the independence of Austria. This was the fruit of Dollfuss's foreign policy, which might have altered the fate of Europe, had he lived.

In the great battle between Pan-Germany and Pan-Europe, Hitler had suffered his first drastic defeat, because he had met for the first time a statesman who preferred death to compromise or surrender.

Throughout Austria Dollfuss was mourned as a martyr and a national hero. Peasants from all over the country, from the Tyrol and from Styria, from Carinthia and from Salzburg, were pouring into Vienna to say farewell to their beloved little chancellor. The funeral assumed the aspects of a nation-wide plebiscite in favor of Austrian independence. That evening a candle burned in almost every window to honor the man who had sacrificed his life fighting Hitler for the sake of Austria, of Europe, and of the civilized world.

FROM 1924 to 1932 my primary efforts had been devoted to bringing about a reconciliation between the French and German republics. If these two nations were to join hands in working toward European reconstruction they would soon become the nucleus of a larger union, including the central European and Balkan states, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, the Baltic states, and eventually the states of the Iberian and Scandinavian peninsulas. Even Italy would be compelled to join a federation of this kind, despite that country's fascist constitution and its exaggerated nationalism.

The whole situation was changed, however, when on January 30, 1933, Hitler became German chancellor. Thereafter attempts to come to a peaceful understanding with Germany were certain to fail. Any French concession toward Germany could only strengthen Hitler's position and weaken the rest of Europe. Hitler's mind concerning German domination over Europe had been made up long ago. He could be checked only by a superior power which stood united against his aspirations. But Great Britain and Soviet Russia had turned their backs on continental Europe; only France, Italy, and some minor states of central Europe were left for possible action against Germany. Therefore France and Italy must join hands to constitute the beginning of any effective defensive league. Hitler had only begun to rearm Germany and was not yet strong enough to challenge both the Latin sisters at once.

A Franco-Italian alliance would include automatically Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Balkan bloc, and Belgium. Backed by Britain and eventually by Russia, it might evolve into a European federation, leaving no chance open for Hitler to conquer isolated and weaker neighbors.

If, on the other hand, Hitler succeeded in isolating France and making an ally of Italy, he could drive a wedge between western and cen-

tral Europe, invade Austria, and get his program of European conquest under way.

To a certain degree the fate of Europe at that period lay in the hands of one man—Benito Mussolini. He still had the choice between France and Germany, between peace and war. His national interest led him toward a union with France; his fascist ideology towards a union with Hitler. Personally he despised Hitler. When he first saw his picture, he is said to have exclaimed spontaneously: "This face is an insult to the human race."

To imagine Mussolini as Briand's successor may seem paradoxical—but not altogether inconceivable. Since he had made peace with the Vatican in 1929, he seemed to incline toward a broader European policy. His attitude toward Briand's Initiative was critical, but not hostile. In order to reconcile France and Germany he had even favored a policy of limited revisionism. When Hitler came to power Mussolini tried the rôle of arbiter of Europe by sponsoring the so-called Four-Power Pact between Italy, France, Germany, and Britain. This pact could be interpreted as a beginning of a new Pan-European Initiative, creating a balance between the western powers and Germany for the sake of Continental peace.

Simultaneously, Mussolini modified his attitude toward the Pan-European movement. After he had entirely ignored our first two congresses—Vienna in 1926 and Berlin in 1930—he permitted an Italian delegate, Marquese Giorgio Quartara, to attend our third congress at Basle in October, 1932.

Already in Briand's day, Mussolini had realized that the movement for European union could no longer be ignored by Italian public opinion. But he did not want to join a union which owed its life to the Initiative of Briand and me. So he reacted in a very characteristic way. He tried to start his own Pan-European movement by encouraging and subsidizing a review named *Anti-Europa*, which combined fascist and Pan-European ideas. This review, edited by a young Fascist, Asvero Gravelli, attacked Briand and me in every issue, and instead promoted the idea of European union under Mussolini's moral lead. The practical effect of this review was to prepare Fascist Italy for Pan-European ideas, in opposition to Russia and outside the pale of the League of Nations.

Before I decided to see Mussolini in the spring of 1933, I had a long talk with his foreign secretary, Dino Grandi, in Geneva. I found him in sympathy with the idea of a European union. He promised to speak

to Mussolini about me and to let me know when he would receive me.

I had been invited by an American broadcasting company to deliver a Pan-European message to America on May 9, 1933. The address was to be broadcast from Nice, which was convenient enough as I was just staying with my family in Cap d'Antibes.

On May 7 I received a cable that Mussolini would receive me on May 10. I asked the broadcasting service to postpone my message, but they declared that dates could not be changed. They suggested, instead, that I speak from the station at Ostia near Rome. This suited me perfectly, and I was in Rome on the morning of May 9 ready for my speech. However, the representative of the broadcasting service, Mr. Thomas Morgan, came to see me at once informing me that, owing to a sudden technical defect of the Ostia station, any transmission to the United States was out of the question that day. Our suspicion that the nature of the defect was political, not technical, was later confirmed.

The audience with Mussolini at the Palazzo Venezia was scheduled for the next day. After passing through a number of narrow corridors with heavily guarded iron gates at each end—deadly traps for anyone who might attempt a murderous attack—I finally reached Mussolini's study and reception room. No, it was no room—it was an enormous hall with Mussolini's desk standing at the other end silently bidding the visitor to come forward.

As I crossed the seemingly endless hall Mussolini continued to write without taking notice of me. Only when I had come to a stop in front of his desk did he look up and offer me a seat.

I found him very much changed from the time when I had seen him eight years before. He looked older, heavier, more monumental. His dark hair had grayed. But he seemed saner, less nervous, and in a state of complete self-control. There was no trace here of the lively journalist I had seen in the Senate. This man was rather like a rich, powerful, and hard-driving business executive. He looked no more like a leopard, but rather like a strong bull.

His head was still impressive, the forehead beautifully shaped. The large, coal-black eyes were very expressive, although they lacked the bright spark of idealism. The upper part of his face was noble and fine; but his mouth and jaw expressed cynicism and brutality, which grew more obvious when he smiled. As long as he sits, the large head seems to be part of a mighty torso, but when he stands up he looks small and disproportioned. All in all, his appearance is striking, and would call for attention even if you met him in a subway.

That day he asked many questions but offered no answers. He wanted to be informed, and he listened attentively to what I had to say. When he did speak, his voice remained on an even keel; his manners were polite and simple. My knowledge of Italian was rudimentary, but I did not wish to have any advantage over him by speaking German. So we conversed in French, and I think he appreciated the gesture. He speaks French almost perfectly although with an accent.

We started our discussion with philosophical issues—with Nietzsche, whom he greatly admired. Then we turned to the Pan-European problem in connection with the Four-Power Pact which he had just proposed. This led to nazism and its racial theories. I told him that these theories were directed against all Mediterraneans, not only against the Jews; that nazism considered the dark-haired Mediterranean as something of a mongrel race between the fair-haired Nordic and the black-skinned African Negro. The inferiority of the Mediterranean races is in fact a basic element of the Nazi racist lore, justifying Hitler's claim to European hegemony on biological grounds. I mentioned Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain in their influence on Hitler and Rosenberg.

Mussolini did not contradict me. He declared anti-Semitism pure nonsense.

"I have studied the racial problem," he said, "I even wrote on the subject years ago. I shall send you the article. It opposes the racial theory of the Germans on the ground that the basic values and achievements of our civilization were created by the Mediterraneans, and again and again almost smashed by Nordic barbarians."

He gave me a short idea of his own theories which advocated the superiority of the Latin races over the Germanic ones. It was still racism, but it reversed the values.

Mussolini was at that time definitely anti-Nazi and anti-German. I was surprised that his nationalism was part of a strong sense of Latin solidarity and Latin pride. As far as Pan-Europe was concerned, the idea obviously interested and fascinated him. But he expressed neither approval nor disapproval. His mind was not yet made up as to whether he should work for or against it. Obviously he was willing to follow its further development from a neutral and not unsympathetic vantage point.

Before parting I asked him to read the latest issue of my review *Pan-Europa*, which I had brought along with some other books of mine. This issue contained a comment on his Four-Power Pact, an article quoting everything Nietzsche had written in favor of a united Europe,

and an article, *The Rights of Man*, as codified by the French Revolution. The last piece explained why Pan-Europe would have to respect many different forms of national constitutions but that in turn these constitutions would have to guarantee the Rights of Man, including those of national minorities, because individual and national freedom was a basic element of European peace and civilization.

The same day I had an audience at the Vatican with the new secretary of state, Cardinal Pacelli, the present Pope Pius XII. We had met him in Berlin at a dinner given by the Prussian minister of education, Dr. Becker. He was Nuncio then. Now I had gone to see him to discuss the Pan-European problem and the necessity of defending Western civilization against nazism. He was in sympathy with my ideas and had no illusions concerning Hitler's basic hostility toward Christianity.

The impression I had gained before was fully confirmed. Here was a great servant of the Church who combined purity and high-mindedness with deep humanitarian instincts. I feel and have always felt a profound sympathy and admiration for this wonderful and really saintly man, the "Angelic Shepherd" of the old prophecy, whose ascetic and aristocratic beauty is the true expression of a very humane and very noble soul. Those who believe that faces are indicative of the inner man will disapprove of some of his critics' opinion that he is primarily a shrewd diplomat. I believe, on the contrary, that Pope Pius XII is a genuine saint, condemned by fate to play the rôle of a diplomat—a rôle he is playing with poor success. He could well have served as a model for Fra Angelico's biblical saints. No deeper contrast exists than that between him and Mussolini, the two outstanding men in contemporary Italy.

Critics of Pacelli have reproached him for not taking a clear stand in favor of democracy and against fascism, although they excuse him with the fact that he is virtually a prisoner of Fascist Italy.

These critics start from the wrong premise. There is no reason for a basically anti-Fascist attitude on the part of Catholicism. Catholicism is the fascist form of Christianity of which Calvinism represents its democratic wing. The Catholic hierarchy rests fully and securely on the leadership principle with the infallible pope in supreme command for a lifetime. Leadership is, of course, open to all classes of the Catholic society and so is leadership within the fascist state. But, like the Fascist party, its priesthood becomes a medium for an undemocratic minority rule by a hierarchy.

~~This constitutional—not moral—analogy between fascism and Ca-~~

tholicism offers the key to the fact that in Europe, as well as in America, Catholic nations follow fascist doctrines more willingly than Protestant nations, which are the main strongholds of democracy. Even in Germany the fascist movement did not come from the Protestant North but from the Catholic South, not from Berlin, but from Munich. Like Hitler himself, most other leaders of nazism have a Catholic and not a Protestant background.

It is obvious that the Catholic Church will prefer the democratic system in states where she forms a minority, because she depends on tolerance there. For a Catholic nation, she seems to prefer a system of moderate fascism like that of Salazar in Portugal or of Dollfuss in Austria, based on authoritarian government, corporative representation, and Christian ethics—uninfected, of course, by the paganism and anti-humanism of Hitler's racial doctrines.

This is important to remember when the time for European reconstruction comes. The basic political conceptions of Protestant nations are different from those of Catholic nations. Democracy lays its stress on personal conscience; fascism on authority and obedience. This may explain why democracy was a success among most Protestant and a failure among most Catholic nations, in Europe as well as in America.

During the following months Mussolini seemed openly to favor the Pan-European idea. In January, 1934, he declared in an interview:

We must create a Europe which will prevent its youth from rising in war against each other. This agitated youth will be calmer within an organized Europe. But this new Europe will not emerge from the League of Nations but from a League of European Nations.

Europe was the cornerstone of the world's civilization. The world has had the benefit of its leadership but it seems now to have succumbed to America and Japan. If it wants to make a comeback and maintain itself it must achieve some minimum of unity. What is lacking among the great nations of Europe and what must weld them together is a European spirit. . . .

At our next Pan-European conference in Vienna Italy was duly represented. Among its delegates was Gravelli, whose review *Anti-Europa* had turned into a veritable mouthpiece of Pan-Europe. The conference at Stresa in the spring of 1935 was the turning point on this Pan-European path of Mussolini's. For the last time Mussolini tried to get the western European nations to take collective action on behalf of Austria against Hitler. Not very long afterwards came the Ethiopian conflict. It thrust Mussolini, step by step, into Hitler's arms.

Two years after my first visit and two days after his Abyssinian victory, on May 9, 1936, I saw Mussolini again. Count Ciano, his new foreign secretary, was present at our interview.

Mussolini's spirits were high. He had come to the climax of his amazing career, with Hitler not yet overshadowing him. He had won out in his struggle with the democracies, had conquered an empire for the Italian nation, and had achieved much prestige for himself. He was again free to seek either closer partnership with the West or to join Hitler in his struggle against the democratic world.

He greeted me like an old friend and started to discuss the latest developments in Europe. I warned him that Hitler was on the way to win European hegemony unless thwarted by force. I told him that neither Italy nor France could venture to tackle Hitler alone. Forty million Italians were as unable to resist the pressure of seventy million Germans as were forty million Frenchmen; separate they would be devoured one after the other. On the other hand, a powerful Latin Europe could still resist Hitler's aspiration and prevent a war, as Hitler was sure to yield to an effective threat of force. I urged him to settle all differences with the French government at the earliest possible moment and to create a strong Latin union as a first step toward European union.

Mussolini listened closely, then asked a number of questions. He spoke of France in a conciliatory tone giving the impression that his sympathies were wholly with the French. There is no doubt that the idea of a close French-Italian union was attractive to him. His secret dream was not Pan-Europe but a great Mediterranean federation of all Latin states, controlling the major part of Africa and being linked to the Latin republics across the Atlantic. Rome, of course, was to be the center of this new regional arrangement.

After a talk of more than an hour he promised to give my suggestions due consideration. He fixed the hour of our next interview at two days from then and accompanied me all the way across the hall to the door.

When we met again it was he who had the first word.

"Your policy is geometrically correct, but impossible to execute. Look here." And he showed me one of the last issues of the French newspaper *Le Populaire* with an article by Léon Blum. "Léon Blum says he regrets that the League of Nations failed to strangle me. Do you really expect me to have confidence in such a man?"

Léon Blum had won the French election some days before and prepared to head a government of the "Popular Front" backed by a

combined liberal, socialist, and communist majority. It was true that such a government could hardly be expected to collaborate with Fascist Italy; besides, and I am quoting Mussolini's words, "England will never tolerate a Franco-Italian union." The only consolation he had to offer was that "he had no further territorial claims."

Although his pronouncements sounded pretty decisive that day, he asked me in the end to go to Paris and find out whether any chance existed that the two nations might get together on the basis of greater military, political, economic, and colonial solidarity, with any projects of union to be limited strictly to the two Latin powers without including England or Yugoslavia.

I went to Paris with little hope. I spoke with Léger and asked to see Blum. Blum, after all, had worked for our French Pan-Europe committee. But the new Premier sent word that he was too busy to see me. Instead I talked to the vice-premier, Camille Chautemps. He seemed personally sympathetic to a closer Franco-Italian collaboration, but he had no authority in the matter. I understood that an outspokenly anti-Fascist government could not seriously consider Mussolini's offer. Mussolini had been right in this: if the Franco-Italian bloc was necessary it was also impossible.

At the beginning of July, in the middle of a broiling hot Roman summer, I was back in the Palazzo Venezia. Mussolini was as amiable as ever, but the atmosphere had definitely changed in favor of Germany. We agreed that nothing could be done until a new French government was ready to take up the suggestions for a Franco-Italian rapprochement. Mussolini asked my opinion on a number of French politicians and seemed to set his hopes on Daladier. In the end we spoke of Austria, which Mussolini was still determined to save from Hitler.

Subsequently I talked with Count Ciano, and with the new under-secretary of state, Giuseppe Bastianini. The two were men of quick intelligence, and neither was in genuine sympathy with Germany or nazism—as little as Benito Mussolini himself.

A few days after my visit to Rome the civil war broke out in Spain. One of its first victims was Asvero Gravelli, who was killed near Sevilla fighting as volunteer in Franco's army. From this moment Mussolini was Hitler's partner, ally, and vassal. My attempts to draw him on the side of Pan-Europe against Pan-Germany had failed. Hitler had won the battle for Italy. Mussolini had lost it. I never saw him again.

FUTURE historians will be very much embarrassed when they have to explain the policy of the European powers surrounding Germany during the period from January 30, 1933, to September 1, 1939.

They will have to find some logical explanation for the amazing fact that Europe did not even try to stop Hitler in his attempt to conquer Europe and the world, after he had explained this intention explicitly in his book and in numerous speeches; and while he was still too weak to execute his planned assault or even to resist any serious pressure by his neighbors. These historians will hardly be able to believe that during this open conspiracy of Nazi Germany against the peace, liberty, civilization, and the very life of Europe, its leading statesmen not only did not attempt to overthrow Hitler, but did everything to strengthen his position in Germany and in the world, by permitting him to break treaties, to rearm, and to achieve one diplomatic success after another.

These poor historians will probably come to the conclusion that Hitler had succeeded in bribing most of the European statesmen. This explanation would offer a relatively simple solution to the puzzle. But it would be wrong. Bribery played a very small rôle in Hitler's conquest of Europe: the overwhelming majority of the statesmen who were helping Hitler to realize his plans were not bribed, but incredibly blind, cowardly, and cynical. They did not fight the rising tide of Hitlerism, because they preferred to go on playing their favorite game of parliamentary and diplomatic intrigue while Europe started to burn in its very center—in Germany.

The verdict of history will state that the men who ruled Europe between 1933 and 1939 were partly responsible for the Second World War, owing to an inconceivable lack of vision, of common sense, and of courage. Until 1937 it might have been possible to stop Hitler and to liquidate Hitlerism even without war. But all opportunities were

missed, because the leading men of Europe did not realize that the new situation in Europe demanded new methods.

As if nothing had happened, France and England, after 1933, continued their policy of conciliation toward Germany, believing that it was possible to appease a man who made no secret of his intention to crush them. So they paved the way to war.

Before Hitler came to power, Europe failed for lack of generosity. After Hitler came to power, Europe failed for lack of courage. During both parts of Hitler's war it failed for lack of vision and of decision.

Even after Hitler had conquered Germany, it was still easy to defeat him; his army was much weaker than the French army alone. But to defeat Hitler Europe had now to apply a method totally different from that applied during his battle for Germany. Hitler could not maintain himself without permanent success in foreign politics. For dictators are like planes: they fly as long as they progress; they fall as soon as they stop. It would have been easy to bar Hitler from any international success and to get rid of him without war. But instead of pursuing this policy, Europe suddenly became generous. It granted Hitler almost everything it had refused to Rathenau, Stresemann, and Bruening. As hard as it had been upon these German Europeans, so mild it became toward Hitler. It tried to reconcile Germany from the very moment when reconciliation had become impossible. It trod on Germany as long as it lay prostrate—but it became generous as soon as Germany jumped up and began to threaten.

With the Weimar Republic, Europe spoke the language of power; with Hitler, the language of reason—the very language he did not understand. The consequence was that Hitler became convinced that Europe was weak, while Germany became convinced that Hitler was right.

So, day by day, Hitler became stronger in Germany and, day by day, Germany became stronger in Europe. Europe had helped Hitler first to win the battle of Germany and then to win the battle of Europe.

Again the road to peace was simple and obvious. It could be expressed by two words—"armaments" and "union."

But at this very moment, Hitler found unexpected help in three movements that had nothing in common with Nazism and hated it, but in a very shortsighted and narrow-minded way—*pacifism*, *anti-Fascism*, and *national isolationism*.

The pacifist movement prevented Europe from arming against

Hitler; the anti-Fascist and isolationist movements prevented Europe from uniting against him.

The responsibility of French and British pacifism for the neglect of armaments, while Hitler was quickly rearming, is now generally admitted. British and French pacifists created a strong current of public opinion, not only against sufficient armaments, but also against any preventive military action as long as Hitler was still weak. Instead of addressing an ultimatum to Hitler to stop his armaments as soon as he began to build up an air fleet, the European pacifists allowed Hitler to build up the greatest army in the world rather than risk a war. They did not understand that the only thing that could prevent a terrible world war was the risk of a minor military action before Hitler had rearmed.

But when I tried to explain this to French or to British statesmen, they considered me a warmonger—in spite of the fact that they knew that I had devoted my life to peace. But they did not understand that, under these circumstances, the price of peace was to assume the risk of war. The rift between me and most of the pacifists on the issue, whether peace or liberty was to be considered the higher ideal, became evident in all its consequences. The pacifists were ready to make all possible concessions to Hitler, to avoid or at least to postpone war. I was trying to convince the European leaders that the only way to save European liberty and civilization was to overthrow Hitler, by a policy of strength and union if possible—by a policy of war, if necessary.

Had the French and British reacted by military measures after Hitler invaded the demilitarized Rhineland, Hitler would not have gone to war, but would simply have been overthrown. That day I sent a note to the French government, imploring it to save the peace by quick military action. But again my appeal was in vain.

The anti-Fascists hated Hitler as profoundly as did the pacifists. And yet they too paved the way to his successes. For these anti-Fascists succeeded in transforming Mussolini, Hitler's strongest enemy during the years of 1933 and 1934, into Hitler's strongest ally.

I don't blame the Italian and Spanish anti-Fascists for their brave and very natural fight against their ruthless political enemies. But I blame the democratic politicians, especially in France, whose foreign policy was inspired by party issues and who did not realize that Hitler, and not Mussolini, was the deadly peril for Europe. Instead of exploiting the profound antagonism between Hitler's Germany and Mus-

solini's Italy in the interest of European democracy, they treated Mussolini as an ally of Hitler till he became one.

In these days Mussolini saw more clearly than his democratic colleagues the threat Hitler represented for all of Europe. He would have much preferred to join the Western democracies in a united front against Hitlerism than, by joining Hitler, to become the vassal of this man whom he despised, envied, and hated.

Some farseeing Allied statesmen, like Churchill, Amery, Barthou, and De Jouvenel, saw this issue and tried their best to renew the alliance of western Europe against Germany that had won the First World War. De Jouvenel's mission to Rome to assure a Franco-Italian understanding was one of the most successful diplomatic missions of our time. Mussolini was on the way to join the West in order to protect Austria against Hitler and to check the threat of German domination over Europe.

But the anti-Fascists did everything they could to prevent such a policy. In France the idea of anti-Fascism was decisive for the alliance between democrats, socialists, and communists, the so-called "*Front Populaire*." The mere name of anti-Fascism instead of anti-Nazism indicates that they considered Mussolini their enemy number one and Hitler their enemy number two. Instead of backing Austria's defense against Hitler by all possible means, they sneered at Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, and Starhemberg, while these men were fighting in the first ditch of Europe's defense line against Hitler, and discredited them by denouncing them as minor Hitlers, without his skill and power. Nothing was more welcome to Hitler than this anti-Austrian and anti-Italian sentiment among the democrats of France and of Britain, because it prevented what he feared most—a European alliance to guarantee the defense of Austria and to smash his pan-German plans.

The result of this anti-Fascist policy was that in 1934, when, after Dollfuss's assassination, Hitler for the first time prepared to invade Austria, Mussolini alone halted him by sending several divisions to the Brenner, while the democracies remained passive.

Some months later, at the Conference of Stresa, Mussolini proposed to his French and British colleagues a joint military action to overthrow Hitler before he was strong enough to attack them. Mussolini argued that the joint power of Italy, France, and Britain was still strong enough to pacify Germany without the risk of a major war. But the two democracies refused his suggestion with the argument that public opinion would never permit them to undertake any preventative war.

From this meeting Mussolini must have retained a double impression: that he could not rely on the help of the democracies on the day he clashed with Hitler on the Austrian issue, and that it would therefore be safer for him to seek an understanding with this ruthless and dangerous man. The other impression he must have retained was that, in view of the extreme pacifism of France and Britain, he could defy them without risk by a campaign against Ethiopia.

When this campaign started, all the anti-Fascists of Europe tried to give to the sanctions against Italy the character of a crusade.

Again the western democracies followed the very worst course possible. It might have been reasonable to get rid of Italian Fascism and of Mussolini before they were allied to Germany, by the bold policy of an oil embargo combined with the closing of the Suez Canal. For a democratic Italy would become a loyal ally of France and Britain against Hitler. The other alternative was to mediate between Mussolini and Ethiopia, to assure collaboration between Mussolini and the West. But neither of these policies was carried through. Weak and timid sanctions, wounding the Italian lion without killing him, were exactly the most pernicious of all possible policies. Hitler saw the nightmare of a European union against Pan-Germanism vanish. He did not have to fear an alliance between Mussolini and Léon Blum, the head of the new anti-Fascist government of France. So he worked steadily to overcome Mussolini's hesitation against an alliance with Berlin—his old dream. So the Axis was born, Austria sacrificed, and eastern Europe militarily isolated from any help from western Europe. Anti-Fascism had succeeded in splitting Europe into two camps; in uniting Nazism and Fascism against the democratic powers and destroying all hope for a defensive union of Europe against Hitler's Germany.

During all these years I warned against this anti-Fascist foreign policy, because I was aware of its consequences. But most of the Frenchmen who did not share my views answered that Mussolini would, for obvious reasons of national policy, continue to defend Austria against Hitler regardless of his relations with the West. Therefore Hitler and Mussolini could never join hands, and France would be able to check each separately, without making any concessions to Mussolini.

While the pacifists were weakening Europe's resistance and the anti-Fascists were splitting it, another group became stronger within the national elements of Europe—the isolationists.

Their theory was based on short-sighted nationalism. They were resolved to defend their national territory against any possible aggression, but they refused any obligation to help other nations that might be attacked. They wished to interpret all their alliances and international obligations in a way that committed them least, and even to break them when they believed this to be in their national interest. French isolationists, for instance, refused to give Austria any pledge to assist her against Hitler's aggression—thus encouraging him to prepare it. They were also hostile to the defensive treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, because they believed that they would not be able to save these allies, and, by assisting them, would only drag their own countries into a war that they wished to avoid or at least to postpone.

For me, Austria remained during all these years the main battle front of Europe. It could only be saved by combined European action; and only if Austria were saved could Europe hope to avert German aggression and domination. So my political activity was centered around the problem of Austria, her independence and her defense. Dollfuss and his successors had assured their country against a successful Nazi revolution. But only the rest of Europe could assure her against invasion. It was evident that the day Austria was isolated, it would be lost.

So, again and again, I tried to convince the European leaders that the invasion of Austria was planned by Hitler as his first and decisive step toward the conquest of Europe.

In February, 1936, I asked Flandin, the French foreign minister, who had always been a friend of Pan-Europe, whether or not Austria, in the event of an invasion, could count on the military support of France. Flandin answered very frankly that the French attitude would depend entirely on England's. Under no circumstances was France in a condition to fight Germany for the sake of Austria without the full support of Britain. But should England be ready to fight, France, too, would defend Austria. He advised me to seek the answer not in Paris but in London.

The next day I crossed the Channel. But after three days I was back in Paris, with the definite conviction that Britain would not move if Austria were invaded; consequently France, too, would remain neutral, as well as Czechoslovakia and all the other states of eastern Europe.

This policy of national isolationism that finally led to the Munich conference, was pursued with bad conscience. Everybody realized that it was shortsighted, cowardly, and immoral. Therefore the responsibilities were shifted. The little states shrugged their shoulders, declaring

that they were dependent on the policy of their big protectors. France, that seemed strong enough to make decisions for itself, shifted the responsibility to Britain. And Britain carried this responsibility on her broad shoulders, as the only great power of Europe that was isolationist by tradition, openly and with a good conscience.

But the effect was that Europe, facing Hitler's rising threat, was weaker and more disunited than ever.

During these shameful years my political attitude remained unchanged. I was looking for a military alliance between Fascist and anti-Fascist states of Europe, directed against Nazi Germany. I considered the anti-Fascist propaganda just as unhappy as pacifism, in spite of my personal sympathy for many of the promoters of both movements. I often thought of the warning example of ancient Greece that finally collapsed because of the split between her oligarchic (today we might say "fascist") and her democratic states, which did not succeed in uniting into a single Pan-Hellenic movement, in spite of the efforts of Demosthenes. My program was to disregard the divergencies between the European constitutions, as long as it was necessary to organize a common defense. And I often quoted the wise example of the Pan-American Union, that does not exclude member states because of their undemocratic constitutions. For had the United States followed the same foreign policy as France, her good relations with Brazil would have become impossible, and Brazil would have been driven into the arms of the Axis. But America was wiser than Europe. So she saved her continental peace and unity.

It was easy for me to preach the simple policy of armament and unity against Hitler's aggressive plans, because it was the only policy that might have prevented Hitler from waging war and that might have led to his fall from within, had he been deprived of all international success. But, at the same time it was also a sound war policy, because, if war broke out, armament and alliances were the safest ways of assuring a quick and decisive victory. But I did not consider war inevitable, because I believed that Hitler would only risk a fight with smaller, weaker, and isolated states but not with a coalition that was by far stronger than isolated Germany. My dual aim was: Peace, if possible; victory, if necessary.

While I led this personal campaign against Hitler, Nazism, and the threat of war, the Pan-European Union continued its research work for an economic union of Europe and for means to overcome the crisis.

In May, 1935, we organized, in the beautiful halls of the old Parliament in Vienna, our fourth Pan-European congress, under the auspices of the Austrian government and with the participation of leading economic experts from all parts of the Continent. A year later, again in Vienna, the first agrarian conference of the Pan-European Union took place. This conference dealt with the agrarian crisis that had ruined a great part of the population of central and eastern Europe. These peasants had been struck by the collapse of prices in the international market that made their successful competition impossible. The idea of a Pan-European preference for farm goods became popular and was promoted by most of the agrarian organizations of Europe. Dollfuss had backed that idea with all his authority, while the new Czechoslovak prime minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, the outstanding leader of the agrarians of his country, assisted our work with his well-trained staff and experience. At our conference he proposed through his brilliant personal representative Dr. Ladislaus Feierabend, the head of the Czechoslovak cereal monopoly, and vice-president of the Czechoslovak Pan-European Union, the establishment of a European clearinghouse for cereals in Vienna.

My collaboration with Hodža and Feierabend, who is now a member of his government in exile, was close and intimate.

This conference was also attended by a large and excellent Italian delegation, led by a leading Fascist, Franco Angellini, head of the Italian Corporation of Rural Laborers.

This Pan-European farm movement, inspired by the ideas of the late Chancellor Dollfuss, was a new and strong element of our general propaganda. Previously its chief followers had been intellectuals and other townfolks. The bulk of European farmers had only little interest in the ideas of Pan-Europe and formed the main electors of nationalist groups. Suddenly the agrarian parties and groups became aware that their material interest in European union was at least as strong as that of the industrial workers. So a new wave of European solidarity emerged from the agrarian crisis. This new wave of Pan-European feeling involved first of all the agrarian states of eastern Europe and of the Balkans.

These agrarian groups and countries invited us to visit the Balkans in the Spring of 1937. I lectured in the different capitals. On this trip I renewed my contacts with the leading men of the region, warning them of the growing peril of Hitlerism and explaining to them that

only a strong European alliance against this threat could prevent a Second World War.

Among the numerous talks I had during these weeks I recall my conversation with the regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, who had been a close friend of my father when both were in the service of the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Constantinople. I also had a very satisfactory talk with his Yugoslav colleague, Prince Paul, who seemed to share my opinions about Nazism, in spite of his future surrender to this power. I discussed the same problems in Athens with King George of Greece and his brother Crown Prince Paul. There I also had a long talk with the dictator of fascist Greece, General Metaxas, who four years later astonished the world by fighting Mussolini with striking courage and success. In Athens I met my Kalergis cousins, among them Emmanuel Tsouderos, who gave me a book he had written in Greek about the long history of our common family. When I met him again in New York, some years later, he had become prime minister of his heroic nation, fighting in exile for liberty and for Europe.

But more than all talks with kings and regents and ministers I enjoyed this beautiful part of Europe with its unforgettable people and scenery. I was deeply impressed by the Acropolis, for more than two thousand years symbol of eternal beauty, defying the barbarism of all ages which was unable to overthrow this eternal legacy of Greece. We also enjoyed greatly a trip along the Dalmatian coast with its immortal jewel, Dubrovnik (Ragusa)—like a petrified dream of a great and glorious past, defying time and evolution, one of the great and incomparable beauties of great and beautiful Europe.

All these trips across Europe, from Spain to Turkey, were devoted to one cause: the fight against Nazism, the salvation of Austria in her deadly peril, and the prevention of the horrors of a Second World War—by strength and imagination, not by weakness and timidity. But the leaders of Europe, with few exceptions, remained blind and deaf.

Europe, as a whole, therefore, bears a tremendous responsibility for the terrible fate it had to suffer from the hands of its torturers. It sinned, first, by its lack of generosity, later, by its lack of courage.

First, during the battle for Germany, it failed to help Rathenau, Stresemann, and Brüning, its German allies, sufficiently in their deadly struggle against Hitlerism.

Then, during the battle for Austria, it limited its help to Europe's martyrs and champions, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, to an attitude of ineffective benevolent neutrality.

Later, in the battle for Czechoslovakia, it sacrificed shamefully its ally Benes, who was ready to fight with his courageous nation and its marvelous equipment. Instead of helping him to fight for Europe, it preferred to help Hitler to mutilate and to strangle this last stronghold and arsenal of democracy in central Europe. Finally it accepted, without flinching, the invasion of that country, just as it had accepted the invasion of Austria.

But the little countries of Europe share this heavy responsibility of the great powers, by refusing, before the outbreak of the war, Britain's offer to organize a defensive alliance of Europe against new Nazi invasions. So these states were overrun and swallowed, one by one, by Hitler's armies.

Thus the entire story of Europe's lack of resistance against Hitler's threat will present a shameful and incredible chapter of Europe's history. After all passions will have passed away, future historians will come to the conclusion that the cruel and ruthless Hitler had the incredible good fortune to face a morbid, blind, and cowardly world. That the tragedy of Europe was half murder and half suicide.

For this tragedy was no unpredictable surprise. Many men and women who judged the facts dispassionately, predicted it. Among these previsions figure eighteen years of my review and a series of my books. Under changing circumstances, I saw the war approaching and did not cease to suggest the broad road that might have led to peace—before 1933, by generosity and revision; after that fatal date, by armament and by union.

Moralists will consider this war a punishment, like the great flood. But this tragedy hit the innocent masses rather than the guilty leaders. And only the war itself revealed the abundant amount of heroism, of faith and of strength that still inspires the anonymous masses of Europe in spite of the sins of their leaders.

So this tragic experience is not altogether lost. It may, one day, serve as a lesson to the new men who will lead a new Europe to new goals, and help them to find the road to union, wealth, and peace.

THE tragedy of Kurt von Schuschnigg, successor of Dollfuss as chancellor of the Austrian republic, arose to a certain degree from his complex personality and character. Where Dollfuss was a genuine son of his native soil, Schuschnigg was primarily an intellectual and a man of varied cultural pursuits. Where Dollfuss was creative and positive-minded, Schuschnigg was skeptically and pessimistically inclined. Unlike Dollfuss, Schuschnigg carried on the struggle for Austrian independence from a sense of duty, not because he believed in final victory. This man of aristocratic features and manners had no popular contacts, no popular ways of expressing himself; he never joked or laughed as Dollfuss had been so fond of doing. He was a man of logic and reason, where Dollfuss was all vision and instinct. An accomplished gentleman, he was essentially cold, far removed from demagogy or Machiavellianism, endowed with a profound sense of decency and with loyalty, honor, and righteousness. He would have made an excellent judge or educator. He inclined toward the aesthetic aspects of life, hating fanaticism and violence in any form. In a peaceful era and within a democratic state he would have been a model prime minister, but he became a political leader in an era of storm and blood, facing a ruthless and unchivalrous enemy in Hitler.

In his struggle against Germany he was handicapped by conflicting loyalties. He considered Austria a state but not a nation. In his mind all Austrians were members of the German nation. He tried to be at once an Austrian patriot and a good German, fighting Nazism no less from the point of view of Austria than in the name of the old German and Christian tradition. He considered Austria the last non-Nazi stronghold of the Germanic world and consequently the trustee of genuine German culture.

This paradoxical attitude, which he shared with many Austrians, weakened his stand against Hitler, for he fought Nazism with a good conscience, but Germany with a bad one. Part of his soul revolved

against the notion of fighting Germany with Italian, Czech, and French help. Although by no means inclined to sacrifice Austria's independence to his Pan-German feelings, he was nevertheless ready to accept any form of Pan-German collaboration which would respect that independence. Had he been optimistic enough to believe in Pan-Europe he would have given it his whole-hearted support, because, after Hitler's fall, it would have given his Austrian, German, and European loyalties a common denominator. He gave half-hearted support to Pan-Europe, because he believed in its necessity—but not in its possibility. As Dollfuss's successor he accepted the honorary presidency of the Austrian Pan-European committee, but brought none of Dollfuss's faith and enthusiasm to the task.

In one way Prince Starhemberg, vice-chancellor, and leader of the "Green Front," was wiser than Schuschnigg. He had no illusions about peace and reconciliation with Hitler, whom he had known personally, and was determined to fight to the bitter end. He knew that Austria must choose between fight or capitulation and that compromise would lead only to surrender. He and Schuschnigg collaborated for two years, until Schuschnigg dropped him as an obstacle to Austria's appeasement policy.

Despite our political differences I maintained rather friendly contacts with the new Austrian government, and my wife and I also continued to see a good deal of the various members of the diplomatic corps. Vienna was considered a focus of world politics, and the European powers had sent their ablest diplomats to this post. America too was represented by a brilliant minister, George Messersmith, who became a close and ever reliable friend in our common fight against Nazism. Intrigues were spun in all directions. It was typical of the trends of the time that in spite of the tension existing between Paris and Rome, Gabriel Puaux and Gabriele Preziosi, their diplomatic representatives, entertained the most cordial relations, collaborating closely against Nazism and their German colleague, Von Papen.

However, anybody who was in the public eye had a curious sense of sitting on a powder keg most of the time. Citizens and foreigners, provided they had a certain amount of prominence, were in continuous need of police protection. An Austrian Nazi, an artist, who had remained an admirer of my books on philosophy, informed me that his associates had decided to kill me at the very start of a Nazi revolution as my status as a Czechoslovakian citizen would make it difficult to keep me interned in a concentration camp. Our house had special

guards stationed at the door, day and night, and there were always detectives around us during a Pan-European conference. When members of the government came to lunch or to dine, our house was first searched for arms, then isolated by a police cordon. Despite the minute precautions of the police, we still would have been blown out of our house and home had the enemy shown a little more nerve.

One afternoon a red-haired young girl appeared in the kitchen with a small package for Joseph the chauffeur, who took it and disappeared into his room. The package contained a time bomb, and Joseph, who was a member of a secret Nazi organization, had orders to place it under an old-fashioned easy chair in the drawing room and make his escape by car before the machine exploded. The bomb was directed less against my wife and me than against Schuschnigg and a few members of the government whom we expected for dinner that night. However, Joseph lost his nerve at the last moment and the bomb landed in the Danube Canal near by.

Unaware of his affiliations we dismissed him a few days later for a minor theft. Only after the Nazis had conquered Vienna did he give his secret away to a friend, boasting that he had saved our lives that day.

In the midst of much excitement and unrest our committee of the Pan-European Union continued to function as actively as ever, accumulating records and statistics and organizing inter-European conferences on various subjects. Our last Pan-European conference, in November, 1937, was well attended by educators from different parts of Europe and resulted in a unanimous move to introduce instruction in Pan-European ideas into all European schools.

Personal efforts on my part against Nazi agitation in Austria continued. I re-edited my father's book against anti-Semitism, completed it with a critical analysis of modern racism, and distributed it in Austrian schools and among leaders of public opinion. I also lectured on Austria's European mission against the anti-European spirit of Nazism. And I found a new and brilliant collaborator in a great and high-minded man, the Jesuit father Friedrich Muckermann.

This German priest, who came from northwestern Germany, accomplished more against Nazism during those years than all of his Austrian colleagues combined. His power of speech, his impressive personality, and his moral authority gave him undisputed leadership in all anti-Nazi Catholic circles. He was known in German Catholic circles by his literary review "*Der Graf*," published in Munich, and by his famous studies on Goethe, Dante, Dostoevsky and Thomas

Aquinas. He had fought Hitler in Germany until the latter came to power. Then he went to Rome to carry on his fight from there. When the Austrian crisis was approaching its climax he was delegated by the Vatican to Vienna. He preached not only in Vienna but all over Austria, from town to town, from church to church, against Nazi paganism, Nazi immorality, and Nazi totalitarianism. He held his audiences spellbound everywhere—an audience of both sexes and all classes. The Nazis considered him their number one enemy, but had no luck with their various attempts on his life. Within one year he drew innumerable Catholics of Austria, some of whom had openly sympathized with Nazism, into the anti-Nazi camp, insisting in every sermon and every address that it was impossible to be at once a good Catholic and a genuine Nazi, and that every Austrian Catholic must choose between loyalty to Christ or to the modern anti-Christ. The courage with which he daily risked his life brought him the keen admiration of all decent Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and atheists.

The struggle against Hitlerism was meanwhile nearing its final stage. Mussolini had become Hitler's open ally in the war against Loyalist Spain. Already they had staged a flamboyant meeting in Berlin and laid the foundation of the Berlin-Rome Axis. Nobody knew from this moment on whether Hitler had pledged Austria's independence or whether Mussolini had sacrificed it.

The personal relations between Mussolini and Schuschnigg had never been cordial. Schuschnigg was a Tyrolese and could not forget that his countrymen were oppressed by Fascist Italy. Sentimentally he would have preferred to collaborate with Berlin rather than with Rome. Mussolini did not like Schuschnigg either. He was fond of Starhemberg as he had been of Dollfuss. After Schuschnigg had sacrificed the leader of the Heimwehren, the last personal link between Rome and Vienna vanished. Schuschnigg stood alone and Austria was isolated and doomed.

In February, 1938, we were in London to plead the cause of an agonizing Austria. Came the incredible news that Schuschnigg had gone to Berchtesgaden and that an Austrian Nazi had been forced on him as minister of the interior—no doubt a Trojan horse for the final assault. A few days later our hopes were revived when we listened to Schuschnigg's courageous broadcast speech which he delivered on his return from Berchtesgaden. It was a wonderful speech indeed, implying confidence, strength, dignity, and beauty—the greatest speech he had ever made in all his life. That it was delivered at all in the very face of the

Nazi peril, seemed proof that Schuschnigg had now the support of Mussolini.

While we were homeward bound through France and Switzerland our friends everywhere urged us to postpone our return till the situation in Austria had cleared. However, our economic committee was scheduled to meet on March 14 with a number of international experts invited to deliberate on the distribution of European raw materials. If I failed to return I would appear to abandon Austria in its hour of greatest need. We decided, however, to leave our daughter, Erica, in Zurich.

We came to Vienna on March 8. The country was transformed. Hitler's brutal threat and Schuschnigg's speech had aroused a sudden wave of patriotism. For the first time since the days of Dollfuss the rift between the Catholics and Socialists seemed bridged. The Socialist workers of Vienna were ready to forget opposition to the semifascist Schuschnigg government and join in the common defense of Austria's independence.

Swept away by this generous wave of a seemingly all-out support for his government, Schuschnigg decided to organize a plebiscite in favor of Austria's independence. He set the date for Sunday, March 13. His decision was a surprise, because a plebiscite had been a long-standing demand of the Nazis, who claimed that the majority of the Austrian population were in favor of a union with Germany. The fact that Schuschnigg, as well as Dollfuss, had refused the plebiscite had been interpreted by the Nazis as clear evidence of their claim. Schuschnigg, however, was sure that at this moment 70 to 80 per cent of all Austrians would vote against Hitler and for Austrian independence. Who was right? Schuschnigg or the Nazis? Hitler's plebiscite after his invasion gave no answer because it took place with bayonets, steel rods, and the threat of torture and concentration camps, tipping the balance in favor of Hitler. And there was no reliable control of the polls.

Personally, I believe that both Hitler and Schuschnigg were only backed by minorities—that the majority of the Austrians were for democracy. Evidently many Austrians favored a federal link with a democratic Germany but rejected the idea of becoming Hitler's subjects. Even the Austrian Nazis hoped that a Nazi-Austria would retain at least local independence and leave them, more or less, sovereign within Austria's frontiers. However, the momentary question was not how will Austria vote, but how will Hitler react? Would he try to

prevent the plebiscite and thus give proof of his disbelief in Austria's alleged pro-Nazi majority?

Vienna continued in a state of exaltation; streets and squares were crowded, and the cheering for Austria and Schuschnigg seemed never to cease. Our house in the center of the city gave us full opportunity to watch the indescribable enthusiasm of this almost revolutionary pro-Austria movement.

On the morning of Friday, March 11, while the Vienna crowds were still cheering Schuschnigg and singing patriotic songs, Alvine Dollfuss called on us. The widow of the former chancellor had remained our close friend. She had also remained attached to the Pan-Europe cause. Her keen intelligence and common sense, but still more her strong intuition in matters of human character and values, made her a valuable collaborator.

The day of her husband's death had found her with her two little children in Riccione on the Adriatic. She had never forgotten the dreadful moment when Benito Mussolini, accompanied by his wife Donna Rachele, entered her room to tell her the tragic news. At that most critical hour of her life Mussolini and his wife had been extremely helpful. The memory of their kindness had stayed with her and had caused her to fly to Rome to remind Mussolini of his one-time promise to her husband and to induce him to save Austria's independence by a last appeal to Hitler.

Mrs. Dollfuss had just returned from that journey, undertaken secretly and under an assumed name. Mussolini had received her instantly and with great courtesy. But, instead of promising help, he seemed disturbed and evasive, advising her to send her children to Switzerland at once. She came to consult us before leaving. We advised her to take the train through Italy and not through the Tyrol because this line could be cut off by a German invasion force at any moment. Mrs. Dollfuss was still with us when a personal message reached me from my Nazi admirer telling me there was no time to lose and that I had better leave Vienna instantly. We were very much tempted to accompany Mrs. Dollfuss to Switzerland, but we could not think of deserting Austria as long as the country was still fighting Hitler.

Suddenly, during the afternoon, the cheers and songs ceased and the streets became deserted. An uncanny silence descended upon the city, ominous evidence that the tide was turning. The patriots had ceased to demonstrate, but the huge counterdemonstration of the Nazis was not yet under way. Nobody knew what Hitler would do, what Schusch-

nigg would do, or what really was going to happen during the next few hours. War? Revolution? Surrender? Rumors filled the air.

In the evening we were notified by telephone that Schuschnigg had yielded to a Nazi ultimatum. He renounced his office with the words "May God protect Austria." His successor was Seyss-Inquart, leader of the Austrian Nazi party. Already German troops were crossing the border into Austria.

I called up the Czech legation and asked for our press attaché, Dr. Šrom, a personal friend of mine, who has since been murdered by the Nazis in reprisal for Heydrich's death. Šrom confirmed the news.

We asked our dinner guests to go home, because we were determined to leave our residence within a few minutes—before the Gestapo would come to arrest or to kill us. We packed a handbag, seized my wife's white Pekingese, Pai-Chuan, and ordered a taxi.

We directed our driver to the Czechoslovak legation, intending to spend the next hours on extraterritorial ground. We expected to drive to Czechoslovakia at night in a diplomatic car. But as soon as we reached the Graben, one of Vienna's main thoroughfares, we saw that we had no chance to reach our legation. The street was blocked with Nazi crowds who waved their Swastika flags, hailed Hitler, and sang their party anthem. We directed our taxi to the Swiss legation situated only a few minutes away from our home. The Minister of Switzerland and Mrs. Jaeger received us with great kindness, asking us to share their dinner, while our flight was being arranged. We expected to use our own car now, but neither my wife nor I could drive and our chauffeur had disappeared. The Minister solved the problem by lending us his own chauffeur who was then sent to our residence with orders to fetch our car, a suitcase, and our big Russian sheep dog, Sasha. He was back within half an hour and we were ready to start.

We left in the direction of Bratislava, the Slovak capital, only forty miles east of Vienna, but were stopped almost at once—this time on the Ringstrasse, where an endless stream of Nazis filed past. We should never have crossed the street had not our car carried a Swiss pennant. Even at this moment of highest nationalistic exaltation Switzerland still retained general sympathy and respect.

The car proceeded slowly, step by step. What if someone should recognize us? The chauffeur had left his passport at home and did not dare to drive on without it. He lived in a remote quarter of Vienna, but we agreed to pass by his home and fetch whatever was needed. The car stopped at the end of an impasse, and before we knew what had

happened the chauffeur had left his seat and disappeared inside his home. The next thing we saw was a dozen young Nazis, steel rods in hand and Swastika badges on their sleeves, pressing dangerously close. We thought we were trapped and lost. However, instead of attacking us, the young Nazis, all between sixteen and twenty years, began to question us eagerly about events in the center of the city and whether we believed that they would still be sent on duty there. They petted our dogs and uttered a few friendly words about Switzerland. They thought we were members of the Swiss legation. Nevertheless we were considerably relieved when our chauffeur reappeared and drove off with us in the direction of Bratislava.

By that time it was almost midnight. We continued along the Danube valley. The chauffeur told us about the young Nazis who had accosted us—for weeks they had been trained in a neighboring school of gymnastics waiting for the moment when Hitler would give the signal and the revolution would start.

We feared that a police car might follow or stop us and I kept my pistol ready, but all we met on the trip was a single motorcycle with three men waving a Swastika flag and racing toward Vienna.

We reached the border soon after midnight. The frontier had been closed by the Czechoslovak authorities to all Austrians, so that our chauffeur, who was Austrian, was not permitted to cross. But Slovak friends of ours, whom my wife had notified by telephone, were on hand on the other side. One of them came to take our chauffeur's seat and guide us safely across. At that moment someone called us from a neighboring car, which proved to be that of the French legation. Inside were two women and two children, one of them lying on a stretcher. It was Mrs. Dollfuss and her family. She had been forced to change her plans; events had moved too fast. The French Minister had offered her his car to save her and her children from falling into Nazi hands. Rudi, her boy, who had broken his leg in a skiing accident, was on a stretcher with his governess by his side. They had been waiting an hour and a half while a member of the French legation telephoned to Prague seeking special permission for her to enter Czechoslovakia despite the emergency rule. At last the permission came and she, too, could proceed on her way.

The only big hotel in Bratislava, the Carlton, was crowded with refugees from Austria, among them two former members of the Austrian government. Nobody thought of sleeping. Mrs. Dollfuss sent Eva and Rudi to bed, and the three of us spent the night discussing the

future of Austria and of Europe, and our own immediate plans. The next day we listened to Hitler's speech made in Linz, proclaiming Austria's annexation to Germany. We left within another twenty-four hours, crossing Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy on our way to Switzerland. In Budapest and Zagreb our Pan-European friends entertained us with great kindness and hospitality. In Budapest I informed the Italian legation that, together with Mrs. Dollfuss and her family, we would cross Italy on our way to Switzerland.

At the Italian border at Posthumia an Italian officer welcomed us in the name of his government and expressed his sympathy for Austria. He introduced us to four young Fascists, who had been ordered to escort our two cars across Italy as a guard of honor. We spent our first night in Trieste, the second at Sirmione on the shores of the beautiful Lago di Garda. At Chiasso we crossed the borders of Switzerland—happy to breathe the air of a country which was free and where we did not require any guards, not even guards of honor.

Rumors circulated in Vienna that immediately after our departure, a car of the Gestapo had taken up our pursuit, but had been stopped by a car defect. Three days after our departure the Gestapo seized the headquarters of the Pan-European Union and transformed it into the office of the new Austrian chancellor, Seyss-Inquart. They also seized its funds and thousands of books and pamphlets; they took over our archives and most of our documents and correspondence, the work of fifteen long years; from our home they took only the anti-Nazi books.

Sad days followed for Vienna and Austria. Many of our dear friends committed suicide, others were killed or arrested and dragged into concentration camps, where some of them are still buried alive. Schuschnigg is Hitler's prisoner, bearing his tragic fate with admirable strength of character.

Mrs. Dollfuss went from Switzerland to England and then to Canada, where she is devoting her life to the memory of her unforgettable husband and to the education of her charming children.

AFTER the outbreak of the Spanish war, peace in Europe might still have been saved by the establishment of a close military and political alliance between France and Britain, provided both empires had consented to rearm on a vastly extended basis. A strong Franco-British bloc would have led to a defensive alliance of large ramifications attracting many of the smaller European states whose security was definitely jeopardized by Hitler's large scale armaments.

Up to this point, however, the British leaders had done little to counteract Hitler's policy of conquest—less even than their Continental colleagues. Either they held aloof altogether or they continued to work for appeasement, some hoping that Hitler and Stalin would eventually come to blows and annihilate each other in a war of mutual destruction.

Such negative attitudes would have persisted except for the fact that in this darkest hour of British statesmanship a man arose to point out the danger and to show the way to deal with it. Winston Churchill, leader of a minority group of British public opinion, rejected any compromise with Hitler, convinced that only his fall could secure the peace of Europe and of Britain. He pleaded for armament and alliances, for resistance against Hitler and for solidarity with endangered Europe.

Churchill's sympathy for a united Europe was not of recent date. He had published an article entitled "The United States of Europe" in *The Saturday Evening Post* as early as February 15, 1930. Because this comment is still timely and illuminates his personal point of view, it deserves to be quoted at length:

Ideas are born as sparks fly upward. They die from their own weakness; they are whirled away by the wind; they are lost in the smoke; they vanish in the darkness of the night. Someone throws on another log of trouble and effort, and fresh myriads of sparks stream ineffectively into the air. Men have always tended these fires, casting into them the fruits of their toil—indeed, all they can spare after keeping body and soul together. Sometimes

at rare intervals something exciting results from their activities. Among innumerable sparks that flash and fade away, there now and again gleams one that lights up not only the immediate scene but the whole world. What is it that distinguishes the fortunes of one of these potent incendiary or explosive ideas from the endless procession of its fellows? It is always something very simple and—once the surroundings are illuminated—painfully obvious. In fact we may say that the power and vitality of an idea result from a spontaneous recognition of the obvious.

For instance, not far from the fire there is a rubbish heap, and as the weather has been very dry for some time and the night breeze is blowing in that direction, one single spark out of all the millions has suddenly acquired enormous importance. It has fallen glowing upon the rubbish; and there is the heap beginning to smolder, smoke and break into flame; and already there is a blaze and everyone can see for himself the rubbish heap and that the spark has set it alight. No one knows how far the flames will go, whose buildings will be threatened or what will happen next. There is no lack of excitement and bustling about and running around, and no one—not even the slowest—has any doubt, but that something has happened, or that it all arose from the spark and the rubbish heap coming together in this way. But what to do about it is quite a different tale.

So when the idea of the United States of Europe drifted off upon the wind and came in contact with the immense accumulation of muddle, waste, particularism and prejudice which had long lain piled up in the European garden, it became quite evident that a new series of events had opened.

The resuscitation of the Pan-European idea is largely identified with Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. He has conducted his campaign from Vienna. The headquarters are well chosen. The plight of Vienna since the Great War constitutes the bitterest example of the waste and folly of the present system. This forlorn capital, for centuries the seat of an empire, now merely the nodal point of severed or strangulated railways, a London walled in by hostile Irelands, makes its unanswered appeal. It is right that that appeal should be no longer mute. The form of Count Kalergi's theme may be crude, erroneous and impracticable, but the impulse and the inspiration are true.

The peace of the Roman world was maintained in the age of Augustus by eight hundred thousand armed men. After ten thousand years of Christianity and of the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, after the immense advance of science and the undoubted improvement of culture and morals, on the morrow of "the war to end war," more than twenty million soldiers or trained reserves, armed with instruments of inconceivable destructiveness, are required to guard the jigsaw frontiers of twenty-six jealous, impoverished and disunited states. No one can suppose that this is going to last.

From all these causes and others that together fill volumes, the conclusion may be drawn with much confidence that the movement towards European solidarity which has now begun will not stop until it has effected tremendous and possibly decisive changes in the whole life, thought and structure of Europe. It does not follow even that this progress will be gradual. It may leap forward in a huge bound of spontaneous conviction. It may even prove to be the surest means of lifting the mind of European nations out of the ruck of old feuds and ghastly revenges. It may afford a rallying ground where socialists and capitalists, where nationalists and pacifists, where idealists and business men may stand together. It may be the surest of all the guaranties against the renewal of great wars.

The League of Nations, from which the United States have so imprudently—considering their vast and increasing interests—absented themselves, has perforce become in fact, if not in form, primarily a European institution. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi proposes to concentrate European forces, interests and sentiments in a single branch which, if it grew, would become the trunk itself, and thus acquire obvious predominance. For think how mighty Europe is, but for its divisions! Let Russia slide back, as Count Kalergi proposes, and as is already so largely a fact, into Asia. Let the British Empire, excluded in his plan, realize its own world-spread ideal, even so, the mass of Europe, once united, once federalized or partially federalized, once continentally self-conscious—Europe, with its African and Asiatic possessions and plantations, would constitute an organism beyond compare.

It is evident that up to a certain point the developments now in actual progress will be wholly beneficial. In so far as the movement towards European unity expresses itself by the vast increase of wealth which would follow from it, by the ceaseless diminution of armies which would attend it, by ever-increasing guaranties against the renewal of war, it bodes no ill to the rest of the world. On the contrary, it can only bring benefits to every nation whose interests are identical with the general interests of mankind. But clearly there are limits, not assuredly to be reached in our lifetime, beyond which a United States of Europe might revive on a scale more vast, and in a degree immeasurably more terrible, the rivalries from which we have suffered so cruelly in our own age. A day of fate and doom for men will dawn if ever the old quarrels of countries are superseded by the strife of continents; if Europe, Asia and America, living, coherent and potentially armed entities, come to watch one another through the eyes with which Germany, France, Russia and Italy looked in the twentieth century. Conflicts of countries are, we trust, ended. They must not be succeeded by the antagonisms of continents. But surely, after all they have gone through, men will have the wit and virtue to take the good and leave the bad; to walk along the high road which leads to wealth and power, without being drawn down the fatal turning to shame and ruin.

The attitude of Great Britain towards European unification or "federal

links" would, in the first instance, be determined by her dominant conception of a united British Empire. Every step that tends to make Europe more prosperous and more peaceful is conducive to British interests. We have more to lose by war than any human organization that has ever existed. The peculiar structure and distribution of the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations is such that our safety has increasingly been found in reconciling and identifying British interests with the larger interests of the world. The prosperity of others makes for our own prosperity; their peace is our tranquillity; their progress smooths our path. We are bound to further every honest and practical step which the nations of Europe may make to reduce the barriers which divide them and to nourish their common interests and their common welfare. We rejoice at every diminution of the internal tariffs and the martial armaments of Europe. We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European commonalty. But we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. And should European statesmen address us in the words which were used of old—"Wouldst thou be spoken for to the king, or the captain of the Host?"—we should reply, with the Shunamite woman: "I dwell among mine own people."

But even this compulsive conception must be reconciled with other forms of British interest. The policy of Canning has endowed us with holdings and connections in South America, and notably the Argentine, which, although in no way affecting the sovereignty of independent states, are of solid and durable importance to us. The scheme of a British Empire economically self-conscious, a commercial unit even perhaps a fiscal unit, can never be widely expressed in exclusive terms.

Here, then, is an aspect of the British Empire which the people of the United States would do well to study. The king's dominions circle the globe. We can never lend ourselves to any antagonism, however unlikely or remote, economic or warlike, between continents or hemispheres. We belong to no single continent, but to all. Not to one hemisphere, but to both; as well to the New World as to the old. The British Empire is a leading European power. It is a great and growing American power. It is the Australasian power. It is one of the greatest Asiatic powers. It is the leading African power. Great Britain herself has for centuries been the proved and accepted champion of European freedom. She is the center and head of the British Commonwealth of Nations. She is an equal partner in the English-speaking world.

It is at this point that the significance of Canada appears. Canada, which is linked to the British Empire, first by the growing importance of her own nationhood, and, secondly, by many ancient and sentimental ties peculiar to young and strong communities, is at the same time intimately associated with the United States. The long, unguarded frontier, the habits and intercourse of daily life, the fruitful and profitable connections of business, the

sympathies and even the antipathies of honest neighborliness, make Canada a binder-together of the English-speaking peoples. She is a magnet, exercising a double attraction, drawing both Great Britain and the United States towards herself, and thus drawing them closer to each other. She is the only surviving bond which stretches from Europe across the Atlantic Ocean. Her power, her hopes, her future guarantee the increasing fellowship of the Nordic races of the East and of the West; in fact, no state, no country no band of men can more truly be described as the linchpin of peace and world progress.

It is possible to set forth the final conclusions of this brief examination of these deep and long-flowing tides.

The conception of a United States of Europe is right. Every step to that end which appeases the obsolete hatred and vanished oppressions, which makes easier the traffic and reciprocal services of Europe, which encourages its nations to lay aside their precautionary panoply, is good in itself—is good for them and good for all.

It is, however, imperative that as Europe advances towards higher internal unity there shall be a proportionate growth of solidarity throughout the British Empire, and also a deepening self-knowledge and mutual recognition among the English-speaking people.

Then, without misgiving and without detachment, we can watch and aid the assuagement of the European tragedy, and without envy survey their sure and sound approach to mass wealth; being very conscious that every stride towards European cohesion which is beneficial to the general welfare will make us a partner in their good fortune, and that any sinister tendencies will be restrained or corrected by our united strength.

It seems obvious now that, had Churchill been prime minister during the thirties, there would be no Hitler and no war but a better integrated, more peaceful, more prosperous Europe. All of Churchill's friends were in sympathy with the idea of European union including, of course, Amery, who was the backbone of Churchill's efforts in this direction. In the struggle between Churchill's England and Chamberlain's England, Churchill was at last gaining the upper hand after the appeasers had almost ruined the moral credit of their nation.

Churchill's increasing influence gave hope in the beginning of 1938 that Britain might be inclined to save Austrian independence and to take the initiative toward a European defensive alliance. To do what I could to assure this double goal I went to London in February, anxious primarily to talk to Winston Churchill with whom I had been previously in contact through Amery, but whom I had never met personally. Churchill invited me to spend the afternoon at his home in Westham, Kent, and even across a distance of years the memory of

our long and detailed conversation has lost nothing of its glamor and fascination.

The impression he left was both stimulating and relaxing because he is not only a strong, vital personality, endowed with an incomparable spirit, but essentially a harmonious nature at ease with himself and the world, free from petty resentment, generous, chivalrous, gentle, yet bold when the occasion demands it. He seems very British and yet more human than the average Englishman—perhaps owing to his American blood. His nature is bright like his face, it has height and breadth. He has much of the artist, nothing of a saint, and nothing of a hypocrite. His controlled dynamism is the source of his extraordinary physical and mental youth. He has often been compared with an English bulldog, but to me he seems rather to be a huge mastiff, fiercely determined to defend the gateway of his British home and its empire-park against any intruder or burglar. Somehow I had expected him to be just as he was, a man of action and vision, a soldier, a writer, and a leader of men. For I had read his books and speeches, which give splendid evidence of the truth of Napoleon's "*Le style c'est l'homme.*"

All his best qualities are in his writings and addresses: his vision, his fairness, his humor, his simplicity, and his common sense, enhanced by greatness of concept. In a way he has a timeless personality. He might have been a Roman consul at the time of the republic or an English buccaneer in the time of Shakespeare. For Churchill's England is Shakespeare's England in the style of the twentieth century. Churchill unites the heart of a knight with a modern brain, an aristocratic nature with a democratic outlook. God blessed England when He gave it such a leader in its time of need, but God also blessed Churchill when He entrusted him with one of the greatest tasks in all history: to lead his glorious nation through deadly peril to triumph and to build up a better Europe and a brighter world.

When I prepared to leave, he asked me to stay for dinner. He invited me to take first a hot bath and a short rest in bed as he is accustomed to do every evening. When, after an hour and a half, we met again at supper, I told him that his method certainly was excellent and that I felt much relaxed. In my own mind I added that this method was probably one of the secrets of his eternal youth.

Before parting, Churchill gave me a copy of his book *Great Contemporaries*. We did not expect the Gestapo to confiscate it from my desk four weeks later. However, he sent me a duplicate to Switzerland.

Some months after our first meeting Churchill republished, without major changes, his article "The United States of Europe" in a London

weekly *The News of the World*. The rise of Hitlerism had not changed but only confirmed his Pan-European convictions.

I was back in London twice during 1938; first in June, when I delivered a lecture on central Europe before the Royal Institute of International Affairs shortly after Hitler had started his campaign against Czechoslovakia, and again in November, after the shameful incident of the Munich conference. And I was surprised to see how much more willing the British public was now to have England join a European federation. While Hitler's star was rising on the Continent, Churchill's star was rising in England. Many conservatives, laborites, and liberals now recognized in him a symbol of national regeneration and strength.

One day I lunched at Amery's house with Churchill and Lord Lothian. Up to the Munich conference, Lothian had firmly believed in appeasing Hitler, even if it meant sacrificing Austria and the Sudetenland, but he had since become converted to Churchill's line of stern resistance. Many British statesmen and politicians had followed this course. One of Churchill's most enthusiastic and faithful admirers was Harold Nicolson, whom I then met for the first time, although our fathers had been friends at the Court of Abdul Hamid where both had served as representatives of their country. We became friends immediately. I also met again Duff Cooper, whose resignation in consequence of the Munich conference had aroused my admiration. The mere fact that a statesman was willing to sacrifice his career for the sake of a principle was a moral triumph which counterbalanced much of the shame of Munich. Duff Cooper became an ardent sponsor of our cause giving some of his reasons for doing so in his book *The Second World War*. Here is how he described our meeting:

It was about this time that I again met Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, whom I had seen only once personally some fifteen years before. I had known then that he was working on plans for the federation of European nations which was known as the Pan-Europe Movement, and that he had gained the support of no less a person than Aristide Briand, who was then at the height of his power. I had vaguely classed this movement in my mind with the various idealistic and impractical schemes for ensuring international peace, all of which seemed to be now consigned to limbo as a result of the advent and the repeated success of power politicians. Almost my first words, therefore, at our second meeting were to suggest that I supposed he retained little hope now of carrying out his scheme for a united Europe. "On the contrary," he replied quietly, "Pan-Europe was never so certain as

it is today. Europe will certainly be united in a near future. The only question now is whether the union is brought about by force or whether it comes about by agreement and good will under the moral leadership of England and France. All the smaller nations would prefer the latter solution, which would allow them to retain their freedom and independence, but since Munich they have begun to doubt whether England and France have the power or the will to protect them and therefore they are inclined to make the best bargain they can with Germany before it is too late." I was much impressed by the views he expressed, by his grasp of the European situation, and by the practical character of his program. . . .

I had a first indication of his good will toward our movement when I read his page-long comment on my book *The Totalitarian State Against Man* in the *Evening Standard* of December 20. A few months later he held the chair at the meeting of the Royal Institute of International Affairs where I lectured again on European union. By that time Prague had fallen, and Churchill's policy had made so much headway that Britain had concluded a military alliance with Poland and given pledges of assistance to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey. Around this new system of alliances Pan-European organization seemed to arise spontaneously. There was no talk now of isolation; Britain, on the contrary, was taking boldly the lead in European coalition and organization.

A few days later I found myself discussing the Pan-European program, in Duff Cooper's house, with Anthony Eden and Sir Archibald Sinclair, and again I encountered only sympathy and agreement.

This was the program:

1. European solidarity in foreign, military, economic, and currency policies.
2. An effective guarantee to all the federated states of their independence, integrity, security, and equality, and of the maintenance of their national character.
3. An obligation on all European states, regardless of differences in their constitutions, to respect the rights of human personality and the equality of their citizens belonging to ethnic or religious minorities.
4. The peaceful settlement of all disputes between European states by a court of justice having at its disposal material and moral means necessary to make its decisions respected.
5. The establishment of a European institution designed to help state-members of the federation to meet their monetary and financial difficulties.

6. The progressive suppression of inter-European economic restrictions which are wrecking and ruining the European market.

7. A constructive plan for the necessary transition from war production to peace production designed to avoid the risk of unemployment.

8. The systematic organization of collaboration in colonial matters with a view to fitting colonial raw materials and markets into the economic complex of Europe.

9. The maintenance of and respect for the political, economic, and cultural links uniting various states of Europe with other parts of the world.

10. The promotion of international peace by collaboration with the British dominions, the American continent, the Soviet Union, and the nations of Asia and Africa in a world-wide organization.

On June 2 Amery organized a meeting of M. P.'s at the House of Parliament, aimed to organize a British group representing the Pan-European movement. Amery, who held the chair, proposed to constitute a "Parliamentary Committee of the Pan-European Union," with Duff Cooper as president and Captain Victor Cazalet as parliamentary secretary. Both accepted their offices and the committee was then constituted by Amery, Sir Edward Grigg, Haden Guest, Harold Nicolson, Sir Geoffrey Mander, and Sir Arthur Salter; representatives of the Conservative, Labor, and Liberal parties joined as members. Within a few days, this "Parliamentary Committee" became a "National Committee," as a number of nonparliamentarians had joined—men like Sir George Clark, the former ambassador to France; A. L. Kennedy of the *London Times*; Commander Stephen King Hall, editor of his *News Letter*; Sir Walter Layton, of the *News Chronicle*; Rennie Smith, of the *Friends of Europe*; Sir Evelyn Wrench, chairman of the Overseas League. It was Hitler who had accomplished the seemingly impossible. Britain was thoroughly aroused now to a sense of European solidarity and was willing to take up the idea of European union.

From then on all Pan-European activities centered on this immediate goal: the strengthening of the ties between France and Britain. It was possible to foresee a united Europe under Franco-British leadership and inspiration. With this prospect in mind, I wrote my book *Europe Must Unite*, which was soon published in French, German, and English. In its preface Amery writes:

The theme of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's book is the fate of that European Continent with which our own destiny must always be so closely concerned and of that European culture of which ours is an indissoluble part. He sees the present European anarchy heading for one of three disastrous

conclusions: ruinous wars, competitive exhaustion and social degradation, or Bolshevik revolution. His solution is the creation, before the catastrophe, of a single European Commonwealth, based on such measure of political and economic unity as may be found possible, but, above all, on a common European ideal, transcending, without weakening, national patriotisms, and including, as a matter of course, the fullest toleration of minorities in each State.

He points out, as many others have done, the absurdity, as well as the mischief, of the European anarchy. But he rightly concentrates on the true cause, the incapacity of Europeans to think of themselves as Europeans. Once Europeans can think of themselves, as Chinese or Indians can think of themselves, as members of an individual culture and tradition, in spite of local diversities of language or gradations of racial origin, then political and economic co-operation will follow and, in their turn, serve to strengthen the sense of common unity. What is needed, he insists, is the moral foundation. Not, indeed, a new moral foundation, but rather the revival, for the needs of our own day, of that moral unity once embodied in the Roman Empire and in the Western Christendom of the Middle Ages, broken up in turn by religious schism, by dynastic ambitions and by linguistic nationalism. The basis of that unity is, in his view, an outlook formed by the fusion of three elements: the classical conception of citizenship, the Christian conception of the equal underlying value of every individual soul, the medieval conception of chivalry, all three summed up, in his view, in our own English conception of a gentleman.

It is by the light of this underlying moral foundation, much more than by purely geographical considerations, that he defines the boundaries of his future Europe. He excludes Russia, not so much because it would carry Europe to the Pacific, or because by its sheer magnitude it would unbalance the whole system, as because Bolshevism, with its materialist atheism, its denial of all the traditions which have built up Europe, and its crude internationalism, could never belong to the same spiritual entity, unless Europe were first Bolshevized, i.e. no longer Europe. By the same standards he would, indeed, have to exclude present-day Germany, even if the real historic Germany must always be the central core of any united Europe, and he frankly admits that there can be no hope for his ideal until the present dictatorship has passed away. Ourselves, on the other hand, he would include whole-heartedly, to whatever extent we are willing to co-operate, and, indeed, he regards our initiative as indispensable to the creation of the new Europe. But he is fully alive to the fact that we already form part of just such a Commonwealth as he wishes to make of Europe, and wisely admits that this must affect the nature and extent of our co-operation.

Only imminent or actual catastrophe will bring the new Europe into being. The author's one concern is that when that moment comes it should find a statesmanship more practical and understanding than the abstract

and mechanical idealism of President Wilson, and a moral background stronger and more definite than the vague pacifist internationalism of the war-weary world of 1919. It is to prepare the way for that occasion that he has worked and preached indefatigably for the last sixteen years, and that he has penned this, the last and most effective of his many writings.

THE Second World War may be said to have started on March 11, 1938, when Hitler's troops crossed the German border into Austria. On this day the long series of invasions began. The next victim was the Sudeten area, then came the rest of Czechoslovakia, then Poland, then Denmark and Norway, then western Europe, then the Balkans, finally Russia.

It was logical for Hitler to attack Czechoslovakia after the fall of Austria. The independence of Czechoslovakia was illusory the moment Austria became a German province. A glance at the map shows that Poland, too, was doomed as soon as German troops had occupied Slovakia and encircled Poland from the north and south. Therefore these three campaigns in eastern Europe are interdependent, and any future reconstruction of Europe should recognize the fact that the fate and future of these three states can never again be separated. Only a free Czechoslovakia assures a free Poland, and only a free Austria protects the flank of a free Czechoslovakia.

It should also be remembered that Hitler started his conquest of Czechoslovakia in the mask of a liberator of oppressed minorities. He tried to convince the world that he was the champion of national liberty and democratic self-determination and that the liberation of the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia was his last territorial aim. He started a double agitation—a revolutionary one among the Sudetes, and an agitation for appeasement in London and Paris. Both campaigns were successful. The autonomist movement among the Sudetes assumed under pressure from Berlin a separatist character, and the western democracies were blind enough to believe that Hitler would stop in his conquest of Europe after annexing a few German-speaking provinces.

While the fate of Czechoslovakia was still in the balance I tried to convince British and French statesmen that Czechoslovakia would be nothing but a German dependency once Hitler was master of her

borders. In this effort I collaborated with the Czechoslovak minister to London, Jan Masaryk, the son of the late President. I was very fond of him because he carried the heavy burden of being the son of a genius with grace and genuine modesty and because he had inherited his father's international outlook, his broadmindedness, common sense, and generosity of mind. The elder Masaryk would have been proud of his son's noble and courageous attitude during the great crisis of his country.

After the Munich conference Czechoslovakia found itself deprived of its most vitally important territory; worse than that, Hungary and Poland, which had profited by the mutilation of their neighbor state, were now Hitler's associates, as were Italy and Spain. Britain's prestige on the Continent was ruined; and, in the eyes of the world, France had become a third-rate power which had abandoned her brave little ally in a moment of utmost danger. Had Hitler, after Munich, sought the permanent collaboration of Chamberlain's England, his conquest of Europe would have been accomplished by purely peaceful means within a short span of time. But his destructive instincts were stronger than his statesmanship and bade him follow a course of military aggression until the fates caught up with him.

When Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, my wife and I happened to be spending a few days in Holland, renewing contact with our Pan-European group there. I had just called on Premier Collijn, and I remember that we were in the middle of an animated conversation on European collaboration when the telephone rang and the news came that Slovakia had seceded from the Czech republic and had declared its independence. Next morning German troops occupied Prague. We returned to Paris at once so as not to be caught, should Hitler decide on an invasion of France via the Lowlands and Belgium.

One very minor consequence of the occupation of my Czech fatherland was the invalidation of our passports. Belgium, the Netherlands, and some other states soon refused to give visas on Czechoslovakian passports that had not been approved by a German consulate. This measure made it necessary for us to obtain another nationality. We applied for French citizenship, which was promised us promptly "for exceptional services rendered France"—in other words in remembrance of my collaboration with Briand. We were grateful to have been adopted by a great nation whose culture and history we had always loved and admired, and established our new center of activity in Paris.

On May 17, 1939, our traditional Pan-Europe Day, we organized

in Paris a large demonstration for European union at the Theatre Marigny under the slogan "Europe Tomorrow."

The affair drew a crowd of diplomats, politicians, professional and business men, who thronged the orchestra and the upper tiers. Duff Cooper had come from England to deliver a brilliant political speech for Pan-Europe. I followed with an outline of postwar European plans, but half-way through my address I changed from the political to a moral interpretation of the future.

I spoke of the futility of any political change without a change in the moral conceptions of Europe. Much of the weakness we had witnessed in the past years had its roots not in political issues but in moral ones. To stabilize the future peace, a reawakening of the great moral virtues of Europe was needed, and a rebirth of the spirit of heroism and of sacrifice.

Part of the audience was amazed by the turn of my oration, wondering what all this had to do with Pan-European politics. They were to realize within a year how closely related political and moral issues are. Ernest Mercier, who presided, closed our meeting with a speech about the economic necessity of European union.

Meanwhile Hitler had started his propaganda offensive against Poland. German newspapers carried huge headlines denouncing Polish "aggressiveness" and Polish "insolence." The world was getting a warning that Hitler soon would be on the warpath again.

Toward the end of August the storm was ready to break. My wife and I had gone to Lucerne to attend the music festival, which scheduled Toscanini, Horowitz, and Adolf Busch. As we listened to their admirable performance we were reminded of our Bayreuth visit twenty-five years before when war had hung in the balance as it did now. The years in between had brought war, then postwar strife and misery, and again prewar agitation, with events now shaping rapidly toward a new and unheard-of climax of universal destruction. On our way home we received, on August 31, our new passports at the French embassy in Bern.

The outbreak of the war found us next day in Gstaad, but as soon as trains began to function normally between Switzerland and France, we returned to Paris.

It was logical for me to continue to work there in close collaboration with the French Pan-European committee and the French government. I suggested that a European legion be formed of central European aliens living in France; I proposed an interallied center of propa-

ganda which was to integrate Pan-European ideas with its anti-Nazi campaign; I took the initiative in the formation of a parliamentary group, which succeeded in organizing a majority within the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in favor of Pan-Europe; finally I gained the co-operation of three outstanding churchmen—Cardinal Verdier, archbishop of Paris, Pastor Boegner, leader of the French Protestants, and Dr. Scharz, grand rabbi of Paris—who agreed to form together the honorary board of a “League for the Defense of Western Civilization.” The latter would be inspired by the great common ideals of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths: personal liberty, social justice, equality without national or racial discrimination, defense of the family and of religion against the assault of paganism and materialism.

In close connection with these Pan-European activities, my wife and I started to work for the resurrection of an independent Austria. We did our best to pave the way toward the establishment of an Austrian government in exile and suggested to the different leaders of Austrian groups that they agree on a free plebiscite that should determine the future constitution of Austria and fight together meanwhile for its liberation. After long effort and innumerable discussions, in Paris and later in New York, this plan failed, because of the resentment still prevailing among the Austrian emigrés as a consequence of the civil war of 1934, and because many Austrians were still clinging to the Pan-Germanist dream of an autonomous Austrian member-state of a socialist and democratic German federation that should rise from the ruins of the Third Reich.

These attempts to unite Austria-in-exile brought us into personal contact with many Austrian leaders living in Paris, among them the socialist Dr. Julius Deutsch, whom we had met in Austria when he was minister of war. Although he always was a sympathizer with Pan-Europe, I did not succeed in convincing him of the necessity of his participation in an Austrian government in exile.

We also met Archduke Otto. This serious and brilliant young man was devoting himself entirely to the cause of Hitler's defeat and of Austria's independence, and had been carried by his democratic convictions to a Pan-European outlook. We had many pleasant conversations about these problems, in Paris as well as later in America. We also saw much of our old friend Father Muckermann, who was now broadcasting to Germany against Hitler.

There was no doubt that the war had given a new impetus to our movement, a fact which my wise friend Nicolas Politis, Greek min-

ister in Paris and a veteran of the Pan-European Union, had foreseen. He told me at the very beginning of the war: "The decisive time for the realization of your program is now. The only thing to be afraid of is that, should the war end too quickly, nothing would be changed, or, should it last too long, then too much national hatred will stand in the way of Pan-European unity."

The belief that Franco-British union represented a first beginning of a European federation was making headway everywhere. The League of Nations had collapsed, and Pan-European union seemed the only alternative. On both sides of the Channel, books, pamphlets, and articles on European union multiplied, while Churchill, Attlee, Eden, Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Paul Reynaud, and Daladier praised this ideal in their speeches. The present Franco-British alliance with its common high command, its common foreign, economic, financial and supply policy had a good many characteristics of a true confederation. It had even evolved some kind of federal government, represented by the Franco-British supreme council, which met intermittently. For once, Britain, instead of clinging to its traditional "balance of power" policy, was taking the lead in a movement for European union.

In April, 1940, a meeting of the French Pan-European committee in Paris was attended by Amery and Duff Cooper, the two most active members of our British committee, who both some weeks later became members of the Churchill government.

On April 9 news came that Hitler had invaded Denmark and Norway. It was evident that Hitler attempted to occupy Norway, first, to assure an uninterrupted flow of Swedish ore to Germany and, second, to obtain a broad Atlantic base for his air force and his submarines from which to attack Britain and its fleet. Both reasons were based on the assumption that France would be strong enough to defend the mines of Lorraine and its Channel ports for a considerable length of time.

This miscalculation induced Hitler to attack Norway and to commit one of his greatest blunders of the whole war—a blunder that may be decisive in his ultimate defeat.

After Britain had lost its equipment at Dunkerque and its French ally at Compiègne, the world expected an immediate invasion attempt on unarmed England by Hitler's victorious divisions. But at this decisive moment Hitler's navy and transportation-fleet were in repair because of the severe damage they had suffered in the Norwegian campaign.

paign. When, in the summer of 1940, Hitler urgently needed this fleet and this navy to send troops across the Channel, under the cover of his superior air force, he had no fleet nor navy at his disposal. His vast superiority on land and in the air could not replace this lack of ships. So he missed this decisive chance to win the war.

Had he not overrated the strength of France, he would certainly have respected Norway's neutrality and attacked France in April; then, with an intact fleet and navy, he might have attempted the invasion and conquered England.

While the German armies were advancing through Amiens to the Channel coast, I admired the calm and courage of the people of Paris. In those days I sent a long message to Mussolini recalling our last conversation and pleading with him to range himself on the side of civilized Europe. The letter had been approved by the French foreign office and was mailed to him through the Italian embassy.

On May 28, the day the Belgian king surrendered to the Germans, I left Paris for Gstaad. The Germans were pressing close to the gates of the French capital, and the future of France lay dimmed by a curtain of blood and tears. As the train pulled out of the Gare de Lyons my heart was heavy because the country I loved was facing bitter days, but I knew that the heroic spirit of the French nation is indestructible and that the day would come, as it has always come in the past, when she would close her ranks, pick up her shattered banners, and march to victory again.

DURING the last days of May and the early days of June, 1940, Switzerland expected invasion almost hourly. If Hitler could not break the defenses of Paris in the north he was sure to try flanking moves in the south, which meant that he would violate Swiss territory.

My wife, my daughter Erica, and I were in Geneva and, although the news from the battle front seemed bad, we had no intention of leaving Europe. All our interests were anchored there. Paris was now our political headquarters, but Geneva had become the seat of our research center for European reconstruction. The center had started plans for extensive studies in the legal, monetary, and economic field, to be used as preparatory material at a future peace conference in connection with a future European organization. We had just secured the collaboration of a number of international experts, but we wished no publicity in connection with this work. I also published my *European Letters* in Geneva, although wartime censorship was strict. Every copy before going to press had to be submitted to the Swiss military censor who often suppressed a line or two if he thought them incompatible with Swiss neutrality.

Somehow I was still firmly convinced that France would hold out and that continuation of my work from Geneva would be possible. But the news from the battle front soon assumed alarming proportions. Rumors began to spread that France was suing for a separate armistice. Finally, when Reynaud had made a last pessimistic speech from Bordeaux, and Paris had capitulated without any attempt on the part of the French army to stop the Germans at the Seine-Marne line, my optimism began to fail. We recalled how the Nazis had almost trapped us in Vienna and decided not to give them another chance. We were grateful to the Swiss government for all the hospitality it had extended us throughout the years, but we did not wish to become a burden. Even if Switzerland were not invaded, only encircled, our presence would prove a serious embarrassment to the Swiss authorities by the

mere fact that we were determined to fight for Pan-Europe and against Hitlerism to the end.

At that moment the only European country still allied with Britain, and relatively safe from the threat of Nazi occupation, was Portugal. We decided to go to Lisbon and either remain there or proceed to London or New York. Meanwhile, events on the battle front were again taking a turn for the worse. The Maginot Line fell to the enemy and the German motorized divisions advanced along the Franco-Swiss border. On June 17 they had reached Vallorbes, twenty miles from Geneva.

So we left Geneva that day at 4 P.M., after having read in the papers that Pétain's government had asked Hitler for an armistice. For twenty years France had been the bulwark of Europe. Now that France fell, Europe seemed to fall. But I retained my hope that Churchill would carry on and fight to the final victory. And just before leaving I wrote in the June 15 issue of my *European Letters*, my farewell message to Europe:

The battle of Flanders was the first round in the decisive battle for the West. It has led to the victory of the German arms: to the occupation of the coasts of Flanders.

But decisive for the destiny of Europe will be alone the outcome of the last round, wherever it will be fought. Neither the number of the victories is decisive, nor the size of the occupied territories, nor the number of prisoners: only the fate of the ultimate battle, leading to collapse and surrender.

All of us who have witnessed the First World War remember the moods of the fortunes of battles and the difference between a victorious battle and a victorious war. We remember the German conquests of Liège and Bruxelles, of Lille and Anvers, of Belgrade and Nish, of Warsaw and Bucharest, of Riga and Kiev. We remember the victorious invasions of German armies into Belgium and the north of France, into Serbia and Rumania, Montenegro and Albania, western Russia and northern Italy. We remember how Turks and Bulgarians joined Germany, how the armies and the empire of the Tsar collapsed, we remember the Peace of Brest-Litovsk and the occupation of the fertile plains of Rumania and of the Ukraine. But we also remember the end of that unbroken chain of success and triumph: the unprecedented collapse of the Central Powers, only a few months after their last offensive in France.

This experience of the First World War recalls the story of Napoleon, this story of fifteen years of victories from Egypt to Spain and from Italy to Russia; this story of his unique march of triumph through Europe with its climax and its end at Moscow. And we recall the words of Goethe,

written during the thundering of the cannons announcing the Battle of Leipzig: "Every man, whoever he may be, must face his last chance and his last day."

In history the road to victory is often paved with defeats and the way to collapse often leads over laurels.

When we left Switzerland we did not know whether we would be able to pass Spain or whether that country, now that France was defeated, would follow Italy's example and join Hitler. We also did not know where Hitler's motorized columns were stationed, nor what cities they had occupied during this day. They must have been in the close vicinity of Geneva and of Lyon. We therefore were obliged to take the side-way of the Savoyan Alps, crossing Annecy, Aix-les-Bains and Grenoble.

Erica, our daughter, sat at the wheel of our car, driving courageously and rapidly through the hills in order to arrive in Valence ahead of the Germans.

Late in the evening we reached at Valence the main highway from Lyon to the Mediterranean. The highway was full of cars, driving refugees from Belgium, Paris, and Lyon to the south. Erica drove on through the night to get us as far away as possible from the advancing German units and to reach the Spanish border as quickly as possible. In Nîmes we tried to find a room to rest, but everything had been occupied by other refugees. When we arrived in Montpellier at dawn, we were so exhausted that we lay down on benches in the public park to take a three-hours rest. Then we went on again, along the coast of the Mediterranean, and finally at 4 P.M. crossed the Spanish border.

While we were racing through France toward an unknown destiny, Churchill was facing the House of Commons to determine Britain's policy in this darkest hour of its history.

Hitler had reached the climax of his career. The European continent lay prostrate at his feet. France was surrendering and Italy was being quickly transformed from an ally into a vassal. It seemed that any day Franco's Spain might follow the path of Mussolini's Italy. In the East, Russia was Germany's partner and associate, while the Balkans seemed to realize that the European balance of power had definitely crumbled and that Europe was at Hitler's mercy.

It was evident that Hitler was now preparing the final assault on Britain. The world was guessing whether he would now, after the fall of France, send his legions immediately across the Channel or whether

he would first try to smash Britain from the skies with his superior air power.

Britain's army was in an almost hopeless state. The Battle of Dunkerque had ended with one of the most glorious retreats of history. But this moral victory was a military defeat. Now, in the hour of gravest peril, Britain, almost disarmed, was facing the strongest army of all times.

In view of these tremendous odds against Britain, Hitler may even have hoped that he could win his war even without a knock-out blow against England, that Britain might recognize its hopeless situation and accept a generous peace from the hands of the conqueror of Europe. Hitler was ready to offer an alliance to Britain, if only it would abandon its Continental allies and sacrifice all of European democracy.

The eyes and ears of the world were now fixed on London. Would isolated Britain decide for war or for peace? For resistance or for negotiations?

Churchill was the symbol of resistance. Would he carry on—or would he resign to give place to a new cabinet of appeasers? Would he, after the terrific blow his policy had received by the surrender of France, be backed or overthrown by Parliament?

In this atmosphere of dramatic tension Winston Churchill began his memorable address to the House of Commons reporting his offer to France to carry on the war on the basis of a Franco-British union. He then proceeded:

However matters may go in France or with the French government, or with another French government, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people.

If we are now called upon to endure what they have suffered, we shall emulate their courage and, if victory rewards our toils, they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all.

We abate nothing of our just demands—Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, all who have joined their causes to our own, shall be restored.

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.

Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our empire.

The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war.

If we can stand up to him all Europe may be free, and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands; but if we fail then the whole world, including the United States and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age, made more sinister and perhaps more prolonged by the lights of a perverted science.

Let us therefore address ourselves to our duty, so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasts for a thousand years men will still say: This was their finest hour.

The House gave a unanimous ovation to the man who embodied the unbroken spirit of his indomitable nation.

In this hour Hitler had lost his war.

Since that day his star has declined.

On the afternoon of this day of destiny, the voice of Free France, unbroken and unconquered by invasion and armistice offer, was heard for the first time across the ether. It was the voice of gallant General Charles de Gaulle, determined to carry on the war on Britain's side till Germany's ultimate defeat. It was a voice of faith, of hope, and of courage.

Since this memorable June 18, 1940, the forces of light have been gaining the ascendancy over the forces of darkness. Since that crucial day, Europe and the world can hope again.

Churchill's and De Gaulle's defiant words, followed by bold and wise actions, were the prelude to a new and brighter page of the war and of human history.

After having waited six weeks for our three Clipper reservations, we left Lisbon the morning of August 3. It was a bright and glorious day. Slowly the last shadows of the European continent faded away in the ocean, as we were flying towards Horta. Far below us we saw a ship. Suddenly the Yankee Clipper went down, almost to the level of the sea, to greet the ship that was slowly moving westward. Our flying boat was greeting the Duke and the Duchess of Windsor, sailing towards their new destiny, the Bahamas. They greeted our plane from the deck of their ship. I remembered the long talk I had with the Duke three years before at the British legation in Vienna, and how keenly he had been interested in the Pan-European movement. It was curious to think that this ship, that we had seen two days ago from the shores of Estoril, when it left Lisbon, would take days and days to arrive in America, where our friends were expecting us the next morning.

Some hours later we arrived at Horta, on the Azores Islands, to admire the beautiful view and to say farewell to Europe.

The beauty of this flight is beyond description. There is no monotony but a constant and amazing change of scenery. The different forms and shades of the clouds, changing constantly from darkest gray to purest white, red, purple, and gold, often spread like a great veil over the distant ocean, or like a huge chain of mountains, or like a herd of innumerable sheep on the blue meadow of the sky—all this gives you an ever changing picture of beautiful colors and overwhelming splendor. For hours and hours you can sit at your window, gazing at the beauties of this world with its incredible wonders and mysteries.

This bright summer day was the longest day of our life, as we had followed the course of the sun and gained about three hours of daylight. After a wonderful sunset, a clear night followed the clear day; the stars seemed larger, nearer, and brighter than ever.

Flying westward I pondered over the destiny that had carried me as a baby from distant Pacific shores to this little European continent which had become my dear home and beloved country. For eighteen years we had struggled for this continent, for its union and its peace. As a result we now were forced to abandon the soil of Europe in order to continue our work abroad.

And it seemed to me like a fairy tale that at the very moment when we felt exiled to the outermost shores of Europe, threatened again by Hitler's armies which had twice forced us to leave our home, a huge iron bird had crossed the ocean to carry us on its strong wings across the skies to a free and peaceful continent.

Crossing the Atlantic, I summed up our work. I remembered our hopes and our disappointments. I remembered our struggle for peace, and the outbreak of war; our struggle for liberty in the shade of tyranny strangling Europe; our struggle for mass prosperity, and the mass misery that now was starving Europe.

But I also thought of the seeds we had sown throughout Europe, the creed for a better future in a peaceful, prosperous, and free United States of Europe, how these seeds were germinating under the snow of war—how they were growing across the misery of the crisis, across the horrors of invasion and the atrocities of tyranny. And I envisaged the glorious day when Hitler's arms would break and his chains would tear; when the war would pass away like a nightmare and all the bells of Europe would ring for the day of Europe's union, of its triumph over hatred, misery, and destruction.

Looking back over the long way behind us and forward on the steep way ahead, I could only thank God that He had given us the chance

to fight this great battle, and was now giving us a new chance to continue it beyond the ocean.

I also thought of all those, who in those decisive years had helped us build up this movement for European union, who had died without seeing its achievement or were still living all over Europe, or in exile, faithful to their belief and hope, expecting the day of peace, of liberation, and of triumph.

And I thanked God with all my heart that in this long and hard strife He had given me in my dear wife such a faithful and helpful companion, and I thanked her in my thoughts for all her love, her confidence, her idealism, her spirit of sacrifice and heroism, her faith, her charm, and her vision, which had carried me through the darkest periods of this struggle again and again toward new hope and new action.

When I awoke next morning, our Clipper was nearing the coasts of America.

My thoughts were turning toward the future. A new chapter of the battle of Europe had begun with the heroic resistance of Britain. This chapter would end one day with the fall of Hitler and the rise of European federation.

In the United States of America we would continue to work for the realization of the United States of Europe. We were approaching a friendly country, a friendly continent.

While considering my plans and my hopes, I saw, to our right, a narrow strip of land. It was America. Soon Long Island appeared with its tiny houses and sailing boats, and its tiny toy-like men and women.

Some minutes later we landed smoothly at La Guardia Field—twenty-six hours after leaving the European shore. I realized that the water we had crossed had ceased to be an ocean and was reduced, through aviation, to the size of a sea. The Atlantic had become the Mediterranean of our days, uniting and not separating the two main branches of the white race and Western civilization.

I understood that the period of continental isolation was definitely over and that the Atlantic Clipper had opened a new page of history: the chapter of a united Atlantic world, including Pan-America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the future Pan-European federation.

And beyond and above Pan-Europe I conceived the vision of a New Atlantis, bringing peace and prosperity and liberty to all men and women and nations of good will throughout the globe.

Part Four

THE ROAD TO LASTING PEACE

SOME months after our arrival in America the chancellor of New York University, Harry Woodburn Chase, kindly invited me to join the teaching staff of its Graduate School of Arts and Science.

In February, 1942, I was enabled to establish, at New York University, the Research Seminar for Post-War European Federation. From this new headquarters I continued my old work for European union, in close collaboration with a brilliant American scholar, Professor Arnold Zurcher, who became my friend, and with a group of post-graduate students.

I also reorganized the American Co-operative Committee of the Pan-European Union, that resumed its activity under the inspiring chairmanship of Dr. Stephen Duggan, under the new name of "American Committee for a Free and United Europe."

On March 25, 1943, the fifth Pan-European conference was called in New York at the invitation of New York University, extended through our Research Seminar for Post-War European Federation.

The council for this conference of Pan-Europe in exile was constituted by a number of prominent Europeans, old and new collaborators: Major Victor Cazalet, member of the British Parliament; Professor Oscar Halecki, director of the Polish Institute in New York; Professor Rudolf Holsti, former foreign minister of Finland; Dr. Milan Hodža, former prime minister of the Czechoslovak republic; Professor Halvdan Koht, former foreign minister of Norway; Professor Louis Marlio, member of the Institute of France; Professor Fernando de Los Rios, former foreign minister of the republic of Spain; Professor Raymond de Saussure, Swiss doctor and author; Leon Schaus, general secretary of the government of the grand duchy of Luxembourg; Professor Richard Schueller, former undersecretary of state of the American republic; Colonel Sophokles Venizelos, leader of the Democratic party of Greece, now member of the Greek government; Dr. Paul Van Zeeland, former prime minister of Belgium.

The conference work is organized in three commissions; the juridical commission presided over by Fernando de Los Rios, one of the noblest figures of the European emigration; the economic commission by Louis Marlio, brilliant economist and collaborator of Pan-Europe for many years, now member of the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington; and the cultural commission by myself. Vice-presidents of the juridical commission are Professor Arnold Zurcher, and Dr. Stephen Ladas, outstanding Greek expert on minority problems; vice-presidents of the economic commission are Professor André Istel, former financial adviser to the French prime minister Paul Reynaud, and Dr. Richard Schueller; vice-presidents of the cultural commission are George Payne, dean of the School of Education at New York University, and Dr. Raymond de Saussure.

Attended by a large staff of outstanding European and American experts, the conference decided to meet periodically till peace is concluded and its aim attained—a European federation, based on a system of personal liberty, of equal rights for all nations and religious groups, of social justice, rising prosperity, and lasting peace.

The concluding banquet, sponsored by more than five-hundred prominent Americans and Europeans, was presided over brilliantly by a faithful friend of the Pan-European movement, Ambassador William Bullitt, the other speakers being Senator Harold Burton, Chancellor Chase of New York University, Dr. Stephen Duggan, De los Rios, Marlio, and myself.

This conference marks the resurrection of the Pan-European movement on American soil. Its echo in the American press and public opinion was strong and very favorable.

The Pan-European conference in New York was borne on a new wave of hope, because only four days before its opening Winston Churchill had again, in a speech broadcast across the world, developed his old idea of European union; but this time in the name of the British government.

The decisive passage of his speech of March 21, 1943, reads as follows:

One can imagine, that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia.

As according to the forecast I am outlining the war against Japan will still be raging, it is upon the creation of the Council of Europe and the

settlement of Europe that the first practical task will be centered. Now this is a stupendous business. In Europe lie most of the causes which have led to these two world wars. In Europe dwell the historic parent races from whom our Western civilization has been so largely derived. I believe myself to be what is called a good European; beside, I should deem it a noble task to take part in reviving the fertile genius and in restoring the true greatness of Europe.

I hope we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work which was accomplished by the creation of the League of Nations. Certainly we must take as our foundation the lofty conception of freedom, law and morality which was the spirit of the League. We must try—I am speaking, of course, only for ourselves—we must try to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, into a really effective league with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture; with a high court to adjust disputes and with forces, armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.

Any one can see that this Council, when created, must eventually embrace the whole of Europe and that all the main branches of the European family must some day be partners in it. What is to happen to the large number of small nations whose rights and interests must be safeguarded? Here let me ask what would be thought of an army that consisted only of battalions and brigades and which never formed any of the larger and higher organizations like army corps. It would soon get mopped up. It would therefore seem to me, at any rate, worthy of patient study, that, side by side with the great powers, there should be a number of groupings of states or confederations which would express themselves through their own chosen representatives, the whole making a council of great states and groups of states.

It is my earnest hope, though I can hardly expect to see it fulfilled in my lifetime, that we shall achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and historic races. All this will, I believe, be found to harmonize with the high permanent interests of Britain, the United States and Russia. It certainly cannot be accomplished without their cordial and concerted agreement and direct participation. Thus and thus only will the glory of Europe rise again.

This speech of Winston Churchill opens a new Pan-European Initiative. For never since the days of Briand has a leading statesman advocated Pan-Europe so wholeheartedly as did Churchill in this speech. Of course Churchill, speaking for his government, remains vague in his definition of "integrated Europe." But whoever wishes to find an authentic interpretation of his speech need only recall his earlier study on

European federation. In this study Churchill could be more explicit, because at that time he was not in office and expressed only his personal opinion, while in his great speech he had to present the views of his government.

Winston Churchill's new Pan-European Initiative makes it evident that the idea of European union has survived the years of war and will dominate the coming peace conference. And it is indeed very probable that Churchill's expectation will come true, that a European peace conference will meet at a time when the war in the Pacific still continues. Therefore the European question will have to be treated first, as a separate issue, independent of the problems of world organization, that can be settled only at the end of the Pacific war.

This does not mean that the problem of European federation can be separated, practically and ideologically, from the wider problem of world organization. On the contrary: I entirely agree with Churchill's statement that Europe can only be organized with the direct participation of Britain, Russia, and the United States. United Europe must be born from an understanding between these three great United Nations living at its periphery.

But it is vital for Europe that, in this broader European system, the United States of America should be included. There are still many Europeans who regard Britain and Russia as European, and America as extra-European, and who therefore wish a European federation including the British Empire and the Soviet Union, but excluding America. Such a European federation, stretching from Capetown to the vicinity of Alaska and controlling not only the whole of Africa and of Australia, but Canada and half of Asia, would be the most powerful political, military, and economic group of the world and consequently unacceptable for America. But it would also be unacceptable for Europe, because Europe would become practically a condominium of Britain and Russia. Either Europe would be torn into a British and a Russian sphere of interest with the certainty of a clash between these two systems in a near future, or all the European states would become playballs between Moscow and Britain, with its states, parties, and statesmen backed by one of these great powers against its rival. Europe's fate would remind us of the fate of Italy during the Renaissance, when all its little states became victims of the rivalry between the two great powers, Spain and France.

This tragic fate can only be averted if Europe is established not on two, but on three feet. If federal Europe is backed and sponsored,

jointly and on equal terms, by Britain, Russia, and America. If not only the whole of Europe, but, as Churchill emphasizes, all the main branches of the European family are partners in this system. And there can be no doubt that North and South America as well as the British dominions and Siberia must be regarded as such branches.

Just as America, for obvious reasons, cannot tolerate a European federation including Britain and Russia but excluding the United States, Britain could never tolerate a united Europe including Russia and excluding England. For the same reasons Russia would not tolerate a European system including Britain and excluding the Soviet Union. The only practical solution is the organization of a close European federation, including the states between Portugal and Poland, within a wider system embracing the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and America. Only if these three powers act as sponsors of the European federation against any internal and external threat, can a peaceful and prosperous Europe be organized and can lasting peace be maintained between Russia and Britain.

Therefore, the Fifth Pan-European Conference has established the following five principles as a basis for its proceedings:

1. We are working strictly within the broad limits of the Atlantic Charter.

2. We conceive any European federation only as a regional group within a world-embracing postwar organization, based on a permanent collaboration between the four big United Nations.

3. Before this regional world system is definitely established, Europe must be organized under the joint sponsorship and active participation of its three great neighbors—America, Britain, and Russia. Consequently, Europe's attitude toward these three powers must be as co-operative, friendly, and cordial as possible.

4. No European system is acceptable that will not rule out definitely any future threat of German aggression or hegemony.

5. The federation of Europe must be based on democratic principles. The people of Europe must, therefore, be given the opportunity to decide their future themselves. Free and fair elections ought to be held as soon as possible after the end of hostilities.

At the end of the European war four main factors will determine the question of Continental reorganization: the United States; the British Empire; the Soviet Union; the people of Europe.

Among those four powers, only the head of the British government

has made a clear statement in favor of European union. But even this fact should not let us forget that strong forces in Britain have retained their century-old hostility to the idea of European union. They will probably not openly oppose Churchill's generous program, but they will try, instead, to transform Europe into a weak League of Nations, based on a new system of balance of power—a policy that would be bound to lead within a short time to a civil war between the members of this European league. Everything will therefore depend on whether the followers of Churchill or the traditional backers of the balance of power will be the stronger among the British leaders at the peace table.

Neither the American nor the Russian government has yet taken a definite stand toward the problem of European federation. But American public opinion has reacted very favorably toward the Pan-European idea and the Pan-European Conference, and there is good reason to believe that this American sympathy toward a democratic federation of Europe is general and genuine. It might even become a bridge of understanding and of compromise between the former isolationists and internationalists, because a European federation would be able to settle minor disputes and internal complications without American intervention, while America would be entitled to interfere in all major issues that would endanger its own future; for instance, to prevent German hegemony or to save Europe from outward aggression. So America would be relieved from the heavy burden of Europe—without European self-government ever becoming a danger to America.

It is even possible that Stalin might welcome seeing his western border definitely assured by the establishment of a European federation that would neutralize the antagonistic nationalism within Europe and make impossible any imperialistic or aggressive action toward its Russian neighbor. Russia has for centuries suffered invasions from imperialistic European nations, from Poland and Sweden, France and Germany. It could, of course, never tolerate any European Union under national hegemony. But a European system, established on the Swiss model, would be incapable of any offensive action owing to its national tensions and diversities. Even Switzerland could not survive an attempt to wage a war of conquest without immediately going to pieces, although it would be very strong and united in any defensive war. The same would be the case with Europe. Therefore Russia might welcome a solution that would make its western border safe and give it a chance to concentrate its political and military attention on the future development of its Asiatic territories.

Even if Britain, America, and Russia should agree on European federation, this solution still needs the backing of the people of Europe themselves. But it is very difficult to be sure now what they are thinking about European federation, because under German domination they are unable to express their political ideas. Only free Switzerland continues to sympathize openly with the idea of European federation as a necessary outcome of the war.

But there is no doubt that in occupied Europe, during the long and dark blackouts, men and women and boys and girls are arguing night by night and hour by hour how it happened that Europe was plunged into an ocean of blood, of tears, and of misery. The cheap explanation, that all this tragedy came about only because Hitler is a villain and the Germans are brutes, is too primitive to cover the entire problem. Most Europeans are clever enough to understand that something must have been basically wrong in the whole system of Europe. They will argue that, if within any society a gang of criminals comes to power, not only the gangsters are to be blamed but also the police whose duty it was to check the gang before it was too late. They will realize that a heavy share of responsibility falls on those statesmen who were blind enough to prevent the union of Europe when it was proposed by Briand, and thus to make the rise of Hitler possible.

These passionate discussions will end with the resolution never again to permit Europe to become the prey of a World War and never again to allow Germany to dominate Europe. Many men and women, young and old, advocate turning the back upon the civilization of yesterday and boldly embracing Communism. By joining the powerful Soviet Union they hope to assure a new era of social equality and of international peace.

But others have remained faithful to their Pan-European ideals. They believe that the great civil war within Europe, waged between slavery and anti-slavery, will finally lead to a free and united Europe, peaceful and prosperous like the United States of America, their admired sponsor and model.

Very few Europeans who have lived through the tragedy of their continent will remain unimpressed by this terrific experience and set their hopes again on the old principles of nationalism, of sovereignty, balance of power, autarchy, rivalry, and division. Their sufferings will have convinced them of the necessity of a radical change in the structure of Europe. But imagination seldom dares to seek unknown forms of life and is rather inspired by experienced models. Thus Europe will primarily be attracted by the two successful systems to the east and to

the west, by the two great neighbor federations of Europe: the Soviet Union and the United States.

Both of these huge federations have found political systems making it possible for men and women of various races and nations to live and to work together without national hate or national wars. Therefore, for all those who are seeking peace, these two outstanding examples of federalism will form the pattern of future Europe. Some will prefer the Russian example of social equality without liberty—and others the American example of liberty without social equality. But most of the Europeans will hope for some compromise, uniting the western ideal of liberty with the eastern ideal of equality—a European federation, more democratic than Russia and more socialist than America.

This will be the general trend of Europe at the end of the war.

Recent documents emanating from the European underground make it quite evident that the idea of a United States of Europe has become the only powerful alternative to a Soviet Europe; because no sane European intends to reestablish Europe as it was when it was overrun by Hitler, because nobody wishes his children to live through the same tragedies he has experienced. The program of the Polish underground, for example, demands a socialist and democratic Poland in the framework of a United States of Europe. French, Italian, Austrian, and German underground movements have issued analogous statements. And should a plebiscite be held in Europe, it would probably decide for European federation.

Meanwhile the general confusion about Europe's future has given Hitler a unique chance to play the rôle of a champion of Europe's unification.

It was very fortunate for the Continent and for the entire human race that Hitler played this rôle so miserably, and that it ended in utter failure.

After the fall of France Hitler was virtually the master of the European continent west of the Soviet Union. In this unique situation he could have exchanged his nationalistic slogans for European catchwords, and done his best to reconcile the occupied nations by presenting them with the ideal and material advantages of European union.

Had Hitler chosen this path, he would, immediately after the Armistice, have concluded a generous and definite peace with the fascist government of France, a peace without any territorial concessions, based on a military, political, and economic alliance. He would then

have established a supreme council for Europe, composed of himself, Mussolini, Pétain, and Franco, with himself as its chairman. This European council, based on legal equality but on a *de facto* hegemony of Germany, would have achieved the economic union of Europe and assured throughout the entire continent social reforms by authoritarian means. Based on such a federation, he might have done his best to assure good relations with Russia and with America, until Britain would finally have accepted some compromise with the united Continent.

Had Hitler been a great statesman, he might have attempted this task. But his statesmanship failed. Instead of assuring the sympathies of big groups among the defeated nations of Europe, his soldiers and executioners did everything to make the name of Nazi and of Germany excoriated from the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean. Thus the occupied nations of Europe remained deaf to all slogans of the New Order based on German domination, and dream only of the day when British troops will drive out the cruel invaders and advance to the heart of Berlin.

Hitler did not even succeed in gaining for his New Order the men who had previously favored European union, because everybody agreed that even the worst European disunion was preferable to Hitler's union based on German domination, exploitation, and oppression. The result is that throughout Europe Pan-Europeans are now fighting side by side with nationalists against Hitler and his New Order.

Although Europe is being unified technically and economically by Hitler's war economy as never before, it is now divided morally as never before by a burning hatred between Nazis and anti-Nazis, Germans and anti-Germans. Hitler has thus lost the decisive battle for Europe's soul—long before he has lost the battle for Europe's soil. Europe is aware that it can only unite against him and his principles—never with him.

The reasons for this spectacular failure lie in Hitler's nature. This man never had a notion what Europe and its civilization really meant. All his political conceptions were fundamentally anti-European. He believes that the limits of the German tongue constitute the limits of what he understands as genuine civilization. Europe is, to his mind, nothing but a geographic unit, the nearest hunting ground and colony for his German master race, a park surrounding his German house. All non-Germanic elements of European life, especially Romanic and Slavic Europeans, are in his eyes either barbarians or decadent. They are just good enough to be transformed into slaves and to work for the German master race. But he would prefer to exterminate them rather

than to concede their equality with the chosen race of the Germans.

Of course some of Hitler's collaborators who had studied the Pan-European movement tried to borrow some of its slogans to reassure public opinion. But it was Hitler himself who made any success for his New Order impossible. He did not understand that the Pan-European idea could only work on the basis of human liberty and of national equality—ideas incompatible with the doctrines of Nazism, Racism, and Pan-Germanism.

These political and psychologic blunders of Hitler have not been sufficiently exploited by the United Nations. During these decisive years they have committed the grave mistake of not opposing to Hitler's New Order a democratic program of European union and reconstruction. They rather gave the impression of wishing to restore Europe to a new state of disunion, similar to Europe's prewar anarchy.

More than ever the European question ought to be discussed freely by the public. Else it may happen that the United Nations, after their victory, repeat the political mistake Hitler committed after his military triumph; that they fail to establish European peace and prosperity, thus preparing for a third World War in the very near future.

To prevent that disaster we must all realize that the European question can only find a definite solution after some great crisis; and that, if this solution is not found right now, it will have to be postponed until the next great war or a general revolution.

It is crime and folly to propose the re-establishment of Europe on the principles of 1919, on the principles of nationalism and of division. The proponents of such a peace would be guilty of a third World War and of the collapse of Western civilization that would be its inevitable consequence.

This third World War, to be waged in our lifetime or in that of our children, dragging the whole world again into the European turmoil, can only be prevented by a European federation, established in the framework of a world organization on the principle of regionalism. This solution alone can assure a long era of peace and of civilization—not only for Europe, but for the whole world.

To understand the problem of peace we must first understand the problems of war. We must realize that the European war has three very different aspects:

(1) It is *Hitler's War*, waged by the Nazis since 1933, to conquer the world for their absurd ideals.

(2) It is *Germany's War*, started in 1914, to establish Pan-Germany's domination over Europe and the World.

(3) It is the last phase of the *European War of Nationalism*, that started in the sixteenth century with the attempt of Spain to dominate Europe, and that has been going on ever since with increasing violence, in spite of shorter or longer periods of armistice.

To finish Hitler's War we must thoroughly liquidate Hitler and his gang, just as the Allies liquidated Napoleon, his regime and empire in 1814-1815.

But Hitler's War is complicated by the fact that it is not only Hitler's war but also the second act of the thirty years' war that Germany started in 1914, a war that has only been interrupted by an armistice. If, at the end of this war, Hitlerism should be defeated, but Pan-Germanism survive it under the aspect of a military dictatorship, we would have no hope for a lasting peace but would have to prepare for the third act of this German War. Therefore not only Nazism must be liquidated but also Pan-Germanism. Not only the Nazi party, but also the German army. And there can be no question of Germany's retaining any of its conquests made in the name of Pan-Germanism: neither Austria, nor the Sudeten region, Danzig, Alsace-Lorraine, nor any other German-speaking region invaded by Hitler.

But this war is not only Hitler's and Germany's war. It is also the third part of the long war of national supremacy over Europe, the war that started four hundred years ago.

This great national war for European supremacy was first waged by Spain under Charles V and his son Philip II, who tried to establish their national domination over Europe.

The second act of this great war was waged by France, after Spain's decline. It was first King Louis XIV and then Emperor Napoleon I who attempted European hegemony, until both were crushed by England, like the Spanish Armada of Philip II.

Only the third act of this great European war is being waged by Germany, first under the Kaiser William II and then under Adolf Hitler. But just as William II was finally overthrown by Britain, the first decisive defeat of Hitler in his Battle of Britain has forecast his doom.

This war of four hundred years would have led to some national domination over Europe, had not Britain prevented it by the wars waged by Elizabeth and Marlborough, Wellington, Lloyd George, and Churchill. To end this long war for European hegemony once for all it is not enough to crush Hitler and even Pan-Germanism. For to-

morrow another nation can take up the claim of dominating Europe, as France did after the fall of Spanish imperialism and Germany after the fall of French imperialism. And looking back we understand how wisely the allied nations acted at the peace of 1814-1815, when they did not crush France, because they were afraid that such an action would only help Prussia to become the dominating power of the Continent.

To end this European war of national supremacy forever, we have to transform the entire organization of the Continent. We must conclude a peace that is directed not only against Nazism and Pan-Germanism, but also against the entire notion of national predominance—a peace based on the conception of national equality and continental solidarity.

On these grounds only can lasting peace in Europe be established.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE *What About Germany?*

HISTORY will probably name this war Hitler's War, because Adolf Hitler is its central figure—just as Napoleon was in the Napoleonic Wars. In both cases a man attempted to overthrow the European order by force and supplant it by his own plans and his personal domination.

But this war is also Germany's war, just as the Napoleonic Wars were expressions of French imperialism. The German nation is not only Hitler's first victim—but also his intimate accomplice. Germany is backing Hitler just as France backed Napoleon. And just as France started to invade Europe years before Napoleon, so Germany undertook its first attempt to conquer Europe years before Hitler. France even proved more attachment to Napoleon than Germany to Hitler, because the plebiscites for Napoleon were more genuine and because the French nation reinstalled Napoleon spontaneously after his exile in Elba.

Hitler, like Napoleon, is the personification of a strong wave of national imperialism, carrying his nation toward conquest and hegemony.

Of course the figure of Napoleon is very different from that of Hitler. If you believe that the face of a man is the seal of his soul, you need only compare the death-mask of the great warrior with the photographs of the great demagogue in order to realize the scale of human values that separates these two self-made men, who both almost conquered the European continent and were finally crushed by Britain and Russia.

But just as Napoleon carried away the French nation through its ambition and thirst for glory, so Hitler carried away the Germans by a deep affinity between his doctrine and the instincts of the average German soul. Adolf Hitler would never have been able to conquer Germany, had not millions of little Hitlers helped and backed him.

Although Nazism is an epidemic disease of the German soul, it is certain that this soul had a strong tendency toward this very disease.

And still it would be unfair to identify Germans with Nazis, just as it would be unfair to identify Russians with Bolsheviks or Italians with Fascists. For in all these cases the ruling system is not the expression of a national will, but of minority groups ruling their nations by means of violence, censorship, and propaganda.

Although the German nation cannot be acquitted of complicity with Hitler, it can not be identified with him. In judging the degree of Germany's responsibility, it would be unfair to forget that, despite fourteen years of demagogic campaigning, Hitler never succeeded in obtaining a free majority vote from the German nation, although he assumed the rôle of a national champion in the anti-Versailles movement for Germany's honor, liberty, and prosperity. During all these years the compact majority of Germans voted against him for democracy, peace, and European understanding.

And even among the Germans voting for Hitler there was always a strong percentage of non-Nazis, considering their vote nothing but a protest against Versailles and Bolshevism.

All elections and plebiscites that took place after Hitler was named chancellor in opposition to the German majority vote must be considered invalid, because they were organized under a reign of terror, without any fair control of the polls. They do not alter the fact that, from a democratic point of view, the German nation has never shared Hitler's responsibility by a free vote.

After Hitler had established his power, backed by President Hindenburg, the army, police, and bureaucracy, he was considered the legitimate chancellor of the Reich, who must be obeyed. Besides, German civilians had practically no means of overthrowing him. The technical progress of killing machines had reduced the means of civil revolution against armed forces. Such a revolution had become impossible in a system based on torture and terror.

The only power that could and still can overthrow Hitlerism is the German army. But have you ever seen an army overthrowing a chief or a system leading it toward victory, glory, and triumph? Hitler's constant and amazing success in foreign policy impressed his generals far more than the suffering of the Jews, socialists and Catholics. Most of them disagree with the methods—but they agree with the results. They accept the barbarism of the Party as a none too high price for Germany's triumphal revenge over its enemies of 1918.

The German army will continue to back Hitler as long as he is victorious. It will drop him as soon as he is defeated.

Millions of Germans were, and still are, voluntary followers of Hitler without being Nazis and without accepting the creed of racialism. In their eyes the issue of this war, as of the previous one, is not racialism against Western civilization, but whether Germans or Anglo-Saxons shall rule Europe and the world. They admire and follow Hitler, not because he is the leader of Nazism, but because he is the strongest expression of Pan-Germanism. They close their eyes to the absurdities and atrocities of Nazism, because they believe that the aim sanctifies the means and hope that these revolutionary symptoms will one day disappear, while the German rule will survive.

This state of mind has often been interpreted as an evidence that the war is not Hitler's war, that the man Hitler is but a puppet and an instrument of Pan-Germanism, nothing but the successor of William II. That, consequently the entire German nation is responsible for the war and must suffer punishment after the defeat.

The strongest argument in favor of this theory is that the German war for European hegemony started in 1914, long before the name of Hitler appeared for the first time in any headline.

Some French scholars have advocated the theory that the German character is basically aggressive, because, throughout history the Germans have disturbed the peace of Europe by their chronic aggressions. They emphasize that four times within a century, from 1814 to 1914, Germany has invaded France and threatened or conquered Paris. But closer examination of these four invasions gives a different picture. In 1814 and 1815 the German armies, together with those of the other Allies, entered France not as conquerors, but to liberate Europe from Napoleon's tyranny. And the responsibility for the German war against France in 1870 must be shared between two imperialistic and ambitious statesmen, Prince Bismarck and Napoleon III. During the six preceding centuries Germany made no attempt to conquer Europe or to establish its national hegemony. The ambitions of Emperor Charles V were based on his Spanish kingdom rather than on his imperial crown. And while Spain and Sweden and France waged imperialistic wars against their neighbors, the German nation was split for centuries by religious and dynastic strifes. The German kingdoms, principalities, and republics were mainly interested in their local political problems.

The idea of German domination, militarism, and imperialism is recent. Born in Prussia, it penetrated Germany only in the course of the nineteenth century.

Prussia was a creation of the Teutonic Order of religious knight-

monks carrying on the spirit of the crusaders, a spirit of ascetic militarism and heroism, across the Middle Ages. First fighting for Christianity against the pagan Lithuanians, this great order continued to fight for Germanic rule against the non-Germanic nations of the East. During this entire period Prussia was not a member of the German empire; it was built up by conquerors on conquered soil, as the eastern bastion of Germanism, surrounded by a threatening ocean of Slavs and of Lithuanians.

With the Reformation the Teutonic Order was liquidated, but its spirit survived in the new rulers of Prussia, the "Junker" aristocracy. By intermarriage and domination, the originally Slav Prussians had been Germanized; the new Prussian nation grew out of this crossing of Slav and German blood.

Inspired by this tradition of warrior-monks, Prussia evolved very differently from the rest of Germany, as a military and half totalitarian power. A series of able and ambitious kings, culminating in the outstanding King Frederick the Great, developed this little Baltic state by a number of wars and conquests into the leading power of northern Germany. After having defeated Austria in 1866, Prussia established its domination over Germany and constituted the new German Empire, ruled by its Hohenzollern kings.

The Prussian spirit was very different from the spirit of the rest of the Germans. It was basically aggressive, disciplined, and totalitarian. Prussia was ruled by its military aristocracy, headed by autocratic kings. Here was no place for democratic ideas and institutions—only for a cult of the state and the army. In this poor country a spirit of puritanism prevailed, and a contempt for softness and luxury. The average Prussian does not believe in any equality between men, nations, or races, but only in masters and serfs. He does not wish to live as an equal among equals—but to command and to obey. He feels happy to do both. Human society seems to him like a pyramid, not like a plate. In this spirit Prussia conceived and established the union of Germany, with Prussia ruling and all other German states accepting its rule. From this conception there was only one step to the idea of a Europe ruled by Germany. For the Prussian spirit conquered Germany since it had dominated and united it. This evolution led first to the war of 1914, and later to that of 1939.

After the German defeat of 1918 the Prussian spirit rebelled against the democratic republic of Weimar and joined Hitler's revolutionary movement. It merged the Prussian worship of the state with the Nazi worship of the race, the idea of Prussian monarchism with that of

Pan-German totalitarianism. Although partially inspired by Prussian ideas and traditions, the Third Reich was born not in Prussia, but in Bavaria, and was directed not by Prussians, but by an Austrian surrounded primarily by Bavarian collaborators. So thoroughly had the Prussian spirit transformed the German soul—as in a remote past the spirit of the Teutonic Knights had transformed the Prussian Slavs.

This spirit of imperialism and domination must be considered as one of the sources of Hitlerism rather than as its consequence. This fact must be remembered, because it warns Europe to count upon the survival of this spirit even after the fall of Hitler.

The racial prejudice that became the dogma of Hitlerism also was an inherent element of the German soul long before Hitler. This racial complex must be distinguished from national megalomania that characterizes not only the Germans but also most of the other European nations. The Frenchman is just as convinced of his superiority over the German as vice-versa, and the Poles, the Italians, the Hungarians, the Czechs, and all other European nations are at least convinced of their superiority over their neighbor nations.

But the German creed in racial superiority is something very different, because it does not believe in the superiority of the Germans alone, but in the superiority of all Germanic races, including Anglo-Saxons, Dutch, and Scandinavians. Its basic conviction is that the fair branch of the human race forms its natural aristocracy. That the human race represents a natural hierarchy, a pyramid of values, with the fair and Nordic man at the top and the Negro at its base, and that other races are links and steps between these two extremes. Next to the Nordic comes the Mediterranean, with his white skin and dark hair; then comes the yellow race; then the brown inhabitants of India; and at the bottom of that racial pyramid, the Negroes.

The average German will never consider a Frenchman nor a Spaniard nor an Italian nor a Greek his equal—but always as some lower species of the human race. But he will, curiously enough, consider the British a superior type of human being, and you can flatter every German by telling him that you believed he was English before he was introduced to you. He has the definite notion that not the German but the English tops the Nordics, and consequently the entire human race. That the British is a purer specimen of the Aryan, because, on his island, he has intermingled less with inferior racial elements than the continental German. Somehow the average German even considers the Scandinavian racially superior; but this feeling is counterbalanced by his na-

tional contempt for little nations, a contempt that has no racial source but is only a consequence of the cult of quantity, of the "colossal." Toward the British, the Germans have a distinct complex of inferiority; their hatred against Britain is free from contempt but not free from envy. The dream of the average German is to be British; as this cannot be achieved, he would like to wipe out the English race from the earth, to replace it, and thus to top the racial hierarchy of the world. The paradoxical fact that the German racial prejudice does not place the German, but rather the British, at the top of humanity gives evidence that this instinct is rooted much deeper in the German soul than any national vanity.

Its root probably goes back to the original Germanic religion, the worship of the sun. For those who worship the sun as a divine symbol, the Nordic man and woman with golden hair appear as symbols of the sun with its golden rays—just as the lion with its golden mane has always been considered a natural symbol of the sun. On the other hand, the Negro is interpreted as the symbol of darkness, of the night, of evil—as superior to the ape as he is inferior to the godlike Nordic man. As all other human races are considered to be the result of crossings between the fair god-man and the black ape-man, they are all superior to the Negro and inferior to the Nordic Aryan.

This racial spirit of mind is evidenced by the fact that in almost all village churches of Germany angels are painted with golden, and devils with dark hair. And that the average German conceives his mythical heroes fair, their villain antagonists dark-haired. For instance, long before Hitler, it would have been considered improper, in a performance of *Lohengrin* to present the two heroes, Lohengrin and Elsa von Brabant, with dark wigs and their villain antagonists, Telramund and Ortrud, with fair ones. Every performance showed the hero-couple fair and the villain-couple dark—as a natural symbol of values and in spite of the fact that Ortrud, the daughter of the King of the Frisians, was certainly fair. The same contrast was expressed by a fair Siegfried and by his dark murderer, Hagen.

This deep racial instinct was not created by Hitler, but only made conscious to the average German with the theories of Count de Gobineau and of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. No wonder that this outlook flatters the Germans, because it transforms them into the aristocrats of the human race. In spite of the fact that dark Hitler has no resemblance whatsoever to the image of the fair Nordic hero, he became the prophet of racialism and transformed this subconscious German creed into a quasi-religious doctrine.

As there are no Negroes in Germany, the Jews have become the German *ersatz* Negroes.

Racial anti-Semitism is closely connected with this racial creed. Long before Hitler, the average German did not consider the Jew his equal. He classified him as half oriental and half Mediterranean, anyhow as an inferior type of man. This contempt was mixed with the traditional religious prejudice, existing among most Christian nations. It arises in early childhood, when the baby sees a crucifix and asks for an explanation. The usual explanation is that the man on the cross is the son of God who is being cruelly killed by the Jews. This prejudice remains in the heart of the child, consciously or subconsciously, and influences its future judgments when it comes into contact with Jews—even when the child has meanwhile lost its religious creed. To find an explanation for this artificial anti-Jewish instinct, the young German will gladly accept the racial theory confirming his prejudice and explaining it. Therefore Nazism did not need to invent anti-Semitism in Germany. It only needed to exploit, to explain, and to intensify it. Thus it could use it as a mighty instrument of propaganda—one of the strongest weapons that carried Hitler to power.

Hitler's career is so amazing that I should be inclined to consider him a genius if I had never seen his pictures. But his photographs give evidence that he is none—because no spark of genius can be discovered in his vulgar and insignificant face.

But there is no doubt that he must be recognized as one of the greatest demagogues of all times, a man who understood, in an incomparable manner, how to mobilize for his aims human instincts and ideals, prejudices, and interests.

All the subconscious instincts of the German soul, its racialism and anti-Semitism, its superiority and inferiority complexes, its sadism and its masochism, its will to power and ambition, its heroism and obedience, its envy and resentment, its Pan-Germanistic and imperialistic dreams, all these were focused by the National Socialist movement.

The very name "National Socialism" appeals much more to the German instinct than would, for instance, the name of fascism, that raised no echo in the German mind. Almost every German is strongly nationalist, and most Germans have a distinct inclination toward socialism. In the years before Hitler, these two genuine German ideals fought each other. Nationalism was the ally of capitalistic groups, represented by the conservative Right; socialism was international and represented the progressive Left. Many nationalists were only anti-socialist because

they considered socialism an ally of internationalism, and many socialists were anti-nationalists merely because they identified nationalism with reactionary capitalism. Hitler's doctrine, blending nationalist with socialist elements, was the very movement millions of Germans were waiting for, the movement that attracted and fascinated them. Of course this movement was basically anti-liberal. But liberalism was not very highly regarded among the German masses. The progressive elements were much more concerned with socialism than with liberalism and were ready to sacrifice a number of liberties for the sake of social security and progress. Therefore Hitler's anti-liberalism was no serious handicap for his movement. By "liberty" the Germans understood liberation from the Treaty of Versailles rather than the right to do and to say what they liked. Most of them did not at all wish such liberty, but preferred a system that told them what to do and what not to do and spared them the task of making decisions and accepting responsibility.

Another element of Hitlerism is its opposition to the moral values of Christianity. Like Protestantism it is a new movement of protest, this time not against the Catholic Church but against the Christian faith and morals. The Christian religion came to the Germans later than to other leading nations of Europe, and it seems that the pagan undercurrent has maintained itself more strongly than in other European nations. This paganism had become conscious in Nietzsche's anti-Christian philosophy, denouncing Christian morality as a morality of decadence and of weakness and claiming new moral standards based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. These teachings, that had influenced most German intellectuals for a generation, were suddenly made popular by Nazism. Biological dogmas are substituted for religion, violence and cruelty for pity and charity. And, instead of God, Hitler is worshiped by his fanatic followers as the incarnation of the superman, standing above good and evil, above law and crime, like nature and destiny. The instinct for hero-worship, very strong among Germans, transforms Hitler into a superman because it realizes that he is not a man like other men, without daring to admit that he is really no superman but rather a subman, not bound by any of the hundreds of unwritten laws that have woven our civilization and that weaken our actions and reactions considerably compared to gangsters and to savages.

Much of this Hitler-worship will disappear after his fall, because the strongest element in his fame is his success, not his personality. And as

the crowd judges men by their successes rather than by their character, many of Hitler's greatest admirers will suddenly, after his fall, become his worst enemies.

I remember when, during the last war, almost all Germans hailed General Ludendorff as the greatest military genius of all times, greater even than Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and Napoleon, because it was he who had won glorious victories against a world-embracing coalition. But with his defeat he lost his fame, his glory, his popularity. When, some years later, he ran for the presidency, this former idol of the German nation received throughout Germany only 200,000 votes. Some years later another man was hailed in Germany as a genius, a financial genius: Ivar Kreuger, the Swedish founder of the international match trust; but after his tragic breakdown and suicide he was quickly forgotten.

The time will come when Adolf Hitler will be loathed by those who now hail him. Only a modest section of his present worshipers will remain his admirers. All others will consider him the man who brought misery and death to innumerable Germans, and shame and hate to their nation; as the man who sacrificed Germany to his ambition and ruined it for generations. The same crowd that is ready to crown him emperor of Europe, while he is victorious, will be the first to despise him after his defeat.

But Hitlerism as a German creed will survive him, just as it existed before his rise. And it will continue to be a danger to the future of Europe, even if it is forced to go underground.

We must expect that even a drastic defeat of Germany will be interpreted by the fanatic Nazis as an evidence that their creed is right; because the Germans, after having conquered France, Poland and the Balkans, subdued Italy and invaded Russia, have been defeated by the only strong Aryans among their enemies, the British, their only equals and, as they believe in the hearts of their hearts, their betters. A generation after Napoleon's fall the cult and myth of Bonapartism reached its peak and carried Napoleon's nephew to his imperial throne. In a similar way Hitlerism can resume its power over the German soul years after his death, if Europe overlooks and underestimates the danger; for Hitlerism is not only a disease of the German nation, but also its most dynamic expression.

While facing these dangers, we must never forget that nations like individuals are apt to change their character, because every character is composed of different and contrasting elements.

We must not forget that not only the Prussians are Germans, but also the majority of the Swiss are of German stock—purer Germans indeed than the half-slavic Prussians. Southern and western Germany is, by blood and civilization, much closer to these Allemanic Swiss, representing the peak of democracy and liberalism, than to the militaristic and totalitarian Prussians.

In almost every German there are elements of the Prussian spirit of domination and of the Swiss spirit of particularism and self-government. If, during the last three generations, the Prussian spirit has infected the German soul, it is not impossible that, as a reaction to the terrible nightmare of the present thirty-year war accompanied with misery, terrorism, and revolution, the Swiss spirit of peace and of federalism may reconquer the German soul and make it as peaceful as it was before Prussianism took hold of it.

History gives us some striking examples of this kind. The Swiss themselves, a nation of warriors and of soldiers, gave up all imperialist ambitions after their defeat at Marignano in 1515 and established a long period of peace thereafter. And Sweden, one of the most militaristic and imperialistic nations of Europe, suddenly, after the Nordic War, and its defeat by Russia, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, gave up all imperialism to become one of the most peaceful and civilized nations of the world. A similar change took place in France after the fall of Napoleon. It may take place in Germany after the fall of Hitler.

Europe would make a tremendous mistake were it to count on such a sudden transformation of the German character. It may hope for it and promote it—but it must never rely on it without risking tragic surprises.

Europe can never be safe as long as Germany remains a sovereign power with a national army. To prevent this danger must be one of the fundamental aims of any peace settlement. Disarmament such as was stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles is certainly insufficient. Germany will always find ways and means to rearm as long as it remains a sovereign power. In this case it would remain a potential threat to all its neighbors. Even if Germany should be transformed into a democracy, nobody could be sure at what moment some kind of nazism would gain a majority in its parliament and lead it to a third World War. The only way to stop this threat definitely is to make an end to German sovereignty and to its national army.

There are two ways to achieve this result: either by transforming

Germany into a colony of the United Nations or by placing it within a federation, limiting and controlling permanently its national sovereignty. The character of such a federation must make any German attempt to achieve hegemony practically impossible.

It would be only natural if after the unspeakable atrocities committed by Nazi Germany the desire to avenge them should play a decisive rôle at the end of the war. Therefore the idea of transforming Germany into a colony of the victorious nations will probably be more popular than the idea of transforming it into their partner. But, seen from the point of view of reason and of statesmanship, the transformation of Germany into a colony in the heart of Europe would inevitably lead, within a very short time, either to a general war or to revolution. For no German would accept this solution voluntarily, and Germany would only wait for the first rift within the victorious camp to re-establish its independence and sovereignty. If this rift did not come quickly enough, Germany would provoke it by some revolutionary move. For, after all, every German, even the most reactionary, would prefer to see Germany an equal partner within the Soviet Union rather than a colony of the western powers. And there is no doubt that it would act accordingly. Therefore Germany, even disarmed, would be able to split Europe—as blind and captive Samson smashed the temple of the Philistines, crushing them and himself, to avenge his cruel fate.

To assure lasting peace between Germany and the rest of Europe two definite steps are necessary: first to make German aggression against its neighbors technically impossible by depriving this country of vital elements of its sovereignty; second, to prepare a future reconciliation between Germany and its neighbors by granting the German people the chance of living as equals and not as pariahs within the European family of nations.

First of all Germany must be deprived of all means of revenge, then only must it, if possible, be deprived of its will for revenge. The first condition must be carried through with energy, the second with generosity. We must hope for a change in Germany's spirit—but we must count upon the worst.

Such a double policy of making new German aggressions impossible and, at the same time, of paving the way toward future reconciliation, is only possible by establishing a European federation that would deprive its members of their unlimited sovereignty in matters of army, foreign policy, currency, economy, placing all these elements in the

hands of a federal government. Germany would be one state, or a group of states, within this federation, with equal rights and duties for all its states and for all its citizens.

The argument that Germany, situated in the middle of Europe, in control of its central industrial regions, might attempt to dominate this federation, can be discounted. For the Germans will form less than one-fifth of the total population of united Europe, while the other four-fifths will for some time be united by anti-German sentiment, ready to smash any German attempt to achieve predominance. This means that Germany, as long as it follows a policy of loyal collaboration, will find its neighbors co-operative. But as soon as it attempts any step toward hegemony, it would find itself hopelessly encircled by the great majority of other Europeans.

We must never forget that Germany only succeeded in overrunning, invading and dominating the major part of Europe because of its disunion. Had Europe been united in 1937, it would have answered the German attack on Austria with a Pan-European invasion of Germany, and we would certainly not be at war now. Only European disunion would recreate the German danger and the German threat of hegemony—not European union.

There still remains the question of the extent of Germany's responsibility for Hitler's crimes. To determine the degree of its complicity has more than theoretical value; it will strengthen the morale of all nations who have suffered from Hitler's brutality. But reconciliation and subsequent pacification of the Continent can only be achieved if the allied nations attempt liquidation and punishment of the responsible Nazis rather than of the German nation as a whole. Europe ought to follow the wise policy of the allied nations of 1815, which after the defeat of imperial France, did not press the question of her complicity with Napoleon. The French kingdom, in consequence, became an ally of its former enemies and participated actively in the reconstruction of post-Napoleonic Europe. If Europe takes a similar attitude toward post-Nazi Germany, the groundwork of future European reconstruction is laid, while a solid anti-German bloc would obviously drive Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union. Even if Russia should not be inclined to back Germany, she might find it a convenient bargaining instrument should her relationship with other allies become one day difficult or strained.

What then, ought to be done with Germany?

This difficult question must be approached from four very different angles: Nazism; Germany; Prussia; and the German individuals.

First, the Nazi regime, doctrine, and leadership must be liquidated and the criminals punished.

Second, the German Reich must be transformed into a loose and balanced federation of states, under effective control of a European authority.

Third, Prussia must be wiped off the map, and its Junker aristocracy deprived of their economic background and political influence by a radical land-reform.

Fourth, the German individuals must become full-fledged European citizens, sharing the benefits of Europe's social and economic reorganization.

The liquidation of Prussia is the key to the future of Germany. For Germany is a nation and Prussia a principle. Any attempt to disrupt German unity would very soon lead to a new dynamic movement toward re-union, either by war or by revolution.

The disruption and destruction of Prussia leads inevitably to the transformation of Germany, for it would break the principle of hegemony and replace it by the notion of equality. As Prussia is no nation, but an artificial agglomeration of states united by conquest, its disruption would be easy and lasting.

To assure a balance within the future German federation, Prussia ought to be broken up into at least three major states, centered in Cologne, Hamburg, and Berlin. This third state, stretching east of the middle Elbe, should recover its old name of Brandenburg, so as not to recall the Prussian tradition of domination. Simultaneously Germany's capital ought to be transferred to Frankfurt, old capital of the pre-Bismarck Germany.

From this liquidation of Prussia would emerge automatically a radical reorganization of all Germany. Liberated from Prussian hegemony, Bavaria, Saxony, and other historic states would strive toward a maximum of autonomy. As the European federation would remove the economic and military reasons for German union and centralism, every German state would stress its regional independence.

Thus the Reich will lose its present emotional hold on German individuals.

This aim will be achieved the more quickly if Germany is not transformed into a ghetto of Europe, but if rather the German people are invited to share the full benefits of the European Bill of Rights and the chances of new prosperity. Then they can quickly realize the advantages of the new European order of liberty and of social justice compared with their old experience of war and of tyranny.

This program would definitely smash Nazism, Prussia and German power—but it would also pave the way to reconciliation between the people of Germany and their present enemies. After a period of re-education and reintegration the German individuals could become precious raw material for the organization of Europe—as they have been, during more than a century, valuable raw material for the organization of America. Their dynamic qualities would work for the common cause of Europe, as they have been working so effectively against it.

Sincere and convinced German anti-Nazis will be found after Hitler's fall in any quality and quantity, just as, at the end of 1918, you could find as many sincere and convinced German democrats as you wished. It will depend largely on the postwar situation of the German people, whether or not these anti-Nazis become Nazis again in a few years. The disposition will certainly remain, in spite of all their deceptions. And only inspired and inspiring leaders, who are not mere political but moral authorities, will be able to redeem the German soul.

One of the greatest dangers for the coming relations between the Germans and the other nations of Europe will be the natural anti-German resentment provoked by the Nazi atrocities. This reaction tends to create a feeling of anti-Germanism all over Europe just as strong and just as inadequate in its generalization as the anti-Semitism of the Nazis. You meet many intelligent and decent people of all nations who are convinced that all Germans are morally and intellectually inferior to the rest of the Europeans. It will be difficult to convince these men and women that their anti-Germanism is essentially no better than Hitler's anti-Semitism, condemning a branch of the human race collectively for actions committed by its members.

It would be a dangerous error to consider the human material of Germany hopelessly inferior to that of other nations, and thus to establish a new racial complex within Europe. To refute this theory it is not necessary to enumerate the long list of great Germans of the past. It is enough to remember that Germans like Pastor Niemoeller, Father Muckermann and Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster are, even in our days, respected among the greatest moral figures throughout the civilized world. That they are imprisoned or exiled, while criminals and degenerates are ruling their country, is not only Germany's tragedy, but also Germany's guilt.

To make the German victims of Nazism responsible for the atrocities committed by the Gestapo would be just as unjust as to make Russians citizens responsible for the mass slaughters of Bolshevism or

the Spaniards for the horrors of their civil war. Minorities of brutes and sadists exist, alas, among all nations and races. If you deliver unprotected prisoners into their cruel hands, encouraging them to ill-treat and to torture them, you may be sure you will have disgraceful and abominable results everywhere.

Germany has acted since 1933 as an unbelievably obedient and uncritical nation in the hands of a group of criminal leaders. But these Germans are acting as instruments and not as individuals. As soon as they are obliged to obey decent leaders, most of them will return to an attitude of honor and of decency. But now even those who hate and despise their government are obeying its orders, because they believe that orders must be executed and not criticized and that every power comes somehow from God.

They have also retained something of the primitive medieval belief that God gives victory to the good and defeat to the bad. This belief Hitler uses by emphasizing that his successes give evidence that God is his ally. But as soon as the tide turns, the Germans will abandon Hitler, because they will conclude that God has dropped him.

All these subtle superstitions and beliefs are difficult for a non-German to grasp—but they are characteristic of a nation with much vision and poor judgment, with much dynamism and little balance.

Future reconciliation between Germany and the rest of Europe is only possible if the Germans learn to realize that not the United Nations, but their own criminal leaders and false prophets, are responsible for the terrible tragedy they have suffered. The bitter hatred and despair that must inevitably follow their defeat will have to be turned against Nazism, its leaders and spokesmen. If the United Nations succeed in creating such a psychological reaction, Nazism will be liquidated by the Germans themselves far more thoroughly than it could ever be punished by others.

Such a moral revolution within German public opinion will be the decisive step toward German re-education. The thousands of German teachers, dismissed by the Nazis for their liberal views, will have to replace their successors and to undertake the great task of re-education, with the help and advice of European and American colleagues, under the control of the European federation.

The stupid creed of racism will have to be overcome by popular instruction in anthropology. The German people will have to learn, by facts and figures, that the notion of an Aryan race is pure fiction. That no group of humans has contributed more to civilization, from

the moral and intellectual point of view, than the Jews in their proud history of more than thirty centuries. That there are no pure races in Europe and that all Europeans are the result of crossings of different anthropologic groups. That the Mediterranean nations have contributed to our common civilization at least as much as the nations of Europe's north and center. That during all the Dark Ages the Arabs were culturally ahead of Germanic Europe and that, until the eighteenth century, Chinese civilization was, throughout the ages, equal or even superior to the civilization of Europe.

This intellectual re-education directed against the racial prejudices of Nazism will have to be completed by a thorough moral re-education. The misled idealists within Germany will have to realize that Nazism represents the utter degradation of human dignity and the negation of the supreme values of honor and liberty; a most vulgar doctrine preached by most vulgar men.

Then the Germans will turn away from their old creed, not because it is ruthless, but because it is mean, lacking all elements of fairness and generosity, of nobility of mind, and of decency. Disgusted and ashamed they will turn away from their false prophets to embrace new and brighter ideals.

The re-education of the Germans can be accomplished rather by presenting new ideals and aims than by merely criticizing old ones. If a new Europe is inspired by a new faith and by strong ideals, Nazism will fade away like the light of the moon when the sun rises.

The European idea by itself will probably inspire German imagination and mobilize its energy to a large extent. New tasks will have to be accomplished, new outlooks opened for those who have lived in the closed and narrow world of nationalism. The German mind, always attracted by the colossal, will realize that Pan-Europe is greater than Pan-Germanism.

I shall never forget how, in 1926, I gave my book *Pan-Europe* to a nice young director of a hotel in Munich. After a lapse of a few days I asked him what he thought about it. This was his surprising and sincere answer: "Yes, Pan-Europe certainly is a grand ideal I believe it is something even greater than anti-Semitism!" This poor man had considered anti-Semitism the greatest idea in the world. Suddenly he became aware that there were still higher aspirations and greater questions to be solved.

Maybe a part of the German youth will, after Hitler's defeat, come to the same conclusion.

THE two greatest achievements humanity owes to America are federalism and aviation.

The names of Alexander Hamilton and of Orville Wright have become symbols of creative leadership in politics and technology.

As the name of Wright is linked forever to the invention of aviation, in spite of all the important experiments of his predecessors, the name of Hamilton marks the creation of the first modern federal state, in spite of all federations that had preceded him.

Since the days of Hamilton his system of federalism has conquered the world; it is now established in Canada and in most of Latin America, in China and India, in Russia and South Africa. The only major part of the world that has not yet applied the inspiring ideas of Hamilton to its organization is Europe. This is the main reason for the European wars, misery, and anarchy.

The creative idea of federalism breaks with the old notion of sovereignty as an indivisible and unlimited idea. Instead, it proclaims the idea that sovereignty can be divided between two different authorities and that some of its elements can be delegated from a state to a federal government.

This idea stands in flagrant contradiction to the old absolutist notion of unlimited national sovereignty, symbolized by the indivisible sovereign. "Federalism" is the magic word that permits a combination of the liberty of little communities with the security of large ones, and the organization of huge markets without conquest. It is the key to any collaboration between free and equal nations, the only sound alternative to war, conquest, and domination.

As the anarchy of Europe is largely responsible for the two World Wars, all the nations involved in these wars have a very obvious interest in abolishing this chronic state of anarchy and replacing it by the principle of federalism. No other way has been found to prevent a

third and a fourth World War starting from this dangerous appendix of Asia, from dismembered Europe.

The fact that Europe has only to choose between future wars and immediate federation is the strongest argument in favor of European federation. But it is not the only argument. Europe also needs federation to recover its prosperity, to accomplish its reconstruction, to bar all attempts toward national hegemony and oppression, and to protect European citizens against cruel and tyrannic governments.

All this can only be accomplished and assured if Europe follows the political philosophy of Alexander Hamilton and the inspiring example of the United States of America, by organizing, at the end of the war, a United States of Europe.

As the first object of this federation is to prevent new wars, its military organization is one of its most important aspects.

The Atlantic Charter provides the disarmament of "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers." The formula "or may threaten" makes it clear that this provision is not directed only against the Axis powers, because their threat is certainly not merely potential. A brief study of history gives evidence that all European nations must be classified in the category of potential aggressors, because each of them committed aggressions during some period of its national history and recalls this very period in all its schoolbooks with greatest pride and satisfaction. Therefore a fair interpretation of this paragraph demands the disarmament of all continental armies of Europe as potential aggressors and their replacement by a federal police force.

For as long as national armies exist in Europe as instruments of national policies, no federal organization can remove the threat of new wars with all their disastrous consequences.

But, on the other hand, Europe, with its long frontier in the East lacking any natural protection and open to invasion, cannot remain unprotected. It will need a federal army, strong enough to protect its border and to enforce federal decisions regarding nations attempting a policy of aggression, of hegemony, of oppression, or of separatism.

This federal army would have to be a small professional and highly mechanized force, composed, like the French foreign legion, of nationals of all the ethnic groups of Europe, but with the provision that no national contingent exceed 10 per cent of this European army. Its commander in chief would be named for a number of years by the federal government; and it might be agreed, to avoid friction, to choose

him from high-ranking Swiss officers, who combine a grand military tradition with a spirit of internationalism, of loyalty, of democracy and of fairness.

The strength of this army will depend on the international military situation at the end of the war. It ought to be of equal strength with the Red army, not to constitute any threat against the Soviet, but, on the other hand, to prevent Europe from being at its mercy.

From the internal European point of view a federal force of 200,000 men would probably be sufficient.

But it would be dangerous for the future of European democracy to establish such a strong professional army in Europe and, at the same time, to disarm all civilians totally. Therefore it would be advisable, under the supervision of the federal army, to train the manhood of Europe for defensive warfare into local or regional militia, after the Swiss model. Such training would increase the defensive strength of Europe, would back its democratic institutions, and would prevent the organization of party armies like those that were established, as a consequence of disarmament, in Germany and in Austria after the last war.

These militia should be trained only with rifles and deprived of any mechanized equipment such as tanks and airplanes. Also they should not be organized on a nation-wide scale, but only for limited regions, such as Bavaria, Brittany, Sicily, or Slovakia. They would be called upon to help the federal army to defend Europe against an invasion, but not for federal intervention against their neighbors.

The form of the European army will not only have to regard the necessities of Continental peace and order but also of international peace. The danger that a democratic and federated Europe could ever become a threat to its neighbors is very remote. The heterogeneous composition of Europe and the deep national antagonism between its members will make any offensive or aggressive policy practically impossible for many generations.

But, in spite of this strong and obvious guaranty against an aggressive policy of a United Europe, the United Nations will certainly have to participate in the establishment of Europe's military status, to prevent any possibility of intercontinental wars between Europe and its neighbors replacing the national wars between European states. The price Europe would probably have to pay for Britain's consent to its union would be the renunciation, on the part of Europe, of building warships, U-boats, and bombing planes. As a compensation, the air forces and navies of Europe's neighbors Britain, Russia, and America

might pledge assistance to Europe, if its federation were invaded from within or from without.

The second reason for the establishment of European federation is the necessity of protecting European individuals against tyrants. If we wish during the coming years to prevent the rise of little Hitlers in different European states in imitation of the impressive career of their model, a European federation must be set up to protect all citizens and nations of Europe in their human and national rights.

This issue demands first of all the establishment of a Bill of Rights for Europe, granted and respected by the constitutions of all European nations. It further demands a federal court, to which European individuals can appeal as soon as they consider this Bill of Rights violated by their national governments. And finally it demands a federal executive, strong enough to enforce respect for this Bill of Rights, if one of the member-states disregards it.

The future European Bill of Rights will have to go beyond the Bill of Rights of the United States or the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution. For it would have to assure not only political but also social rights to the individual, in the spirit of Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and, especially, of the great idea of the new Freedom from Want.

To establish a European Bill of Rights is insufficient, if its application is blocked and sabotaged by partial and unfair national courts. Therefore this principle demands the establishment of federal courts as courts of appeal in all cases where a European does not receive satisfaction from his national courts on issues connected with the Bill of Rights. Bitter experiences with national pledges concerning the protection of minorities are sufficient warning not to rely on the justice of national courts in wide sections of Europe.

To be effective, every court needs police to enforce its decisions. Therefore the federal executive must have the power to enforce the decisions of its federal court, even against the opposition of national governments. This demands a powerful federal government, strong enough to enforce its authority without having to wage wars against reluctant states; strong enough to carry through federal executive orders, as the Swiss federal council did several times since its establishment.

One of the main issues of the European Bill of Rights is the question of protecting national minorities. For the treatment of minorities by

itself has for a century been one of the main reasons for European wars. As long as this problem finds no adequate solution, Europe will again and again be threatened by wars and revolutions.

For beside wars of aggression and wars of defense there has always existed a third category of wars: wars of liberation. These wars of liberation are technically wars of aggression, but morally wars of defense, because every oppression is but a frozen aggression—and every liberation a defensive action. Even if these wars for the liberation of an oppressed minority are outlawed by international treaties, they will be approved by all liberal-minded nations and individuals, because they emanate from the natural human right to liberty.

The peace treaties of 1919 took this into consideration by establishing a series of treaties for the protection of national and religious minorities. In experience these treaties have proved ineffective, because the very classification of a group of citizens as permanent minorities attributes to them the character of political inferiority in a society based on majority rule. The power of political minorities lies in the fact that every political minority is a potential majority, capable of taking over the government at the next elections. But national minorities are permanent minorities, submitted to the rule of permanent national majorities. These minorities are at the mercy of the majorities who can enforce legally any law directed against them—even a law of extermination or deportation. The protection of these minorities by law is limited, because they always risk unfair judgments by judges belonging to the national majority. The protection of these minorities by the League of Nations proved to be merely platonic, because the League had no power to enforce on national governments the respect for the treaties protecting these minorities.

If we wish to put an end to national oppression in Europe and, at the same time, put an end to irredentism and national hatred, we must seek a solution to this grave problem from a new angle. We must follow the very successful example of Switzerland that has broken with the notion of national minorities and reduced the national problem within its limits to a mere linguistic question.

In a Federal Europe minorities should not be protected as national groups, but as individuals, enjoying the constitutional right of using their mother tongue just as they worship God following their personal religious convictions.

This form of protecting national minorities would follow the evolution of the protection of religious minorities in past centuries. The

French Protestants, for instance, the so-called Huguenots, were oppressed for centuries, as long as they were considered a political entity with special rights and duties, basically different from the Catholic majority. They were oppressed, despite all laws and stipulations protecting them as a distinct religious minority.

All this ceased, suddenly, with the French Revolution. The Rights of Men were proclaimed, including the principle of freedom of worship. The Huguenots had the same religious rights as the Catholics and ceased to be a minority. They were just Frenchmen of Protestant creed. Since then they are not oppressed and not specially protected. They have ceased to be a problem.

In the same way the Swiss of Italian tongue are no ethnic minority, but Swiss citizens like all others, using their Italian idiom. They are protected like all other Swiss citizens by their Bill of Rights and do not need to fear any national oppression, although they constitute only 6 per cent of the total Swiss population.

If this principle is carried through all over Europe, the minority problem will cease to exist. There will remain only technical problems concerning the use of the different mother tongues—but no problems of prestige, oppression, irredenta, and liberation.

To solve these linguistic problems it will be advisable to assure far-reaching self-government to linguistic groups forming little islands within states speaking different languages. In some mixed districts bilingual solutions will be found, as in the mixed districts of Switzerland. But, in principle, the question of the mother tongue will have to be considered as a private matter, as an element of the Bill of Rights. Freedom of Speech will mean not only freedom to speak what you wish, but also to express it in your own idiom.

Of course this principle will have to be limited in the same way as it is limited in Switzerland. When a German-speaking Swiss of Zurich establishes his residence in French-speaking Geneva, he learns French and sends his children to French schools, without intending to establish a German-speaking minority through non-co-operation.

In the same way Germans and Italians residing in France will have to send their children to French schools—just as American immigrants send their children to American schools to educate them as genuine Americans.

This element is important, because in a Europe of free trade not only the circulation of goods will have to be free, but also the circulation of men. This circulation would be very much hampered and would create

new tensions and frictions if the immigrants did not intend to become assimilated in their new surroundings.

In regions where at present old and new hatreds make peaceful collaboration between citizens of different tongues difficult, it would be advisable to organize federal administrations, modeled after the League of Nations regime of the Saar between 1920 and 1935. This would not hamper nor be hampered by the sovereignties to which these regions belong. It would, for instance, be advisable to administer the Sudeten region in this way, while it would continue to form a part of Czechoslovakia. This principle could also be applied in regions like Danzig, Fiume, Carpatho-Russia, Macedonia, and Transylvania, protecting all citizens against nationalistic hatreds and oppressions by assuring a fair and impartial administration in a genuine European spirit.

In a unified Europe none of its smaller nations will have to sacrifice its claims for home rule for the sake of a larger market or of greater security within a strong state. Consequently nations like the Catalans and Basques, Croats and Slovenians, Slovaks and Ruthenians will achieve full autonomy, similar to the autonomy of all nations within the Soviet Union. Thus will the small nations of Europe have the same opportunities for developing their national culture as have its big nations.

European civilization is based on diversity, not on unity. To attempt cultural unification of Europe would mean to strangle its soul and spirit. European federation shall give to all regions and nations of Europe the full chance to develop more than ever their variety of languages and dialects, traditions and constitutions. Europe will follow the inspiring example of Switzerland, that has succeeded in combining the advantages of political and economic integration with those of cultural autonomy and of local self government.

Another strong reason for European federation lies in the interest of the whole civilized world in preventing the hegemony of one European nation over all others. The danger of such hegemony would continue to exist in a dismembered Europe, because two nations might be strong enough to attempt such domination—Russia and Germany.

The danger of Russian hegemony over Europe would only become imminent if Europe were to embrace the Communist belief and join the Soviet Union. If Europe becomes democratic, while Russia remains totalitarian, a closer federation between these two neighbors is impossible. It would become possible only if Europe evolves toward communism, or the Soviets toward democracy. For the present Russian regime

it would be inconceivable to admit a European guaranty or control of its human rights, its army, and its foreign policy. Therefore we can dismiss the thought of the Soviets accepting membership in a European federation—and also the danger that it might strive toward European hegemony. The Soviet Union is, like Europe or India, a subcontinent of Asia. It was Sir Stafford Cripps who, in his broadcast to India, used this adequate expression. With its numerous races, languages, religions, and states, it is a world by itself, three times as large as Europe with different problems, tasks, and ideals.

The relations between Europe and Russia, based on good neighbor policy and non-intervention, will be organized in the framework of a new League of Nations, just like the relations between Europe and America.

The mere magnitude of Russia compared with Europe would make its inclusion as an equal member of the federal organization difficult, even if the Soviets were democratic and not totalitarian. But this question cannot arise, as long as Europe sticks to the ideals of the West that are rejected by Russia.

Therefore the danger of national hegemony for Europe is almost identical with the German danger. And the threat that Germany may one day try to re-establish its hegemony over Europe, is used as one of the most serious arguments against any continental federation.

The first step in preventing this danger is to break Pan-Germanism by re-establishing the German frontiers of 1937. Germany must give up all gains made by Hitler, including Austria, the Memelland, and the Sudeten area. The map of Europe explains this necessity. As long as Germany remains master of the Sudeten region, the Bohemian plain is almost encircled and practically indefensible, and Germany remains master of Prague. If Germany dominates Austria, then Czechoslovakia also is encircled and becomes an annex of the Reich. And if Czechoslovakia becomes a dependency of the Reich, then Poland is encircled and faces the same doom as in 1939. So the question of the independence of Poland is inseparably linked to the problem of Czechoslovakia and of Austria. And the problem of Poland is one of the key problems of Europe; for only a strong and independent Poland can prevent Germany from joining hands with Russia and from breaking down European union and civilization.

This major interest of Europe in a strong Poland, protected on its southern flank by a strong Czechoslovakia and an independent Austria, must prevail over all German claims for self-determination and

for national union. Even if the Sudetes should wish to join the Reich, Europe could not admit it because of its common and higher interests. Europe will have to take effective measures to see that the German population of these regions shall never suffer oppression or revenge—but, in spite of the German-speaking population, it will have to prevent Germany from keeping this region that for a thousand years formed part of Bohemia.

In this and other matters we must remember that the principle of regional self-determination led to the Civil War in the United States and that it would certainly lead to civil wars within the European federation should it be introduced there. Lincoln waged and won the Civil War to defend the principle that the common interests and ideals of the Union must prevail over those of individual States or regions. This same principle must dominate the future organization of Europe, if lasting peace and liberty is to be assured. No territorial changes should therefore be possible in Europe without the consent of the federal authorities, and the principle of self-determination should be respected only when the wishes of a state or region are not opposed to the general interests of the European community. In the Sudeten as in the Austrian question, the psychological problem is as important as the political one. If Germany retains these big conquests of Hitler, millions of Germans will continue to say that Greater Germany is Hitler's creation and that he therefore remains the greatest man in German history. When one day the sufferings and sacrifices of the war are forgotten most Germans would agree that the price for these conquests was not too high, if this booty remains German.

Frederick the Great of Prussia waged the Seven Years' War for the sake of keeping Silesia, a country that he had previously conquered from Austria. Although the Prussian king gained nothing in that hard and terrible war, history sees in him the victor because he succeeded in keeping Silesia. In the same way, Hitler would be considered, even after his fall, the victor of the Second World War, should Germany retain Sudetenland and Austria. Only if he loses these two territories, would he, in the eyes of German posterity, have lost the war and wasted the lives of millions of his countrymen.

In addition to reducing Germany to its preinvasion frontiers and liquidating German centralism, any German attempt toward hegemony must be made impossible by a series of precautions written into the European constitution.

Europe ought to follow the Swiss example that no single president

should represent the federal executive, but a council of seven men, with the stipulation that two citizens of the same canton can never be elected members of the same Executive Board. If Europe applies the same principle, more than one German could never figure in the Continental government, so that any attempt toward hegemony would become legally impossible. The fact that in a European house of representatives the Germans would control no more than one-fifth of all seats would frustrate any German move to alter the constitution to their advantage. The proportion of Germans in the European senate would be still smaller.

But the suspicion against Germany and its ambitions will certainly be, for a long period, a strong handicap to European reconciliation. The mere fact that seventy million Germans live in the industrial centers of Europe, surrounded by a dozen smaller and weaker states, will keep this fear and suspicion alive. It has, therefore, been suggested by Winston Churchill, that Germany's power should be counterbalanced by establishing, within Europe, some large federal groups of states, equal in size and in population to the German giant.

Two such groups would be the most important of all, because they would be Germany's immediate neighbors: a union of the West, associating France and Switzerland, Belgium and Holland; and a union of the East, associating Poland and Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary. Italy would be a group of its own, while the three other peninsulas of Europe would be organized into distinct unions: Scandinavia; the Iberian Peninsula; and the Balkans.

There is much to be said in favor of such an organization, that has already been started by the federal treaties between the exiled governments of Poland and of Czechoslovakia and also of Greece and Yugoslavia. These treaties can be considered the first practical steps toward European federalism. But it must be stressed that these regional groupings ought to be considered as parts of a general European scheme, and not as a substitute for it. For nothing would be more dangerous than to create a so-called "Cordon Sanitaire" against Russia, or to revive the old game of European balance of power—until this balance should be overthrown again by war and national hegemony.

Not only political reasons make the establishment of European federation necessary, but also economic considerations.

The reconstruction of ruined Europe will have to be undertaken according to a general plan of co-operation and not by the dispersed

efforts of competing little states. It can not be based on the small economic units and the unstable currencies of yesterday, but it must be the starting point of a Continental economy of tomorrow.

The experience of the two last decades gives evidence that customs boundaries, once established, have a general tendency to rise and not to fall; that too many vested interests are attached to the protection of national markets and currencies to make radical changes in the interest of consumers possible in times of peace.

Such changes can only take place in times of emergency. If Europe does not use the moment of reconstruction to establish its economic union, it will have to postpone this until the end of the next war or of the European revolution.

Since Germany is in control of the greater part of Europe, the continent is steadily progressing toward economic unification. Germany is systematically organizing the resources and man power of the entire continent for its war effort. All European currencies are based on the Reichsmark, and all national banks of the occupied territories are but dependencies of the Reichsbank.

Huge trusts, such as the Hermann Goering-Werke, directly or indirectly owned by the Reich, are now exploiting the productive capacity of the Continent.

It is Germany's aim to organize a united European economy with a highly industrialized Germany in the center, surrounded by agricultural half-colonies. This system is being organized to serve the future of Germany, not of Europe. Already the standard of living of the average German is far higher than that of the starving occupied nations, and it is the intention of the planned economy of the Third Reich to perpetuate this difference.

Postwar Europe will have to upset this plan and principle without re-establishing the prewar anarchy. Just as a tank, conquered during a battle, is not demolished but is used as an instrument for victory, so the German system of economic unification ought not to be demolished, but be used as an instrument for European reconstruction.

All the big European trusts, owned and established by Nazi Germany, will have to be taken over immediately by federal authorities. Thus they will serve the common interests of Europe and no longer the interests of Germany. Instead of working for war, this greatest economic machine of all times will have to be put into the service of reconstruction.

By this method the European federation will control the entire German armament industry and make any secret armaments impossible,

Such a seizure of the gigantic economic machine, built up by the Nazis on the basis of state socialism, will provide the European federation with all the means necessary to assure a rapid and sound reconstruction of the Continent. It also will shift the economic power of Europe during the period of reconstruction into the hands of the federation.

Even after the period of transition the European federation ought to retain not only the property of the armament industry of Europe but also of all public utilities, as far as they do not belong to states or to communities. It will be of the utmost importance for the European federation to remain in effective control of the continental railway system, civil aviation, the monetary system, and the system of inter-European electricity.

The economic system of United Europe will probably represent a combination of state ownership and private enterprise.

Not only business, but—even more important—agriculture, will have to be based on the principle of private property. Private initiative will have to be encouraged to speed up European reconstruction. British and American participation in this great task will be of utmost importance and will lead to large investments of capital in Europe.

Another gigantic task of European reconstruction will be the settlement as farmers on their national soil of many millions of Europeans that have lost their means of existence. To make such a large policy of resettlement possible, Europe will have to break up into farms the big estates of landowners in Germany and Poland, in Spain, Hungary, and other countries. The old and new farmers will have to develop a system of co-operatives throughout Europe to combine the advantages of private property with those of mechanized agriculture.

All these and other radical reforms of Europe's economic life will be necessary, because millions of Europeans have lost everything by war and by Nazism. It is impossible to give them back all they have lost. First the poorest victims of Hitler will have to be considered, and only lastly the richest. If a man has had a cow and lost it, he will have to get it back; but if a man has lost a thousand cows, he will have to be happy to receive five. This will be the new principle of justice in a new Europe. The rich will have to pay the price of war and reconstruction, not the poor.

Such a procedure is necessary not only because it corresponds to social justice and decency, but also because this method alone can avert a great European revolution.

The greater part of Europe regards this war not merely as a war, but also as a decisive social revolution. If these men and women feel deceived, a general European revolution will be the inevitable consequence, a revolution that would destroy the rest of European civilization and prosperity.

This Pan-European economy will of course upset the German plan of reducing the non-German nations to the status of agricultural laborers. For undoubtedly in backward regions of Europe a number of new industries will be established, as in Spain and the Balkans. Finally, the different parts of Europe will be developed according to their natural resources and the skill of their populations—without the notion of a master race with an industrial monopoly.

This new economic policy of Europe will influence profoundly the status of the European colonies. Some of them, in North Africa, will certainly have to exchange their present status for a situation corresponding to that of American territories, growing toward full-fledged state rights. Tropical Africa will have to be merged into a large economic unit, regardless of political affiliations. Economic Europe will reach across the Mediterranean to Katanga and Angola.

Proceeding from the four major aims of a postwar Europe—peace, Bill of Rights, anti-hegemony, and reconstruction—it is not impossible to trace some outlines of a European federation.

It is evident that the union of Europe cannot follow the example of the British Commonwealth, but that it needs a central government strong enough to assure continental peace, to protect the individual rights of all European citizens, to overcome the threat of any national hegemony, and to start a policy of continental reconstruction.

All these conditions could be fulfilled, if Europe established its federation after the greatest existing European model—the Swiss confederation.

A century ago, the Swiss cantons had to face similar problems as had the European States before the war. The federal constitution of Switzerland brought an ideal solution to almost all of these problems. It would certainly be better to base the future of Europe on this practical and successful experience than on any product of creative imagination.

By accepting the main outlines of the Swiss federation, Europe would practically be transformed into a federal and democratic republic.

Its legislature would be formed of a house of representatives, emerg-

ing from general elections, and a senate, composed of two delegates from every member state. To assure closer collaboration between the federal and the national authorities, it may be advisable not to follow the Swiss and American example of elected senators, but to consider the prime ministers and foreign secretaries of all European states as national delegates to the senate.

These two houses would elect the federal executive, composed of seven men originating from different states. These seven members of the federal council would each be in charge of a special department: foreign affairs, army, finance, commerce, interior, justice, and transport. Their annually changing chairman would perform the functions of a president of the United States of Europe.

The supreme court, as the highest moral authority of the federation, would be elected by the legislature.

Evidently the European federation would not be a copy of Switzerland, but would only follow its general plan. In some points it would have to set up very different principles. While in Switzerland women have no vote, Europe ought to emphasize, as one essential point of its Bill of Rights, the complete legal equality between the sexes, including the right to vote.

As in Switzerland, all state constitutions must be approved by the federal government. But, while in Switzerland all cantons are bound to be republics, Europe will have to give an equal chance to republics and to constitutional monarchies. There can be no question, in Europe, of abolishing popular and democratic kingdoms like those of the Scandinavian states or the Netherlands, or of preventing the establishment of constitutional monarchies in states like Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Austria, or Bavaria, if the majority of their populations should wish them. Such monarchies, following the grand British example, would have to combine tradition with democracy, thus helping to stabilize the future of Europe against self-made tyrants.

In another essential point Europe will have to differ from Switzerland. While Switzerland has established its four national idioms as official languages, Europe will have to choose a single federal language that every European would be bound to learn within a generation besides his mother tongue. Many practical reasons recommend English as such an inter-European instrument of understanding. In the extra-European world English has already become practically the international language. Just as today Chinese, Indian, and Japanese speak English to one another, tomorrow Germans, French, and Italians ought also to be able to confer in English. This would serve as a close link

etween Europe, Britain, and America—one of the keystones of our common future.

But it would be up to the European parliament to choose any language as an instrument of inter-European understanding.

The great and generous offer, made recently by the British government to India through Sir Stafford Cripps, contained the following promise:

Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

This is exactly the promise, offered now by the United Nations to Europe, that would provoke a general movement in Europe, not only among the occupied nations, but also within Italy and Germany, strong enough to lead to unpredictable consequences. For it would give the hope that the future status of Europe would not be established by diplomatic compromises, but by the democratic will of the Europeans themselves. Such a promise would create spontaneously, everywhere in Europe, a European party, thinking about the future, discussing and preparing it. Like a sun breaking through heavy clouds, this new hope for a brighter future would inspire the hearts and minds of millions of desperate Europeans.

There is no reason whatever why the United Nations should refuse to Europe what Britain is spontaneously offering to India; why the elections for a constitutional assembly, immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, should be possible for India and impossible for Europe. Europe has certainly the same right to claim continental federation as India. And it must be up to Europe to decide, by its own elected delegates, whether and under what conditions it wishes to federate.

The establishment of a European federation could be carried out by the following steps:

When the preliminary peace treaty is signed, marking the definite boundaries of Germany and Italy, it ought also to establish the procedure for European elections. These elections could eventually be combined with national elections in all liberated countries. But the preliminary peace should also determine the high commissioner for Europe, preferably an American, who would, until the establishment of a federal authority or the signing of a definite peace, be in charge of the com-

mon administration, government, and reconstruction of all liberated and re-occupied Europe. The heads of the Continental governments would form his advisory board, but all final decisions regarding emergency matters for Europe as a whole would remain in his hands, as well as the problem of feeding the starved regions of Europe. He would act as a trustee of united Europe.

This high commissioner would also be in charge of the whole economic and financial machine taken over from the Third Reich. He would be assisted by a trained staff of collaborators, as the nucleus of a preliminary European government, and by all allied occupation forces.

During this period of military occupation direct or indirect elections for the constitutional assembly would have to take place, under the supervision of the high commissioner and the control of the army of occupation.

Evidence that such elections are possible even during a revolutionary period has been given by the election of the Russian constitutional assembly soon after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. This fact has been almost forgotten, because Lenin dismissed this assembly on account of its noncommunist majority.

The constitutional assembly, representing perhaps one million Europeans through every delegate, would first have to decide whether or not it wished European federation. Should it decide against federation, it would be dissolved and the national sovereignties of the various European regions turned over to their new national governments who would organize a traditional peace conference. But should the European assembly decide in favor of federation, it would have to elaborate a federal constitution and elect an executive board, acting as an emergency government for Europe, while the State governments would be simultaneously established under federal control.

The new federal government, backed by the European assembly, would take over the authority from the high commissioner, who could be left in charge of a reconstruction office, invested with wide inter-European powers. All questions concerning inter-European peace would be settled by the new federation, that would also negotiate definite treaties with all extra-European powers.

Not all European states would have to join the European federation immediately. If, for instance, European neutrals, with higher standards of living, should prefer to stay out, they might do so. But they certainly would soon join the federation, to share the advantages of the vast European market.

The linguistic problem would form no major obstacle for this constitutional assembly, because it would be easy to agree provisionally on the two official languages of the League of Nations, English and French. It would then be the duty of the European assembly to choose a single federal language.

The argument that the European parliament would be split into national groups fighting one another and making majority governments impossible, would probably prove to be an error. At least four Pan-European parties would be constituted: a Communist party; a Social Democratic party; an Agrarian party; a Catholic party. Catholics and Agrarians would probably together form the right wing of the European assembly, while the Communists would constitute its left wing and the Social Democrats its center. The nationalistic groups with fascist tendencies would probably be so antagonistic on account of national resentments that it would be difficult for them to present a united bloc.

The establishment of European federation would certainly not mean European reconciliation, but only co-operation. It took almost two generations to reconcile the North and the South after America's Civil War. To reconcile Europeans after all the horrors of Hitler's War will probably take still longer. But, as in America the hatred and resentment after the victory of the North did not prevent the functioning of the federation and the reconstruction of the country, so postwar hatreds will not prevent common effort toward reconstruction as the first definite task of federated Europe.

The Europeans will feel like a group of personal enemies meeting after a disaster in a lifeboat. They will have to get on somehow, whether they like it or not; and they will certainly dislike it.

The length of the period of European reconciliation will largely depend on how radically the German nation liquidates Nazism and its responsible leaders, because that will determine how largely this nation will be identified with or separated from their crimes. After all, not only the Germans but also the other European nations will have to punish their own Nazi and pro-Nazi leaders.

The lack of sufficiently trained Europeans to constitute the bureaucracy of federal Europe will certainly create some difficulties. By no means should the federal government accept the principle of parity, choosing an equal or proportional number of citizens of every nation for federal jobs. Instead it will have to build up its staff on the basis of training, aptitude, and lack of nationalistic prejudice. A number of

American citizens will certainly be engaged, and a number of Europeans who have lived in America. But the largest contingent would have to be taken from Switzerland, because most Swiss would be loyal, impartial, and reliable officials of a European federation, trained to think in democratic, supernational, and federal terms. Only after European education will have trained a new generation in a genuine European spirit will it be possible to distribute federal jobs equally among European nationalities.

This evolution of a genuine European spirit will be one of the most important tasks of federal Europe. Beyond all national antagonisms the feeling of European solidarity will have to be planted in the hearts of all European children, together with pride in the great common past and the realization of an equally great common future.

At the end of the eighteenth century neither Germans nor Italians had the feeling of being nations. The Germans considered themselves Prussians or Bavarians, Saxons or Hanoverians; the Italians Romans or Venetians, Neapolitans or Sardinians. Within one generation these two movements of national consciousness were aroused by some inspired poets and philosophers. Although deep resentments between German and Italian regions persisted, the feeling of a common history and a common destiny prevailed and enforced the unification of Germany and Italy.

The feeling of a common European patriotism that started after the end of the last war, might well be developed by inspired European leaders to overcome the reactionary forces of European disintegration and separatism.

In this work of European reconciliation the Christian churches will play a decisive part. Again and again they will have to remind their followers of the significance of their daily prayer: "And forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who have trespassed against us." For this prayer of the Lord, said with a heart full of hate and revenge, would turn into a blasphemy and a challenge to God.

THE idea of a United States of Europe must face the following argument: "Why only a United States of Europe and not a United States of the World, since in the era of aviation the limits of continents too have been overcome? The only political organization that matches the present phase of technology is a united world."

This argument is impressive. If the world were as homogeneous as are the American or the European continents, a United States of the World would be the only adequate solution of postwar problems. A united world with a common government, parliament, supreme court, air force, and currency; without colonies, without customs barriers, without armies and navies, without foreign policy, without oppression, and without war.

The only drawback to this splendid program is that its execution is, at present, impossible. An analysis of the world situation gives evidence of this deplorable fact.

Most of those who are suggesting the establishment of a world federation are think in democratic terms. They are dreaming of a world constitution, inspired by the Constitution of the United States of America. But they are not aware that the principle of democracy if applied to any system of world federation would signify the abdication of the white race from leadership and the opening of all white territory on the globe to an unprecedented stream of non-white immigration.

From the point of view of the white man the establishment of a democratic world federation would mean political suicide. Only the Chinese and the Indians, who would, together, obtain world leadership, would be interested in promoting this idea.

Because of the superior power of the white man and his determination not to abdicate, a democratic world federation is now impossible.

This does not, however, mean that any world union is impossible at present. For today we face three serious programs of world federa-

tion—all based on minority rule: the German blueprint; the Japanese blueprint; the Soviet blueprint.

Hitler's outspoken object is to organize the world into a single hierarchy with himself dominating the Nazi party, the Nazi party dominating Germany, Germany dominating Europe, Europe dominating the world.

The Japanese plans are similar to those of Hitler; they aim at the rule of the Mikado over Japan, of Japan over the yellow race, of the yellow race over Asia, of Asia over the world.

For all those who reject these two blueprints the only practical hope of achieving world federation now lies in the triumph of communism all over the world. For Bolshevism, too, has a realistic scheme for a United States of the World. The establishment of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has taken place with the outspoken intention of becoming the nucleus of a United States of the World. For this Union is open to all states and all continents ready to embrace the Communist doctrine. If, for instance, Germany or Japan or both should turn Communist tomorrow, they would be entitled to join this federation as equal partners without geographic, national, or racial limitations. However, this Soviet federation, too, is based not on democracy, but on minority rule. An aristocracy of three million organized Communists directs the fate of the Soviet Union with its 180 million inhabitants. A Soviet world federation would be ruled by the Communist parties, and this international aristocracy by Stalin. It would probably be more socialist, yet as little democratic as a world federation ruled by Hitler or by the Mikado. But this program has, at least, the advantage of facing realities realistically.

This is not the case with the numerous plans for a world democracy, all of which seem to ignore the fact that the yellow race, together with the population of India, represents half of humanity. And as it is certain that the black race too would be opposed to the rule of the white man, Chinese and Indians would lead the majority of any democratic world parliament. Consequently, neither Roosevelt nor Churchill would have any chance of becoming world president, but only Chiang Kai-Shek or Nehru. The commander of the world air force too would be some Asiatic general, and the majority of the international air police would be Asiatic. Based on such a constitutional and military power, the Asiatic majority of the world parliament would decree, as its first fundamental law, the complete equality of all races in matters of world immigration and the opening of all under-

populated areas of the world for overpopulated nations. If Americans and Australians tried to oppose the execution of such a world law by force, they would be considered rebels and face punishment by the international air police. If their revolution failed, their continents would be forced to accept Asiatic mass immigration; if their revolution succeeded, the era of world federation would have come to a rapid and dramatic end.

Every scheme of world organization acceptable to America and Europe would have to respect the predominant position of the white man against the non-white world majority, because Americans and Europeans together represent a distinct minority of the human race. Consequently, from the point of view of the white man, any practical scheme of world organization must be based, not on the democratic principle of majority rule, but on the anti-democratic principle of minority rule. The white race as a whole is facing the alternative that had to be met by the white colonists of the Union of South Africa: to sacrifice either their democratic principles or their control of public life. The South African decision was taken against democracy, establishing racial supremacy and minority rule. A white minority now rules South Africa as a racial aristocracy over a vast majority of Negroes.

The representatives of Western civilization throughout the world constitute only about one-third of the entire population of our planet. Europeans, North and South Americans, and white citizens of the British dominions amount to less than 700 million individuals. This figure is not identical with the number of persons belonging to the white race, because 250 million human beings living in the Soviet Union and in the Near East are mostly children of the white race, without sharing the principles of Western civilization. But even including these 250 millions the white race represents less than half of humanity and could never establish a majority. Owing to the higher birth rate of the other races the proportion of the white race is steadily decreasing, and there is no hope for the white man ever to obtain a majority in the world population.

The great difficulty for the Western democracies is to work out a scheme of world organization that seems to be based on democratic principles, without transforming the white man into an oppressed or protected minority. The League of Nations Covenant fulfilled this condition, by dealing only with governments and not with populations. China, for instance, was represented at Geneva by a single delegate, although its population matches the combined populations of Europe and Latin America, who were represented at the League by more than

forty delegates. Consequently one white man had, at the League of Nations, the same representation as had forty Chinese. In its Assembly and at its Council the white race had a certain and overwhelming majority. India and China, representing more than the majority of all citizens of the League, had together but two lonely delegates in its Assembly, neither of whom even had a permanent seat in the Council, as had the French, British, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian delegates.

It is doubtful whether in future the Asiatic races will again accept such an unfair basis of world organization. Since the prestige of the white man all over the world is in decline, the other races will never be satisfied with any world-organization based artificially on white supremacy. They will claim racial equality on democratic terms, because they know that this means practically their own supremacy over the white race and over the representatives of Western civilization.

This claim is no mere question of prestige. It is mainly a question of land.

Europe, China, and India have been, for many centuries, the three biggest agglomerations of the human race, distant and independent from each other. Suddenly, in the sixteenth century, the Europeans began to conquer and to colonize the world. They settled America, Australia, and Siberia, dominated India and Africa, and controlled China. This entire operation was executed by means of superior European technology and by a ruthless use of power. The result is that the white man is now in control of nine-tenths of the underpopulated areas of the world. He has turned these areas into his racial monopoly, by closing them to immigrants from the overpopulated regions of Asia.

Evidently, this partition does not appear just to the nations of the East. They are ready to accept it as a fact as long as they are not strong enough to overthrow it, but they are determined to enforce their access to these underpopulated areas as soon as they feel able to do so. They are willing to use the same methods against the white race as the white race had used against them: to smash this colonial monopoly by force. On the other hand the white settlers of these contested areas are not ready to open their gates to the Orientals. Were Australia, for instance, with its seven million inhabitants to permit Asiatic immigration, its white population would very quickly be transformed into a tolerated minority.

This racial issue hangs like a dark cloud over the future of humanity. It is at present inconceivable that the white man should give up his

racial monopoly on the big countries and continents he has discovered, conquered, and colonized—but it is just as inconceivable that the other races should abandon their claim for racial equality in matters of migration. No court or arbiter could settle this conflict in a manner satisfactory to both branches of humanity, because both sides are bound to consider the issue vital for centuries to come.

A realistic view of the world must accept the fact that power and not justice will decide this issue. As soon as the white man's military or moral strength fails, a new world war becomes inevitable, a war for a new partition of the globe between the races.

The main question for the future of the white race is whether or not Asia will one day rise united against the white man and his claim for world leadership. For a united white race may be strong enough to counterbalance the dynamic forces of the yellow race; but sooner or later it would be doomed if the whole of Asia should follow the leadership of the yellow race in its struggle for world supremacy.

Pan-Asia is the greatest of all dangers for Europe. It is the strongest weapon of psychological warfare used by Japan in this war. It is based on the conception that Asia, from Japan to Syria, and even beyond the limits of Asia to Morocco, represents a natural unit, threatened and oppressed by Europe; that this greater part of the world must rise and fight against Europe's predominance to recover its lost independence.

The first power that used this weapon was not Japan, but the Soviet Union. Lenin, in 1921, organized the first Pan-Asiatic congress in Baku to mobilize Asia's revolution against Europe. The idea of a United States of Soviet Asia under Russian leadership, directed against capitalistic Europe and America, dominated that policy. It was, however, soon dropped after Russia's disappointment with Chinese Communism. Some of China's greatest leaders were also thinking in pan-Asiatic terms, like the inspired founder of the Chinese republic, Sun-Yat-Sen. And now it is Japan that pretends to fight for Asia's future against Europe.

Against this Japanese propaganda the West must react by a new conception of Asia and by new relations with the different sections of this vast supercontinent. Europe must break up the idea of united Asia by analyzing it as an artificial union of four very different groups, races, and cultures: the Far East, India, the Near East, and the Soviet Union; each of them equal to Europe, the fifth subcontinent of Asia.

The traditional division of the great continent stretching from the

Straits of Gibraltar to the Straits of Bering, into two very unequal halves, one named Europe and the other Asia, is not only a wrong conception of geography but also a dangerous political conception.

This notion of Europe and Asia as antagonistic continents was born in a period when Europe had explored only a little part of Asia and believed that it was not very much larger than Europe. For Greeks and Romans Asia meant practically the Near East and the unknown worlds beyond. It meant the Eurasian land mass as far as it was not European. "Asia" was rather a negative than a positive conception: as the Greeks called all non-Greeks barbarians, or the Christians all non-monotheists heathens, so the Europeans called all non-Europeans, who happened not to be Africans, by the vague name of Asiatics.

In fact, Asia never existed as an entity separate from Europe. It never represented either a geographic or historic or cultural or racial unit. For centuries Eurasia—for that is the genuine continent—had developed four great and distinctly different civilizations—the Chinese, the Indian, the Mohammedan, and the European. And only recently a fifth civilization has emerged on this continent—the Russian civilization of Bolshevism, combining modern European ideas with old Asiatic instincts, establishing for the entire north of the continent a new form of life and of society. Never in history had Asia considered itself a single continental unit apart from Europe. It had never existed outside of European maps and brains.

Only after Europe had invaded and conquered the world did Asia take up the European terminology and swing it as a weapon against Europe. Asia, that had been used by the Europeans in the sense of non-Europe, became in the spirit of the Asiatics the expression for anti-Europe. The Pan-Asiatic movement is essentially an anti-European movement. The slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" calls for a revolution of all Asiatic civilizations against European domination. It creates an artificial link between Japanese and Arabs, between nations that have nothing in common except hatred for Europe, for its world domination, its arrogance and supremacy.

So it is Europe that unites Asia.

It would be a serious confusion to believe that it was the Pan-European movement that provoked and created Pan-Asiaticism. For Pan-Asia is a consequence of European oppression, and not of European union. Lenin's Pan-Asiatic congress in Baku took place one year before the Pan-Europe movement started. And in the course of its further evolution, Pan-Asiaticism has hardly taken note of Pan-Europe.

The parallel to Pan-Europe is not Pan-Asia; it is rather to be seen in movements like the All-Indian Congress movement, the Pan-Islam movement and the movement toward a union of the Far East. For these movements are subcontinental movements like the Pan-European, trying to unite a natural branch of the human race or of human civilization into a federal unit. With Pan-Asia these movements have nothing in common.

But although Pan-Asia has not been provoked by Pan-Europe, it has become a strong argument for European union, because it is being used by Japanese imperialism against European imperialism and threatens Europe itself. We must never forget that, in this unnatural division of Eurasia, Europe represents but one-tenth and Asia nine-tenths. Facing a Pan-Asiatic threat it is Europe's first and most urgent task to unite.

Its second task is to adapt its general policy toward Asia in a manner to face and to remove this deadly threat, by dismembering Pan-Asiaticism.

Regarding the Far East, the white man, under the present circumstances, can not remove the main cause for the existing antagonism. Here superior strength is the only way toward lasting peace, as long as no compromise can be found in the immigration question. All pacifists and world federalists should therefore first try to work out a peaceful solution of that migration question, satisfying both races, before they take the trouble to proceed with their plans.

For although it is psychologically impossible to expect Americans or Australians to open their lands to Asiatic mass immigration, it is possible to reduce the pressure of Far Eastern overpopulation by helping China in its industrialization and in the fertilizing of some of its own underpopulated areas. It is also possible to reserve some other underpopulated countries around the Indian Ocean for Far Eastern immigration and to improve the economic relations between East and West as much as possible.

All that can reduce the tension created by the immigration issue—without overcoming it.

But in spite of this pending conflict the West and the Far East can collaborate, just as an industrialist can collaborate with his socialist workers toward the common goal of a prosperous enterprise. After the war the West ought to start a period of close economic collaboration with the Far East, based on mutual respect and racial tolerance. This new collaboration must be established on terms of racial equality and

not of racial predominance. The Europeans must become aware of the fact that the children of the Far East are very different, but by no means inferior, that Europe can learn just as much from China and its great philosophers in the sphere of morals as China can learn from Europe in the sphere of technology. The existing racial problems cannot be solved right now—but they need not be poisoned by a wrong and arrogant attitude of the white man.

It may be that one day new and surprising developments may make solutions possible that today seem utopian. A new wave of human brotherhood may sweep suddenly over the earth as centuries ago first Buddhism did and later Christianity.

It may happen, also, that one day biologists may find out that some racial crossings are not detrimental but advantageous to the development of humanity and that finally the two great races of the world will mingle, as they did in Russia and Turkey, in Hungary, in Finland and Bulgaria, or as Indians and Spaniards did in Mexico. But all these hopes lie in a distant future. Meanwhile it seems that racial antagonisms are going to haunt our poor planet during coming centuries as national hatreds are doing now and as religious hatreds did before the modern era of nationalism. At that period it would have seemed paradoxical and impossible to imagine Catholics and Protestants living peacefully together as citizens of the same states and as personal friends. Tomorrow such a racial utopia may become reality. But it would be a great danger to confound tomorrow with today and to underestimate the growing importance of the racial issue.

India is one of the keys of the future world. Inhabited by one-fifth of the human race, its position is of decisive importance for the future of our planet. If India swings toward Pan-Asia, this group obtains the world majority; if it remains linked with Europe, the yellow race remains a minority.

By race and by history India's place in the world is far closer to Europe than it is to China. In its long history India has had more ties with the West than with the Far East. The only strong link between India, China, and Japan was the fact that Buddhism came from India to conquer the hearts of the Mongolian nations—just as Christianity had come from the Near East to conquer the hearts of Europe. But here and there these two gentle and beautiful religions vanished in their countries of origin, while they were flourishing in distant lands. Therefore Buddhism no longer forms a link between the worlds north and

south of the Himalayas, this highest mountain chain of the world, separating India from the Far East.

Racially India is closer to Europe than it is to China. I recall the great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, whom I met in Berlin, as a man of beautiful European features. The old Indian language, Sanskrit, is closely related to almost all European languages, and has nothing to do with Chinese and Japanese. It recalls the times when white tribes conquered India, mingled with its original population and created a new race combining European and non-European elements.

There are just as strong reasons for India to establish a free federation as there are for Europe. But there is no reason whatsoever for India to join the Far East—except the common antagonism to Europe. A free India would have much more reason to carry on its contacts with Europe than to break them. It would have more reason to fear Japan's domination than Britain's partnership.

The Anglo-Indian problem is most complicated. Britain has done much harm and much good to India during the last two centuries. But the vital question is not the past but the future. British domination over India is obviously abdicating. The great question of the future is whether British-Indian partnership will survive. This problem is vital not only for Britain and India, but also for the whole of Asia and Europe, vital for the general future of our planet.

Examining this problem with dispassionate eyes, we must admit that India has more to win from co-operation with Britain than Britain from co-operation with India. For Britain would remain, even without India, a free and powerful country. But it is very doubtful whether the same can be said of India, that, at all periods of its history, attracted conquerors and would risk becoming, not a dominion, but a province of Far Eastern imperialism. Furthermore, India, in the center of the great ocean that bears its name, needs a strong navy to protect its sea lanes, without, for years to come, being able to construct it. Britain controls the two wings of the Indian Ocean. Some of these regions are tropical and uninhabitable for major white immigration. These regions might become for Indians what America has been for Europeans if India remains associated with the British Empire. Japan and China could offer nothing equal; and if they could they would certainly reserve such territories rather for their own settlers.

The great postwar problem India and Britain will have to solve is the problem Britain has solved more than once by the transformation of its colonies into dominions. But it is doubtful whether the dominion status would be satisfactory for a country representing one of the larg-

est and greatest nations of the world. The very word "dominion" would be incompatible with India's national pride and urge it toward complete separation.

I therefore believe that Britain and India ought to seek another way out of the present deadlock, a way that would give India independence from and equality with the British Commonwealth of Nations, without separation. The Austro-Hungarian reconciliation and reconstruction in 1867 indicates such a possible solution.

In 1848 Hungary, led by Kossuth, had revolted against Austria and its emperor and proclaimed itself an independent republic. After this revolution had been smashed, Hungary became an Austrian province. This status was never accepted by Hungary's public opinion, which reacted with hatred, passive resistance, and non-co-operation, especially during the two wars of 1859 and of 1866. After these two defeats Austria realized, in 1867, that this situation could no longer continue and opened negotiations with Hungary. They led to the following settlement: The Austrian empire was transformed into a dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary, consisting of two independent and equal states, Austria and Hungary. The emperor of Austria was crowned as king of Hungary and took an oath on the Hungarian constitution. During several months a year he set up his residence at Hungary's capital, Budapest. Beside the two completely different governments, responsible to their respective parliaments, there were only three common ministers: for foreign affairs, war, and finance. These three common departments were responsible to the delegations, consisting of forty delegates of each of the two parliaments, meeting once a year alternately in Vienna and Budapest.

This system worked until the World War—probably even more to the benefit of Hungary than of Austria. For Hungary united the advantages of independence with those of active participation in the direction of a great power.

This example might give some inspiration to Britons and Indians seeking a solution based on independence without separation. A dual British-Indian empire with its two capitals of London and Delhi would offer an analogous solution. The federal empire of India and the British Commonwealth of Nations would become equal partners and associates, united by the identity of the emperor of India with the king of England. While Britain would have to give up all control of India, the emperor of India would occupy the throne of Delhi as successor to the Great Mogul, as the symbol of national unity, the overlord of the

Indian princes, the supreme arbiter of the conflicts between the religious groups and the protector of minority rights. Were he attacked in his Indian empire, the British navy would help to protect him. So he would represent the constitutional link between two of the greatest branches of the human race.

Such a settlement would link India to the West and frustrate an alliance between China, Japan, and India in a Pan-Asiatic and consequently anti-European spirit. But it is evident that such a solution can never be achieved by force, but only by reason, vision, wisdom, and generosity.

The Near East is closely linked to Europe by blood and religion, by history and geography. With the Far East it has almost nothing in common. In the eyes of the Far East, the Near Easterners with their white race, their monotheistic creed, and their cultural affinities to Europe must seem like a branch of the European community. The only link between Japan and Morocco is again their common antagonism to Europe. Thus Europe alone is driving the Near East into the arms of the Far East and of the Pan-Asiatic ideology. No Japanese propaganda could ever create any community between these two different worlds, races, civilizations, and religions, if Europe would cease to dominate and to control the Arabic world. In this part of the globe, the Europeans are almost the only propagandists for Pan-Asia, owing to a short-sighted policy toward the Mohammedans.

The relations between Europe and the Near East are so important and so complicated because their living spaces are interlocked. Because culturally the Near East does not end in Egypt, but in Morocco. And because Europe cannot permit an Asiatic wedge to separate it from its African colonies and to control half of the coasts of its vital Mediterranean Sea.

Therefore Europe will have to change its policy toward the Near East in the same way as Britain must change it toward India: by transforming its relationship from domination into association, from supremacy into equality. Europe will have to see in all the Near Eastern nations, from Morocco to Afghanistan, its equals and relatives. The nations between Morocco and Libya must, for geographic reasons, become members of a federated Europe. It may be that the nations between Egypt and Afghanistan will follow them. But they may also constitute a federation of their own, associated but not united with Europe.

Europe and the Near East have for centuries formed a close cultural

community. The limits of the empire of Alexander the Great and of the Hellenistic civilization he inaugurated were almost identical with the Asiatic limits of the Near East. Later the Roman Empire united all border nations of the Mediterranean. This community has been split only since the seventh century A.D., by the triumph of Mohammedanism and the conquests of the Arabs. Half of the Mediterranean remained Christian and European, while the other half accepted Islam and its culture. But this new world of Mohammedanism had grown from the same roots as its elder sister, the world of Christianity; from Jewish religion and Greek philosophy. Seen from the Far East, Christianity and Islam are not two different religions, but only two powerful branches of Mosaism, both founded by Moses, but inspired and reformed by two great prophets. Thus the monotheistic world, from India to America, forms one great religious community embracing half of humanity.

The time has come for Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans to realize how much they have in common; to overcome the religious fanaticism that has separated them for centuries; to overcome the racial prejudice that derived, from the linguistic difference between Indo-Germanic and Semitic languages, the existence of racial differences between an Aryan and a Semitic race—which never actually existed.

Europeans and Christians must learn to see in the Near Eastern and in the Mohammedan nations full-fledged members of a common race, linked by faith in a common God.

The most important step toward such a new understanding between Europe and the Near East has been accomplished by modern Turkey, that recently under its great leader Kemal Ataturk, embraced without any European pressure all vital elements of Western civilization. This Turkish revolution is paving the way for a complete reconciliation between Europe and the Near East. It can be hoped that this great example will be followed by the long chain of states and nations stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan; that all these nations may accept, voluntarily, the civilization and the political ideals of the West, without giving up their religion, thus becoming conscious of their close association and relationship to the nations of Europe.

Such an evolution would push the realm of Western civilization forward to the limits of India, creating a natural bridge and link between the world of Europe and that of India. It would destroy forever the nightmare of a Pan-Asiatic bloc of nations, stretching from Tokyo to Tangiers, and hating and threatening Europe.

The Soviet Union is situated on the fence between Europe and Asia, the major part of its territory being Asiatic and the major part of its population being European. For many centuries Russia was a part of Europe and during other centuries a part of Asia. It is now free to consider itself as an Asiatic or a European power, or rather a Eurasian power, connected with both but bound to none. This is precisely the attitude the Soviet Union is taking now: that of a subcontinent by itself, situated between Europe and the Far East, free to join Asia against Europe or Europe against Asia—or to embrace either or both if they decide to join its federal union.

Racially the majority of the Soviet citizens are Europeans with a strong mixture of Asiatic blood. Within the great racial issue of the future their interests correspond to those of the West. For Siberia, one of the biggest and richest countries of the world, is permanently in danger of being colonized and absorbed by the Far East. For this enormous and underpopulated country, neighboring China with its extreme overpopulation, is a permanent temptation for the yellow race. But Russia knows that, should it permit such a Chinese colonization, the Chinese element would form within one generation the majority and absorb the country by peace or by war. Far Eastern powers might organize within one generation an army of fifty million first-rate soldiers to invade Siberia. Against this peril the Soviets alone cannot defend their Siberian frontier; they need the help and backing of the Western world.

On the other hand the antagonism between Communism and Western democracy is so deep that it drives a wedge between these two groups of the white race. The mutual distrust between these two conceptions of life makes any closer union impossible. The Soviet citizens would consider it just as impossible to accept Churchill or Roosevelt as commander of a world air force as the democracies of the West would be reluctant to charge Stalin with such an office. The good relations between the Soviets and the democracies, inaugurated by Hitler's attack on his Russian associate, can only be maintained on the principle of mutual non-interference and equality, not on that of federation.

It may be hoped that after the war, Stalin will devote his national energies to the reconstruction of his devastated and reconquered lands and not to world revolution. There are many reasons for expecting such a policy, that alone would assure friendly relations between him and the other United Nations. For only on such a basis can a close collaboration be established between the Soviet Union, the European

federation, and all other regional groups of the world. This collaboration, essential for the period of reconstruction, also urges Europe to give up its hostility toward the Soviets and to abandon all attempts to incorporate Russia or parts of Russia, into its democratic federation. Europe and Russia must agree to differ on vital problems of life, civilization, and economy. But they also must agree on their common aim of establishing a sound world organization to assure international peace and a rising living standard for all nations.

We must never forget that Soviet civilization is still in the making, that it can suddenly swing toward Western civilization or away from it. Much will depend on the attitude of the Western powers. Russia's hostility has often been only the expression of fear and of distrust. This feeling will vanish when Western democracy gives up all attempts to convert Russia to its own doctrines and gives to the Soviet Union all possible help in the gigantic task of reconstruction that awaits it after the war.

Should the Soviets swing toward democracy, they would automatically become part of the Atlantic world—either as members or as associates of a United Europe. But even if they carry on their principles of totalitarian state socialism and anti-religious materialism, the West will have to consider this Soviet world as its equal partner in all attempts to establish a sound world organization on regional grounds.

The recognition of the fact that neither Asia nor Europe is a genuine continent, but that the great Eurasian continent is split into the five subcontinents of the Far East, India, the Near East, Russia, and Europe, may indicate the way to avert a Pan-Asiatic development with all its disastrous consequences for Europe and the world.

THE Europe of tomorrow will be a genuine democratic federation, like the United States, Switzerland, Canada, South Africa, or Australia. But the commonwealth of the world will not follow the same plan. It will be shaped according to a different model, the model of the British Commonwealth of Nations, linking different parts of the world and different forms of federation in a single and elastic organization, based on geographic facts, on independence, and on solidarity.

Apart from all theoretical objections to an effective world government commanding an international army, such a scheme must be considered utterly impracticable now, owing to two major realistic obstacles: the Senate of the United States and Stalin.

Without the consent of the Senate no participation of the United States in a system of world government is possible. And it would be unrealistic to expect a majority of the American Senate to accept, at the end of this war, any set-up delivering national and hemispheric security and sovereignty into the hands of a non-American world government.

But even if the consent of the American Senate could, by some miracle, be assured, Stalin would not be in a position to hand over the security of the Soviet Union to any board of nations with a non-Communitic majority. For he could never be safe against the danger of this non-Communitic majority's being one day transformed into an anti-Communitic majority, thus imperiling the Soviet Union and everything it stands for. Therefore our most optimistic hopes for the postwar world must aim at world organization, not at world government.

After this war the world will be divided into six or seven large groups of states, with different continents, civilizations, races, traditions, religions, and principles of life. If these groups face each other without international ties, this system would lead in the very near future to another World War, between continents.

The structure of the postwar world will recall the structure of Europe at the beginning of our century. At that period six great powers, equal in rank but not in strength, were deciding together the fate of Europe, constituting the so-called European Concert.

But this balance without organization led, after a generation of European peace, to the tragedy of the First World War. This example ought to warn the world not to trust the peaceful effects of balance without organization, and advise it to assure a closer union at the end of the war, establishing something like a world-wide commonwealth of nations.

This commonwealth of the world can develop out of the present alliance of the United Nations. Its five leading world powers can become the natural nucleus of the future commonwealth of the world: the United States; the British Empire; the Soviet Union; China; and France.

Since France has constituted her emergency government in Algiers, on French soil, she must be considered as a power equal in rank to the other four big United Nations. And it is only natural that in any world council of the United Nations France should act as the trustee for continental Europe, just as the United States is the trustee for Pan-America, China for the Far East, Great Britain for its empire, and the Soviets for their own federation.

For as long as no European federation is constituted, France is the only great power capable of representing the European continent: strong enough to guide her sister nations toward the European goal, but not strong enough to dominate them.

The supreme world council should be organized in a way very different from the old League of Nations: not as a world parliament of states, but as a permanent council of delegates of big regions.

The aims of this future world commonwealth have been drafted clearly by the Atlantic Charter. They are distinctly limited to the five following issues:

- (1) to establish an era of general peace and of international security;
- (2) to reduce the crushing burden of armaments;
- (3) to assure a rising prosperity all over the world by fullest economic collaboration and by equal access of all to trade and raw materials;
- (4) to improve labor standards, economic adjustment, and social security all over the world;
- (5) to assure the freedom of the seas.

These aims of world organization have become, by unanimous ap-

proval of all United Nations, the code of the world of tomorrow. They can only be accomplished by the creation of a new and efficient world organization, by the establishment of a commonwealth of the world.

The Commonwealth of the World would have to be organized as simply as possible. The old Secretariat of the League of Nations would continue to function as a world office, just as would the International Court, the International Labor Office, and the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation. The League Assembly would disappear and the League Council would be transformed into a permanent board of leading representatives of world regions, evolving progressively from the United Nations.

This supreme council would direct the entire world organization. Its most important task would be to assure, by a lasting alliance, by mediation, and by arbitration, the peace of the world. In all questions of international law it would back the decisions of the International Court of Justice.

To assure world peace the principle of non-intervention should guide the general relations between the regions, wherever no special treaties stipulate exceptions for certain regions. International help would also be given to any federal authority on its special request; if for instance Japan should try to rise against the Far Eastern federation or Germany against the European authorities.

But should a conflict arise between Russia and the Ukraine, or between England and Eire or between two Latin American states, such a conflict would be considered a civil war within one of the regions, demanding neutrality from all other parts of the world.

This would be exactly the opposite principle to that established within the European federation, where the federal authorities would be bound to interfere in any civil or local war between Europeans. In the Commonwealth of the World peace can only be assured by mutual non-intervention. The Mohammedans of the Near East would, for instance, have no right to interfere in India in favor of the Indian Moslems, just as the Western powers would have no right to protect the Christians in the Soviet Union or in the Far East. The Soviet Union would have no right either to protect the Communists outside its borders, nor would the Far East be entitled to protect the colored races in Africa or America. Any such intervention, not stipulated by special treaties, would create permanent tensions and distrust, thus threatening to transform local revolutions or conflicts into world wars.

This principle of non-intervention alone cannot, however, assure in-

ernational peace. Another principle is of equal importance: the principle of permanent consultation and mutual assistance, establishing a world alliance against aggression.

Should one of these regions attempt an aggression outside its frontiers, all other regions would be bound to defend the attacked power against the aggressor, if he did not accept mediation by the supreme council. The question of who would be considered the aggressor would be determined by the International Court.

Only by this double principle of non-intervention and of mutual assistance might a long period of world peace be established.

The second main task of the world organization would be, according to the Atlantic Charter, to lighten for peace-loving people the crushing burden of armaments, after the disarmament of all aggressors and potential aggressors.

This task demands first of all the establishment, by the supreme council, of a general plan of disarmament. It further demands the organization of an international police for investigation, whose members would be armed with all diplomatic privileges and immunity, to visit and to investigate all plants of the world, assisted by all regional and local authorities. This international police would every year publish the results of its investigations.

It is impossible to include in the future system of disarmament provisions against the military training of manpower, because there is no clear line to be drawn between military and gymnastic exercises. The development of aviation as the main offensive arm of the future will reduce the importance of all other arms as instruments of aggression. An army of millions of soldiers without the command of the air is as incapable of successful aggression as a blind giant. The international police ought, therefore, to concentrate its control on arms of aggression: on planes, warships and tanks—but, first of all, on planes and again on planes.

The plan for a world-wide reduction of armaments in the air must follow the example of the Naval Disarmament Conference of Washington in 1922. The regional groups must agree on certain contingencies for which their air, navy, and tank forces are to be adequate.

To prevent civil aviation from becoming camouflaged war aviation, all long-range civil aviation, connecting continents and oceans and spanning the world of tomorrow, should be pooled in a single international company, under the control of the supreme council.

Should the international police announce a grave violation of the

stipulations limiting the respective air forces, and should the violating power refuse to repair its violation, the international disarmament pact would be considered broken, and all signatories free to resume the race of armaments. Furthermore, the violating power would lose all benefits of the pact of mutual assistance, and would risk having its aircraft plants smashed by the bombers of one or several of its neighbors before it was able to outproduce them.

Had the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles acted in that way after Germany had broken its obligations by starting the construction of the most powerful air fleet of the world in 1933, Hitler would have been overthrown and the world would not be at war. For no future war of aggression will be possible without superior air force. As soon as the great powers realize this fact, they will, out of budgetary necessity, cut their other armaments to a minimum, considering them a pure waste of money.

The third task of the future world organization is, according to the Atlantic Charter, "to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victors or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

This task would have to be accomplished by a special department of the world office in a businesslike, and not in a bureaucratic spirit. Separate agencies will have to deal with the problems of grain, of oil, of rubber, and of other vital materials and their distribution. In the field of currencies this economic department will endeavor to establish some stable, international monetary system, at least as effective as it was before the First World War.

This economic co-operation between the world groups would not be coercive. Should one of these groups decide to close its markets to the others, no military action would be taken. The isolationist group would just lose the benefits of international trade and of the world market, without ceasing its collaboration within the supreme council in the field of peace and disarmament. Any attempt to enforce economic relations by military means would only lead to chronic international conflicts and to a new world war.

The same principle will have to govern the execution of the fourth aim of world organization, "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing,

for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustments and social security."

The International Labor Office will continue to work toward this goal, backed by all the moral authority of the Commonwealth of the World. It will recommend social reforms and interregional or international agreements, but without attempting to enforce them. Europe will have its own labor standards that will differ from those of America, of the Soviet Union, of the Far East, and of India. The International Labor Office will have to work out methods to raise the standards of living all over the world, especially in the Far East and India, by international co-operation. But here again any attempt to enforce social legislation internationally would merely create permanent conflicts and prepare new wars.

The world office should carry on all successful activities of the League of Nations in the field of its health department, its struggle against white slavery and drug traffic, and in its work for intellectual co-operation. As the world is growing smaller with every day through the development of technology, the field of international activities will be growing larger with every passing day. New sections of this world office will be constituted according to decisions taken by the supreme council. And it will be a function of the council to interpret and to assure the realization of the seventh paragraph of the Atlantic Charter: "Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance."

The establishment of this new world organization should not be delayed till the end of the war. The supreme council could be created right now out of prominent leaders of America, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China. It could invite some Indian of high moral authority to act as a trustee for his nation until the establishment of Indian independence. In the same manner the Near East, as far as it is backing the Allied cause, could be represented by an Arab delegate to the supreme council.

This supreme world council could start immediately to work out the status of the future Commonwealth of the World, to build up the world office, and to begin its activities, without waiting for the conclusion of peace.

So the world organization of tomorrow could emerge directly and progressively out of the war effort of today.

At the end of the last war it was a grave mistake to break up all inter-Allied agencies and organizations before the League of Nations

had developed. At the end of this war the opposite line ought to be followed. All economic organizations, established to increase co-operation between the United Nations, must be preserved and transformed gradually into agencies of the Commonwealth of the World.

The transition of the United Nations into a United World would evolve progressively. London is better qualified than any other city to be the seat of such a world agency, because Britain will remain the only intercontinental power in the world, a natural link between all continents and regional groups: closely attached to the United States and to the entire Western Hemisphere, almost a part of Europe, an ally of the Soviet Union, an associate of India, and linked by old and strong ties to all nations of the Near and of the Far East.

Therefore London is more than any other city indicated as the cosmopolis of tomorrow, the headquarters of our globe.

Independent of the evolution of the supreme council and its world office, the different regions of the world would have to develop their respective organizations.

The Soviet Union alone represents, in itself, a definite and organized region of the world.

The British Commonwealth of Nations too can be considered as a definite region, representing, even without India, one of the most important communities of the globe, embracing the entire continent of Australia, half of Africa, and half of North America, united under a single crown as a single empire.

But India too, as soon as it achieves its promised independence, will have to be recognized as a full-fledged member of the supreme council, whether it remains linked with Britain or not. For in population India represents the second nation of the world; and regarding its contributions to humanity, it figures among the first.

The establishment of a democratic federation of the Far East around the Chinese republic seems the only constructive solution of the Japanese question—just as the establishment of a democratic United States of Europe appears the only constructive solution of the German question. Both problems ought, therefore, to be solved in an analogous way.

Any attempt to separate Chinese and Japanese would lead to the same conflicts as would the separation of Germany from the rest of Europe. Chinese and Japanese are as different and as similar as are French and Germans.

They are united by a common race and civilization, by their common Buddhist religion and Confucian ethics. But they are still more closely

linked than French and Germans by the community of the Chinese characters, that make it possible for Japanese and Chinese to read the same books without translations. As every symbol signifies a word, these words are independent of the differences in the phonetic languages spoken by Chinese, Japanese, or Koreans. Literally they have a common script language, but very different idioms.

Just as Europe will unite despite all hatreds and atrocities, the Far East, too, will one day unite despite the Japanese atrocities in China and the profound hatreds they have aroused. The decisive issue, in Europe as in the Far East, is not whether these regions will unite, but whether these federations will be established on the principle of democracy or of oppression. Just as a German domination over Europe would signify anti-democratic minority rule, a Japanese domination over China would have the same significance. If, on the contrary, the Far East were organized on democratic principles, the leadership would lie automatically in the hands of the Chinese, because their population numbers seven or eight times the total of Japanese. In a Far Eastern parliament the Japanese minority would consequently be even smaller than the German minority within a European parliament.

As a united Europe would assure peace in Europe and give to the individual Germans the same rights as to all other Europeans, a Far East federation would assure peace between China and Japan and would assure the same personal rights and chances to the Japanese individuals as it would to the Chinese.

Any solution of the Japanese question, transforming Japan into a dependency of the West and not into a part of the Far East, would create deep resentment in China—just as all European enemies of Germany would still be shocked if this country were to be transformed into a colony of China. In the same way any Western attempt to establish a white domination in the Far East would provoke new racial antagonisms and promote the Pan-Asiatic threat.

The establishment of a Near East region would probably meet with the greatest difficulties. Although all these countries, with the exception of the little Christian Lebanon republic, have Mohammedan majorities, the religious conflicts between these states are almost irreconcilable. Shiite Iran has an old animosity against the Sunnite majority of Turks and Arabs. The Wahabite puritans ruling the major part of the Arabian peninsula under their king, Ibn Saud, hold views in conflict with the rest of Islam, while anti-clerical Turkey is hated by the Arabian orthodox (Kemal Ataturk in 1924 abolished the Turkish Caliphate of

the Osman dynasty). It is doubtful whether these religious antagonisms can find peaceful solutions without the active help of the West, but it will be difficult to organize such help without violating the national feelings of Arabs and Persians.

It may be that the two most westernized states of this region, Turkey and Egypt, would prefer to become members of the European federation instead of joining the Near East, and there is no reason whatsoever why Europe should decline their admission. The same might happen with the three other Mediterranean states of Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine. Neither the Christians in the Lebanon nor the Jews in Palestine can be left unprotected at the mercy of the surrounding Mohammedan world. The fate of the Armenians and of the Christian Assyrians is a sufficient warning. Furthermore, the fate of the Jews in eastern Europe demands some kind of Zionist solution of their problem.

Misery and hatred in eastern Europe will, for years to come, aggravate a situation that will make it almost impossible for the Jews of this region to earn their living in Poland and Rumania. The world owes substantial reparation to the Jewish victims of Hitler, who have suffered most, giving them a chance to settle down as a majority in a land of their own. If Palestine proves inadequate, some parts of East Africa ought to be transformed into an autonomous colony, giving the Eastern Jews the right and the chance to "live out their lives in freedom from fear and want," as the Atlantic Charter promises to "all the men in all the lands." If once this problem of Zionism were settled for the Eastern Jews, the assimilated Western Jews would soon be considered full-fledged members of their respective nations, in spite of the fact of their forming a religious minority, and the scourge of anti-Semitism would vanish.

But any Zionist solution demands precise special arrangements between Europe and the Near East.

No other group of independent states in the world constitutes, from the geographic point of view, such a clear and natural region as the American continent.

This fact has been recognized more than half a century ago by the creation of the Pan-American Union, associating all republics of the Western Hemisphere in a single group of nations. But the hopes that had been fixed on this Pan-American Union at the time of its creation have not matured. The Pan-American Union has remained the frame of a Pan-American federation—but, alas, a frame without a picture. Its

practical achievements hardly match the meager results of the League of Nations.

The main reason for this lack of dynamism in the Pan-American movement lies in the distrust the Latin-American states feel for their great and powerful neighbor to the north. The Latin-American nations would prefer to establish a federation of their own, without the inclusion of the United States. But such a Latin-American federation, reaching from Cape Horn to the Rio Grande, would conflict with the main interests of the United States in the Panama Canal Zone. For, as this Canal forms the link between the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts and navies of the United States, its control is vital to that country. The United States can never admit a powerful federation of states encircling that Zone, as long as such a federation has no Pan-American character. Therefore any attempt to unite Latin America without, or against, the United States would not serve peace but war. The only policy of peace in the Western Hemisphere is Pan-America. If the twenty-one republics of this hemisphere do not wish to follow the tragic example of European disunity, they will have to federate. This federation is certainly facilitated by the existence of the Pan-American Union.

The anti-imperialist Good Neighbor Policy of the United States toward its Latin-American sister republics, inaugurated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles, paves the way toward a closer inter-American understanding and collaboration. For the links between North and South America are not only geographic. They are based on a common tradition of republicanism and of liberty. Many Latin Americans have learned to understand that Pan-Americanism means peace, liberty, and prosperity for the entire hemisphere, and that their interest in the development of this Union is by no means smaller than that of the United States.

The fact that the Pan-American Union has its headquarters in Washington is often interpreted by Latin America as an indication of North American hegemony. It would certainly be better for the evolution of Pan-Americanism if it were transferred to Panama, as the geographic and historic center of Pan-Americanism. This would remind the Latin Americas that the Pan-American idea was not born in the North, but originated in the vision of South America's liberator, Simon Bolivar, who, as early as in 1826 organized the first Pan-American congress in Panama with the aim of continental union. The collaboration between North and South America could also be promoted by teaching the

Spanish language in all schools of the United States and English in all schools of Latin America.

The main element of Pan-Americanism, however, lies in the economic field. The lack of demographic pressure makes a federal union less necessary for America than for overpopulated Europe. The Pan-American commonwealth of tomorrow will probably be somewhat tighter than the British Commonwealth, but much less tight than the European federation. An economic union between all republics of the Western Hemisphere would probably represent the strongest and soundest basis for it.

Such an economic link could start with a preferential system, progressing toward a complete suppression of economic boundaries within the hemisphere. But European experience with such projects must serve as a warning against optimism. In peacetime it is almost impossible to induce sovereign nations to give up their economic isolationism, owing to vested interests protected by tariffs. Only in times of war and emergency can generous ideas overrun the fences of personal and national egotism.

It might perhaps be easier to achieve an economic union of the Americas by following the method by which Germany established its economic union. This German *Zollverein* was started in 1834 by a bilateral treaty between Prussia and Hesse, establishing a common market surrounded by common tariffs. It took one generation before all German states, one by one, joined this economic union, that was soon followed by the political union of Germany. A similar development might take place, if the United States would start an economic union with one of the states of Latin America. Anyhow, it will be much easier to achieve a substantial progress toward Pan-American Union in times of war than during the coming period of peace.

A NEW page of history began on December 17, 1903, when Orville Wright first rose from the earth with his flying machine.

From times immemorial man had been creeping on the surface of the earth. Since Mongolfier had invented the balloon, human beings could rise to the clouds—but they were unable to direct their course against winds and storms. Now, at last, one of the greatest dreams of mankind had become reality—man had conquered the air and extended his living-space to the third dimension. With his new mechanical wings he had become the largest of all birds, flying faster than an albatross and higher than an eagle.

Since that memorable December day mankind has taken a new course toward a new destiny. This new page of history that has just begun can become the brightest or the darkest of all ages. It may lead to a great and splendid era of civilization—or to utter doom and barbarism. Everything will depend on how man uses his new invention.

In the distant future, when all the conquests of Hitler will live only in the books of some historians, as the conquests of Rameses do today, all the little boys and girls, learning to fly in their toy planes, will recall the name of the great American who conquered the skies for the human race—Orville Wright.

History will then be divided into two great periods: the pre-aviation era and the era of the flying man.

Discussing the politics of tomorrow, we must be aware of this decisive change. We must realize that, for the first time in history, the globe has become a real unit—that tomorrow it will be possible to reach any point of the world from any other point within two days and that the whole world will then be reduced to the size, not of a continent or even of a state, but of a county. Thus the progress of aviation urges world unity, while the political and psychological developments are still far from that goal.

But if aviation does not lead to global union it threatens to lead to

terrible wars and destruction, compared to which even Hitler's War will seem to have been hardly more than a maneuver.

Seen from that angle the problem of world unity is one of the most important and most urgent problems of our generation.

To understand the revolutionary impact of aviation on politics and strategy, we can compare it with two older inventions that have successively changed the course of history and the aspect of our planet: the use of the horse, and the invention of gunpowder.

Many thousand years ago the man who first mounted a horse transformed the world. Since that day men on horseback have invaded entire continents, defeated most armies on foot, and created great empires all over Asia and Europe. For thousands of years the military superiority of the men on horseback over the men on foot was at the very basis of human society. The rider was the ruler, the lord, the "chevallier," the knight; the man on foot had to obey his orders.

A new invention suddenly overthrew the rule of the rider—the invention of firearms. For a man with a firearm was stronger than many men on many horses. With the firearm the Europeans overthrew the feudalism of the knights and conquered the globe for the white man.

The airplane offers still greater and more fantastic opportunities. For it overthrows all strategical and political doctrines of yesterday and asks for entirely new conceptions of war and of peace. Aviation leads straight across the problem of huge regional groups to the problem of world organization and world control by a single power: by the power that first grasps the magnitude of this problem, the nation that first becomes air-conscious.

As long as all skies were inaccessible and neutral, every state that was able to defend its boundaries against aggression was sovereign. Since skies have become battlefields, no state can any longer be considered sovereign that is unable to protect the air above its territory; consequently, no state without a strong air force.

Only big industrial states are able to construct strong air fleets—states like the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan. They alone can be considered sovereign in a modern sense. For all other states must, when attacked by an air power, seek the protection or alliance of another air power.

These minor states have therefore practically ceased to be independent. Their alliances with strong air powers are practically not based on reciprocity and equality, but on dependence and protection. Therefore the independence and sovereignty of all nonindustrial states is

only theoretical; the world is rapidly progressing toward large groups of states, strong enough to protect themselves in the air. At the end of this war the German and the Japanese air fleets will probably have disappeared from the skies or be turned over to the United Nations. Then three air fleets only will dominate the skies of the globe: the American, the British, and the Russian air fleets.

Among these three surviving air fleets the American will be predominant, the R.A.F. somewhat weaker, and the Soviet air fleet the weakest.

The relative strength of those three surviving air fleets will indicate the power of their respective nations to determine the peace and the new order of the world.

Many people recommend that after the war an international air force be established to police the globe. This idea certainly corresponds to the evolution of technology. But it demands a world government directed by a common program, a single will, and a common political creed. It is not possible to consider the command of the world air force as alternating between an American, British, and Soviet general. It would also be inconceivable to have four units of this world air force organized and commanded by an American, a Briton, a Russian, and a Chinese General. For these four air fleets could one day fight, not with one another, but against one another.

No democratic world government could now be conceived, sufficiently united to direct a common air force without the danger of disruption. On the other hand the suggestion of abolishing military aviation altogether would only transform civil aviation into the most formidable military weapon, just as every liner would automatically become a battleship as soon as all warships of the world disappeared.

The postwar world will face the alternatives of establishing a balance of air power—or accepting the possibility that one nation builds up an air force superior to the air forces of all others, thus assuring peace in the skies and under the skies by means of its military superiority. After the defeat of Germany and of Japan the United States of America alone would be strong enough to assume this task.

For such a realistic American peace policy Britain set the example after the Napoleonic Wars, by constructing a navy of overwhelming strength and maintaining its unchallenged superiority for more than three generations.

Britain's undisputed command of the seas for more than a century brought peace to the oceans and contributed very largely to the eco-

nomie and cultural development of the world in the period between the Napoleonic and the German wars. The British navy exercised the policing of the high seas, putting an end to the piracy that for thousands of years had infested the oceans.

What Britain has accomplished for the world during the nineteenth century by its naval superiority is but a small indication of the enormous benefits American supremacy in the air could give to the world by assuring several generations of peace, of general security, of economic recovery and of cultural progress, if America were ready to follow the inspiring British example. America could thus inaugurate a new century of peace and progress, an American Century, taking up the British tradition.

Had the United States taken this course after the last war, it could easily have prevented the wars in China and in Europe by two simple cables of its President to Berlin and Tokyo—if these cables had been backed by an air force of only ten thousand bombers.

If America maintains its air superiority, it will probably never be obliged to use it, according to the principle of Marshal Lyautey, the French conqueror of Morocco: "One must show one's force so that one is not obliged to use it." And history gives evidence that Britain did not need to fight a single major sea battle during the century of its unchallenged rule of the waves.

Britain did not build up its naval supremacy for the sake of ruling the world, but merely to protect its coasts and waterways to all parts of the globe, primarily to its colonies. But to protect its coasts and waterways it had to be stronger than any other sea power. Accordingly, the United States must, for its own security, control the skies above the Atlantic and above the Pacific. The most extreme isolationist must now accept this necessity, owing to the development of aviation, making it possible in a few years for large air fleets to cross the Atlantic and Pacific just as they now cross the Channel. The only sound protection against aviation being air superiority, even the most anti-imperialist American must wish to see American rather than other air fleets controlling the skies above the two oceans surrounding America in the east and west. But as soon as America's air force is strong enough to control the air above the Atlantic and the Pacific, it automatically controls the sky over our entire globe. So America is bound to choose between these alternatives: either to neglect its defense by permitting other air fleets to dominate these oceans, or to take over the command of the skies. No imperialism, but technical and strategical problems of

security urge America to rule the skies of the globe, just as Britain, during the last century, ruled the seas of the world.

Pacifists and anti-imperialists will be shocked by this logic. They will try to find an escape. But they will try in vain. Perhaps they will suggest an international air force under American or British-American command. But such a legal claim of American or Anglo-American world hegemony would be far more provocative for other nations than the mere fact of America's air superiority among political equals. Had Britain ever claimed a *de jure* control of the high seas, the European powers would never have agreed. But they accepted voluntarily its *de facto* control because it was not based on the assumption of political hegemony.

At the end of the war the crushing superiority of American plane production will be an established fact. If the other air powers do not recognize this superiority by an agreement regulating future air armament, the United States can just continue with its output, till the other powers give up this hopeless race of production and suggest a pact for the limitation of air armaments. Any such pact would have to be established not on abstract claims but on realistic figures, like the treaty that evolved from the Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington in 1922.

The future quotas of plane production will have to be based on the figures of production at the time of the signature of the pact. It should be agreed that the existing air fleets would not increase in number or horsepower, but that only overaged machines could be replaced by new models.

Thus an agreement could be reached reducing substantially the burden of armaments for all air powers, without altering their relative strength. The practical result of such an agreement, however, would be the lasting air supremacy of the United States.

This solution of the problem raised by the invention of the airplane is by no means ideal nor even satisfactory. But it is the minor evil, compared with the alternative of several competing air forces fighting each other, or of a single international air force split by dissension. Both alternatives would lead to destructive air wars, aimed not at the conquest but at the utter annihilation of all enemy towns and lands.

This danger can, as long as no strong and united world authority is established, only be prevented by the air superiority of a single power. And it certainly is preferable for Western civilization that America represents that power, rather than some imperialistic and aggressive

nation like Germany or Japan. Furthermore, the United States, with its thin population spread over a vast and rich country, will be less tempted to seek conquests than overpopulated and poor nations with imperialistic traditions. One day, when a genuine world federation is possible, the world government will be able to take over the burden of the American air fleet. But as long as the globe is based on organized anarchy, America's air rule is the only alternative to intercontinental wars.

Protected by the air force of the great American democracy, the charter of the world commonwealth would meanwhile become for the globe what the Magna Charta was for England and the Declaration of Independence for America.

During the third century B.C. the Mediterranean world was divided between five great powers—Rome and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. This balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the "Pax Romana," the cradle of the Christian religion. It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace.

This is the only realistic hope for a lasting peace. For no greater mistake concerning human nature could be made than to hope that lasting peace can be established on some artificial mechanism of figures, by adding and grouping troops and planes as masons pile up bricks to build a house. For the material of states, federations, and empires is the human soul with its surprising and unpredictable reactions.

Were a federal system sufficient to assure peace, the Civil War within the United States would never have occurred. That war disrupted the best federal constitution in the world, because the opinions of North and South disagreed on the vital issue of slavery.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Catholic Church seemed as united and powerful as ever. Suddenly an unknown monk, driven by his conviction, rose against the Catholic hierarchy, disrupted the unity of the Church, and started a century of civil wars between Christians of different creeds.

We have no right to assume that religious wars belong to the past. Human nature has not changed, in spite of its intellectual developments. Europe is in the midst of such a religious war. In this struggle political doctrines have replaced theological problems, while human emotions react with an equal spirit of sacrifice, loyalty, and cruelty—just as they did in the religious wars of the sixteenth century. Nazism

is a modern quasi-religion, like Bolshevism. Both have inspired their prophets and churches, their martyrs and missionaries.

Any day new creeds can rise and spread, mobilizing love and hatred, the noblest and the basest human passions and instincts.

The most bloody war of our era was not the First World War, but the religious Tai-Ping War in China, provoked by a man who declared, and perhaps believed himself to be, the son of God and a younger brother of Jesus Christ. He founded a new religion and started a war between the South and North of China that is said to have led to twenty millions of casualties—just double the total figures of the First World War.

We may conclude that human nature is more emotional than rational. Even if all political and economic reasons for wars should disappear, the dangers of ideologic wars would persist. In some crazy brain some crazy idea can suddenly be born and lead to a mental epidemic, sweeping away the emotions of millions and provoking wars just for a whim. No mechanical peace organization can insure humanity against such outbreaks of collective madness that characterize the entire course of human history. If organization were a sufficient weapon to prevent wars, there would be no civil wars. And even if the whole world were united in a single federation, civil wars between its continental provinces would remain possible. And even if a single international force should replace national armies, an ideologic issue could provoke a mutiny within the international force and, consequently, a war between its sections.

When working for international peace and organization, we must always keep this danger in mind. But the fact that there is no absolute insurance against war is no reason nor argument against international organization. For there is no doubt that in an organized community of states the war danger is far smaller than within an unorganized group. The experience that murders occur in spite of the police cannot be considered an argument against the institution of the police.

We must only beware of making the mistake of believing that wars can be ruled out definitely by international organization, or even by education. Men will not suddenly be transformed into angels. And even in heaven one of the angels, Lucifer, is said to have revolted and provoked a civil war, until he and his followers were defeated by the loyal armies of heaven and banished to hell.

A materialistic conception of history assumes that war and revolutions

ire consequences of economic conditions and that wars will cease as soon as misery is overcome by socialism and technology.

Misery is certainly one reason for wars and revolutions. But by no means the only or even the main reason.

This materialistic theory might just as well assume that lions and tigers attack men only when they are hungry and advise the directors of zoological gardens to feed them well and then to open their cages, because they would have no further reason for attacking visitors to the zoo.

History gives some evidence that hungry people are inclined to revolt—but it gives no evidence for the theory that wealth makes them peaceful. During all the Dark Ages the traditional aggressors, fighters, and conquerors were not the starving peasants nor the miserable town folks, but the well-fed knights, baronets, counts, princes, dukes, and kings, who were fighting not for bread, but just for their pleasure and power. And most of the leaders of fascist revolutions in our day were not poor, but members of the middle-class bourgeoisie. The same can be said about warmongers all around the world. Very few wars have been caused by the misery of the nations involved, and even very few revolutions. Most of them were caused by some ideology.

The Trojan War was waged for beautiful Helen and the Thirty Years' War for the interpretation of Christianity. The official reasons for wars were often nothing but pretexts for the fighting instincts of leaders and nations. They chose some ideal or interest as a pretext—but they were just as ready to fight for some other interest or other ideal. They waged war because they wished to fight and were bored with living in peace.

This human passion for war is closely related to the passion for hunting. Here and there killing is the aim. To explain the passion for shooting by hunger is just as shortsighted as to explain war with want. Many poachers risk their lives gladly just for the pleasure of shooting a deer—certainly not for the sake of eating or of selling it.

This human instinct is so deeply rooted that it will take centuries to modify it. Meanwhile it must be taken into account as a psychological and, consequently, as a political fact, as an irrational and illogical source of wars.

Fighting and making war is less a human than a male instinct. The male animal is by nature aggressive. Bulls are far more aggressive than cows, cocks more than hens, men more than women. This is no ques-

tion of courage: the female fights with the same passion and ferocity for her cubs if they are in danger; but this fighting is defensive, while the nature of the male is offensive and aggressive.

As long as males are running the world, they will dream of wars. Men are again and again attracted by the dangerous flame of war like moths by the dangerous flame of the candle. Even if their ideas and convictions are peaceful, their instincts will be aggressive. Their essential passions are love and fight, whether this fight is war or revolution, hunting or fishing, racing or gambling, sporting or business. Every genuine man is a born fighter, with a natural respect for good fighters and a natural contempt for bad fighters. Every boy likes to play soldier—as every girl likes to play mother. A sword or gun is for a boy what a doll is for a girl, the symbol of their future lives.

For it is the destiny of woman to give life, to nurse, and to raise a helpless little creature, as it is the destiny of man to be a good fighter. Man asserts himself by fighting his rivals and smashing his enemies—woman asserts herself by bearing children and making them happy. Therefore the male and female outlook on life is totally different. Man's natural policy is imperialist, just as woman's natural policy is pacifist. Although women love warriors they hate wars. A woman who is a genuine imperialist is just as much a paradox as a man who is a genuine pacifist.

A world in which women would have a decisive influence on politics would certainly be more peaceful than a world directed by men. Therefore feminism is of vital influence for lasting peace.

At the threshold of our civilization, not men but women stood at the head of human society. Maybe during that period wars were rarer and civilization could therefore rise above barbarism.

Since man overthrew matriarchy, the ancient rule of the woman, he established a world dictatorship of his own sex, excluding women almost entirely from politics. But one important job remained open to some women: the queen's job. And it is amazing how successfully they accomplished this job, compared with their male rivals, predecessors, and successors.

A short survey of history establishes the fact that almost half of all queens were remarkable rulers—a quota far higher than that of successful kings.

Queen Elizabeth was undoubtedly the greatest ruler of England, while the long and successful reign of Queen Victoria marks the golden age of her empire. Catherine II of Russia was greater than all the

czars, with the one exception of Peter the Great. The Austrian empress Maria Theresa was, in modern times, undoubtedly the greatest ruler of her dynasty. And it was Isabella who sent Columbus to discover America. Although in France women were excluded from the throne, women were several times highly successful as regents. The experience that queens are on the average more successful than kings has also been proven to be true in the history of the East, from Egypt and Babylonia to China and Japan.

This historic analysis of the political talent of women cannot be ignored. In the postwar world women should be given not only theoretically, but also practically, political opportunities equal to men.

Such a change might have far-reaching and beneficial consequences on political life, replacing the masculine methods of war and revolution by feminine methods of peace and evolution.

Until such an evolution takes place we must admit that we are living in a fighting world, in an unending contest of valor and skill, of energy and intelligence. Political life is a struggle between individuals and families, parties and nations, races and civilizations, for power and liberty. In this struggle for life only heroic nations and civilizations survive—all others are swept away by the broad stream of history.

To believe that the white race or Western civilization will continue to lead the world just because of their superiority is bare nonsense. This race is being challenged by the yellow race—and this civilization by the principles of communism; and nobody can predict who will emerge as victor out of this decisive contest.

It may be that the white man and his Western civilization will survive this double challenge; but it also can be that they will decline as Rome's great civilization collapsed under the double offensive of the Germanic invaders and the Christian religion.

The peaceful organization of the postwar world would rest on a double basis: on the working Commonwealth of the World, established on regional grounds; and on the American supremacy in the skies, making international wars almost impossible.

The legal organization of the world would be backed by this military power, as during the medieval ages the moral authority of the Church was backed by the military power of emperors.

For any organized society both elements are indispensable: right and

might. Right without might leads to anarchy, and might without right to despotism. A civilized state needs tribunals to judge and police to act.

It is but a remnant of the old struggle of early Christianity against imperial Rome that many men and women of high morality still consider power as an evil in itself. Evidently power is neither good nor evil; for its value depends entirely on its use. Just as a gun is good when used by a policeman and bad when used by a gangster—armaments are good when undertaken for the sake of peace and bad when undertaken for war. Britain and France have sinned more against humanity by not arming against Hitler than they ever could have sinned by over-arming.

Peace can only be established for a long period by men who are aware that the dangers of war never disappear, and that superior power in the hands of the peaceful is the only realistic weapon against wars. A weak government is an invitation to civil war and a weak state an invitation to invasion. As a strong police assures civil peace, strong armaments of peaceful powers are the safest method of preventing international wars.

We must attempt to establish world-wide peace by organization, education, and understanding; but we must also insure it with the powerful weapon of superior air force.

To base the future peace of the world on good will alone would be mere folly. We can hope to see nations and leaders inspired by good will—but we have no right to expect it. On the contrary, we must expect that Hitler will not be the last specimen of his kind and prepare in time to stop the Hitlers of tomorrow by superior force before they can do major damage.

We must realize the fact that, after all, the human world is a world of conflicting powers; that some but not all of these conflicts can be solved by justice. And that every unsolved conflict represents a potential war.

The postwar period will have to face an incomparable era of history with incomparable means. It will have to draw the consequences of aviation and put this gigantic invention into the service of peace. Thus will it combine a peaceful world organization with a powerful force, *de jure* equality with *de facto* leadership. For the first time in history will a working Commonwealth of the World be organized, protected by a peaceful nation commanding the skies.

This double method of establishing a Commonwealth of the World and of insuring it by America's superior air power can lead to a long period of peace and prosperity throughout the globe.

But the inauguration of such a glorious century of peace demands from us abandonment of old conceptions of peace. The new Angel

of Peace must no longer be pictured as a charming but helpless lady with an olive branch in her hand, but like the Goddess of Justice with a balance in her left and a sword in her right; or like the Archangel Michael, with a fiery sword and wings of steel, fighting the devil to restore and protect the peace of Heaven.

A WORLD FEDERATION, based not on power but on free consent, is impossible as long as the human race does not recognize common moral standards. That is the reason why our world faces the alternative of international anarchy or of a stable peace backed by power.

When Wilson attempted to establish his world-embracing League of Nations, without regional or continental limits, humanity seemed closer than ever to moral and cultural unity.

After the triumph of Western democracy in Japan and China, Germany and Austro-Hungary, it seemed in 1918 as if Western civilization had embraced the whole world. India and the Near East seemed to accept voluntarily the principles of the West, that inspired the greatest alliance of all times. The only part of the world that was, at that moment, proclaiming anti-democratic principles, was the Soviet Union. But most people were convinced that Bolshevism would only be a short episode, either evolving toward a democratic regime or being overthrown by it. The day seemed imminent when all parts of the world would accept voluntarily the moral, political, economic, and social standards of Britain and America, thus constituting a powerful and democratic League of Nations against war and tyranny.

This dream of a peaceful, civilized, and democratic world met the tragic fate of the Tower of Babel, constructed to defy a second great flood. Instead of moving toward a united world, since 1918 humanity has been moving steadily toward disunion.

Not only did Bolshevism consolidate its anti-democratic structure and break definitely with the ideals of Western civilization; Japan too broke its moral union with the West by attempting to dominate the world of Chinese civilization and to alienate it from the West. Meanwhile Gandhi was preaching cultural nationalism in India, attempting to dissociate his country from Western principles of life, while in the Near East Arabia's King Ibn Saud built up his kingdom on the old teachings of Mohammed.

But more important than all these movements is the gigantic revolution that started in the very heart of Europe against all principles of Western civilization: the rise of nazism.

As a consequence of all these movements and evolutions Western civilization has been reduced in force and power. No common moral, political, social, and economic standards are respected throughout the world, no international law, no common traditions or values. What is considered good in one region of the world is condemned as bad in another. Written and unwritten laws differ essentially in America, Germany, Russia, Japan. Even after Hitler's defeat and the re-establishment of Western civilization throughout Europe, mankind will never, within our lifetime, reach the degree of moral unification it had achieved in 1918, when the opportunity of building up a new and democratic world order was so unwisely missed. For Russia will probably carry on its communistic and totalitarian principles of life, while India, the Near East, and the Far East may try to combine Western technology with their own cultural and moral traditions, liberating themselves definitely from the influence of an imported civilization.

To assure lasting peace and world collaboration, the West will have to renounce all attempts to force its moral and political standards on these Asiatic branches of mankind. It will have to face the tragic fact that its dream of a single world-embracing civilization, based on common ideals and principles, has passed away. Only by respecting the Eastern forms of civilization in a spirit of wide tolerance can a loose world organization be established, but without the ambition to be transformed into a world federation, as long as the plurality of civilizations prevails.

This tolerance has its distinct limits. The West must be aware that no European peace and prosperity are conceivable if nazism spreads within Europe or if Europe should remain divided between nazism and Western civilization. Europe must fight its war for unity to the end, just as the United States had to fight its Civil War to the end rather than see the Union disrupted. Moreover, America can never tolerate a Nazi Europe that would make peace and collaboration across the Atlantic impossible. It can never tolerate that Western civilization should remain limited to the Western Hemisphere, because the American continent would have to face the eventual hostility of a united Old World, if Europe were to break off from the Atlantic civilization.

One of the issues of the war is whether Europe will join Asia or

America—whether Europe will accept the Eastern doctrine of totalitarianism or uphold the Western gospel of liberty. Whether Europe and America will stand together in the coming world, linked by the Anglo-Canadian bridge of the British commonwealth, by common ideals and by a common civilization—or whether Europe will be absorbed by a different civilization, different values, and different moral standards.

This aspect of the war can be interpreted as the defense of Western civilization against the onslaught of Nazi barbarism. But we must be aware that this struggle between nazism and civilization is not a mere political and military issue, but one of the greatest moral and educational problems of our age.

Within the larger frame of humanity, America, Europe, and the British commonwealth constitute, beyond all political and economic divisions, a single family of nations and a single branch of mankind. These three regions are united by a common civilization, common ideals, common values, common standards of honor, common unwritten laws, common history, and a common destiny.

Europeans and North Americans, South Americans, and South Africans, Australians, and New Zealanders should never forget that they are children of the same blood and that their common ancestors have been living together for thousands of years on the old soil of Europe, their common cradle.

Including Europe, the Atlantic world of Western civilization embraces one-third of the human race, spread over two-thirds of the globe, over Europe and America, Africa and Australia. United they are stronger than all the other branches of humanity together. Only if this Atlantic family of nations should split through internal strife would the era of Western civilization drown in an ocean of blood and open a period of anarchy and of barbarism comparable to the dark centuries following the downfall of the Roman Empire.

Therefore the sentimental union between all children of this Atlantic civilization ought to become so strong that any war between them would be as inconceivable as is now a war between British dominions or between Britain and the United States of America.

This Atlantic union could be strongly promoted if the future European federation would decide to choose English as its international auxiliary language—thus transforming English into the common idiom of the Atlantic world.

This Atlantic community, based on a growing collaboration between England and Pan-Europe and between Canada and Pan-America,

would transform the Atlantic Ocean into the Mediterranean of our days—into a bridge rather than into a ditch between the two sister continents, America and Europe.

This cultural union and solidarity of the Atlantic world, based on common ideals and on common interests, would form the nucleus for the growth of a genuine human brotherhood, attracting all other nations and regions of the world, till one day the idea of human solidarity would not only assert itself in common institutions, but also in the hearts of all human beings throughout the globe.

Atlantic civilization has its origins in ancient Greece, when this great nation discovered, twenty-five hundred years ago, the principle of individual liberty and defended it against the superior forces of Persian aggression. But this Greek civilization of liberty became the foundation of European religion only after it merged with the Gospel of Christ, preaching the brotherhood of man and the equality of all human beings in the face of God, their common Father.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire the principles of Western civilization were again transformed. To survive in a cruel and fighting age, Christianity had to combine its ideals of liberty and of charity with the fighting instincts of paganism. This new ideal, chivalry, was very different from passive martyrdom and from contemplative sanctity.

Chivalry saved Western civilization during the onslaught of Arabs and Vikings. For it faced the basic laws of a fighting world, but ennobled them by a Christian spirit of fairness, of self-sacrifice, of self-control and of generosity. Thus chivalry became the code of free and fighting warriors throughout the Dark Ages, inspired by a morale of heroes and not of saints.

Chivalry accepts the fact that we are living in a hard and ruthless world—that whoever wants to survive must be ready to fight. That the world is deaf to the weak and open to the strong. That right never can replace might, but only complete it. That we cannot abolish fighting, but that we can ennoble and bless it by respecting the rules of fairness, even if they are against our interest. That the tragedy of life can be overcome by courage, if rules of chivalry replace the barbaric way of fighting without rules, without fairness, and without respect for unwritten but sacred laws.

After the Dark Ages had passed away, Britain renewed the ideal of chivalry by divorcing it from feudalism. Thus the modern and still eternal ideal of the gentleman was born, gentle and generous, free and

fair, kind and bold. Around this modern ideal, purified of class prejudice, a new type of Atlantic civilization can crystallize.

We must again recall the importance of heroic values in the crucial fight for our civilization and avoid the dangerous error of confounding chivalry with feudalism and heroism with militarism.

Our democratic age must never forget that heroism is not only essential for life but also for liberty. That all life ends if women lack heroism and cease to bear children—and that all liberty ends wherever men lack heroism and refuse to defend it. It was this neglect and contempt of heroic values on the part of many democratic leaders that threw thousands of young and vigorous Europeans into the arms of fascism. And only if democracy renews its heroic traditions of revolutionary days can Western civilization prevail.

For nazism is the greatest revolution of all times against Western civilization and against its ideals of liberty, of charity, and of chivalry.

Nazism attempts to destroy the very roots of our civilization by poisoning the souls of youth with lies, blasphemy, and the propaganda of hate—by transforming all human beings from children of God into wheels of a state machine or into breeding beasts, by condemning poor men and women from their cradle to their grave to swallow lies and to drink hatred.

The love of God and of thy neighbor are replaced by the idols of totalitarianism, worshiping unscrupulous criminals as earthly gods. On their altars the highest values of civilization are being sacrificed, the ideals of truth and of justice, of liberty and of honor. Art and science are abused for political propaganda. Brutality is confounded with greatness, cruelty with courage, ruthlessness with boldness. Fairness is considered stupid, generosity decadent. Might is set over right, slyness over wisdom, violence over justice. Gangsters and murderers are hailed as great men, while saints and heroes and poets and philosophers are being tortured in concentration camps or are starving forgotten in their homes.

This revolution of hate against love, of cruelty against charity, of totalitarianism against liberty, of blasphemy against religion, characterizes the moral aspect of the present world crisis. To check this revolution of immorality we must unite, on both sides of the Atlantic, all strong and living forces of our common civilization.

The moral offensive against the destructive forces of Hitlerism must inaugurate a complete rebirth of our glorious Atlantic civilization and of its eternal values.

The young generation of the West will welcome an education based on heroic values, because every boy with sane instincts admires chivalry and can be induced to transform his admiration into imitation. And every sane girl dreams of one day being loved and married by a chivalrous man. The idea of modern chivalry is divorced from the outmoded conceptions of feudalism, wherein it originated; today nobility is not a question of blood, but of character.

Inspired by this old ideal in its modern forms, the young generation will learn to respect unwritten laws and to practice good manners and decency; it will learn courtesy toward women, respect toward the aged, gratitude toward parents and teachers, loyalty toward friends and comrades, fairness toward enemies, kindness toward those who are weak, and generosity toward those who are helpless. In short, chivalry toward women, toward friends and enemies.

Such a generation of boys and girls will be able to distinguish real greatness and to admire the authentic genius, saint, and hero, instead of confounding greatness with success, with fame, or with power. Its strong minds and passionate souls will be inspired by the eternal gospel of idealism, the foundation of Western civilization, which teaches:

That our body is but a shadow of our soul;

That all matter is but an aspect of spiritual forces;

That man shall not strive toward happiness but toward perfection;

That life is not the supreme good nor death the greatest evil;

That it is nobler to die as a hero than to live as a coward;

That neither politics, nor economy, neither power nor wealth, are values by themselves, but only functions of moral values.

In this struggle against the revolt of nazism, Europe has had the good fortune to find, among its political leaders, an inspiring example of modern chivalry.

Winston Churchill has not only saved our civilization in its darkest hour against the onslaught of barbarism, but he has also inspired his great nation with his personal example of courage and fairness. A new spirit lives in his speeches, that do not speak of wealth and happiness but of blood, sweat, and tears; that, again and again, appeal to duty and courage, to honor and sacrifice—to the noblest instincts of the human race.

This new spirit of chivalry has inspired and transformed his nation and give it the force to hold out alone, during the most tragic year of its history, against the superior forces Hitler had mobilized to bring it to its knees.

This unyielding spirit of Churchill's England is spreading throughout the world, as a challenge to the unchivalrous spirit of nazism and to the cowardly spirit of those who failed to check its rise to power.

It is no mere chance but destiny, that Hitler, symbol of unfair and ungenerous fighting, is being defeated by Churchill, symbol of eternal chivalry. In this gigantic duel between Churchill, the great gentleman, and Hitler, the great gangster, St. George again overpowers the dragon.

This modern and still eternal symbol demonstrates the great truth that life is a contest of valor and that moral issues finally determine the fate of nations and of civilizations, their rise and their fall, peace and war, liberty and slavery.

And, in the gigantic struggle of creeds and races and civilizations, it recalls the grand watchword of Roman greatness and of Roman peace, that in a dark and decisive hour of history should inspire our generation in its crusade for the future:

If the world falls broken asunder
Its ruins will carry the brave.*

* *Fractus si illabatur mundus
impavidum ferient ruinae.*

Horatius.

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