

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN HISTORY

VOLUME 1
A-G



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Kevin Shillington, Editor

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INTRODUCTION

African history as a modern academic discipline came of age in the 1950s, the decade of African nationalism that saw the parallel emergence of African institutions of higher education on the continent. The true origins of African higher education can be traced back many centuries to the Islamic universities of North Africa, Timbuktu, and Cairo, while the origins of recorded history itself are to be found in the scrolls of ancient Egypt, probably the oldest recorded history in the world. Beyond the reaches of the Roman Empire in North Africa, the tradition of keeping written records of events, ideas, and dynasties was followed, almost continuously, by the priests and scholars of ancient, medieval, and modern Ethiopia. Meanwhile, preliterate African societies recorded their histories in the oral memories and ancestral traditions that were faithfully handed down from generation to generation. Sometimes these were adapted to suit the political imperatives of current ruling elites, but as the modern academic historian knows only too well, the written record is similarly vulnerable to the interpretation of the recorder.

Before the European incursion at the end of the nineteenth century, literate Africans in western and southern Africa had appreciated the importance of recording oral traditions and writing the history of their own people. Following the colonial intrusion, however, Europeans took over the writing of African history, and interpreted it primarily as a timeless backdrop to their own appearance on the scene. They brought with them not only the social Darwinism of the imperial project, but also the perspective of their own historical traditions. Thus, early colonial historians saw an Africa of warring “tribes” peopled by waves of migration, such as Roman imperialists had seen and conquered in Western Europe some 2000 years earlier. To these historians, African peoples had no history of significance and were distinguished only by a variety of custom and tradition. Any contrary evidence of indigenous sophistication and development was interpreted as the work of outside (by implication, northern Eurasian) immigration or influence. The origins of Great Zimbabwe (a Shona kingdom founded between 1100 and 1450), originally believed by European colonial historians to be non-African despite much evidence to the contrary, proved to be the most notorious and persistent of these myths. Despite early academic challenges, these European-constructed myths about Africa’s past exerted a dominant influence on approaches to African history until well into the second half of the twentieth century.

Encouraged and supported by a handful of European and North American academics, pioneering Africans seized the opportunities offered by the newly open academic world that emerged after World War II. So began the mature study of African history, which established the subject as a modern, respected, academic discipline. The fruits of this discipline were summarized in two major collective works, written and published primarily in the 1970s and 1980s, the *Cambridge History of Africa* (8 volumes, 1975–1986) and the *UNESCO General History of Africa* (8 volumes, 1981–1993).

The present *Encyclopedia of African History* builds upon this tradition, and in doing so provides a new reference resource on the history of the African continent and an up-to-date survey of the current state of scholarship at the turn of the new millennium. Unlike other reference works that do not treat North Africa together with Sub-Saharan Africa, the coverage of this encyclopedia is that of the whole continent, from Morocco, Libya, and Egypt in the north to the Cape of Good Hope in the south, and includes the surrounding islands, from Cape Verde in the west to Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles in the east. Covering the history of the continent as a diverse whole—with complementary and competing cultural forces from north to south and east to west—reflects the direction toward which contemporary scholarship of African history has moved in recent years. It is an indispensable feature of this work that students can find African history presented with a view to the continent in its entirety.

The historical periods covered are also unique for a reference work. This encyclopedia does not chop African history into discrete and seemingly unrelated periods. To allow students to find the interlinking histories of continuity and change, the periods included in this encyclopedia range from the earliest evolution of human beings on the continent to the new millennium. Approximately one-third of the encyclopedia covers the history of Africa to the end of the eighteenth century, a fascinating period of rich cultural achievements and profound historical developments that occur in the time before the Roman Empire through the European Middle Ages and beyond. Students can find information about the emergence of foraging and food-producing societies, the flowering of the great Egyptian civilization, and the development of other, less obviously dramatic, civilizations in the savannas and forests in all regions of Africa. Attention is paid both to indigenous developments and to the impact of outside influences and intrusions, including the spread of Islam and the slave trade in all its forms, to provide students with the dynamic cultural context of the continent within the many forces shaping human history. Most of the remaining two-thirds of this encyclopedia details the history of each region from the precolonial nineteenth century, through the twentieth-century colonial period that defined the modern states, and takes the user into the postcolonial contemporary period, and the dawn of the new millennium.

How to Use this Book

The *Encyclopedia of African History* is organized into a series of free-standing essays, most of them approximately 1,000 words in length. They range from factual narrative entries to thematic and analytical discussions, and combinations of all these. There are, in addition, a number of longer essays of about 3,000–5,000 words, which analyze broader topics: regional general surveys, historiographical essays, and wide historical themes, such as the African Diaspora, African Political Systems, and Africa in World History. The encyclopedia takes a broadly African viewpoint of the history of the continent, where this is appropriate, and as far as possible provides the reader with a reliable, up-to-date view of the current state of scholarship on the full range of African history. Where debates and controversies occur, these are indicated and discussed. As far as possible, this book takes the history of Africa up to the present, at least to the opening years of the twenty-first century. Thus topics such as Nigeria's Fourth Republic or the civil war and demise of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia are put into their historical context, as are themes such as the disease pandemics of malaria and HIV/AIDS.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the encyclopedia is the easily accessible A-to-Z format. The titles of the essays are organized for easy reference into composite articles on the major regions, states, themes, societies, and individuals of African history. Within these multiple-entry composites, the essays are organized in a broadly chronological order: thus Egypt under the Ottomans precedes Egypt under Muhammad Ali. Cross-referencing in the form of *See also*'s at the end of most entries refers the reader to other related essays. Blind entries direct readers to essays listed under another title; for

example, the blind entry “Gold Coast” refers the reader to the entry on Ghana’s colonial period. In addition, a full index is provided for reference to those items and individuals that are mentioned within essays but do not appear as head words in their own right. A list for Further Reading at the end of each entry refers the reader to some of the most recent work on the subject.

Other special features include 100 specially commissioned maps, one for each of the 55 modern states, and a further 45 specially designed historical maps, indicating such important features as the Languages of Africa, the New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt, the Songhay Empire, and the Peoples of the East African Savanna in the Eighteenth Century. I researched widely in other people’s work for the material for these historical maps, in particular Ajayi and Crowder’s *Historical Atlas of Africa* (1985), the various works of the late David Beach for the Zimbabwe Plateau of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, and the work of Jan Vansina for the peoples of the Congolese forest of Equatorial Africa by the early nineteenth century. I should like to take this opportunity to thank Catherine Lawrence for drawing the maps and for her patience with my not-infrequent editorial interventions. Any errors of interpretation, however, particularly in the historical maps, must remain mine alone. In addition, 103 illustrations are dispersed throughout, many of them not previously published in a work of this nature.

The encyclopedia consists of nearly 1,100 entries. The original list of entry topics was devised by the editor with the advice of a panel of 30 advisers, all of them established specialists in a particular field of African history, and some with decades of experience, not only in the teaching, researching, and writing of African history, but also in the editing and publication of large collaborative volumes. The final decision on the selection or omission of topics remained, however, my own.

A total of 330 authors have contributed the entries to this encyclopedia, and approximately 130 of them are African. About half of the latter are currently working in African universities, and the remainder overseas, mostly in North American universities, but also in Europe, India, and Australia. A number of entries from Francophone West Africa, Madagascar, France, and Belgium have been translated from their original French.

Acknowledgments

This encyclopedia has taken considerably longer than originally planned, both to write and prepare for publication. Anybody who has worked on collaborative projects, even on a small scale, knows only too well how delays quickly get built into the system. I am grateful for the patience of advisers and contributors, many of whom have inevitably been asked to add last-minute updating to their entries. I am particularly grateful for the help, guidance, and encouragement I received from our team of eminent advisers in the early stages. In addition, the commitment to the project by the large number of contributors was always an inspiration to me, and the whole project is greatly indebted to that handful of contributors who responded so willingly to appeals for yet more work to be produced on short notice. My thanks to Kristen Holt and her team at Routledge Reference, New York, who took up the project at a late stage, trusted my judgment, and completed the work expeditiously. Special acknowledgment, however, is due to the originator of the concept, Mark Hawkins-Dady of Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, who first proposed the project to me, and then, through several years of inspiring and industrious work, saw it through, almost to its final stages. Without him, this book would not have happened. Finally, I dedicate this book to Pippa, my wife, always an inspiration in my work.

Kevin Shillington
Editor

A

‘Abd Allah ibn Yasin: Almoravid: Sahara

Most accounts of the origins of the Almoravids indicate that ibn Yasin (d.1059) was dispatched as a religious instructor to the western Sahara by his master, Wajjaj b. Zallu, at the request of the Sanhaja leader Yahya ibn Ibrahim. The Sanhaja tribes of the region had only been recently Islamicized, and their knowledge of Muslim dogma and rituals was limited. Ibn Yasin was entrusted with the mission of spreading the Islamic creed and helping wipe out unorthodox religious practices among the Berbers of the western Sahara.

The brand of Islam preached by ibn Yasin was based on a strict application of Qur’anic injunctions and a literal interpretation of the sacred text. Among the first measures he adopted after settling among the Sanhaja were the imposition of Islamic law (*Shari’a*) in all spheres of life, the introduction of a public treasury, and the levying of the tithes (*‘ushr*). He also adopted Malikism as the officially-endorsed legal practice. Ibn Yasin adhered to a rigorous spiritual code dominated by asceticism and self-discipline and demanded absolute obedience from his followers, the growing religious community later known as the Almoravids.

The term *Almoravid*, a deformation of the Arabic *murabit*, has long been the subject of controversy among historians. The prevalent view is that it derives from *ribat*, a type of fortified convent, and referred to the religious compound where ibn Yasin allegedly sought refuge, together with his closest followers, after a disagreement with one of the Sanhaja chiefs. Some scholars, however, dispute this interpretation and claim that the term *murabit* does not refer to the legendary island retreat founded by ibn Yasin according to some sources. It would be connected, rather, with the Qur’anic root *rbi*, commonly translated as “wage holy war (jihad),” but also “perform good deeds.” Supporters of this version also point out that the term *Almoravid* is

clearly linked to the name given by Wajjaj b. Zallu, ibn Yasin’s mentor, to the residents of the ascetic lodge set up by the former in the Sus region: the so-called *dar al-murabitin*.

The reform movement inspired by the teachings of ibn Yasin spread rapidly due to the support of Sanhaja chiefs. The three main branches of the Sanhaja, namely the Massufa, Lamtuna, and Guddala, had just been united into a loose confederation under the command of Yahya b. Ibrahim. Mostly nomads, they made a precarious living by engaging in pastoralism and often supplemented their income by charging protection dues to the caravans that circulated along the Saharan trade routes. Natural adversity, in the form of a prolonged drought in Mauritania, and the new religious ardor instilled into them by ibn Yasin’s reformist message, prompted the Sanhaja to seek alternative sources of income that ultimately entailed wresting control of trans-Saharan commerce from their immediate competitors.

Before the advent of the Almoravids in the first half of the eleventh century, the Sanhaja had only played an ancillary role in the trade links between southern Morocco and Ghana and the western Sudan. They had been passive witnesses of the intense commercial exchanges taking place through their territory without gaining any profit from them. Control of the trade routes was in the hands of the Soninke state in Ghana, in the south, and of Zanata Berbers—a rival tribal group—in the north. The first Almoravid campaigns were aimed, therefore, at occupying the main commercial centers. Sijilmasa, the northern terminus of the caravan trade and ruled by the Maghrawa, a Zanata clan, since 970, was seized by ibn Yasin in 1053, apparently with the acquiescence of the local population. The following year, the Almoravids conquered Awdaghust, an important commercial center, especially in salt

coming from Ghana, and virtually the other end of the Saharan trade.

Once control of the commercial routes had been consolidated, the Almoravids turned their attention to other areas of southern Morocco with obvious economic appeal: the pastures of the Draa and the Sus valleys. This period of quick military expansion was marred, however, by infighting within the Almoravid ruling elite. During Yahya b. Ibrahim's lifetime, the Almoravid polity had a de facto dual leadership: Yahya exercised political power and oversaw military campaigns while ibn Yasin had authority over religious and legal matters. After the death of his royal protector, ibn Yasin fell in disgrace and went into exile, probably around 1052–1053. He soon gained favor, however, among the new Almoravid leadership, this time dominated by the Lamtuna chiefs Yahya b. 'Umar and his brother Abu Bakr.

Yahya b. 'Umar died in 1056 trying to quell the rebellion of the Guddala, one of the original components of the great Sanhaja confederation who resented the new status quo. Although not entirely subdued, a *modus vivendi* was agreed upon whereby, although nominally autonomous, the Guddala agreed to end their resistance and participate in further expeditions. Once order in the royal household was restored, military activity soon resumed. Abu Bakr b. 'Umar seized the Draa Valley and, after arduous negotiations, ibn Yasin managed to secure the submission of the Masmuda of the High Atlas and the Sus in 1058. After the initial resistance of local people, the town of Aghmat Warika was also occupied and the allegiance of recalcitrant notables secured through the marriage of Abu Bakr, the Almoravid *amir*, and Zaynab, the widow (or daughter, according to some sources) of one of its chiefs. Unhindered access to the plains of the Tansift valley was now possible. The Almoravids' northward expansion was two-pronged: on the one hand, through the central plateau where the future capital, Marrakesh, was to be erected and, on the other, along the Atlantic coast. The region of Tamesna, dominated by a heretical sect known as the Barghawata, resisted Almoravid penetration fiercely. In fact, their first incursions in the area were successfully repelled, and ibn Yasin died in one of them in 1059.

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ-MANAS

See also: Yusuf ibn Tashfin: Almoravid Empire: Maghrib: 1070–1147.

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
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'Abd al-Mu'min: Almohad Empire, 1140–1269

The circumstances surrounding 'Abd al-Mu'min's accession to power after the death of ibn Tumart, founder of the Almohad movement, are still unknown. 'Abd al-Mu'min did not belong to one of the so-called Almohad tribes (the first to embrace the Mahdi's doctrine), and furthermore, other members of ibn Tumart's "entourage" occupied a higher rank and could have claimed rights of succession. It seems, however, that the fact that he was a relative outsider was an asset rather than a liability, and he was viewed as a compromise candidate among Masmuda chiefs. The support of Abu Hafs 'Umar al-Hintati, one of the Mahdi's closest confidants, seems to have been crucial in ensuring that his rise to power progressed smoothly. But loyalty toward the new leader was lukewarm at this early stage, and 'Abd al-Mu'min had to prove both his political acumen and military skill.

His first military campaigns were aimed at occupying the mountain ranges and encircling the Almoravid capital, avoiding direct clashes on the plains, where the Sanhaja cavalry was proving unbeatable. Control of the Anti- and High Atlas left the regions of Sus and the Draa valley clearly exposed; their populations did not fail to observe the potential danger and recognized Almohad authority. Further north, the conquest of the Middle Atlas and the Tafilalt in 1140–1141 led to the occupation of the Rif, the Taza region, and the Mediterranean littoral. 'Abd al-Mu'min's military ambitions were not confined to the western Maghrib; he wished to unify all the lands of North Africa between Tunisia and southern Morocco under a single command.

The first serious confrontation with the Almoravid army took place near Tlemcen in 1145, and resulted in the defeat of the ruling dynasty and the death of its *amir*, Tashfin b. 'Ali. This event signaled the inexorable decline of the Almoravids. In less than two years the main cities of Morocco—Fez, Meknes, and Sale—were taken. Marrakesh fell in 1147, after a prolonged siege. Once control of Morocco had been achieved, 'Abd al-Mu'min turned his attention to



Almohads, c. 1140–1269.

Tunisia (known in Arabic sources as Ifriqiya). The Norman kingdom of Sicily did not conceal its territorial ambitions in the area, and the Almohad caliph saw this campaign as a kind of jihad. The Qal'a, the capital of the Hammadi kingdom, was captured in 1152. The Arab tribes that had assisted the local Sanhaja Berbers were pushed back toward the region of Setif in 1153. The eastern campaign had to be interrupted, however, because various outbreaks of dissent in Morocco required the attention of the caliph. It was resumed in 1159. The last remnants of the Zirid kingdom were suppressed and the Normans, then occupying Mahdiyya and other coastal enclaves, were repelled.

The creation of a North African empire was the paramount objective of 'Abd al-Mu'min's foreign policy. This goal was hindered, however, by the impossibility of concentrating military efforts on this campaign. Instability in Morocco as a result of sporadic rebellions, mostly instigated by the Almohad hierarchy, and the perennial issue of the war in Muslim Spain meant that imperial troops had to fight on several fronts at the same time. Domestic policy was not exempt from difficulties, either. The caliph's attempts to turn the empire into a hereditary monarchy proved successful, but he was forced to make important concessions to the Almohad chiefs. 'Abd al-Mu'min's successors (*sayyids*) served as provincial governors, but their decisions were closely monitored by advisers selected from among the Almohad shaykhs.

'Abd al-Mu'min's heir, Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (1163–1184), spent most of his reign fighting disgruntled opponents. In fact, he was unable to take the caliphal title until 1168, after two years of trying to quell the rebellion of the Ghumara in the Rif mountains. His campaigns in Spain had more immediate results and culminated in the defeat of ibn Mardanish, the last of the pro-Almoravid rebels, in 1165.

The reign of Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (1184–1199) was equally turbulent. As soon as he became caliph, one of the longest anti-Almohad rebellions broke out in the eastern fringes of the empire. Its leaders belonged to a family of former Almoravid officials, the Banu Ghaniyya, who had settled in Tunisia after being expelled from the Balearic Islands, where they had served as governors. The unrest increased even further as a result of attempts, on the part of local Sanhaja, to revive the Hammadid kingdom in eastern Algeria. The seizure of Bougie in 1184 put an end to Sanhaja ambitions. The Banu Ghaniyya insurrection was more difficult to check for two reasons: a) long distances forced the Almohads to rely on the navy and, although they could take coastal towns quite easily, they could not pursue their punitive strikes further inland, precisely where the rebels sought refuge, and b) the Banu Ghaniyya managed to obtain the support of the Arab tribes of the region, such as the Judham and Riyah, thus notably increasing their military capability. The defeat of 'Ali ibn Ghaniyya near Gafsa in 1187 was a severe blow to the rebels, but it did not seal their fate. His descendants managed to regroup their troops and establish a new base in the central Maghrib. They even occupied the town of Sijilmasa during the reign of Muhammad al-Nasir (1199–1214) but were finally crushed in the Libyan region of Jabal Nafusa in 1209–1210. Reprisals against the Arab tribes of Ifriqiya had important repercussions, especially in the demographic make-up of North Africa. They were "evicted" and resettled in the region of Tamesna, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. This measure was not only momentous demographically, but also politically. From then onward, Almohad caliphs partly recruited their armies from these Arab contingents, to counterbalance the weight of Berber tribes, notorious for their volatility.

Defeat by the Christians in the battle of Navas de Tolosa (Spain) in 1212 was the first sign of the process of imperial fragmentation. Military weakness, infighting within the ruling elite, and the abandonment of the Almohad doctrine by al-Ma'mun (1227–1232) marked the first half of the thirteenth century, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the empire into three political entities, roughly equivalent to present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ-MANAS

See also: **Ibn Tumart, Almohad Community and.**

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'Abd al-Qadir (1832–1847)

Amir of Mascara

'Abd al-Qadir, who led a mid-nineteenth century revolt against France, is considered by modern-day Algerians as the greatest hero in their country's struggle for liberation. Early in life, 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Muhyi al-Din quickly acquired a reputation for piety, good manners, and intelligence. His father, Muhyi al-Din ibn Mustafa al-Hasani al-Jaza'iri, was a local religious leader, the head of a Sufi brotherhood, and director of a local religious school, or *zawiyah*. In 1830, when 'Abd al-Qadir was twenty-two years old, French forces invaded Algeria on the pretext of avenging the dishonor suffered by the French consul when the *dey* struck him in the face with a fly whisk during a disagreement about France's debt to Algeria (though in fact, the French invasion had much more to do with diverting the attention of the French from the domestic problems caused by their own inept kings). Then nominally controlled by the Ottoman Empire (in the person of the *dey*, or governor), Algeria was already deeply divided between those supporting the *dey* (mainly the Turkish Janissaries, responsible for choosing the *dey* and keeping him in power, a group of local elites of mixed Turkish and Algerian descent known as the Koulouglis, and a number of tribal elites), and the mass of Algerians, who opposed the government of the *dey* and who had begun launching a series of minor revolts in the early nineteenth century.

These divisions resulted in a government incapable of combating the French invasion; instead, opposition was organized by religious brotherhoods like that led by Muhyi al-Din. However, Muhyi al-Din was not a young man, and in 1832, one year after French forces occupied the port city of Oran, he engineered the election of his son, 'Abd al-Qadir, to take his place as head of the brotherhood (and hence, of the opposition). In this position, 'Abd al-Qadir took responsibility for organizing opposition to the French in Oran and in nearby Mostaganem, calling for a jihad (holy war) against the invaders. He also took the title of *amir al-mu'manin* (commander of the faithful), a title symbolic of the role religion played in his military exploits. An effective military leader, his campaigns forced the French to sign the Treaty of Desmichels in 1834. This treaty gave the young leader control of the area around Oran. Three years later, in the Treaty of Tafna, 'Abd al-Qadir scored another success. Since the signing of the previous treaty, the *amir* had managed to expand the

amount of territory under his control (including occupying the towns of Médéa and Miliana, located south and southwest of Algiers, respectively), had defeated the French forces under the command of General Camille Trézel at Macta, and had further mobilized Algerian support of his movement. The 1837 treaty gave 'Abd al-Qadir further control of areas near Oran and control of the Titteri region.

After 1837, the *amir* spent two years consolidating his new state. Governing at times from Mascara and at times from the fortress of Tiaret, 'Abd al-Qadir established a model administration in which equal taxation and legal equality, fixed salaries for officials, and the absence of tribal privilege were prominent features. He expanded educational opportunities for his people, which helped spread ideas of nationalism and independence. Although he functioned as an absolutist leader, 'Abd al-Qadir was willing to employ anyone he deemed qualified, including foreigners and religious minorities. With the occasional help of such advisers, the *amir* organized a permanent regular army of approximately 2,000 men; when the need arose it could be supplemented by tribal recruits and volunteers. His military was supported by fortified towns such as Boghar, Taza, Tiaret, Sebdo, and Saga located in the interior, where they were safe from attacks launched from French-controlled territory near the coast.

The *amir* also continued in his quest to gain more territory for his new state. He began occupying all areas in the interior not already occupied by the French military, expanding eastward to the border of the territory governed by the *bey* of Constantine, taking revenge against the Koulouglis in Zouatna who supported the French, and pushing to the south, where he successfully challenged the authority of al-Tijini, the leader of the southern oases, destroying his capital and winning the allegiance of the Saharan tribes. In the span of about one year, 'Abd al-Qadir had asserted his control over a sizeable portion of Algeria: across the mountainous Kabylie region in the north and from the Biskra oasis to the border of Morocco in the south.

Conditions changed in 1841, however, when a new governor-general arrived from Paris. General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud was no stranger to Algeria nor to 'Abd al-Qadir, having defeated the *amir* five years earlier in a battle at Sikkah; he had spent the interim developing ideas for more effective techniques of irregular warfare which he anticipated using against the Algerian opposition upon his return. Bugeaud's arrival in Algeria in 1841 signaled a change in French policy toward *occupation totale*. No longer was it sufficient for French forces to hold the coastal regions of Algeria, now they were to take the interior as well. This new policy clearly meant that 'Abd al-Qadir's budding state must be crushed. In 1841, the *amir's* fortified towns were

destroyed, and the *amir* himself was left without a home base from which to counteract the French attacks. Bugeaud's armies set about conquering the interior, systematically taking district after district and establishing army posts and regular mounted patrols in areas they occupied. This systematic conquest carried a high price for the Algerian population, as French military action became increasingly brutal. Villages and homes were burned, crops destroyed, and all types of civilians killed during the conquest of the interior.

Seeking refuge briefly with the sultan of Morocco after 1842 (who helped channel British arms to the *amir* for use against the French), ‘Abd al-Qadir quickly returned to Algeria and launched a new campaign against French forces in the interior. However, the *amir* lost the support of Morocco two years later, when the sultan's forces were drawn into the conflict and soundly defeated by Bugeaud at the battle of Isly in 1844 (Bugeaud earning the title *Duc d'Isly* in consequence). The withdrawal of Moroccan support (accompanied by orders from the sultan that the *amir* be imprisoned if caught trying to enter Morocco) seriously damaged ‘Abd al-Qadir's campaigns. The *amir*'s power base had all but eroded; though supported in spirit by many Algerians, he had neither territory nor weapons to effectively challenge the French, and in 1847, was forced to surrender to the French armies under the command of General Christophe-Louis-Leon Lamorcière. After his surrender, the *amir* was sentenced to exile in Damascus, where he died in 1883.

Though his movement was defeated by the French, and though France's policy of total colonization in Algeria had by 1870 essentially eradicated all vestiges of a separate Algerian national identity, the *Amir* ‘Abd al-Qadir remains a national hero. The short-lived state he established in the mid-nineteenth century, with its ideals of equality, piety, and independence, was idealized in the popular imagination and served as a rallying cry for the long and difficult process of Algerian liberation in the mid-twentieth century.

AMY J. JOHNSON

See also: **Algeria: Conquest and Resistance, 1831–1879; Algeria: Government and Administration, 1830–1914.**

Biography

‘Abd al-Qadir was born in 1808 near the city of Mascara in northwestern Algeria. In 1832, his father Muhyi al-Din ibn Mustafa al-Hasani al-Jaza'iri, the head of a Sufi brotherhood, engineered the election of his son to take his place as head of the brotherhood. Al-Qadir led military campaigns in France, resulting in treaties in

1834 and 1837, in which he was ceded territory. In 1841, al-Qadir's towns were destroyed, in renewed attacks from the French. He sought refuge in Morocco after 1842, returned to Algeria, and launched a new campaign against French forces in the interior. He was defeated at the battle of Isly in 1844, and forced to surrender to the French in 1847. Al-Qadir was sentenced to exile in Damascus, where he died in 1883.

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‘Abd el-Krim: See Morocco: Resistance and Collaboration, Bu Hmara to Abdelkrim (Ibn ‘Abd el-Krim).

Abdile Hassan: See Somalia: Hassan, Muhammad Abdile and Resistance to Colonial Conquest.

Abdlekrim: See Morocco: Resistance and Collaboration, Bu Hmara to Abdelkrim (Ibn ‘Abd el-Krim).

Abolition: See Slavery, Abolition of: East and West Africa; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Abolition: Philanthropy or Economics?

‘Abouh, Muhammad
Egyptian Scholar and Reformer

Muhammad ‘Abouh (1849–1905) is regarded as the most important and influential proponent of Islamic modernism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

During the course of his student days at al-Azhar, ‘Abouh came into contact with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), a Persian who advocated a program of Muslim self-strengthening based on Muslim political unification and religious reform. He was particularly attracted to al-Afghani’s idea that Muslims had an obligation to foster those elements within the Islamic heritage, which encouraged an ethos of activism and progress in the socioeconomic and political realms. Encouraged by al-Afghani’s activist example, ‘Abouh joined the mounting protest that arose among sectors of the Egyptian population in reaction to the political autocracy of Egypt’s rulers and to Europe’s growing influence over Egypt’s financial affairs. Although mistrustful of radical solutions to Egypt’s political and economic problems, the tide of events eventually prompted him to support the measures of rebel army colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi, who early in 1882 succeeded in establishing a new government that was protective of Egypt’s national sovereignty.

‘Abouh, however, paid for his support of the ‘Urabi government. After Britain invaded Egypt in September 1882 in order to restore the khedive’s power and thereby secure its interests in the country, he was sentenced to exile. He traveled first to Beirut and in 1884 joined al-Afghani in Paris. In Paris the two founded and edited a journal called *al-’Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The Firm Bond; a reference to the Quran), which called upon Muslims worldwide to liberate themselves from European imperialism and the despotic governments under which many of them lived. The journal, which lasted only eight months, had a profound effect on many Muslim writers and activists of the era, including the Syrian Rashid Rida, who became ‘Abouh’s biographer and one of his most important disciples. In 1885 ‘Abouh returned to Beirut and took up a teaching post at the Sultaniyya school, where he delivered a series of lectures on theology that were published in 1897 as *Risalat al-Tawhid* (Discourses on Unity), one of the most influential theological works of Islamic modernism.

In 1888, six years after the commencement of Britain’s occupation of Egypt, the khedive Tawfiq granted ‘Abouh the right to return to his homeland and, in recognition of his talents, allowed him to enter into public service. ‘Abouh was initially appointed Qadi (judge) in the native tribunals, which tried cases involving Egyptians according to the new codes of positive law. In 1890 he was made counselor to the court of appeals and in 1892 was instrumental in establishing the Muslim Benevolent Society for the benefit of Egypt’s poor. In 1895 he was asked to set up a council for the reform of al-Azhar’s administration and curriculum, a project that was only partially successful due to the opposition he encountered from

that institution’s conservative scholars (*’ulama*). The apogee of ‘Abduh’s career came in 1899 when he was appointed mufti, which made him the authoritative interpreter of Islamic law (*Shari’a*) throughout Egypt.

‘Abouh’s elevation to positions of influence and authority within Egypt’s educational and legal institutions provided him with the opportunity to express more freely than had hitherto been possible his ideas concerning the reform of Islam. At issue for ‘Abouh were the implications of the rapid economic, social, and political change that had taken root in Egypt since the early decades of the nineteenth century. Although ‘Abouh recognized the importance of modernization to the advancement of Egypt and other Muslim countries, he also understood the necessity of linking the processes of change with the true principles of Islam. In ‘Abouh’s view, unless Muslims of the modern era made an accommodation with the novel circumstances of the modern age, Islam’s relevance, both at the level of individual faith and as a worldly force, would continue to diminish. ‘Abouh’s response to the threat of modernity was to go behind the established edifice of medieval theology and law to Islam’s first sources, the Quran and the prophetic *Sunna* (example), and to fashion from these an ethical understanding of Islam that advanced the common good (*maslaha*). ‘Abouh’s interpretive efforts were guided by a belief in the compatibility of reason and revelation: wherever there appeared to be a contradiction between the two, he used reason to interpret scripture. His method led him to identify certain Quranically-based concepts with modern institutions. Thus he equated *ijma’*, the principle of legal consensus, with public opinion, and *shura*, consultation with the elders, with modern forms of consultative government. While such identifications point to the apologetic nature of ‘Abouh’s reformism, ‘Abouh himself conceived his project as deriving from the pious example of the early generations of Muslims, *al-Salaf al-Salih*, whose faith and practice derived from the essential principles of the Quran and *Sunna* alone.

The chief organ of ‘Abouh’s views in his later years was the *Manar* Quranic commentary, which first appeared in 1897 and continued after his death under the editorship of Rashid Rida. Unlike traditional Quran exegeses, the *Manar* commentary was written in a style designed to be understood by ordinary people, and focused on practical matters of guidance rather than on grammatical usage and theological controversy, as had been the norm. During his lifetime, ‘Abouh influenced many Muslim scholars. In addition to Rashid Rida, these included the Algerian ‘Abd al-Hamid ibn Badis (1889–1940),

who met 'Abouh during the latter's visit to Algiers and Constantine in 1903, and the Moroccan scholar Shu'ayb al-Dukkali (1878–1937).

JOHN CALVERT

See also: Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood; Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements.

Biography

Born in the village of Mahallat Nasr in the Nile Delta, Muhammad 'Abouh received his early instruction at the Ahmadi mosque in Tanta and then attended Cairo's al-Azhar, the preeminent center of learning in the Sunni Muslim world, where he evinced an interest in mysticism. After concluding his studies in 1877 he embarked on a short-lived career as a teacher. He simultaneously held positions at al-Azhar, the Khedival School of Languages, and Dar al-'Ulum, the teachers' college that had been established a few years earlier to train "forward looking" Arabic language instructors for the emergent system of government schools. In 1879 'Abouh was forced to step down from his posts at Dar al-'Ulum and the language school by the khedive Tawfiq, who appears to have been wary of his ideas concerning religion and politics. However, due to the intervention of a liberal government ministry, he was allowed the following year to assume the editorship of the official government gazette *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya* (Egyptian Events). He was exiled in 1882, but allowed to return to Egypt in 1888. He died in 1905.

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Abu Madian, al-Shadhili, and the Spread of Sufism in the Maghrib

Mysticism manifested itself in Islam as Sufism, of which there were two schools, the one of Bestami, the other of Junaid. Whereas the pantheism of the former could not be harmonized with Islamic *tawhid* (the unity of God), the latter could. It was not until the twelfth century, however, that the Sufism of Junaid's

school, acceptable to Islamic orthodoxy, was institutionalized in a rite, the Qadiriyya *tariqa*, by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077–1166) of Baghdad. The harmonization embodied in the Qadiriyya *tariqa* was probably not without the influence also of Islam's greatest theologian, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d.1111), the "father of the church in Islam," in whom "orthodoxy, philosophy and mysticism found a happy combination," having "reconciled sufism, with its many unorthodox practices, with Islam, and grafted mysticism upon its intellectualism" (Hitti 1968a: 431, 436; Hitti 1968b: 163).

Islam Sufism penetrated the Maghrib in the late tenth or early eleventh century. One of its earliest exponents in the Maghrib was Abu Imran ibn 'Isa, an *alim* of Fez, who went to Baghdad at about the end of the tenth century and returned to Qairawan, where he taught Sufism of the Junaid's school. This was disseminated in Morocco in the twelfth century by, among others, Ali ibn Hirzihim and Abu Median, a scholar and a holy man (*wali*) of repute in Fez, but originally from Seville in Spain; he is credited with having introduced to Morocco the Qadiriyya *tariqa*, whose founder, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, he had met in Baghdad. An Idrisid sharif and pupil of these two teachers, 'Abd al-Salam ibn Mashish adopted Sufism in the twelfth century and became the second "pole" of western Islam; western Islam acknowledges 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani as its first "pole." (The "pole," namely *qutb*, the "pivot of the universe," is regarded as the greatest saint of his time, occupying the highest point in the mystic hierarchy). Maghribian Sufism did not become institutionalized in a rite until the thirteenth century, when another Idrisid sharif and pupil of 'Abd al-Salam ibn Mashish, 'Abd al-Salam al-Shadhili, founded the Shadhiliyya *tariqa*; he is the third "pole" of western Islam. The Shadhiliyya, like the Qadiriyya in the east, became the chief vehicle for the transmission of Junaid's school of Sufism in the west. The Shadhiliyya is also the first indigenous Sufi order in the Maghrib, the Qadiriyya being an import from the east.

The foregoing illustrates the seminal role of the Idrisids, the sharifian family of Fez, in the development and institutionalization of Sufism in the Maghrib. In the years of political obscurity following the demise of the Idrisid state in northern Morocco, the Idrisids seemed to have found a new vocation in the pursuit of mysticism and its propagation.

Before the sixteenth century, however, Sufism commanded a severely circumscribed following in the Maghrib. The religious ferment generated by the "national" uprising against Portuguese imperialism in Morocco was to benefit the Sufi movement in the Maghrib, serving as the catalyst for its popularization. It was under a new guise, however, the Jazuliyya

tariqa, founded by Muhammad ibn Sulaiman al-Jazuli, that Shadhilism was propagated in Morocco and in the rest of the Maghrib from the sixteenth century onward. Al-Jazuli is the fourth “pole” of western Islam and the author of a popular mystic “guide manual,” *Dala ‘il al-Khairat*. Jazulism may thus be regarded as the latter-day reincarnation of Shadhilism; it has provided the doctrinal basis of the majority of the *zawiya-s* in Morocco, and it is from al-Jazuli that the founders of these *zawiya-s* trace their spiritual descent (*silsila*).

A characteristic Maghribian variety of Sufism is maraboutism, which may be described as the “Islamization” of the prevalent tradition of hagiolatry, or saint-worship. It is in Morocco that this Maghribian species of Sufism is most pronounced; indeed, it has been remarked that “Islam in Morocco is characterized by saint-worship to a greater degree than perhaps in any other country” (Hitti 1968a: 437).

B.A. MOJUETAN

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Abuja

Abuja is Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory. It was chosen as Nigeria’s new capital in 1976 by a panel headed by Justice Akinola Aguda as an alternative to Lagos, which suffered from heavy congestion problems. Situated north of the confluence of the Benue and Niger Rivers, Abuja is centrally located; this has earned it the appellation “Center of Unity.” The city, which is about 8,000 square kilometers, was carved out from the Niger, Plateau, and Kogi states of Nigeria.

Originally inhabited by the Gwari, Gwandara, and Bassa peoples, it was founded by the Hausa ruling dynasty of Zaria in approximately the fifteenth century. Most of the area covered by the new Federal Capital Territory did not come under the control of the Fulani jihadists of the nineteenth century. Even though subjected to several raids, the area known today as Abuja was never really “Islamicized,” as the topography assisted the anti-Fulani resistance. However, with the advent of colonialism, the area was brought under the political suzerainty of the Sokoto caliphate. Although its inhabitants were predominantly practitioners of African

traditional religion, a good number of them later embraced Islam and Christianity, during the colonial era.

The vegetation of Abuja is largely that of a guinea Savanna. More than 85 per cent of its traditional population are farmers. These features of Abuja remained primary, until it was chosen as the site for Nigeria’s new capital.

The transfer of Nigeria’s seat of power to Abuja took place in December 1991. This was effected after the attempt to topple General Ibrahim Babangida, through a coup carried out by Major Gideon Okar and his cohorts on April 22, 1990. The coup attempt resulted in the attack and partial destruction of Dodan Barrack, the then-Nigerian seat of power in Lagos. The feeling of insecurity engendered by the coup must have contributed to the need to quickly move from Lagos. The haste that accompanied this movement significantly increased the pace of construction of the new capital city of Abuja. The amount of resources committed to it, coupled with the speed of work, made it one of the most quickly developed state capitals in the world.

Twice the size of Lagos, Abuja was planned to accommodate a population of 3.1 million people when fully developed. From its inception, Abuja was supposed to create a greater sense of unity among Nigerians. All residents of the city could, therefore, claim citizenship of the Federal Capital Territory. It was also to afford the authorities the opportunity of rectifying the inadequacies of Lagos, such as persistent accommodation and traffic jam problems.

Throughout the 1990s, Abuja witnessed a significant influx of people from across the country. This is due primarily to the movement of most government ministries into the city. Currently, it is mainly populated by civil servants and a fast-growing business community. The return of Nigeria to democratic rule in April 1999 has further consolidated Abuja as a center of unity. The convergence of politicians from different parts of the country has finally settled the question of its acceptance.

Abuja is one of the most beautiful cities in Africa. Some of the main settlement centers are Bwari, Garki, Gwagwa, Gwagwalada, Karo, Kubwa, and Kuje. The beauty of Abuja is enhanced by its relatively new buildings, modern architectural styles, elaborate road network, and the parks and gardens that dot the city.

Apart from the numerous federal government ministries and offices, and the growing number of business establishments, other major features of Abuja are the presidential villa (Aso Rock), the Economic Community of West African States Secretariat, the International Conference Center, Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, three five-star hotels (NICON,

Sofital, and Sheraton), the University of Abuja, and the National Assembly Complex.

C.B.N. OGBOGBO

See also: **Nigeria: Colonial Period: Federation; Nigeria: Gowon Regime, 1966–1975; Nigeria: Second Republic, 1979–1983.**

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Accra

Like many of the important coastal towns of Ghana, Accra began as an offshoot of a key inland capital, but geography and history combined to bring about the break between parent and offspring earlier than was the case elsewhere. Archaeological evidence indicates that in the late sixteenth century the Ga people, who had been moving into the area of grassy plains south of the Akwapem escarpment, established Ayawaso, or what Europeans came to know as Great Accra. Initially, the Ga were reluctant to allow Europeans to establish permanent settlements on the coast, but in 1649 they allowed the Dutch West India Company to establish Fort Crèvecoeur at “Little Accra.” Then, the Danes established Christiansborg Castle at the settlement of Osu, two miles to the east of the Dutch fort in 1661. Eleven years later the English company, the Royal African Company, began construction of James Fort at the village of Tsoco, half a mile to the west of Fort Crèvecoeur.

According to Ga traditions, the coastal area was settled sometime during the reign of Okai Koi (1610–1660); the settlement of the region probably took place as a more gradual series of migrations. In 1680–1681 the Akwamu invaded and destroyed Great Accra. Fifty years later the Akyem defeated the Akwamus, and shortly after, in 1742, the Asante conquered this area and incorporated it into the southern provinces of their empire. The result was that the connection between inland capital and the coastal settlement was broken early. Nevertheless, a centralized state did not develop on the coast largely due to the presence of competing European trading companies in this area. Even in the nineteenth century Accra remained divided into three distinct towns (Ussher Town, or Kinka, James Town, or Nleshi, and Osu), which in turn were divided into their own *akutsei*, or quarters. It was not until 1867 that the British finally

acquired all of the forts in this area of the coast and brought these towns under one administration.

Connections with Europeans enhanced the powers of various *mantse*s, the rulers of towns and quarters, with the *mantse* of the Abola *akutso* as *primus inter pares*. However, this ordering was fiercely contested at times and was to remain a central issue of twentieth-century political life. Contributing to these tensions was the history of invasions and conquests that made this one of the most culturally heterogeneous areas of the coast. Apart from Ga there were Adangme, Allada, Akwams, Akyem, Fante, and Asante. There were also people from what was to become Nigeria, and freed slaves from Brazil continued this influx in the nineteenth century. Undoubtedly it was the Akan element that was most important and contributed to an Akanization of Ga institutions. For example, Ga patrilineal systems of inheritance came to intermingle with Akan matrilineal inheritance.

The extension of European rule was challenged, as opposition in 1854 to a British attempt to introduce a poll tax indicated. Only after two bombardments from the sea were the British able to regain control of the areas around their forts. Nevertheless, in 1877 the British relocated their capital of the colony from Cape Coast to Accra. The area was healthier and the open plains of its hinterland made expansion much more possible than was the case for cramped, hilly Cape Coast. These benefits compensated for the harbor conditions, among the roughest on the coast, and the area’s susceptibility to earthquakes as the devastating 1862 tremor indicated. At that time Accra was already the largest trading town on the coast with a population of about 20,000. Initially growth was slow, but by 1921 the population was more than 38,000.

In 1894 Accra was the first town in the Gold Coast to get a municipal council. The combination of house rates and an African minority on this body contributed to making it extremely unpopular. Not until 1898 could three Africans be persuaded to accept nomination. Plague and yellow fever scares in the early twentieth century transformed the council into even more of an arm of government, and African participation remained limited. These epidemics also stimulated growth outside of the original, congested areas of settlement. The plague scare of 1908 resulted in the establishment of new suburbs such as Kole Gonno, Riponsville, Kansehie, and Adabraka. From the 1870s British officials had been moving to Victoriaborg to escape the congestion of Osu. The yellow fever outbreak of 1910 resulted in the establishment of the Ridge residential area somewhat further inland.

There were also extensive infrastructure improvements. In 1907 construction of a breakwater for the

harbor began. In 1909 work began on a railway line to Nsawam that was to reach Kumasi in 1923. The Weija reservoir was opened to serve Accra with pipe-borne water in 1914, and two years later the town was supplied with electricity. Compensating local chiefs for the land required for these projects inevitably resulted in bitter litigation, and much of Accra's political life was linked to this growth of the city. In the 1920s infrastructure development continued, the most notable being the building of the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital (1923), and the Prince of Wales College at Achimota (1927).

By the 1930s Accra was the center of the colony's political life. The National Congress of British West Africa (established in 1920) was dormant, but new political organizations came into being, such as J.B. Danquah's Gold Coast Youth Conference (1930 and 1937), the Central National Committee (1934) that organized protest against the "Obnoxious Ordinances," and the Sierra Leonian I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson's West African Youth League (1935). Under the editorship of Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe, it had the first regular daily newspaper (*The African Morning Post*—1934). The town doubled in size, with newcomers arriving from different regions of the colony and other areas of West Africa. A serious earthquake in 1939 caused considerable property damage and spurred the government to develop housing estates in the suburbs that contributed to the town's spatial expansion.

After World War II, Accra became the center of nationalist activity. It was here, in 1948, that the anti-inflation campaign initiated by the Accra chief Nii Bonne began. Shortly after, a march of ex-servicemen ended in shootings and general looting of stores. Building on these events, in 1949 Kwame Nkrumah announced at Accra's Arena meeting ground the founding of the Convention People's Party, which eight years later was to lead Ghana to independence. As the colony advanced toward independence, Accra's expansion also followed at a hectic pace. A 1954 estimate put the population at just under 200,000 with an annual growth rate of close to 10 per cent. Areas like Adabraka that had been distinct suburbs were now linked to the center, and in 1961 Kwame Nkrumah declared Accra a city.

The population of what is now known as Greater Accra is estimated to be more than two million, and the city, with its many suburbs, extends more than eight miles inland. In 1961 an artificial harbor was built at Tema, 25 kilometers to the east, to solve Accra's harbor problems. More recently there has been considerable highway building to ease traffic congestion in this rapidly expanding city. Administering this large area is the Accra Metropolitan

Assembly, which traces its origins back to the Town Council of 1898.

ROGER GOCKING

See also: **Ghana Empire: Historiography of Origins; Ghana, Empire of: History of; Ghana (Republic of): 1800–1874; Ghana (Republic of): Colonization and Resistance, 1875–1901; Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence; Ghana, Republic of: Social and Economic Development: First Republic.**

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Achaempong: See Ghana, Republic of: Achaempong Regime to the Third Republic, 1972–1981.

Achebe, Chinua

Albert Chinualumogu Achebe is generally considered to be the most widely read African writer. Chinua Achebe, as he first started to call himself on entering university, grew up at a time when the two different lifestyles—that of the more traditional Igbo people and that of those who had converted to Christianity—still coexisted; his work is influenced by both. While his exposure to the fables of his indigenous background is omnipresent in his writing, his family's Christian background enabled him to attend one of the prestigious colleges of colonial Nigeria. He later continued his education at Ibadan University, where he soon switched to literature, having started as a medical student.

Achebe's literary ambition was first nurtured when he read Joyce Cary's *Mister Johnson* (1939) while at university. Achebe found the depiction of Africa in a novel written by somebody whose knowledge of African cultures and languages was only that of an outsider grossly inappropriate. While the positive reception of that novel surprised Achebe, it also encouraged him to start work on what later became a series of novels describing the changes in Igbo communities as

a result of the confrontation with European traditions. Achebe has commented repeatedly on his reasons for writing these novels. In “The Novelist As Teacher” (included in *Hopes and Impediments*), he argues that his aim is to present to his African readers texts that show that Africa’s past “was not one long night of savagery” (p. 45). According to Achebe, pride in the historical achievements of African societies can, for example, be based on the wealth of knowledge passed on in the form of oral traditions, for instance in proverbs. In another essay included in the same book, Achebe heavily criticizes the subliminal racism in Joseph Conrad’s work, most notably in *Heart of Darkness* (1902).

Alongside his essays, it is mostly his fictional writing, primarily his first three novels, which have won Achebe a lasting reputation. The relationship between traditional and newly adopted customs forms a common theme in Achebe’s texts. Opposing the dissolving of all traditions, Achebe pleads for a combination of the positive features of both old and new; thus an incorporation is preferable to a revolution. In his first novel, *Things Fall Apart* (1958), he describes life in an Igbo village where the customs are still intact. However, life changes drastically with the arrival of missionaries, whose questioning of such practices as the abandonment of twins wins them support among some members of the community. Soon the village deteriorates into a state of instability. *No Longer at Ease* (1960) concentrates on contemporary Nigeria and the difficulties that people have to face when they return to Nigeria after studying abroad. The Western habits and values they have adopted prove inappropriate when applied to life in postindependence Nigeria. In the novel, a young man returns from Britain, where his village had paid for him to study, and finds work in an office. Both the wish of his village that he should return the money that paid for his studies, and his parents’ disapproval of his choice of wife, who is an untouchable, put more pressure on the tragic protagonist than he can handle. He accepts a bribe and as a consequence loses his job. In *Arrow of God* (1964), set between the first two novels and completing what is often called Achebe’s “African Trilogy,” a village chief-priest is looking for a way to combine his own beliefs with the new ideology of British colonialism. Despite his effort, this protagonist, too, fails tragically.

Achebe’s fourth novel, *A Man of the People* (1966), won attention for the fact that in it Achebe predicted the military coup that coincided with its publication. It is a bitter satire on the poor moral state of the governing classes of newly independent African nations.

A refusal to think and argue in terms of binary oppositions is another constant theme in Achebe’s texts. He argues that claims to absolute truths—a European tradition—are mostly futile. This attitude might also

explain why, after initial interest in the new idea, Achebe sided with numerous other Anglophone writers in criticizing the predominantly Francophone *Négritude* movement, which emphasized African culture to the exclusion of foreign elements. There too, Achebe sees himself in the role of the mediator.

With the secession of Biafra in 1967, Achebe became actively involved in the political future of the Igbo people, whose independence from Nigeria he supported. Following Biafra’s unconditional surrender in 1970, Achebe left Nigeria for the United States, where, between 1972 and 1976, he taught at various universities. During these tumultuous years Achebe found himself unable to work on more extensive texts, and instead concentrated on shorter writings. He completed various political, didactic, and literary essays, as well as short stories, poetry, and books for children. Through his involvement with Heinemann Publishers and its “African Writers Series,” which he edited from 1962 to 1972, Achebe was of crucial importance for the then still young tradition of African writing. Together with the poet Christopher Okigbo, who died in August 1967, Achebe also published a journal, *Okike*, devoted to new African writing.

Achebe sees the role of the writer in contemporary African societies as mostly didactic. Accordingly, he opposes any view of art as an exclusively aesthetic medium. His continuing involvement with the struggles of Nigeria features prominently in his *The Trouble with Nigeria* (1983), which attempted to inform voters about the state of their country and government, as well as in his intellectual biography, *Home and Exile* (2000), which includes detailed commentaries on Achebe’s early experiences with literature. In the ongoing debate about whether a truly African literature should be written in African languages, Achebe believes that the colonial languages can be an element that supports the unity of the newly independent nations of Africa by offering a single language within a multilingual nation.

GERD BAYER

See also: Soyinka, Wole K.

Biography

Albert Chinualumogu Achebe was born on November 15, 1930, in Ogidi, an Igbo community in eastern Nigeria. He was educated at Ibadan University, where he switched to literature, having started as a medical student. After graduation, he worked as a teacher. In 1954, he took employment with the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. Following Biafra’s unconditional surrender in 1970, he left Nigeria for the United States. Between 1972 and 1976, he taught at various universities.

He was paralyzed in a serious car accident in 1990. Currently, he teaches at Bard College in New York state.

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Acheulian: See Olduwan and Acheulian: Early Stone Age.


Adal: Ibrahim, Ahmad ibn, Conflict with Ethiopia, 1526–1543

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, political, military, commercial, and religious conflict between Christian Ethiopia and the Muslim regions flanking its southern and eastern borders was long-standing and followed an established pattern in which the Christian kingdom invariably held the advantage. This was principally due to its political cohesion in comparison to the Muslim states which, although led by the Walasma dynasty, ranged over such a vast area occupied by disparate peoples that they lacked both a reliable communications system and a cohesive political focus. Gradually, however, the balance of power began to shift in favor of the Muslim regions. As Islamization proceeded in the lands to the south and east of the central Ethiopian highlands and also in Nubia to the north, the Christian kingdom became increasingly isolated. The growing power of the

Ottoman Turks, who conquered Egypt in 1517, further increased this isolation and threatened Christian Ethiopia's access to the northern port of Massawa on the Red Sea coast. Control of the southern trade routes running through Adal to the port of Zeyla and the Gulf of Aden consequently became an issue of ever more pressing importance to the Christian kings, especially as firearms imported through Zeyla were far more difficult for them to obtain than for the Muslim rulers situated nearer the coast.

However, the Muslim states could not make use of these developments to pose a serious threat to their Christian neighbor while they continued to lack a strong, unifying leadership that could overcome the conflicting interests of merchants and warmongers and bring together often fiercely independent, nomadic peoples in a common cause. These divisions were aggravated by the waning authority of the Walasma dynasty, which was challenged by various ambitious military leaders, the most successful of whom was Ahmad ibn Ibrahim.

Ahmad seized his opportunity in 1526 when the Walasma sultan, Abu Bakr, was killed. He installed the sultan's brother as a puppet ruler and made the wealthy commercial city of Harar his power base. Assuming the title of imam (in this context meaning the elected leader of the *jihad* or holy war), he set about both tempting and



Adal, fifteenth–sixteenth centuries.

coercing the neighboring Afar and Somali pastoralists into an alliance against the Christian kingdom. Islam as a conquering force in the Horn of Africa had now acquired what previously it had lacked; a charismatic military leader with the ability to unite fragmented Muslim communities under the banner of holy war.

Preliminary hostilities were limited to border skirmishes and raids. Far more extensive operations began in 1529 when the Christian king, Lebna Dengel (1508–1540), suffered a major defeat in battle. According to custom, however, the Muslim forces subsequently dispersed and returned home with their booty, thereby failing to consolidate their victory. This was clearly not enough for Ahmad, whose ultimate aim was to occupy permanently the regions he conquered and convert the local populations to Islam. At first his followers refused to leave their homes and settle in recently subjugated lands but, as the Muslims made ever deeper incursions into the Christian kingdom, it became obvious that settlement was the only practical option. By 1532 almost all of the southern and eastern provinces of the kingdom had been overrun, and by 1533 Ahmad's forces had reached as far north as Amhara and Lasta. Two years later the final stage of the conquest was launched against the most northerly province of Tigray. But here, despite support from Ahmad's Turkish allies, the Muslim advance faltered. The main reason for this seems to have been one of logistics. In the mountainous, in the rugged terrain of Tigray, Ahmad's lines of supply and communication were probably stretched beyond their limit and without this backup the Muslim troops had no choice but to turn back.

Although the failure to conquer Tigray was a setback, it was not a decisive one. By this stage the Christian kingdom had already virtually ceased to exist, and Lebna Dengel, with the remnants of his followers, was reduced to nothing more than a fugitive in what had once been his own realm. In 1535, in desperation, he sent for help to the Portuguese. As a Christian ally with trading interests in the Horn of Africa, Portugal could reasonably be expected to send military assistance, but it was only in 1541, by which time Lebna Dengel had died and been succeeded by his son, Galawdewos (1540–1559), that a Portuguese contingent of 400 men finally reached Massawa. The arrival of these well-armed Portuguese soldiers raised the morale of the beleaguered Christian resistance and together they were able to inflict considerable damage on Ahmad's troops. However, it was not until 1543, when the imam was killed in battle, that the Christian side was able to gain the upper hand. Without their charismatic leader, the cause for which the Muslim forces had fought so long collapsed, although not quite entirely. Fighting continued sporadically until 1559, but it became increasingly clear that both sides were exhausted and unable to inflict any further serious damage on each other.

Inevitably this conflict had many consequences. In the long term, the most significant was that it facilitated the migration of Oromo pastoralists into the Ethiopian region, a process that was to continue for many years and was ultimately to have a much more profound and lasting impact than Ahmad's holy war. For the Christian kingdom, Portugal's intervention proved to be a mixed blessing. Although it promoted much needed contact with the wider Christian world, it also ushered in a period of intense religious disagreement between the exponents of Roman Catholicism and orthodox Ethiopian Christianity. The short-term consequences were only too obvious to see. The war left both sides depopulated, severely impoverished, and politically weakened. In fact, so devastating was this damage, it helped to ensure that Muslim and Christian never confronted each other in the Horn of Africa in such a destructive way again.

CAROLINE ORWIN

See also: Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries; Ethiopia: Portuguese and, Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries; Religion, History of.

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Addis Ababa

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia. It is one of the fastest growing cities, with a population of approximately 3.5 million people.

The establishment of the town by King Menelik II in 1886 ended a period of shifting Ethiopia's capital, foremost for military reasons. Menelik's wife, Queen Taytu, played a crucial role in the founding of Addis

Ababa. She preferred the mild climate of the Finfinne plains to adjacent hilly Entoto, a rather inaccessible, cold, and windy summit that located the then capital city a few hours journey to the north. In 1886, with Menelik away battling in Harar, Taytu camped at Filwoha (“hot-spring”). She decided to build a house north of the hot springs. Queen Taytu settled fully in 1887, after Menelik’s return in March of that year, and gave it the name Addis Ababa (“New Flower”), possibly due to the presence of the mimosa trees. Officially the name of the capital city changed from Entoto to Addis Ababa in 1906.

Menelik’s generals were allocated land around the royal camp. Each resided in a *safar* (encampment area), which brought together relatives, servants, soldiers, and priests linked to this person. Rivers and valleys separated *safars*. As a result, Addis Ababa became a spacious city, and many hours were needed to traverse the town, especially during the rains.

In 1889, shortly before Menelik’s coronation as emperor, construction of the royal palace started. A fire in 1992 destroyed the palace but was soon rebuilt. Because of the 1889–1892 famine, many countryside people sought refuge in Addis Ababa. Another period of immigration followed the 1896 battle of Adwa, where Menelik’s forces defeated an invading Italian army. After the war the nobility settled in Addis Ababa; so did foreign advisors, traders, businessmen, and diplomats. This boosted the rise of Addis Ababa from a military camp to an important civilian settlement. Plastered huts and wooden constructions replaced tents. The *gebbi* (palace complex) was extended, bridges were built, and Italian prisoners of war constructed modern roads. The settling by archbishops of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church made Addis Ababa an important religious center.

By 1900–1901, Menelik started building Addis Alem, (“New World”) approximately 60 kilometers to the west. Yet Menelik decided to keep Addis Ababa alive; the heavy investments in public and private facilities, and the c.1894 introduction of the fast-growing Australian Eucalyptus tree saved the city. Within five years, this tree attains a height of more than twelve meters, albeit at the cost of high water consumption. It gave Addis Ababa the nickname Eucalyptopolis.

The first decades of the twentieth century saw the building of the Bank of Abyssinia, the first hotel, the first modern school, the capital’s first hospital, a brickmaking factory, a hydroelectric power station and the Djibouti railway track reaching Addis Ababa by 1917. The initial growth of Addis Ababa was largely unplanned. The main advantage of this “spontaneous growth” was the absence of specific quarters (rich versus the poor, foreigners versus Ethiopians), as often witnessed in African cities that developed under colonial rule.

By the mid-1930s, Addis Ababa was Ethiopia’s largest city, with a population of approximately 300,000 people. Thus it was a natural target for colonization by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in 1935. He sought revenge for the Adwa humiliation and wanted to establish an Italian East African empire with Addis Ababa as administrative center. Emperor Haile Selassie I, the successor to Menelik, had left shortly before the Italian occupation.

The discussion whether to abandon Addis Ababa was renewed, but Mussolini decided to retain it. The authorities accepted an Italian plan that emphasized the “prestige of the colonizer.” It projected two residential areas in the east and south of the city for the exclusive use of Italians, one for officials, the other for “ordinary” Italians. Ethiopians were to be moved to the west, as was the main market (Arada), which was transferred from St George’s Cathedral to an area known as Mercato, the largest open-air market in Africa, still in use today.

The equestrian statue of Menelik II, pulled down by the Italians, and the removal of the Lion of Judah statue, were restored after the patriots and Allied Forces defeated the Italians in April 1941. Several streets were renamed in honor of Allied leaders (such as Churchill Street). Although the planned settlement of thousands of ordinary Italians in Addis Ababa never materialized, the Italian occupation resulted in dozens of European-style offices, shops, and houses as can still be witnessed, for example, in the piazza area of the city. After the Italians left, the Ethiopian elite took over their legacy of improved housing and amenities.

Except for the division of Addis Ababa into ten administrative districts (*woredas*) the post-Italian years witnessed a continued growth without any structured town planning. The Abercrombie Plan of 1956 (Abercrombie had been responsible for town planning in greater London) was an attempt to guide the growth of Addis Ababa. However, this plan—containing satellite towns and ring roads—did not materialize, nor did the 1959 redrafting attempt by a British consulting group.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Addis Ababa witnessed the construction of a number of much larger and modern buildings: the Africa Hall, Addis Ababa City Hall, Jubilee palace (now National palace), and a Hilton Hotel. A French city plan (1965) guided this construction boom period. By now Ethiopia’s capital was recognized as the unofficial capital of Africa. Haile Selassie’s pan-African diplomacy was rewarded when the city was chosen in 1963 as headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Due to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, however, the capital witnessed the deposition of Haile Selassie and the coming to power of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

His policy of movement restriction and land reform slowed down the urbanization process until 1991. During this period more than one-third of the city's forests were destroyed with little attempt at reforestation. The Derg regime introduced *kebeles*, a kind of neighborhood cooperative of urban dwellers. In the 1980s, house cooperatives were installed to address poor living conditions and new neighborhoods created at the city's boundary. The most notable physical development was the erection of monuments to celebrate the revolution, among them the vast Revolution Square designed by an Hungarian planner. It was renamed Meskal Square after the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991.

Another plan, the Addis Ababa Master Plan, was developed from 1984 to 1986. It was a joint undertaking by the government of Ethiopia and the government of Italy, in collaboration with the Venice School of Architecture. A new boundary of the city was defined, but only approved in 1994. The master plan gave an ideal vision of the future city, but lacked practical applications of the ideas presented.

After the removal of the Derg regime, Ethiopia was subdivided in fourteen regions, of which Addis Ababa was named Region 14. Private initiative was, within certain limits, promoted resulting in the construction of new office buildings and apartments. In the 1995 constitution of the "Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," Addis Ababa was given the status of a self-governed city and the Region 14 administration transformed into the Addis Ababa city government. It initiated the Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan (ORAAMP).

By early 1998 the city administration produced the "5-year Action Plan for the City of Addis Ababa." Citywide discussions and deliberations were held on the document. A new city charter, master plan, and urban management system have been operational since 2001. Among the major achievements have been the Dire Water Dam and the Ring Road project. Yet, there has been a lack of job creation, handling of garbage collection and other sanitation projects, and especially the housing policy of raising rents, bulldozing slum areas, and its investment policies have been criticized.

The challenges facing Addis Ababa are enormous, starting from the provision of fundamental city services like trash collection, access to clean water, employment, housing, transportation, and so on. The city's new administration, which took office in 2003, has indicated to establish counsels in partnership with all stakeholders to address these difficulties in a transparent way. This should realize the vision statement "Addis 2010 a safe livable city," which portrays Addis Ababa as an effective center for national economic growth and as Africa's diplomatic capital.

MARCEL RUTTEN AND TEREFE DEGEFA

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Afonso I: See Kongo Kingdom: Afonso I, Christianity, and Kingship.

African Development Bank

The African Development Bank (ADB) promotes the economic development and social progress of its member countries in Africa. It operates on the basic principle of providing long-term finance for projects that are bankable and developmental. Historically, the ADB was seen as the single most important institution that could fill the gap in the financial systems of African countries. However, some criticisms, fueled by periods of poor performance, have been leveled against the ADB.

The bank was conceived in 1963 by the Organization of African Unity; it started functioning in 1966, with its headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. The Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, together with a nine-member committee of experts from member states, engineered the original agreement of establishment, though the bank is not formally associated with the United Nations. Its aim was to promote African self-reliance through the provision of nonconcessional loans (English and Mule 1996).

The bank's operations were restricted by the weak capacity of African members to honor financial subscriptions, so membership was opened to non-African countries in 1983, which raised the borrowing capacity of the ADB by 200 per cent. This occurred despite concerns of turning the ADB into a World Bank or an IMF, bodies which enforce free

market development ideology (Ruttan 1995). Now two-thirds of the shares are owned by the African members. Shareholders include the 53 countries in Africa and 24 countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. The United States, with 5.9 per cent of shares, is the third largest shareholder in the ADB Group, behind Nigeria and Egypt. The U.S. is also the largest shareholder among ADB's non-African shareholders. The wealthier member countries provide guarantees that enable the bank to borrow money on international bond markets at favorable interest rates, which the bank passes on to its poorer African borrowers. Loans are made through two windows: the African Development Bank hard loan window, which lends at market rates to lower and middle income developing countries in Africa, and the African Development Fund, which makes concessional loans at below market rates, or interest-free loans to Africa's poorest countries. The African Development Fund is financed by regular cash infusions from the wealthier member countries.

Although nonregional members provide the bulk of the bank's resources, African members continue to retain control on both boards of directors by limiting the voting power of nonregional members to 50 per cent and 33–36 per cent, respectively. Between 1985 and 1992, the ADB group's share of total disbursements to Africa, mostly in the form of nonconcessional loans, grew substantially from 2.7 per cent to 8.1 per cent. Yet with the entrenchment of the African debt crisis, arrears began to rise, demand for nonconcessional lending fell, the ADF dried up, and the net income of the ADB group began to plummet.

The ADB's main functions are lending, the provision of guarantees, cofinancing to the public sector, and lending and equity investments to the private sector for projects developed in its African member countries. The ADB is second only to the World Bank in the project-lending field in Africa. Project loans are generally awarded to governments and government-owned institutions. Government loan recipients use the bulk of these funds to conduct procurement activities that result in contract awards to private companies from ADB member countries. The ADB has six associated institutions through which public and private capital is channeled: the African Development Fund, the Nigeria Trust Fund, the Africa Reinsurance Corporation (Africare), the Société Internationale Financière pour les Investissements et le Développement en Afrique (SIFIDA), the Association of African Development Finance Institutions (AADFI), and Shelter-Afrique. The bank's other principal functions are: to provide technical assistance for the preparation and execution of development projects and programs, to promote investment

of public and private capital for development purposes, to respond to requests for assistance in coordinating development policies and plans of member countries, and to give special attention to national and multinational projects and programs that promote regional integration.

The bank's operations cover the major sectors, with particular emphasis on agriculture, public utilities, transport, industry, the social sectors of health and education, poverty reduction, environmental management, gender mainstreaming, and population. The loan disbursement of the ADB historically goes to the agricultural sector (31 per cent), public utilities (23 per cent), transport (19 per cent), and industry (14 per cent) (English and Mule 1996). Most bank financing is designed to support specific projects, but it also provides program, sector, and policy-based loans to enhance national economic management. The bank's highest policy-making body is its board of governors, which consists of one governor for each member country.

In early May 1994, a consultancy report by David Knox sharply criticized the bank's management. He identified numerous management problems: lack of accountability, boardroom squabbles, allegations of corruption and fraud, and a top-heavy bureaucracy (Adams and Davis 1996). One symptom of this bureaucracy is that about half of its \$28 billion in loans have been disbursed to only seven countries (Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Zaïre/Congo, Tunisia, Algeria, and Côte d'Ivoire). The bank has another forty-six borrowing members. In recent years, it has lent money at commercial rates to countries such as Zaïre/Congo and Liberia that were either too poor, or too torn by conflict, to have any hope of paying the loans back. An estimated 40 per cent of the bank's projects have been unsuccessful.

In August 1995, Standard and Poor's, one of the world's foremost credit rating agencies, downgraded the ADB's senior long-term debt. The downgrade made it more expensive for the bank to borrow money on international markets, rocking the bank's already precarious financial foundation, and threatening the bank's very survival. Since 1995, the ADB, under the new leadership of President Omar Kabbaj, has been undertaking a comprehensive program of institutional reforms to ensure its operations get results and restore the confidence of shareholders and the support of development partners (Herrling 1997). However, the question of reform raises the prospect of the bank losing its "African character" and becoming a replica of the World Bank, enforcing (via policy-based lending) the donor-driven policy agenda of structural adjustment programs (English and Mule 1996). In 1997, the bank's authorized capital

totaled about \$23.3 billion. The ABD's major operational objectives continue into the new millennium; it aims to meet the demand for project investments (especially given the low level of production capacity and socioeconomic infrastructure prevalent in Africa), and promote private sector development and regional integration. The bank's concern for poverty reduction and human resource development constitute high priority areas, along with the strengthening of production capacity and socioeconomic infrastructure.

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See also: Currencies and Banking; Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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African National Congress: See South Africa: African National Congress.

Industrial and Commercial Workers Union: See South Africa: Industrial and Commercial Workers Union.

African Union: See Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism.

Africanus, Leo *Traveler and Writer*

Little is known of the life of this Moroccan traveler, in spite of his well-established fame. All details of his vicissitudes before his arrival in Rome are based upon the few autobiographical notes in his surviving geographical work. Even during his stay in Italy, he did not leave

many traces in the contemporary documents. Hence it has been suggested that no Leo Africanus ever existed and his description of Africa was composed by a Venetian ghostwriter, according to Italian reports from the Barbary Coast. This interpretation is too rigid but it contains a grain of truth. Leo Africanus is a somewhat mythical character, and much of our conventional knowledge of his life rests on speculations made by his enthusiastic admirers.

Africanus was born in Granada. The exact date is unclear, but it took place after the city had surrendered to Spaniards in 1492. His parents, however, moved soon to Morocco. They settled in Fez where their son received a sound education. In 1507–1508, Leo Africanus is said to have performed the first of his great voyages, visiting the eastern Mediterranean. His reason for undertaking this journey is unknown; it is not even certain that he actually went on this journey. In the winter of 1509–1510, Leo, who (according to his own words) was at that time sixteen years old, accompanied one of his uncles in a diplomatic mission to Timbuktu. Two years later he allegedly revisited Timbuktu, though this time on personal affairs. From Timbuktu, he is claimed to have extended his travels to other parts of the Sudanic Africa; thence to Egypt, returning in Fez in 1514.

Thereafter, Leo Africanus devoted himself to a vagabond life. During his Moroccan adventures, he was often accompanied by a sharif who was rebelling against the Wattasid sultan of Fez. This person might have been Ahmad al-Araj, the founder of the Sadid dynasty, who had become in 1511 the ruler of southern Morocco and gained much popularity by his fighting against the Portuguese. From Morocco, Leo extended his wanderings to Algeria and Tunisia, including a visit to Constantinople, possibly his second. In the spring of 1517, he appeared in Rosetta where he witnessed the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. He then continued to Arabia. Leo was returning Tunis, perhaps from a pilgrimage to Mecca, when he fell into the hands of Christian corsairs, near the island of Crete in June 1518. For a long time it was believed that Leo was captured near the island of Djerba, off the Tunisian coast, but recent research by Dietrich Rauchenberger has proven this unlikely.

Initially, Leo was taken to Rhodes, but he was soon transferred to Rome, where he was presented to Pope Leo X Medici (1513–1521), who was planning a crusade to northern Africa. From the pope's point of view, the appearance of a learned Moor who was willing to collaborate with him and his counselors by providing them with accurate information of northern Africa, was certainly like a gift from heaven. In Rome, he was freed and given a pension. Moreover,

he converted to Christianity and was baptized at St. Peter's on January 6, 1520, receiving the name Johannes Leo de Medicis, or Giovanni Leone in Italian, according to his noble patron, or Yuhanna 'l-Asad al-Gharnati, as the man preferred to call himself in Arabic.

Leo Africanus left Rome for Bologna in 1522. The reason for this move was probably that the new pope, Hadrian VI (1522–1523), the former imperial viceroy of Spain, was suspicious about the presence of a converted Morisco at the papal court. Another reason was certainly the outbreak of plague that killed nearly half of Rome's population by the end of 1523. While in Bologna, he put together an Arabic-Hebrew-Latin medical vocabulary, of which the Arabic part has survived. This manuscript, now preserved at the Escorial library, contains Leo's autograph, which is one of few surviving sources for his original Arabic name: al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Wazzan.

Africanus returned to Rome in early 1526, living there under the protection of the new Medici Pope Clement VII (1523–1534). Nothing is known of his final years with certainty. According to Johann Albrecht von Widmanstetter, who had arrived in Italy in 1527 to study Oriental languages, the man (whom he called Leo Eliberitanus) had left Rome shortly before the sack of the city in May 1527. Subsequently he went to Tunis where he is believed to have passed away around 1550. This information can be considered reliable, for Widmanstetter was moving in the circles where Leo Africanus was remembered well. Considering, however, that Leo had forsaken Christianity, he hardly wanted to witness the Spanish conquest of Tunis in 1535. Against this background, Raymond Mauny's speculation that Leo Africanus spent the remaining years of his life in Morocco sounds reasonable.

Upon his return to Rome, Africanus completed his magnum opus on African geography, according to his own words, on March 10, 1526. It was believed that Leo composed his work first in Arabic, translating it afterward into Italian. This hypothesis rested on the claim by Paul Colomiés, according to whom Leo's original manuscript had belonged to the Italian humanist Gian Vincenzo Pinelli (1535–1601), whose collection forms the core of the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana in Milan. The Ambrosiana possesses an anonymous Arabic manuscript containing a description of Africa but it is not written by Leo Africanus. It is now considered that Leo wrote his work directly in rather corrupted Italian, though he certainly relied upon Arabic notes that he might have composed during his travels.

An Italian manuscript version of Leo's geographical work was unexpectedly found in 1931 and purchased by the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome. The style in this

manuscript (entitled *Cosmographia & geographia de Affrica*) differs greatly from that of the Italian printed edition, but the manuscript represents clearly the original text written by Leo and that was later adopted by his Italian publisher. The manuscript is still unpublished, except for the sections and fragments describing the Sahara and Sudanic Africa, which were published by Rauchenberger with German translation.

Leo's geographical work was printed at Venice, bearing the title *Delle descrittione dell' Africa*, in 1550. It was incorporated in the first volume of the anthology of travels and discoveries, *Delle navigationi et viaggi*, edited by Giovanni Battista Ramusio (1485–1557). When and how Ramusio had obtained Leo's original manuscript is a mystery. The anthology was an immediate success and several reprints were called for. Subsequently, Leo's text was translated into major European languages, which made it available for the ever-widening audience. French and Latin versions were both published in 1556; an English in 1600; a Dutch in 1665. These translations were, however, of a poor quality, being arbitrarily abridged and including many errors. The Latin version, especially, which was the most popular, contains many grave mistranslations.

Modern times have produced further translations of Leo's text. A German version appeared in 1805; an updated English version, based upon the earlier translation, in 1896; an updated French version in 1896–1898. A scholarly annotated, new French translation, based upon Ramusio's printed text and superficially compared to the Italian manuscript version, was published in 1956. An Arabic translation from the French edition of 1956 appeared in Morocco in 1982.

A reason for the popularity of Leo's work was the lack of available rival sources for African geography. The Portuguese had put the coasts of Africa adequately on the map, but their access to the interior was checked by local resistance and the lethal endemic diseases. Also, most of the Portuguese chronicles describing their discoveries in Africa were not printed. According to a contemporary reader, Leo Africanus discovered a new world for Europeans, like Columbus "discovering" America. It is even suggested that Shakespeare modeled the character of Othello on Leo Africanus. The *Descrittione* maintained its authoritative position in the European geography of Africa until the early nineteenth century explorers brought more reliable information of the Niger and the adjacent regions. In the historiography of western Africa, Leo's influence lasted much longer, till the early twentieth century. Leo's *Descrittione* has justly been characterized as the final contribution of Islamic learning to European civilization.

Despite its title, the *Descrittione* is not a comprehensive exposition of African geography. The emphasis is on the Barbary Coast; especially on Morocco, which

had become Leo's native land. The description of the city of Fez alone takes as much space as the sections reserved for Tunisia and Libya. As to the rest of the continent, Leo's knowledge was limited to Sudanic Africa; he wrote nothing about the Guinea Coast, Congo, or Christian Ethiopia, which were at that time familiar to European readers from the Portuguese reports. The section describing Sudanic Africa is the shortest, and there is nothing that would prove that it was based upon the author's own observations. Leo could have derived all the information from Arab traders and West African pilgrims, whom he had met during his wanderings in northern Africa. Leo's view on Sudanic Africa is strongly Islamic, and he claimed that the blacks had been uncivilized savages until they were subjugated and educated by the Muslim Berbers of the Sahara in the twelfth century. He also pictured Timbuktu as a center of West African gold trade. This image turned, in the hands of his later copyists in Europe, into a vision of an African Zipangu, which had an important impact in the beginning of the exploration of West African interior at the end of the eighteenth century.

According to internal references, Leo was planning to supplement his *Descrittione* with two volumes, one describing Europe and another the Middle East. Nothing came of this plan. He also wrote, or at least intended to write, an exposition of Islamic faith, and a treatise of North African history. Neither of these two works, if he ever completed them, has survived. Besides his magnum opus, Leo wrote a biographical work of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, which he completed in Rome in 1527. This work was published in Latin translation in 1664, in Zürich, by Johann Heinrich Hottinger under the title *Libellus de viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes*, and later in 1726 by J.A. Fabricius in Hamburg. Leo also made an Arabic translation of the Epistles of St. Paul, which is now preserved at the Biblioteca Estense in Modena.

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See also: Europe: Explorers, Adventurers, Traders; Historiography of Africa.

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Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism, Nineteenth Century

Exactly *when* Afrikaner nationalism originated has been the subject of debate between traditional

Afrikaner historians and more recent commentators. Traditional Afrikaner historians saw the nineteenth-century trekker states of the interior as expressions of a national self-awareness that could be traced back to Hendrik Bibault's declaration of his identity as an "Africaander" in 1707. However, more recent commentators, such as L.M. Thompson and T.R.H. Davenport, destroyed much of the nationalist mythology surrounding the Great Trek, and identified Afrikaner nationalism as a phenomenon commencing only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Early Afrikaner historians such as Gustav Preller had depicted the trek as a modern-day reenactment of the biblical exodus from Egypt, with the Boers as God's elect escaping from the bondage of the British pharaoh to the "Promised Land" of the highveld, where they became a people bound to God by a covenant (sworn by Boer leaders before confronting the Zulu army at the battle of Blood River in 1838), and dedicated to the spread of Christian enlightenment (as proclaimed in the Retief manifesto of 1837).

In his *Political Mythology of Apartheid*, Leonard Thompson demonstrated that many of these notions only took shape half a century or so later: the Day of the Covenant (December 16) commemorating the Blood River victory was celebrated as a religious occasion only after the renewal of the covenant, when the independence of the British-controlled Transvaal was proclaimed at Paardekraal in December 1880. The concept of the Boers as God's chosen people planted in Africa by God was the product of the strong neo-Calvinist influence within the Dutch Reformed Church in the 1880s and 1890s, becoming the prevailing ideology only after World War I. The early trekker states themselves seem to have lacked many of the attributes of modern nation-states, built as they were around individual Boer leaders and their followers, with the minimum of formal political institutions: the personalized and highly factional nature of Transvaal politics delayed the acceptance of a constitution for the whole country until 1860, while the development of a viable governmental system there had to await the rise of Kruger and the restoration of Transvaal independence in 1881.

Davenport has made a strong case for placing the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism at a much later stage than the trek, and in the British-controlled Cape Colony rather than the Boer republics. He presents it as, initially, the reaction of the Cape Dutch elite to the imperial annexation of the Kimberley diamond-fields at the expense of the Orange Free State Boers (1871), and to the way in which the English language had become "the hallmark of breeding" in the Cape's urban centers. In the mid-1870s, the neo-Calvinist minister Rev. S.J. du Toit launched the *Genootskap van Regte*

Afrikaners (Society of True Afrikaners) in the country town of Paarl, dedicated to winning acceptance for Afrikaans, the *patois* of the common Afrikaner people (in contrast to High Dutch), and a language that he declared had been given to Afrikaners by God. In 1876, he produced a history of South Africa, written in “the language of our people,” followed by a newspaper, *Die Afrikaanse Patriot*, and talked about setting up separate Afrikaner institutions such as banks, a dream that was to achieve reality after World War I. *Genootskap*’s anti-imperial political agenda led to the creation of the *Afrikaner Bond* in 1880, proclaiming the goal of a united South Africa with its own flag. By 1883, forty-three Bond branches had been set up in the Cape and the interior republics, but the association of the Bond with Joubert and Reitz, Kruger’s opponents, led to its early demise in the newly-independent Transvaal. Thereafter, the opening of the Witwatersrand gold fields in 1886 and the resulting urbanization of Afrikaners, many lacking the necessary industrial skills, provided a seedbed for later radical nationalism, forced into rapid growth by the South African War (1899–1902).

Meanwhile, in the Cape itself, Jan Hofmeyr’s Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging (Farmers Protection Association), formed in 1878 to protest a new excise duty on spirits that hit the farming industry, succeeded in taking over control of the Bond, and steered it in a less exclusivist direction. The Bond now welcomed all those white people, English as well as Dutch/Afrikaans-speaking, who saw themselves as “South Africans,” and significantly muted its opposition to imperial rule. Politically more astute than du Toit, Hofmeyr saw the electoral virtue of seeking to unite the farming interest irrespective of language in the Cape legislature, and was to win a position strong enough for him to act as kingmaker, most notably in 1890, when he offered the support Cecil Rhodes needed to form his first ministry. In exchange, Hofmeyr secured special favor for white farmers. The Afrikaner nationalist cause lost ground as a result of Hofmeyr’s more moderate approach. It was the more “polite” High Dutch of the elite, rather than the Afrikaans of the common people, that secured acceptance for use in the assembly (1882), and Hofmeyr decided to throw in his lot with Rhodes when Kruger attempted to thwart his plans for expansion to the north at the end of the 1880s. The Jameson Raid (December 1895) eventually brought the alliance with Rhodes to an end, although—ironically—du Toit remained a supporter of the disgraced premier. The remaining years of peace saw the Bond in an increasingly equivocal position. On the one hand, Milner cast doubt on its loyalty to the imperial cause and accused it of undue sympathy for its republican cousins, thus placing the

Bond on the defensive—although in reality, it had little patience with many of Kruger’s policies such as the Uitlander franchise. On the other, it sought to be an effective spokesman for the Afrikaner (as well as the wider farming) interest. The Afrikaner nationalist cause was the main casualty, with the Bond becoming set even more firmly into the stance of moderation Hofmeyr had imposed on it after becoming its leader. Its fortunes thus revived only after the traumas of the South African War and its aftermath.

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See also: *Cape Liberalism, Nineteenth Century; Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Kruger, Paul; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881; South African War, 1899–1902.*

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Aghlabid Amirate of Ifriqiya (800–909)

The Abbasid caliph assigned Ibrahim ibn Aghlab, his governor of the Mzab oases in the Sahara, the task of quelling an uprising in the province of Ifriqiya in 800. In return, Ibrahim secured an acknowledgment of autonomy in civil and military affairs for himself and his heirs, contingent only on the submission of an annual tribute to the caliph recognizing him as the spiritual head of the Muslim community. Since the Abbasids were no longer able to exert effective control over Ifriqiya in any event, they viewed such nominal influence as preferable to none at all.

The Aghlabid *amirs* encountered problems from the outset. They were contemptuous of Ifriqiya’s Berber majority, but also alienated the influential religious leaders of Qairawan, who vehemently objected to the Aghlabid habit of levying non-Quranic taxes. The rulers’ adherence to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence favored in Baghdad, rather than the Maliki school that predominated in North Africa, constituted a further irritant until they adopted the views of their

subjects in this sensitive matter. The subsequent entrenchment of Maliki practices gave the population of Ifriqiya an identity that differentiated it from the peoples of the Middle East.

The Aghlabid army consisted of Arabs from the Middle East, slave troops, and mercenaries. The fractious nature of this institution prompted the *amirs* to engineer overseas adventures—epitomized by the conquest of Sicily, begun in the 820s—that minimized the army's opportunity to meddle in political activities. After pushing the Byzantines out of Sicily, the Aghlabids used the island as a springboard for attacks on the Italian mainland. They portrayed these expeditions as jihads, thereby emphasizing their commitment to Islam and legitimizing their rule.

Hostilities were not permitted to jeopardize commerce. Although Aghlabid raiders preyed on Christian shipping in Sicilian and Italian waters, they rarely attacked vessels trading with Muslims and some southern Italian communities even allied with the Aghlabids. Religious critics of the dynasty questioned the wisdom of such linkages, but could not deny that substantial economic benefits flowed from its cultivation of Mediterranean trade. The *amirs* also augmented Qairawan's religious importance by turning the city into a major entrepôt whose merchants shipped slaves and other Sub-Saharan commodities to lucrative Middle Eastern markets. Revenues amassed through conquest and trade financed both rural improvements and urban growth. The Aghlabids oversaw the construction of extensive irrigation canals and reservoirs that heightened agricultural productivity and supported increasing urbanization. To guarantee the security of coastal towns and villages, the rulers built *ribats*, or fortified mosques, at key points along the shoreline.

Except for the mercantile elite, the Aghlabid rulers made little effort to foster the development of close ties with their subjects. The reign of Ibrahim II (875–902) demonstrated the importance not only of guarding against potential threats from external enemies, but also of maintaining the allegiance of the sedentary population. Doing so required the pursuit of sound economic policies and the exertion of sufficient strength to protect settled areas from nomadic incursions. Despite a sequence of climatic disasters and inadequate harvests during his reign, Ibrahim II levied high taxes to finance the construction of the royal city of Raqqada, near Qairawan. This extravagant project created antagonisms that not even his notable victories in Sicily could offset. Indeed, Ibrahim's overseas activities drew troops from Ifriqiya's western frontiers just as a serious threat was emerging there. Shi'ite propagandists won support among many Berbers by sowing dissatisfaction with the Abbasids and the

Aghlabids, both representatives of Islam's Sunni establishment. The individualistic nature of the Berbers predisposed them to appeals against authority, but the frequently deplorable treatment the Aghlabids had accorded them increased their susceptibility and many Berbers embraced Shi'ite Islam.

Despite their disengagement from Ifriqiya's affairs, the Abbasids realized that Ibrahim II could not surmount this challenge and that the continuation of his reign provided the Shi'ites with a choice target. They encouraged his relatives to demand Ibrahim's abdication. His successor's opposition to the Maliki legal school—which may have been intended to tighten the province's links with Baghdad—deprived him of local support and precipitated his assassination. The last Aghlabid ruler, Ziyadat Allah III (903–909), gained power by murdering relatives who opposed him. His actions not only weakened family solidarity, but also lent credence to accusations of immorality that the Shi'ites had leveled at the Aghlabids from the start of their campaign.

As Aghlabid fortunes ebbed in the early tenth century, those of the Shi'ites rose. Led by Abu Abdallah, the Berbers won a string of victories. These successes swelled their ranks, often with Berbers motivated more by materialistic concerns than moral or religious ones. The Aghlabids hesitated to seek the help of Baghdad, fearing that the Abbasids might take advantage of their weakness to reassert direct control over Ifriqiya. The rout of the Aghlabid army at al-Urbus in 909 signaled the dynasty's end. Ziyadat Allah III fled to Egypt, leaving Ifriqiya open to his enemies.

Aghlabid efforts to build a viable autonomous entity foundered on the dynasty's failure to forge durable links with the local populace. Extensive overseas campaigns supplied the revenue for the region's economic development, but the ill-considered practices of Ibrahim II weakened the ties between rulers and ruled. To many of their subjects, the Aghlabids' extravagant lifestyle emphasized their lack of interest in the people of Ifriqiya. When an alternative to the dynasty arose, many Aghlabid subjects, especially the Berbers from the fringes of the territory, supported it. Yet Shi'ite doctrines and rituals never took root in Ifriqiya, suggesting that the movement's attraction rested primarily on the framework it provided for political protest. Irritation with the rulers had grown so acute that any force capable of ousting them—even one based on a sect with little acceptance in Ifriqiya—gained followers. The Aghlabids fell because Abu Abdallah's Berber forces defeated them repeatedly on the battlefield, but a more fundamental cause of their collapse lay in their subjects' conviction that they had nothing to lose, and perhaps much to gain, in any political restructuring of the province.

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Agriculture, Cash Crops, Food Security

The majority of African nations became independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the immediate postcolonial period, most African nations chose mixed economies, with a concentration on industrial development, education, and expansion of their economies. Financing for these projects would come not only from revenue generated from agriculture, but also from foreign aid. Countries such as Mali, Ghana, and Guinea changed dramatically to revolutionary socialism in the early 1960s, and Nyerere's Tanzania adopted *ujamaa* or African socialism in the 1970s in the Arusha Declaration. *Ujamaa* was a unique socialist concept, which recognized the specificity of the African reality and experience. It focused on self-reliance through a process of villagization. The idea was to create cooperative villages where the means of production would be communally owned and directed by the village cooperative.

In spite of the different ideological directions of postcolonial African leaders, they all did not pay much attention to modernizing and diversifying the agricultural sector of their economies. Furthermore, African postcolonial regimes placed little emphasis on food production. To be sure, African leaders, both civilian and military, saw agriculture as a vehicle for generating much-needed surplus in the form of taxes to finance industrial development. Furthermore, the marketing



Sowing maize, Eritrea. Note the use of a camel for plowing.
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boards, which had been set up in the colonial period to stabilize cash crop prices, were continued in the post-colonial period and became instruments for appropriating surplus revenue. The surplus revenue has been used to provide social services, educational institutions, and infrastructure for the large cities to the neglect of the rural areas.

Among the reasons for the low priority given to agriculture in the 1960s was the assumption that industrialization was the most appropriate way to bring about rapid economic growth, structural change, and economic independence. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, there was a significant decline in the prices of agricultural commodities. Declining revenues from agricultural exports combined with ambitious programs of industrialization and inefficient bureaucracies engendered growing deficits in both government budgets and balance of payments. In order to be able to finance their development programs, African economies resorted to obtaining loans from international financial houses, which would result in a significant debt problem.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, almost all African governments shifted from industrialization, export promotion, and agricultural transformation to espousing the multiple goals of food self-sufficiency, improved nutrition, diversification of their economies, and increased income and social services.

One of the most formidable challenges faced by postcolonial, Sub-Saharan Africa has been lack of food security. From the early 1970s through the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa's food sector was characterized by a decline in per capita food production. In the last ten years Sub-Saharan Africa has had the largest growth of population in the Third World and the slowest growth of food production. Sub-Saharan Africa moved from an exporter to a significant importer of basic food staples. Final exports of basic food staples by Sub-Saharan Africa in the period from 1966 to 1970 were an average of 1.3 million tons a year. In fact, between 1961 and 1980, almost half of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gained annual increases of about 2 per cent. Eastern and southern Africa accounted for more than half of the total increase in food production in Sub-Saharan Africa, central Africa accounted for about a quarter, and West Africa was responsible for a little less than a quarter.

But this promising trade situation changed dramatically because production could not keep pace with the rise in demand. Consequently, net imports increased to ten million tons by the mid-1980s. For example, in West Africa, food exports, primarily groundnuts, declined, while food imports tripled. Structural constraints, ineffective government policies, changing environmental conditions, and the scourge of pests and

insects have adversely affected food security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

For example, cereal production in Tanzania plummeted because of drought in major parts of the country in the early 1970s and early 1980. The case of Sudan illustrates the inability of a country to harness its agricultural resources to stimulate economic growth and ensure food security. In the mid-1970s, it was hoped that the Sudan would get economic aid from the Middle East to develop its huge reserves of uncultivated land to become a major supplier of grain to the region. But in the 1980s Sudan's food imports amounted to \$30 million.

During the 1970s, several Sub-Saharan African countries launched accelerated food production programs to reverse the long decline in food production per capita and to reduce dependence on food imports. For example, when Ghana inaugurated its "Operation Feed Yourself" in 1972, the government stated that the decline of food production was attributable to the higher priority given to cocoa and palm oil. In the early stages of the program, the government placed emphasis on large-scale farms, which did not result in any significant increase in food production. Nigeria also inaugurated a similar program christened "Green Revolution" in the 1980s. In the immediate postcolonial period, Nigeria was a net exporter of food, primarily oil palm and groundnuts, but by the early 1970s, Nigeria was importing food. Nigeria imported 1.4 million tons of basic staples in 1977, and by 1981 the figure had reached \$1.3 billion.

Although these programs were intended to increase smallholder food production by enlarging peasant access to improved seeds, fertilizers, and other modern inputs at subsidized rates, the results were not encouraging. These programs failed to achieve their ambitious targets because of an unwieldy, bureaucratic organization, bad planning and implementation, lack of involvement by peasant farmers, and mismanagement.

There were, however, some exceptions to this rather dismal situation. Among the success stories on the food production front in the 1980s were food programs in Malawi and Zimbabwe. For example, in 1980, Zimbabwe exported 500,000 tons of maize. Also, Zimbabwe had a record maize crop of 215 million tons in 1981 and about one million tons was available for export. Although Zimbabwe was a net exporter of food in the 1980s, it was also characterized by a lack of the infrastructure for sustained food production by smallholders.

The structural policy failures of the 1970s and the worldwide recession of the early 1980s, resulted in a steady economic decline, and finally in a severe economic crisis. This made several African countries adopt the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)

initiated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SAPs were designed to diversify and rehabilitate African economies by stimulating domestic production in the agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial sectors. Furthermore, it was hoped that by generating internal production through the utilization of local raw materials, the balance of payments deficit would reduce and there would be a diminution of Africa's dependence on foreign imports. The SAPs also strove to deregulate the economy by removing administrative encumbrances and reducing the stranglehold of government on the economy. This new economic philosophy would effect liberalization of trade, privatization, and the fostering of a market economy.

Despite the improvement in the economic performance of many African countries in relation to food security since 1983, there are still a number of structural constraints and long-term challenges such as 1) a still high inflation rate, 2) a still high external debt burden, 3) an agricultural production that was still well below potential, and 4) still high prevalent rates of poverty and food insecurity. In order to cope with the above-mentioned structural bottlenecks and long-term challenges, African countries have continued to intensify their macroeconomic reforms.

For example, with regard to agriculture, the government of Ghana launched the Medium Term Agricultural Development Program (MTADP), 1991–2000. One of the main objectives of the MTADP was the provision of food security for all Ghanaians by way of adequate and nutritionally balanced diets at affordable prices. However, agricultural output and performance during this period was weak. The Accelerated Agriculture Growth and Development Strategy has been adopted as a new strategy for the period 1997–2007. The primary goal of this strategy is to increase the annual growth rate in agriculture to 6 per cent by 2007. Also in Malawi, specific projects such as Rural Financial Service and the Agricultural Services Project have supplemented the structural adjustment program. One of the new directions in most African countries regarding food security is the placing of greater reliance on the private sector and their grassroots organization while reducing the role of the public sector, especially in the direct production and marketing activities of agricultural inputs and outputs.

EZEKIEL WALKER

See also: Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment; Egypt, Ancient: Agriculture; Lesotho (Basutoland): Peasantry, Rise of; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Arusha Declaration; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Ahidjo, Ahmadou (1924–1989)

Politician and Cameroon's First President

To some, Ahmadou Ahidjo was an opportunist who found himself at the right place at the right time and, given the opportunity, did not hesitate to take advantage of his situation and outmaneuver his contemporaries. To others, he was an able leader who succeeded in molding the vastly diverse peoples of Cameroon into a united, stable, and prosperous country. He was the first president of Cameroon and served in that position for twenty-four years. He left office on his own accord, unlike many of his contemporaries, who were forced from power by coups d'état.

He worked in various parts of the country as a radio technician for several years before entering politics. He began his career as a radio technician in the Yaounde Broadcasting Station in 1943. He was then transferred to Bertoua in the eastern part of Cameroon to begin the first radio station in the region. After Bertoua, he was sent to Mokolo in the north for a similar task. In 1944, Ahidjo was made head of the Garoua radio station. The position was a very important position because Garoua was the headquarters of the northern region of Cameroon and the center of most activities in the region. He made the best use of his stay in his hometown to lay the foundation for his political career.

Ahidjo's political career began in earnest in 1946 when he was elected to the First Consultative Assembly of the then East Cameroon, created after the war in response to French Africa's support for Charles de Gaulle's Free French Movement during World War II. In 1952, when the French government replaced the Consultative Assembly with the Territorial Assembly, Ahidjo was reelected into that body. The French National Assembly passed the *loi cadre* ("enabling law") in June 1956, granting East Cameroon self-government and its own assembly. On December 23 of that year, Ahidjo was elected to the newly created East Cameroon Legislative Assembly. In February of 1957, Ahidjo organized the northern representatives of the

assembly into a voting bloc called Union Camerounaise (UC). In 1958, after the fall of the government headed by Andre Marie Mbida, Ahidjo, who had been vice premier and whose party controlled thirty-one of the seventy seats in the assembly, was asked to form a new government. No new elections were held again until after East Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960. Ahidjo became president by default and the country took the name the Republic of Cameroon.

On February 11, 1961, British-administered Southern Cameroon opted to reunite with the Republic of Cameroon in a United Nations-supervised plebiscite. Ahidjo became president of the new entity that was created from the union of the two territories, called the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The country's federal structure was changed in 1972 to a unitary system, called the United Republic of Cameroon. In 1982, Ahidjo suddenly resigned from office and handed power to his constitutionally designated and hand-picked prime minister, Paul Biya. Biya was from the Beti ethnic group in the south of Cameroon and also a Christian. But Ahidjo still kept his position as president of the ruling party after his resignation. Not long thereafter, friction erupted between him and Paul Biya, with Biya accusing him of meddling in state affairs. Ahidjo saw it differently, arguing that as head of the country's sole party (Cameroon National Union), he had the final say on state matters. Biya won out in the struggle that ensued. In 1983, the Biya government accused Ahidjo of plotting to overthrow Biya. But before the plot was made public, Ahidjo resigned his position as president of the party and left the country, entering a self-imposed exile.

In April 1984, members of the republican guards, who had been responsible for presidential security under Ahidjo and then Biya, attempted to overthrow the Biya government, without success. Ahidjo, who was implicated in this effort, was tried in absentia and given a death sentence, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. In 1989 he suffered a heart attack and died in Senegal.

Ahidjo was a contradictory figure, commanding respect and love within some segments of the population, earning hatred and repugnance from others. He brought stability to Cameroon, a diverse and multicultural country of more than 200 ethnic groups, two colonial cultures, and a north-south division along geographic as well as religious, cultural, and educational lines. His success at achieving national unity, however, came at a high cost in terms of democracy. Individual liberties, press freedom, human rights, and other democratic norms, including the right to organize and participate in political activities within the framework of free, fair, and competitive elections, were done away with under his rule. He imprisoned and even eliminated

individuals that he considered a threat to his regime. In 1966, he officially made Cameroon a one-party system with his Cameroon National Union party as the sole political party.

Under Ahidjo's leadership, the Cameroonian economy experienced unprecedented growth. He emphasized food and cash crop agriculture in his economic policy while pursuing an industrial policy that was built on medium-size import substitution industries. This paid off as income levels rose and Cameroon moved from being a low-income to a middle-income developing country. Cameroon under his rule also became one of the few African countries to be self-sufficient in food production.

MOSES K. TESI

See also: **Cameroon: Independence to the Present; Cameroon: Rebellion, Independence, Unification, 1960–1961.**

Biography

Born in the northern city of Garoua in 1924 to Fulani parents. In 1932, at age eight, entered the Garoua regional primary school. Joined the veterinary service in Maroua after failing to pass the final examination to graduate from primary school in 1938. After repeating the final year of primary school, he graduated and went on to Yaoundé Higher School, graduating in 1942. Completed a six-month training in Douala to be a radio technician in 1943. Named president of the Republic of Cameroon (former East Cameroon) on January 1, 1960. Named president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (later the United Republic of Cameroon) in 1961, created when Southern Cameroon opted to reunite with the Republic of Cameroon. In 1982, resigned and handed power to his prime minister, Paul Biya. Accused of plotting to overthrow Biya in 1983. Left the country in self-imposed exile. In 1989, suffered a heart attack and died in Senegal.

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Aid, International, NGOs, and the State

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been instrumental in providing a wide range of aid to African countries. Mostly multinational in composition, they operate with the consent of host governments. They are a diverse group of largely voluntary, nonmembership support organizations that work with communities to provide technical advice and economic, social, and humanitarian assistance to address development issues. In Africa, some of their specific developmental objectives include tackling poverty, providing financial credit and technical advice to the poor, empowering marginal groups, challenging gender discrimination, and delivering emergency relief.

NGOs can be professional associations, religious institutions, research institutions, private foundations, or international and indigenous funding and development agencies. The NGOs are usually either international or indigenous organizations; most of the indigenous organizations are community-based grassroots and service-based organizations.

Some well-known NGOs in Africa are the Catholic Relief Services, the Salvation Army, CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, Ford Foundation, and Oxfam. Some NGOs focus on particular issues; for example, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the Population Council, and Family Planning International Assistance address population issues, while the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) deliver humanitarian aid.

The number of NGOs has accelerated recently. For example, the number of NGOs registered with the United Nations jumped from 48 in 1989 to 1,300 in 1994. Numbers of NGOs within each country vary; for example, Kenya has more than 400 NGOs, while Ethiopia has less than 50 (Bratton 1989). The principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that Western governments, not just private donations, finance them (*The Economist* 2000). For example, of Oxfam's \$162 million income in 1998, a quarter (\$24.1 million) was given by the British government and the European Union. Medecins Sans Frontieres receives 46 per cent of its income from government sources.

NGOs play an important role in the social and economic development of Africa in directing government aid and setting policy. The present prominence of NGOs in development thinking stems from economic constraints on state activity, the propensity of donors to channel aid through the voluntary sector, and a set of

beliefs about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of NGOs (Curtis 1994). Donors increasingly see NGOs as a means of filling gaps in weak, ineffective government programs, and have begun to call for more NGO involvement in programs that have traditionally been implemented through government organizations (Bebbington and Farrington 1993).

Some African governments have instituted coordinating bodies to supervise NGO activity. Some examples of these coordinating bodies include the Voluntary Organizations in Community Enterprise, the Council for Social Development in Zambia, the Permanent Secretariat of NGOs in Burkina Faso, and the Council of NGO Activity in Togo.

The relationship between NGOs and states is highly variable and contentious. Ndegwa (1994) argues that NGOs have contributed to the wider political reform movement in Kenya by successfully repelling controlling legislation of their activities in 1990. Ndiaye (1999) maintains that NGOs and grassroots organizations such as village self-help groups, women's organizations, and peasant associations have been highly effective in Africa. However, many discussions of NGOs overoptimistically assess their effectiveness as agents of grassroots change and agricultural development, and NGOs' rhetoric of democratic participation exceeds reality (Bebbington and Farrington 1994).

In some cases, NGOs are becoming instruments of Western government foreign policy (*Economist* 2000). In 1999, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution to deliver food aid to rebels in southern Sudan via USAID and some Christian NGOs. Other NGOs are directly intervening in African politics. For example, UNICEF brought about a peace deal between Uganda and Sudan, and the Italian Catholic lay community of Sant' Egidio helped to end thirteen years of civil war in Mozambique in 1992.

Some authors identify negative relationships between NGOs and African states. Beinart (1994) argues that NGOs in Somalia in the 1980s condoned and engaged with corrupt networks and repressive strategies to win government approval. These policies decimated civil society and eventually led to civil war. Only one NGO, a small Australian agency called Community Aid Abroad, spoke out and left the country in protest against Muhammad Siad Barré's human rights record in 1989. In South Africa, Johnson (1998) claims that NGOs undermined democracy. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the National Democratic Institute (NDI) apparently to promote multiparty democracy in South Africa, and the NDI has been linked with communists. And the Ford Foundation supported a bill that would give the South African government broad powers over all nongovernmental organizations.

Other researchers argue that NGOs undermine governments. By filling a void in terms of additional investments, capital, and services to rural areas, NGOs undermine the ability of governments to perform as effective leaders and policymakers.

Partnerships between international, national, and indigenous NGOs are growing, with increasing calls for African states to encourage growth and interaction among NGOs (e.g., Chazan 1992; Kingman 1994). For example, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations, formed in 1987, encourages NGOs to exchange ideas, share their expertise and resources, support local initiatives, and establish effective channels of communication and partnerships with governments and intergovernmental organizations. An increasing number of NGOs collaborate with the World Bank to address rural development, population, health, and infrastructural issues that are relevant to the human dimensions of its structural adjustment programs. Several NGOs also have consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

There are numerous successful cases of NGOs working closely together and with governments, in particular in times of crisis in Africa. For example, during the Ethiopian famine in 1984 and 1985, the United Nations coordinated the relief program. The Ethiopian government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and sixty-three NGOs distributed basic food rations to more than seven million people. Since the early 1990s it has been widely suggested that development strategies would benefit from increased collaboration between government and NGOs. This suggestion has come from various points across the ideological spectrum, from NGO activists and radical economists to the new right and the multilateral institutions. They claim that NGO involvement ought to increase the impact of programs in grassroots development and poverty alleviation, and contribute to the democratization of the development process.

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Air, Sultanate of

Traditionally, the largest Tuareg political unit is the group under the leadership of a supreme chief, known as the *amenukal* or sultan. He is also traditional leader of the drum-groups (descent-based clans) within the larger political group. In Air, the Amenukal is more often called the sultan of Air in Agadez. In the past, the sultan of Air was considered supreme chief with superior judicial rights and also war leader of the whole group. But the authority was somewhat limited, and quarrels between the various drum-groups within a larger confederation were very frequent.

The people who are placed under the sultan of Air are called the Kel Amenukal ("People of the Sultan"), and are predominantly pastoralists, with some sedentary or semi-sedentary groups also among them. They are comprised of Itesen, Kel Faday, Kel Ferwan, and Kel Geres (though the latter now live outside Air, to the south in the Hausa borderlands).

Accounts of the history and origin of the sultanate have different variants. These are connected to the relationships among the various Tuareg precolonial drum-groups and confederations, and also to their relationships with neighboring peoples. The first sultan of Air was Yunus. He was succeeded by his nephew, Akkasan (Hamani 1989:146). There is vagueness and dispute concerning his precise genealogy preceding this, but these feminine names clearly indicate the initial importance of at least the Berber matrilineal type of descent and succession. The *Agadez Chronicle*, a compilation of Arabic manuscripts kept by the current sultan, dates the establishment of the Air sultanate as in 1405 BCE. Before that time, it was said in oral and chronicle traditions, anarchy reigned over the country.

Despite disagreements and uncertainty surrounding the origin of the Air sultanate, most traditions now agree on the existence of a situation of crisis in Air toward the end of the fourteenth century. The Itesen were the most powerful of the Tuareg groups, but their supremacy was not uncontested. Certain factions refused to obey their leader, Aghumbulu, and these troubles caused them to search for a supreme arbitrator from outside. The document *Kitab Asi Sultanati Ahyar I*

reports that the Isandalan, after the out-migration of the Gobirawa (proto-Hausa, Sudanic farming) populations who had earlier lived in Air, had no designated sultan. "Their [The Itesens'] social state was like that of Arabs, and like the Arabs, there were only elder judges to adjudicate among them. This situation obliged them to look for a sultan" (Hamani 1989: 137–138). This document continues to relate the story of five groups going to Aghram Sattafan to find a sultan and transporting him to the country of Tadaliza.

Traditions indicate the marginal but prestigious position of the sultan in Air Tuareg society. Whether his reputed descent from the sultan of Constantinople is literally "true" or mythical/symbolic, the point is that this legend is in effect a metaphor that endows him with spiritual, as well as secular, creativity and power, and conveys his ability to mediate in disputes from outside the local descent and alliance system of the noble clans. From this perspective, of viewing the lines of "myth/history" as continued and blurred rather than discrete, one can understand why the noble drum-groups still elect as heir to the sultanate a son of a concubine of Sudanese origins, rather than the son of a Tuareg wife from among his sons.

The first sultans were installed in the southern parts of Air, in the rocky mountainous zones, indicating that their Tuareg drum-groups had not yet come out of the massif into Agadez and needed a leader there, near them, in the Itesan region, near the caravan passage points. The proximity to Agadez soon became important, however. War (victory of the Kel Taghazart Zigrat over the Tasannagat) caused the royal family to leave the mountainous zones and move closer to the town's security and centrality to trade routes (Hamani 1989:147). Agadezian traditions state that Sultan Yusuf was the first sultan of Air to be installed in Agadez. This move was also a response to other, wider events and conditions during the fifteenth century in the region extending between Middle Niger and Lake Chad. In the Chad region there was the renaissance of the Sayfawa and a new expansionist Bornu kingdom. To the west of Bornu, the Hausa lands attained political and economic complexity: a new dynasty appeared in Katsina with Muhammad Korau, and by the middle of the century, Katsinawa merchants were present in Agadez. A trading connection was solidly established between Hausa country and North Africa by the Air.

At the junction of these events, the installation of the first Sultan Yusuf in Agadez took place. Djibo Hamani analyzes oral traditions' accounts of the installation of the first sultanate, as recorded in the *Tarikh Asli Wilayat Amir Abzin VIII* in Agadez, obtained from Sarkin Makada Kutuba, as follows: in the sixteenth century there were wars against Tigidda. Following the death of a co-leader, Al Ghadil against Tigidda, war

continued until the day when they called in Aligurran, the Tuareg mythical ancestor who in local legends inscribed the Tifinagh (Tamajaq alphabet) writings on the Saharan rock art. They made him a large lance, of gold and copper, and performed rituals. Aligurran divined by throwing this lance, from Tadaliza (where one still sees his footprint), to where it fell: at the place where the palace of the sultan would be built. The day after this lance-throwing, all the Tuareg mounted donkeys, oxen, camels, and horses, and they left in search of the lance. They found it near a stream with many euphorbia (a type of plant). The people gave cries of joy, cut the euphorbia in their enthusiasm, and constructed the palace. Then they went to search for the sultan and installed him. The Tuareg who were with the sultan built themselves small dwellings and occupied them (Hamani 1989:155–156).

On the surface, this tradition appears to imply that the sultan leadership of Tadaliza wished to escape from Tigidda to find a better leverage point for maximizing their chances for success against Tigidda. But the end of the text contradicts this idea: Kutuba related how, after some time, the Tuareg, who came from the sultan's installation, said: "Agadez is not a place where one can install (a sultan); it is a place of visiting, a place for the Maggades (Agadezian people, of Songhay origin) and the Arabs." So they got up and left the town, leaving their slaves in their homes. When they came in from the desert to see the sultan, they lodged with their slaves, but did not have their own homes in Agadez. Thus the nomadic Tuareg saw their own homes as outside of Agadez. Indeed, a similar pattern persisted in Agadez in the 1970s: many nomads at that time still tended to reside outside the town, coming into it only for trading and other business and lodging with clients and formerly servile families who resided there.

In precolonial eras, the sultan was the main arbitrator and judge in disagreements between the different Tuareg groups, whose supreme chiefs were installed by him. But he could not meddle in their internal affairs, and rarely was so influential that he could stop the frequent disputes and battles. Since the French colonial administration, the power of individual drum-chiefs has diminished, while that of the sultan of Air has increased, now backed by central state coercion. During the French subjugation of the Tuareg regions of the Sahara, Sultan Tegama was involved in much Tuareg resistance. In more recent times, the sultan of Agadez became a liaison between the independent nation-state central government in Niamey, the capital of present-day Niger, and local government: he was placed in charge of tax collection and school registration. The current sultan of Air was caught up in the 1990–1995 armed conflict between Tuareg separatist/nationalist rebels and the central state government of Niger. Many

Tuareg cultural events have shifted from the sultan's palace near the Agadez mosque, their former place of performance, to the newly-constructed Maison des Jeunes (Youth House) on the outskirts of the town. The sultan now spends much of his time in Niamey.

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See also: **Tuareg.**

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Aja-Speaking Peoples: Aja, Fon, Ewe, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The Aja (Adja), the Fon, and the Ewe are often classified together in the historical literature under blanket terms such as the Aja, the Aja-Ewe, or more recently, the Gbe. Although distinct from each other, the Aja, the Fon, and the Ewe share a common set of cultural beliefs and practices, their languages all belong to the Kwa subgroup of the Niger-Congo language family, and they have a collective history of migrations from areas to the east of their present locations. These migrations originated from Ketu, a walled city in present-day southeastern Benin, probably in the fifteenth century, according to oral traditions.

During the seventeenth century, the migrations entered their final phase, and the Aja, the Fon, and the Ewe each settled into the areas that they inhabit today: the Aja and Fon in southern Bénin, with small populations of each in southern Togo and southwestern Nigeria, and the Ewe in southeastern Ghana and southern Togo. Flanked by the Akan to the west and the Yoruba to the east, this stretch of West Africa was referred to as the "Slave Coast" by European cartographers by the end of the century.

There was a series of migrations out of the Aja kingdom of Allada, located on the coast of present-day Benin, due to a succession dispute in the early seventeenth century. The migrants settled in a plateau area of woodland savanna about sixty miles north of the coast, established the kingdom of Dahomey in the 1620s, and eventually became known as the Fon. The kingdom gradually expanded into areas to the south and southeast of Abomey, the capital of Dahomey. But, throughout the seventeenth century, the most powerful local polities were Allada and Hweda, another coastal Aja kingdom

that was later superseded by the town of Ouidah (Whydah), both of which conducted trade directly with European merchants. Furthermore, Dahomey was a tributary state of its powerful neighbor to the east, the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo.

Under King Agaja (1708–1740), Dahomey came to dominate most of the Aja kingdoms, including Allada, Hweda, Grand Popo (Popo), and Jakin, by the 1740s. Concerned with Dahomey's growing power, Oyo attacked the Fon kingdom four times between 1726 and 1730. As a result, Agaja agreed to continue to pay an annual tribute and to recognize Oyo's control over Porto Novo (in present-day Benin).

The central kingdom of Dahomey became the most powerful state between the Volta and the Mono Rivers. Dahomey was one of the biggest suppliers of slaves in West Africa and derived most of its revenues from that trade. During the early eighteenth century, the trade in slaves to the French, the English, the Portuguese, and the Dutch at Ouidah, controlled by Abomey, increased dramatically.

Further to the west, the Ewe split into three distinct groups after their dispersal from Notsé, a walled-town in central Togo. The first traveled in a northwesterly direction and settled the upland and valley regions and founded, among others, the towns of Hohoe, Kpandu, and Peki (in present-day Ghana), as well as Kpalimé (Togo). Ho and surrounding towns (Ghana) were settled by the Ewes, who migrated westward from Notsé. Finally, the third group moved toward the southwest and settled along the coast and founded the towns of Be (which includes what is presently Lomé, the capital of Togo) and Anlo (Ghana), among others. After arriving in these locations in the mid-seventeenth century, the Ewe were soon joined by other immigrants from west of the Volta River, including speakers of the Ga, Akan, and Guang languages. In addition, it is assumed that speakers of the Central-Togo languages (also known as the Togo Remnant languages) were indigenous to the central and northern areas settled by the Ewe and other migrant groups.

The Ewe-speaking region (often referred to as Ewe-land) was comprised of numerous chieftaincies and small states. Chieftaincies existed at the town level, while several towns together constituted a state, presided over by a paramount chief, who was elected on a patrilineal basis, from one or two lineages of the founding families, and advised by a council of elders. Although each of the Ewe polities was independent of the others, their shared linguistic, cultural, and historical ties served to foster a common identity.

The areas inhabited by the Ewe, particularly the northern part, were drastically affected by the slave trade in the eighteenth century. Highly decentralized and thus lacking an organized military defense, the

Ewe were attacked by nearby powerful states, particularly those of the Akan, and sometimes participated in the slave trade themselves. Various Ewe groups repeatedly battled one another for prominence in the local slave trade. During the 1680s, for example, the Anlo Ewe and the Ge Ewe fought several wars in their attempts to wrest control of this trade from each other.

Several Ewe groups also allied themselves with non-Ewe. The longest-lasting of these alliances was between the Anlo Ewe and the Akan state of Akwamu, who together waged war against other Ewe polities in the 1730s. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Anlo Ewe state had become a local power based on its position within the regional trading network, particularly due to its commerce with the Danes at the coast, who built a fort at Keta in 1784.

In the early eighteenth century, the Akwamu subjugated the Ewe towns of Ho, Kpandu, and Peki. The Akwamu were forced to retreat from this area in 1730 after their conquest by the Akyem, another expansionist Akan state, who themselves were defeated in 1742 by the Asante. By the mid-eighteenth century, Asante assumed its place as the dominant economic and military power in the region west of Dahomey.

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Aja-Speaking Peoples: Dahomey, Rise of, Seventeenth Century

Throughout the seventeenth century, the Aja lived in the southern third of the modern Republic of Benin. The Aja kingdom, known as Dahomey, was created by a ruling dynasty of the Fon or Aja, during the second half of the seventeenth century. This dynasty ruled Dahomey until the end of the nineteenth century. The kingdom began as a vassal or tributary state of the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo. It became independent in 1818. Under the leadership of King Gezo (1818–1858),

and King Glele (1859–1889), Dahomey developed into one of the most efficient indigenous African states in history.

Dahomey began as an offshoot of Allada. A branch of the Allada dynasty set out, with several hundred followers, to conquer the stateless and leaderless people who lived on the Abomey plateau. Dahomey, by contrast, was a centralized state with a well organized, disciplined, and hierarchically arranged military machine. By the late seventeenth century, Dahomey was in command of the coastal hinterland, which it raided at will to collect slaves. The Dahomey also broke away from the parent Aja kingdoms because they wanted to trade with European merchants. The other Aja kingdoms refused to trade with Europeans, yet European power was growing. As European power grew the Aja kingdoms declined. Public order was threatened, and good government declined. The European presence created new difficulties for the Aja. The Dahomey believed that by working with Europeans solutions to these problems would evolve.

Dahoman kings were not absolute monarchs; they consulted frequently with the Great Council and the council of ministers, as well as distinguished merchants and soldiers. Representatives of most interest groups had access to the king and could influence him. Dahomey's rulers rose to power through courage in battle and success in war.

Dahoman officials were appointed, transferred, and dismissed by the king. Conquered states formed integrated provinces within the kingdom. Neither vassal kings nor separate laws were recognized. The king and his council of advisors dominated hereditary aristocrats. The *mingi* served as the king's chief magistrate and police chief. The *meu* collected taxes for the king and acted as minister of finance. The *topke* served as minister of agriculture, and the *yevogan* acted as foreign minister and handled external affairs for the Dahomey. His duties included supervision of seaports, such as Whydah, overseas trade, and European relations. Female officials, known as *naye*, served in each province as the king's special envoys. They inspected male officials' work, and reported any irregularities directly to the king. Dahomey developed a special class of fierce female warriors. They joined the army to protect their children from Yoruba slave trading cavalry. On a continent where women are usually subservient and deferential to men, this marked an extraordinary development. The British explorer, Sir Richard Burton, called these female soldiers Amazons and created a legend.

The civil service planned and managed the economy for the king. Farm production allowed for the support of all royalty, the elite, the urban craft population, the army, and a surplus cash crop for sale. During crop

shortages, the government forced specific regions to produce more of it. An annual census counted all livestock. The state collected income tax, custom duties, and road tolls to generate operating revenue. Rental of royal estates created additional wealth. This revenue, together with guns and ammunition, became the foundation for their power and their freedom. Without these, Dahomey would become a victim of neighboring kingdoms' slave raids.

Oyo frequently raided Dahomey and forced the Dahomans to pay the Yoruba tribute, in the form of an increased but tragic flow of slaves. Historians estimate that Allada and Whydah exported more than 20,000 slaves a year between 1680 and 1730 (Oliver 1981: 99). African city-states, such as those created by the Aja, saw the slave trade as a peripheral issue. Their goal was power and territorial expansion. To achieve this they needed guns from Europe and horses from the north. Northern Hausa city-states captured and trained horses. They demanded slaves in payment for their horses. Europeans, likewise, demanded slaves as payment for guns. As Aja power grew, Dahomey kept an increasing number of slaves who were put to work on farms, which supported the urban population. Slave agricultural villages emerged in areas around cities. Taxes and tribute from an expanding tributary region soon exceeded the slave trade in value. More and more people were needed to man Dahomey's expanding armies. Slave soldiers grew in importance. The neighboring Yoruba city-state of Benin restricted the sale of slaves to Europeans. Agricultural expansion required their labor at home. Slave status did not carry the stigma it had in the Americas and Europe. Few Africans realized that fellow Africans sold into slavery in the America's faced permanent bondage. They thought of slavery as Europeans think of serfdom. Tradition demanded the adoption of loyal slaves into the master's family. Commonly, rewards of land and freedom followed the master's death (Davidson 1961: passion.) Descendants of slaves easily assimilated into society as members of one social class or another.

Dahomans are often portrayed as bloodthirsty savages because of mass killings. This view is inaccurate. Indirectly, European slave traders caused mass murders. Dahomey gathered together large numbers of slaves at special coastal bulking stations. Here they waited for European slave ships that visited every month or so. European slave traders preferred to buy entire shiploads of slaves, rather than buy slaves in lots from different ports. Europeans tried to give Dahoman kings sufficient time to collect an entire shipload of slaves before visiting their ports. Often Europeans miscalculated how long it would take Dahomans to gather a shipload of slaves. If European slave traders waited too long, then slaves at coastal bulking stations

exhausted local food supplies. Dahoman kings devised massive ritual murders, rather than watch slaves die of starvation. The kings viewed these killings as humanitarian. To justify these acts to their people they claimed that such rituals were required to guarantee their continued strength, vitality, and courage to rule. In time, this became part of their tradition. On several occasions, European slave traders pulled into port too late to buy the slaves Dahomey collected for them, but soon enough to witness the bloody ritual murders, not realizing that their demand for slaves helped to cause such horrors.

The need for defense against nearby slave raiding states and the need to collaborate with Europeans to guarantee the safety of Dahomey's children caused the formation of this great state in the seventeenth century. Its armies pushed out in all directions, trying to create buffers to safeguard the state. The state first broke through to, and captured, slave ports in an effort to end the slave trade. The need to acquire guns and ammunition from Europeans caused the reversal of this policy.

The Dahomey state reached its pinnacle between 1790 and 1858. In 1818 its armies won independence from Oyo and ravaged surrounding areas for slaves to work palm oil plantations. By 1850, the palm oil trade supplanted the slave trade as the dominant trade relationship binding Dahomey and Europe. The decline and abolishment of the slave trade eased pressures upon Dahomey to defend itself. Today, the modern nation of Benin occupies Dahomey's territory plus additional lands to its north.

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See also: Yoruba-Speaking Peoples; Yoruba States (Other Than Ife and Oyo).

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Akan and Asante: Farmers, Traders, and the Emergence of Akan States

The Akan people, who comprise close to 60 per cent of the modern nation of Ghana, have a richly textured history, which can be traced back to at least 1500 BCE. They possess a common language that is called *Twi*, a lineage system based on the matriline, and common religious beliefs based on worship of the supreme being, *Onyame*, although the names of secondary deities may vary from place to place. How and when the Akan people coalesced from disparate local origins into the large, identifiable ethnolinguistic subgroup that is today classified as part of the greater Kwa subfamily of West African languages is uncertain. Whereas older formulations suggested origins of the Akan from more distant parts of Africa (perhaps as far east as the Nile Valley), the most up-to-date archaeological and linguistic research points to local origins near the present-day frontiers of Ghana and the Côte d'Ivoire. Today the Akan, or Twi-speaking peoples, occupy the southern half of Ghana, and also parts of Togoland and the southeastern corner of the Côte d'Ivoire. Their closest neighbors are the Ga-Andangme peoples of southeastern Ghana. They are bounded on the east by the Ewe peoples and on the north by the Guan-speaking peoples. Some of the major linguistic and political subdivisions of the Akan are Akyem, Akuapem, Asante, Assin-Twifo, Wassa, Fanti-Agona, Ahanta, Wassa, Nzema, and Sefwi/Aowin.

It would appear that, from at least medieval times, the people later called the Akan were living in small



The Akan of Ghana. A group of village elders in the Akan region from the 1970s. © Raymond E. Dumett.

chiefdoms in the forests and coastlands of what is now Ghana. According to most local traditions, as well as early European sources, the original heartland of the Akan people was called “Accany,” an area that was roughly congruent with the modern Akan states of Adanse (in southern Asante), plus Assin and Twifo. Early Dutch maps of the seventeenth century sometimes show a “Great Akani”; but it is difficult to know if this was a true state, a league of chieftaincies, or simply a broad geographic or cultural expression. Simultaneously, the period 1000 to 1500 also witnessed the organization of towns and pre-states on the northern fringes of the Akan cultural area. Bono-Manso (in the Brong region), which became the early hub of a northern trading network appears to have been the first entity where the well-known royal regalia of all future states—the golden stool, golden sword, and the mace—were conceived and then diffused further south.

It would be a mistake to speak of the early Akan simply, or even mainly, as farmers, even though that is their main reputation today. From the earliest times of recorded history, it is clear that the Akan exhibited entrepreneurial skills in a diverse range of economic activities. To express this diversity a better term would be farmers/hunters/fishermen/gold miners and long-distance traders. It is important to point out that in most districts before the twentieth century a majority of the Akan states were sparsely populated, and so the demands on the land for intensive food crop cultivation were not great. Forests blanketed much of the land, and villages with extensive cleared land fields were few and far between. Most cultivated family plots surrounding characteristic *nkuro*, or hamlets, were small, dispersed, and difficult for strangers to discern. Modern specialists estimate that the average size of family forest farms in Asante was about 2.5 acres (or one hectare). Early sources indicate that in the precolonial period interior markets were rare, that the wants of most people were relatively simple and based on subsistence production; and that, therefore, the agricultural requirements for the most common staples—bananas, plantains, plus native yams—were not overwhelming. People supplemented their diet with protein derived from considerable time spent in forest hunting (deer and “bush puppies”), river fishing, and foraging (for example, forest snails were a significant food item).

The inception of the Atlantic overseas trade constituted a major watershed in the life of the Akan people. Trading contacts, with European oceanic traders—first the Portuguese and later the Dutch and English—brought economic betterment for some and with it social change. The opportunities for profit from trade drew upcountry people to the coast, stimulating

population growth; and this gradually transformed, in some cases, what had previously been villages into trading towns, near the European trading forts and the offshore roadsteads for passing ships. Documents speak of a constant coming and going of producers and traders into such coastal towns as Saltpond, Cape Coast, El Mina, and Axim. Although most transactions continued to be in gold dust or by barter, there was a gradual monetization of the local economy based on the introduction of European coins. Although slave labor was common, both at the European trading factories and under indigenous African entrepreneurship, opportunities for artisanship led to experience and local traditions in the skilled trades, such as carpentry, stoneworking, and blacksmithing.

The other major development, which gained force in the late 1600s, was the growth of state formation among major Akan subgroups. States and kingdoms grew slowly out of earlier family, lineage, and village organizations and were often the product of alliances and confederations of chieftaincies. It should be noted that the Akan states were seldom defined by rigid territorial boundaries: the power of a paramount ruler over subordinated kings and chiefs was highly flexible, and it depended on the dynamism of the particular man holding office. Often a state’s power extended along major trade routes, and was felt mainly in the towns and villages along those routes, like the nodes in a spider’s web. It is clear, however, that the great expansion of Atlantic commerce in which imported firearms and other manufactured products were exchanged, first for gold and later, and most substantially for slaves, ran parallel to, and, indeed, was a prime causal factor in the expansion of the great Akan forest kingdoms, such as Akwamu, Denkyera, Gyaman, and, above all, Asante. In each of these states complex, centralized administrative cadres developed.

Modern Akan nationalism evolved slowly out of a mixture of Western-style education and a reaction against British colonial rule. Under the leadership of both traditional kings and chiefs, plus the westernized elite of the central coastal districts, the Fante Confederation (1868–1873) reflected a strong attempt by the coastal Akan to establish their own self-governing institutions and also to provide a counterweight to the great inland power of Asante. The inability of British officials at the time to perceive the worth of this organization as an early building block for democratic nationhood constituted one of the great missed opportunities of colonial rule. Another Akan-based proto-nationalist movement was the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society of 1897, which successfully blocked efforts by colonial officials to bring all exploitable mineral and forests lands under government control.

Throughout their history, the Akan people have displayed remarkable entrepreneurial capabilities. Gold mining—both small-scale/artisanal and capitalistic/mechanized—has been a continuing major theme up to the present day. But by the second half of the nineteenth century, these qualities were also evinced in their responsiveness to price incentives for the production of palm oil and palm kernels, in the development of the export trade in wild rubber, in the exploitation of local mahogany forests, initially in the southwestern region and later in Asante and the Brong-Ahafo region; and, above all, in the famous cocoa-growing revolution. Research by Polly Hill and by Gareth Austin has underscored the great abilities of Akan cocoa farmers from Akwapim, Akyem, and Asante in adapting traditional socioeconomic institutions and in perfecting growing, drying, and distribution methods to meet the demands of the world market in the development of Ghana's primary export industry of the twentieth century.

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Akan States: Bono, Dankyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

The Akan constitute the largest single ethno-cultural group of Ghana, forming about 50 per cent of its population. They consist today of the Akyem, Asante, Assin, Akuapem, Akwamu, Bono or Bron, Denkyira, Etsi, Fante, Gyaaman, Kwahu, Twifo, and Wassa.

At one time it was thought that the Akan migrated from the north and east, from ancient Ghana, Mesopotamia, Egypt, or Libya. However, on the basis of archaeological, linguistic, ethnic, and oral evidence, it seems likely that the Akan evolved in Ghana in the Adansi-Amansie region by about 1000.

The first Akan state to emerge was Bono (capital Bono-Manso), southwest of the Black and White Volta and east of the important Mande or Dyula trading

center of Begho (Nsoko), and north of the forest region. It was founded in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century with a view to tapping the Banda gold fields and controlling the trade routes linking the areas of the Niger bend, the Sahara, and Hausaland to the north and the Akan gold and kola-producing forest regions to the south. The rapid development of the state is attributed to two of its early kings, Ameyaw and Obunumankoma, during the second half of the fifteenth century. By the third decade of the seventeenth century, Bono had developed into a large, wealthy, and cultured kingdom; this is borne out by the fact that Bono is clearly indicated on a map drawn on Christmas Day 1629 by a Dutch cartographer at Moure in Asebu on the coast.

The other Akan states of Denkyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, and Kwahu developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

According to oral tradition, Fante was founded by the Borebore Fante, who migrated from Tekyiman, first to Kwaaman and then to Mankessim. Fante had become well established by the time the Portuguese appeared on the coast in the 1470s. Unlike many of the Akan emigrants, the Borebore Fante did not establish different states or kingdoms, but all settled together at Mankessim about ten miles from the coast in five different quarters, namely, Kurentsi Aman, Anafo, Bentsi, Edumadze, and Nkusukum. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the government of that state was not monarchical (unlike neighboring Akan states). The state did have one head, but he was referred to in the European records as *Braffo* and not *Ohene* of Fante, and that office rotated among the *Braffo* of the different quarters of the city-state.

The founders of the present three Akyem states, Akyem Abuakwa, Akyem Kotoku, and Akyem Bosome with their capitals of Kyebi, Akyem Oda, and Akyem Swedro, respectively, belong to the Asona and Agona clans, and originated in the Adansi area from where they migrated to found these states. Since these states appear on the 1629 map as well established, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they were founded during the second half of the sixteenth century. By the time of that map, Akyem Abuakwa—from its capital at Bansa—was dominating that Pra-Birem area, and must have established control over the trade routes and the gold-producing districts of the area. By the end of the seventeenth century, Akyem Abuakwa had grown into a large, rich, and centralized kingdom and one of the leading producers of gold in the country, ruled by “the king. . . who may be called an Emperor.”

The Agona founders of Akyem Kotoku also migrated from Adansi about that same time as the Abuakwa, first to Ahwiren near Bekwai, and from where they settled finally at Adupon near Dwansa on

the Konongo-Agogo road by about the end of the sixteenth century. By the middle of the seventeenth century, they had succeeded in establishing the Kotoku state in the present Asante-Akyem area between the Pra and Lake Bosumtwi. The Agona founders of Bosome also migrated with their kinsmen, the Kotoku, to Ahwiren and thence to Kotoku Omanso on Lake Bosomtwe. They remained on the lake as a small state, becoming a tributary state first of Denkyira during the second half of the seventeenth century, and then of Asante throughout the eighteenth century.

While the Akyem states were emerging in the Adansi/Pra-Birem areas, Denkyira and Akwamu were also rising in the west and east. The founders of Denkyira were members of the Agona clan, which evolved in the Adansi area near Akrokyere and from where they migrated southwestward to settle at Bansa or Abankeseeso in the rich gold-producing Oda-Ofin basin. It has now been established that, as in the case of the Akyem states, the foundation of Denkyira was laid toward the end of the sixteenth century. It was not until the second half of the seventeenth century that the state rapidly expanded and conquered all the pre-Asante states including Adansi to the northeast, part of present Ahafo area to the northwest, Wassa and Aowin to the west, and Twifo and Assin and even Fetu to the south. By the end of the seventeenth century, Denkyira had developed into a large and rich empire dominating the southwestern part of the country.

While Denkyira was emerging in the west, the Aduana state of Akwamu was rising in the east. According to oral tradition, they migrated from the early Akan state of Twifo and settled at Asamankese from where they later migrated eastward and founded their second capital, Nyanoase, near Nsawam. Its foundation, like that of the Akyem states, probably took place during the second half of the sixteenth century.

The second phase of Akwamu's expansion began after 1600 and ended in about 1670. It was during this period that Akwamu expanded northwestward to the Atewa hills and Anyinam, northward to the border of Kwahu, and eastward by conquering the predominantly Guan principalities of Tafo, Aburi, Equea, Aberadi, Late, and Kamana. The final phase began in 1677 and ended in 1700. The Akwamu defeated the Ga kingdom, the Adangbe Ladoku kingdom, and the Agona state, and crowned its successes with the capture of Christiansborg Castle in 1693. By the end of the seventeenth century, the small inland Aduana state of Asamankese had been converted into the largest Akan kingdom (if not empire), dominating southeastern Ghana.

In the southwestern part of the country, a similar political revolution was taking place in the rise and

growth of Wassa. There are now three Wassa states, Wassa Amenfi, Wassa Fiase, and Wassa Mpoho with their capitals Akropon, Benso, and Mpoho, respectively. It appears, however, that until the eighteenth century there was only a single Wassa state. The founders of this Asona state, like their Abuakwa kinsmen, evolved in the Adansi area and while the latter migrated eastward, the former turned southwestward, possibly through Twifo-Heman to Nerebehi. Since Wassa was well-known to the Portuguese as a rich gold-producing state by the early decades of the sixteenth century, and in fact, the Portuguese sent an ambassador to the king's court in 1520, it would appear that the founders of Wassa migrated from the Adansi area much earlier than the Asona of Abuakwa, probably during the second half of the fifteenth century. During the second half of the seventeenth century, the Wassa rulers continued their expansionist activities southward toward the coast, and by the end of that century Wassa was dominating southwestern Ghana and had become the leading producers of gold in the country.

It is evident from the above that by the end of the seventeenth century, a veritable political revolution had taken place in the Akan areas of southern Ghana. In place of the forty or so small states and principalities in place prior to the sixteenth century, just a few large kingdoms, or rather empires, had emerged.

There are several reasons for these developments. All these states were founded in the gold-producing regions through which the important trade routes passed. Enlightened and courageous leadership, which all these states enjoyed, also played a key role. The third and undoubtedly the most important reason was the use of firearms in warfare at this time. It is evident from Dutch and English records that from the 1640s onward, the Europeans began to sell firearms to the local rulers; by the 1660s and 1670s, guns and gunpowder had become the main imports into the country. Since these inland states emerged in the gold-producing areas of the country, they were able to accumulate the greatest quantities of firearms. The introduction of firearms was linked to a great increase in the number of war captives, which led to the replacement of the gold trade by the notorious slave trade as the principal economic activity of these states in the following century.

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Akan States: Eighteenth Century

The history of the Akan states in the eighteenth century can be divided into three phases: 1700 to 1730, 1730 to 1750, and 1750 to 1800. During the first decade of the eighteenth century, the states of Akwamu, Akyem Abuakwa, and Denkyira attained their widest territorial expansion, mainly through conquests. The Akwamu continued their expansionist activities eastward under their famous King Akonno. In 1702, he launched a campaign to suppress the resistance in Ladoku and pushed across the Volta and occupied Anlo, and conquered the inland Ewe states of Peki, Ho, and Kpando. He then recrossed the Volta and conquered Kwahu between 1708 and 1710. These conquests brought Akwamu to its widest territorial extent and the apogee of its fame and glory.

The two Akyem states also attained the peak of their power during this period. After suffering defeat at the hands of the Asante in 1702, which led to the migration of the Kotoku across the Pra to Da near Afosu, the two Akyem states inflicted a decisive defeat on the Asante in 1717, during which they ambushed and killed the great Asantehene Osei Tutu. In 1730, both of them also invaded and defeated Akwamu, moving across the Volta to their present location. They took over the Akwamu lands, the greatest portion of which went to Akyem Abuakwa. Thus, by the middle of the eighteenth century, Akyem Abuakwa had become the second largest of the Akan states in southern Ghana. It was also during this period that, in reaction to the increasing threat to their middleman role, the Fante launched a series of campaigns and conquered the coastal states of Fetu, Aguafu, and Asebu between 1702 and 1710, and Agona in 1724. By the end of the third decade, the Fante controlled the entire stretch of the coast from the mouth of the Pra to the borders of the Ga kingdom to the east.

The final political change, which in fact amounted to a veritable revolution, was the arrival in Ghana of Asante, with its dramatic defeat and overthrow of the powerful state of Denkyira at the famous battle of Feyiase near Kumasi in October 1701, under the leadership of King Osei Tutu. Immediately after that victory, Osei Tutu attacked the Akyem states for assisting Denkyira. In 1711, he turned his attention northward and conquered Wenkyi, sacking its capital Ahwenekokoo, hoping to gain control of the trade routes leading to Bono and the important Dyula trading center of Begho. Osei Tutu marched southward, and between 1713 and 1715 conquered Twifu, Wassa, Aowin, and Nzema. In 1717 Osei Tutu turned eastward and

attacked the two Akyem states, which ended in his defeat and death. But that time, Asante had replaced Akyem and Akwamu as the largest of the Akan states.

How can this dramatic emergence of the Asante state be accounted for? The first reason was the creation of not just a new Asante state, the Asanteman, but also of a new nation, Asantefoo, by Osei Tutu and his friend and adviser, Okomfo (Prophet) Anokye. They did this by uniting all the preexisting states within a 30 mile radius of Kumasi and endowing it not only with a new constitution with the Oyoko clan of Osei Tutu as its royal family, a federal governing council, a new common capital, Kumasi, and a national annual festival. But the most effective device that they used was the creation of the famous golden stool, Sika Agua Kofi, which Okomfo Anokye is believed to have conjured down from the sky and which was accepted as embodying the soul of the nation, to be preserved and guarded at all costs. These factors endowed this young nation-state with a sense of destiny that has ensured its survival to this day. Osei Tutu also provided it with leadership and inspiration, which was further enhanced by the more effective application of the new military technology in the form of firearms, which the Asante were able to acquire in large quantities because of their great wealth derived from their rich gold mines, trading activities, and tributes, and which made their armies virtually invincible.

The period from 1730 to 1750 saw even more revolutionary changes than before. After three years of internal instability, Opoku Ware succeeded Osei Tutu. He began his wars with attempts to suppress the revolts against Asante rule by Akyem, Wassa, Aowin, and Denkyira with an attack on Akyem in 1720–1721. He then turned westward and beat back an invasion of Kumasi by Ebrimoro, the king of Aowin. Opoku Ware moved northward and attacked and defeated the ancient and famous kingdom of Bono in 1723–1724, and invaded Wasa again in 1726. It was as a result of this defeat that Ntsiful I (c. 1721–1752) moved the capital of Wassa from the north to Abrade near the coast, where it remained until the nineteenth century. Opoku Ware overran western Gonja and Gyaaman in 1732, Banda in 1740, the Akyem states of Akyem Abuakwa and Kotoku in 1742, and eastern Gonja and Dagomba in 1744. By the time of his death in 1750, Opoku Ware had proved more than a worthy successor of Osei Tutu and had converted Asante into a sprawling empire extending over an area wider than modern Ghana and including all the existing Akan states with the sole exception of Fante. Using experts, craftsmen, and musicians captured or recruited from the conquered Akan states, Osei Tutu and Opoku Ware brought the Akan monarchical civilization to its fruition, marked today by its gold regalia and ornaments, colorful *kente* cloth, beautiful music and dance forms, and impressive and elaborate court ceremonies.

AKAN STATES: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The history of the Akan states during the second half of the eighteenth century is essentially the history of the determination of the Asante to preserve their huge empire, the determination of the Akan vassal states (especially Denkyira, Wassa, Twifu, and Akyem Abuakwa) to regain their independence, and the desire of the Fante to retain and safeguard their independent existence. Thus in 1760, 1776, and 1785, the Asante moved their troops to suppress the rebellions of the Wassa. In 1765, 1767, and 1772–1773, Akyem also revolted. The Asante won a victory over the Akyem in 1765 and 1767, but they were defeated in 1772.

Of all the Akan states, it was only Fante that remained outside the control and domination of the Asante in the eighteenth century, and Fante was able to achieve this mainly through diplomacy and especially the support of the British. After the defeat of the Akyem states by the Asante in 1742, the Fante felt so threatened that they worked hard to form an alliance consisting of Kommenda, Abrem, Fetu, Akwamu, Assin, Wassa, and Denkyira, which imposed a blockade on the trade with Asante. So successful was this blockade that no Asante could trade on the Fante coast from 1742 until 1752. By that time, the Fante were feeling the negative consequences of this blockade, and so secretly allied with the Asante in 1759. But they broke with the Asante in 1765 and formed a new alliance with Wassa, Twifo, and Akyem, and only the intervention of the British prevented a clash between the two groups. In 1772 the Asante threatened to invade the Fante for refusing to hand over some Asante hostages; only the intervention of the British, who had by then adopted the policy of supporting the Fante to prevent the Asante from becoming masters of the entire stretch of the coast of Ghana, deflected a potential conflict. Thus by 1775 peaceful relations were ensured between Asante and Fante and trade was flourishing, and this continued until 1785 when Wassa revolted, which was effectively suppressed. Wassa remained a unified state until the 1820s, when it broke into the present Wassa Fiase and Wassa Amenfi states.

To summarize, by the end of eighteenth century, the Asante empire was still intact and dominating all the Akan states except Fante, which succeeded through diplomacy and the support of the British to maintain its sovereign and independent existence until the early nineteenth century, when it was finally incorporated into the Asante empire.

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See also: Akan and Asante: Farmers, Traders, and the Emergence of Akan States; Akan States; Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Administration

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Akhenaten Egyptian Pharaoh

King of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty, Akhenaten reigned from approximately 1360 to 1343BCE. Akhenaten is notable for having briefly replaced the entire Egyptian pantheon with a single deity, the Aten, the physical manifestation of the sun. It is now argued that the basis of the cult was the deification, while still alive, of Akhenaten's father, Amenhotep III, as the living Aten. Certainly, the whole cult of the Aten was centered on the royal family, and it was possible to worship the deity only through his representative on Earth, the king.

Akhenaten was born with the name Amenhotep, which he continued to bear for the first five years of his reign as the fourth king of that name. It is possible that up to the first twelve years of the reign were spent ruling jointly with his father, with Egypt's principal religious capital remaining at Thebes. Here, a large temple to the Aten was built behind that of Amun-Re,



The ruins of the North Palace at Amarna. The city contains many of the best preserved examples of Egyptian domestic architecture. The buildings were largely of mud brick, with a few stone elements such as column bases (shown) and door lintels. Photo © Aidan Dodson

king of the gods, of Karnak. However, in his fourth year Amenhotep IV decided to seek a unique cult center for the Aten, establishing a new city called Akhetaten (modern Tell el-Amarna), roughly halfway between Thebes and the civil capital, Memphis. At the same time, he changed his name from Amenhotep (“Amun is satisfied”) to Akhenaten (“Effective Spirit of the Aten”).

It is often suggested that these moves were a reaction against the growing power of the Amun priesthood, with a move toward a more democratic form of religion. However, this is at best an oversimplification, at worst completely inaccurate. The intimate links between the king and the Aten, particularly if the latter was to all intents and purposes Amenhotep III, certainly heavily reinforced the royal household’s position at the center of both political and religious power. However, the divine king had always held a central role, and one should be careful of making too many assumptions about the motivations of ancient individuals, records of which have not survived.

As to the supposedly democratic nature of the cult, it is a telling fact that the focus of devotion in private household shrines at Amarna was a single stela showing the royal family in the act of worship. This provides a strong suggestion that an ordinary person’s access to the god was limited, at the very best.

Akhenaten had two known wives. The senior was Nefertiti; nothing is known of her origins, but it is possible that she was the daughter of a general named Ay. The suggestion that she was a princess from the north Syrian state of Mitanni, who joined the king’s harem in a diplomatic union, has now been almost entirely discredited. The junior wife was Kiya; her origins are likewise obscure, and it is not impossible that she was the Mitannian lady. Nefertiti bore her husband six known children, all girls: Meryetaten, Meketaten, Ankhesenpaaten, Neferneferuatentasherit, Neferneferure, and Setpenre. In addition, a son named Tutankhaten is recorded in an inscription originally from Amarna. However, his mother is not known.

The city of Akhetaten was built on a virgin site on the east bank of the Nile. The royal residence was at the north end of the area, while the private residential suburbs extended around the central city, where lay the palace, temples, and government offices. The city limits, delineated by a series of fifteen large boundary stelae, also embraced a large swathe of agricultural land on the west bank. The tomb-chapels of the nobility were cut into the eastern cliffs behind the city, with the royal cemetery placed at the end of a 5 km-long wadi, running into the eastern desert.

The city site has been excavated since the 1890s, primarily by German and British teams. A large quantity of clay tablets inscribed in Mesopotamian

cuneiform script, which represent letters received from other great powers as well as from vassals, was found at the site. These have been used to argue for a decline in Egyptian power in Syria-Palestine during Akhenaten’s reign, exacerbated by willful neglect on the part of the king. Given problems in ordering many of the letters, and the fact that this is the only extant archive of this kind known from Egypt, one needs to be careful in drawing such conclusions. Old views as to Akhenaten’s alleged pacifism are also made problematic by the survival of fragments showing the king (and the queen) smiting Egypt’s enemies.

The Aten faith is well summarized in the so-called Hymn to the Aten, inscribed in a number of private tomb-chapels. Its universalist outlook and structure have been likened to some of the Hebrew Psalms. There is no evidence for direct links between these two texts; rather, they are manifestations of a cultural milieu that was common across the Near East during the late Bronze Age.

Soon after his twelfth regnal year, which may also have seen his transition to sole rule following the death of Amenhotep III, Akhenaten’s daughter, Meketaten, died. Also, the king took a new coruler, initially named Smenkhkare, later Neferneferuaten. Since Nefertiti disappears from the record at the same time, it has been suggested that one or both of these names refer to her as female king. However, there is clear evidence that the name Smenkhkare was borne by a male, married to Princess Meryetaten, while a set of inscriptions showing a transitional titulary, halfway between those associated with the names Smenkhkare and Neferneferuaten, indicate that we actually have a single individual (probably Akhenaten’s eldest son), who subsequently changed his name.

Smenkhkare/Neferneferuaten seems to have died before Akhenaten. To the last months of the reign should probably be dated Akhenaten’s attack on polytheistic monuments, particularly involving the destruction of the names and images of Amun, whose continued worship had been supported by the dead coruler.

Akhenaten died in his seventeenth regnal year, and was succeeded by his probable younger son, Tutankhaten, married to his third daughter. Under the tutelage of the generals Ay and Horemheb (both later kings), the religious status quo was restored by the middle of the ten-year reign of Tutankhamun (as he was renamed). It is likely that directly after Tutankhamun’s death, Akhenaten’s tomb at Amarna was desecrated, its furnishing destroyed, and the king’s mummy burned.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia; Egypt, Ancient: Religion.**

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
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Aksum, Kingdom of

Aksum was the principal metropolis of a major polity that arose during the early centuries CE in the highlands of northern Ethiopia (Tigray) and southern Eritrea. The development of sociopolitical complexity in this region may be traced directly to the first half of the last millennium BCE, although its economic foundations are of even greater antiquity.

The period during which the formative processes of Aksumite civilization must have taken place remains very poorly understood. Within the relevant area, virtually no archaeological sites have been investigated that clearly date to the last few centuries BCE or the first century CE. There is no indication of human settlement at the actual site of Aksum itself until the first century CE, which is also the date of the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, a trader's handbook to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coastlands which refers to the port of Adulis near modern Massawa in Eritrea and to "the people called Aksumites." By the third century CE, Aksum was capital of a powerful centralized kingdom, controller of abundant resources, ruler of extensive territories, trading extensively and, by c.270, issuing its own coinage, which circulated both locally and internationally.

By this time the rulers of Aksum were designated kings. Inscriptions of the early fourth century imply that they personified the power and achievements of the state. These inscriptions boast wide-ranging military conquests and extraction of tribute. Largely because of their personalized grandiloquence, we know very little about the mechanisms by which the royal authority was implemented, or how it was transmitted from one generation to another. There are hints that Aksum may at times have been ruled through a dual kingship. Contemporary foreign records and subsequent Ethiopian traditions both indicate that kingship



Aksum, fourth–seventh centuries.

may have been hereditary through the male line, although it is hard to confirm whether these hints reflect ancient Aksumite reality rather than transferred assumptions based on foreign or subsequent practice. It is, however, incontrovertible that Aksum rapidly established itself in nominal control (however exercised) of extensive territory and thereby acquired very substantial human and material resources. These territories appear to have comprised much of the modern Eritrea apart from the extreme north and west, as well as the greater part of what is now Tigray region in Ethiopia, their southerly extent remaining poorly understood. At times, Aksumite political authority extended eastward across the Red Sea to the Yemeni highlands and, less certainly, westward as far as the Nile valley. Whether or not Aksum finally conquered Meroe in the fourth century, as is often suggested, there can be little doubt that it was the rise of Aksum that led to the economic decline of its Nilotic neighbor.

Aksumite royal inscriptions mention the taking of numerous captives. Slaughter is not specifically mentioned; indeed, it is claimed that the captives were maintained by their conquerors. This is in accord with the archaeological evidence, which indicates that a huge labor force was available at Aksum for processing raw materials and for erecting grandiose monuments. The extent to which these people were temporarily or perpetually slaves remains unknown.

There is reliable archaeological evidence of a substantial population enjoying a high level of material prosperity. At and around Aksum there are remains of stone buildings where a tall central structure is surrounded by an extensive walled court and ranges of rooms. In the older literature, these buildings are often referred to as "palaces," but the less committal "elite structures" is probably a preferable designation. The

largest and most elaborate of these structures was that in western Aksum, known as Ta'akha Maryam. Those for which archaeological dating evidence is available were probably erected during the fifth or sixth centuries; we do not know whether similar structures existed in earlier times. However, by about the second century CE, burials were accompanied by grave goods of varying richness, some of great abundance, which indicates unequal access to resources.

Although until recently archaeologists and historians have placed almost exclusive emphasis on international aspects of the Aksumite economy, there can in fact be little doubt that this economy was locally based on the productivity of the land and indigenous Ethiopian agriculture. Recent research has indicated that, while sheep and goats were herded, cattle was the dominant domestic species being used both for food and for traction. Donkeys and chickens were also available. Inscriptions indicate that the herds were augmented by capture and tribute in the course of military campaigns. The range of cultivated crops was remarkably similar to that exploited in the region during more recent times, including wheat, barley, teff, finger millet, and sorghum as well as chick peas, noog, and linseed. Cereals thus predominated, including varieties originating in the Near East as well as local domesticates. Oil was obtained from linseed and from the locally domesticated noog. Traces have also been recovered of grapes and cotton; in neither case can one be certain whether the plants were grown locally or their produce imported from elsewhere. Grape vines were, however, known to the ancient Aksumites, being represented in contemporary artworks; and rock-cut tanks in the vicinity may have been used for making wine.

It has long been recognized that the Aksumites imported luxury goods from a wide range of sources, the evidence being both documentary and archaeological. The items concerned included glassware, beads, metals, textiles, wine and, probably, olive oil. What has only recently become apparent is the extent to which these imports provided stimuli for local production: glass vessels were, for example, made in imitation of foreign forms, Aksumite metalwork displayed great technological and artistic sophistication, while wine was probably obtained from local as well as imported sources.

The *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* states that ivory was a major Aksumite export in, it would appear, the first century CE; and archaeological evidence now confirms this for later times also. A tomb of the late third century has yielded quantities of finely turned and carved ivory in the form of boxes, decorative panels, and furniture-components that are interpreted as having formed parts of an elaborate chair or throne. At workshops on the outskirts of Aksum highly standardized

flaked stone tools were used in enormous numbers to process raw material, perhaps ivory or timber.

Gold may have been another significant export. From about the third quarter of the third century it was used to produce coins, Aksum being the only polity in Sub-Saharan Africa to have produced its own coinage in ancient times. Denominations were struck in gold, silver, and copper, those in the two less valued metals being frequently elaborated by the application of gilding to particular parts of the design. Aksumite gold coins are found only rarely in Ethiopia and Eritrea but are more frequent overseas, notably in Yemen and India; significantly, they almost invariably bear Greek inscriptions. This, and the fact that their weight was apparently based on standards prevailing in the eastern Roman Empire, suggests that they were primarily intended for international circulation. By contrast, coins in silver and copper are much more common on Aksumite sites and bear inscriptions in the local Ge'ez language, as befits media whose circulation was largely internal. Study of Aksumite coinage, which bears the names of successive rulers, permits an ordering of the various issues and of the rulers named in their inscriptions. It is not easy, however, to correlate the names on the resultant "king-list" with those preserved in traditional sources, the only undoubted links being provided by kings Ezana in the mid-fourth century and Kaleb early in the sixth.

Study of Aksumite coinage throws considerable light on several other aspects of its parent civilization: art styles, metallurgy, regalia, and religion. In the last-named instance, it provides a clear indication of the adoption of Christianity at Aksum during the reign of Ezana, an event also recorded in surviving Aksumite stone inscriptions, in Roman historical records, and (less directly) in Ethiopian historical tradition. Prior to this event, which probably took place around 340CE, the Aksumite rulers adhered to the polytheistic practices of earlier centuries which had much in common with those prevailing in South Arabia and were reflected in the use of the crescent-and-disc symbol on the earliest Aksumite coins. This symbol was replaced, during the reign of Ezana, by the Christian cross. The cross was subsequently accorded greater prominence in coinage design, sometimes accompanied by an inscription indicating the gradual adoption of the new religion through the Aksumite countryside.

The adoption of Christianity exerted a powerful influence over the subsequent history of Aksum, which came to be regarded by Roman and Byzantine emperors as a potential ally both in doctrinal controversies and in political maneuvers. Much of the Ethiopian and Eritrean highlands has remained a staunchly Christian area ever since; the Ethiopian Orthodox Church traces its origin and its authority to Aksum, which is to this

day a place of unparalleled sanctity. The Cathedral of Maryam Tsion (Saint Mary of Zion) at Aksum was first built in ancient times. There is controversy whether this took place during the reign of Ezana or, rather later, during that of Kaleb. In any event, it took the form of a five-aisled basilica that survived, doubtless modified, until the sixteenth century; the huge plinth on which it stood may still be seen.

Apart from church buildings, none of which can so far be dated with any precision, it is only in the burial customs of the elite that the impact of Christianity's advent may be discerned in the Aksumite archaeological record. The most famous monuments that have survived from ancient Aksum are the huge monolithic stelae, carved in representations of multistoried buildings; one, which still stands, is 23 m high and weighs approximately 150 tons. Another, which probably fell and broke while being erected, would have been 30 m high and more than 500 tons in weight. It may be the largest single monolith that people anywhere have ever attempted to erect. These stelae were quarried about 4 km distant from the site where they were erected. Their extraction, carving, transport, and erection would have required enormous investment of labor. The largest stela was intended to mark a pair of tombs, at least one being a monumental structure of great complexity and magnificence. There can be little doubt that the other great stelae were likewise tomb-markers and that these tombs, being by far the grandest such monuments at Aksum, were those of the kings. The largest stelae and their associated tombs probably date from the third and fourth centuries, immediately prior to the advent of Christianity under Ezana. Later elite tombs were of distinct types, lacking stelae, although other elements of their design show continuity with earlier practice.

Use of upright stones as grave markers has been widespread through much of northeastern Africa over several thousands of years. Aksumite sites illustrate one specialized local manifestation of this tradition. The custom was followed at several levels of Aksumite society, the elaborate (probably royal) examples just described being contrasted with shaft or simple pit-graves marked with plain or undressed smaller stelae. There is corresponding variation in the quantity and elaboration of the associated grave goods.

This funerary evidence for socioeconomic stratification is paralleled by the domestic architecture. Aksumite "palaces" or elite structures have been noted above; they utilized the same materials and stonemasonry of a similar quality to that employed for the finest funerary monuments. In no case, unfortunately, has archaeological evidence been reported that would permit a confident assessment of the purposes to which these buildings were put. They may, however, be contrasted with other buildings, erected on a smaller

scale using only undressed stone with or without supporting timbers, which are associated with farming pursuits and/or small-scale craft industry. It seems likely that the actual dwellings of the lowest strata in Aksumite society have not yet been unearthed; they are, however, probably represented by clay models of small thatched houses.

Our knowledge of Aksumite art is restricted by the limited survival of material. With the exception of funerary monuments, most surviving Aksumite architecture is poorly preserved and difficult to date. Religious buildings of this period have been little investigated, and it is probable that few if any have survived except in severely modified form. The original cathedral at Aksum is known only from accounts that were committed to writing many centuries after the building was constructed. Such accounts mention the existence of rich and elaborate mural decoration, no physical trace of which has survived. Likewise, ancient accounts mention the existence of large metal statues but, with the exception of a stone base recorded in 1906, no archaeological confirmation has been preserved.

Domestic and portable artifacts are better known. Pottery was, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, exclusively hand made, without use of a wheel. The elaborately decorated wares known as "Classical Aksumite" are mainly known from funerary contexts of the third-fourth centuries; doubt remains of the extent to which such vessels were the prerogative of the elite and/or reserved for interment with the dead. Elaborate painted decoration has been preserved in certain circumstances, almost invariably in tombs, but may have been widespread. Many of the vessels from tombs are small and poorly fired, with soft fabric that contrasts markedly with that recovered on domestic occupation sites. The full significance of this variation vis-a-vis chronology, status, and function cannot be understood until further excavations have been undertaken and published. Pottery of particular interest includes bowls in the foot of which stand molded figures of yoked oxen, and jars with necks modeled in representation of female heads whose elaborate hairstyles strongly resemble those favored in the area today.

It may be assumed that most domestic pottery was produced close to its area of use, although it has not yet proved possible to undertake the detailed fabric studies necessary to confirm this. At least some finer and smaller vessels were, however, transported over considerable distances. Although some Aksumite pottery was slipped and finely burnished, true glazes occur only on vessels (mostly wheel-thrown) that were imported from beyond the Aksumite polity. Imported pottery may be divided between vessels that came to Aksum primarily as containers for some foreign commodity, and those that were brought as luxury items in their own right.

Examples of the two categories are large amphorae from Cyprus and/or Syria, which contained wine or olive oil, and the fine red-ware bowls of African red-slip ware made in the Mediterranean regions of North Africa. The former, once their contents had been decanted or consumed, were often reused for a variety of purposes, while the characteristic shapes of the latter were imitated by Aksumite potters.

Quantities of glass vessels and beads are found on Aksumite sites, particularly but by no means exclusively in elite tombs. It was often assumed that all this material was imported and, indeed, very close parallels for some may be recognized at sites around the eastern Mediterranean. However, parallels for other items have proved extremely hard to find; and certain vessels, although closely resembling Mediterranean counterparts, display idiosyncratic features. The suspicion that some of these items may have been produced in Aksum, perhaps by reworking imported glass that may have been broken in transit, has recently been confirmed by the recovery of raw glass in an industrial area of Aksum, providing clear evidence that some glass was worked there. Such a practice was by no means unique to Aksum, being attested, for example, at several broadly contemporary sites in the Sudanese Nile valley. It is not yet possible clearly to distinguish all imported glass vessels from those that were produced locally, but it is clear that both categories are represented.

Gold, silver, ferrous, and cuprous metals are well represented in the Aksumite archaeological record. They were clearly worked with considerable skill: in addition to the basic smelting and forging, techniques for which we have evidence include welding, riveting, production of even-thickness plates, drilling, perforating, casting, polishing, plating (including both annealing and mercury gilding), and enameling. Despite the recovery of slag and crucible fragments, no extensive Aksumite metalworking site has yet been located. Wherever they were, such sites and their associated debris must have been very substantial and their operation must have involved much labor and fuel. Quarrying must have involved the use of large numbers of iron wedges, none of which have yet been found. The sheer scale of Aksumite metallurgy indicates that it was largely local, involving production of utilitarian and luxury goods: a few imported luxury items have nonetheless been recognized.

Alongside the technological sophistication represented by the working of metal, ivory, and glass, it is important to recognize that the Aksumites continued to make and to use flaked stone tools in continuation of traditions practiced in the area for many centuries, if not millennia, previously. This, and the agricultural base on which the civilization's prosperity

ultimately depended, emphasize the local roots of ancient Aksum.

When considering imports, it is essential to include the less tangible as well as those directly represented in the archaeological record. Here must be included Christianity itself, which came in later Aksumite times to occupy a major place in state and popular affairs that continued for many hundreds of years after the decline of Aksum. From the third century, Aksum's aspirations to membership of the eastern Mediterranean world were symbolized by the use of Greek in stone inscriptions and by the issue of coinage.

Although there are major gaps in research coverage, it is possible to suggest some changing patterns in Aksumite material imports. In the third and early fourth centuries, glass and occasional pieces of metalwork are represented, pottery from outside the Aksumite hegemony being effectively absent. By the sixth century, however, glazed pottery was imported from Mesopotamia and Egypt, amphorae and their contents from Cyprus/Syria and the northern Red Sea, and bowls from North Africa. Aksum's exports are less easy to recognize in the archaeological record of recipient countries, but gold coins in both Yemen and southern India/Sri Lanka indicate the scale of dispersal. Ivory cannot yet be traced to its original source, but it is tempting to attribute the decline of its price in the Roman Empire during the late third century, and its sudden scarcity from the early seventh, to the fluctuating fortunes of Aksum's export trade.

The decline of Aksum is a topic surrounded by controversy. Ethiopian tradition is often interpreted as indicating its survival as a political capital into the tenth century; and the Aksumite coinage was formerly interpreted as having continued until that date. More detailed study has, however, suggested a significantly shorter coinage chronology that has recently received support from radiocarbon dates for late Aksumite occupation. It now appears that issue of the coinage ceased around the early seventh century and that by or even shortly before that time the scale of human settlement at Aksum sharply declined. Two factors may have contributed independently to this decline. Locally, the scale of the area's exploitation during the previous half-millennium must have had a great impact on the essentially fragile environment: reduced availability of timber for construction and fuel would have reduced availability and increased the cost of metal and numerous other commodities; increased runoff and soil erosion would have reduced agricultural productivity and predictability, affecting not only the overall prosperity and physical well-being of the population but also the availability of labor for prestige projects. Internationally, the rapid expansion of Islamic control of the lands bordering the Red Sea, most

notably the conquest of Egypt in 642, effectively cut Aksum's link with the long-distance trade on which its prosperity had partly depended.

For centuries thereafter, the peoples of highland Ethiopia developed their predominantly Christian traditions on an island surrounded by Islam, maintaining only tenuous links with their coreligionists around the Mediterranean. It is in the architecture and other accoutrements of medieval Ethiopian Christianity that the legacy of ancient Aksum may be most clearly seen. Churches both built (as at Debra Damo) and rock-cut (as at Lalibela), display the timber-frame construction attested in the Aksum "palaces" and represented on the carved stelae.

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See also: **Ethiopia: Aksumite Inheritance.**

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Akwamu: *See Akan States: Bono, Denkyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.*

Akyem: *See Akan States, Bono, Denkyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.*

'Alawite Dynasty: *See Morocco: Maraboutic Crisis, Founding of the 'Alawite Dynasty.*

Alcohol: Popular Culture, Colonial Control

Alcohol has always played an important role in African societies, but its functions and significance began to change with the advent of colonial rule. European colonizers attempted to control the production and consumption of alcohol to increase revenue, engineer social development, and suppress what they viewed as a potential source of rebellion, especially within the rapidly expanding labor force of the mining compounds and urban areas. New forms of popular culture, centered on the trade and social relations of drinking establishments, developed as a form of adaptation and resistance to colonial attempts to

control every aspect of African life, including work and leisure time.

By the start of the colonial period, a variety of alcoholic drinks were found throughout Africa. More common to non-Muslim, Sub-Saharan areas for religious reasons, these included palm wine, fermented honey and fruit drinks, and beers made from maize, sorghum, bananas, or millet. Alcohol had both ritual and social significance and was used for many different occasions, including initiation rites, weddings, funerals, work meetings, and planting and harvest festivals. It also served as a fine to be paid for social infractions, as a method to confer honor, and as a means to spend an evening of leisure. The right to drink was usually reserved as a privilege of male elders, and drunkenness was regarded as disgraceful.

From the early days of colonial rule, officials saw alcohol as a cause of disrespect, indolence, and criminality. The 1890 Brussels Convention and the 1919 Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye banned the importation of European liquor into "prohibition zones," areas beyond the coast where the liquor trade had not yet been established, and restricted the importation of "trade spirits" in tropical Africa. Some laws, like the East Africa Liquor Ordinance of 1902, went even further by attempting to prohibit all locally produced intoxicating liquors. This proved unenforceable and was followed by the 1930 Native Liquor Ordinance delegating authority to district commissioners to closely supervise legal brewing and thus allow regulation and taxation. Measures such as this became even more common with the development of European controlled urban and industrial areas.

With the rise of the mining industry in South Africa, officials used alcohol as a magnet to draw and keep workers from rural areas, creating a close association between wage employment and drinking. Composed largely of young, male migrants, usually separated from their families, the workforce turned to drinking as a prominent form of leisure. The bar or pub became a focal point of this activity, especially after they were paid their wages, which in some cases were made in drink vouchers. This not only encouraged consumption, but also offered a form of European management over where Africans could drink. But government officials sought further control over African drinking habits, which they blamed for low productivity, high absenteeism, and unacceptable accident rates. They developed the "Durban system," a series of liquor restrictions designed to give local governments a monopoly over the production of local spirits and then sell them exclusively in municipal beer halls. This not only gave the state a means to shape urban, working-class leisure activities, but it also helped to secure the funds needed to enforce segregationist policies and remove

African alcohol consumption from the view of whites. In a limited sense, the Durban system was successful. By the late 1930s it had spread throughout the Union of South Africa. But the shift in drinking patterns and locales also helped to bring about new forms of popular culture. The workers developed *shebeens*, illegal drinking establishments serving local brews, to take the stress off their daily jobs. Within the *shebeens*, *marabi* culture thrived and new dance and music forms emerged, such as South African jazz, *marabi* music, and *isicathamiya*. Despite the perceived success of the Durban system, drinking patterns of Africans were never totally under white control, and the private and illegal trade in alcoholic drinks flourished.

Alcohol was also very important to colonial rule in the Gold Coast, or Ghana, where liquor taxes accounted for up to 40 per cent of government revenue in 1913. The enforcement of new liquor laws throughout the 1920s, however, led to a sharp drop in revenue and a rise in the production of local gin, *akpeteshie*. Drinking places associated with the consumption of *akpeteshie* became common and new forms of music, dance, and theater developed into a growing and dynamic popular culture. Acoustic guitar highlife and “concert parties” incorporated rural and urban aspects and met the social needs of new urban, working-class immigrants. Restrictive liquor laws in the 1930s attempted to quell, or at least limit, these cultural forms, but were largely unsuccessful because of the rapid growth of local drinking places and the production of *akpeteshie*, which became a symbol of resistance to colonial rule. Like the *shebeens* and *marabi* culture in South Africa, *akpeteshie* and the popular culture associated with it developed into a political issue and raids on illegal establishments inspired resentment and anger among Africans, often ending in violence and bloodshed.

The colonial state attempted to control the production and consumption of alcoholic beverages in Africa by promoting European distilled beverages, implementing liquor duties, and attempting to outlaw the local production of traditional brews. Control of alcohol consumption, however, was an area where colonial powers were destined to fail because of their dependence on African labor, and the rise of illegal drinking places and new popular culture forms. The role of alcohol in urban and industrial drinking locales differed markedly from that in rural communities as alcohol became available to a wider range of age and gender groups. Urban industrial drinking culture shaped new notions of leisure, community, and resistance, providing escape from the atmosphere of control exemplified in the workplace and acted as a means to cope with the harsh demands of everyday life.

STEVEN J. SALM

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
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Alexandria

Alexandria, now second only to Cairo in terms of size and importance in Egypt, has historically been considered a city somewhat separate from the rest of Egypt. In late antiquity, Alexandria came to be known as a Mediterranean, rather than an Egyptian, city; the phrase *Alexandria ad Aegyptum* (Alexandria next to, or adjacent to, Egypt) illustrates this sense of separation. Perhaps best known today for its beaches and its thriving port and industries, Alexandria’s history is a rich one.

The city was founded by Alexander the Great in 332BCE, when the Macedonian conqueror seized Egypt from Persian control. Alexander wanted a new capital city, one that would link Egypt to the Mediterranean. Alexandria was established as Egypt’s new capital, and it remained so until the Arab invasions in the mid-seventh century. The city also was to serve Alexander as a naval base from which to control the Mediterranean.

Less than one hundred years after its founding, Alexandria was already known as a center of learning, science, and scholarship. Under the Ptolemaic dynasty (which ruled Egypt from 305BCE until the death of Cleopatra VII in the year 30), the city flourished and earned the nickname “the center of the world.” Ptolemy I, also known as Ptolemy Soter (savior), who had ruled Egypt from Alexander’s death in 323BCE before being crowned officially in 305BCE, began the construction of Alexandria’s famous library. The Library of Alexandria was the most famous library of the ancient world, and it was founded with the purpose of collecting the entire body of Greek knowledge. Here, on papyrus scrolls and vellum, works of literature, poetry, medicine, science, and philosophy, among other subjects, were collected and housed; Ptolemy I contributed his own history of Alexander’s campaigns to



Pharos of Alexandria (reconstruction after Adler). One of the Seven Wonders of the World. Built by Sostratus of Cnidus for Ptolemy II of Egypt, c.280BC on the island of Pharos in the harbor of Alexandria. Anonymous. © Foto Marburg/Art Resource, New York.

the hundreds of thousands of volumes stored there. The library was part of a larger complex founded by Ptolemy I: the Mouseion, or museum, the city's research center, which hosted such luminaries as Euclid, Archimedes, Herophilus, Erasistratus, and Eratosthenes. Alexandria also became a center of Jewish learning; it is believed the translation of the Old Testament from Hebrew to Greek (the Septuagint) was produced here.

Under Ptolemy II, the city gained one of what were to become known as the seven wonders of the ancient world: the Pharos, or lighthouse at Alexandria. The approximately 350-foot-high lighthouse was an engineering wonder for its time. Situated on the island of Pharos in the city's harbor, the lighthouse was built by Sostratus of Cnidus and stood for centuries. Records indicate the lighthouse survived until the twelfth century, but by the mid-fifteenth had become so dilapidated that the Mamluke sultan Qait Bey built a fortress atop the ruins. Like the lighthouse, neither the Mouseion nor the library survived into modern times. The Mouseion complex, including the library, was destroyed by civil war under the Roman emperor Aurelian in 272; a companion library, housed in a separate complex, was destroyed by Christians in 391.

Alexandria is also well known for its association with Cleopatra VII, the Egyptian queen and last of the Ptolemies, who in that city wooed and won Julius Caesar, claiming to have borne him a son. After Caesar's death, Cleopatra conspired with Marc Antony against Caesar's grandnephew Octavian. The unsuccessful conspiracy foundered in 30BCE when Octavian gained control of Alexandria and Egypt, adding them to the Roman world, and both Antony and Cleopatra committed suicide.

The Roman period in Alexandria (30BCE–313) brought changes to the city, principal among them religious conflict. Alexandria was said to be one of the cities where Saint Mark had preached in the first century; as such it was a stronghold of Christianity in the region, and Christian and Jewish communities alike resisted Rome's attempts to impose its own pagan religion upon the city. Persecution of Christians in Alexandria reached a high point under the emperor Diocletian, who is believed to have been responsible for the deaths of almost 150,000 Christians. Even after the emperor Constantine made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire, religious conflict continued in the city. This time, conflict arose over issues of doctrine, specifically, the nature of Jesus and his role within the Trinity. The Alexandrian church also found religious doctrine a way to assert its independence from Constantinople (from which it was governed following the division of the Roman Empire in 364CE). Declaring its belief in monophysitism (the idea that Jesus had a single divine nature despite taking on human form), the Alexandrian church held fast to this belief even after the Council of Chalcedon rejected the view in 451. This atmosphere of dissatisfaction with Byzantine rule contributed to the ease with which Arab armies took the city in 642.

After the Arab conquest of the city, Alexandria declined in importance. The Arab conqueror, Amr ibn al-'As, chose to found the new city of al-Fustat (later part of Cairo), which became the political and economic center of Egypt. Yet despite its being overshadowed by the new capital, Alexandria remained an important trading center, particularly for textiles and luxury goods.

Although the Ottoman conquest of Egypt occurred in 1517, little changed in Alexandria. Trade continued, but the city's waterways were allowed to become laden with silt. The gradual decline of Alexandria continued unabated; when Napoleon's troops arrived in Egypt in 1798, the "center of the world" had become a small fishing village with a population of under 5,000.

Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt who came to power in the early 1800s, revived the city. 'Ali's desire to make Egypt into a modern nation meant Alexandria's return to relative prominence. Egypt needed a seaport, both for commercial and military reasons, and Alexandria was deemed suitable. The opening of the Mahmudiyya canal in 1820 linked Alexandria to the Nile, and thus to Cairo. European advisers and aid helped build a harbor, docks, and an arsenal; many Europeans stayed and took up residence in the revitalized city, helping to increase the population of Alexandria to more than 200,000. Alexandria became an important banking center in the mid-1800s as well. Alexandria also profited from Egypt's cotton

industry boom in the 1860s (a result of the Civil War in the United States), the opening of the Cairo railway in 1856, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. British shelling of the city in response to a nationalist revolt against the authority of the khedive Tewfiq (and against foreign influence in Egypt) by army colonel Ahmad 'Urabi resulted in heavy damage; rioting and looting worsened the situation, and the British used the opportunity to seize control of Egypt (which they retained until formal independence in 1922).

Alexandria was a key base of operations for the Allied forces in both world wars. In World War I it was the main naval base in the Mediterranean; in World War II it was nearly taken by German armies and was frequently a target of bombing raids. Alexandria played an important role in the Egyptian revolution and the government of Gamal Nasser as well. It was from Alexandria that King Farouk sailed into Italian exile in 1952, and the sequestrations of property after the 1956 Suez War, or Tripartite Aggression (of Israel, France, and Britain against Egypt after 'Abd el-Nasr's nationalization of the Suez Canal) served as the impetus for many minorities and foreign residents to leave the city. These sequestrations were followed by a series of nationalizations in the 1960s that were designed to further "Egyptianize" the country, and more foreigners deserted Alexandria.

While the city lost much of its international character after the revolution, it nonetheless benefited from Nasser's industrialization plans. Food processing and textile manufacturing industries in Alexandria grew rapidly. The port of Alexandria became extremely important during the 1967 war with Israel, when the Suez Canal was temporarily closed; the diversion of goods from Port Said to Alexandria swamped the port, and Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat's policy of economic liberalization (*infatih*) begun in 1974 further increased the amount of goods coming into the city, straining its capacity. Encouraged by Sadat's economic policies, the merchants of Alexandria began demanding more financial independence from the government. The Sadat years also witnessed the discovery of offshore and onshore natural gas reserves (in Abu Qir Bay and at Abu Mai in the delta region near the city), which in turn fostered further industrial development, particularly in petrochemicals, iron, and steel. Attempts have been made in recent years to revive Alexandria's international character—the establishment of a free trade zone in al-Amiriyyah, the reopening of the stock exchange, and plans for improvements in the city's infrastructure are all designed to resurrect some of the city's lost glory. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that Alexandria is no longer *ad Aegyptum*, but instead has become a part of Egypt.

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See also: **Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy; Egypt, Ancient: Ptolemaic Dynasty: Historical Outline; Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest and Occupation: Historical Outline; Egypt: World War II And.**

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Alexandria and Early Christianity: Egypt

Early Egyptian Christianity (like Egypt as a whole in the period from 100 to 450CE) reflects sharp differences between its urban and rural expressions. Alexandria was a vast Greek-speaking cosmopolitan city, with a substantial Jewish community, and a hub of the Roman imperial system. Its famous library and imperially patronized museum helped make it one of the main intellectual and cultural centers of the Hellenistic world. Alexandrian Christianity was Greek-speaking, and it developed an intellectual tradition that made it one of the principal foci of Christian theological activity. But Alexandria had a massive hinterland, not only in the Nile Delta but also in the lands beyond, watered by the Nile and shading off into desert, supporting a large rural population engaged in agriculture. This population spoke Coptic (in several dialects), a language derived from old Egyptian, with a script derived from Greek. Ethnically, the population was descended from the old Egyptians, with an admixture of the darker-skinned peoples long resident in Egypt and known to the Hebrews as Cushites; the traditional religion was also derived from old Egypt. A vigorous vernacular Christianity grew up in these rural areas, and produced at least one innovation that spread across the Christian church at large, and helped to ensure the survival of Christianity in Egypt to the present day. The two Christian streams were never wholly separated. Alexandria and its hinterland were interdependent in the social, economic, and political spheres, and, in a period of rapid social change

and increasing urbanization, townsfolk were often transplanted villagers. A single church structure linked Alexandria and the rest of Egypt, with all Egyptian bishops recognizing the leadership of the see of Alexandria, and its bishop as patriarch and coordinator.

Christian Origins

The New Testament writings speak of Jesus being taken to Egypt as a refugee child, but the origins of Christianity, urban or rural, are obscure. The Acts of the Apostles mentions a learned Alexandrian Jew called Apollos who became a notable Christian teacher, and some have attributed to him the anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews, since its style of argument is consonant with what we know of Alexandrian Jewish writing; but all references to Apollos locate his activity outside Egypt. In any case, Christianity probably entered Alexandria through its large Jewish community; church tradition from the fourth century attributes the foundation of the church to the Gospel writer Mark. The tract known as the Epistle of Barnabas, variously dated between 70 and 138, is probably Alexandrian. It reflects intense controversy between Christians and traditional Jews over the right use of Scripture; the author may himself have been Jewish. Fragments of an early Gospel, otherwise unknown, have been found in Egypt, but the first named Egyptian Christian writers (all using Greek) belong to the Gnostic wing of Christianity, which produced a radically Hellenistic interpretation of the Christian message, distancing it from the synagogue. There are also works of Gnostic tendency, purporting to represent the words of Jesus, most notably the Gospel of Thomas, found in Coptic translation. None of these works necessarily represents the ethos of Alexandrian Christianity of the time as a whole, but they do reflect the intellectual challenges that the Greek tradition in Alexandria presented for Christianity, and perhaps a reaction against an earlier period when Christianity was presented in essentially Jewish terms.

Clear evidence of an organized Alexandrian church appears around 180 (though its origins must be much earlier), with a bishop and twelve presbyters. Public preaching was hardly possible where Christianity was not a legal religion, and a key to Christian expansion lay in its teachers, resembling those of a philosophical school. The catechetical school of Alexandria, first heard of about this time, not only prepared enquirers for baptism, but presented Christianity in terms of the Greek intellectual tradition. Successive leaders of the school were Pantaenus, a converted Stoic philosopher, Clement, also a converted philosopher, of Athenian origin, and Origen, born of Christian parents around 185, who studied under Ammonius Saccas and other

Alexandrian philosophical luminaries. Much of the writing of Clement and of Origen survives. Clement saw philosophy as part of a divine educational process to prepare humanity for Christianity, and the Christian life as a school of perfection. Origen was the most prodigious scholar of early Christianity, pioneering new forms of learned activity such as textual criticism and systematic theology, extending others such as the biblical commentary, and engaging with the whole range of Greek thought and science. Origen left for Caesarea after a dispute with his bishop, but Alexandria was his intellectual home. Like Clement he drew on the Platonism already used by the Alexandrian Jewish scholar Philo to present biblical teaching, and, like Philo, used allegorical exegesis of the Old Testament, thus maintaining the link between Christianity and Israel that more radical Gnostics rejected.

Origen's work underlies much of the theology of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries. The first major theological crisis, subsequent to the toleration of Christianity in 313, arose when an Alexandrian presbyter, Arius, produced a theory of the divine "sonship" which, (though this was probably not his intention) could be interpreted as making Christ a sort of demigod. Denounced by his bishop, Alexander, Arius found support elsewhere in the Greek world. The creed of the Council of Nicea (325CE) established the position generally regarded as orthodox, which was elaborated by the Alexandrian theologian and future bishop Athanasius (295–373). Both sides could claim to be drawing on Origen's legacy. Alexandrian theology continued to focus on the full divinity of Christ, and (perhaps assisted by Coptic spirituality) on the union of the divine and human in Christ—an emphasis later visible when a majority in the Egyptian church adopted a Monophysite form of theology.

Up to 313, Alexandrian Christianity suffered periodic violence, sometimes severe, from the Roman state. Origen became head of the catechetical school at a young age because his seniors were dead or dispersed. Persecution sometimes strengthened bonds; for instance, it drove Bishop Dionysius from Alexandria, but brought him into contact with rural Christians and provided missionary opportunities with non-Christians.

Coptic Christianity

Still less is known of Christian origins in the Coptic-speaking areas, where the literary sources are more sparse. The evidence suggests a background of regressive taxation with traditional temples used as tax collection points, administrative corruption and oppression, and abandonment of agricultural land. The earliest literature in Coptic consists of magical formulae. By the third century this gives way to the Bible

translated into the Sahidic dialect of Upper Egypt, suggesting a steady spread of Christianity there. The earliest evidence of its nature comes in the story of Antony, born to Christian parents, wealthy by local standards, some 60 miles south of modern Cairo around 251. From his life as written by Athanasius, we gather that by about 270 (still in the age of persecution), Christianity was well established and organized in this rural community on the Nile. Antony evidently rejected Greek education and, seeking to be a radical disciple of Christ, sold his land to devote himself to following Christ's example. At first he emulated earlier holy men who had lived outside their villages, valued as sources of advice and wisdom. He next took the unusual step of moving into deserted areas, even tombs, recognized as the abode of demonic powers. His spiritual combats were interpreted as demonstrating Christ's triumph over the demons in their own territory. Others followed his example and sought his advice, until desert areas once left to demons could be described as a city full of those praising Christ.

Antony, who lived to a great age and gained significant celebrity, did not organize his disciples, believing that Scripture and spiritual conversation provided guidance enough. Organization was the contribution of Pachomius, a former soldier (c.290–346), who formed communities living under strict discipline to imitate Christ's life and seek perfection. Rural communities saw holy men and women as sources of counsel, power, and protection; the monasteries of Pachomius, numerous and often large, also became important economic units. They could be the landlords of share-cropping peasants, and places of supply and refuge in hard times. Antony and Pachomius, the principal figures of Coptic Christianity, were pioneers of the monastic movement that spread throughout early Christianity and took different forms elsewhere. In Egypt it helped to shape the self-understanding of a whole community.

Coptic Christianity was essentially rural. Antony and Pachomius understood the peasant worldview and the place of spiritual powers within it. It was also a vernacular movement. Antony refused the entry to cosmopolitan society that Greek education offered, and Pachomius eschewed use of it. In its origins the movement was not literary; some of Antony's letters have survived, but the early Coptic literature is essentially practical; its business is the spiritual life. As Greek works of theology or spirituality were translated, Coptic became a literary language for the first time. Meanwhile, Coptic Christianity developed a distinctive oral genre of its own. Sayings of the "Desert Fathers," often vivid, pithy, or gnomic, were treasured, collected, and translated into Greek and even Latin. They form perhaps the first literary expression of rural Africa, an early example of collected proverbial lore.

Coptic Christianity was charismatic, its leading figures subject to visions and extraordinary experiences. (Pachomius was credited with second sight and accused by more conventional churchmen of witchcraft.) This Christianity was radical, and honed under hard conditions. It produced single-minded dedication, and a capacity for extreme behavior. In the politico-theological battles of Alexandria, the passionate intensity of the desert monasteries was often a decisive—and sometimes an explosive—factor.

Christianity, in elevating the status of Coptic and giving a voice to its rural population, helped to shape a new Egyptian identity, capable of resisting Roman attempts to establish a single religious discourse throughout the empire. Between the mid-fifth century and the Arab conquest, this came to be expressed in explicitly Monophysite form, and reinforced the political and economic alienation of Egypt from the imperial center.

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See also: Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640.


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Algeria: Algiers and Its Capture, 1815–1830

Although the regency of Algiers had declined considerably from its peak in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when its corsairs had raided for slaves as far afield as southern Ireland and the English Channel, it was still strong enough in the early nineteenth century to capture ships belonging to weaker Christian states and hold their crews for ransom or to get undertakings that annual tribute would be paid. Not surprisingly, the regency was seen as a continued and nagging threat to naval commerce in the western Mediterranean. However, the port of Algiers was sufficiently well-fortified to repel most attacks, and even when its armaments were systematically destroyed by Lord Exmouth's fleet in August 1816, the regency was able quickly to repair the damage once the British had left. All together, it survived a total of seventeen separate operations mounted between 1541 and July 1830, when it finally capitulated to France.

This French military action was the culmination of a lengthy and at times tangled sequence of events going back over thirty years. In 1796/1797, the financially-pressed directorate government had purchased wheat



Algeria.

on credit at allegedly inflated prices through the agency of the Bacri and Busnach families, who dominated Algiers's foreign trade. In 1801 France set aside just over half of what was claimed (eight million francs), a sum that was held on account in Marseilles. By 1819, interest on the debt had increased the due amount to fourteen million francs, but after negotiation, Hussein, the *dey* of Algiers, declared himself satisfied with an offer of seven million. Later, he asked the French government to advance a part of this sum to himself to clear a debt the families owed him personally, a request rejected as inadmissible under French law. The *dey* then asked for the full amount to be paid, and tried to get the French consul, Pierre Deval, recalled as he believed the consul had personally influenced his home government to take a negative stance. Finally, on April 30, 1827, Deval was received in audience by the irritated Hussein, who asked him why he had not received a reply. The consul then made slighting remarks about the *dey*'s status as compared with that of his king, adding that it was useless/pointless (*inutile*) to expect a reply. Infuriated, the *dey* told him that the audience was at an end. Accounts vary as to what happened next: either he tapped Deval on the arm with his flywhisk to indicate that business had ended, or he struck him angrily once (or even three times, according to some authorities) on the sleeve with what is described as a flyswatter.

Whatever the *dey*'s intentions, Charles X's restoration government took this incident as a grave insult to the French monarch and sent him an ultimatum that, among other things, required the *dey* to make a public

apology and salute a French flag to be hoisted over the Algiers forts. Hussein refused to comply, and a French naval blockade was set in place on June 16. Some desultory and indecisive naval action ensued, and in January of the following year, new and less stringent conditions were offered to the *dey*, again in vain. Over the next eighteen months, the increasingly ineffective blockade continued, until Charles's final ministry, led by Polignac, was appointed in August 1829. Polignac suggested a Muslim solution to the problem, inspired by an offer from Mehemet Ali, ruler of Egypt, to send an army (financed by France) overland to supplant the *dey* and bring "piracy" and slavery to an end. However, the French military influenced the king to reject this proposal as logistically impractical. In February 1830, Polignac finally grasped the nettle, and with the king's approval, decided upon direct military action against the regency. A force of 37,000 soldiers, supported by 27,000 naval personnel, was placed under the command of General Bourmont and dispatched from Toulon to secure a beachhead at Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers, as a prelude to a land-borne assault on the *dey*'s stronghold. This less direct approach, starting with a virtually unopposed landing, and culminating after a campaign lasting only three weeks in a successful attack on the port's less formidable landward defenses, is usually credited to the French restoration government's strategists, although the initial plan had in fact been drawn up by Napoleon in 1808, after an extensive reconnaissance, but postponed following complications in Europe. Algiers port surrendered on July 5, and other coastal towns submitted or were reduced over the next few months. The *dey*, plus the bulk of the Turkish military elite, were expelled, and the local population was informed that the French had freed them from tyranny.

The restoration government's intentions for Algiers were unclear, from the implementation of the blockade to the final victory. British hostility, rooted in its historical mistrust of its rival's ambitions in the Mediterranean, and expressed in tacit support for the *dey*'s obduracy, had inclined Polignac and his predecessors to hide behind generalities and high-sounding rhetoric: Polignac made great play of France's Christian and humanitarian purpose in seeking to rid "civilized" nations of the curses of piracy, slavery, and demands for tribute, and had even suggested the possibility of an international conference to determine Algiers's future (not followed up by his successors). Also, he seemed to have contemplated handing it back to its Ottoman overlords, an option that ran contrary to the actual situation on the ground with Bourmont's expulsion of the Turks. However, Charles X, who had seen the value of a successful military campaign as a means of restoring his waning prestige at home, had few doubts: as he told the British ambassador on July 20,

1830: “In taking Algiers, I considered only France’s dignity; in keeping or returning it, I shall consider only her interests.” The 1830 revolution, which swept him from power a few days later, aborted this process, and left his Orleanist successors with a choice that was more likely to favor retention because of the costs and prestige of military victory, as set against the uncertainty that would follow a departure from Algiers.

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
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Algeria: Conquest and Resistance, 1831–1879

At the end of May 1830, a French military expedition under the command of the minister of war, Comte de Bourmont, left for Algeria. The French troops landed in June at Sidi Ferruch, a small coastal town west of Algiers. Facing the weak and less organized army of the *dey*, they were able to rapidly crush it and capture Algiers on July 5. This French conquest of Algeria seemed to have taken place for a number of reasons, ranging from those viewed as trivial causes to those dictated by important political and economic considerations.

One reason was a financial dispute originating in France’s failure to honor its debt to the regency of Algiers. Unsatisfied by the arguments of the French consul about this issue in a meeting in April 1827, the *dey*, Hussein, used his fly-whisk to strike his host’s shoulder to signify the end of their discussion. This incident, known as the *coup d’éventail*, was viewed by French officials as a major diplomatic affront, particularly when the *dey* refused to apologize. Considering France’s prestige and honor affected as a result, the decision was taken to send a punitive military expedition.

But the incident was not so decisive in itself as to justify a military invasion. Other motives can be adduced to account for the French venture. These had more to do with domestic problems and were not openly stated. The regime of Charles X, king of France (1824–1830), was experiencing internal difficulties and its popularity was declining. The idea of engaging in a military invasion of Algeria seemed a good oppor-



Algeria, nineteenth century.

tunity to divert attention from prevailing domestic political discontent. A military victory would then enhance the regime’s popularity and ensure its success in the elections of July 1830. However, the revolt that ensued ended Charles’s reign, and he was replaced by the “July Monarchy” of King Louis Philippe.

It is also worth mentioning that certain local economic and commercial circles, especially from Marseille, were supporting, if not putting pressure on, the French government to conquer Algeria. This was because their trade had stagnated during the three-year period (1827–1830) that France blockaded Algiers. The conquest would therefore help restore, and even promote, the affected trade exchanges.

In sum, at an early stage the occupation was not the outcome of a colonial policy thought through and carefully elaborated, but was largely a reaction to external and internal events and, at the same time, an attempt to rescue the regime of the restoration Bourbon monarchy and enhance its popularity.

After the occupation of Algiers and other coastal cities, there was no immediate resolve on the part of the French to engage in a full-scale expansion into other parts of the territory. Instead, they were officially content with what they considered as limited occupation, until the end of 1840. But in reality this did not prevent French military command in Algeria from attempting on several occasions to extend the occupation beyond the areas under their direct authority. To oppose this foreign invasion, resistance movements emerged. The first attempts to contest the French military presence in Algeria came from two leaders: in the east Hadj Ahmed, *bey* of Constantine (1826–1837), and in the west Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir, proclaimed *amir* by tribes in the region of Mascara in September 1832.

In the eastern province of Algeria, Ahmed Bey refused the French demand to submit to their authority.

Rather, after 1830 he started transforming the whole area under his authority into an independent province with its own government, currency, and flag. This annoyed the French, and under the leadership of Marshal Bertrand Clauzel (governor-general in Algeria, 1835–1837), an attack was launched on Constantine in 1836. It ended in a total failure and disaster for the French troops, who suffered the loss of a thousand of their 7,400-man expedition. A second offensive, commanded by General Comte Damrémont, who replaced Clauzel, was successful; the city was captured in October 1837. Ahmed Bey fled to the south and continued the struggle, though he was more weakened and isolated as time went on.

In the western part of Algeria, ‘Abd al-Qadir was able to unite various tribes to resist the French occupation. He also succeeded in creating an autonomous state in the region he controlled. In 1834, the treaty signed with the French General Louis Alexis Desmichels stipulated that the *amir* enjoyed sovereignty over western Algeria and recognized him as the commander of the faithful. His position was strengthened further when, in 1837, he signed an agreement with General Thomas Bugeaud, who had already defeated him at the battle of the River Sikkak in July 1836. Called the Treaty of Tafna, it redefined and extended the area under ‘Abd al-Qadir’s sovereignty, to include more than two-thirds of Algeria’s territory. This enabled him to extend his authority into the eastern region and to strengthen his position in the west and center.

Toward the end of 1839, a violation of the territory under his control caused him to declare a state of war and to invade the plain of the Mitidja, the main area of French settlement. This led France to end its so-called official policy of limited occupation and reinforce its military presence in Algeria. Having decided on all-out war, General Bugeaud, commanding one-third of the total French army force (more than 100,000 men), was assigned the task of waging the war against ‘Abd al-Qadir. Gradually the latter’s territory was reoccupied by the French. Becoming aware of the fact that it was more and more difficult to continue the fight, he decided to surrender to the French in December 1847. He was detained in France until 1852. After his release he settled in Damascus.

The defeat of ‘Abd al-Qadir did not mark the end of resistance. Popular movements contesting the French occupation and its administration continued until the beginning of the twentieth century. The inhabitants of the Zaatcha, an oasis near Biskra in the southeast, fought the French troops until their resistance was crushed in 1849. The invasion of eastern Kabylie in 1851 was also met with strong opposition. After successive expeditions, this region was brought under control in 1857. However, the rebellion in the whole

region of Kabylie was not completely suppressed until its leader, Mohamed el-Mokrani, was killed in action in May 1871. After this rebellion, other uprisings of smaller scale took place: El-Amri in 1876 and the Aures in 1879. However, the southern region of Oran was to witness another serious insurrection led by Cheikh Bouamama (1881–1883).

Unlike the resistance led by ‘Abd al-Qadir on a large scale, these revolts and uprisings, with the exception of the significant rising of el-Mokrani, were generally isolated and ineffective. It was not until 1954 that Algeria was to experience the start of a great insurrection on a national scale.

AHMED AGHROUT

See also: ‘Abd al-Qadir; Algeria: Algiers and Its Capture, 1815–1830; Algeria: Government and Administration, 1830–1914; Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962.

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Algeria: Government and Administration, 1830–1914

The administration of Algeria between 1830 and 1914 falls into two phases: the first (1830–1870), primarily military and monarchist in character, reflecting the

aggressive nature of the colonial occupation; and the second (1870–1914), civilian and pro-settler, reflecting the growing ascendancy of the local French *colons* over the Paris bureaucracy.

Following its capture of Algiers in July 1830, the French army established an administration, the legitimacy of which was confirmed after some hesitation by the incoming Orleanist monarchy. Under a succession of military governors-general, reporting to the French war ministry, the bridgehead at Algiers was extended through various expedients, including treaties with local rulers and piecemeal conquest, throughout the 1830s. The pace of this expansion quickened under Thomas-Robert Bugeaud (1841–1848), who defeated France's erstwhile ally Abdel-Qadir after a long campaign, and in 1844 established the colony's administrative basis: coastal areas of European settlement, organized on a civil basis; and in the interior, predominantly Arab/Berber areas under military governance. In these latter districts, existing *bureaux arabes* were formalized as administrative structures, with military officers "advising" traditional authorities, reportedly in a rather directive fashion. Meanwhile, those areas settled by Europeans developed along more metropolitan lines. In the wake of the 1848 revolution, and the renewed impetus given to assimilation policies, three *départements* (Algiers, Oran, and Constantine) were formed and given direct representation in the French parliament for the brief life of the Second Republic (1848–1852).

France's Algerian policy underwent several shifts during the Second Empire (1852–1870). Bugeaud's aggressive expansionist policy was continued by General Randon, later Napoleon III's minister of war, who extended the practice of *cantonement*, of taking for the state tribal land that was apparently unused. Napoleon then abolished the governor-generalship in 1858, and created a ministry for Algeria and the colonies, run by his nephew. His visit to the colony in 1860 brought about another policy change, with the restoration of the governor's post, reporting directly to the emperor himself. However, the most radical turn occurred in 1863 when, influenced by his visit and his counselor, Ismaïl Urbain (a Muslim convert), he declared the colony to be an "Arab kingdom" (*arabe royaume*), with himself as protector equally of Muslims and Europeans, whom he regarded as equal partners in the state. Although his declaration greatly angered the *colons*, his policy differed in method rather than spirit from that of earlier assimilationists: a hybrid local government system (*communes mixtes*) was set up to bring Arabs and Berbers (meaning "Algerians") into the French system, while in July 1865, a decree was introduced allowing naturalization only if Muslim civil status was set aside. The principle behind this legislation

survived until World War II and ironically undermined its intrinsically assimilationist purpose, as few Muslims were prepared to reject Islamic values: only 1,557 Muslims had been granted French citizenship up to 1913.

The emperor's final attempt at liberalism, a constitution that would have allowed Muslims to participate in elections to a new assembly in Paris, was aborted by the 1870 revolution. The Third Republic's new parliamentary structure effectively excluded the Muslim majority, while rewarding the *colons* for their traditional republican loyalty. They were given direct representation in the assembly and senate, while the three *départements* became overseas provinces of France, separated from it only by an accident of geography. As a further mark of this administrative assimilation, in 1871, Algerian affairs were placed under the corresponding metropolitan ministries (*rattachements*), a policy that turned the governor-general into a minor functionary. Civil administration was progressively extended with the confiscation of tribal land after the 1871 revolt and the resulting spread of white settlement into the interior: *communes mixtes* were transformed into *communes de plein exercice*, corresponding to their metropolitan equivalent. Especially in urban areas, the *communes* were dominated by *colons*, who jealously guarded their exclusive right to elect their own mayors. The *bureaux arabes*, with their essentially paternalist attitude toward native Algerians, were eventually restricted to the military districts of the south (*communes indigènes*), much to *colon* satisfaction. After some years of formulation, the *code d'indigénat* was formally adopted in 1881, giving district officials powers to punish Muslims (with the exception of a privileged elite) without due legal process. Legal discrimination was matched by the imposition of the *arabes impôts*, a wide range of taxes imposed on native Algerians for such items as plows and date palms, and who in consequence were paying 70 per cent of all direct taxes in 1909, despite their general impoverishment. In summary, the *colons* saw assimilation as a process related to their exclusive political (and economic) needs, and one from which Muslim Algerians were excluded. This was an assumption from which the local administration rarely dissented in the period up to 1914.

The only major exception took place in the mid-1890s, when in response to *colon* high-handedness, Governor-General Jules Cambon succeeded in getting the *rattachement* system abolished in 1896, thus strengthening his own position: thereafter, Algeria came under the interior ministry. Cambon himself paid the penalty for this intervention: Étienne, the Algerian-born leader of the colonial lobby in the French assembly, secured his recall. The next stage in the reform process ironically gave back to the *colons* more than

they had lost. In 1898 anti-colonial deputies complaining about the heavy cost of Algeria to the exchequer managed to obtain a separate budget for the colony, with a view to curtailing metropolitan expenditure. A complicated mechanism to advise the governor-general, the *délégations financières* (made up of three panels, two *colons* and one Muslim), was set up. Following *colon* protests, this body eventually secured actual control over more than four-fifths of the budget—a situation unmatched in the French empire—and gave the local settlers a wide measure of control over the allocation of services between themselves and the Muslim majority, even though they had only an advisory voice in the governor-general's superior council. Thus, despite fitful attempts to protect the interests of the Muslim majority, colonial reformers were unable to achieve much before 1914, leaving the *colons* in a position of considerable influence over all levels of administration in Algeria.

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Algeria: Muslim Population, 1871–1954

A series of calamities struck the Algerian Muslim population between 1867 and 1871. Already pushed onto marginal territory by French land confiscation, they were acutely vulnerable to the drought that hit in 1867–1868. Then, on the heels of France's defeat by the Germans in 1870, there was a large-scale uprising centered in the mountains of eastern Algeria led by Muhammad al-Mokrani. The French army crushed that revolt and still more land was confiscated. French refugees from Alsace and Lorraine, the provinces annexed by Germany, contributed to increased European presence in Algeria.

The 1870s and 1880s were in many ways the darkest decades in the experience of the Muslims of colonial Algeria. Europeans dominated politics at the local level. The government decreased funding for the Islamic courts and the three government schools that trained Muslim judges and interpreters. The settler-dominated



Tuareg Chiefs in Algiers, 1930s, during the celebrations for the 100th anniversary of the French occupation of Algeria. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

commercial agricultural economy expanded, especially after a blight hit French vineyards. It was during these years that there occurred the last of the desperate rural revolts, notably that of the Awlad Sidi Shaykh along the Moroccan frontier.

By the mid-1880s the situation began to change. As nationalist French politicians called for a war of revenge against Germany they realized that Algerian Muslims constituted a possible source of military manpower. But conscription would require political concessions. There were periodic waves of emigration by Algerian Muslims to the territory of the Ottoman empire that caused embarrassment for France in the Middle East.

Within Algeria, urban Muslim leaders took a more active role, protesting repressive measures and defending Muslim interests. The French metropolitan government saw the need to accommodate these leaders. In 1891, a new governor more sympathetic to Muslim interests, Jules Cambon, was appointed by Paris. He took measures to respond to the grievances of the Muslim urban leaders. There were expanding opportunities for Muslims within the French school system.

The rural Muslim population, however, lived in desperate poverty. A local rebellion around the settler village of Margueritte in 1900 dramatized their plight. The rebels' trial, held in France, proved a forum for exposing the injustices that led to the outbreak.

The French parliament finally passed a conscription law in 1911, drawing support from a small, French-educated Muslim elite. The conscription system was in place by the outbreak of World War I. Though there were incidents of resistance, many young Algerian men found in military service or wage labor in wartime France an alternative preferable to a life of poverty and humiliation in Algeria.

At the end of the war, with the inspiration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination, there was a brief upsurge of Muslim political activity in Algeria, focused on Emir Khalid, a grandson of nineteenth-century resistance hero Abd al-Qadir. But the movement lacked the ability to withstand harassment and manipulation by colonial authorities. More durable was the current of labor migration to France. This emigrant community proved the seedbed for Algerian nationalist politics. Messali Hajj, a wartime conscript who returned to France as a worker, emerged as leader of the North African Star, the first organization to clearly advocate independence.

Within Algeria, Islamic associations sprang up, concerned mainly with providing Algerian Muslim youth with a modern-style Arabic-Islamic education. They coalesced into the Association of Algerian Ulama in 1931, led by Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, scion of an influential family in the city of Constantine.

There was some hope for political reform within Algeria, first in 1927 under liberal Governor Maurice Violette, and again at the time of the Popular Front government in France in 1936. But these efforts, which would have granted full political rights only to a minority of French-educated Muslims and army veterans, were resisted vociferously by settlers, many of them drawn to the racist ideologies of the European right.

With the fall of France in May 1940 Algeria came under the rule of the pro-Nazi Vichy regime. Prominent Muslim religious and political activists were arrested and interned. But in late 1942 British and American forces took over Algeria, bringing in their tow the Free French forces led by Charles de Gaulle. He recruited Algerian Muslim troops who fought loyally for his cause. Muslim leaders now set their aim on ambitious changes, embodied in the Manifesto of Liberty. They called for full political equality for Muslims and autonomy for Algeria. The war, which brought trade to a standstill, left most Algerian Muslims in deepening poverty. It also made them aware that a re-ordering of global power relations was in the making, one in which France would have a secondary role.

Demonstrations in favor of the manifesto were scheduled for V-E Day (May 8, 1945). The goal was to convince the British and Americans of the widespread popularity of the nationalist cause. Muslim leaders, warned by French authorities, called off demonstrations in most localities, but they went ahead in the small eastern city of Setif. Demonstrators unfurled the Algerian flag, and shots were fired. In the ensuing repression an estimated 50,000 Muslims were killed.

In the wake of these events the French government began one final effort at reform. In 1947 a new legal framework was established for Algeria that for the first time made Algerian Muslim representation possible in the French parliament. But the French administration in Algeria rigged elections in favor of its own malleable protégés.

The nationalists themselves were divided between moderates, led by Ferhat Abbas, and militant nationalists under Messali Hajj. There was a failed attempt in 1949 to launch an uprising. Then in 1954 the victory of the Viet Minh over the French at Dien Bien Phu helped convince a group of young nationalists that the time was ripe for armed struggle. They met in the summer and laid plans for an insurrection that was to begin on All Saints Day, November 1, 1954.

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See also: **Algeria: European Population, 1830–1954.**

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Algeria: European Population, 1830–1954

White settlement in Algeria started immediately after the capture of Algiers in July 1830, at a time when the new Orleanist government in Paris was debating whether or not to withdraw, and on the initiative of Clauzel, the local military commander. By the time the decision to stay was taken, in 1833, some 10,000 settlers (*colons*—alternatively, *pieds noirs*) had established themselves in urban centers such as Algiers and Oran, and also on the fertile Mitidja plain. Although a succession of official settlement schemes organized by Clauzel, Bugeaud (the best-known of Algeria's early administrators), and Randon, failed, a flood of settlers arrived in the colony, seeking a fresh start in an area conveniently close to the European states of the western Mediterranean. Initial conditions were harsh, and the death rate high, inspiring the contemporary rueful

comment that “the cemeteries are the only colonies that continually prosper in Algeria.” Nevertheless, the white population steadily rose: 1840: 25,000; 1848: 110,000; 1860: 205,000; 1880: 376,000; 1896: 578,000—making Algeria second only in size to South Africa as a colony of white settlement.

The success of this colonization was underwritten by a series of expensive wars of conquest, and later punitive confiscation of land as a reprisal for rebellion, official decrees from 1844 onward giving the state control of allegedly “unused” tribal land, and in 1873, an endeavor to spread the benefits of “civilization” by introducing individual tenure, which ironically led to many indigenous Algerians having to sell off land to pay for the surveying costs involved. Through these and other processes the white rural population acquired about 40 per cent of Algeria’s arable land, mostly located in the more fertile coastal areas.

The character of this rural settlement was essentially peasant. Successive administrators from Clauzel onward had favored the *petit-colon* peasantry over the plantation system (*grands domaines capitalistes*) of other French colonies. Conservative administrators saw this as a solution to the impoverishment of French rural communities, especially in the south, while those appointed by republican regimes regarded the *colons* as reliable allies against royalists and the military. With the exception of a short period toward the end of the Second Empire (1852–1870), when Napoleon III proclaimed an Arab kingdom and halted land grants to settlers, this *petit-colon* policy continued until the economic dislocation following World War I. Algeria became the home of French peasant farmers seeking better opportunities abroad, joined by a substantial number of Spanish and Italian peasants similarly escaping from rural hardship. The size of this foreign element caused some concern in Paris, but they were soon assimilated into the French *colon* population, a process assisted by a decree in 1889 that automatically naturalized them, unless they requested otherwise. From 1878 to 1904, European peasant proprietors were able to obtain free grants of land, provided they occupied holdings for three years and carried out prescribed levels of improvement. However, from an early stage the majority of *colons* lived in urban centers, where they were later joined by peasants unable to make a living from Algeria’s often hostile environment, who drifted to the towns in search of employment. By 1900, Algeria had a large “poor white” population, generally urban-based and demanding special treatment because of their white (and French) identity. The pace of land consolidation in the countryside accelerated during the interwar (1918–1939) period, with a contracting number of successful vine and cereal farmers.

The *colons*’ political ascendancy was secured in 1870, when in response to the Paris revolution they

ejected the local imperial bureaucracy in Algiers and won from the new republican authorities a number of important changes, including direct representation in the French parliament (three senators and six deputies), and control over the coastal *communes* with directly elected mayors. The Algerian-born deputy, Eugène Étienne (1844–1921) became their main advocate, holding office in various ministries between 1887 and 1913, and leading the colonial group in the assembly. From 1900, the *colons* were able to exercise control over a substantial part of the local budget, a unique situation within the French empire at that time. The *colon* ascendancy established itself behind the banner of *Algérie Française*, perceived as an integral and inseparable part of France, and having no other credible identity; where the interests of the *colons*, long-term defenders of the French republic and French values, prevailed over those of the Muslim (Arab and Berber) majority.

From the start, the *colons* had opposed any liberal, or suggestion of liberal, policies toward the “lazy Arabs” (as they were termed). In 1918, they greeted with extreme hostility Georges Clemenceau’s modest proposal to reward Algerians for their assistance to the war effort by giving the vote to certain elite Muslims without their having to set aside Muslim civil status, a sticking point for the overwhelming majority of Algerians. This was eventually abandoned for less contentious reforms. Leon Blum’s attempt to revive the proposal and extend the vote to some 20,000 Muslims without sacrificing their Muslim civil status was again attacked by the *colons*, who joined hands with the French right to get the legislation (the Blum-Viollette Bill) thrown out by the senate in 1938. Although the wartime de Gaulle administration introduced this reform in 1944, the Algerian settlers were able, with the help of the postwar revival of French imperialism, to renew their ascendancy in 1947, when the Organic Law gave them an effective veto in the new Algerian assembly. Ostensible attempts to balance interests by having two electoral colleges, equal in size (one *colon* with a small number of elite Muslims; the other, entirely Muslim), were effectively undermined by the provision that a second vote, requiring an overall two-thirds, could be demanded if requested by at least a quarter of the assembly members. The value of this constitutional instrument was enhanced by a process of ballot rigging that ensured the victory of Muslim conservatives over most of their radical opponents in the second college. At the outbreak of the Algerian revolt in November 1954, the 910,000 *colons* had thus made *Algérie Française* into an apparently unchallengeable—and permanent—feature of French policy.

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See also: Algeria: Muslim Population, 1871–1954.

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Algeria: Arabism and Islamism

The best known formulation of the Algerian national identity is that coined by Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis in 1936: “Arabic is our language, Islam is our religion, Algeria is our fatherland.” This statement served as an inspiring rally cry for the revolution that led to Algeria’s independence in 1962. But, in certain respects, it is a problematic proposition.

The political unit known as Algeria came into existence with the external catalyst of Ottoman intervention in the 1520s. Before then there had been distinct state traditions in eastern and western Algeria. These separate traditions were still evident in resistance movements to the French conquest in the 1830s and 1840s, split between that led by Abd al-Qadir in the west, and the one led by Hajj Ahmad Bey in the east. The frontiers of the modern Algerian state were created by French colonial armies as they penetrated far into the Sahara, a process not completed until the early twentieth century.

Linguistically the country is divided between speakers of Tamazigh or Berber dialects, in the Kabylia mountains near Algiers, in the Aurès mountains south of Constantine, and among the Tuareg of the far south, and speakers of Arabic dialects. Many Tamazigh speakers also speak Arabic. Algeria’s colonial language, French, was and remains limited to written communication or formal speech.

Arabism, as a cultural movement, has meant the promotion of the modern written version of Arabic through the development of print publications and modern schools. These phenomena first emerged in the eastern Arab countries in the late nineteenth century. They did not take root in Algeria until the decade before World War I.

It was only after World War I that cultural Arabism took on a clearly anticolonial association. There were now full-fledged national movements in Egypt and Tunisia, and their published expression was largely in Arabic. With the collapse of the Ottoman empire Algerians who had been living in exile and had been immersed

in the modern cultural developments of the Middle East returned to Algeria and took up teaching and journalism.

At the same time, French education, compulsory military service, and labor migration to France worked to create a growing knowledge of French among Algerians. Those who worked and studied in France formed social ties with French people, and some married French women. Algerian nationalists sensed that this erosion of cultural and social boundaries made it important to take measures to revive Algerian religious and linguistic identity. They began by forming local associations to support Arabic and Islamic schooling. In 1931, these associations coalesced into the nationwide Association of Algerian Ulama, led by Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis (1889–1940).

The Association of Ulama promoted the doctrines of the Salafiyya, a reform movement seeking to revive the pure, unified Islam of the religion’s early days, rejecting the heterodox practices of the Sufis, and condemning their collaboration with colonial authorities. But the Sufi orders had been a key element in organized resistance to the French conquest in the nineteenth century. Some orders, especially the Rahmaniyya, had links with nationalist parties in the 1930s and 1940s, and developed their own network of modern Arabic Islamic schools. A problem facing the nationalist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the failure to achieve a united front on a wide range of issues. The rivalry between Sufis and Salafis contributed to this failure to find consensus.

It was the establishment of an independent state in 1962 that consolidated the roles of Arabism and Islamism as mainstays of the Algerian national identity. During the war, the Algerians relied heavily on the political and financial support of other Arab countries, especially Egypt, where Arabism was a key element of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s program.

The new government of Algeria sought to strengthen its ideological and institutional foundations. During the war the Association of Ulama had all of its property confiscated and its schools closed down by the French. Thus they presented the dual advantage of espousing a unitary ideology and lacking an independent resource base. The Sufi orders were suspect because of their autonomy and their past links to the colonial authorities and traditional power holders.

Under President Houari Boumédiène (1965–1977), Ben Badis was elevated to the status of a national icon, and Salafi doctrine received strong official endorsement. But relatively few resources were channeled into building mosques or religious schools. Arabism proved of more practical relevance to state policy as secondary and higher education underwent extensive Arabization starting in the early 1970s.

This brought an influx of teachers from Arab east, many of whom came to Algeria because of difficulties

with their own ministries of education due to their connections with the Society of Muslim Brothers. They helped to promote Islamist views among a new generation of students. In the early 1980s, the government of President Chadeli Benjedid made efforts to co-opt this new wave of Islamism with government support. But by the mid-1980s the growth of grassroots Islamic sentiment outstripped the regime's ability to manage the Islamist movement.

Meanwhile, the political appeal of Arabism had ebbed. Iraq's defeat in 1991 seemed to confirm the bankruptcy of Arabism, while the victory of rebels in Afghanistan lent credence to the power of Islamism. But there was a wide range of tendencies within Algerian Islamism regarding political strategy and the degree to which their views should be imposed on other Algerians.

When the military regime suppressed the Islamic Salvation Front in early 1992 it had little in the way of an ideological arsenal to combat it, only the fears of many Algerians that the more radical wing of the front would prevail. The brutal excesses of the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) worked to reinforce these fears but also undermined confidence in the military regime's ability to protect Algerian citizens. The resignation of most Algerians to the election as president of the army's candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in May 1999 seemed to express a sense of exhaustion with conflict among nearly all segments of Algerian society. Disaffected with unitary nationalists and religious ideologies, Algerians may be prepared to come to terms with their own diversity.

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

See also: **Algeria: Ben Bella, Boumédiène, Era of, 1960s and 1970s; Algeria, Colonial: Islamic Ideas and Movements in; Algeria: Muslim Population, 1871–1954.**

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Algeria, Colonial: Islamic Ideas and Movements in

The Algerian experience under French colonial rule (1830–1962) ranks as one of the most intense and difficult Muslim encounters with modern Europe. There were repeated rebellions and a large-scale influx of

European settlers. Algerian Muslims were exposed to French schooling and compulsory military service, and large numbers of men traveled to France in search of work. The experience climaxed with a seven-year revolutionary conflict. The development of Islamic thought and movements in colonial Algeria reflects broader trends in the contemporary Islamic world, but also needs to be considered within the context of the Algerian historical experience.

When the Ottoman administration collapsed with the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, Algerian Muslims were faced with three choices: armed resistance, emigration to a Muslim territory, or living under French rule and attempting to preserve their identity and promote their interests within a colonial framework.

The foremost resistance leader was Abd al-Qadir whose family had a tradition of attachment to the Qadiriyya Sufi order. Their base was in the Eghris Plain near Mascara in western Algeria.

Between 1832 and 1847, Abd al-Qadir used his religious prestige and organizational skill to lead sustained resistance to the French. After his surrender in 1847 he was, contrary to French promises, interned in France. During his five-year captivity he entered into dialogue both with French Catholics and Saint Simonian apostles of a universal civilization based upon science and run by engineers.

In 1852, Abd al-Qadir went into exile in the East, first in Bursa, Turkey, then after 1854 in Damascus. Through the colonial period until World War I, many Islamic scholars chose not to live in Algeria under French rule and went into exile, some joining Abd al-Qadir in Damascus, others going to Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, or the Hijaz. Abd al-Qadir himself continued to cultivate an intense mysticism, but also kept up his ties to the Saint Simonians, helping to gain Ottoman consent to Saint Simonian Ferdinand De Lesseps, project of building a canal through the isthmus of Suez. Politically, Abd al-Qadir maintained a studied ambivalence toward both French and Ottoman authority. After his death in 1882 his sons and grandsons split, some affirming loyalty to France, others to the Ottoman sultan.

Within Algeria, many Islamic leaders continued to advocate armed resistance. Sufi orders played a key role in organizing rebellions. But as rebellions throughout the mid-nineteenth century met with failure, others counseled a realistic approach, urging cooperation in order to secure Muslim cultural, political, and economic rights within the colonial order. Some advocated reform and self-strengthening of Muslim society. Advocates of this approach included al-Makki Bin Badis, a Muslim judge in Constantine, who had a major role in creating a merit-based Islamic judicial bureaucracy in the 1860s, and Abd al-Qadir al-Majjawi, a leading Islamic educator who promoted scientific

study and reminded Algerians that earlier Islamic scholars had excelled in the sciences.

In the 1890s, as the French sought to expand their influence in Muslim territories in North and West Africa and the Middle East, they took a more benevolent attitude toward Islam in Algeria. French Islamic specialists worked closely with Algerian scholars and helped them to publish their work and gain scholarly recognition, as did Muhammad Ben Cheneb at the International Congress of Orientalists, held at Algiers in 1905. But the passage by the French parliament that same year of a law separating religion and state crippled efforts to promote a loyal colonial Algerian Islamic religious establishment.

The decade before World War I saw the emergence of voluntary associations among Algerian Muslims, some of them dedicated to promoting Arabic Islamic education in order to sustain the Algerian national identity in the face of assimilationist pressures. In the 1920s these efforts intensified with the return to Algeria of men who had studied in the Arab East: Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, Tayyib al-Uqbi, and Bashir Ibrahimi. In 1931 they helped establish the Association of Algerian Ulama in order to coordinate promotion of efforts to provide modern-style Arabic Islamic education at a national level. While Bin Badis and Uqbi were inspiring religious figures, it was Ibrahimi, with the most experience with modern intellectual developments in the East, who was the chief educational theorist and organizer.

By the 1930s, a number of Algerians with both French and Islamic educational backgrounds had gone to study in France. The best known of these is Malek Bennabi (1905–1973). His experience as an Algerian Islamic intellectual in France continued themes seen earlier in the case of Abd al-Qadir. He became involved in relations with French student members of the lay religious organization, Catholic Action, and he pursued a scientific education, studying electrical engineering. In the process, he developed a philosophy that emphasized the need for religious revitalization and the intellectual discipline of modern science. He spoke disparagingly of the secular political ideologies popular among many of his fellow Algerian students. These were the key themes in his best-known work, *Vocation de l'Islam*, published in 1954.

When the British and Americans pushed Axis forces out of North Africa in 1943, Bashir Ibrahimi (1890–1965) took the helm of the Association of Algerian Ulama. As nationalist leaders formulated Algerian grievances in a national charter, Ibrahimi contributed the document's religious plank. He called for the French government to compensate the Algerian Muslim community for the loss of religious endowment properties they had confiscated in the 1830s, and for scrupulous application of the law separating religion

and state—thus allowing Muslims free religious expression without government intervention. Except for minor concessions, the French rejected these demands. Frustrated, Ibrahimi went into exile in Cairo in 1952. Bennabi also went to Cairo, in 1954. Both spent the revolutionary years (1954–1962) in the Middle East where they were thoroughly exposed to the ideas of Arab nationalism and of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both men would return to Algeria after independence where they contributed to the complex task of articulating the role of Islam within postcolonial Algeria.

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

See also: **Algeria: Arabism and Islamism; Algeria: Muslim Population, 1871–1954.**

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Algeria: Nationalism and Reform, 1911–1954

After the defeat of the Muslim Algerian armed rising in 1871, Algeria was resigned to being governed as three French departments (Algiers, Oran, and Constantine). Few Muslims were naturalized, as the conditions regarding “personal status” were unacceptable for practicing Muslims. Very few even received a French education. Among those who did, a protest movement grew up in the early twentieth century that sought true equality of rights between Muslims and French-Algerians, without insistence on conditions for citizenship contrary to Islam.

This loosely organized movement took the name *Jeunes Algériens*. Founded in 1909, it rarely had more than a thousand members. It fully accepted French rule and was rejected by some Muslims for that reason, besides being denounced by the French-Algerian lobby (powerful in Paris then as later). The *Jeunes Algériens* accepted compulsory military service. The hope was that military service would be rewarded with French citizenship. Many Algerians fought in World War I, and in 1919 thousands of Muslim Algerians received French citizenship and the right to vote.

The movement for rights under French rule was continued by people such as “Emir” Khaled (grandson of the nineteenth-century resistance leader Abd al-Qadir, and an officer in the French army), who was prominent in local politics in Algiers in 1919–1923, and Ferhat Abbas (1899–1985), a chemist of Sétif who became a prominent spokesman of the French-educated (or

évolué) class in the 1920s and 1930s. Their proposals, if adopted, would have ended the colonial order in Algeria; but as they accepted French rule in principle, their views came to be rejected by many Algerians. In 1926 a radical nationalist party, the Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA), was founded in Paris, mainly supported by the thousands of Algerian workers in France. It was founded with the help of the French communist party, but under Ahmed Messali of Tlemcen (1898–1974), who became the ENA's secretary-general in 1926, it was a nationalist party which at first saw the communists as a useful ally but gradually parted company with them between 1928 and 1933. From the start the ENA called for independence for Algeria.

Active in France, the ENA was at first unable to operate in Algeria where radical anticolonial activity was firmly suppressed. However, French rule was increasingly rejected in another way in Algeria, by Muslims who adopted ideas of reform of Islam preached by Muhammad Abduh of Egypt and others. They challenged the depressed state of the Muslims and the Islamic faith under French rule, and denounced the Sufi *marabouts* who were venerated as saints and approved by the French but who, according to the reformers, led people into false ideas. The leader of this movement in Algeria, Abdelhamid Ben Badis (1889–1940), founded newspapers and then formed in 1931 an association of Muslim teachers or *ulama*, the Association des Oulémas Musulmans Algériens. It spread rapidly, founding many schools, and became a nationalist movement with its slogan “Algeria is my country, Arabic is my language, Islam is my religion.”

In 1936 the ENA was allowed to organize in Algeria. Meanwhile, a Muslim congress, dominated by the *évolués* and the Oulémas, met in Algiers and put forward “assimilationist” demands including universal suffrage. While the ENA had for the moment stopped calling for independence, it disagreed with the congress's and the Oulémas's loyalism. It rejected as highly inadequate the new government's bill, the Blum-Violette bill, which would have extended citizenship initially to about 20,000 more Muslim Algerians. The bill failed owing to opposition from the French-Algerian lobby, and meanwhile, the French left-wing parties, including the communists in Algeria (where a separate Parti Communiste Algérien [PCA], was set up in 1936) and France, were turning against colonial nationalism because of the priority need to face the Nazi-fascist danger. Accordingly, the Popular Front government banned the ENA on January 27, 1937.

Messali founded a new party, the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), in Paris on March 11, 1937. It called for self-government, plus major reforms, but not for

independence. Messali and some fellow leaders of the party were arrested in Algiers in August 1937. While Messali served a two-year sentence the party's popularity increased. In contrast the Muslim congress declined, but Abbas founded a new Union Populaire Algérien (UPA) in 1938, with policies less assimilationist than those he had followed before. The PPA was banned on the eve of World War II, and soon afterward Messali was arrested again; he received a sixteen-year sentence in 1941.

In February 1943 Abbas joined fifty-five other *évolués* to draw up a “Manifesto of the Algerian People,” calling for equality, agricultural reform, and free compulsory education; a supplement was added calling for an Algerian state. General Charles de Gaulle announced in December 1943 that the Muslim Algerian elite would be given full French citizenship rights. But leaders of that elite now wanted more, and on March 17, 1944, Abbas launched the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML), which aimed ultimately to form an Algerian republic federated with France. Fiercely denounced by the settlers, Abbas was also rejected as too moderate by many ordinary Algerians; the PPA had continued underground, and its more militant views prevailed at the AML central conference in 1945. PPA followers were involved in protests at Sétif in May 1945 that led to riots and ferocious repression; Abbas was among thousands arrested.

The French government allowed Muslim Algerians to elect thirteen representatives to the constituent assembly. Abbas, released in March 1946, founded a new party, the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA); his candidates won most Muslim votes in the elections for a second constituent assembly in June 1946, and in August he submitted a proposal to the assembly for an Algerian republic federated to France. Instead of this, the national assembly of the Fourth French Republic adopted in September 1947 an Algeria statute that created an Algerian assembly with equal representation for the Muslim majority and the settler minority, and very limited powers; the rule of France and the settlers was little altered. Nationalists believing in peaceful progress were further frustrated when the elections to the Algerian assembly in April 1948 were rigged on a large scale.

Messali was freed in 1946. He organized a new party, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), to replace the outlawed PPA. While Messali (called Hadj Messali after his Mecca Pilgrimage in 1951) was highly popular among Muslims, he had become more distant from his party while in prison, until eventually the MTLD split in 1952–1954. By then Messali, arrested during a triumphal tour of Algeria in 1952, had been confined by government order to the area of Niort in France. His

influence was still great, but events were passing out of the hands of leaders like Messali and Abbas (who was a minor political player by then). In 1948 some younger activists in the MTLD formed the Organisation Secrète (OS) committed to armed action against the French rulers. It was broken up in the succeeding years, but some of its members were able to form the Comité Révolutionnaire de l'Unité et de l'Action (CRUA) in 1954. That small group, joined by a few others, became the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which initiated the efforts that launched the war of independence on November 1, 1954.

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See also: Algeria: Conquest and Resistance, 1831–1879; Algeria: European Population, 1830–1954; Algeria: Muslim Population, 1871–1954; Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Northern Africa.

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Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962

The Algerian War for Independence began on November 1, 1954, when the FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale*, or National Liberation Front), a group advocating social democracy with an Islamic framework, called upon all Algerians to rise up against French authority and fight for total independence for Algeria. The FLN had been created the same year by the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, or CRUA), in an attempt to unite the various nationalist factions in Algeria and to formulate a plan of action for resistance to French rule. Resistance was to include two specific tactics. At home, the rebels were to use guerrilla warfare as their primary method of resistance, while internationally, the FLN launched a diplomatic campaign to gain support for Algerian independence (including mobilizing support in the United Nations and sending representatives to Bandung).

One of the most important of the rebel leaders was Ahmed Ben Bella. Ben Bella had been convicted of robbing the post office in Oran in 1950 (an undertaking

designed to acquire funds for the emerging nationalist movement), and sent to prison. After serving two years of his sentence, Ben Bella escaped from prison and took refuge in Egypt, where he was received with open arms by Gamal 'Abd el-Nasr (after the Egyptian revolution in 1952), who promised support for the Algerian cause. Ben Bella, along with other revolutionary leaders outside Algeria, played a key role in founding the FLN in 1954; he also was instrumental in arranging arms shipments to the Algerian rebels.

In 1956, several key events took place. The French government, having been unable to stem the growing tide of violence in Algeria, began calling up reserves, resulting in a doubling of the French military presence in Algeria; by April there were almost half a million French troops in Algeria. The Soummam Conference, held in August and September 1956, resolved two important disputes within the FLN leadership (despite the fact that Ben Bella was not present at the conference, his absence being variously attributed to intentional efforts by other leaders to exclude him and to Ben Bella's inability to elude French security forces and reenter Algeria for the conference). The conference decided that political affairs were to take precedence over military matters and that internal action must have precedence over external action. The FLN also further organized itself in preparation for a new campaign against French control.

The new campaign began shortly after the Soummam Conference ended. On September 30, 1956, the FLN bombed two locations frequented by young French colonists, the Milk Bar and the Cafeteria, marking the beginning of the battle of Algiers. Ben Bella was kidnapped by French forces the following month and put in prison, where he remained until independence in 1962 (he then served as Algeria's prime minister from 1962 to 1963, and president from 1963 to 1965). In November 1956 the French military was distracted temporarily by other events in North Africa, as French and British forces landed in Egypt as part of the Suez War (following 'Abd el-Nasr's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company); they were forced by international events to withdraw in early 1957. In Algeria, 1957 began with a reaffirmation of the permanent linkage of France and Algeria by French Prime Minister Guy Mollet. In late January, a general strike called by the FLN in Algiers was broken by French forces, and in February the French succeeded in capturing another key rebel leader, Larbi Ben M'hidi, who died in custody a few days later. The battle of Algiers officially ended later that year with the capture of the head of the Algiers branch of the FLN, Yacef Saadi.

In Algeria, French settlers, unsatisfied with the French response to the rebellion, seized government buildings in Algiers in May 1958, prompting the French army to

take full control of the government of Algeria until June 1. Charles de Gaulle, elected president of France in December 1958, was no stranger to Algeria, having set up a shadow government in Algiers in 1943–1944 during the German occupation of France in World War II. Though a new offensive against the FLN was launched in July 1959, de Gaulle offered Algeria self-determination in September, prompting French settlers to revolt once more against the French government in Algeria. The revolt was unsuccessful, as were peace talks between France and the FLN in June 1960.

Meanwhile, in France, pressure had been mounting for an end to the war in Algeria. A growing number of French citizens began criticizing the conduct of the war, and allegations of the widespread use of torture by the French military were made public; Henri Alleg's 1958 work, *La Question*, which gave a detailed account of torture during the battle of Algiers, was banned by the French government after it had sold some 65,000 copies. French citizens also aided the FLN by serving as couriers to transport funds from the Algerian expatriate community in France to the FLN in Algeria, by helping hide FLN members, and by helping smuggle FLN members across national borders. The Algerian rebels were supported by many intellectuals in France, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, André Breton, and André Masson. These were some of the members of a group of 121 intellectuals who in 1960 published the "Declaration of the Right to Refuse to Take up Arms" (also known as the 121 Manifesto), that recognized the right to resist involvement in the war through illegal means (such as desertion from the French army). By December 1960, international pressure was mounting as well, as the United Nations recognized Algeria's right to self-determination.

Negotiations began again in 1961. A national referendum was held in February 1961 in which the vast majority of Algerians voted in favor of independence. However, the referendum results prompted another settler revolt, this time led by a group called the Secret Army Organization (OAS). Peace talks held in mid-1961 at Evian failed, and in late 1961 and early 1962 more than 200 Algerians were killed in demonstrations in Paris. France and the FLN finally signed a cease-fire agreement in March 1962; three months later a truce was signed between the FLN and the OAS. The previous year's referendum results were subsequently approved, and on July 3, 1962, after 132 years of French domination, Algeria became officially independent.

The announcement of independence caused some one million European settlers to flee Algeria, fearing reprisals and the loss of their favored political and economic position. The Algerian war for independence

had lasted eight years. More than 8,000 villages had been destroyed in the fighting, some three million people were displaced, and more than a million Algerians and some 10,000 *colons* lost their lives.

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Algeria: Ben Bella, Boumédiène, Era of, 1960s and 1970s

Ahmed ben Bella and Houari Boumédiène emerged from the war of 1954–1962 as the dominant figures who would control the newly independent state of Algeria. Ben Bella had fought for the Free French in Italy, but in 1947 he severed his links with the French to create the Organisation Secrète (OS), which advocated an Algerian armed struggle to achieve independence from France. In 1950 Ben Bella led an OS armed attack on the Oran post office to obtain money for the revolt; he was imprisoned by the French but escaped after two years. In 1954, with Belkacem Krim, Ben Bella formed the Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action (CRUA), which later became the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

At independence in 1962, the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) was divided between Colonel Houari Boumédiène, who commanded the FLN army in Tunisia and was supported by Ben Bella, and the more moderate members of the GPRA. The possibility of a civil war between these two factions loomed briefly when the new government, then headed by Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, dismissed Boumédiène for plotting a coup. However, Boumédiène advanced on Algiers with his troops, Ben Khedda fled, and a new, more radical government was set up with Ben Bella as prime minister and Boumédiène as chief of staff. Elections on September 20, 1962, were won by the Ben Bella-Boumédiène faction.

These two contrasting characters left a profound imprint upon Algeria both during the struggle against the French, and in the years that followed independence. The chances of the two men working well together were slim, for they differed sharply in their approaches to government and its problems. Ben Bella

was the more radical of the two, Boumédiénne a greater pragmatist. Moreover, Ben Bella, despite his popularity, became increasingly dictatorial. He promised Algerian support to other revolutionary movements while simultaneously eliminating perceived political rivals. On June 19, 1965, to forestall Ben Bella's dictatorial behavior and his apparent intention of establishing a Marxist state (as well as to safeguard his own position), Boumédiénne used the army, the loyalty of which he had retained, to mount a coup to depose Ben Bella. Thereafter, despite enjoying only limited popular support, the austere Boumédiénne would rule Algeria as a socialist until his death in 1978. At first he set up a military Council of the Revolution and attempted to create a "true socialist society."

Ahmed Ben Bella was born in 1918, the son of a small businessman of Maghnia in the department of Oran. He served with distinction in the French Army, which he joined in 1937 and he was to win both the Croix de Guerre and the Médaille Militaire. In the later 1940s, however, Ben Bella joined the Algerian nationalist underground movement and became one of its leading members. After the 1950 OS raid on the Oran post office, he spent two years in prison, before escaping. He moved to Egypt where he obtained support for the nationalists from the new government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. With others he was instrumental in creating the FLN, which launched its armed struggle against the French in 1954. Seen as a major threat to the French position in Algeria, Ben Bella was the target of two assassination attempts during 1956, in Cairo and Tripoli. He returned to Algeria in 1956 to negotiate peace terms with the French prime minister, Guy Mollet, but he was arrested by the French. He was imprisoned from 1956 to 1962, a fact that allowed him to keep his radical reputation intact. Upon his release from prison, and following the events of that year when Ben Bella and Boumédiénne emerged as the new government, Ben Bella was elected unopposed to the presidency of Algeria in 1963.

As president, Ben Bella had to create a working state out of the ruins of a devastated country when almost all the French *colons* (settlers) had returned to France, decimating the class of skilled workers. One of Ben Bella's first political decisions was to set aside 25 per cent of the budget for education. He nationalized the huge farms of the former French settlers and embarked upon other agrarian reforms. He supported the anti-Zionist Arab states opposed to Israel. At the same time he tried to develop cultural and economic relations with France.

Ben Bella, whose humanist instincts appealed to the people, enjoyed great popularity; however, he tended to govern on a day-to-day basis and, crucially, he failed to obtain the full support of the army or the FLN. Following Boumédiénne's coup of June 19, 1965, Ben

Bella was to be imprisoned for fifteen years and was only released on October 30, 1980, two years after Boumédiénne's death.

In many respects, Boumédiénne was the antithesis of Ben Bella. One of a family of seven children, Mohammed Ben Brahim Boukharouba was born on August 23, 1927, at Clauzel near Guelma. When he failed to obtain deferment from conscription into the French army so that he could continue his studies, Boumédiénne fled to Egypt. In Cairo he forsook his studies to join Ben Bella and the other Algerian nationalists who were there and changed his name to Houari Boumédiénne. Once the FLN had launched the armed struggle against the French in Algeria in 1954, Boumédiénne pushed himself forward in search of a leadership role. He was given military and then guerrilla training in Egypt and Morocco respectively and by 1958 had been promoted to commander of the Armée de la Libération Nationale (ALN) in the west while, by the end of the war, he had risen to the command of the ALN general staff.

Following independence in 1962, Boumédiénne became involved in the power struggle between the old guard nationalists led by Ben Khedda and the radicals led by Ben Bella, with whom he had identified. After Ben Bella was elected prime minister (taking 90 per cent of the vote) on September 20, 1962, he appointed Boumédiénne minister of defense. On September 15, 1963, Ben Bella became president; he made Boumédiénne first deputy premier. Boumédiénne also retained his post as minister of defense and army commander, which placed him in an exceptionally powerful and influential position. By 1964 Ben Bella began to see Boumédiénne as a threat and attempted to downgrade his influence. He nominated Colonel Tahar Zbiri as chief of the army general staff but Zbiri entered into a secret pact with Boumédiénne to allow him to keep control of the army. Then Ben Bella forced the minister of the interior, Ahmed Medeghri, who was a strong supporter of Boumédiénne, to resign. Finally, when Boumédiénne learned that Ben Bella intended to oust him from office during an Afro-Asian summit due to be held in Algeria during the summer of 1965, Boumédiénne mounted his successful coup.

Boumédiénne was to rule Algeria from 1965 until his death in 1978. He was a "hawk" in relation to both Israel and in the councils of OPEC, and he played a prominent role promoting the idea of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was one of the consequences of the rise of OPEC power in 1973–1974. At first Boumédiénne ruled through a twenty-six-member revolutionary council, but following a coup attempt against him in 1967 he ruled directly.

Austere and Spartan in his personal life, Boumédiénne's principal source of support was the army.

Although he was a socialist and introduced a range of socialist measures he was neither extreme nor doctrinaire. He argued that people did not need speeches but wanted “bread, shoes, and schools.”

GUY ARNOLD

See also: **Algeria: Bendjedid and Elections, 1978–1990; Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962.**

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Algeria: Bendjedid and Elections, 1978–1990

Conquered by France in the 1830s and formally annexed in 1842, Algeria achieved independence as a result of a nationalist guerrilla struggle that commenced in 1954 and ended with the withdrawal of the French in July 1962. However, the group that took power, the National Liberation Front (FNL), was handicapped by deep divisions, especially between commanders of the nationalist army and the predominantly civilian political leadership headed by Ahmed Ben Bella. Although the latter was elected to a five-year presidential term in 1963, his lack of popularity within the armed forces led to a military coup d'état, led by Colonel Houari Boumedienne, in June 1965. Following his accession to power, Boumedienne assumed power as the leader of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria embarked on a socialist development strategy (land reform, nationalization of the oil industry, and an “agricultural revolution”), and between 1962 and 1988 the country had a single-party political system. The Algerian people took part in three major referendums in 1976, which not only confirmed Boumedienne in power, but also approved a new constitution and committed the country to a socialist development path. However, Boumedienne died soon after, in December 1978. He was briefly replaced by assembly president Rabah Bitat, who soon gave way to Colonel Chadli Bendjedid following a national election in February 1979. Bendjedid was unopposed in his reelection bid in January 1984. However, his government was shortly beset by a host of problems.

In the 1980s, with the economy in rapid decline, demands grew for more political and cultural freedoms. The growing importance of cultural demands was reflected in the rise of a movement of the minority Berber people as well as the emergence of fundamentalist Islamist groups. Economic decline helped stimulate the growth of an Islamist opposition to the Chadli Bendjedid government. The Islamists advocated a reversal of Algeria's modernization path under the FLN government, arguing for a culturally authentic replacement based upon the tenets of Islam and embodied in *shari'a* (Islamic law) to replace Algeria's French-influenced civil code. The Islamists pushed for reforms based on Islamic principles, including a strict dress code for women, increased religious broadcasts on radio and television, and the banning of public consumption of alcohol. Initially ignored by the Bendjedid government, the Islamists began to take over state-controlled mosques and to install their own preachers. Conflict erupted on several university campuses at this time between Islamists and secular students. The state's response was to clamp down on the Islamists by arresting the main leaders.

Economic concerns and the political problems posed by the Islamists led to growing tension within the government. While political infighting limited the effectiveness of reform efforts, critics charged that many of those entrenched in positions of power were reluctant to surrender economic and social privileges. Pent-up anger and frustration erupted into rioting in the capital city, Algiers, in early 1988, quickly spreading to other urban centers. These events shattered Algeria's reputation as an “oasis of stability” in an otherwise turbulent region. More than 500 people died when the armed forces opened fire on demonstrators in Algiers, while more than 3,000 were arrested. Following these events, President Bendjedid adopted a conciliatory attitude, converting what could have been a challenge to his authority into a mandate for sweeping economic and political change. A referendum in November 1988 led to voters overwhelmingly approving a constitutional amendment that reduced the FLN's political dominance. Henceforward the prime minister would have greater responsibility and would be responsible to the national assembly. Bendjedid appointed a new prime minister, Kasdi Merbah, who quickly announced a new cabinet with many new faces, while agreement was reached that future elections would allow the participation of non-FLN candidates. In December 1988 Bendjedid secured a third five-year term in office, achieving an overwhelming mandate in a presidential election in which he was the sole candidate.

The constitution was liberalized in February 1989; from that point on, multiparty elections were to be the

chief mechanism for choosing popular representatives. The first polls under the new regime, at municipal and provincial levels, took place in June 1990. These elections highlighted the growing political importance of the Islamists. During the preceding few years the Islamist movement had been building its strength. Initially rather fluid and nebulous, the 1988 riots had encouraged it to solidify into a variety of formal organizations, including political parties with religious, social, cultural, and political objectives. The largest party was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), followed by Hamas (*al-Haraka li-Mujtama' Islami* [Movement for an Islamic Society]) and the MNI (*La Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique* [Movement for Islamic Renewal]). Smaller groups included *Rabitat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya* (League of the Islamic Call) and the Party of Algerian Renewal. While differing in their tactics to achieve the Islamic state, they agreed that Algeria's problems were caused by the public downgrading of Islam during decades of Western-style modernization.

The FIS emerged as the main political rival to the ruling FLN in the municipal and provincial elections of June 1990, taking control of more than 50 per cent of Algeria's municipalities and winning over 54 per cent of the vote. The FIS platform was that Algeria should at once replace Western-style pluralism and representative democracy, replacing it with rule on the basis of *shari'a* law and *shura* (popular consultation). The FIS (along with Hamas, MNI, and the Party for Algerian Renewal) then took part in elections for the national assembly in December 1991, winning 188 of the 430 seats in the first round of voting (3.26 million of the 6.8 million votes cast [47.9 per cent]). This impressive result was achieved despite the fact that its leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, were in prison. The other Islamic parties did much less well in the election.

Following the elections the army forced President Bendjedid to resign, replacing him with a five-man collective presidency, the High Committee of State (Haut Comité d'Etat, HCE), chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf. Boudiaf was assassinated in June 1992. The FIS was banned and thousands of its activists and supporters incarcerated, while an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 people died in the ensuing civil war.

JEFF HAYNES

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Algeria: International Relations, 1962–Present

When the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) took power in 1962, it embarked immediately on a determined and high-profile foreign policy that was to continue throughout the party's thirty years of rule. It was characterized by strong opposition to Western imperialism and colonialism, solidarity with other Arab, African, and Third World countries, defense of Third World economic interests, and sympathy for leftist and revolutionary movements and governments. But the FLN's desire to maintain good relations with France, despite the bloodshed and bitterness of the war of independence, modified its generally radical stance.

Algeria's foreign policy mirrored its socialist domestic policies (in October 1963, for example, the last remaining 5,000 French farms were nationalized). Relations were soured by that and other factors, and France began to impose restrictions on the Algerians' migration to France from 1964. But the two countries negotiated a revision of the oil exploitation agreements, and a new fifteen-year pact was signed in July 1965, a month after Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown.

Colonel Houari Boumedienne's coup on June 19, 1965, came on the eve of a scheduled Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization conference, which was intended to be held in Algeria. The conference was postponed and then never held, and many of Ben Bella's Third World and nonaligned allies were angered by the coup. Eventually, Algeria's foreign policy initiatives were resumed much as before, implemented and defended by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, foreign minister under Boumedienne as under Ben Bella.

The main difference under Boumedienne was greater emphasis on the Arab world. Algerians were generally sympathetic to the cause of Palestine, and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war Algeria was a leading advocate of an uncompromising stance against Israel.

Relations with neighbors in the Maghreb were more complicated. Treaties of "brotherhood, good neighborliness, and cooperation" were signed with Morocco in 1969 and Tunisia in 1970. But in the 1970s, Algeria and Morocco clashed severely when Morocco and Mauritania annexed Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara) against the opposition of the territory's nationalist leaders, the Polisario Front, which declared the

independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Algeria recognized the SADR; a prolonged breach between Algeria and Morocco followed. Tindouf in Algeria became the main base for the SADR government and guerrilla forces and the main concentration of Sahrawi refugees. French military aid to Mauritania in 1977–1978 added to tensions between Algeria and France.

For years France and Algeria quarreled over many issues and yet continued to work together. There were disputes over implementation of the 1965 oil and gas agreement, before Algeria asserted itself with the nationalization (on February 24, 1971) of oil and gas deposits and pipelines, and a 51 per cent takeover of French oil companies. Meanwhile, when France and Algeria clashed over Algerian wine exports, the USSR stepped in and offered to buy Algerian wine. This developed further the increasing economic ties with Moscow that had been growing, together with military ties, since Ben Bella's time. Despite large-scale Soviet military aid with equipment and training, Algeria remained resolutely nonaligned. However, in the Cold War it was considered pro-Soviet in U.S. eyes, and Algerian policy was often vocally anti-American, especially during the Vietnam War. However, Algeria sold natural gas to the U.S. and was able to mediate over the U.S. hostages in Iran (1979–1981).

Algeria and France had to work together, above all because of the large and increasing numbers of Algerian workers in France, useful to both countries but especially to countless Algerian families, through their remittances. They numbered about 820,000 by the late 1980s. Algeria was concerned about immigration restrictions, police harassment, and racist attacks and propaganda, but needed the labor migration to continue and negotiated with Paris on aspects of it. Despite the various disagreements, President Giscard d'Estaing of France visited Algeria in April 1975. After years of worsening relations, an improvement led to a visit by President François Mitterrand in November 1981, followed by an agreement on natural gas pricing in February 1982.

Algeria's assertion of state power over the oil and gas industry was followed by full support for OPEC's aggressive oil pricing policy started in 1973. This was in line with Algeria's consistent calls for an end to the economic inequality between developed and developing countries. Representatives of seventy-seven countries met in Algiers in 1967 and agreed on the Algiers Charter of the Economic Rights of the Third World, founding the "Group of 77," which still meets under that name (though its numbers have much increased).

The death of Houari Boumediene on December 27, 1978, and the accession of President Bendjedid Chadli, did not affect the structure and policies of the

FLN party or state. Bouteflika was replaced, after sixteen years, by Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia (who was killed in an air crash, and then by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi until 1988. In February 1983 President Chadli Bendjedid met King Hassan and the border with Morocco was reopened, but only on May 16, 1988, were normal relations restored with Morocco, and even then suspicion continued as Algeria continued to back the Sahrawi republic.

President Bendjedid visited France in November 1983, declaring, "It is a new page which the Algerian people inaugurate with the French people." In fact many causes of discord continued, especially relating to the Algerians in France; in the early 1990s France drastically cut back on the issuing of visas for Algerians. French aid, however, continued, and Mitterrand visited in March 1989.

Bendjedid paid an official visit to the U.S. in April 1985. However, he backed Libya at the time of the U.S. air raid on Tripoli in 1986 and during the Chad civil war. Algeria maintained its militant stand on Palestine, denouncing Egypt for its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and organizing an Arab summit to declare support for the Palestine Intifada starting in 1987. In November 1988, the Palestine National Council met in Algiers and declared the independence of Palestine.

The Gulf War and crisis of 1990–1991 aroused passions in Algeria, where public opinion strongly favored Iraq. Internal affairs preoccupied Algerians more than ever after the military takeover of January 1992, depriving the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) of its expected general election victory, and the subsequent Islamist guerrilla action leading to years of civil war. But the war inevitably affected foreign relations.

France generally gave the Algerian government diplomatic support and, it was reported, some covert military aid also; it was more favorable to the government than other European Union (EU) members. But Algiers protested at French and other Western expressions of concern over the government's own crimes. In particular, it was angry at the meeting in Rome in early 1995 at which several parties operating legally in Algeria met the FIS and agreed on some points, and at some Western sympathy for that effort to end the crisis. The U.S. and Germany were criticized for giving asylum to top FIS leaders, and Britain for sheltering some other Algerian Islamists. For some years Algeria broke off relations with Sudan because of its government's support for the FIS. Meanwhile, in 1994, renewed tension with Morocco led to closing of the border until 2001.

When Bouteflika became president in 1999 he softened the attitude to foreign concern about human rights; the war had, in any case, declined in intensity by

then. Bouteflika has become one of the most prominent African heads of state on the diplomatic scene, and the OAU summit of 1999 was held in Algiers. However, the Western Sahara issue remains unresolved.

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Algeria: Islamic Salvation Front, Military Rule, Civil War, 1990s

In October 1988 riots by disaffected urban youth shook Algiers, the Algerian capital. Their anger stemmed from high unemployment and deteriorating living standards that had accompanied the decline of oil and gas revenues over the preceding four years. President Chadli Bendjedid called in the army to quash the riots. Then he launched a bold political opening. The FLN (National Liberation Front) lost the monopoly it had held since independence in 1962.

The most important, but by no means the only, new party to emerge was the Islamic Salvation Front, known by its French initials, FIS. Its strength derived from a multitude of local Islamic associations and informal networks. These had sprung up mainly since the late 1970s but the history of such associations can be traced back to the early twentieth century. It sought to fill a void left by the regime that had spent large sums on sprawling apartment complexes but gave little thought to providing religious infrastructure for rapidly growing cities.

The FIS drew its ideas in part from local Algerian currents of modern Islamic thought, particularly from Malik Bennabi (1905–1973), mentor of the movement's leader Abassi Madani. As a student in Paris in the 1930s, Bennabi had been impressed by the French lay religious movement Catholic Action. He saw in it an alternative to the political movements that usually attracted Algerian students. These he found flawed both by the boundless ambitions of their leaders and the mindless sloganeering of the followers.

The FIS was also influenced by transnational Islamic movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Algerian Islamic leaders living in Cairo had been in contact with this movement since the early 1950s. It provided a model for religious social action ranging

from establishing prayer groups to providing charity, job finding, and health services. Official and private parties in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had a long history of supporting this kind of activity in Algeria.

There was also a current within the Algerian Islamic movement that stressed armed struggle. There had been an Islamic guerrilla movement led by Mustafa Bouyali, brought to an end with his death at the hands of security forces in 1983. A number of Algerian Islamic militants had seen service with the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan.

The FIS view on politics was ambiguous. Some members argued that elections were a clever snare. The FIS's most popular preacher, the young Ali Ben Hajj, lashed out against party politics as running against the grain of Islam's unitary spirit, yet he spurred the party faithful forward into the electoral fray.

Many Algerians were disaffected with the military-dominated regime that had held sway since independence and so gave their support to the FIS in municipal elections in 1990. But they still worried that the FIS, as its critics argued, stood for "one man, one vote, one time," in other words using elections merely to legitimate establishment of a new authoritarian regime.

The emergence of the FIS as by far the most powerful in a field of otherwise small parties prompted both the FIS and its opponents in the regime to plot their next moves. Neither proved astute in this game. The regime attempted to tinker with electoral laws in order to favor the FLN. But the implementation of "first past the post" electoral rules would provide an even greater advantage to the FIS. As for the FIS leadership, they attempted to use popular demonstrations in June 1991 in order to pressure the regime to accepting a fast track toward presidential elections. But the top leaders were jailed, and the FIS did not have such overwhelming popularity that it could force their release.

Neither the FIS nor its regime opponents seemed to grasp the necessity of appealing to the numerous smaller parties, nor did they recognize the importance of Amazigh (Berber) particularism or of showing commitment to the right to free speech and political expression. Both sides contributed to reducing the political question to a choice between the regime and the FIS, leading to the regime outlawing the FIS in early 1992.

There ensued a civil war, with the FIS establishing a military wing, the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS), and more radical Islamists forming the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA). Unable to rely on the largely conscript army to suppress the rebellion, the government turned to establishing local militias, known as "patriots," to suppress the Islamic rebels. The conflict produced numerous atrocities, some attributable to the rebels, some to government forces.

The regime sought to enhance its credibility by bringing back from exile in Morocco Mohammed Boudiaf, a founding father of the FLN, to serve as president. He was assassinated in June 1992. Some Algerians blamed the Islamists; others believed the killing was ordered by high-level officials fearful that they would become targets of his anti-corruption drive.

The first major efforts toward peace were facilitated by a group of Catholic peace activists, the Community of Sant' Egidio. They brought together parties ranging from the FIS to the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), based in the Berber Kabylia region, to the FLN. The resulting platform established principles for a solution to the Algerian conflict, including respect for the right of free political expression. However, both the regime and the GIA rejected the platform and violence and repression continued.

In 1996 President Liamine Zeroual made his own bid to gain support of a wide coalition by holding elections. A new regime-sponsored party, the Democratic National Rally, came out on top, but moderate Islamic parties, those with mainly Berber constituencies, and others all won seats, and some were rewarded with subordinate roles in government.

By early 1998 the death toll had reached, by various estimates, from 60,000 to 100,000. But later that year violence began to subside and a cease-fire took hold between the AIS and the army. Zeroual announced his resignation and a presidential election to be held in April 1999. Several prominent candidates distanced themselves from the regime, including the liberal Mouloud Hamrouche, Hocine Ait Ahmed of the FFS, and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, associated with the Islamists. The military made clear its preference for Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister. Sensing a rigged election, the other candidates withdrew, so that Bouteflika won without competition.

He began his presidency by announcing himself as the man who would restore peace to Algeria. He released thousands of Islamist detainees in July 1999. He also alleviated the widely resented military service obligation. Nevertheless, the future of democratic liberties in Algeria remains very uncertain.

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

See also: Algeria: Arabism and Islamism; Algeria: Bendjedid and Elections, 1978–1990; Algeria, Colonial: Islamic Ideas and Movements in; Algiers.

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Algiers

The city of Algiers stands on a bay marking roughly the midpoint of Algeria's coastline. It draws its Arabic name, al-Jaza'ir, from the islands in the bay. This was the site of a small Phoenician trading center, and later a Roman outpost named Icosium, which had fallen to ruins by the time the Muslim town was founded in the tenth century. Prior to the sixteenth century, the main centers of state formation in northwest Africa had lain in the fertile plains of what are now Morocco and Tunisia. Parts of Algeria alternately fell under the control of these states or asserted their autonomy from them.

A transformation of this pattern occurred in the sixteenth century. Muslims expelled from Spain (during the Reconquista) found refuge in Algiers, which they found a convenient base for corsair raids against Christian Spain. In response, the Spanish seized the islands in the bay and fortified them. The Muslims of Algiers called upon Turkish corsairs who held the port of Jijel to the east to come to their aid. By 1529 they succeeded in expelling the Spanish from their island fortress, which they then dismantled, using the rubble to create a breakwater. This made Algiers into an important all-weather port. The city became the capital of a new province under the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan.

The population of Ottoman Algiers was diverse, composed of Turkish-speaking military personnel, Kulughlis (the offspring of Turkish soldiers and local



The harbor at Algiers, Algeria, 1930. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

women), an established Arabic-speaking urban population, slaves (drawn mainly from south of the Sahara), and a Jewish community. In addition there were temporary residents including merchants from the Mزاب oasis, laborers from Biskra in the Sahara and from the nearby Kabylia mountains, and varying numbers of Christian captives hopefully awaiting redemption.

The wealth derived from corsairing made possible the emergence of a strong urban community. A substantial proportion of this wealth was invested in religious endowments, which came to own many of the houses and shops in the city. Rent from these properties supported the building and maintenance of mosques, Islamic education, charity for the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and public services such as the provision of water.

The French conquest of 1830 altered the city, first politically, then physically. The Turkish military elite departed, and some of the city's Muslim population fled, eventually to other Muslim lands. The French seized the property of those who had departed, and also took ownership or religious endowment properties. The Katjawa Mosque became a cathedral, in spite of large-scale protests by the Muslim population. Algiers's covered market, together with its mosque, was destroyed to provide space for a large public square, the Place du Gouvernement, now the Place des Martyrs. Other buildings were leveled in order to straighten and enlarge streets.

But the French left untouched the Muslim neighborhoods known as the Kasbah, which climbed up a steep hill just beyond the Place du Gouvernement. They also refrained from destroying the New Mosque, which stood at the edge of the Place, facing the bay. It remains today a landmark in the heart of downtown Algiers.

By the 1860s, Algiers began to thrive as a center of colonial administration and as the main hub of an agricultural export economy. As the colony became more secure, new neighborhoods sprang up outside the walls. Europeans of French origin came to dominate the city, while immigrants of Spanish, Italian, and Maltese origin filled out the lower ranks of European society. The city's Muslims, barely a quarter of the total population by the end of the century, were largely impoverished. Yet there remained an elite who held government jobs or had carved out specialized niches in the economy, such as timber or tobacco.

After reaching a low point in the 1870s, the Muslim community of Algiers regained numbers and importance. Before World War I, they had founded their own newspapers and cultural associations. Following that war, Algiers was the base for the first major political challenge to colonialism led by Emir Khaled. By the 1940s Muslims were a major force in municipal politics,

a factor recognized by socialist mayor Jacques Chevalier, though the city failed to meet the rapidly growing needs of its Muslim population for housing and services. The result was a burgeoning expansion of *bidonvilles* (shanty towns) on the urban periphery.

In stylistic terms, the French oscillated between imposing their own architectural and planning norms and accommodating styles of local origin. In the interwar period, French modernist architect Le Corbusier fused enthusiasm for indigenous styles with modernism in plans for renovating downtown Algiers. Though these plans remained on paper, this penchant for fusion was revived in independent Algeria with the works of Fernand Pouillon.

With the outbreak of revolution in 1954, the special configuration of Algiers, with the impoverished Muslim Kasbah at its heart, had a major role in the unfolding of events. Protestors could mobilize in the Kasbah and in minutes reach the Place du Gouvernement. Bomb carriers could slip out and sow terror in the prime European commercial streets. Control of the Kasbah was the chief object of the "battle of Algiers" in 1956.

With Algerian independence in 1962 there was a massive exodus of the European and Jewish populations. Property abandoned by them fell under government control, and new Muslim tenants moved in. But physically, the existing city remained much as it had been. The most important new developments took place on the urban periphery: the university complex at Ben Aknoun, the international fair grounds at El Harrach, a Pouillon-designed luxury hotel on the beach at Sidi Ferruch, where the French had landed in 1830, and a towering monument to revolutionary martyrs built in the 1980s on the heights above the city.

Turbulence returned to the city in 1988 as angry urban youth, frustrated over deteriorating living conditions, rioted for several days in October. Algiers again became the setting of large-scale political demonstrations. Since the army's crackdown against the Islamic Salvation Front in 1992, Algiers has suffered great insecurity affecting above all the densely populated older quarters and sprawling apartment complexes on the city's outskirts. Private security forces provide relative security for the elite living in the tree-shaded villas of such hilltop neighborhoods as Hydra and El Biar.

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See also: **Algeria: Algiers and Its Capture, 1815–1830.**

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Allada and Slave Trade

The Aja-speaking peoples are, historically speaking, cousins of the Yoruba, with whom they share many cultural affinities. Indeed, by the early eighteenth century, the most prominent of Aja states was Allada, bordering the old Oyo kingdom in the south. Although it was an inland kingdom, Allada maintained control over some coastal settlements (such as Jakin, Offra, and Huedah [Whydah]), where European traders were stationed. Thus, the most significant economic development in the old Aja kingdom of Allada in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was the growth in the volume of slaves that passed through. Essentially, the Allada kingdom received substantial revenue from its principal port towns such as Offra and Jakin, as well as the kingdom of Whydah (with capital and port at Sahe and Grehue, respectively), and Great Popo. During the Allada kingdom's peak, the slave trade was its steady source of revenue and accounted for most of its commercial activities. The income from the slave trade enabled Allada to meet its obligations to its overlord, the old Oyo kingdom to the north.

However, by 1724, a new kingdom had been fully developed out of Allada. This new kingdom was Dahomey, which sought to repudiate the age-long suzerainty of Oyo (the dominant military power in the area), and thus promote the independence of its Fon peoples. To consolidate its independence from the old Aja-state of Allada, Dahomey's most prominent ruler in its incipient years, Agaja Trudo, organized many wars of expansion and conquest around the Aja country, creating in the process a new power center at Abomey, its capital. This development led to the rise of an atmosphere of insecurity, which truncated the relative peace and economic boom of the societies in this area. It also sought to discourage the slave trade as a major economic activity of the new Dahomey kingdom. Not surprisingly, European slave traders, apprehensive about continued investment in an unfriendly environment marked by internecine strife and civil wars, shifted base to the east of Allada, where the old Oyo kingdom had encouraged the establishment of new centers of commerce such as Ardrah (Porto Novo) and Badagri. Thus, new slave ports were developed in these two towns, which formed new centers for slave trade activities by Europeans as well as the Yoruba,

who continued to attack the new Dahomey kingdom until the latter acknowledged Oyo suzerainty.

At the same time, the fortune of slave trade in the Aja-speaking areas continued to suffer as attention also shifted to Lagos (situated further east of Allada), which soon became, in the words of a contemporary visitor, a veritable slave emporium. Lagos became a natural successor to Allada in the slave trade era because of three major factors. First, Lagos had a natural seaport. Second, it was relatively peaceful prior to growth of the slave trade, which transformed it from neglected backwater of Yoruba land to a nascent coastal kingdom with a semi-divine kingship along the lines of other Yoruba kingdoms. Third, by the mid-eighteenth century (when Lagos became attractive to the slave traders of Allada, and then Ardrah and Badagry), Akinsemoyin, who had ascended the throne, had been a familiar figure in the Aja country and had been well-known to many of the European slave traders. Thus, the political and economic decline of Allada led to the growth of new slave ports and new centers of European influence on the West African coast.

The relevance of Allada in the history of the slave trade in West Africa began to wane from the mid-eighteenth century when Dahomey, despite its problems with Oyo, gained full ascendancy in the politics and economy of the area. Indeed, by the middle of the eighteenth century, Dahomey had brought the whole of the Aja region under its influence. Correspondingly, new ports such as Porto Novo, Badagry, and Lagos, which were developed as a result of Allada's decline, projected a new slave-driven economy with its attendant consequences on the politics, economy, and society of the area. Succession disputes became frequent among claimants to the throne, as it was obvious that whoever controlled the throne would control the economy. Such political disputes characteristically involved violence. It was not surprising, therefore, that demographic repositioning became frequent throughout the coastal areas, as people moved from one area to another in an attempt to avoid the negative consequences of wars and civil disorders. The turbulence of the early and mid-eighteenth century West African slave trading coast could be attributed to the collapse of Allada and the rise of Dahomey.

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See also: Aja-Speaking Peoples; Dahomey: Eighteenth Century.

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All-African People's Conference, 1958

Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister of Ghana, declared on March 6, 1957, at the independence of his country that independence for the Gold Coast was meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African continent. Following Ghana's independence, Pan-Africanism became identified with Ghana under Nkrumah's leadership. From the time of the All-African People's Conference of December 1958, the drive of African colonial states for independence was interwoven with the drive for continental unity. The conference opened a new chapter in the relations between Africa and Europe when it called upon the colonial powers to apply the principle of self-determination to their African colonies.

Following an earlier meeting of independent African nations in Accra in April 1958, a preparatory committee consisting of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic prepared for a larger meeting of the African states in December 1958.

From December 5–13, 1958, 300 people representing political parties and trade union leaders from twenty-eight African countries met at Accra at the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah. There were also observers from Canada, China, Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The meeting was attended by representatives from Angola, Basutoland, Belgian Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, French Central Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South West Africa, Tanganyika, Togoland, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zanzibar. All of these countries, except Ethiopia and Tunisia, were still under some form of colonial rule. Individual notable attendees included Felix Monmie of the Basutoland Congress Party, M. Roberto Holden from Angola, Horace M. Bond, president of Lincoln University, and Marguerite Cartwright, an African-American author and journalist.

The preparatory committee chose Tom Mboya, general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor as chairman of the conference. Mboya in his plenary address compared the conference to that of the Berlin Conference seventy-four years before and told the gathering that Africans were tired of being governed by other people. In his view, Africans should control

their destiny, and he therefore appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid involving Africa in the Cold War. Mboya wanted the colonized states to acquire political power as quickly as possible and urged Africans to avoid Balkanization.

W.E.B. Du Bois, the prominent African-American who championed Pan-Africanism during the course of his long life, also addressed the plenary. Aged 91, and suffering from illness, his wife read his speech for him. Du Bois told the conference that Pan Africanism meant that each nation must relinquish part of its heritage for the good of the whole continent; in making such a sacrifice, the African people would lose nothing except their chains, and they would gain back their dignity.

During the working session of the conference, five committees discussed and passed resolutions concerning imperialism and colonialism, frontiers, boundaries and federations, racialism and discriminatory laws and practices, tribalism, religious separatism and traditional institutions, and a resolution on the establishment of a permanent organization.

The committee on imperialism resolved to see the end of economic exploitation and declared its support for freedom fighters in Africa. It called for independence for areas still under colonial rule and territories dominated by foreigners who had settled permanently in Africa like Kenya, Union of South Africa, Algeria, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique. The committee on frontiers, boundaries, and federations was also interested in the ending of white settlement in Africa and deplored the alienation of land for colonial use and underlined the theme of a United States of Africa. The committee on racialism voted to abrogate diplomatic and economic relationship with territories like South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and Rhodesia that practiced racism. It further urged dismantling of the UN mandate that placed South West Africa under the Union of South Africa. The committee on tribalism, religious separatism, and traditional institutions viewed these elements as obstacles to the rapid liberation of Africa and urged that steps be taken for political organizations and trade unions to educate the masses. The committee on the establishment of the permanent organization wanted the All-African People's Conference to be put on a permanent basis with a professional secretariat at Accra. The organization was to promote understanding among Africans, accelerate liberties for Africans, mobilize world opinion against the denial of fundamental rights of Africans, and develop a feeling of community among Africans.

Kwame Nkrumah, the host of the conference, concluded his closing remarks by emphasizing that Africa's independence and the creation of an African community were of paramount importance and that

future Africa's economic and social reconstruction should be on the basis of socialism. Tom Mboya, the chairman of the conference in his final address told the people that the problems facing the conference were colonialism and European minority elements in East and South Africa and that the attitude taken by Europeans to African freedom would determine if they would be driven to violence.

The conference had a tremendous impact on the African independence movement, and many of the delegates from the conference returned home to redouble their efforts for independence. Congolese Patrice Lumumba for example, had been a little-known delegate at the conference, but he returned home and addressed a mass meeting in Leopoldville. There is no doubt that the ideas people like Lumumba brought home hastened Belgian's granting of independence to the Congo. Many African nations were imbued with the ideas of the conference and the confidence it inspired, and by the end of 1960, eighteen additional African countries had attained their independence. More important, Pan-Africanism moved from the realm of idea to become a practical reality, and the discussion that followed the conference contributed to the formation of the Organization of African Unity.

EDWARD REYNOLDS

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Anglo-Zulu War, 1879–1887

The Anglo-Zulu war marked the end of an independent Zulu kingdom and the forcible integration of the region and its people into the white settler-dominated capitalist political economy of South Africa. On December 11, 1878, the British high commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, provoked the war by presenting the Zulu king, Cetshwayo KaMpande, with an untenable ultimatum demanding what was tantamount to the dismantling of his kingdom. Cetshwayo had no choice but to reject the unreasonable demands. Subsequently, for fear of the supposed threat that the Zulu posed to Britain's neighboring Natal colony, and under the pretext of border violations and Cetshwayo's refusal to comply with the ultimatum, British and Natal forces invaded Zululand on January 12, 1879. The war ended in British victory with the burning of Cetshwayo's royal homestead on July 4, 1879, and his capture on August 28 of that year. Thereafter, the British established their authority over the Zulu through the suppression of the Zulu monarchy, the political division of the territory, and the stationing of a British resident there. British domination culminated in the annexation of the former kingdom in 1887.

The war represents a classic case of British imperial intervention driven by grand colonial strategies, yet precipitated by local events. Moreover, it remains the hallmark of imperial conflict with powerful African states, and was distinguished by some of the most remarkable military successes and blunders in colonial Africa. The postwar colonial settlement, however, was an expedient marked by an equally remarkable Machiavellian quality. It divided the vestiges of the kingdom against itself and served British interests for the political subordination and fragmentation of Zululand.

Prior to 1879, the Zulu kingdom presented something of an obstacle to both imperial and Natal colonial designs on southeast Africa. A burgeoning Natal settler population sought to expand north to satisfy their desire for land and labor resources they believed were held by the Zulu monarchy. Moreover, by the 1870s, Natal officials felt supremely confident in their ability to manage Africans under the system of indirect rule devised by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, secretary for native affairs, although this was tempered by an almost

paranoid fear of the military might of the Zulu. Much of this fear was fueled by a colonial mythology of Zulu military prowess developed since the days of Shaka and the establishment of the kingdom in the 1820s.

Nevertheless, Natal demands converged with imperial designs to precipitate the war. The consolidation of the Boer republic in the Transvaal to the northwest, and its encroachment onto Zulu lands threatened not only Zulu interests, but also British desires to contain the republicans as well as to protect Natal's obvious route to the interior. For Shepstone, and many of the British officials he influenced, the Zulu monarchy and military system were a menace. Moreover, Frere, beset by conflicts with other African states in the region, was determined to establish a confederation of Boer and British territories, thus creating a united white state and a uniform policy for Africans within it. To that extent, the conquest and annexation of Zululand was "inevitable" in the eyes of nervous colonial officials and calculating imperial agents.

Under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Thesiger, second baron of Chelmsford, more than 17,000 troops invaded Zululand. Of these, less than half were white, including some 5,700 British regulars and the rest assorted colonials. More than 9,000 of the force were Africans of the Natal native contingent, which gives some indication of the divisions between African societies, and that black race unity against whites was a product of a terrified colonial imagination. The Zulu forces, which significantly outnumbered the invaders, and had the home-ground advantage, could not sustain the fighting. They did not make full advantage of outmoded firearms procured through trade, and they were constrained by Cetshwayo's defensive strategy. The Zulu king, baffled by British aggression, still hoped to negotiate an end to the hostilities. This may account for reports that the Zulu *impi* (army) simply melted away after heavy engagements, rather than take the offensive, although heavy casualties and the need to tend to cattle and crops were more probable factors. Nevertheless, the Zulu had put up a formidable resistance that tempered the peace in their favor.

The war itself was far from the easy romp of an industrialized nation over a traditional African military system hoped for by the British. Chelmsford's advance was hampered by poor organization, logistical problems of supply over difficult terrain, and more importantly, shrewd Zulu tactics. Overly sanguine about their chances for a short and successful war, myopic British officers discounted reports of Zulu forces where they were not expected. Chelmsford then broke a cardinal rule of engagement by splitting his forces. He took half his own column in pursuit of a small Zulu reconnaissance party, leaving the rest camped at Isandlwana. It was here, on January 22, 1879, that a force of some

20,000 Zulu struck their most telling blow of the war, annihilating more than a third of Chelmsford's force. Following this massacre, a Zulu reserve force under Cetshwayo's brother, Prince Dabulamanzi, then abandoned the defensive strategy to besiege the fortified depot at Rorke's Drift just inside Natal. A Welsh regiment of 150 men, demonstrating the deadly effect of modern weapons, put up a heroic defense inflicting 500 casualties out of an estimated 2,000–3,000 Zulu attackers. The British garrison lost only 17, but won 11 Victoria Crosses for heroism, the most ever awarded for a single engagement. The Zulu managed one more major victory, overwhelming a cavalry force at Hlobane. Thereafter, however, Zulu defenses fell away. British forces pressed on to take Cetshwayo's capital, Ondini. By September 1, British victory was assured.

At the end of the war, the Zulu retained their land and formal independence, but at the cost of their monarchy, military system, and political cohesion. Cetshwayo was exiled, and it was the ensuing British "settlement" of Zululand that ultimately caused the destruction of the kingdom. Sir Garnet Wolseley, the new high commissioner for southeastern Africa, influenced by practices elsewhere in the empire, and the decidedly anti-Zulu monarchist, Shepstone, devised the notorious division of the kingdom into thirteen chiefdoms. By recreating and exploiting long-standing divisions within Zulu society, local Natal officials supported compliant appointed and self-aggrandizing chiefs such as Zibhebhu kaMaphitha and the white chief, John Dunn, against remaining Zulu royalists.

The settlement failed, and the result was a protracted and bloody civil war. In the interim, Cetshwayo and his missionary allies, Bishop Colenso of Natal and his daughters, Frances and Harriette, successfully petitioned the British government, which now had flagging confidence in the settlement, for the restoration of the exiled king, albeit with drastically curtailed powers and territory. This and the imposition of British administrators and a reserve territory as buffer between the Zulu and Natal only served to exacerbate the violence. Both Cetshwayo and his rival Zibhebhu enlisted the aid of white mercenaries in continued fighting. After Cetshwayo's sudden death on February 8, 1884, it was his son and successor, Dinuzulu, who turned the tide of the civil war. He engaged a formidable force of Boers, who had been encroaching on Zululand for decades, to support the royal cause. The exorbitant price for their success was the unprecedented cession of vast Zulu lands to the Boers to the northwest and along the coast.

Faced with the rapidly deteriorating conditions and coupled with imperial anxieties over a Boer-German alliance, the British intervened. After recognizing limited Boer claims in the interior of Zululand, imperial authorities formally annexed the remaining territory

in 1887. Thereafter, colonial officials intensified the integration of a devastated Zulu society into the ambit of the wider colonial political economy. Thus, the British finally crushed Zulu independence with an administration that retained only certain features of the preconquest kingdom. Furthermore, they imposed taxes paid for by migrant wage labor that redirected the productive forces away from the monarchy system to the service of the capitalist South African state.

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See also: Cetshwayo; Natal, Nineteenth Century; Shaka and Zulu Kingdom, 1810–1840.

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
Angola, Eighteenth Century

Although the first century of the Portuguese presence in Angola had been characterized by an aggressive policy of territorial expansion and political interference with Angola's neighbors, by the late seventeenth

century these options were no longer available. Strong opponents, such as the kingdoms of Kasanje, Matamba-Ndongo, and Kongo had halted further expansion. Although Angola was primarily an exporter of slaves, it no longer obtained the slaves by direct capture as it had during most of the seventeenth century.

The only exception to this pattern was in the south, in the land behind the small outlying colony of Benguela. Founded in 1617, Benguela had not been as aggressive as the main colony, and during most of the seventeenth century had acted as more of a trading post than military base. In 1682, however, Benguela became involved in the politics of the central highlands with the establishment of a new fort at Caconda, and sent a number of expeditionary forces into the region between about 1715 and 1725. These, however, did not result in any further conquests.

Military policy in Angola focused largely on gaining control of the trade industry, both in order to tax it efficiently and to prevent it from being appropriated by non-Portuguese shippers. Policy changes in Lisbon freed governors' salaries from the slave trade, both reducing their incentive to conduct war and increasing their desire to control trade. Dutch merchants had been particularly problematic in the seventeenth century, especially those fixed along what Angolans called the "North Coast," the coast of Kongo and the smaller states north of the Zaire River. In the eighteenth century French and English merchants joined them, encouraging trade to their ports across Kongo. Many Angolan merchants, anxious to avoid taxes and with long-established contacts in Kongo were willing to ship slaves to the northern regions—even from the heart of Angola itself.



Angola.

Beginning especially after the Dutch were expelled from Angola in 1641, Brazilian commercial interests became more pronounced in Angola. Angola remained a major center for the slave trade, and much of its formal export trade was directed to Brazil. Merchant houses from Brazilian cities set themselves up in Luanda and even in the hinterland, competing with Portuguese interests, even as the governors and bishops were increasingly drawn from Brazil. In many respects, Angola was a subcolony of Brazil within the Portuguese empire.

For much of the early eighteenth century, Angola governors did not feel capable of enforcing their power fully, but dreamed of constructing posts and forts at key points on the “North Coast” in the “Dembos” regions and in the central highlands to channel all the trade to the coast. Military and financial resources to carry out such plans were lacking, however, and they had the often active resistance of Angolan settlers and the local allied African rulers who enjoyed the freedom of trade that Portuguese laxity allowed them.

The Portuguese government and army rested on a combination of resident settlers and alliances with local *sobas* (African rulers) who supplied troops for wars and porters for trade as part of their tribute arrangements. The Portuguese settlers were primarily landowners, whose estates were located along the Dande, Bengo, and Kwanza-Lukala rivers, and shipped a host of agricultural goods to Luanda to feed the hordes of slaves being exported from the colony. Provisioning the 10,000 to 15,000 slaves that passed through the city every year provided ample markets for this produce. In addition to agriculture, they or their agents, typically trusted slaves or clients called *pombeiros*, were engaged in trade, traveling to markets far from Angola (since the government banned whites from going into the interior). Settlers often married into the families of the *sobas*, and in many respects the rights and legal positions of the two groups became blurred. Equally frequently, the cultures of the two groups blended as well, Kimbundu being the most frequently spoken home language of settler and *soba* alike, while both also claimed competence in Portuguese. Christianity, the universal religion of all groups, included an ample mixture of elements from the Mbundu culture of the colony.

In the mid-eighteenth century the fortunes of the colony shifted, particularly as the Lunda empire, which had emerged in central Africa in the earlier eighteenth century sent armies to conquer the areas around the Kwango, disturbing political relations and sending thousands of slaves westward to the Atlantic ports. In addition, more powerful states came into being in the central highlands, especially Viye, Mbailundu, and Wambu. At this time, a new and aggressive governor, Francisco Innocenzo de Sousa Coutinho, arrived in Angola.

Sousa Coutinho and his successors sought to enforce more vigorous policies. He hoped to reunite Angola with Portugal and favor Portuguese interests against those of Brazil. Portuguese merchants arrived in the country in larger numbers, and the plans for new fiscal management were revived. He completed a new fort at Encoge intended to stop illegal trade across the Dembos, moved the fort at Caconda from the foothills of the central highlands to the heart of the highlands, opened an iron works, created a salt monopoly and many other programs intended to promote local industry and fiscal obedience. Later governors were equally aggressive, seeking to force the kingdoms of the central highlands into submission, and launching military campaigns to attempt to subdue the southern Kongo districts accused of supporting smuggling, and even far away Cabinda. At the same time they also sought to reinstate Portuguese culture and eliminate what they considered non-Christian elements from local religion.

In the end the more ambitious of the plans failed to achieve their objectives, being beyond the capabilities of the colony. Military campaigns proved expensive and disruptive, the forts were too difficult to supply against determined resistance, and even the large haul of captives for enslavements was impossible. Angola remained essentially one of several trading posts managing a sizable agricultural population that Portugal only partially controlled. Real control would await the last half of the nineteenth century.

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See also: Angola: “Scramble.”

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Angola: Ambaquista, Imbangala, and Long-Distance Trade

Along the northern Angolan trade route, which led from Luanda into the interior, different communities had established themselves by the nineteenth century. They played a crucial role as intermediaries in the trade between the population groups in the interior further to the east and the Portuguese merchants in Luanda.

Two of the most important groups in the hinterland of Luanda and the Kwanza valley were the Imbangala at Kasanje, who settled outside the territory controlled by the Portuguese, and the Ambaquista, settling within the Portuguese colonial sphere. Contrary to central Angola, the area that was under direct Portuguese

control stretched further inland and included portions where larger African populations had been living. Therefore, cultural contact was much more intense here than in other parts of Angola, and resulted in the creation of a mixed Afro-Portuguese settler community around the town of Mbaka, which was founded in 1618 and from which the name Ambaquista derives. This mixed population used both languages, Kimbundu and Portuguese, and at present, Eastern Kimbundu, which owes its existence to this intimate cultural contact, shows numerous vestiges of Portuguese. By the mid-nineteenth century the name Ambaquista (Mbakista) was in common use for this important branch of the Afro-Portuguese community.

Interestingly at a later stage, the fact that such mixed communities existed in Angola was used by the Portuguese as an argument to justify Portugal's colonial claims. They aimed at showing the close links between metropolitan Portugal and Angola, emphasizing the high degree of interaction between the European- and African-based populations. The Portuguese pointed at examples such as the Ambaquista in order to demonstrate that, as they claimed, Portugal's presence in Angola would necessarily lead to an acculturation of the African population. In the case of the Ambaquista, a far-reaching assimilation did in fact take place. Many European customs were adopted, and Portuguese influence was strong. Economically and politically the Ambaquista belonged to the colonial Angolan society, in contrast to their eastern neighbors, the Imbangala at Kasanje (Cassange). However, some observers from outside did not necessarily value these phenomena as a positive consequence of Portuguese colonialism. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the strength of economically independent groups such as the Ambaquista was regarded as a potential threat to the new colonial policy.

Long before the nineteenth century, the Imbangala and the Ambaquista had both become involved in the slave trade, from which they had earned a good income. Due to their integration into the Luso-Angolan colonial society, the Ambaquista were able to adapt quickly to the changing economic situation after the slave trade was officially abolished.

In the case of the Imbangala, slavery had a much deeper impact on the sociopolitical system. In contrast to the Ambaquista, the Imbangala maintained political sovereignty until the mid-nineteenth century. Only when the slave trade had become insignificant, and this major source of revenue ceased to exist, did the system fail. Internal problems evolved because the position of the *kinguri*, the Imbangala king at Kasanje, depended on individuals who were loyal to him, rather than on the influential and antagonistic lineage elders who pursued their own policies and at times opposed royal

decisions. As long as the *kinguri* was able to gather enough followers (usually slaves who lived in Kasanje in large numbers and did not belong to any of the powerful matrilineal clans because they were deprived of their social networks based on family ties), he was strong enough to counteract such secessionist tendencies. Furthermore, he gained a direct income from the slaves, whom he could also turn into material wealth by selling them to the slave traders from Luanda. Since in the nineteenth century the slave trade had decreased in importance, the position of the *kinguri* in the highly centralized state of Kasanje grew weak. Finally, the kingdom disintegrated and fell prey to the Portuguese advance to the east in the second half of that century.

Long-distance trade underwent radical changes in the nineteenth century because of the abolition process. Some of the effects were of equal significance for both the Ambaquista and the Imbangala, especially after the latter had come under direct Portuguese colonial administration. The coastal areas and the northern interior were confronted with a great number of dislocated people from the interior who had been brought there as slaves. The Portuguese government tried to encourage the production of new export goods. Soon coffee, palm oil, palm kernels, and groundnuts were produced on plantations in northern Angola. However, there was considerable competition by an emerging export-oriented African peasantry. Furthermore, other export goods, e.g., rubber, beeswax, and ivory, were more profitable. Unfortunately for the northern parts of Angola, these were provided mainly by the interior and transported via the central plateau toward the central Angolan ports. Thus, long-distance trade suffered more from the abolition process in the north than at the central route, where commercial interest shifted to the successful substitutes. In the north the cultivation of coffee, one of the major agricultural export goods in Angola, experienced a more difficult start, since world market prices went down in the later nineteenth century. Hence, the communities living in the Ambaka and the Kasanje regions needed to diversify more to cope with the changing situation. Economically, this led to a paradoxical situation: On the one hand, the north yielded less produce for export and thus the Ambaquista and the Imbangala, albeit economically successful, gained a smaller income than those participating in the central Angolan rubber trade. On the other hand, however, that was also, in part, an advantage, since economic activity centered increasingly around internal commerce, which would prove more stable in the long run. Also, in terms of general development this was rather favorable, since it went hand in hand with a slow infrastructure improvement that the central plateau only experienced when Portuguese settlers arrived in larger numbers.

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Angola: Chokwe, Ovimbundu, Nineteenth Century

Before the nineteenth century, the history of contact with the Portuguese and the degree of world market integration were rather different for the Chokwe and the Ovimbundu. Whereas the latter had been interacting directly with the Portuguese for a longer period, for the Chokwe the colonial encounter—in the form of direct contact with Portuguese military, traders, missionaries, and administrators—took place much later (notwithstanding the consequences of the advancing slaving frontier, which had been affecting the Chokwe at an earlier stage). However, in the nineteenth century, both groups became integrated into the Angolan economy on an increasingly global scale, taking on similar functions. For the Portuguese colonial economy, trade with Angola during the 1830s and 1840s was characterized mainly by the decrease in maritime slave exports. In the second half of the nineteenth century, trade with communities inland centered on rubber, ivory, and beeswax. These commodities were brought to the central Angolan coast by intermediaries. At first, Ovimbundu traders often called *ovimbali* dominated the trade in the central part of Angola serving Benguela.

Numerous Ovimbundu states had developed before the nineteenth century. These kingdoms occupying the central plateau in the hinterland of Benguela formed a network of political entities that had for a long time been marked by warfare and continuous raiding, as well as by the activities of the "barefoot-traders" serving as intermediaries between the producers in the interior and the Portuguese merchants along the coast. By the nineteenth century, significant changes led to new economic opportunities. Laws that prohibited the entry of Portuguese traders into the interior dating from the early seventeenth century were abrogated, and the number of Portuguese colonists (and with them, European influence) on the central plateau increased between 1770 and 1840. Some resident traders were considerably successful and established

themselves in close vicinity to the Ovimbundu kings to whom they paid tribute. Whereas before raiding had rendered this risky, the local authorities were now inclined to take advantage of the commercial opportunities that were due to the higher number of traders settling in their sphere of influence. Some of the coastal traders were absorbed into the inland communities. At the same time, the Ovimbundu themselves became more and more involved in trade, especially after the number of Portuguese residents decreased in the 1830s and 1840s due to the abolition of the slave trade. From the 1840s the Ovimbundu experienced a great commercial development, following the growing demand for ivory and other produce, which substituted for the slave trade.

It is important to note, however, that not all of the relatively small Ovimbundu kingdoms acted alike in this process. As a matter of fact, formerly more important kingdoms, such as Caconda, became less powerful, whereas Viye (Bié), Mbailundu (Bailundo), and Wambu (Huambo) grew in importance. The significance of the particular Ovimbundu kingdoms relied less on military strength than on commercial success. This became most obvious when the coffee prices on the world market dropped in the later nineteenth century, whereas the rubber export flourished. As a consequence, during this period the towns along the central coast became more significant for the Angolan export economy than Luanda. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese interest in central Angola as an area for European settlement grew fast and the number of Portuguese colonists from Europe rose sharply on the central plateau. With the influx of Portuguese settlers and in particular when the rubber boom came to an end, the African population in this area, largely Ovimbundu, faced a difficult situation. Those who had taken an active part as skilled employees or traders usually tried to find remunerated work, thus creating a labor force for the Portuguese settlers, whereas the larger part of the population took to small-scale farming and petty trade.

Contrary to the Ovimbundu traders, the Chokwe had not taken an active role in the commerce with the coast before the nineteenth century. Instead, they were affected by slave raids from their western neighbors. The nineteenth century saw a remarkably quick expansion of the Chokwe in the eastern half of present-day Angola. The changing European demand for African products initiated the success story of the Chokwe, who entered the long-distance commercial stage in the mid-nineteenth century. After Portugal had abolished its monopoly on ivory in 1830, prices went up 300 per cent. Wax exports rose even more drastically in the mid-nineteenth century, to the benefit of the Chokwe and Lucazi who had so far been excluded from active

participation in long-distance trade. Being situated between the powerful Lunda empire and the well-established trade routes of the Ovimbundu and Imbangala, the Chokwe took advantage of the fact that their core land in present-day Moxiko provided large quantities of ivory and wax. The Chokwe relied on local products where their competitors, the Ovimbundu, spent some of the income gained by trade on the European goods they had already adopted, e.g., cloths, salt, metal knives. Therefore, the Chokwe could build up an arsenal of fire weapons within a relatively short time. This enabled them to hunt larger numbers of elephants and added to their commercial success. At the same time, they grew in military strength.

Both aspects had important consequences. Within a few years, the elephant population had been decimated in the Chokwe area. The Chokwe hunters came to an agreement with the Lunda who did not exploit ivory as a resource and allowed the Chokwe to enter their area in return for a share in the economic yield. However, shortly after the temporary hunting parties had begun, Chokwe started to build permanent settlements in this area. At the same time, they integrated women of other ethnic groups into their own. Inter-marriage between ethnic groups was frequent, and the number of people regarding themselves as Chokwe increased rapidly. After the hunting grounds of the Lunda had also been emptied of elephants, the Chokwe tried a similar system with regard to their northeastern neighbors, the Luba. However, the Luba themselves hunted elephants, and the role of the Chokwe changed from that of producers to commercial intermediaries who traded in the goods they formerly produced. Hence they became competitors to the Imbangala and Ovimbundu traders.

From that point on, Chokwe were frequently to be seen at the coastal ports. The system of trade routes in the interior grew. The Chokwe bridged the two older latitudinal trade routes in a north-south direction. By the time elephant hunting became increasingly difficult, the rising demand for rubber once again changed the economic basis of the Angolan trade system. Due to the high world market prices, those participating in the trade of rubber experienced a material wealth unknown in these regions before. Both the Ovimbundu and the Chokwe had by now highly developed commercial skills and benefited from the rubber boom.

Unfortunately, the boom came to an end in 1910, and the Chokwe, who had changed their entire economic system within a relatively short time, were deprived of their major sources of income. The socio-economic conditions that had led to population growth became less favorable. The Chokwe migrations once motivated by population growth now received further stimulus by the relative poverty that these people experienced after the breakdown of the rubber trade

and the appearance of the Portuguese military conquering southeastern Angola. At this stage the Chokwe could rely solely on subsistence farming, craftsmanship, and remunerated work, albeit to a lesser extent than the Ovimbundu.

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Angola: Slave Trade, Abolition of

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most European nations started to implement bans on slave trading. Since the overseas commerce concerning Angola was focused almost solely on slaves, Portugal, given its dependence on the Angolan slave trade, lagged behind in implementing the ban. Throughout the nineteenth century Portugal was often viewed negatively for its reluctance to abolish its slave trade. However, there were also voices from within the Portuguese colonial system arguing against slavery, or at least demanding an end to the atrocities committed against African slaves.

In 1810, Portugal gave way to the pressure from Britain. Five years later, Portugal and Britain reached an abolition agreement. As a concession to the British, Portugal restricted its slave trade to the southern hemisphere. However, for a number of years Portugal refused to give up slave trading entirely. Portugal pointed out that Britain had also limited its traffic in slaves gradually, which had led to an increase in the number of slaves exported to its colonies in the years preceding the British ban on slave traffic. When Britain eventually abolished the transatlantic slave trade, a certain saturation of the labor force occurred in its colonies. In Brazil, the demand for slaves continued to be high, and Portugal had not experienced a similar restructuring from a mercantilist to an industrialized economy as had Britain in the early nineteenth century. Thus, the economic network between Angola, Brazil, and Portugal still

relied to a large extent on the slave trade. Only in 1836 did a Portuguese decree finally prohibit the transatlantic slave trade altogether. Britain also influenced the Portuguese slave exports from Angola by exerting pressure on Brazil, which gained independence in 1822. Officially, Brazil suppressed the slave trade following a treaty with Britain from 1826, a prerequisite to recognizing Brazil's independence demanded by the British. In 1831 the first steps were taken toward setting up a system of punishment for captured slave traders.

Although slave trade was prosecuted as piracy, traffic in slaves continued. For Portugal, it was nearly impossible to enforce abolition laws in Angola, where slaves were the main economic resource, and influential merchants and slave dealers resisted the antislavery decrees issued from Portugal. The export of human beings went on for several years, particularly from the northern ports of Ambriz and Cabinda. In Britain, a humanitarian, antislavery lobby grew stronger, and eventually the British government decided to intervene again. Taking advantage of its economically stronger position and naval strength, Britain sent its navy to raid along the Angolan coast. In 1842 another treaty was signed between Britain and Portugal, in which the slave trade was declared piracy. Yet, the export traffic continued, supplying Brazil until 1853 and Cuba until the late 1860s. Thereafter, slaves were still exported from Angola to the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. Since this type of slave traffic was intra-imperial, it did not necessarily fall under the regulation of the international treaties. When external pressure on Portugal grew, the slave deportations to the Portuguese Atlantic islands persisted under the guise of contract labor.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries began to support abolitionism more unanimously than before. Whereas they had first been working among freed slaves along the African coast, they now started to found stations in many parts of the African interior where they found slavery to be widespread, even after it had been officially abolished. Their humanitarian wish to end slavery in all its forms was taken up by colonial politicians. During the Brussels Conference (1889–1890), the colonial powers used the widespread occurrence of slavery as a moral justification for the conquest of Africa. The Brussels Act, an international agreement against slave trade in any form, was reached in 1890. However, the colonial powers did not necessarily intend to effectively end slavery within a short time. Portugal feared political unrest, initiated by the considerable number of liberated slaves, that would result if slavery was abolished. Moreover, the work force was badly needed, compensations to former slave owners were costly, and the means of effective control inland were meager, thus hindering the enforcement of the regulations.

After a proposal in the Portuguese parliament that the children of slaves be considered free (1845), and a project for the gradual abolition of slavery in Portuguese Africa (1849), a limited abolition decree was introduced by Portuguese Prime Minister Sáda Bandeira in 1854. It encompassed clauses on all government slaves who were declared *libertos* (“freed slaves”). Often these changes did not affect the actual situation of the individuals. *Libertos* remained with their former owners as unpaid apprentices. Sáda Bandeira's decree further required that all slaves in private possession (approximately 60,000 individuals) be registered.

These measures met with protests from the colonists in Angola. One of the leading figures in the debate was António da Silva Porto, who welcomed the repression of traffic to foreign territories, but criticized the Portuguese government's decision to act not only against the slave trade, but also against the institution of slavery itself. Economic considerations stood behind such attitudes among Portuguese colonists in Angola. In 1869 a Portuguese decree abolished slavery. All slaves were to become *libertos*, a status that persisted until 1875. The abolition law from 1875 envisaged the complete freedom of all slaves in Angola in the year 1878. Again, Portugal was not able to enforce this law except in the coastal towns, and even there only to some extent. Slaves continued to be traded. Although officially slavery had been brought to an end in 1878, in many instances little changed for the affected population. In rural areas, the authorities either ignored the extent to which slavery occurred among the subjugated African peoples, or they were not capable of dealing with the matter. Former slaves were often kept as remunerated workers whose living conditions were not any better than before. Former slave traders in the interior still provided a labor force by contracting cheap workers. However, since freed slaves often preferred not to become part of the remunerated work force, but to engage in either small-scale trade or farming, a constant lack of cheap labor led to even harsher measures, such as an increase in forced labor. With the introduction of strict vagrancy laws, some officials considered any African not under contract a vagrant, and thus available for recruitment as cheap labor, either in the form of contract labor, or as forced labor. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that slavery and disguised forms of the slave trade continued to exist well into the twentieth century.

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Angola: “Scramble”

In 1838, an intensified Portuguese expansion from the Angolan harbor towns began with the successive foundations of new military outposts, soon to be accompanied by settlements, both along the coast and further inland. Before this period, Portuguese merchants did not move inland on a regular basis to trade. Instead, African traders served as middlemen. In the nineteenth century, this began to change when prohibitive decrees by the Portuguese government were lifted, and military outposts in the interior seemed to favor settlement in these areas. However, trading inland was still a risky and costly enterprise because of tribute payments to the African authorities and enmity on the part of the African competitors. At the same time, military campaigns were necessary to bring a larger area under effective control and to subdue contraband along the Angolan harbors by means of controlling the immediate hinterland of these coastal spots, especially between Luanda and the mouth of the Congo River.

However, financing these measures turned out to be impossible. A hut tax was introduced to alleviate the precarious situation, but instead of yielding an increased revenue, it caused many Africans to migrate beyond the limits of the area brought under Portuguese control, and thus added to the relative depopulation formerly caused by the demand for slaves. From 1861 until approximately 1877, Portugal showed a limited interest in Angola, albeit with a few innovations, illustrated by several facts: the Portuguese withdrawal from frontier garrisons, a new policy introducing forced labor, and a concentration on the coastal towns.

Around 1877, Portuguese enthusiasm for the colonial endeavor increased again, especially in the cities of Portugal. In Portugal, an imperialist ideology became so inextricably associated with the late nineteenth-century nationalism that its repercussions lasted far into the twentieth century. It was, at least in part, such ideologies that instigated the renewed interest in the colonial empire.

The old idea of connecting the two largest territories in Africa upon which Portugal laid its claims, Angola and Mozambique, was taken up. Several overland expeditions between the Angolan hinterland and the southeastern African coast took place. The explorers who organized these expeditions produced a knowledge

about Africa that was accessible to a broader public in Portugal. Matters concerning Angola became part of a more general concern for what was seen as a civilizing mission bestowed upon Portugal due to its longstanding history as a naval power. Such considerations were used to construe a political agenda. For Portugal the overseas possessions grew in importance not only because of the expected economic yields, but as a means of strengthening the nation's weak position in Europe. Portuguese politicians expressed their fear that unless imperialist claims succeeded, Portugal would face political insignificance.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain's informal hegemony on the African continent seemed largely uncontested. Ports in Angola were open to British traders, and Portugal's sovereignty near the mouth of the Congo River was violated.

However, the pace of appropriation accelerated when France became more influential as a colonial power and new participants in the “Scramble for Africa” appeared on the scene, among them the Belgian monarch King Leopold II (acting as a private entrepreneur), as well as Spain, Italy, and Germany. In the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1884, Britain agreed to recognize Portuguese sovereignty on both sides of the mouth of the Congo River; in exchange, Britain would gain commercial privileges. The treaty was sharply criticized by other colonial powers. France as well as the Belgian king also demanded rights to the mouth of the Congo. The complicated situation called for diplomatic intervention. The German chancellor Bismarck organized the Congo-Conference, which was held in Berlin between November 1884 and February 1885. Apart from some areas of present-day Malawi, the mouth of the river Congo was again a heavily disputed issue. Finally, the earlier treaty was abandoned and Portugal retained a small enclave, Cabinda, north of the river Congo. To the south, the present coastline of Angola was regarded as the Portuguese sphere of influence.

The outcome of the Berlin Conference for Portugal was both disappointing and surprising. Although for some time Portugal sought (and was eventually to receive) support from France and Germany, who initially recognized Portuguese rights of sovereignty in the territories between Mozambique and Angola, the idea of linking the two territories overland had to be discarded in the end. Portugal was in no position to compete with Britain over what would become part of present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, taking into consideration Portugal's weak position, the territories it gained were considerable. At the time of the Berlin Conference, Portugal controlled barely 10 per cent of the overall territory of Angola.

Much remained to be done in order to meet the dictate that the colonizing nations were entitled to their

claims only if they proved capable of effectively maintaining law and order within the respective borders. Lacking financial resources and manpower, it was difficult for Portugal to bring Angola under effective control. Portugal was eager to found police stations in the interior and to build forts along the boundaries of the prospective Angolan territory because Portugal not only had to suppress African resistance, but also to demonstrate to other colonial powers that it had, in fact, occupied the entire area delineated in successive bilateral treaties with Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa. The “Lunda issue” concerning the border between northeastern Angola and the Congo Free State was first addressed in a treaty between Belgium and Portugal in 1891, and later determined in subsequent negotiations until 1927. Regulations concerning the border with the French and German territories to the north and south were installed in 1886, but it took until 1931 until the Kunene was finally accepted as the border between South West Africa (then under South African control) and Angola.

Negotiations with Britain were marked by increased hostility, especially after the British ultimatum to withdraw from the Shiré river in present-day Malawi under the threat of military measures in 1890. Only in 1915 were the eastern borders of Angola against Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) determined, and the intention to link Angola and Mozambique was abandoned. Roughly at the same time, the Portuguese authorities had brought Angola under effective control.

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Angola: New Colonial Period: Christianity, Missionaries, Independent Churches

The Catholic Church has been present in Angola for more than 500 years, its first representatives having arrived with Portuguese explorers in 1492. But missionary activities were initially few and limited to the coast and the region along the Kwanza river. By the mid-nineteenth century, the church in Angola had almost vanished. When, in 1866, the first members of the Congregation of the Holy Ghost began their work in northern Angola, they had to “replant” the church. Soon they were followed by

various other Catholic congregations and non-Catholic mission organizations.

The colonial authorities aimed at making the African people under their domination Portuguese in terms of culture, and therefore Catholic by religion. The Catholic Church was, therefore, considered a natural ally and aid of the government. The close relationship between the state and the Catholic hierarchy was later formalized in the concordat of 1940. However, since Portugal had to grant religious freedom in its territories (due to the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885), it tolerated, albeit grudgingly, non-Catholic missions from other Western nations. In order to control their work better, the government assigned a certain region to every mission. Belonging to one denomination rather than to another became, for the people of Angola, not so much a question of creed, but of geography. The missionary training and translation programs contributed to the perception of the existing ethnolinguistic differences as different identities; on the Protestant side, this resulted in a striking parallel between membership of an ethnic group and membership of a particular Christian denomination.

Particularly by providing health assistance and education, the churches came to represent the only positive aspect of colonialism, and people adhered to them in large numbers. Reliable statistics are not available, but one can say that in consequence of the various foreign and, later, Angolan missionary initiatives, roughly 80 per cent of the population are Christians, and two-thirds of that population is Catholic. Only very recently have Islamic missionary activities been undertaken, limited so far to the capital, Luanda.

In 1961, the Angolan war began as a struggle for independence. Many of its Angolan militants had been trained in mission schools, both Catholic and Protestant. The colonial authorities accused mainly the Protestants of subversive action. Some missions (the Baptist, the Methodist, the North Angola Mission) were closed down, their members persecuted and driven into hiding or exile. It is, however, an oversimplification to state that the decision whether to support the independence movements depended on whether one was Catholic or Protestant.

When independence was declared in 1975, it became obvious that the various political movements and factions were not prepared to join forces in the necessary task of nation-building, but were turning their aggression against each other in a struggle for power and its privileges. The anticolonial war became—in the context of the Cold War—an internationalized, civil war. The regional character of some Protestant denominations was now to have problematic consequences, as parties to the civil war politically exploited regional and ethnic factors. Some of the denominations were

seen to be in too close an alliance with one of the belligerent parties, and the churches were thus partially paralyzed in their duty of promoting reconciliation.

The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) succeeded in securing power and declared an organized independent Angola as a socialist people's republic. The churches were regarded by the MPLA as reactionary forces from the past and of no use to, if not dangerous for, the revolution. The process of the Africanization of the churches was accelerated by the exodus of most of the foreign mission personnel. The action of the churches was limited to the realm of the spiritual, since, with few exceptions, their medical and educational institutions were nationalized.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the 1980s, the government loosened its tight control on people identified with the churches and sought to establish more constructive relationships with them. Realizing the almost total loss of popular support, and threatened by an internal rival it could not overcome by military means, the MPLA calculated that it might be advantageous to have the churches as allies rather than as adversaries. A series of churches were officially recognized and received a judicial status. Some of the formerly nationalized institutions were handed back to the religious communities. The ruling party was strongly centralized and inclined to favor the Catholic Church.

In the authoritarian systems of Portuguese colonialism and state socialism, "African independent" Christianity hardly had space to develop. While in most surrounding countries African indigenous churches blossomed, Angola seemed an infertile soil for forms of Christianity that were not linked either to the Catholic Church or to a Western mission board and church. The most long-standing exceptions have been the Kimbanguist Church, spreading from Belgian Congo and then Zaire, and the Tokoist Church, founded by a former member of the Baptist mission in northern Angola. The situation changed when the government abandoned its restrictive religious policy. Religious communities proliferated, many of them founded or established by former refugees returning from Zaire.

The emerging African independent fellowships, many of them consisting of only a few dozen members, were responding not only to the need for a culturally African expression of faith. In more than thirty years of war, Angolan society has suffered a process of disintegration. The health and education systems have broken down, and the economy offers viable prospects for only a small minority linked to the power elite. In this context, churches function as networks of mutual assistance. In one way, the founding of a church became one of the strategies of economic survival, since it seemed to offer the possibility of establishing links with foreign partners and, by that means, gaining direct access to foreign assistance.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Angolan Christianity is a multifaceted reality. The Catholic Church, organized in twelve dioceses and led by the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé/CEAST, remains the largest body. Two umbrella organizations bring together the majority of the traditional and some of the independent non-Catholic churches: the Council of Christian Churches in Angola/CICA and the Association of Evangelicals in Angola/AEA.

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See also: Missionary Enterprise: Precolonial.

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Angola: New Colonial Period: Economics of Colonialism

The early 1890s were a time of renewed Portuguese expansion into the Angolan interior after the Berlin Congress of 1884–1885 obliged Portugal to show effective control of all areas for which it made colonial claims. A primary concern of the conference was to open up the continent's interior for commerce, and more fully, drive local African labor into the global market economy.

Much work was done during the first decades of the twentieth century to establish the economic infrastructure and tighten Portuguese control of Angola. New towns were established in the interior, and networks of roads and rails were developed after the mid-1920s.

The centerpiece of this development was construction of the Benguela Railway, completed in 1929, which was funded by British capital. Not only did it become the largest employer in Angola, it also provided the crucial connection between the copper mines of the Katanga province in Belgian Congo and Angola's port at Lobito, while also providing a route to deliver Portuguese settlers to the Angolan interior. Direct and indirect methods were derived to compel participation in the capitalist economy and labor market. The indirect pressure took the form of taxes, while the direct method was forced labor.

Three types of forced labor were imposed in Angola. The most severe was a form of modern slavery in which workers were shipped to São Tomé or

Principe for five years of hard labor on coffee and cocoa plantations, from which few returned. The second type of forced labor put people to work for major government and business enterprises throughout Angola. The colonial government contracted with major employers to provide required numbers of workers in exchange for substantial administrative fees paid by employers for this service. The third type of forced labor involved local service by men, women, and children on public works such as highway construction and maintenance, cultivation of gardens, building of houses, and other tasks determined by the local administrator. While exact numbers are impossible to determine, one estimate suggested that as late as 1954, almost 380,000 workers were subjected to forced labor. Despite some reforms in the 1940s and 1950s, forced labor was not abolished until 1962. The compulsory labor system played a great part in uniting Africans against Portuguese rule during the early liberation struggles.

In 1908 the "native tax" was instituted as another means to force Africans into the capitalist money economy and to raise revenue for the government. The tax had to be paid in Portuguese currency rather than traditional means of exchange such as shells, salt, calico, or cloth. The compulsion to pay money taxes brought local societies within the economic realm of the colonial powers.

In 1928 the annual tax for an African male in central Angola was the equivalent of 100 days pay for a contract laborer. By 1945 the tax had increased by 50 per cent. Many fled to neighboring countries rather than pay the tax. Those who could neither pay the tax nor flee were the most likely to be subjected to contract labor.

Between 1920 and 1960, the Angolan economy remained primarily agricultural. The emergence of coffee as a cash crop was perhaps the major economic development in the north between 1920 and 1960. While coffee production stood at only 3,000 to 4,000 tons annually in the first two decades of the twentieth century, by 1961 coffee exports had reached 118,000 tons. Between 1948 and 1961 the land area given over to coffee production grew from 120,000 to 500,000 hectares. In 1974 Angola stood as the second most important coffee grower in Africa and the third largest in the world. The coffee plantations enjoyed great economic success for their primarily settler owners, until disruption of most of Angola's agriculture during the civil war. Tens of thousands of Africans were displaced by European producers in townships across the coffee-producing areas. While coffee production brought great prosperity to the Portuguese and large profits to foreign investors, for Africans it created only great resentment directed against the government.

In addition, many Africans were forced from their subsistence lands to work on cotton plantations. In

some areas African families were forced to grow cotton for no wages on prescribed plots of land. Their harvests were sold at below-market prices in order to subsidize the floundering urban-based textile industry. When plots ceased being productive, the African workers were forced to move to new ones, often great distances from their homes.

In central Angola, the development of corn and sisal as export crops likewise forced many subsistence farmers into wage labor. Corn exports expanded from zero in 1919 to 100,000 metric tons in 1950. Corn production, which took place on small family plots, greatly impoverished the region's already poor soils.

Production of crops such as coffee, corn, cotton, and sisal for export greatly diminished the land and labor available for subsistence activities. The minimal wages gained through contract labor could in no measure make up for the loss of subsistence production and goods. In addition the loss of community members to contract labor contributed to the deterioration of village life and the breakdown of kinship groups.

From 1920 to 1960 the government undertook a policy of colonization as white settlers were provided with free transportation, land, housing, animals, seeds, and technical advice.

Overall, Portugal invested little capital in Angola until after World War II.

Trade barely revived after the collapse of the rubber boom just before World War I. By the end of Portugal's republican period (1910–1926), Angola's finances were in serious trouble.

The Salazar regime's Colonial Act of 1930 placed strict financial controls on Angola's economy, bringing it into close alignment with policies being applied in Portugal. This policy shift was directed toward economic, political, and social integration of Portugal with its colonies. Protective trade barriers were erected and foreign investment capital was discouraged, except in the construction of the Benguela Railway and the exploration and mining of diamonds and later oil. This economic system was designed to allow Portugal to benefit from intensified exploitation of its colonies.

Angola became an overseas province (Ultramarine Province) of Portugal and a market for Portuguese goods, while also developing its own industries. By 1940 Portugal took in almost two-thirds of Angolan exports while supplying almost half of Angola's imports. These amounts were up from less than 40 per cent only a decade earlier. Angola's industries were largely reliant on Portugal for equipment and markets.

Postwar increases in the price of principal crops, especially coffee and sisal, encouraged the Portuguese government to invest in projects of infrastructure development in Angola. This included the construction of dams, transportation networks, and hydroelectric

power stations in the 1950s. By the mid-1950s several mining operations had been developed for the extraction of iron ore, copper, and magnesium.

Diamonds were discovered in Luanda in 1912, and in 1917 the Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, or Diamang) was formed as a monopoly with rights covering all of Angola. Capital was provided by British, Belgian, South African, and American firms with the Portuguese government holding 5 per cent of the shares. Diamond mining began in the 1920s.

Diamang, an exclusive concessionaire in Angola until the 1960s, employed almost 20,000 African workers and delivered massive investment and some social services in welfare, health, and education in the Luanda district. A condition for granting the exclusive concession was that the government would receive 40 per cent of Diamang's earnings. In 1954 the proportion was raised to 50 per cent. By 1960, diamond exports had reached almost \$20 million per year, an increase five times over the value from the late 1930s.

In 1955, Petrofina struck oil in Benfica and sent the first shipment of crude petroleum for processing the following year. In 1957, the Companhia Concessionária de Petróleos de Angola (Petrangola) was founded with an investment from Petrofina, which also turned over one-third interest to the Portuguese administration in Angola. By 1974 there were at least thirty-three wells under exploration in northern Angola.

In 1966, extensive oil deposits were discovered off the coast of Cabinda by Cabinda Gulf Oil, a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Gulf Oil Company. By the early 1970s production from the Cabindan oil fields had reached almost 10 million tons of oil per year, making Angola the fourth largest oil producer in Africa, behind Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria. Between 1971 and 1974 oil revenues accounted for more than 40 per cent of Portugal's foreign earnings from Angola.

Oil provided Portugal with a major source of revenue to finance its wars against the independence movements in the colonies. Taxes and royalties from Gulf's operations provided almost half of the military budget of the Portuguese administration in Angola in the early 1970s. In 1972 alone, oil revenues provided 13 per cent of Angola's provincial budget and 60 per cent of its military expenditures.

In an attempt to stem potential uprisings, the Salazar regime initiated, in the early 1960s, a program of economic infrastructure development. Among the most important initiatives included expanding the paved road network by 500 per cent, developing domestic air routes, and making emergency aid available to coffee producers. Through reforms, including the abolition of compulsory labor and increased access to administrative positions for Africans, the Portuguese regime hoped to

win greater loyalty among the civilian population. Compulsory cultivation of cotton was also abolished.

By 1965, growing defense expenditures related to Portugal's attempts to contain the liberation movements forced the Salazar government to allow foreign capital, especially from the U.S. and South Africa, into Angola. South African capital financed the building of the Cunene River Dam project along Angola's border with Namibia. This initiated a period of economic expansion and industrialization that was further propelled by increased military spending, which stimulated investment in communications and transportation infrastructure.

In 1972 the Portuguese national assembly redesignated Angola's status from an overseas province to an autonomous state. Angola was able to draft its own budget and collect its own taxes, but Portugal maintained a supervisory role with regard to the economy and administration. Expanded agricultural production and surpluses in coffee, iron ore, oil, and diamond exports continued into the early 1970s. Between 1965 and 1974, enormous productive growth was experienced in iron, diamonds, and manufacturing. This great economic expansion made Angola more economically valuable to Portugal than any of its other colonies in Africa. As a result Portugal became even more determined to oppose Angolan independence.

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Angola: New Colonial Period: White Immigration, Mestiços, Assimilated Africans

The revival of Portuguese colonial expansion in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century produced a radical change in relations between resident whites and Angola's black "modern elites." Throughout the

final years of the monarchy (to 1910), the short-lived republic (1910–1926), and the Salazarist dictatorship up to the 1961 revolts, the status of the “old” *assimilados*, or Creoles, *mestiços* (people of mixed race), and “new” *assimilados* (Africans who had passed the colonial “civilization test”) was gradually eclipsed by the increasing wave of white Portuguese immigration. In conjunction with the repressive and exploitative nature of Portuguese imperial control, it was a material factor in the emergence of radical political movements in the 1950s, and their decision to use force against the Salazar regime in the 1960s.

At the end of the 1860s, there were only 3,000 resident whites in Angola, mostly officials, businessmen, and planters. Interior trade was dominated by the “old” *assimilado* families, culturally Portuguese, but otherwise black: *mestiços*, often acknowledged by their white fathers, who had secured sometimes important positions in government service and professions such as journalism. While it was certainly stratified, Angolan society prior to the new colonial period offered significant opportunities for nonwhites to advance on the basis of merit rather than race, opportunities that were to diminish as the old century gave way to the new.

The partition of Africa was the main harbinger of change. It galvanized Portugal into action to protect its African interests, generating an intense patriotism that expressed itself through the agency of the “Generation of 1895.” From the start of the new century onward, Portuguese rule was extended over the hinterland, bringing the entire country under its control by 1920. Rural revolts, such as the Kongo hut tax rebellion of 1906–1913, were crushed. The main symbol of Portuguese control, the 1899 Labor Code, which required all nonassimilated Africans to work for six months each year, was imposed throughout the colony.

The overall effect of this consolidation of imperial control was the growth of white racism, influenced also by the contemporary and international current of social Darwinism, and assisted by the steady rise of white immigration into Angola. By 1950, the 78,000 whites then resident in Angola exceeded the *assimilado* and *mestiço* elements by a ratio of more than two to one, and were to more than double, to a total of 172,000, in 1960. The social class of the typical settler fell from the coffee planters of the monarchy to the lower middle-class civil servants of the republic, and thence to the peasants, often illiterate, planted in the countryside in the 1950s to establish a Portuguese presence. Creole coffee planters were displaced, while the “new” *assimilados* and *mestiços* were progressively frozen out of responsible civil service jobs, a process formalized by the 1929 decree restricting their advance to the level of clerk. The post-1950 flood of immigrants affected nonassimilated Africans (*indigenas*); the

coffee boom of the 1940s and 1950s resulted in the expropriation of black-occupied land for white producers, while opportunities in the towns diminished with even semiskilled jobs being taken by Portuguese peasants who had given up on rural agriculture and become what amounted to a “poor white” population. By the late 1950s, a severe socioeconomic situation had developed in several towns, and particularly in Luanda: a lack of facilities, including adequate housing, and major unemployment that affected all racial groups (including whites), creating a potentially revolutionary situation.

Also, the political climate for the black elites worsened. There had been relative freedom of speech during the monarchy, although critics of Portuguese rule tended to publish their criticism in Lisbon rather than Luanda. At times, Portuguese sensitivities were very noticeable: the Angolan *mestiço* lawyer Fontes Pereira (1823–1891) lost his government post after making a negative remark about the monarchy’s record of development in Angola over the previous three centuries. The new republic started with the best of intentions: the first major black organization, the *Liga Angolana* (1913), proclaiming a moderate, reformist message, was able to thrive. However, the white settlers in Angola influenced successive high commissioners to implement illiberal policies. With their approbation, Norton de Matos (1920–1923) proscribed the *Liga*, allegedly for subversive activities, in 1922. The ensuing Salazar period witnessed a general ban on all (including white) political activity, obliging organizations to transform themselves into “cultural clubs.” After 1942, this ban was relaxed somewhat, allowing “loyal” blacks to operate within the straitjacket of the corporatist state. The postwar period saw the rapid growth of political activity, open and clandestine, in Angola itself and in Lisbon, where Angolan students met their peers from other Portuguese colonies, and came into contact with the underground Portuguese communist and socialist parties. Some radical activists made two approaches to the UN, in 1950 and 1955, expressing dissatisfaction with Portuguese rule, in the hope of some kind of international intervention. Following the failure of this and other reformist initiatives, radical politics moved in a revolutionary direction. The underground Angolan Communist Party, led by Agostinho Neto (1922–1979), and Mario de Andrade was formed in October 1955. Subsequently, two nationalist parties were set up in 1956: the multiracial MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), also led by Neto, in which *mestiços* played a significant part; and Holden Roberto’s predominantly Bakongo UPNA (Union of the People of Northern Angola), which adopted a more exclusive, “Africanist” stance. The Salazarist authorities infiltrated secret agents into

the MPLA from 1957 onward, and, following riots in the adjacent Belgian Congo (January 1959), arrested more than a hundred political activists (including Neto) in two separate operations, thus setting the scene for the revolts of early 1961.

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See also: Angola: "Scramble"; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974.

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Angola: Revolts, 1961

In Luanda, early in the morning on February 4, 1961, small bands of insurgents, numbering altogether approximately 180, attacked a police patrol, the prison, army and police barracks, and the radio station. Each of the attacks was repulsed and throughout the next two days armed white civilians inflicted reprisals in the *muçiques*, the shanty neighborhoods surrounding the Angolan capital. In the absence of an anticipated insurrectionary response from Luanda's African population, the remaining insurgents fled the city to find refuge in the densely forested mountainous Dembos region, from which they would conduct intermittent guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese and rival insurgencies for the next fourteen years, until independence.

One month later, a much more formidable challenge to Portuguese rule arose in the north. In the weeks following the Luanda uprising, emissaries of revolt had been arriving in the villages of the Zaire and Uige districts to mobilize support for a rebellion. On March 12, the first small-scale attacks on coffee plantations began, reaching a climax three days later. The rebels killed 250 Portuguese officials and farmers within the first week and 500 more over the next three months. At least as many plantation workers from southern Angola also died. As in Luanda, reprisals were led by a civilian militia, the *Corpos de Voluntarios*, but in this

case they considerably magnified the scope of the insurgent movement, claiming 20,000 victims and prompting a mass exodus of 250,000 refugees across the Congolese border and into isolated settlements (*sanzalas*) deep in the forest. In April, the revolt's leadership declared the inception of a second "guerrilla" phase, and in August the Portuguese army began a full-scale counteroffensive, entrenching a military conflict that would persist in Angola until the end of the century and beyond.

These two rebellions were organized by sharply contrasting movements. In Luanda, the uprising was inspired by the *Movimento Popular Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA), formed from a cluster of Marxist and communist groups in December 1956. The MPLA's following and activities were largely confined to African *assimilados* and *mestiços*, relatively privileged subaltern groups in colonial society; both Methodist ministers and Catholic priests played an important role in its early history, and its leadership was dominated by a group of interrelated Creole families who had prevailed in Luanda's cultural politics for decades. Between March and June 1959, many of the MPLA's key adherents were arrested and detained by the PIDE, the secret police, including its president, Agostinho Neto, a medical doctor. Other leaders established themselves in exile; the planning of the February rebellion seems to have been local and prompted by further PIDE operations in the *muçiques* in the previous month. Nominally a workers movement, there is little evidence that the MPLA enjoyed generalized support outside the home villages in which its leaders were "favorite sons."

Overseeing the northern insurrection was the *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola* (UPA), originally an irredentist Bakongo movement formed in 1954 with the ostensible aim of restoring the autonomy of the Congo kingdom, the boundaries of which had for 500 years straddled the Angolan/Belgian Congo border. In 1958, the UPA's leaders had been persuaded by their Baptist allies (Baptist missionaries were very influential among the Bakongo) as well as their contacts with Pan-African circles to drop their ethno-regional presumptions. From 1958, the key personality within the UPA was Holden Roberto, formerly a clerk in the Belgian administration (though of Angolan birth). Roberto had spent most of his life in the Congo, and the precipitate departure of the Belgian colonizers in the wake of the Leopoldville riots helped to convince him that the Portuguese would be similarly intimidated by an anticolonial revolt.

Roberto had little personal knowledge of conditions among the Bakongo on the Angolan side of the border, but both historical tradition and recent developments had created a receptive atmosphere for the UPA's activists. Many of the UPA partisans who appeared in the

villages during February 1961 presented themselves not as sophisticated political cadres, but as prophets (*nqunzas*), holding services at which all in attendance drank a cup of holy water and paid 2.50 escudos. The authorities later found “fund registers” recording collections of 30,000 escudos at single meetings. The ritual echoed generations of Christian millenarian practices in the region. Millenarian traditions had an especial force in Bakongo society as a consequence of a centuries-old heritage of African syncretic Christianity as well as a colonial presence that had been especially prolonged and intrusive.

Reinforcing the cumulative influence of generations of millenarian imaginings, as well as the memory of a golden age of Bakongo statehood, were more immediate material setbacks. Portuguese sponsorship of white settlement into Zaire and Uige districts after 1945 had resulted in the confiscation from the Bakongo of 360,000 acres of land, much of this dispossession illegal. As a consequence, about half the preexisting population of African smallholder coffee producers had been forced off the land, a process that had accelerated through the 1950s and that peaked at the end of the decade. As African purchasing power declined as a consequence of the loss of farm incomes, indebtedness to an increasingly rapacious class of Portuguese traders mounted. In 1960, the age of tax liability was lowered to sixteen and Bakongo men for the first time began to be forced into indentured labor contracts on settler-owned coffee plantations. Remaining African farmers had their livelihoods further threatened by the effects of Portugal’s agreement to an international coffee quota system, which caused a sharp fall in coffee producer prices in 1960. Intensifying economic hardship and social resentment in Bakongo villages in early 1961 were fresh restrictions on slash and burn field clearance and cultivation. Unlike the cerebral Marxist modernizers of Luanda’s Creole elite, the UPA’s leadership of Bakongo businessmen was able to tap successfully popular predispositions for rebellion, recruiting a local layer of activism among African coffee farmers and thereafter acquiring a mass following in a social context characterized by material crisis and millennial expectation.

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Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974

In many respects, Angolan history forms part of the history of southern Africa. While most states in the rest of Africa became independent, in many southern African countries a reverse trend was visible: white rule became more entrenched. South Africa’s apartheid system, Rhodesia’s settler government, and Portuguese investments to expand their administrative and military system in the colonies were all aimed to prevent African independence. To interpret Angola’s past in a southern African context, however, runs the risk of promoting reasoning from within a colonial framework. For the Angolan nationalist parties involved, relations within the central African context may have been just as important. Apart from contact with leaders from nations such as Tanzania, North African states, and other Portuguese-speaking colonies, the ties with independent Congo, Zaire, and Zambia were crucial for the Angolan nationalist movements. These regional aspects can hardly be separated from the wider international scene. This was the age of the Cold War: the parties involved all had their own channels of support, such as China, the Soviet Union, or the United States. The complex linkages between local, regional, and international spheres set the stage for later developments after Angolan independence in 1975.

Many names from different epochs have been associated with the Angolan resistance against colonialism, such as Queen Njinga, who fought the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, Chief Mandume, who opposed colonial conquest at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the prophet António Mariano, who led Maria’s War in January 1961.

The Luanda rising of February 1961 is generally taken as the beginning of the Angolan war of liberation. It started with Africans making an abortive attempt to release political prisoners, whereupon white immigrants entered the Luandan slums and engaged in a killing spree that left an unknown number of mostly educated Africans dead. A movement called MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which had been founded in 1956, was linked with the rising. Its leadership mostly consisted of Luandan *assimilados*, who, despite a Portuguese upbringing, were eager to explore their African background. Their

poetry and protest, both with Marxist and *négritude* overtones, soon aroused the suspicion of the Portuguese police and many of them were detained, executed, or forced into exile. Some MPLA supporters were involved in the Luanda rising, but many MPLA leaders were in exile trying to create internal cohesion and to look for international support, neither of which proved an easy task.

Just a month after the Luanda rising, eruptions of violence occurred in the north of Angola, where immigrant plantation ownership led to the impoverishment of local entrepreneurs. Soon the coffee plantations became the scene of widespread murder and mutilation, with atrocities committed by all sides involved. Many people from the region fled to neighboring Zaïre, where some joined the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). This movement was led largely by Baptists from the Angolan Kongo region, of whom Holden Roberto became the most prominent. The leadership stood close to the Kongo royalty, but concerns of local capitalist trade were equally important for its otherwise little-developed program. Soon relations between FNLA and MPLA became marked by fierce competition and fighting. While Holden Roberto managed to secure Zairian support and international recognition, the MPLA did not. In addition, the factions in the MPLA leadership faced sharp opposition from Viriato da Cruz and others against Agostinho Neto, the MPLA president. Internal strife was, however, not confined to the MPLA: in 1964 Jonas Savimbi left the Angolan government, which had been created in Kinshasa by Holden Roberto. Two years later he formed his own movement: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Zambian independence changed the scene. After 1966 both UNITA and MPLA started guerrilla activities in the sparsely populated plains of eastern Angola neighboring Zambia. Portuguese retaliation was harsh, the border between Zambia and Angola was cleared, most of the inhabitants were herded into wired camps, and helicopters dropped bombs on both guerrillas and any remaining villagers. Cooperating with South African forces, the Portuguese managed to hold the towns, while the guerrilla movements held the countryside. With few strategic targets to be conquered or lost, the war became what Basil Davidson has called “a war for people” (1972). Using methods ranging from ideological explanation and material attraction to threat and abduction, the fighting parties tried to control as many civilians as they could.

The MPLA and UNITA never managed to face the Portuguese forces with a common front. To the contrary, the Portuguese were able to employ their mutual animosity to check guerrilla activities. None of the parties tolerated the presence of another group in its

vicinity, and there is proof that during the final years of the war UNITA cooperated with the Portuguese to oust its rival. Furthermore, internal tensions mounted. In the MPLA the strained relations between learned political leaders from Luanda and local army leaders with little education proved too difficult a problem to overcome. A second internal crisis ensued: in 1973 both the “Active Revolt” and the “Eastern Revolt” nearly caused a split. The latter movement was led by chief commander of the eastern forces, Daniel Chipenda, who later assembled his followers, broke away from MPLA, and formed a southern branch of the FNLA.

In the meantime, the northern branch of the FNLA continued to gather support from African coffee planters who wished to safeguard their interests against white plantation holders. Increasing reliance on Western support and the capitalist ethos of FNLA diminished its revolutionary outlook. This did not prevent guerrilla actions, and in the northern region the FNLA was rather successful in this respect. With its regional base and interests, however, the FNLA only managed to expand to other areas on a limited scale. Furthermore competition with groups ready to negotiate with the Portuguese, a mutiny against the leadership suppressed with the aid of the Zairian government, and rivalry with MPLA did much to damage the party. Only with Zairian support the FNLA was able to remain a political and military force worth mentioning. In the oil-rich Cabinda enclave FNLA and MPLA interests clashed with FLEC (Cabindan Liberation Front), which sought Cabindan independence, both from Portugal and Angola. In this region fighting diminished.

In the east and south the war initiative shifted from this fighting party to that. On the whole the war slowly expanded and at times reached eastern Malange and the central highlands. Especially for UNITA, whose leadership mainly originated from the central highlands this was an important development. UNITA had started out with limited Chinese support, but on the whole had a far less developed structure outside Angola than FNLA and MPLA. Its leadership, in contrast to the other nationalist groups, largely operated from within Angola, especially after Savimbi had been expelled from Zambia in 1967. Due to its external contacts, MPLA troops were on the whole somewhat better armed and better trained than UNITA soldiers. Yet, they also suffered from a lack of supplies and their fragmented leadership was unable to provide the necessary coordination.

Attempts to unite the Angolan nationalist movements, sometimes initiated by the leaders of the movements themselves, sometimes led by African heads of state or the OAU, never succeeded: the Angolan liberation movement remained hopelessly divided. Yet

despite the cleavages in the nationalist movement and Portuguese efforts to build up a decisive war machinery, the Portuguese forces were unable to wipe out the nationalist groups. Portugal spent nearly half of its annual budget on the war in the colonies, in 1969 alone it sent some 150,000 troops to Africa and lost an average of 100 soldiers and more than 200 civilians annually in Angola. When war-worn Portuguese soldiers and their commanders staged a coup in Lisbon in 1974, a new epoch in Angolan history started. The first war of liberation had come to an end; soon another would be fought. Hitherto the period between 1961 and 1974 has been studied largely in terms of the discussions on nationalism and liberation. This valid approach may be widened by detailing other aspects of the war, such as the interactions between local, regional, and international support networks, witchcraft accusations, magic and political power, the relations with the churches, mobility, containment and concepts of space, questions of morality, agency and gender. Although the available sources may not provide answers to all questions, many questions still remain to be asked.

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See also: **Neto, António Agostinho.**

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Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976

The military coup that overthrew the Portuguese government on April 25, 1974, led to a resurgence in organized African political activity in Portugal's colonies. However, Angola's natural resources, primarily oil and diamonds, also attracted the interest of external forces. Eventually, the Angolan civil war would be perceived by the global media as a microcosm of the Cold War.

Following the coup, Holden Roberto, the leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in exile in Zaire, assembled an army under the

guidance of Chinese and Zairian instructors. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, rapidly abandoned Maoist rhetoric and opened channels of communication with the Portuguese authorities. The socialist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, was caught off guard by the April coup and beset by factionalism.

By September 1974 the MPLA had split into three factions. Daniel Chipenda's *Revolta do Leste* (Eastern Revolt) opened communications with the FNLA and UNITA. Two months earlier, UNITA had accepted a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese. By October, the Neto-led MPLA and the FNLA had also come to terms with the colonial administration. The Chipenda defection led the MPLA to appeal to the Cuban government for assistance. In November, the Soviet Union, partly in response to Chinese assistance to the FNLA, began to provide support for the MPLA through the OAU Liberation Committee.

On January 3, 1975, Neto, Savimbi, and Roberto assembled in Mombasa to sign an accord pledging peaceful cooperation, the facilitation of national reconstruction, and the safeguarding of Angola's "territorial integrity." Two weeks later, the Alvor Agreement was signed by all three parties. The agreement declared that Cabinda, where the oilfields were situated and which had been the subject of a secessionist movement, was "an unalienable component part of Angola." November 11, 1975, was set as the date for independence, and the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA were recognized as "the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola." The agreement also constructed a coalition government made up of the three parties which was mandated to conduct legislative elections and draft a provisional constitution under the guidance of the high commissioner general.

American intervention focused on the Alvor attempt to create a viable Angolan polity. In late January 1975, the United States covertly provided the anticommunist FNLA with \$300,000. Fighting erupted in Luanda, and Chipenda formally joined forces with the FNLA. In response to the U.S. intervention, the Soviet Union increased arms deliveries to the MPLA. Meanwhile, UNITA attempted to consolidate its position in the central highlands, while Savimbi traveled overseas in search of funding. In June, the three leaders attended talks in Kenya under the chairmanship of Jomo Kenyatta.

The FNLA, working closely with right-wing Portuguese elements, held the northern districts of Angola but were forced out of Luanda by the MPLA. Military advances by the MPLA, by now linked to leftists within the Portuguese administration, concerned the American government. On July 17, the U.S. provided increased funds to the FNLA and UNITA.

At the same time, the South African army was adopting positions on the Angola-Namibia border. Under the guise of pursuing South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas, the South African troops made a number of sorties into Angola. The MPLA attempted to publicize these interventions but to no avail. As the FNLA and UNITA waited for the American-financed weapons to arrive, they turned to South Africa for assistance. On September 21, 1975, South African officials arrived in Silva Porto to help UNITA against the MPLA. On October 14, the South African army launched Operation Zulu, an armored force supported by helicopter gunships that moved rapidly up the Angolan coast, dislodging and expelling the MPLA army in its wake.

In Luanda, the MPLA were besieged on all sides. In the north, the FNLA prepared to strike, while in the south, the UNITA/South African forces were dominant. Cuba and the Soviet Union moved quickly to bolster the MPLA. The airlift of Cuban combat troops known as Operation Carlota started on November 7. Within days, the war began to turn in the MPLA's favor. The Portuguese administration fled Angola, and on November 11, independence was declared. The MPLA immediately announced the foundation of the People's Republic of Angola. In response, the FNLA and UNITA joined forces to establish the "Democratic People's Republic of Angola."

Following the public exposure of the South African intervention (November 22), support for UNITA began to ebb. On November 27, Nigeria recognized the MPLA government and offered them funding in a show of support. In the United States, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's attempt to provide more money to the FNLA-UNITA alliance foundered in the Senate. The Tunney-Clark amendment (December 18) cut off any further covert aid.

Cuban reinforcements continued to pour into Angola. After the FNLA had been defeated in the north, Chipenda's FNLA in the south abandoned any pretense of organized warfare. Eventually, the Chipenda FNLA and UNITA fought each other, creating in the process a war within a war. The final blow for the anti-MPLA forces was the failure of the OAU to provide majority support for either a condemnation of the Cuban intervention or a tripartite political solution. On January 22, 1976, the South African force began to withdraw from Angola. By late February, the MPLA-Cuban army had defeated UNITA.

By mid-1976, the MPLA was well established as the governing party of Angola. Holden Roberto had returned to exile in Zaïre, and Jonas Savimbi and UNITA had retreated to their prior position as guerrillas. Savimbi, however, retained contacts with the South African army, contacts that would return to torment Angola in the future.

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Angola: Cold War Politics, Civil War, 1975–1994

Angola's national independence struggle became deeply entangled with both global Cold War politics and an increasingly bloody regional confrontation, as South Africa's white minority government attempted to halt the spread of African self-rule. The MPLA, while weakened by internal divisions, won crucial levels of external support on the eve of independence, first from Yugoslavia, then from Cuba, and finally from the Soviet Union. Slaves from Angola's shores had been shipped to Cuba in earlier centuries; hence there were strong historical links between the two countries. President Fidel Castro of Cuba made an early commitment to support the MPLA that brought in the Soviet Union superpower on its coattails. The United States placed its support behind the other two nationalist movements, UNITA and the FNLA. Herein were laid the seeds of an ongoing Cold War confrontation by proxy.

Into the midst of this cocktail of Cold War politics was added South Africa's efforts to maintain white minority rule by creating a *cordon sanitaire* around its borders. South Africa was determined to undermine the postindependence socialist government of the MPLA, which provided external bases for the nationalist movement of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), fighting for the independence of South West Africa (now known as Namibia), a territory under South African control, and of the African National Congress (ANC) fighting to overthrow the apartheid system in South Africa. The South African government joined the U.S. in actively supporting UNITA and the FNLA against the MPLA and its socialist bloc backers. Both SWAPO and ANC camps inside Angola were subjected to periodic attack, and the South African Defense Forces (SADF) fought alongside UNITA in battles with the Angolan government army.

Following the initial defeat of UNITA and the FNLA along with its western and South African supporters in 1976, and the consolidation of the MPLA government in Luanda, Angola entered into an extended period of civil war encouraged by the prevailing global

and regional confrontations. The MPLA government declared itself a Marxist-Leninist regime and relied increasingly on Soviet bloc support along with significant aid from northern European social democracies. Angola's government was never a puppet of Moscow, but the heightening of Cold War confrontation with the election of President Ronald Reagan in the United States created an ever-deepening divide within Angolan politics.

Throughout the 1980s the civil war intensified, fueled by this Cold War proxy confrontation and South Africa's newly found position as the regional champion for "rolling back communism." The South African Defense Forces continually supplied UNITA with weapons and logistical support and brought their own troops in to fight alongside UNITA when MPLA government offensives were launched in the center and south of the country. UNITA paid for this support in part by killing elephants and exporting ivory along with precious hardwoods. The U.S. provided assistance to UNITA via the northern neighboring territory of Zaïre. Soviet Union and Cuban support bolstered the MPLA regime.

An attempted resolution to the multilayered conflict that had national, regional, and international dimensions began to unfold toward the end of the 1980s. United States policy under Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker was to link the withdrawal of the Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola, with South Africa moving toward granting independence for Namibia. This was finally achieved following a major battle at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola in 1988, when the SADF were obliged to withdraw. The U.S. had encouraged an aggressive South African "roll back" strategy, but after a decade, the South African military needed taming somewhat, to let the South African diplomats take the running. Hence the United States did not permit the use of all available military technology in that confrontation to enable the South African military to win. On the side of the Soviet Union and Cuba, they needed to be able to claim some shared success in achieving their policy aims as well as being given an opportunity to pull out.

The South African government agreed to free elections in Namibia, which brought a SWAPO government to power. Cuban and Soviet support to the MPLA government was withdrawn. The path was created for a new peace initiative to try to end the civil war. Finally, in 1992, the Bicesse Agreement was signed, leading up to a UN monitored peace process with an end to armed hostilities, and a democratic election took place in September 1992. The MPLA won a majority of the seats in the national assembly and Jose Eduardo dos Santos a majority of votes in the election for president, held in tandem. Savimbi and UNITA refused to accept

the judgment of the international community that the elections were free and fair and Savimbi returned to war with a vengeance. By so doing, Savimbi revealed that he had deliberately misled the international community by failing to integrate his troops into the national army and demobilize the remaining forces. UNITA's hidden military forces struck swiftly and soon had nearly two-thirds of the national territory under its control.

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See also: Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Savimbi, Jonas.

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Angola: Civil War: Impact of, Economic and Social

Angola first entered into war in 1961, with the start of the anticolonial struggle, and war has continued into the twenty-first century. From 1975 onward, this took the form of a civil war, waged between the MPLA government and UNITA, with only two very brief periods of troubled peace in the 1990s.

Angola's rich natural resource base offered virtually limitless potential for economic development. War

destroyed the opportunity for that potential to be realized in productive economic endeavors that would accelerate the social development of the country. Instead, agricultural and industrial production collapsed. Two nonrenewable resources, oil and diamonds, became the mainstay of the economy. By 1997, oil exports were worth 4.5 billion U.S. dollars, and diamond exports an estimated half a billion U.S. dollars. Following the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial power in 1975, the MPLA government relied upon the country's oil revenues, while UNITA used the country's diamond revenues, as well as ivory exports, to fuel an ongoing civil war.

From 1975 to 1990 the war was essentially confined to the rural areas. The farmland being cultivated at the end of this period represented only one-quarter of that being cultivated in 1975, as a result of mine laying and general insecurity, with infrastructure, transport, and all forms of social provision being seriously disrupted. A massive rural population exodus occurred of internally displaced persons to the capital city of Luanda and to the provincial capitals. Over two decades of warfare since independence contributed to the urban population growing from 20 per cent to well over 50 per cent of the total population. In addition, refugees poured into neighboring countries, notably Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), and Zambia. By the mid-1990s, 1.2 million were refugees or internally displaced persons; there were 70,000 amputees and tens of thousands of street children. Agricultural production collapsed, as did industrial production.

Only 12 per cent of the economically active population are employed in the formal sector. Urban unemployment is more than 30 per cent, affecting women and youth in particular. This situation emerged as a combined result of the war, the state's misguided socialist, centralized economic planning, and the absence of effective management and education strategies. Oil revenues continually grew, however, alleviating the need for the government to seriously address economic renewal in the rest of the economy. By the late 1990s, oil accounted for about 90 per cent of government revenue and 95 per cent of export earnings. Angola went from being a food exporter at the time of independence, to becoming heavily reliant on food aid and imports. The petroleum sector remained relatively immune from the war as most of the production was offshore, benefiting from new deep water mining technologies.

Undoubtedly the main responsibility for the war lay with UNITA, which was able to obtain the backing of the South African government and its defense forces. UNITA's activities crippled the non-oil sectors, destroying the economy and people's livelihoods. As a result of the civil war, government expenditure was

primarily targeted on defense, reaching a peak in 1993 of almost half of total official expenditure. Social sector expenditure was correspondingly squeezed. According to UNICEF, levels of social expenditure remain far below comparable levels in neighboring countries. As the radical socialist ideology of the government was gradually undermined, corruption and enrichment of the small elite around President Jose Eduardo dos Santos replaced the genuine social concerns of the MPLA government in the early years of independence. In spite of the oil and diamond wealth, the population sank into ever deeper levels of poverty.

One of the most serious economic impacts of the war was to compound the hyperinflation that resulted from the government's unrealistic economic policies as well as from UNITA's military activities. From independence to the beginning of the 1990s, the government maintained an official exchange rate of 30 kwanza to US\$1. This artificially low exchange rate produced a parallel market exchange rate of 2,400 kwanza to US\$1 in 1991. Goods were only available to the population on the parallel market, not in the state shops at artificially low controlled prices. By 1999, as a result of ongoing war and the government's refusal to adopt economic stabilization measures, US\$1 on the parallel market was equal to 1.5 billion old kwanzas, or 1.5 million new kwanzas.

This MPLA government policy ensured a redistribution strategy from the poor to the rich. Those with assets, the rich, benefited from an increasing kwanza value for their assets, while those wishing to purchase assets, the poor, had to pay ever more. Wages remained appallingly low, based upon the unrealistic official rate of exchange. Public sector workers could not survive on their salaries; hence all pursued separate avenues of earning. Corruption thrived as a survival mechanism. Moral values deteriorated, spreading out from the top of the political system.

The dual exchange rate allowed the small ruling elite to profit from their privileged access to purchase dollars at the official rate of exchange and sell these for kwanzas on the parallel market at the far higher rate of exchange. Then the cycle of accumulation could begin once again for the elite, by exchanging the kwanzas for dollars at the beneficial official rate of exchange. This system provided a license to become rich for the few and a recipe for poverty for the many. Two-thirds of the urban population live below the poverty line, with one in ten living in extreme poverty.

The war not only destroyed the economic and social fabric of the country, it also offered the excuse for the government to resist economic reform. War also presented lucrative economic opportunities for the military leaders to enrich themselves. This took a variety of

forms. Generals on both sides, the MPLA and UNITA, benefited from controlling some of the diamond mines, and selling diamonds illegally. Arms purchases allowed big “kick-backs,” and military control of territory allowed taxation of any trade and commerce occurring within the area controlled.

The government has reaped the reward of the development of offshore deep water oil drilling technology, selling off concessions with high bonuses paid on signature of the concession by the foreign oil exploration companies. Since the mid-1980s the balance of payments was permanently in deficit, and arms and food imports were paid for by mortgaging future oil revenue. In the absence of an agreed structural adjustment program with the IMF and World Bank, the government was obliged to borrow money at extremely high levels of interest, further indebting the country.

BARRY MUNSLow

See also: Angola: Cold War Politics, Civil War, 1975–1994; Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Angola: Peace Betrayed, 1994 to the Present.

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Angola: Peace Betrayed, 1994 to the Present

The Lusaka Protocol peace agreement between the MPLA and UNITA was signed on November 20, 1994. This followed two years of heavy fighting after UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, refused to accept that he had lost the UN-supervised democratic elections of September 1992. The Lusaka Protocol followed earlier peace accords between the two parties, Alvor (1975) and Bicesse (1991), both of which were broken. Savimbi of UNITA did not attend the signing ceremony, which was taken as a bad omen. He was angered by the MPLA’s final offensive on the eve of the signing, which led to the fall of Huambo, the principal city in the heartland of his Ovimbundu regional base in the central high plateau, which had great symbolic significance. Savimbi felt obliged to go along with the agreement because of reversals on the battlefield and

because of increasing international pressure. He was never committed to the Lusaka Protocol, regarding it as a capitulation if it were fully implemented.

Fundamentally, there was a basic lack of trust between the two protagonists, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, given the extensive history of broken agreements and in particular Savimbi’s unwillingness to accept his defeat in the national assembly and presidential elections of 1992, which were deemed to be free and fair by the international community. Savimbi never accepted the legitimacy of his defeat.

The implementation of the Lusaka Accords proceeded at a painfully slow pace. Not until May 1995 did dos Santos and Savimbi meet face to face. The UN Security Council only authorized the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III in February 1995, and the first Blue Helmet troops became operational in May. Delays occurred across all fronts against a backdrop of accusation and counteraccusation of cease-fire violations. The first critical issue was the quartering of UNITA troops, the engagement of an agreed number of these into a unified Angolan army, and the demobilization of the remaining UNITA forces. UNITA continuously delayed implementation, questioning the location of the sites, the inadequacy of the camps, and security issues. UNITA wanted the sites located in the areas of its dominance, the MPLA in areas further away from direct UNITA influence. Heavy laying of land mines, with bridges and air strips destroyed, all created delays in establishing the quartering areas. The actual quartering process only began exactly one year after the Lusaka Protocol was signed.

The agreed-upon process involved UNITA committing its troops and armaments into the quartering areas and the government withdrawing its troops into defensive positions and confining to barracks the Rapid Intervention Police known as the *ninjas*. In fact, UNITA never committed its core troops, instead recruiting young boys and civilians, then sending them into the camps with frequently old and unserviceable weapons. Formally the incorporation of UNITA generals into the new national army and the completion of UNITA’s troop quartering was achieved in December 1996. Yet in the words of Paul Hare, the U.S. special representative until 1998 for the Angolan peace process: “The simple truth was that UNITA was never enamored with the Lusaka Protocol, especially the provision calling for the disarming of its troops. The problem was fundamental, as UNITA’s military arm had formed the backbone and *raison d’être* of the movement since 1966.”

In essence, Savimbi was simply not prepared to relinquish control of his military power base. This was linked to a second critical issue, the expansion of the state administration over the whole country. At the time of the peace agreement, the country was effectively

divided between areas controlled by the government and those controlled by UNITA. The protocol had called for the free movement of goods and people, and this was only ever partially attained in certain areas of the country. When the government began in earnest to expand the state administration in 1997 and 1998, tensions began to erupt. UNITA complained of government police behaving like an occupying army, while the government saw its efforts to implement the agreement being blocked at every turn. Some of the pillaging by government police reflected personal survival strategies, as often they received neither their salaries nor supplies.

There was great expectation that the entry of UNITA deputies and ministers and vice-ministers into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) when this occurred in April 1997, would facilitate the peace process. UNITA provided four ministers and seven vice-ministers out of a total of twenty-eight ministers and fifty-five vice-ministers. At the inauguration ceremony, once again Savimbi refused to attend.

At the heart of the contestation was maintenance of the economic and political power bases of the rival leaders. The main flash point was the control of the diamond mining areas in the provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul in the northeast of the country. The MPLA relied upon its control of Angola's oil wealth to finance its power base, while UNITA controlled much of the diamond mining areas of the northern interior. The MPLA were keen to expand their control of the diamond areas and to restrict access to UNITA, thereby cutting off the financial resources for UNITA's military effort.

The critical issue was whether a compromise could be negotiated to leave UNITA front companies with guaranteed access to diamond revenues if UNITA fully implemented the peace agreement. In fact, UNITA hung on to its essential revenue source by going through the motions of the peace agreement while building up sufficient revenues from diamond production to reequip and upgrade its army to launch yet another major offensive intended to defeat the MPLA-dominated government. Diamond revenues also enabled UNITA to break United Nations sanctions imposed in a serious way from September 1998. Logistical access for UNITA rearmament was purchased by bribes paid to political and military leaders in neighboring countries.

The MPLA strategy, on the other hand, was to try to cut off UNITA's logistical access through those same neighboring countries. This strategy led to heavy Angolan government military commitments in the two northern bordering countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), and Congo-Brazzaville.

Dos Santos had supported the opposition forces of Laurent Kabila in his overthrow of President Mobutu of

Zaire in 1997. UNITA's friendly relationship with Mobutu had allowed Zaire to be a resupply zone for the areas of Angola that UNITA controlled. Kabila failed to halt the use of his country for attacks by various groups against the neighboring states that had supported his successful military campaign, notably Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola. While Angola's government continued to support Kabila, Uganda and Rwanda grew impatient and launched a new offensive to oust Kabila. UNITA found new allies with Uganda and Rwanda, while the Angolan government, supported by the governments of Zimbabwe and Namibia, provided military support to Kabila in a new central African war that escalated regional tensions. These new regional dimensions of conflict fueled the breakdown of the peace agreement between the MPLA and UNITA.

In February 2002, Jonas Savimbi was killed during a skirmish with government forces. In April of that year, MPLA and UNITA signed a formal cease-fire, raising hopes that a lasting peace may be achieved.

BARRY MUNSLow

See also: Angola: Cold War Politics, Civil War, 1975–1994; Angola: Civil War: Impact of, Economic and Social; Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974.

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Antananarivo

Located at the highest point (1,480 meters above sea level) of three ranges of hills forming a Y-shape, Analamanga dominated a plain, more than 200 meters below, that was floodable, being drained by the River Ikopa, and that was transformed over the centuries, through the irrigation policies of successive kings, into a set of rice-growing regions known as the Betsimitatatra. This immense space, undivided by canals, became one of the symbols of the unity of the kingdom, and of the alliance between the monarch (the rice) and the people (the water).

The migrants who entered Imerina before the end of the first millennium preferred to establish themselves relatively close to the lower ground, but control of a position as exceptional as Analamanga's attracted the interest of the Vazimba, who established their capital there by the end of the fourteenth century at the latest.

The site aroused the greed of the Andriana dynasty, who came from the east and arrived in the vicinity of Analamanga in the course of successive relocations of their capital. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, they were based to the northeast, at Ambohimanga. It was from there that the ruler Andrianjaka set out to conquer Analamanga, seizing the citadel and expelling the Vazimba kings. However, he chose not to live in their *rova* (the fortified enclosure in which the royal palaces stood), preferring a location slightly lower but further to the north, the cardinal direction associated with political power in the symbolic organization of space in Imerina. A moat formed part of the defensive complex and boundary, separating it from the residence of the Vazimba. While the Andriana *rova* was given the name Analamasina (“in the sacred forest”), Analamanga became Antananarivo. This place name, imposed by Andrianjaka, has traditionally been translated as “town (or village) of the thousand,” meaning the settlers, but it may be a deformation of Antaninarivo, “in the land of the people,” a meaning that would fit better with the purpose of the capital, conceived in the image of the kingdom.

In the early eighteenth century, Andrianampoinimerina, whose own capital was Ambohimanga, reunified Imerina, which had been divided into four kingdoms, and restored the political preeminence of Antananarivo. He too had free subjects settle there. Following the tradition of his ancestors, Andrianampoinimerina assigned to each territorial or status group a specific district within the moats or in the suburbs. The reallocation of these districts, which became *tanindrazana* (ancestral lands containing tombs), was carried out in relation to the *rova*, which was regarded as the central pillar structuring the space of the “great house,” the kingdom itself.

Antananarivo clung to its rocks (forming today’s Haute Ville [Upper City]) until the nineteenth century, when it became the capital of the kingdom of Madagascar. Then it spread onto the slopes to the west, which were sheltered from the winds, and onto the hills to the north, reaching Faravohitra, a suburb that was held in low esteem until the British missionaries began to favor it as a place of residence. They secured a privileged status for their district by constructing, between 1863 and 1872, a memorial church on the site of the martyrdoms under Ranavalona I, built on the initiative of James Sibree of the London Missionary Society. Their use of stone for this and other buildings led to an upheaval in the symbolism of Imerinian architecture, which had traditionally made a contrast between stone, the material of monuments to the dead, and vegetable matter, used for the residences of the living. Even the Manjakamiadana, the largest of the palaces in the *rova* (an ensemble almost completely destroyed by fire in November 1995), having been built of timber by

a Frenchman, Jean Laborde, was refitted in stone under the direction of James Cameron, a Scottish craftsman and missionary who departed from Madagascan tradition and conceived a model for residential building that was to be adopted by the elite. Even today, this model still gives the city its distinctive cachet, with its brick-built houses, each with a sloping roof, an upper story, a veranda, and several rooms, including a drawing room. The bourgeois homes of the colonial period may be distinguished by their more massive aspect, an arcade over the veranda, and the addition of a tower.

The colonial administration insisted on stamping a certain “Frenchness” on Antananarivo. It started with innovations in infrastructure, with paved roads, electric lighting, and sewers carrying drinking water, as well as with the laying out of the districts of the Ville Moyenne [Middle City] in the vicinity of the governor-general’s headquarters. In 1924, the French architect and town planner Géo Cassaigne drew up the first programmatic plan for the layout, expansion, and embellishment of the capital. This plan paid special attention to the circulation of automobiles and the specialization of districts within the city; it also provided for garden suburbs for the Europeans and for “villages” for the natives, within a city where racial segregation had been unknown. However, material and financial constraints forced the abandonment of this plan.

Modern town planning in the Western style was adopted mainly in the Betsimitatatra, where the rice farms gave way to the Ville Basse [Lower City], which was given a park, squares, and other geometric open spaces. The buildings on this main axis, including the Hôtel de Ville [city hall], which was burned down at the time of the movement of May 1972, formed a homogeneous ensemble typical of the 1930s. The edges of the city held little interest for the administration, or for European speculators, and the less salubrious establishments were located there. In those valleys and parts of the plain that had not been cleared, residential districts were developed by the common people, beyond the reach of any planning controls. The hillsides were deficient in roads, yet they were more and more densely filled by the houses of the Madagascan petty and middle bourgeoisie.

The estates constructed in the suburbs under the city plan of 1956 only partially resolved the housing problems caused by the growth of the city, which had become especially rapid after World War II. Antananarivo also continued to expand into the Betsimitatatra, which became the site of major embankment operations after the serious flooding of 1959. The plain became the location of an administrative complex, with ministries, a hospital, and educational institutions, as well as more estates, but little was done to clear the ground, and, in the absence of policies for housing or credit, the municipality failed to prevent

either illicit occupation or spontaneous settlement. The development in the last few decades of a great suburban sprawl has impeded the process of urban development. The implementation of a plan for Grand Tananarive [Greater Tananarive], extending as far as the ranges of hills several kilometers from the center of the city, is also expected to contribute to reducing congestion in the greater metropolitan region.

FARANIRINA RAJAONAH

See also: **Madagascar.**

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Anticolonialism: See Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism.

Anti-Slavery Movement

The anti-slavery movement in Western Europe stemmed from two main sources: evangelical Christianity in Great Britain and the ideals of the Enlightenment on the Continent. As early as 1744 John Wesley, founder of the Methodist Church, had written *Thoughts on Slavery*, one of the first influential tracts to condemn slavery on moral grounds. But the heart of the movement for legislative action in England stemmed from the leadership of three men. One was Granville Sharp, who had won the benchmark Mansfield decision in 1772 that slavery could not be sustained by law on English soil. Another was Thomas Clarkson, author of a *Summary View of the Slave Trade and the Probable Causes of Its Abolition* (1787). The third was William Wilberforce, a great parliamentary orator. Both Clarkson and Wilberforce were inspired by evangelical preachers at the University of Cambridge. Enlisting the support of other activists (including J. Stephen, T. Babbington, Z. Macaulay, and the former slave Olaudah Equiano), they formed the Anti-Slave Trade Society. The society, with its connection to the Methodist Church, effective organization, pamphleteering, and mass petitions to

parliament, inspired other pressure groups focused on societal improvement during the age of reform.

Assisted by votes from the Irish bloc in the House of Commons, as well as behind-the-scenes support from politicians of the highest rank, such as William Pitt and Lord Grenville, the group succeeded in overcoming the entrenched power of the West Indies sugar lobby and opposition in the House of Lords to outlaw the slave trade (for British citizens) and, at the same time, to establish the Sierra Leone Colony in West Africa for freed slaves in 1807. Meanwhile, other nations prohibited the slave trade: Denmark in 1803, the United States in 1808, Sweden in 1813, and the Netherlands in 1814. During its radical phase (1793), the French National Assembly abolished both the slave trade and slavery, but slavery was reinstated by Napoleon, and the institution was not finally abolished in the French West Indies until the 1840s. British diplomatic pressure and naval coercion would play a significant part in ending Brazil's participation in the slave trade in the 1850s.

Meanwhile, the British humanitarian movement had revived in the 1820s under T.F. Buxton, who founded the new Anti-Slavery Society, with a base at Exeter Hall, London, in 1823. The final end to slavery as an institution throughout the British Empire, ten years later, was preceded by extensive missionary activity in the West Indies, which roused British Caribbean slaves and led ultimately to rebellion (i.e., the Montego Bay uprising and the gruesome planter retribution of 1831, where upwards of 600 Africans were killed). These events once again stirred British public opinion and led to action. The final 1833 Emancipation Bill, drafted by James Stephen, Jr., and passed by the reformed 1832 parliament, had to be approved by the Jamaican legislature (on condition of compensation paid to slave owners, coupled with a lengthy seven-year apprenticeship for the ex-slaves), thus it was not immediately successful. A majority of ex-slaves, fueled by frustration and disappointment, would lead to further unrest and rebellion in Jamaica in the years ahead. The freeing of slaves would not be completed in a majority of the other European colonies of the Caribbean until forty years after the British effort. During this time, and up until the American Civil War in the 1860s, the British Anti-Slavery Society corresponded with kindred spirits in the U.S., led by William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, and New England-based abolitionists.

Most of the great powers, including Britain, viewed African internal slavery (sometimes recast as "domestic servitude") in a different light from New World plantation slavery, and colonial governments proceeded slowly against it in order to avoid antagonizing African rulers and disrupting indigenous social structures. Still, British humanitarians vowed to stifle the inland slave trade and slave raiding. Buxton and

the African clergyman, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, led the campaign for their replacement by “legitimate trade” (mainly the export of palm products), commencing with the River Niger expeditions of the 1840s and 1850s. The celebrated Victorian explorations and missionary activities of David Livingstone in east and southern Africa from 1841 to 1873 became a beacon for late nineteenth-century anti-slavery movements in Africa. But this also served as a prelude to, and a rhetorical cover for, imperialism and territorial annexations during the “scramble for Africa.” French colonial policy regarding the ending of slavery in Africa (like that of nearly every other European nation) was uneven and marked by contradiction. At times nearly all the colonial powers were guilty of perpetuating servitude through harsh schemes for labor recruitment and the use of slaves as transport workers. The epitome of “abolitionist imperialism” in British colonial Africa was exemplified by the exploits of Frederick Lugard (c.1900), who used anti-slavery as a partial rationale for his military and territorial conquest of the northern Nigerian Muslim emirates.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain used its leverage with other nations to curb both the slave trade and slavery as an institution by diplomatic influence, colonial administration, the legal nonrecognition of slavery, and periodic naval and military actions. Over the last century African internal slavery slowly disappeared in most countries, owing to the assimilation of former slaves into their host societies. However, both slave raiding and use of slave labor have reared their heads again in modern times. The humanitarian abolitionist movement lives on today in the group Anti-Slavery International.

RAYMOND E. DUMETT

See also: Crowther, Reverend Samuel Ajayi and the Niger Mission; Equiano, Olaudah; “Legitimate Commerce” and the Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century; Livingstone, David; Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, “Indirect Rule”; Slavery in African Society.

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Anti-Slavery Squadron, Decline of Export Slave Trade, Nineteenth Century

The transatlantic trade in slaves dominated Euro-African relations from the late fifteenth through the early nineteenth centuries. It grew rapidly in volume and importance over the years, undergoing vast increases, especially from 1650 to 1850. Although the Portuguese were the leading slave traders in Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and although they were superseded later by the Dutch and the French, the English had, by the eighteenth century, become the main dealers in the nefarious trade. Ironically, Britain was also the nation that, toward the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, had spearheaded the anti-slavery movement, due to new socioeconomic attitudes toward Africa in general and West Africa in particular, which were then growing in several British circles.

In 1807 Britain abolished its slave trade. The British were by no means alone in outlawing the sea-borne trade: it appeared that opinion worldwide was turning against slavery, as reflected in the actions of other countries. Denmark, for instance, had abolished it in its areas of jurisdiction (including those in the Caribbean), while the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands each independently enacted similar laws, which took effect in 1808, 1813, and 1814, respectively. However, the British campaign against the traffic in human beings was far more active and widespread than that of any other European nation; in addition to outlawing its own slave trade, the nation actively suppressed the slave trade of other nations.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the climate of public opinion in Britain was such that abolition became possible. Although it was 1833 before the British parliament passed an act (effective from 1834) outlawing the institution of slavery in all of Britain’s imperial possessions, it had been illegal for British subjects to engage in the obnoxious trade since the Act of Abolition of 1807. Severe penalties were imposed on British subjects caught trading in slaves, and by 1824 such actions were punishable by death.

The road to abolition, however, was not an easy one. Even in 1807 there were still groups in Britain anxious to continue the slave trade. Measures taken by Britain were frustrated as substantial numbers of slaves were

transported across the Atlantic after 1807. Several European nations and individuals derived their wealth from the trade and were therefore reluctant to support any move to suppress it. At the same time, new centers of demand for slaves developed, especially in Cuba and Brazil. The same went for the southern states of the U.S. While the British prohibition was stringently enforced in the British Empire, it was difficult to put into effect the new laws on an international scale without the full support of other nations.

To enforce the Abolition Act of 1807, Britain instituted an anti-slave trade squadron, as an arm of the royal navy, to patrol the West African waters, inspect ships, and seize any found to have slaves aboard. Slaves found in such captured ships were set free and settled in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the base of the squadron. The naval squadron undertook a blockade of the major slave trading ports. Between 1808 and 1830, British efforts at putting an end to the slave trade were concentrated on the activities of the anti-slave trade squadron, and this was quite active and widespread, producing some positive results.

Having hopefully abolished its own slave-trading practices, Britain shifted its attention toward securing the cooperation of others through a tortuous and protracted phase of international diplomatic bargaining. Its sustained pressure led to the passage of anti-slavery legislation by other principal slave-trading nations in Europe, North Africa, the Americas and the Middle East during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. This resulted in France outlawing its trade in 1818 and Brazil in 1825. Earlier, Portugal and Spain had initiated laws (in 1815 and 1817, respectively) which increasingly restricted their slave traders to the seas south of the equator, in return for British loans and financial subsidies.

Although the British government had succeeded in persuading other nations to enact laws banning slavery, by the 1820s it had become apparent that, apart from Britain itself, most of those other powers had not taken positive measures to enforce compliance with the laws. The next stage in the British campaign was thus devoted to efforts to get those states to agree to "reciprocal search treaties" granting the right of search of ships suspected of carrying slaves to all nations that were party to the treaty. At Freetown, after the granting of reciprocal search treaties, slave traders of any nation were brought to justice and their slaves set free by courts of mixed commission (that is, courts with judges of various European nationalities notably British, Spanish, and Portuguese).

The anti-slavery squadron failed to stop the transport of slaves to the Americas, but the presence of those royal naval patrols had a deterrent effect as it

made the slave trade a risky venture. Between 1825 and 1865, for instance, no less than 1,287 slave ships were captured, from which about 130,000 slaves were released alive, even though nearly 1,800,000 slaves were still exported from West Africa alone about this same period. By the late 1860s (that is, more than fifty years after Britain passed the Act of Abolition), however, the slave trade overseas was no longer significant. At that time, the impact of the industrial revolution was being felt all over Europe and in the United States. On the other hand, Christian missionary enterprise and the new "legitimate commerce" (the African version of the pervasive mid-nineteenth-century British doctrine of free commodity trade) had gained a fairly strong footing in Africa. The quest for slaves, therefore, became increasingly anachronistic, thus complementing the efforts of the anti-slavery squadron to suppress the slave trade.

Be that as it may, following the stationing of the naval squadron, which undertook a blockade of the major slave trading ports in West Africa, a new European interest and influence began to develop. The concomitant weakening of the economic and political sovereignty of the coastal states gradually set in motion a chain of events that prepared the way for the eventual British and European occupation of the respective states starting in the late nineteenth century.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Abolition: Philanthropy or Economics?; Slavery, Atlantic Basin in the Era of; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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Anywa: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anywak

Aouzou: See Chad: Libya, Aozou Strip, Civil War.

Apartheid: See South Africa: Antipartheid Struggle, International; South Africa: Antipartheid Struggle: Townships, the 1980s; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: Apartheid, Education and.

Arab and Islamic World, Africa in

Africa has long interacted with the Arab and wider Islamic worlds. Historically, Islam spread from the Middle East via North Africa to Sub-Saharan Africa in two main ways: first, by a series of jihads from the seventh and eighth centuries, and second, by trade in commodities and people from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries. Trade was focused on the eastern seaboard of Africa, beginning before and ending after the Western Europe and Americas centered trade on the west coast, which brought Christianity to Africa. The spread of Islam took about twelve centuries; by the nineteenth century the faith had spread throughout much of the African continent.

By the time that European colonialism came to an end in Africa, there was a Muslim presence in virtually all African countries. But because of European colonialism, during the first half of the twentieth century the pace of growth of Christianity generally outstripped that of Islam. The numbers of Christians increased from around 10 million in 1900 to more than 250 million by the 1990s, while the numbers of Muslims in Africa grew from about 34 million at the beginning of the twentieth century to around 300 million during the same period. The consequence was that, while many of Africa's Muslims live in North Africa, a substantial number also reside south of the Sahara. The continent is predominantly Muslim above the tenth parallel, a dividing line that cuts through the northern regions of Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The same line roughly separates Muslim from non-Muslim in Sudan and Chad.

In the late nineteenth century, the Muslim world experienced the slow demise of the Turkish Ottoman empire and the (near) contemporaneous emergence of Saudi Arabia as champion of Islamic reformist ambitions. During this time, the growth of Sufi brotherhoods in Africa led to the extension of Muslim networks throughout much of Africa and beyond, and the introduction of new modernizing ideas. African Muslims joined Sufi brotherhoods to further their own commercial networks and were often receptive to Islamic reformist ideas, as well as to Pan-Islamic ideals during the first half of the twentieth century.

The historical characteristics of the Arab/Islamic-African connection make the relationship between the two regions easy to trace but difficult to assess. Interac-

tions between Islam and Africa began with the arrival of Arabs and the process of religious conversion. This was a process reflective of the "dominant Arab/dominated African" relationship, which was to become an unhappy component of some of Africa's historical development. Given the historical significance of slavery in Africa, the role of the Arabs in the region was hardly auspicious. This is not to diminish the impact of the effects of European colonial rule, for the latter tended to forge a closer link between the Arabs and the Africans, especially during the postindependence period as both regions fought the struggle against imperialism. Yet the years of colonial rule underlined the fact that divisions widely existed between Muslim Africans, often powerful in their communities, favored and patronized by some colonialists, and non-Muslim Africans who, often deeply resenting the burden of European colonial control, produced the great majority of African nationalist leaders after World War II.

In the postcolonial era, the sometimes uneasy relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims has significantly informed political developments in a number of African countries including Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad. Religious rivalry in such countries was informed by two main issues: first, putative or actual African membership of the wider Islamic community and, second, the role of Arab oil wealth in Africa's economic and social development.

Certain Arab or Muslim countries have sought to pursue foreign policy goals in Africa in recent years. The Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Libyan governments have all been active in Africa since the 1970s, seeking to pursue strategic foreign policy goals that often had the impact of helping to stir up Arab-oriented discontent. Decades of oil revenues gave such states the financial ability to prosecute aggressive foreign policies in Africa, policies in which the separation of political, diplomatic, and religious goals was sometimes difficult to draw. For example, Iran's status as a predominantly Shi'ite country, when most African Muslims are Sunni, was partially offset for some African Muslim radicals (for example, in Nigeria) by its bona fide revolutionary credentials.

Also controversial in recent years was the role in Africa of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC was formed in Rabat in 1969, with the first conference held a year later in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The aim of the OIC was to promote Islamic solidarity and further cooperation among member states in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and political fields. The OIC had fifty-three members in the late 1990s, half of which were African countries. However, in at least two African countries, Nigeria and Zanzibar (a part of the unified state of Tanzania), the issue of the country's membership was highly controversial. This was because Christians in both countries

felt very strongly that membership of the OIC implied that each was a “Muslim country,” a policy direction they wished strenuously to contest.

Another important area of Arab-Muslim/African interaction was the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). The idea of an Arab bank to assist in the economic and social development of all non-Arab African states was first discussed by the Arab heads of state during the Sixth Arab Summit at Algiers in 1973. The BADEA, with headquarters at Khartoum, Sudan, began operations in March 1975. Its main functions include the financing of development projects, promoting and stimulating private Arab investment in Africa, and supplying technical assistance. All member states of the Organization of African Unity, except Arab League participants, are eligible for funding. BADEA’s lending to Arab countries, which regularly totaled more than \$100 million annually in the early 1980s, dropped significantly in the second part of the decade as oil revenues fell; in 1988, only \$35 million was loaned by BADEA. However, annual levels of loans grew again over the next few years to total \$90 million in the mid-1990s.

The bank indicated at this time that it would like to increase funding levels to needy African countries, but was constrained by the adverse economic climate in most of them. The third Five-year Plan (1995–1999) aimed to increase the percentage of concessionary lending and refocus lending away from large infrastructural projects to smaller rural ventures, as well to health services and educational programs.

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See also: Islam: Eastern Africa; Religion, History of; Religion: Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Islam.

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Arab Bedouin: Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ma’qil (Eleventh to Fifteenth Centuries)

The Fatimid rulers who had controlled Ifriqiya since the early tenth century shifted their political center eastward to the Nile Valley in the 960s, entrusting a vassal Berber

group, the Zirids, with the administration of Ifriqiya. Within a century, however, the Zirids had proclaimed themselves independent rulers. The Fatimids’ attention was then focused on the task of solidifying their position in the eastern Mediterranean, but they were unwilling to ignore the Zirids’ defiance. In retaliation, they set in motion a process that punished their disloyal subordinates and simultaneously ameliorated a recurrent problem in Egypt. Bedouin tribes that had immigrated across the Red Sea to Upper Egypt as Islam expanded out of the Arabian Peninsula had long wreaked havoc in that region, frequently disrupting the agriculture on which Egypt’s prosperity hinged. By forcing as many as a quarter of a million of these Arab nomads from the Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, and Banu Ma’qil confederations to leave the Nile Valley and migrate westward, the Fatimids avenged the Zirids’ temerity and rid themselves of troublesome subjects. The Banu Sulaym resettled in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, but the Banu Hilal and Banu Ma’qil pushed farther westward.

As the nomads poured into Ifriqiya, the Zirids at first tried to integrate them into their army, hoping to use them to quell the unrest triggered by economic deterioration in rural areas. Some Banu Hilal accepted the offer to join forces with the Zirids, but far more ignored it. As they overran the province’s plains and steppes, the Zirids were compelled to mount a defense of their most valuable lands. In a pitched battle at Haidaran, northwest of Qairawan, in 1052, the bedouins routed the Zirid forces. More vulnerable than ever to the depredations of the nomads, the Zirids were powerless to prevent the Banu Hilal from sacking Qairawan in 1057. The city was already in the process of losing much of its economic vitality as a result of shifts in the trans-Saharan trade routes, but the departure of the Zirid court for Mahdiyya, on the coast, marked Qairawan’s demise as Ifriqiya’s political center of gravity. In the ensuing decades, many bedouin shaykhs carved out enclaves that they were able to govern independent of Zirid influence.

Other factions of the Banu Hilal continued to push into the central Maghrib, where some allied with the Hammadid dynasty that controlled the region. Like their Zirid relatives, however, the Hammadids were soon overwhelmed by the bedouins and retreated to the coastal city of Bajaia, replicating the Zirids’ retreat to Mahdiyya. In the course of the twelfth century, the Banu Hilal who had remained in Ifriqiya were joined by bands of the Banu Sulaym who were beginning to enter the region from Tripolitania. In 1153, these groups united in an unsuccessful attempt to thwart the eastward advance of the Almohad empire. After their victory in a pitched battle near Setif in 1153, the Almohads deported thousands of the defeated bedouins to Morocco, incorporating them into their army. These bedouin

contingents later participated in the Almohad campaign that brought Ifriqiya under the dynasty's control in 1160.

To the south, along the fringes of the Sahara, the Banu Ma'qil were also on the move during the twelfth century. Penetrating into eastern Morocco, they rapidly asserted their dominance over a swath of territory stretching from the Mediterranean southward to the oasis of Tafilalt. With the collapse of Almohad power in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Banu Ma'qil challenged the authority of the dynasty's successors, the Banu Marin. Recurrent conflicts marked the following two centuries of Marinid rule, after which the bedouins added the region around Marrakesh, much of the Middle Atlas, and parts of the Atlantic plain to their domain.

Students of Maghrib history have long debated the impact of this influx of bedouin groups. Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century Tunisian scholar, compared the Banu Hilal to a swarm of locusts that destroyed everything in its path and showed particular contempt for sedentary, civilized society. But Ifriqiya was experiencing considerable turmoil even before these nomadic incursions. Shifting patterns of trade had already set in motion the province's economic decline, which was marked by the increasing marginalization of Qairawan. This situation increased the region's vulnerability to the bedouins, and they used it to their advantage, but they were neither the sole, nor even the primary, cause of Ifriqiya's ills. Even so, the bedouins never gained control of Qairawan, nor of any other important urban center, for any extended period. Indeed, because Qairawan's collapse required smaller provincial cities to explore new economic horizons, many of them enjoyed an era of prosperity following these events.

While not so catastrophic as their critics charged, the bedouin did have a pronounced impact throughout the Maghrib. Their presence raised the incidence of nomadism, inevitably menacing agricultural life. This was especially true in the interior, where agrarian activity was more fragile than along the coast. In the areas where their numbers were greatest, some previously sedentary Berbers turned to nomadism themselves. More importantly in the long run, the Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, and Banu Ma'qil swelled the Maghrib's small Arab population, although the Berbers continued to constitute the majority of the region's population. The bedouins' presence rendered the Arab customs and traditions that had overlain the Maghrib, especially its eastern and central portions, since the seventh century much more apparent. No general process of Arabization yet developed, but more Berbers were more intensively exposed to more Arabs than ever before. Finally, the bedouins' mastery of large areas of the deserts and the steppes combined with the already precarious conditions of the trans-Saharan trade to alter the

commercial focus of the Maghrib from the interior of Africa to the Mediterranean. The transfer of the Zirid capital to Mahdiyya after the sack of Qairawan, the Hammadid shift to Bajaia, and the Almohad decision to site their eastern Maghrib headquarters at Tunis all suggested this reorientation.

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See also: **Ibn Khaldun: Civilization of the Maghrib.**

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Armies, Colonial: Africans in

European success in the African colonial wars was due largely to the ability of Europeans to recruit large armies of African troops. The availability of these African soldiers, it should be pointed out, was largely the result of the extraordinary flux that beset internal African politics in the nineteenth century, as empires expanded and retracted and smaller states rose and fell. The "peripheral flux" that stemmed from the decline of African states (and sometimes also their growth, as in the case of Samori's empire in Guinea) gave the European invaders the opportunity to insert themselves into local political disputes and, ultimately, to divide and conquer. But the benefit to the newcomers was even more direct than that. From out of the upheaval and civil war that afflicted African states, they were able to draw the manpower they needed to build their armies.

The European forces that took part in the conquest of Africa in the second half of the 1800s were very small because European imperial troops were needed elsewhere, colonial budgets were restrained, and the scale of warfare in Africa was considered modest. Additionally, fears of susceptibility to tropical diseases and a hostile climate also kept European armies in Africa small. Perhaps most importantly, European imperialists thought that colonies should bear a significant part of the burden for defense. Thus, although their numbers and the nature of their employment varied from one colonial army to another, large numbers of African soldiers were employed by each of the European powers. In their wars of conquest in Africa, David Killingray exaggerates only slightly when he asserts that:

European empires in Africa were gained principally by African mercenary armies, occasionally supported by white or other colonial troops. In what Kipling described as “savage wars of peace” the bulk of the fighting was done by black soldiers whose disciplined firepower and organization invariably defeated numerically superior African armies.

Of the European powers involved in Africa, the French probably used the largest number of African troops, even though the African percentage of overall French troop strength in West Africa was lower than in the admittedly smaller *Schutztruppe* in German East Africa or *Force Publique* in the Congo Free State. From 1857, when the first battalion of Senegalese light infantry (*Tirailleurs Sénégalais*) was raised, up to World War I, the part played by African soldiers in the French forces in West Africa grew steadily. In 1910 there were 12,500 African soldiers in West Africa and the Congo-Chad region. British forces in tropical Africa also relied heavily on African troops. The 11,500 soldiers serving under the Union Jack in West Africa, East and central Africa, and northern Nigeria in 1902 included no more than 300 white officers and NCOs.

The Great War of 1914–1918 in Africa required an extensive infusion of military resources and manpower. Africa’s greatest service to the war effort was as a source of military labor. Large areas were exploited, with the heaviest burden being borne by East and central Africa, and Egypt. The French conscripted more than 180,000 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, and many served on the western front. The performance of these troops is much debated, but their use was hotly contested everywhere. Europeans did not want African soldiers directly involved in “white man’s wars.” The Germans feared the “black barbarians” and reports of brutality by African soldiers. They argued it was one thing to recruit *askaris* as soldiers and carriers in East Africa, but quite a different matter to use these troops in

Europe where they might be exposed to new political perceptions and expectations. For the same reasons, the South Africans refused to arm African soldiers during the conflict and kept them confined in separate compounds in France. European powers also worried that veterans would act as catalysts for resistance against white rule. World War I had a disastrous impact on Africa. The war pundits, related of tragedies the dispersed people, increased taxation, and reduced food surpluses. To these human disasters can be added the impact of the influenza pandemic of 1918–1919. Influenza carried into Africa by the routes of war reached most regions of the continent, hitting with great severity those areas already weakened from the effects of war.

World War II found African soldiers across the globe. After helping to defeat the Italians in Ethiopia in 1940, the King’s African Rifles were sent to Burma to fight the Japanese. All together, some 166,000 African troops served Britain outside Africa during World War II. Around 141,000 black soldiers served in the French forces during the war; some defending the *metropole* in 1940. They spent the rest of the war in German prisons. World War II had a great effect on imperialism and thus on Africa. Africans had fought on behalf of the Allies, they had been educated by travel and by the army, they had enjoyed a higher standard of living than before, and they returned home to conditions that did not satisfy them. They had seen white men killed in battle, they had gained confidence from becoming proficient at the white man’s weapons, and they had heard of the humiliation of Europeans in the Far East. Above all, the great British Empire, which had seemed so powerful only fifty years before, was quaking everywhere with protest. By 1959, European decolonization was underway.

Postcolonial Africa inherited European military institutions that stressed elitism and ethnic divisions. This tended to put the armed forces at odds with civilian governments and contributed to the endless cascade of military coups in Africa since independence. Contemporary African armies are struggling to restore the symbiosis between armies and the people that existed before the imperial conquest.

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See also: Soldiers, African: Overseas.

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Arms, Armies: Postcolonial Africa

At independence, the states of Africa inherited the military structures established by the European colonialists. During both world wars, Africa had been a fertile recruiting ground for the Western powers. However, the permanent forces established in each colony were generally small in number and devoted primarily to internal control rather than defense against external aggression. This legacy is reflected in the composition and size of many of Africa's postcolonial armies. Generally speaking, they are small in number, averaging around 42,000 across the continent as a whole. Twenty-four Sub-Saharan African countries have militaries with a strength of less than 20,000. The majority of African armies are lightly equipped with regards to armor and artillery. Most contemporary African states are incapable of sustaining large-scale military operations without disastrous consequences for their economies and societies. There are exceptions to this general rule. Egypt, for example, is possessed of a large and sophisticated military machine as a consequence of its involvement in the politics of the Middle East. Other North African militaries are more numerous than their Sub-Saharan counterparts, but of debatable quality. Large forces and concentrations of equipment can also, by definition, be found in those states engaged in persistent internal or external conflicts, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Angola.

Despite being essentially configured for internal security tasks, African armies have been involved in a surprisingly large number of operations in neighboring states. Countries such as Morocco, Zaïre (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana are among the many states that have been involved in these interventions. Some of these operations have been for peacekeeping purposes under the auspices of organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For example, both Nigeria and Senegal contributed to the OAU's Inter-African Force in Chad in 1982, and Nigeria was the largest contributor to ECOMOG in Liberia. Other interventions have been motivated by self-interest, such as Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979, which led to the overthrow of Idi Amin. A further category of interventions includes those that have been

initiated in support of friendly regimes. Morocco's support of Mobutu in Zaïre in 1977 and 1978 falls into this group.

The armies of the minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa were constantly involved in raids on their neighbors. Their general level of success against guerrilla forces and other African armies helped them acquire a reputation for ruthless efficiency. For the South Africans, the shine was taken off this reputation to a degree when they suffered reverses at the hands of the Cubans in Angola in 1975. The long, drawn-out nature of these conflicts led to the development of a high level of skill within the ranks of both the government forces and their guerrilla opponents. This "professional" image survived the transition to majority rule. However, the Zimbabwean military has recently suffered a number of embarrassing setbacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The South African National Defense Force's (SANDF) attempt at intervention in Lesotho in September 1998 became something of a fiasco. Together with the problems associated with restructuring this force in the post-apartheid era, this has led to questions being raised about the SANDF's professionalism and capabilities.

The military ethos, ceremonies, and uniforms of many African armies, and especially the attitudes of the officer corps, often reflect their colonial past. Many still receive their training from the former imperial power. Prior to 1989 several of the more radical African militaries received training and assistance from the USSR and its allies. African states have also sought training for their armies from other sources such as the United States, Israel, China, and North Korea.

The professionalism of Africa's militaries has been best by decades of political interference, ethnically based recruitment and promotion, corruption, and military coups. Many African armies reflect the fractured nature of the societies from which they are recruited. They can often give the appearance of being nothing more than a collection of armed groups whose loyalty is restricted to individual military or political leaders. The proliferation of "presidential guards" and special forces units, with their first call on resources, undermines the overall efficiency of the military. Often mired in the politics of the state, the officer corps is more often than not more interested in the acquisition of personal wealth rather than military skills. This decline has rendered many African armies incapable of their primary task of defending the state against either external or internal threats.

It is during periods of actual fighting that African armies tend to reinforce the negative image of them widely held outside the continent. Looting, cruelty to civilians, and the use of child soldiers have now

become almost synonymous with African conflicts. The contest for the control of mineral resources, particularly diamonds, is at the heart of these contemporary wars, for example, in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The potential for acquiring wealth under these circumstances can serve to undermine military discipline and control. In several recent civil wars, particularly Sierra Leone, it has become almost impossible to distinguish between soldiers and rebels, leading to the emergence of so called “sobels.” In Liberia, the looting by the peacekeepers became so notorious that local people said that the acronym ECOMOG actually stood for “*Every Car Or Movable Object Gone*.” The failure of their militaries has led a number of regimes including Angola and Sierra Leone to seek the assistance of private security companies such as Executive Outcomes and Military Professional Resources, Inc. Such help as is provided almost inevitably comes with economic and political strings attached. The use of such “private” forces reflects a decline in the reliance placed by African states in their own armed forces.

Many of Africa’s postcolonial military conflicts can be accurately described as “low tech” and often “low intensity.” The principal casualties are usually civilians, often as the indirect result of the fighting, through such associated causes as famine or disease. Increasingly civilians are being seen as a target for armed forces. In Angola UNITA has used terror to force the rural population into government-held urban areas, thus increasing the burden on them. In Sierra Leone mutilation has been used to terrorize the civilian population into submission to the rebels. Across the continent children are press-ganged and forced to become combatants. Pitched battles between military forces are rare and often inconclusive. In the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the intervention of the armies of a number of neighboring states, no military conclusion has been reached. Even when battle is joined with intensity, the tactical impasse remains unbroken. In the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, World War I tactics and casualties have met late twentieth-century weaponry. Both sides have employed sophisticated weapons systems such as MIG fighters, together with mercenary pilots to fly them, yet after months of intense fighting the front lines have barely moved.

Africa as a whole has little in the way of an indigenous arms industry. The most obvious exception to this is South Africa. Here an arms industry was developed in response to the imposition of sanctions against the apartheid regime. The weapons developed were more suited to the terrain and budgets of Africa than many imports and the post-apartheid

government has continued to seek export markets for this important industry.

During the Cold War the primary sources of arms for African states were the two superpower blocs. They, in their turn, were keen to support their clients and woo new allies. As a consequence Africa became an increasingly armed and militarized continent. This process was accelerated from the mid-1970s onward due to the revolutionary wars of liberation in southern Africa and the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As superpower rivalry increased, so the USSR in particular poured increasing amounts of weaponry into its client states. Eastern Bloc weapons were particularly attractive to African states. They were cheap, designed for ease of use and maintenance, robust, capable of surviving any amount of abuse from soldiers, and did not require great technical expertise from their users. The classic example of all these features is the ubiquitous AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and other Eastern European countries have continued to export weapons to Africa in an effort to bolster their economies. The flood of small arms in particular, into Africa via both official and unofficial routes, has made them both cheap and readily available. This has contributed not only to levels of violence and instability but also—in no small measure—to the intractability of many contemporary African conflicts.

The majority of Africa’s militaries are too weak and ill-equipped to effectively defend their countries from external attack. Fortunately, most African states face little in the way of serious external military threats. A side effect of the continent’s economic problems is that African states lack the capacity to wage aggressive war. However, these economic factors also have a negative impact on their capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. Despite these limitations Africa’s politicians continue to involve themselves in the affairs of their neighbors, often with disastrous results.

Significant disarmament, especially of irregular forces, regulation of the arms trade, the exclusion of the military from politics, and an end to military adventurism continue to be top priorities for the continent.

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See also: Armies, Colonial: Africans in; Soldiers, African: Overseas.

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Art and Architecture, History of African

In precolonial Africa, art was not created for its own sake but for social, political, or religious purposes. The human body, utilitarian objects, and architectural structures were adorned not only to enhance their visual appeal, but also to reflect taste and economic status. Sculptures and masks were used to mediate between the human and spirit worlds. As a result, the traditional African artist ignored imitative naturalism, emphasizing conceptual or symbolic representations in an attempt to capture the spiritual essence of a given subject. Once mistaken for a failed attempt to imitate nature accurately and hence called “primitive” by evolutionist-minded anthropologists and art historians, this conceptual approach ironically inspired the birth of modernist art at the beginning of the twentieth century, being canonized as the epitome of artistic creativity by Western artists such as Picasso and Matisse, among others, who had revolted against academic naturalism.

This new development had both positive and negative consequences for the study of African art. On



Baule mask, wood, 47 cm, Côte d'Ivoire. Such masks fulfill the Baule's ideal of beauty. The Baule are an Akan-speaking people that settled in the Ivory Coast 200 years ago, and took up the mask traditions of neighboring Senufo, Guro, and Yaure. © Markus Matzel/Das Fotoarchiv.

the one hand, it eliminated the evolutionist prejudice against conceptual representations, obliging the art historian to research the *raison d'être* for their creation, thus deepening our understanding of African aesthetics. On the other hand, it fostered a scholarly bias for Sub-Saharan African woodcarvings because of their seminal influence on art. The focus on the woodcarvings also marginalized significant artistic expressions in other materials within and from outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Further, it isolated the study of Sub-Saharan African art from those of northern, northeastern, and southern parts of the continent where different artistic traditions predominate, making it extremely difficult to pursue the type of interdisciplinary research that could have shed some light on the historical interactions as well as the extensive artistic exchanges among different groups during the precolonial period. It is gratifying to note, however, that some scholars are beginning to correct this anomaly by looking beyond the traditional boundaries previously set for African art and providing a broader geographical and historical coverage. Thanks to the new data from archeology, the prehistoric rock art, various eyewitness accounts by Arab and European visitors to the continent between the eleventh and nineteenth centuries, as well as the art works of African origin that had been preserved in European collections from the fifteenth century onward, it is now possible to attempt an overview of the artistic activities in the continent from the earliest times to the present, even if there are still several gaps in our knowledge.

The hundreds of thousands of rock paintings and engravings found all over the continent strongly indicate that art has played an important role in African cultures from time immemorial. At any rate, the oldest African rock paintings so far discovered come from the Apollo Cave 11 in Namibia, southwest Africa, and are dated to c.27,000BCE. Many of them are naturalistic drawings of animals such as antelopes, hipopotamuses, and rhinoceros rendered in charcoal on portable stones. Some paintings depict stylized human figures wearing what appear to be animal and bird masks either for ritual or hunting purposes. More complex representations, featuring animal and human figures in different styles, can be found everywhere in southern Africa, from Zimbabwe to the Cape, although their exact age cannot yet be ascertained. Most of them are thought to have been created by the ancestors of the present-day San, who still paint and engrave on rock walls in connection with rainmaking, healing, initiation, hunting, fertility, and shamanistic rituals. It may very well be that a good majority of the rock art found in the other parts of the continent had similar functions in the past.

Some of the most spectacular engravings and paintings have been discovered in the Sahara desert and North Africa. They are classified into five main periods. Those assigned to the Bubalus period (*c.* 10,000BCE), the earliest, are distinguished by their emphasis on the naturalistic rendering of hunting scenes and wild game such as the buffalo, elephant, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, giraffe, and other animals. Several engravings depict the ram with collars and a disk on the head, suggesting either domestication or the association of the animal with supernatural forces.

The paintings of the Round Head period (*c.* 9000BCE) occur mainly in the Tassili n'Ajjer. They are so called because the human figures in most of the paintings frequently have large and featureless heads. Some wear elaborate body adornment, feathered headdresses, masks, and tailed garments; but many are shown engaging in various activities, such as running, hunting, drumming, and dancing. The artists frequently combine the front and side views in the same figure.

The art of the Cattle/Pastoralist period (dated *c.* 6000 and 3000BCE) seems to reflect the dawn of the African Neolithic because of its emphasis on sedentary life: there are representations of what appear to be huts and special enclosures for domesticated animals, especially sheep, goats, and cattle. Human beings are often depicted playing, herding cattle, courting, or fighting. The combination of frontal and side views in the same figure continues and is most conspicuous in the animal representations, which show the body in profile, and the horns from the front.

The paintings and engravings of the Horse period (dated to *c.* 1200BCE) feature charioteers and horsemen rendered in the flying gallop style. The dating is partly based on the association of this style with the "People of the Sea" from the Aegean Islands who reportedly attacked ancient Egypt in the second millennium BCE.

The art of the Camel period is characterized by an emphasis on the animal, which is thought to have been introduced to Africa about 700BCE, although some scholars argue for a much later date. At any rate, the various archaeological excavations in the Sahara and North Africa, coupled with the representation of water-loving animals, such as buffalo, hippopotamus, rhinoceros, elephant, giraffe, sheep, goat, and cattle in the rock art, strongly indicate that the area once enjoyed a wetter climate and sustained a large number of people who hunted and eventually domesticated some of the animals depicted. A gradual decrease in the rainfall would seem to have caused the former inhabitants of the Sahara to flee to more hospitable regions along the Mediterranean coastline and the Nile valley, as well as to Sub-Saharan Africa, among other places.

That some of the founders of ancient Egypt were immigrants from the Sahara is suggested by the stylistic

and thematic similarities between the prehistoric rock art of Sahara and ancient Egypt. For example, the frontal-cum-profile style that characterizes much of Saharan rock art would continue in ancient Egyptian art, along with the tradition of showing figures wearing tailed garments.

Through a combination of social, economic, political, and environmental factors, ancient Egypt soon developed into one of the most advanced civilizations in Africa. A belief in the supernatural and a quest for immortality shaped ancient Egyptian art and architecture. Huge and lavishly adorned temples, containing assorted sculptures and murals, were dedicated to the gods to secure their benevolence. As the living representatives of the gods on earth, the kings (pharaohs) wielded enormous spiritual and political powers, which were reflected in the gigantic monuments that they commissioned during their reigns to preserve their memory for posterity. Moreover, the bodies of deceased pharaohs were mummified and concealed beneath pyramids, massive tombs, and mortuary temples that were furnished with pottery, household and ceremonial utensils, elaborate works of art in wood, stone, ivory, brass, marble, glass, and metal, as well as biographical murals, all intended to ensure that the *ka* or life force of a departed king lived on and continued to enjoy the same amenities in the afterlife. Retinue burial was practiced in the early periods before being replaced with miniatures of servants, courtiers, and soldiers whose spirits were expected to wait on the departed king.

Nubia, another early African kingdom, developed in the Nile valley about the same time as ancient Egypt. Situated between present-day Darfur and Khartoum, it had a predominantly black population. The early arts of Nubia consist of decorated ceramics, clay figurines of humans and animals, jewelry, and beaded objects. Some Nubian kings were buried under huge circular mounds that were furnished, as in ancient Egypt, with artifacts for the use of the deceased in the afterlife. Although Nubian art and architecture had come under Egyptian influence as early as the third millennium BCE when the two nations traded with one another, this influence intensified between 1550 and 1100BCE, when the pharaohs subjugated Nubia and forced it to pay annual tributes. The Nubians, however, took advantage of the war between Libya and Egypt about 1100BCE not only to assert their political independence, but also to invade and impose Nubian rule on Egypt in the eighth century BCE. But following its defeat and expulsion from Egypt by the Assyrians (*c.* 673BCE), the Nubian dynasty retreated to its homeland, establishing a new capital at Napata and later, further to the south, at Meroe, where Egyptian cultural and artistic influences continued.

The introduction and spread of Christianity in North Africa, Egypt, Nubia/Meroe, and Aksum/Ethiopia between the first and sixth centuries brought new art and architectural forms. Basilicas were built at Numidia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Djemila, Leptis Magna, and other cities. Paintings, murals, mosaics, and sculptures with biblical themes adorned many of the basilicas. According to the Greek shipping handbook, the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, published in the first century, Adulis, Aksum's capital city and main seaport, was the most important market for ivory in northeast Africa. It was also noted for the sale of high-quality crafts, weapons, incense, and herbal preparations. A booming economy spawned the construction of prestigious buildings, temples, tombs, and public monuments. In the fourth century, the Aksum king, Ezana, converted to Christianity and made it a state religion. But by the eighth century, Adulis had declined as a commercial center, necessitating the establishment of a new capital in what is now Ethiopia.

The ascension of the Zagwe dynasty in the twelfth century ushered in an era of economic development that peaked in the thirteenth century, when King Lalibela commissioned massive rock-cut churches, some adorned with murals in the Byzantine tradition and yet reflecting an Ethiopian identity.

In the meantime, a new religion called Islam had risen in the Arabian Peninsula about 632, sweeping through Egypt and North Africa and replacing the Christian basilicas with mosques and other forms of Islamic architecture, emphasizing the dome and minaret. The ancient traditions of sculpture in the region were soon replaced (though not completely) by the Islamic emphasis on the decorative arts.

Although it failed to penetrate the whole of Ethiopia and southern Nubia, Islam did succeed in spreading along the East African coastline, which had been participating in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean trade for several centuries, exporting slaves, ebony, ivory, rhino horns, gold, and leopard skins from the African interior to the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia, and importing glazed porcelains, carnelian and glass beads, scents, weapons, fabrics, and food plants. As a result, big cities sprang up along the coast, from Mogadishu (Somalia) to Sofala (Mozambique) before the Islamic era. Between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, larger cities developed along the coastline and the neighboring islands, distinguished by their huge stone mansions, palaces, and mosques, which, though influenced by Arab models, still had significant African contributions in terms of craftsmanship and form.

This brings us to cultural developments in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is ample evidence that the inhabitants of the region interacted with their North African counterparts as far back as prehistoric times.

For example, pottery and ground stone implements, excavated from Iwo Eleru in southeastern Nigeria and dated to about the sixth millennium BCE, have strong affinities with materials from the "wet" Sahara period. Moreover, the rock paintings of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, northern Nigeria, and Chad, as well as the human and animal clay figurines found in a second millennium BCE context at Karkarichinka in the Tilemsi valley of northern Mali, are now widely regarded as evidence of the southern spread of ancient Saharan populations.

The oldest terracotta sculptures in Sub-Saharan Africa are those associated with the Nok culture of northern Nigeria, dated between about the sixth century BCE and CE200. They consist of human and animal representations, characterized by highly simplified and stylized features with an emphasis on spherical and cylindrical forms. The head almost always dominates the human body, recalling the figures in the paintings of the Round Head period of Saharan rock art. However, the Nok facial features are clearly delineated, while the eyes, nostrils are usually pierced. Also reminiscent of the Saharan rock art is the stylistic dichotomy in the rendering of the animal and human figures, the one being much more realistic than the other. The original context and cultural significance of the Nok terracottas are unknown, though the placement of clay and terracotta on ancestral altars and graves in many parts of the continent may imply that some of the former might have had a similar function. Other ancient terracotta sculptures in Sub-Saharan Africa have turned up at Ancient Djenne, Mali (tenth–sixteenth century), Komaland, Ghana (CEthirteenth–sixteenth century), Sao, Chad (CEtenth–sixteenth century), Yelwa, Nigeria (CEseventh century), Ife, Nigeria (CEtwelfth–fifteenth century), ancient Benin, Nigeria (CEthirteenth–nineteenth century) and Lydenburg, South Africa (CE500–700), among others.

Sculptures and ritual/ceremonial objects cast in gold, copper, brass, or bronze (by the lost wax technique) constitute another important category of African art. The earliest ones, so far, are from ancient Egypt and date from about the second millennium BCE. Those found in Nubia, Aksum, Meroe, Ethiopia, and many parts of North Africa belong to a later date. Although Arab visitors to the ancient kingdoms of Ghana and Mali between the ninth and fourteenth centuries observed the use of jewelry and ceremonial objects cast in gold, silver, and brass, the earliest bronze objects produced by the lost wax technique are from Igbo-Ukwu in southeastern Nigeria. Castings recalling the Igbo-Ukwu style have been found in several parts of eastern Nigeria, the lower Niger, and the Cameroon, suggesting that such objects were traded (as prestige items) across cultures in precolonial times.

Raw materials for casting were obtained either through local mining or from long-distance trade.

By the beginning of the twelfth millennium, the artists of the Yoruba kingdom of Ife had acquired knowledge of the lost wax technique, using it to cast highly naturalistic portraits of kings, queens, chiefs, and other notables. The technique was introduced to ancient Benin from Ife sometimes in the fourteenth century, where it was employed to cast assorted sculptures and commemorative plaques. Ancient castings in brass/bronze, copper, and gold have been found in other parts of Africa as well, especially among the Bamana and Dogon of Mali, Baule of Côte d'Ivoire, Asante of Ghana, the Fon of the Republic of Benin, the Bamum and Bamileke of the Cameroon, and the Kongo of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaïre).

Although Sub-Saharan African artists carved in various materials such as stone, ivory, and bone, wood was undoubtedly the most popular medium of artistic expression in precolonial times because much of the continent lies in the tropics, and is dense with trees. Moreover, wood is easy to carve and hence affordable. The dryness of northern and northeastern Africa has enabled woodcarvings dating back to the second millennium BCE to survive in the Nile valley. The oldest specimen so far is a carved animal head found in 1928 on the bank of the Liavela river in central Angola and dated by radiocarbon analysis to the CEighth century.

As noted earlier, much African woodcarving functioned in a religious context in the form of statues, masks, altar furniture, and ritual implements used in the veneration of deities and spirit forces. Others, such as carved posts and royal staffs, neckrests, containers, beds, thrones, and stools, functioned at the secular level either to project taste, reinforce high status/political power, or promote social and gender harmony. Thus, the artists of a given culture were trained in the past to work within a group style handed down from the past and aimed at creating a sense of oneness within the culture and at differentiating its art forms from those of neighbors. Yet certain more than fortuitous similarities are evident in the woodcarvings of west, central, equatorial, eastern, and southern Africa—especially in the conceptual approach and the emphasis on the head—similarities that underscore closer ethnic interactions in precolonial times.

In West Africa, the rise and fall of kingdoms (i.e., ancient Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Mossi, Asante, Oyo, Dahomey, and Benin) between the fourth and nineteenth centuries, the trans-Atlantic slave trade (CEfifteenth–nineteenth century), and the Fulani jihad of the nineteenth century, set into motion a series of population movements that not only relocated artistic styles, but also encouraged cultural and aesthetic

exchanges among contiguous and far-flung groups. These factors would seem to be responsible for a certain formal and stylistic relationship between, say, the terracotta of ancient Djenné (CEtenth–sixteenth century), on the one hand, and the woodcarvings of the Tellem/Dogon, Bamana, Senufo, Mossi, Bwa, Nuna, Winiamana, and Nunuma, on the other. A similar phenomenon occurred in central, equatorial, eastern, and southern Africa as a result of the various waves of Bantu migrations into the region from the Nigerian/Cameroon border in the early centuries of the Christian era. Little wonder, the heart-shaped face mask has a wide geographical distribution, stretching from southeastern Nigeria to equatorial and southern Africa. Recent archaeological excavations by Ekpo Eyo in Calabar have yielded pottery dated to the first century CE, displaying diamond and circular motifs commonly found in Kongo and Kuba art and suggesting some kind of genetic relationship, the exact nature of which is yet to be analyzed. Also contributing to the homogenization of forms and symbols in this region in precolonial times were interethnic marriages, trade in art works, and the military expansion associated with the Kongo, Luba, Lunda, Marawi, and Mutapa kingdoms.

Although stone sculptures were produced in many parts of Sub-Saharan African in precolonial times, they are few and far between. They range in style from the naturalistic and the semi-naturalistic (such as Ife, Esie, Igbajo, and Esure figures of southwestern Nigeria, (dating between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries) and the *mintadi* grave figures of the Kongo (dating to about the fifteenth or sixteenth century), to stylized representations (such as the *pondo* and *nomoli* ancestral figures of Sierra Leone dating about the fifteenth or sixteenth century). Others are anthropomorphized monoliths such as the ones from Zimbabwe (thirteenth–fifteenth centuries) and the *akwanshi* ancestral figures of the Ekoi-Ejagham (eighteenth century), who inhabit the Cross River region of the Nigerian-Cameroon border. The monoliths from Tondidarou in Mali (seventh century) are phallic in shape, while some of those from Zimbabwe are in the form of pillars and are adorned with reptiles and surmounted by bird motifs.

The use of stone and other durable materials for architecture in north and northeastern Africa and the Swahili coast has enabled many ancient structures in these areas to survive for centuries. On the other hand, the preponderant use of perishable materials for construction in many Sub-Saharan African cultures reduced the life span of most of the buildings, except in a few cases. In precolonial times, mud or clay were the most common materials for the wall, although they were sometimes mixed with palm oil, shea butter, or cow dung and other materials which served as bonding agents. The roof was normally covered with leaves or grasses.

This building practice continues to the present, co-existing with the use of modern construction materials and techniques. In the coastal or swampy areas (usually inhabited by fishermen), the predominant building type is the rectangular, gable-roofed structure with bamboo or wooden walls, constructed on stilts to prevent flooding. Moving away from the coast, one begins to encounter the rectangular, wattle-and-daub house. The wall is often made of interwoven branches or mangrove poles plastered with the brittle mud found in this area. But in the rainforest and tropical woodlands area, where the laterite soil has less water (and hence more plastic), the wattle is dispensed with. Frequently, four rectangular structures are grouped to form a courtyard which has a hole in the middle to drain out rain water. The houses of the Kuba and related groups who live along the Kasai and Sankuru rivers often have their walls adorned with woven mats. Among the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, a verandah usually runs along the courtyard supported by figured posts.

In eastern central Africa, south of the Zambezi River, an area of open grassland and rock formations, the ruins of many ancient constructions with mortarless dry stone walling have survived at Bambandyanalo, Khami Leopard Kopje, Mapela, Mapungubwe, and Naletale, among others, dating between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries. The most advanced of the constructions is at Great Zimbabwe. Built by the Shona between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, it consists of three groups of structures: an enclosure with high stone walls that seems to have once doubled as a palace and temple, a collection of walls and enclosures, and what appears to be a rampant. Shona oral history and archaeological excavations reveal that the site and its surroundings were occupied by farmers and cattle herders who benefited from the long distance trade in gold and ivory between the Swahili coast and the African interior.

In the dry savannah region of West Africa, called the Sahel (the Arabic word for "shore" because this region adjoins the Sahara desert), round and rectangular houses often coexist; the flat, mud-plastered roof is common in this area. In the urban areas, rectangular forms outnumber the round ones. The principal building material here is *adobe*, that is, sun-dried blocks of clay mixed with dung or straw. Among the Hausa and Fulani, the walls of the houses are adorned with interlace designs in high relief, echoing the embroidery patterns found on dress, leatherwork, and carved doors, and reflecting Islamic influence from North Africa and the Near East. This influence can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when Arab and Berber merchants began to settle in the western Sudan and other parts of the Sahel, bringing with them different aspects of Islamic art and architecture.

Contemporary Developments

Today, the skyline of many African cities is dominated by Western-type architecture, such as high-rise buildings of concrete, steel, and glass. The beginnings of this phenomenon can be traced back to the fifteenth century, when European slave traders built temporary residences, castles, and forts along the African coast, from Cape Blanco in Mauritania to Mombasa in Kenya. The arrival of Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 began the gradual Westernization of the South African landscape that has transformed cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg into the "concrete jungles" that they are today. The European colonization of the continent toward the end of the nineteenth century has since spread this Westernization process to virtually every nook and corner, resulting in a large-scale use of cement, burnt bricks, steel, glass, corrugated iron roof, and asbestos in contemporary building construction.

In precolonial Africa, the layout of a house or compound was determined by the social structure and the size of the family, its construction being a communal activity involving all members of a given family, assisted by friends, relatives, and some craftsmen. As a result, all buildings within a given culture tended to look alike, although economic status determined size and the degree of embellishment. European colonialism has changed all that by introducing the idea of an architect whose design must be approved by the government before a building could be erected, especially in the urban areas. Such a design usually reflects the individuality of the architect or his/her Western training. Urbanization has also disrupted village life, causing many to flee to the cities in search of modern education and better-paying jobs. The limited space of a rented city apartment discourages the African extended family residency pattern normally found in the traditional compounds. Admittedly, the nationalism generated by decolonization has led some African architects to seek inspiration from indigenous African architecture, yet the emphasis continues to be on international trends dictated by Western materials and spatial concepts.

A similar situation exists in the visual arts. Western education, coupled with large-scale conversion to Islam and Christianity since the turn of the twentieth century, has encouraged many urbanized Africans to abandon their traditional values, especially the ancient belief that art has the power to influence the spirit world. The Western-type art schools, a byproduct of colonialism, have introduced the concept of "art-for-art's-sake" and an imitative naturalism that stresses the cultivation of a personal idiom of expression, unlike in the precolonial period when the artists of a given culture were expected to conform to a

group style inherited from the past, but which still allowed for individual and regional variations. Having lost many of their local patrons, many traditional artists now work for the tourist industry, mass-reproducing ancient forms and sometimes copying the styles of other ethnic groups (from African art books) in order to meet the high demand of the trade. In short, contemporary African art not only reflects the metamorphic changes precipitated by colonialism, urbanization, industrialization, and new socioeconomic forces, but also a frantic struggle to cope with them. Although its formative period was marked by a tendency to ape Western forms and styles—which turned off many art historians and collectors—the nationalism precipitated by political independence is galvanizing the search for an African identity. Conscious of their rich artistic heritage and its contributions to modern art, many formally and informally trained contemporary African artists are now digging back to their roots in an attempt to reconcile the present with the past so as to create new forms that will capture the spirit of the postcolonial era. Some seek inspiration from indigenous African sculptures, while others, especially those from Islamicized cultures, experiment with the nonfigurative, combining Arabic calligraphy with abstract forms. The growing international interest in the study and collection of contemporary African art is a testimony to its inventiveness and potential.

In summary, a survey of African art and architecture from the earliest times to the present reveals not only extensive interactions between northern and Sub-Saharan Africa dating back to prehistoric times, but also varying responses to external influences. The similarities are as significant as the differences. Hence the urgent need to integrate the art history of the entire continent in order to facilitate a more objective study of continuities and change in form, style, context, and meaning.

BABATUNDE LAWAL

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Art, Postcolonial

In many African countries that attained independence around 1960, art was seen to play an important role in celebrating the new nation, expressing a new postcolonial identity, unifying fragmented ethnic entities, and asserting traditional African culture and values (Vogel 1994). This general sentiment was most systematically and saliently propagated in Senegal, where Leopold Senghor—poet, art collector, statesman, and the newly independent nation’s first president—formulated the philosophy of *Négritude*. Deeply influencing artists in Senegal and beyond, *Négritude* became a discourse aimed at the rehabilitation of Africa and the search for a uniquely African identity. With the foundation of the École des Beaux Arts, Dakar soon became the African continent’s first and most important center of postcolonial art production. Artists associated with the early days of the school include Ibou Diouf or Boubacar Coulibaly, who produced colorful oil paintings merging references to traditional African art (e.g., masks) with dynamic abstract shapes. Although art was soon considerably deprioritized, Dakar still holds an important position as a regional focal point, among other things hosting the Dakar Biennale.

Two opposing ideologies emerged in response to the challenge of finding a modern African form of expression: Some artists rejected foreign (colonial) styles, materials, and subjects in their search for an artistic language that was innately African. Others asserted their artistic freedom to make whatever art they chose, including works resembling European art (Vogel 1994). The latter approach is to be understood in the context of a tradition of marginalization due to the West’s rejection of “derivative” work.

Négritude and the search for an innate “Africanness” strongly influenced the African art scene of the 1960s in the West African region and beyond. In Nigeria, for instance, artists from the Zaria Art Society (Uche Okeke, Demas Nwoko, and Bruce Onobrakpeya) developed the theory of “Natural Synthesis,” which called for the merging of indigenous art traditions, forms and ideas with useful Western ones (Okeke 1999). Okeke’s organic, lyrical drawings of the early 1960s, for instance, were influenced by *uli*, the local tradition of wall painting.

Mounting skepticism toward essentialist projects throughout the contemporary art world eventually lead to a shift away from the search for innate African identity toward a more universalist perspective and aesthetic, influenced by current theoretical discourses (especially on identity and postcolonialism) and the visual language of the international art world. A small elite of

so-called *avant-garde* or “international” artists are now active participants in this arena, and some have moved to the West. On the whole, however, contemporary African art continues to be marginalized within a global art system.

Postcolonial African art is characterized by important regional differences, while simultaneously sharing significant similarities that tend to distinguish it from art produced in the West. Throughout postcolonial Africa, art has been shaped, to some degree, in relation to the respective country’s history of colonialism. In some instances, entire genres have developed around the complex issue of dealing with this historical legacy, most notably the *Colonie Belge* theme that has become popular in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Other aspects of the colonial legacy include the shortage of higher education and artistic training opportunities, which have resulted in a large number of informally trained or autodidact artists with a limited aesthetic and conceptual range (e.g., Kivuthi Mbuno from Kenya, or sculptor Agbagli Kossi from Togo). Shortage or unavailability of (imported) art materials has produced a tradition of economizing materials, work on a small scale, and use of recycled materials (e.g., scrap metal sculptures by Calixte and Théodore Dakpogan from Benin, or Ndary Lô in Senegal). Art museums and galleries are virtually absent anywhere on the continent outside South Africa, and knowledge of contemporary Western art is at most available through photographs. Like traditional African art, contemporary art in postcolonial Africa is to a considerable degree functional, as it is expected to play a political, social, and moral role (Vogel 1994).

Despite these and other hurdles, the visual arts are flourishing throughout the African continent, and the repertoire of forms available to young artists in Africa is larger than ever before. The Cairo Biennale is Dakar’s counterpoint for the north of Africa, but also the wider Mediterranean world. Historically, art in North Africa is influenced by Islamic traditions of visual representation, some incorporating calligraphy and showing a preference for abstraction. Artists such as Ibrahim El Salahi (Sudan), or Skunder Boghossian (Ethiopia), were regarded as pioneers, whose development of a new visual language have defined the modern art movement in their countries (Hassan 1995). The current generation of artists, exemplified by the colorful work of Rashid Diab or Hassan Ali Ahmed from Sudan, has developed a more universal aesthetic that merges Western, African, and Islamic influences and expresses cultural identity in a global context.

In the south, Johannesburg serves as an important hub of the contemporary postcolonial art world, and the city hosted two biennials in 1995 and 1997. In South Africa, postcolonialism can, in many respects,

be equated with the post-apartheid era (since 1994). Historically, the country’s art world with its various institutions and support structures has been highly developed, but until recently, this has mostly benefited white artists. Despite the fact that the legacy of the past still impacts on the current art scene, a number of young black artists (notably Sandile Zulu, Moshekwa Langa, and Kay Hassan) have ascended to the global stage of the international contemporary art world. For both black and white artists, the current emphasis is on issues of (often redefined) identity in a country in transformation.

African art is often classified into different genres or categories, but in reality the boundaries are often fluid and much dependent on context. International, “elite,” or *avant garde* artists, such as Issa Samb (Senegal), David Koloane (South Africa), Antonio Ole (Angola), Abdoulaye Konate (Mali), Sane Wadu (Kenya), or Sokari Douglas Camp (Nigeria), one of the few female international artists, tend to have absorbed Western concepts of creative freedom and art as a means of self-actualization and expression of identity. Their work is either influenced by current theoretical discourses and aesthetic trends in the global art world, or—perhaps more often—perceived (by the West) to be allied to such trends and therefore worthy of attention and inclusion. Yet, unlike many of their Western counterparts, these artists rarely produce work of an intensely private, intimate, or autobiographical character. Like traditional African art, much of contemporary work appears to have a more public function, expressing collective concerns.

The Congolese artist Cheri Samba has in a sense become an international artist, but emerges from the genre of urban painters, of which the Congo region has a particularly strong tradition (as well as some parts of West and East Africa). Urban painters such as Cheik Ledy, Moke, or Tshibumba Kanda from the DRC produce realistically painted work in series for street sale to tourists and members of their own urban community. Although this type of art is market driven and commercial, it often serves an important societal function, containing moral or educational lessons, social or political commentary.

The genre of urban painting overlaps to some extent with various forms of tourist and popular art, which have received considerable scholarly and public attention lately. Examples include Nigerian truck paintings, vernacular sign painting in Ghana, religious murals in Senegal, hotel art in Ethiopia, or the famous coffins by the late Ghanaian sculptor and carpenter Kane Kwei and his son. Art in postcolonial Africa also includes a strong and continuing tradition of craft-making and production of traditional artifacts (masks, wood sculptures, pottery, beadwork, etc.) both for use by the community for ceremonial occasions and traditional practices and

for sale to tourists. Especially the tourist wares have often been creatively developed in accordance with market forces to include more cosmopolitan imagery and incorporate new materials.

Much of African art either developed through the initiative of white artists, art teachers, or culture brokers, such as Uli and Georgina Beier in Nigeria, or in response to white patronage. Among the latter are the “primitive” paintings and prints produced by largely untrained members of San and Bushmen communities in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa (e.g., Qwaqwa or Steffaans Hamukwaya), which have attracted much attention in the West. Certain sculptural traditions, notably the so-called Shona sculptures in Zimbabwe by artists such as Nicholas Mukomberanwa or Bernard Matemera, were initiated by white culture brokers for sale to mostly white patrons, but soon developed into a vibrantly creative and self-sustaining tradition. These sometimes monumental works—thematically inspired by traditional African stories and beliefs and formally derived from German Expressionism and early twentieth-century abstraction—tend to straddle the line between tourist art and “fine art.”

The current interest in and scholarly research about art and artists in postcolonial Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon, which has emerged with the field of African art studies, informed by cultural studies and postcolonialism as major theoretical trajectories, and driven mostly by scholars and curators situated in the West. A truly African art historiography has yet to be written.

SABINE MARSCHALL

See also: **Négritude.**

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
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Asante Kingdom: Osei Tutu and Founding of

Osei Tutu, ruler of Asante from 1701 to 1717, stands out as one of the most important figures in Asante history. He finalized the long task of nation building initiated by Twum and Antwi, the first two Asante rulers. With the support of his friend and lieutenant, Okomfo Anokye, Osei Tutu gave the Asante a capital, a constitution, a military machine that assured a long period of political stability, and a unifying element, the Golden Stool. The Asante great oath, *memeneda kromante*, which recalls the death of Osei Tutu, attests to his greatness and role in the development of the Asante nation.

Early Asante tradition records the sojourn of Osei Tutu in Denkyira, and later in Akwapim, where he met and became friends with Okomfo Anokye, a native of Awukugua, who was to become his most trusted counselor and lieutenant. Osei Tutu’s sojourn in Denkyira and Akwamu not only introduced him to the politics of the two principal powers of the time, but more importantly, it emphasized for him the importance of the Atlantic trade at the coast for firearms.

On his return home to Asante after the death of his uncle, Obiri Yeboa, Osei Tutu, with the help and support of Okomfo Anokye, contributed to the growth of Asante in five main ways: he completed the union of Akan states that were within a twenty-five mile radius of Kumasi, provided the Asante union with a new capital, Kumasi,



Asante, seventeenth–eighteenth centuries.



Akan figure made of gold. © Daniel Koelsche/Das Fotoarchiv.

and a national festival, the Odwira, provided the new union with a constitution, introduced a new military organization, and expanded the boundaries of the kingdom.

The elements of a union already existed before Osei Tutu became ruler of Asante. All the chiefs of the original *Amantoo* (nucleus of Asante empire), except the chief of Mampon, belonged to the Oyoko clan and thus the notion of brotherhood consistent with the Akan family system was maximized. Osei Tutu utilized this bond, and playing on the common fears and aspirations, he convinced the chiefs of the Amantoo states to recognize the Golden Stool as the soul, strength, and vitality of the Asante nation. The Golden Stool has, to this day, remained a symbol of Asante nationhood.

The Golden Stool, supposedly conjured from the sky by Okomfo Anokye, was believed to contain the spirit of the Asante nation. By astute statesmanship, and by playing upon the religious beliefs of the Asante, Osei Tutu and Okomfo Anokye invested a sense of collective destiny in the national consciousness. The various clans were thus linked in a mystical and religious bond whose physical manifestation was personified by the Golden Stool, which was displayed during festivals.

Moreover, the songs and recitals connected with the traditional history of Asante were couched in terms calculated to foster and perpetuate the notion of a community of origins and a common collective destiny. The most potent of these instruments, however, were the Asante army, the Golden Stool, the Odwira Festival, and the Asante Constitution.

After forging the union, Osei Tutu and Okomfo Anokye were determined that the Asante state should last, especially since Osei Tutu was familiar with the dissension that plagued Akwamu and Denkyira. To this end, a number of state-building instruments (some inherited, some created) were put to use to ensure this unity. Osei Tutu moved the capital from Kwaman to Kumasi. This was achieved through diplomacy and religious rituals designed to indicate the consent of the ancestral spirits.

Osei Tutu is also credited with devising a constitution for the Asante nation. This defined the hierarchy of authority in the Asante administrative system. At the head of the structure was the Asantehene, the political and spiritual head of Kumasi. Under the Asantehene were the chiefs of the Amantoo states. These chiefs attended the annual odwira festival, swore the oath of allegiance to the Asantehene, contributed regiments in times of war or emergency and gave up the right of declaring war. They also recognized the Asantehene's court as the court of appeal, and contributed to *apeatuo*, a national levy imposed for specific tasks. On the other hand, the Amanhene had the right to lands conquered before the union was forged, and had a say in the formulation of foreign policy.

Osei Tutu crystallized the spirit of aristocratic ranks by using different insignia and emblems in accordance with the levels of clan-family positions and dignities of the different chiefs. Therefore, Dwaben, Kumawu, Bekwae, and Mampon were ranked on almost the same level as the Asantehene himself.

The successful employment of the Asante in rapid territorial expansion suggests the existence of a highly developed system of military organization. The Asante national army was composed of a body of scouts (*nkwanrafo*), an advance guard (*twrafo*), a main body (*adonten*), a personal bodyguard (*gyase*), a rear-guard (*kyidom*), and left (*benkum*) and right (*nifa*) wings, respectively. The effective coordination of these segments contributed to Asante successes in war. Each member state of the Union (Amantoo) was assigned a place in the military formation. The Mamponghehe was the commander-in-chief, the Essumengyahene was commander of the left wing, and the Krontihene, the commander of the right wing.

Osei Tutu used this effective military organization to deadly effect. He avenged the Asante defeat by the Dormaa, fought and defeated Denkyira between 1699 and 1701, and conquered Akyem and Offinso. He incorporated conquered states such as Amakom, Tafo, and Ofinso into the union. Asante forces commanded by Amankwa Tia crossed the Pra and campaigned in the Begho area. The Akyem had not been fully subdued, and Osei Tutu died in 1717 fighting against the Akyem.

By the end of his reign, Osei Tutu had completed the task of building an effective administrative system and expanding the empire, a process initiated by his predecessor.

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See also: Akan and Asante: Farmers, Traders, and the Emergence of Akan States; Akan States.

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Asians: East Africa

The origins of Asians in East Africa lie in the subjugation of India by the British and its incorporation into the British Empire. The subjugation of India initiated the Indian Diaspora, which led to the dispersal of Indians into the far-flung parts of the British empire where they were taken over as indentured labor. In East Africa Indians bought by the British worked as indentured labor on the construction of the East African railway in the late nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century many Gujarati (from Gujarat, a western Indian state) traders found their way into East Africa and joined Indian traders who were already resident in Zanzibar. Throughout the period of the Indian Diaspora, Indians in East Africa, as elsewhere, maintained close links with their homeland.

Although Indians became more populous in East Africa following the colonization of the region by the British, contact between East Africa and India goes back as far as the fifteenth century. For example, it is strongly suggested that in 1468, Vasco da Gama met a Cutchi-speaking Muslim ship captain who showed him the way to India. When the British colonized East Africa, they found the Cutchi speakers already present in East Africa. They were mainly traders, and they represented nearly twenty different groups, who were either Muslim or Hindu. A small group became Christian in the mid-twentieth century.

Another Indian community found in East Africa is that generally known as the Sikhs. These were a militant order, and the British used them in the colonial armies of East Africa to police the colonies. The Sikhs went to East Africa, Kenya in particular, as soldiers, and later as guards in the building of the East African railway. Other Sikhs went as professionals and skilled workers. The history of Sikhs in East Africa is that of a community that from the very beginning were among the most affluent people, since they easily became entrepreneurs in their new country.

Also common in East Africa are Asians commonly called Shia Muslims. These came to East Africa from India's Gujarati state. They came largely as part of the indentured labor community to build the East African railway in the 1890s and early twentieth century. Many

stayed in Kenya after the completion of the railway. They became part of the backbone of the modern Indian business and trading community in Kenya and Uganda and Tanzania.

There are three clearly distinct Shia Muslim communities in East Africa: the Khoja Ismaili, Dawood Bohra, and Ithanashari. These groups resulted from schism within the Muslim sect over the years. Despite these differences, the Shia Muslims command a large share of the economic wealth of Kenya and the other East African countries of Tanzania and Uganda.

Apart from the Shia Muslims who came as indentured labor, there were also the Punjabi-speaking Asians, who included Muslims, Orthodox Hindus, Arya Samaj Hindus, Ahmadiyyas, and Sikhs. While it is generally true that Indians lived under conditions of appalling poverty in many places where they were taken as indentured labor, many easily transformed themselves within a few generations into a prosperous community. By sheer perseverance, labor, and thrift, these Indians transformed their social and economic conditions to affluence and prosperity. This transformation attracted resentment from the indigenous communities of East Africa.

In Kenya and Uganda the resentment against Indian traders was displayed through the policy of Africanization in trade and services. The policy was deliberately aimed at Indians who held British passports. By the late 1970s, economic stagnation and poverty among indigenous communities was blamed on Asian economic exploitation of the indigenous communities. Consequently, in 1972, Idi Amin of Uganda decided to expel all Asians from his country irrespective of their nationality. The expulsions of Asians from Uganda signified clear racial hatred of the Asian community by a state president. The expulsion of Asians from Uganda further weakened Asian confidence in East Africa as their new permanent home. The world condemned Idi Amin's action, but could not reverse the expulsions, which clearly showed the vulnerability of the Asian racial minority in a hostile environment.

Asians in East Africa are a resilient community, and within a few years they were able to overcome the difficulties caused by the expulsion. While some permanently left Uganda, others returned after the overthrow of Idi Amin and started all over again. It is also important to point out that Asians in East Africa are not just involved in business. They are also actively involved in politics, and in Kenya a number have held important political and ministerial positions. This development legitimizes their new nationality in their adopted countries of East Africa. Asians in East Africa are, for all practical purposes, as patriotic to their adopted countries as are the indigenous communities. However, as a racial minority, they are constantly discriminated

against, and blamed for most economic problems experienced by the indigenous communities.

However, it is important to point out that after the independence of Kenya in 1963, and that of other East African countries, the Asians who chose to take up citizenship in the various countries were joined by more Asians. The Asians in business prefer to employ immigrants from India. This process contributed to the fast growth of the Indian population of East Africa. Some Asian immigrants to East Africa found that life was not at all easy in East Africa. Their hope of a better life in East Africa was shattered because they could not get the kinds of jobs they hoped to find in East Africa. East African countries receive more unskilled Asians from India than they can employ. The presence of these unskilled Asians generates racial conflict between communities.

Another source of conflict is the experience of Africans working for Asian employers as housemaids and those who work in Asian-owned businesses. Many complain of underpayment and poor conditions of service. On the other hand, Asians see Africans as being responsible for the many crimes committed against Asian businesspeople. The Kenya press, for example, observed that the 1990s have seen mounting tension between Africans and Asians. The source of the rising tension is high levels of unemployment among the Africans who, in turn, blame Asians for their plight.

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See also: Kenya: Independence to the Present; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979.

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Ateker: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Eastern Nilotes: Ateker (Karimojong).

Augustine, Catholic Church: North Africa

As church leader and theologian, St. Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus, 354–430) was the outstanding representative of the vigorous regional Christianity of the

North African provinces in the Roman Empire—chiefly modern Tunisia and Algeria, but reaching also eastward into Libya and westward through Morocco. Here Latin-speaking Christianity emerged, exercising a formative influence on the church in the western empire even before Rome rose to ecclesiastical hegemony. Through his extensive writings, Augustine became one of the most influential Christians of all time.

The origins of Christianity in Roman Africa (which, in antiquity, did not include Egypt) are obscure. From the later second century, the works of Tertullian (c.60–c.225), effectively the creator of Christian Latin, reflect a vibrant church in and beyond Carthage (near modern Tunis), the Roman capital. Tertullian made important contributions to developing Christian doctrine, especially regarding the Trinity and the person of Christ (Christology), and helped stamp a distinctive ethos on the growing church. It was ethically and religiously rigorist—glorifying martyrdom and brooking no compromise with paganism—spiritually enthusiastic, and rhetorically confident.

Issues of church unity and discipline dominated the troubled career of Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (246–258), who died as a martyr. He bequeathed to Latin Christianity a tightly episcopal definition of the church expressed in potent utterances such as “no salvation outside the church.” His refusal to recognize baptism given outside the boundaries of episcopal communion brought him into collision with Stephen, bishop of Rome. In Cyprian more clearly than any before him one recognizes the ecclesiastical counterpart to the Roman imperial official, an early harbinger of the medieval prelate.

Persecution, and varied responses to it, featured prominently in early North African Christianity. The *Passion of Perpetua and Felicity* (203) is an exquisitely feminine firsthand account of martyrdom in Carthage. The Great Persecution initiated by emperor Diocletian in 303 exposed deep-seated divisions over accommodation to Roman officialdom that led to schism and the formation of the Donatist counter-church. Its roots in earlier North African Christian tradition favored its rapid growth, and for most of the fourth century it held the edge over the Catholic Church.

This was so in Thagaste (modern Souk-Ahras in Algeria), where Augustine was born in 354 to Patrick and his zealously Christian wife, Monnica. Augustine’s *Confessions*, a classic of Western Christian literature, a kind of spiritual autobiography written c.400 after he had become bishop of Hippo, credit Monnica’s tenacity in his eventual baptism into the Catholic Church at Milan at Easter 387. His parents had him dedicated as an infant, but numerous twists and turns would mark his intellectual, moral, and religious pilgrimage, including a decade-long association with Manichaeism,

a late, Persian form of gnosticism, until, outside Africa, the combined impact of Neoplatonism, the ascetic movement, and Bishop Ambrose brought him full circle, as it were, back to the religion of his childhood, in a famous conversion in a Milanese garden in August 386.

Returning to Africa in 388 after his mother's death, Augustine was able briefly to pursue a quasi-monastic calling as a Christian philosopher in Thagaste. But the clamant needs of the Catholic Church claimed him for the presbyterate (391), and then the episcopate (395) at Hippo Regius (modern Annaba, on the Algerian coast). There he remained, never leaving Africa again (he avoided sea travel), until his death in 430, with Hippo besieged by the Vandals, who would shortly oust Rome from power in North Africa. Most of Augustine's massive theological corpus was produced while he served as chief pastor and preacher of Hippo's Catholic community. He was inevitably a prominent figure in the town, in great demand as counselor, champion of the disadvantaged, troubleshooter, ombudsman, and trustee. In the wider region, with Bishop Aurelius of Carthage he spearheaded a final period of ascendancy for the Catholic Church before the Vandal takeover.

Augustine spoke only Latin (he never read Greek with ease). The whole story of Christianity in the North African littoral seems almost an aspect of the Roman presence. Yet Augustine provided Punic-speaking pastors within his diocese, and hasty judgments about the alleged failure of Christianity to indigenize itself in North Africa (relevant to an assessment of Donatism) must be resisted. Augustine's life and work not only summed up the era of the church fathers in the Latin West, but also witnessed the empire's accelerating terminal decline. The Gothic sack of Rome in 410 set Augustine writing his greatest work, *City of God* (413–422). The North African church always retained a degree of independence from papal pretensions.

Augustine's importance for African Christianity was manifold, although his greater influence lay beyond Africa. He promoted monasticism, running his episcopal residence as an ascetic seminary, producing numbers of clergy for other churches. He routed Manichaean spokesmen in debate, and against Manichaean teaching vindicated the Old Testament (in the process defending the just war), Christianized a Neoplatonic account of the nature of evil, and set out the relations between faith and reason. In an explicit change of mind, he provided the first extended Christian justification of state coercion of religious dissidents: the Donatists. This was in part a pragmatic move, for Donatism had remained largely impervious to Augustine's historical, biblical, and theological refutation of their case. Admitting Cyprian's error, he

argued for the recognition of Donatist baptism and ordination—but as valid only, not spiritually efficacious. The unity of a mixed church was preferable to a deluded quest for earthly purity. After the decision of a conference under an imperial commissioner went against the Donatists (411), Augustine was much involved in their compulsory absorption into the Catholic Church.

Augustine's anti-Pelagian theology dominated subsequent Western thought, but Pelagian teaching was never a force in Africa. In defense of infant baptism (for the remission of the guilt of original sin), and in rejection of false claims to moral competence and false aspirations to sinlessness, Augustine expounded humanity's dependence on grace (given only to the elect), and the inclusive embrace of the church. He orchestrated the African church's condemnation of Pelagian errors, which prevailed over a vacillating papacy.

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See also: Donatist Church: North Africa; Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640.

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Awolowo, Obafemi (1909–1987)

Nationalist Leader

Obafemi Awolowo was a mission-educated Yoruba politician and nationalist leader who, during Nigeria's decolonization years, articulated and to a large extent successfully initiated movements that challenged British colonial monopolies of wealth and power. Although Awolowo's political education began early, through his exposure to nationalist politics and culture in southern Nigeria and India, his occupational activities as a money lender, public letter writer, and transport and produce merchant all exposed him to the vagaries of living in a colonial society. One of his first involvements as an activist was to help organize the Nigerian Produce Traders Association. He eventually became secretary of the Nigerian Motor Transport Union, and in 1937 basically single-handedly engineered a successful strike against an unjust and inequitable colonial law that had undermined the union's welfare.

Awolowo used his experiences as a trader and later a newspaper reporter to gain experience in colonial economic practices and to assist with the birth of a new liberal media. He was named secretary of the Ibadan branch of the country's foremost political party, the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), in June 1940 and led the agitation that reformed the Ibadan Native Authority Advisory Board in 1942. In 1944, as secretary of the Ibadan branch of the Nigerian Produce Traders Association, Awolowo successfully organized a mass protest involving more than 10,000 farmers against the government's ban on the exportation of palm kernel.

One of the earliest African politicians to critique the workings of the colonial administration in relation to indigenous political structures and economic responsibilities, Awolowo was also a pioneer in the postwar intellectual debates in favor of a new and appropriate constitution for a modern Nigeria. His trailblazing publication, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, published in 1951, outlined the relevance of a local intelligentsia opposed to colonial conservatism within a postwar colonial political and economic setting. When the controversy concerning the form of Nigeria's constitution began in 1960, he had already been a dedicated federalist for more than eighteen years. His federalist philosophy was highly influenced by his familiarity and fascination with East Indian politics and political figures. While in London studying to be a lawyer, he had helped establish the Yoruba cultural organization *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* with the support of a corps of the wealthy Yoruba

intelligentsia. These progressive groups exploited the rich combination of a western Nigerian cultural and economic setting to create a primarily Yoruba cultural and political interest association. The Awolowo-led group, combined with other Nigerian nationalist efforts, helped erode major exploitative colonial economic policies. At the same time, they found that appropriating certain aspects of those infrastructures was useful for shaping some of their own welfare and development programs. Their efforts undermined the waning colonial policies of "indirect rule" by obtaining the support of prominent traditional rulers of Yorubaland. Galvanized by educational, developmental, and welfare programs, the *Egbe* was able to cultivate a large following among the masses. On his return to Nigeria in 1947, Awolowo worked as a legal practitioner while also elevating his activities within the *Egbe*. In 1949, he started the *Nigerian Tribune*, a daily newspaper still in circulation, which served as the mouthpiece for his populist welfare programs. The paper became the main tool for defending Yoruban interests in the midst of emergent postwar interethnic nationalist rivalries. Backed by a combination of traditional Yoruba and Western communication media, Awolowo's emphasis on welfare policies and educational programs helped the Yoruba intelligentsia triumph over the conservative postwar initiatives of the British Colonial Office. In the country's transition to political independence, Awolowo's policies from his base in Nigeria's western region allowed a core number of his followers to impose their influence on the nation-building project.

In April 1951, Awolowo launched the Action Group (A.G.) political party, which displayed able and disciplined characteristics under his leadership. A year later, Awolowo was named the leader of government business and minister of local government and was elected into the then Western House of Assembly on the A.G. platform. At its peak, the A.G. arguably became the most efficiently run party in the history of modern democracy in Africa. The success of the party's economic and welfare initiatives saw a radical shift in the colonial-guided Africanization of the civil service and constitutional reforms in Nigeria. In 1954, with the introduction of the new constitution, Awolowo was named the first premier of the western region and minister of finance. During his term of office, he introduced a revolutionary program of free primary education. Under the postwar influence of British Fabian socialism and what Awolowo described as indigenous humanistic-guided responsibilities and duties, the A.G. launched major welfare programs centered around primary education, scholarship provisions for higher education, free healthcare, and the curbing of urban and rural unemployment. With a

combination of stringent and disciplined policies, Awolowo was able to deliver a high-standard model in public affairs management. He and his party members later realized that there were financial hurdles of mountainous heights to overcome, especially without the financial and political clout of power at the center. In 1959, he contested federal elections in a bid to form government at the center, but he lost. Awolowo relinquished his premiership of the western region and moved to Lagos as the leader of the opposition. His attempts to extend his political and economic influence and projects nationwide were frustrated by colonial machinations, class conflicts, and interethnic rivalries within Yorubaland and Nigeria. In 1962, he was falsely charged with treasonable felony and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He was pardoned and freed from prison on July 31, 1966. In 1967, Awolowo was appointed federal commissioner for finance and vice chairman of the Federal Executive Council. In 1971, after realizing the limits of his influence on government policies, he resigned and returned to private law practice. In September 1978, Awolowo founded the social welfarist-oriented Unity Party of Nigeria and contested elections as president of Nigeria, but lost in a controversy-ridden election. He contested another equally troubled presidential election in 1983, though again he was defeated. This time, Awolowo retired from active political duties for good. He died on May 9, 1987, at age 78.

The popularity of the nationalist programs initiated by Awolowo's Action Group political party threatened colonial hegemonic designs in the decolonization era. They alienated the Yoruba intelligentsia from colonial authorities and conservative elites on one level and the less economically or materially endowed political associations on the other. The impact of Awolowo's legacy on Nigerian political and intellectual history is visible in the political terrain of southern Nigeria, a postwar political emphasis on welfare policies of free education as a tool for social, democratic, and economic development and national integration. In addition to the many intellectual and political protégés of Awolowo, who went on to adopt his policies and become successful politicians, are the progressive political associations and individuals who have invoked his name and philosophies to oppose feudalist unitary and military autocracy in Nigerian politics. In a contemporary era characterized by competing nationalist ideals, conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources draw attention to the federation's ability to instill power in the different nationalities so they may shape their own policies free from a powerful center, as well as carry out debates on the extent to which foreign capital should be allowed into the country. Such initiatives reveal the durability of Chief Obafemi Awolowo's

vision for the political future of Nigeria and Africa at large. Some of his major publications include: *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (1947); *Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution* (1966); *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic of Nigeria* (1970); *Adventures in Power, Book One: My March Through Prison* (1985); *Adventures in Power, Book Two: The Travails of Democracy and the Rule of Law* (1987).

SAHEED A. ADEJUMOBI

See also: Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence.

Biography

Born on March 6, 1909. Educated at Anglican and Methodist schools in his hometown, Ikenne, and at Baptists Boys' High School in Abeokuta, Western Nigeria. Enrolled in 1927 at Wesley College, Ibadan, to obtain training in shorthand and typing. In 1928, dropped out of college to take up a job as a schoolteacher in Abeokuta and Lagos. Returned to Wesley College in 1932 to assume a position as school clerk. In 1944, moved to Great Britain. Obtained a bachelor of commerce degree from the University of London. Studied law at the University of London and qualified as a barrister at law two years later. Called to the bar by the Honorable Society of the Inner Temple on November 18, 1946. Died May 9, 1987, at age 78.

Ayyubid Dynasty: See Egypt: Ayyubid Dynasty.

Azande: See Central African Republic: Nineteenth Century: Gbaya, Banda, and Zande.

Azania: See Swahili: Azania to 1498.

Azikiwe, Nnamdi (1904–1996)

Nigerian Nationalist and Politician

Nnamdi Azikiwe achieved academic distinction before turning to journalism. Moving from Nigeria to the Gold Coast (Ghana), he was editor of the *African Morning Post* for three years. A collection of his articles written for the *Post* was later published as *Renascent Africa*. His aim around this time, he wrote, was to shock Africa out of its stagnation and state of "arrested mental development" under British colonialism. Acquitted on a technicality from a charge of

publishing a seditious article, he left for Nigeria in 1937 and set up Zik's Press, Ltd. In November of that year he published the first edition of the *West African Pilot*. Describing itself as "a sentinel of liberty and a guardian of civilization," the *Pilot* employed a sensational and pugnacious style, vaunting the achievements of Africans and criticizing the colonial government. Azikiwe also joined the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), the foremost nationalist body in the country, which won all three Lagos seats in the 1938 Legislative Council elections. Yet "Zik," as he was now widely known, soon found the NYM leaders, most of whom were older than himself, to be too moderate.

Zik established a good relationship before the outbreak of war in 1939 with Governor Sir Bernard Bourdillon, who helped him acquire government-controlled land for his printing presses and appointed him to several official committees. Yet a war against Nazi imperialism, which saw high inflation, inspired Zik to be far more critical of the British regime. The years 1944–1948 saw intense conflict in Nigeria, and Azikiwe was at its very heart. Bourdillon was replaced by the more astringent Sir Arthur Richards, and the new governor was determined to combat the growing nationalist movement around Azikiwe. Something of a personal vendetta developed between the two men.

In 1944 Azikiwe and the veteran nationalist Herbert Macaulay founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). Azikiwe was calling for self-government within fifteen years, while the new Richards Constitution, which was about to be inaugurated, though conceding an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council, was designed to conserve British control. In June 1945 Zik supported a "general strike" involving 30,000 workers, and in July the government banned two of his papers. A week later Zik alleged that he had discovered a government plot to assassinate him. These charges were not taken seriously in the Colonial Office. Zik, however, may well have taken the plot seriously. What is beyond doubt is that he used his journalistic skills to publicize his cause. A tall, handsome, and charismatic figure, and a superb orator, he had long been popular among the Igbo: now Zik became a hero to many.

Richards decided that Zik was "an irresponsible lunatic" and prosecuted the newspaper, the *Daily Comet*, of which Zik was managing director, for libel; but although its editor was imprisoned, Zik was untouched. The governor, however, took comfort that when he retired in 1947 his constitution was working reasonably well. Even Azikiwe, who won one of the Lagos seats, did not boycott the Legislative Council for long. Yet Richards's satisfaction was short-lived, for in August 1948 the British an-

nounced that the constitution was to be replaced (and within a few years the appointment of Nigerian ministers signaled internal self-government for Nigeria and the beginnings of speedy decolonization). Some historians have argued that Zik compelled the British to quicken the tempo of reform. Certainly the formation of the radical "Zikists" (originally a bodyguard of young men pledged to protect their hero during the assassination scare) was disquieting for the British, though they could make little of the philosophy of "Zikism," which lacked rigor. But the decision to scrap the Richards Constitution was made without any compulsion. The Accra riots of February 1948 produced a commission which called for extensive constitutional change in the Gold Coast, and it was judged in the Colonial Office that Nigeria had to keep in step.

Almost immediately Azikiwe began to be overshadowed. His very success in establishing himself as Nigeria's foremost nationalist, and in attracting huge personal publicity, produced a backlash from non-Igbos. Zik always insisted that he spoke for the whole of Nigeria, but early on the emirs of northern Nigeria repudiated him, and in 1941 he fell foul of the NYM. After the war the wider political scope offered by constitutional reform led rivals to the NCNC to appear, including the Action Group in the west and the Northern People's Congress. The dominance of the Nigerian federation by the latter was consequent upon the size of the northern region, and Zik had to be content with the position of premier of Eastern Nigeria from 1957 to 1959. An investigation by the Foster-Sutton Commission into his decision to invest £2 million of public money into the African Continental Bank, which led to his being mildly rebuked, had delayed regional self-government for a year. On independence in 1960 he was president of the Nigerian senate, and shortly thereafter governor-general, but these were largely honorific positions. Real power lay in the regions and with the federal prime minister.

After independence Zik helped to found the University of Nigeria at Nsukka, and after the coup of 1966 he was an adviser to the military government of the eastern region. He was a respected elder statesman until his death in 1996.

ROBERT PEARCE

See also: **Journalism, African: Colonial Era; Macaulay, Herbert; Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence.**

Biography

Born in November 16, 1904, in Zungeru, in northern Nigeria. Educated at the schools in Calabar and Lagos

before becoming a clerk in the treasury department in 1921. Stowed away on a ship bound for the United States in 1925. Studied political science, obtained a doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania for a dissertation later published as *Liberia in World Politics*. Lectured at Lincoln University before returning to West Africa in 1934. Rejected for the post of tutor at King's College in Lagos, he turned to journalism. Premier of Eastern Nigeria from 1957 to 1959. Named president of the Nigerian senate in 1960. Died May 11, 1996.

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B

Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur

Bagirmi (1522–1897)

Located southeast of Lake Chad, Bagirmi has a history marked by constant warfare to acquire slaves from its southern neighbors, while struggling to maintain its independence or to ameliorate its status as a tributary of Kanem-Bornu and Wadai to the north. According to tradition, Bagirmi emerged from the welter of village polities in north-central Africa about 1522. During the sixteenth century the sun kings, or *mbangs*, forged a recognizable state. Islam became the court religion, but the rural people continued to worship their traditional gods. The mbang consolidated the heartland of the state, reduced vulnerable neighbors to tributaries, and became an important provider of slaves for trans-Saharan trade. During the reign of Burkumanda I (1635–1665), Bagirmi established its influence as far north as Lake Chad. Slaves procured in the south were the fundamental commodity of the economy, whether as chattel for trans-Saharan trade, agricultural laborers on local estates, retainers for the mbang and *maladonoge*, or eunuchs for the Ottoman Empire.

The military and commercial hegemony of Bagirmi did not go unchallenged. Between 1650 and 1675, Bornu claimed sovereignty over Bagirmi, but it did not inhibit the mbang from sending raiding parties into Bornu. More successful was the claim of suzerainty by the *kolak* (sultan) Sabun of Wadai who, taking advantage of the decline of Bagirmi's power at the end of the eighteenth century, launched a brutal offensive in 1805, captured Massenya, the capital, slaughtered the mbang and his relatives, and decimated and enslaved the populace. Sabun's invasion was the beginning of a century of decline and disintegration, during which the armies of Wadai plundered with impunity. This period ended only in the 1890s with the invasion of the kingdom by the forces of the Sudanese freebooter, Rabih Zubayr.

In desperation the last mbang, Gaugrang II, sought to ally himself with the advancing French, but when he signed a treaty of protection with Commandant Emil Gentil in 1897, he in fact consigned the Kingdom of Bagirmi to its place as a footnote of history.

Darfur (1650–1916)

The sultanate was established by the Fur, a non-Arab people who inhabit the western Nile River Basin surrounding the mountain massif of Jabal Marra. Their origins are obscure, but as cultivators they long interacted with the Fazara nomads, the non-Arab Toubou, and Arabs from Upper Egypt. The original state founded by the Tunjur may have appeared as early as the fifteenth century, but the first historically recorded Fur sultan was Sulayman Solongdunu (c.1650–1680) who founded the Keira dynasty.

Although the royal house claimed an Arab heritage, it was probably more the result of intermarriage with Arabs from the Nile Valley whose holy men and merchants brought Islam to the court. Fur ritual and traditional beliefs, however, prevailed in the countryside. The successors of Sulayman are more obscure, but they seemed to have been preoccupied with unsuccessful attempts to extend their authority westward into Wadai and their unpopular enlistment of slave troops as an imperial guard from the equatorial south.

Frustrated in the west, the seventh sultan, Muhammad Tayrab (r.1752–1786), turned east to conquer Kordofan from the Funj sultanate of Sennar, opening the Fur to Islamic legal and administrative practices and Muslim merchants. As early as 1633 the Darb al-Arba'in (the Forty Days Road) was an established trans-Saharan route from Kobbei to Asyut in Egypt. The reign of Abd al-Rahman was the apogee of the Keira sultanate, symbolized by his founding the permanent capital at El Fasher in 1792.

In the nineteenth century, Darfur began a tempestuous passage through a period characterized by problems. In 1821 the forces of Muhammad 'Ali conquered the Funj Kingdom of Sennar and the Kordofan province of the sultanate of Darfur. Thereafter, the Keira sultanate in El Fasher continued an uneasy coexistence with the riverine Arabs on the Nile and the Turco-Egyptian government at Khartoum whose traders established their control over the traditional slaving regions of Darfur to the south in the Bahr al-Ghazal. In 1874 the head of the largest corporate slaving empire, Zubayr Pasha Rahma Mansur, invaded Darfur with his well-armed slave army, defeated and killed the Sultan Ibrahim Qarad at the Battle of al-Manawashi, and occupied El Fasher as a province of the Turco-Egyptian empire in the Sudan. In 1881 Muhammad Ahmad Al-Mahdi proclaimed his jihad against the Turco-Egyptian government. By 1885 his *ansar* had captured Darfur and destroyed Khartoum, ending their rule in the Sudan. Led by pretenders to the sultanate, the Fur resisted Mahdist rule in Darfur, the last of whom was Ali Dinar Zakariya. When the Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the forces of the Khalifa at the Battle of Karari in 1898 to end the Mahdists state, he restored his authority over the sultanate. For the next eighteen years Ali Dinar ruled at El Fasher, his independence tolerated by the British in Khartoum while the French advanced from the west, conquering Wadai in 1909. At the outbreak of World War I Ali Dinar allied himself with the Ottoman Empire, which precipitated the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of the sultanate. Ali Dinar was killed, and with him ended the kingdom of Darfur.

***Wadai (c.Sixteenth Century–1909;
Also Waday, Ouadai, Oueddai)***

The kingdom of Wadai was founded by the Tunjur as they moved westward from Darfur. They were eventually driven farther west into Kanem by the Maba under their historic leader Ibrahim Abd al-Karim (c.1611–1655). He built his capital at Wara, introduced Islam, and founded the Kolak dynasty, which ruled Wadai until 1915.

After his death the history of Wadai was characterized by desultory civil wars, hostile relations with Darfur and Bornu, and the development of a hierarchical aristocracy. Islam was the state religion, but its dissemination among the cultivators and herders was casual, the subjects of the kolak observing their traditional religious practices. The resources of the state came from the trade in slaves and the ability of its slave-raiding expeditions to supply the trans-Saharan caravans. The expanding economy was accompanied by more able

sultans in the nineteenth century. 'Abd al-Karim Sabun (r.1805–1815) promoted Islam, controlled commerce, and equipped his army with chain mail and firearms to raid and plunder Baguirmi and Bornu. After his death, Wadai was plunged into internecine strife that enabled the Sultan of Darfur to intervene in 1838 and install the younger brother of Sabun, Muhammad al-Sharif (r.1838–1858), in return for loyalty and tribute. Muhammad al-Sharif did not remain a puppet. He formed a close alliance with Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Sanusi, whom he had met in Mecca, embraced the Sanusi order, and profited from their control of the new eastern trade route through the Sanusi strongholds of Jalu and Kufra. He founded a new capital at Abeche (Abeshr), from which he tightly controlled the Sanusi merchants and their commerce. His successors, protected and prospered by their connections with the Sanusiyya, imported firearms that enabled them to expand their influence in Bornu and continue their intervention in Baguirmi.

In 1846 the sultan defeated the army of the *shehu* of Bornu, sacked the capital Kukawa, and enforced the tributary status of Bagirmi. Relations with Darfur degenerated into inconclusive *razzia* (raid and counter-raid). Muhammad al-Sharif was succeeded by his two sons, 'Ali ibn Muhammad Sharif (r.1858–1874) and Yusuf ibn Muhammad Sharif (r.1874–1898), both of whom enjoyed long, stable, and prosperous reigns that enabled them to increase trade and expand the state. The death of Yusuf in 1898 ironically coincided with the return of 'Ali Dinar to El Fasher to rejuvenate the sultanate of Darfur and to intervene in the succession struggles in Wadai. His candidate, Ahmad al-Ghazali, was enthroned only to be assassinated and replaced by the Sanusi candidate, Muhammad Salih, the son of Yusuf, known as Dud Murra, "the lion of Murra." Dud Murra repaid the Sanusiyya by allowing free trade for Sanusi merchants. In 1906 the French initiated an aggressive policy against the Wadai complete with a puppet sultan, Adam Asil, a grandson of Sultan Muhammad al-Sharif. On June 2, 1909, Abeche fell to a French military column. Dud Murra fled to the Sanusiyya, Asil was proclaimed sultan, and the French prepared to conquer and confirm French sovereignty over the tributary vassals of Wadai.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

See also: **Central Africa, Northern: Slave Raiding.**

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Balewa, Alhaji Sir Abubakar (1912–1966)

Prime Minister of Nigeria

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was born in the village of Tafawa Balewa in the modern Bauchi area of north-eastern Nigeria. He trained as a teacher, and was a respected member of the elite of the northern region of Nigeria after the end of World War II. He was a founding member of the conservative Northern Peoples' Congress, and acted as its vice president. Although he taught for many years, Balewa's importance in the political history of modern Nigeria was in the area of politics during the struggle for independence and immediately after, when he was Nigeria's first indigenous prime minister (1960–1966). Before independence, Balewa was appointed central minister of works, transportation, and prime minister in the era of the transfer of power (1952–1960).

To understand Balewa's importance in the politics of Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s, it is necessary to appreciate the fact that he was a liberal politician within the conservative politics of the northern region in the wake of nationalism. Compared to his contemporaries—such as the late premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and Alhaji Aliyu Makaman Bida, who were extremely northern-oriented in their political outlook and temperament—Balewa was capable of appreciating issues of national importance within the context of a Nigerian nation. It can be said with some authority that Balewa stood between the left-wing Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) of Mallam Aminu Kano on the one hand and the extreme reactionary conservatives (of which the Sardauna was a leading spokesman) on the other.

Thus, not surprisingly, when the British colonial government had to make a decision as to who should lead the government of Nigeria as independence approached in the late 1950s, Balewa was the natural choice. He did not differ too significantly in his positions from the other emergent conservative northern elites on issues of core value to the northern region—primarily the preeminence of the north in national politics, and the north's control of the federal government. Balewa's Anglophilism was never in doubt. His accommodation of some issues that his colleagues

from the conservative north considered as irritants, such as minority rights (including fundamental and human rights), endeared him to the decolonizing British as an ally in the impending transfer of power. Britain was able to offer unified support of Balewa for the position of prime minister because his was considered a good rallying point for divergent opinions within the emergent Nigerian nation, as he was respected by other political parties. Thus, in spite of the controversy that accompanied the 1959 federal elections heralding Nigeria's independence, Balewa was invited to form a new federal government.

In the first six years of independence, Balewa led Nigeria's federal government until a combination of factors culminated in a bloody military coup that not only terminated Balewa's government but his very life. It was during his period of rule that the midwest region was carved out of the old western region, a development seen by some as an attempt to undermine the electoral position of the Action Group, the ruling party in the west. These six years were also characterized by political crises exemplified by riots in central Nigeria by the Tiv, who were agitating against domination by the ruling Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, as well as against intolerance on the part of the ruling elites in Nigeria's various political regions. His government constantly faced allegations of corruption and high-handedness, but Balewa himself was considered to be above the fray, a gentleman with a pan-Nigerian outlook. A major reason for the mutiny undertaken by the army in January 1966 was the widespread allegation of election rigging that followed the chaotic western regional elections of October 1965. Balewa's decision to send the army to restore law and order was hardly accomplished when a section of the armed forces staged a coup d'état on January 15, 1966, during which Balewa was killed.

In foreign affairs, Balewa placed considerable weight on British colonial views of international affairs. In January 1966, however, Balewa convened and hosted an extraordinary session of the commonwealth heads of state to discuss the crisis arising from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the minority regime headed by Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Balewa's respect for British ideals was not in doubt. Correspondingly, he was respected by the British official classes throughout his ascendancy in the government of colonial and independent Nigeria. In 1952, Balewa was named Officer of the British Empire, and in 1955 he was named Commander of the British Empire. At independence in 1960, the Queen of England conferred the title of Knight Commander of the British Empire on Balewa, who was also appointed a privy councillor in 1961.

KUNLE LAWAL

See also: **Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence; Nigeria: Federalism, Corruption, Popular Discontent: 1960–1966; Nigeria: Gowon Regime, 1966–1975; Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Smith Regime, 1966–1979.**

Biography

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was born in Tafawa Balewa village in the modern Bauchi area of northeastern Nigeria. Trained as a teacher. Served as Nigeria's first prime minister, 1960–1966. Died January 15, 1966, during a coup d'état.

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Bamako

Bamako (its name means “marshland of crocodiles” in the Bambara language) is the capital of independent Mali since 1960, and formerly the capital of colonial Soudan Français (French Sudan); today it has around 900,000 inhabitants.

By the time the French arrived in the nineteenth century, Bamako was already a multiethnic settlement that could trace its origins to some time between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the period of its formal foundation by Séribadian Niaré, a Sarakollé. In the nineteenth century it was still no more than a small town surrounded by a defensive *tata* (adobe wall), but it had a degree of commercial importance, being located at the junction of routes among Sotuba, Segou, and Kangaba. The explorer Mungo Park visited Bamako twice, in 1795 and in 1805, and René Caillé referred to it in 1830.

At the time of the wars launched during the 1880s by the French army under Gallieni against the Tukolor ruler Ahmadu Seku, this small town was chosen as the base for a military post on the Niger River. The struggle against Samori Touré further enhanced its strategic importance. A treaty imposed on the chief Titi Niaré in 1883 provided for the building of a French fortress, and it was around this that the city rapidly expanded; the fortress was built on the right bank of the Niger, and a “village of liberty” was established close by as an enclave for freed prisoners, who formed a reservoir of labor for the French.

Bamako was, therefore, a colonial refoundation rather than a new foundation in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the colonists' choice of Bamako, particularly after it became the capital of French Sudan in 1908, was crucial to the development of the city, which continued at the expense of its rival Kayes, but also induced decline in secondary centers such as Gao or Timbuktu. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Bamako experienced spectacular growth under the influence of two successive governors general, Trentinian and Clozel. Most of the government buildings were assembled on a single site on the hill of Koulouba during the first decade of the century, and the railway line from Dakar reached Koulokoré in 1904, while commercial buildings, the first residential quarters for Europeans, and the “native” districts were all established on the plain below. Educational and medical institutions gradually prevailed over military facilities, which were on the decline, since they were being relocated several miles away, at Kati. In fact, the fortress itself was destroyed in 1903. The main layout of the city center was designed under the terms of the development plan of 1923, with a network of major streets, a market, public buildings, a cathedral, and a zoo. The Niger still had to be crossed by ferry until 1929, when a submersible causeway to Sotuba was constructed. The European districts were given electricity and provided with street-cleaning services early in the 1930s.

Bamako “la coquette,” as the city was known between the two world wars, had 20,000 inhabitants in 1930 and close to 40,000 by 1945. The exodus from the countryside, which began during the crisis of the 1930s, had a major impact on the capital of French Sudan. Its growth became explosive after World War II, and the city continued to acquire enhanced infrastructure and to be modernized, thanks to investments by the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development). However, its uncontrollable growth undermined the changes that were carried out during the 1950s.

Meanwhile, the capital also seemed to be increasingly explosive in the political and social sense. The congress that established the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (African Democratic Rally) was held in Bamako in 1946 due to the influence of the nationalist leader of French Sudan, Fily Dabo Sissoko, and the city became a focus for African nationalism. The great strike by railway workers on the Dakar–Niger line in 1947 was to have a lasting impact on the city.

By the time Mali became independent, Bamako had a population of 100,000, and its relative lack of infrastructure was apparent despite the previous

concerted efforts to expand it. The central districts inhabited by Europeans were almost unique in being provided with electricity, street cleaning, and other modern amenities such as a water supply, hospitals, and schools. The construction of the Vincent Auriol Bridge, which was completed in 1958, contributed to the development of the right bank of the Niger from that year onward.

The rise to power of Modibo Keita as president of an independent Mali (1960–1968) transformed the situation. He achieved a rapprochement with the Communist bloc (though, in spite of everything, he also maintained the link with France), and Mali became committed to nonalignment; these political orientations had their effects on the country's capital city. During the 1960s Mali received infrastructure from the Soviet Union and funds from the United Arab Republic, mainland China, and North Korea. At the same time, the new regime launched a campaign against people arriving in the city from the countryside, introducing a system of internal passports and organizing the compulsory return of young peasants to the provinces.

The policy of cooperation with the former colonial power, which was confirmed by the coming to power of Moussa Traoré in 1968, continued, despite these changes, to provide the French residents of the city with an important role in its development. Bamako was given guidelines for development, and its transformation continued, but from the middle of the 1970s a decline in urban investment, coupled with exponential growth of the population, which reached 800,000 in 1986, further aggravated the problems faced by the majority of its poorer inhabitants, while existing facilities and services declined. Social tensions found expression in such events as the uprising by secondary school students in Bamako in 1979–1980 and the sporadic student protests of the early 1990s. *Finye (The Wind)*, a film directed by Souleymane Cissé, offers an outstanding view of the difficulties of life in the poorer districts of the Malian capital.

During the 1980s and 1990s, bilateral and multilateral aid became more diversified, with funds from the World Bank and the United States. Within the constraints of Mali's economic problems, there was a new emphasis on the development of the suburbs, such as Badalabougoue, that lie on the right bank of the Niger. A reallocation of resources in favor of such secondary settlements has been encouraged, within the framework of the *Projet Urbain du Mali* (Mali Urban Project), which is being implemented under the guidance of the United Nations, in order to counterbalance the predominance of the capital city.

SOPHIE DULUCQ

See also: **Mali.**

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Bambandyanaló: See Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Leopard's Kopje, Bambandyanaló, and Mapungubwe.

Banda: See Central African Republic: Nineteenth Century: Gbaya, Banda, and Zande.

Banda, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu (c.1896–1997) *Malawian Doctor and Former President*

Hastings Banda, president of Malawi from July 1964 to May 1994, was born around 1896 near Mthunthama, Kasungu. In 1915 or 1916, he went to South Africa, where he took the middle name Kamuzu (*Kamuzu* meaning "little root").

Unlike most Nyasalanders who went to that part of Africa to seek employment, Banda planned to attend Lovedale College, founded by the Free Church of Scotland in the nineteenth century. He found employment at the Witwatersrand deep mine Boksburg, and for the first time was exposed to the rough life of a growing mining city. He was never to forget this experience and, when later he became head of state, would always oppose labor migration to South Africa on the grounds that, among other things, it rendered the migrants vulnerable to criminal elements and to venereal diseases from prostitutes in the cities.

Although he was fully employed, Banda's quest for further education remained prominent in his personal plan and to this end he enrolled at a local night school. In 1922, he joined the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, and in November 1923 attended the church's annual meeting at Bloemfontein, where he met the American Bishop W. T. Vernon, who agreed to sponsor Banda's travel to the United States to pursue his education. By July 1925, Banda had raised the fare to board a ship for the New World.

Banda registered as a student at the AME Church's Wilberforce Institute, Ohio, graduating in three years. In 1932, he became a student at the Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee. After qualifying as a doctor in 1937, he went to Edinburgh, Scotland, where in 1938 he became a student at the School of Medicine

of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons. Such additional qualifications were necessary for him to practice within the British Empire, his ambition being to return to Nyasaland as a medical missionary. However, even after satisfactorily completing his Edinburgh courses, it became clear to him that neither the Church of Scotland nor the colonial government in Zomba would allow him to work for them. During World War II, he worked in Liverpool and, after the war, established a thriving practice in London.

Postwar London was a hive of activity, especially among Africans working and studying in the United Kingdom; they included the future leaders Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and Seretse Khama. Increasingly, Banda became involved in Pan-African affairs, but he also became active in the Fabian Society and the British Labour Party.

In 1944, the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) was formed, bringing together the various pressure groups, and Banda acted as its external advisor, regularly giving it financial assistance. He strongly campaigned against the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and, when it was actually established in 1953, he left London for Kumasi, Ghana, where he continued to practice medicine. In 1957, the NAC became convinced that only Banda could lead the fight for decolonization, and they invited him to return home, which he did on July 6, 1958. Although most Nyasalanders had not heard of Banda before that year, the NAC had constructed a powerful image of him, presenting him as the only African able to deal effectively with Europeans given his education and experience of living in the West. Banda was welcomed back by large crowds as a messiah-like figure.

Within a few months of his arrival, the NAC was reorganized, and the political atmosphere became highly charged. In January and February 1959, riots and minor incidents took place in various parts of the colony and on March 3, Governor Robert Armitage declared a state of emergency. The NAC was banned, and Banda and many congressional leaders were imprisoned in Southern Rhodesia; hundreds of others were detained in various parts of the country—mainly at Kanjedza, Limbe.

Released on April 1, 1960, Banda took over the helm of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which had been formed while he was in detention. After constitutional talks in London attended by various political interests, Nyasaland held general elections in August 1961. The MCP was swept into power, and Banda became minister of agriculture, a position he sought because he viewed it as crucial to the development of the country. In January 1963, he became prime minister, and on July 6, 1964, Nyasaland attained independence and was renamed Malawi.

However, within two months, Prime Minister Banda was arguing with most of his cabinet over his style of leadership, and domestic and foreign policies, including Malawi's future relations with communist China and with the white-ruled regions of southern Africa. The "cabinet crisis" of 1964 was a turning point in Malawi's short postcolonial history, in that it turned Malawi into a full-fledged one-party state and Banda into a virtual dictator. With the rebelling ministers in exile in Zambia and Tanzania and, with a new cabinet of ministers, Banda's will was law. Political incarcerations increased. He dominated the print and broadcasting media and, on the economic front, he supervised the creation and expansion of Press Holdings, which had interests in a wide range of economic sectors. In 1971, he became life president of Malawi, and visited South Africa—the first African head of state to do so.

Banda's domination of Malawi continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as did abuse of human rights. However, with the demise of the Cold War, the Western powers that had supported Banda began to press for political reform and, by the early 1990s, aid was conditional on change. Within Malawi pressure mounted and, by the end of 1992, Banda was forced to accept the possibility of losing his position of power, a fact confirmed by a national referendum in June 1993. In the free general elections in May of the following year, the MCP lost, and Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front replaced Banda as president. Aging and frail, he virtually retired from politics. He died on November 25, 1997, and received a state funeral on December 3.

OWEN J. M. KALINGA

See also: **Malawi: Independence to the Present; Malawi: Nationalism, Independence.**

Biography

Born about 1896 near Mthunthama, Kasungu, a primarily Chewa area bordering with the Tumbuka-speaking region conquered by the M'belwa Ngoni in the 1860s. Attended three local Free Church of Scotland schools. In 1914, passed the standard three examinations and either at the end of the following year or early in 1916 left Chilanga for South Africa. Registered as a student at the AME Church's Wilberforce Institute, Ohio, graduating in three years and, early in 1928, proceeded to Indiana University for premedical studies. Two years later, transferred to the University of Chicago at the suggestion of a professor of linguistics, who wanted Banda to be his research assistant in Bantu languages. In December 1931, awarded a Bachelor of Philosophy degree from the the University of Chicago, with a double major in history and politics. In 1932, became a

student at the Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee. After qualifying as a doctor in 1937, went to Edinburgh, Scotland, and in 1938 became a student at the School of Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons. Returned to Malawi in 1958, and in January 1963 became prime minister. In 1971 was named life president. Lost the free general elections in 1994 to Bakili Muluzi. Died November 25, 1997, and received a state funeral on December 3.

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Banking and Finance

The financial systems of African countries at the time of independence in the 1960s were dominated by foreign-owned and foreign-managed commercial banks. Other financial institutions, such as development banks, building societies, and agricultural or land banks were relatively small, with few resources and small portfolios of loans compared with those of the commercial banks. It was clear, therefore, that in the short and probably the medium term, significant domestic finance for development would have to come from the commercial banks.

In Anglophone Africa, these foreign-owned commercial banks were nearly all British and followed British banking practice. In particular, lending policy was to make short-term loans, largely to finance foreign trade and working capital; to take security; and largely to neglect medium- and long-term lending or investment in equity. Newly independent African governments also accused these banks of lending mainly to the expatriate business community. It appeared (rightly or wrongly) that African businesses, and individual Africans, had little or no access to commercial bank credit, and that this was both irrational and unjust.

Governments therefore intervened extensively in the financial sector, intending to create a financial system to support their development objectives. Intervention included takeover by governments (partial or complete) of foreign-owned commercial banks;

creating government-owned commercial banks from scratch; directing credit to favored sectors; creating government-owned development banks to provide long-term loans, in particular for industry and small-scale agriculture; creating government-owned development corporations to provide equity finance for both domestic and foreign investors; exchanging control regulations to limit the borrowing of foreign-owned businesses; and setting interest rates below market levels to encourage investment and reduce the costs of borrowers.

The regulation and supervision of financial institutions tended to be badly neglected—partly because the foreign-owned commercial banks clearly did not need supervision and partly because it was difficult for central banks to supervise government-owned financial institutions that were pursuing government development objectives—so that the buildup of bad debts in their loan portfolios was often ignored.

Not every country pursued all these interventions, and a minority of countries did not intervene in commercial bank ownership at all. Overall, however, a new type of commercial banking sector tended to emerge, with three distinct types of bank: the old expatriate banks, frequently with a much reduced share of the market (or no share at all in a few countries, including Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania); government-owned banks, which were dominant in some countries (including Ghana, Malawi, and Uganda) but had only a minority share of the market in others (including Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); and new indigenous or local banks, wholly owned and managed by local people (initially most notable in Kenya and Nigeria, to a lesser extent in Uganda and Zambia, and in Ghana, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s).

Unfortunately, most local banks were licensed before the reform of banking legislation and the rehabilitation of bank supervision capacity. This proved extremely damaging, because the most common cause for local bank failures, of which there were many, had been uncontrolled insider lending (the lending of depositors' money to the directors and managers and to their businesses) which was only later made illegal. The survival of some local banks, despite inadequate legislation and supervision, suggested that better sequencing would sharply reduce the number of failures.

Those countries in which the economy had deteriorated most in the 1970s and 1980s tended also to be those in which the banking system was most decayed: government commercial banks with extremely high levels of bad debt (government commercial banks in Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania; some of the Nigerian federal government banks and most of the Nigerian state banks, the Gambia, Malawi, and the smaller government bank in Kenya, had up to 80 per cent bad debts), and large numbers of local bank failures.

Reform of the larger failed government banks was difficult. Most of them had been recapitalized, and management reforms had been implemented, but reversing previous lending practice was difficult, and there was already evidence of some reformed banks building up new portfolios of bad debts. Only one country, Guinea, took the radical alternative action of closing down the country's whole (entirely government-owned) banking system and starting again.

Compounding the problem of banking reform was that financial liberalization and structural adjustment programs—usually introduced as part of International Monetary Fund and World Bank conditionality for loans and for support from other aid donors—included sharp increases in interest rates. Higher interest rates were intended to attract more deposits into the commercial banks, so that they could provide finance to businesses as the economy recovered. However, attracting more deposits into banks that were fundamentally insolvent, badly managed, and, in many cases, corrupt tended only to make things worse. In some countries it was also necessary to simultaneously reform the loss-making parastatal sector along with the banks in order that the banks might have profitable lending opportunities; this was exceptionally difficult.

A further problem was that some reformed banks had been, understandably, excessively cautious in making new lending decisions; the Ghana Commercial Bank, for example, had loans and advances in the early 1990s equivalent to only 8 per cent of its total assets, which created a shortage of credit because of its dominant position. On the other hand, it is notable that some of the economies that had recovered from economic disaster with some success (including Ghana) did not embark upon banking reform immediately, putting it aside for five to ten years. It could be argued, therefore, that economic recovery was possible (at least for some years) without reforming the banking system. Another positive factor was that most countries had introduced reformed banking legislation and supervision. It was important that these reforms were effective, because a repetition of past banking failures would be extremely expensive; rehabilitating the Tanzanian banking system, for example, cost more than 10 per cent of its gross domestic product.

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See also: Debt, International, Development and Dependency; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Bantu Cultivators: Kenyan Highlands

The Kenyan Highlands stretch across south-central Kenya; they are delimited in the south and north by arid zones, in the west by plains which extend to Lake Victoria, and in the east by the plateau east of Mount Kenya. The Rift Valley separates the Western Highlands, which are inhabited mostly by Southern Nilotic peoples of the Kalenjin group from the Central Highlands, which are home mainly to Bantu groups like the Igembe, Meru, Tharaka, Chuka, Embu, Mbeere, Kikuyu, and Taita. Major boundary landmarks of the Central Highlands are the Nyandarua (Aberdare) Range and Mount Kenya in the west and the Tana River in the northeast.

The Taita inhabit the upland valleys and slopes of the Dawida, Saghala, and Kasigau regions, where the fertile valley bottoms are exploited for the cultivation of bananas, sugarcane, and yams, and the higher regions for cattle raising. The Kikuyu, who live on top of the ridges of the Central Highlands, cultivate perennial crops such as arrowroot and sweet potato and also practice stock farming. The Embu live on the fertile and well-irrigated slopes of Mount Kenya above 1200 meters; and the Mbeere live in the lower dry savanna. While the Embu are well-positioned to practice intensive agriculture, the Mbeere grow drought-resistant field crops such as maize, millet, or sorghum in addition to raising cattle. The Chuka and the Meru are neighboring tribes of highland farmers on the northeastern slopes of Mount Kenya.

To date, no comprehensive picture has emerged from the scarce evidence available concerning the Iron Age history of these Bantu peoples. Such evidence comes chiefly from historical linguistics, archaeology, and oral history. Particularly problematic are the construction of a chronology of historical events and the establishment of synchronisms of historical findings across multiple disciplines. According to the leading hypothesis about the geographical origin of these peoples, whose languages belong to the Thagicu group of northeastern Bantu, they originally migrated into the Kenyan Highlands from Zaïre. Judging from

percentages of shared cognates, the languages of today's highland Bantu must have begun developing from proto-Thagicu around the tenth century.

The Bantu peoples of the Central Highlands have no unitary myth of origin. The Chuka, Embu, Mbeere, and Kikuyu south of Mount Kenya maintain that they immigrated from Igembe/Tigania in the northern Meru region. In the early phase of the migration they were pastoralists and hunters, but after colonizing the higher forest regions of the Highlands they became agriculturalists. Kikuyu oral traditions maintain a record of age-groups going back into the past; thus counting back from today's age-groups, it could be argued that the Kikuyu left Igembe/Tigania in the fifteenth century and reached the northern part of their modern settlement areas in the early seventeenth century. The Meru claim to have migrated from an island called Mbwa, which several scholars believe is Manda Island, off the northern Kenyan coast. These migrations are estimated to have taken place in the first half of the eighteenth century. Oral traditions of various highland Bantu groups agree that the highlands were acquired by land purchase from southern Nilotic Okiek hunters.

In addition, the oral traditions of the Kikuyu, Chuka, and Embu recall the Gumba, a cattle-raising and iron-manufacturing people. The Gumba are said to have resisted the colonization of the highlands by the Kikuyu and were defeated by them only in the nineteenth century. The Kikuyu emphasize that they inherited their iron manufacturing techniques and their circumcision rites from the Gumba. Archaeological finds near Gatung'ang'a in central Kenya, which have been tentatively attributed to the Gumba, point to a population who raised cattle, worked iron, and used obsidian and Kwale-like pottery; the findings are dated to the twelfth–thirteenth and fifteenth–sixteenth centuries. The culture reflected in these material remains represents a mixture of elements of the later Stone Age and the Iron Age. If it was really a Bantu culture, it must have already been present in the highlands before the migrations mentioned in the traditions began.

Discrepancies become evident when one tries to align the findings of historical linguistics and oral traditions. On the one hand, the overall picture emerging from the oral traditions points to a variety of geographical origins for the migrations of the highland Bantu—regions as diverse as Igembe/Tigania, the coast, and Mount Kilimanjaro. On the other hand, the uniformity and present distribution of the so-called Thagicu languages suggest a single common center of dispersal in the highlands. Moreover, the circumcision terminology of the Kikuyu is borrowed from southern Cushitic languages; ironworking terminology, however, is of Bantu origin. This, coupled with the fact that

the origin myths of the various clans show substantial differences, leads to the conclusion that Kikuyu culture is an amalgam of different overlapping traditions. The explanation for the close linguistic relationship on the one hand and the variability of the migration legends on the other probably lies in the ecological and topographical diversity of the highlands. This can be illustrated in the sphere of political organization. The Kikuyu, for example, after taking possession of the highland ridges, developed localized lineages connected with particular ridges; each ridge is occupied by a certain group of lineages, inhabiting a fortified settlement. On the other hand, the main political and social organizational unit of the valley-dwelling Taita is the neighborhood, comprising a number of lineages having equal rights and living together in the same valley. Thus, local cultural institutions arose through adaptation to the respective ecological and topographical niches and through cultural convergence on a local scale. This could plausibly have engendered inconsistencies in the folk memory of origins and migrations.

Many of the “contradictions” outlined above will undoubtedly turn out to represent successive overlays of historical processes, if and when the problems of chronology and interdisciplinary synchronisms are solved.

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See also: Iron Age (Later): East Africa.

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Banu Ma'qil: *See Arab Bedouin: Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ma'qil.*

Banu Sulaym: *See Arab Bedouin: Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ma'qil.*

Barbary Corsairs and the Ottoman Provinces: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in the Seventeenth Century

The corsairs are the subject of legend. Inspired by seventeenth-century seafaring lore, the European fear of the Muslim corsairs represented a link to the era of the crusades, which persisted well into the modern period. The legend of Muslim cruelty and Christian suffering was at the heart of the Barbary legend. The corsairs, however, were not pirates; their raids on Christian shipping were legitimized by the holy war between Muslims and Christians, which had the support of the Ottoman and Christian European governments. The taking of Christian captives enabled the Ottoman provinces to exert pressure on European states, whether to raise ransom money or else regular subsidies to forestall Muslim raids upon European shipping. In some cases, a truce or a regular peace treaty could also be won as a result of corsair activity. It was also of course a means to liberate Muslims captured by Christian corsairs. In the North African ports, Christian captives were rarely objects of commerce, except by ransom, but while the wealthier captives could purchase exemption, those who were not ransomed were integrated into North African society as concubines, slave officials or skilled slaves in the service of the rulers.

In contradiction to the legend of Muslim piracy, the Ottoman provinces in North Africa were important trading partners with Europe, and the corsairs were the principal agents of interregional trade. This development came after the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto in 1571, when the corsairs lost their strategic importance to the Ottoman Empire. However, the continuation of the naval war by independent corsair activity provided a means for the Ottoman provinces of North Africa to maintain a naval presence in the Mediterranean, as well as ensuring their share of Mediterranean commerce. At the same time the European states competed for control of the Mediterranean after 1571 and relied upon the facilities of the North African ports to provision and refit their fleets. In the course of the seventeenth century, the rivalries of the European states and the relative indifference of the Ottoman Empire enabled the corsairs to pursue regional, economic interests, which propelled the development of autonomous regimes in North Africa.

The port of Algiers underwent a phenomenal development during the seventeenth century, as it became both an important commercial and political center. Its prosperity was founded by the corsairs, who constituted a powerful corporation (*ta'ifa*) within the city, which acted as a check upon the corporate power of the militias (*ojak*). The corsairs controlled an equal share of the profits of seafaring with the leading officers of the militias, the *deys*, while the merchants of Algiers marketed the cargoes, as well as local wheat, wool, and leather, largely to a European market, through Marseilles intermediaries. The interdependence of Algeria and France, in particular, contradicts the legend of barbarous "piratical states" preying upon "civilized" Christian states. Instead, trade with France and other European states made Algiers a prosperous and cosmopolitan port in the seventeenth century, with a fleet numbering 75 ships in 1623 and a population that included Muslim Turks, Arabs, Berbers, and Andalusians (political refugees from Spain), as well as Christians, and Jews. The trend toward political autonomy began in 1659, when the Ottoman-appointed pasha, Ibrahim, attempted to tax subsidies paid by the Ottoman government to the corsairs. The corsairs and *ojak* revolted, but while the pasha was defeated and stripped of his powers, the revolt turned to the advantage of the *ojak*. Afterward, the ruler was a *dey* selected by janissary officers, rather than by the *ta'fa*, which was incorporated into the *ojak* by 1689.

The Tunisian economy was less dependent upon the corsairs than Algiers. The bulk of its exports were produced domestically for export to the Middle East and Europe. The Andalusians, of whom 60,000 had arrived in 1609, developed the olive oil industry. This export, alongside wheat, wool, leather, coral, and wax, as well as the manufacture of the fez (*shashiya*), constituted Tunisia's main sources of income. However, during the reign of Yusuf Dey (1610–1637), seafaring became an important state activity. The capture of ships provided income for the ruler, who took the captured ship and half its cargo (including captives), while the remainder was distributed among the corsairs. Unlike Algiers, however, the *deys* of Tunis did not have the backing of strong militia; therefore they were overwhelmed by an alliance of Tunisia's urban notables behind an administrative official, the bey. Murad Bey (*r.*1612–1631) thus secured appointment as pasha, which became hereditary in his family when the notables forced Yusuf Dey to appoint his son, Hammuda Bey (*r.*1631–1666), as his successor. Hammuda was officially invested with the title of pasha by the Ottoman sultan in 1657, which meant that the *beys* superseded the *deys*. Murad Bey (*r.*1666–1675) rebuilt the fleet, which amounted to 17 ships, and constructed a new palace for the Muradite dynasty on the western walls of the city. The last quarter of the century

witnessed a period of political conflict between Murad's successors, until the situation was complicated further by a series of invasions by the Algerian ojak, in 1686, 1694, and 1705. The crisis was not resolved until 1710, when the Husaynid dynasty established its supremacy.

In Tripoli, Muhammad Saqizli Pasha (r.1631–1649) extended Ottoman military authority over the surrounding Arab lineages as far as Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, which more firmly grounded Tripolitania as a territorial state. As an indicator that this expansion of the state was connected to commercial prosperity, a French consul, chosen and financed by the Marseilles chamber of finance, was sent to Tripoli in 1630. The consul represented commercial interests only; Tripoli continued to target European, including French, shipping, though England signed a treaty with Tripoli in 1675 to spare its ships from the corsairs. In Algiers, a treaty was made with France in 1670, which provoked war with England and Holland, indicating the development of a complex intercontinental system that cut across Christian and Islamic cultural frontiers. Likewise, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers tolerated a European consular and trading presence alongside the North African merchant communities resulting in a cosmopolitan urban culture that combined African, Ottoman, and European influences. This tends to contradict the legend of Muslim exclusivity, as well as religiously inspired hatred between Europeans and Muslims. Ottoman culture had an impact mainly upon the political elites, as some North Africans were integrated into Ottoman political culture, while at the same time the Ottomans were absorbed into the politics of the indigenous society, as is evident in the case of Tunisia.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Maghrib: Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli under the Deys, Husaynids, and Qaramanlis in the Eighteenth Century; Maghrib: Ottoman Conquest of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis.

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Bedouin: See Arab Bedouin: Banu Hilal, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ma'qil.

Beira Corridor

A major port and the capital of Sofala Province in central Mozambique, Beira was significant largely depending upon its ability to service the landlocked countries of the interior. The city is situated on the Mozambique Channel of the Indian Ocean at the mouths of the Pungue and Buzi rivers, and was founded on an old Muslim settlement. The beginnings of the modern city were established in 1889; it was to be the headquarters of the Companhia de Moçambique (Mozambique Company). In 1892 Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company began the construction of the railway from Beira to Umtali (later Mutare) in Rhodesia; this was completed in 1898, and the following year the line reached Salisbury (Harare), the capital of Rhodes's new colony. Nyasaland's right of access to the sea through Mozambique was recognized in the bilateral Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1890. The city celebrated its centenary in 1989 when, after a long

period of decline due to the civil war in Mozambique, it at last appeared that a slow rejuvenation was underway, assisted by a large European Union loan to rehabilitate the port.

The city was controlled by the Companhia de Moçambique until 1942, when the administration was handed over to the Portuguese colonial authorities. British capital was an important factor in the development of Beira. British entrepreneurs led by Cecil Rhodes, British colonial officials, and the white settlers in the Rhodesias always saw Beira as a vital outlet for the British-controlled territories of the interior: Zambesia (later Northern Rhodesia, then Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (later Rhodesia, then Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi), and Beira's prosperity depended upon its principal role as a port serving the interior.

Beira is a major rail terminus, with links extending to Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Malawi. In particular, it is the main and most convenient port for both Zimbabwe and Malawi. The principal exports passing through Beira are mineral ores, especially copper from Zambia and chromium from Zimbabwe, tobacco, food products, cotton, hides, and skins. Its major imports, again for the countries of the interior, are fuel oils, fertilizers, wheat, heavy machinery and equipment, textiles, and beverages. A separate fishing harbor was constructed in the early 1980s comprising canneries, processing plants, and refrigeration units. The Mozambique Channel is one of the world's richest fishing areas.

The population of Beira was approximately 300,000 at the beginning of the 1990s. The end of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992 saw Beira begin to recover as the country's second city and as a tourist destination. Prior to the escalation of the nationalist war against the Portuguese in the mid-1960s, Beira had derived much of its income from Rhodesian and South African (white) tourists who sought relaxation on its beaches, and the city had developed a number of hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs to cater to such visitors.

The short route of 250 kilometers, which connected Beira to Mutare in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and was that country's best route to the sea, came to be known as the Beira Corridor. The creation in 1953 of the Central African Federation led to an upsurge in trade and a consequent economic upswing in Beira, which was equidistant from London by either the Cape or Suez routes. This was to last until the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 imposed sanctions upon Rhodesia, including an oil blockade of Beira by Britain. Even so, as long as the Portuguese controlled Mozambique (which they did until their departure in 1975), Beira and the Beira Corridor played a crucial role in breaking international sanctions and allowing

Rhodesia to export its minerals—especially chrome. By 1973, however, when it became clear that the nationalist Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo) forces were winning the war, and that the Beira Corridor was at risk of being shut down, Rhodesia developed a new railway to Beit Bridge in the south so as to link it into the South African network. From this time until the early 1990s, the fortunes of Beira declined, due to a number of circumstances.

First, from 1976 to 1980 the new government of Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia to deny the latter the use of its railways and ports. Second, once Rhodesia had become independent as Zimbabwe in 1980, the Beira Corridor was threatened by the insurgent anti-Frelimo forces of the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, so that its use was constantly interrupted. By this time the corridor provided a passage for the railway, a road, an oil pipeline, and overhead electric power lines, each within half a mile of the other. Only after the deployment of substantial numbers of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira Corridor during the latter part of the 1980s did the corridor begin to operate effectively again. Even so, as a result of war and neglect, the port of Beira had silted up so that it could only handle vessels of 5,000 tons or less. And only after 1992, when the civil war in Mozambique had come to an end, could the port of Beira and the corridor begin to handle substantial traffic again.

Throughout the years of confrontation between the "front line states" and South Africa (1965–1990) the fortunes of Beira fluctuated, depending upon the extent to which at any given time the Beira Corridor could be fully used. During the latter part of the 1980s Mozambique was at least able to attract substantial international aid for the rehabilitation of the Beira port, including \$600 million provided by a Western (European) consortium. Following the end of the civil war in 1992 and Mozambique's abandonment of Marxism, international funds began to return to the country and Beira began to regain its place both as a vital port servicing much of southern Africa and as the second city of Mozambique.

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See also: **Mozambique.**

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Bello, Alhaji (Sir) Ahmadu (1910–1966)

Northern Nigerian Politician

One of Nigeria’s greatest politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, Alhaji (Sir) Ahmadu Bello, the *sardauna* of Sokoto was, in fact, the acknowledged political leader of Nigeria’s northern region both in the devolution years (the 1950s) and immediately after independence in 1960. Bello was born in Sokoto in 1910 into the family of the great Islamic reformer of the early nineteenth century, Shaykh ‘Uthman dan Fodio, whose Islamic movement brought about the creation of a new ruling elite in northern Nigeria. After his primary education in Sokoto, Bello proceeded to the Katsina Higher College for his secondary education, where he was a contemporary of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first indigenous prime minister.

In 1933, Bello unsuccessfully contested the throne of the Sultan of Sokoto and settled for the office of the district head of a locality, Rabah, where his father Ibrahim—who was Fodio’s grandson—had been chief. His regal and royal background seems to have determined his political worldview and role. At the commencement of Britain’s devolution of power in Nigeria in the 1950s, Bello joined others to establish the Jammiyyar Mutanen Arewa, which metamorphosed into the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in 1951, ostensibly to contest the first local elections of the decolonization years. He became the president general of the NPC and minister of local government, works, and community development, playing the role of its foremost spokesman and symbol. In 1954, he was appointed the first premier of northern Nigeria.

Thus, Bello was totally devoted to the cause of the people of the north because he thought that it was his inherited duty to be so. He was one of the most important indices in the determination of Britain’s attitude toward Nigerian nationalism in the 1950. It is, therefore, not surprising that Macpherson (who was governor general in Nigeria, 1948–1954) saw Bello as being “too narrowly

northern in his outlook” and thus not at a good rallying point for divergent opinions in Nigeria. But Bello himself never aspired to the direct physical control of Nigeria. He was contented in his roles of northern regional leader and president general of the NPC, which was the largest political party in the country. As late as 1965, Bello was quoted as saying that he would rather be called the sultan of Sokoto than the president of Nigeria.

Bello’s extreme love for the north generated its own resentment from many of his political opponents in the other political regions. Without doubt, he commanded a lot of respect from friends and foes alike. His deep attachment to the north and the efforts that many of his political adversaries perceived to be an indirect attempt to utilize his political leverage within the ruling party to control the entire country further alienated him from non-northern regional political leaders of his time. Even within the north, Bello’s influence and seeming omnipotence was opposed by the Tiv of Central Nigeria and the aristocracy in Kano, the north’s leading commercial center. Such opposition was resisted and repressed harshly. Yet Bello was a man of considerable intellect who had a clear grasp of the northern political milieu. His strength appears to have been his ability to utilize human and material resources to achieve set goals for the overall benefit of his people.

Bello’s importance in Nigeria’s political history should be understood within the context of the subnationalism of the 1950s and early 1960s. Many of the enduring physical infrastructures in the entire northern Nigeria were planned by him. Among these were Ahmadu Bello University (appropriately named after him), the Bank of the North, and the Northern Nigerian Development Company, among others. The belief that the *Sardauna* was the most powerful politician in Nigeria, more powerful than the prime minister, led a group of army officers to the conclusion that once he was removed from the scene, Nigeria’s multifaceted problems would have been solved. In January 1966, a group of army officers led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu attacked Bello’s residence in Kaduna, and he was killed brutally. The political stature of the *Sardauna* remains intimidating in northern Nigerian politics; even after Bello’s death, many politicians still use his name and politics as a basis of galvanizing political support in contemporary Nigeria.

KUNLE LAWAL

See also: **Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence; ‘Uthman dan Fodio.**

Biography

Born in 1910 in northern Nigeria; received a primary education in Sokoto, and attended Katsina Higher College. In 1954, appointed the first premier of Northern

Nigeria. In January 1966, a group of army officers led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu attacked his residence in Kaduna, and he was killed brutally.

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Ben Ali: See Tunisia: Ben ‘Ali, Liberalization.

Benin, Empire: Origins and Growth of City-State

Forest areas east of the Volta and west of the Niger long served as refuge to numerous small groups of peoples. There is no written record of how some of these developed into important kingdoms; however, oral tradition, evaluated in the light of archaeological findings and linguistic evidence, has helped historians reconstruct the past.

The kingdom of Benin, in what is now southwestern Nigeria at the center of an area inhabited by a linguistically defined bloc known as the Edo-speaking peoples, was founded by one such group. At first family clusters of hunters, gatherers, and agriculturalists formed more complex societies centered on villages and organized by kinship along patrilineal lines. It seems that the components of social life—administration of justice, land rights, farming, and religious beliefs and rituals—were already in place.

Early in the second millennium of the common era, invaders from the grasslands of the Sudan moving south and southwest on horseback due to increasingly harsh climate conditions, or perhaps fleeing their own land’s conversion to Islam, settled in the region and married daughters of local elders. Further development proceeded by agglomeration rather than conquest. Villages grew into towns surrounded by walls. The excavations by Graham Connah have shown that these walls were a honeycomb of linear earthworks defining territory rather than defensive fortifications. This suggests that Benin city may originally have been an aggregate of small settlements, each of which owed allegiance to the king, but had its own farmlands surrounded by its own walls and ditches. In the countryside around Benin City lies a complex of walls, the height and extent of which suggest that the region may already have had a large population.

Society was hierarchical, headed by a succession of kings, known as *ogiso*. The kingdom was divided into a number of tribute-paying units entrusted to chiefs responsible for their daily administration. The king was assisted by seven powerful nobles, the *uzama*, holders of hereditary positions. The king’s palace represented temporal power and was also the center of spiritual forces.

This city-state was financed by tribute rather than trade. Its economy was largely agricultural, depending on yams and palm oil. Nevertheless, with urbanization traders and craftsmen became increasingly important. By the eleventh century the expansion of trade had major consequences for technological development, accumulation of wealth, and the structure of state institutions.

Cotton was already cultivated and woven by the tenth century. A regular northward trade in salt, cloth, metal, beads, and pottery was flourishing in the middle Iron Age. Ere, the second *ogiso* (tenth century), is believed to have introduced many symbols, such as human heads made of wood and terra cotta, used in a religious context. The development of sculpture seems to indicate that Benin society had, at the time of Ere, reached the point where it included spare manpower for pursuits not directly related to survival.

Clearly the use of copper in bronze and brass sculpture—which soon replaced the previously used wood and terra cotta—reveals the existence of a long-distance trade in luxury goods, since the nearest sources of copper were in the Saharan Air Massif and in the Sudan around Darfur. The quantity of copper items in Benin before 1300 indicates that trade was on a large scale and had already been in existence for a while. The technique of brass casting by the lost wax method in use in Benin, had probably been introduced to Ife by northerners who founded the city, and had spread from there. Until the fifteenth century, brass casting remained exclusively a palace art, producing sculptured heads and other cult objects for royal altars.

According to Benin tradition, around 1300 the Edo people felt that the *ogiso* was no longer an effective leader and asked Oluhe, king of Ife, the spiritual center of the region, to send them a king. He sent his son Oranmiyan, who stayed in Benin only long enough to father a child with a daughter of a local chief. Their son, Eweka I, became the first *oba* (king) of Benin. Oranmiyan thus headed a dynasty that was to last over six centuries, a fact that seems verifiable because Benin’s oral tradition refers to the past in terms of dynastic time, relating significant events to the reigns of particular kings. Some historians have suggested that the tale of a marriage between Oranyan and a chiefly family of Benin may actually have been invented to disguise the fact that Benin was at that time

conquered by outsiders who became its rulers. Groundless though the legend may be, its message seems clear. It asserts that the dynasty is of alien origin, but claims that it came to power by will of the Edo and was nurtured by their culture.

Royal power grew under Eweka I, whose reign was relatively peaceful. Division of labor in the town progressed and society became more stratified; but basic social and political organization did not change much since the uzama held on to their ancient rights and controlled Eweka I. The *oba* do not seem to have been able to assert their authority until the reign of Ewedo (c.1255). Aware of the symbolic significance of ritual changes, Ewedo began by forbidding the uzama to carry their ceremonial swords in his palace and to sit down in his presence. He then reorganized the army, and proceeded to deprive the uzama of their inherited right to hold national offices and to appoint persons of their choice to key positions. This enabled him to surround himself with administrators answerable to him alone.

There is archaeological evidence that Benin continued to grow with the expansion of long-distance trade during his reign. Indeed bronze sculptures became more numerous, and bronze was no longer used for altar pieces exclusively, but also for plaques set into palace walls or pillars of houses.

The medieval era of the kingdom of Benin ended with the accession to the throne of the most famous *oba*, Eware the Great (1440–1480), and the arrival of the Portuguese.

NATALIE SANDOMIRSKY

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
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Benin, Empire: Oba Ewuare, Trade with the Portuguese

The kingdom of Benin, situated in the Yorubaland forest in present-day southwestern Nigeria, reached its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under the reigns of the *oba* (king) Ewuare (r. c.1440–1473), his son Ozolua (r. c.1481–1504), and his grandson Esigie (r.1504–1547).

Ewuare relied on his subjects' belief in the divine nature of kings to consolidate his power. The king was believed to influence the weather, fertility, harvests, and social harmony; he was sacred and feared. On this basis Ewuare instituted reforms aimed at diminishing the power of the *uzama*, hereditary chiefs who traditionally participated in the selection of the *oba*. He enacted a rule of primogeniture to eliminate their role in the process of succession to the throne. In time, the chiefs themselves adopted this rule, thereby impeding the development of large lineage support groups and further strengthening the *oba*. Ewuare, however, needed chiefs to supervise the day-to-day administration of the kingdom and to collect the tributes from villages, which constituted much of his revenues. To further dilute the *uzama*'s authority he appointed additional "town" and "palace" chiefs, directly beholden to him.

The degree of the king's authority fluctuated for a century. However, palace skirmishes had little effect on the expansion of Benin's empire. During the dry season Ewuare and his successors regularly undertook campaigns to extend Benin's frontiers eastward to the



Benin Kingdom, fifteenth–eighteenth centuries.

Niger delta, southward to the sea, and westward into Yoruba country. These conquests have earned Ewuare the title of “Ewuare the Great” and his son that of “Ozolua the Conqueror.”

During the century of expansion, the vitality and stability of the kingdom were displayed in many ways. Ewuare rebuilt the capital Benin City, dividing it into two sections—the larger for the bulk of the town’s residents and the smaller for the royal palace and the elite. He also improved communications by ordering construction of broad avenues and smaller intersecting streets. In the sixteenth century, Benin was a city 25 miles in circumference, protected by walls and moats. The arts flourished. As trade brought more copper and brass into Benin, craftsmen refined casting techniques. They produced not only palace art and elaborate altar pieces, but also bronze bas-reliefs, representing the oba, his court, and his contacts with the Portuguese. As a historical record, these are reminiscent of Western Europe’s medieval tapestries.

Tradition, perhaps alluding to Ruy de Sequeira’s trip to Africa in 1472, credits Ewuare with having been the first oba of Benin in contact with the Portuguese, who were then exploring the region. It is likely that European goods reached Benin prior to the arrival of the Europeans themselves. It is known from writings of Portuguese eyewitnesses that upon arrival in Benin they found a large centralized state already involved in political and commercial relations with several—sometimes distant—areas.

The Portuguese were then the only Europeans seeking trade in the region. By the 1480s their policy was to make trade with the Guinean coasts a Portuguese monopoly. Their forts and ships in the region were meant to keep other Europeans out as much as to control Africans. The Portuguese thought that an alliance with Benin would offer them sizable markets for their own goods. Benin traded with Europeans to obtain guns, powder, metals, salt, and cloth in exchange for palm oil, ivory, cloth, beads, pepper, and slaves. Except for slaves, a natural by-product of the wars waged by Benin, the other exports do not seem to have come from local sources. Apparently one of the keys to Benin’s wealth was its location at a junction of east-west and north-south trade.

Little of what Benin was exporting went to Europe: there was pepper at first (until the Portuguese succeeded in establishing their spice trade with Asia), and small numbers of slaves. Beads, cloth, and slaves the Portuguese also initially exchanged in African ports along the Gulf of Guinea for gold—the west African product they sought above all else at that time. However, the Portuguese interest in slaves grew steadily throughout the sixteenth century, first to supplement the labor force of Portugal itself and then to work in

the newly developed Portuguese plantations on islands off the west African coast and in the Gulf of Guinea; but Benin never became deeply involved in the slave trade.

For the Portuguese, trade with Benin was complicated by the fact that the kingdom lay about 50 miles inland. In 1487 they built a fort at Ughoton (Gwato), which was as near as their ships could get to Benin City. To get there, they had to travel about 40 miles from the sea up treacherous rivers and could still reach the capital only by traveling 19 miles overland. Benin controlled river and land routes. Authority here depended on labor; the Portuguese were few and had to rely on local inhabitants for military support, fresh water, and provisions. They could trade at Benin only with the oba and his accredited agents on terms laid down by him. After about 30 years they found the oba’s conditions, particularly the new ban on the export of male slaves, too onerous, and abandoned Ughoton. Later trade was conducted mainly by individual Portuguese merchants from Gulf of Guinea islands.

However, relations did not end when the Portuguese left Ughoton. It seems that both Africans and Europeans were investigating what they could gain from each other. In 1514 oba Esigie sent a delegation to Portugal, complaining about Portuguese slaving activities, but also asking for a Christian mission and firearms. What Benin needed from the Portuguese was, above all, firearms. King Manuel I was, however, reluctant to sell weapons to pagans. This request seemed to the Portuguese to be the opportunity they had been waiting for. Actually the oba was far less interested in Christianity than he was in obtaining firearms, and though he learned to speak Portuguese, permitted establishment of a Christian mission, and allowed his son Orhogba and some officials to be baptized, he did not accept baptism himself. By the middle of the century the Portuguese had virtually no contact with Benin.

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See also: Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century.

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Benin Kingdom: Nineteenth Century

By the nineteenth century, the Benin kingdom had begun to face a crisis of adaptation as a result of several internal and external factors. At the domestic level, Benin lacked strong and committed leadership. The incessant succession disputes for the throne, coupled with the civil wars they engendered, increased political and social instability in the kingdom. The reign of Oba Obanososa in 1804 was inaugurated by a civil war in which over one thousand people lost their lives. His successor, Oba Osemwede, had to engage his rival, Ogbeko, in a protracted, bloody, and destructive civil war. In the course of this civil war, Eredia-Uwa, as he was known before he became Oba Osemwede, has to flee to Ewokhimi in Ishan for safety. The auspicious intervention of Ogie, his cousin, tipped the scale in his favor and he eventually secured the throne. Odin-Ovba, who ascended to the Benin throne in 1848 as Oba Adolo, also had a troubled rule. Despite his accession to the Obaship, his implacable rival, Ogbewekon, remained. From Igueben, in Ishan, where he sought refuge, Ogbewekon instigated two rebellions against Adolo (in 1853 and 1854), both of which were crushed. It was only in 1880, upon the death of Ogbewekon, that Adolo could feel safe in his position. The reign of Oba Ovonramwen, the last of the nineteenth-century kings of Benin, is marked by his decision to execute some notable chiefs whom he claimed had opposed his succession to the throne.

Notwithstanding the debilitating impact and unrest brought about by these disputes and civil wars, the obas of this period, particularly Osemwede, Adolo, and Ovonramwen, still managed to make occasional attempts at asserting imperial control over Ekiti, Akure, and Owo in northeast Yoruba, parts of the Ishan county, and the western Igbo areas. Nonetheless, the last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a considerable diminution of Benin's authority over its imperial domain. To a large extent, the kingdom had shrunk to virtually its heartland.

This latter development was due largely to external factors over which Benin had no control. As a result of

the "Scramble" for Africa in the 1880s, Britain began signing treaties with the people of the Niger Delta. In 1885, the Niger Coast Protectorate was declared, but it was not until 1891 that the British decided to assert its control over the areas with the appointment of Claude Macdonald as commissioner and consul general. A number of vice consuls and other officials were also appointed. One vice consul, Gallwey, was given jurisdiction over the Benin rivers in the Western Delta of the Niger; Benin itself also came under his authority.

Up to this time, the obas of Benin had continued to run the sociopolitical and economic affairs of their kingdom unhindered. In matters of trade, the oba exercised royal monopoly over certain items of merchandise. He also set the terms by which non-Bini traders were to participate in trade within his domain.

This situation was to change for the worse for Benin with its incorporation as part of the Niger Coast Protectorate. European trade, which had earlier flourished in Benin up to the eighteenth century, had greatly declined by the first decades of the nineteenth century. Ughoton, Benin's foremost port, had ceased to be of any commercial relevance given its replacement by such Itsekiri coastal ports as Jakpa and Ebrohimi, founded by Chief Olumu in 1865. Backed by his powerful fleet, Olumu was able to dominate other rival Itsekiri houses and to control virtually all the trade on palm produce on the Benin rivers, enforcing his monopoly at its source in the hinterland. This situation led to a deterioration in the Benin-Itsekiri relationship, and even led to war, in which Benin supported Uwangu against the Olu of Itsekiri. Since Oba Osemwede lacked the resources to carry out a waterborne attack against the Olu, the most he could do was to place a curse on him. Through his strong-arm tactics, Olumu was able to establish himself firmly in the Benin rivers region, a fact that the British recognized when they appointed his son, Nana, governor in 1879. In 1884, the Itsekiri signed a protectorate treaty with the British that implied their loss of sovereignty. Thus the Itsekiri, who lived along the coast, exploited their strategic advantage by playing the role of middlemen between the Bini and the European traders at the coast.

The *oba* imposed dues on the Itsekiri, who had to pay a certain amount in goods before they were allowed to trade. Failure by the Itsekiri to meet their tax obligation meant stoppage of trade by the oba until the necessary conditions were fulfilled. In taking such action, the *oba* wanted to maximize his opportunities in the European trade.

Throughout the 1880s, European traders tried to convince the *oba* to abolish the dues imposed on non-Bini traders, but the *oba* refused to do so. In an

attempt to gain access to the riches of the hinterland, Gallwey became more determined to sign a protection treaty with the Oba of Benin. After a prolonged delay, Oba Ovonramwen reluctantly granted him audience on March 1892, and the anticipated treaty was signed between Gallwey and the oba's chiefs. The oba was suspicious of the vice consul's intentions and personally refused to sign the treaty. The signing of the treaty was tantamount to accepting British rule. But whether the *oba* and his chiefs saw it in that light is a different matter. For the vice consul, the treaty provided a perfect excuse for interfering in the internal affairs—both political and economic—of Benin. Some of the provisions of the treaty infringed upon the entire social, political and economic foundation of Benin. For instance, it now became mandatory for the Oba of Benin to accept the advice of the consul in matters of internal and external policy. Trade restrictions were relaxed, and Christianity was forced upon Benin.

Consequently, between 1892 and 1896, European officials, traders and their Itsekiri middlemen attempted to force the *oba* into submission. The British conquest of Chief Nana in 1894 and Brass in 1895, and the accusation in 1896 that the *oba* had closed all the markets in this territory heightened the isolation, desperation, and sense of foreboding that hung over Benin.

In late 1896, the acting consul general, James R. I. Phillips, embarked upon a visit to the Oba of Benin to persuade him to lift the ban then placed on trade. Phillips's visit came at an awkward time, when the oba was observing the annual festivals and was therefore not receiving visitors; but nothing would detract Phillips from his stated objective. His foolhardiness was to cost him and his party of six Europeans and over two hundred carriers their lives at the hands of Benin soldiers who ambushed them on January 3, 1897. The incident presented the *casus belli* for the punitive expedition that sacked Benin on February 17, 1897. With this event, the Benin monarchy and the ancient kingdom came to an inglorious end. Oba Ovonramwen, the last of the nineteenth-century Benin kings, was exiled to Calabar, never to return. Thus, economic interests and a desire to dominate the oba prompted the British conquest of Benin.

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Benin Kingdom: British Conquest, 1897

The kingdom of Benin was located in the western part of the Niger Delta. The population of the kingdom consisted of the Edo-speaking Bini people and was headed by the *oba*, the traditional ruler supported by a number of councils and societies consisting of chiefs and advisors.

The kingdom was one of the first on the coast to be encountered by Europeans in the late fifteenth century. The British had continuous contact with Benin. The late-nineteenth-century history of relations was strongly influenced by the consular authority and travelers' accounts. The former was the manifestation of Britain's informal empire in the region, first initiated on the island of Fernando Po in the 1840s and later entrenched in Lagos after 1851; it represented the policy that relied on individual authority and ill-defined political aims while emphasizing the economic advantages of free trade. Among travelers, it was the consul Richard Francis Burton who visited Benin in 1862 and presented, as later scholarship argues, a possibly distorted picture of human sacrifices and moral decay, a significant element in formulating the British image associated with the kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century.

The Niger Coast Protectorate, the other British territory besides the Royal Niger Company in the Niger Delta, was an administrative unit under the Foreign Office that had its headquarters in Old Calabar and some centers in coastal commercial depots like Warri and Sapele. The consular authority extended to the kingdom in 1892 when vice consul Gallwey completed a treaty with Oba Ovonramwen, who had been on the throne since 1888. As some scholars argue, Benin leaders most probably misunderstood the treaty. The British interpreted it as the formal submission of the kingdom to British economic requirements to allow free trade, thus bypassing the Bini middlemen in rubber and palm oil trade, a commodity that was in great demand in the European market after the Dunlop company's invention of the pneumatic tire in 1887. Based on the treaty, there was an increasing pressure from the protectorate to allow the activities of traders in Benin territory. At the same time, it seems, the oba and Benin leaders interpreted these as a growing tendency to penetrate into the kingdom and overthrow its government.

In the protectorate there existed a certain intention to break Benin's resistance by force, a tendency that

had prevailed on the West African coast. In the few years preceding 1897, there was some correspondence between Ralph Moor, consul general of the protectorate and the Foreign Office, indicating his intention to use force against Benin as early as 1895. The Foreign Office turned down the initiative, which prevented both Moor and acting consul James R. Philips from advancing their position by achieving acts similar to those of Gallwey's mission. These personal career aspirations most probably played an important part in the expedition that was ambushed by Benin soldiers in January 1897 and resulted in the death of seven Europeans, including Philips. Although initially launched as a peaceful diplomatic envoy, Philips's mission was, on one hand, without Foreign Office authorization, an issue that was being lobbied by Moor in London. On the other hand, its clear aim was not defined and most certainly was not communicated to Benin authorities. The British party was told that they could not be seen by the oba as there was an important festival, the *Ague* celebrations, going on, during which outsiders were not allowed to see the ruler. Despite warnings, Philips continued his advance. Later investigations showed that Philips probably survived the attack and was taken to Benin City, where he probably either died of his wounds or, as contemporary claims asserted, was executed. Both Moor and Philips overstepped the limits of their authorities when the consul had planned a military action earlier and the acting consul initiated an unauthorized diplomatic mission. The Benin political and military leaders misunderstood the situation, as reports only reached them about the coming of a large party. Although it was not confirmed that they were armed, permanent fears previously induced them to defend the kingdom's independence against an upcoming attack.

The public uproar in England and the subsequent punitive expedition followed a swift wave of actions. In two months' time Benin City was captured by British troops, and the oba and most of his chiefs fled. The city was burned, and ivory was looted to compensate the cost of the expedition. Bronzes, some of the most exquisite and priceless pieces of art of royal Africa, were either sent to the British Museum or auctioned. Museums in Berlin and Vienna acquired a great number of treasures.

Accounts of the city presented images of human sacrifice and bloodshed that, in contemporary arguments, justified the arrival of the British. Alfred Turner was appointed to initiate British administration; his immediate policy was consolidation and the demonstration of peaceful intent, a move that was to bring success when the majority of Benin chiefs and the oba returned. Moor insisted on a trial of the chiefs who were considered to be responsible for the deaths in the

Philips party, as well as a trial of the *oba*. Two chiefs were sentenced to death, while the *oba* was dethroned and eventually deported to Tenerife.

Three war chiefs, including Ologbose, who had been sentenced to death for his participation in the ambush, put up stiff resistance around Benin city, which was only crushed by British military force as late as 1899. The death sentence of Ologbose marked the beginning of long consolidation, now under the amalgamated administration of the Southern Nigerian Protectorate. The native council, consisting of former members of the *oba's* court, acted as administrative middlemen for the colonial government. In 1914 the new *oba* was enthroned, representing the changed British policy in the region—an attempt to implement indirect rule.

The punitive expedition against the kingdom of Benin was in many ways a typical example of the British expansion policy in the 1890s and the 1900s in West Africa. Similar examples of small-scale campaigns directed against independent states and political units that resisted British interests could include examples like the Ijebu campaign in 1892, Jaja's deposition in 1894, or the Ashanti campaign in 1896. The consolidation of colonial southern Nigeria involved many similar actions, like the Aro campaign in 1902 up to 1911, a year when further similar unauthorized actions were prevented by legal measures. It was mostly the members of the previous administration of the protectorate, taken over by the colonial government, who carried out these highly controversial wars. Yet the looting of the Benin bronzes in the palace still remains a controversial issue as well as a bitter memory of 1897 and aggressive imperial conquest and subjugation.


LÁSZLÓ MÁTHÉ-SHIRE

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Benin (Republic of)/Dahomey: Colonial Period: Survey

The Republic of Benin is situated between Nigeria to the east and Togo to the west, along the west coast of Africa. Until 1975, Benin was known as the Republic



Benin.

of Dahomey. The name *Dahomey* derives from the pre-colonial Kingdom of Dahomey, which dominated the trade in slaves between the interior and the Atlantic coast until the end of the nineteenth century. To the northwest, Benin borders Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), while to the northeast it shares a common border with the Niger Republic along the Niger River. The Atlantic coast forms Benin's southernmost limit. With an area of about 113,000 square kilometers, which extends in a north-south direction for approximately 700 kilometers, the modern state of Benin has a population of approximately 6.5 million. Among the largest ethnic groups are the Fon, Aja, and Gun. The population also comprises groups of Yoruba- and Ewe-speaking peoples.

Between the late seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the slave-raiding exploits of the Kingdom of Dahomey dominated the political economy of the "Slave Coast" located between the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) and the Bight of Benin, from which millions of African slaves were shipped across the Atlantic to the Americas. In addition to a standing army of men, the Kingdom of Dahomey was famous for its women soldiers. Dahomey emerged as a leading player in the coastal slave trade by defeating rival states, with the exception of Porto Novo, which became a French protectorate in 1863, hoping to deter Dahomey.

As the campaign against the slave trade and slavery spearheaded by Britain gathered momentum during the first half the nineteenth century, European abolitionists

decried Dahomey for persistently dealing in slaves. In addition, European missionary and travel accounts recorded Dahomey's use of slaves in sacrificial ceremonies to pay homage to the ancestors of the royal family. Recent research, however, indicates that Dahomean leaders were not entirely negligent of respect for human life and made conscious effort to preempt wanton destruction of life. After the French invasion of 1892–1894, which paved the way for the establishment of colonial rule, the slave trade in Dahomey gradually ended as "legitimate" trade increasingly dominated the economy. Agricultural produce, especially palm oil and palm kernels, became the colony's main export.

French conquest led to the deposition of King Béhanzin and the annexation of Dahomey. A French-appointed successor, Agoliegbo, replaced the deposed king; Béhanzin was exiled to Martinique and subsequently died in Algeria, where he had been transferred in 1906. The war with the French decimated Dahomey's female army. Moreover, many slaves were set free following the French conquest. France also extended its jurisdiction into the hinterland so that the new colony occupied a much larger area than the erstwhile Dahomey Kingdom. As in other parts of Africa, the new frontiers resulting from the European "Scramble" for colonies cut across precolonial political and linguistic boundaries. Ewe-speaking peoples and other smaller ethnic groups were split between German Togoland to the west and the French-occupied Dahomey. Similarly, the Yoruba and Borgou states to the east were divided between Nigeria, which became a British colony, and Dahomey.

Colonial rule meant the effective end of Dahomey's political independence. Moreover, it led to the increasing penetration of French commercial interests and eventual domination of the economy. Local rulers, merchants (especially the displaced Afro-Brazilian commercial elite), and common people alike resented French colonial rule. Indeed, resistance to French colonialism in the form of revolts and strikes intensified during World War I, when Africans from all over French West Africa were recruited to fight for France in Europe. In addition, disputes over chieftaincy, some of which French colonial officials failed to resolve, and urban discontent only compounded the numerous problems the colonial regime encountered. In 1923, for example, mass demonstrations took place in Porto Novo (Benin's capital), a thriving coastal city during the colonial period. To a large degree, increasing taxes and dropping commodity prices aggravated discontent among the local population. Colonial administrators, however, downplayed the import of these factors and were quick to blame indigenous intellectuals and Islamic leaders as the chief instigators of local resistance.

In 1904, Dahomey became part of French West Africa, which stretched from the mouth of the Senegal River on the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad in the east. Colonial rule did not stimulate economic development in Dahomey. Instead, the colony's potential income subsidized the regional government of French West Africa headquartered in Dakar, Senegal. Deprived of opportunities to accumulate capital, the people of Dahomey resorted to popular protests, to which the colonial regime responded with characteristic force and brutality. French commercial interests monopolized the palm oil industry, the mainstay of Dahomey's economy during the colonial period. Of course, dependence on primary commodities meant that the colonial regime hardly attempted to stimulate industrial growth in Dahomey. Hampered by limited funds, the colonial government developed only infrastructure, such as roads and railway, to meet its own needs; it also constructed a seaport at Cotonou (Benin's largest city) to facilitate the exportation of local products. Despite an increase in the output of palm products, the cost of running the colonial administration increasingly outweighed the revenue from Dahomey's agricultural exports.

Because of its limited military presence in Dahomey, the French adopted a form of "indirect rule" to govern the southern part of the colony through local representatives, including *chefs de canton*, *commandants* (district officers), and a host of local auxiliaries—clerks, interpreters, nurses, and other medical personnel. African soldiers and the African commercial elite complemented the corps of local administrative personnel. With the *chefs de canton* at the helm of local administration, the *commandants* were in charge of forced labor recruitment, military conscription, and tax collection. A more direct system of rule was practiced in the northern part of the colony.

Dahomey's missionary and state schools produced a relatively high number of educated bureaucrats who served throughout French West Africa. Some of Dahomey's "expatriate" bureaucrats became more active in politics after World War II. Together with demobilized army veterans from the war, they made demands the French government found difficult to ignore. This led to the creation of a territorial assembly in 1946 and the election of Dahomean deputies to the French parliament in Paris. Among other things, Dahomey's emerging politicians were concerned about the recruitment of Dahomean soldiers for France's war in Indochina during the 1950s, forced labor, and, perhaps most important, decolonization. Significantly, the Loi Cadre of 1956 introduced more reforms by not only proclaiming a universal franchise but also expanding the powers of the territorial assembly. In 1958, Dahomey gained administrative autonomy within a French community of West African states (Guinea and

Conakry opted out). Benin eventually gained independence from France on August 1, 1960, with Herbert Maga, a teacher from northern Benin who served in the French assembly, as its first president.

TAMBA M'BAYO

See also: **Anti-Slavery Movement; Benin Kingdom: Nineteenth Century.**

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Benin (Republic of)/Dahomey: Independence, Coups, Politics

Under French influence since the mid-nineteenth century, the territory then known as Dahomey became self-governing within the French community in December 1958, before achieving full independence in August 1960. While electoral politics in the country had begun under French colonial rule, it did imply the dominance of one single political leader during the struggle for independence, unlike the situation in many other French colonies. This was a reflection of the fact that the country was divided into three spheres of influence largely corresponding to traditional loyalties according to regional, ethnic, or religious concerns, with leaders emerging that reflected such divides.

Between 1960 and 1972, mirroring such a state of affairs, personal and regional animosities generated five military coups d'état, interspersed with short-lived civilian governments. Overall, ten different heads of state served during this time. In an attempt to end a period of debilitating political turmoil, a military government was established in October 1972, evolving into a Marxist one-party system during 1972–1975. The government adopted a strongly Marxist orientation from the mid-1970s on, a shift in political orientation reflected in a change in the country's name to the People's Republic of Benin in late 1975.

The years of rule of General Mathieu Kérékou (1972–1990) were primarily notable for the creation of a top-down system under the political leadership of a single legal party, the Benin People's Revolutionary

Party (BPRP). However, the BPRP did not seem particularly revolutionary or popular, especially in the rural areas of the country, where 70 per cent of the population live. The consequence was that some rural communities, primarily comprising peasant farmers, were not well integrated into the formal polity, and, as a result, the central authorities were widely perceived as a form of alien colonialism.

During the 1980s, Kérékou's government privatized a number of state-run companies in an attempt to counter an economic situation characterized by high international indebtedness, serious state-level corruption, and economic problems. Reflecting a weak economic position, per capita gross domestic product was only US\$380 in 1988. Economic problems led to wide-ranging austerity measures, which not only facilitated international aid agreements but also led to social unrest, culminating in the shift to democratic government.

Once again, in early 1990, a change in political orientation led to a change in the country's name, this time to the Republic of Benin. This alteration was delivered at the behest of the National Conference of Active Forces of the Nation, which also repudiated the Marxist-inspired constitution of August 1977. A multiparty constitution was approved by popular referendum in December 1990, and presidential and legislative elections then inaugurated Benin's second democratic experiment. This political liberalization provided an initial step toward a more democratic polity, with the political structure, formerly dominated by the only legal party, the BPRP, replaced by a highly fragmented party system with dozens of parties fighting for the allegiance of Benin's fewer than three million voters. Perhaps surprisingly, despite the plethora of parties, there were few preelection debates in 1991 about economic policy, with the competing parties failing to offer alternative economic or development agendas to the package of International Monetary Fund-sponsored economic reforms that was the price of continued foreign economic support.

Five years later, not much seemed to have changed: before and during the 1996 elections no substantive policy issues were publicly debated. This state of affairs was facilitated by the fact that the regime of Nicéphore Soglo, who had taken power in 1991, saw fit to ban all political transmissions and radio programs with a "political slant" on the grounds that they might not be in the "national interest." The outcome was that—despite ditching the one-party state dominated by the BPRP—the political system that took its place, despite a clear degree of political liberalization, was not one that seemed calculated to gain and keep the allegiance of Benin's voters. This was especially true in many rural areas that were notable, in many places,

for the virtual absence of modern amenities such as good roads, clean water, and the adequate provision of state-provided health, education, and welfare programs.

On the one hand, Benin's democratizing credentials were most clearly rooted in the fact that the country managed to hold two, orderly and relatively peaceful, rounds of free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections during the 1990s. While the parliamentary polls were inconclusive with, on both occasions, a large number of parties acquiring limited amounts of seats, the second presidential election of 1996 produced a second consecutive defeat for an incumbent president. By establishing the principle of alternation of leaders in office, this appeared to bode well for eventual democratic consolidation. The situation was given piquancy by the fact that Kérékou, the country's unelected president from 1972 to 1991, was chosen as president in the 1996 elections, having lost power five years earlier to Nicéphore Soglo.

At the end of the 1990s, Benin presented a politically complex mixture of continuity and change. Apparently, Kérékou was undeterred by this rich irony, for in the 1996 elections he was able successfully to present himself as the democratic alternative to Soglo, although he had support from all the dictators in the surrounding countries. The return of Kérékou to power emphasized how little had changed in the country politically, despite two recent democratic elections. While Soglo's administration had been successful in some ways (for example, in managing to reverse to some degree the dramatic economic decline under Kérékou), it had shown itself to be willing to rely too much on old-style dictatorial politics and, as a result, lost popular favor. As during Kérékou's two decades of rule, the timbre of politics under Soglo showed that political power was still largely a function of ethnic affiliation, with religious allegiance also an important factor in deciding which individuals enjoyed political power.

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**Benin, Republic of (Dahomey):
Kérékou, Mathieu (1935–)**

Former Military Leader and President of Benin

The adoption of the Marxist doctrine by Mathieu Kérékou in his first stint as ruler of Benin condemned his administration to utter contempt and a number of political problems. Kérékou, born on September 2, 1933, in Kouarfa village in the Vattitingou Local Government Area of the northeastern state of Atacora, Dahomey (the previous name of Benin), first assumed the mantle of leadership as president of the military revolutionary government and as head of state in 1972. There was nothing in Kérékou's education that suggested any exposure to or admiration for Marxism. On the contrary, the dominant field of his education was Western philosophy. He attended Saint-Louis Secondary School in Senegal; the Military Training College in Frejus, France; and Saint Raphaël Military School, also in France. In 1960, Kérékou joined the French army. The following year he enlisted in the Dahomeyan Army. He was made the aide-de-camp to Hubert Maga, Dahomey's first postindependence president. He held this post from 1961 to 1963, when Maga was overthrown by the army.

From the mid-1960s on, Kérékou became involved in the high-level corruption that characterized the political terrain in Dahomey. In 1967, he took part in the military coup that displaced President Christopher Soglo. Thereafter he became the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council from 1967 to 1968. In 1968, a civilian government was restored under Emile-Dersin Zinsou, who was to serve as president of the republic for five years. Between 1970 and 1972, Kérékou was commander of the Quidah paratrooper unit and deputy chief of staff. In 1972 he was made minister of planning. Not content with being in the shadows, Kérékou led a coup in October 1972; for the next seventeen years, he was an absolute military dictator.

The president brought considerable change to the political and economic character of his country. In 1975, he changed the country's name from Dahomey to Benin. Communism became a state-approved ideology, and all foreign enterprises were nationalized; as a result, most foreign investors, particularly the Europeans and Lebanese, left the country.

As an absolute ruler, Kérékou dissolved all political structures and drove all democratic groups and every form of opposition underground with a ferocity that

was uncommon even in Africa. Michael Aikpe, the man who had spearheaded the 1972 coup, met a tragic death in Kérékou's detention camp based on a trumped-up charge that he was having an affair with Kérékou's wife. In 1973, Majors Jean Baptiste Hacheme and M. Chabi Kao were jailed for dissidence. Two years later, Kérékou sentenced Captain Jamie Assogba and Betin Boma, former minister of finance, to death for opposing him. In October 1975, 11 others were sentenced to death for plotting against Kérékou.

By 1977, however, the opposition had had enough of Kérékou's antics. Exiles, aided by foreign mercenaries, landed at the Cotonou airport and attempted to seize power. The attempt failed, but it provided ample opportunity for Kérékou to clamp down on opposition; several exiled individuals were sentenced to death in absentia.

In 1979, Kérékou began to regard democratization as a viable option of political development. However, his initial attempt at democracy was to hold an election in which he was the only candidate. By 1989 the failure of his Marxist socialist doctrine was all too apparent; he had no option but to renounce it. Demand for reforms and unpaid back wages had led to serious disaffection among the people.

The unrelenting protest against Kérékou's regime crystallized into the convening of the 1990 Sovereign National Conference, which was mandated to work out a new modus operandi of governance. The conference, presided over by Dr. Nicéphore Soglo, an intellectual and former International Monetary Fund expert, was the first of its kind in Africa. Initially, Kérékou did everything he could to frustrate the convocation of the national conference, but it held against all odds. The constellation of interests and open agitation for a change in the political process eventually culminated in multiparty elections. In 1991, Kérékou was defeated and Soglo was sworn in for a five-year term as president.

The former president bowed out and went into a sort of voluntary political exile in his home region. In spite of his tyrannical antecedents, it is interesting that Kérékou refused to use the incumbency factor to his advantage during the process of transition to multiparty democracy. Indeed, he was credited with the wisdom of reading the trend of events correctly and so did not exploit it to perpetuate himself. Also curious was the fact that, although Kérékou was an absolute ruler for seventeen years, his people never associated him with affluence. He lived a simple life in and out of office.

Five years after he was rejected by his people, Kérékou, who had been popularly called "the Tiger of Atakora," reappeared on the political scene. His return was as dramatic as his exit had been. In the 1996 presidential elections he presented himself as a candidate. In the first round of the elections neither Soglo, who

was seeking reelection, nor Kérékou received the necessary 53 per cent of the vote. A runoff election was held in March 1996, at which time Kérékou received 54 per cent of the vote and thus declared the president elect. But the incumbent president, after alleging electoral irregularities, refused to concede defeat to the former dictator. The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court, which upheld the result of the runoff elections and declared Kérékou the winner and president elect. On April 4, 1996, in a colorful ceremony that Soglo refused to attend, Kérékou was sworn in as the democratically elected president of Benin.

OLUTAYO ADESINA

Biography

Born on September 2, 1933 in Kouarfa village in the Vattitingou Local Government Area of the northeastern state of Atacora. Attended Saint-Louis Secondary School in Senegal; Military Training College in Frejus, France; and Saint Raphael Military School, also in France. Joined the French army in 1960. Enlisted in the Dahomeyan Army in 1961. Acted as aide-de-camp to Hubert Maga, Dahomey's first postindependence president, from 1961 to 1963, until Maga was overthrown by the army. Participated in the military coup that displaced President Christopher Soglo in 1967. Acted as chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council from 1967 to 1968. Commander of the Quidah paratrooper unit and deputy chief of staff from 1970 to 1972. Made minister of planning in 1972. Led a coup in October 1972, named president of the Military Revolutionary Government and head of state. In 1991, lost democratic elections to Nicéphore Soglo. Stood in next elections, won, and was named president in 1996.

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Benin, Republic of (Dahomey): Democratization, National Conference and, 1990s

In 1991, Benin began to institutionalize democracy and the rule of law. Prior to this, there were no developmental prerequisites for liberal democracy in that country which, for almost two decades, had been ruled

under the tyranny of one man, Mathieu Kérékou. Since his ascension to power, Kérékou had not only instituted an authoritarian rule but had also privatized political power. Benin (formerly Dahomey) had achieved political independence in 1960.

Between 1963, when the first military coup occurred, and 1972, when Kérékou came to power, Dahomey was characterized by political intrigue, mistrust, and instability. The coup led by Kérékou in 1972 was the country's sixth. Between 1972 and 1990, Kérékou held on tightly to the reins of government, brooking no opposition and trampling at will on fundamental human rights. Unfortunately for his people, the period of his reign as an autocratic ruler coincided with the era of the Cold War, when global society tolerated behavior that patently disregarded conventional notions of the rule of law, democracy, and civilized governance. Kérékou (who adopted Marxism as an official state ideology) became a living example of the "sit-tight" school of African leaders. From time to time Kérékou not only succeeded in containing pressures for reforms but also succeeded in establishing the trappings, but not the substance, of democracy. He created an avenue for himself to hold on to political power with the aid of the country's sole ruling party, the Parti de la Revolution Populaire du Benin. His mock attempt at democratizing in 1979 consisted of an election in which he was the only presidential candidate. A similar situation occurred in 1984. But by 1989 things changed.

With the end of the Cold War, Kérékou and other African leaders like him were forced to come to terms with the requirements of the new international order. As demands for democratization and multiparty structures increased in the 1990s, autocracy and dictatorships began to succumb to pressures both domestic and international. Benin was one of the first countries where the demand for fundamental changes became highly vociferous and potent.

The events that turned Benin into an autocratic state were unparalleled even by West African standards. The ferocity with which Kérékou drove all opposition underground effectively silenced any attempts at reform. Even when the opposition succeeded in mustering enough clout to launch a foreign mercenary-aided invasion of Benin in 1977 to topple Kérékou, the reprisals taken by the government against all opposition effectively silenced dissent.

The lack of a competitive spirit in both the economy and politics pushed Benin to the brink of disaster. By December 1989, the failure of Kérékou's Marxist-oriented strategy was all too apparent. The country's foreign debt stood at \$1 billion, with nothing to show for it. Left with no option other than to liberalize the economy, Kérékou renounced Marxism as an official state ideology in 1989.

The renunciation of Marxism and the relaxing of state control over the lives of the citizenry allowed thousands of disgruntled people to openly voice their grievances for the first time. Public servants, employees of the private sector, and teachers who were owed several months of back wages spilled into the streets demanding not only payment but also political reforms in the hope that a change in government would also lead to a better economic future. The looming chaos prompted a group of concerned legislators and citizens led by Robert Dossou, the dean of the faculty of law at the Université Nationale du Bénin, to meet with Kérékou and to advise him that it was only through a de-monopolization of the political terrain, a general amnesty, and an end to all repressive measures that the impending national calamity could be averted. President Kérékou accepted the new challenges and agreed to a multiparty state.

Kérékou presented a decree inaugurating and empowering a committee of eight ministers, headed by Dossou, to convene an assembly of “forces vives de la nation, quelles que soient leurs affinités” (all living forces of the nation whatever their political persuasion) to take part in the construction of a new democratic process. In the aftermath of this decree, a national preparatory committee for the conference was set up and vested with the power to set the agenda for the conference, identify the interest groups, and recommend the number of delegates. The committee came up with a list of 488 delegates representing all shades of opinion in Benin.

In February 1990, a constitutional conference was convened. Those present, representing a variety of opinions, were united by a common goal: to reform the system and remove the incumbent. The conference came up with a series of guidelines for the new political process. It voted into law a constitution that limited the age of the president to between 40 and 70 years. It, delegated powers to the High Council of the Republic, and an interim administration was mandated to conduct elections.

As a result of the new liberal climate, by the time the multiparty elections were held on March 28, 1991, there were as many as 13 political parties. Kérékou was defeated by Nicéphore Soglo, who was sworn in for a five-year term. The victory of the prodemocracy factions in Benin effectively demonstrated the capability of a national conference to engender a sustainable democracy; the situation in Benin was to serve later as a model for other African nations.

The inability of Soglo to actually reform the economy of the hapless country was, however, to cost him his exalted position after his first term. In a surprising development, Soglo lost the presidency to Mathieu Kérékou in the 1996 presidential election. Although

neither Soglo nor Kérékou could muster the required 53 per cent of the votes, Kérékou went on to win the runoff election with 54 per cent. The government, however, contested the provisional results of the election as published by the National Independent Electoral Commission, citing irregularities; nevertheless, the Constitutional Court declared Kérékou the winner, and he was sworn in on April 4, 1996, as the second democratically elected president of Benin. Benin thus symbolized not only a sincere attempt at democratic transition in Africa, but a landmark victory for democracy in the Third World.

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Benue Valley Peoples: Jukun and Kwarafa

The Nigerian Middle Belt is home to numerous ethnic groups, the most notable of which are the Nupe, Baruba, Idoma, Tiv, Ebira, Igala, Chamba, and Jukun. Of these groups, the most enigmatic is the Jukun, who have been associated with the establishment of the powerful but ephemeral state of Kwararafa. Kwararafa became famous in Nigerian history because, between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, it was a terror to the Hausa states and Borno. However, the identification of Jukun with Kwararafa has been questioned, largely because the term *kwararafa* means nothing to present-day Jukun, who have virtually no memories of their allegedly martial past. The weight of evidence seems to indicate that *kwararafa* was a generic term used by the Islamic peoples of the Central Sudan to refer to non-Muslim peoples from the south.

Today, over a dozen ethnic groups, scattered over a wide area of northern and central Nigeria, claim ancestral linkages with the Kwararafa. This could mean that Kwararafa was a confederacy. At the core of this were the Hausa-speaking Kutumbawa-Abakwariga, as well as the Arago, Kalam, Gwana, Pindiga, Kona, Kundi, and Jukun. The location of the capital, like the membership of the confederacy, appeared to have oscillated with the vicissitudes of the confederacy and the location of the particular group or groups dominant in it. Organized for specific purposes such as defense and trade, the confederacy had no clearly defined frontier or permanent

geographical location, established no lasting hegemony over the peoples they conquered, and disbanded once their specific aims had been achieved. They left behind no histories or chronicles. Therefore, much of what we know today about them comes from the records of their enemies. The reconstruction offered here is based on the creative use of other sources, such as the chronicles of successor states and peoples, and the historical analysis of spirit masquerades and shrines as well as of political and biological totems.

Pioneering studies by J. B. Webster (1976, 1993) and others show that four phases are discernible in Kwararafan history. The first began with its establishment, around the year 1000, at Santolo, on the southern bank of the Hadeija River, east of Lake Chad. By 1380, the center of the confederacy had moved to Tagara, north of the Gongola-Hawal confluence. Ruled by a Kutumbawa dynasty, Kwararafa rivaled and competed with the Hausa Habe states—especially Kano—for the control of Saharan trade. Commercial and religious antagonisms soon developed into confrontations. In these early encounters, the Habe states appeared to have had the upper hand. According to a Katsina account, Korau, the ruler of Katsina, waged a war against the Kwararafa in 1260. A century later, it was the turn of Kano, whose rulers Yaji (1349–1385), and Kanajegi (1390–1410) successfully compelled the Kwararafa to submit to an annual tributary payment that included, among other things, 200 slaves. Further, defeated in battle by Queen Amina of Zaria, the Kwararafa paid tribute to Zaria for most of the fifteenth century. Their devastating defeat by Bornu, between approximately 1462 and 1495, dramatically brought this first phase of Kwararafan history to a close. Thereafter, the capital shifted to Biepi, on the southern bank of the Benue River.

In the meantime, refugees fleeing from the forces of Islam in the northern states flooded the Kwararafa region, transforming the confederacy into a bastion of traditionalism. Active engagement in both Saharan and Atlantic commerce made this second phase, which ended with the ascension of King Kenjo in about 1610, one of prosperity. With their control of the salt supply of the Benue Valley, they traded this essential but scarce commodity for horses to build up their army, as well as for slaves in order to gain access to European commodities on the coast. Calabar, on the Atlantic coast, became known as the port of Kwararafa.

Increased wealth and a demographic upsurge permitted the establishment of a powerful cavalry army. This would, over the course of the next two centuries (c. 1610–1790), enable the Kwararafa to maintain its independence in addition to inflicting a series of spectacular defeats on the Hausa and Kanuri states and rivals to the north. Zaria was the first to be reduced to tributary status. Between 1582 and 1703, Kano came

under repeated attacks, as its army watched helplessly while a new and reinvigorated Kwararafan army ravaged through the heart of the Hausa country. Katsina, situated farther to the north, did not escape the Kwararafan depredations. By 1680, Kwararafa was at the peak of its power when it once again swept through the Hausa country and its army reached the gate of Ngazargamu, the capital of the Borno empire, which it sacked, putting its ruler to death. Borno, however, soon rallied and the Kwararafan were repulsed.

It was during the final phase of this era of conquest that Kwararafan history began to merge into Jukun history. Now situated in the Benue Valley, Kwararafa began to experience waves of Jukun migrations, and the Jukun before long became the dominant group in the region. Internal dissension and unabated external attacks, combined with natural disasters such as drought, contributed to Kwararafa's decline. The Chamba drove Adi Matswen, generally acknowledged as the last king of the Kwararafa, from his capital at Uka. He fled north across the Benue, establishing a new capital at Wuse.

By 1820, a Jukun dynasty based at Wukari, south of the Benue, had taken control of what was left of the Kwararafa state. With this transformation, the martial state of Kwararafa had finally come to an end. The Jukun inherited the political power of Kwararafa, but not its martial tradition. The far-flung confederacy had become the homogeneous Jukun kingdom of Wukari. Kwararafa under the Jukun ceased to be a warrior state; extant accounts portray the new state as a pacifist and religious one, made up of a collection of unwarlike people solely and strictly devoted to the maintenance of their innumerable religious cults and the veneration of their sacred kings, a people whose prestige and continuing legitimacy depended on their successful performance of their main ritual function, which was to guarantee good harvest and good health for the people.

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See also: Hausa Polities: Origins, Rise; Kano; Niger Delta and Its Hinterland: History to Sixteenth Century; Niger Delta and Its Hinterland: Peoples and States to 1800.

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Berbers: Ancient North Africa

At the dawn of the first millennium BCE, a new cultural development began in the Maghrib as Phoenicians from Tyre, now organized into a robust mercantile civilization, began to settle along the North African coast. The emergence of Phoenician and Roman culture in North Africa created patterns still apparent in the landscapes and societies of the Maghrib: a littoral civilization connected with the exterior Mediterranean world; an interior Maghrib, Berber and largely contained within itself. In antiquity (which in North Africa dates from c. 1000 BCE to the advent of the Arabs in the late 600s CE), a series of external cultures—Phoenician, Greek, Roman, and in many ways, a separate Christian one—built a succession of cultural overlays that fused Berber society and culture with their own. Our knowledge of the Berbers comes largely from accounts (often fragmentary) of them filtered through Punic and Roman histories.

What unfolds is the development of three cultures: (1) the mercantile Mediterranean civilizations of the littoral, which, depending upon their levels of power and defensive organization, had varying reach into the Maghribi interior and fused Berber culture to their own within their perimeter of rule and formed part of the great interconnective cultures of the day; (2) a series of indigenous Berber societies, eventually recognized mostly as kingdoms, the most important of which are the Numidians and the Mauri of Mauritania, who surrounded the Mediterranean civilizations and interpenetrated their histories and who seem to have had levels of organization that competed directly with the Mediterranean cultures; and (3) peoples deeper in the Maghrib (the Atlas mountains and the desert fringe), also Berber, who lay outside the framework of the Mauri, Numidians, and others, whose ethnic names occasionally surface in history and about whose social organization and history we know almost nothing.

Greek and Latin traditions place the earliest Phoenician arrivals (in search of gold and silver) outside the Strait of Gibraltar at Gades (Cadíz) in Spain and Lixus (Larache) in Morocco toward the end of the twelfth century BCE. But the focus of Phoenicia in North Africa became the settlement at Carthage, founded

along the Bay of Tunis sometime around 800 BCE. Here civilization was to flourish for 1500 years, first in its Phoenician form—or as it is called in North Africa, Punic (after their culture) or Carthaginian (after the city)—and then, after the destruction of Carthage at the hands of Rome in 146 BCE, in a synthesis of Punic and Roman cultures. In and around the Phoenician and then Roman settlements, the original North Africans merged with the new, creating a new society in place.

East of the Gulf of Sirte, a similar phenomenon took place as Greek settlements were implanted in Cyrenaica, so named after their principal city, Cyrene, in the land of the people the Greeks consistently identified as Libyans of different, known tribes. From 639 BCE on and the arrival of the first colonists from the Greek island state of Thera, Greek settlements grew in size and scope, absorbing "Libyan" (read: Berber) elements into their culture, which was primarily focused on agriculture and noted for their monopoly export of silphion, an elusive and extinct native plant of the desert steppes used widely in the Mediterranean world for culinary and medicinal purposes. The Greeks of the Pentapolis, or "Five Cities," as Cyrenaica was often known, were annexed by Ptolemy I of Egypt in 322 BCE and by Rome in 74 BCE. Here, as throughout much of North Africa to the west, a thorough synthesis of local and Berber cultures emerged that lasted throughout antiquity.

In the Maghrib, the Berber kingdoms of Numidia (Latin *Numidae*; Greek *Nomades*, and the origin of the word *nomad*)—which extended westward from the boundary of Carthage to the Moulouya River in Morocco; and Mauritania, land of the Mauri, who were in northwest Morocco beyond the river—enter history in a significant way at the time of the First (241–237 BCE) and Second Punic Wars (218–202 BCE).

By the time of Roman friction with Carthage, the Numidians were divided into two kingdoms, the Masaeylii in the west, with their capital at Siga (at the mouth of the Oued Tafna in Algeria) and the Maseylios in the east, whose capital was Cirta (Constantine). The long-lived king of the Maseylios, Masinissa (d. 148 BCE), seeking expansion of territory, fought against first Carthage and then Rome in Spain; he made a secret alliance with the Roman commander and conqueror of Carthaginian territories in Spain, Scipio, to secure his throne against challengers at home. At the Battle of Zama (northern Tunisia) in 202, ending the Second Punic War, Masinissa gained all of Numidia. Masinissa's continued aggressions against Carthage, now prohibited from making war, led to Carthaginian attempts to rearm itself and the subsequent Roman declaration of war against Carthage and its complete destruction in 146.

For the next 150 years, North Africa was largely left to itself, and Phoenician culture continued, and even expanded, among the North African population. Punic alphabetic writing was appropriated by the Berbers at some point, and used in different styles, of which only the archaic *tifnagh* script of the Tuareg persists to the present.

Rome declared the realm of Carthage the new province Africa (named after its indigenous people), constructed the *fossa regia* (royal ditch) to demarcate its boundary with Numidia, and intended to leave the rest of the Maghrib to itself. As time passed, however, internecine Numidian politics led to Roman intervention against Jugurtha, grandson of Masinissa, and the eventual division of Numidia into two parts, east and west. Numidia subsequently became involved in the Roman civil wars between partisans of Marius and Sulla, and then between Caesar and Pompey, and in 46BCE when Caesar invaded the province of Africa, held by the Pompeians, he did so by invading from the territory of the Mauritians; upon his victory, eastern Numidia was annexed to the province of Africa, which then became Africa Nova. Africa Nova was subsequently enlarged with the absorption of Western Numidia and the previously independent cities of Tripolitania.

At the time of Jugurtha, the Mauritanian king Bocchus, deeply involved with the Numidian royal family, betrayed Jugurtha and made a separate peace with Rome in 105BCE. Mauritania then, too, became involved in the civil wars of Rome, and the kingdom was annexed to Rome by Caesar Octavian in 33BCE and then reformulated as a client-kingdom in 25BCE with Juba II of Numidia as king. Juba, son of an opponent of Caesar, had been brought up in Octavian's household in Rome. He established a new capital at Caesarea (Cherchel, Algeria) and received as consort the daughter of Antony and Cleopatra, Selene. Juba's long reign (*d. c.*23) was marked by his deep scholarly interests. Juba wrote a compendium in Greek (which is long lost) on the geography of Africa and Asia. He sent missions to distant territories and left his kingdom to his son, named Ptolemy in honor of his mother's Egyptian-Macedonian heritage. Caligula convoked Ptolemy to Rome in 40BCE, however, and murdered him, annexing Mauritania in the bargain. This brought all of the coastal Maghrib, Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica under direct Roman control, where it remained in varying size and administrative arrangements until the collapse of Roman power in the early 400s.

The littoral populations of northern Africa, already profoundly influenced by Punic civilization, underwent a gradual Romanization. Rome expanded agriculture and trade; the cities of North Africa expanded in number and size. Roman settlers were encouraged

to populate the provinces of Africa and Numidia, and considerable flow of people entered and exited North Africa to move across the mercantile and administrative arteries of empire. Wheat and olive oil were exported in large quantities, leading to the naming of North Africa as the "granary of Rome." Latin replaced Punic as the vernacular in the cities; in the countryside, Berber held sway. Roman life reached a high point, both in wealth and geographic control, under rule of the emperors of the Severi (193–235), themselves a dynasty of African origins. Eastern Algeria and Tunisia were densely urbanized and Romanized in every way; Morocco, by this time the province of Mauritania Tingitana, was Romanized far less, in effect in a small triangle from Lixus to Volubilis to the Tangier Peninsula. Mauritania was reduced in size even further following a retreat ordered by Rome in 285.

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See also: **Carthage; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire.**

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Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884–1885

The International Conference held in Berlin between November 1884 and February 1885 was convened because relationships between the great powers of Europe seemed, for the first time, likely to be seriously affected by the activities of their representatives on the

West African coast. As competition for access to possible export markets intensified, governors of British and French colonies were making treaties with African rulers that granted political rights over increasing lengths of the coastline, and covering their administrative costs by imposing customs duties. The British claimed that, provided such duties were not discriminatory, they did not infringe the principle of free trade; others did not agree.

Three areas became problematic during 1884. The British feared that France might aspire to monopolize the trade and navigation of the Congo River, recently explored; on February 26 they made a treaty with Portugal, recognizing old territorial claims covering the mouth of the Congo in return for guarantees of complete free transit and trade. France in turn feared a British monopoly of navigation on the Niger, where Goldie's National African Company was in process of buying out its French competitors. And in Namibia, where the German trader Lüderitz wished to establish a settlement, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck was greatly irritated by Britain's reluctance either to guarantee him the protection of the Cape Colony government or to authorize Germany to impose its own protectorate.

In October 1884, the French and German governments issued formal invitations to a conference in Berlin. There was a crucial diplomatic subtext; both governments were tentatively exploring a possible rapprochement in their European policies. The agenda of the conference was more limited:

- i. Freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths of the Congo.
- ii. Application to the Congo and the Niger of the principle [based on the Vienna treaty of 1815] of free navigation on international rivers.
- iii. The definition of formalities to be observed in order that occupation on the coasts of Africa shall be effective.

Twelve European governments were represented, together with the United States and the Ottoman Empire. Liberia, the only West African state with diplomatic credentials, was not invited. But the interests of Leopold II's International Association of the Congo, shortly to become the Congo Free State, were closely watched by both Belgian and American delegates.

The General Act that the participants agreed to on February 26, 1885, did not partition Africa, nor did they intend it to do so. Their common aim was to find a legal framework that might allow the capitalist world to pursue the development of African resources with a minimum of international friction over tariffs or territory. Free trade in the Congo (which Britain's contentious treaty had been intended to secure) was

defined in precise and binding terms. Within a vast area defined as the Conventional Basin of the Congo (extending from the watershed of the Nile to that of the Zambesi, and toward the Indian Ocean) it was agreed that imports of any origin should be free of taxation. There might be exceptions for duties to compensate for "expenditure in the interests of trade," but these were to be nondifferential. These provisions served the interests of leading exporters—notably, Britain, Germany, and eventually the United States—in securing the "Open Door," and were to restrict the future fiscal policies of a dozen colonial governments: the British, French, German, Portuguese, and Belgian.

They did not, however, prove effective in preventing restrictive monopolies over natural resources. Perhaps the most fateful decision at Berlin was made outside the formal sessions of the conference; here Leopold II of Belgium so skillfully manipulated his diplomatic relationships as to secure recognition of his International Association as a political entity with sovereign rights over much of the Congo Basin. Each of the powers was persuaded that Leopold's personal rule would guarantee its future commercial interests more securely than any of the other contenders. But his Congo Free State did not effectively serve other professed aims of the delegates: to promote civilization, combat the slave trade, and protect African interests.

There was general acceptance of the principle that navigation on the Congo and its tributaries should be open to ships of all nations on equal terms, though France and Portugal offered some resistance to the proposal that this regulation should be supervised by an international commission. Britain undertook to apply similar principles to the navigation of the Lower Niger; but since the nation could claim by 1884 that no foreign governments or companies held rights on that part of the river navigable from the sea, no commission was established to enforce this.

Having agreed to these patchy and imperfect safeguards against the extension of protectionism in Africa, the conference tried to define procedures which might minimize future diplomatic squabbles over territory. Article 34 stipulated that any power taking possession of land, or establishing a protectorate, on the African coastline should give notice to the other signatories; Article 35 declared that the occupation of territory (though not, at Britain's insistence, the establishment of a protectorate) implied an obligation to establish an authority to protect existing rights and freedom of trade. Since most of the coastline was already subject to such claims, the direct effect of these provisions was very limited.

The conference can perhaps best be understood as a largely abortive attempt to impose some sort of international law on what—it was already possible to

predict—would be a rather lawless “scramble” to appropriate African resources. For a few more years European governments remained reluctant to assume the costs of extending their control to the hinterland of their coastal possessions; but once they did, Articles 34 and 35 did not prove easy to apply to their relations with one another. On relations with Africans the Berlin Act said nothing concrete, and its statements of humanitarian intent, however sincerely intended, had negligible immediate effect. The most that can be said is that a few Europeans continued to believe that African development might be most effectively and economically undertaken by cooperation among themselves and that some sense of their responsibility as international trustees remained on the agenda of the antislavery movement, of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

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Bhambatha Rebellion, 1906

The Bhambatha—or Poll Tax—Rebellion was an uprising by Zulu-speaking Africans against the colonial government in the British colony of Natal in 1906. It was significant for southern African history in two main respects: It was the last major uprising—by the Zulu or any other southern African peoples—organized within the vestiges of precolonial African political structures, and it helped persuade whites in Natal and in Great Britain's three other southern African colonies to form the Union of South Africa. For the Zulu themselves, the rebellion indicated that Zulu ethnic identity was spreading, as many people who had hitherto been opposed to the Zulu king now rallied around him.

The main proximate cause of the Bhambatha Rebellion was the decision in 1905 by Natal's settler-dominated government to impose a £1 poll tax on all adult males except those who paid “hut tax” or were under terms of indenture. In practice, this meant that all adult male Natalians paid the tax except married,

non-Christian Africans and Indian indentured servants. As the tax was not indexed according to income, it was severely regressive and hit the poorest households hardest.

It was not just the imposition of the tax that caused Africans to rebel, however, but the fact that the tax was introduced at a moment of economic crisis for most Africans. Several factors contributed to this. First, an increasing number of European landowners were evicting their African tenants and choosing to farm the land themselves. Second, these evictions led to serious overcrowding on the small areas of land reserved for Natal's African majority. Third, the 1880s and 1890s brought a series of ecological disasters to Natal, including droughts, locust plagues, and, worst of all, an 1896–1897 epidemic of the cattle disease rinderpest that wiped out more than 90 per cent of the colony's cattle. Fourth, the South African, or Anglo-Boer, War of 1899–1902, which created economic boom conditions within Natal, was immediately followed by a severe economic slump. Finally, in 1904 Natal's government opened more than two and a half million acres of African-occupied land to white settlement, exacerbating overcrowding on the African reserves. All these factors dealt a serious blow to the Africans' ability to pay the new tax in addition to the old ones.

While these material stressors were perhaps necessary preconditions for the rebellion, they were in and of themselves the cause. In fact, right up to the eve of the rebellion the same factors had succeeded only in pitting Africans against one another, leading to endemic feuding in rural Natal. What the rebellion also needed was a motivating and unifying ideology, which came in the form of loyalty to the deposed Zulu king Dinuzulu. When the British released Dinuzulu from government custody in 1898, millenarian rumors about him began to circulate among Africans throughout Natal. According to the rumors, Dinuzulu, in league with other prominent Africans, was conspiring to launch a rebellion that would overthrow the colonial government and expel the white settlers. The rumors spoke of the supernatural forces that Dinuzulu would use to accomplish these ends, but they also called on Natal's Africans to unite and prepare to participate in the rebellion. There was some irony in this, for many of the same communities that rebelled in Dinuzulu's name in 1906 had fought for the British against the Zulu king in 1879, thereby contributing to the British conquest and dismemberment of the Zulu kingdom.

The imposition of the poll tax provided an ideal focus for this emerging ideology of unity through loyalty to a rebellious Zulu king. Immediately following the promulgation of the tax, and especially once tax collection commenced, young men throughout the colony engaged in spontaneous demonstrations replete

with aural and visual allusions to the Zulu king. In most places chiefs and other elders tried to rein in their young men. In the Thukela Valley and the Natal Midlands, on the other hand, there was no shortage of African patriarchs willing to lead the young men into rebellion.

The rebellion proceeded in several stages. From January to March 1906, there were frequent demonstrations at poll tax collection assemblies, culminating in the deaths of two white constables in the Natal Midlands on February 8 and the declaration of martial law the following day. Just when it seemed the rebellion was over, Chief Bhambatha and his followers in the upper Thukela Valley initiated a small guerrilla war with colonial forces from April 3 onward. Bhambatha's rebellion only ended with his death and the routing of his followers at the Battle of Mhome Gorge on June 10. This was followed by another rebellion led by Chief Meseni in the lower Thukela Valley from June 19 to July 11. Finally, colonial forces spent the rest of 1906 rooting out small pockets of perceived resistance on a "shoot first, ask questions later" basis. In terms of African casualties, this last stage was the bloodiest of the war, leaving 3,000 to 4,000 African rebels dead, versus 24 whites and 6 Africans fighting on the colonial side. Ironically, in 1908 a special colonial court cleared the Zulu king Dinuzulu of any role in inciting, planning, leading, or fighting in the rebellion.

Although Natal's white settlers managed to crush the rebellion and to inflict far more damage than they suffered, the rebellion nevertheless convinced many whites throughout South Africa that they would have to unite in order to maintain white supremacy. Each of South Africa's four settler-dominated colonies (Natal, the Cape of Good Hope, the Orange River Colony, and the Transvaal) was too small and weak for whites to have much confidence in their chances against future African uprisings. Neither did most South African whites feel they could rely on the British government to bail them out, for they considered British attitudes toward South African blacks to be too liberal. South Africa's white legislators thus decided to pool their resources by uniting to form the Union of South Africa in 1910.

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See also: **South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910.**

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Biafran Secession: See Nigeria: Biafran Secession and Civil War, 1967–1970.

Bigo: See Great Lakes Region: Ntusi, Kibiro, and Bigo.

Blantyre

With a population of about half a million, Blantyre, Malawi's largest city and commercial capital, is named after David Livingstone's birthplace near Glasgow, Scotland. Nestled in the Michiru, Ndirande, and Soche Hills, the city is also traversed by the Mudi River, which for a long time was its main source of water. Being in the Shire Highlands, Blantyre has a mild climate and, though today large-scale cultivation within the city is not practiced, its soils are fertile and rainfall adequate. It is a recipient of the cool and moist chiperoni winds that between May and August blow from Mozambique into southern Malawi, bringing with them rains during the dry season.

It is not surprising therefore that this was the home of the industrious Mang'anja under their ruler, Kankomba, conquered in the late 1860s by the Yao from Mozambique, who were in the process of establishing themselves all along the eastern side of the upper Shire region. Kankomba's authority was replaced by that of the Yao chief, Kapeni, who in 1876 was to host Henry Henderson and his guide and interpreter Tom Bokwito. Henderson was a member of a party of Scottish missionaries who had arrived in the Lake Malawi area to set up operations in memory of David Livingstone. Shortly afterward, Henderson was joined by other Scottish missionaries, clergymen, and laymen. Africans, mostly workers and students, also came to live near the mission, and descendants of early employees such as Lewis Bandawe and Joseph Bismark, both originally from Mozambique, still live in Blantyre. As more permanent buildings were constructed, the character of the place changed, and the mission station became a major center of activity in the Shire Highlands.

In 1878, a Glasgow-based firm, the African Lakes Company (ALC), established a base two miles from the Blantyre mission, just across the Mudi River; it was jointly managed by brothers Fred and John Moir. As the ALC's operations spread the length and breadth of the Lake Malawi region, their headquarters—which, like the company itself, came to be popularly known as Mandala—became a hive of activity. Mandala became a major employer of mission-trained and unskilled

Africans, and of former lay missionaries who had served their contracts. Among the latter were John Buchanan and R. S. Hynde, of the Blantyre and East Africa Company and also founding editor of the first newspaper, the *Central African Planter* and, later, the *Nyasaland Times*, which would become the voice of the European settler community.

After the country became a British protectorate in 1891, Europeans arrived to join the colonial service and, though most of them went to Zomba, the administrative capital, Blantyre remained the commercial and social center. In 1894, the ALC started banking services. At the invitation of the European community, the Standard Bank of South Africa had established a branch in the town in 1901; hotels also opened and, in 1894, Blantyre was declared a town, with a Council of Advice and a town clerk. Informal segregation became a feature of the town, with different races mixing little except in work situations. European residential areas were different from African ones and, as Asians from the Indian sub-continent settled in the town (originally as government employees and later mainly as retail traders), they lived in their separate areas. Even as the number of “coloureds” (people of mixed race) increased, they, too, lived in their own communities.

Five miles west of Blantyre, a small urban center was developing at Limbe. Although firms such as the British Central Africa Company (BSAC) were active in Limbe, which became a town in 1905, its growth greatly benefited from three principal factors: it was the main operating base of the Imperial Tobacco Company; the headquarters of the railways; and a predominantly Asian retail commercial center. Like Blantyre, Limbe had electricity and piped water systems, mainly in the European areas, by the end of World War I. Most Africans lived in villages around Blantyre but, as space became a problem with the arrival of more Africans, new informal settlements, such as Ndirande, began to develop. In the 1920s and 1930s, the two town councils had recommended that more African residential sites be identified, but only in the 1940s and early 1950s were they built. Among these were Soche, Kanjedza, and Naperi.

The Great Depression of the 1930s adversely affected all business in Blantyre, but with more overheads and cash investment, African businessmen faced particular hardship. Many people lost their livelihoods. Some recovered by the beginning of World War II, whereas others did not recover until after the war.

Blantyre was greatly affected by the 1949 famine, which devastated most of Malawi. The people managed to survive because African traders bought food from farmers far from the town.

In 1956, Blantyre and Limbe amalgamated under one mayor and, three years later, the Blantyre-Limbe Council became a municipality.

During the months leading to the declaration of the state of emergency on March 2, 1959, Blantyre was politically tense, primarily because it had become a pivotal point of advocates of decolonization; it was the headquarters of the main African political organization, the Nyasaland African Congress, and Dr. Banda returned to Malawi to live there. It was also the territorial base of the mainly European procolonial and the pro-Central African Federation movement, the United Federal Party. Hundreds of Africans detained under the emergency regulations were housed at a center at Kanjedza, Limbe.

The constitutional changes leading to the general elections of 1961, which ushered in an African-dominated government, were also reflected in the municipal government of Blantyre. In 1963, an eminent Asian lawyer, Sattar Sacranie, was elected the first non-European mayor; two years later, John Kamwendo became the first African mayor.

As more development aid came in and as Blantyre’s prosperity beckoned investors, more buildings were constructed, greatly changing the landscape of the city. Roads were widened and extended; the national stadium, site of major celebrations, was enlarged to accommodate an additional 10,000 people. The University of Malawi opened in Blantyre in 1965. One of its constituent colleges, the Polytechnic, was a major structure on the Blantyre-Limbe road. On a hill in the Mitsidi area, the government built the Nsanjika Palace, which became the main residence of the country’s president. Although government departments were in the capital in Zomba, they also had branch offices in Blantyre.

Throughout the 1990s, Blantyre continued to attract people who sought employment and a better life and, by the end of the decade, its population was 500,000, causing much pressure on services such as water and electricity. Another major problem for the city’s social services was the increasing number of orphans, who had lost their parents to AIDS. In spite of these problems, Blantyre has remained a vibrant and friendly city.

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See also: **Malawi.**

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Blyden, E. W. (1832–1912)

Educator, Scholar, Diplomat, Politician

Edward Wilmot Blyden became a leading figure in the fields of academia, politics, and black nationalism in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the 1850s to his death in 1912. Blyden's scholarly themes and his brand of black nationalism were fundamentally influenced by his experiences with the Western world.

Although they lived in a slave society, Blyden's parents were free and professional. His mother, Judith, taught in a primary school, and his father, Romeo, served as a tailor. The Blydens were accepted by their Jewish and English neighbors in Charlott-Amalie, the capital of the Virgin Islands. They worshiped in an integrated Dutch Reformed Church in St. Thomas. It is there that Edward also began his primary education. The family left for Porto Bello, Venezuela, in 1842, which contributed to Edward's fluency in Spanish. His acquaintance with the fact that menial tasks in Porto Bello were mostly done by blacks helped to give rise to his black nationalism.

After the family returned to St. Thomas in 1845, Edward Blyden attended school, but received subsequent training as a tailor from his father. His considerable intellectual ability was recognized by Reverend John P. Knox, a white American who served as a pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church in St. Thomas. Against this background, young Blyden was encouraged by the pastor to study oratory, literature, or theology in the United States, and he left St. Thomas for America in 1850. This was followed by his attempt to enroll at Rutgers Theological College, where Reverend Knox had received his training; Blyden was denied admission because he was black, and this too would contribute to his black nationalistic stance. His departure from America on the vessel *Liberia* on December 21, 1850, for Liberia, a country that had been established in 1822 by the American Colonization Society (ACS) for African Americans, was a manifestation of Blyden's nationalism. It was further bolstered by the fact that he now lived in a black-led country that was independent, at least in theory.

Such black nationalism, like that of nearly all Westernized blacks in the nineteenth century, is best described as a synthesis of opposites. Although Blyden praised African civilizations like the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Abyssinia, Egypt, and others, he accepted the description "dark continent" that was employed by white officials of the ACS and Europeans to justify their "civilizing mission" in Africa. He also held the view that the enlightenment of Africa should be carried out by Westernized blacks. Against this backdrop he maintained

that Liberia should be extended to include the area that became part of modern Ghana and Dahomey. Further, while Blyden condemned the settler elites of Liberia for their superior attitudes toward the indigenous people, he participated in the military actions taken against the Via and Kru ethnic groups of that country in the 1850s. Indeed, he later portrayed the defeats of the two ethnic groups as part of God's divine plan.

Blyden disliked the Liberian mulattoes because he felt they disliked dark-skinned blacks, yet he married Sarah Yates, a very light-skinned settler Liberian, in 1856. Blyden also wanted the settlers to interact with Muslims and other nonsettler Liberians. Nevertheless, he did not view such interaction as a means of bringing about a pluralistic Liberian society; rather, he saw it as a vehicle of assimilating the nonsettlers to the ACS-introduced American values in Liberia. Although he admired attributes of Islam and indigenous African values such as polygamy and communal modes of production and ownership, Blyden continued to be strongly committed to his acquired Western values throughout his life in Liberia and Sierra Leone. His black nationalism and concepts of building a powerful black country were greatly informed by European scholars such as J. G. von Herder, Giuseppe Mazzini, Count A. de Gobineau, James Hunt, and G. W. F. Hegel. His black nationalist sentiments were also contradicted by his strong support of the ACS, which was evidently racist and paternalistic. Mary Kingsley, who believed that blacks were inferior to whites, was portrayed by Blyden as among Europe's leading philosophers. Although he frequently condemned the Liberian settlers for behaving like white Americans, Blyden continued to be a great admirer of Britain throughout his life. In fact, he became a strong supporter of British imperialism in Africa, for he felt that such imperialism would enlighten Africa.

Evidently, Blyden was one of the leading champions of black people in the nineteenth century. Black pride and the rights of black people to determine their own destiny were among the dominant themes of his many publications and speeches from 1851 to 1912. His black nationalism and Pan-Africanism were, however, fundamentally informed by his favorable and unfavorable experiences with the Western world. It is no wonder that his activities in and worldviews on Liberia and Sierra Leone, like those of other Westernized black nationalists and Pan-Africanists, were contradictory.

AMOS J. BEYAN

See also: **Liberia.**

Biography

Born August 3, 1832 in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Family lived in Porto Bello, Venezuela from 1842 to

1844. Visited the United States in 1850, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to enroll at a theological college there; left for Liberia that same year. Following his graduation from Alexander High School in Monrovia, Liberia, became editor of the *Liberia Herald*. Published his first major pamphlet, *A Voice from Bleeding Africa*, in 1856. Was ordained as a Presbyterian clergyman in 1858, and appointed principal of Alexander High School twice between 1858 and 1877. Represented Liberia in Britain, in the United States at the Court of St. James, and in France. Taught at and served as president of Liberia College and as Liberian secretary of State. Ran an unsuccessful attempt for the presidency of Liberia in 1885. Visited Freetown, Sierra Leone and Lagos, Nigeria several times between 1885 and 1905; Pan-Africanism and black nationalism were the dominant themes of his many publications and speeches from 1855 to 1906. From 1906 to 1912, lived mostly in Sierra Leone. Died in Freetown on February 7, 1912.

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Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa

By the time British colonial authority became entrenched at the Cape of Good Hope in 1806, a cordon of Boer settlement stretched eastward, about 200 kilometers wide, as far as the Great Fish River. According to the 1797 census there were only about 22,000 free white farmers in the entire colony. Although the word *Boer* is a Dutch term for farmer, the basis of the Boers' economy was the raising of cattle and short-haired fat-tailed sheep. The typical Boer farm was more than just a family affair. It was a little community headed by the patriarchal head of household, his wife, their children, and perhaps a few relatives. It often included as well some *by-wohners*, whose principal responsibility was the supervision of a workforce composed of a slave or two, and servants, many

of whom had grown up on the property. The language of this little community had, by the nineteenth century, evolved from Dutch into a specialized dialect that came to be known as Afrikaans.

The expansion of this population was largely the result of private initiative. The former Dutch East India Company's governors had, on many occasions, tried to confine the Boers within prescribed frontiers. The government had contributed little or nothing to their well-being or defense. Boers on the frontier had evolved their own system of offensive warfare based on formations of horsemen. They would advance on their enemy, fire their muskets, then gallop away to a safe distance in order to reload before advancing again. They called this system of military action the "commando system" because it originated in a command to assemble. By the early nineteenth century, the commando system had become an institutionalized method of warfare. It was employed not only as a means of defense but also as a terrifying method of assault. It was also the means by which children could be captured to work on Boer farms. When the British took the Cape, they seized upon the commando system as a cheap way of consolidating their hold on the frontier districts. British governors always needed the Boers more than the Boers needed their governors.

When the advancing line of Boer settlement reached the realm of the Xhosa people, it ground to a halt. Further settlement east was effectively blocked. Expansion to the north was likewise halted for some time by the resistance of the San people, or "bushmen," who compelled Boer settlers to retreat from the lands they had claimed in the Sneeuwberg Mountains. By the 1820s, however, some Boers were discovering new pastures for their animals north of the Orange River near the lower end of the Caledon River. The way for their entry into this territory had been paved by people very like themselves, the so-called Griqua, who though they were of mixed racial descent spoke Dutch. They relied on herding for their livelihood, and used their horses and guns to attack and rob the people they met. Like the Boers, they had waged wars of extermination against the San; like the Boers they captured children. Their disruptive entrance into the lands north of the Orange River created a wave of terror among Sotho and Tswana people of the Highveld regions, thus opening a way for others to follow.

At first, the Boers were a transient presence in those lands, using the pastures but establishing few permanent dwellings. The Cape government forbade their settlement north of the Orange but tolerated the occasional back-and-forth movement of these *trekboers* and their herds. (*Trek*, meaning "pull," was the word wagon masters shouted to their oxen at the beginning of a

journey.) In the 1830s a series of events multiplied their numbers. First there were reports of rich lands lying vacant in Natal. Boers who accompanied Andrew Smith's expedition to Zulu territory in 1832 marveled at the vast grasslands they saw. Further private expeditions confirmed that new realms of settlement might be opened by negotiation or determined commandos. The abolition of slavery in 1883–1884 created resentment among slaveholders, who complained at the amount of compensation paid to them and the method used to pay it. More resentment was caused by the frontier war of 1834–1835. The government raised Boer commandos to fight the Xhosa, taking them away from their farms and families for a long period of time without pay. When Governor D'Urban announced the annexation of a large tract of Xhosa lands, many Boers looked to him for compensation for their forced military service. When the annexation was disallowed by the British government, a torrent of shrill criticism poured out from both Boers and British settlers in the eastern districts. Many Boers were determined to leave the colony, with or without permission, and to find new lands to colonize on the Highveld and in Natal. They sold their farms, fitted out their wagons, and trekked across the Orange with their retinues of relatives, ex-slaves, children, and servants.

The British government lacked the will to stop what they called "the movement of the emigrant farmers." The movement into the interior was almost entirely a movement of the eastern districts of the Cape. Very few middle-class or wealthy Boers joined the trek. No ordained minister could be persuaded to go with them. Many British officials privately let it be known that they condoned the emigration. British colonists in the eastern districts frankly cheered the movement on, hoping for fresh annexations of territory.

African rulers, of course, knew the trekkers were coming. Chiefs in the Caledon River Valley greeted them warily, but allowed them to pass through their territories without a challenge. However, Mzilikazi, king of the Ndebele, sent a party south to attack a trekker encampment and seize its cattle. The Boers retaliated with a vicious raid against the Ndebele settlement of Mosega, where many women and children died. More calamities marked the progress of the trekkers into Natal. The Zulu king, Dingane, prepared a trap for trek leader Piet Retief in February 1838 and dispatched soldiers to attack the Boer encampments and steal their cattle. The trekkers fought back in the battle they called Blood River (December 16, 1838), where 3000 Zulu died. Eventual victory in the war against the Zulu came after the defection of King Dingane's brother, Mpande, and many Zulu regiments in September 1839. After Mpande's forces routed Dingane, he and the Boers agreed that the boundary

between their respective domains should be drawn at the Tukhela River. The trekkers now constituted themselves the independent Republic of Natalia.

By this time, however, the Cape government had become alarmed that the mayhem that had accompanied the great emigration would adversely impact on their own position on the eastern frontier. They also feared that an independent government in charge of the potentially important harbor at Port Natal could threaten their customs revenues as well as their strategic maritime interests on the route to India. In 1843 they annexed Natal.

Meanwhile, the friendly relations initially established between the trekkers and the African chiefs of the Caledon River Valley had soured. Instead of merely moving through the territory en route to other destinations, many Boers began to claim land for themselves. They also tried to exploit existing rivalries among chiefs in the area, such as Moshoeshoe of the Basotho and Sekonyela of the Tlokwa. As tensions mounted, the British again intervened. They first concluded a treaty with Moshoeshoe (1843), then attempted to define an incontestable boundary between the trekkers and African domains. When these measures failed to end tit-for-tat skirmishes and commandos, a new Cape governor, Sir Harry Smith, led a military expedition into the territory in 1848 and declared all the lands occupied by the Boer trekkers to be annexed to the crown as the Orange River Sovereignty. For Smith, who had served in the war of 1834–1835, the annexation was the vindication of D'Urban's policies.

Once again the British government stepped in to revoke annexations. The Sand River Convention of 1852 conceded sovereignty to Boers north of the Vaal, and by the time of the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 the same rights were extended to settlers between the Vaal and Caledon rivers. Eventually these two territories were recast as the South African Republic and the Orange Free State; they became important building blocks of the system of apartheid which dominated South Africa in the twentieth century.

At the time of these agreements, most of the Boer settlements were in the Free State, where the introduction of thick-fleeced merino sheep laid the foundations of a new economy. North of the Vaal the trekkers were concentrated in a handful of widely scattered tiny villages, leaving much of the territory they claimed still effectively in the hands of African governments.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the growth of ethnic community sentiment among the white, Afrikaans-speaking population of South Africa caused the movement into the interior to be reinterpreted as the "Great Trek." The trekkers were celebrated as the *Voortrekkers*: nationalist patriots who had cleared a path for their countrymen to follow.

NORMAN A. ETHERINGTON

See also: Difaqane on the Highveld; Mfecane; Natal, Nineteenth Century; Pedi Kingdom, and Transvaal, 1822–1879; Lesotho: Treaties and Conflict on the Highveld, 1843–1868.

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Boer War: *See South African War.*

Boganda, Barthélemy (1910–1959)

Founder, Central African Republic

Barthélemy Boganda is best known as the founding father of the Central African Republic and as an advocate of equatorial African unity, but he was also the first African priest from the colony of Ubangi-Shari, the first Ubangian to serve as a deputy in the French National Assembly, and the last president of the Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa.

Boganda was born in about 1910 in Bobangui, a village in the Lobaye River Basin of what was then the French colony of Moyen Congo. For administrative purposes, the date of his birth was later registered as April 4, 1910. Very little is known about Boganda's early years except that his father was murdered at about the time of his birth, and his mother was beaten to death by the agents of a concessionary company for not collecting enough rubber.

In about 1920, a French colonial officer took Boganda and some other orphans into his custody. Boganda was sent to a Catholic mission school and then a primary school at the St. Paul's Mission in Bangui, the capital of the French colony of Ubangi-Shari. It was at St. Paul's, in 1922, that Boganda was baptized and given the Christian name Barthélemy.

In 1931, his Catholic mentors decided to send him to Saint Laurent de Mvolve seminary in Cameroon.

Boganda studied theology and philosophy in Cameroon between 1931 and 1937 and then returned to Bangui where, on March 27, 1938, he was ordained, becoming the first Ubangian priest. For the next eight years, from 1938 to 1946, Boganda served as priest in Ubangi-Shari. During this period he became more outspoken and controversial; he argued with his superiors about the need to initiate more social work programs, and he led personal campaigns against the forced marriage of women, polygamy, and various other "un-Christian" customs.

During World War II, tension between Boganda and his superiors became more pronounced, but in 1946, when Ubangi-Shari held its first elections for deputies to the French National Assembly, Boganda's apostolic prefect, Monsignor Grandin, encouraged him to present himself as a candidate of the Second College, which included only a small number of Ubangians. Father Grandin wanted to prevent the election of a communist or socialist deputy. Boganda won the election and thus became the first Ubangian deputy in the French National Assembly. The First College, including the French citizens living in the colony, elected René Malbrant, a colonial veterinarian who soon became Boganda's most outspoken critic.

As a deputy in Paris, Boganda initially associated himself with the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), a new Catholic centrist party that posed a serious challenge to the strong socialist and communist parties of the postwar era. It soon became apparent, however, that the MRP was not really supportive of Boganda's efforts to end the abuses of the colonial regimes in Central Africa, and so Boganda turned his attention to the promotion of cooperatives and the establishment of a new political party in Ubangi-Shari. In 1948 he started the Cooperative Society of Ubangi-Lobaye-Lessé (Socoulolé), and in 1949 he launched the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN), the goal of which was "the complete development of the black race and its liberation by means of progressive and peaceful evolution."

Boganda's persistent exposure of the mistreatment of Central Africans and his active promotion of local cooperatives in Ubangi-Shari so annoyed his opponents that they attempted to end his career by having him convicted of breaking the law. Efforts to depict Boganda as a criminal and to have his parliamentary immunity removed increased in the period leading up to new elections in 1951, but these attempts made Boganda even more popular with the Ubangian voters. Thus, in spite of strong opposition by colonial businessmen, administrators, and missionaries, in 1951 Boganda was reelected to serve as a deputy in the French National Assembly. Then, in 1952, the MESAN gained control of the new Territorial Assembly of Ubangi-Shari, which chose Boganda to serve as one of

its three representatives to the new Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa in Brazzaville.

In 1955, some members of the expatriate business community in Ubangi-Shari established the Ubangi Liberal Intergroup (ILO), which allied itself with Boganda's MESAN. One of the ILO's leaders, Roger Guérriot, formerly one of Boganda's fiercest opponents, concluded a pact with the deputy, according to which one-half of Ubangi's seats in the French National Assembly and one-fourth of its seats in the local Territorial Assembly would be reserved for European members of the ILO.

In 1956, Boganda was reelected to serve in the French National Assembly; he was also elected mayor of Bangui and president of the Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa in Brazzaville. As president of the council, Boganda became more vocal in his criticism of the French colonial administration. By this point, Roger Guérriot and his colleagues appear to have convinced Boganda that businessmen could play a critical role in the economic development of the territory, while colonial administrators would continue to impede progress. In other words, capitalism would bring economic development if it was released from government control.

In 1957, French Equatorial Africa was administratively reorganized to include a French high commissioner in Brazzaville, territorial heads of governments, government councils composed of ministers, and territorial assemblies with expanded powers. In March of 1957, Boganda's MESAN party won every seat in Ubangi's new territorial assembly, and every electoral district elected at least one European chosen by Guérriot and his ILO colleagues. Boganda stayed out of the new government but handpicked its ministers, who served on a council whose president was still the French governor of the territory.

Boganda chose two members of his own Ngbaka ethnic group, David Dacko and Joseph Mamadou, to serve as ministers, and he chose Abel Goumba, who belonged to the closely related Gbanziri ethnic group, to serve as vice president of the council. However, Guérriot was put in charge of both administrative and economic affairs, and soon gained Boganda's support for an "economic salvation" plan that envisioned dramatic increases in the production of export crops. Several members of the MESAN who voiced opposition to Guérriot's impractical schemes were accused of being communists and had their names removed from the party's membership list. These politicians published a pamphlet that accused Boganda of being "the toy of Guérriot and the other whites of the ILO."

Boganda's intolerance of political opposition became more evident in 1958, when he stated that "any political campaign would be considered a provocation to disorder and must be severely punished." He spoke ominously

of using a machete to "get rid of the proponents of all political activities which are not in the interest of our country," and he toured the country making passionate speeches about the need for farmers to work harder in order to increase the new nation's production of cash crops. New animators were sent out to "encourage" greater production of cotton, though *enforce* would be a term more accurate for describing their actions.

Also in 1958, French president Charles de Gaulle announced that all French colonies would vote on whether to join the French Community or obtain complete independence without any further ties to France. Ubangi-Shari voted to join the French Community, membership in which Boganda described as "independence within interdependence." Interdependence meant, in part, that France should provide substantial assistance to the territory because the former colonial power was, in Boganda's words, "responsible for the harm she has done here and she must make amends."

By this time, Boganda was becoming increasingly aware that Guérriot's plans to attract private capital were attracting ridicule instead, and so he transferred responsibility for administrative affairs to Dacko and asked Goumba to take over management of the government. Boganda then turned his attention to promoting the idea of a unified Central African state "with French language, inspiration and culture." He argued that Central African unity was needed to prevent the establishment of small states with high administrative costs, and because of the growing threats of communism, Pan-Arabism, and the so-called Yellow Peril.

Boganda's effort to establish a united state in equatorial Africa was undermined by French opposition, by African politicians determined to retain their power, and by the opposition of richer territories unwilling to subsidize the poorer ones. Boganda accused his opponents of being "traitors to the African family" who gave a yes to joining the French Community but a no to African unity.

On November 28, 1958, the territorial assemblies of the French Congo, Gabon, and Chad voted to become separate member states of the French Community. On December 1, 1958, Boganda proclaimed the establishment of the Central African Republic and became its first head of government. His new French-style parliamentary regime announced that elections would be held on April 5, 1959.

On Easter Sunday (March 29, 1959), while Boganda was returning to Bangui from a campaign trip to Berberati, his plane exploded and everyone on board was killed. Investigators found clear evidence that a bomb had caused the explosion, and other evidence also suggests that Boganda was assassinated, but no definite proof has ever been found to link his death to any specific suspects.

Boganda's death transformed him into a martyr and national icon whose ideas are often treated with reverence, particularly by politicians who claim to be his heirs. Thus, the controversial nature of his leadership has been largely ignored. As a deputy in the French National Assembly, Boganda was an eloquent and relentless critic of the mistreatment of Central Africans by colonial officials and businessmen, and he overcame the opposition of many powerful interest groups to become the leader of Ubangi-Shari's independence movement. He also made a heroic effort to prevent the "Balkanization" of Central Africa. However, Boganda eventually became intolerant of political opposition, formed an alliance with opportunists in the local business community, backed unpopular and impractical economic development schemes, and, as an ardent assimilationist, shared many of the cultural prejudices of Europeans of his era.

RICHARD BRADSHAW

See also: **Central African Republic: Colonial Period: Oubangui-Chari.**

Biography

Born in about 1910 in Bobangui, a village in the Lobaye River Basin of what was then the French colony of Moyen Congo. In about 1920, was taken with some other orphans into the custody of a French colonial officer, and was subsequently sent to a Catholic mission school and then a primary school at the St. Paul's Mission in Bangui. From 1924 to 1931, attended seminaries. Ordained on March 27, 1938, and served as a priest in Ubangi-Shari from 1938 to 1946. Won election to the French National Assembly in 1946. In 1948, started the Cooperative Society of Ubangi-Lobaye-Lessé (Socoulolé) in 1948, and in 1949 launched the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa. In 1956 was reelected to serve in the French National Assembly, and was also elected mayor of Bangui and president of the Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa in Brazzaville. On December 1, 1958, proclaimed the establishment of the Central African Republic and became its first head of government. On Easter Sunday (March 29 1959), while returning to Bangui from a campaign trip to Berberati, the plane exploded, resulting in his death and the deaths of everyone else on board.

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
Bongo, Omar: *See Gabon: Bongo, Omar, and the One-Party State, 1967 to the Present.*

Bono: *See Akan States: Bono, Dankyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.*

Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Origins and Rise, Fifteenth Century

The establishment of the Borno sultanate was carried out in the fifteenth century by the ruling Sayfawa dynasty. It was preceded by the arrival of the Kanem court, under Mai Dunama Dibalami (about 1210–1248), in that area. From that point, Borno served as the central province of the Sayfawa polity in spite of the fact that several Mais continued to reside in the Kanem capital of Djimi.

The great instability in their original homelands, caused by threats from the Bulala warrior aristocracy of that region, caused the last decisive shift of the Sayfawa from the Kanem area to Borno. The movement of the dynasty to this well-developed province (generally portrayed in literature of the time as a monumental event), had occurred during the reign of the *mai* (sultan) 'Umar bin Idris, who settled in the town of Kaha (Kaka or Kawa), which appears to have been the first capital of Borno. This territorial loss did not affect the future development of the empire to a serious extent, since losses in the east were largely compensated for by earlier gains in the west.



Borno, fifteenth–eighteenth centuries.

In the fifteenth century, the Sayfawa dynasty wandered up the banks of the Komadugu Yobe River. On its banks they built a series of temporary capitals such as Wudi, Birni Kime, and Yamia (Muniyo). Rulers of the Sayfawa dynasty were provided from the Magomi. The Magomi are believed to have been the most numerous Kanuri-speaking people, of those who migrated into Borno after the collapse of the Kanem polity.

Throughout the fifteenth century and beyond, the various Magomi settlements were distributed from Zinder and Munio in the northwest to the Gamergu area in the southeast, and from the Komadugu Yobe Valley in the north to Deia and Mabani in the south. Also with Magomi came various clans, such as the Ngalma Dukku, the Kai, the Tura, various sections of the Kanembu and other smaller groups.

The first mai to reign in the fifteenth century was Bir bin Idris, who was known by the name of ‘Uthman. We know from al-Qalqashandi that this Mai had a friendly relationship with a Mamluk sultan of Egypt; at least, there was a letter sent from the Borno court to the Egyptian sultan Zahir Barquq.

During the reigns of the further 13 mais, stretching from about 1421 until 1465, there were constant feuds between the Dawud and the Idris dynasties. The inter-dynastic rivalry seems to have been associated with the problem of tracing lineage and descent caused by the fact that sons of Dawud were kindred to Bulala tribes on the mother’s side, rather than sons of Idris. This caused lingering dynastic conflicts, although the later Borno chroniclers reinterpreted it as the Bulala wars. It was the continuity of “the Dark Ages” for the Sayfawa dynasty. Sometimes mais had not reigned more than a year before being killed by their rivals. Concurrent with these wars were encounters with the Kwararafa (Jukun), Kebbi, Songhai, and the continual rebellions of the so-called Sao tribes in the south.

By the end of the fifteenth century the situation had changed. The Sayfawa and their clan, Magumi, had obtained sovereignty to the southwest of Lake Chad, and under a series of able monarchs established their kingdom of Borno as a great power in the Sudan. The first of these rulers to organize and establish a powerful state was Ali Ghajedeni, the 48th sultan of the Sayfawa dynasty. He built a new capital called Birni Ngazargamo (“the walled fortress”) at the north end of Bornu, and united this new kingdom under his control. Ali is supposed to have reconquered Kanem and reestablished control over the Saharan trade, while making war against Songhai to the west over the east-west trade routes across the Sudan. His reign was followed by a series of others no less notable; these subsequent mais maintained Borno at an apogee of greatness.

The last mai to reign in the fifteenth century was Idris Katagarmabe. By that time, Borno had secured its trading

contacts along the Kawar-Fazzan route. For example, in the late fifteenth century, the mais of Bornu were in touch with the local Banu Makki and Banu Ghurab shaykhs of Tripoli.

Late in the century, the institution of a coruling senior female (*gumsu*), who had been in former times an essential factor in the designation of royal power, had changed. The real power of the *gumsu* was lessened under the influence of the emphasis of patrilineal ideology proliferating among the Muslim Sayfawa. Furthermore, the isolation of the Magomi from other clans must have led to a new system of mai legitimation. This resulted in the change of significance attached to the title of *Gumsu*, and in the appearance of a new female title of *Magira*.

Granted initially to an elder female relative of the mai, the title of *gumsu* was eventually simply given to his wife. Once the new title of *magira* had appeared, the title of *gumsu* shifted to the senior wife of the mai. Both titles were essentially honorific; neither the *gumsu* nor the *magira* took part in formal government activities.

During that time, there had been a steady migration of learned Muslims to the area following the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols. The late fifteenth century is distinguished by the first *mahrams* (charters of privilege) granted by the Sayfawa to a group of *ulama* (scholars). The *mahrams* as written documents confirmed the granting of *hurma* (inviolability) to an *‘alim* (scholar) in return for his promise to pray for the mai and provide him *baraka* (blessings). It was the starting point for further state and *ulama* relations that, in the process of the following ages, resulted in substantial independence for the *ulama* from the mai.

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Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Mai Idris Aloom (1571–1603) Kanuri Ruler of Borno

The greatest and most famous of all the Kanuri rulers of Borno, under whose rule the empire reached the peak of its glory, Mai Idris Aloom came to power after a period of about 25 years when feeble and incompetent rulers sat on the Kanuri throne. He ascended to the throne after a short period during which the reins of government

were held by the queen mother, Magira Aisha, a forceful and influential woman. It was she who saved the young Idris from threats to his life and who, during her regency, instilled into her son the princely qualities of warlike courage and vigor—coupled with justice—that were to prepare him for his work as ruler in later years.

Records indicate that Idris Aloomaa was active at home as a soldier, administrator, and proponent of Islam, while in foreign affairs he was a skilled diplomat and negotiator, corresponding with the major Islamic powers of his days. Much of Borno's success under Idris was achieved by his army, the efficiency of which was greatly enhanced by numerous innovations in the spheres of transportation, supply, armaments, and leadership. Although he was well served by able commanders, it was Idris himself who was the leader and architect of Kanuri victories. Shortly after his ascension, he established diplomatic relations with the rulers of North Africa, especially Tripoli, and from them he was able to obtain muskets and a band of expert Turkish musketeers who helped him train his men and decide the issues of some of his most serious battles. Taking advantage of the numerous caravans who came from North Africa with many Arab horses and camels for sale, he built a large and well-equipped cavalry. As a good tactician and soldier himself, he equipped his troops with arms and saw to their efficient training by the Turks.

With a skillful deployment of his forces, Idris Aloomaa embarked on numerous campaigns of subjugation and empire building in and around the Lake Chad area. Within his kingdom, he subdued the So (or Sao), a warlike people, who had constantly threatened Borno since the reign of Mai Ali Ghaji, one of his predecessors, and captured their stronghold of Damasak. Similarly, he directed his military attention against the troublesome Tetala and Kotoko, whose power and threat he curtailed. He then turned west against northern Hausaland, especially the province of Kano, although his army failed to take Kano city. To the northwest he repulsed the Taureg, whose province of Ahir he successfully dismantled. With these and related military campaigns, he was able to destroy all resistance to Kanuri rule in the Lake Chad area, embark on the unification of Borno, and consolidate his authority in the region.

In the realm of religion, Idris Aloomaa saw the spread of Islam as a duty and a political necessity. He made Islam a state religion for all the notables of Borno as well as his subjects. His own pious conduct set an example for his subjects and encouraged strict adherence to the tenets of Islam. In the ninth year of his reign, Idris Aloomaa undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca, and there he built a hostel in the holy city for the use of Borno pilgrims. His numerous contacts with the Islamic world, including Turkey, earned him great respect throughout that world and helped to increase the prestige of his empire.

Judicial affairs in Borno under Mai Idris Aloomaa were organized in line with the Shari'a, the Islamic code of law. Numerous Muslim scholars from North Africa were attracted to the court, which took on a cosmopolitan character. Partly under their influence, coupled with the sights and experiences of his pilgrimage, Idris introduced a number of reforms that attempted to bring his empire increasingly in line with other Islamic lands. The Shari'a was substituted for customary law in several matters, while the adjudication of cases was transferred from the traditional rulers to the Muslim magistrates, the *qadi*, who also served as legal advisers to the local leaders. Under Idris Aloomaa, learning flourished, as the learned class, or *ulama*, received constant encouragement from him.

Idris Aloomaa built brick mosques that superseded those of reeds, especially in his headquarters at Ngazargamu. Similarly, the process of urbanization received a boost as Gambaru, a town about three miles east of Ngazargamu, is believed to have been built during his reign.

On the whole, Idris Aloomaa increased the prosperity of Borno and the wealth of the citizenry. Trade was boosted as the Kanuri empire maintained an effective control of trans-Saharan trade. His conquest of the Tuareg, in particular, ensured Kanem Borno's control of the important trade route to Tripoli. He brought the second Borno empire to the apogee of its greatness, securing for it the greatest territorial extent and its highest prestige in the entire central and western Sudan. His achievement was more striking as it coincided with the overthrow of Songhai, the counterpart and rival of Borno to the west, which was conquered by the Moroccans at the battle of Tondibi in 1591. It is significant that when the Songhai forces were defeated by the Moroccans, the fugitive Askia Ishaq sought refuge in Borno territory.

After a successful tenure spanning about 32 years, an aging Idris Aloomaa was assassinated when on an expedition in a marsh called Aloo, near Maiduguri, in the northwestern part of present-day Nigeria, during one of his many military campaigns. Much that is known about him today is derived from the detailed records of his chronicler, Ahmad ibn Fartuwa.

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See also: Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Origins and Rise, Fifteenth Century; Religion, History of.

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Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Saifawa Dynasty: Horses, Slaves, Warfare

The Saifawa dynasty (claiming descent from the Yemenite culture hero Saif bin Dhi Yazan of Himyar) first came to prominence in Kanem, the area to the northeast of Lake Chad, between the tenth and eleventh centuries. After consolidating its position in the lake area by about the twelfth century, the influence of the dynasty expanded as far north as Traghan in the Fezzan (present-day Libya) by the thirteenth century. This was a remarkable feat in that Traghan is about 1,380 kilometers from Njimi, the capital of Kanem under the Saifawa.

However, the fortunes of the dynasty gradually began to wane so much that Kanem had to be abandoned for Borno, the area to the southwest of Lake Chad, in the fourteenth century. Situated in the Lake Chad Basin, Borno has been inhabited by pastoral and agricultural peoples since the beginning of the common era. Following the establishment of Gazargamo as a capital (in the confluence of the Yobe and Gana rivers) along the boundary of the present-day republics of Niger and Nigeria in the second half of the fifteenth century CE, the Saifawa dynasty witnessed a rebirth under Idris Alauma (c.1564–1576). For instance, under him, Borno's influence reached as far as Kano in Hausaland, as far north as Dirku and Agram in the central Sahara, as far east as the Shari River, and as far south as the Gongola River Valley.

This expansionist phase in the history of Borno, characterized by extensive military campaigns, was followed by what might be termed as a period of consolidation under the immediate successors of Idris Alauma. But decline set in from the mid-eighteenth century, culminating in the invasion of Borno by Fulani jihadists in the first decade of the nineteenth century. This event subsequently paved the way for a dynastic change, with the Borno rulers inviting a Muslim cleric, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, to assist them in ridding their territory of the Fulani menace. Having reigned for nearly 900 years, first in Kanem and later in Borno, the Saifawa dynasty was one of the longest ruling dynasties in the world.

Since its establishment by Ali bin Dunoma (also known as Ali Gaji) in the fifteenth century, the Borno sultanate relied upon the use of conquest and diplomacy to bring new groups within its fold. Militarism, especially

during the Idris Alauma period, was revolutionized with the inclusion of Turkish musketeers, camel corps, and the use of canoes. The adoption of the scorched-earth policy incapacitated the enemy to the extent that surrender to the mighty Borno army was eventually ensured.

Given the crossroads position of Borno in terms of both trans-Saharan and trans-Sudanic trade, the acquisition of horses strengthened its cavalry, thus increasing the potency of the sultanate to engage in further warfare. Apart from locally bred ponies, Borno was well situated to replenish its stock with supplies from North Africa and from the Bahr al-Ghazal area, to the southeast of Lake Chad. Besides serving as an important status symbol, horses were needed by large states such as Borno for military purposes. Indeed, Borno's horsemanship was cultivated using similar methods to those of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt. The popularity of Borno in horsemanship is usually attested to by the common Hausa saying, "An kara wa Barno dawaki" (meaning, literally, "taking horses to Borno for commerce is synonymous with taking coal to Newcastle for sale").

Notably, there seems to have been a close relationship between the slave and horse trades and warfare in the sultanate. The demand for slaves, especially from the Muslim countries of North Africa and beyond, encouraged warfare for procuring this human merchandise. Though not every military campaign had the demand for slaves as its main aim, most encounters ended up in the acquisition of slaves as booty. The demand for slaves for export and for domestic use was further increased in a region like Borno, with limited items for foreign markets in the precolonial period. Leather, ostrich feathers, and ivory were important trans-Saharan exports from Borno. But slaves surpassed all other items throughout much of the precolonial period. And apart from their significance in the domestic, political, military, social, and economic life of the state, slaves were almost always crucial in trans-Sudanic trade between Borno and other neighboring states. It is perhaps worth noting that enslavement of non-Muslims was justified by Islam, and virtually all military campaigns against members of the other faiths were regarded as holy wars (jihad) in the cause of expanding the Islamic domain. Therefore, in analyzing warfare in the Borno sultanate under the Saifawa, one cannot help but see a corresponding close interconnection between the trade in horses and the trade in slaves, with all three converging at one level. The connection between the horse and slave trades lay in their relation to war. Horses were valued principally for their use in warfare, and were possibly especially useful in the pursuit and capture of fleeing enemies—that is, in securing slaves. Slaves, on the other hand, were most readily obtained through capture in warfare. The exchange of horses for slaves therefore tended to become a circular or

reinforcing process: horses were purchased with slaves, and could then be used in military campaigns that yielded further slaves and financed further purchases of horses. Thus, trade and war reinforced one another in a self-sustaining process that in turn sustained the domination of the warrior aristocracies.

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See also: Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Mai Idris Alooma; Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Origins and Rise, Fifteenth Century.

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Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The dynastic list, *Diwan of the Mais of Borno*, indicates eleven *mais* who reigned during these two centuries. Borno traditions claim that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a decline of the power of the sultanate. It is said that the state was becoming weak and overburdened with pomp and rituals celebrating the mai. However, this may have been a reinterpretation of Borno history by the new dynasty and their followers, who would naturally have played up the failures of the previous Sayfawa regime when they took over in the nineteenth century.

There is certainly evidence of many successful military campaigns during this period. At the time, Borno retained a widespread reputation as a great kingdom. Evidently, Borno had sustained contact with various other civilizations. For example, communication between Borno and Turkey was sustained for two centuries.

This is not to imply that Borno enjoyed friendly relations with all its acquaintances and neighbors. The northern trade route was increasingly threatened, as Tuareg and Tubu raiders attacked the northern boundaries of Borno and harassed the caravans with greater intensity than before. Under Mai Ali ibn Hajj 'Umar there were troubling developments in relations with both the Kwararafa (Jukun) and the Tuareg; both enemies were simultaneously besieging Birni Ngazargamu. At

the same time, the Borno army suffered several defeats at the hands of the Mandara. They were also severely attacked by the growing numbers of Fulbe and Shuwa Arabs settled in the Dikwa area. There were long famines under various mais throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was also recorded that in the middle of the eighteenth century Borno attacked Kano, Katsina, Gobir, and Zamfara.

During this period Borno was actively involved in trade with the surrounding south regions. The main products were cotton, Manga salt, ivory, and Islamic books. Beginning in the late seventeenth century, Borno traders gradually replaced other merchants on alternate routes linking Borno to the south and the east. By the eighteenth century, elephant hunters from Borno had founded settlements north of the Benue Valley, to begin the ivory trade. Borno cotton weavers settled in the Adamawa region. From there they produced and traded woven strips, the latter being necessary among the local tribes for use as ritual items.

The power of the mai became strongly centralized and newly symbolic during this period. The ruling mai appeared in public in a cage, which only his most trusted servants could approach. He rarely led military expeditions himself. Turkish author Evliya Celebi relates that while traveling, the ruler of Borno covered his face and eyes in front of strangers. All this, while resembling the practices of non-Muslim Sudanic rulers, easily coexisted with Islam and its practitioners, which was increasingly influential given the rise of Muslim education. The mai of Borno was considered the *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) or even *khalifa* (caliph).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the granting of *mahrims* (charters of privilege) closely resembled a juridical practice meant to distribute *hurma* (inviolability) and other privileges among the Muslim community. In this context a special status of *mallemtis* (settlements established by mahram holders) should be outlined: mallemtis afforded mahram holders a large degree of autonomy in the social system of Borno.

The increase of mallemties and augmentation of the Muslim community in Borno resulted in the appearance of a large and powerful social group that soon (early in the nineteenth century) would play a crucial role in the decline and the end of the Sayfawa dynasty.

In an educational context, "the inviolability of the mallemtis apparently attracted a large number of students and provided a stable basis for the conduct of educational activities during the Sayfawa period and beyond" (Bobboyi 1993, p.198). The high degree of deeply rooted Muslim education among Borno society can be confirmed by a copy of the Qu'ran written in Arabic, found in Borno and dating to 1669.

The mahram institution was open to individuals regardless of race or ethnicity; thus, it afforded Muslim

scholars (and their relatives and ethnic group) a means of integrating into the mainstream Borno society. The population of the region was increasing rapidly at this time, and many were eager to reap the benefits of membership in greater Borno society. Various peoples were moving into Borno; simultaneously, residents of Borno were expanding into the neighboring regions. The Borno people (the future Kanuri) were spreading west, east, and south with a consequent sociocultural influence on the indigenous people of those regions, which encouraged the emergence of new peoples including the Babur, Gude, and Mandara.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Borno's expansion and integration into the surrounding areas was so considerable that some patterns of Borno's administrative system, warfare patterns, official titles, and Islamic tradition were adopted by the very different polities situated throughout the Mega-Chad region.

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
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Botswana: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial

Precolonial Botswana was populated by several ethnic groups scattered throughout the country. In the south were the so-called First People of Botswana, otherwise known as the Basarwa (Khoisan), the Bakgalagadi, and the Batswana. While these groups were initially close, they later became stratified, with the Batswana being the dominant group, followed by the Bakgalagadi and the Basarwa. The Basarwa were *malata* (servants) of the Bakgalagadi while the latter were under the Batswana, who enjoyed the privileged position of controlling both groups. However, not all the subjugated groups were under the Batswana. A substantial number fled to the remote areas of the Kgalagadi desert to maintain their independence. By 1820, most of what is now southern Botswana was controlled by the militarily strong Batswana groups of the Bakwena and the Bangwaketse.

Like the Basarwa, the Bakgalagadi are composed of various groups and have lived in southern Botswana for many years. These groups include the Bakgwatlheng,



Botswana.

Babolaongwe, Bangologa, and Bashaga. The Baphaleng, another group of the Bakgalagadi, could be found in the northern part of the country, having broken away from the Bakgwatlheng in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

By the seventeenth century, the Bakgwatlheng were firmly established at the Dithejwane Hills near Molepolole, where they were found and eventually defeated by a Batswana group of the Bakwena. The Bakwena not only made them *malata* but also made them pay tribute. Some ran away to Hukuntsi, farther toward the desert, where they earned a reputation for their trading and work in skins.

By 1790, the Bangwato and Bangwaketse had consolidated themselves, subjugating many other groups in the process. The Bangwaketse, under Kgosi (Chief) Makaba II, had built their capital at Kanye, while the Bangwato, under Kgosi Mathiba, settled near the Shoshong Hills. Meanwhile, the original Bakwena remained around the area of Molepolole under their despotic leader, Motswasele, who was later executed by his own people. By 1820, the Batswana were fairly established in the southern part of the country, raising cattle and farming. They also traded with other groups in the north in copper and grain.

The northern part of what is now Botswana was distinct from the south in terms of population by virtue

of its population being non-Tswana. Among the people inhabiting this northern region were the Bakalanga, Basarwa, Bakgalagadi, Bayeyi (Wayeyi), Hambukushu, Babirwa, and Batswapong. The few Batswana lived in the present Central District of Botswana and included such groups as the Bangwato, Bakaa, Batswana, and Bakhurutshu.

By 1817, the Bangwato under Kgosi Kgari emerged as a strong *morafe* (nation) because it incorporated most other conquered groups. The Basarwa were, like those in the south, made malata.

The Bakalanga, one of the largest non-Tswana group of Shona descent, lived in the northern region of present Botswana for more than 1,500 years. By 1450, the Bakalanga had formed a powerful kingdom called Butwa under their king, Mambo, and they traded with the Portuguese in the east coast. The Bakalanga are really a conglomeration of different peoples; those linked to the Butwa Kingdom before 1680 are Balilima, while the immigrants are Banyayi. The Butwa kingdom attracted immigrants of the likes of the Bapedi and Babirwa, who later adopted the Bakalanga culture. By 1840, the Bakalanga were dominated by the Amandebele of Mzilikazi and later by the Bangwato.

Other groups in the north included the Batalaote, who were originally Bakalanga after they had split from Banyayi. Their leader, Dalaunde, had moved with his followers and sought refuge from the Bangwato in Shoshong, where they adopted the Setswana language and became an integral part of the Bangwato. The Batswapong are another group found in the north, around the Tswapong Hills. Originating from South Africa, some were Bapedi, while others were Transvaal Ndebele. Although they lived in scattered villages, each with its own leader, they fell under Kgosi Maletse, a Ndebele leader. Sometimes they were called Bamaletse, but they are not related to the Baletse of Ramotswa. They were skilled ironworkers; they also traded iron goods.

Another large group found in the north were the Wayeyi (Bayeyi) who migrated to Ngamiland area from Zambia. Wayeyi were “fish people,” and they traveled around the Okavango Delta in their *mekoro* (canoes). Although they had an overall ruler, he did not conduct much power. They avoided war, and lived peacefully with their neighbors. They cultivated grain on the river banks and specialized in trapping hippopotamuses; they traded in fish and grain with the Basarwa but also traded with the people of Angola.

The Hambukushu also lived in the Okavango area. They kept cattle, farmed, and traded in all kinds of goods. By 1800 they were living along the Okavango River, stretching to Angola. Some Bakgalagadi—notably the Bangologa—were found in Ngamiland. The Batswana made them malata, but most sought

independence by running away. They later became the neighboring Hambukushu.

In the 1830s, the Bakololo and the Amandebele invaded the Batswana *merafe* (nations). As a result of the invasion, some communities were completely ruined, others were weakened and scattered, and still others, facing starvation, turned on one another for survival.

The Amandebele also terrorized the Batswana, after being routed by the Boers of the “Great Trek” when they had moved west and northward. The Amandebele leader, Mzilikazi, not only captured and incorporated the Batswana into his group, but made them pay tribute in the form of grain and cattle. Many Batswana *merafe* lost their lives.

For a time, peace and prosperity returned to the Batswana. The peace was short-lived, however, as the Batswana faced another foreign threat: the Boers. Prosperity was still possible due to trade between the Batswana and European traders from the coast. The Batswana sold game products such as ivory in return for guns. The Batswana needed and used the guns to defend themselves against the Boers, the Amandebele, and the Bakololo. The missionaries—notably Dr. David Livingstone—encouraged the Batswana to trade not only in guns but also in European goods such as cloth and plows.

The Batswana employed the guns they acquired from the Europeans at the battle of Dimawe, which was fought against the Boers in 1852–1853. The Boers were intent on expanding and acquiring Batswana lands, using the Batswana as free laborers on their farms, and above all, taking away the Batswanas’ guns. Sechele of the Bakwena was the hero of the Batswana as he not only withstood the onslaught of the Boers but also repelled their attacks at the Battle of Dimawe. The missionary Livingstone was accused by the Boers of arming Sechele and the Bakwena; the accusation may not have been unfounded.

After the Boer threat subsided, the Bakwena and the Bangwaketse emerged as powerful kingdoms due to their control of the trade in local game. They also took in refugees who escaped Boer domination. These included the Bakgatla-ba-ga-Kgafela, the Batlokwa, and the Baletse, though all three groups later asserted their independence. Although there were intermerafe wars, by the 1880s the groups had established cordial relations in the face of European threats to the region.

In the northwest, the Batswana emerged as a powerful kingdom under their various leaders, Mogalakwe, Letsholathebe, and Moremi II. They expanded their territory by conquering other peoples in the area, including the Wayeyi, Habukushu, Khoe, Bakgalagadi, Ovaherero, and Basubia (Bekuhane). Like their southern counterparts, they controlled the ivory trade, which brought them guns, in turn making them more powerful. The

Batswana also established the *kgamelo* (bucket) system, which was based on lending herds of cattle to various headmen who in turn became servants of the *kgosi*. A system of *bolata* (servitude) was also instituted whereby conquered groups worked for the Batswana without pay.

The Bangwato emerged a powerful group between 1840 and 1885. The Bangwato exerted dominance over various other peoples in the area, including the Bakalanga, Batswapong, Babirwa, Bakaa, Bakhurutse, Bakgalagadi and Basarwa. The Bangwato also used the *kgamelo* system and conquered groups such as the Basarwa, who were subjected to slavery under a system of *bolata* (serfdom).

The Bangwato, having survived the attacks of the Amandebele and Bakololo, were, by 1840, involved in ivory trade with traders from the coast. Their capital, Shoshong, became an important commercial center linking the north with the south. Sekgoma I, then *kgosi* of the Bangwato, not only controlled his neighbors, but dominated the trade route. In the 1870s his son Khama III was baptized by the missionaries; he thereafter introduced Christian ideals among his people before he became *kgosi* in 1875.

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Botswana: Missionaries, Nineteenth Century

Protestant evangelical revivals spread across Europe in the late eighteenth century, resulting in the formation of mission societies dedicated to spreading Christianity to non-Christian lands. In Southern Africa, mission societies began proselytizing at the Cape from roughly 1800 onward, gradually extending their way ahead of formal imperial control into the interior. By the 1820s, the London Missionary Society (LMS) and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society were working near the Orange River among the Thlaping and the Rolong, more southerly settled Tswana groups. Robert Moffat began work among the Thlaping in 1821. Missionaries from these societies forayed forth into what is today Botswana. Mission work there was disrupted by the *difaqane*, the internal skirmishes and fights that had origin in the chaos caused by European and Griqua slave-raiding as well as the northerly movement of Mzilikazi's Ndebele, fleeing from incorporation into the expanding Zulu state.

By the 1850s, the LMS had settled among the Ngwato, the Kwena, the Ngwaketse, and the Kgatla. Tswana chiefs invited missionaries to live with them with the intention of using missionaries as unpaid diplomatic aids (to negotiate for guns with the Cape and the Boer republics), but the result of such encounters was often very different from what these chiefs anticipated.

One of the first Tswana chiefdoms in Botswana to display an interest in missionaries was the Kwena, under their chief Sechele. Sechele had welcomed the LMS missionary David Livingstone's settlement near the Kwena capital in the 1840s, and through this connection had built up the Kwena supply of firearms to the extent that they were able to repel a Boer invasion from the Transvaal in 1852. In a bid to stave off further attacks from the Boer Republic to his east, Sechele acquired the services of five Hermannsburg Society missionaries in 1857, whom he hoped to use as diplomatic aids and as aids in the purchase of guns. However, the association of these missionaries with the Boers made them unpopular, and they left soon after.

Before leaving, the missionaries came into contact with some of the Ngwato royal family, in exile as a result of an internal coup during the late 1850s. Khama and his brother Kgamane, sons of the Ngwato chief Sekgoma, gained further exposure to Christianity during this period. When Sekgoma reasserted his control of the Ngwato chiefdom and returned to his capital city, Shoshong, he requested his own missionaries. In 1859 Heinrich Schulenburg, a German from the British colony of Natal, came to work among the Ngwato. In 1860 Khama was baptized, and in 1862 he and Gobitsamang Tshukudu were joined in first Christian marriage ceremony among the Ngwato, rejecting the bride chosen as part of Khama's previously arranged traditional marriage (Landau 1995, 12). In 1862 the Price and MacKenzie families arrived to become the first permanent LMS missionaries among the Ngwato. Under Khama, who promoted Christianity probably as much for material as spiritual reasons, the missionaries prospered and Christianity became more widespread, as greater numbers of people became adherents. Converts rejected Tswana customs and practices, causing rifts within the chiefdoms. In particular these occurred between Khama and his father, the former ultimately assuming rule over the Ngwato in 1875. This rule, which included Khama's promotion of Christianity, was to last until 1925. By this point Christianity, first brought by the missionaries, was well-established in Botswana.

Christianity and the missionaries brought the Ngwato into preeminence within Botswana. On the basis of a union forged between missionaries and the Ngwato, the latter established themselves as legitimate representatives of the Tswana to the British government when Botswana

was annexed as the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885. Support for Ngwato policies and the promotion of Christianity came particularly from women.

This account of missionary influence in modern Botswana glosses over the cultural and ideological implications of missionary work. Missionaries to Africa have been described as agents of imperialism, encouraging the destabilization of African societies and their loss of independence to colonizing powers. More recently it has been suggested that this subordination was not only political, but cultural. According to John and Jean Comaroff (1991), exposure to missionaries and Western culture brought about the conversion of the Tswana in ways much more powerful than the extension of political overlordship. Africans were incorporated into a hegemonic European worldview, which ensured their collaboration with the project of modernity. This is believed to have resulted from the outlook and aims of missionaries, who believed not only in the necessity of Christianity but the superiority of European civilization, which they promoted assiduously.

The missionaries who settled among the Tswana believed that Africans were lost without the word of God and that it was their duty to bring Africans to an enlightened state. This was to be achieved through proselytizing and education. However, because they believed that African custom and social practice were detrimental to Christianity, that continual exposure to African ways of life would cause converts to regress, the missionaries were convinced that they would have to reeducate the Tswana in order for the seed of Christianity to flourish. This meant abandoning traditional rites and practices, social habits, and fundamental social renewal practices like those centered around marriage. In their place the Tswana were taught how to make European clothing, to practice agriculture instead of herding, and to build square houses. Moreover, they were introduced to a cash economy in which they could use agricultural surplus to buy the accoutrements of European life. This brought about the destruction of much of precolonial African society and its subordinate incorporation into a European system.

Africans, as is shown in the case of the Ngwato, adopted Christianity for what they could wrest from it spiritually and materially. Missionaries may have been deliberate or unwitting agents of imperialism, but some Tswana were able to shape the terms of their long conversation with missionaries, to ensure that they retained power even as colonialism was extended over the area.

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Botswana: Bechuanaland Protectorate, Founding of: 1885–1899

The state of Botswana, as it is today defined territorially, originated as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, established in 1885. At the time of its founding, the protectorate was occupied by eight main Tswana chiefdoms: the Kgatla, Kwena, Lete, Ngwaketse, Ngwato, Tshidi-Rolong, Tawana, and Tlokwa. The establishment of the protectorate has to be seen in the context of the late-nineteenth-century European "Scramble" for Africa. In this case, four main external forces came to bear on Tswana territory at that time: British imperialism, Boer expansionism, German imperialism, and the expansionist drive of Cecil Rhodes.

From the late 1870s on there had been a period of instability in Tswana territory south of the Molopo River, which was to become the southern boundary of the protectorate. Divisions between Tswana chiefs were exploited and fueled by Boer freebooters from the Transvaal in search of new land. These freebooters formed alliances with particular chiefs and established two minirepublics in southern Tswana territory. The British government became alarmed in 1884 when Germany's declaration of a protectorate over southern Namibia presented the threatening prospect of German territory linking up with the Transvaal across Bechuanaland. The British intervened; in 1884 they declared a protectorate over Tswana territory south of the Molopo, and early in 1885 they dispatched a military expedition under General Charles Warren to drive away the Boer freebooters. In September 1885, the British extended the protectorate across a large area north of the Molopo, bounded by the Limpopo River in the east, the German protectorate in the west. In 1890, in agreement with Germany, Britain further extended the protectorate as far as the Chobe River in the north. Two Tswana chiefs, Khama of the Ngwato and Gaseitsiwe of the Ngwaketse, initially welcomed the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, seeing the British presence as protection against external threats from Transvaal Boers and from the Ndebele to the northeast.

After the gold discoveries on the Rand in 1886, the protectorate became a focus of attention for mineral prospectors. The search for a "second Rand" brought

to the protectorate adventurers who believed that the Johannesburg gold reef might stretch westward and northward. From 1887 on, all the main Tswana chiefs in the protectorate sold mineral, land, and trading concessions to a number of these adventurers. These concessions mostly turned out to be worthless. Some concessionaires would be bought out by Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company (BSAC), while other concessions were eventually disallowed by the British imperial government.

In this context of imperial expansion and increasing mineral exploitation in southern Africa, the status and future of the protectorate became a matter for discussion and contestation in the late 1880s and early 1890s. There were those like the missionary, John Mackenzie, and the British high commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, who wanted the protectorate to become a full-fledged British colony. (Protectorate status stopped short of this, allowing local chiefdoms a fair degree of autonomy.) For Rhodes the protectorate also held an important place in his expansionist ambitions. He saw the territory as an important artery: “the Suez Canal into the interior,” he called it. In Rhodes’s grandiose Cape-to-Cairo vision the protectorate was the gateway to the north, but in the shorter term the protectorate was also to serve as a stepping-stone for Rhodes. The BSAC’s pioneer column (an expedition of white settlers that moved into Mashonaland in 1890) used Ngwato territory as a starting point. Three years later the company launched an aggressive, but risky, invasion of Lobengula’s Ndebele kingdom. A supporting invasion by an imperial force from the protectorate created a second front, weakening the defensive capacity of the Ndebele.

In the meantime, the future status of the protectorate remained a matter of dispute in the early 1890s. Loch continued to push for imperial annexation. Rhodes demanded that the territory be transferred to the BSAC. The Tswana chiefs, however, were implacably opposed to a takeover by the company. In 1895 three chiefs, Khama, Sebele (the Kwena chief), and Bathoen (the Ngwaketse chief), went to Britain to voice their opposition to such a takeover. A deal was struck in November 1895: Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen would retain a large degree of autonomy under continuing imperial protection, but would also give up to the BSAC a narrow strip of territory on their eastern border as well as a vast swath of territory in the western and northern regions of the protectorate. The eastern strip was handed over for the ostensible purpose of railway construction. The real, immediate reason for the transfer was to provide Rhodes with a base for an invasion of the Transvaal. Within two months of the transfer, Leander Starr Jameson embarked upon his ignominious raid into Kruger’s Transvaal republic

from his base at Pitsane in the protectorate, only to suffer a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Boers on January 2, 1896. The Jameson Raid wrecked Rhodes’s political career, but ironically also spared the northern Tswana from the fate that had befallen the Shona and Ndebele. After the raid the British government abandoned the transfer of a large area of the protectorate to the company, so the Tswana were not to be swallowed up in a Rhodesian-type colony of white settlement.

Colonialism brought virtually no benefits to the northern Tswana in the last 15 years of the nineteenth century. Protectorate status was supposed to preserve the autonomy of the eight Tswana chiefdoms in the protectorate. In practice, though, the small British administration in the protectorate constantly interfered in the chiefdoms’ internal affairs. The head of that administration from 1885 to 1895, Sir Sidney Shippard, was an authoritarian figure who expected the chiefs “to obey the Government in all things lawful.” So the British administration intervened in dynastic disputes, limited the jurisdiction of Tswana courts, and overrode the right of chiefs to sell concessions to prospectors and other entrepreneurs. In 1899 the imperial administration arbitrarily demarcated reserves for the eight chiefdoms, and imposed a 10-shilling “hut tax” on all homesteads in the protectorate.

The administration was also concerned to keep colonial expenditure in the protectorate to a minimum. There was therefore no provision for expenditure on welfare or development during these years. Education and health were not deemed to be government responsibilities. The BSAC did oversee the extension of the railway from Vryburg to Bulawayo during the years 1896–1897, but this had the effect of undermining the local carrying trade. The last four years of the century were particularly difficult for the protectorate’s inhabitants: about 90 per cent of cattle herds were lost in the rinderpest epidemic of the 1890s; this was followed by three years of drought and locust invasions.

Between 1885 and 1899, the protectorate was treated essentially as a kind of imperial appendage. It was viewed as an important artery for imperial expansion to the north. It was used as a launchpad for aggressive, expansionist colonial ventures. Imperial “protection” brought little to the northern Tswana except for irksome interference in their internal affairs and neglect of their economic interests

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See also: **Khama III; Rinderpest and Smallpox: East and Southern Africa.**

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Botswana (Bechuanaland Protectorate): Colonial Period

Before the 1885 imposition of colonial rule, three types of Europeans had a major impact on Botswana: traders, missionaries, and Boers. Trade had existed with the Boers at the Cape and the Portuguese stations of coastal Angola and Mozambique since the early eighteenth century. Game products, including ivory, ostrich feathers, and skins, were traded over long distances and sold for guns and other goods from Asia, the Americas, and Europe. The London Missionary Society (LMS) sent missionaries as early as 1816 to work among the southern Batswana, but it wasn't until 1822 that Robert Moffat visited Kgosi Makaba II of the Bangwaketse to establish the first permanent mission. The famous explorer and missionary David Livingstone started the first church and school in Botswana at Kolobeng in 1845.

European contacts remained infrequent except for those of the South African Boers, who seized land from the Batswana for grazing cattle. The Batswana peoples traded for guns and combined their military strength to resist Boer incursions into their lands. Under the excellent leadership of Kgosi Sechele I, the Batswana were repeatedly able to drive the Boers back to the South African Republics in 1852 and 1853. In January 1853, a peace agreement was signed between the Batswana and the Boers.

Relations between the two groups remained tense for many years, due to border disputes and cattle raiding. Between 1882 and 1884 there were conflicts among the southern Batswana and Transvaal mercenaries; but the British administrators at Cape Town were not prepared to militarily intervene, following their withdrawal from the Transvaal in 1881. In 1885, the British unilaterally proclaimed the Bechuanaland Protectorate to counter Germany's occupation of Namibia and the growing infiltration of German soldiers, traders, and missionaries into Ngamiland. Ngamiland's wildlife resources, especially elephants, were abundant due to the Okavango River that flows into the region and forms a large delta. The Batswana peoples had conquered the region and consolidated their military power by selling ivory for guns and horses. Kgosi Moremi signed two mining concessions with British traders in the late 1880s, which led to Britain's successful bid for the region in 1890.

The British colonization of southern Batswana began with the 1871 annexation of territory containing

the newly discovered diamond fields in and around Kimberly, South Africa. Recognizing that the mineral discoveries would lead to greater white settlement near the border, the Batswana formed another confederation to counter Boer raids on cattleposts inside Botswana. When Kgosi Khama of the Bangwato peoples asked for British support in keeping the Boers out of his territory, the British led an expedition to the region under the leadership of Charles Warren. Warren's main task was the enforcement of land promises made by Cecil Rhodes to the Boers, not the protection of Batswana interests. By May 1886 a British land commission, chaired by Rhodes's close associate Sidney Shippard, had robbed the Batswana living south of the Molopo of 92 per cent of their land. Shippard, who became known as *morena maaka* (lord of lies), was then appointed as Bechuanaland's administrator.

Meanwhile, the British government decided to end any possibility of a link between German Namibia and the Transvaal by extending the Bechuanaland Protectorate north of the Molopo River to include the southern half of Botswana. In March 1885, Warren was instructed to communicate this development to the Batswana leadership. Most Batswana *dikgosi* (chiefs) objected to colonial rule, especially Sechele and his son Sebele of the Bakwena. Khama had been convinced by the LMS missionary, John Mackenzie, that the British presence was a good thing and, despite Bangwato opposition, offered extensive lands for British settlement.

Fortunately, the British government accepted its South African high commissioner's conclusion that "as to the country north of the Molopo River. . . it appears to me that we have no interest in it, except as a road to the interior." Subsequently, the British government refused the offer of settler land and ordered that the chiefs should rule over their own peoples. The British presence north of the Molopo would be limited to occasional police patrols and very limited settlement and administration. The Molopo River was the administrative dividing line; the lands south of the river became part of the colony of British Bechuanaland, which was later incorporated into South Africa. The Bechuanaland Protectorate north of the Molopo survived to become Botswana.

Before 1890, the British interfered little in the rule of the *dikgosi*. Thereafter they gradually began to introduce a system of indirect rule. Under this system, colonial officials ruled through the *dikgosi*, who were no longer free to run their own affairs without interference. The reason for the change was that Botswana became a base from which British imperialism could expand northward into central Africa. In October 1889 Queen Victoria issued Rhodes's British South African Company (BSAC) a royal charter to administer Botswana and Central Africa in the name of the British crown. In 1890 despite overriding local objections, the British

granted themselves the right to exercise colonial control over Botswana through the Foreign Jurisdictions Act. The protectorate was also extended to Ngamiland and the Chobe River region in the north.

Meanwhile the growing power of the BSAC began to threaten the independence of the Batswana rulers and their ability to manage their own affairs under crown protection. Rhodes wanted to control all of southern Africa to exploit its rich mineral wealth in diamonds and gold. In order to accomplish his dream of complete dominance in the region, he needed to acquire administrative control of Botswana. In July 1895 the Batswana sent petitions to London against BSAC rule.

Three paramount chiefs, Bathoen, Khama and Sebele, decided to take their *merafe's* cases directly to the British government and people. They traveled to Britain, speaking in 40 English towns and cities. Queen Victoria granted them an audience and promised them continued protection against BSAC capitalist exploitation. The dikgosi left Britain with the belief that their territories were safe from Rhodes. However, important friends of Rhodes were strategically placed in the Colonial Office, and they plotted to take over Bathoen and Sebele's domains. The colonial secretary had also given Rhodes permission to go ahead and invade the Transvaal, because Paul Kruger was becoming a threat to Great Britain's control of gold mining in southern Africa.

Rhodes hired a mercenary by the name of Dr. L. S. Jameson to organize an armed force to overthrow Kruger's Transvaal Republic. Jameson invaded on the night of December 29, 1895, from Botswana, while British expatriates in Johannesburg were supposed to lead an uprising there. The rebellion was disorganized and failed due to poor leadership and planning. The Jameson Raid resulted in a huge international scandal and dashed Rhodes's plans for a takeover in Botswana. Four years after the Jameson Raid, war broke out between the British and Boer Republics in South Africa. The protectorate played a small but key role in the Anglo-Boer War by guarding the railway and border positions and working in British army camps.

The leaders of the Boers and the British met from 1908 until 1909 to discuss the formation of a new united state. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed as a self-governing state under the British monarch. The result of the formation of the Union for Africans was the loss of all their political rights, a development watched closely by fearful eyes in Botswana. The dikgosi knew that the South Africa Act, establishing the union, provided for the eventual incorporation of the three High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Lesotho.

Over time, British administrative reforms in the protectorate reduced the powers of the dikgosi. The

resident commissioners interfered in local politics and rarely listened to the African Advisory council's recommendations. In 1943, new proclamations restored some of the powers that the dikgosi had lost in 1934. The Botswana rulers were given limited jurisdiction in their own areas. Britain neglected the development of Bechuanaland for fifty years.

Such development that took place, whether political, economic, or social, occurred after World War II, with grants-in-aid from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The war had an enormous impact on the protectorate in many ways. The dikgosi supported the British war effort with 10,000 men, food and money. After the conflict, growing nationalism in Africa encouraged the Batswana to unite for their freedom.

The Bechuanaland's People's Party (BPP) was formed in 1960 by Motsami Mpho and K. T. Motsete at the time when Britain was introducing constitutional changes through the Legislative Council. The BPP spoke out against white rule and demanded immediate independence. The Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) was formed in 1961 by Seretse Khama and other educated leaders who stressed multiracialism for a better Botswana. Elections were held in March 1965, on the basis of the new constitution of 1963. The BDP, which had become a very strong, well-organized party, won the election with a large majority, taking 28 of the 31 seats in the National Assembly. Seretse Khama became the prime minister of the country's first African government.

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See also: **Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899.**

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Botswana: Independence: Economic Development, Politics

Prior to independence in 1966, Botswana was neglected to a degree unusual even in colonial Africa. The Act of Union of 1909 said that the three High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland) would eventually be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. Britain therefore did very little

for Bechuanaland; and South Africa did nothing because Bechuanaland was considered British. Britain did, however, refuse to allow incorporation, despite considerable pressure from the government of South Africa.

Botswana therefore inherited almost nothing in 1966 and was then one of the poorest countries in the world. Until just before independence the country had no capital city, having been governed from Mafeking in South Africa; there were just a few kilometers of tarred road; and in 1965, only 27 students had graduated from five years of secondary education.

The country was entirely surrounded until 1980 by hostile white-ruled states, apart from a theoretical pin-point boundary with Zambia that was not acknowledged by the governments of Rhodesia or South Africa. The new government was dependent on British aid for half of the recurrent budget. On the other hand, ethnically and linguistically the population was relatively homogeneous, and the first president, Seretse Khama, was well-educated, having studied at Oxford and in London. A tradition of pragmatic diplomacy, to which the country owed its existence, was carried forward after independence into both foreign and economic policy.

The discovery of mineral deposits (copper and nickel at Selebi-Phikwe and diamonds at Orapa) made rapid economic growth possible. In addition, beef exports gained access to Europe at prices above those from other parts of the world, Botswana's sources of aid were diversified, and renegotiation of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) increased Botswana's customs revenue. The copper and nickel mine was never profitable, but the government's share of large diamond profits, from the three mines eventually developed, generated a surplus on the recurrent budget in 1973 and on the development budget in 1984. By the 1990s, Botswana was the world's largest producer by value of gem diamonds. Financial surpluses continued in most years thereafter. As a consequence, the government accumulated balances equivalent to two years' spending, and foreign exchange reserves equivalent to three years' imports.

Botswana avoided the problems of other mineral boom economies. Government expenditure took account of the scarcity of skilled manpower and the government's own capacity to manage public spending. The result was not only rapid economic growth (Botswana's economy was bound to grow rapidly), but rapid growth of employment and considerable diversification of the economy. Employment growth did stop in the first half of the 1990s but resumed thereafter.

From the time of independence, the Botswana government handled relations with its white-ruled neighbors in a pragmatic way. Permission was sought

and granted from the United Nations for Botswana not to apply sanctions to Rhodesia, although despite this there were security problems until the Rhodesian war for independence ended in 1980. Botswana offered sanctuary to refugees, but did not allow military training or military bases to be established. Again, this was not sufficient to prevent a number of military raids across the border from South Africa during the 1980s. Trade, however, was not seriously affected.

Botswana has been a multiparty democracy throughout the postindependence period, with elections every five years. For many years, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party held all but 3 or 4 seats out of approximately 30 in the country's parliament. The opposition achieved majorities in the main town councils, and came to hold most of the urban parliamentary seats, winning 14 out of 40 seats in the enlarged parliament in the 1994 election. As the country had moved from being 4 per cent to 50 per cent urban, it would appear that the opposition might have done even better and for the future to be on its side. However, it split badly between 1994 and 1999, when the election was contested by some 14 parties.

Although there was no change of ruling party arising from elections, there have to date been three peaceful changes of president. Sir Seretse Khama was succeeded on his death in 1980 by his vice president, Sir Ketumile Masire, who chose to retire in 1998. He was succeeded by the then vice president, Festus Mogae; Mogae's vice president is Ian Khama, who was formerly head of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), and is the eldest son of Seretse Khama.

Botswana played a leading part in the creation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the 1990s, SADC members were divided on a number of political issues, and attempts to establish a SADC free-trade area were subject to delays. Nevertheless, the SADC continued to be active in settling regional political issues, in which Botswana played a part, for example, contributing to troops brought into Lesotho by the SADC in 1998. The BDF also contributed to peacekeeping forces elsewhere in Africa.

Most of Botswana's other international trading agreements were in a state of uncertainty in the late 1990s. The SACU was in the process of renegotiation; South Africa had agreed to free trade with the European Union, which would result in reductions in customs union revenue and in the level of protection of SACU producers; the Lomé agreement was due for renegotiation and was not expected to continue substantially unchanged as previously; and a further global round of World Trade Organization negotiations was imminent. On the other hand, all of Botswana's neighbors were ruled by democratically elected governments, with which Botswana had normal diplomatic relations.

Both the economic and the strategic position of Botswana had therefore been transformed for the better since 1966. However, the period of diamond-led growth was coming to an end, and the economy could not depend indefinitely on further rapid growth of government spending. Future economic growth, and growth of employment, depended therefore on Botswana being able to attract foreign investment in such sectors as manufacturing, financial services, and tourism. Unusually, Botswana did not necessarily need the inflow of income, but did need scarce skilled management resources and access to foreign markets.

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Boundaries, Colonial

During the nineteenth century, Europeans who had established colonies on the African coast found it increasingly necessary to define territorial boundaries. These would justify their claims to exercise jurisdiction over property rights in the territories of African neighbors and, more particularly, to collect customs duties from persons trading on neighboring coasts. Though many such claims were asserted unilaterally, more often they were based upon treaties with African rulers—who may or may not have understood the implications of the claims to which they assented. But beyond the coastline, boundaries were rarely defined. For example, one British Sherbro treaty of 1861 referred to territory extending “about thirty miles inland.”

Since treaties with Africans did not automatically receive international recognition, European governments also increasingly made treaties among themselves. In the European peace treaties of 1783 and 1815, France

and Britain attempted to allocate broad spheres of territorial and commercial interests in Senegambia; and as international rivalry intensified during the nineteenth century they made unsuccessful moves toward a comprehensive partition of the wider West African region. But increasingly there were bitter local disputes over points of commercial access, which could only be resolved by detailed bilateral agreements. By the time the Berlin Act of 1885 attempted to regulate such procedures, almost all the West African coast was already allocated by such treaties.

From about 1889 imperialist pressures in Europe led colonial governments to extend their ambitions from the coasts to the interior of Africa. During the 1890s, disputes over African territory became increasingly frequent and bitter; nevertheless, all were eventually resolved by bilateral agreements. The British Foreign Office collected and published these in an authoritative compendium entitled *Map of Africa by Treaty*.

The new boundary lines were drawn by negotiators meeting in Europe, remote from African realities. They did take advice from their colonial colleagues, and sometimes tried to respect the territorial integrity of African polities with which treaties of protection had been signed. More often the diplomats were concerned with making some rough allocation of territory and resources that the colonial lobbies in each country would find acceptable. Working with limited knowledge of African topography, and still less of human geography, they sometimes decided on the line of a river, or alternatively a watershed. Convenient though such identifiable features might seem, they did not always respect existing trade routes or settlement patterns. Many boundaries were drawn, with thick pencils, along lines of latitude or longitude, in hope that these would prove capable of objective survey. For diplomats, even such arbitrary lines were preferable to uncertainty. There was a tiny safeguard for rationality in the subsequent demarcation commissions, where surveyors laying down boundary posts were authorized to recommend minor deviations in accordance with “ethnological divisions.” But even these proved politically contentious; substantive revisions of the initial boundaries, as in the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, were extremely rare. The major exception was the repartition of the German colonial empire, under mandate, in 1919.

Other colonial boundaries were unilaterally defined, and sometimes redefined, within a single recognized sphere of colonial influence. As the British empire in South Africa expanded and was reordered, three countries where British authority rested on treaties of protection—Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland—retained their own identities, within historic boundaries. By orders in council, the British

government also fixed the borders between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and those with their South African neighbors. Similarly, French statutory instruments, motivated largely by administrative convenience, defined boundaries between the eight constituent colonies of Afrique Occidentale Française, and the four colonies of Afrique Equatoriale Française. In the case of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), France successively created, dissolved, and reconstituted an entire colonial entity. Regional and provincial boundaries of significance were also redefined within such colonies as Nigeria.

The impact on African populations of the colonial boundaries that were thus more or less arbitrarily imposed upon them varied considerably. The negative effects were at first most obvious. Virtually every borderline cut across some bonds of kinship, culture, and language, or threatened to impede the movement of persons and commodities along established routes. Colonial states incorporated diverse communities that might previously have had little in common, and imposed on them new laws, new taxes, and an alien language of government. Historically, few African boundaries could be represented by lines on maps, even mental ones; rather, they had identified populations as members or dependents of the same political authority, and legitimized obligations and payments which visiting strangers might be required to incur at points of entry to their territory. Colonial frontiers imposed territorial divisions unprecedented in their precision and rigidity, reducing communities that had formerly been accommodated as strangers to the new and vulnerable status of political minorities.

With time, however, colonial boundaries might come to seem more tolerable. Most of them proved easily permeable, too long and difficult for effective policing. The differences in tariff regime and fiscal policy which they were intended to enforce offered new opportunities to African entrepreneurs (or smugglers, in the eye of the authorities). Except where intimate relationships with close kinsfolk or traditional trading partners had been impeded, local communities often remained indifferent to political attempts to revive or construct wider tribal identities across the borders. Whether out of self-interest or habit, even African patriots gradually acquired new attachments to their own colonial masters. Although Pan-African idealists spoke of reversing the partition and redrawing boundaries after independence, this did not happen to any significant degree. Too many interests were now involved in maintaining new state identities. In 1963 the Organization of African Unity judged it prudent to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member-state. Since then the management of boundary disputes and cross-border relationships has been a major concern of African diplomacy.

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See also: **Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Ideology of Empire; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.**

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Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth Century

These Indian Ocean islands were known to Arab, Portuguese, British, and Dutch seamen of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but they were unpopulated until the 1640s, when a handful of Frenchmen from India and their slaves occupied Bourbon (Réunion). From here in the early eighteenth century French families, settling on the heels of the departed Dutch (1638–1710) from their Mauritius, turned Bourbon's companion island into Ile de France. Seychelles, which was explored in the 1740s, had to wait until 1770 to receive its own small complement of French settlers and slaves.

For Bourbon, coffee was the major agricultural export staple of the eighteenth century when aristocratic or *soi-disant* aristocratic families like those of the Bourbon-born poets Antoine de Bertin and Evariste-Desire de Forge de Parny built Indian-inspired mansions in timber or stone; the coffee dried on the flat roofs of the verandas. Cotton served Ile de de France and Seychelles, with Ile de France's stone-built Le Reduit reckoned a miniature tropical Versailles, though it was built inland between two ravines for defense against the British.

Ile de France and Seychelles, with their fine harbors so much safer for shipping than Bourbon's exposed roads, were directly attuned to world trade in peace and war, as calling points first for the Compagnie des Indes, which administered Ile de France and Bourbon, and then for the king's ships when the company retreated, and always for privateers. At the same time, a considerable proportion of ships were likely to be slavers from Mozambique, Zanzibar, and Madagascar, because these islands' worlds paralleled the Antillean slave-based world, under local interpretation of the Code Noire set out in letters patent of 1685 and 1723. The use of whips, iron collars, and heavy chains was

in vogue as a matter of law and course. And equally as a matter of course, slaves were running away from the time of the beginning of the islands' settlement. In one early case on Bourbon, the cause was ascribed to quarrels between Frenchmen and slaves over a particularly beautiful Malagasy slave woman, which serves as a pointer to the appearance of populations of color. These were discriminated against in all islands, despite often being slaveowners themselves.

Human frailty was reckoned particularly visible among slaves who, if Malagasy, always seemed to be pining for their lost homeland. "They are very fond of nocturnal excursions, either to gratify their gallantry, or to pilfer from their neighbours," which necessarily meant that "I frequently rise in the night to see if they are in their huts," explained Charles Grant de Vaux, a 1740s soldier-settler in Ile de France from Normandy. And on the eve of the revolution itself, the virtuous lovers in Jacques-Henri Bernardin de St. Pierre's popular romance *Paul et Virginie* lived in Ile de France, outside its corrupted white society, but were nonetheless expected to have many slaves of their own.

The dodo was hunted to extinction in Ile de France, and timber in all the islands was being rapidly removed by fire and axe by 1800, even though it was remembered how Madeira had burned disastrously for seven years and conservation laws had been passed to prevent it here. Cinnamon, which the famous botanist Pierre Poivre had sent for planting on the Seychelles' main island of Mahé, eventually covered the mountain slopes after timber was cut there when the first settlers set a pattern of despoiling the place. Here an attempt at more tightly regulated colonization broke down, with settlers immediately requiring all the privileges assumed by Creole (meaning locally born) French people on these islands. A fruitless attempt was made to keep the free Indian Ramalinga family out of Seychelles. If Seychelles in the end became more relaxed than Ile de France and Bourbon, this was no fault of the major *grand blanc* families; and if one of the first signs appeared as early as 1785 when a Breton married a part-Malagasy girl, the reason was that she was heiress to land and slaves acquired more by despoiling the environment than by planting.

While Seychelles refreshed slave ships and Bourbon became a spice garden worked laboriously by the hoe, Ile de France, with its own expanding sugar plantations, still looked very much to the sea in the 1790s with its overseas merchants reckoned to have run into the hundreds, and its privateers legendary. Robert Surcouf, most famous of privateers, and unlike his brother and many others never captured by the Royal Navy, had started here in the slave trade. Under British blockade the island was kept alive by neutral Danes and Americans carrying off British prized goods.

All the time, from the outbreak of the revolution, Ile de France and Bourbon, too, with their relatively crowded port towns, were desperate to keep out overseas news like that of the Saint Domingue slave revolt and the National Convention's abolition of slavery; they were also efficient in hunting down any individual, whether free man or slave, whose language or demeanor indicated willingness to take revolutionary tenets about the rights of humankind seriously. Avowed Jacobins hunted down maroons even while the Colonial Assembly of Ile de France attempted to reduce the severity with which maroons might be treated. The threat of abolition in 1794—said the Assembly of Bourbon—meant that "everyone saw escaping from his hands the feeble bonds still controlling the stupid and ferocious Africans." Colonial institutions involving those—in fact very strong—bonds actually survived revolutionary fervor as Paris attempted to impose it in the 1790s, were strengthened under the Empire, and, in Bourbon's case, were reckoned to have been vindicated (during that period of 1810–1815 when Bourbon was occupied by a British garrison that was determined to put down the slave trade) by the St. Leu slave revolt of 1811.

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See also: **Mascarene Islands Prior to the French; Mauritius.**

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Brazzaville

The site where Brazzaville emerged as the capital of French Equatorial Africa in 1910 was long held by the Teke as a trade center. Ncouna, as it came to be known when it was ceded in 1880 by the Teke *makoko* (king) to French explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, was only one of many thriving villages on the two banks of the River Congo. Its location was highly strategic for the Teke, as well as for the French, who evicted the Teke soon after the French post of Ncouna was established.

After its long course of almost 1,000 miles from its source in southeastern Zaïre, the Congo River curves

westward across the equator for some 700 miles, then bends again southward across the equator and flows toward the Atlantic. Before rushing to the sea in a succession of cascades and rapids, through rock gorges that compress the water into fast-moving chutes of white foam, the powerful river bulges out to make Pool Malebo, an expanse so huge that it contains dozens of islands, including the island M'Bamou, 20 kilometers long and 10 kilometers across. Pool Malebo had been a prosperous and bustling region before the French and the Belgian presence. Sources point to the economic, political, and demographic importance of the area centuries before the colonial penetration and the founding of Brazzaville and its Belgian counterpart, Leopoldville, on the left bank.

In 1884, the Italian-born French explorer Savorgnan de Brazza was honored for his efforts to give France a foothold in the region when the Geographical Society of Paris decided to name the French post at Pool Malebo after the Italian-born explorer. From then on, Brazzaville grew out mostly as an administrative center with little economic vocation, especially when compared to its twin, Kinshasa, across the river. Indeed, colonial Brazzaville, sometimes referred to as *Brazza la verte*, developed in the shadow of its rival twin, which the Belgians promoted as the most prosperous and bustling city in central Africa. Brazzavillians who flocked across the river either to work, to visit relatives, or to attend cultural events were amazed at the modern look of Kinshasa and the enviable social status of its African elite. In December 1903, Brazzaville became capital of the French Congo and, in 1910, capital of French Equatorial Africa (FEA). Its growing political vocation had General Charles de Gaulle name Brazzaville the capital of *La France Libre* (Free France), on October 27, 1940, after the Germans had occupied France.

Under French colonization, Brazzaville added to its administrative role to become a center of cultural creativity. There, in 1944, in the multiethnic neighborhood of Poto-Poto, was established the first "bar dancing," *Chez Backer*, which catered to the growing population of young blue-collar workers. At least 50 more such "bar-dancings" would proliferate in Brazzaville alone before independence, the most famous being *Chez Faignon* (founded in 1948), located also in Poto-Poto. Young male (mostly the urban educated elite) and female patrons used these strategic spaces not only for entertainment centered around dancing, eating, drinking, and socialization but also for subversion. In the 1950s, these "bar-dancings" housed the first political meetings and served as informal headquarters for several political parties.

During the 1930s, a variety of sports (soccer, basketball, volleyball and track and field) developed in

Brazzaville under the aegis of the Catholic missionaries and the colonial government. The growing interest of Brazzaville's youth in sports prompted the French to build, in 1946, one the largest stadiums ever built in French colonial Africa, next to the Sainte-Anne Cathedral of Poto-Poto. The stadium was named after Felix Eboué, a black French native of Guyana who assumed the governorship of FEA in 1940 after he rallied de Gaulle's Free France.

In 1951 an art school was also founded—the Poto-Poto School of African Art—under the auspices of French painter Pierre Lods. Aspiring artists worked freely, producing both romanticized and traditional paintings, which became very popular in the major cities of FEA, catering mostly to the tourist market.

Up until the early 1990s, a substantial proportion of Congolese lived in Brazzaville: around 110,000 at independence and an estimated 937,000 in 1992, which represented more than one-third of the Congolese population. The end of the one-state party regime that held the country in a tight grip under the banner of scientific socialism heralded a new era of prosperity in Congo's largest city, with an influx of Congolese repatriated businessmen, artists, and college graduates who came back from abroad (mostly from France) with fresh ideas and capital. However, starting in 1993, the country was plunged into recurrent violent political conflicts between ethnopolitical factions that created militia groups to serve as private armies to the country's three main leaders. In the 1990s, an entrenched militia culture developed in the country's capital, fueled by widespread unemployment and a sense of hopelessness among the city's large youth population that played in the hands of power-driven political leaders. Brazzaville was the site of the latest conflict when, in June 1997, government forces attempted to disarm former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso's militia before the presidential elections. The five-month civil war that ensued, opposing Sassou's militia (the Cobras) against president Pascal Lissouba's and his prime minister Bernard Kolélas's forces (known respectively as the Cocoyes and the Ninjas), was marked by the use of heavy artillery that left Brazzaville totally destroyed. Over 10,000 people (mostly civilians) were reported dead, and hundreds of thousands fled Brazzaville to seek refuge in the villages in the interior or across the river to neighboring Kinshasa, reducing the population to less than 200,000. Ironically, the only building in Brazzaville spared by the bombing was the French embassy, which only sustained a single hit and was later looted by Sassou's militiamen when they entered Brazzaville, triumphant, in October 1997.

Today, Brazzaville resembles more a ghost town than the bustling and attractive metropolis it once was.

Insecurity linked to the ravages by militiamen; food shortages; and massive destruction and looting of private homes and public infrastructures still prevent people who have fled from returning. Most of Brazzaville's wards, especially the southern neighborhoods of Bacongo and Makelekele (where most southerners used to reside), have yet to recover from heavy damage before normal social activities can resume.

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See also: **Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of.**

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British Togoland

British Togoland was a region in Western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea in the south. The western section of Togoland, the former British Togoland, is now part of Ghana. A German protectorate over Southern Togoland was recognized by the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885). The boundaries of Togoland were delimited in treaties with France (1897) and Great Britain (1904). In August 1914, British and French forces took Togoland from the Germans. In 1922, the League of Nations divided the region into two mandates, one French and the other British. In 1946, the mandates became trust territories of the United Nations. The area placed under British control amounted to 13,041 square miles (33,776 square kilometers). The northern part was placed under the administration of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (the colonial name of Ghana), and the southern section was made a district of the eastern province of the colony. The southern section held a plebiscite in May 1956 over the topic of joining Ghana when independence came. In 1957, British Togoland became part of the independent state of Ghana.

The League of Nations defined, in its treaty from July 1922, the task of the mandatory as being “responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and the social progress

of its inhabitants.” The northern part of British Togoland contained ethnic groups who also lived in the protectorate. This was the reason why the mandate gave the Gold Coast government the right to administer them as a unit. In 1946, the population of the trust territory was about 400,000. The northern portion included in 1932 the districts of Kete-Krachi, Dagomba, Eastern Mamprussi, and Kumassi. In Eastern Dagomba, cattle raising and agriculture, as in most of this area, were the principal occupations of its people, along with crafts such as weaving, ropemaking, leather tanning, and pottery making. Yet British Togoland had neither the mineral resources nor the large plantings of cocoa as had the Gold Coast. Because of the fact that the future of the region was uncertain, the British hesitated to invest in a territory under international control.

During the period 1890–1930, a decentralization of native authority took place. After 1930, the numerous small divisions of the Northern Territories and north Togoland were reunited into several large states such as Mamprussi and Dagomba. In 1933, three ordinances relating to the executive, judicial, and financial reorganization were promulgated. The chiefs were able to use these new powers to carry out economic and social reforms. The Native Tribunal Ordinance permitted the chief commissioner to establish tribunals to define the extent of its civil and criminal jurisdiction. Moreover, the government passed in 1932 a Native Treasuries Ordinance that gave the chief commissioner the right to establish treasuries, to define the sources of revenue, to provide for specified forms of taxation, and so forth. The revenue was applied to roads, dispensaries, sanitary conveniences, and regular salaries for chiefs and tribunal members. The economic growth of the area was steadily improving, and a slow increase of interest in education, health care, and religion was occurring. In 1946, a Northern Territory council, representative of all the chiefs, was established.

South Togoland was much smaller, at 5,845 square miles. The ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony were applied to Southern Togoland, while those for the Northern Territories were promulgated in Northern Togoland. The five districts of the mandate were managed by district commissioners. As in the Northern Territories, from 1930 on the government aimed to amalgamate small ethnic groups. By 1939, all but 15 of the 68 divisions had amalgamated into 4 large states. After this, the local institutions were strengthened: the governor had the right to declare local authorities. Divisional and state councils were recognized and allowed to investigate political and constitutional disputes. The governor had the power to establish tribunals in each native authority area. An ordinance of

1932 granted the divisions the right to set up stool treasuries and collect taxes. In the mandate, education was in the hands of missionaries, assisted by government funds. Economic development resulted from an increased production of cocoa.

After 1951, the constitutional changes taking place in the Gold Coast began to affect conditions in Togoland. The government had taken measures to ensure that the people of Togoland participated in every level of government under the increased representation provided by the 1951 and 1954 constitutions. In June 1954, the British government informed the United Nations that it would not be in a position to administer the Togoland trusteeship separately after the Gold Coast became independent. At first, a majority of the members of the United Nations were opposed to the establishment of British Togoland as an independent state, but they soon recognized that this meant the rule of British Togoland as an independent African government and not a colonial annexation. In December 1955, the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed to a British Togoland plebiscite to determine whether the population preferred an integration with the Gold Coast after independence or its own independence as a separate entity. When the plebiscite was held on May 9, 1956, the majority, aware of the imminent independence of its neighbor, voted for the integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast. The UN General Assembly thus agreed to the reunification of British Togoland and the Gold Coast after the independence of this last territory.

The last constitution before independence was published in February 1957. The date of independence was fixed for March 6, 1957. On this date, the unified Gold Coast and British Togoland became an independent state within the British Commonwealth with the name of Ghana.

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See also: Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence.

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Brussels Conference and Act, 1890

The first general treaty for the suppression of the African slave trade was negotiated at the Brussels Conference of 1889–1890. By this time the Atlantic slave trade had ended, but slave raiding and trading were widespread in Africa and slaves were still exported to the Muslim world or sent to European colonies disguised as contract labor. After the British outlawed their own slave trade, they had built up a network of separate treaties with the colonial and maritime powers, and with Asian and African rulers and peoples, granting rights to search and laying down rules for the arrest and trial of slavers. Although often mutual in theory, only the British exercised these rights continuously, and rival powers suspected that the British were trying to hinder their commerce and colonial development.

By the 1880s, with the “Scramble” for Africa in full swing, these treaties were out of date, and there was no treaty with France. The colonial advance, spearheaded by missionaries, traders, prospectors, and adventurers, provoked resistance. British settlers on the shores of Lake Malawi, French missionaries around Lake Tanganyika, and the posts of King Leopold II of Belgium's Congo Independent State in the far interior were threatened by Swahili/Arab traders and their African allies, who were importing quantities of arms and ravaging large areas in which slaving and raiding were endemic. To impose their rule, the imperial powers needed to disarm them.

The antislavery movement was now used to rally hitherto lukewarm domestic support for colonial ventures. The British public had been galvanized by David Livingstone's earlier appeals to end the trade, and, in 1888, Cardinal Lavignerie, the French founder of the missionary order of the Society of Our Lady of Africa, or White Fathers, toured European capitals calling for volunteers to fight the slavers. The British, anxious to retain leadership of the antislavery movement, and fearful of the havoc that might be created by the cardinal's “crusaders,” asked King Leopold to call a conference of the European colonial powers to negotiate a new treaty against the export of slaves. The idea was popular in Britain, and an invitation from Brussels was less likely to arouse suspicion than one from London. The British initially merely wanted to prevent rival powers, particularly the French, from attracting trade

to their colonies by allowing slavers to sail under their flags. Similarly powers could attract trade in the interior to the detriment of more scrupulous neighbors, by countenancing the slave traffic and the lucrative arms trade that supported it. King Leopold determined to extend the proposed treaty to further the interests of his nascent state. To achieve these aims, all the African colonial powers (Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the Congo, Italy, and Spain) together with the other signatories of the Berlin Act (Holland, Belgium, Russia, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States) had to be invited. The Ottoman Empire, which had territories in Africa and Asia and imported slaves, was included to avoid appearing to launch a Christian “crusade.” Zanzibar was asked in order to please its sultan, and Persia was added as it was a Muslim power believed to be cooperating against the slave trade.

The treaty that was hammered out, the General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade of 1890, known as the Brussels Act, declared that the colonial powers could best attack the slave trade by establishing their administrations, developing communications, protecting missionaries and trading companies, and initiating Africans into agricultural labor and the “industrial arts.” Having thus established the exploitation of Africa as an antislavery measure, the signatories undertook to prevent wars, end slave trading and raiding, stop the castration of males, and repatriate or resettle freed and fugitive slaves. They agreed to restrict the arms traffic between 20° north latitude and 22° south latitude. The Ottoman Empire, Zanzibar, and Persia undertook the outlawing of the import and export of slaves, and the mutilation of males, as well as the freeing, repatriating, or caring for illegally imported slaves.

To maintain the right to search, the British agreed to restrict their existing rights to vessels of less than 500 tons and to search only in a designated “slave trade zone” that included part of the Indian Ocean, Madagascar, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. In this zone signatories were to exercise strict control over the granting of flags to native vessels and over the movements of passengers. To minimize disputes, rules were laid down for the search and arrest of suspects. The French refused to ratify the clauses on the right to search or verify the flag, but they introduced regulations that virtually implemented them.

A bureau was to be established in Zanzibar to disseminate information that might lead to the arrest of slavers, and one in Brussels was to collect information on the measures taken to carry out the treaty, and produce statistics on the slave, arms, and liquor traffics.

Two modifications were made in the Berlin Act. To please British temperance and missionary societies, and help the Royal Niger Company keep control of

trade on the Niger, the liquor traffic, between 20° north latitude and 22° south latitude, was to be subject to duties where it already existed, and to be banned altogether in still “uncontaminated” areas. Similarly, to assist King Leopold against rival traders, a declaration was appended to the treaty allowing import duties to be imposed in the conventional basin of the Congo.

The Brussels Act came into force in 1892. In 1919 it was abrogated together with the Berlin Act, by the victorious allies Britain, France, Belgium (now ruling the Congo), Portugal, Italy, the United States, and Japan. Theoretically it remained in force for the other signatories, but in practice it ceased to exist. The two acts were replaced by three conventions signed at St. Germain-en-Laye in 1919, embodying some of the arms, spirits, and commercial clauses. The slave trade, considered moribund, figured into only one article. This bound signatories to preserve the well-being of native peoples and secure the complete suppression of the slave trade and—a new departure—of slavery in all its forms.

The Brussels Act was only one factor in reducing the slave traffic. It contained no mechanism for enforcement, and it did not cover the various devices, including forced and contract labor, by which the European powers exploited Africans. However, it was in the interests of the colonial rulers to suppress slave raiding, large-scale slave trading, and the export of slaves, and these ended as their administrations were established. Slavery itself, not covered by the act, was tolerated for many years, and petty slave dealing, together with a small export traffic, continued in some areas until the end of colonial rule.

The Brussels conference brought the evils of the slave trade forcefully to public attention, and the act, while serving the interests of the colonial powers, bound them to suppress it. Humanitarians regarded it as a triumph, an important step in the doctrine of trusteeship. The principles embodied in it were passed on to the League of Nations and ultimately to the United Nations.

SUZANNE MIERS

See also: Anti-Slavery Movement; Slavery, Colonial Rule, and.

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Buganda Agreement: *See* **Uganda: Buganda Agreement, Political Parties, Independence.**

Buganda: To Nineteenth Century

Popular oral traditions in Buganda, one of the ancient kingdoms in the East African interlacustrine region, center the origin of the kingdom around the figure of Kintu, the first king. Kintu, who is claimed to have arrived in Buganda from the northeasterly direction of Mt. Elgon leading a number of clans, did not find the country empty. There were a number of Baganda clans describing themselves as *banansangwawo* (or, simply, indigenous clans), claiming to have been ruled by at least 30 kings before the arrival of Kintu. It was their last king, Bemba Musota, who was defeated by Kintu. The little archaeological evidence that is available seems to indicate that these lakeshores had been settled by a Bantu-speaking population a long time ago, perhaps as early as the sixth century. These were the makers of the early Iron Age pottery now classified as Urewe pottery, which dates from the sixth to the twelfth centuries. By this time Buganda is said to have been a very small kingdom made up of just the three central counties of Kyadondo, Busiro, and Mawokota.

Numerous other clans moved in later, mainly coming in from the east and across Lake Victoria, to join other clans then settling down under Kintu's leadership. These traditions, which paint a larger-than-life graphic picture of Kintu at the time of settlement, also claim that Kintu simply disappeared without trace after laying the foundations of the kingdom.

The other important king besides Kintu was Kimera, who may have come into Buganda from neighboring Bunyoro, to the west. He is said to have led a number of clans that moved eastward at the time of the collapse of the Bachwezi hegemony in Bunyoro. It is now widely believed that Kimera may have founded a new dynasty in Buganda. The popular tradition, however, cites 36 kings of Buganda in an unbroken line of descent from Kintu to the present king, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II. Among these past kings was Muteesa I, who invited Christian missionaries to Uganda; Daniel Mwanga, who had early Christian converts—now saints—executed for

rebellion; and Sir Edward Muteesa II, who was deported to Britain in 1953 for defying the colonial government and who in 1963 became the first president of Uganda before he was finally deposed and exiled to England by Milton Obote in 1966.

Buganda started territorial expansion during the sixteenth century after Bunyoro-Kitara had reached its peak and was declining. Buganda's expansion continued right into the nineteenth century, but this was not all at the territorial expense of Bunyoro, as it has often been claimed. There are several areas and semiautonomous chiefdoms that were conquered by or annexed into Buganda, such as Budu (Bwera), Kkoki, the Ssesse and Buvuma islands, and parts of Kyagwe, as well as various principalities of Busoga that never belonged to Bunyoro of Babito, though some of these areas may have been under some influence of the earlier Bachwezi hegemony to which Bunyoro Kitara was the successor state.

Over a period of four centuries, Buganda increased its territory to at least 20 counties as compared to only 3 in the twelfth century. Most of this expansion occurred between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly during the reign of three eminent Buganda kings: Kimbugwe, Katerega, and Mutebi. After them, kings Mawanda, Semakokiro, and Suna, in the last half of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, put the final touches on the boundaries of Buganda, which the Europeans found in place in the nineteenth century.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Kabaka was ruling with three chief ministers including a prime minister (*katikiro*). Below them was a council of county chiefs who administered the districts of the kingdom. Buganda kings of the nineteenth century appeared despotic, but this was a development over the later years. In the early centuries, the Kabaka held his position at the mercy of the clan heads. Over the centuries these heads gradually lost their political power and hold over their clansmen to the kings, as clans gradually became more social, rather than residential, groupings. Buganda's residential pattern had gradually become socially heterogeneous as the kingdom expanded its territory, rendering kinship bonds and relations inept in dealing with political control.

One of the key elements that turned Buganda into the powerful and cohesive kingdom it had become in the nineteenth century was the evolution of the home-grown institution of kingship. This was a gradual process that saw the development of kingship as a focus of all the Baganda's loyalty to the kingdom. Each and every Muganda was linked to the kingship as an institution through his or her clan by a dint of constitutional genius and social engineering wherein the king took the clan of his mother in a strictly patrilineal society. This meant that since Baganda clans were exogamous, it became relatively rare for one clan to

provide kings in any two successive reigns. As such, no exclusive royal clan ever developed in Buganda, unlike in Bunyoro, where the Babiito were distinct from their non-Bahima subjects.

Over time, Buganda was able to develop a very effective military organization, which it put to very good use in its wars of expansion. Many of the kings took active part in these military operations themselves, and indeed a number of them lost lives on the battlefield. Explorer H. M. Stanley was witness to and a participant in one such war, this time on the Buvuma Islands, where the Buganda king deployed his navy on Lake Victoria, and the battle was decisively won.

Buganda's political system also had a number of weaknesses, which sometimes negated development and political cohesion. Primary among these was the absence of a proper system of succession to the throne. In the beginning of the kingdom, it appears that succession to the throne was passed on from brother to brother rather than from father to son. This meant that all the surviving princes had equal right to claim the throne. Since all the brothers were not necessarily of the same mother, they each obviously had the backing of their mother's clansmen, who were all eager to provide the next king. By about the eighteenth century, many kings were coming to power after complete annihilation of their brothers. This had the disadvantage of dividing up the population into militant factions as wars of succession ravaged the kingdom soon after the death of a king. Many of these wars usually ended with the dispersion of people through clan persecutions as the victors and their nephew king installed themselves into power and positions of influence after the war.

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See also: Great Lakes Region.

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Bulawayo

Bulawayo is the second largest city in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia), situated in the southwest,

111 kilometers from the Botswana border on the main rail and road links between southern Africa and the interior. The establishment of Bulawayo is related to Cecil Rhodes's efforts to open up the central African interior for European settlement. Inspired by the gold discoveries in South Africa, in the 1880s Rhodes (and others) hoped to find more gold in the interior. In order to gain a foothold there, Rhodes sent emissaries to GuBulawayo, capital of the Ndebele king Lobengula. Offshoots of the Zulu people of South Africa, at that time the Ndebele controlled a large part of what was to become Southern Rhodesia, including many of the indigenous Mashona inhabitants. They had a large, well-disciplined army and had to be carefully courted. Working with British missionary Helm, who lived in Lobengula's court, Rhodes's emissaries managed to trick Lobengula into signing away complete territorial rights, when he believed he was only granting access to limited mineral rights. Ignoring Lobengula's renunciation of the "concession," in 1890 Rhodes sent a pioneer column into the country. To appease Lobengula, the column passed around and to the south of his kingdom and settled in the Mashona area to the northeast.

The presence of European settlers and adventurers quickly upset the political and social balance of the region. Tension mounted, and in December 1893 Rhodes's agent, L. S. Jameson, led a punitive raid against the Ndebele capital. As Lobengula abandoned his capital in the face of the better-armed invading force, Jameson's men sacked and burned Bulawayo to the ground. The Ndebele defeat and Lobengula's death provided an opening for the settlers, and the modern town of Bulawayo was formally established in 1894, backed by Rhodes's British South Africa Company. A town plan established a central core, streets wide enough for an ox cart to turn, and a number of housing areas, carefully laid out in the rectangular grid pattern popular in North America at the time. The residential area for Europeans provided spacious gardens and wide streets. Parks were demarcated. An African location provided small, poorly built houses for Africans who were regarded as temporary members of the urban community.

Bulawayo soon became a busy hub for communications and business; the telegraph line reached there in July 1894. That year, Bulawayo boasted over 100 general stores, 3 banks, 12 hotels, 3 newspapers, 26 share brokers, and 9 solicitors. Cecil Rhodes built an elegant home on the foundations of Lobengula's former *kraal*. By 1895, over 1,500 Europeans lived in Bulawayo, including a few hundred women. Social clubs soon developed, along with hospitals, schools and churches. An uprising by the Ndebele in 1896 threatened the town and set back plans for expansion. However, once

peace had been established, Bulawayo resumed its growth. It was declared a municipality in 1897, the same year the railroad arrived to link Bulawayo with major South African centers. The railroad would provide the economic backbone for Bulawayo's expansion in the twentieth century. Although mining in the area disappointed the hopes of the early settlers, Bulawayo soon became a hub for transporting goods, including minerals and agricultural products from the region. A dam provided more secure water, which would always be a problem in Bulawayo. Businesses flourished and the population grew. By 1904 the town had approximately 6,000 European residents and about the same number of African servants living within the township boundary. More Africans lived on the periphery, where they enjoyed greater freedom from European control. The population remained relatively stable until the 1920s. Cultural life flourished. By 1899 the Empire Theatre of Varieties was providing regular opera performances and musical concerts. In 1898 a choir performed George Frideric Handel's *Messiah*. In 1901 the Musical and Dramatic Society embarked on a long record of fine musical productions.

The African community in Bulawayo grew as well, contributing to the city's economic and cultural prosperity. Housing for Africans, however, lagged abysmally behind the needs of the population, and poor living conditions fueled African discontent. Tensions exploded in 1929, when riots broke out in the municipal location. The fighting raged for two days, encompassing the railway compound as well. The riots brought little immediate improvement to housing but put African urban living conditions on the government agenda. The most notable improvement for Africans in Bulawayo came with the government's construction in the late 1930s of Luveve, a township for African civil servants. For most Africans, crowding in the municipal housing areas continued to be the rule, with as many as five or more people sharing a single room. Employers' compounds and squatter camps were often much worse.

World War II fueled the Bulawayo economy and attracted large numbers of Europeans and Africans of both sexes. The hub of the colony's industrialization until the 1950s, when it was overtaken by Salisbury (Harare), Bulawayo was the epicenter of the widespread and partially successful railway workers' strike of 1945. By 1951 the European population had grown to 32,000, twice the figure for 1941, while the African population was above 60,000, with a marked increase in the number of women. Declared a municipality in 1943, the municipal council gradually improved housing for Africans, even introducing a home ownership scheme in 1952. Hugh Ashton, town clerk from the 1950s on, played a key role in Bulawayo's housing policies. Despite the government's Unilateral Declaration of

Independence in 1954, with its commitment to white supremacy, Ashton managed to maintain Bulawayo's earlier progressive record for housing and amenities with the support of key Europeans and Africans. However, housing continued to be demarcated along racial lines and the quality of African housing and amenities were, for the most part, well below European standards.

Since independence in 1980, Bulawayo has continued to expand, reporting a population of 621,742 in 1992. Access to housing is no longer based on race but on the ability to pay, and many middle-class Africans have moved into the former low-density (European) suburbs. During the 1980s and early 1990s, schools, housing, and hospitals improved for poorer Africans as well. The Bulawayo City Council continues to play a crucial role in city policies and practices under the leadership of African civil servants such as Ndubiwa (former town clerk) and Magagula, director of housing and community services. However, the efforts to maintain and expand Bulawayo's progressive urban policies have been hampered by a growing economic crisis that shows no sign of abating.

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See also: **Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia; World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa; Economic Impact; Zimbabwe: Nineteenth Century, Early; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): African Political and Trades Union Movements, 1920s and 1930s; Zimbabwe: Incursions from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele.**

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Bunyoro

Iron Age communities probably moved into Bunyoro around 2,000 years ago, gradually moving inland from early riverine and lakeshore settlements. Very little archaeological work has been done on Nyoro iron-production sites, but Nyoro iron hoes were considered

the best in the Great Lakes Region in historical times, and Bunyoro enjoyed an abundance of iron ore and wood for making charcoal. An economy based on cattle, grain, and plantains probably developed more than 1,000 years ago. Sites such as Ntusi and Bigo indicate that, in the first half of this millennium, cattle played a large part in the regional economy and there existed a relatively large degree of authority over labor. It is certainly likely that holders of political authority relied on Bunyoro's sources of wealth, iron products, cattle and later salt, to maintain themselves in power.

Buchanan's work on clan histories (1978) indicates that Bunyoro has received immigrants from all directions, but primarily from the north and west. The Songa, Gahi, Ranzi, Yaga, Rungu, Gabu and Yanga clans are held to be the oldest in Bunyoro, but are believed to have originated elsewhere, mostly to the west of Lake Albert. While these clans are assumed to have always been Bantu-speaking, Buchanan found that the traditions of twelve now completely Bantu-ized clans trace their origins to Luo-speaking areas north of the Nile. By 1800 most Nyoro were Bantu speaking, but northern and eastern Bunyoro was predominantly Luo speaking. These linguistic and cultural connections facilitated Bunyoro's attempts to exert influence over northern and eastern Uganda and to dominate the trade of the entire region.

Bunyoro's ancient political history has been the subject of some controversy. Nyoro have long claimed that their kingdom is the true heir to an immense empire called Kitara. Nyakatura (1973) asserts that Kitara, in its heyday, encompassed most of Uganda, parts of western Kenya, eastern Congo, northern Tanzania and Rwanda, and the southern Sudan. Court-related historians have detailed the divine origins of the empire: how it was inherited from the godly Batembuzi dynasty by the semidivine Bacwezi, who ruled for a short time before transferring power to the Babito clan, Luo immigrants from the northeast, who still rule today. Revisionist historians, such as Henige (1974) and Wrigley (1996), have argued that Nyoro historians' primary concern was with emphasizing the former importance and influence of Bunyoro, and they have questioned the lengths of Nyoro king lineages, the existence of an ancient empire, and the reality of a Bacwezi dynasty. Tantala (1989) has recently suggested that Babito, upon taking power in Bunyoro, synthesized numerous ancient traditions, including those relating to Bazwezi spirits, in order to legitimize their rule.

It is clear from traditions and linguistic evidence that kingship predated the arrival of the Babito. While many Babito personal names are Luo, there are only two Luo words in Bunyoro's political terminology. The predominance of Bantu political terms indicates

that kingship preceded Babito rule. All precolonial kings in Uganda claimed to be the true heirs to Kitara, which suggests that such a state did preexist Bunyoro and its neighboring kingdoms. It is not inconceivable that Bacwezi did once possess political as well as sacred authority. The link between Kitara and Bacwezi was first reported by Emin Pasha as long ago as 1881. Bunyoro has as strong a claim as any to be the heir to Kitara. The Babito kingdom included the area regarded as the core of the Kitara state, while the dynastic histories of the region support the view that Bunyoro was preeminent in the Great Lakes until the eighteenth century.

It is impossible to know what form the pre-Babito state took, but its influence is likely to have been much greater than its actual area of sovereignty. Many sources confirm the existence of powerful Bantu clans in pre-Babito times, and it is likely that kingship in this period was heavily concerned with the building of alliances with the country's great clans. That this process took on a new form with the arrival of the Babito is suggested by Tantala's interpretation of certain legends about the Bacwezi spirits. Tantala believes that when the Babito took over Bunyoro, they respected the power and autonomy of Bacwezi ritual centers. It is certainly likely that Bunyoro's religious centers preexisted Babito rule, and that Babito acceptance of indigenous religion involved recognition of the position of the clans that were guardians of the Bacwezi shrines.

The Babito probably took power in Bunyoro around the late sixteenth century. Early kings appear to have secured some kind of regional dominance. Traditions in Rwanda, Nkore, and Karagwe describe a devastating invasion by Nyoro forces in this period, which, after great initial successes, ended in disaster. Evidence of Bunyoro's supremacy over ancient Buganda is ample. Babito princes established themselves in Kiziba, Busoga, and beyond Rwenzori. By 1800, however, Bunyoro had taken on the character of the "sick man" of the lakes region, suffering successive violent reversals of fortune. Through a series of military victories and alliances with rebellious princes and chiefs, Buganda had dispossessed Bunyoro of much of its territory. Nkore took advantage of Bunyoro's concern with Buganda to achieve dominance south of the Katonga River.

The classic interpretation of Bunyoro's decline portrays an ancient, loosely organized, pastoralist-dominated empire challenged by a younger, compact, and highly centralized agricultural neighbor, Buganda. This analysis may rely too heavily on a backward extrapolation from the mid-nineteenth century situation. The contribution of powerful clans to Bunyoro's problems has been overshadowed by the historiographical concentration on rebellious Babito on the

borders. Bunyoro's decline was perhaps not one of an imperial structure falling apart, but rather resulted from localized, often clan-related, resistance to a newly centralizing and aggressive government in the eighteenth century. Buganda was quick to extend its influence in areas such as Bwera, where Bamooli clan guardians of a Cwezi shrine, on being persecuted by King Olimi (*r. c. 1710–1730*) of Bunyoro, turned to Buganda for support. Bunyoro's greatest military defeats, moreover, occurred after it launched ill-considered invasions of its southern neighbors. Thus the weakness of Bunyoro by 1800 was the result of royal overambition, the desire of clans and princes for local autonomy, and the rising power of Buganda.

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See also: **Great Lakes Region.**

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Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Nineteenth Century


During the nineteenth century, the dense network of trade routes between the Sahel and the forest (as

mapped by the explorer Heinrich Barth in 1853) provided links among the valleys of the Upper Volta (Mouhoun, Nazinon, and Nakambe in contemporary Burkina Faso). Cola nuts, livestock, salt, and slaves were the main commodities traded.

In the eastern half of this territory two relatively homogeneous concentrations of peoples, known as the Mossi and the Gulmaba, each formed a group of about 20 kingdoms. In several of these kingdoms the chiefs were effectively independent of the central government. As pretenders frequently competed for power, conflict continued among these kingdoms, but the relatively dispersed pattern of settlement undoubtedly allowed for a degree of security. Islam was present throughout the territory, from the courts of the rulers to the networks of merchants arriving from the Mande country (mainly Yarse, from the land of the Moaga) over preceding centuries.

The western half of the territory was a mosaic of peoples, mostly lacking centralized structures or hierarchies, who recognized the authority of hereditary chiefs and of the holders of religious offices linked to the worship of the land, rain, the creator deity, masks, and so on. There were village communities (Bwa, Bobo, Marka, San) and "clans" (Lobi, Birifor, Dagara), while in the eighteenth century the Wattara regiment of the reigning dynasty of Kong (modern Côte d'Ivoire) had begun to develop embryonic kingdoms around Sya (Bobo-Dioulasso). However, their authority had been considerably reduced, and some of their descendants no longer ruled anything more than their own villages along the caravan routes.

To the North, the Fulbe (or Peul), moving from the West in successive waves over centuries, had begun to form a stable society. At Dori, in about 1810, the Ferohe established the emirate of Liptako, pushing the Gulma kingdom of Coalla farther south. Finally,



Burkina Faso.

certain communities of livestock farmers (Dokuy, Barani) had carved out an area on the middle reaches of the Black Volta for themselves.

The Muslim resurgence in the early years of the eighteenth century, spreading from the Hausa lands to the Macina, had sparked off holy wars in certain areas. The jihad launched by Mamadou Karantao, a Marka of Ouhabou, along the middle reaches of the Black Volta during the first half of the nineteenth century was repeated in the 1880s by another Marka, Amadou Deme (Ali Kari), from Boussé in the San country (Tougan); the latter's confrontation with the French in 1894 ended with his death. From 1860 onward, the mounted Muslim Zaberma, arriving from the left bank of the Niger by way of the Dagomba country, invaded the Gourounga country to the Southwest of the Mossi kingdoms. Their repeated raids have left indelible traces in the traditions of the Nuna, the Kassena, and the Lyele. One of their leaders, Babato, even led a victorious expedition into the Moaga country.

To the west and south of Bobo-Dioulasso, Tieba Traore, King of Kenedougou (in modern Mali), launched numerous expeditions against the villages of the Toussian, the Turka, the Samogo, and others. The Bobo, the Dioula, and the Tiefo formed an alliance against him and defeated him at Bama in 1893, but his brother Babemba continued his policy of expansion. It was the arrival of Samori in what is now Côte d'Ivoire that shifted the balance of power in the region: the impact that his armies made along the cliff, from Banfora to Toussiana, was devastating, resulting in the destruction of Noumoudara.

The 1890s sounded the death knell of independence for the whole of this region, which, following the Berlin Conference in 1885, became a bone of contention for three European powers—France, Britain, and Germany—each seeking to overtake its rivals in the Moaga country, known for the density of its population and the solidity of its political organization. A German captain, von François, left Togoland in 1888 on a mission to secure the maximum possible number of treaties. Having reached the borders of the Mossi kingdoms he had to turn back, however. Meanwhile, a French captain, Binger, took up residence at Ouagadougou, from June 15 to July 10, 1888, but all his attempts to arrange a treaty of “protection” were rejected. Neither Dr. Crozat, in 1890, nor Captain P. L. Monteil, in 1891, had any more success with successive local leaders. Finally, one Ferguson, acting on behalf of the British, who were seeking to preserve their trading interests in the hinterland of their colony of the Gold Coast, signed, on July 2, 1894, the first treaty of “friendship and free trade” at Ouagadougou. The chief, Wobogo, was undoubtedly convinced of the wisdom of signing by the Yarse and Haousa merchants engaged in

business with Salaga. He agreed not to accept any protectorate, nor to conclude any agreement with any other foreign power, without the consent of the British.

At the beginning of 1895, the French enjoyed a diplomatic success in the Gulma country. Commandant Decoeur arrived there from Dahomey (Benin) and signed a treaty of “protection” with Bantchandé, a Nunbado, on January 20. The Germans had also conducted negotiations, but with chiefs whose advisers acknowledged shortly afterward that they were dependent on Nungu. In the same year a French mission, led by Commandant Destenave, reached the Yatenga. Baogo, the Yatenga *naaba*, had been in power for ten years by then, but had not yet succeeded in disarming his opponents. He therefore accepted a “complete treaty,” providing for a French resident and escort, on May 18, 1895. His successor, the Yatenga *naaba* Bulli, renewed this treaty on November first of that year.

In 1896 Lieutenant Voulet, commanding 500 men, was ordered to overtake the British at Ouagadougou, and at Sati, the capital of the Gourounsi. The ruler's capital at Ouagadougou was attacked on September 1 of that year. Several clashes occurred, but by late afternoon the French flag was flying over the palace in the capital. A counterattack was repelled on September 7, 1896.

The French then went on to take control of the Gourounga country, where Babato, a Zaberma, was grappling with the rebellion of a Gourounga chief, Hamaria, in the region of Sati and Leo. Samori, who supplied himself with horses in the Moaga country, had imposed his good offices on him. On September 19, Hamaria, who had to be paid a tribute of horses, accepted a treaty of “protection” from Voulet.

For the French conquest of the Upper Volta, 1897 was the pivotal year. At Ouagadougou the French designated a candidate to succeed the leader Wobogo and, after signing a treaty of protection on January 20, 1897, the new leader Sigiri was duly invested in the customary manner. French rights over the Gulma country were enshrined in a Franco-German convention of July 23, and on September 11, Commandant Caudrelier signed a treaty of protection with Barkatou Wattara, the chief of Koubo and Lokhosso, at Lokhosso. Bobo-Dioulasso was taken over on September 25, despite the resistance of the Bobo-Dioula chief, Zelelou Sanon, and an army post was set up there on November 23. British interests, meanwhile, were secured via diplomacy in 1898. In June of that year a company of 200 soldiers, commanded by a Colonel Northcott, marched on Ouagadougou to enforce recognition of the treaty signed by Ferguson, but then the news of the conclusions of the Conference of Paris, on June 14, compelled him to turn back. The frontier between the French and British territories was fixed on the 11th parallel, north latitude.

To the north, the French resident at Dori, Captain Minvielle, still had to face the resistance of the Fulbe and the Tuareg. The response of one Tuareg chief to the French advance, in August 1898, reveals the prevailing attitude of a large number of the region's inhabitants: "My ancestors never surrendered, I shall never surrender. The French are not doing wrong, but they are not doing right either. If they want peace let them stay where they are. . . . The land belongs to God, and God shall decide what must become of it."

Nevertheless, one may regard this date as the beginning of the colonial era in what was to be the French colony of Upper Volta.

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Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Colonial Period

In 1899 the lands on the Upper Volta had been absorbed into the first and second military territories, but between 1904 and 1919 they formed part of the vast colony of Haut-Sénégal-Niger. Taxes, initially in kind or in cowrie but later in French currency, were imposed on rubber, on cotton, and, above all, on trade with the British colony of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), to which the region sent livestock, shea butter, and cotton cloth in exchange for cola nuts. The Franco-British agreement of 1898 had established a zone of free trade from the coast to Ouagadougou.

In December 1915 the uncovering of a "Muslim conspiracy" resulted in trials and punishments along the middle reaches of the Black Volta, where numerous villages had joined in the rebellion. In 1916 heavily armed military units crisscrossed the region, and in June and July of that year the resistance was crushed.

The revolt led to the partition of Haut-Sénégal-Niger after World War I. The new colony of Upper Volta (Haute-Volta) was created on May 20, 1919, with its administration based in Ouagadougou, the capital of the Mossi. The French relied on the labor force drawn from these densely populated regions toward the centers of development in Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. Hesling, the first governor of the new colony, remained



Moro Naba, the king of Upper Volta, visiting the French governor of the region. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

in post until 1927. The colony was initially divided into seven districts (Bobo-Dioulasso, Dédougou, Ouagadougou, Dori, Gaoua, Fada N'Gourma, and Say), but changes soon followed. The district of Ouagadougou was reduced in size with the formation of Ouahigouya, in 1921, and of Tenkodogo and Kaya, in 1922; a district of Boromo was created by dividing Dédougou; and Say was transferred to the colony of Niger in 1927.

The program of colonization was centered on the forced cultivation of cotton that was imposed throughout the colony, but this turned out to be a fiasco. In practice, the colonial system embodied numerous contradictions. In order to pay their taxes, many Voltaïques moved every year into the Asante country to sell livestock, shea butter, and *soumbala* (fermented *nééré*). In the course of these movements some would work for a few months in the gold mines, on the cocoa plantations, or on the construction sites that had begun to be developed from the end of the nineteenth century. These migrations were also aimed at avoiding having to take part in maintaining roads inside the colony or recruitment for work outside it, whether on the railways between Thiès and Kayes, Kayes and Bamako, or Abidjan and Bobo-Dioulasso, or in private enterprises in Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, or Senegal. The working conditions of such forced laborers were often appalling.

The crisis of 1930 revealed the disastrous consequences of these levies of workers. The drought of 1932 made an endemic state of famine even worse. A decree issued on September 5, 1932, divided the colony among its three neighbors, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Niger. Côte d'Ivoire took the largest share (with Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso), while Yatenga went to Sudan, and Niger absorbed the Gulmu and Liptako areas.

Thus, the main export product of what had been Upper Volta became its labor force, moving into the developing zones that bordered upon the territory.

Some went in response to calls for workers on infrastructure projects, such as canals or the Markala Dam, issued by the Office du Niger au Soudan from 1932 onward. However, the recruitment of workers for Côte d'Ivoire was on a larger scale, whether for building work in the port of Abidjan, or for the cocoa, coffee, and banana plantations. The *inspection du travail* (labor inspectorate) established for French West Africa in 1932 was supposed to protect the workers, but it often limited itself to helping employers in the south gain easier access to the workers of the north. The workers themselves, meanwhile, preferred to head off for the Gold Coast, where they were paid more and treated better.

Paradoxically, it was during this period that an embryonic sense of nationhood gained strength among the inhabitants of what had been Upper Volta, pushing the traditional chiefs as well as members of the intellectual elite to call for the recreation of the colony. In 1937 they secured the creation of a new administrative entity, Haute (Upper) Côte d'Ivoire, taking in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, and governed by an official based in Abidjan.

At the time of the elections organized within the Union française (French Union) from 1945 onward, in line with the decisions of the Brazzaville Conference, the Voltaïques were still divided among Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Niger. Felix Houphouët-Boigny was elected to represent Haute Côte d'Ivoire; as leader of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA, or African Democratic Rally) and the man responsible for the law that put an end to forced labor, Houphouët-Boigny came to play a decisive role in re-creating Upper Volta. He negotiated with the traditional ruler, known as the Moog-naaba, the supply of Mossi laborers to the plantations of Côte d'Ivoire in return for his assistance in reconstituting the colony. However, its resurrection, in 1947, was used against the members of his own party, the RDA, who were accused of collaborating with the Parti communiste (Communist Party) and abused by the colonial authorities.

The economy of Upper Volta was transformed by the construction of a railway line from Bobo-Dioulasso to Ouagadougou that was completed in 1954. This created a new migration route in the direction of the coast, with the result that workers heading for Côte d'Ivoire soon came to outnumber those setting off for the Gold Coast.

The French Four-Year Plans (for 1950–1954 and 1954–1958) contained proposals for developing both subsistence farming and cash crops, largely through investments in dams, silos, schools, and other projects by the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (Investment Funds for Economic and Social Development) and the Fonds d'équipement rural et de développement économique et social (Funds for Rural Infrastructure and Economic and Social Development). The existing *sociétés de prévoyance* (literally,

"foresight societies") became *sociétés mutuelles de production rurale* ("mutual societies for rural production"), with a reserve fund to support subsistence. However, annual exports of groundnuts remained below 10,000 tons, rather than reaching the 15,000 tons that had been hoped for, while exports of cotton stagnated at 3,000–4,000 tons, those of shea at 5,000–10,000 tons, and those of sisal and sesame at less than 500 tons. The only positive developments came with the cultivation of rice and the increase in livestock farming, with exports to the Gold Coast and Côte d'Ivoire. There was virtually no manufacturing in Upper Volta once the shea-processing factory near Boromo closed down in 1954, and the output of gold from Poura amounted to just a few kilograms. By 1960 exports accounted for 75 per cent of tax revenues, yet they were equivalent to just 4 per cent of gross domestic product, so customs dues and remittances from migrant workers were crucial. The budget for 1958, for example, within which 17 per cent of spending was earmarked for investment, was balanced only because the French government provided a subsidy of 5 billion francs.

The expansion in the number of salaried workers, in both the public and the private sectors, to about 20,000; the development of labor unions; the first experiment in democratic institution building, with the Assemblée territoriale (Territorial Assembly) and the Conseil de gouvernement (Council of Government) established in 1957—these formed the main legacy of the last few years before independence. After the death of Ouezzin Coulibaly, vice president of the council (or deputy prime minister) in 1958, leadership passed to Maurice Yaméogo, who became the first president of independent Upper Volta in 1960.

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Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Independence to the Present

Since achieving independence from the French on August 5, 1960, the history of Burkina Faso has been marked by a short-lived, democratically elected administration and a succession of military coups. Upon independence, the country's first president and leader of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (African Democratic Assembly), Maurice Yaméogo,

BURKINA FASO (UPPER VOLTA): INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT

promised great economic strides for the fledgling state; these were promises upon which he soon found it impossible to deliver.

A failing economy, combined with rigged elections, brought nationwide demonstrations that led the army to intervene and take control of the country in January 1966. General Sangoulé Lamizana was installed as the president and ruled for the next 15 years, gradually offering degrees of limited power to the people. Trade union-organized unrest led to a bloodless coup in November 1980, the reins of power going to Colonel Saye Zerbo, who lasted two years, being removed from office by a group of army officers in November 1982 amid corruption allegations.

Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo was declared president by the officers who seized power, and Captain Thomas Sankara was appointed prime minister. Serious divisions within the new regime soon came to light, however, with Ouedraogo ordering the arrest of Sankara in May 1983. Unfortunately for the president, Sankara was very popular among the general population and army officers alike, as he was able to keep the ramshackle coalition government of radicals and conservatives together. Efforts to remove him from office led to riots among students, workers, and officers alike. Almost inevitably, given Burkina Faso's recent history, Ouedraogo was deposed in a military coup.

The disgruntled officers, who were responsible for Sankara being in power, now took control of the country, forming the Conseil national de la révolution (CNR), with Sankara as its president. Sankara managed to hold the council—another peculiar mix of left-wing civilians and army officers—together only with strong support from those allies who were responsible for removing Ouedraogo from power, among them Captain Blaise Compaoré, Captain Henri Zongo, and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani.



Peasants building a stone wall near Kongoussie, Burkina Faso, to reduce erosion. © Knut Mueller/Das Fotoarchiv.

Sankara's popularity increased when he ordered all politicians, including himself, to make details of their personal bank accounts a matter of public scrutiny. And in 1984 he ordered the country's name, Upper Volta, changed to Burkina Faso—"land of righteous people"—in the hope of instilling some national pride and perhaps a sense of civic duty. The government headed by Sankara was also responsible for great strides in public health, through immunization programs, public housing, and women's rights.

Policy disagreements and growing personal animosities among different wings within the CNR led to Sankara's assassination in October 1987. The killers were Compaoré loyalists, and Compaoré lost no time in declaring himself president. The popularity of Sankara, alongside the violence of the takeover, led to swift condemnation from the international community and nationwide dissatisfaction at home. Compaoré moved to consolidate his position by replacing the CNR with the new Front populaire (FP). Further tightening his grip on the country, he had former allies Zongo and Lingani arrested in September 1989. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the government, summarily tried, and executed on the same night. In the subsequent government reorganization, Compaoré made himself head of both departments of defense and security.

A new constitution was drafted and approved by referendum in June 1991. Among the provisions of the new constitution were a commitment to multiparty democracy and the denial of legitimacy to any future government that came to power as the result of a coup. Compaoré attempted to show some relaxation of his rule, when the government that was formed in June 1991, under the banner of the Fourth Republic, contained some members of opposition parties, and the minister of defense was, for the first time, a civilian.

Presidential elections were held in December 1991, as Compaoré continued his attempts to appear conciliatory, but they were boycotted by opposition parties. Compaoré ran unopposed, being elected by a voter turnout of just 25 per cent. In legislative elections the following year, opposition groups managed to take only 23 seats out of a possible 107 for the National Assembly, largely as a result of their own disunity. The opposition fared no better five years later, when the ruling party took 101 seats out of the 111 available. The 1998 presidential election saw Compaoré reelected with a more realistic margin than he had eight years earlier. With a turnout of 56 per cent, the incumbent won 87 per cent of votes cast.

In December 1998, a prominent independent journalist and newspaper editor, Norbert Zongo, and three of his colleagues were found murdered, allegedly by members of the presidential guard. These deaths resulted in nationwide strikes and demonstrations, with a coalition of opposition and human-rights

groups—the Collectif d'organisations démocratiques de masse et de partis politiques—demanding that a complete and transparent investigation be held. Surprised by the continuing strength of the protests, the government eventually agreed to hand Zongo's case over to the courts and compensate the families of the murdered men. It wasn't until 2001 that anyone was charged with the murder of Zongo, including certain individuals already in prison for other murders.

Further constitutional changes relating to the office of the president were introduced by the parliament in 2000. A minimum candidacy age of 35 was introduced, as well as a two-term limit, a reduction of the term length from seven to five years, and a stipulation that only civilians were permitted to run for election. However, as these changes were to be implemented after the 2002 elections, Compaoré, who resigned his army commission, would be eligible to run for office again in 2005 and 2010.

The May 2002 elections saw a more organized opposition, with the ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP; a replacement of the FP after 1996) majority being significantly reduced. Polling half a percentage point less than 50 per cent of votes cast, the party managed to take just 57 seats out of 111 in the National Assembly. A cabinet reshuffle in June saw a reversal of an earlier policy of including opposition members in government, with the new 31-member cabinet containing only CDP ministers.

Despite holding onto power since 1987, Compaoré has never had the popular support of his predecessor, Sankara, and periodic rumors of planned coups allow him to maintain fairly draconian security measures. The latest reported plot, in October 2003, resulted in the arrest of 16 individuals, including a prominent opposition leader and one-time Sankara ally, Norbert Tiendrebeogo, head of the Social Forces Front.

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
Burundi to c.1800

Small against the backdrop of the immensity of the African continent—it is one of Africa's smallest countries,

approximately 10,746 square miles (6,448 square kilometers) in area—Burundi promises to have considerable depth in antiquity of human and protohuman experience as its past becomes known.

Burundi's Western Rift Valley location places it squarely in the midst of the nexus of ancient human, and even protohuman, habitation in Africa. Although the tiny country remains largely unsurveyed by archaeologists, surface surveys and chance finds have turned up the cultural remnants of long and continuous occupation. For example, Acheulean biface hand axes characteristic of the early Stone Age (approximately 500,000–100,000BCE) have been uncovered at two Burundian sites. Middle Stone Age artifacts, including stone points for arrows and spears found in seven Burundian sites, demonstrate that prehistoric craftsmen of the region worked in the Sangoan-Lupembian style (dating from 100,000BCE). Microliths and other artifacts of the late Stone Age found throughout Burundi reflect a variety of techniques and tool-making cultures (or "industries"), including the Magosian, Upper Lupembian, Lupembo-Tshitoliien, and Wilton-Tshitoliien industries. These finds suggest an occupation of considerable time depth, and possibly of considerable diversity as well.

Situated in the fertile corridor of the Great Lakes Region (also called the interlacustrine region), ancient Burundi was home to many different groups of people who dwelled along its marshy waterways and forested hills. Its known history reaches back to beyond 1000BCE, when its densely vegetated hills and valleys (at that time part of the Congo Basin rain



Burundi.

forest) supported small communities of foragers, hunters, and fishers. Aspects of these early lifeways have been preserved by rural Burundians, many of whom make active use of a vast reservoir of knowledge of plants and forest animals that has accumulated over millennia of human experience. The Burundian subcommunity that has preserved these ways of life most actively and completely is that identified collectively as the Batwa, some of whom live today in forest or riverine settings and incorporate foraging, hunting, and fishing techniques into their daily economic activities.

Food production emerged in Burundi around 1000BCE, and with it came changes in the relationship between people and their environment. Burundi became a patchwork of fishers, foragers, and farmers living side-by-side in particular microenvironments nestled among the valleys and hills. Environmental and social changes accelerated some time after 500BCE with the advent of ironworking. With stronger and sharper digging tools and axes, iron tool-using farmers felled the forests to make way for fields and homesteads. As forests thinned and gradually receded, forest-dwelling people became less proximate, and hence increasingly “remote” and “different” from the farmers, leaving a mark on their social dynamics. In addition, forest-dwelling predators, including the tsetse fly, receded from the farmers’ zones. This opened up a new ecological corridor that could support new kinds of activities, including much denser agricultural settlement and the raising of livestock. These varied economic activities developed, over time, into more specialized lifestyles—including those that emphasized pastoralism (practiced by many of the forebears of the modern Tutsi and Hima identity groups) and those that emphasized farming (practiced by some of the forebears of the modern Hutu group). These specialized lifestyles developed in relation to each other and were interconnected through social relationships and trade.

The ecological particularities of Burundi’s various subregions fostered a certain degree of regional variation in economic, cultural, and social patterns, and even in strategies for human organization. Small local and regional dynasties developed, as did various kinds of claims to authority, such as descent from an “original” family that had cleared away the wilderness, or ancestry from magical newcomers who had brought peace and order to residents whom they had found living in discord. By the second millennium of the present era, many such dynasties existed within the space of modern-day Burundi. They have left their traces upon Burundi’s physical and cultural environment in many forms, from spirit shrines,

toponyms, and tomb sites to family names, chanted expressions, and oral traditions.

Midway through the second millennium, certain local dynasties began to expand and coalesce, particularly in a political center remembered as Burundi of Nyaburunga in the south and a region associated with a leader named Ntare Karemera in the north. These two centers were unified, oral traditions recount, by a king named Ntare Rushatsi (whose name translates literally as “Shaggy-haired Lion”). Although many of the tales that center on Ntare Rushatsi are mythical in tone, Burundian scholars see him as an actual historical figure. Historical information about his successors, however, is somewhat sketchy and limited, until the beginning of the nineteenth century when Ntare Rugamba (literally, the “Battle Lion”) reinforced and further expanded the kingdom. Ntare Rugamba (who is believed to have governed c.1800–1850) is remembered as an intrepid warrior who, with the help of his elder sons, significantly expanded Burundi’s eighteenth-century boundaries. He followed up on his territorial gains by establishing a firm politicoadministrative structure: he is remembered as the founder of the Baganwa system of territorial governance, whereby his royal sons (the Baganwa), as well as his wives and men of confidence moved out to far-flung regions to build their own “courts.” There, they represented the king’s interest by working to erode the authority of local families or dynasties. And by obliging local families to give “gifts” or tribute as an expression of political support, they enriched themselves as well.

Ntare Rugamba’s Baganwa system reached its apogee during the rule of his son, Mwezi Gisabo (c.1857–1906). Backed by a strong group of Baganwa as well as a skillful standing army and a shrewd and influential entourage of sorcerers, ritualists, and advisors, Mwezi Gisabo withstood numerous challenges to his authority and threats to his kingdom’s security. These challenges included Arab-Swahili slave traders who tried to penetrate Burundi from the west and south; the militarized and expansionist Wanyamwezi who attacked from the east; long-standing rival Rwanda, with which he maintained an uneasy border to the north; would-be usurpers; and ecological and epidemiological disturbances.

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Burundi: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial

Located in fertile highlands overlooking the northeastern shore of Lake Tanganyika, the precolonial kingdom of Burundi developed during the course of the nineteenth century from a relatively small dynasty tucked between two politically more powerful and expansive regions, Rwanda and Buha, into a formidable political force of its own. By century's end, Burundi prevailed not only as an important regional power among the kingdoms of the Great Lakes corridor, but also as an African kingdom capable of staving off foreign penetration, keeping slave traders, missionaries, and colonial soldiers at bay.

Burundi's emergence in the nineteenth century was made possible by two long-ruling and adept kings, Ntare Rugamba (c.1800–1850) and Mwezi Gisabo (c.1857–1908). Ntare Rugamba, an intrepid warrior, expanded the kingdom's boundaries through conquest; he established a new territorial framework for the kingdom that his son and successor, Mwezi Gisabo, worked to consolidate politically. Mwezi's reign is considered to be the apogee of the Burundian monarchy.

It was military strategy and father-son cooperation that marked Burundi's nineteenth-century ascendance. Ntare Rugamba's carefully trained personal guard, the Abatezi ("attackers"), recruited from the sons of aristocrats, court advisors, and regional leaders, formed the nucleus of an army that could grow to several thousands in time of war. At their peak in the 1840s, the Abatezi were led by Ntare's son, Prince Rwasha, whose strategy relied on attacking with a main body archers while encircling the enemy from the flanks. These tactics brought the Abatezi success in campaigns against small regional dynasties as well as against the larger armies of Rwanda and Buha-Buyungu. In victory, Rwasha's warriors concentrated on seizing cattle, not generating casualties. If they captured the opposing leader, however, they were likely to behead him and burn his residence to the ground.

To bring newly conquered regions under his rule, Ntare Rugamba established a politicoadministrative structure known as the Baganwa system of territorial governance whereby he granted governing rights to his royal sons (the Baganwa), as well as to his wives, ritualists, clients, and confidantes. Thus armed with a royal mandate to claim territory, these potential governors moved out to far-flung regions to seek to build up their own "courts." There, if they managed to establish themselves, they represented the king's interest by working to erode the authority of preexisting local leaders or dynasties. Concurrently, they fulfilled their own interests as well by obliging local families to give

gifts or tribute as an expression of political support. Under this system, a favorite client who had performed services for the king over the course of many years could hold governing rights to several noncontiguous territories, each territory representing a "reward." During Ntare Rugamba's reign, the largest landowners were his older offspring—particularly his sons Rwasha, Ndivyariye, Birori, and Busumano.

Although he bestowed territories on loyal supporters, Ntare directly controlled numerous domains, many of them in prime locations in the heartland. From these he drew wealth—for example, livestock, foods, beverages (such as honey wine), and beautifully crafted products (such as bark cloth)—that he could redistribute at court or bestow on loyal subjects. He also received these products as tribute.

Although military conquest and material wealth attested to the king's strength, the basis of his power was spiritual. The king's title, *mwami*, derives from the verb *kwama*, which means "to be fertile," and the king himself was seen by his people as the human embodiment of fertility. The mwami was a living charm from which derived the well-being of the Burundian people. Linked to this mystical aspect of the king's power was a constellation of images and rituals meant to express his mystical qualities and to augment them. This included a special vocabulary for aspects of the king's physical being; a complex set of charms—such as a royal bull, a royal python, sacred drums—protected by a broad network of ritualists; and an annual ritual, *umuganuro* (the first fruits or sorghum festival held in December), which blessed the king and reinvigorated his sacred aspect. The handling of a deceased king's body and the identification of a successor also came under the supervision of ritualists. The rituals of the court are best known for the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, the last king to maintain these rituals before the pressures of Christianity and colonialism led to their interdiction.

Great controversy and secrecy surround the circumstances of Mwezi Gisabo's birth and accession to *ubwami* (the office of the mwami that is represented by the drum, the Burundian symbol of royal power). One of the youngest of the royal offspring, Mwezi Gisabo was pushed into *ubwami* at the expense of the designated heir, his brother Twarereye. This move led supporters for each brother to take up arms on the battlefield, and ultimately to Twarereye's death. Throughout these skirmishes Mwezi, too young to rule, lived at court under the guardianship of his mother Vyano and his eldest brother Ndivyariye, who governed on his behalf. When Mwezi Gisabo grew into adulthood, he himself took up arms to force his reluctant guardian Ndivyariye to surrender power. This fraternal conflict, which took place in the late 1860s, generated a vendetta between

their descendants (the Batare and the Bezi) that continued to influence Burundian politics 100 years later.

These initial challenges to Mwezi Gisabo's authority, which came from within the ranks of his own family, set the tone for his long and difficult reign. But backed by a strong faction at court, as well as by a skillful royal guard and a shrewd and influential entourage of sorcerers, ritualists, and advisors, Mwezi Gisabo withstood numerous challenges to his authority and threats to his kingdom's security. These challenges included militarized and expansionist Wanyamwezi who attacked from the east (1884); Arab-Swahili slave traders who tried to penetrate Burundi from the west and south (from the 1850s on); long-standing rival Rwanda, with which he maintained an uneasy border to the north (1880s–1890s); would-be usurpers; and ecological and epidemiological disturbances (1870s–1890s). Mwezi met each of these challenges and remained in power.

Despite the number of external threats that Mwezi confronted during his long reign, the greatest threats came from inside his kingdom, from his own relatives. The Baganwa system of territorial governance established by Ntare Rugamba had served the warrior-king well, but generated all manner of obstacles for his son. It had the flaw that once the recipients of Ntare Rugamba's mandate to govern actually established themselves in relatively remote regions, after the death of their patron, they and their offspring had little incentive to pursue active and loyal relations with his successor Mwezi Gisabo. It therefore behooved Mwezi Gisabo to dislodge these untrustworthy kinsmen and reallocate their lands to those loyal to him, such as his own sons. These conflicts among the Baganwa created an environment of internal instability and political intrigue which external challengers sought to exploit. It was internal dissent that brought success to the German conquest in the early years of the twentieth century.

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Burundi: Colonial Period: German and Belgian

The precolonial kingdom of Burundi, which had expanded rapidly through military conquest in the

early nineteenth century under king Ntare Rugamba (c.1800–1850), was engaged in the process of stabilizing and consolidating these gains under king Mwezi Gisabo (c.1850–1908), when the region found itself on the newest frontline of European imperial expansion.

This expansion made its presence felt in 1879 when a group of Catholic missionaries of the Société des Missionnaires d'Afrique, known as the White Fathers, established a mission station on the Lake Tanganyika coast in the vicinity of the modern-day town Rumonge. This region, although not directly under Burundian control, was nevertheless within the orbit of the kingdom's political interest. The mission station was short-lived, however, when conflict with the local leader, Bikari, over the priests' attempt to "rescue" one of his retainers from what they perceived as slavery, brought the fledgling mission to a violent end in 1881. Despite this loss, the White Fathers persisted in their efforts to establish themselves in or near the densely populated kingdom.

As King Mwezi Gisabo monitored and thwarted the progress of the missionaries, in 1896 he confronted a new form of European encroachment on the edges of his kingdom: a military post established by Germans at the northern end of the lake. Unbeknownst to Mwezi Gisabo, his kingdom had been claimed by Germany, and was known on European maps as the Urundi district on the western frontier of German East Africa. Early communications between the king and the German officer in charge, in 1899, passed between emissaries in a diplomatic, even friendly, tone. But continued German presence under subsequent, more belligerent officers, led to a breakdown of diplomacy.

In 1902, the German officer in charge led a brutal and destructive campaign against Mwezi to force him to submit. This campaign, which relied on the assistance of several of Mwezi's personal enemies, deteriorated into a hunt across Burundi's heavily populated hillsides. In 1903, with his kingdom plundered and numerous of his subjects engaged in open revolt, Mwezi Gisabo presented himself to his pursuers. But far from suffering humiliation and political defeat, the king found his authority bolstered.

The German officer who had ravaged his kingdom and forced Mwezi Gisabo to surrender had done so in direct violation of the orders of the colony's governor, in faraway Dar es Salaam, whose political strategy centered on establishing cooperative relations with African leaders. Within months, Mwezi's vanquisher was recalled, and the officer sent to replace him worked to reaffirm Mwezi's authority.

The Germans who had sought to ruin Mwezi now protected him. Indeed, the king could influence the decision to send German military expeditions to target uncooperative regional leaders. With German help, Mwezi

reestablished his hold over his father's kingdom and even expanded into regions that had not previously fallen under his control. By 1906, when German occupation shifted from military to civilian rule, the king and the German Residents at Usumbura were building a fragile collaboration. It lasted until 1908, when the elderly king died.

With Mwezi's death, and the coronation of the adolescent king Mutaga, 1908–1915), collaboration collapsed. Mutaga's enthronement had occurred only after much manipulation, and he was king in name only. In reality, his mother Ririkumutima, and his paternal uncle Ntarugera, both avaricious and shrewd, divided control of the kingdom. Many regional leaders, even princes, found their positions jeopardized by shifting favoritism at court, and appealed to the Germans for support. On the basis of their vigorous criticism and political information, the German Residents divided Urundi district into three political zones indicated by degree of loyalty to, or autonomy from, the central kingdom.

In this unstable political context, a rapid succession of German Residents sought to integrate Urundi district into the developing structure of the larger colony. They built a set of outposts in order to administer through local ties rather than by military expeditions, and relocated the district headquarters to geographically central Gitega. To prepare the population for a peasant-based economic program, they introduced money and taxes. To connect Urundi, with its enormous labor and agricultural potential, to the rest of the colony, they built a railway from Dar es Salaam out to the Lake Tanganyika port of Kigoma, and began a spur up to Urundi. These efforts were cut short, however, with the outbreak of World War I.

German East Africa's western boundary became the launching point for German assaults against the Belgian Congo. These operations engaged the administrators and soldiers of Urundi. Amid this destabilization, King Mutaga died under mysterious circumstances in November 1915. With the royal court wracked by conflict surrounding the succession of a young child, Mwambutsa, and with Belgian troops from the Congo set to invade, Urundi's German administrators fled in the spring of 1916.

Belgian military occupation of Urundi lasted from mid-1916 until 1924, when the League of Nations granted Belgium a formal mandate to rule. As Urundi's internationally recognized trustee, Belgium set about dismantling and reorganizing Urundi's politico-administrative system along more convenient lines. The reorganization, which took place during the 1930s, reinforced the authority of members of select branches of the royal family, and their allies, while systematically disempowering a broad range of others who had previously wielded regional governing authority, including royal ritualists, women, advisers, and clients,

and autonomous leaders from powerful local families. Although some of the disempowered leaders resisted vigorously—particularly in regions that had previously experienced relative autonomy or had been under the authority of respected ritualists—their resistance was subdued with force. Once opposition was eliminated, the territories were seized and incorporated into a streamlined and authoritarian three-tiered system of *territoires* (headed by a Belgian, staffed by Burundians), *chefferies* (governed by Belgian-appointed chiefs), and *sous-chefferies* (under Belgian-appointed subchiefs).

As the colonial government worked to reorganize the regional administrative system, the White Fathers, who had maintained a presence throughout the war and into the period of Belgian administration, worked to convert and educate those upon whom the new system would rely. Early mission schools targeted almost exclusively the sons of princes and prominent Tutsi pastoralists, with the goal of concentrating education upon the next generation of leaders. Their female counterparts—and intended wives—were young Christianized women from royal or prominent Tutsi families who were trained by nuns to uphold the norms of Western-style morality and domesticity. At the nexus of this effort to mold a Burundian colonial elite was the King Mwambutsa and his wife, Thérèse Kanyonga (they married in 1930). This young couple represented the epitome of Belgian ambition—and manipulation.

By the 1940s, the colonial system of indirect rule, that is, governance by a broad, regional network of Burundian administrators under the leadership of a relatively small group of Belgian officials, functioned very effectively. The vast majority of the population was comprised of peasant producers who grew cash crops—such as coffee or tea—for the state, and survived mostly on subsistence crops such as beans, cassava, corn, and peas. These peasant producers were legally categorized as being of Hutu ethnicity. *Hutu* was a word that had meant “servant”; it was also a label assigned to anyone who was of ordinary social status and hence a candidate for servitude. By contrast, Urundi's elites identified as Tutsi, a label that had once referred to pastoralists, and by extension to the wealthy, since livestock were a major form of wealth. Prior to colonialism, the labels *Hutu* and *Tutsi* denoted social reference points, and as such they were relative, flexible, and subject to correspond with new social realities, and hence subject to change. Under the Belgian colonial system, however, terms were transformed into fixed ethnic categories. By the prevailing social “rule of thumb,” they denoted one ethnic group that the system empowered, the Tutsi, and the other which the system had explicitly or more structurally and passively disempowered, the Hutu.

The Belgian colonial system had created a small privileged elite, nearly all of whom were Tutsi (including

members of the royal family who had been legally subsumed into the category) and a large underclass, the majority of whom were classified as Hutu. When the winds of change and independence swept through the colonial world in the 1950s, Urundi's modern political foundation was now built upon dangerously elitist and undemocratic principles.

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Burundi: Independence to 1988

Political conflict, as complex as it was intense, characterized Burundi's first generation of independence from 1962, when multiple power struggles, including the remnants of century-old antagonisms, converged.

Burundi's strong and optimistic beginning collapsed just months before the official transition to independence when in October 1961 the king's eldest son, Crown Prince Rwagasore, one of the organizers of the political party Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) was assassinated. The prince had been the lynchpin of the massive UPRONA coalition. He had personified, and with his royal prestige had guaranteed the viability of, a middle ground. Without him the UPRONA, and the impetus to work in a broad-based coalition, disintegrated.

Burundi gained its political independence and separated from Rwanda in 1962, a year characterized by political floundering and violence. Inquiry into the prince's death uncovered a conspiracy led by two Batare of the Parti démocrate chrétien, the other dominant political party. The Batare were one of two conflicting branches of the royal family (the other being the Bezi); they had used colonialism to their advantage and wanted to retain their power. The discovery of their involvement in the prince's death, in combination with the political devastation caused by the inability to fill Rwagasore's void, taught newly independent Burundians the cynical lesson that, regardless of the courage and effort expended to develop a broad-based democratic movement, one well-placed assassination could bring democracy to its knees and reestablish the status quo for those not inclined to share power. It was a lesson to which future politicians would adhere. But in 1962, the immediate lesson that political extremists drew from Rwagasore's murder was the efficacy of political violence. The example was followed by others throughout the country who engaged in acts of arson, intimidation, and assassination.

As the UPRONA split into factions by multiple claimants to the mantle of Rwagasore, the prince's father tried to use his personal influence, and the notion of the monarchy as above and outside ordinary social groups, to maintain a political common ground. But with the spread of the notion that intimidation was the "easy" path to political victory, that common ground eroded and the *mwami's* (king's) approach shifted toward the heavy-handed. Between 1963 and 1965, he became increasingly autocratic, in open violation of Burundi's constitution. The pattern of the mwami's interventions suggests an awkward balancing game, which he initially played through the office of the prime minister, but later played directly himself. From 1963 to 1965, Burundi saw a succession of five prime ministers, including Baganwa (members of the royal family) from each of the rival factions, a Tutsi, and two Hutus, the most popular of whom was assassinated. As the political balance was threatened, the mwami seized control of the army, and the national police, placing them under his exclusive jurisdiction, took over the national radio network and refused to recognize newly elected parliamentarians. He even invested his own personal secretary as prime minister in a bid for direct political control.

These bold moves on the part of the mwami constituted his response to a growing trend of polarization between Hutus, who were rapidly gaining political skill and a sense of their potential for power in democratic politics, and a developing coalition of Baganwa and Tutsi who responded defensively to the threat of a Hutu-centric democracy. Although demographically inferior, the developing Tutsi lobby met the Hutus' straightforward numerical dominance with carefully crafted strategy. The prevailing Cold War political environment, and intense international interest in Burundi as a stepping-stone to resource-rich Zaïre (Democratic Republic of Congo), provided politicians such as Tutsi prime minister Albin Nyamoya the opportunity to make clandestine pacts with world powers. In one shrewdly orchestrated move, he manipulated the mwami into recognizing China, which distanced the king from his Western backers. Such moves represented not only clever gamesmanship in the Burundian political arena, but also a bid for non-Western support by those who perceived Western democracy as the source of their political destruction.

By 1965, tension, ambition, and polarization had reached such a pitch of intensity that in July the mwami took the desperate step of declaring an absolute monarchy. This move only increased the agitation on all sides; it ignited, in October of that year, a political explosion that has been alternately described as an uprising, a coup, or a set of coups carried out by Tutsi, then Hutu, instigators. The net effect of the October upheaval was

to unleash two successive waves of political violence that concentrated in Muramvya, the center of royal politics, and in Bujumbura, the center of modern politics. The initial wave of violence was directed against Tutsi victims and led to the deaths of several hundred persons, including ordinary Tutsis living in rural communities in Muramvya who were killed not because of their politics but because of their misfortune in becoming targets of opportunity. With many of the Baganwa and Tutsi from traditionally powerful Muramvya families left shocked and devastated, the group with the greatest potential to move to the political fore appeared to be the Hutu political elite. This, therefore, was the group targeted for the second wave of violence.

This second wave centered on Bujumbura, where the inability of the mwami and the wounded prime minister to muster an effective response created a power void, into which stepped the army, commanded by Captain Michel Micombero, a young officer who had been handpicked and promoted by the mwami. Micombero was a political outsider, a Tutsi from a minor regional faction that came from outside the kingdom's heartland and that had not wielded influence at the royal court. Micombero seized the opportunity, using his outsider status to appear neutral and his military authority to appear dynamic. Within days, under Micombero's command, army units had killed the majority of the Hutu political elite, including labor and political leaders, and nearly all of the Hutu deputies recently elected to the parliament. Thousands of ordinary Hutus were killed as well, particularly in and around Muramvya—a move that helped to placate Baganwa and Tutsi families. In the aftermath of the killings, the mwami fled to Europe, key Hutu politicians were dead, detained or in exile, Baganwa and Muramvya Tutsi families were temporarily sidelined, and Captain Micombero remained the *de facto* strongman.

A year later, in two shrewdly executed moves, Micombero formalized his political dominance. First he assisted 19-year-old Crown Prince Charles Ndizeye, on a tour of Burundi from Europe where the royal family had remained, to depose his father, crown himself, and appoint Micombero as his prime minister. Then, in November 1966, when the young monarch departed on a state visit to a neighboring country, Micombero seized command, deposed him, and declared a republic.

With this declaration, Micombero brought about an important shift in Burundian politics. With Burundi now a republic, the long-standing Batare-Bezi aristocratic rivalry was diminished in significance and the Baganwa gradually coalesced into "Tutsi" politics. The October 1965 massacre of Hutu politicians had eliminated them from the political arena as well. Hence, in the politics of the new republic, what mattered was the particular Tutsi faction from which

a political aspirant hailed. Micombero's previously politically inconsequential group, from the southern province of Bururi, now moved into major cabinet positions and into key economic and judicial posts. Micombero narrowed the pipeline for political ascent by outlawing all political parties but one, the UPRONA, which he controlled. And in a sense, he superseded government by running the country through a national revolutionary council, his primarily military inner circle.

By 1968, much of the country was in the hands of Micombero's inner circle, including his relatives, coregionalists, and close associates. Monarchists and Hutus, now outside "the system," occasionally challenged it with what became the conventional tools of the disempowered, anonymous tracts and rumors. Micombero met these threats with his own increasingly conventional techniques: mass arrests, charges of treason, and death sentences. But while his government exerted tight control of the political climate, it failed to exert similar control economically. In 1968–1969, Burundi experienced an economic downturn that quickly became a political weapon for "nonsouthern" Tutsi factions to use against Micombero's group. This intra-Tutsi rivalry was expressed in the language of an anticorruption campaign. In 1971, Micombero's group arrested several prominent nonsouthern Tutsi politicians, charging them with treason and sentencing them to death. The sentences were commuted, however, for fear of backlash.

Into this simmering antagonism, in late March 1972, stepped ousted King Ntare Charles Ndizeye. Within hours of his arrival he was detained and placed under house arrest in Gitega, a town in the heartland of the old kingdom and adjacent to Muramvya Province. One month later, the political repercussions of the mwami's presence became clear. On April 29, 1972, Micombero dismissed his government, as well as the UPRONA's executive secretary, and announced on the radio that "monarchists" (a nomenclature often applied to nonsouthern Tutsis) had attempted to overthrow the government. As events unfolded, first in Bujumbura and in the vicinity of Gitega and then in southern Burundi, it was announced that the king had died while being "rescued," and that the true culprits behind the coup were "Hutu intellectuals." To "restore order," Micombero mobilized the army, which focused its retaliation on Hutus, and in particular those who had distinguished themselves by studying beyond the primary school level, or by their involvement in local-level commerce. The organized killing carried out by the army in April 1972 left between 100,000 and 200,000 persons dead and about 200,000 others seeking refuge in neighboring countries.

The massacre of 1972, or what Hutus have described as a genocide, effectively silenced not only Hutu voices, but even many of the nonsouthern Tutsi.

It provoked only muffled criticism from the international community, which preferred to describe it as “tribal slaughter” rather than political violence. Nevertheless, a certain uneasiness between Burundi and international donors festered, making Micombero a political liability to his country. In 1976, his coregionalist and fellow officer, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, overthrew him and declared a “second republic.”

Presented in the guise of democratic reform, Bagaza’s program initially promised to be even-handed and inclusive. Bagaza spoke of national reconciliation and social integration. He emphasized the importance of elections and implemented universal adult suffrage, promoted land reform and outlawed an archaic system of overlordship and forced labor, and built roads and made other infrastructural improvements. Counterbalancing these progressive steps, Bagaza continued to ban all parties except the UPRONA, ran unchallenged in national elections, arrested and tortured accused critics (including members of the clergy), and in response to the resultant outcry, expelled large numbers of foreign clergy. He banned certain kinds of public gatherings and restricted religious and cultural celebrations. With governmental, political, and security structures that penetrated all the way down to the grassroots, Bagaza held Burundian society in a choke hold, allowing little room for individual autonomy or initiative. By 1986–1987, the tension had mounted to such a degree that it seemed that only a coup could alleviate it. In September 1987, that coup came from yet another military officer touting reconciliation and reform, once again a “southern” Tutsi from the Bururi region: Pierre Buyoya.

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See also: **Rwanda: 1962–1990.**

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Burundi: 1988 to Present

In August 1988, hundreds of Tutsi living in the north of Burundi were slaughtered by armed Hutu who

explained their actions by claiming Tutsi provocation. In restoring order, forces of President Jean-Baptiste Buyoya’s Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) government, which had taken power eleven months earlier, killed an estimated 20,000 Hutus and created in excess of 60,000 refugees, most of whom fled to Rwanda. In October, Buyoya both appointed a Hutu, Adrien Sibomana, as prime minister of the Council of Ministers and established a Commission for National Unity that had the task of examining the most recent massacres and suggesting ways to foster national unity. Significantly, both the council and the commission had equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi, despite a national bias of more than five to one in favor of the Hutu.

Following the April 1989 publication of the commission’s report, the government announced new legislation to fight all forms of discrimination and to create equal opportunities for Hutus in all walks of life, including the armed forces. Tensions remained high, however, and several unsuccessful coup attempts by supporters of former president Jean-Baptiste Bagaza and hard-line Tutsi followed. In April 1992, after the adoption of a new constitution and a cabinet reshuffle that gave 15 out of 25 ministerial positions to Hutus, violent clashes along the border with Rwanda continued to increase. The violence was blamed by the government on the Parti de libération du peuple Hutu, which it said had been trained in and armed by Rwanda. An agreement between the two countries on the repatriation of refugees and increases in border security did nothing to stop the violence.

Elections held in June 1993 for president and legislature both saw sizable victories for the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and its presidential candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, who was sworn in in July. On October 21, members of the majority Tutsi armed forces staged a coup, taking control of the presidential palace and other key buildings before killing a number of Hutu politicians and the president and declaring a state of emergency. The scale of the ethnic massacres that ensued, along with internal and international protests, led to the ultimate failure of the coup (though it has been called the “creeping coup,” leaving as it did the government in such a weak position as to be almost powerless).

Some 50,000 people were killed in a matter of weeks. Additionally, 700,000 individuals became refugees, while 600,000 were made “internally displaced persons.” Clashes between ethnically based militia groups escalated in early 1994, partly disguised as “disarmament operations” and partly provoked by the government’s request for an Organization for African Unity force to be sent to the country to protect

its ministers. Hundreds more were killed during this period, and, again, thousands more were made refugees or internally displaced.

On April 6, 1994, President Cyprien Ntaryamira (elected by the national assembly in January that year) was killed when the plane he was traveling in with President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down. Ethnic killings followed—though on nothing like the scale of those in Rwanda—as calls for peace by the interim president were largely heeded. Unable to stop Hutu rebel attacks against government forces, the June elections were suspended. Tensions increased, however, as more than 200,000 Rwandan refugees (almost exclusively Hutu) flooded into the country, away from the advancing Tutsi-dominated Front Patriotique Rwandais (Rwandan Patriotic Front).

In June, certain Hutu rebels formed together as the Front for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and displayed a greater military capability than before. Interethnic killings and ethnic cleansing continued throughout 1995 and gathered speed from early 1996. Localized interethnic massacres continued throughout 1995 and 1996 while numerous power sharing and coalition agreements were tried and failed, even as the government and Tutsi opposition persuaded the United Nations not to intervene, as a negotiated settlement was possible.

Another coup was staged by the army in July 1996, forcing the remaining FRODEBU politicians to either flee or seek refuge with foreign missions in the capital while Buyoya was restored as interim president. A nationwide curfew was imposed, national borders sealed, and the forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees halted, while Burundi's neighbors reacted by imposing an embargo. This was relaxed somewhat in April 1997 in order to allow deliveries of food and medicine to resume. Fighting between the army and Hutu militia continued across large parts of the country throughout the year, as did the government's violent regroupment policy and institution of camps, causing further displacement of the civilian population.

Peace talks properly began in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1998. Progress was slow, and at various points during the proceedings certain key parties and rebel groups, both Tutsi and Hutu, refused to take part. An agreement for pretransition and transition periods to be followed by democratic elections was eventually signed in August 2000, an achievement due in no small part to the efforts of the former South African president Nelson Mandela. In October, Mandela also announced that a 700-member-strong force of South African troops, to be joined by troops from other African nations after a period, would be sent to Burundi to ensure the safety of returning politicians. The presence

of the head of the FDD at another summit suggested that they, too—who had so far refused to endorse the Arusha accords—might now agree to a ceasefire. However, the party split, with the breakaway group seemingly having the greater support.

In November 2001, under the terms of the August 2000 agreement, a transitional government was installed, with Buyoya to remain in power as president for a further 18 months, when he was to hand over power to a Hutu for the next 18 months, which would mark the end of the transition phase, with elections to follow. In May 2003 Buyoya did indeed hand over power to his Hutu counterpart, Domitien Ndayizeye, who had been the vice president for the preceding year and a half. Since then fighting has increased, steadily encroaching on the capital, and a lasting peace still appears to be some way off, a feeling widely shared by the 500,000 refugees who remain in Tanzania.

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See also: Rwanda: Genocide, 1994.

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BuSaidi Sultanate: See Zanzibar: Busaidi Sultanate in East Africa.

Buthelezi and Inkatha Freedom Party

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi is the leader of the dominant political party in the South African province of KwaZulu Natal, the Inkatha Freedom Party. He has been a major actor in the late-twentieth-century history of South Africa, in a variety of capacities. Buthelezi was born August 27, 1928, in KwaZulu to Chief Mathole Buthelezi and Princess Magogo ka Dinuzulu, and

into the upper levels of the Zulu aristocracy; on his mother's side he is a descendant of the Zulu king Cetshwayo, and on his father's side he is descended from Chief Mathole Buthelezi, prime minister to the Zulu king Solomon kaDinzulu.

Buthelezi received his education in the African school system, culminating in a B.A. from the University of Fort Hare in 1950. In 1952 he married, and shortly thereafter he began a career in the Zulu political system. The early 1950s were a major transitional period in South Africa. The National Party, which won the elections of 1948, was firmly in power and beginning the process of implementing its policy of apartheid.

Like many black South Africans of his generation, Buthelezi responded to these changes by becoming a member of the African National Congress (ANC). He joined the ANC Youth League while at Fort Hare, in 1949. The ANC would engage in a number of highly publicized struggles against the South African government; it was ultimately banned by the government on April 8, 1960, in the wake of the negative publicity it received after the police initiated the Sharpeville massacre of ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) activists.

Buthelezi's greatest impact would be in the homelands government of his native KwaZulu. Starting in 1954, Buthelezi became the acting chief of the Buthelezi tribe, or division, of the Zulu. Later, during the 1970s, he would become the chief executive officer and chief executive counselor of the KwaZulu legislature.

The position from which he would make his greatest impact, though, was that of chief minister of KwaZulu (1975–1994). As chief minister, Buthelezi was essentially the head of government for the KwaZulu homeland. It was in this position of leadership that Buthelezi founded what was then the Inkatha liberation movement. Inkatha was a political organization based on the cultural traditions of the Zulu people. According to official Inkatha literature, the purpose of Inkatha was to “fill the vacuum caused by the banning of the ANC and PAC.” Inkatha notes that its founding was roughly contemporary to that of the black consciousness movement founded by Steve Biko.

The differences among Inkatha, the black consciousness movement, and the banned organizations were quite profound. Whereas the black consciousness movement, the ANC, and the PAC all tried to make connections between the various communities that suffered from apartheid, Inkatha, though open to all, was founded firmly on a basis of Zulu culture, which had the effect of functionally limiting its appeal to members of the Zulu community. In particular, Inkatha tended to gain membership among men either in the rural homeland or among those workers who found

themselves living in single-sex hostels in Johannesburg. These men were often unfamiliar with urban life, and Inkatha provided them with a sense of identity and importance. Many antiapartheid activists, however, regarded political organizations based on ethnic or tribal lines as playing into the preconceptions of the proponents of the apartheid system.

Throughout the period of struggle against apartheid, a majority of black South Africans were skeptical of Buthelezi and Inkatha, because Buthelezi retained his position in the homeland government despite a general agreement that the homelands were, at best, puppet regimes, and at worst, warehouses of potential labor for South African mining and industry. Although Buthelezi refused to accept “independence” for his homeland as part of the South African government's separate development strategy, many of his critics felt that this was not enough and that any participation in the homeland system invalidated his criticisms of the South African government.

Buthelezi and Inkatha disagreed significantly with other groups on the issue of economic sanctions against South Africa. While the ANC and PAC leadership strongly argued in favor of sanctions and increasing pressure on the apartheid state, Buthelezi argued that such actions were counter to the interests of poor, black workers. Buthelezi's stance against sanctions, along with the ethnic foundation of Inkatha, were his strongest sources of support in the period of the antiapartheid struggle.

For a period of time, some South African business and political leaders in the white communities saw Buthelezi as a leader who could offer an alternative to the ANC leadership, which was seen as too strongly allied to the Radical Left. For instance, in 1981 Buthelezi arranged a meeting with white business leaders during which he urged them to work toward dismantling the apartheid system. However, as the 1980s continued, it became clear that Buthelezi had a limited appeal, and that only the ANC would be able to provide the kind of legitimacy that would allow for a binding settlement between South Africa's communities.

In 1990 the South African president, F. W. de Klerk, released ANC leader Nelson Mandela from prison. From that point forward, it became clear that Mandela would be the key to any new political arrangement in South Africa. During the early 1990s Buthelezi began to search for political allies, to ensure a major role for himself and Inkatha in the transition process. At times, Inkatha engaged in talks with conservative groups such as the Afrikaner Volksfront, who sought to secure white homelands for themselves. Also of great significance were the clashes that regularly occurred between members of Inkatha and the ANC, especially in KwaZulu and Natal. (It later became clear that the South African security forces supported Inkatha in

these violent clashes). In the years leading up to the election of the country's first nonracially determined government in 1994, these clashes came close to civil war and killed many thousands of people.

Buthelezi, along with former president de Klerk, would serve as vice presidents in the coalition government headed by newly elected president Mandela; Buthelezi also served as home affairs minister. The Inkatha Freedom Party is still active in South Africa as a political party, and still dominates politics in the province of KwaZulu Natal in the current administration of President Thabo Mbeki.

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See also: South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle; South Africa: Transition, 1990–1994.

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Byzantine Africa, 533–710

Byzantine imperial control of North Africa, which lasted from 533 to about 700, will forever be associated with Justinian the Great (r.527–565) and his acclaimed military commander, Belisarius, whose conquest of the earlier Vandal Empire in 533–534 was chronicled by the historian Procopius. The task of defeating the Vandals was formidable, but the weakening of Vandal resistance had been prepared by the defection of Roman Christians in the North African cities (owing to their religious hostility to Vandal Aryanism) and especially by the independence of the indigenes, dubbed by the Romans as the Mauri (i.e., Moors; later known as the "Berbers").

Though both archaeological and literary evidence is sparse, there appears to have been considerable continuity in municipal administration between the Roman, subsequent Vandal, and later Byzantine governments, at the capital city of Carthage and at such well-known towns as Cillium, Casae Calanae, Apisa Maius, Calama, Hippo Regius, Bagai, and Lepcis Magna. But we know little about the ethnolinguistic composition of the settler populations or the administration of these

towns during the Byzantine period. Virtually all the Byzantine farmers spoke Punic or Latin, while the Berbers were mostly herdsmen. The immigrant Greek population was probably limited to a few thousand soldiers, a few hundred officials, and several dozen merchants. At the height of its territorial power, the Byzantine Empire was organized systematically into the four praetorian prefectures of Italy, Illyricum, the East, and significantly, "Africa." We know that Byzantine "Africa" centered on the territories that today comprise Tunisia, the eastern part of Algeria, and western Libya; and that it was subdivided into six provinces, each under a governor (or *dux*), including Mauretania Caesariensis, Mauretania Stitfensis, Zeugitana, Byzacena, Tripolitania, and Numidia.

At this time Byzantine Carthage, with a population of perhaps 10,000, was probably the largest city in the whole of Africa. Viewed in its totality, Justinian's reassertion of Roman (the Byzantines always called themselves "Roman") Mediterranean supremacy required a substantial bureaucratic and military establishment, which was extremely expensive. This imposed a heavy tax burden, including a ground tax or "tribute," and the *annona* (a land tax), on all subjects of the empire, including those of North Africa. Indeed, the burden of local taxes is cited as one of the causes for continued Berber intransigence against Byzantine rule in North Africa.

Recent archaeological excavations of Byzantine fortifications suggest that the Byzantine political presence extended inland from the Mediterranean to the great Dorsal of Tripolitania, including the Mountains of Tebessa, the Aures Plateau, and Hodna, but it scarcely touched the Berbers of the deep interior or the Atlas region (present-day Morocco). Beyond the coastal plain, Byzantine power depended on precarious alliances and delegated administrative powers with the leaders of friendly Berber tribes, who in return for cash payments intermittently undertook the collection of taxes and assistance in maintaining a frontier zone of relative order. The ability of the Byzantines to defend against hostile Berber attack depended less on their forts (which were, indeed, stronger than in Roman times) than on the ability of their soldiers (*comitatenses* and *limitanei*) to resist the Berbers in the field. Still, the outer limits of the African Prefecture remained in the hands of independent and resistant tribal chieftains; and there were violent insurrections in 539, from 544 to 548, and again in 563, all suppressed by the Byzantines—but only after great effort and cost in money and lives. Deepening the contemporary sense of turbulence and crisis were the terrible effects of the Bubonic Plague in 542–543. During the latter part of Justinian's reign and under succeeding emperors, the Byzantine military garrison depended increasingly on diplomacy and the playing off of one Berber subgroup against another.

Throughout the Byzantine period a substantial commerce between North Africa and other parts of the empire, including Asia Minor, continued to be based in part on the export of wheat, which accounted for a significant part of the prefecture's taxes to the imperial government at Constantinople. Another famous product was African "Red Slip" pottery, which found ready markets in many parts of the Mediterranean. Carthage, in turn, imported silks, spices, and oils from the Near East. In fact, the desire to gain control over the eastern spice and silk trades at the expense of the Persians had been one of the motivations behind the famous Red Sea expedition by Emperor Justin (Justinian's uncle) to assist the kingdom of Axum in Ethiopia in its invasion of Himyar in southwest Arabia in 524–525; and there were further diplomatic and commercial contacts with Axum during the reign of Justinian. Despite the fact that the Ethiopian Church followed the Monophysite doctrine while the Byzantines adhered to Orthodoxy, the emperors of the House of Justin always viewed Axum as a brother Christian kingdom and ally. Modern historians have begun to reassess the extent of Byzantine cultural influence in Africa wielded through the Greek language—frequently in conjunction with Latin—and through the priests and bishops of the Orthodox Church. Recent research reveals that there was an interesting and fluctuating interplay between the North African Church and both Rome and Constantinople. It further suggests that the Christianization of Nubia (especially the Novidae people) of the Nile Valley in the sixth century was accomplished mainly by Byzantine missionaries under the control of Constantinople, rather than by priests of the Coptic church of Egypt.

Though Byzantium ultimately failed in its efforts to displace the Persians in the Near Eastern/Asian trade, until the mid-seventh century the Byzantine Empire still held the Mediterranean Basin, including Egypt; most of the northwest African coast; Dalmatia; northwest Italy; Crete; Corsica; Malta; Sardinia; and the Balearics under its political and naval sway. And though there continued to be raiding by the Berber tribes, the impression gained from the chronicles is that the period from 564 to the 640s was one of relative stability and prosperity for Byzantine North Africa.

One indicator of the growing strains on the frontiers of the empire during the reigns of the Emperors Maurice (582–602) and Heraclius (610–641) was the subordination of Byzantine civil administrators at the two vital strategic prefectures of Italy and Africa to military control under governors general called exarchs. These exarchates set the tone for the further militarization of provincial administration under themes in the centuries ahead. But these changes were not enough to stem the erosion of territorial power under external assault—by the Persians in Asia, by the Lombards in northern Italy, and by the rising force of Islam in North Africa. The first invasion by Arabs on the eastern flank of the African Exarchate was reported in 647, when a small marauding party from Egypt defeated an army under the exarch Gregory at Sufetula in Numidia. Neither this, nor the landing of an Arab force by sea in 660, ended the Byzantine presence in North Africa. Byzantine "Africa," partly with the aid of Berber military support, continued to exist as a semi-independent kingdom against repeated Arab assault until the fall of Carthage in 698. Its presence was not finally extinguished until the Muslim march on the port of Ceuta, en route across the Straits to Spain, in 709–710.

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See also: Berbers: Ancient North Africa; Carthage; Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640; Vandals and North Africa, 429–533.

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Cabinda

With the cessation of conflict between the Angolan government and UNITA militias in April 2002, attention turned to the ongoing separatist conflict in Cabinda. An oil-rich enclave separated from the rest of Angola by a slender strip of territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cabinda has been the site of a decades-long war of independence between the Angolan government and various separatist factions, a struggle that has been called “Africa’s forgotten war.” Approximately 30,000 people have lost their lives in almost 30 years of struggles for independence. Despite the severe humanitarian crisis, access to the enclave has been largely closed to all but those who work in the oil industry.

Cabinda’s massive oil wealth has made the enclave an essential contributor to Angola’s national economy as well as a much contested site. Cabinda’s oil fields generate approximately 60 per cent of Angola’s oil. The province accounts for the majority of Angolan oil revenues, which contribute 42 per cent of the gross domestic product and 90 per cent of the state budget.

Cabinda’s offshore deposit, Block Zero, is among the world’s most lucrative oil fields and the cornerstone of Angola’s petroleum industry. Concession rights to Block Zero were initially granted in 1957, and exploration began shortly thereafter. Since production started in 1968, Block Zero has produced more than two billion barrels of oil. By 1983 Gulf had invested \$1.3 billion in the Cabindan operation, accounting for 90 per cent of Angola’s foreign exchange.

The 1980s and 1990s saw substantial new investments in development and increased production. Oil exports from the enclave stood at \$2.5 billion in 1997. By 2000, Angola’s production was almost 800,000 barrels per day, almost six times 1980s levels. This placed Angola behind only Nigeria as the largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Chevron Texaco has dominated the province’s development from its near-colonial operational base at Malongo. The company’s complex, including oil storage depots, a residential area for Chevron employees, and a small refinery, is set apart from the rest of Cabinda and guarded by private security companies. Local staff do not live within the settlement, and there is much resentment over disparities in living standards. This has fueled local resentment regarding exploitation of the area’s vast resources by outsiders.

Cabindans have been deeply critical of the role of oil companies in the region. In 1999 an oil spill near the Malonga base severely damaged fish stocks. Cabindan fishers have sought compensation for destruction caused by oil spills but have only received US\$2000 in compensation from Chevron Texaco and this was paid to only 10 per cent of fishers. In addition to spills, ongoing pollution from regular production has also been identified as contributing to reduced fish stocks.

Cabinda’s relationship with Angola has been a point of great conflict since the time of colonial rule. The territory was linked politically to Angola in the Treaty of Simulambuco of 1885, which acknowledged Cabinda’s distinct status as an enclave. Cabinda was governed by Portugal as a separate colony until 1956, when it was incorporated into Angola and brought under direct authority of the Portuguese governor general of Angola. Despite its administrative connection to Angola, Cabinda has remained geographically, linguistically, and ethnically linked with what are now Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many Cabindans have long maintained that theirs is an autonomous territory, and separatists insist that Cabinda should have been granted its own independence following the end of Portuguese colonial rule.

The first independence movement, the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda was founded in 1960, the year of emergence of armed struggle against Portuguese rule in Angola. Two other groups, the Committee for Action and Union of Cabinda and the Maiombe Alliance, emerged around the same time. In 1963 the three movements combined to form the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC).

The FLEC was excluded from participation in the April 1974 Alvor talks between the Portuguese colonial authorities and three Angolan nationalist groups, the MPLA, the FNLA, and the UNITA, which set the stage for Angolan independence. Article 3 of the Alvor Accord, signed in January 1975, maintained that Cabinda would remain an integral part of Angola. FLEC appealed to the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, but, receiving no satisfactory assistance from those organizations, took up armed struggle against the MPLA government of Angola. The ensuing guerrilla war saw attacks on government troops stationed in Angola and the occasional kidnapping of Chevron employees.

During the 1980s, FLEC split over strategic differences to form FLEC-FAC, the main armed faction of FLEC, and FLEC-Renovada. FLEC-FAC has maintained some armed activities, but was severely weakened by the overthrow of their patron, Zaire's president Mobutu Sese Seko, in 1996.

The talks between the Angolan government and the UNITA during 1991–1992 that culminated in the signing of the Bicesse Accords also excluded the Cabindan separatists. Left out of the peace agreement, they continued the war in the enclave. Once again, in 1994, a new peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, failed to include the Cabindan separatists, meaning that fighting continued unabated. FLEC-FAC did not participate in a 2002 conference on the constitutional future of Angola that was held in Angola and that discussed such matters of importance to Cabindans as local autonomy, decentralization, and constitutional reform.

Meetings throughout the 1990s among the various Cabindan independence groups and the Angolan government brought no resolution to the conflict. The Angolan government's involvement in the civil wars in the civil wars in the DRC and the Republic of Congo rendered those countries unavailable as bases of operation for the Cabindan rebels.

Since the 1990s the Angolan government has begun to address Cabindan grievances concerning the lack of infrastructure and development in the province. To this day only 10 per cent of oil revenues are returned to the province. Cabinda's oil wealth has ensured that the

Angolan government, like the Portuguese government before it, would never willingly grant independence to the enclave.

A massive sweep of the enclave by Angolan forces in October 2002, targeted at driving secessionists out of Cabinda, destroyed FLEC-FAC's main base and forced many independence fighters to abandon the guerrilla struggle. By the end of the year the army had also captured the main base of FLEC-Renovada, causing the group to cease operations. The 2002 offensive that militarily defeated FLEC left its leaders in exile and renewed government hopes for an end to the lengthy conflict. A meeting in July 2003 between Angolan authorities and Ranque Franque, FLEC cofounder and leader, further raised hopes that a negotiated settlement was on the horizon.

While the military defeat left FLEC leaders willing to negotiate a settlement, any successful outcome of peace talks will depend in part on whether civil society groups, rather than only the FLEC leaders, take part in the process. Civil society groups have demanded a cease-fire, the end of human rights violations by the Angolan Army (which carried out atrocities against civilian population), and improved rights and conditions for local oil workers.

Calls by the separatists for Portugal to intervene and establish a transitional government have been rejected by the Portuguese government, which views the conflict as an internal Angolan issue. Similarly, FLEC calls for a referendum on independence, similar to the one held in East Timor and supervised by the United Nations, in which only Cabindans would vote, have been rejected by the government which argues that all Angolans should vote on an issue of national importance. While Cabindans still desire independence, many would now settle for autonomy, some form of which the Angolan government has claimed it would be willing to negotiate.

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Cairo

Although the city of Cairo was not founded until the medieval era, the approximate geographical site has a much longer history. The city of Memphis, one of the capitals of ancient Egypt, was originally established on land currently part of the modern city of Cairo. After conquering Egypt, the Romans then established a nearby city they called Babylon (now located in the Misr al-Qadimah portion of the city of Cairo). Next came the city of al-Fustat, founded by the Arab conqueror of Egypt, 'Amr ibn al-'As, who was also responsible for bringing Islam to Egypt. The modern city of Cairo (in Arabic, *al-Qahirah*, "the victorious"), however, owes its establishment to the Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz.

From its establishment in 969 and its adoption as the Fatimid capital a few years later, Cairo has remained the seat of political and economic power in Egypt and a city of major strategic importance. The Mamluk Sultanate (1260–1516) made Cairo its capital, and under Mamluk rule the city prospered. By about 1340, not only had Cairo's population swelled to half a million inhabitants (making it the largest city on three continents), but, as the home of al-Azhar University, it had also become the main seat of learning in the Islamic world. It was also well-positioned to profit from the spice trade from Asia to the Mediterranean. The later years of Mamluk rule were not so kind to Cairo, however. The bubonic plague swept through Cairo in 1348, resulting in severe human losses. Economic losses soon followed, as Portuguese adventurer Vasco da Gama successfully sailed from Europe to India, establishing a sea route to the east and thus allowing the spice trade to bypass Cairo.

The arrival of Ottoman rule in Egypt in 1517 did not help Cairo's fortunes either, as the city became one of many provincial capitals in the larger Ottoman Empire, ruled from Istanbul. The city remained relatively unimportant for several centuries; by the time Napoleon's armies invaded Egypt in 1798, Cairo's population had declined to fewer than 300,000.

The city began a period of renaissance, however, in the 1830s, due to the modernizing efforts of Muhammad 'Ali, who served as Ottoman governor of Egypt from 1805 until his death in 1849. Muhammad 'Ali's modernization program included improvements in irrigation, roads, agriculture, education, and the military, all of which had a positive effect on Cairo's economy and population. However, it was during the reign of the *khedive* Isma'il (1863–1879) that Cairo



David Roberts (1796–1864), *Cairo from the West* (CT25870). Victoria and Albert Museum, London. © Victoria and Albert Museum, London/Art Resource, New York.

became a truly modern city. Embarking on a lavish spending program that Egypt could not afford (and which was a major contributor to the huge foreign debt that provided Britain with an excuse to occupy the country in 1882), Isma'il set out to make Cairo a European city. He ordered the construction of a new city next to medieval Cairo, to be planned by French engineers. The districts of Abdin, al-Isma'iliyyah, and al-Ezbekiyyah (located in the center of present-day Cairo) were the fruits of his labors. These new districts became the heart of colonial Cairo after the British entry into Egypt in 1882.

The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed more changes for the city, chief among them massive growth in population as a result of migration from rural regions as well as higher overall population growth rates. This influx of people has crowded the city beyond its capacity, resulting simultaneously in the development of shantytowns on the outskirts of the city, the establishment of residences in the vast northern and southern cemetery complexes (known as the City of the Dead), and the development of new suburbs (such as Heliopolis and al-Ma'adi), satellite towns (such as Tenth of Ramadan City and Sixth of October City) and planned communities (such as al-Mohandessin and Medinat Nasr).

Nonetheless, Cairo, known for centuries as *Umm al-Dunya* (mother of the world) remains the heart of Egypt. To Egyptians, *Misr* (Egypt) means both Egypt and Cairo, further illustrating the importance of the capital city. In 1919, Cairo was the location of the short-lived 1919 revolution against British control; three years later Egypt gained formal independence (though Britain retained certain rights in Egypt, including the stationing of troops). The city also played a key role in further revolts against British domination (which continued until after the 1952 revolution) after

World War II. In January 1952, riots erupted in Cairo directed against centers of “foreign” influence, including targets such as the British Turf Club, the Shepherd’s Hotel (long a center of European social life in Cairo), cinemas that showed foreign films, nightclubs, bars, and many Jewish-owned commercial establishments. Later that year, on July 23, the revolution (really a military coup) occurred, toppling the corrupt and widely despised King Faruq from power and installing in his place the kindly figure of General Muhammad Naguib (though real power was retained by the coup’s mastermind, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who shortly took sole control of the government). Nasser’s policies of sequestration and “Egyptianization” (particularly after the 1956 Suez War) affected Cairo as they did Alexandria: many of the city’s foreign and minority residents opted to leave the country. Though Egypt benefited from a cessation of its state of war with Israel after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, Cairo’s status among Arab capitals suffered. Many Arab nations cut diplomatic ties with Egypt, and the League of Arab States moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, leading to a mass exodus of Arab diplomats from the city. (Relations have been restored since, however.) An earthquake in Cairo in 1992 resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,000 people, when poorly constructed high-rise buildings and hastily built dwellings collapsed.

Today Cairo’s population is approaching 20 million. As the year-round seat of government (the use of Alexandria as Egypt’s summer capital having been halted after the 1952 revolution), the center of commerce and industry, the home of foreign embassies, once more the headquarters of the League of Arab States, and an eternally popular tourist destination, Cairo remains—as it has been since medieval times—the political, strategic, diplomatic, economic, and cultural key to Egypt.

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See also: **Egypt: Fatimid Caliphate; Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy; Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt (1798–1801)**

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
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Cameroon: Nineteenth Century

During the nineteenth century, the history of what is now the Republic of Cameroon was characterized by extreme diversity and considerable change. This brief entry cannot do justice to the variety of societies and historical experiences key to that era, but will concentrate on a few examples. On the coast, the Duala had been involved in overseas commerce since the mid-eighteenth century, acting as middlemen between European traders and peoples of the interior. The Duala engaged in fishing and agriculture, the latter mostly carried out by slaves and women. However, their most lucrative activity was bartering goods (slaves, and in the nineteenth century, mainly palm oil and ivory) obtained through inland canoe expeditions and exchanged for important commodities brought to them by European trading vessels. In the nineteenth century, Duala *roi-marchands* (merchant kings) succeeded in bringing the littoral river network under their control. The influence of the Duala went beyond purely economic aspects, but could never be transformed into a stable political system. On the contrary, during this period the Duala split into rival lineages. Trading zones in the hinterland were divided up among Duala groups, but without coming under the political control of the various clans and lineages involved. *Big men* is probably the best label to describe the principal actors in a political system of this kind; they were successful operators of local enterprises, centered around trading canoes with large numbers of personal retainers including kinsmen, unrelated Duala, and slaves. Within nineteenth-century Duala society, slaves were the key element in constructing an effective commercial organization, as well as the exploited victims of such an enterprise. For centuries the Bamiléké highlands and the neighboring grasslands in what is now Western Cameroon had served as an important slave and labor reservoir not only for the Duala, but for the coastal and southern parts of Cameroon and Nigeria in general.

The term *Bamiléké* is a twentieth-century construction. For a long time most Bamiléké had no conception of themselves as such, but rather identified with the particular chiefdoms from which they originated. There were more than 100 of these entities, differing greatly in size, spread across the Bamiléké homelands. By the second half of the nineteenth century, various population movements, wars, and currents of commercial and cultural exchange had given rise throughout the grasslands to highly complex



Cameroon.

political formations. Chieftaincies old and new (the very first—a polity called Baleng—existed in the sixteenth century) were coming into their own, developing increasingly centralized governments and systems of socioeconomic organization. By the 1880s, the Bamiléké social structure as it is described in the accounts of colonial observers was well in place. At the heart of this structure, in each chieftaincy, stood one central figure: the *fo*, an all-powerful, semidivine ruler. Each polity's citizens could be divided into four categories: notables and their heirs, chiefly retainers and their heirs, untitled folk, and slaves. Titles were available to men only, as were positions in the chief's employment. Though in many respects profoundly rigid, the system did allow for social mobility. Central to a notable's status was participation in at least one of the numerous associations charged with overseeing key aspects of the community's day-to-day life. The population of the grasslands grew more or less continuously from around 1700. In the nineteenth century, for instance, entire communities fled before the onslaught of Fulbe slave raiders hailing from the Muslim north; the attacks pushed thousands of men, women, and children across the Noun River to the Bamiléké Plateau.

By 1850, in the north of Cameroon, long-distance slave raids were a large-scale phenomenon. In Adamawa, with its center Ngaoundéré, slavery took on major proportions. The Adamawa jihad, an extension of Usman dan Fodio's conquest of the Hausa states of Nigeria, was undertaken in the early nineteenth

century by small groups of Fulbe who established a Muslim emirate and a number of lamidates. The Fulbe, however, were substantially outnumbered by the local "pagan" groups of the region. Ngaoundéré was no exception in this regard, and the rapid integration of conquered Mbum and other peoples into the Fulbe state, which transformed large numbers of former enemies into effective elements of the state political and economic apparatus, is remarkable. In addition to locally conquered "pagan" peoples, the size of the servile population at Ngaoundéré was further enlarged by slaves captured at distances of 200 to 500 kilometers from Ngaoundéré town itself. European observers at the end of the nineteenth century estimated that as many as 8,000 to 10,000 slaves were taken on these raids annually. Those captives who were not settled at Ngaoundéré were sold to Hausa or Kanuri traders, and Adamawa soon gained a reputation as a "slave traders' Eldorado." The structure of slavery in Adamawa in the nineteenth century was determined primarily by military and commercial factors. The involvement of slaves in production, while undoubtedly the source of much of the food on which the Fulbe states subsisted, was of relatively minor structural importance. The Fulbe conquest did not go beyond what is now northern Cameroon. However, the ruling aristocracy of the kingdom of Bamum in the grasslands was converted to Islam in the nineteenth century, following contact with Fulbe invaders and Hausa traders.

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Cameroon (Kamerun): Colonial Period: German Rule

The establishment of a German protectorate in Kamerun (English "Cameroon," French "Cameroun") in July 1884 came as a surprise to the British, who were slow to accept the requests from the Duala kings to annex their territory. The area that was called Kamerun was limited to the coast and the principal town was Douala, its inhabitants known as the Duala. King Akwa (Ngando Mpondo) and King Bell (Ndoumb'a Lobe) were the two principal kings in Douala.

After the 1840s, the British successfully established their trading and missionary activities in Douala and

the Duala abandoned the inhumane trade in slaves in favor of trade in items such as palm oil and kernels, cocoa, and rubber. After 1869, however, British traders experienced stiff competition from the Germans. The British activities in Douala so impressed the Duala that their kings later requested the British to annex their territory.

Despite these appeals, the British government failed to act promptly because, among other reasons, it felt that the territory was not viable enough to finance without an additional tax burden on the British taxpayers; the “unhealthy” West African climate, “the whiteman’s grave,” did not help the Duala request. Meanwhile, the German government of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck encouraged the establishment of a German protectorate in Cameroon.

In February 1884, Bismarck instructed Gustave Nachtigal to go to Africa and safeguard the interests of German traders; the British Foreign Office was informed accordingly. However, in a secret dispatch to Nachtigal, Bismarck commissioned him to annex the coast between Bimbia and Cape St. John, hoist the German flag, and declare that German firms had signed treaties with the local chiefs. In Douala, Eduard Schmidt, of the Woermann Firm, was instructed to secretly convince the Duala kings to accept a German annexation of their territory. Through intrigues and gifts, the kings were persuaded to sign a treaty with the representatives of the German firms in Douala on July 12, 1884.

According to the terms of the treaty, the Duala kings and their subordinates ceded their rights of sovereignty, legislation, and administration over their people and land to the private German firms. However, the land of the towns and villages remained the private property of the indigents, and the kings were allowed to continue to levy their dues and retain their customs and usages. The Duala also retained their middleman commercial role. Although the treaty was between some German private firms and the Duala kings, the German government later took over the administration of the territory and expanded into the hinterland, through the subjugation of unwilling ethnic groups and active collaboration from others. This treaty was one of the 95 treaties that the Germans signed with various ethnic groups in Kamerun between 1884 and 1916 in which the indigenous kings or chiefs surrendered their rights of sovereignty, legislation, and administration.

In Kamerun, the colonial authorities used what the British later called the indirect rule system, though with certain modifications, to suit the given circumstance and environment. This system was used alongside the divide-and-rule principle. The colonial authorities also collaborated with prominent local

chiefs. In Muslim northern Kamerun, the colonial administrators used the traditional rulers, the *lamibe*, though they did not hesitate to punish and/or depose recalcitrant rulers, as was done elsewhere in the territory.

Kamerun was, for administrative purposes, divided into divisions that were controlled by divisional officers. There were two distinct judicial systems for the maintenance of law and order, and the execution of justice: one for Europeans and another for Africans. The most common form of penalty was whipping, but women were, generally, exempted from this type of penalty. Offenses by African employees were punished by disciplinary sanction, which was either flogging or confinement in irons. These offences included desertion, laziness, theft, disobedience, and carelessness. The most severe sanction was the death penalty, and this was passed only after the approval of the governor. The police force assured public security, and in 1895 a regular colonial troop was created.

In order to foster German economic interests, the colonial authorities, traders, and agricultural agents ran into problems with the indigenous population, who resisted the German intrusion. The causes of the resistances included the forceful use of indigents as laborers for either the plantations or road and railway construction companies, the disappearance of the middleman monopoly of trade that several ethnic groups enjoyed, the reluctance and/or refusal to pay taxes by the local population, and the expropriation of indigenous land by the colonial administration. The resistances came mainly from the Duala, the Bakweri, the Beti, the Bangwa, the Banyang, and the Nso. The most celebrated resistance was the Duala resistance of 1910–1913, led by King Rudolf Duala Manga Bell.

Despite these resistances, the German colonial administration and economic interest groups wanted to establish a commercial colony in Cameroon. Several German companies subsequently established plantations, the most prominent of which was the West African Plantation Company, Victoria. In order to ease the transportation of goods, the authorities built roads and railways. Apart from economic interests, various German missionary bodies were involved in evangelization. These missionary bodies were the German Basel Mission, the German Baptist Mission, and the Roman Catholic Church, led by the Pallotin Fathers. J. Deibol was ordained in 1901 as the first indigenous Basel Mission pastor, and Lotin Same was consecrated in 1908 as the first indigenous German Baptist Mission pastor. The missionaries also established health centers and schools.

In the field of education, the first German teacher, Theodor Christaller, arrived in Cameroon in 1887. In 1910, the colonial authorities enacted an education

law, and Article 2 stipulated that no other language, except German, could be taught or used as a medium of instruction. Article 3 of the law, however, defined the areas where the Duala language could be used as a medium of instruction. This law provided a school program for the mission schools and a primary cycle of five years. The administration, in an attempt to educate its future indigenous administrators, sent several Kamerunians to Germany for further studies. Incidentally, some of these German-educated Cameroonians returned home and became the flag bearers of the opposition force against German colonial rule, as was demonstrated by Rudolf Duala Manga Bell and Martin-Paul Samba on the eve of the outbreak of World War I. Others, like Charles Atangana, became fervent supporters of the Germans.

In August 1914, World War I was transported to Kamerun as Germany tried unsuccessfully to get Britain and France to respect the neutrality clauses (Articles 10 and 11) of the Berlin Act of 1885. A joint Anglo-French force, led by Major General Charles Dobell, and a Franco-Belgian force headed by General Joseph Aymerich invaded German Kamerun, but a French-proposed joint Anglo-French administration of Kamerun failed to materialize. The combined allied forces, nonetheless, eventually defeated the German forces in Kamerun and in February 1916 Britain and France provisionally partitioned Kamerun between themselves along the Picot Provisional Partition Line; Britain occupied one-fifth of the territory while France occupied four-fifths. With this, the German administration of Kamerun ended.

The Germans, in promoting their economic interests in Kamerun, introduced the people to the world market economy. Politically, despite the resistances, the Germans set in motion the steam to unite the coastal, southern, central, and northern peoples into a single cohesive Kamerunian unit and provided the foundation for a modern state. German rule enabled the politically conscious Kamerunians to regard the 1916 partition as *ad interim* because it reminded them of a period when, according to them, Kamerun was a single entity.

VICTOR JULIUS NGOH

See also: Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; World War I, Survey.

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Cameroon: Colonial Period: British and French Rule

Cameroon has a checkered colonial history. Unlike most African states that experienced a single colonial administration, Cameroon came under three colonial administrators: the Germans, the French and the British. The legacies of colonialism have been a mixed blessing, but for the most part they have left the country with huge problems, the most prominent being the distinct British and French cultures that were nurtured simultaneously in the territory during 1916 to around 1961. These divergent cultures have made meaningful national integration in independent Cameroon elusive.

During World War I, the Allied forces, consisting of British and French troops, defeated the Germans (with some help from the Belgians) in Kamerun. The capitulation of the last German garrison at Mora in February 1916 brought about the end of the German Kamerun Protectorate. The victors established an Anglo-French protectorate that, for all intents and purposes, was financed and manned by the British, with the French playing only a passive role. The Anglo-French protectorate was short-lived: on March 14, 1916, the two powers, by mutual agreement, delineated their zones of influence. The division of German Kamerun between Britain and France was surprisingly lopsided. Five-sixths of the territory came under French rule, while the remainder went to Britain. This arrangement has engendered intractable problems in the politics of reunification up to the present.

Unlike the French mandate, which was administered as a distinct administrative unit, the British Cameroons was, for administrative expediency, managed as an integral part of Nigeria. Thus, the indirect rule system adopted by the British in Nigeria and other administrative structures were extended to British Cameroons. Some have justified this arrangement on the ground that British Cameroons was too small to warrant a separate administration.

Opinions are divided on the wisdom of administering British Cameroon from Nigeria. One school of thought holds that the British Cameroons did not receive adequate British attention, remaining a rural backwater. Another school of thought argues that British Cameroon benefited immensely from its association with Nigeria in political, economic, social, technical, and educational terms.

Regardless, Cameroonian politicians felt overshadowed by the more experienced Nigerian politicians in the Eastern House of Assembly. This nurtured among Cameroonian politicians feelings of animosity toward

the Igbo people, and later on provided the platform for reunification with French Cameroon following the plebiscite of 1961.

Colonial developments in French Cameroon can be studied under two broad periods: pre-World War II and post-World War II. Until the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, France lived under the illusion that French colonies and France would one day fuse into a single integrated political and economic unit. Therefore, unlike Britain, the French at the time did little to prepare their colonies for self-government. Assimilation was the guiding policy.

Though retaining its autonomy as a mandate territory of the League of Nations, French Cameroon was governed as part of the French colonial empire. French rule was characterized by forced labor, the deposition of chiefs, and the creation of artificial chieftaincies and despotism.

At the apex of the administrative pyramid was the French high commissioner, who was the only link between the mandated territory and the French Colonial Ministry. The commissioner set up a series of *conseils* (councils) that had advisory but not legislative functions. The commissioner was, therefore, the kingpin in the power equation.

The much-discussed assimilation in Cameroon was basically a facade, for in reality only a negligible number of “black Frenchmen” (*évolués*) were created. Assimilation existed only insofar as it created a tiny elite of *évolués* who were set off from the vast majority of the population (the *indigènes*). In 1922, a modified version of association that involved some measure of indirect rule and accorded recognition to some indigenous institutions was put in place by Colonial minister Albert Sarrant.

From 1944, French colonies witnessed significant reforms. The Brazzaville Conference recommended administrative decentralization while retaining political assimilation as a goal. Thus, the idea of the colonies evolving outside the framework of the French Empire was dismissed. However, the defeat of the French in Indochina, the gaining of independence by Morocco and Tunisia, the Algerian revolution, and the radicalization of the independence struggle by Cameroonian political parties like the Union de Populations du Cameroun forced France to introduce sweeping reforms in the colony. These reforms, collectively called the *loi cadre*, made substantial concessions for African local autonomy.

A direct result of the *loi cadre* was the dissolution of the Territorial Assembly elected in 1952 to make way for fresh elections in 1956. On May 9, 1957, the assembly took the name of l'Assemblée législative du Cameroun, and, on May 15, 1957, Andre-Marie Mbida became the first prime minister of French Cameroon.

However, his government, which was short-lived, paved the way for the regime of Ahmadu Ahidjo.

Through the “carrot and stick” approach, Ahidjo gradually peripheralized all political opposition. The United Nations approved the termination of the trusteeship, and French Cameroon became independent under Ahmadu Ahidjo on January 1, 1960.

The next item on the political agenda was reunification. In 1960 both Nigeria and French Cameroon gained their independence, thus leaving the British Cameroons in the cold. On both sides of the trust territories, the Anglo-French partition of Kamerun had been viewed as an act of brazen imperialism which had to be redressed. This goal was easily achieved, thanks to the joint efforts of both Dr. John Ngu Foncha, the premier of Southern Cameroons, and Ahmadu Ahidjo, the president of French Cameroun. Following the 1961 plebiscite, Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly to reunite with French Cameroun, while their northern counterpart voted in favor of remaining part of Nigeria.

CANUTE A. NGWA

See also: Cameroon (Kamerun): Colonial Period; German Rule; Cameroon: Rebellion, Independence, Unification, 1960–1961.

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Cameroon: Rebellion, Independence, Unification, 1960–1961

The processes of rebellion, independence, and reunification are closely linked and culminated in the birth of modern bilingual Cameroon. Rebellion broke out in the French Cameroon in 1955. The rebellion was championed by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), and it ultimately degenerated into a bloody guerrilla war that spilled over into the postcolonial era. Instead of implementing the provisions of the trusteeship system in Cameroon, France preferred to treat Cameroon like an ordinary overseas colony. Article 76(b) of the United Nations (UN) Charter set forth the political objectives of the trusteeship system, which was to promote the evolution of trust territories like Cameroon and Togo toward self-government and

independence. France ignored this procedure and proceeded to integrate Cameroon into the French Union in line with its colonial policy of creating a “Greater France.”

The UPC was formed on April 10, 1948, and under the leadership of its secretary general, Reuben Um Nyobe, the party adopted a radical nationalist program that envisaged immediate independence and reunification with the British Cameroons. Such a program aroused the wrath of the French because it ran contrary to their postwar integrationist colonial policy. The UPC further infuriated the French by establishing ties with the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, an affiliate of the French Communist Party. The stage for a tug-of-war between France and the UPC was set. The UPC was therefore subjected to systematic harassment and discrimination ranging from the arrest and intimidation of its leaders to the obstruction of its members from winning any election organized in the territory.

The UPC responded in May 1955 by starting a series of violent demonstrations in a bid to oust the French from Cameroon. By the end of the month, when the colonial authorities had restored order, 26 people had lost their lives and 176 had been wounded. On July 13, 1955, the French government outlawed the UPC. This triggered a long-festering rebellion (1955–1971) that was initially concentrated in Basaland but finally spent itself in Bamileke country.

The independence of the French Cameroons was made inevitable by changing local and international circumstances. The UPC nationalist ideals were gradually espoused by moderate Cameroon nationalists, and France came under increasing international pressure, particularly from the anticolonial bloc in the UN to introduce political reforms in Cameroon. Furthermore, the defeat of France in Indochina forced the French to grant independence to the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in 1954 and to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956. These concessions signaled the possibility of an explosion in French Sub-Saharan Africa if constitutional reforms were not quickly introduced. So the French parliament enacted the *Loi-cadre* (Enabling Act) on June 23, 1956, which provided the introduction of internal self-government. The *Loi-cadre* dictated the holding of fresh elections in Cameroon on December 23, 1956. The UPC nationalists did not participate in the elections, which turned out to be the last before independence, because the ban on their party was still in force. The logical outcome of such an election, without the UPC, was the emergence of an overwhelmingly moderate and pro-French assembly.

Andre-Marie Mbida, the leader of the *Démocrates Camerounais*, was appointed premier by the French high commissioner and endorsed by the assembly

on May 15, 1957. Owing to his firm opposition to independence and reunification, Mbida suffered from parliamentary sanctions and fell from office on February 17, 1958. His successor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was wise to conform to the mode of the time by openly subscribing to the nationalist goals of independence and reunification, and France conceded.

On January 1, 1960, the French government proclaimed the independence of the French Cameroons in the presence of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Ahidjo became the first premier. Thus, by an ironic twist of events, the UPC that fought and shed their blood for independence failed to be its beneficiaries.

After the independence of the French Cameroons in 1960, reunification with the British Southern Cameroons followed in 1961. Reunification was the dream and struggle for, and the attempt at re-creating, German Cameroon within its original 1884–1916 boundaries. The sentiments of reuniting the British and the French Cameroons were nurtured by memories of a common colonial experience under the Germans. The Anglo-French partition painfully separated frontier ethnic groups and families, and subsequent attempts by Britain and France to impose boundary restrictions only worsened matters. During the interwar years, petitions from Cameroon’s educated elite against the partition of their homeland were registered.

It was, however, in the post–World War II period that the reunification ideology was popularized and vigorously pursued. The UPC forcefully pursued reunification and implanted the idea in the British Cameroon through French Cameroonian émigrés. The UPC was sensitive to French colonial despotism and the reluctance of France to ensure the evolution of the territory toward self-government. By inserting reunification as part of their political program, the UPC hoped to locate the legal battle field for the advancement of the French Cameroons in the UN.

The first prominent British Cameroonian reunificationist was Dr. E. M. L. Endeley. When in December 1949, Endeley’s Cameroon National Federation met with the UN Visiting Mission for the first time, it denounced the British colonial arrangement of administering the British Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria, and requested the reunification of the two Cameroons. In 1953 Endeley formed the Cameroon National Congress to struggle for the achievement of independence.

Britain granted a quasi-autonomous regional status exclusively to the Southern Cameroons in the Nigerian federation in 1954, and Endeley started retreating from reunification. Reunificationist converts under the leadership of John Ngu Foncha abandoned Endeley and formed the Kamerun National Democratic Party in

1955, with secession from Nigeria and reunification as its avowed objectives.

The UN finally resolved the issue of the political future of the British Cameroons by organizing plebiscites in the Southern Cameroons on February 11, 1961 and in the North Cameroons on February 12, 1961. The Southern Cameroons overwhelmingly voted for reunification, with 235,571 votes against 97,741, while the Northern Cameroons opted to remain in Nigeria. On October 1, 1961 the Southern Cameroons obtained independence by reunifying with the independent Republic of Cameroon.

NICODEMUS FRU AWASOM

See also: Ahidjo, Ahmadou; Cameroon: Colonial Period: British and French Rule; Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa.

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Cameroon: Independence to the Present

By reputation one of Africa's stable nation-states, Cameroon enters the twenty-first century less than comfortably. Four decades after the reunification of French and British trust territories, the early years' achievements and search for symmetry are waning. Living standards decline, political disputes flare and linger, and sections of the borders are insecure. There are three distinct contours, corresponding roughly to three formal designations for Cameroon: the Federal Republic (1961–1972), the United Republic (1972–1984), and, simply, the Republic (1984–).

Two presidencies also mark contrasts. Until 1982, Ahmadou Ahidjo consolidated governance and, though contested, used an authoritarian yet skillfully balanced statecraft to advance Cameroon materially. The regime of Paul Biya, his successor, lacks Ahidjo's inclusiveness and endures economic crisis, so that questions now arise about his legitimacy and the nation-state's viability during his disputed constitutional mandate until 2010 and beyond.

The Union des Populations de Cameroun (UPC) insurgency challenged the terms of independence until 1970. But the constitutional bargain struck between the federated states of East and West Cameroon at

Foumban in 1961, and de facto one-party rule from 1966, with the Cameroon National Union (CNU) bringing the politicians under Ahidjo's control, harmonized elites from the francophone 75 per cent majority and Anglophone 25 per cent minority populations. Familiar African nation-building projects went ahead. Franc zone trade, investment, domestic food and export cash crops from naturally abundant or newly irrigated and fertilized soils, processing and refining agroindustries, an aluminum smelter with hydroelectric capacity, and then Cameroon's early oil boom brought macroeconomic growth and some microeconomic distribution. A bilingual language policy, a respected multicultural journal (*Abbia*), and a promising university at Yaounde made Cameroon appear progressive. Ahidjo's appointments and patronage ably managed the imbalances Cameroon shares with its neighbors, between a largely Muslim North with customary rulers and a more formally educated, commercially active, urban and transient Christian South, as well as the legacies of its own two colonial languages and 250 cultures. A "baronial alliance" politics emerged, and the armed forces kept to the barracks.

The system's first jolt was Ahidjo's hastily called referendum, which a vast majority approved, ending federalism in 1972. This now "United Republic" alerted Anglophones to the erosion, real or incipient, of "Anglo-Saxon" minority safeguards, values, and institutions in law, public service, education, and projects like Douala's harbor, with its silt preferred to deep-sea Limbe's; they smacked of unilateral decisions and development budget choices favoring francophones. Constitutional protest, muted then, began to feed other grievances that Biya would face a quarter century later. But the 1970s, as oil revenues rose, produced few open dissenters at home, and studies by UPC exiles like Mongo Beti and Abel Eyinga about domestic tyranny and French complicity were banned. Jean-François Bayart and Pierre Flambeau Ngayap record the mature Ahidjo years' hegemony, using 1,000 well-disciplined, mostly francophone appointees to various offices. The legislature and judiciary atrophied in a presidentially ruled Cameroon that Richard Joseph labeled "Gaullist Africa."

Ahidjo's abrupt 1982 resignation from the presidency (though not CNU leadership) brought Biya to power. He withstood Cameroon's one serious military coup threat in 1984, attributed to Ahidjo's northern supporters; it ended quickly and bloodily. Ahidjo was exiled, Biya's prime minister fled, and a fundamental realignment of state power from the northern to the southern pole of the CNU's ruling axis followed, as did a decree abolishing the "United Republic" and any formal trace of the federation. Biya's Beti ethnic coalition gained dominance as the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement

(CPDM) in 1985. Its governance and style, and the opposition it engenders, have defined public life ever since. A “communal liberalism” phase introduced policy and voting reforms in state and party, but any firm commitments to reform or lasting benefits fell prey to foreign debt and export price declines. Betis commandeered high political offices, the security apparatus, and scarcer state resources. By 1988 structural adjustment from global fiscal institutions, then by 1990 domestic democratization forces, following European and southern African leads but fully indigenous, sought to discipline a now parasitic and unwieldy regime, ushering in a most contentious decade.

It began when lawyer Yondo Black and nine associates called for human rights reforms and a multiparty political layout. A military court tried them, convicting some and acquitting others, and this provoked intense conflict on the street level throughout the country. Simultaneously, picking up threads of Anglophone hostility since federalism was gutted in 1972 and 1984, John Fru Ndi organized the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Bamenda, Northwest Province. Massive state security challenged its peaceful founding rally, held on May 26, 1990. Six young people were shot dead, and a period of intense crisis began. The regime legalized multiple parties and liberalized press laws but the opposition demanded more—namely, an end to “presidential monarchy.” A test of the new laws, Célestin Monga’s open letter to Biya in Pius Njawa’s *Le Messager*, led to a defamation trial, and street and then campus casualties. Protracted struggle began in mid-1991. All foreign interests except France urged regime concessions; internal debate weakened the CPDM, big cities in four of ten provinces took up a general strike call by a SDF-led coalition in support of a Sovereign National Conference, and an undeclared state of emergency enforced by a military Operational Command ruled seven of ten provinces.

A resolution could not be reached. The opposition peaked in 1991’s strike, then declined as the regime stretched its resources and incumbency powers to detach resistance leaders, curb the press, and dodge demands for electoral code and constitutional reforms. Monetary and moral support, denied by others but given by France, helped Biya to “stabilize” Cameroon. Legislative elections in March 1992 reduced the CPDM’s monopoly to a plurality and a coalition pact, for much of the north and the urban south (even in the capital Yaounde) defected, but Biya kept Fru Ndi from the presidency in the October 1992 election, broadly understood as rigged beforehand and fraudulently counted. A two-month-long state of emergency in Northwest Province enforced Biya’s “victory” but intensified Anglophone hostility. A war of attrition set in for the rest of the decade, as local elections in 1996

mirrored 1992’s patterns, and the SDF in 1997 entered the legislature as a minority party but pulled out of the presidential ballot, claiming misconduct. Biya won, in a setting his foes among intellectuals now stigmatize as no longer “Gaullist” but “Vichist.”

In perceived “popular support” terms but never confirmed by valid elections, the CPDM in 2000 held the Center, South, and East Provinces; the SDF dominated the Northwest, West, and Littoral Provinces, and the National Union for Development and Progress party maintained Fulbe-Muslim hegemony in three northern provinces, claiming Ahidjo’s legacy against the region’s 1984 losses but allying with Biya in return for ministry posts in 1997. The tenth province, Southwest, sways in patronage winds, and the capital Yaounde remains volatile. In reality, Beti domination of key civilian and military offices, the nullification of Biya’s electoral losses, and France sustain the regime while the SDF maintains a popular following that the CPDM frustrates but cannot subdue. A familiar patronage politics of ethnic and business lobbies continues, with many enclaves not easily satisfied in a stagnant economy. The mix since 1993 includes the SDF’s “return to federalism” call and a militant anglophone Southern Cameroon National Conference lobbying the United Nations to return Cameroon to status quo 1960–1961 and to require francophones of “la république” to negotiate a constitution between equals—failing which, it advocates secession.

The past thus contested, the future may be problematic. World Bank studies disclose 14 million people compositely worse off in the year 2000 than in 1980. With reserves subject to depletion, oil and timber earnings will drop, further antagonizing 4 million anglophones, since France is the major beneficiary. Many Bamilekes—the richest, most migratory, and thus resented ethnicity as business and land use competition intensifies—leave the CPDM, join the SDF, or want their own party, a group all the more unsettled since a CPDM 1996 constitutional clause, risky for them or any Africans, favors autochthonerights over migrants. The “oil border” with Nigeria is disputed with arms and in the World Court. Other borders are porous, so people, loot, and grudges from central Africa’s wars enter Cameroon, edging the once calm hub of the region toward its vortex.

The CPDM claims *une démocratie avancée* and enjoys French support. The SDF denies the regime’s legitimacy and seeks anglophone and socialist international allies abroad. Paul Biya and John Fru Ndi have never met. Both in their 60s, they pose disruptive succession questions for their parties and not just the state. Absent a domestic resolution, perhaps brokered from outside, Cameroon could face difficult years ahead.

CAMEROON: INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT

In April 2003, after delays and missed deadlines, a new stock exchange opened in the hopes that this will assist Cameroon's entrance into the modern world economy. As of this writing, no companies are yet quoted on the exchange; thus, shares cannot as of yet actually be traded.

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See also: **Ahidjo, Ahmadou.**

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
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Campaoré: See Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Independence to the Present.

Cape Colony: Origins, Settlement, Trade

The Cape Colony originated in 1652 as a settlement of the Dutch East India Company. With the development of its trading empire in Southeast Asia, the company sought to establish a refreshment station on the shipping route from Europe. Dutch failure in 1607–1608 to oust the Portuguese from Mozambique led to a search for other midway ports of call for supplies of water and fresh meat. They temporarily occupied Mauritius, but Table Bay, as the only known and sheltered source of fresh water along the southern African coast, was more regularly visited. In 1651, as a preemptive move against their English rivals, the company sent Jan van Riebeeck to the bay with instructions “to found a fort and garden there.” They envisaged a dual role for the station: a defensive post against both European trading rivals and the local Khoi, as well as a source of fresh water and food for passing ships.

The early years were not easy. Although cattle and sheep were obtained from the Khoi, supplies were irregular and the post was dependent on rice imports from Madagascar. In order to achieve self-sufficiency as well as fulfill the need to supply produce, some company employees were released from their contracts in 1658 to become “free burgher” farmers. Despite the provision of slave labor and the ejection of Khoi herders from the land, this early farming was not successful, largely because the settlers used the intensive farming methods of the Netherlands in an unsuitable climate and soil. It was only with the adoption



Cape Colony, seventeenth–eighteenth centuries.

of extensive methods of grain cultivation in the late 1670s, and with the successful growth of vines, that the settlement was able to find farming success. There were some later immigrants, including women brought from Dutch orphanages and 156 Huguenot refugees in 1688, but many Cape colonists were descended from ex-crewmen, a number of whom had only disembarked because of illness. Most became farmers, though a small burgher community also developed in Cape Town. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a few freed slaves also acquired farms, though most such “free blacks” lived in Cape Town.

The development of extensive agriculture led to geographical expansion of the settlement. From 1679 to the 1680s the company granted land to settler farmers, from which it had extruded Khoi pastoralists, initially in Stellenbosch and later in Paarl, Franschoek, and the Paardeberg regions. Although this system of freehold land grants was terminated in 1717, by the end of the eighteenth century colonial settlement had spread beyond the Drakenstein Mountains to the drier Bokkeveld, Roggeveld, and Namaqua regions of the north and along the coast to the east, reaching the Zuurveld and Great Fish River by the 1770s. New magistracies were established at Swellendam (1745) and Graaff-Reinet (1786). The farmers in these more arid frontier regions were sheep and cattle breeders, producing meat as well as tallow and hides.

There has been much debate about the causes of this geographical expansion. Neumark (1957) argued that it was encouraged by the potential profits of the Cape Town meat market, frontier suppliers replacing the uncertain bartering trade with the Khoi, who had been decimated by disease and colonial land encroachment. Later historians instead stressed factors that propelled settlers away from the southwestern arable regions. An exceptionally high birthrate and a system of inheritance led to a constant search for land by the sons of many burgher farmers who lacked sufficient capital to

buy their way into the land market of the arable districts. The existence of slave labor preempted the possibilities of such men becoming a proletarian workforce. Such arguments have stressed the economic isolation and relative poverty of settler pastoralists on a remote frontier. More recently, Susan Newton-King (1999) has shown that frontier pastoralists required some capital, were certainly not removed from Cape markets, and were closely dependent on exchange of goods with Cape Town suppliers. At the same time she argues that many such farmers did live in relative poverty, vulnerable to market fluctuations and dependent on coercing local labor to work under indenture.

Certainly a high level of wealth disparity existed among the Cape colonists. Robert Ross (1983) has argued that during the eighteenth century there emerged a wealthy elite, or “Cape gentry,” who owned the biggest farms and the largest number of slaves and dominated local politics. Yet the lack of a staple export crop meant that there were no large-scale plantations of the kind that existed in many other settler colonies at the time. Some wheat and wine was exported to Batavia, though in relatively small amounts. Access to lucrative contracts to supply the company with produce for the local garrison was therefore vital. Although the volume of company ships entering Table Bay stagnated, the number of foreign vessels greatly increased from the mid-eighteenth century on. Export of goods to outsiders by private individuals was forbidden by the company, though in practice a number of officials and colonists did undertake small-scale exchanges with foreign ships, and they also obtained imported goods for sale. The accumulation of private merchant capital was, however, limited. Only in the 1770s did some trading houses emerge, each headed by company officials. This angered those locals who were excluded from participation, and they voiced their complaints as “patriots” to the company directors in the Netherlands.

The internal market was more active. Exchange of produce among grain, wine, and stock farmers was constant, and Cape Town provided a ready market for rural produce. A particular boom took place in the 1780s when allied French and mercenary troops were stationed in Cape Town to defend the colony from the British. Supplies from rural areas poured into the town and inflation set in. After their departure there was a major slump, which was only overcome with the infusion of merchant capital and trading after the takeover of the Cape Colony by the British in 1795. There was also active barter in hides, tallow, iron goods, and livestock between settlers and the Xhosa in the eastern regions of the colony by the late eighteenth century, though this was disrupted by conflict over land and grazing in the 1790s. It was not until the

development of merino wool production in the nineteenth century that major mercantile activity transformed settler agriculture in the central and eastern Cape.

NIGEL WORDEN

See also: **Cape Colony: Khoi-Dutch Wars.**

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Cape Colony: Khoi-Dutch Wars

The Dutch East India Company settlement at the Cape was established on land which had been occupied by Khoikhoi herders and pastoralists for well over a thousand years. They, in turn, had been preceded by San hunter-gatherers, many of whom had retreated to remoter mountainous sites by the seventeenth century. Since the sixteenth century, European ships calling at Table Bay obtained cattle and sheep from the Khoi in return for copper and iron, though there are signs that this local market for metals was becoming saturated by the early seventeenth century.

The building of a “fort and garden” on the shores of Table Bay, and the subsequent establishment of arable farming by the Dutch in 1658, encroached on the seasonal pastorage of Khoi herders. The Khoi refused to accept this and insisted on continuing to graze their livestock as before, breaking down the hedges built to exclude them. In 1659–1660 open conflict broke out; the free burghers formed a militia company and sent their families to the greater security of the fort. Despite a subsequent uneasy truce, conflicts continued. In the 1670s the Khoikhoi of the Saldanha Bay and Boland regions were defeated in a series of Dutch raids, lost their cattle, and were reduced to tributary status. The Dutch East India Company subsequently claimed this land by right of conquest and parceled it out for settler farms. From then on some Khoikhoi began to work alongside imported slaves as laborers on the farms, a clear sign of their loss of economic independence. The Khoi were further devastated by the smallpox epidemic of 1713, but it was the earlier loss of grazing

land that had been decisive in their collapse. Although they were not formally enslaved, they were increasingly brought under company control and reduced to dependence on settlers for pasturage and employment.

As some Dutch settlers turned to pastoralism and expanded their activities farther inland, this pattern of conflict continued. To the north, the Khoikhoi were denied access to grazing and water resources and in some cases were robbed of cattle by settler commandos. There is clear evidence that by the early eighteenth century some Khoi were reduced to the hunter-gatherer existence of the San retreating to the mountains of the Cederberg or to the remoter and more arid lands of the Roggeveld. In the late 1730s there was a protracted period of guerrilla resistance by the Khoikhoi and San against white settler farmers beyond the Piketberg. This was intensified in 1739, after settlers on an illegal trading expedition to Little Namaqualand seized Namaqua cattle. It appears that some of the Khoi who had accompanied them were dissatisfied with their share of the loot and instead joined the Namaqua and raided Dutch herds and farms in the Bokkeveld. The company was only able to reestablish control over the region by sending a major commando to the area, killing a number of the Khoi “rebels” and thus also condoning settler theft of Namaqua cattle. As a result, settlers established control over the grazing lands of the Onder Bokkeveld, though guerrilla-type resistance continued in the mountains of the Bokkeveld and Roggeveld until the end of the century.

From the 1770s to around 1800, as settler pastoralists encroached still farther north, conflict over environmental resources again broke out. As a result the armed *trekboer* commando became more firmly established, both to combat Khoikhoi and San opposition and to capture women and children who were to be used as indentured laborers. Settler control was also extended over indigenous laborers by such devices as the enforced carrying of passes by “Bastaard Hottentots” (the offspring of Khoikhoi and slaves, or Khoikhoi and colonists).

As a result of these conflicts and controls, numerous Khoikhoi, San, and escaped slaves fled to Namaqualand and the Orange (Gariëp) River region by the late eighteenth century, where they formed independent Oorlam captaincies (later known as the Griqua). For example, in the 1790s the notable Oorlam leader Jager Afrikaner killed a white settler in the Hantam region, with whom he had entered a clientship relationship, after a dispute over grazing rights, and fled with his kin to the islands of the Gariëp River. From here he led raids on the surrounding areas, including both Nama and Dutch grazing lands, and attracted other Khoi and San refugees as followers. He was outlawed from the Cape and migrated in 1806 to Namibia, where he was

converted by missionaries and turned to hunting and trading.

Meanwhile, settlers were also expanding eastward, parallel to the south Cape coast, controlling water and grazing lands. In the process they pushed back Khoikhoi pastoralists—already weakened by the influx of Khoi refugees from the west—toward the Karoo and Camdeboo regions, as well as shooting out much of the game upon which San hunters were dependent. By the 1770s, settlers had penetrated into the rich grazing lands between the Gamtoos and Fish rivers, which were also being used by Xhosa herders and cultivators. In 1786 the company formally extended the colony to this region with the establishment of a *landdrost* (magistracy) at Graaff-Reinet. This led to a protracted period of conflict in the 1770s–1790s.

Historian Susan Newton-King (1999) has demonstrated that the heightened violence of this period was at least in part the result of settler need to obtain war captives. Lacking sufficient capital to employ waged labor, settler commandos regularly captured Khoi and San women and children, as well as some men, to use as indentured *inboekseling* labor. Other Khoi and San were reduced to working for the trekkers as herders because they had lost access to cattle and pasturage. But this was not without retaliation. By the mid-1790s Khoisan resistance, both in the form of stock theft and direct attacks on settlers and their slaves, seriously disrupted the frontier meat trade. In 1799 a major rebellion broke out when Khoikhoi and San *inboekselings* deserted the farms, grouped themselves into captaincies (modeled on precolonial social structures), and began a four-year war aiming to reclaim the “country of which our fathers have been despoiled.”

In several ways the 1799–1803 rebellion differed significantly from earlier Khoikhoi and San resistance. First, it was an uprising by those who had already lost the means of an independent existence, worked for the *trekboers* and aimed to overthrow settler society from within rather than simply to stem its territorial expansion. Moreover, the rebels made common cause with the Zuurveld Xhosa chiefs who were resisting colonial advances in the region with considerable success. They defeated a settler commando and raided the Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam districts, forcing many farms to be abandoned. The threat that this posed to the colonial order led to decisive intervention by the new colonial rulers who had taken over control of the Cape from the Dutch East India Company: the British and, for a brief interlude, the Dutch Batavian administration. Divisions among the Khoi and between them and the Xhosa eventually led to a truce in 1803. The rebellion marked the last consistent stand of the Khoisan against settler occupation.

By the early nineteenth century, few Khoi or San had retained independent access to land. Legislation introduced by the British, such as the Caledon Code (1809), attempted to lock them into farm labor. These restrictions were removed by Ordinance 50 (1828), and attempts were made to settle some Khoi groups at mission stations or on land at Kat River, though independent farming was discouraged. A number preferred to live among Xhosa farmers. In the northern Cape, further conflicts took place in the 1860s and 1870s against San who were displaced by the fencing of settler pastorage. In some places, this was tantamount to genocide.

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See also: Cape Colony: Origins, Settlement, Trade.

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Cape Colony: Slavery

Chattel slaves were imported to the Cape Colony by the Dutch East India Company, which had long used slaves in its Asian settlements. The first company Cape commander, Jan van Riebeeck, had a few personal slaves in his household from the earliest years of the colony; he appealed to the company's directors in Batavia (Jakarta) for slave labor to support settler farming in the Cape Town hinterland in 1658. The first cargo of 228 slaves was imported from Dahomey, and the capture of a Portuguese slaving ship brought another 174 slaves from Angola. Thereafter the company traded for slaves in Madagascar and obtained others from its trading post at Rio de la Goa and along the Mozambique coast. Slaves were also brought to the Cape aboard ships returning to Europe from the

company trading posts in South and Southeast Asia. They had been obtained in the extensive trading network of South and Southeast Asia and came mainly from Bengal; the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of India; Ceylon; and the Indonesian archipelago. After the British took over the Cape from the company in 1795, private merchants imported over 7,200 slaves to Cape Town from Mozambique and Madagascar before the trade was abolished in 1807. Although there are no complete extant records, it has been estimated that some 80,000 slaves were imported to the colony altogether. Children born to slave women at the Cape were automatically of slave status. In 1833, the last complete year of slavery, there were 38,343 slaves at the Cape.

Until the nineteenth century, the Cape Colony depended on imported slaves to maintain its labor force. The majority of these were male, and there was thus a major gender imbalance. There were four male slaves to one female slave in 1738. Even where family ties were forged, couples could be broken up and children sold. After the abolition of the slave trade, a higher proportion of slaves were Cape-born and the balance was redressed to a gender ratio of 1.18 males to 1 female in 1834. More extended slave kinship networks emerged in the nineteenth century. Families, however, were still often separated from each other among differing owners.

Slaves were used by the company on its cattle and defense posts as well as on public works in Cape Town. The majority of slaves worked for settlers on the grain and wine farms of the southwestern Cape. Almost all arable farmers owned slaves, though there were no large-scale plantations, and the number of slaves on each farm was usually less than 20. Some slaves were owned by pastoralist farmers, though the indigenous Khoi and San inhabitants were more often used as indentured or casual workers on frontier farms. Most Capetonians also had slaves as domestic servants and artisans. Together with the political exiles brought by the company from Asia, slaves formed the basis of a thriving Muslim community in Cape Town.

Recent historiography has shown that Cape slaves could be treated just as brutally as in other colonial slave societies. Some acquired small amounts of money or livestock from earnings permitted by their owners, but the majority lacked any resources of their own. Only a few acquired freedom, some 900 in the company period, though manumission rates increased in Cape Town in the early nineteenth century. Most freed slaves were urban women. A few ex-slaves obtained land or property, but the majority remained at the bottom of the social ladder.

Rebellion was difficult because slaves were physically separated in relatively small units on remote farms.

Arson was relatively common. Some slaves ran away, and a small community of escaped slaves existed at Cape Hangklip, opposite the Cape Peninsula, throughout most of the eighteenth century. A few runaways escaped from the colony altogether, becoming part of the mixed Oorlam and Griqua societies of the Orange River region and beyond or joining the Xhosa chiefdoms in the eastern Cape region. Not all slaves acted in such ways. Historian Robert Shell (1994) has argued that paternalism and deference, particularly of female household domestic slaves, inhibited open resistance.

After the British occupation of the Cape, changes took place in the slave system. The slave trade was abolished in 1807, cutting off external supplies, and high infant mortality levels made it difficult to maintain slave numbers from local births. The wine farms on which many slaves worked suffered a slump in the late 1820s, while wool production, the boom sector of the colony's economy, was less dependent on slave labor. As colonial settlement expanded in the eastern Cape, a more mobile labor force was needed. Hence, merchants and new commercial pastoral farmers began to oppose slavery and opt for cheap wage labor. The slaves themselves became more assertive and lodged complaints against their owners to the authorities. There were two rebellions: an uprising of over 300 slaves in the Cape Town hinterland in 1808 and a small revolt in the more remote Bokkeveld region of the northern Cape in 1825. Thus, when the British Parliament abolished slavery in 1834 (with a four-year period of apprenticeship until final emancipation in 1838), there was only muted opposition from the slaveowners.

Slave emancipation did not alter the social structure of the colony. As elsewhere in the British colonies, no land or capital was provided for the freed slaves, and though some moved to the towns and villages, and particularly to mission stations after 1838, many others remained on the farms as permanent or seasonal workers. Families were united and many women withdrew from farm work. But most freed slaves lacked the resources to obtain a truly equal position in Cape society.

Although indigenous South Africans were not formally enslaved, the existence of slavery in the Cape influenced other types of labor use. Many Khoi worked alongside slaves on settler farms in conditions that differed little from those of slaves, though they were not legally the property of their employers. Khoi and San captured in raids were used as indentured labor, especially in the eastern Cape from the 1770s. Most were women and children, though there were also some men. Slave raiding also took place in the Delagoa Bay region in the 1820s, and slaves were taken by the *trekboers* from the Cape into the interior in the 1830s. Slavery in the Transvaal was abolished by the Sand

River Convention in 1852, though indentured labor was still widely used.

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See also: Slavery, Colonial Rule and.

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Cape Colony: British Occupation, 1806–1872

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Cape society was radically altered in many respects by its integration within a British imperial system and a globalizing economy. But it was not necessarily transformed in the fundamentals of its racial structure. On the one hand, British administrations enforced "the replacement of slave-owner tyranny by a more powerful state regulation of labor;" but on the other, they ensured the maintenance of "social hierarchy and inequality of race and class" (Worden and Crais 1994, p.13).

The Cape Colony first became a part of the British Empire on an indefinite basis during the Napoleonic War. It was seized from the Dutch Batavian Republic in 1806 due to its strategic location on the shipping route between Europe and the East Indies, but its retention was not confirmed until 1814. During the first two decades of British occupation, autocratic and predominantly military governors pursued conservative policies, similar to those adopted in Britain, which were intended to maintain an inherited social order. Thus, the 1809 Caledon Code, while it attempted to moderate physical abuse of the colony's Khoi workforce, nevertheless reinforced their subordination to colonists by imposing a pass system which restricted their movements. Close links were forged between the small number of British officials in the colony and the Dutch-speaking colonial elite, and British forces were used to secure the eastern colonial margins for frontier farmers by expelling Xhosa chiefdoms across the Fish River.

By the 1820s, however, the middle classes' ongoing struggle against aristocratic hegemony in industrializing Britain was undermining the status quo in the Cape as well as in the metropolis. In 1807, a campaign fought largely by middle-class evangelicals culminated in the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade for British ships, bringing labor shortages to many parts of the colony. Further British humanitarian intervention led to the amelioration of the Cape slaves' conditions during the 1820s. The colony's aristocratic governor, Lord Charles Somerset, was directly challenged by British settlers such as the journalists Thomas Pringle and John Fairbairn, who were advocates of reformist programs in Britain. Among the 4,000 "1820 settlers" located on the eastern frontier of the colony, the majority of the gentry, who had emigrated as leaders of group parties, joined in the pressure for an end to the governor's unmitigated powers. An official commission of inquiry appointed in 1823 recommended reforms that were the first step away from the old autocratic and mercantilist system and toward freer trade under an advisory legislative council.

Reformist pressure did not end with the assault on Somerset's ancien régime. The London Missionary Society director in the Cape, Dr. John Philip, represented the plight of the colony's Khoi as being akin to that of slaves. Metropolitan humanitarians took up his call for their freedom, and in 1828 Ordinance 50 abolished the pass laws and accorded Khoi equal rights to colonists under the law. Despite the vehement opposition of both established Dutch-speaking colonists and recent British settlers, Ordinance 50 was hailed by humanitarians as the Cape's own Charter of Freedom. In 1834, a British humanitarian campaign against the continuance of slavery in the West Indies culminated in the abolition of the institution of slavery throughout the British Empire, including the Cape.

While reform took precedence in the Cape under Somerset's successor, Lieutenant Governor Bourke, the humanitarian concept of freedom was nevertheless qualified. In Britain, humanitarian reformers held out the prospect of workers' freedom from arbitrary legal restraint, but advocated their docility, sobriety, and productivity within an unequal class system. In the Cape, freed slaves had four years of "apprenticeship" to their former masters in which to learn the traits of respectability and submission to "proper" authority. In case these lessons were not sufficient, the 1841 Masters and Servants Ordinance prescribed criminal sanctions for any laborer's breach of contract with a new employer. Although the legislation itself was nonracial, the vast majority of laborers were freed slaves or Khoi, by now known collectively as "colored," while the vast majority of employers were white. Only a tiny proportion of the Khoi freed under Ordinance 50 had

actually been allocated land along the Kat River on which they could attempt to acquire a living independent of colonial employers, and even this humanitarian "experiment" was part of a buffer strip defending the colony's eastern frontier from Xhosa raids.

British administration created favorable conditions for British merchants to operate from the Cape, especially once sterling had replaced the rixdollar as local currency and once British preference for Cape wine exporters had been removed, breaking the established Dutch elite's economic stranglehold. With their connections in London, British merchants were able to act as agents retrieving much of the compensation money offered to the Cape's slaveowners upon the "emancipation" of their workforce. Dutch-speaking merchants soon assimilated within this English-speaking elite and, from the 1830s, both helped to finance settler capitalist expansion, based on wool production, in the eastern Cape. These merchants were also behind the complex of scientific, literary, and artistic institutions centered on the company gardens in Cape Town—institutions that did much to bolster a sense of respectability and pride in a Cape colonial identity.

It was partly the "respectable" colonists' desire for metropolitan recognition that led to the "Convict Crisis." In 1848, the British government ordered that the Cape be used as a penal colony in order to appease Australian settlers, who had repeatedly complained about the "export" of British convicts to their territories. Dutch- and English-speaking commercial interests forged an alliance of classes in Cape Town to protest at this challenge to the Cape's status as a colony of free settlement. Governor Harry Smith, despite securing the support of eastern Cape settlers, whose expansion onto Xhosa lands he had facilitated, found that he could not govern effectively as long as the Cape Town elite boycotted the legislative council. He was forced to order the first and only convict ship to arrive in Table Bay on to Tasmania, saving the Cape from degradation in the eyes of its bourgeois elite. Victory in this struggle with metropolitan authority gave the colonial elite the confidence and the determination to follow Canada in securing greater powers of self-government.

When representative government was granted to the Cape in 1853, it came in the form of a compromise. Eastern Cape British settlers, many of whom supported a separatist movement which aimed to bring governmental authority under more direct settler expansionist influence, had generally argued for a franchise qualification that would include only wealthier capitalists such as themselves. But western Cape commercial and Afrikaner farming interests were generally in favor of a more inclusive franchise that would empower the entire white population (as well as wealthier "coloreds" and land-owning Africans). The constitution

finally adopted contained the relatively low franchise qualification of £25 worth of property, regardless of race. It has been argued that the inclusion of a small minority of blacks within the enfranchised classes acted as a kind of “safety valve” for black grievances in the wake of the “colored” and Xhosa eastern Cape uprising of 1850–1852. The nonracial constitution served as a counter to the destabilizing effects of settler expansionism which had caused the rebellion, giving blacks the aspiration to join the governing elite rather than overthrow it.

With representative government, the Cape’s authorities managed relatively successfully to contain the tensions within colonial society for the next 20 years while consolidating colonial control over Xhosa territory in British Kaffraria. Under the governorship of Sir George Grey (1854–1862), Xhosa resistance was overcome in the wake of the cattle-killing movement, and expenditure increased on roads, prisons, hospitals, and schools in both the east and the west of the colony. This created a budget deficit, which in turn contributed to an economic downturn in the 1860s, but it meant that by 1870 there was surplus capital in the Cape ready for speculation and investment in the mineral discoveries to the north. Ultimately, the success of black farmers occasioned by commercial expansion would threaten white dominance of the electoral roll under the Cape’s nonracial franchise. But once the colony was granted responsible government in 1872, the white elite was in a better position to raise the franchise qualification and maintain white political privilege. There would be little protest from liberal merchants now that their economic interest had shifted from the agrarian enterprise of black farmers to the expansion of industrial activities.

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See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; South Africa: Missionaries: Nineteenth Century.

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Cape Liberalism, Nineteenth Century

Liberalism has meant different things at different times in South Africa. Ideas relating to individual human rights—against the authoritarianism of big government—came to the Cape from the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, reappeared with the advent of Batavian rule between 1803 and 1806, and then surfaced again in the 1820s, after the arrival of the British settlers. The challenge to the authoritarianism of early British rule at the Cape then mounted produced victory in the form of the establishment of freedom for the press in 1828, and then took the form of a campaign for colonial self-government, which was won in 1853.

A different, if related, meaning of liberalism concerned attitudes toward the oppressed, and in particular whites’ attitudes toward blacks. In this meaning, liberalism involved a rejection of discrimination based on race, and a concern that people of color should be treated with equal justice. Such ideas were held in particular by missionaries—especially those of the London Missionary Society (LMS)—who pressed for the removal of restrictions imposed on the Khoikhoi and argued for liberating the slaves. Dr. John Philip, superintendent of the LMS, was the leading figure in this liberalism of the 1820s and 1830s, which won the passage of Ordinance 50 of 1828 and then saw the emancipation of the slaves in 1834. The 1836 House of Commons select committee on aborigines was a high water mark in humanitarian influence.

Such humanitarianism fell on hard times in the 1840s as liberal confidence faded in the face of settler assertiveness, but the British government insisted that in the representative government system granted to the Cape in 1853 the franchise should be color-blind. From this, the tradition emerged that all colonial legislation should be color-blind, and with very few exceptions this was the case at the Cape for the rest of the century. This set the Cape apart from other parts of South Africa, most strikingly from the tradition of “no equality in church or state” in the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The policies of Sir George Grey, Cape governor in the late 1850s, aimed at the assimilation of those Africans incorporated into the colony, and contrasted with the segregationist policies of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal. While the Cape tradition was one of identity, a uniform legal

system for all, the other white-ruled states insisted on separation for blacks—both territorial and legal.

But Cape liberalism was not merely an imperialist imposition, or limited to missionaries who came to South Africa to work. It took root in the Cape Colony and became the ideology of local interest groups. It was William Porter, the Cape attorney general from 1839 to 1872, who was the prime advocate of a relatively low qualified franchise in the early 1850s, and his liberalism was shared by others who were colonial born. Merchants on the Eastern Cape frontier sought the formation of a prosperous black peasantry with whom they could trade, and promoted ideas of the incorporation of such a class. Local missionaries advocated liberal policies in the interests of conversion and, particularly in the eastern Cape, some white politicians appealed to black voters for support, and sometimes won thanks to their support. Individuals such as Saul Solomon, member of parliament for Cape Town, and, at the end of the century, Olive Schreiner, the novelist, stood up for the rights of oppressed peoples and expressed liberal values.

There were, of course, limits to the enlightened paternalism of such whites. Cape Town itself, the seat of government, was a long way from a large African population, and a cynical view is that whites there could afford to adopt liberal positions. There was no question of extending nonracialism to social relations, and nonracialism was not incorporated into the political parties that emerged from the 1880s. Nevertheless, there were real and substantial differences between the Cape tradition, which Cecil Rhodes summed up in the 1890s in the dictum “Equal rights for every civilized man,” and the ideologies and policies of the other states of nineteenth-century South Africa.

As the mineral revolution gathered pace, mining interests (and those of Rhodes among them) sought to draw labor from the Cape’s African reserves, and so took steps that undermined the African peasantry. With the incorporation of a large African population as the Transkei was annexed, at a time when social Darwinist ideas became popular, racial distinctions in social relations were drawn ever more distinctly, and the new educated African elite found that barriers rose on lines of race. The nonracial franchise remained, but the qualifications were raised in 1892, effectively excluding large numbers of blacks. Nevertheless, liberal values survived both in a small segment of the white community and among the black elite. Though Phyllis Lewsen (1971) has argued that liberalism was in a “terminal” phase by the end of the century, its continuing strength was to be seen at the National Convention in 1908–1909, when the Cape delegates strongly and largely successfully defended the Cape nonracial franchise. By the late twentieth century the Cape liberal tradition had

been largely forgotten, and *liberal* had become a term of abuse, but many of the values of Cape liberalism of the nineteenth century were to be embodied in the constitutions of 1993 and 1996.

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See also: Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism, Nineteenth Century.

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Cape Town

Cape Town was founded on the shores of Table Bay, the site of Khoi grazing lands, by Jan van Riebeeck of the Dutch East India Company in 1652. As one of the few sheltered harbors with supplies of fresh water on the southern African coast, it had been frequently visited by European trading vessels on their way to the Indian Ocean, and the company occupation was a preemptive move against English rivals—the first structure to be built was a defensive fort. Cattle and sheep were also bartered with the Khoi, and the company established a garden to grow fresh vegetables with which to supply its ships. After the establishment of settler farming, Cape Town became a market center for local produce. By 1775 a distinctive urban community had emerged of some 7,000 people, the majority of whom were slaves and company employees. There were about 2,500 free burghers, employed in a range of craft and boarding house occupations which served the needs of the port and of up-country traders.

The takeover of Cape Town by the British in the early nineteenth century brought about major transformations. British immigration and an influx of merchant capital led to the establishment of a commercial exchange,

banks, and insurance companies, while shipping links with other parts of the British Empire—notably, India and Australasia—greatly increased. Yet Cape Town lacked a solid economic base and stagnated in the 1840s when the eastern Cape’s wool boom instead benefited Port Elizabeth. This changed with the development of the Kimberley diamond fields in the 1870s–1880s, which brought a new influx of capital and immigrants into Cape Town and firmly established it as the prime city of the Cape Colony. A new harbor was completed in 1870 and extended in 1905. The flow of migrants was further intensified during the South African War (1899–1902). Cape Town’s population more than doubled, from 80,000 in 1880 to 171,000 in 1904. Although economic power by then centered on the gold mines of the Rand, Cape Town’s significance was confirmed when it became the seat of the new Union of South Africa Parliament in 1910.

Cape Town’s nineteenth-century population was one of the most cosmopolitan of the British Empire. Descendants of Dutch and German settlers were joined by immigrants from Britain and, in the later nineteenth century, Eastern Europe. Slaves and exiles had been brought to Cape Town from a range of Indian, Southeast Asian, Malagasy, and Southeast African societies. After final slave emancipation in 1838 many worked as fishers, artisans, and in crafts. These, together with Indian traders and storekeepers who arrived from the 1870s, formed the basis of a sizable Muslim community in the city. The indigenous Khoisan had been driven into the interior, but black African migrants were an important component of the population, providing the mainstay of dock labor.

Yet Cape Town was a divided city. While the wealthy mercantile elite built houses on the slopes of Table Mountain and in the new southern suburbs, overcrowding was a serious problem in the many landlord-owned slum properties that existed in the center of the town. Disease was the inevitable outcome. Municipal politics in the 1870s–1880s were dominated by conflicts between mercantile interests advocating sanitary and housing reforms and landlords who resisted them. A regular water supply was only established by 1904.

Although there was a greater degree of interracial social interaction among the lower classes of nineteenth-century Cape Town than in other South African towns, social segregation markedly increased from the 1880s. This was largely the result of concern by the city’s dominant English elite at what they perceived as lower class disorder and the need to protect the white “deserving poor,” at a time when growing numbers of immigrants were arriving from Europe. An outbreak of plague at the docks in 1901 provided the municipality with the pretext for forcibly moving black African

workers to a segregated location at Ndabeni on the outskirts of the town. In 1927 Africans were again relocated to the new township of Langa.

The docks continued to be the mainstay of the city’s economy in the early twentieth century, though the growth of light manufacturing, food processing, and clothing industries also became significant by the 1920s. Many factory workers were colored women, though by the 1930s Afrikaner migrants added to their number. Afrikaner, African, and European (especially Mediterranean) migration into Cape Town increased its total population to 369,410 by 1945. These decades also saw the rise of trade unions (notably the precursor to Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union, founded by Clements Kadalie at the Cape Town dockyards in 1919) and organizations established to advocate colored people’s political rights, such as the African People’s Organization founded in 1902 by Cape Town’s first colored city councilor, Abdullah Abdurahman, and the more radical National Liberation League, formed in 1935 by his daughter Cissie Gool. The latter was a predecessor of the Non-European Unity Movement, founded in 1943. Great disparities of wealth continued to exist, with informal squatter settlements emerging at the city’s outskirts on the sandy Cape Flats.

The decades after World War II were ones of massive social engineering. In part this was the result of modernist city planning, which sought to demolish inner-city working-class slums. But it was given particular force by the implementation of apartheid. Black African migrants were barred from the city by influx control policies, and under the Group Areas Act (1950) over 150,000 people, most of them colored, had been forcibly moved from inner city areas such as District Six and the southern suburbs by the 1970s. They were relocated to low quality housing estates on the Cape Flats, far removed from places of employment. By the 1980s influx control was breaking down and large squatter settlements such as Crossroads emerged on the Cape Flats, despite constant state harassment. Acceptance of the status quo was finally marked by the building in 1983–1984 of a new township for black Africans at Khayelitsha, some 40 kilometers from the city center.

Opposition to apartheid policies intensified. During the Sharpeville crisis (1960), thousands of residents marched from Langa into the city center under PAC leader Philip Kgosana, and protests took place in Langa and other Cape Town townships after the 1976 Soweto uprising. But it was not until the 1980s, with the founding of the United Democratic Front, that extensive resistance took place in the black African and “colored” townships of the Cape Flats, leading to army suppression and occupation.

Postapartheid Cape Town faced numerous challenges. Migration had increased its population to over three million by 2000. But it lacked a strong industrial base, its traditional textile manufacturing suffered from foreign competition and unemployment levels soared to over 40 per cent. The burgeoning tourism industry offered some hope, attracted by the region's natural beauty, though this was threatened by urban terrorism in the late 1990s, apparently caused by conflicts of rival gang and drug-dealing interests.

NIGEL WORDEN

See also: **Cape Colony.**

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
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Cape Verde, History of

The Republic of Cape Verde (in Portuguese, República de Cabo Verde) is a small West African country consisting of ten volcanic islands and five islets 300 miles due west of the westernmost point of Africa. The archipelago features two island groups. The Barlavento group on the north includes Santo Antão, São Vicente, Santa Luzia (uninhabited), São Nicolau, Sal, and Boa Vista, along with the islets Raso and Branco. The Sotavento group on the south includes Maio, São Tiago, Fogo, and Brava, and the islets of Grande, Luís, Carneiro, and Cima. Praia on São Tiago is the capital and main town of the Sotavento islands, while Mindelo on São Vicente is the main town in the north.

The majority of the population is *Crioulo* (Creole) or *mestiço*, the result of early relationships between slave owners and their female slaves. The people of Cape Verde descended from both European and African ancestry, developing a Luso-African culture.

The official language of Cape Verde is Portuguese. However, it is Crioulo that is the mother tongue and national language. Crioulo expresses the *saudade* (soul) of Cape Verde and is the defining linguistic feature of cultural identity. Crioulo, consisting of



Cape Verde.

antiquated Portuguese modified through contact with various African languages, emerged in the sixteenth century. It initially served as the lingua franca for Portuguese and African slave traders, a hybrid language of commerce.

Although evidence is not conclusive, the Cape Verde Islands may have been visited, but not occupied, prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. It is possible that Phoenicians, Moors (Arab-Berbers), and West Africans visited the islands. Phoenician traders may have sailed there in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, and the Moors may have arrived in the tenth and eleventh centuries. However, it was not until Portuguese and Italian navigators sailing for Prince Henry "The Navigator" of Portugal that the islands were colonized. It was between 1455 and 1462 that the islands were reached by navigators such as Ca da Mosta, Diogo Gomes, Diogo Afonso, and António and Bartolomeu da Noli. In 1462, early settlers (including Portuguese Jews) arrived at São Tiago and founded Ribeira Grande (today known as Cidade Velha), the first European settlement and church in the tropics. The early intentions of the Portuguese were to use the islands as an entrepôt and site for producing cotton and sugar. In 1495, the islands were declared a crown possession of Portugal, which subsequently began importing slaves from the West African coast to cultivate the land.

Aside from importing slaves, the Portuguese imported criminals, exiles, social outcasts, and a feudal (*companhia*) system to Cape Verde. At this time, Portuguese slave masters began to initiate sexual relations with African slaves, developing a heterogeneous Crioulo society. The



Women carrying water in a little village near Tarrafal, Santiago, Cape Verde, 2003. © Wolfgang Schmidt/Das Fotoarchiv.

feudal social structure included *capitães* (captains), *fidalgos* (noblemen), *cavaleiro-fidalgos* (noble knights), *almojarites* (tax collectors), *degradados* (convicts), *exterminados* (exiles), and *lançados* (outcasts). Slaves occupied the bottom of the feudal social structure and were classified as *escravos novos* or *boçais* (raw slaves), *escravos naturais* (Cape Verde-born slaves), and *ladinos* (baptized or “civilized” slaves). Slaves often were used to clear land, labor in the salt flats of Sal, gather indigo, orchil, and urzella (plant dyes), and work on the cotton, sugar, and coffee plantations. In addition, runaway slaves called *badius* cultivated land in the interior and retained a degree of African authenticity (that is, they were less assimilated to Portuguese culture). Eventually, the *companhia* system was abandoned for the *morgado* or *capela* system of land ownership. *Morgados* were large tracts of privately owned land transmitted under the principle of primogeniture. In 1863 the *morgado* system gave way to land reforms and was abolished.

With the expansion of the slave trade in the sixteenth century, the Cape Verde Islands became a key interface among Africa, Europe, and America. The archipelago was soon at the center of a triangular trade, sending regular shipments of slaves, ivory, and gold to the Americas and Europe in exchange for cheap manufactured goods, cloth, firearms, horses, and rum. Due to the wealth accumulated from the transatlantic slave trade, the islands became attractive to Spanish, English, Dutch, and French pirates. These pirates and foreign raiders (William Hawkins in the 1540s, Francis Drake in 1585, and the French in 1712) repeatedly attacked the islands, especially the city of Riberia Grande during the following centuries. The islands were also attractive to smugglers, who would use *panos* (trade cloths) as currency (two *panos* were equal to one iron bar), thus undermining the Portuguese Crown trading

monopoly. Wolof spinners and weavers made *panos* from cotton, which was then dyed using both orchil and urzella. Efforts, though unsuccessful, were made to control the corruption and smuggling. For example, the sale of *panos* was prohibited and punishable by death during the 1680s.

As the transatlantic slave trade was reluctantly abandoned in 1876, the Cape Verde Islands once again became an important commercial center during the late nineteenth century. With the advent of steam-powered ocean vessels, the islands served as a refueling stop (at Mindelo) on the transatlantic passage. Submarine cable stations also attracted many ships until World War II. Despite renewed interest in the islands, the people of Cape Verde still suffered from drought, famine, and poor administration. Most Cape Verdeans worked as tenant farmers and sharecroppers. Others sought employment in São Tomé and Príncipe as agricultural laborers, while many signed onto whaling and sealing ships. Between the late 1800s and early 1900s, tens of thousands of Cape Verdeans voluntarily migrated to the United States (mainly to southeastern New England) to work as longshoremen or in cranberry bogs and factories.

In the early twentieth century, opposition to the Portuguese crown was growing in both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In 1926, the fascists took control of the Portuguese government and later added a colonial policy into the constitution. Consequently, anticolonialist movements grew in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Prison camps, which were known for their brutality, were established at Tarrafal, São Tiago (known as Chão Bom), to house dissidents and nationalists from Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, and Portugal. Initial nationalist sentiments were expressed in the literary *claridade* (clarity) movement, founded by Baltazar Lopes, Jorge Barbosa, and Manuel Lopes in 1936. The *claridade* movement spoke out against racism, fascism, and Portuguese colonialism.

In 1951, Portugal changed Cape Verde’s status to that of an overseas province, in an attempt to avert growing nationalism. Despite this action, nationalists responded by founding the clandestine Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), a party founded (in Guinea-Bissau) by Amílcar Cabral and several others in 1956. The PAIGC’s goal was to liberate both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portuguese colonialism. In 1958 the PAIGC initiated a series of general strikes. In 1959 a strike at Pijiguiti, Guinea-Bissau, turned into a massacre. Still, the PAIGC concluded that the violence practiced by the colonial state could only be defeated by counter-violence and armed-struggle. The PAIGC thus abandoned peaceful means of protest for a war of national liberation. In 1963 the armed struggle began,

with fighting concentrated in rural Guinea-Bissau. Due to logistical reasons, the PAIGC withheld from attacks in the Cape Verde Islands. With the PAIGC making steady military progress, the Portuguese responded with bombing attacks, using white phosphorous and napalm provided by the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

By 1972, the PAIGC controlled much of Guinea-Bissau despite the presence of Portuguese troops in fortified towns. On January 20, 1973, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated, but the PAIGC quickly intensified its attacks against the weakened Portuguese military and by September 24, 1973, independence was declared. Following this declaration, the fascist Portuguese government was toppled on April 25, 1974, thus prompting the new Portuguese government to negotiate a process of decolonization with the PAIGC.

In December 1974, Portugal and the PAIGC agreed to a transitional government. Full independence was achieved in Guinea-Bissau by September 24, 1974, and in Cape Verde by July 5, 1975. Aristides Pereira became the first president of the Republic of Cape Verde, and Pedro Pires became the first prime minister. Although the original constitution envisioned political unification with Guinea-Bissau, a coup in November 1980 strained the relations between the two countries. Shortly thereafter, Pedro Pires founded the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV) abandoning the hope for unity with Guinea-Bissau. The PAICV established a one-party system and ruled Cape Verde from independence until 1990.

In 1991, the first multiparty elections took place. The PAICV leaders were replaced by the Movimento para Democracia (MPD). António Mascarenas Monteiro replaced Pereira, and Carlos Veiga replaced Pires. A new constitution was adopted in 1992 instituting multiparty democracy. The MPD won the majority of the votes in the 1995 elections, which were judged to be both free and fair by domestic and international observers.

The 2001 elections once again saw a changing of the guard, as Pedro Pires and José Marie Neves, both members of the PAICV, became president and prime minister, respectively. Cape Verde is a member of the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and PALOP (African Countries with Portuguese as the Official Language). With assistance from the World Bank, Cape Verde has undertaken several infrastructure improvement projects, in such areas as urban development, water management, and education.

PAUL KHALIL SAUCIER

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Carthage

The civilization of Carthage (now modern Tunisia), one of the great civilizations to be established in Africa, was situated at the great crossroads where Africa and the world of the Mediterranean met. Carthage began as a colony of the Phoenicians about 800BCE. It emerged in a location regarded as the most sizable single area of fertile agricultural land in north-western Africa. As Phoenician power and influence suffered due to the depredations of Assyrians and the Persians, Carthage began to act more independently. By the sixth century, Carthage had emerged as an independent power and expanded along the African and Mediterranean shores and into the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and the western part of Sicily.

It was ruled by a commercial oligarchy. Before long, Carthage had grown in wealth and importance to become a major city with an estimated population of about 400,000. In the fourth century it extended its control over the Tunisian plain to ensure a steady supply of food and of Berber elements for its army. By the beginning of the third century BCE, it had monopolized the trade not only of African territory, which reached almost to the Sahara Desert, but also that of the coasts of almost all of the area of the western Mediterranean, both of Africa and Spain, the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and parts of Sicily.

As Carthage became more prosperous, it began to require considerable military and naval forces to protect itself from invaders drawn by its wealth. A formidable fighting force under great commanders was established. The army consisted almost entirely of mercenaries, of different tongues and races. An important feature of the army was the Numidian cavalry, which was made up of riders carrying shields of elephant's hide and wearing a lion's skin over their shoulder. They used no saddles or bridles, and were fearless riders and warriors.

Carthage did everything possible to extend the frontiers of commerce; this policy eventually brought it in conflict with Rome. Soon after the establishment of the Roman republic, both powers entered into an agreement in which the greater part of the western Mediterranean was recognized as Carthaginian, and only the coast of western Sicily was open to all. In fact, so completely did the Carthaginians control the western Mediterranean region that they declared the Mediterranean Sea a Carthaginian lake, in which

nobody could even wash his hands without Carthaginian permission.

When the Carthaginians began to seize the Greek cities in eastern Sicily, the trouble with Rome began. The conquest of Magna Graecia (a Greek area in southern Italy) had made Rome a near neighbor of the Carthaginian state. Thus, when Sicilian Greeks appealed to Rome for help, the Romans welcomed an opportunity to cut Carthage down to size. The struggle between Rome and Carthage culminated in the First Punic (from the Latin word “Phoenician”) War, 264–241BCE. In that war, the Roman fleet defeated the Carthaginians at sea. They then forced Carthage to give up all claim to eastern Sicily and to cede western Sicily as well.

To compensate for the losses, Carthage expanded its holdings into Spain, in order to partake of the latter’s rich minerals and manpower. A military expedition under the great general Hannibal was dispatched to Spain.

In 218BCE, when the Second Punic War (218–201BCE) started, Hannibal took his troops across southern Gaul and then over the Alps into Italy. In that expedition, he lost in the snow half of his men, great quantities of baggage, and many of the elephants he used as pack animals. In spite of that, he won a string of victories as he marched southward. The Roman general Fabius Cunctator “the Delayer” tried to exhaust the Carthaginian forces by adopting his “Fabian” tactics: refraining from full battle, and instead merely attacking Carthaginian supply trains and patrols with the hopes of lowering their morale. But when this strategy was reversed in favor of an all-out battle at Cannae (216BCE), the Romans suffered a crushing defeat. Hannibal was able to achieve such a feat through his skill and daring, his genius for command, his concern for the welfare of his soldiers, and his good judgment.

It was not until several years later that another Roman general, Scipio, emerged to defeat Carthage. This was in 202BCE at Zama, a few miles south of Carthage. It was the last battle in a long and bitter war. For the first time in his career, Hannibal was defeated in war. The defeat was so devastating that Carthage had no option but to surrender. The terms of the peace treaty were extremely harsh: Carthage was to give up Spain and all of the islands between Africa and Italy, the king of Numidia was to be recognized as an ally of Rome, and Carthage was to pay to Rome an annual tribute of 200 talents for 50 years and relinquish its elephants and warships. However, Carthage was left as a free and independent nation. While Hannibal fled in shame to the court of the king of Syria, his adversary Scipio, in honor of his great victory over Carthage, was given the surname Africanus. He thus became the first commander in chief to whom the Romans bestowed the name of the people he had defeated.

Although Carthage had been humiliated, Rome watched its growing prosperity with increasing anxiety and jealousy. The speedy recovery alarmed the Roman ruling class and soldiers who thereafter agitated for its complete destruction. Cato the censor and senator would end each of his speeches with the words *Delenda est Carthago* (Carthage must be destroyed).

Thus, 52 years after the defeat of Hannibal, the Third Punic War (149–146BCE) began. War was declared against Carthage with the excuse that it had violated a treaty that made it mandatory for it to receive Rome’s consent before engaging in war. (Carthage had made preparations to defend itself against constant raids by the king of Numidia.) In a war in which Rome showed neither mercy nor pity and in which Carthage was besieged for two years, the cruel order was finally given in 146BCE that Carthage must be utterly destroyed. The inhabitants were massacred, and the city plundered and burned. After leveling the city, the whole site was ploughed, salt was sprinkled on the earth, and a solemn curse was pronounced upon whomever would attempt to rebuild the city. The other territories that belonged to Carthage were then annexed as the Roman province of Africa.

OLUTAYO ADESINA

See also: North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire.

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Carvajal, Luis del Mármol (c.1520–c.1600)

Spanish Soldier, Geographer, and Historian

Along with the *Delle descrittione dell’ Africa* by Leo Africanus, another popular sixteenth-century source for the geography of Africa was the *Descripcion general de Affrica*, written in Spanish by Luis del Mármol Carvajal. The first two volumes were printed in Granada in 1573; they were followed much later by a third volume printed in Málaga in 1599. While Spanish authors had published extensive accounts of the New World earlier in the century, it is somewhat surprising that the first comprehensive European description of Africa was written by a Spaniard—especially since Spain’s connection with the continent was limited to the Barbary Coast. A French translation appeared in 1667. An Arabic translation, based on the French version, was published in Morocco in 1989.

English, Dutch, and German extracts were included in most of the popular seventeenth- and eighteenth-century encyclopedic works dealing with African geography and the history of European discoveries.

Little is known of the life of Carvajal except what he tells of himself in his preface, and what can be gleaned from the few surviving documents on his military career. Carvajal was born in Granada to a Castilian family around 1520. It has been suggested that Carvajal's family had Moorish ancestry, which could explain his knowledge of Arabic and interest in northern Africa.

After the Spanish conquest of Tunis in 1535 (in which he took part), Carvajal pursued his military career in Northern Africa for ten years until he was taken prisoner in a battle near Oran, probably in 1545. According to his own words, he spent the following seven years and eight months in captivity. During this period, he was transported as a slave into various parts of Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. The Christian captives, most of whom were Spaniards, played a vital role in the economies and societies of the North African states. They were important both as slave labor and for the substantial sums paid to rescue them. Carvajal was ransomed by an unidentified redemptionist order around 1554, but he carried on exploring the African continent as a free man, probably visiting Egypt and Ethiopia. He even went as far as the borders of the Sudanic zone. Having spent 22 years in Africa, he finally returned to Spain in 1557.

Thereafter Carvajal fought in the Spanish army in Italy, returning to Granada in time to witness the *Morisco* revolt in 1568–1572. At the end of the revolt, he settled near Málaga where he began to write his *Descripcion general de Affrica*. It was certainly during his long stay on the Barbary Coast that he learned to read and speak Arabic fluently. On the grounds of this knowledge, he was in 1579 on the point of being named Spanish ambassador to Morocco. At the last moment King Philip II rejected him, only because he was not a nobleman by birth. Nothing is known of the rest of his life. Carvajal died in Granada, probably in 1600.

Carvajal has been regarded for a long time as a mere copyist of Leo Africanus, and hence his work has largely been neglected by modern historians of Africa. He was criticized particularly by contemporary scholarly readers because he did not acknowledge Leo Africanus at all, despite incorporating large sections of his *Descrittione* in his own work. This accusation is not exactly accurate, as Carvajal does refer to his famous predecessor (whom he called Iuan de Leon) twice. Moreover, quoting earlier texts without any acknowledgment was not considered to be a mark of egregious scholarship, or a violation of copyright, as it is presently.

Carvajal nowhere reveals when and in what circumstances he became aware of the work of Leo Africanus, or his impetus for writing the *Descripcion general de Affrica*. He certainly relied on Ramusio's Italian edition of Africanus, rather than the French or Latin translations of 1556. It is tempting to speculate that Carvajal obtained a copy of Ramusio's *Delle navigatione et viaggi* while fighting in Italy. Perhaps he was commissioned, based on his experiences in northern Africa, to produce an updated, Spanish edition of Leo's text by Spanish military authorities. This would at least explain the contents and structure of Carvajal's work, and the fact that the second part was published at the author's expense more than 20 years after the first part. (The second part focuses on the Sahara, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudanic Africa, and the Guinea Coast—all areas of little interest to the Spaniards, who were fighting against the Moorish corsairs in the western Mediterranean.)

Carvajal's work is not a mere regurgitation of that of Leo Africanus. He was able to supplement the latter's text with many new details and corrections on the grounds of what he had learned during his stay in northern Africa. It contains a lengthy exposition of the history of Islam up to the year 1571. The focus is understandably on the events in Islamic Spain and Northern Africa. This history, however, proves that Carvajal must have known some of the chronicles written by the Muslim historians in Granada and Morocco. During the long reign of King Philip II (1556–1598), a large quantity of Arabic manuscripts were acquired by the Escorial library from all of the Spanish cities where Muslim culture had flourished. Furthermore, Carvajal described areas which had been unfamiliar to Leo, such as the Guinea Coast, the kingdoms of Congo and Monomotapa, Zanzibar, and Madagascar. Carvajal, who was at Lisbon in 1579, seems to have had access to some unpublished Portuguese and Spanish sources; he also probably interviewed persons who had been to western Africa.

Besides his *Descripcion general de Affrica*, Carvajal wrote a history of the Moorish revolt in Granada, entitled *Historia del rebelión y castigo de los moriscos del reino de Granada*, which was published in Málaga in 1600. Moreover, there exists in the Escorial library a manuscript written by Carvajal, describing a Turkish standard that had been captured in the naval battle of Lepanto in 1571. (Carvajal himself did not participate in this battle.)

PEKKA MASONEN

See also: Africanus, Leo.

Biography

Born in Granada, Spain, around 1520. Participated in the Spanish conquest of Tunis in 1535. Pursued a

military career in Northern Africa for ten years, until taken prisoner in a battle near Oran, probably in 1545. Held in captivity for seven years and eight months; ransomed by an unidentified redemptionist order, around 1554. Returned to Spain in 1557. Settled near Málaga, and there began to write the *Descripcion general de Affrica*. Died in Granada, probably in 1600.

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Casablanca

Casablanca, Morocco's largest city, with a population over 3 million (2.94 million in the 1994 census) was a construction of the French colonial occupation. It is the economic and cultural capital of contemporary Morocco. The city, organized into five separate prefectures since the early 1980s, holds 10 per cent of the Moroccan population. In the regional context of North Africa it is not only a demographic giant but a manufacturing powerhouse. In any given year, one-third of Morocco's industrial investments are made in Casablanca, which has yielded the city nearly 60 per cent of the country's factories and industrial employment.

"Casa," as it is commonly called by Arabic and French speakers alike, was a town of 20,000 in 1912 when the French arrived as colonizers. By 1952, it had become a major French metropolis of 682,000 inhabitants. Today, Casablanca spreads north and south of its central points (the Old Medina and the French-inspired central business district) to encompass a city remarkably differentiated in its quarters and neighborhoods. Casablanca is the southern anchor of the Rabat-Casablanca urban corridor. The city is growing inland and northward along the coast quite rapidly, and the distinction between Casablanca and the beginning of the oil-refinery port of Mohammedia has become blurred. Casablanca is 50 miles from Rabat, the political capital, a distance connected by rapid rail and four-lane expressway.

Atlantic Morocco has few natural harbors and no large bays or inlets. Casablanca's rapid growth is traceable to the decision by Lyautey, first resident general of the French Protectorate (as the colony was officially known) to build the port for French Morocco

at Casablanca. The port is thus entirely artificial, and has undergone several significant enlargements, including that going on from the year 2000 to the present.

Casablanca was first so named by the Portuguese after a white house overlooking the ruins of the city in the same location, Anfa, which they had destroyed ff. 1486–1489 in their quest to quell corsair activity ("Casa Branca"). The Spanish renamed it Casablanca and the name was translated literally into Arabic as Dar al-Beida, which is used interchangeably with Casablanca in both French and Arabic today. Anfa is retained as the name of an elite residential neighborhood.

Sultan Muhammad III (r.1757–1790) rebuilt the city as a defensive coastal bastion (*skala*) between Rabat and El Jadida (then Mazagan), filling it with loyal Berber subjects from the Haha Plain (Essaouira region) and Arabs from Meknès. Once the city was rebuilt, wheat was exported to Spain from 1782 to 1794, when the governor revolted. The port was closed to commerce until 1830. European traders multiplied in Casablanca after 1840 (the first were French, in search of wool to replace British supplies), and the first diplomatic representative was named to the city in 1857. By the first decade of the 1900s, Casablanca was a scheduled port in maritime trade and the largest port in Morocco, exceeding the traffic of Tangier. Following the Conference of Algeciras in 1906, which internationalized the economic life of Morocco and prepared the way for full-scale colonization, French customs agents and construction managers took over the port of Casablanca. This provoked anger in the Chaouia (the outlying rural district), and on July 30, 1907, peasants attacked and killed nine Europeans and blocked the entrance to the French consulate. In retaliation, the French bombarded the very port they had coveted; looting, especially of the *mellah* (Jewish quarter), broke out; in August, more than 2000 French (and some Spanish) troops landed. The French created a security perimeter around the Chaouia, effectively creating the toe-hold that five years later culminated in the official establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates over Morocco.

Casablanca attracted over one million immigrants during the twentieth century, reaching a peak of over 56,000 new residents per year in the 1970s. The city quadrupled in population between 1907 and 1921, when the rate of growth was greatest, and added 622,000 people in the period from 1971 to 1982, when growth in absolute numbers was strongest. The positive additions to the city's population have taken place despite the subtraction of virtually the city's entire Jewish community, which numbered 75,000 in 1952 (more than one-third of Morocco's Jews) and most of the European population as well, which amounted to

nearly 133,000 at the same time (near its highpoint). One should note, however, that Casablanca's contemporary Jewish population (variously estimated between 3,000 and 8,000) is the largest in North Africa, and that its French population (25,000) forms the largest single French expatriate community in Africa.

Much of Casablanca's population lives in poor urban conditions. The United Nations Development Program noted in 1993 that an average wage in Casablanca was 1400 DH (US\$155) per month, while a typical three-room apartment rented for 2500 DH (US\$278) per month. Since the 1930s, the problem of substandard housing (*bidonville*, to use the French term for shantytown; the term may even have been invented here) has been endemic in Casablanca, especially in the Ben Msik and Carrières Centrales neighborhoods. Casablanca largely consists of undifferentiated, bland apartment buildings three to five stories high. On the other hand, the city's central business district is a storehouse of art deco buildings from the 1930s to the 1950s, and includes several important examples of the Franco-Moorish style in its public buildings (the courthouse and city hall) and cathedral. The French architect Ecochard, imported to develop a new urban plan after World War II, was responsible for the development of several urban innovations, most important of which was the Nouvelle Medina, an attempt to synthesize traditional urban form with modern economic, administrative, and residential needs. The French often referred to Casablanca as "our Los Angeles," and the city truly reflects the style and flair of the new. The city houses many notable examples of the modern Moroccan architectural style, especially along the Corniche, in elite residential areas such as Anfa, and in the burgeoning central city, where the beginnings of a vertically oriented city were apparent by the 1980s. Casablanca is the location of Morocco's stock exchange. The skyline of the city was transformed by the construction, completed in 1993, of the enormous Hassan II Mosque along the coast on the southern edge of the central business district. Casablanca's University Hassan II, established in the 1970s, contains one of two medical schools in Morocco, a law school, and six other faculties, and enrolls approximately 35,000 students.

JAMES A. MILLER

See also: **Marrakech.**

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Casamance: See Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict in.

Casely Hayford, Joseph Ephraim (1866–1930) *Lawyer, Journalist, and Politician*

Joseph Ephraim Casely Hayford was born on September 29, 1866, in Cape Coast. His father, Reverend Joseph de Graft Hayford, was a Wesleyan Methodist minister, and his son attended the Wesleyan Boys' High School in Cape Coast and later Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone. On his return to the Gold Coast, Casely Hayford taught at the Accra Wesleyan High School and then became its principal. He lost this position on account of his journalistic activity as the subeditor of his uncle James Hutton Brew's weekly newspaper, the *Gold Coast Echo*; after this paper collapsed he was the editor of two other short-lived local newspapers. He also served as an articled clerk for a European lawyer in Cape Coast and eventually went to England, where he graduated from St. Peter's College, Cambridge. He then entered the Inner Temple, London, to study law. In 1896 he passed the bar exam and returned to the Gold Coast to practice law.

His return coincided with the Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights Protection Society's (GCARPS) opposition to the Lands Bill of 1894. Casely Hayford helped prepare the society's brief against this legislation, which was designed to regulate the administration of land in the Gold Coast. He collected a great deal of information on indigenous institutions and published his first book, *Gold Coast Native Institutions* (1903), on this subject. He felt that Africans had to preserve their own culture. His second work, *Ethiopia Unbound* (1911), took up this theme as its hero, Kwamankra, (in many respects Casely Hayford's stand-in in this hybrid of novel and "intellectual autobiography" [July 1967, p.433]), urges his countrymen to "emancipate [themselves] from the thralldom of foreign ideas inimical to racial development." Like much of Casely Hayford's thought, this work was deeply influenced by Wilmot Edward Blyden's "Ethiopianism," which had profoundly inspired the young man when he was a student in Sierra Leone. *Ethiopia Unbound* criticizes the blunders of colonial policy and the hypocrisy of materialistic Europe in contrast to the "simple idealism of unspoiled, persecuted Africa." The "gin trade" had undermined native chiefs. Christian churches preached brotherhood but practiced racial segregation among their congregations, and officials denied Africans representative government.

Protest against the Forestry Bill of 1911 inspired Casely Hayford to publish *The Truth about the West African Land Question* (1913), in which he sought to link this new attempt to “manage reserved lands” with the defeated Lands Bill of 1894. As an indication of his status in the colony, he went as a one-man delegation to London in 1911, and as part of a four-man delegation in 1912 to protest against this legislation. These delegations had little influence on the committee that the British government established to review land policies in West Africa, but the measure eventually died under the weight of deliberations in committee. Colonial policy was shifting in favor of an active role for the chiefs in the administration. Encroaching on their control of land seemed likely to undermine this policy.

The regional approach that the British government had taken to the question of land stimulated Casely Hayford to think of a more West African organization than the GCARPS, which his generation felt had become too parochial. To give himself more editorial freedom, in 1902 he had established his own newspaper, the Cape Coast weekly *Gold Coast Leader*. He used the paper to raise the idea of a conference of leading men from the four British West African colonies. However, World War I intervened, and it was not until 1919 that Casely Hayford, along with other Gold Coast professionals, was able to organize the Gold Coast Section of the Projected West African Conference. Allied war aims and the Versailles Peace Conference had popularized the idea of self-determination. Casely Hayford also felt that it was time for the “educated natives” to establish themselves as the “natural leaders” of their country, and he antagonized the leadership of the GCARPS and the colony’s most prominent chief, Nana Ofori Atta of Akyem Abuakwa.

In 1920 the first meeting of what was to be known as the Congress of British West Africa took place in Accra, and Casely Hayford was elected its vice president. The congress passed 83 resolutions that dealt with such diverse issues as elected representative government, the creation of a British West African university and more opportunities for Africans in the upper ranks of the civil service. At first the administration of Governor Guggisberg was mildly sympathetic, but when the congress hastily organized a deputation to London to press for reforms this sentiment evaporated. The chiefs under the leadership of Nana Ofori Atta also attacked the idea that the educated elite were the natural rulers and undermined whatever chances Casely Hayford and his fellow deputation members might have had in influencing the Colonial Office in London.

The conflict between the chiefs and the educated elite allowed the government in the Gold Coast to dismiss the congress as unrepresentative. To challenge this perception the congress captured control of the

GCARPS and Casely Hayford became vice president. In the Legislative Council, where he had been an unofficial member since 1916, he “impeached” Nana Ofori Atta and his supporters as “traitors to the cause of British West Africa.” The damage had been done, however, and though there were a number of joint sessions (at Freetown, 1923; Bathhurst, 1925–1926; and Lagos, 1929) it was only at these times that the movement actually came alive.

In addition, Governor Guggisberg’s new constitution of 1925 rapidly shifted the political focus. It heightened the conflict between the chiefs and the educated elite by giving the former more representation in the expanded Legislative Council. Casely Hayford bitterly attacked this legislation.

In 1926 he went as a one-man delegation to London, but in keeping with his pragmatic approach to politics, when he realized that further opposition was pointless, in 1927 he ran for election and became the municipal representative for Sekondi. This action split the ranks of the educated elite. A predominantly Cape Coast faction led by the lawyer Kobina Sekyi took control of the GCARPS and assailed Casely Hayford and those members of the educated elite who had gone along with him as “defective leaders.” As a member of the Legislative Council in 1929 Casely Hayford effected a reconciliation with Nana Sir Ofori Atta, who had been knighted in 1927. Casely Hayford had been awarded the MBE in 1919. Shortly after this reconciliation he died in Accra on August 11, 1930.

ROGER GOCKING

See also: Ghana.

Biography

Born September 29, 1866 in Cape Coast. Attended the Wesleyan Boys’ High School and Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone. Taught at the Accra Wesleyan High School, also served as the school’s principal, and then became its principal in Cape Coast.

Graduated from St. Peter’s College, University of Cambridge. Studied law at the Inner Temple, London. Passed the bar and returned to the Gold Coast to practice law in 1896. Established a newspaper, the *Gold Coast Lead*, in 1902. Published first book, *Gold Coast Native Institutions*, in 1903. Published *Ethiopia Unbound* in 1911. Published *The Truth About the West African Land Question* in 1913. Elected municipal representative for Sekondi in 1927. Awarded the MBE in 1919. Died in Accra on August 11, 1930.

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Central Africa, Northern: Slave Raiding

It is now widely accepted that the institution of slavery, in one form or another, had deep roots in Africa long before Islam became a significant social influence. The first accounts of the early Arab penetration of the central Sahara to the frontiers of the Sudan (in its widest geographical sense) in the seventh century confirm that slavery, if not active slave trading, were already established there. The Arab conquerors were able to exact tributes in slaves from several of the places they conquered in Fezzan and even, according to one account, as far south as the oases of Kavar, two-thirds of the way to Lake Chad. Such accounts do not confirm that there was a regular or even an active slave trade in the Sahara at the time, either in Saharan peoples or in black slaves drawn from farther south. It is possible that in order to meet Arab demands for tributes of slaves, the conquered communities of Fezzan and Kavar had to draw on long-established sources of slaves from the central desert itself, or from the southern desert fringes around Lake Chad, or even farther south. It has been suggested that once the Arab demand for slaves had been established as a result of specific tributes levied by conquest, it evolved into a regular and larger traffic, conducted notably by Ibadi Berbers, based on the oasis of Zawila in Fezzan, from the eighth century onward.

Early Arab writers remarked how easily the black peoples of the Sudan were enslaved: “Blacks are caught with dates,” was an old Arab adage. In the first instance, slaves were not usually made by outsiders, but by slaves’ own rulers; by kidnapping; as punishment for crime; or in raids by stronger neighbors. Al-Yaqubi wrote, in the ninth century, “I have been informed that the Kings of Sudan will sell their people without any pretext or war.” Al-Idrisi, in the twelfth century, told how the people of Lamlam in the western

Sudan were constantly being seized by neighbors “using various tricks,” and sold in Morocco. But, as medieval Arab sources confirm, slaves were more usually made during the course of wars, or as a result of organized slave raids into the lands of weaker and more vulnerable peoples. Thus the twelfth-century geographer, Al-Zuhri, reported that the Muslims of ancient Ghana made yearly (but not always successful) slave raids into the lands of the pagans whose ebony-wood clubs were no match for the iron weapons of the Ghanaians. Here are clearly established what were for centuries the common slavemaking practices of inner Africa, with more “advanced” organized and partly Islamized states, their armies equipped with superior (often imported) weapons, mounting regular slave raids against more “primitive” pagan neighbors.

Under Shari’a (Islamic law), Muslims were forbidden to enslave fellow Muslims; but as the enslavement of pagans was legal, and their conversion meritorious, slave raiding into heathen lands acquired some of the character of religious war (jihad), with nonbelief held to justify enslavement. Thus in the Sudan, the elusive and shifting borders between the Islamic world, the Dar-al-Islam, and the as-yet unconverted Dar-al-Harb (literally, “House of War”) for centuries marked off these lands where slavemaking was considered a licit activity. And the many residual pockets of paganism within the boundaries of the Sudanese Dar-al-Islam were always equally vulnerable to slave raiding. There is indeed evidence that some pagan peoples (notably the Sara communities south of Lake Chad) were deliberately not converted to Islam simply to sustain their eligibility for enslavement.

Raiding campaigns usually took place during the dry season (October–April) after much of the agricultural work had been done and when travel was easier. Raiders’ success depended on a combination of surprise, organization, numbers, and the use of horses and (before the more widespread use of firearms in the nineteenth century) superior iron weapons.

Most slaves were made for use in the raiders’ own communities; only limited numbers were selected by successive markets for eventual export northward across the Sahara in exchange for the imported horses and weapons needed for further slave raiding. About two-thirds of those exported were women and young girls intended to meet the demands of Islamic domestic slavery. While it has been suggested that most of these exported slaves were the rejects of the Sudanese markets, some valued slaves, including eunuchs as the most valuable of all, were part of the northbound trade system.

There is evidence from nineteenth-century European travelers of raiders killing all surplus male slaves on

capture, but it is not clear whether this was common practice in earlier times, before the use of firearms made slave raiding more widespread, bloody, and destructive. Again, nineteenth-century evidence that up to three-fourths of captured slaves died from mistreatment, starvation, and disease between first capture and points of final sale cannot be safely projected back to earlier times. What is clear is that the medieval Arab world regarded the Sudanese as numerous and prolific, a constantly replenished reservoir of slaves. According to modern estimates, at least 5,000 slaves were exported across the Sahara at its widest extent every year in the Middle Ages. But the slave raiders' initial annual booty must have been at least ten times greater, taking into account deaths after capture and retention of most slaves in the Sudan itself. It is also clear that despite these regular depredations, the countries beyond the Islamic slaving frontier remained prolific sources of more or less constant supply for many successive centuries.

JOHN WRIGHT

See also: **Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur; "Legitimate Commerce" and Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century.**

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Central Africa, Northern: Central Sudanic Peoples

Central Sudanic peoples belong to a subgroup of the Nilo-Saharan language group, one of the four major language groups found in Africa (along with the Niger-Congo, Afro-Asiatic, and Khoisan). The geographical distribution of these peoples is extremely large, running east to west from the southern Sudanese regions of Equatoria and the Bahr el-Ghazal and northernmost Uganda, through eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), across the Central African Republic, and into Cameroon. Although definite distinctions between ethnic and linguistic differences are

even now not always possible, among those that are clearly belonging to the Central Sudanic subgroup are the Bongo, Kresh, Lendu, Lugbara, Mangbetu-Efe, and Sara-Bagirmi.

The Nilo-Saharan group of languages does not contain the same numbers as other African language families but the diversity of the Nilo-Saharan languages is, far greater than that of most other groups. Added to this, the geographical range of occurrence makes the study and classification among the most controversial of all. In general there is agreement on the six branches of the Nilo-Saharan group, which are Songhay, Saharan, Maban, Fur (Furian), Koman, and Chari-Nile. Under Chari-Nile we find the further distinction between Central and Eastern Sudanic (the Eastern, Western and Southern Nilotics) and Nubian. There are estimated to be anywhere between 20 and 30 million Nilo-Saharan speakers, while the numbers for speakers of Central Sudanic languages (of which there are estimated to be a total of 65 million) do not exceed 6 million.

The Nilo-Saharan shares many similarities with the Niger-Congo language family, enough to lead many scholars to suggest that there may have once been a common ancestor between the two. A majority of languages in both groups have adopted the same use of tones to make meaning clear, and both were essentially oral languages (Nubian excepted) until modern attempts used the Arabic and Roman alphabets to transliterate them. The earliest Nilo-Saharans lived between 15,000 and 11,000 BCE. At the same time that the Central and Northern Sudanic divergence occurred (c.8000BCE) in southwestern parts of the Nile Basin, two other dramatic occurrences took place: the birth of pottery and the domestication of cattle. As a result, the various ethnolinguistic groups enjoyed a period of strong divergence and the growth of those elements that provide distinguishing features among them.

The Lendu people can trace their origins back to the western and southern shores of Lake Albert, with their greatest concentrations remaining in the north-eastern part of the DRC and neighboring Uganda. Early on they developed the dual skills of farming and fishing, which allowed them to prosper and support a higher than usual density among people in the region as a whole. The Mangbetu (Manbetu) of the north-western part of the DRC long ago stood out among the peoples of Central Africa for having created a centralized political system with a strong class system in place, thus allowing them to expand their territories and in the process assimilate other ethnic groups in the vicinity. Their language, basically Mangbetu or Kere, like that of the Lendu and the Madi of north-western Uganda, is a part of the Ugandan-based Lugbara cluster of languages, which all fall into the

Central Sudanic group. The assimilation of other ethnic groups has, however, meant that there were some variations in the language, with the Chadic and Adamawa languages also being present among a number of their subgroups.

Chad's largest ethnic grouping is the Sara who, despite the fact that the name is often used to refer to a single ethnic entity, represent a large number of smaller, distinct ethnic groups that share similar languages. Among the Sara's many ethnic groups are the Gulay, Kaba, Mbay, Nar, Ngambay (the largest single group), and Sar. The Sara are non-Muslim, settled farmers. Also living largely in Chad are the Barma (Bagirmi) who were the sixteenth-century founders of the eponymous empire. Despite their adoption of Islam in the seventeenth century, large numbers retained their original languages, so that the Arab Barma spoke Arabic while the indigenous Barma spoke Tar Barma, a close relative of the language spoken by the Sara.

Among the Central Sudanic group of peoples are a number of pygmy groups of the so-called Eastern Cluster (one of the four major subgroups of pygmies). The Mbutis (Bambuti) contain the subgroups of the Aka (there is another, unrelated ethnic group called the Aka in the Western Cluster) and Efe, which are both pygmy. The Ituri forest in the northeastern part of the DRC is the traditional homeland for the Mbuti, while the Aka live to the northwest and the Efe to the east and north of them. The Bongo is a subgroup of the Mbenga, one of the largest remaining groups of hunter-gatherers inhabiting the tropical forests of Central Africa. The land over which they formerly ranged was gradually reduced in size as agriculturalist cultures grew in number and cleared their traditional lands.

One final Central Sudanic group of note is the Kresh (Kreich), who trace their origins back to the Nile Basin before their migration to the Ubangian Plateau in the east of what is today the Central African Republic. There they lived among, and increasingly became assimilated with, the Banda, members of the Niger-Congo language group, and thereby losing much that set them apart as being of the Central Sudanic family.

EAMONN GEARON

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Central Africa, Northern: Chadic Peoples

The large number of ethnic groups present in Chad through the centuries makes the task of disentangling their separate strands challenging. As a result of its geographical position, combined with the presence of such favorable geographical features as Lake Chad, migrations to and through Chad from every direction and point of the African continent and beyond have gone on since at least 5000BCE. Consequently, this area has been the site of a great number of empires, all of which have left something of their culture, ethnicity or language in their wake.

The most powerful empires in the Lake Chad region during this period were those of Kanem and its neighbor for a time, Bornu. Their histories, however, became so close that they are often referred to as the single entity of Kanem-Bornu. Established in the ninth century (and lasting, in reduced form, until the nineteenth), it was initially peopled by an amalgam of nomadic tribes without urban centers. The location of the kingdom, across a great swathe of the Sahara, allowed it to prosper through exploitation of the trans-Saharan trade routes. Over time the tribes became more homogeneous, particularly with the influx of increasing numbers of Muslim Kanuri from the eleventh century on. This process was completed when their eponymous language supplanted the various preexisting Teda-Daza languages of the area.

The Fula (Fulani, Fulbe) were originally a pastoral nomadic people whose influence and size grew to such an extent that they became both the world's largest group of pastoral nomads and one of the largest Muslim groups in Africa. Early converts to Islam, they were instrumental in its spreading across the continent, while at the same time increasing their own range of influence. Following a series of religious wars the Fula controlled an empire that stretched from Lake Chad to the Niger Bend and back to their original Lower Senegal homeland. The empire declined not long after the start of the nineteenth century.

The Bagirmi (Barma) belonged to a state that was founded in the area southeast of Lake Chad by their first king, Dala Birni, in 1522. By the start of the seventeenth century, it had adopted Islam and acted as a buffer to its two larger neighbors, Bornu to the northwest and Wadai in the northeast. Forced to pay tribute to both, it was eventually taken over by Bornu at the start of the seventeenth century and remained a vassal until the start of the nineteenth century. Over the years there has also been a large degree of assimilation between the Bagirmi and other local tribes—notably, the Fula, Kanemba, Sara, and Massa.

The first Hausa settlements were established in the eleventh century before the emergence of city-states in the late thirteenth century. With the mid-fourteenth-century introduction of Islam, which began among the prosperous walled cities of the region, notably Kano and Katsina, their numbers grew significantly and they moved into more of the Kanem-Bornu empire and, in the sixteenth century, the Songhai empire. The last effort gave rise to the Fula empire and the unification of the two groups initially under the spiritual leadership of Usman dan Fodio.

The history of the Kanemba (Kanembu, Kanuri, Borno, Bornu) can be traced back to the ninth century, when they established the kingdom of Kanem. Of Arabic origin, the royal family adopted Islam in the late eleventh century, while also expanding their sphere of influence to cover from Kano to the Western Sudan. In the mid-thirteenth century they expanded farther out of Chad, into Bornu, where they moved their capital in the fourteenth century. At the end of the fifteenth century there was a further revival in the kingdom's power when it was transformed as the Kanem-Bornu empire. It reached its peak by the end of the seventeenth century before remaining stationary for a further hundred years before starting to decline in the eighteenth century.

Kotoko tradition claims ethnic descent from the Sao (Sau), a race of giants that used to inhabit the area to the south of Lake Chad, between the northern regions of both Nigeria and Cameroon. The Sao civilization, which dates back to 3000BCE, was first present in the Lake Chad region around the year 800CE. The Kotoko achieved preeminence in the fifteenth century when they moved out from their homeland, down the Rivers Logone and Chari, to rule large parts of northern Nigeria and Cameroon. Their conversion to Islam was relatively late, and they retained significant elements of their pre-Islamic beliefs.

The Maba (speakers of the Nilo-Saharan language of Bora Mabang) are another almost wholly Muslim ethnic group who were formerly the main power behind the Wadai kingdom. Perhaps as a result of this former glory, the Maba always refused to do manual work, viewing themselves as an aristocratic class. Their social framework was like that of the Fula, and they were closely related to the Moussei (Moussei) from the north and center of the country.

The Sara (Kirdi), found primarily in the south of the country, are a Nilotic race that are assumed to have arrived in the sixteenth century. From that early date they were subjected to violent slave raids from their northern neighbors—notably, the Fula—and as a result they moved progressively farther south. In spite of heavy losses to the slavers, they remained the single largest ethnic group present in Chad.

The Teda (Tebu, Tibbou, Toubbou) are made up of some 40 or so clans and have always enjoyed a nomadic or seminomadic lifestyle. Early converts to Islam, the Teda were known through the centuries as raiders of livestock when they weren't making money by charging a protection fee to travelers that happened across the extensive desert tracks they patrolled. Following the arrival of Ottoman authorities in the region, their activities were curtailed, forcing them into small-scale farming of dates in the Tibesti region.

One last group that should be mentioned is the Bilala (Bulala), whose cultural background is Arabic, and who claim descent from a common ancestor, Bilal (Balal). From the time of their conversion to Islam on they held onto a number of their former beliefs and partial nomadism alongside farming.

EAMONN GEARON

See also: Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Origins; Kanem: Decline, and Merge with Borno (c.1400).

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Central Africa, Northern: Islam, Pilgrimage

The identity of Islam in north-central Africa was peculiar to the region as a result of its growing out of a particular set of circumstances. To begin with, the spread of Islam was far slower in this region in part because it was not initially spread, as in other parts of the continent (and indeed the world), along major trade routes. The populations here, especially in Saharan areas, were also less in number and density than those of western Sudan and North Africa, which made the impact of the newly arrived faith less evident. Another feature particular to this region is that when Islam did take root, contact with the greater Muslim world was somewhat limited, resulting in its presence being nominal for a number of centuries. The lack of reputable religious schools and other centers of learning also hindered the growth of a strong religious sentiment among the population.

The relative remoteness of north-central African Islam meant that the undertaking of the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) required of all Muslims at least once in their lifetime (if they are able) was, to begin with, less well observed than among other Muslim populations.

Initially, the small number of local pilgrims would hope to meet up with caravans made up of their West African counterparts and travel to the *hijaz* along the latter's favored routes: north across the Sahara and via Cairo. One reason for this was that these routes, along which Islam had arrived to the west of the continent, were well-established, thriving trade routes, and both pilgrims and traders would have been familiar sights along their length. The new pilgrims were happy to follow these familiar paths and to travel in company, thereby reducing the risk of attack.

For many in the Muslim world the pilgrimage season had often as much to do with trade and diplomacy as it did with religion. It was the one time in the year that merchants would have ready access to large caravans to travel with, and the opportunity to trade over an area that might cover thousands of miles. The need to resupply distant customers, at least on an annual basis, and the chance of establishing new markets made the hajj a boon time for trade. And in an age when the hardships of travel should not be underestimated, there would be a substantial appeal in traveling in company where those hardships could be shared.

The primacy of trade was especially true for the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu, which had adopted Islam in the late eleventh century and began to rely on trade rather than warfare as its means of expansion. The influence of Islam on the kingdom was limited, however, with many pre-Islamic features being kept long after their supposed conversion, such as the divine status that was accorded to the king. The later use of warfare, including war in the name of Islam, saw the kingdom's influence expand as far as the River Niger by the mid-thirteenth century. Despite having the enormous advantage of controlling much of the Sahara through which traders wished to travel, a series of internal disputes saw its slow decline from the late fourteenth century onward.

Apart from the fact that the most well-established routes ran south to north through Kanem-Bornu, another reason for pilgrims and merchants not using the more southerly routes earlier was that these southern or savanna routes, which led directly to the Red Sea coast, were not common trade routes at that time. Once these trans-Sudanese routes became established in the fourteenth century they too proved to have trading opportunities of their own. Following the Muslim conquest of the kingdom of Makkura in 1317, this route to Mecca—which ran from northern Nigeria, through Chad to Darfur in western Sudan, and on to the Suakin on the Red Sea coast—became a practical possibility, though the numbers using it initially were very small. Not until the Fulani holy war in the early nineteenth century and the emergence of a more radical form of

Islam did the numbers of ordinary citizens making this southern journey increase significantly.

Another result of the late adoption of the savanna route was that Islam was not as firmly entrenched along its path, even if it was nominally present. And while the local rulers may have adopted Islam following limited contacts with the Muslim world, there was less protection for pilgrims, traveling through what remained largely pagan areas. Coupled with this, there were far fewer opportunities for traveling in the company of holy men and receiving religious instruction along the way, a sought-after benefit of the pilgrimage.

Conversion of the Nubians started in the early fourteenth century, and by the end of the sixteenth century they were known to be most fervent and Christianity had disappeared from their ranks. They too, however, maintained significant portions of their original culture, such as an unwillingness to adopt the Arabic language. The conversion of the Funj, which began in the fifteenth century, met with similar success and, providentially for the spread of Islam, coincided with the Funj making large territorial gains to the south and west of their heartland; thus, another prominent central African dynasty was within the Islamic fold.

By the time of the conversion of the Fur in the seventeenth century, Islam was very secure across the region. Territorial gains made by the Fur in the following century also assisted the spread of Islam and significantly impacted pilgrimage routes in the area, though for at least a century after their conversion the rulers of Darfur continued to travel via Cairo. Poverty, too, combined with increased religious fervor, persuaded the growing numbers of ordinary citizens, who wished to make the hajj but were too poor to take the Cairo route, to accept the risks of the savanna route.

The execution of the pilgrimage journey across the region no doubt was a major reason for the continuing practice of Islam across territorial boundaries. Making such diverse groups of people aware of Islam's wider context provided a degree of unity between Muslim societies everywhere. They were also kept informed of such religious developments that might have come out of the Hijaz, which was especially true for the large numbers of holy men and rulers who went on pilgrimage, bringing their newfound knowledge home to their followers and subjects.

EAMONN GEARON

See also: **Kanem: Slavery and Trans-Saharan Trade.**

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Central Africa, Northern: Arab Penetration, Rise of Cavalry States

The arrival of Islam in north-central Africa was synonymous with the arrival of the Arab world. Religion and trade came as a package, and the single imported item that was to have the longest lasting effect, altering and directing the course of regional history for the next 500 years, was the horse. Although horses had been seen in Egypt, perhaps as early as the seventeenth century BCE, they did not travel far and it was not until the first century BCE that they were widely traded as a most valuable item across the Maghreb and into Nubia.

One of the reasons for the late widespread introduction of the horse in Sub-Saharan Africa was the initial logistical difficulty of moving the animals through areas where there would be a guaranteed water supply at all times. While they were not well suited to life in the desert, horses proved to be ideally matched to conditions in the savanna lands to the south of the Sahara. Farther south, too, and in the tropics west of Ghana, they also failed to prosper, being susceptible to the diseases in those parts. Once transportation routes were established, they spread fairly quickly, at least among those peoples who were wealthy enough to pay or trade for them. When proper knowledge permitted, sometime toward the end of the twelfth century, breeding took place on a local level, in areas along the River Niger.

From its first appearance in north-central Africa, the horse was utilized in a military role, playing a major part in the rise or fall of a number of states there. The cavalry units that were established locally tended to be elite divisions, often only having members of the aristocracy or ruling classes among their number, as was the case in the empires of both Songhai and Mali. The main reason for such exclusions to otherwise perfectly competent foot soldiers was the cost of horses, which gave them a status that would have been unseemly if bestowed on the common man; there were, after all, limited numbers of horses and a far more disposable supply of men.

The kingdoms of Kanem-Bornu, Mali, Songhai, and Ghana all depended, to a greater or lesser extent, on both trade and conquest for their success. The arrival of Islam from the north, along with the markets that it opened, played a leading role in this growth. Unsurprisingly, history shows that it tended to be the ruling and or merchant classes that were keenest to adopt the new religion when it appeared. This was certainly true in Kanem-Bornu (founded c.800), the growth of which was significant following the tenth-century arrival of Islam from central Sudan. The kingdom was ruled from about 1085 to 1097 by Mai (King) Umme, who upon his conversion to Islam opened his kingdom to the Arab world. Unpopular with the general population, Islam was slow to gain acceptance in spite of the kingdom's expansion under its newfound religion. The growth continued under the rule of Umme's son and heir, Dunama (Dibbalemi), with N'jimi being established as the capital and the northward and westward expansion gathered momentum, and conquests often being carried out under the clarion of jihad, or holy war, in the name of Islam.

By the reign of Dunama II, the army boasted an enormous cavalry of more than 30,000 as well as a mounted camel force for desert fighting. These innovations made the conquest of the Fezzan and subsequent control of trans-Saharan routes a possibility for the first time. Newly conquered lands were also patrolled by a cavalry force, thereby ensuring the stability of their newly acquired and extremely precious trade routes. Islam also benefited from the devout nature of Dunama II, who insisted on conversion to Islam for the ruling class of all lands he conquered.

Islam was introduced to the capital of Ghana, Kumbi Saleh, in the middle of the eleventh century before the city was overrun by the Almoravids in 1076. While it is apparent that many did leave the city at this time, it is far less certain that the city's inhabitants were offered the choice between death or conversion as once commonly believed; again, it is more likely that Islam was simply adopted by the ruling class and merchants as was the case elsewhere. The Almoravids held sway for only a short time before it regained its independence while remaining Muslim.

In Ghana, the early discovery of how to work with iron, thereby allowing soldiers to fight with metal spears and iron-tipped arrows, gave them a powerful advantage over iron-technology-free enemies. This fact, combined with a standing army and cavalry numbering 200,000 in the eleventh century, made it the most powerful empire in the region until 1200. The immense gold supply available in Ghana was, obviously, a major factor in allowing the country to develop such a sizable force.

Kangaba, the earlier foundation of Mali inhabited by the Mandingo, was invaded by the neighboring

Kaniaga under their ruler, Sumanguru, who had all but one of the royal princes murdered to prevent their rising against him in the future; the sole survivor was allowed to live because he was unable to walk, weak, and not expected to live. However, this prince, Sundiata, eventually grew strong and led a cavalry force back to Kangaba, successfully winning back the throne that was rightfully his. Sundiata continued to use these forces to unite and expand the empire, taking advantage of the declining power of Ghana, which by 1240 had been completely absorbed within Mali's territory. In its turn the empire of Mali was destined to go into decline partly due to dynastic infighting and partly due to extravagant spending on the part of its rulers.

Once again it was cavalry that tipped the balance in the battlefield, and allowed the region's next ascendant power, the Songhai (who had been rivals for some time), to defeat the ailing Mali. The enormous advantages that these so-called cavalry states had over their infantry-based or cavalry-deficient neighbors ceased to matter from the fifteenth century on, superseded by the growing availability of the latest technological advancement to reach the battlefield—guns—and the slow replacement of the bow and arrow and spear and horse.

EAMONN GEARON

See also: **Central Africa, Northern: Islam, Pilgrimage; Yusuf ibn Tashfin: Almoravid Empire: Maghrib, 1070–1147.**

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
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Central African Republic: Nineteenth Century: Gbaya, Banda, and Zande

The terms *Gbaya*, *Banda*, and *Zande* are ethnolinguistic labels for the largest groups of people who speak Ubangi languages belonging to the Niger-Congo family and reside in the savannas north of the Congo forest. These groups were little affected by external forces until the nineteenth century, when African slave traders, and then European colonialists, introduced unprecedented violence and economic exploitation into their lives.

The Gbaya lived in small, scattered hamlets in the western half of the Central African Republic (CAR) and adjacent areas of Cameroon in the early nineteenth century, when traders from Hausaland and Borno began to penetrate this region. Then, from the mid-nineteenth century on, the Fulbe state of Ngaoundere on the Adamawa Plateau began to send slave-raiding expeditions into Gbaya territory. Some Gbaya clans accepted Fulbe hegemony and began to raid their neighbors for slaves to sell to Muslim merchants who settled in their territories. Other Gbaya clans united under a leader named Bafio to resist the Fulbe slave raiders.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, French missions from the south moved up the Sangha River into Gbaya territory. Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, commissioner general of the French Congo, dreamed of



Central African Republic

establishing a French-supported Fulbe protectorate over this area, and so the French initially assisted the Fulbe in fighting Bafio's alliance. In 1894, however, a boundary between the French Congo and German Kamerun was drawn through Gbaya territory and left Ngaoundere to the Germans, after which the French helped Bafio's Gbaya defeat Fulbe slave raiders.

In 1899, the French granted private European companies the right to exploit all of the resources of huge concessions in the Gbaya region, and brutal European and African employees of these concessionary companies began to force the Gbaya to collect wild rubber. The territory inhabited by the easternmost Gbaya group, the Manja, was not granted to concessionary companies because the French wanted to use the Manja as porters for their missions to Chad. The Manja suffered terribly as a result.

The Banda were concentrated in the northeastern part of the CAR and adjacent areas of Chad and the Sudan at the turn of the nineteenth century, when African traders from the north began to establish small commercial centers in Banda territory. Then slave raiders from Wadai and Darfur began to penetrate Bandaland with increasing frequency, leading some Banda groups to migrate southward toward the Ubangi River. The decision of the Egyptian government to curtail the slave trade on the Nile in the 1860s encouraged Khartoumers such as al-Zubayr and his lieutenant Rabih to shift their operations westward into Banda territory. This led Banda groups to migrate westward. During the 1880s Rabih sent so many slave raiders into Banda territory that the depopulation of the eastern CAR began. Before Rabih moved north into Chad, he set up a client, al-Sanusi, as sultan of the state of Dar al-Kuti in northern CAR. Al-Sanusi procured a large number of firearms by ambushing a French mission in 1891 and signing a treaty with the French in 1897. Dar al-Kuti was thus able to send very well-armed slave raiders throughout Banda territory during the 1890s and to defeat Banda leaders who had become rival slave traders in the northeastern region of the CAR.

The Banda were also raided from the south in the late nineteenth century by slave traders from Zande states. The Zande people lived just north of the Congo forest in what is today the southeastern region of the CAR and adjacent parts of the Sudan and the Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaïre). Unlike the majority of Ubangians who lived in stateless societies, the Zande were ruled by members of a Zande clan, the Vongara, which had established its dominance over most Zande and many non-Zande neighbors over the past century. By the mid-nineteenth century, the number of people calling themselves Zande had increased sharply as a result of "Zandeization," but the Zande were not united politically because competing members of the Vongara

clan established numerous small states which captured men and women in order to transform them into Zande laborers, soldiers, and wives.

The arrival of slave raiders from Sudan in the mid-nineteenth century led Zande rulers to focus their efforts on the capture of slaves rather than on the conquest and assimilation of their neighbors. Some Zande rulers allied themselves with Sudanese slave traders while others fought them and attacked their caravans. The Zande had to contend with growing European influence in their region by the late nineteenth century as well. The defeat of British troops by the Mahdists in the Sudan in the 1880s encouraged Belgian king Leopold II and French expansionists to set their sites on the Nile Valley. Belgian and French agents thus moved up the Ubangi River toward the Nile and signed treaties with Zande leaders, and this initially enabled these rulers to procure more arms and thus to expand their slave-raiding activities.

In 1894 Leopold II and the French agreed that the Mbomu River running through Zandeland would serve as the border between their colonies, and so the Zande north and south of the river found themselves under different colonial administrations. When the French sent the Marchand mission up the Ubangi and to Fashoda in the Sudan at the end of the century, Zande rulers helped to provide porters and paddlers. After the British asserted their control over the southern Sudan, the eastern Zande found themselves under British administration.

Thus, Zandeland became a neglected cul-de-sac of three different European colonies. In the French colony, Zande territory was granted to a huge concessionary company that both collaborated and competed with the Zande rulers, who continued to capture Banda slaves.

The arrival of African slave raiders and European colonialists and businessmen clearly had a very negative and often fatal impact on the lives of many Gbaya, Banda, and Zande individuals during the nineteenth century, but the flexible social structures and subsistence economies of the Ubangians who survived this violent period were not destroyed but rather have continued to exist in modified form until the present.

RICHARD A. BRADSHAW

See also: Concessionary Companies; Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Origins; Libya: Muhammad Al-Sanusi (c.1787–1859) and the Sanusiyya.

Central African Republic: Colonial Period: Occupation, Resistance, Baya Revolt, 1928

The French colony of Oubangi-Shari (renamed at independence the Central African Republic) was

slowly occupied by France in the 1890s and 1900s. It had an indigenous population of several ethnic groups including the Azande (who had an important kingdom partly occupied by the Congo Free State), the Banda, and the Gbaya (or Baya). There was considerable resistance to the French occupation and especially to the harsh impositions it meant for the Africans. Oubangi-Shari formed part of a large area called at first French Congo and then, from 1910, French Equatorial Africa. To occupy this area inexpensively the French government, following the example of Leopold II in the Congo, allocated huge areas of it to concessionary companies in 1899.

These companies were subject to French sovereignty, but in fact had almost unlimited control over the Africans in their areas, whom they were allowed to exploit ruthlessly to produce wild rubber and other goods. Rubber was the main product demanded in Oubangi-Shari as in the Congo Free State; Africans were forced to collect it by all sorts of means, including the taking of families as hostages until the rubber was brought in. The French administration and its troops helped enforce the regime of extortion, and officials supplemented the terror imposed by the company staff. One murder of an African by the officials Gaud and Toqué in 1903 led to a public outcry in France and to the dispatch of a commission of inquiry into French Congo under Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, the original colonizer of the area (1905). Little improvement resulted, and the companies lost only some of their territories and rights. Wild rubber collection was largely abandoned a few years later, but in the 1920s the government imposed forced cotton cultivation in Oubangi-Shari, while from 1921 to 1934 its men were conscripted in large numbers for work on building the railway from Pointe-Noire to Brazzaville (the Congo-Ocean Railway), which led to the death of thousands of workers.

African resistance was persistent, but scattered and sporadic, and defeated quite easily, though slowly, as the administration and troops were thin on the ground. There were uprisings in 1903–1905, especially among the Mandjias, a Baya subsection subjected to conscription of porters for the French route to Chad. In 1907 revolts hit the Mobaye region in the southwest and many areas in the center and east of the colony, where the leader, Baramgbakié, was captured in 1909. In 1914 there was a revolt of the Langbassis, a Banda-speaking people in central Oubangi-Shari, refusing to collect rubber and ivory to pay taxes; their leader Amba was captured in late 1915.

In 1911 a considerable area of western Oubangi-Shari was added to the German colony of Cameroon, but in World War I it was retaken by the French in operations for which Africans were forced to endure

new impositions. New uprisings followed: the Dji and Mangana uprisings in 1915, the 1916 insurrection led by Mopoi Inguizimo (heir to the former Zande rulers), and the Bongbou and Mobaye insurrections in 1918. In fact there was for years an almost regular cycle of risings, “police operations” involving great brutality and more uprisings. This was admitted by the French governor general himself in a circular in 1921, saying that after repressive actions, “The idea of revenge, perfectly excusable, filled the minds of the natives; an ambush threatened every agent of the government, an African or French soldier was felled by some arrow.” The Bongbou leader Ajou led a new revolt in 1926. The greatest rising of all was to come later, in 1928. The Baya people played a major role in this revolt, which is often called the “Baya revolt,” but others also joined, over a large area of contiguous portions of Oubangi-Shari, Chad, French Cameroon and Middle Congo.

This rising is called the Kongo-Wara War (*kongowara* meaning “hoe handle,” a symbol of the insurgent peasants). It initially had a leader, a Messianic Baya “native doctor” named Karinou or Karnu, invoking supernatural powers and considered by some as an ancestor returning to earth, but showing great organizing skill. Originally named Ngainoumbey Barka, he adopted the name Karinou (meaning “he who can change the world”) and spread the message of rejection of European rule from 1927 without the French knowing for months. He preached nonviolence at first, but people who had been oppressed for years, and now were suffering even more from the Congo-Ocean Railway conscription, took up arms in mid-1928. Fighting began with a clash between Bayas and Fulanis; but then French traders, and chiefs and soldiers working for the French, were attacked, as were French government posts, for example at Bouar (which was occupied and burned down). For months the insurgents, though very poorly armed, continued advancing. Then came a French counterattack with reinforced troops, and Karinou was killed in action on December 11, 1928. But others fought on, continuing even to spread the revolt, and French forces did not succeed in defeating them until 1931; two of Karinou’s lieutenants, Bissi and Yandjere, were captured only in 1935. Echoes of the revolt reached Europe and led to condemnations of French rule in the area by communists and others. (French suspicions of communist instigation of the rising, however, were absurd.) After the revolt there was tighter administrative control, with forcible movement of Bayas into new villages, but for long there was little change for the better in the treatment of Africans. Further resistance, however, waited until the era of modern nationalism, after World War II.

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See also: **Concessionary Companies.**

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Central African Republic: Colonial Period: Oubangui-Chari

Although an administration had been set up at Bangui, the future capital, in 1889, Oubangui-Chari was at that time, to quote Pierre Kalck (1971), “not more than a great white blank on the map.” It took another 20 years for its boundaries to be finalized, its indigenous rulers subdued, and an effective colony-wide administration set up. In the meantime, France had turned to the concession company as an instrument to develop the colony and provide revenue for its maintenance. From the turn of the century onward, over 20 of these companies, such as the *Compagnie des Sultanats*, commenced operations in Oubangui-Chari, imposing quotas on chiefs for the collection of rubber and ivory, and punishing those who failed to meet them.

However, little had been achieved by the outbreak of war in 1914. Few companies had made any substantial return, and Oubangui-Chari remained an isolated backwater. Following the collapse of rubber prices in 1920–1921, the colonial authorities took a direct hand in development and introduced cotton as a cash crop, again setting quotas but giving bonuses to chiefs with good production records. The cultivation of cotton increased substantially, and it became Oubangui-Chari’s main export crop, though returns to peasant producers were small, once high transportation and other overhead costs had been deducted by the government.

Despite its success in ending the precolonial slave trade and creating a stable administrative system, early French colonial rule had a negative impact on Oubangui-Chari’s people. A sleeping-sickness epidemic in the first decade of the twentieth century caused severe loss of life, but the continuing extraction of labor was probably more deleterious to traditional life and economy. The production of subsistence crops suffered, with cultivators being obliged, through a shortage of available labor resulting from the impressing of able-bodied men into work, to switch to easily grown (but less nutritious) staples such as manioc, with consequent widespread malnutrition. This forced labor regime continued, in spite of the revelation in 1906 of concession company abuses and André Gide’s later exposé *Voyage au Congo* (written after his October 1925 visit), which attacked the use of compulsory labor

recruited from the colony for the construction of the Pointe Noire–Brazzaville railway in the neighboring (French) Congo. A prominent victim of this abuse was the future leader Bokassa’s father, a local chief who was beaten to death in November 1927 after refusing to provide labor supplies. The state added further burdens, imposing taxation on the colony’s peasants (one of the causes of the Baya revolt against the authorities in the later 1920s). Obligatory labor thus remained a feature of life in Oubangui-Chari until after World War II, when it was abolished, along with the *indigénat*, which had allowed administrative officials on their own authority to sentence “indigenous” people to short periods of imprisonment.

World War II witnessed the beginnings of some improvement in Oubangui-Chari. The region’s accession to the Free French cause, proclaimed by the black governor general of French Equatorial Africa, Felix Eboué (1884–1944), a former district official in the colony, led to the development of internal communications to meet the demands of the Allies’ war effort, such as the construction of airfields and roads, bringing the colony more into contact with the outside world. After the war ended, France embarked on a new political structure for its empire, setting up a *conseil représentatif* (representative council) for the colony, with a limited franchise that favored local settlers and black *évolués*. The young charismatic nationalist and former priest Barthélémy Boganda was elected to the National Assembly in Paris the same year (1946), and launched the *Mouvement d’Evolution Sociale d’Afrique Noire* (MESAN) as a mass nationalist organization in September 1949.

However, the 1950s saw some faltering in the colony’s economic development. Cotton fields showed growing evidence of overcropping and environmental degradation, with lowered yields, and efforts to set up a textile industry on the basis of this production failed. Attempts to diversify black agriculture were blocked by local white farmers, who were determined to safeguard their monopoly of production. Although diamond production had steadily increased in importance from the mid-1930s to become a significant contributor to the economy, it failed to fill the gap between revenue and expenditure. Even in the late 1950s, two-thirds of the colony’s revenue was supplied by Paris, and the average annual per capita income at independence was only 3,000 French community francs, one of the lowest in the world.

The 1950s nevertheless witnessed speedy political evolution, especially after the 1956 *loi cadre* (enabling law) approved by the French National Assembly. The franchise had been progressively widened since 1946, until the first election on a one-person, one-vote basis was held in March 1957. Boganda’s

MESAN won this election with an overwhelming majority and dominated the new *Conseil de gouvernement* (council of government), nominating its ministers.

Thereafter, France accelerated the pace of decolonization. In 1958, Oubangui-Chari voted to accept autonomy within the French Community in the Charles de Gaulle referendum, and on August 13, 1960, it became independent. Boganda and his successor David Dacko had reservations about the speed of the process, believing that the underdevelopment of the economy, institutions of state, and infrastructure left the new state unprepared for the burdens of self-rule and thus still dependent on the outgoing colonial power. These concerns increased after their failure to persuade the other territories of the outgoing French Equatorial African federation to form a united Central African Republic, a title that was eventually assumed by Oubangui-Chari itself at independence. The course of events after independence certainly upheld many of their reservations about the political and economic viability of the new state.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Boganda, Barthélemy; Concessionary Companies.**

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Central African Republic: Nationalism, Independence

Black nationalism developed slowly in the colonial Central African Republic (CAR), delayed by the exploitative nature of French rule, the paucity of educational facilities, and the area's geographical isolation. This legacy of underdevelopment has continued to disfigure its political progress since independence, creating a palpable French neocolonialist presence that persisted into the late 1990s and facilitating the emergence of one of the most brutal military regimes in Africa in the 1970s.

Prodded into life by World War II and the creation of the French Union in 1946, black politics evolved steadily under the leadership of the charismatic

Barthélémy Boganda, who set up the Mouvement d'Evolution Sociale d'Afrique Noire (MESAN) in September 1949, in which his Mbaka ethnic group, who lived in the most developed, southern part of the colony, were to play a dominant role. Under his inspirational leadership, MESAN won all of the seats in the first fully democratic election held after the 1956 *loi cadre* (enabling law), which authorized French jurisdiction over its African colonies). The momentum toward independence quickened with the 1958 referendum, which transformed the colony into an autonomous republic within the French community. Sensing that the balkanization implicit in the devolution process would weaken his scarcely viable country, Boganda attempted to preserve the unity of the old French Equatorial Africa entity by pressing for its transformation into the Central African Republic, but failed to win the support of his neighbors. His death the following year in a plane crash (still shrouded in mystery) robbed his country of the one leader who might have coped with the sudden thrusting of independent status upon it, as the Central African Republic, on August 13, 1960. At that stage, it was one of the poorest countries in the world, with an educational system staffed by, and a budget largely subsidized by, the departing colonial power.

David Dacko, a relative of Boganda, succeeded to the leadership of MESAN and took office as president of the CAR with French support. Described by many authorities as lackluster and vacillating, Dacko soon attracted criticism, which he met by imprisoning his chief rival Abel Goumba and delaying elections until he had built up MESAN into a mass party that could safely secure a popular mandate, a goal achieved at the end of 1963 when Dacko was elected unopposed for a seven-year term with 99 per cent of the vote, followed soon afterward by a clean sweep in the parliamentary elections. The Dacko administration rewarded its supporters with patronage, including civil service posts, while opportunities were taken to lease out for personal profit housing built with public funds. Despite increasing French aid and an increase in diamond production, the CAR's economy came under increasing strain. By late 1965, profligate expenditure resulted in a payments crisis, at which point Dacko opportunistically turned to Beijing for an interest-free loan. Alarmed, Paris looked to other figures in the CAR who might be counted upon to protect French interests. However, the installation of their main hopeful, head of the police force Jean Izamo, was forestalled by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, commander in chief of the army, who seized power on New Year's Day 1966, placed Dacko under house arrest, and disposed of Izamo after charging him (ironically) with planning a pro-Chinese coup.

Bokassa invoked the spirit of Boganda, claimed as a relative, to legitimize his takeover, and embarked on a program of austerity and reform. This proved to be short-lived. He was swept along by the same forces that had undermined his predecessor, and expenditure on the civil service and army continued to rise, reinforcing the CAR's dependence on France. Bokassa added personal vices of his own: an intolerance of criticism, an arbitrary cruelty, an extreme vanity, and a growing venality. The first vice is exemplified in his treatment of his finance minister Alexandre Banza, reputedly the only person in his cabinet who stood up to him. In April 1969, Banza was executed for allegedly plotting a coup, and several of his male relatives were imprisoned. Bokassa's 1972 decree, laying down the penalty of mutilation for theft, is an example of the second vice: an international outcry forced him to rescind it.

Bokassa's vanity is epitomized in his declaration of himself as Emperor Bokassa I, ruling over the "Central African Empire," in December 1976. He was strongly influenced by Napoleonic precedent; as a young man, he had served overseas in the French army and had achieved commissioned rank; and as head of state, he had gathered together an extensive library on Napoleon. The French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing supported the imperial project, providing most of the US\$22 million required for Bokassa's coronation, and is alleged to have received presents of diamonds on his various visits to the country.

The "emperor's" generosity to his guest is indicative of the wealth he managed to obtain through his various business interests. One of these contributed indirectly to his eventual downfall. In January 1979, he ordered that high school students should buy uniforms, available only from a business owned by his wife. Students staged a protest, in which several were killed, and then mounted a bigger demonstration in April, after which over a hundred young people were beaten to death in prison. Following protests by Amnesty International, a commission of inquiry from other francophone African countries investigated and sustained these charges. Meanwhile, Bokassa had traveled to Libya (then in dispute with France) to seek financial support. This gave France the opportunity for military intervention in September 1979, and the installation of Dacko as president of the restored republic.

Bokassa's already woeful reputation has been further vilified by stories of ritual cannibalism, of prisoners being thrown into crocodile pools, and the claim that he personally killed several young people after the April 1979 student demonstration. While not denying his cruelty, vanity, and venality, a recent study by Brian Titley suggests that the veracity of these lurid stories is questionable.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Boganda, Barthélemy.**

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Central African Republic: 1980s and 1990s

The French military intervention of September 1979 resulted in the restoration of the republic, the reinstatement of David Dacko as president, and the renewal of the French military and economic presence. Dacko attempted to restore the political system of his first term of office, setting up the Union Démocratique Centrafricaine as a successor to the old Mouvement d'Evolution Sociale d'Afrique Noire of the early 1960s. A new constitution, giving the head of state a six-year term of office, a maximum of two terms, and powers to appoint a prime minister, was introduced in January 1981. In the subsequent election, Dacko was returned as president amid allegations of ballot rigging. The popularity of his government soon waned; an economic downturn sparked off urban unrest, which he attempted to curb using repressive measures, as he had done in the early 1960s.

On September 1, 1981, Dacko's army chief of staff André Kolingba seized power from the local French military detachment, claiming that the country was drifting toward civil war. His regime embarked upon an austerity and anticorruption campaign, which included the detention of opponents but avoided the worst excesses of the Bokassa period (1965–1979). However, Kolingba lacked either the will or the authority to sustain his campaign of reform, and within a year the bureaucratic class was back in control and able to protect its privileges. By the mid-1980s the civil service was absorbing some 80 per cent of the republic's budget, thus sustaining its continuing dependence upon Paris. Attempts to raise further revenue via an export tax on diamonds, the Central African Republic's (CAR) chief source of wealth, merely stimulated widespread smuggling. Meanwhile, Kolingba had followed the example of brother military leaders in Africa, civilianizing his regime, and declaring himself "chief of the nation" in 1986. The other major event of his period of government was the trial of Bokassa, who returned voluntarily to Bangui in the autumn of 1986. After a

protracted show trial, the former “emperor” was sentenced to death, but that sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in February 1988.

Under considerable pressure from France and other Western countries, Kolingba restored multiparty democracy in 1991, but elections were delayed until August 1994, when a former Bokassa minister, the northerner Ange-Félix Patassé, was elected president. The resulting eclipse of Kolingba’s southern Yakoma group, well represented in the armed forces, led to a growing military disaffection, aggravated by a government freeze of salary levels. Three army mutinies occurred, in April, May, and November 1996. The first was over pay, the second saw a mob attack on the French cultural center in Bangui, and the third was inspired by a government decision to relocate the soldiery to a safe distance from the capital. On each occasion, Patassé’s reliance on French military protection was further underlined.

In January 1997, the Patassé government and its opponents attempted to resolve their differences with the signing of the Bangui Accords. A Government of National Unity was to be set up, and it was agreed that a supervisory force drawn from other African francophone states, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB), should be created to oversee the process of political reconciliation, and to replace the increasingly unpopular French military presence. Over the next year, the issue of logistical and financial support for the MISAB was discussed, alongside arrangements for a withdrawal of French combat troops, with negotiations conducted by the administration clearly anxious about its future security. Further violence, this time directed against the MISAB, led to renewed discussions between CAR politicians and the signing of the National Reconciliation Pact of March 1998, which set out arrangements for legislative elections later that year. Several African states, concerned with what they perceived to be a threat to the security of the CAR’s neighbors, prevailed upon the United Nations to intervene. A Security Council resolution (No. 1155) established MINURCA (the UN Mission in Central Africa), comprising MISAB and military detachments from Canada and France, all wearing the UN blue beret and charged with the responsibility of monitoring the election arrangements. Eventually held in November 1998, the election gave Patassé’s Central African People’s Liberation Movement a narrow victory (by just one legislative seat), created when an opposition deputy in Dacko’s coalition, the Movement for Democracy and Development, defected to the government’s side after the results were announced. However, after a short boycott, the opposition took up the portfolios that had earlier been offered by the new administration in accordance with

the March 1998 pact. Similarly, in September 1999, Patassé was reelected by a narrow margin (51.63 per cent of votes cast in the first ballot), again triggering accusations of fraud.

Although the mid- to late 1990s was a period of extreme political crisis during which the government became progressively dependent on outsiders for its very survival, the essential structure of the CAR’s ruling elite, the Gallicized political and bureaucratic class based in Bangui, remained substantially intact: it is significant that Kolingba, Dacko, and Dacko’s old rival from the early 1960s, Abel Goumba, took part (albeit unsuccessfully) in the 1999 presidential elections. Meanwhile, the CAR’s dependence on its former colonial master, reliance on a single major item of production (diamonds), and its geographical isolation continue to hinder its economic development.

The early twenty-first century has seen a continuation and deepening of the political crisis, with the CAR’s neighbors playing an increasing role in its affairs. Two major coups occurred: the first (unsuccessful), in May 2001, led to its alleged instigator Kolingba being sentenced to death in absentia and resulted in the displacement of many Yakoma from Bangui; the second (successful), in March 2003, brought to power Patassé’s erstwhile ally and fellow northerner, General François Bozize, who for the time being suspended the CAR constitution.

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Central and Southern Africa: *See Stone Age (Later): Central and Southern Africa.*

Cetshwayo (c.1826–1884)

Zulu King

Cetshwayo, oldest son of Mpande and Ngqumbazi of the Zungu chiefly house, was born near present-day Eshowe. Nephew of the founder Zulu kings Shaka and Dingane, he was to live through all but a decade of Zululand’s independent history.

Like all of the Zulu kings, Cetshwayo lived through turbulent times. He witnessed the first battles between Zulu armies and European invaders in his childhood,



Zulu king Cetshwayo, sketched in the 1880s. © Das Fotoarchiv.

was present at the negotiations between Mpande and the Boers that led to their alliance, and saw his father attack Dingane in January 1840 and become Zulu king with Boer assistance in exchange for the cession of the land south of the Tugela River that became the Afrikaner Republic of Natalia. As a young man he observed its annexation by the British in 1843 and the coming of British settlers.

Allegedly introduced to the Boers in 1840 as Mpande's heir, Cetshwayo's actual succession remained far from certain. Mpande's apparent acquiescence in Boer importunities, inability to reward his soldiers as raiding declined in the face of settler expansion, and deferment of regimental demobilization all led to disaffection in the army. When in the last major Zulu campaign against the Swazi (1852–1853) Cetshwayo revealed his military prowess and young men flocked to join him, Mpande felt his authority challenged.

Nor did Cetshwayo's popularity escape his half-brother, Mbuyazi. At the end of 1856, rivalry between the brothers, perhaps deliberately fomented by Mpande, culminated in civil war between their followers. Despite the support of Mpande and the white trader and gun runner John Dunn, Mbuyazi was overconfident and outnumbered, and at Ndongakusuka, near the mouth of the Tugela, his army was annihilated. Mbuyazi and five of Mpande's sons were slain, as were thousands of his supporters.

Cetshwayo's ascendancy was now assured, and Mpande was forced to share power with him. When, despite this, the king began to favor a younger son by a junior wife as his heir, the wife was murdered by Cetshwayo's followers, the Usuthu. Her sons fled, first to Natal, then to the Boers on the northwestern borders of Zululand. To secure their return, Cetshwayo negotiated with the Boers while Mpande called on Natal's

secretary for native affairs, Theophilus Shepstone, to mediate. In 1861 Shepstone traveled to Zululand and, for his own motives, endorsed Cetshwayo as heir. The kingdom was now effectively in Cetshwayo's hands. Boer encroachment persuaded Cetshwayo and Mpande to unite, yet the dynastic disputes had given both Natal and the Boers an entry into Zulu politics which had serious repercussions for Zulu independence.

In 1872, Mpande died and Cetshwayo inherited a still formidable polity, numbering some 300,000 people. Nevertheless, he faced serious internal and external problems. Hoping for Natal's support against the Boers and an end to the threat from Natal-based pretenders, Cetshwayo began accumulating firearms and invited Shepstone to preside over his installation as king in 1873. Cetshwayo's alleged noncompliance with Shepstone's coronation "guidelines" was later justification for war.

It was, however, the changes wrought in southern Africa by the diamond discoveries in Griqualand West in the late 1860s that overwhelmed Cetshwayo's kingdom and ended its independence. Accelerated capitalist development and the greatly intensified encroachment on African land and labor in the scramble for mineral rights, coupled with the proliferation of firearms in African hands, heightened black-versus-white conflict all over southern Africa. Everywhere white settlers believed Cetshwayo was conspiring against them with local chiefs, a view sustained by his communication network all over southern Africa.

Lord Carnarvon, secretary of state for the colonies (1874–1878), became convinced that the complexity of affairs in southern Africa could only be dealt with by confederating its assortment of British colonies, Afrikaner republics, and independent African chiefdoms. The humiliation of the South African Republic at the hands of the Pedi, widely believed to be colluding with Cetshwayo, gave Carnarvon his opportunity, and at the end of 1876 Shepstone was instructed to annex the republic. With this the Zulu struggle with the Boers was transformed, as Shepstone, hitherto a Zulu supporter, changed sides and persuaded the new British high commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, that Cetshwayo was the chief obstacle to peace in the region.

Anxious to avoid war, Cetshwayo approached the Natal governor to appoint a commission of inquiry into the disputed territory. Although it fully supported Zulu claims, Frere used the commission's report to demand the surrender of Zulu accused of border incursions, the payment of a huge fine, and the disbanding of the Zulu military system, which effectively meant the dismantling of the Zulu state. Compliance was impossible, and on January 11, 1879, British troops entered Zululand.

Well aware of the superior firepower and overseas reserves of the British army, Cetshwayo adopted a defensive strategy, hoping to negotiate a settlement, but in vain. After initial spectacular success at Isandhlwana, the Zulu soon suffered severe setbacks, and after the battle of Ulundi on July 4, Cetshwayo's exhausted followers acknowledged defeat. Two weeks later, Sir Garnet Wolseley, now in command of the British forces, announced the end of the Zulu kingdom, promising the people their land and cattle, if they laid down arms and surrendered the king. After six weeks of torture and terror, Cetshwayo was betrayed, and sent into exile in Cape Town.

Wolseley promptly dismantled the Zulu regiments and installed 13 appointed chiefs, subject to the authority of a British resident, over the kingdom. Cetshwayo's immediate family and supporters, known as the Usuthu, were placed under Zibhebhu and Uhamu, who had been the first chiefs to defect, and who were most closely allied to the British authorities and the colonial economy. Violence erupted almost immediately as they seized Usuthu cattle and built up their own political and economic power.

In exile, Cetshwayo displayed extraordinary diplomatic skill, attracting influential supporters, including Bishop Colenso of Natal, who helped publicize Cetshwayo's case in South Africa and Britain. In 1882 the new colonial secretary, privately acknowledging the injustice of the war, finally allowed Cetshwayo to put his case in person in Britain. His dignity and royal bearing made a deep impression on a British public long fed tales of his "bloodthirsty" tyranny, and faced with widespread disorder in Zululand the British government decided to restore Cetshwayo.

In his return to South Africa in January 1883, Cetshwayo found, that, despite his objections, his kingdom had been severely truncated. A large tranche of country in the north was allocated to his chief enemies, Uhamu and Zibhebhu, while in the south a sanctuary was reserved for those who rejected his rule. The true destruction of the Zulu kingdom now followed. Usuthu protests against their loss of territory went unheeded, and their unsuccessful attacks on Zibhebhu simply invited retaliation. The ensuing civil wars culminated in Zibhebhu's attack on Ulundi on July 23, 1883, in which Cetshwayo's most trusted and experienced councilors were killed. Once more forced to flee, Cetshwayo attempted in vain to rally his supporters from the Nkandhla forests, and on October 17 he surrendered to the British Resident commissioner at Eshowe. He died there suddenly on February 8, 1884; many Zulu were convinced he had been poisoned. He was succeeded by his son Dinuzulu, an inexperienced boy of 16. The independence of the Zulu kingdom was over.

SHULA MARKS

See also: Natal, Nineteenth Century; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament, and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881.

Biography

Born about 1826 near present-day Eshowe. Embroiled in civil war with half brother for rule of the kingdom in 1856. In 1872, inherited rule of the kingdom upon half-brother's death. On January 11, 1879, British troops entered Zululand. Surrendered to the British after the battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879, and was sent into exile in Cape Town. Restored to power by the British government and returned to South Africa in January 1883. Surrendered to the British resident commissioner at Eshowe on October 17, 1883. Died there on February 8, 1884.


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CFA: See Communauté Financière Africaine.

Chad, Nineteenth Century: Kanem/Borno (Bornu) and Wadai

Kanem-Borno, a former Muslim kingdom located northeast of Lake Chad, was created by a branch of the Zagawa people called the Beni Sefi, with the likely collaboration of the Tubu, around the year 800. While Kanem is part of Chad today, Bornu, located in Kanem's southernmost part and west of Lake Chad, is part of Nigeria, a result of the imperial territorial divisions that occurred between the French and the British during the 1880s and 1890s. The first Beni Sefi dynasty seems to have taken power around 1075, under the Sefuwa dynasty, which was headed by *Mai* (King) Hummay (1075–1180). A mythical *mai* named Idris Sayf Ibn Dhi Yezan is said to have converted to Islam during the second half of the eleventh century and exerted pressure on the rest of



Chad.

the kingdom to embrace Islam as the state’s religion. During the thirteenth century, the Sefuwa were able to designate a specific capital for the kingdom, Njimi.

As the mais solidified their power, Kanem expanded considerably during the thirteenth century, controlling the Bornu principality and virtually all that constitutes northwest Chad today, particularly during the reign of Mai Dunama Dabbalemi (1221–1259). Under his rule, the sultanate encompassed Wadai and the Adamawa Plateau in northern Cameroon. Parts of Nigeria, Niger, and Sudan were also incorporated into the sultanate. The greatness of Kanem was predicated upon two major factors. First was Kanem’s ability to control the trans-Saharan trade route, resulting from its location at an important trade crossroads. During the first zenith of its power during the thirteenth century, Kanem’s markets exchanged, sold, and bought such items as salt, horses, ostrich feathers, camels, hides, cotton, cloth, perfumes, copper objects, kola nuts, ivory, jewelry, and, evidently, slaves.

The second source of power was Kanem’s extensive intercourse with North Africa via the Sahara Desert from Tripoli, down to the oases of Fezzan, and to south of Kawar on to Lake Chad. Contact with North Africa not only resulted in active commerce but also in cosmopolitan contacts and influences, as well as the infusion of intellectual and religious trends that enlightened the new kingdom and its people. Firm control of the trade routes and the safety created by the Sefuwa state was such that there was a common saying that even “a lone

woman clad in gold might walk with none to fear but God.”

Imperial expansion notwithstanding, the Sefuwa dynasty was plagued with inherent royal conflict, as virtually no sultan or mai was totally secure on his throne. Fratricidal incidents were common, as well as overthrows, poisonings, blindings, vicious assassinations, and intrigues. Militating also against the rulers were the intermittent uprisings of the Bulala (classified variously as farmers or nomads) and the constant incursions of the desert Berbers and the Tuaregs. A major revolt by the Bulala forced the weakened dynasty to leave the kingdom during Mai Umar Ibn Idris (1384–1388) and seek refuge at Bornu, most likely a Kanem principality then, establishing a new capital at Ngazargamu, in present Niger, around 1484. Obviously, the new mais would attempt at various times to reconquer Kanem, but to no avail, until Mai Idris Katakarnabi (1504–1526) partially succeeded in the effort. However, only Mai Idris Alooma (1580–1619) completed the protracted task of recovering the old kingdom. Yet the sultans or mais continued to reside in Bornu or Bornu, inaugurating the kingdom’s second zenith, characterized by renewed and purified Islam, new brick mosques, and the introduction of new military tactics and weaponry, including “fixed military camps, armored horses, Berber cavalry, iron-helmet musketeers, and scorched earth tactics” that frightened the neighboring states and principalities. Despite the reconquest of Kanem by the old dynasty, for several reasons Bornu was maintained as the capital. First was the fact that the Tubu in Kanem seem to have been very hostile to the dynasty. Second, the Tuareg incursions never subsided. Third, agriculturally, Bornu was more productive than Kanem. Thus, for reasons of security and resources, the mais preferred Bornu, which sometimes was interchangeably called Kanem.

The year 1804 presaged the decline and eventual demise of Kanem-Bornu as a kingdom. Islamic warrior and leader ‘Uthman dan Fodio sacked the capital with his Hausa-Fulani crusaders, and in 1814, Shehu Mohammad el-Amin el-Kanemi, a scholar-warrior, virtually replaced the ruling mai and assumed total control of the kingdom in 1837. He ruled unhindered until 1853, but could not maintain the kingdom as a cohesive whole. Meanwhile, the displaced mai was forced to move the capital to Kukawa, in Bornu. To the Sefuwa dynasty’s chagrin, Rabih ibn Fadl Allah, a former slave from Sudan, turned into a formidable potential conqueror of all of Central Africa, and dislodged the mais from Kukawa, a city he sacked in 1893. Kanem-Bornu was finally conquered by the French and the British who had appeared in the area during the 1880s and 1890s and divided the imperial spoils once Rabih had been killed at Kuseri (present

Cameroon) in 1900. The Tubu, assisted by the Turkish or Ottoman Empire and the Senoussiya Muslim order, resisted the French for a time but, by 1920, the latter had prevailed and Kanem became part of the military colony of Chad. Today, it is one of Chad's 14 prefectures, and, with support from Nigeria, Kanem has at times been a source of several rebel movements against the central government. Bornu is an emirate in northeastern Nigeria.

The history of Kanem-Bornu endured for more than a thousand years. During much of its existence, Kanem-Bornu became not only a hegemonic state at several stages in North Central Africa but also an Islamic entrepôt encompassing several learning centers that drew scholars from several parts of western, northern, and northeastern Africa. Kanembu society was hierarchic, and the king was assisted by a council. The existence of the council has caused a debate among scholars as to whether or not the mai was an absolute monarch. Apart from the consistent raids by the Berbers and the Tuaregs, Kanem's greatest weakness was internal strife, of which citizens or subjects, such as the Bulala, took advantage. Caught up in the turmoil that beset Chad during the nineteenth century, reflected in the rivalries between Wadai and Baguirmi, Kanem-Bornu was doomed to failure even prior to the French conquest. Rabih had dealt it a deadly blow in 1893.

Located in eastern Chad, Wadai became one of the most powerful states in Central Sudan during the mid-nineteenth century. Its existence as a state dates back to some point between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. According to the scanty records available, the Tunjur may have been the founders of the sultanate, which turned to Islam during the seventeenth century from the conversion of Sultan Abdel el Kerim following an uprising of the Maba. Notwithstanding its imposing presence, up until the eighteenth century Wadai paid tribute to Bornu (part of Kanem) and Darfur (in Sudan), but it subsequently freed itself from the tribute and expanded its territory to include the small sultanates of Dar Sila, Dar Kuti, and Salamat. Wadai was a typical predatory state, spending most of its time in battle against other states in the region, including Bagirmi, which it sacked on numerous occasions (e.g., in 1805 and the 1870s), eventually annexing it during the reign of Kolak (King) Abdel el Kerim II. However, victory against Bagirmi was tempered by a defeat under the weight of Darfur troops. Wadai's defeat resulted in the crowning of a puppet *kolak*, Mohammad Shariff (r.1825–1858). In 1850, Shariff transferred the capital from Wara to Abeche, the present capital of the prefecture. During Shariff's reign and thereafter, the influence of the Senoussiya brotherhood became paramount.

Wadai managed to put up a fierce resistance against the French for a time. Several inconclusive battles ensued between the two following declaration of a holy war against the French by Sultan Doud Murra from 1904 to 1908. After a series of battles between 1909 and 1913, the French eventually prevailed and Wadai became a de facto part of Chad in 1913, even though a 1900 Franco-British treaty had already designated it as such. Yet, Wadai continued to pose a threat to the French presence, thereby forcing the colonial government to install a military administration in the area.

Undoubtedly, during its zenith, the state of Wadai achieved high stature in the affairs of central Sudan. Indeed, just prior to the French arrival, Wadai commanded the largest and strongest army in the area. Unfortunately, just as in Kanem-Borno, dynastic infighting in the sultanate was rampant, and the state coffers relied on violent slave raids carried out among the non-Muslim societies in the south and southwest. Early explorers estimated that Wadai received a minimum of 4,000 slaves a year from tributary states and from its yearly and seasonal raids, or *gazawas*, over which the state, at least in theory, had the sole monopoly. Therefore, Wadai's resistance to France's presence was a means not just of preserving its sovereignty, but also of maintaining its economic lifestyle, which was heavily dependent upon the capture, employment, and sale or exchange of slaves, along with the region's trans-Saharan trade items such as horses, salt, and ostrich feathers.

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Chad: Colonial Period: French Rule

Chad was one of the last territories to be added to the French colonial empire. Its conquest by France occurred in several stages. The French appeared in southern Chad with imperial designs for the first time in 1892. The native population was friendly to the



Kitoko woman pounding grain, Chad, French Equatorial Africa, 1950s, wearing a skirt showing the British queen.
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French, as it saw them as liberators from the enslavement they suffered under the Islamic northern states, including Kanem-Bornu, Baguirmi, and Wadai. By 1899, the French had built a permanent post at Fort-Archambault in the present-day Moyen-Chari Prefecture and had secured several agreements with the southern traditional authorities, as was the case at Moissala and Bediondo. By 1912, the French had imposed their authority, to the extent that, notwithstanding sporadic resistance from some ethnic groups and traditional authorities, one could say that, for all practical purposes, they had secured what later became Southern Chad.

The conquest of the north, by contrast, was a different story. The sultans and the Muslim religious brotherhoods, such as the Senoussyia, fiercely resisted French intrusion and did not give up until they were overpowered militarily, but only after many French lives had been lost. Costly French military successes started around 1900, when Rabbah Fadlallah was defeated and killed at Kusseri by a combined contingent of three French expeditionary forces. In 1905, Kanem was subdued, followed by Abeche (Waddai's capital) in 1909 and 1912, Fada in 1914, Bardai in 1915, and Zouar in 1917; finally, the Tubu resistance was quelled in 1920. Until then, Chad had been under a colonial military government. A civilian government was subsequently installed, and Tibesti, detached from Niger, was made part of the new colony in 1929. Chad itself had been administered as one entity with the

colony of Oubangui-Chari, now the Central African Republic.

Once conquest had been completed, the problem was how to administer this huge but poor colony to tap into its scarce natural resources. Few civil servants wished to be posted to Chad, as such an appointment was considered to be a demotion. As a result, Chad became replete with unmotivated officers, military adventurers, and poorly educated personnel. Up to 20 per cent of the government positions remained vacant from the 1920s to the 1940s.

To maintain a semblance of peace and progress, the French pursued a policy of appeasing the north and developing the south, called *Le Tchad utile* ("useful Chad"), at the expense of the southern populations. Whereas in the north the sultanates were left politically intact as long as they paid taxes and allowed free access to the colonial authorities, southerners, especially the Sara (who for decades have constituted a third of the Chadian population), turned into a reservoir of forced labor (*corvée*), portage, military conscription, and the enforcement of compulsory cotton cultivation initiated around 1928. Concessionaire companies, such as the Societe Cotonniere Franco-Tchadienne, founded in 1925, were granted a monopoly over cotton cultivation, rubber collection, and timber harvesting. The task of developing Chad, however, was difficult.

Thousands of military conscripts from the south were used as part of the intercolonial mobile army. Up to 20,000 southern Chadians were forcibly recruited to participate in the completion of hundreds of government and private projects in the colony and elsewhere in the French African empire. Thousands of others were employed as porters, traveling with and outside Chad, and carrying heavy loads on their backs and heads, with an attending mortality rate of 15 per cent, according to explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza. In this context, the worst French project was the construction of the Congo-Ocean Railway in 1924–1934, which required 120,000 forced laborers, most of whom were Sara. While about 50,000 of them died in the *chantiers*, an additional 50,000 never returned home.

The south was also burdened with irregular and abusive tax collection by both the French *commandants de cercle* and subdued African authorities. This resulted in violence that subsided only during the 1950s, when the French took measures to put a halt to colonial abuses. As a consequence of the violent reaction by the Africans, Chad's jails were full of "criminals," at times encompassing over 2 per cent of the able population in some areas. The absence of able-bodied males, who had been siphoned from the villages to serve in the administration projects, resulted in famines, migrations, and revolts against both the administration and the traditional authorities on whom the French relied

throughout the colonial period, especially in the countryside.

Ever since the beginning of their empire, the French believed in the gradual assimilation of some of their colonial subjects as a guiding policy. Thus, they created what was called *le système de l'indigénat*, which divided the African population into the assimilated and the indigenous (or “noncivilized”). While the former, by law, had to be treated like French citizens, with political representation (along with the expatriates) in the metropolis, the indigenous were subjected to forced labor, had to follow traditional customs, and could lose their property at any time through confiscation.

Political and social reforms were finally enacted immediately following World War II, partly as a way of showing gratitude to the Africans for their heroic participation in the war. Chad, in particular, under black governor Felix Eboué (who later, in 1941–1944, became governor general of French Equatorial Africa), was the first African colony to join the French resistance led by General Charles de Gaulle against the Germans.

Thus, in 1946, following a conference presided over by de Gaulle himself at Brazzaville, the *système de l'indigénat* was abolished and all Africans were declared French citizens of a multiracial French empire. Political parties were allowed in the colonies, though the hope was that they would be affiliated with the French political parties in the metropole. Yet, voting was still separate: there was a dual college, with one side for white and educated voters and the other for the Africans. This racialist practice was, however, eliminated in 1956, by the so-called *loi cadre* (enabling act), the result of which was the overwhelming number of the Chadian population at the polls, almost invariably voting for black candidates.

By 1959 dozens of parties, some based on religion and some based along ethnicity and region lines, emerged and disappeared, leaving only a few to endure and form territorial governments prior to independence. Included among these were the Union Démocratique du Tchad, based in the North, and the Parti Progressiste Tchadien (PPT), founded in 1946 by Gabriel Lisette of the Antilles. Southern-based but with northern appeal as well, at least during its early existence, the PPT came to be dominated by the southerners, especially the Sara, under the leadership of a former teacher and labor union organizer, François Tombalbaye. The PPT trounced its rivals by securing a landslide victory at the polls on March 31, 1958, when it captured 57 of the 85 seats in the Territorial Assembly. It was allowed to form a new government. Eventually, on June 16, 1959, Tombalbaye formed a permanent government, which propelled him to the country's presidency following

ascension to independence from France on August 11, 1960. France remained the protector of Chadian sovereignty through treaties signed with the new government, agreements subsequently invoked by every Chadian government since the early 1970s. Indeed, until 1965 French influence was marked by the presence of its military forces in the BET Province in the north, in an attempt to suppress any potential revolt in that part of the country.

There is no doubt that, in Chad, France lost more of its soldiers and officers than anywhere else in its drive to create a vast empire for itself. At the heart of Africa, Chad, notwithstanding its shifting sands and its lack of abundant natural resources, was considered to be of a strategic importance for France in its dogged effort to control West and Central Africa, and as a springboard to its colonies and outposts on the Indian Ocean. In Chad, France followed a policy of exploiting the south at the expense of its inhabitants whom it regarded primarily as a reservoir of labor and military conscription, while the north, considered more civilized and hard to govern, was given a virtual free rein. What followed was a split of the colony along religious, regional, and ethnic lines, exacerbated by the precolonial slaving activities of the north over the southern populations. Although slavery ended during the 1920s, the French had little time to prepare the colony for independence.

The promulgation of the *loi cadre* and the acceptance of Western education by the south allowed this region to come out of the colonial experience united under the banner of the PPT, forcing the French to reverse themselves, as they ended up handing over power to southerners rather than their northern proteges. What resulted were bitter social, political, and economic cleavages, fueled by unforgettable recriminations predating the colonial period, a concoction ripe for civil strife that has endured up to the present. The role of France both prior to and following independence appears to have been more detrimental than helpful to Chad's future as an aspiring nation-state.

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See also: **Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa.**

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Chad: Independence to the Present

For the most part, Chad's postcolonial history has seen unremitting civil strife, interspersed with cyclical external interventions. Reasons for the conflict overlap in a complex web of ethnic, religious, economic, and political motivation.

On an elemental level, an animus between the Goranes Muslim ethnic groups—especially the Toubou—of northern Chad and the Christian Sara people of the south was exacerbated and entrenched by a negligent French colonial administration. On August 11, 1960, Chad became an independent republic. The first president, François (later renamed Ngarta) Tombalbaye, consolidated his rule using all possible means. In 1963, his Parti Progressiste Tchadien (PPT) was declared the country's only authorized party. Tombalbaye's prime motivation was the retention of power. Politicians, civil servants, and eventually the military, whether from the north or south, were subject to arrest and imprisonment. However, after 1963 many in the north perceived themselves to be the target of a calculated strategy of domination by a southern elite. Tax excesses and ill-conceived economic and cultural policies ensured continued resentment. In April 1975 Tombalbaye was killed in a coup d'état and replaced by a political prisoner, General Félix Malloum.



Digging a well, Gredaya, Chad. © Frank Kroenke/Das Fotoarchiv.

As early as 1966, a rebellion had coalesced behind the Front de Libération Nationale de Tchad (FROLINAT). Foreign involvement in the Chadian conflict was already evident. Various elements within the FROLINAT, itself established in Sudan, received support from Libya or Nigeria. Between 1969 and 1972, Tombalbaye accepted French military intervention to contain the increasingly successful rebellion. However, Tombalbaye's ouster intensified pressures toward fragmentation and factionalism within the rebellion. In the absence of an integrating ideology, the FROLINAT had depended on the battle against the oppressive regime for its cohesion. The movement was ideologically multifaceted. Moreover, the sociology of the conflict had always extended beyond the crude dimensions of a north/south or Christian/Muslim dichotomy. Around a hundred distinct language groups, frequently split into several subgroups, exist among a population of only five million people. Furthermore, intragroup relations, especially in the bellicose north, were highly prone to segmentation. The factionalism of the civil war underscored this inclination to find allies among neighboring subgroups, rather than among inclusive ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups. In this respect, the Chadian conflict fits the "warlord" model, with its stress on regional centers of power based on personalized rule and military force, and the consequent prevalence of a politics of conflict and war.

Malloum's new administration pursued a policy of national reconciliation. At the same time, Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's continued incursion from the contested Aouzou Strip in the far north and his meddling in factional politics led to a pivotal schism within the FROLINAT and increased concern in the West. Anti-Libyan elements under Hissène Habré, retaining the name Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), joined a short-lived coalition government with Malloum's military council under a "fundamental charter." The remaining majority of the FAN under Goukouni Oueddei, having regrouped as the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), maintained a strong territorial and military position. In mid-1978, French military reinforcements were needed to halt the advance of Goukouni's troops on the capital. As the Habré-Malloum coalition began to collapse, a process of recurring disintegration occurred. The result was a proliferation of factions. Together with the FAN and FAP, two groups proved to be especially significant: the remnants of the national army regrouped as the Forces Armées Tchadiennes under Colonel Wadal Kamagoué in the south and Ahmet Acyl's New Vulcan Army in the north and center of the country.

The resignation of Malloum in April 1979 was followed by a series of reconciliation conferences. As a result, a broad-based Gouvernement d'union nationale de transition (GUNT) was formed with Goukouni as

president, Habré as minister of defense, and Kamougué as vice president. These were to prove essentially fictitious positions in a government that existed in name only. Civil war resumed. An inter-African peacekeeping force sponsored by the Organization of African Unity met with intractable obstacles of mandate and resources. Actions by external powers were more pertinent. While Gaddafi chose a temporary tactical withdrawal, French diplomatic manoeuvres and American covert aid promoted Habré's FAN. Following an offensive launched from the Biltine, home of the FAN's operational commander, Idriss Deby, Habré entered the capital on June 7, 1982.

Factionalism endured. The south fragmented between a number of private militias, dubbed "codos." In the north, Goukouni successfully reformed the GUNT with Libyan support. Only intervention by French paratroops in 1983 stopped the GUNT from taking N'Djaména. Habré realized that if he was to maintain power he had to extend control both beyond the capital and his own core constituency. That he was largely successful was a consequence of iron rule and pragmatic policy. Beyond military superiority and repression, Habré relied on the twin props of the United States and France—especially the latter. Throughout the 1980s, French president François Mitterrand's support had been contingent on Chad maintaining a bulwark against Libyan incursion, while remaining compliant to French influence. In 1986 and 1987 Chad inflicted costly military defeats on Libya. As a result, Gaddafi accepted the arbitration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague to settle the Aouzou Strip dispute. In 1994, the ICJ found in Chad's favor.

At the Franco-African Summit in 1990, President Mitterrand sought to publicly realign French policy to African democratization, endorsing pluralism and liberal democracy. Despite voicing objections to the new line from Paris, Habré had already instigated preemptive constitutional reform. A referendum on December 10, 1989, both adopted a new constitution and elected Habré as president for a seven-year term—by a reported 99.94 per cent of votes cast. In reality, freedoms and rights enshrined in the constitution were not actionable in law. Regardless of the credibility of the proposed nonparty National Assembly, Habré and his ministers would remain above censure.

Throughout 1989, ethnic tension among government troops serving in the south led to insecurity that was mirrored by disaffection in N'Djaména. Leading members of Habré's subclan, the Anakaza, sought to prevent other groups within the alliance from profiting from the sale of Libyan arms captured during the 1986–1987 campaign. Isolated groups, especially the Bideyat and Zaghawa, found champions in war heroes Deby and Hassan Djamous, together with the influential

minister of interior, Mahamat Itno. After a failed coup, only Deby survived to flee to Darfur in western Sudan in order to regroup. The Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) was constructed, with Libyan support, mainly from alienated Hadjerai and Zaghawa, including substantial Zaghawa elements from Sudan. Following Habré's outspoken reaction to Mitterrand's initiative at La Baule, France executed an about-face, effectively withdrawing support from Habré. On December 2, 1990 Deby, at the head of the MPS, entered N'Djaména.

The transition to democracy, promised by Deby on his assumption of power, developed into a long and difficult process. In early 1993, a Sovereign National Conference was held to formulate a draft constitution. It would be a further three years before the recommendations of the conference would be put to a referendum. Two-thirds of the electorate voted for the new constitution based on that of the French Fifth Republic, with a strong presidency. The result cleared the way for presidential and legislative elections. A two-round election in June and July of 1996 saw Deby defeat Kamougué for the presidency. Legislative elections held in January and February 1997 saw Deby's MPS win an outright majority over nine other parties in a new National Assembly. The outcomes of the three polls were generally held by both domestic and foreign observers to have fulfilled the wishes of the majority of the electorate. However, it became apparent that there was evidence of malpractice in each poll. While manipulation of the process and result was slight in the referendum, it was more visible in the legislative elections and manifest in the presidential ballot.

The Deby era has seen a decline in the level of civil violence. Negotiated peace accords have resulted in several politico-military groups abandoning rebellion to amalgamate with the government and national army. Nonetheless, conflict endures. In January 1999, rebel forces launched an offensive in the north and east of the country. Moreover, the government has been accused by human rights associations of employing repressive tactics, including extrajudicial execution and torture, against opponents. The most salient determinant of Chad's immediate future is the potential wealth from the oil fields in the southern subprefecture of Doba. This controversial project, while having the capacity to transform the Chadian economy, might also result in environmental degradation and provoke a return to civil war.

SIMON MASSEY

See also: **Chad: Libya, Aozou Strip, Civil War; Tombalbaye, F. Ngarta.**

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Chad: Libya, Aozou Strip, Civil War

In 1853 Muhammad ibn al-Sanusi established his *zawiya* (place of learning) at Giarabub (Jaghub) in eastern Libya. Born in Algeria, educated in Islamic Sufism at Fez and orthodoxy at Mecca, *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, became famous for his teachings that attracted *talibes* (students) from everywhere in North Africa and Arabia. After his death in 1859, the Sanusiyya evolved from a religious brotherhood into a political and commercial organization by the spiritual confidence and military support of the Bedouins in the interior that was accepted by the ruling Ottoman Turks of the coast. His son, Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, increased the number of Sanusi lodges throughout southern Libya and northern Chad from which they imposed their authority over the merchants and the faithful. This symbiotic relationship could not survive the advance of the French between 1902 and 1914 from the south at the time the Sanusiyya were confronted by Italians in the north.

Italy had become a unified nation in the nineteenth century and a frustrated imperial state at the beginning of the twentieth. Its leaders were determined to convert the Mediterranean into an "Italian Strait" by the conquest of Libya. On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war against the Ottoman Turks to revive the glories of ancient Rome by new conquests in Africa. The Ottoman Turks made peace in 1912, leaving Libya to the Italians and the Sanusiyya, whose Bedouin waged guerrilla warfare from their desert sanctuary for another 30 years. The Italo-Sanusi wars were a contest between advanced military technology and organization, and the Sanusiyya, who knew the territory, possessed the faith, and were led by the charismatic military leadership of Sidi Umar al-Mukhtar. Half the Bedouins lost their lives in battle and concentration camps, and when Umar, the "Lion of the Desert," was hanged on September 18, 1931, the Sanusi insurgency collapsed. The imposed *pax Romana* was brief, for British and French forces conquered Libya in 1943 during the North African campaigns of World War II. Libya survived the war impoverished

and governed by an Anglo-French military administration until the Sanusiyya were restored when Idris Muhammad al-Sanusi was acknowledged king of the United Kingdom of Libya on December 24, 1951.

The discovery of oil in 1965, Arab nationalism, and the paternal mismanagement of Idris led Libyan captain Muammar Gaddafi and his fellow officers to seize the government on September 1, 1969. He terminated the British and American military presence, expelled the Italian colonists, and used the abundant revenues from new oil resources to seek the unity of the Arab world. His efforts to forge a united Arab state were compromised by theology, terrorism, and imperialism. His political and religious philosophy was published in the *Green Book* of 1976, which was unacceptable to many Muslims. His hostility to the West and disputes with his Arab neighbors gave sanctuary, encouragement, and resources to terrorists willing to undertake missions against the West and the Libyan opposition—particularly the Sanusiyya. His pursuit of a unified Arab *Dar al-Islam* committed Gaddafi to an imperial war against Chad for the Aozou Strip.

The Aozou Strip lies on the border between Libya and Chad. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had claimed this wasteland as an essential link with the Italian East African empire. In Rome on January 7, 1935, the French recognized Italian ownership of Aozou, but after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October of that year the Laval-Mussolini treaty was never consummated. Despite attempts by France and the kingdom of Libya to define their ambiguous frontier between Chad and Libya, Gaddafi's revolutionary government was determined to lead his Arab revolution down the ancient trans-Saharan caravan routes that passed through the Strip to Africa south of the Sahara. In November 1972 the Libyan army occupied Aozou that precipitated 20 years of conflict with Chad.

The war for Aozou was sustained by Gaddafi's determination to expand his revolution and Islam south of the Sahara, rumors of rich uranium in Aozou, and the personal ambitions of traditional leaders threatened by the elite in Ndjamena and Tripoli. His political and religious imperialism was made possible by oil revenues to purchase sophisticated armaments from the Soviet Union that proved of limited success in the Sahara. Two decades of futile warfare on a barren frontier resulted in many thousands of casualties and refugees, political instability in Chad, and the anxiety by African states and those in the West to deny Gaddafi's obsession to acquire the Aozou Strip. On December 2, 1990, Idriss Deby seized control of the government of Chad in yet another coup. In February 1991 he announced during a state visit to Tripoli that Aozou belonged to Chad. The combatants, exhausted by 20 years of war, were no longer prepared to fight for

a wasteland. In February 1994 the World Court ruled, 16 to 1, that Aozou belonged to Chad. In May the last Libyan troops left the Aozou Strip. In June of that year Deby and Gaddafi signed a Treaty of Friendship that ended a half-century of struggle for these wastelands on a barren frontier.

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See also: **Libya: Gaddafi (Qadhdhafi) and Jamahiriyya (Libyan Revolution); Libya: Italian Invasion and Resistance, 1911–1931.**

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Changamire Dombo: See Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rovzi.

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Chwezi Dynasty: See Great Lakes Region: Kitara and the Chwezi Dynasty.

Civil War: Postcolonial Africa

Since 1945, Africa has witnessed a range of wars, beginning with independence struggles against the colonial powers that often merged into postcolonial power struggles and civil wars, while after 1960 there have also been a number of wars between African states. Civil wars in postcolonial Africa from 1960 onward fall into three broad categories: racial or ethnic wars; ideological wars; and power struggles. As a rule these causes overlap and are often indistinguishable from one another.

Most of Africa's civil wars have been deeply affected by the colonial legacy and the divisions that the colonial powers left behind them. For example, the tribal or ethnic basis of many African civil wars poses questions about the nature of the divisions which the colonial powers created and encouraged, and a number of wars broke out as a direct result of the end of colonialism. The centralizing tendencies of the European colonizers created artificial states, with the principal unifying factor being the colonial presence itself (as with the British in Nigeria, the French in Chad, or the Portuguese in Angola).

The end of an empire always leaves in its wake a series of power vacuums. In Africa four European empires came to an end during the 1960s and 1970s: those of Britain, Belgium, France, and Portugal. In the circumstances of the abrupt disappearance of imperial power over a period of 25 years it is not surprising that



In Lueshe, eastern Congo, close to the Virunga National Park, the German company Somikivu is mining the rare metal niobium, which is used in space research as well as in the production of mobile phones. The plant was closed for several years because of the civil war; it reopened in the summer of 2000. © Sebastian Bolesch/Das Fotoarchiv.

a series of power implosions followed. The subsequent search for power, clashing ideologies, and ethnic divisions lent themselves to civil confrontations and conflicts, and these duly occurred.

African leaders were acutely aware of the dangers of ethnic divisions, and in such countries as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, for example, the postindependence leaders worked hard to persuade their people that they were Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Zambians first rather than members of competing ethnic groups, while Julius Nyerere of Tanzania justified the one-party state, in part, on the grounds that a multiparty system would inevitably lead to particular ethnic groups associating themselves with opposed political parties. Ethnic divisions and rivalries were not to be disposed of that simply, however, and they have been at the root of many African conflicts. In the years since 1960, civil wars have occurred in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and ethnic divisions have always played a part and sometimes the dominant part in these conflicts.

The genocidal massacres of Hutus by Tutsis and Tutsis by Hutus that have been a regular feature of life in Burundi and Rwanda since before independence in 1962 have deep historical causes, yet in colonial times divisions that could have been played down were in fact highlighted first by the Germans, and then by the Belgians, who emphasized the dominant role of the Tutsi minority in both countries by using them as their principal instruments of control. The introduction of European-style democracy on the eve of independence in two countries where the Hutus enjoyed a majority 85 per cent of the population while the Tutsis represented only 14 per cent meant the permanent domination of the minority group; the ugly civil conflicts that have periodically exploded in both countries since 1960 were fueled by Tutsi fears of such domination. These particular conflicts raise issues about the kind of democracy that makes sense for such societies.

The drawn-out civil war in Sudan between north and south (1957–1972, and then 1985–present) embraces a number of divisions that reinforce each other. First, ethnic divisions between north and south also coincide with religious differences. The northern peoples, the majority, are Arab or Arabicized and Muslim, while the minority southern peoples are from a number of Nilotic ethnic groups and are Christian or follow African animist religions. Second, for centuries the northerners saw the south as a source of slaves and regarded its people as inferior, a racist attitude that continued after independence. Third, in the postindependence era after 1956, political power and control of economic decisions lay with the north, so that

southerners saw themselves being both exploited and treated as second-class citizens, a perception that was increased when northern Muslim politicians tried to impose the Shari'a (Islamic law) upon the non-Muslim south. The result has been one of the longest, most bitter civil wars in postcolonial Africa. This war, moreover, has raised a question that African political leaders have determinedly avoided ever since independence: whether intransigent conflicts based upon irreconcilable differences should be solved by partitioning the state rather than clinging to an inherited boundary that makes little sense and ensures continuing conflict. A strong case could be made for dividing north and south Sudan into separate states, despite the early Organization of African Unity resolution that Africa's new states should all accept their inherited colonial boundaries.

The Nigerian civil war illustrates how the colonial legacy can lead to breakdown. During the nineteenth century the British created several colonial structures in what later became Nigeria, which they only brought together to form a single, centralized colony on the eve of World War I. Subsequently, British colonial administrators became fierce rivals as they safeguarded (as they saw it) the interests of their different regions—the north, west, and east. These rivalries were to be carried on after independence in 1960 in a power struggle to see which ethnic group could control the political center. Moreover, the discovery of major oil wealth centered in the eastern region made an Ibo secession an attractive and practical possibility. When Nigeria did descend into civil war in 1968, the British role in supporting the federal government was dominated by its oil interests; the Soviet readiness to support the federal government followed from its desire to obtain hitherto nonexistent influence in West Africa's largest state; and the French concern to support breakaway Biafra (through support provided by proxy African states) reflected its determination to lessen British influence in the region. As a result, by the end of the war the Nigerians had acquired a healthy suspicion of, and disrespect for, the motives of the major powers in Africa.

In Angola, following the departure of the Portuguese in 1975, the three principal causes of civil wars became intertwined. At first, when the Portuguese left, the war that at once erupted between the three liberation movements—the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), which became the government, and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)—was fiercely ideological, with the MPLA fighting to establish a Marxist state and its rivals claiming to stand for a Western-style capitalist system. Not surprisingly, in the years that followed, since the Cold War was then at its height, the

MPLA received massive assistance from both the USSR and Cuba, while its opponents obtained U.S. and South African assistance. Later, though ethnic loyalties became increasingly important, the war developed into a blatant power struggle: this was clearly demonstrated after Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA party lost the United Nations-brokered elections of 1992 and promptly returned to the bush to continue the war.

Most of Africa's civil wars have been both complicated and prolonged by foreign interventions of two kinds: those of major powers from outside Africa "safeguarding" their interests, and those of African neighbors. The general weakness of African states, their dependence upon international aid, and continuing Western pressures for influence (neocolonialism) have ensured that outside interventions have constantly taken place. Sometimes these interventions have been in the form of peacekeeping operations; at others they have been in support of a regime or contender for power that suited the outside power as was the case in the 1997 civil war in Congo (Brazzaville), when France was determined to see former President Sassou-Nguesso replace Pascal Lissouba as the Congo head of state.

In the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, five African states intervened when that country collapsed into civil war in 1998, a year after Laurent Kabila had ousted Mobutu Sese Seko from power. Rwanda and Uganda sent forces to support the Tutsi-led rebels against Kabila, while Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops to support his government. The motives of these intervening states were mixed but appear to have been more concerned with looting the wealth of the DRC than anything else.

The complexities of Africa's wars sometimes defy easy analysis. Somalia possesses one of the most homogeneous populations in Africa, yet it collapsed into fratricidal clan warfare at the end of the 1980s, a disaster made worse by UN and U.S. interventions in the early 1990s. The long-lasting war in Ethiopia from 1962 to 1991 included the ultimately successful bid by Eritrea to break away and become an independent state; the Tigrayan revolt which was more about power than secession; and the Oromo revolts, which represented the dissatisfaction of an ethnic group that had long been oppressed by the Amharic ethnic center.

Other civil wars have been ignited by religious extremism (Algeria), or ethnic-based power struggles (Liberia and Sierra Leone) in the 1990s.

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See also: **Algeria: Islamic Salvation Front, Military Rule, Civil War, 1990s ; Angola: Cold War Politics, Civil War, 1975–1994; Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Independence, Revolution, 1958–1979;**

Ethiopia: Civil War and Liberation (to 1933); Liberia: Civil War, ECOMOG, and the Return to Civilian Rule; Nigeria: Federalism, Corruption, Popular Discontent: 1960–1966; Rwanda: Civil Unrest and Independence: 1959–1962; Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution.

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Climate and Vegetational Change in Africa

Climate is a major factor that has affected vegetation, human settlement, and subsistence patterns in Africa. Regional differences in vegetation can best be explained in terms of variation in the amount and seasonal distribution of rainfall.

Two prevailing wind systems have a dominant influence on the climate of equatorial Africa. These are the Atlantic moisture-laden southerly monsoon and the continental, dry northeast trade winds. The former predominate in summer, bringing rain, while the latter predominate in winter, bringing the harmattan winds (dry, dusty winds that blow along the northwest coast) from the Sahara. It is believed that at least the southerly monsoon wind system probably has blown from the southwest since the Palaeocene period (approximately 65 million years ago). Periodic

variations in the vigor of these two wind systems and relative latitudinal positions of the intertropical discontinuity (where the two winds meet) contribute to climatic changes in the region.

Climatic fluctuations are historically characterized by alternating wet and dry phases, resulting in general atmospheric circulation. During the wet phases, which lasted from a few to several thousand years, the south-westerly monsoons were invigorated, causing a northward shift in the intertropical discontinuity far above its present-day July position. Then during the dry phases, the northeast trade winds pushed down the intertropical discontinuity below its present-day January position.

It is believed that up to about 70 million years ago, the equator was situated around northern Nigeria. Most of Africa at this period was in a wet phase. It was after this period that the equator started a southward shift to its present position, the wet phase therefore giving way to a dry one. There were, however, fluctuations in between. The change from a wet to a dry phase was caused by the reinforcement of the northeast trade winds, thus bringing about the establishment of desert conditions in the Sahara.

Geomorphologic and paleological evidence also suggests that there was a climatic change from a predominantly wet equatorial condition to a tropical seasonally dry one in north-central and northwestern Nigeria 26 million years ago.

The effect of these climatic changes on the vegetation of Africa was enormous. There is evidence to show that at the beginning of the Tertiary period (approximately 70 million years ago) there existed a tropical savanna in the present-day Sahara belt, which was due largely to regular supply of summer rain. Furthermore, there is presently no fossil botanical evidence of the occurrence of grasses in the tropics as a whole during this period. This therefore suggests that the tropics at this period were thickly forested. It was, however, only from about 26 million years ago that savanna in the form of an open grassland became established in Nigeria.

During the Late Paleocene and Early Eocene periods (approximately 70 million years ago) equatorial conditions prevailed in the present-day southern Sahara, especially in Mali and Niger. These conditions prevailed until there was a significant change in climate to a drier, tropical, seasonal one approximately 26 to 36 million years ago.

Some of the main plant families as represented by their pollen were *Euphobiaceae*, *Combretaceae*, *Caesalpinaceae*, *Papilionaceae*, *Palmae*, *Sapindaceae*, and *Annonaceae*. In the northern Sahara region, including Egypt, a savanna with abundant grass cover and presumably woody species of *Sapotaceae* and *Bombacaceae* was present at about the same period.

In West Africa, plant species seem to have retained their basic character over the last 26 million years, even though paleological evidence indicates that subsequent to the Miocene period (approximately 26 million years ago) there were some cases of extinction.

Generally, the major tropical vegetation belts stretching across West, central, and East Africa have many species in common. Compared to the present day, there had been a series of changes in the characteristic features of the savanna during its evolution about 26 million years ago. These changes involved the appearances of a new species as well as intermittent significant shifts in the climatic fluctuations. Human factors only became evident within the last 3,000 years.

It is believed that the most dramatic climatic and vegetational changes in Africa took place during the Quaternary period, which is the latest geological period, spanning the last 1.8 million years (it is often referred to as the Ice Age). It is characterized as the geological interval during which the climate of the earth witnessed spectacular alternations of cold dry phases and warm wet phases. These changes were more varied and widespread in Africa. While desert sands, soils, alluvia, lacustrine deposits, cave earth, and mountain glacial sediments accumulated in different parts of the African continent, peat beds, deltaic, shelf and shoreline sands, deep-sea fans, and carbonates were laid down on the continental margin and deep-sea floor. Sea levels rose and fell as ice caps melted. Rivers rapidly filled their valleys, only to dry up at the next abrupt change of base level; lake levels rose and fell, and some lakes even vanished completely. Subsequently, forests turned into deserts. Plant and animal groups responded to these sharp climatic changes primarily by migrating frequently.

Fairly recent climatic changes in Africa are those of the last 40,000 years. From 40,000 to 20,000 years ago, lakes in North Africa were high as it was relatively wet, though a dry episode in Lake Chad had set in by about 30,000 years ago. From 20,000 to 12,000 years ago, lakes within the same area were low as a result of a dry cold period. From 7,000 to 5,000 years ago, lakes in the same area again rose. Then from about 5,000 to 3,000 years ago, there set in a drier condition heralding the fairly rapid evolution of the African climate to the conditions which prevail today. This evolution, however, was punctuated by minor fluctuations with higher precipitation setting in the last 1,000 years.

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Clothing and Cultural Change

It is revealing to analyze prevailing fashion and clothing trends, especially in periods when a traditional system has been subjected to sudden upheavals, as was the case in Africa during the colonial period. From the late nineteenth century on, fundamental social, economic, and political changes occurred in most parts of the continent that strongly influenced and shaped its socio-cultural history. These changes were manifested in shifting fashion trends and clothing styles. Fashion became a form of symbolic language, or a code that assisted in the comprehension and explication of the entire colonial period. Besides this, clothing styles became an instrument for examining the mannerisms and daily habits of social groups in that era. An indicative but extremely significant illustration of this phenomenon is the lifestyle of the Creoles of Sierra Leone, the Saros of Lagos, and the Gold Coast elite in the nineteenth century; and the Asante elite in the twentieth century. Elite groups, as distinct and self-conscious social entities, set trends in various aspects of everyday life and in particular modes of dressing, and their trendsetting was not limited to a particular gender or generation. The elite group was composed of affluent individuals who had acquired their wealth through commerce or were prominent members of the teacher/clerk group that has been described as "professional culture bearers." As an entity, the colonial elite set trends in fashionable behavior. Therefore, emulating them enhanced one's prestige. Thus, other people in society attempted to mold their lifestyles after trends set by these groups.

The agencies through which social change was transmitted included Christianity, Western education, European colonial rule, industrialization, and increased inclusion in the global economy. Individuals who either converted to Christianity or were educated felt the need to set themselves apart. Such groups included the Assimilés in francophone Africa and the Evolués in Portuguese Africa.

This period was characterized by the transformation of subsistence economies into ones in which cash transactions increased. By the beginning of the twentieth century, indigenous Africans in most parts of the

continent had reasonable access to cash as a result of the expansion of the cash economy. Cash in most African societies was not uniformly distributed. The more affluent members of colonial elite society were therefore in a better cash position, and sometimes even felt the need to demonstrate their affluence by subscribing to a lifestyle that visibly set them apart from others of their own group. A typical example was the Kumase *akonkofuo* (merchants) in the Gold Coast. The elite there cherished their right to participate in wealth accumulation within the cash economy. They endeavored to accumulate and to store wealth in forms that could be publicly displayed to emphasize affluence.

Clothing was an aspect of popular culture that revealed different areas of the cultural conflict between tradition and modernity in Africa. From the earliest period European clothes were presented as gifts to traditional rulers. Such presents included laced hats, shirts, coats, walking sticks, and ties. They were almost exclusively for important individuals, and their possession therefore helped to reinforce their unique status within society. These exotic presents were accepted and worn out of a sense of decorum, and a desire to preserve good diplomatic relations.

There were mass conversions to Christianity during the colonial period. This was part of an attempt to be accepted as part of the new regime. The Christian missions were also prominent in the provision of formal education. Through the schools and the churches, Africans were encouraged to adopt European culture. Although Africans sometimes reacted against European discrimination and racism by forming syncretist movements, they still maintained perceived trappings of (European) "civilization." Among these was clothing. Thus, though the Kimbanguists in the Congo and members of the Watchtower movement in Nyasaland rejected orthodox Christianity, they continued to wear European clothes. A reconstruction of the changes in clothing styles that were caused by shifts and deep-seated influences in fashion over the period therefore reveals conceptions of social mobility. Thus, these developments can be discussed as historical phenomena. European clothes became a mark of distinction among certain social strata such as the educated and Christianized groups. The kinds of clothes that the colonial elite wore inform us about culture and hegemony, as well as their influence. They were linked to the "superior" European culture.

In the colonial period, there was also a great desire for imported European goods that stemmed from the fact that they were still a novelty, but one to which access was now beginning to broaden for the very first time to incorporate a general public. New practices such as the use of mail order eliminated the role of the middleman. This made it more attractive and

enabled individuals to order up items that suited their own particular desires and tastes. Thus, it satisfied individualism and augmented the desires of the fashion conscious.

The basic disruptions that occurred in colonial African society increased the scope for individual acquisition of wealth. Consequently, the changes contributed to the emergence of new elite groupings. However, since incomes were not evenly distributed it became necessary to establish the relative marks and indicators of a superior status. Thus, individuals who had acquired substantial independent incomes and those who had new Western education sought to set themselves apart by simulating a lifestyle that was reminiscent of the perceived behavior of great men. Increasingly, it became fashionable to adopt and to adapt new trends in clothing. These changes were relentlessly enhanced by external stimuli, such as mail order from overseas that made available endlessly new sources and types of commodities.

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See also: Colonial Imports versus Indigenous Crafts; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Cold War, Africa and the

In Africa, the Cold War served above all to impede the socioeconomic development of African states and peoples from the hour of independence through the end of the 1980s. The United States and the Soviet Union competed with one another on the continent by providing aid and ideological reinforcement to favored clients or insurgent groups. In so doing they increased the scale of fighting in many conflicts whose roots were essentially indigenous. African leaders of ethno-regional constituencies often found that the adoption of a particular ideological label brought increases in military aid from the corresponding superpower. The main positive ramification of the Cold War for African peoples was that the two superpowers also sometimes competed in the provision of economic aid. Since the end of the Cold War, Soviet/Russian aid has largely evaporated, while aid from the United States has declined.

Surprisingly, neither superpower benefited substantially from the Cold War competition in Africa. The most important perceived measure of success in the competition was the establishment and maintenance of "client regimes," yet such regimes did not act reliably in the interest of their superpower patrons. Moreover, neither those regimes identifying themselves as market capitalists nor those considering themselves Marxist-Leninist in orientation were able to devise practical development programs based on their putative ideologies. Meanwhile, many moderate African leaders were alienated from both superpowers by the patterns of intervention and counterintervention that characterized the competition. As a result most chose to be formally nonaligned, even if they received aid from one superpower or the other. In economic terms, most superpower investment on the continent yielded meager financial returns. Several Marxist-Leninist states, notably Angola, continued to carry on a mutually beneficial trade with the West, to the chagrin of the Soviets. The maintenance of client regimes in power often required substantial subsidies to keep them financially afloat while they proved to be ideological failures and political embarrassments. This was the case in the United States–Congo/Zaire relationship, for instance. Thus, the only benefit of client regimes was often to deny a "strategic space" to the competing superpower.

The rise of the superpower competition in Africa coincided with the rise of nationalist movements for independence across the continent. Until the moment

of independence, the United States mostly deferred to its European (colonial) allies on questions of African politics and development and remained largely absent from the continent. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Stalin took a dim view of the potential contribution that “bourgeois nationalists” might make to the global socialist struggle, and demurred from meaningful support for African nationalist movements. After Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev’s consolidation of power in the Soviet Union over the ensuing years, however, Soviet policy began to change. Khrushchev reinterpreted Marxist-Leninist ideology in a way that allowed for vigorous Soviet support for nationalist, “anti-imperialist” movements in the developing world.

The Soviets were soon providing both rhetorical and material support to African nationalists like Algeria’s Ben Bella and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Soviet political support was especially important in 1956, when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and was subsequently attacked by Britain, France, and Israel. Despite a lack of deep ideological affinity, the anti-imperialist rhetoric and intentions of African nationalist and Soviet leaders resonated closely during this period. The intensely bitter war against France for national liberation in Algeria further estranged African nationalists from the West.

The United States lost a position of primacy in Africa to the Soviets in this period through its ambivalent attitude toward national liberation movements and its constant fretting about the communist ties of African nationalists. The United States rarely put any pressure on its European allies to hasten the pace of decolonization in Africa, while it generally gave tacit support to the apartheid regime in South Africa. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) even cooperated with South African security in monitoring and undermining the activities of the African National Congress.

The Cold War competition in Africa escalated dramatically with the onset of the Congo (Kinshasa) crisis in July 1960. While both superpowers supported the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Congo, each had a different interpretation of the UN’s mandate. Accordingly, each put pressure on UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld to carry out the mission in keeping with its own preferred vision. The United States saw it as a neutral effort, designed to keep peace among warring factions; the Soviets saw it a mission to support the elected government of Patrice Lumumba in the face of foreign intervention and internal secession (of the Katanga province). When the United States prevailed in this competition, the Soviets ceased cooperation with the UN effort and called for Hammarskjöld’s dismissal. Meanwhile, each superpower engaged in its

own unilateral, clandestine interventions, which sought to promote local favorites. Ultimately the United States was the more determined intervenor. Congo’s radical, charismatic prime minister Lumumba was murdered in January 1961 with the encouragement and support of the CIA. Likewise, American operatives encouraged Joseph D. Mobutu to seize power on two occasions, in 1960, and later, permanently, in November 1965.

Beginning in the late 1950s, the superpower competition was complicated by the advent of an independent and vigorous Chinese policy on the continent. China provided some modest economic assistance and somewhat successfully presented itself as the natural leader of nonindustrialized, revolutionary regimes in Africa. China’s impressive aid to Tanzania and Zambia in the construction of the TanZam Railway in the late 1960s pleased many nonaligned African leaders and indirectly challenged both superpowers. While Chinese rhetoric in Africa was initially more anti-Western, it became more balanced in its condemnation of both superpowers after the early 1970s.

In the period between 1975 and 1980 the Soviet Union was the more determined intervenor in African conflicts, as evidenced by the Angola and Ethiopia cases. In the Angolan case, three local parties were contesting control of the country at its independence in 1975. A struggle for power among them that had started several years earlier had begun to escalate, with each superpower providing clandestine aid to its preferred local client. African opinion on the legitimacy of the various parties was sharply divided until South Africa launched an invasion of the country in October 1975. This quickly swayed African opinion in favor of the Marxist MPLA party, which then controlled Luanda. Politically, it also allowed the Soviet Union to launch a major, overt military intervention in support of the MPLA, partly at the initiative of its Cuban ally. The Soviet-Cuban intervention soon resolved the conflict in the MPLA’s favor, though it also marked the beginning of a 25-year civil war in Angola. In the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977, the Soviets had international law as well as African opinion on their side when they intervened on behalf of Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam. While the Soviets lost favor in Somalia as a result of their dispatch of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, they gained a more populous, regionally important ally.

The Cold War began to wind down in Africa in the late 1980s, and its decline is marked particularly by the promulgation of the Angola-Namibia Peace Accords in December 1989. These accords, negotiated with the full participation of the superpowers, led to a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and independence (from South Africa) for Namibia in 1990. These accords also facilitated an end to the apartheid

regime in South Africa, given that anticommunism had been a legitimating tool of the National Party of South Africa among the white community. Several other regimes in Africa whose existence depended heavily on superpower support, including those in Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia, also collapsed within two years of the Angola-Namibia Peace Accords.

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See also: Socialism in Postcolonial Africa; Soviet Union and Africa.

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Collaboration as Resistance

Even though very limited areas of Africa were under European domination by 1880, during the period of the “new imperialism” that followed, virtually the whole continent came under European domination. However, African reactions and responses to European imperialist conquest and occupation were not indifferent or passive. Various leaders resorted to different devices and measures designed to maintain their independence. Different types of motivation and calculations went into assessing the interests and probable consequences of collaboration, resistance, or compromise. Whereas some African chiefs vehemently opposed the change in their political fortunes, others chose to ally with the Europeans in the hope that they would maintain their sovereignty rather than lose it through war. In fact, almost all states, and most of the rulers recognized as resisters (such as Samori Touré in Guinea and Menelik II in Ethiopia), attempted in some way to come to terms with the European powers, and even manipulate them when possible, so that they would not have to fight against them. The African leaders who resorted to this type of delaying action have been referred to as collaborators. But more often than not, they were the same people at the center of all policies, both those centered on resistance and those focused on collaboration.

Collaboration was a means by which African leaders responded to imperialism using an active policy of cooperation and compromise rather than submission. Collaboration, in this case, was a method of resistance. It was adopted by those African rulers who felt that the best way to recover territory lost to enemies or rivals was to cooperate with the Europeans. Thus, collaboration and resistance are different sides of the same coin. The focal point in either case was how best to deal with European invasion of the African continent. Short-term advantages from treaties or collaboration with Europeans included access to firearms, consumer goods, and opportunities to enlist powerful allies in internal and external conflicts. Any distinction between collaborators and resisters is, therefore, mechanistic.

Faced with the option of surrendering, retaining, or regaining sovereignty and independence or going to war, many African rulers opted to defend their sovereignty; but they differed in their tactics. Touré of the Mandinka empire and Kabarega of Bunyoro adopted the strategy of both diplomacy and military means. Touré, aptly called the “Napoleon of the Sudan,” resisted the French conquest of the Western Sudan with remarkable tenacity between 1891 and 1898. Yet, in the initial phase of European contact, Touré was ready to negotiate bases for genuine cooperation with the European powers (France and Britain) on condition that they recognized his sovereignty and independence. On the other hand, the French seemingly accepted Touré’s overtures while they built up their military force in the Niger Valley and invaded Boure in early 1885. When Touré realized the extent of French hostility, he contacted the British in Freetown and tried to secure their support to ward off the French. The British response to Touré’s overtures was cool. The latter’s diplomacy was doomed to failure by the incompatibility in objectives and the hostility of the French.

In much the same way, Wobogo, the Mogho *naba*, first received Captain Binger cordially to the Mossi Kingdom. Over time, however, his cordiality and cooperation were replaced by cautious awareness and suspicions of French activities as a threat to his independence. In 1891, Wobogo refused to receive P. L. Monteil at all, and in 1894 signed a treaty of friendship with George Ekem Ferguson for British protection. But the remoteness of British troops reduced the practical value of the treaty. In July 1895, when French lieutenant Voulet set out to occupy Ouagadougou, Wobogo raised an army of horsemen in defense of his state.

Like Touré and Wobogo, the *damel* of Cayor in modern Senegal accepted the French. Later, when General Louis Faidherbe tried to replace him, the

damel resisted forcefully. He outlived Faidherbe and cooperated with succeeding French governors, but the construction of a railway through his territory convinced him that the French were out to take his land, and he died in war against them in 1886.

Similarly, the Dahomean government of Porto Novo collaborated with the French to combat the expansion of British Lagos. In the end, French merchants secured a duty-free entry for their trade. The checkered course of French fortunes in Porto Nov was a direct result of the activities of the Dahomean government.

Thus, rather than see examples of African resistance as gallant anachronisms and collaborators as farsighted rulers who sought to ensure the survival of their kingdoms and regimes, scholars have increasingly come to see resistance and collaboration as two sides of the same coin. African reaction and responses to European invasion in the nineteenth century were conditioned by a multitude of ethnocultural, political, and economic factors. The introduction of European norms and power was resisted everywhere. In the end, different groups were concerned with how best to maintain their sovereignty and independence. Collaboration became the means by which some African leaders preserved this independence and even where some signed away their territories, others were remarkably successful in harnessing European support for their aims, namely, maintenance of independence, retention of power in their dominions, and elimination of rivals.

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See also: Ethiopia: Menelik II, Era of; Senegal: Faidherbe, Louis and Expansion of French Senegal, 1854–1865; Touré, Samori (c.1830–1900) and His Empire.

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Colonial Administrations, Africans in

According to Max Weber, the great sociologist and theoretician of modernity, the modern state can be compared with a factory. It is he who insisted that "the real power, the power which has an impact on daily life, inevitably is in the hands of the bureaucracy." The importance of those Africans—the overall majority of them male—who staffed the colonial bureaucracy primarily hails from the fact that they inherited power at the end of colonial rule. Many of the first generation of independent Africa's political elite had previously worked—at least for a certain period—for the colonial administration. In Tanzania, for instance, nearly all African members of Julius Nyerere's first cabinet were former members of the colonial administrative staff. But in colonial times they played a pivotal role, because the colonial state was first of all an administrative state, with markedly despotic features. Hence it was the administrators who to a large extent made up the state. Or at least they were perceived as the true representatives of state power. This has not changed very much with independence. Now, as then, the state in Africa is in many places synonymous with the government, and the government is synonymous with government services—that is, the administration.

Sure enough, in colonial times the government was by definition European, as were the higher ranks of the administration. But due to their very weak number—"the thin white line" (Kirk-Greene 1980)—from early on the Europeans had to rely on a number of local people in order to administer their African territories. Most of these locals were employed in auxiliary services; a few of them, however, were put in charge of local affairs in faraway places. Some, such as the ubiquitous government interpreters working with the European district officers, were even at the very center of things. Although they had no position of official authority, they had great influence simply due to their language skills.

All colonial powers were faced with a dilemma which centered on how to create an effective administrative structure with inadequate local revenues. Local administrations were run through those Africans that were perceived by the Europeans as "traditional rulers" or "natural rulers," which they called "chiefs" or sometimes "kings" or "princes." This solution was essentially a pragmatic one; it was not perceived as optimally efficient, but it was felt to be the best system that the limited resources allowed. In colonial Africa, *chiefs* stands for a bewildering variety of rulers, some very powerful; others with extremely limited access

to material, coercive, and other resources; some more or less “invented” by the European administrators. Colonial government often used chiefs as a shield to be held between their unpopular measures and popular critique. In any case, for the vast majority of Africans throughout the colonial period, their most immediate contact with government was to be at the hands of these “traditional authorities.”

In the early twentieth century, at least, many chiefs were preliterate. Other Africans had to have a Western-style education in order to obtain even low positions in the colonial administration. Colonial governments might try to limit the content of that education—as the Belgian Congo did, emphasizing literacy and vocational training under missionary management but until the mid-1950s systematically curbing any form of postsecondary schooling for Africans (apart from seminary training for the clergy). But such limitations rarely worked. In between the two world wars, educated Africans, or *évolués*, many of them former pupils of mission schools and now working for the colonial government, started to organize themselves into political parties, trade unions, and other voluntary associations. After World War II the new development ideology of Britain and France allocated to the “clerk class” a more important role in administration and politics. However, the local administrative power of chiefs only rarely was cut back. Moreover, access to higher administrative posts was given to Africans only at the very end of the colonial period. In Kenya as late as 1960 there were only five Africans holding senior posts; in Malawi, the first four Africans were not appointed to the Administrative Service until 1959; their number increased to 40 by 1964, the year of independence. The situation was slightly better in Ghana, where African numbers in the administration rose from 550 in 1952 to 1,950 in 1958, the year after independence.

Even a cursory look at contemporary source materials shows that the European colonizers found it hard to come to terms intellectually with their African administrative staff. In general, they depicted the Africans in very derogatory terms, which boiled down to the stereotype that almost all Africans were at best half-educated and corrupt to the bone, and at worst arrogant cheats and indolent idlers. What little admiration and respect there was was reserved for chiefs and peasants, not the “African bureaucrats” (Feierman 1990): the further they were removed from colonial culture, the better they were perceived. These stereotypes are undoubtedly mainly due to the very hybrid position of African government clerks as pupils, collaborators, and competitors of the Europeans. However, little is known about the ways in which the Africans who worked for the colonial government machinery managed their lives, and there is scant information about their professional

ethos, concepts of authority and power, behavior in public, and treatment of their fellow citizens.

Africans in colonial administrations formed a rather heterogeneous group with many different goals and conflicting interests. One could think of the conflict between bureaucratic ideals, with its stress on achievement, division of labor, and impersonality on the one hand, and the loyalty to local political culture on the other—not to mention the influence of chiefly politics with their stress on accumulation, generosity, and personal loyalty. But for all of their differences, the African bureaucrats had one thing in common: their position in the middle, between the local and the global, between the old and the new. As a consequence, one of their main tasks was to mediate between different worlds, to act as cultural brokers. No doubt, this intermediate position was cause of many new conflicts, but it also resulted in a peculiar understanding of power and authority developed from a mix of local cultural repertoires and quite specific forms of social interaction, neither traditional nor modern.

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See also: Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Ideology of Empire: Supremacist, Paternalist; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey

In spite of their rivalry, a collective cultural arrogance shared by Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal asserted itself at the time of the colonial conquest. At the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884–1885, and later at the Brussels Conference of 1889–1890, the European powers set out rules for colonization, agreeing on the duties necessary to bring order to an African continent considered disorderly. However, the colonial powers lacked clear concepts of how to administer and

exploit their African territories. Thus, colonial rule was marked by a great variety of administrative expedients, which in turn reflected the highly different situations on the ground, as well as changes over time.

None of the European powers had at their disposal all-conquering forces of superior strength when they established colonial rule in Africa. In the beginning, the colonizers usually concealed their numerical inferiority by pursuing a policy of selective terror. The practice of massacre seemed to be the best means for the colonizer to achieve maximum intimidation with minimum use of resources, most notoriously in King Leopold's Congo and Portuguese Angola.

It was only during the post-conquest period that the power of the colonizers could be strengthened into colonial domination. For this to be possible, power needed to be firmly secured; this was provided by establishing district officers or *commandants de cercle*, civil servants who operated at the local level. They were in charge of all aspects of district administration, from judicial appeals to tax collection, road construction to education, usually with a few assistants, plus specialized personnel for engineering, medicine, agriculture, or education. With the help of such people, the colonial state built itself up. Colonial rule was thereby bureaucratic rule, though it admittedly always had the despotic instrument of violent repression at its disposal. Its bureaucratic character ripened during a third period of rule, when the colonial state gained growing control over knowledge. A continuously raised bureaucratic tax became a central feature. Educational institutions, literacy, and statistics were introduced, and the capabilities of the colonial headquarters were strengthened by technical innovations such as the telegraph.

However, the bureaucratic colonial state always remained "incomplete," its power limited. In any case, it did not produce the social or economic forms it sought. The everyday life of colonial rule, characterized by violence, indicates the organizational impotence of the administration. Moreover, colonial rule never was true territorial rule. Its laws and decrees often were no more than unrealized academic plans and hopes. The routinization of colonial power and the establishment of a colonial administrative structure very soon demanded alliances and collaboration with local figures—first with persons who were perceived as "traditional" or "natural rulers," and later, though often hesitatingly, with educated "commoners." Although it was above all the British administrative philosophy of indirect rule that explicitly implied the incorporation of chiefs into the bureaucratic state apparatus, the French system of more direct rule, too, in its daily administrative routine, heavily relied on local African collaborators. Whether in this context the difference stressed by some historians between ruling *through* chiefs

(British) and ruling *over* chiefs (French) was always relevant to the colonial practice seems doubtful. All other colonial powers relied on Africans (mostly on "traditional authorities") as well in order to administer their territories. At the high noon of colonial rule in Africa between the wars, there were astonishingly few European administrators for the extent of territory they governed. The whole of French Equatorial Africa in the mid-1930s was run by only 206 administrative officers, assisted by 400 specialists and technical officers. In the same period the whole of British Africa (except Egypt, the Sudan, and southern Africa) was governed by around 1,000 general administrative officers, plus another 4,000 or 5,000 European specialists, while the Belgians ruled the Congo in 1936 with 728 officers. In Rwanda and Burundi, they ruled with an administrative staff of less than 50 Europeans. Within British Africa, the ratio of colonial administrators to local population considerably differed, running in the 1930s from 1:19,000 in Kenya to 1:54,000 in Nigeria. In any event, most day-to-day governing had to be done by African intermediaries. In the administrative sphere, Africans always had a critical role in shaping encounters between Europe and Africa.

Colonial government was remarkably uniform, regardless of the European power in charge. The key administrative unit of a colony was a district. Above this level, the larger colonies had an intermediary level of provinces, grouping several districts. At the center sat the governor, assisted by his staff and usually sharing power with some form of administrative or legislative council. These councils might consist only of the heads of government departments, sitting as a kind of advisory cabinet, but they often included important nonofficial interests such as a few "traditional rulers," the chambers of commerce or agriculture, or key trading firms. Sometimes European missionaries represented African interests. British governors enjoyed considerable freedom of action in their territories, while their French counterparts more often had to obey an order from Paris. The British regarded each colonial territory in Africa as an autonomous administrative unit. Projects of a close cooperation among neighboring colonies (the East African Closer Union; the Central African Federation) in the end never went beyond initial stages. In contrast, France united several colonies in Federations (French West Africa, or FWA; French Equatorial Africa, or FEA) and by this created long-term structures. The French insisted firmly on the spreading of the French language, while in British territories some local languages (Ewe, Hausa, Swahili) played an important role in the administrative realm. Still, the famous distinction between British indirect rule and French association was less significant than the political realities on the ground. These realities

were characterized frequently by newly defined struggles between colonizers and colonized as well as within these groups. The parameters of these struggles in turn depended upon the conditions of the respective colony: the existence of mineral resources, the condition of the soil, the climate, the density and structure of the population, local political cultures, and forms of division of labor. Administrative models could never be applied consistently for one colony, let alone for all African territories of one European power.

Never before was Africa so important for the European colonial powers than in the 15 years after World War II. In a strictly economic sense this is especially true for Africa's oldest colonial power, Portugal. But it was mainly France and Britain that launched a "development colonialism" characterized by considerable public investments that were supposed to grant the centers direct economic benefits and Africans the "maturity" necessary for future independence. Throughout British Africa, there was a great intensification of government activity; in contrast to earlier years, and to the recent war period when territories were drained of staff, this access of official energy amounted to a "second colonial occupation."

Africans were drawn into more direct contact with agents of the colonial state than ever before. Young British graduates and ex-servicemen were recruited by the hundreds, with every expectation of a lifetime career in colonial administration, and instructed in the new doctrines of good government in a series of university summer schools. Specialists were recruited to implement new policies for agricultural production and marketing, to provide new social and medical services, to work in fisheries or education.

However, the overall success of these projects was fairly limited due to financial restraints but also to British ignorance and paternalism. Moreover, the "Africanization" of public services, though an important part of the new development rhetoric, proceeded only sluggishly, especially concerning higher ranks. Numerous local government reforms suffered from permanent experiments. The growing number of educated Africans was integrated into local politics only hesitatingly. The French territories experienced a great political restructuring. Africans gained rights to electoral politics, trade-union organization, and steps toward citizenship. Administrative expansion paralleled the growth of electoral politics. The governments general in Dakar (FWA) and Brazzaville (FEA), spurred on by the new politics of development and social responsibility, sought to expand port facilities, schools, and hospitals. They were encouraged further by the demands of elected officials and their constituents, and they were funded in part by money raised through FIDES. By the mid-1950s, however, France

and Britain recognized Africa's irrelevance to the reinvigorated European and global economies: the possibility of negotiating a disengagement and a positive postcolonial relationship with African elites began to seem more attractive than continuing colonial rule, which carried immense political risks and socio-economic uncertainties.

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Colonial Federations: British Central Africa

A federation is defined as a union of states that delegate certain powers to the central government and retain others for local administration. Generally, federations are formed to make common goals achievable. Federations are generally established for sociopolitical and economic expediency.

The British East African Federation exemplifies the concept. Kenya, seen as the would-be site of the central government, would harness the economic potentials of the other two sister countries of the federation, Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) for the benefit of all in the region.

The British Central African Federation of 1953–1963 was formed along similar lines. It was initiated by the settlers of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), a territory that was named after, and administered on behalf of, the British government by the diamond magnate and imperialist Cecil John Rhodes. He ruled it through a chartered company

granted by the British government called the British South Africa Company.

Following the death of Rhodes in 1902, the end of company rule, and the attainment by the settlers of responsible government in 1923, the settlers agitated for some kind of amalgamation with the territories of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). The two were British protectorates (as opposed to British colonies like Southern Rhodesia and Kenya). For such an amalgamation of a protectorate and a colony to come to fruition, it was understood by British government officials that it had to have the support of the African inhabitants.

In 1929, the British government set up the Hilton-Young Commission ostensibly to conduct feasibility studies on the proposed Federation of Central Africa; the results affirmed the possibility of such a venture, but with an emphatic proviso that African interests had to be taken into account. Sir Godfrey Huggins, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953, pursued the federation scheme vigorously. Following the 1935 Victoria Falls conference between Southern and Northern Rhodesia, another commission was requested to look at the possibility of a federation. The 1939 British Bledisloe Commission accepted the federation in principle, but deferred taking any action on the matter until after the end of the war.

Many reasons were advanced for the formation of the federation. Closer political ties of the federated territories would help in the development of their respective resources; individual territories were thought to be too vulnerable because their economies were not balanced. Copper deposits in Northern Rhodesia, agricultural products and labor from Nyasaland, and the budding industrial and agricultural sectors of Southern Rhodesia could all be harnessed to make a sound Central African economy; railways could be built, rivers dammed, power developed to supply the growing industry, and farming improved to feed the ever-growing population. The federation was also supposed to attract foreign investments that would contribute to a stronger economy, and the standard of living would be raised as the federation generated more employment opportunities. More subtly, the federation was intended to halt the onslaught of the rise of African nationalism emanating from the Gold Coast (Ghana), which sought self-government and eventual independence. The settlers feared that African nationalism would end their colonial program.

The federation came into existence in 1953 with the support of almost two-thirds of the settler electorate in all three territories. Its government was headquartered in Salisbury, then the capital of Southern Rhodesia. The federal constitution was designed in such a way that the settlers dominated the electoral roll, quite contrary

to notions of multiracialism and equality, the premises upon which the federation was ostensibly built. Africans were initially only allowed paltry representation in the federal parliament by two members from each federated territory. In the subsequent years of the federation, the settlers increased African representation to 15 seats out of a total of 65, in a bid to appease mounting African discontent.

The key concept of the federation, pursued by the successive federation prime ministers Garfield Todd, Sir Roy Welensky, and Sir Edgar Whitehead, was *partnership*. It was a subtle term designed to convince the British government and the Africans that the federation was color-blind, and that the Africans and the settlers were partners in championing the region's future.

The vagueness of the term *partnership*, and continued race-based policies, sparked African opposition that eventually led to the federation's demise. The federation was increasingly seen as a settler ploy intended to dominate all aspects of African life. The franchise was restrictive, allowing only a selected number of Africans to vote. The salaries and working conditions of the Africans were not comparable to those of settlers. Land continued to be owned by Europeans and racial discrimination was rife.

Nationalists then opposed the federation. They formed political movements, designed to achieve self-determination for the Africans. The northern territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in particular, wanted secession from the federation. They argued that they were protectorates and not colonies like Southern Rhodesia. The British prime minister Harold Macmillan's 1960 speech on the "winds of change blowing across the continent of Africa" strengthened African opposition to the federation. Ghana had become independent in 1957, and other countries of Africa were about to follow suit, territories of the federation included.

Southern Rhodesia had a larger settler community and was not prepared to change the constitution of the federation; therefore it opted to secede from the federation and perpetuate settler domination. With the independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland looming, the federation was headed for a demise. Southern Rhodesia, however, was adamant that it was not going to follow the example of its northern neighbors. Instead, it was intent on negotiating with and if need be wrenching power from Britain in a determined effort to secure independence for the minority settlers. In 1963, after ten years of existence, the federation collapsed as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were just about to become independent, while Southern Rhodesia agitated for a unilateral declaration of independence, which came into being in 1965.

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Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa

French Equatorial Africa (FEA) was a vast region of central Africa ranging from tropical rain forest to arid desert. Its constituent parts became the modern states of the Central African Republic, Chad, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Gabon. Although one of the largest territories of colonial Africa, it was very sparsely populated (an estimated 3.2 million people in 1930) and had one of the least developed infrastructures of the colonial era.

French interest began with coastal trade to Gabon and the establishment of a settlement for freed slaves at Libreville in 1849. The explorer and adventurer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza was the first European to penetrate the dense interior in the 1870s and 1880s and explore the tributaries of the Congo River. The establishment of the Congo Free State by King Leopold of Belgium and concurrent French expansion south from Algeria and east from Senegal created a strong interest among French imperialists in an empire converging on the remote Lake Chad. The Comité de l'Afrique Française was founded in 1890 to encourage public interest in Africa and the support of new missions. By 1900 the French claimed all of the territory between the Congo Free State frontier on the Ubangi and the central Sahara. Resistance was considerable, especially from the kingdom of Wadai and the sultanate of Dar Kuti, but these were reduced by 1911.

The administrative structure of FEA was patterned on the recently established French West Africa, with a division into four territories (Gabon, Moyen-Congo, Oubangui-Chari, and Tchad) governed as a federation from Brazzaville, on the Congo River. African sovereignty was legally suspended in a series of decrees in 1899, which annulled all existing treaties and vested sovereignty in the French state. However, effective administration was almost impossible given the paucity of financial and human resources, and in 1908 only 26 per cent of the territory was governed by colonial

officials. The lack of revenue produced by this huge area, especially compared to the Congo Free State, led the French government to grant commercial monopolies to concessionary companies in return for rent and 15 per cent of the profits. The companies operated virtually free from government oversight and paid low prices for products such as ivory that could be resold for huge profits. Company agents conscripted African labor and extracted quotas for productivity that rivaled the abuses widely reported in the neighboring Congo Free State (after 1908, Belgian Congo). Despite the protests of liberal opinion in France, the system remained largely unchanged through the interwar period. A reported 17,000 African laborers reportedly died building 100 miles of railroad from Brazzaville to Pointe Noire. Government revenues, derived primarily from a poll tax, were used to support the (small) colonial administration and police force, and very little was left for education or other services that would directly benefit the inhabitants. In 1960, on the eve of independence, the entire territory had only five university graduates.

The poverty and brutality of French rule, the sparse population, and poor education made FEA difficult ground for nationalist movements. Nevertheless, a Christian messianic movement founded by André Matswa Grenard in the 1920s had elements of a modern political character. A product of mission schools and the customs service, Grenard founded a kind of self-help movement in 1928 that collected funds in Brazzaville and enjoyed wide support among the Bakongo people. Official suspicion led to his imprisonment for fraud, touching off violent protests in Brazzaville. The movement survived, avoiding all contact with Europeans, but played no role in the future political development of the colony.

Events in metropolitan France had the greatest effect on the political evolution of French Equatorial Africa. Colonial administration in Africa was largely unaffected by Germany's defeat of France in June 1940 and the replacement of the Third Republic by a collaborationist regime at Vichy. Under the terms of the June 22, 1940, armistice, France retained administrative responsibility for its empire until a final peace was negotiated. There was much support for the Vichy regime among French colonial personnel, with the exception of the Guianese-born governor of Chad, Félix Éboué, who in September 1940 announced his switch of allegiance from Vichy to the Gaullist Free French movement based in London. Encouraged by this support for his fledgling movement, Charles de Gaulle traveled to Brazzaville in October 1940 to announce the formation of an Empire Defense Council and to invite all French possessions loyal to Vichy to

join it and continue the war against Germany; within two years most did.

In January 1944, de Gaulle returned to Brazzaville for a meeting of France's African governors to discuss the postwar administration of the empire. Autonomy or self-government was ruled out in favor of territorial assemblies and the election of two representatives from each territory to France's Constituent Assembly. The Fourth Republic constitution of 1946 allowed each African territory to send representatives to Paris. French Equatorial Africa's small uneducated population ensured that the political process was dominated by the French colonial administration and by events in Paris. In contrast to French West Africa, no political party or nationalist movement of any importance emerged in French Equatorial Africa. Parties were organized on a territorial basis in the 1950s among the colonial elite and were loyal to the French state. This changed in 1956, when the *loi cadre* (enabling law) reforms dramatically widened the franchise. Parties then became more populist and ethnically based. Nevertheless, events elsewhere propelled French Equatorial Africa toward independence; de Gaulle's French Community proposals of 1958 (which replaced the 1946 French Union) granted greater territorial autonomy but retained the preeminence of French sovereignty, and finally France's willingness to grant independence to French West Africa in 1960. In August 1960, the four territories of French Equatorial Africa became independent, but remained closely tied to France economically and fiscally.

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See also: Central African Republic: Nationalism, Independence; Chad: Colonial Period: French Rule; Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: De Brazza and French Colonization; Gabon: Colonial Period: Administration, Labor and Economy; Gabon: Colonial Period: Social Transformation; Gabon: Decolonization and the Politics of Independence, 1945–1967.

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Colonial Federations: French West Africa

The administrative federation of French West Africa comprised the modern states of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. It was the largest administrative unit in Africa, with a total area of 1.8 million square miles. Until 1891, the largely desert region (generally known as the Western Sudan) was under the control of army officers largely independent of the nominal governor at the coast in Saint-Louis. As French expansion proceeded eastward from Senegal and southward from Algeria, a greater level of administrative efficiency was required. The post of governor general of French West Africa was created in 1895, but was held by the governor of Senegal, who enjoyed only modest powers over the interior regions. In 1904 a separate administration was formally created, with a governor general based in Dakar who was responsible for agriculture, health, communications, and public works. Interior boundaries were constantly redrawn through the 1920s as military "pacification" gave way to civilian administrators. Eventually all of the French West African territories were brought under a federal structure (including the mandated territory of French Togoland). The governor general in Dakar in turn supervised the governors of the separate colonies within the federation. Each was advised by an administrative council made up of officials and business representatives.

The French tendency toward centralization was evident in 1902 when the governor general was vested with the full powers of the French Republic to promulgate laws and issue decrees. Article 33 of the Financial Law of April 1900 required all administrative costs to be charged to the colony, with the exception of military expenditure. The latter was particularly important because large portions of French West Africa remained unpacified until well into the 1920s. Although various African rulers maintained a successful resistance to French rule, even those who had submitted to treaty relationships or protectorate status saw this reversed in 1904 when the theoretical sovereignty of the African chiefs was abolished and replaced by the sovereignty of the French state. The chiefs did not disappear, but they were wholly subordinate to French administrators and functioned at the bottom of the colonial apparatus, at the canton and village levels. Their duties were often onerous and unrewarding, and included tax collection, labor requisition, compulsory crop cultivation, and the provision of military recruits.

French West Africa's relative economic poverty, when compared to its British neighbors (in 1924, all of French West Africa could afford £9 million in imports, compared to £23 million for Nigeria and the Gold Coast), meant that the French territory relied more heavily on direct taxation instead of customs duties. A *capitation* (head tax) was collected from people as young as ten, and a *prestation* (labor tax) was necessary for various public works. French West Africa provided 180,000 recruits for the French Army in World War I, and after 1919 French Africans were liable for military service or work in labor battalions. French administrative practices were derived primarily from metropolitan France or Algeria. Apart from the four communes of Senegal, where *les citoyens* elected a member to the French parliament, French West Africa was unrepresented in the metropolitan government. Education remained at a minimal level; in 1945 an estimated 95 per cent of the population was illiterate. The sparse and often dispersed population (apart from Senegal) and economic poverty ensured a minimum of political or nationalist activity until after World War II.

The fall of the Third Republic in the wake of military defeat by Germany in June 1940, and its replacement by the Vichy regime, had no effect on the administration of French West Africa, many of whose bureaucrats and soldiers were in sympathy with the political Right during the 1930s. A Gaullist-British attack on Dakar in September 1940 was a failure. The November 1942 Allied landings in North Africa, however, brought a change of allegiance to the Free French, who soon established their headquarters in Algiers. At Brazzaville in January–February 1944, Charles de Gaulle and the senior administrators of French Africa discussed the future of the empire but did not effect a fundamental political reappraisal: "The aims of the civilizing work accomplished by France in the colonies exclude any thought of autonomy." Nevertheless, in 1945 the provisional French government headed by de Gaulle invited each of the French African territories to elect two representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Representation of the African territories was incorporated into the Fourth Republic's constitution of 1946, of which French West Africa had 67 members (20 senators, 20 deputies, and 27 counselors of the French Union; of these, 45 were of black or mixed descent). This had the effect of removing French West Africa's evolving political class to Paris, where most associated with the Socialist or Communist party. Among the leading figures were Léopold Senghor of Senegal and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire. The elimination of the communists from the French coalition government in 1947 led to political upheaval in Côte d'Ivoire and eventually forced a divide between the French communists and their African allies, the *Rassemblement*

Democratique Africain (RDA). Led by Houphouët-Boigny, the RDA skillfully played the factional French politics of the 1950s to extract concessions for French West Africa.

The *loi cadre* (enabling act) of 1956 granted some internal self-government to French West Africa. Universal suffrage was introduced, and African representation in the territorial assemblies increased. Executive power, however, was still concentrated in the hands of the high commissioner (formerly governor general) in Dakar. Independence on the model of Ghana in 1957 still seemed out of the question. The collapse of the Fourth Republic in May 1958 and the reaccession of Charles de Gaulle to French leadership signaled yet further change. In proposing a French Community as part of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle envisioned a federal arrangement in which African territorial autonomy was increased but Paris still held substantial reserve powers. A referendum in September 1958 offered a choice between the French Community or independence; the latter implied a termination of all French assistance. Only the anti-Gaullist Sekou Touré of Guinea urged his supporters to reject the French proposals, and Guinea was promptly propelled to independence.

Guinea's example nevertheless heralded the collapse of federal French West Africa. In 1959 Senegal and Sudan formed a smaller federation called Mali, which in 1960 requested independence from France. When this was granted, the other territories also demanded independence, so that by the end of September 1960, French West Africa had become nine independent states, though still with close ties to France.

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See also: **Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Colonial Period; Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Colonial Period: Administration and Economy; Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Colonization and Resistance; Guinea: Colonial Period; Mauritania: Colonial Period: Nineteenth Century; Niger: Colonial Period to Independence; French Occupation and Resistance; Senegal: Colonial Period: Administration and "Assimilation"; Senegal: Colonial Period: Economy; Togo: Colonial Period: Dual Mandate, 1919–1957.**

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
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Colonial Imports versus Indigenous Crafts

Before European rule was formally established in the nineteenth century, a vibrant indigenous manufacturing sector existed in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The production of cotton textiles was the most important industry; next, in order of importance, were ironworking, leather crafts, and pottery. Locally grown cotton was ginned, spun, woven, dyed, and made into garments. Major cloth-making centers were found in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, the Republic of Benin, and Nigeria. In Kano in northern Nigeria, textile production was deemed to be the “national industry,” and contemporary observers claim that the city’s cloth was unrivaled in Africa for its beauty and excellence.

Iron mining and manufacturing was generally done on a small scale throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there were large centers in Oume in southern Côte d'Ivoire and Oyo in southwest Nigeria. Metalworking was done by blacksmiths and metalworkers who either traveled to mining centers with portable tools or purchased pig iron from traders. Hoes, spearheads, knives, blades, and swords were the main items produced for local consumption. Leather goods were manufactured from hides and skins; production was concentrated in the savanna lands of Sub-Saharan Africa, where animals were reared. Pottery making was widespread, and was done mainly by women; the industry provided most of the containers that were used to store liquids and foodstuffs.

The industrial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa underwent a profound transformation after Portuguese explorers opened up the African continent more fully to trade with Europe and Asia. Between 1500 and about 1850 European traders made a conscious attempt to replace indigenous products with cheaper imports from Europe. Their efforts were enhanced by the economies of scale accruing to them because of the Industrial Revolution. The increase in European imports provided a disincentive for the improvement of technology in the cotton manufacturing and ironworking industries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Cheap imported yarn was more attractive to weavers than yarn produced by the much slower weaving process, and cotton



Weaving in Africa: traditional methods on an industrial scale, Cameroon, 1920s. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

could also be purchased in a greater variety of colors than was available locally. Imported iron bars allowed metalworkers to overcome some of the deficiencies in the African manufacturing process. By the 1820s, for example, cotton textiles from Europe were West Africa’s most important import. Significant quantities of iron bars, metal vessels, blades, and tools were also imported. Prior to the onset of colonial rule, the high costs of internal transportation in Sub-Saharan Africa and the quality and intricacy of locally manufactured garments enabled textile industries in the interior to remain competitive. On the other hand, ironworkers survived by using imported iron bars to manufacture blades, hoes, and woodworking instruments.

Formal European colonization in Sub-Saharan Africa began in the second half of the nineteenth century, and by the beginning of the twentieth century most states in the region were under either French, British, Portuguese, German or Belgian rule. Colonization led to the dismantling of many of the physical barriers that had permitted indigenous manufacturers to withstand the competition from European imports. Critically factoring in this process were the roads and railways that were constructed to facilitate the exploitation of the resources of the interior. In addition, the pressure exerted on traditional industries during colonial rule increased because colonial administrators sought to retain the advantages of market control by opposing industrialization. As the cost of moving manufactured goods and raw material between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa declined, there was no reason for large overseas firms to invest in industrialization. Worse still, technological and capital constraints did not allow African producers and merchants to promote the development of internationally competitive indigenous industries.

During the colonial era a concerted effort was made to expand cotton production for export in the hope that this would have led to increased African demand for imported cotton. In French and Belgian colonies in Equatorial Africa, local chiefs in cotton-growing areas were forced to sell given quotas to merchant firms and/or government officials. Cotton imports also increased significantly throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, for example, imported cotton yarn from England increased from an estimated 200,000 pounds in the 1890s to about 1,000,000 pounds by 1914. In Nigeria colonial administrators were confident that local textile production would have declined as the industry was exposed to foreign competition. However, as in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, their expectations were not fulfilled.

The local cotton industry survived in part because there was a guaranteed market among the elite and status-conscious Africans for local textiles such as those manufactured at Iseyin in western Nigeria and Kente cloth in Ghana. Also, in parts of Nigeria, for example, weavers usually belonged to households that produced their basic needs of food as well as other necessities. Often they were farmers, merchants, or Muslim clerics for whom textile production was a part-time activity or off-season occupation. For them the marginal cost of production was virtually nonexistent. Therefore, they were able to produce cloth that could compete in price with imported cloth.

The nature of the organization of production also enabled the pottery industry to survive. Leather craft, on the other hand, retained its importance primarily as a result of the growth in the livestock industry in Sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period. The traditional industry most affected by colonial imports was iron mining and manufacturing. It declined significantly during the colonial era because even though the capital outlay for traditional smelting was negligible, the iron output of furnaces was small and inferior to the European import. By 1939 cheap colonial imports had virtually eliminated the markets for locally smelted iron and its byproducts, in all but the very remote areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.

ALLISTER HINDS

See also: Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Colonialism: Ideology of Empire: Supremacist, Paternalist

The nineteenth century saw a dramatic change in Africa's contact with Europe, as European powers sent their armies to initiate and implement their plans of colonization. The gradual European penetration into the African hinterland escalated in the 1870s, so that by the 1890s the entire map of Africa was altered, with large tracts of land nevertheless still unconquered. Numerous European exploratory and missionary expeditions were made into the African interior, with clear motives. For example, the International Geographical Conference held in Brussels in 1884 had the theme of bringing civilization to Africa and an end to the transatlantic slave trade. European nations initiated and maintained the trade, making huge profits from the barbaric conditions of the transatlantic passage and the enslavement of Africans in the Americas. Thus, the supremacist and paternalistic underpinnings of colonialism were etched in the motives of European exploratory and missionary expeditions that were precursors of invading armies. By 1914, when World War I broke out, all of Africa, except for Ethiopia and Liberia, was under European colonial rule.

In Africa, European expansionism and empire building manifested themselves in the forceful acquisition of territories and colonization. Europe's relationship with Africa was marked by domination; fundamental decisions that affected the lives of everyone within the carved colonies were made and implemented by European colonial rulers (governors, their supporting administrative officers and armies) in pursuit of the interests of the colonial powers. European colonialism in Africa meant rejection of political, economic, and cultural compromises with Africans based on the conviction of European superiority and a belief in a divine mandate to rule and to civilize Africa.

Europe had interest in Africa for three reasons that were mutually inclusive, all of which were supported by the notion of European superiority. The first was to gather scientific knowledge of Africa, the "Dark Continent." Exploratory expeditions were, therefore, made to "discover" the unknown for Europe. The second was to proselytize and convert Africans to Christianity; so scientific research and geographical

investigations were combined with missionary work. Evangelical activities often accompanied military campaigns that killed hundreds of thousands of Africans in order to save the heathen and lost Africans who survived the massacres. The third was imperialistic. European patriots augmented national pride, political and economic grandeur of their nations, by invading Africa and laying claim to vast territories.

The rationale for European imperialism in Africa was political, cultural, and economic. The European ideological stance of the period equated colonial expansion with prestige and status. Overseas colonial possessions also brought geopolitical advantages. African colonies provided European powers with strategic advantage in their global imperialistic expansion and competition. They were provided cheap sources of labor and natural resources. European intellectuals found moral and philosophical justification for colonialism in ethnocentric arguments that Africans were physiologically, intellectually, and culturally inferior. These arguments were buttressed by military victories of colonial armies overrunning indigenous armies of African kingdoms and states. African armies equipped with old-fashioned rifles, spears, and bows and arrows were no match for cannon and machine-gun wielding colonial armies. Technological advancements in Europe were, therefore, presented as evidence of European superiority at all levels of human endeavor. Racism was an integral component of colonialism in Africa. Skin color, physiology, and a notion of the African being “the white man’s burden” (expressed by Rudyard Kipling in a poem with the same title as well as his description of African people as “half-devil and half-child”) captured the racism and paternalism that characterized European colonial presence throughout Africa. It was argued that to “uplift” and to “civilize” Africans was a duty divinely sanctioned, so the colonization of these peoples was right for the European “civilizing mission.”

While each European colonial power approached the “civilizing mission” with a peculiar national trait, they all established colonial systems that were inherently paternalistic. The French introduced “the assimilation policy” with the goal of transforming Africans into French people. Africans and African cultures were considered primitive, and though race seemed not to matter, in reality “Frenchness” in the African colonial experience was racist, supremacist, and paternalistic because it negated “Africanness.” Colonial rule was administered through *direct rule*, which took political power away from indigenous rulers and put every aspect of polity under the control of the French government.

The Portuguese and the Germans used direct rule as well. Portuguese ruled the colonies as overseas

provinces inseparable from Portugal. The German system was also highly centralized. Traditional African rulers were completely disregarded, and any resistance was quickly and violently suppressed by German military officers and private entrepreneurs, who were given power and responsibility to rule the colonies by the German chancellery in Berlin.

The Belgians operated the most brutal colonial system in Africa, that of company rule. King Leopold II of Belgium, the ultimate paternalist, made the Congo Free State his personal property. Despite its name it was in no way free, and Belgium businessmen were allowed to exploit its natural resources using forced labor. The colonized were virtually slaves enduring the most severe deprivations and were mutilated or killed if they resisted. The administrative system was controlled by a coalition of Belgian businessmen, administrators, and the clergy of the Catholic Church.

The British administered their colonies through *indirect rule*, in which the colonial administration identified the local power structure, especially the chiefs and elders, and incorporated them into the colonial hierarchy. The chiefs were at the bottom of the hierarchy and passed down to the citizenry demands for taxes and forced conscription into the colonial army or for labor. The colonial army and police force were always at hand to enforce demands and decrees should the chiefs and elders refuse to carry them out.

In every case of the European colonial system, Africans were not allowed to exercise political or economic will. Colonial administrators acted as if they understood the needs of the colonized and argued that colonization was good for them. Colonialism was presented as order that would rectify African “chaos.” African languages were termed dialects or “vernacular,” and all, especially students, were taught and forced to speak “cultured” European languages. Colonial pedagogy showed disdain for African cultures, and education was employed as a vehicle for establishing cultural imperialism and maintaining European hegemony.

The European colonizers of Africa were not only armies of occupation, but also economic exploiters, cultural chauvinists, usurpers of power, and disrupters of political growth in Africa. Supremacist ideology informed the European understanding of Africans and their cultures; thus home government policies and colonial administrations forced European cultural norms on Africans. European paternalism in the colonies was underlined by racist and ethnocentric trends of the era that were ingrained in the oppressive political, economic, and social practices.

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See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.**

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Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism

The anticolonial struggle in Africa began as soon as the European colonial powers sought to establish their control of African states and territories. What has been called “primary” resistance was waged throughout the nineteenth century by rulers and states such as the Mandinka empire of Samori in West Africa; Moshoeshe in Lesotho; and Emperor Menelik II, the Ethiopian conqueror of the Italians at Adwa in 1896.

Other early forms of anticolonial resistance, which had a more popular character, were in response to the economic demands made by the colonial authorities or European settlers and include the 1898 “hut tax” rebellion in Sierra Leone and the Bambatha rebellion in Natal in 1906. Other anticolonial economic protests used religion as a unifying ideology such as the Maji Maji rebellion in German Tanganyika in 1905–1907 and the Chimurenga revolt of the Shona people in 1896–1897. In some instances the adaptation of Christianity provided the ideological basis for anticolonialism, as in the Ethiopian and Independent African Churches in different parts of the continent, the Kitawala movement in Central Africa, and the 1915 rebellion associated with John Chilembwe in Nyasaland. Islam provided a unifying force for the anticolonial struggles of the Sanusiyya in Libya, and the resistance of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan in Somalia. In 1929–1930 in Nigeria, gender played a significant role when Igbo women organized anticolonial resistance to

British rule, in a revolt that became known as the Aba Women’s War. The rebellion, which may have been precipitated by opposition to the perceived threat of taxation, led to the destruction of native courts, looting of local stores owned by British firms, and opposition to the “warrant” chiefs imposed by the colonial authorities and to the authority of the colonial regime itself.

As early as the late nineteenth century, there were the beginnings of various “secondary” forms of anticolonialism, waged by those new social classes and strata that were formed partly as a consequence of European imperialism in Africa. In the Gold Coast, the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS), formed in 1897, was an early example of the role of the Western-educated elite in anticolonial politics. The ARPS forced the colonial administration to withdraw legislation that threatened African property rights and proposed to alienate land to the crown. In the twentieth century, anticolonial resistance waged and led by the new educated African elite increasingly assumed the form of nationalism. At first African nationalism was based on the demand for reforms to the colonial system and subsequently, especially after World War II, for African political sovereignty or political independence in the new states created by colonial rule. Anticolonial nationalism eventually had the aim of uniting all sections of the population in a colony, irrespective of national origins, against colonial rule. Often anticolonial nationalism took advantage of increasing literacy, and newspapers such as *al-Liwa* in Egypt and Azikiwe’s *West African Pilot* became important means of anticolonial agitation and propaganda. Also of importance were the ideologies of anticolonialism that developed within the continent, often influenced by political trends in the African diaspora. These were sometimes fueled by the need to vindicate the “African race” and to demand “Africa for the Africans,” as in the Pan-Africanist ideas of Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey, and others and the *Négritude* movement that was influential throughout francophone and much of lusophone Africa. Africans living abroad, especially students in the United States and Europe, often played an important part in developing the nationalist movements and transmitting anticolonial ideologies and formed influential anticolonial organizations such as the West African Students Union in London and La Ligue de Defense de la Race Negre in Paris. Increasingly, often as a result of the activities of Africans abroad, anticolonialism was not only influenced by Pan-Africanism, or notions of European nationalism, but also by the internationalism of socialism and communism.

In North Africa several nationalist political parties, based on elites that had existed in precolonial times, emerged after World War I. These included the Wafd Party in Egypt and the Neo-Destour Party, founded

in Tunisia in 1934, which is sometimes seen as the continent's first true nationalist party. Nationalist organizations were formed throughout the continent; one of the earliest in Sub-Saharan Africa was the African National Congress, founded in South Africa in 1912. In West Africa the political and commercial elite of all four British colonies joined together to form the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920. In East Africa in the early 1920s, Harry Thuku's East African Association not only united Africans of many nationalities but also began to establish African and Indian unity and agitated against the political and economic consequences of colonial rule. In many colonies, however, there was little organized political activity of this kind before World War II.

Colonial rule continued to provoke widespread economic protests that necessarily assumed an anti-colonial character, especially during the era of the Great Depression. There were armed rebellions in French Equatorial Africa during the 1920s in response to taxation demands, the collapse in international rubber prices, and French demands for forced labor on the Congo-Ocean Railway. In the 1930s farmers in the Gold Coast, with general popular support, organized two cocoa "holdups." The most successful boycott in 1937 kept most of the crop off the market, until the major European trading companies agreed to raise the price paid to the producers and the government was forced to intervene to reform the monopolistic practices of the trading companies. Protests by workers also sometimes assumed a political or anticolonial character, such as those associated with Clement Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in Southern Africa. But actions by workers were seldom effective, at least until the 1940s, when the general strikes in Nigeria and Tanganyika showed the political potential of concerted trade union activity.

World War II, which for Africa can be said to have begun with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, ushered in a new period of anticolonial struggle. African involvement in the war, which was ostensibly fought by the Allied powers against racism and for the right to self-determination, raised expectations that at its conclusion Africa and Africans would reap their just rewards. The war considerably weakened the European colonial powers, both economically and politically, and led to the world dominance of two anticolonial superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The declarations in the Atlantic Charter and at the Brazzaville Conference, the founding of the United Nations, and the postwar success of anticolonial struggles in Asia heralded the beginning of the end of colonial rule for millions of Africans. Perhaps most important, the war led to significant economic changes, increasing urbanization and the emergence of

the masses of African people onto the political stage. Anticolonial nationalism entered the era of mass support for nationalist movements and of the demand for independence. This demand, the need to mobilize the masses in the anticolonial struggle, and the threatened use of force if necessary were in evidence in the resolutions of the delegates at the Manchester Pan-African Congress held in 1945.

In the postwar period urban and rural workers began to play an increasingly significant part in anticolonial politics and new and more radical nationalist parties were formed, such as the interterritorial Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) in French West Africa and the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) in the Gold Coast. Nevertheless, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa—especially in those colonies without European settlers—African nationalism was generally channeled along constitutional lines by the colonial governments. For most African nationalists the goal was political control of the colonial state, with more or less Africanization of the economic and political institutions handed down by the colonial rulers. Such aims were ultimately not in contradiction with the need for continued economic domination by the major world powers.

It was the CPP that became the preeminent nationalist party of the postwar period, adept at utilizing popular support for electoral success and mass actions such as economic boycotts and strikes. It paved the way to Ghana's independence in 1957 and constitutional independence in most of Britain's other Sub-Saharan colonies throughout the following decade. In the French African colonies and especially in Cameroon, the RDA and other nationalist parties, even with mass popular support, had a more difficult and complex path to political independence, which for the majority occurred in 1960. With the exception of Sekou Touré's Guinea, the French government was often able to retain considerable economic and political control of its former colonies with the connivance of the local nationalist elite.

The violence that characterized the anticolonial struggle in Cameroon, where there were significant numbers of French settlers, was repeated, sometimes on a much larger scale, in most other colonies with substantial numbers of European settlers. Armed "national liberation" struggles broke out in Madagascar, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola. In the Portuguese colonies independence was only achieved in the 1970s. Independence only came to Namibia after a lengthy guerrilla war in 1990, while the nationalist struggle against settler control in South Africa, which included guerrilla actions as well as other forms of political struggle and concerted international pressure, led to majority rule only in 1994.

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See also: **Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle; Ethiopia: Menelik II, Era of; Libya: Muhammad Al-Sanusi (c.1787–1859) and the Sanusiyya; Moshoeshe I and the Founding of the Basotho Kingdom; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907; Touré, Samori (c.1830–1900) and His Empire.**

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Colonialism, Overthrow of: Northern Africa

The overthrow of colonialism depended upon the development of nationalism, which marked a break with primary forms of resistance to colonialism in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century northern Africa. Initial resistance was based on regional and Muslim solidarity, like the resistance of ‘Abd al-Qadir to the French in Algeria between 1830 and 1847. Meanwhile, in Tunisia and Egypt, there was a renewal of ideological leadership through the development of nationalist ideologies and the reform of Islamic thought. Nationalist and Islamist ideologies were formulated by those exposed to modern European thought and appealed to new social categories created by the modernizing programs of African state builders such as Tunisia’s Ahmed Bey and Egypt’s Muhammad ‘Ali. Educated in Western languages and political concepts, administrators, professionals, and entrepreneurs identified their interests within the nation-state. They provided the personnel of the colonial state system after the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. In Algeria the colonial state enabled the formation of similar social groups by the early twentieth century, as it did in Morocco after the French occupation in 1911. Muslim clerics, heads of religious brotherhoods, and lineage groups of the traditional type also played a role in the overthrow of colonialism. For instance, the Sanusiyya

brotherhood in Libya led the resistance against the Italian occupation until 1932 and thereby won the recognition of the British after the Allied occupation in 1943. As a result, when Libya became independent in 1951 the leader of the Sanusiyya founded a new, ruling dynasty. In Morocco, the Rif rebellion in the early 1920s was led by ‘Abd al-Karim, who combined the ideology of Islamic reformism with a social base among Berber lineages. This movement was unsuccessful, though it did topple the French resident, General Lyautey, who had attempted to win the support of the Berbers for the French colonial state.

While the old elites resisted social and economic change, the new professional elites were exposed to pressures that made them more in favor of change. For instance, the nationalists in Tunisia did not reject economic change; rather they protested the increasing marginalization of Tunisian investors and liberals in the period after 1907, when the French adopted more reactionary politics and a prosettler economic policy. A Muslim reformist, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Tha’alibi, formed the Constitutional (Destour) Party in 1919 to demand the restoration of the constitution written by the nineteenth-century reformer Khayr al-Din. However, Tha’alibi’s constitutionalism was superseded by a more radical, working-class movement in the 1920s and 1930s, resulting in a split in the Destour and the formation of the Neo-Destour under Habib Bourguiba in 1934. After riots in Tunisia in 1938, Bourguiba was arrested and radical activism suppressed, thus favoring the liberal moderation of the old Destour Party. Similar developments occurred in Egypt. Entrepreneurs profited from the colonial administration’s reform of Egypt’s finances, yet free-market fluctuations and dislocations in production caused by the war economy adversely affected landholders, peasants, and professionals alike, prompting the national rising against the British in 1919. The revolt was initiated by lawyers, civil servants, and students, and led by the politician Sa’d Zaghlul, who formed a Delegation (Wafd) to petition the European powers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The British adopted a policy of treaty negotiations with the more moderate, Liberal-Constitutional Party and reformed the colonial system in 1923. However, elections in that year brought Zaghlul’s ultranationalist Wafd Party to power in 1924, which legitimated the nationalist demand for complete independence.

In Tunisia and Egypt the reforms that followed the conclusion of World War I fell short of independence and therefore failed to satisfy nationalist demands. In Algeria, on the other hand, the Young Algerians did not demand independence in 1919, but only equal rights for the Algerian majority as French citizens in colonial Algeria. Assimilationists, such as Ferhat Abbas, appealed

to the republican and democratic traditions of France, yet the inability of French governments to override settler resistance to the assimilation of Algerian Muslims meant that the representatives of the Algerian population adopted an increasingly nationalist stance. In the elections of 1919–1920 the grandson of ‘Abd al-Qadir, Emir Khalid, rejected assimilation by demanding equal rights for Algerians without any loss of their Muslim status or Arab cultural identity. Nascent nationalism developed a popular base with the absorption of the trade unionists, led by Messali Hadj after 1927, and the formation of an organization for Islamic reform, led by Ben Badis from 1931. An occasion to reform the colonial system was lost in 1937, when representatives of the settlers in the French National Assembly blocked discussion of the Violette Reform Bill; likewise, Charles de Gaulle failed to provide a workable framework for a settlement after World War II. Consequently, the followers of Messali Hadj turned to open confrontation, forming the Secret Organization (OS) in 1947, which served as the nucleus for the later National Liberation Front (FLN).

Colonialism in northern Africa increased the amount of land and minerals exploited for colonial development, causing dislocations in the traditional agrarian sector and swelling the size of the modernizing, urban sector of colonized societies. Consequently, northern Africans were included in modern European economic and social realities, yet excluded from participation in political systems of the modern type. This fundamental contradiction within the colonial system provided the nationalists with a massive constituency among the lower and middle classes. In French North Africa the colonial economy divided the indigenous population from the settler minority, which controlled the best arable lands and the profitable export economy. In Egypt, similar social divisions existed between a landholding aristocracy, who were often culturally Westernized, and the mass of the urban poor and peasant population. As a result, the struggle against colonialism took on the character of a social and cultural revolution. From the late 1930s on, the Egyptian Islamist organization the Muslim Brothers organized demonstrations against social injustice, Western cultural influence, and the British military presence in Egypt and Palestine. After clashes between British forces and Egyptians in the Canal Zone in January 1952, rioters burned the colonial sectors of Cairo. The monarchy and the Wafd government, bereft of popular support, were brought down in the July Revolution, which was led by Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser. The social revolution was begun with a land reform that dispossessed the aristocracy, but colonialism was overthrown only after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which provoked the invasion of Egypt by

Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. The Egyptian victory, more diplomatic than military, finally destroyed Britain’s colonial ambitions in Egypt.

In North Africa, the defeat of France in 1940 and the Allied occupation had a profound impact on the nationalist movements. In Morocco, the nationalist parties of the prewar period united into the Independence (Istiqlal) Party in December 1943. After the war, the French attempted to pit a Muslim brotherhood, led by al-Khittani and a southern feudal lord, Thami al-Glaoui, against the sultan and the urban nationalists. But when the French exiled the sultan in 1953, the national movement burst into full-scale armed struggle. After his restoration, the sultan was able to outmaneuver the Istiqlal in the negotiations for independence, which came in 1956. Likewise, in Tunisia the ruler Bey Moncef petitioned the French for reform during World War II, while Bourguiba was liberated by the Germans and restored to the leadership of the Neo-Destour. However, the death of Moncef in 1948 secured Bourguiba’s leadership of the national movement, which had a popular base among the trade unions as well as a guerrilla army, formed in 1950. Bourguiba’s arrest in 1952 intensified resistance; as a consequence the French freed Bourguiba for negotiations between 1954 and 1956, rather than wage a war against the guerrillas.

In Algeria, the French crushed the OS in 1950, but the militants formed the Revolutionary Committee and the Liberation Army in 1953. In 1954, the defeat of French forces by the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu convinced the militants to mobilize for immediate guerrilla war. The FLN was formed and the campaign against France began on November 1, 1954. Although the French captured Ahmed Ben Bella and other FLN leaders in 1956, the guerrilla war within Algeria had the support of the Algerian population and was supplied by Egypt (and thus the Eastern Bloc) through Tunisia and Morocco. As a result, a massive French military occupation was required to defeat the guerrillas in the field, which further alienated the Algerian population. While the French could claim to have won a military victory by 1958, the war undermined the Fourth Republic. A coup d’état with military support brought Charles de Gaulle to power with greater presidential powers, enabling him to negotiate with the FLN in the teeth of settler and French military opposition. The FLN itself reorganized in 1958 with the formation of a provisional government in Cairo, which immediately demanded self-determination for the Algerian nation. Negotiations in 1960 were answered by a French terrorist group, which targeted the French government and FLN supporters in Algeria. France nevertheless conceded to FLN demands for complete sovereignty in 1961 and an agreement was signed in

March 1962. After the flight of the settler population and clashes between guerrilla groups within Algeria, the FLN leadership occupied Algiers in September 1962 to proclaim an Algerian republic under Ben Bella.

Colonialism spurred the growth of nationalist and revolutionary movements in northern Africa. In Algeria, the determination of France to hold onto the colony meant that a long, violent struggle was necessary to overthrow French rule. Tunisia and Morocco, on the other hand, were protectorates whose settler population did not elect deputies to the French assembly; therefore, negotiated settlements were less problematic. However, even in those cases armed insurrection was required to compel France to negotiate independence on African terms. This was also true of Egypt, which remained under colonial domination until Nasser forced the issue between 1952 and 1956.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: **‘Abd al-Qadir; Egypt: Muhammad Ali; 1805–1849; Tunisia: Ahmad Bey and Army Reform; Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Government and Opposition.**

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Colonialism, Overthrow of: Sub-Saharan Africa

After World War II, nationalists in Africa and Asia overthrew European colonial rule and regained their peoples’ independence in one of the world’s great revolutionary movements. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this political revolution stretched from the birth of Ghana in 1957 to the first democratically elected government of South Africa in 1994. The character and pace of

decolonization varied from relatively peaceful constitutional transfers of power to protracted liberation struggles, but everywhere it eventually reflected the irresistible nationalist demands of self-determination and democracy.

The confluence of African initiatives and a receptive international setting provided the preconditions for successful liberation struggles. The resistance of traditional African leaders to European imperialism in the late nineteenth century offered an indigenous base for this movement. Colonial rule itself had produced a new class of Western-educated Africans and independent Christian churches that increasingly challenged colonial authorities with their own ideals. As African leaders escalated their demands, they frequently won mass support from those who attributed their economic hardships to the colonial systems, such as young people, peasant farmers, and urban workers. Black struggles against racism in the Americas and the Pan-African visions of Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore also influenced and energized African intellectuals.

World War II, and to a lesser extent the Italo-Ethiopian War that preceded it, aroused African nationalism and undermined colonial rule. Fascist Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 angered African intellectuals on the continent and throughout the black diaspora. This anger expanded into a growing disillusionment with the other colonial powers when they failed to effectively assist Ethiopia, long a symbol of African freedom.

During World War II, early Allied defeats and the military experiences of thousands of African soldiers cracked the image of invincible European colonial rulers. At the same time, Allied leaders appealed in the name of democracy for a crusade against Nazi tyranny. African intellectuals generally supported this appeal while recognizing the obvious, if unintended, logic that it must lead to African self-determination after the war. Further, the significant contributions made to the Allied cause by soldiers and raw materials from Africa created a belief that some form of political and economic compensation was due.

After the war, African independence movements formed part of the global revolt against Western imperialism. In 1945 African activists, meeting in Manchester for the Fifth Pan-African Congress, shifted their efforts from colonial reform to ending colonial rule. Two years later, India’s independence offered an example of successful tactics and achievement. Continued European colonial rule also encountered pressures from the Cold War policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, the world’s newly dominant superpowers.

At the United Nations (UN), the advocates of African liberation grew as former colonies gained their

independence and admission. The UN trusteeship system, which provided international oversight in the former German colonies, sent visiting missions to Africa and provided a global forum for African nationalists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

In West Africa the end of colonial rule was relatively rapid and peaceful. Kwame Nkrumah's remarkable success in Ghana set the pace and then resonated across the continent. Accurately sensing popular opinion, Nkrumah demanded immediate self-government and established the mass-based Convention People's Party. In 1951 the party won a landslide victory at the polls that convinced British officials to release Nkrumah from prison and offer him the position of leader of government business. Over the next six years, Nkrumah won repeated electoral victories and negotiated the constitutional transfer of power that reached a climax with Ghana's independence in 1957. The following year African nationalists from across the continent gathered in Accra for the All-African Peoples' Conference. Tom Mboya of Kenya captured the delegates' intentions and determination when he pointedly told European imperialists that "Africa must be free. Scram from Africa."

Throughout western and central Africa this is just what happened in the spectacular outburst of 1960. In that year Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, gained its independence. Nigeria followed the Ghanaian pattern of a negotiated settlement with Britain, though this was complicated by efforts to reconcile the competing objectives of the nation's ethnic groups.

Most of France's African territories gained independence at the same time, but after traveling along a different political road. The French had attempted to accommodate the growing postwar African demands for liberty by conceding increasing equality within a framework of Franco-African cooperation. West African leaders, such as Léopold Senghor of Senegal and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, were elected as deputies to the French National Assembly where they joined together in a federation of parties known as the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and achieved influential bargaining positions in Paris.

In 1958, Charles de Gaulle returned to power in a France weary of colonial wars. Hoping to preempt further colonial conflict in Africa, he proposed a Franco-African Community in which the African states would have autonomy but not independence. De Gaulle used his personal charisma and the pressure of French economic assistance to win support for his plan in a referendum held throughout the French territories of western and central Africa. Although some African leaders were reluctant to abandon the goal of independence, only Guinea voted against the proposal. There, the popular Sékou Touré led opposition to

France's continued dominance of African affairs. Despite French attempts to isolate and punish Guinea, Touré received foreign aid and recognition.

The attraction of independence soon proved too powerful for the French-educated African elite in the other states, and in 1960 the remaining French territories became independent. Yet in spite of formal African independence, France maintained strong economic, cultural, political, and military influence in many of its former colonies.

Elsewhere in Africa, the winds of change sweeping the continent encountered entrenched colonial opposition. Until the eve of independence in the Belgian Congo, paternalistic colonial authorities banned political parties and provided few opportunities for higher education. Confronted with growing Congolese unrest, Brussels suddenly reversed its policies in 1959. Although politics in the enormous territory fractured along ethnic lines, Patrice Lumumba emerged as a champion of national unity and a rapid end to colonial rule. The precipitous independence that followed in 1960 was quickly marred by Lumumba's murder, chaotic ethnic and political conflict, Belgian intervention, and the need for intervention by UN peacekeeping forces.

Portugal, even more recalcitrant than Belgium, refused any significant concessions to African nationalism. Free of democratic pressures, the dictatorial regime in Lisbon brutally suppressed independence movements in its African colonies, leading to protracted liberation struggles in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Independence came only after discontented Portuguese soldiers overthrew their country's dictatorship in 1974. Ironically, these African liberation struggles indirectly brought democracy to Portugal but left an unfortunate legacy of continued instability in Africa.

Colonies with significant European settler communities also resisted the growing African demands for democracy and independence. In Kenya, the exploitation of African labor by white settlers, along with other factors, provoked the uprising of the Land Freedom Army (or Mau Mau Rebellion) in 1952. Although Britain defeated the rebellion after a major military campaign and the imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta, the country's most prominent nationalist leader, the effort failed to preserve colonial rule and settler privileges. Disillusioned with the military effort, the British eventually released Kenyatta and negotiated Kenya's independence in 1963. Failing to learn a lesson from Kenya's example, British settlers in Rhodesia attempted to maintain white rule by declaring unilateral independence in 1965. Britain and the United Nations imposed sanctions, but only after a protracted armed struggle did freedom fighters win majority rule in 1980.

In the Republic of South Africa the National Party, with the overwhelming support of Afrikaner voters, won control of the white-minority government in the crucial election of 1948. The Afrikaners, primarily the descendants of long-established Dutch settlers, had struggled both to secure control of the land from its African inhabitants and to overthrow British colonial rule dating from the early nineteenth century. To maintain white power and privileges, the National Party imposed the system of rigid segregation and brutal exploitation of the African population known as apartheid.

The African National Congress, advancing an alternate vision of racial equality, led the opposition to apartheid through decades of struggle. After demonstrations, civil disobedience, boycotts, an armed struggle and international sanctions, the South African government finally was compelled to abandon apartheid. In the process Namibia, sometimes called Africa's last colony, gained its independence from South African rule in 1990. When South Africa finally held its first democratic election, the African National Congress won a convincing victory in 1994, and its leader, Nelson Mandela, became president.

For both the country and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, this election marked the end of the long struggle for political emancipation from colonial rule. Although South Africa's complicated conflicts among Africans, Afrikaners, and Anglo-Saxons could tempt some historians to portray the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 or the establishment of the Republic in 1961 as the overthrow of colonialism, these developments were designed to perpetuate white minority rule. It was the democratic election of 1994 that brought majority rule.

The political overthrow of colonial rule in Africa left much unfinished business. The partition of the continent in the nineteenth century compelled African nationalists in the twentieth century to operate within established colonies and to wrest power from differing European political systems. As a consequence, the independence struggles often served to reinforce colonial borders despite the Pan-African ideals of many African leaders. Discontented African nationalists soon levied charges of neocolonialism, where the former colonial powers protected their economic interests and sometimes maintained their political influence despite the formal independence of African states. In many countries the rise of new African elites meant that the majority of the population exchanged one group of exploiters for another.

The transfer of power was frequently accompanied by elections and the creation of democratic constitutions, but these generally proved fragile foreign instruments. The formal structures of newly independent African

governments often lacked strong foundations in either their African societies or the colonial experience. Frequently the unifying force of the nationalist struggles was replaced by ethnic conflict after independence. Soon the continent also was rocked by military coups d'état, as colonial armies proved a more durable inheritance from imperialism than constitutions.

In spite of these limitations, the recovery of African independence, with its promises of liberty and equality regardless of race, remains a momentous achievement of African nationalists and a dramatic chapter in the continent's history.

BRIAN DIGRE

See also: **Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle; Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence; Nkrumah, Kwame; South Africa: 1994 to the Present; South Africa: Transition, 1990–1994; World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Impact.**

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Colonialism, Overthrow of: Thirty Years War for Southern African Liberation

The decolonization process that unfolded across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s as the British, French, and Belgians felt constrained (albeit from continued bargaining positions of relative economic strength) when entering into negotiations with rising nationalist elites in their several colonies came to a halt when African aspirations confronted the established power of intransigent white minorities in southern Africa. Portugal remained in colonial occupation of Angola and Mozambique, and the white settlers would soon consolidate their own control over Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) through the 1965 Unilateral Declaration

of Independence from Britain. Most centrally, South Africa's apartheid government stood firm in its illegal possession of Southwest Africa (Namibia) and confident of the sustainability of its own racist premises and practices inside South Africa itself. Such regimes were not prepared to yield to the nationalist and democratic claims of the majority in any of these territories. As had happened only infrequently in Africa north of the Zambezi—and as was not to be required in the British-controlled High Commission Territories within the region, independent from the mid-1960s onward as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—revolutionary violence and ever more effective forms of mass action would be necessary to defeat white minority rule, both colonial and quasi-colonial, across most of southern Africa. In consequence, the “overthrow of colonialism” that ultimately did occur in this region has come to stand as one of the most dramatic and heroic moments in all of African history.

Between 1960 and 1990, southern Africa became a theater of war. This was a period bounded, in its beginnings, by the 1960 banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress, which precipitated attempts by these movements to launch armed struggles in South Africa, by a further build-up in Angola of the pressures that erupted into violent confrontation there in 1961, and by Dar es Salaam's emergence as the central staging ground for liberation movements dedicated to struggles farther south in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. The period spanned the ensuing conflicts that brought independence to both Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the establishment of majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980. And it closed, in 1990, with the liberation of Africa's last colony, Namibia, and with the release in South Africa of Nelson Mandela and the lift of the ban on the ANC that set the stage for a period of negotiations (1990–1994) toward establishment of a democratic constitution there and the holding of the “freedom elections” of 1994 that brought the ANC to power.

This regional war of liberation can be seen as having significance on three levels. First, there was W. E. B. Du Bois's remarkable assertion, in 1902, that the chief issue facing the twentieth century would be “the color bar,” the “world movement of freedom for colored races.” In this respect, the Thirty Years War in southern Africa had produced, by the turn of the century, the overthrow of the last (and most intransigent) expression of institutionalized and unapologetic racist rule in the world. Second, in continental terms, the liberation of southern Africa was the final act in the continent-wide drama of nationalist-driven decolonization that was at the center of African history in the post–World War II period. Finally, the nationalist assertions in

southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s also partook in the anti-imperialist radicalization of the time that seemed to promise, at least momentarily, a socialist advance in many parts of the developing world. On this front, however, and for a variety of reasons (perhaps above all the growing hegemony of global neoliberalism by the end of the period), neither the guerrilla-based “people's wars” nor (in South Africa) a genuine mass mobilization produced sustainable socialist projects or even, in many cases, markedly democratic ones. Moreover, given the importance of Eastern military support for the liberation wars, southern African nationalism intersected with Cold War rivalries (the American preoccupation with Cuban assistance to the MPLA regime in Angola offering one especially negative case in point) and with Sino-Soviet tensions that also compromised radical outcomes.

The various territorial theaters of war (Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa) had their own concrete histories and dynamics, each considered elsewhere in this volume. Here it is important to underscore the distinctly regional dimensions of the war of liberation carried out across the subcontinent. Military relations established between liberation movements ranged from the abortive joint military campaign of the ANC and Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia in the 1960s to the far more effective links forged between the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in northern Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe during the 1970s. Political ties also developed, with Frelimo, Angola's MPLA, and the PAIGC in Portugal's West African colony of Guinea-Bissau cooperating to establish an alternative international voice to Portugal's own posturing, for example. Indeed, the liberation movements more broadly shared in the work of projecting the importance of the southern African struggle in Africa; in international forums; in the “socialist” countries; and, together with their supporters from nongovernmental organizations, churches, trade unions, and even some governments (notably in Scandinavia), in Western countries. Nor should the pan-regional symbolism of shared struggle be underestimated; the successes of Frelimo and the MPLA were potent and oft-cited points of reference for activists inside South Africa as the popular movement revived there in the 1970s and 1980s.

The various liberation movements were also forced to take cognizance of the regional nature of the resistance to their claims. Economic, political, and military links established among Portugal, Rhodesia, and the apartheid regime in South Africa in defense of white minority rule were significant. Equally so was the fact that victories in the region did not occur simultaneously. This meant, for example, that Mozambique and

Angola, coming to independence in the mid-1970s a full fifteen years before Mandela's release, became targets of ruthless wars of destabilization waged by a South Africa anxious to retain a protected perimeter against the precedent of liberation and the establishment of ANC rear bases. Hence South Africa's invasion of independent Angola, and its creation of and/or support for such markedly destructive counterrevolutionary forces as UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique (Renamo itself having first been created by the Rhodesian regime). Such aggression also was backed, both tacitly and overtly, by various Western interests, notably by the United States under President Ronald Reagan, who was both well-disposed toward apartheid South Africa and, driven by countersocialist and Cold War considerations, quite willing to target countries like Angola and Mozambique for "roll back," and to delay Namibian independence.

Against this, the extent to which the liberation of southern Africa became a focus of continental political endeavor bears noting. Despite differences among themselves in terms of concrete political priorities and the levels of commitment of resources each was prepared to offer, the already independent African states did assume, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a significant responsibility for the waging of the struggle. Central in this regard was the OAU's Liberation Committee, itself successor to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central, and Southern Africa. Moreover, the part played by the front-line states—notably, Tanzania and Zambia, and, once they had achieved their own freedom from Portuguese rule, Angola and Mozambique—in advancing the struggle farther south was notable. The establishment of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was also noteworthy as a move, however modest, to provide countries within the region with an institutional counterweight to South Africa's overbearing economic power. Indeed, despite very real shortcomings, the role of Africa in contributing to the struggle for liberation of southern Africa stands as the most significant expression of Pan-Africanism in practice yet witnessed on the continent.

The outcome of the Thirty Years War remains contradictory. Certainly, the overthrow of white minority rule was an achievement of world-historical consequence. At the same time, the devastation inflicted across the region during the war, and especially upon Mozambique and Angola (where, indeed, violent confrontation continued after 1990), was vast both in material and human terms. And, as noted, the broader goals that emerged in the course of these struggles—for the transformation of the impoverished state of the mass of the population of the region—have proven difficult to realize. Even the sense of a common regional

identity that might have been expected to surface from shared region-wide struggle has been offset, if not entirely effaced, by many of the same kinds of xenophobia and interstate rivalries that mark the rest of the continent. The transformation of SADCC into a new Southern African Development Community that now includes South Africa may hold some greater promise, though it is, at present, a regional project driven more by elite than popular interests, and one rooted in neoliberal premises.

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See also: *Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Angola: Civil War: Impact of, Economic and Social; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Angola: Peace Betrayed, 1994 to the Present; Angola: Revolts, 1961; Cold War, Africa and; Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Namibia: Struggle for Independence, 1970–1990; Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle; South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle: Townships, the 1980s; South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle, International; Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Smith Regime, 1964–1979.*

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Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle

African women played a crucial role in post-World War II national liberation movements. Their contributions, many and varied, demonstrated their courage and devotion to national liberation. Their participation in these wars also introduced the complex interrelationship between national liberation and women's emancipation.

In the settler colonies in which these wars of national liberation took place, colonial capitalism

introduced and institutionalized migrant labor and alienation of African land for white settlers or foreign economic enterprises. The majority of the migrant laborers were male. As a result, women came to shoulder increased responsibilities and to discharge some tasks that, in precolonial Africa, would have been considered male duties. To facilitate the flow of African labor, the African family's economic viability as a relatively self-sufficient unit had to be thoroughly compromised. This involved reduction of land available to Africans and imposition of colonial taxes that had to be paid in colonial cash. In Kenya there was alienation of land in Central Province and also the introduction of cash crops. These two factors restricted women's access to land. Together with constant colonial labor needs, there was economic desperation among African families (especially among those in Central Province, the Rift Valley squatters, and the slum residents of Nairobi) in the period after World War II. In Algeria, forcible expropriation of land for the white settlers, *pied noir*, undermined the indigenous local domestic economy and led to massive unemployment, poverty, and desperation. African women in settler colonies were rarely spared from compulsory labor. In Mozambique, this entailed the forcible "cultivation of cotton and rice."

Women's duties and roles varied from one liberation movement to another. In all of the liberation movements (in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia), the majority of the women activists were peasants. In Algeria, those women who volunteered were generally excluded from combat roles. During the course of the liberation war some of the women came to bear arms to perform specialized duties like strategic assassinations or delivery of bombs. The majority of the women performed noncombat roles specified by the FLN; these included roles traditionally associated with women, such as nursing or cooking. In the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, women procured food and transported it to the edge of the forests or sometimes into the interior of the forests where guerrillas resided. They also gathered information and, like women in the other movements, spied on behalf of the national liberation movement. This information involved movement of government troops with the purpose of gaining the colonial government's secrets about the prosecution of the war. A significant degree of trust had to exist and be actively maintained between the guerrillas and the women who rendered this courier service. Those women who accompanied the Mau Mau guerrillas to the forests rarely engaged in combat. Most of them performed noncombat duties: cooking, keeping camps clean, caring for the sick, and singing.

In the Mozambican revolutionary war under (Frelimo), women were initially assigned to perform

traditional female roles. They transported war material from Tanzania to internal bases in Northern Mozambique and also from one base to another. They cultivated food to feed the guerrillas and washed clothes. Men in Frelimo were initially very reluctant to cede any power to women. In 1967, a women's detachment was formed. Subject to the same training as men, this unit was deployed to defend liberated areas and also to engage in combat. Women of Namibia whose activities were coordinated by the SWAPO Women's Council also trained and fought as guerrillas alongside men. As in Mozambique, male fighters (and some leaders) in SWAPO were initially very reluctant to accept women as comrades in arms. Other women participated as teachers and nurses in the refugee camps, while some were engaged in the production and preparation of food for the guerrillas.

Women's traditional familial roles determined their roles in the liberation war (Chimurenga) in Zimbabwe. Mothers stayed in Zimbabwe and became crucial in the "passive wing." They cultivated food that fed the guerrillas, made cash contributions, and attended clandestine meetings called by the guerrillas to "spread the word." There were those young women, or daughters, who went out of Zimbabwe to join the liberation movements in neighboring countries (Zambia, Mozambique) and those who remained at home. Those young who joined the liberation movements outside Zimbabwe trained in several capacities, including guerrilla warfare. It has been estimated that, by 1977, up to one third of the guerrillas in ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) were women. At home, the young women known as *chimbwidos* prepared food and carried it to the bush for the guerrillas while evading police detection. They did laundry and obtained supplies; their services were crucial in the rural support network for the guerrillas. In all of the liberation movements, women were effective mobilizers and recruiters for the nationalist struggle.

These women activists who participated in national liberation struggles were, above all, nationalists. In almost every settler colony, the demands of women and those of the nationalist activists came to converge on the need to uproot colonialism from Africa. As well, no sizable African women's movement devoted exclusively to women's emancipation existed in any territory under colonial rule; it would have been difficult to have one. There was also the question of the definition of women's emancipation embraced by even the most radical of these national liberation movements, which tended to differ from the definitions associated with liberal Western feminism.

In Mozambique, the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) was subsumed under Frelimo. At its first conference in 1973, Machel stated that "The

liberation of women is the fundamental necessity of the liberation, a guarantee of its continuity, and a precondition for victory." This conference was at pains to warn Mozambican women against the danger of identifying men as the enemy. Gender warfare was seen as counterproductive to the revolutionary cause. It was the result of "inaccurate analysis." In Angola, the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) operated under the MPLA. Since its formation in 1962, the OMA had always seen its activities as complementary to those of the MPLA. The OMA's definition of emancipation continued to embrace the legal, political, economic and social aspects of a woman's life. The emancipation of women in Angola was seen both by the MPLA and the OMA as a long-term process. Overcoming colonial legacies and parts of traditional cultures not receptive to gender equality required structural changes, economic development, stability, and political education. Legal equality alone would not guarantee emancipation and liberation. In South Africa, the African women organized under the African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL) saw apartheid as the fount of misery, oppression, and exploitation. There could be no progress or freedom as long as apartheid remained in place.

The linkage—indeed, the close affiliation—between women's movements like the OMA, OMM, ANCWL, and their male-dominated national liberation movements has been criticized by several Western academic feminists and also increasingly by some African feminists. These feminists have argued that the integrity of these women's movements was compromised and that their focus shifted away from critical gender problems and issues because of male domination of the discourse.

The success of these nationalist struggles as champions of women's emancipation was dependent on several factors, including how fervently each nationalist struggle embraced gender equality as a precondition for victory. There were movements like the Mau Mau that failed to address themselves to gender questions, either during the revolt or in a possible liberated society. There were others that advocated for a radical transformation of the postliberated society. These included the Frelimo, the MPLA, and the PAIGC. Others opted for a more cautious, even contradictory, position. This was true of the FLN in Algeria. To avoid alienating its male supporters, the FLN chose to be vague and ambiguous when dealing with gender issues. Its dual strategy of a possible socialist transformation of society and "cultural restoration" underlined this ambiguity.

The radical liberation movements that embraced gender equality had to undertake this and other social problems within the context of almost collapsed economies, a desperate lack of amenities, and massive

poverty. In the case of Angola and Mozambique, there would also be the fateful external aggression that aimed to destroy the revolutions.

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See also: Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt; Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Women: History and Historiography.

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Colonialism, Inheritance of: Postcolonial Africa

Three hundred years of foreign domination and a century of formal colonial rule in Africa left political, economic, and social scars that are still conspicuously evident in contemporary African society. The colonization of Africa resulted in the territorial ordering of the hitherto disparate communities into defined specific territories under the ambit of the colonial powers. The territories were administered as nation-states, a development that had gained wide currency in the Europe of the late nineteenth century as the premier form of political organization. But the ordering of the African societies into the artificial construct of nation-states was so arbitrary that some communities, clans, and even lineages were torn apart and placed under different nation-states. In the same vein, many and varied societies, with little in common, were lumped together into nation-states whose construction and

boundary drawing was not reflexive of African cultural interests.

The interterritorial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers in the pursuit of nation-states disregarded preexisting cultural bonds among the various communities. One of the major challenges to the postcolonial state has been how to reconcile the arbitrariness of the boundaries and its offspring, the nation-state, with the obtaining cultural realities existing in the continent. While at its formation in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) upheld as sacrosanct and inviolable boundaries as they were at independence, postcolonial conflict—such as the search for a greater Somalia, which has led to wars between Somalia and most of its neighbors—is a manifestation of the persistent plague of colonial boundary drawing in postcolonial Africa. So too are the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, which have claimed millions of lives over the last four decades, as well as the Western Sahara conflict of the 1980s. The travails of colonial boundary demarcation and the constructed nation-state are persistent themes in the discourses on African political stability.

Colonial governance thrived on the strategy of divide and rule. It emphasized differences in culture, economy, and politics among the various communities. Under the colonial order, terms that were hitherto merely expressive of ethnic identity became transformed into stereotypical prisms of ethnic differences. By nurturing and privileging myths in which some communities were adulated as superior and enlightened while others were made to seem inferior as indolent and permanent subjects, the colonial state instituted and charted a course of unholy competition, rivalry, hatred, and destruction. Indeed, the uneven nature of economic development during the colonial period and the nature of administration—direct or indirect—privileged certain groups over others. While these characterizations were kept in control by the authoritarian colonial state and its coercive apparatus, the end of colonial rule unleashed these forces of cultural, ethnic, economic, and national intolerance with untold suffering to the citizenry.

Africa stills finds itself battling with the legacy of its colonial past in the attempts to institutionalize liberal democracy. The colonial state was not a democratic state; it was the very antithesis of liberal democracy. Thus, nationwide political parties were not encouraged. Political organization was domesticated at the ethnic or regional levels. This development, coupled with the fact that the strategy of divide and rule fostered difference and rivalry over compromise and unity, has complicated Africa's experiment with multiparty politics and majority rule.

Most of the African countries were allowed less than five years to exercise open, competitive

multiparty politics leading to decolonization. This was an extremely brief period of time considering the scars of difference and division that had been nurtured and carried to frightening extremes by the colonial order. It is also instructive that, in the case of the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, the colonial power had an impractical time table for readying the country for independence. Their abrupt departure at a time when the Cold War was at its high noon exacerbated the interparty rivalry in these two countries, whose lands were reduced to "Cold War playgrounds." Indeed, Angola has yet to stabilize its polity since independence; the same is also true of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a former colony of Belgium. The Nigerian Civil War of the 1960s, the ethnic genocide within Rwanda in the 1990s, and the turmoil in Uganda between 1971 and 1985 are all expressive of the challenges facing the postcolonial African state as a result of its colonial legacy.

But African leadership has been equally responsible for some of the political and economic problems that plague the continent. Even though the majority of European powers bequeathed to their former colonies constitutions that were meant to encourage liberal democracy, most of the African countries ended up with either *de facto* or *de jure* one-party systems or military dictatorships within the first decade of independence. The democratization of the state as well as the establishment of supportive structures for civil society became quite elusive. With pressures from ethnic constituencies, economic challenges, and external politics of the bipolar world of the Cold War era, the postcolonial African state became not only overdeveloped but also quite authoritarian in protecting local clients as well as external patrons. Indeed, the majority of the African leadership turned the coercive instruments of the state against their own citizenry.

Postcolonial African economies are replete with the scars of the uneven and exploitative nature of colonialism. African countries are among the least developed and industrialized nations in the world. While three decades or more in the life of a nation is not short and African countries must share the blame for their economic predicament, it cannot be denied that the postcolonial African economies are, by and large, a function of their colonial past. Industrialization of the colonies was hardly accorded a pride of place by the colonial powers. At independence, no African country, except South Africa, had its share of manufacturing more than 20 per cent of its gross domestic product. The continent was reduced to the role of provider of primary products such as coffee, cocoa, tea, palm oil, rubber, and cotton, whose prices were determined by the importing countries. In addition, the farm inputs as well as machinery had to be imported from those very

colonial powers that imported the raw materials, processed them, and determined the prices.

The colonial economies were directly linked to the economies of their respective metropolitan powers through an array of policies ranging from control of currency, trade policies, and infrastructure. The development of colonial economy and attendant infrastructure was not meant to promote trade within the continent. The colonial rail and road networks in Africa speak to the intent of their planners. The infrastructure invariably linked “economic areas of interest” in the hinterland to the ports at the coast, where the primary products were shipped abroad to the metropolitan countries for processing before being exported back to the country. This deliberate underindustrialization, coupled with slanting infrastructure, manipulation of currency, and trade policies through price fixing and monopolistic tendencies has adversely impacted Africa’s postcolonial economies.

Out of the gloom of the past there is, however, a guarded optimism as Africa, like most parts of the world, is grappling with the transition to liberal democracy by instituting various reforms in support of that goal. Although most African countries have embraced competitive multiparty politics, this is only one step on the long road to liberal democracy. Africa has not been oblivious to the adverse economic scars of its past. African countries have instituted a number of correctives with a view to taming the wild economic excesses of its colonial legacy. The formation of regional economic blocks, namely the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community, and Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, was aimed at reducing tariffs among the member states with a view to promoting trade within the continent. Industrialization is also a topical theme in the development plans of African governments.

Despite these positive moves to redress the economic shortcomings of the past, African countries have to contend with a whole array of external economic actors dictating the nature, course, and speed of economic reforms in their countries. Both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund exercise unparalleled economic influence over Africa. The African state in the era of structural adjustment programs is being forced to cut costs by implementing prescribed measures such as debureaucratization, import liberalization, and cost-sharing in the provision of basic needs such as education and health care under the threat of otherwise losing economic aid. While it is too early to assess the extent to which the policies will catapult Africa from its economic quagmire, it is a point of fact that Africa has never overcome the setbacks put in place during the colonial era.

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See also: **Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Evolués, Politics, Independence; East African Community, the, 1967–1977; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence; Polisario and the Western Sahara; Rwanda: Civil Unrest, and Independence: 1959–1962; Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution; Southern African Development Community; Uganda: Independence and Obote’s First Regime, 1962–1971; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

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Colonialism: Impact on African Societies

Although the European colonial intrusion into Africa had roots that stretched back to the Portuguese enclaves of the sixteenth century and the Dutch East India Company’s South African colony in the seventeenth century, the colonization of the continent as a whole could be said to have begun with the French invasion of Algeria in 1830; it lasted until Namibian independence in 1990. Within this 160-year time span, European governments both consciously and unconsciously caused massive changes in African politics, economies, societies, cultures, and religions.

In keeping with nineteenth-century ideas about the role of government, European powers in Africa set up administrations whose main focus was the maintenance of order rather than any type of economic or social development. At the same time, there was a notion that the colonies should be made to pay for

themselves; European powers wanted the colonies but did not want them to become economic burdens. As a result, during the early years of colonialism European governments either kept relatively small colonial staffs or contracted out the duties of governance to chartered companies (as with the British Royal Niger Company in northern Nigeria). In either case, the European administrations needed to make alliances with elite groups in the colonial population to ensure effective governance (e.g., the Barotse in Northern Rhodesia, the Baganda in Uganda, the Fulbe in northern Nigeria, and the coastal Swahili peoples in German East Africa). These types of alliances had the effect of favoring certain groups over others, often creating or exacerbating ethnic and tribal divisions (e.g., Belgian support of the Tutsi vis-à-vis the Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi). They also resulted, in many instances, in the creation of a privileged class from which the colonial governments drew their indigenous administrators, police, interpreters, and clerks.

While a small minority of peoples were privileged by colonial rule, a vast majority suffered. Groups that refused to cooperate with the colonial regime, as well as traditional enemies of the now-privileged groups, quickly found themselves frozen out of the power structure in the colonies. Examples of groups who resisted, rather than cooperated with, colonial rule are numerous. The Ndebele and Mashona in Southern Rhodesia revolted against the white colonizers several times in the late nineteenth century; these groups lost their lands and were forced onto reservations, often deprived of their livestock, where they lived in new circumstances in societies broken up as a result of war and forced migration. In Uganda, British favoritism toward the Baganda met with resistance from the latter's traditional enemies, the Bunyoro; British rule included giving Bunyoro lands to the Baganda, deposing the Bunyoro ruler, and insisting upon the Bunyoro appointing Baganda administrators. In German Southwest Africa (Namibia), the Herero revolt resulted in two-thirds of the Herero population being killed, all their lands seized by the colonial state, and the government forbidding survivors to own livestock.

In some instances colonies were used as settlements for relatively large numbers of Europeans (e.g., German eastern and southwest Africa, Cameroun, and Togo; French Algeria; Portuguese Angola and Mozambique; the British South Africa Company's encouragement of settlement in Southern and Northern Rhodesia; and, most obviously, South Africa). In most cases, governments (or companies) encouraged European settlement by providing economic incentives, some of which included free land, provision of agricultural supplies, transportation and relocation costs, and favorable trade terms with the home country. In some areas (such as

the Portuguese colonies), settlers operated like feudal states; settlers had the right to tax, administer justice, recruit laborers, and raise private police forces on their own estates. In other cases (e.g., Algeria), settlers comprised a powerful lobbying group in the home country and were able to significantly affect colonial policy.

In the economic sphere, colonialism also brought major changes to the continent. Before the colonial era, most African regions did not have any system of wage labor. For colonial administrations, this presented a difficulty: how to mobilize people to do the labor of the government, such as constructing roads, canals, and bridges. The answer in many cases was simply to force Africans to labor for the colonial regimes; colonial administrations worked with local chieftains, who supplied the governments with slaves and tribute labor. The Congo Free State under the Belgian King Leopold (and from 1908 ruled by Belgium as the Belgian Congo) is the classic example of the abuses of colonialism. In exploiting the region's wild rubber, ivory, and palm oil resources, the government not only used forced labor but also introduced bodily mutilation and lashings as punishments for a variety of offenses and often used hostage taking as a way of ensuring villages met their rubber quotas.

Despite such abuses, colonial governments did succeed in many instances in improving infrastructure; by World War I, the road system in central Africa had opened up most of the interior of the continent for transportation. Though development per se was generally not a priority for colonial regimes, construction of roads, railways, canals, and the like was important, as these were needed for moving troops, supplies, and trade goods through the continent. Many historians argue that the diminution of conflict between African peoples and the construction of this sort of infrastructure led to a period of "colonial peace" that in turn resulted in more attention being paid to development and to social, cultural, and religious issues. Others, however, stress the dislocation of African societies and the disruption of indigenous laws and authority and argue that the colonial peace was instead a type of cultural warfare.

In West Africa, colonial governments entered into an economy that already included the production of cash crops used for trade with Europe (though most agriculture was still for subsistence). Colonial administrators thus could simply tax already existing trade and agriculture and encourage further developments in peasant production in order to raise revenue (as the French did in Senegal). In central and eastern Africa, Africans were also required to pay tax to colonial governments; the result was that Africans were in effect forced to work for Europeans (usually as migrant laborers on agricultural estates) in order to raise the

money needed to pay their taxes. Economic reorganization of this type, coupled with the use of coins and notes, helped expand trade and bring parts of Africa into a cash-based market economy. Yet it did so at terrible cost to the people. As Africans were forced into wage labor in order to pay colonial costs, they tended to work in nonagricultural sectors; not only did this disrupt rural life, increase rural poverty, and contribute to rural-to-urban migration, but it was also ultimately to contribute to the postcolonial famines of the 1970s.

African societies and cultures also experienced significant dislocations and alterations during the colonial era. As colonies were established on the continent, borders were drawn that in many cases bore no relationship to indigenous and political realities. Colonial borders thus served to group together traditional enemies and to divide communities that had previously been united, the worst example of the latter being the division of the Somali people among British, Italian, French, and Ethiopian authorities.

Though primarily a European conflict, World War I affected Africa profoundly. The European colonial powers used their African colonies as sources of men for battle and resources and wealth to finance the war and supply their troops. Initially, African men joined the war as part of already established colonial militaries (e.g., the British West African Frontier Force, the Belgian Force Publique, the French Tirailleurs, and the German Schütztruppen). These regiments were enlarged when the war began, and African men joined them either out of obedience to their traditional leaders or in hopes of earning wages. However, as the war continued and loss of life mounted, colonial powers began to require greater military service of the mass of their subjects. French forces during the war included over half a million Africans, some 200,000 of whom died in the war. The British conscripted over a million men as combatants and support personnel; German, Belgian, and Portuguese forces also included large African contingents. While there is no agreement on the total number of African lives lost in the conflict, a conservative estimate puts the figure at 300,000. Not only did Africans lose their lives, but African societies were further disrupted as men fled and hid to avoid conscription or staged protests that turned violent.

As European authority began to replace traditional authority, crimes began to be tried in colonial courts, and local chieftains began to be forced or enticed to work (in a subordinate position) with the European administrators, traditional leaders began to lose their legitimacy. Since most traditional leaders relied on religious sanction for their rule, as they lost legitimacy and were increasingly seen as unimportant, religious questions began to be raised as well.

Since colonial governments tended to focus on political and economic matters, education and social work were left largely to European missionary societies; in most parts of Africa, missionary work preceded the formal establishment of colonies. Colonialism gave new energy to these missions, as European men and women were increasingly attracted to the idea of converting the indigenous populations of the colonies. Mission work was most often done through the establishment of village schools, where children would be taught basic reading, writing, and mathematics and given religious instruction. Conversions to various denominations of Christianity were quite successful almost everywhere in Africa where Islam was not the predominant religion. The result was the formation of a new class of mission-educated Africans who often became not only the driving force behind further education and mission work, but also a rival center of power challenging the traditional elites. Those educated in the mission schools were able to deal with colonial administrators more easily and as a result often gained positions in the colonial administration.

While missionary education might have been initially beneficial for the colonial powers, it gradually became a source of opposition to European rule. Mission-educated leaders began to demand the Africanization of the religious and political institutions implanted by the West; it is from this group in society that many of the first generation of African nationalists came. These African Christians not only began to criticize colonial government, but also to criticize the churches in the colonies, emphasizing the contradictions between the Christian doctrines they were taught in the mission schools and the actual practices of colonial government. One result of this was the formation of independent African Christian churches in the early twentieth century. Yet not all depictions of mission work in Africa are positive. Many historians argue that it was mission work that set the stage for colonialism by bringing Africa to European attention, portraying its indigenous peoples as weak, divided, and uncivilized.

Colonialism thus had both positive and negative effects on African societies, but in general the balance was not in favor of Africa. Colonial systems were founded for the benefit of Europe. Economies were reorganized to benefit the administration, the home country, and the European merchants, industrialists, and traders in the colonies. Political systems aimed at keeping African populations obedient and docile, rather than at providing Africans with tangible benefits. Although railways were introduced, they were to facilitate trade for the benefit of Europe. Although education was spread, it was education via mission schools that served to break down African societies and traditional patterns of social

organization. Although European administration resulted in greater resource extraction, its profits were not used to develop the colonies. And although Europe introduced modern technologies to Africa, it did not train Africans in their uses. The roots of many of the political, economic, social, and cultural problems of several modern African states can be traced back to the colonial era.

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Colored Identity: See South Africa: Colored Identity.

Commonwealth, Africa and the

Growing organically out of the British Empire, the British Commonwealth generally attempts to work by consensus. For a time, as a new commonwealth emerged after World War II, the suspicion persisted that it represented no more than an easy let-down for Britain as its empire diminished, but this perception died away during the 1970s and 1980s when issues such as apartheid in South Africa or the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia placed Britain in opposition to most of the new commonwealth. The principal value of the commonwealth association is a membership that bridges the gap between two regions (in this case, north and south) and provides its members with an additional international forum through which to express their views and needs. There are a range of commonwealth organizations dealing with many aspects of development; for example, its finance ministers meet every year. The Commonwealth Secretariat is situated in London.

From the Act of Union of 1910, which created it, until 1948, South Africa was treated as one of Britain's white dominions (with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), but when the National Party came to power in the latter year and began to implement apartheid, this policy set South Africa upon a path that would lead to its isolation within the commonwealth.

The decision of newly independent India to remain in the commonwealth, and the new formula devised by Britain under which the British monarch became head of the commonwealth association, allowed India to join as a republic. This naturally made it possible later for fiercely nationalist African ex-colonies also to join as republics. Led by Ghana in 1957, almost every British African colony joined the commonwealth at independence. There were two exceptions: Sudan did not become a member of the commonwealth, while British Somaliland was united with former Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.

The Suez Crisis of 1956, though an African commonwealth problem, just preceded the era of African independence and only South Africa took part in the heads of government debates, supporting British military action against Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt.

Two major long-running crises defined African attitudes toward the commonwealth and Britain: apartheid in South Africa, and the UDI in Rhodesia. The subject of South Africa's race policies was raised at the 1960 commonwealth meeting in London but was shelved. The issue was again raised at the 1961 meeting (the South African white electorate had meanwhile voted in a referendum to become a republic), and the South African prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd did not seek readmission for South Africa to the commonwealth as a republic.

Over the years, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs) regularly discussed the South African issue. This dominated the 1985 meeting in Nassau, Bahamas, which established the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to make recommendations for change in South Africa, though the EPG was rebuffed in Pretoria. South Africa also dominated the CHOGMs of 1987 (Vancouver) and 1989 (Kuala Lumpur), while in 1990 a group of commonwealth leaders met Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), in Lusaka. The 1991 CHOGM in Harare proposed a three-stage lifting of sanctions as South Africa dismantled apartheid. Following the all-race elections of 1994 that brought Nelson Mandela to power as the country's first black president, South Africa was invited to rejoin the commonwealth, which it did in May 1994.

Rhodesia, whose white minority government under Ian Smith made the UDI in 1965, was to be central to commonwealth discussions for 15 years, and it has

been argued, without the pressures exerted upon it by the African commonwealth members, Britain might have allowed Rhodesia to go its own way under a white minority government. A special commonwealth meeting was held in Lagos, Nigeria, during January 1966 when the formula “no independence before majority rule” was adopted. At the 1979 CHOGM in Lusaka, Britain’s prime minister Margaret Thatcher agreed to accept a process that involved months of negotiations in London and led to elections in March 1980 and independence for Rhodesia (as Zimbabwe) on April 18 of that year.

The Harare Declaration, arising from the 1991 Harare CHOGM, set forth commonwealth principles in relation to democracy and human rights. Newly independent Namibia was welcomed as the 51st member of the commonwealth. The 1995 CHOGM at Auckland was especially concerned with African affairs. On the eve of the conference, in defiance of many pleas from around the world, the Nigerian government of General Sani Abacha had the Ogoni leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight other environmental activists hanged. The CHOGM then suspended Nigeria’s membership for human rights abuses. The same CHOGM welcomed two new members to the commonwealth: Cameroon, which had been created out of the British and French mandates of the former German Cameroon, and Mozambique, which was the first country with no previous connection with the British Empire to join the commonwealth.

One of the principal subjects at the 1997 CHOGM at Edinburgh concerned the civil war in Sierra Leone. The death of General Sani Abacha of Nigeria in June 1998 opened the way for Nigeria to resume its membership in the commonwealth.

Seventeen African countries are also members of the commonwealth, and though over the years several members have threatened to leave the association (always in reaction to a disagreement with its most powerful member, Britain) none have done so. The reentry of South Africa into the commonwealth in 1994 gave the association a new sense of primacy and purpose, while the successful applications to join made by Cameroon and Mozambique illustrated that the commonwealth was valued for reasons beyond links with the former imperial power.

The 17 African members of the commonwealth (in 1999) were Botswana, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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See also: **Colonial Federations: British Central Africa; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Sub-Saharan Africa; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910.**

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Communaute Financière Africaine

At independence, the former French colonies and territories under French mandate entered into a series of agreements with France on a wide range of political, military, economic, and cultural issues. Regarding financial matters, the countries agreed to continue the monetary union they had with France when they were colonies by remaining within the French franc zone. This led to the organization of the former colonies (except Guinea and Mali) into a common currency zone called the *Communaute Financière Africaine* (CFA; African Financial Community). In 1984, Mali abandoned its own version of the franc that it had used since 1962 and joined the CFA zone. The former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea also joined the CFA area in 1985, and in so doing dispelled the image of the CFA as an exclusive club of former French colonies.

The CFA’s activities are regulated by two central banks—one for the West African countries, known as *Banque des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest* (BEAO) and the other for the Central African countries, called *Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale* (BEAC). The BEAO is headquartered in Dakar, Senegal, and the BEAC in Yaounde, Cameroon. The two banks issue the currency in use in member countries, with *CFA* inscribed on the currency. Each member country also has a national unit of the bank that acts to regulate the activities of commercial banks, develop national banking laws, and deal with monetary policies (interest rates, inflation, etc.).

The French treasury guaranteed the convertibility of the CFA at a fixed parity rate of 50 CFA francs to one French franc. CFA members who had financial difficulties were allowed to borrow from the French treasury at the low interest of 1 per cent for amounts not exceeding five million French francs. The French treasury also provided security for commercial transactions made between or among members of the community. In return, members of the community were obligated to hold a portion of their foreign reserves in the French treasury. Further, France was equally represented on the board of directors of the Central Banks, where monetary decisions and regulations were made.

In 1994, France devalued the CFA, raising its parity rate against the French franc by 50 per cent. France also insisted that future aid to countries in the CFA monetary area would henceforth be tied to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund conditions.

The adoption of a common European currency, the Euro, in 1999 led to speculations that France would devalue the CFA again. France, however, dismissed such speculations as unfounded. As a member of the European Union, France does not itself have complete control over its own monetary policy, which is regulated now by the European Central Bank. For that reason, it may not continue to back up the CFA in international currency matters and markets, when that may weaken its own monetary situation within the European Union.

Since the CFA is connected to the French franc and enjoys the backing of the French treasury, it has enjoyed greater stability in currency markets and the confidence of those engaged in business transactions with the region than the currencies of other African countries (except for South Africa). However, the arrangement also raises the issue of the independence of the CFA countries. Because the arrangements virtually give France a veto power over what the countries can and cannot do, many analysts consider such a veto power to be too high a price for the benefits of currency stability and convertibility.

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See also: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Communications

As the global economy increasingly revolves around an emerging global information infrastructure (GII), Africa will find it more difficult to compete in the twenty-first century. Since independence, most of Africa has steadily lost ground in communications development. With the exception of those of a handful of states, most African national transportation and communications networks are badly deteriorated, outdated, and grossly insufficient for the large and growing urban populations who depend upon them, let alone rural citizens (who have rarely enjoyed such services). Africa's information infrastructure is by far the least developed,

least accessible, and most restrictive in the world. Privatization of telecommunications and broadcasting has led to some improvement in a few countries, however, such as Uganda and Botswana.

In setting priorities for communications development, all African governments face painful dilemmas. Never before have African states been presented with such an array of choices in telecommunications services and providers. Dependence on expensive, increasingly sophisticated imported communications technologies is near total. At the same time, the communications infrastructure in most places is so rudimentary that one must rank road construction and rural electrification far ahead of even extension of telephone service, newspapers, and television to rural areas. Only far into the future might one realistically put in a claim for meaningful expenditure on development of computer networks, microwave links, and satellite access despite the fact that these have already become the "basics" of the global communications infrastructure.

Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere once remarked that "while you (the United States) are trying to reach the moon we are still trying to reach the village." In the past, and continuing to a certain extent today, extension and development of communications in Africa was based primarily on the interests of the Western colonial and global economic powers. Historically, this meant linking African colonial cities with European capitals via oceanic cables and the laying out of national transportation and communication infrastructures from coastal capital cities to regional administrative centers, with very little effort to connect colonies with each other. It has always been easier to phone Paris or London than to communicate with fellow citizens up-country, and even today there are few interstate highways linking African states.

Until the 1970s, railways built by the departing colonial powers constituted the principal commercial lifelines for many new African states. Most lines suffered declines in quality of rolling stock and track, were put under parastatal management, and cut back service as debt forced deferred repairs and maintenance. Few passenger lines remain. Freight lines are significantly better off, at least within and between some countries, particularly in the South African Development Community subregion.

Following independence, paved, all-weather roads built by colonial governments fell progressively into disrepair, particularly in areas where climate conditions break down pavement rapidly, as in tropical West Africa. A few states, like Botswana, maintained, expanded, and modernized road networks with significant external financial assistance.

Most African countries set up national airlines, as parastatals, after independence. Escalating costs,

inefficiency, and growing competition from global carriers forced many into debt, resulting in deteriorating service and fewer destinations. Indebtedness plagues even those airlines which have been well managed, forcing cutbacks.

There are more personal telephone lines in New York City's borough of Manhattan than in all of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of main lines is lower than one per 100 persons. Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, at over 111 million, has fewer than 500,000 main lines. South Africa and Botswana maintain and are extending modern, dependable telephone and telecommunications systems, including telex, telegraph, fax, and radio communications services. Until very recently, these were managed by government parastatals. Botswana's 40,000 telephones are connected internationally through satellite stations and microwave relays.

Video technology has enjoyed a limited educational and developmental impact but made a deeper entertainment impact in Africa. Videocassette recorders (VCRs) have been employed by religious groups in evangelization and social work. Some countries have employed the technology (audiovisual education) to teach literacy and to educate women on issues of child care, nutrition, health, and income-generating activities. Most VCR technology in Africa is used in private homes for entertainment. Videocassette recorders and players are generally owned by middle- and upper-income urban dwellers, supplanting boring, single-channel state-run television services and movie theaters. Most African cities today have several large video rental shops with a wide selection of popular movies from the United States, Europe, and India.

African access to satellite communications technologies significantly increased in the 1990s. The most common applications were to extend national telephone and telex communication networks. Only in the mid-1990s did satellite distribution of national television and radio broadcasts become an option for some state networks who could afford the high costs involved. Some of the larger countries have domestic satellite systems with transponders leased from INTELSAT for purposes of receiving foreign news via satellite. By the close of the decade, considerable progress had been made in establishing regional satellite systems for common carrier telecommunication and for broadcasting.

Significant inter-African communications cooperation is now occurring via such organizations as the Union of National Radio and Television Organizations in Africa, the Regional African Satellite Communications System, and the Pan-African Telecommunications Network. Despite the creation of the Pan-African News Agency in 1983, most African countries continue to depend upon Western, transnational news

agencies, even for news about Africa. These organizations continue to suffer from severe shortages in finance, equipment, and personnel. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the World Bank, the German government, and the United States Agency for International Development have provided significant assistance.

By late 1995, well over half of all African countries (33 of 54) had developed some form of low-cost dial-up service to the Internet. Fourteen had achieved live Internet public access service, and full Internet access had been achieved by South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho, with at least as many countries soon to follow.

A number of Western-based communications interests have begun to undertake special efforts to promote and underwrite development of African telecommunications infrastructures, including Teledesic, Iridium, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and the Internet Society. Cellular telephones feature prominently in these plans, as do satellite links. AT&T's Africa One plan calls for an undersea fiber-optic cable system that will ring the entire continent.

The Internet Society proposes an "Internetworking" facility, installing new Internet nodes and improving upon existing national and regional African networking links. One of the key elements of this plan involves training African network service providers so that systems are rapidly owned and operated by Africans and financially self-sustaining, and networks are open, accessible, and able to serve education as well as commerce.

The most serious obstacle to telecommunications development in Africa is lack of financial resources. For example, Iridium in 1997 estimated it would cost US\$28 billion to increase telephone availability in Sub-Saharan Africa to one line per 100 people.

Africa must find ways to transform its communications infrastructures to levels where the continent can smoothly connect with the rest of the world. Whole economies will soon be either fast or slow, with economic information and global commerce operating at near real-time speeds. Without radical, rapid telecommunications growth, economic growth prospects for Africa over the medium term are not promising.

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See also: Journalism; Media; Press.

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Community in African Society

Introduction

In spite of the continent's great size and diversity, many African states and communities interacted with one another on an ongoing basis during the lengthy period preceding colonial rule. Such interactions produced certain tangible commonalities among various African societies regarding belief systems and cultural characteristics and practices. At the same time, specific kin lineages, communities, and ethnic groups also bear, to one degree or another, marks of distinction by means of those same qualities, which also include language and heritage, among other traits. Historically speaking, a separate lineage often emerged within a community in Africa when the membership of a kin group had grown beyond one generation.

Kinship

African history began as, and largely remains, a tale of family interdependence and connectedness. Kinship is a set of relationships linking a number of people who may or may not be connected through biology. The institution of kinship, in which social and biological conventions are filtered through distinctly designed value systems, has long been used to establish formal relationships with members of outside communities through birth, marriage, or other family-based rituals. In precolonial Africa, the institution of kinship was often the most embraced and privileged mode of social relationship. In order to identify such networks, each African society selected specific genealogical links, while ignoring others. The history of each lineage was grounded in common ancestry, and this became the

glue that held communities together. Kinship as a primary social institution was also at the core of the labor force, with the nuclear family at the helm. The emergence of advanced agriculture introduced a differentiated and more complex kind of human organization and recognized inventory of rights and obligations.

The institution of kinship enabled communities in both centralized and decentralized societies to facilitate social, political, and economic activities. Centralized states such as the Oyo, Zulu, and the Luba-Lunda, which had a strong political structure usually headed by a king or queen, emphasized the sacred nature of kinship rule that covered peripheral fishing, farming, and pastoral communities. Royal families often had a designated male or female kin member who behaved toward the king in an informal manner, enhancing formal events by praise-singing or lampooning festivals in the evaluation and appreciation of the ruler's social and political activities. Decentralized societies like the Tallensi, Igbo, Luo, Logoli, and Nuer had no single authority enjoying a concentration of political, judicial, or military power or governance and were organized primarily by a hierarchy of kinship relations.

Kinship ideology assigned roles among kin members, which served as guides for appropriate social actions and cultural behavior. It also determined the allocation of resources and validated the outcome of physical residency among various communities. With the aid of oral traditions such as proverbs, folklore, and songs, African communities expressed the importance of the connection between kin networks and individual actions. Other activities that promoted kinship obligations included visitations, such as frequent social or home calls during designated market days; festivals or social activities, like child-naming ceremonies, weddings, and funerals; the obligation to help a kin in times of physical need, as with agricultural and construction undertakings; and the obligation to fulfill emotional needs, especially in times of distress or calamity. Important social and familial functions such as the disposal of property, wills, claims, and duties all depended on the institution of kinship. Practices like scarification, the bearing of distinct tattoos or hairstyles, and even dress codes often identified the connections between the individual, the extended family and their community. As an article of social organization, kinship gave the individual full personhood. This is visible in the Yoruba proverb *Ebi eni l'aso eni* ("your extended family members act as your closet apparel"). Hence, cultural markers like scarification, tattoos, or brands served as physical representations of kinship protection and social currency.

Traditional social education in African communities focused on an individual's obligations to family and community. Different ethnic groups emphasized their

own unique historical experiences to define related kinship requirements. In this sense, though kinship was based largely on biological connections, it was a social convention that was equally reinforced through specific values and social usage. Other forms of social networking combined to coordinate the activities of a community, including the function of age grade societies, secret rituals, and occupational societies and guilds. The relevance of the institution of kinship does not minimize the fact that other social networks were also very influential in providing supplemental support for the survival of African communities.

Family

The functional value of education in African communities cannot be overemphasized. Kin groups devised means to pass down their store of accumulated knowledge across generations in what became a succession of cultural activities. Parents and adults in both the nuclear and extended family had the responsibility of educating children about the cultural obligations tied to kinship and ethnicity. The primary functions of education in indigenous African communities thus included the acquisition of knowledge, the preservation of culture and the transformation of intellectual traditions. As a micropolitical and economic organ in precolonial Africa, kinship functioned to stress relationships of consanguinity and affinity (i.e., blood or marriage). It also emphasized ancestry and the historical developments in a society, which influence differentiation between one group and another. In addition, the role of elders in preserving the centrality of the institution of kinship was a form of political contract.

The nuclear family (i.e., a family incorporating the father, mother or mothers, and their children) was the building block for kinship systems and, by extension, communities. As a rule, Africans believed that the extended family reflected the continuity that bound various generations and nuclear families through lineal or horizontal networks of affinity. In addition to providing the core of labor force for agricultural production, the extended family offered a network of security. It also imposed the burden of extensive obligations that called for reciprocal actions, moral sanctions, and codes that could not be violated without the threat of sanctions. The function and value of the extended family was dependent on certain resources and territorial bases, power, status, and prestige in African social thought. Large families, which were particularly prevalent in precolonial Africa, were highly valued for economic and social reasons. As previously noted, the extended family served as the main labor force in an agricultural setting. Children were raised by their parents, but also belonged by extension to the community

of relatives, who were closely united by a bond interlocking functions and reciprocities.

Associated with the development of agriculture was the increased value and significance of land, which was regarded as a symbol of wealth and prestige. The agricultural system was closely linked with the position of authority from which, in principle, every member of the community derived his or her right to land cultivation. Villages, towns, and markets also emerged as a result of agricultural development. As related economic units, they all relied on the corporate ownership of land, which united all members of a community as a cohesive force. Every African society had laws and regulations on access to and distribution of its land, as well as on how to settle disputes over its allocation. Though these laws varied from one community to another, there were some underlying features they all had in common. Elders administered communal land, with group consent being paramount over individual decisions. Like the agriculturists, pastoralists were also connected to particular pieces of land through perennial use for grazing. On the other hand, hunting bands and food collectors had less need for rigid rules about land ownership and use because they moved frequently in search of food over large areas. Land was thus useful as a key item in the economic system of individual communities, and it was also used as a political tool since political power and organization takes effect over particular territories.

Various indigenous concepts of citizenship were utilized to establish people's rights to settle and exploit land. In many African communities, there were religious beliefs and sanctions behind the land tenure system. Land was often deified, and it was considered sacrilegious to sell it. Among the Igbo and several other communities, the earth deity or spirit force of the land was the guardian of the people's morality. It was also considered a special abode of the gods, buried ancestors, and their shrines, thus creating a bond between living individuals, comprising descent and lineage groups, and the dead. The nature of this connection was a major factor in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century African communities' resistance to European colonizers, who demanded the choicest land.

The relationship of communities to their land was highly altered by colonial political, economic and social policies. The Kikuyu system of landholding had been based upon the *githaka*, an assemblage of not necessarily contiguous land, owned by a subclan or small lineage called *mbari*. Traditionally, each male *mbari* member was entitled to a portion of his clan's *githaka*, thus providing him with economic support and securing his personal position within his section of the Kikuyu nation. Since the entire Kikuyu society was built upon the *mbari* system, loss of *githaka* with the

advent of colonial land policies was more than an economic disaster; it involved the loss of the very identity of the individual or group and, therefore, the cohesion of the Kikuyu people.

Gender

The principle of kinship can be subdivided into two descent groups, patrilineal and matrilineal. The majority of precolonial African societies recognized descent through the male or patrilineal line, while fewer recognized relationships through the female or matrilineal line. Examples of the latter group included the Asante, Bemba, Tonga, and some Tuareg groups. In a handful of other cases, such as with the Yoruba, a combination of both matrilineal and patrilineal descent practices was adopted. Lineage membership affected the residence of bride and groom after marital vows; whereas in the case of matrilineal descent the couple moved in with a male member of the bride's maternal family, with a patrilineal system the bride was expected to join the household of the groom's relatives.

The hierarchy and distribution of power in the kinship structure usually favored male offspring. In most nuclear families, the eldest son assumed control of the family's contractual arrangements and economic welfare in the society. He was expected to provide structure, permanence, and continuity in family social life. Generally, the oldest male figure in a patrilineal setting guided the family toward conforming to customs, law, and traditions of the kin group. He controlled the means of production and access to political power (a king, however, could overrule an elder's decision). As the transmitter of kinship solidarity, he was also usually well-versed in folklore and ancestral theology, and family relics.

The institution of marriage was often used to build meaningful and enduring ties between families and kin groups. Marriage, in this sense, increased the social capital of the joined lineage. In African parlance, it created networks with social linkages and implied societal responsibilities. The payment of a dowry for the wife was seen as a reflection of the honor, beauty, and righteousness of the bride, as well as the reputation of her family. Payment and collection of the dowry was a collective responsibility that helped maintain interrelationships among lineage members. Dowries were also a form of compensation to the bride's kin groups for the "loss" of a daughter and her productive capabilities.

Although the hierarchy dominating most kin groups favored men, in many circumstances women wielded enormous power as well. Senior wives often helped facilitate the growth and development of African communities. The senior wives in Yoruba communities were addressed as "mothers of the house," and the

Swazi of southern Africa recognized the title of "mother" of the kingdom, while the Lozi have a title for the king's sister. Among the Ankole, the king's maternal uncle collects tributes and the royal ladies have the authority to demand cattle from community members. In communities such as that of the Dahomey, women participated in politics, and in ancient Egypt, as among the Baganda, Ankole, and Shilluk, significant political responsibilities were also given to the queen mother.

Ethnicity

Africa is a very large and diverse continent in terms of physical and human geography. It is difficult to place an exact number on how many ethnic groups exist in Africa, though by rough estimations there may be eight to twelve hundred, depending on how the lines are drawn between closely related people. Precolonial ethnic boundaries are often very difficult to decipher, as constant population expansion and sociocultural contacts often frustrate such attempts. The relationship between people and their physical environment plays an important role in determining regional characteristics and patterns of population distribution and economic activities. For example, among the people who had geographical advantages were those in the highlands of Ethiopia, the equatorial regions of East Africa, and most parts of West Africa. In contrast, communities in Central Africa or those situated along the northern parts of the Nile River were constrained by their physical environment. Ethnic groups have culturally acquired characteristics, such as languages or beliefs. Where there is an absence of written records, linguistic relationships provide the most dependable evidence of historical connections between groups.

Varying historical experiences and sociopolitical structures triggered a wide range of forms of identity politics and ethnicity. Distinctive ways of life, shared values and meanings, and exchanges of labor and goods within and between groups were also highly important in defining social life and ethnicity. Multiple adaptation has also developed based on environmental niches. The open savanna country supports both sedentary agriculture and nomadic or seminomadic pastoralism. In addition, lakes and rivers support fishers. Such multiple adaptations are often utilized unequally by groups within the same area so that diverse ecology supports different or differentiating units. In many precolonial east African communities, the sense of day-to-day life focused on localized and autonomous kinship and territorial associations. Acephalous, or decentralized, political structures such as that of the Turkana mean that relation to the environment, occupation or military conquests often defines identity. Natural dichotomies are important in defining the

boundaries between groups such as the Shambaai, a people named after their mountainous abode, and the Nyika of the lowland areas. Over time, the Maasa became known as the archetypal pastoralists. There was cooperation in the organization of regional trade that moved through the west African forest, connecting it to the savanna and, ultimately, to the traffic across the Sahara to North Africa. Thus, in addition to the exchange of ideas and commodities, there was also the movement of people and interethnic relationships.

Ethnic identification could also be very fluid in nature. In Kenya, the emergence of ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Kamba, Embu, Mbeere, and Meru owed more to shifts in social formation in the transition to the modern era than to culturally inherent characteristics. Commerce became the specialty of certain groups, such as for the Dyula of west Africa, who had their representatives located strategically along trade routes. The marketplace featured a wide range of goods from various communities or ethnic groups. These included gold dust, fabrics, kola nuts, shea butter, and other food products and consumer goods. In each community, these marketplaces were more than centers of economic exchange. They were also zones for leisure and the exchange of information and ideas.

The transatlantic slave trade and the ongoing warfare that accompanied it disrupted the African institution of kinship with regard to familial, ethnic, and gender relations. The emergence of European colonial administration between 1890 and 1914 led to a redefinition of African administrative bureaucracy and ethnic identity. European colonialism witnessed the external creation of nation-states that were held together by mostly new coercive and legal instruments of governance. The strategic logic of political control in the colonial state rested on the application of a policy of "divide and rule." This fragmented and isolated African political activity within the confines of local administrative subdivisions, thereby inhibiting the spread of opposition and resistance. The creation of new "tribes," chiefs, and identities meant, in most cases, that ethnicity became a zero-sum game in which the winner took all in the competition for resources. The policy of ruling indirectly through existing structures introduced a new form of patron-client relationship. In addition, though households retained an independent productive base through access to land, the relationship between the state and its various communities was imposed by political force rather than being based on mutual economic development. The emergence of new cities as centers of administration also engendered the dissolution of family and community-based civic structures.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the failure of the decolonization process and the postcolonial state has resulted in competitive elections and the ethnicization of the

modern bureaucracy. "Tribal" unions emerged, later developing into political parties, which did not augur well for the nation-state models birthed at the departure of European colonialism. Western education also helped facilitate the use of literature like books and newspapers to help advance the cause of one ethnic group over the other. This weakness, which amounted to multinationals within one nation, was subsequently exposed and the colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client relations, and a complex ethnic dyslectic of assimilation, fragmentation, and competition continued in the postcolonial era. Patronage networks have often been extended to include links between state officials, local middlemen, military officers, and international capital.

Conclusion

In precolonial African society, the institution of kinship was the ideological platform that held African communities together. The learning process was also a cultural activity that enhanced the continuity of communities. Communities devised ways to pass down their store of accumulated wealth and wisdom from one generation to another. The task of socializing the child was a community affair. As a result, the African child was deeply aware of the debt owed to the family, the extended family, kinship groups, and, in modern parlance, ethnic communities. These institutions enhanced the survivability of groups in physical residence and during various historical periods of social transition. The father, mother, chiefs, queens, and kings all had functional roles dedicated to carrying out these activities that represented the core values of civil society in Africa.

Although African states have remained conscious of the use of education as a tool for community and nation building, economic problems and competition for scarce resources continue to prove a major obstacle. The transition to modernity in many African societies was imposed by a combination of external forces and international capital. In many instances, particularly in urban cities of colonial legacy, individuality has replaced collectivity, and communities have been fraught with unstable political atmospheres and economic hardships. In this climate, there has repeatedly been a lack of fiscal and material investment in societal infrastructures, even when the will to nurture civic institutions and organizations has been present. Nevertheless, cultural standards and traditions have continued to play out their functions. In this resilience lies the enormous potential African communities possess both commercially and culturally in relationship to the rest of the world.

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See also: **Identity, Political.**

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
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Comoros: Before 1800

The geographical position of the Comoros Islands—Ngazidja (Grande Comore), Nzuani (Anjouan), Mwali (Mohéli), and Maoto (Mayotte)—is one of the main determinants of their history. The islands act like stepping stones from northern Madagascar to northern Mozambique, and they have been the main route by which human migrations and cultural influences have moved between Africa and Madagascar. It is likely that Indonesian migrants used this route when settling in Madagascar; migrations from central Africa to Madagascar have taken place continually over the centuries. With the arrival of Islam in the tenth century, Islamic migrants also used this route, bringing the cultures of the Swahili coast of eastern Africa to northern Madagascar. The population of the Comoros Islands was continuously added to by new arrivals and always reflected the threefold influence of Madagascar, Bantu central Africa, and the Islamic culture of the Swahili cities.

Early town and burial sites in the islands suggest an active commercial civilization as early as the tenth century, but it is from the fifteenth century that written evidence of trading towns like Domoni survives. The traditional histories of the different towns, though recorded at a much later date, nevertheless make it clear that the ruling families of the islands had close ties with Kilwa and, like the rulers of Kilwa itself, laid claims to a Shirazi origin.

In the sixteenth century the island merchants traded both with the East African coast and with the towns of northern Madagascar. The main products of the islands were foodstuffs, but there was also a boat-building industry and almost certainly a trade in slaves as well. In spite of persistent traditions to the contrary, there is no



Comoros.

record of the Portuguese ever having conquered or settled the islands, though boats from Mozambique Island regularly made the short crossing to buy provisions. Early in the seventeenth century, Portuguese was widely known as a trading language, Spanish currency circulated, and traders from as far as the Red Sea and the Gulf came to the islands in search of slaves.

With the arrival of Dutch, English, and French traders, the Comoros Islands suddenly assumed a considerable importance in international affairs. The Portuguese control of the East African coast forced the newcomers to look for ports of call elsewhere, and from the later sixteenth century on the Comoros Islands became the focus of their attention. Dutch ships used the Mayotte lagoon as a base for their attacks on Mozambique Island in 1607 and 1608, and French traders stopped to repair their boats and take on provisions. It was the British East India Company, however, that made the most regular use of the islands to restock their ships, as a place to leave the sick to recover and as a post office.

Not all of the islands were equally favored by the visiting ships. Whereas Anjouan and Mohéli supplied fresh water, had relatively protected anchorages and a population anxious to do business, Grande Comore acquired a reputation for the hostility shown by its inhabitants to foreigners which complemented the rugged, inhospitable coastline and the almost total lack of fresh water. Mayotte, on the other hand, was difficult to reach, as it was surrounded by coral reefs with narrow entrances into its lagoon.

The regular visits of European ships to Mohéli and Anjouan probably had the effect of increasing the

wealth of the ruling families, in particular that of the main Anjouan port of Mutsammudu, whose ruler came to claim primacy in island affairs and was recognized by the Europeans as sultan of the whole island. The constant demand for fresh food and provisions for the fleets helped to develop the agricultural resources of the islands. Slaves were imported as agricultural labor as well as for resale, and the islands began to develop a plantation economy. As a result, a cultural division developed between the Islamic families of the towns that traditionally had ties with East Africa, Arabia, and the Gulf, and the largely African inhabitants of the countryside who were only partially Islamized.

An increase in the number of merchant ships using the islands, and the prosperity of the islands themselves, began to attract the unwelcome attention of pirates. With corsairs operating along the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean and establishing bases for their operation in northeastern Madagascar, the Comoros Islands found themselves increasingly involved in their activities. Pirate ships visited Anjouan and Mohéli to dispose of captured plunder or slaves, and they used the Mayotte lagoon to waylay British East India Company vessels. It was in the waters off the Comoros Islands that many of the naval actions between company vessels and pirates took place.

By the 1730s, most of the pirates had been captured or had abandoned their trade; until the 1790s, the islands were relatively free from external threats. British East India Company ships continued to visit Anjouan and Mohéli. In these islands, the Sultan of Mutsammudu emerged as the dominant political figure and was recognized by the British as sultan of the whole island. Mohéli, with two ancient trading towns, Fomboni and Numa Choa, also came increasingly under the influence of the Sultan of Anjouan. Grande Comore was seldom visited by Europeans, but by the eighteenth century the rivalry between the 20 towns on the island was already well established. Each of these towns had its own sultan, one among them being recognized as Sultan Thibé, a sort of ceremonial, paramount sultan. However, Sultan Thibé had no real power, and the ruling families of the towns, some of them only a few miles apart, continued with their often violent and bloody feuds.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the French began to develop a slave trade route from Madagascar and eastern Africa to their sugar plantations in Ile-de-France and Ile de Bourbon. Once again the Comoros Islands became an important slave market. However, the slave trade was to backfire on the islanders, when in the 1790s Sakalava and Betsimisaraka raiders from northern Madagascar found the islands to be an easy target for their raids.

MALYN NEWITT

See also: Comoros/Mayotte: Nineteenth Century to 1975; Comoros/Mayotte: Independence to the Present; Slavery, Colonial Rule and; Slavery: Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean.

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Comoros/Mayotte: Nineteenth Century to 1975

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Comoros Islands—Ngazidja (Grande Comore), Nzuani (Anjouan), Mwali (Mohéli), and Maoto (Mayotte)—were repeatedly raided by slave-hunting Sakalava and Betsimisaraka pirates from northern Madagascar. The raids led to depopulation, destabilization of the agricultural and commercial economy, and the construction of defensive walls around the main island towns. The British East India Company offered some protection to Anjouan, with which it had the closest relations, and the British diplomats encouraged Merina conquests of the Sakalava coast. By 1820, the pirate raids had come to an end, but one of the Sakalava princes, Andrian Souli, fled the Merina conquest and settled on Mayotte with his followers. At the same time one of the Merina generals, Ramanetaka, fearing arrest and execution, seized control of Mohéli.

The arrival of these chiefs linked the fortunes of the islands closely with the struggle unfolding in Madagascar. At the same time, the islands were affected by the growth of the commercial power of Zanzibar. In particular the islands became important entrepôts in the east African slave trade, and many slaving dhows used the islands as a staging post for journeys to the south and for the shipment of slaves to Madagascar itself.

During the 1840s, rivalry increased between Britain and France in the western Indian Ocean. While Britain concentrated on suppressing the slave trade and on protecting the interests of British Indian traders, the French were seeking opportunities to expand the plantation economy of Réunion and to continue the supply of slave or *engagés* laborers to the sugar fields.

In 1841 the French occupied Nossi Bé off the coast of northwest Madagascar and in 1843 negotiated a

treaty of protection with Andrian Souli in Mayotte. According to this treaty, the French were allowed to build a naval base on the small island of Dzaoudzi as well as rent lands for sugar production. The French presence in Mayotte stimulated the British to establish a consul in Anjouan in 1846. The man appointed, William Sunley, owned a sugar plantation and used slave labor.

During the 1850s, Mohéli came under the influence of Zanzibar. Ramanetaka died in 1841, and his seven-year-old daughter was married to a Zanzibari prince. However, in 1860 pro-French factions on the island expelled the Zanzibaris and called in the aid of a French adventurer, Joseph Lambert, who obtained vast land concessions as the price of his support. A final attempt by the Zanzibari party to expel Lambert failed when French warships intervened, and from 1871 French influence dominated the island. A formal protectorate was declared in 1886 at the height of the "Scramble" for Africa. In 1901 the last queen of Mohéli eloped with a French gendarme, and in 1912 the island was formally annexed.

Grande Comore remained divided between the 20 nominally separate sultanates, but after 1843 the French from Mayotte consistently backed the claims of the Sultan of Bambao, whose capital was Moroni, to be the paramount sultan, or Sultan Thibé. When Sultan Thibé, Said Achmet, died in 1875, the French hastened to back the claims of the French-educated Said Ali. In 1883 Said Ali, desperate for more active French support, signed a huge land concession with a French naturalist and entrepreneur, Léon Humblot. Said Ali's rivals tried to obtain German support, but this only precipitated the French declaration of a protectorate over the island. Said Ali eventually went into exile in 1893, leaving Humblot as virtual ruler of the island. Humblot's Société de Grande Comore established a kind of feudal regime over the island which the various French residents never successfully challenged. Humblot died in 1914, and the island was then annexed as a colony.

Anjouan remained firmly under the influence of the British consuls, who introduced sugar as a crop and plantation agriculture. However, British attempts to force an unpopular treaty outlawing slavery on the sultan in 1882 led to the latter seeking French aid. A protectorate treaty was signed with France in 1886. In 1889 widespread rebellion among the slave population broke out in Anjouan. This gave the French an excuse to intervene and conquer the island and to distribute the lands of the former sultans to French companies.

In 1908 the French began the process of consolidating the islands with Madagascar. The families of the sultans were forced to give up their claims, and in 1914 the four islands were finally incorporated into the colony of Madagascar.

For the next 40 years the islands remained a colonial backwater in which the plantation companies

dominated, producing vanilla, sugar, cloves and scent-bearing plants (principally ylang ylang). The population of the islands tried to survive on noncompany land but was increasingly driven abroad to Zanzibar, Majunga, and South Africa. The islands became increasingly dependent on remittances from emigrant workers.

The government of Madagascar sided with the Vichy regime in 1940, and in 1942 the British and South Africans captured the port of Diego Suarez, sending a small force to take Mayotte and restore the Comoros Islands to France. Many of the leading island families became strongly Gaullist and in 1946 the Comoros were declared a *territoire d'outremer* and allowed to elect a *conseil général* (general council). More autonomy was granted to the islands in 1947 and 1952, and formal ties with Madagascar came to an end in 1960. From 1947 on, the islands sent deputies to the French Assembly. The period up to 1970 was dominated by the cautiously conservative Said Mohammed Chaik, who remained loyal to France and negotiated a series of development loans and grants from the French government. Chaik made no moves to claim independence during the 1960s, and it was only with his death in 1970 that the rival political groupings in the islands began to demand independence from France. This had the effect of splitting the islands as Mayotte, which had been under French rule the longest and was dominated by a strongly Gaullist party, the MPM, wanted to retain the links with France. In 1975 three of the islands declared their independence, while Mayotte voted in a referendum to remain French.

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See also: Comoros: Before 1800; Comoros/Mayotte: Independence to the Present; Madagascar: Colonial Period: French Rule.

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Comoros/Mayotte: Independence to the Present

The four islands of the Comoros archipelago are Ngazidja (Grande Comore), Nzuani (Anjouan), Mwali (Mohéli), and Maoto (Mayotte). Until July 1975 the

four islands had collectively had the status of *territoire d'outremer*, which gave them local autonomy under the overall control of France. Various nationalist parties, notably MOLINACO and PASOCO, had campaigned for total independence with the support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and it was largely to preempt further gains by these parties that the islands' elected head of government, Ahmed Abdullah, a member of a leading family from Anjouan, declared independence from France on July 15, 1975.

The move was at once denounced by the MPM, the ruling party in Mayotte, which was firmly pro-French. France recognized the independence of three of the islands, while a referendum was held in Mayotte which voted to stay with France as a *collectivité territoriale* (territorial collective). From that time, the Comoros Islands have been divided; one island has remained French, while the other three have established an independent Islamic Republic. This division of the islands is not recognized by the OAU, which continues to press for the unification of the archipelago.

Within a month of his declaration of independence, Ahmed Abdullah was overthrown by a coup carried out by French mercenaries under Bob Denard. Abdullah was replaced by the conservative prince Said Hussein, but he was rapidly replaced in his turn by a group of radical politicians led by Ali Soilih, a French-trained economist. Ali Soilih ruled the three islands for just over two and a half years. During this time he attempted a fundamental reorganization of the economy and social structure, addressing many of the issues which had been identified as problems for the islands. He broke up and distributed some of the large landed estates; he nationalized vanilla marketing, and in a sweeping move abolished the central bureaucracy (the idea being to return decision making to the local level). He also attacked many of the religious customs and in particular abolished the *grand mariage*, the expense of which had bankrupted many families and used up capital accumulated by overseas migrant workers.

Soilih's government was rapidly overtaken by economic, human, and natural disasters. Under the chaos of the changes he introduced, the economy collapsed, revenue was not collected, and schools and hospitals closed down. On top of this, Madagascar expelled large numbers of Comorians from Majunga after serious rioting and the Karthala volcano on Grande Comore erupted, causing devastation on the eastern part of the island.

Ali Soilih's government was overthrown, and Soilih himself was killed in another mercenary coup in July 1978. This time the mercenaries worked closely with the French DGS, with the objective of returning Ahmed Abdullah to power.

Abdullah introduced a new constitution, and signed a bilateral defense agreement with France and an agreement linking the Comorian franc to the French franc. Abdullah ruled the islands without serious opposition for 11 years. His rule was supported by a presidential guard made up of Denard's mercenaries, who were partly supported by France and partly by the South African Ministry of Defense. South Africa emerged as one of Abdullah's strongest backers, as it needed to use the islands to import arms and to provide a base for supplying Renamo guerrillas operating in Mozambique. South African businessmen also began to invest in tourist infrastructure in the islands.

Abdullah's internal power base was his Ufumu Party and the strong backing he received from his native island of Anjouan. His opponents could not unite behind any one leader, and some of them went into exile as Abdullah took a strong hand against the activities of dissident politicians. Abdullah himself was one of the leading vanilla traders in the islands, and his regime was backed by a number of business syndicates which made large profits from the concessions he allowed them.

Mayotte, meanwhile, remained firmly under the control of the MPM. The islanders voted Gaullist and received pledges from Debré, and later from Jacques Chirac, that the question of their future would be put to them in a referendum. The MPM has campaigned for full departmental status like that of Réunion, but no French government has actually proposed this solution, partly because of the international opposition that it would arouse and partly because of the huge financial cost of raising living standards and services in Mayotte to the level of metropolitan France.

Abdullah's rule left many of the islands' problems unresolved. The government ran a huge deficit and had to be propped up by French aid. The population grew, and the crude subsistence agriculture led to a rapid degradation of the environment. Services and the infrastructure were neglected, while Abdullah practiced a shameless patrimonial politics, rewarding his supporters with government jobs, many of which were mere sinecures.

Abdullah's increasing reliance on South Africa lost him support in the rest of Africa and in France. On November 26, 1989, in circumstances that have never been fully explained, mercenaries of his guard murdered the president and took control of the country. France mobilized its forces in Mayotte and, after two weeks, the mercenaries agreed to hand over power, according to the constitution, to Said Mohammed Djohar, the president of the Supreme Court. In 1990 Djohar was voted in as president, his main rival being Said Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim. Djohar had the backing of France and was able to negotiate a structural adjustment policy with the International Monetary Fund in 1991.

Djohar remained president until 1996, but during this time Comorian politics became increasingly chaotic. Over 20 political parties contested elections, forming a veritable kaleidoscope of alliances and coalitions. Djohar was not able to establish a strong party of government, as Abdullah had done, and came increasingly to depend on his son-in-law, Mohamed Mchangama, who became the power behind the throne. During this period there were frequent attempts to stage coups, with allegations of mercenary involvement. One of these, in 1993, led to the arrest and imprisonment of Abdullah's two sons. During this period Djohar's various governments tried to grapple with the demands of structural adjustment, in particular the reform of the civil service and revenue collection. In December 1993 the coalition of Djohar's supporters barely managed to win a majority in the elections, and it became clear that the president lived on borrowed time. More seriously, he began to lose the support of France. In 1994 the structural adjustment program came to an end and, smothered by mounting debts and an unbalanced budget, Djohar was toppled by a successful coup in October 1995—led, once again, by Denard, with the backing of the French.

Djohar was removed to Réunion, ostensibly for medical reasons, but he refused to resign and the OAU continued to support him as the legitimate president. In any case, he had to be restored to office, if not power, pending presidential elections in March 1996. These brought a clear victory for Mohammed Taki Abdulkarim. Taki at once began to decisively shape Comorian politics, merging most of the political parties into one or two groupings and adopting a range of Islamic policies that proved highly popular with the heads of the traditional families.

Mayotte remained in its political limbo as a collectivity. The French made no moves to hold a referendum on departmental status, while the MPM retained its hold on power and demanded full integration with France. The weakness of the island's economy led to huge French subsidies, which in turn attracted economic migrants from the poverty-stricken neighboring islands and to demands from dissidents in Anjouan that they return to direct rule by France as well, so that they could enjoy the same economic benefits.

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Conakry

Conakry, the capital city of the Republic of Guinea, had an estimated population of over one million people in the late 1990s, only a century after its official founding by the French colonial authority. The location for the new city was chosen both because there was a political vacuum on the coast, and because of the region's potential as an international harbor. It formed the outermost extremity of the Kaloum region, a small and flat peninsula (or island) previously known as the Tumbo Peninsula. Some villages on the peninsula predated the French conquest, totaling about 300 inhabitants in the 1880s. One of them, Conakry, gave its name to the new city. These villages, possibly founded in the late eighteenth century, were inhabited by the Susu and Baga peoples, who had migrated from the hinterland; they were joined later by the Fula.

In 1885, it was decided that the French resident of the new administrative district (the "cercle de Dubréka") would be established there. After a military confrontation in 1887, the French took over and proclaimed themselves the sole landowners. This enabled them to plan the city according to their will. In a few years, under Governor Ballay, the city was laid out as an example of French colonial urbanism. Conakry soon became known as "the pearl of West Africa."

The plan of the town, conceived in 1890, was simple, consisting of a grid of 14 avenues crossing 12 boulevards. It was efficient and forward looking at a time when the island was almost empty. The monumental architecture of its official buildings and the scale of the streets made it into a showcase for French power. A segregationist policy divided the town into quarters, according to social status. The result was a dual city, made up of the European quarter, and a native quarter (*zone indigène*) where public facilities were less developed; there was almost no electricity in private housing in the native quarter, for example, and the sewage system was insufficient.

The administrative and commercial functions of Conakry attracted many newcomers and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the population had grown to approximately 10 to 15,000 habitants, mainly Susu and Fula.

Subsequently, however, Conakry entered a financial slump because of the end of the wild rubber boom and attendant economic problems that afflicted the colony of Guinea. In the late 1940s urban growth began to accelerate, the town spread onto the mainland, and the

suburbs were integrated into the city. A new town-planning scheme was adopted in 1947, but its implementation was not possible due to the rapidity of urban growth. The post-World War II period also saw the building of new public facilities, financed by a public investment program, including a new market, a hospital, and a secondary school. From around 30,000 people in 1948, the population rose to 100,000 ten years later.

Conakry had been granted municipal status in 1904, but its mayor was an administrator and the African population had only a consultative and politically marginal role. In 1955, the municipal law was drastically changed, as local elections were declared. The first elected mayor, in 1956, was Sekou Touré, the leader of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) and future first president of Guinea. Conakry became, increasingly, a center of political activities and the location of demonstrations and active opposition to colonial power.

Today, Conakry stretches beyond the peninsula along approximately 22 miles (35 kilometers). This long and narrow space is the source of many traffic problems, due also to the prevalence of spontaneous growth and the absence of public planning. Only recently have new roads been opened, while at the same time, some neighborhoods have been demolished with the intent of replacing them with areas marked for better construction and planning. The city is administratively divided into four communes, united under the supervision of a nominated governor.

Due to limited financial means, only a few new significant buildings were built under Sekou Touré. These include the Palais du Peuple, which was built by the Chinese as the site for large cultural and political events, and the villas and meeting house constructed for the 1984 meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The city underwent accelerated changes after Touré's death in 1984, including significant construction, and the subsequent opening up of the country, both economically and politically. Some fine colonial buildings were destroyed, while others, such as the old customs house, were carefully renovated. As in many other African cities, the large population (about 60 per cent of the urban population of Guinea and 20 per cent of the total population) has led to high density, overconstruction, and a lack of facilities, especially as most of the new neighborhoods grew without any real planning. Attempts to correct the chaos were made recently, as Conakry continues to attract a rapidly growing population. As the center of the railway system and the main international harbor, it is the outlet for the exports of the main products (bauxite and iron ores and agricultural products such as bananas). It also has plentiful administrative jobs and light industries.

Conakry's cultural life is active, with many famous bands, dating from Sekou Touré's time and revived

recently. (The most famous is the Bembeya Jazz Band.) Conakry is also a focal point for the press, the broadcasting system, and higher education facilities.

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See also: **Guinea.**

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Concessionary Companies

Concessionary companies were an important component of economic development in much of colonial Africa, particularly during the early consolidation phase from 1885 to 1920. Most typically, these were private European businesses lured to make investments of capital and manpower in Africa in return for a grant (or concession) of land, over which it gained privileged rights of exploitation. While specific features varied from colony to colony, as well as over time, the widespread use of this policy highlights two crucial features of African colonialism. First, it reflects the prevailing philosophy that economic development should be led by private enterprise, much as it had been done in European history. As a consequence, most colonial administrations lacked the financial resources and the personnel to undertake development alone. Second, the concessionary policy embodied a pervasively negative European perception of Africans and their culture. The promotion of European enterprise in Africa was in part based on the belief that Africans were too backward and lazy to make a meaningful contribution beyond the role of common laborer. Together, these constraints and beliefs forged a colonial policy that favored European interests over those of Africans, and helped to lay the foundations for African economic underdevelopment.

The concessionary policy in colonial Africa evolved out of the European tradition of chartered companies, which had successfully enlarged imperial possessions and trade in Asia and North America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Europeans became interested in Africa in the mid-nineteenth century,

private companies again expanded the territorial and commercial domain of European powers. The United African Company (later renamed the Royal Niger Company), the Imperial British East Africa Company, and Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company, for example, secured for Britain future colonies in eastern, western, and southern Africa. Following the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, concessionary companies played a crucial role in consolidating European rule. In many colonies, companies took the lead in expanding Western influence, improving transportation, and introducing Africans to export-commodity production. To attract private investment, colonial administrations commonly offered large land concessions and varying amounts of administrative power. A general exception was found in the colonies of West Africa, where a longer tradition of European-African trade encouraged the colonists to rely more heavily on African household production.

From 1885 to 1920 in some areas of colonial Africa, concessionary companies dwarfed all other forms of economic activity. In King Leopold's Congo Free State, one large mining consortium, the Katanga Company, gained administrative and commercial control over a huge tract covering more than 100 million acres. In the neighboring French Congo, forty companies were granted concessions totaling nearly 70 per cent of the entire colony. Additional huge portions of equatorial forest were ceded to businesses interested in the ivory and rubber trade. In return, colonial administrations frequently took a substantial share of the profits, as well as company commitments for investments in railways and other expensive projects. As a result, the success and well-being of many colonial governments became firmly intertwined with company profits, resulting in a close collusion of interests, policies, and personnel.

The early reign of concessionary companies was generally abusive, unprofitable, and ultimately untenable. Granted sweeping administrative powers, private companies ruled their territories absolutely, erecting economies oriented toward short-term profits over long-term investment. In the forest regions of central Africa, the rubber and ivory trade quickly degenerated into a brutal and violent system. Company agents and administrative personnel were typically rewarded or promoted in proportion to the amount of exportable commodities produced in their territories, resulting in widespread atrocities and a reign of terror. African workers who failed to meet their ever-increasing quotas of rubber or ivory were beaten, whipped, and tortured. In some regions, forced labor dramatically undermined normal subsistence activities, causing famine, illness, and early death. But such wholesale exploitation of people and resources ultimately proved

counterproductive. African armed resistance required costly military interventions and diminished production, causing several companies to declare bankruptcy. Excessive harvesting of rubber and ivory also destroyed natural resources, causing a steady decline in production and profits by 1900. Finally, when missionary reports of the atrocities reached Europe, an outraged public demanded reform. In the most dramatic case, King Leopold was forced to cede his Congo Free State to Belgium in 1908.

By 1920, the concessionary policy in much of colonial Africa was significantly reduced or revised. European private enterprise was still widely encouraged, but under stricter supervision and tighter control. An illustrative example is seen in the Belgian Congo's agreement with Lever Brothers, the British soapmaker. In 1919, the company received five concessionary zones (much smaller than those awarded earlier by the Congo Free State), in which to establish palm plantations and processing facilities. In addition, Lever Brothers was required to improve and invest in the welfare of its workers by instituting labor contracts and by building schools and clinics. In the Belgian Congo, as in other colonies, such reforms were heralded as promoting long-term economic development for the benefit of Europeans and Africans alike. But in reality, the basic Eurocentric structure and orientation of the colonial economy remain unchanged. While the concessions were smaller, they were often more numerous, resulting in even greater European control of the economy. Company investments in African welfare were generally minimal and rarely enforced. Instead, the state actively ensured the success of private European capital, enacting taxation and other policies to create a large, compliant, and cheap labor force. To protect company interests, African economic competition was stifled or prohibited, under the pretext that such production would yield inferior quality exports. Lacking viable alternatives, African participation in the colonial economy remained largely limited to the role of unskilled laborer. Despite the reforms, the enduring concessionary policy shows that European profits and interests remained preeminent over African needs and concerns.

Colonial concessionary companies have left a lasting legacy to postcolonial Africa. At independence, African governments inherited economies dominated by European capital and oriented toward European markets. Prohibitions placed on African competition had successfully hindered the rise of an African entrepreneurial class, which might have served as the catalyst for new economic growth and opportunities. Instead, the vast majority of the population remained underskilled and underfinanced. In some former colonies, the lingering economic power of European companies has promoted neocolonialism, whereby

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foreign interests have exerted considerable influence over the policy decisions of African leaders, often at the expense of its citizens. Moreover, lacking the capital and resources to restructure their economies, many African nations have been forced to maintain the same cash crop, export-oriented economies created by the concessionary companies, reinforcing a continuous cycle of underdevelopment that has proved exceedingly difficult to overcome.

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See also: **Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.**


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Confederation: See South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament, and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881.

Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial

As with most African countries, Congo is a recent colonial creation, the result of late-nineteenth-century European imperialism and violent conquest. Before the onset of colonialism, two kingdoms and several chiefdoms populated the area. In the early 1300s, the Bakongo, the largest ethnic group, established one of the most powerful early kingdoms in central Africa. The Kingdom of Kongo, as it was known, extended south of present-day Congo and through the western region of the present-day Democratic Republic of



Congo.

Congo; its capital, Mbanza Kongo, was located in the northern part of present-day Angola. The kingdom was well organized, with a centralized administration. Trade was the most important economic activity of the kingdom, using palm cloth and cowrie shells (called *nzimbu*) as currencies. When in 1484 the Portuguese arrived at the mouth of the Congo River, the Mani Kongo (king of Kongo) had managed to assert his authority south of the Lower Congo River by establishing several vassal states. The Mani Kongo exerted power across his vast kingdom through appointed provincial governors who were responsible for collecting taxes and monitoring trade. Portuguese presence and involvement within the kingdom stimulated a dynastic dispute between those in favor of greater foreign contacts and those opposed. Aided by the Portuguese, the former emerged victorious, and in 1506 a Kongolese Christian convert became the Mani Kongo under the title of Affonso I (1506–1543). Under the influence of the Portuguese, Christianity was introduced to the Kongolese elite. Mbanza Kongo, where most of them resided, took the name of São Salvador. The most important change instigated by the Portuguese, and which led to the decline of Kongo, was slavery and the slave trade. During the course of the seventeenth century, the authority of the Mani Kongo collapsed and the kingdom disintegrated into rival factions battling each other in order to get prisoners of war that would be sold in slavery.

Another important kingdom that developed in Congo was the Tio or Teke kingdom, arising in the

fourteenth century west of the Lower Congo River region through the fusion of former smaller kingdoms. The Tio kingdom was less centralized than the Kongo, for the king only received tribute from vassal groups and did not maintain a military presence outside of his capital.

In the early nineteenth century, on the eve of the European takeover, the Teke people found themselves in a very strategic position, serving as middlemen in the trading system between the Kongo in the south and the Mbochi and Boubangi in the north. These latter groups were mostly hunters and gatherers organized in various chieftaincies in the rain forest of northern Congo. The trading system used the Congo River as a means of transportation to exchange products as varied as copper, ceramics, ivory, tobacco, groundnuts, cattle, goats, yams, textiles, mats, nets, and boats.

This economic activity along the Congo River reached its climax in the nineteenth century as the Teke asserted their authority in the Malebo Pool region, halfway between the northern savanna and the coastal areas. Their strategic presence in the Malebo Pool region, the area where Brazzaville and Kinshasa are located, allowed them to control the economy of the whole region by serving as middlemen between the people of the forest in the north and the Kongo in the south. Before colonial penetration, the Malebo Pool region was a thriving hub where products from the forest and the coast were exchanged among various groups. Teke chiefs monopolized the trade, used slave labor, and directed market activities on the two banks of the Congo River. Their most important trading strongholds were Mpila and Mfwa on the north bank. On the south bank the major settlements controlled by the Teke were Kintambo, Kinshasa, Kingabwa, Ndolo, and Lemba. The Congo River did not demarcate two different economic and political domains, as it came to be known after the onset of colonialism. It was, on the contrary, used as a "highway" to accelerate the flow of products, ideas, and people. Sometime in the eighteenth century, the Teke imposed upon their trading partners the *ngele* (copper bar), which replaced the Kongolese *nzimbu* as the most indispensable currency in the region.

Although economically nineteenth-century Congo appeared to be thriving, with a well-built commercial network linking the rain forest to the Loango coast, it was a politically fragmented region. In the north, political power was even more diluted than in previous centuries as individuals strove to connect themselves with the trading networks commanded by the Teke from the Malebo Pool region. The Teke society itself resembled only remotely the powerful centralized kingdom that reached its climax in the seventeenth century. Major chiefs in the northern region of the Teke kingdom had grown wealthy and autonomous through

trade. They now claimed political and spiritual independence as well. This situation led to a series of wars between the Teke and their northern neighbors, especially the Boubangi and the Mbochi, that were not settled until the 1840s. By the nineteenth century the Teke *makoko* (king) ceased to be regarded by his former vassals as a lord but more as a *primus inter pares*. In the south, the territorial cohesiveness of the Teke kingdom was also encroached by the arrival of the Kongo after their kingdom dismantled in the late 1600s. The Kongo occupied strategic positions (previously held by the Teke) around Mindouli, Boko, and Kinkala, and gradually drove the Teke back beyond the Djoue River, upstream from the Malebo Pool. At the end of the nineteenth century, this lack of centralized territorial polities accounted for the somewhat easy colonial conquest by the French.

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Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: De Brazza and French Colonization

In the 1830s, the French were already present on the fringes of western equatorial Africa through several trading stations and missionary centers on the Gabon coast. This period corresponds to the beginning of European penetration of Africa. The Atlantic slave trade had become unprofitable for European countries, and many countries (especially Britain and France) began to view Africa no longer as a reservoir of slaves but as a source of raw materials (ivory, rubber, nuts, and gold) and a market for the manufactured products

of the growing industrial economies of Europe. Africa was also regarded, as in the case of America and Australia, as a virgin land where Europe could export its troubled minorities and social groups. In 1830, France conquered Algeria and began relocating criminals and religious minorities there.

When the French abolished the slave trade and founded in 1849 the coastal settlement of Libreville (Gabon) as a haven for freed slaves, the interior of western equatorial Africa still remained a terra incognita to them. In 1875, the French government decided to dispatch Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza (1852–1905), a French explorer of Italian origin, on a first mission to establish French influence over the Central African Basin. On his first journey, Brazza left from Lambaréné on January 11, 1876, and traveled up the Ogooué River and into the Congo River Basin. During his second mission (1879–1882), accompanied by Malamine, a sergeant and interpreter from Senegal, Brazza traveled up the Congo River, crossed the Teke plateaus, reached the Lefini and Congo Rivers, and came in contact with the by now declining Teke kingdom. By the time Brazza arrived at Malebo Pool, another European explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, was roaming the land in search of a colony to satisfy the gargantuan appetite of his employer, Belgian king Leopold II, who had hired him to carve out a piece of Africa. In order to prevent Leopold II's control of the northwest bank of the Congo River, Brazza signed a dubious treaty with Makoko, the Teke king, allowing a permanent French settlement in central Africa. This treaty, ratified by the French parliament in November 1881, ceded to France the site of N'couna, where the city of Brazzaville is now located. This soon led to a French colony on the northwest bank of the Congo River. It is likely that Makoko had given Brazza ownership of the land on behalf of France, but only the usage since according to Teke's laws land belonged to the ancestors and could be only ceded in usufruct. Further treaties were to be made with several chiefs of the lower Ubangi during Brazza's third expedition, when he joined forces with his lieutenant, Albert Dolisie. This third expedition took Brazza and Dolisie as far as the west coast, where Brazza made another questionable protectorate treaty with Ma Loango, the Vili chief, who ceded outright to France the area known as Pointe Indienne.

By 1885, Brazza had carved out for France the whole region west of the Congo River, preventing the king of the Belgians, who had already claimed the east bank of the river through the work of Stanley, from spreading his claims eastward. A year before, in November 1884, the European powers had met at the Berlin Conference, called by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to thwart British colonial ambitions in Africa. The resultant Berlin Act formalized the

colonial claims made by European nations. This on-paper division of the region was followed by a series of bilateral treaties that delineated the boundaries between the Congo and the neighboring colonies. In 1885, the boundary between the Congo and Cabinda was established via a treaty with Portugal, and the border with Cameroon was demarcated via an agreement with Germany. In 1887, two other treaties recognized the Oubangui and Congo Rivers as the frontier between the French Congo and Leopold II's État Indépendant du Congo (Congo Free State). In the bargain, France lost direct access to the mouth of the Congo River but retained possession of the Niari Basin and the areas explored by Brazza.

In 1886, the "Scramble" for Africa was underway, and more territories, regardless of whatever African population inhabited them, remained to be acquired and claimed in the Congo Basin. Brazza, now commissioner general of the Congo, set out on a fourth mission in the Upper Sangha River, an area coveted by the Germans. Under Brazza's leadership, all of the French Equatorial African territories (Congo, Gabon, and Oubangui-Chari-Tchad) were grouped into one administrative unit known as Congo-Gabon. Three years later, in 1891, Congo-Gabon became known as the French Congo, and in 1903 Congo was detached from Gabon and renamed Moyen-Congo (Middle Congo).

Unwilling to be directly involved in the colonization of the Congo, France decided to divide up the colony among large concessionary companies. These companies were granted, for a period of 30 years, exclusive economic and political rights over the areas conceded. They had right over all agricultural, forest, and industrial exploitation. After 30 years of exploitation, they retained ownership of any land they had developed. In exchange, they were required to exploit the wealth of the concessions for the benefit of the French economy. They paid the state a quitrent depending on the size of their concession and 15 per cent of their annual profits. In addition, they were to build roads, enforce justice, and safeguard natives' rights by creating reserves for them and respecting their customary use of land and forests. In 1893–1894, Théophile Delacassé, then French minister of colonies, signed decrees granting two individual entrepreneurs 30-year concessions covering nearly 150,000 square kilometers. More decrees were to follow, conferring to 40 concessionary companies monopolies over 650,000 square kilometers, a little more than the whole area of France. All of the land from the coast to the Oubangui Bend, except for small areas around Libreville and Brazzaville, were claimed in this way. In effect, the whole Congo was handed over to large companies with a registered capital of 59 million francs. The government in practice abdicated

its functions and limited itself to the imposition of taxes and the collection of quintrents.

In 1898 several decrees transferred ownership of the land and waterways from the Africans to the French State, thus laying the groundwork for the establishment of the concessionary regime. That same year Brazza, who opposed these decrees in favor of a more humanitarian colonial approach and who was increasingly branded a “negrophile” by the French government and the French press alike, was dismissed from his position and recalled to France. A commission of colonial concessions was created in Paris and paved the road for the adoption of the concessionary system, which was notorious for its abuses and cruelties as it caused depopulation and misery in regions that were once populated and prosperous. Natives were forced to work as porters and rubber collectors in order to pay taxes. They received low wages and were severely punished when they attempted to avoid compulsory labor. Punitive expeditions conducted by both officials and company agents resulted in the destruction of farms, the burning of habitations, and the massacre of women and children. In the early 1900s charges of cruelty and abuses of Africans by French settlers surfaced, and the French government dispatched Brazza to investigate the charges. On his return from Moyen-Congo, Brazza died at Dakar (Senegal) on September 14, 1905. Although Brazza’s conquering methods could be considered pacifist, especially when contrasted to those of Stanley, they led to a brutal colonial rule in Congo.

CHARLES DIDIER GONDOLA

See also: **Concessionary Companies; Stanley, Leopold II, “Scramble.”**

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Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Colonial Period: Moyen-Congo

In 1910, the French decided to reorganize their possessions in Equatorial Africa, as they had done in West Africa in 1904, by uniting Moyen-Congo, Gabon, and Oubangui-Chari (the future Central African Republic, which was then coupled with the military territory of

Tchad) into one federal territory. French Equatorial Africa (FEA), as it came to be known, was headed by a governor general appointed directly by the French minister of colonies in Paris. Brazzaville, the capital of Moyen-Congo, was then promoted to be the federal capital of FEA.

Due to its administrative importance, Moyen-Congo received preferential treatment. In 1934, Brazzaville was connected to Pointe Noire by the Congo-Ocean Railway, the only railway in the entire federation. Brazzaville was provided better public buildings, schools, telecommunications, trading houses, and health facilities than the other three colonies of FEA.

During colonization, Moyen-Congo experienced economic and social upheavals caused by two offshoots of the Berlin Act of 1884–1885, which formalized European colonial claims: missionary enterprises of all denominations could carry their venture with the help of the colonial state, and concessionary companies were encouraged to exploit the natural wealth of the colony. Education was first provided by Catholic missionaries, who sought not only to evangelize the Congolese but also to organize their social and cultural life. This cultural colonization referred to by the French as a *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission) soon sparked different forms of sociopolitical protest that culminated in the 1930s and the 1940s when messianic cults spread throughout the south of the colony. The concessionary companies’ regime in Moyen-Congo, under whose terms some 40 companies were granted 30-year monopolies on the economic production and administration of huge portions of territory, turned out to be disastrous in financial as well as human terms. Ivory and rubber disappeared from the conceded territories, which also experienced dramatic demographic losses. Compulsory labor, colonial discipline, and diseases imported by Europeans took their high toll.

In the early 1900s, portage from the interior to the coast took such a toll on the local populations of FEA and gave such meager returns that it became obsolete. The French then started to build a railroad to evacuate raw materials to the coast (Pointe Noire) and from there to Europe. The project started in 1921 using forced labor from all over the federation. It was open to traffic on July 10, 1934, and cost France 231 million gold francs. In all, at least 30,000 African workers perished during the construction of the 511 kilometers of this railroad. In 1925–1926, French writer André Gide (1869–1951) set off for FEA in order to fulfill his childhood longing to see the Congo. Gide was to witness the dramatic effects of French colonization in the Congo. In his travel account, published in 1927 under the title *Voyage au Congo*, he wrote, “I did not foresee that the agonizing social questions raised by our

relations with the natives would soon preoccupy me and become the *raison d'être* of my journey."

It is against the backdrop of this colonial exploitation that the most important anticolonial movement developed against the French. It was led by André Matswa, a former Catholic catechist, who in the early 1920s had left Moyen-Congo to settle in Paris. In 1926, Matswa founded a movement in Paris called the Association of Natives of French Equatorial Africa. The movement catered to natives of FEA living in France and stressed education, mutual aid, and the promotion of Africans to equal status with French citizens. The movement spread to Moyen-Congo and gained enough support among the Lari and Sundi populations of Brazzaville and the Malebo Pool region to alarm the colonial government.

When Matswa returned to Brazzaville in 1930 to campaign for his movement, he was immediately arrested along with three other leaders, Constant Balou, Jacques Mayassi, and Pierre Nganga. The three were tried and deported to Chad. This decision sparked a series of riots, and workers in Brazzaville went on strike. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the movement took roots in the rural communities of the Malebo Pool region and fostered an atmosphere of indiscipline among the Lari peasants. At first undecided about an appropriate repression, the colonial government took advantage of the restrictive climate of World War II to crack down on the movement. In 1940, several Matswanist activists were executed and Matswa fled to France, where he volunteered to serve in the French army. After being wounded in battle in April, he was arrested and sent back to Moyen-Congo to be jailed in Mayama, where he died under mysterious conditions. Matswa's death not only reinforced the basic anticolonial undertones of the movement, but it placed him at the center of a new religious syncretist and messianic cult among the Lari and Sundi. Many of them believed that Matswa was not dead but in exile in Paris and would return as a savior to liberate Congo from French colonial rule.

After World War II, political reforms were introduced in French colonial Africa and prompted the development of political parties. In 1946, Jean-Félix Tchicaya founded the first political party in Moyen-Congo, the Congolese Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Congolais), an ethnic-based party with a large Vili constituency. Two more major parties were to be created along similar ethnic lines: the African Socialist Movement (Mouvement Socialiste Africain) of Jacques Opangault from the Mbochi group; and the Democratic Union for the Protection of African Interest (Union Démocratique pour la Défense des Intérêts Africains) of Fulbert Youlou, a former Catholic priest who claimed the mantle of Matswa and catered to the Lari people.

In November 1956, after a rough political campaign that opposed these three parties, Youlou was elected mayor of Brazzaville and became the first African to be elected mayor in FEA. In 1958, General Charles de Gaulle's return to power in France prompted further reforms that would eventually lead to the proclamation of the autonomous Congo Republic as part of the French community. De Gaulle took this reform a step further, granting "full independence" to France's former African colonies. After a successful campaign, Youlou became the first president of an independent Republic of Congo on August 15, 1960.

CHARLES DIDIER GONDOLA

See also: **Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884–1885; Concessionary Companies; Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Independence, Revolution, 1958–1979.**

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Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Independence, Revolution, 1958–1979

By the eve of Congo's independence in 1958, three notable politicians had taken center stage in the country's fascinating political drama. One, Félix Tchicaya, had been a fixture on the Congolese scene since 1945, when he was elected to the French National Assembly. His local party, the Parti Progressiste Congolais (PPC), was at that time affiliated with Houphouët-Boigny's Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) political movement. Tchicaya had support among the coastal Vili people, as well as among many intellectuals.

Jacques Opangault, with an ethnic base among the northern Mbochi, was a second important leader of the era. Opangault led the local affiliate of the French socialist party, which became the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA) in August 1957. Tchicaya and Opangault had been long rivals in the postwar period, but joined in coalition with one another in 1957 against Congo's third important political figure of the era, Fulbert Youlou.

Although he was a Catholic priest, Youlou began his political career by mobilizing the Lari people, many of whom had been previously devoted to a martyred, messianic hero, André Matsoua (also spelled Matswa); the Lari had essentially disenfranchised themselves after Matsoua's death. Youlou created the Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains (UDDIA) in May 1956 and was elected mayor of Brazzaville in November.

Following the implementation of the *loi cadre* (enabling act) and the elections of March 1957, the territorial assembly was divided nearly evenly between deputies of the MSA-PPC coalition (25 seats) and the UDDIA (24 seats). As a result, the colonial governor insisted upon a coalition government, headed by Opangault. In September, however, one MSA delegate defected, giving the UDDIA a bare majority. Afterward, there was a sharp increase in intragovernmental tension, but no change of regime. In August 1958, Charles de Gaulle appeared in Brazzaville in support of the French Community referendum, which Congo duly approved the following month with 79 per cent in favor. In November of that year, after the defection of another MSA delegate, the UDDIA party forced through a new constitution and formed a new, provisional government with Youlou as the prime minister. In February 1959 ethnic violence between Lari UDDIA partisans and Mbochi MSA loyalists erupted in Brazzaville, and Opangault was briefly arrested. Youlou was able to consolidate his power when his UDDIA won an overwhelming majority in new elections for the assembly. On August 15, 1960 Congo became a fully independent republic. Later that year Youlou brought Opangault back into the government as vice president.

During his short period of rule, Youlou managed to alienate all of the major political forces in Congo. His “natural” Matsouanist constituents renounced him when he pursued national goals, while he never reconciled other ethnic groups to his rule. Meanwhile, the youth, unions, and educated classes recoiled at his conservative foreign policies and lackluster development efforts. Finally, the country's few pluralists were put off by his intention, announced in August 1962, to create a one-party state. Youlou's opponents coalesced in three days of mass demonstrations (*les trois glorieuses*) between August 13 and 15, 1963, leading to his resignation. A Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR), including union, army, and youth elements, took control of the country. In December, the speaker of the assembly, Alphonse Massemba-Débat, was elected president, and a constitution based on “scientific socialism” was adopted.

In 1964, the country's new leaders instituted a single, national party, the Mouvement National de la Révolution (MNR), as well as mass organizations for

youth (JMNR), women, civil defense, and labor; education was nationalized. In 1965, Congo established relations with the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Vietnam while severing relations with the United States. The CNR remained the locus of real power, though the army exercised considerable influence behind the scenes. Meanwhile, JMNR leaders perpetually tried to push Massemba-Débat further to the left, causing a serious rivalry between that organization and the army. Unable to reconcile the various institutional and ideological factions in his own regime, Massemba-Débat finally succumbed to a coup d'état led by Captain Marien Ngouabi in July 1968. Thus ended Congo's second republic.

Ngouabi soon made Congo's commitment to Marxism-Leninism even more unequivocal. At the end of 1969, the country was renamed the People's Republic of Congo, and a more rigorously Leninist constitution was adopted, launching the third republic. The Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT) replaced the MNR. Despite this rhetoric, the real politics of the country centered on competing ethnoregional barons and various army factions. The most important factional leader to contest Ngouabi was Ange Diawara, an ardent Maoist, who attempted a coup on February 22, 1972; Diawara remained an important clandestine opponent of the regime until he was killed by the army in April 1973. Ngouabi frequently purged the PCT and senior army ranks of those he suspected of disloyalty or independent ambition. On the economic front, rising oil production and prices allowed Ngouabi to nationalize many foreign firms and create state-owned enterprises as well as expand the civil service and army.

Ngouabi was assassinated on March 18, 1977, by a group of soldiers who were themselves then quickly killed by loyal army troops. Officially, the assassination was the work of Barthélemy Kikadidi, a former chief of military intelligence under Massemba-Débat, but the real origins of the assassination remain a matter of highly contentious debate in Congo. A number of southern politicians, including Massemba-Débat, were subsequently executed by the regime, and a prominent Catholic cardinal, Emile Biayenda, was murdered by unknown assassins. Many PCT figures, including President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, have also frequently been implicated in the death of Ngouabi, who is now widely remembered as Congo's least corrupt and most devoted leader.

Ngouabi was succeeded as president by Joachim Yhombi-Opango, another prominent Kouyou army officer, but one far less committed to socialism. Yhombi began a process of reconciliation with the United States that was finally concluded in 1979. Yhombi never managed to consolidate his grip on power,

however, and was himself displaced in a bloodless coup by Sassou, a Mbochi, in February 1979. Sassou soon returned the country to a more “revolutionary” path in principle, but in practice he proved himself pragmatic in foreign relations and his development strategy.

JOHN F. CLARK

See also: **Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Liberalization, Rebellion, 1980s and 1990s; Sassou-Nguesso, Denis.**

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Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Liberalization, Rebellion, 1980s and 1990s

Both Congo’s economy and its political fate were tied to the value of its petroleum revenues during the 1980s. Following the oil price shock of 1979 and production increases, Congo was flush with official funds during the first half of the decade. While some of these funds were diverted for patronage and conspicuous consumption by regime barons, much was recirculated to the population through civil-service staff salaries, parastatal support, educational stipends, and other public subsidies. An ambitious Five-Year Development Plan for 1982–1986 was adopted by the Congolese Worker’s Party (PCT) in December 1981. In these favorable circumstances, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso was able to consolidate his power with little public protest. In foreign relations, Sassou signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in 1981, but he also allowed the French Elf-Aquitaine company to take the lead in developing Congolese oil and improved relations with the United States.

The oil price collapse of 1985 led to a rapid rise in public discontent during the second half of the decade. In June of that year, the PCT Central Committee canceled the costly 1982–1986 Development Plan. Meanwhile, the government began negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a debt-relief plan that would lead to a standby agreement in July 1986. Sassou reshuffled his cabinet in December 1985, and

began to speak of the need for liberalizing economic reforms, but these were instituted only halfheartedly. Under the resulting austerity economy, both public protests and attempted coups d’état increased over the following years. Sassou was forced to rely more on repression and less on patronage to remain in power as the decade wore on.

Following the National Conference in Benin (another francophone, Afro-Marxist state), as well as the end of the Cold War in Europe, public pressure on the Sassou regime to liberalize escalated sharply in 1990. Under this pressure, Sassou announced in July 1990 that Congo would take steps to become a multiparty state. The opposition, however, demanded the immediate convening of a sovereign national conference. Students, unionized workers, and religious groups organized public demonstrations to rally support for such a conference during the final months of the year. At year’s end Sassou finally bowed to this demand, and the conference was allowed to convene on February 25, 1991. Once the opposition gained control over the conference, it proceeded to expose the sins of the Sassou regime, dismantle the one-party state, organize a transitional government, and set up a constitution drafting committee.

The new constitution was approved in March 1992 and legislative elections were held in June and July. Three important parties emerged in these elections. Finishing first was the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADs) led by Pascal Lissouba and regionally based in the Niari, Bouenza, and Lékoumou regions (the Nibolek); second was the Congolese Movement for Democracy and Comprehensive Development (MCDDI) led by Bernard Kolélas, and supported chiefly by the Lari people of the Malebo Pool region; third was the reformed PCT led by Sassou, which drew most of its support from the North. In August 1992 Sassou was defeated in the first round of the presidential elections, after which he endorsed Lissouba. The latter then defeated Kolélas in the second round by a margin of 61 per cent to 39 per cent.

When Lissouba named his first cabinet, however, it contained few PCT members, and the UPADS-PCT alliance quickly broke apart, depriving Lissouba of a majority in the parliament. Instead of naming an opposition prime minister, though, Lissouba illegally dissolved the parliament and ordered new elections. This led to a wave of civil unrest that was only ended by the appointment of a neutral cabinet in December 1992. When the legislative elections were rerun in May 1993, the opposition rejected the results and boycotted the second round. Serious military confrontations between the militias of Lissouba and Kolélas followed, continuing through early August. In that month, intensive foreign mediation achieved an

agreement to rerun the elections for contested seats. Nonetheless, serious fighting resumed during the November 1993–January 1994 period. When all of the final elections results were in, Lissouba had regained a parliamentary majority through a coalition excluding both the MCDDI and the PCT. Approximately 2,000 or 3,000 Congolese were killed between December 1992 and February 1994.

Although an uneasy peace prevailed over Congo from mid-1994 until May 1997, Lissouba's record was undistinguished. Reforms of the parastatal sector and civil service were perpetually delayed, and Congo remained as oil dependent as ever. Meanwhile, the level of corruption and the diversion of petroleum revenues increased. Lissouba relied heavily in his administration on staff from the Nibolek, and particularly on Bembe partisans.

As the elections scheduled for July 1997 approached, the population perceived that Lissouba was not seriously preparing for free elections. Meanwhile, Sassou returned from a long exile in France and began readying his militia as well as his electoral campaign. In May 1997 violence broke out during one of Sassou's campaign swings through the northern town of Owando, home of former president Yhombi, then serving as Lissouba's campaign director. Despite an apparent settlement of the resulting dispute, Lissouba sent a military detachment to arrest "certain associates" of Sassou at his home on June 5, 1997. Sassou's militia's successfully resisted this attempt, and a full-scale civil war soon commenced. As in the first civil war, ethnic cleansing accompanied the fighting. In late August, Kolélas foreswore his previous neutrality and ordered his militia into battle against Sassou. In early October, however, a large contingent of Angolan troops joined the fray on behalf of Sassou, allowing his forces to seize power. Some 10,000 Congolese died in this round of fighting.

Throughout 1998 Sassou followed a dual strategy of coopting some opposition politicians, while assassinating or jailing others. Yet his regime remained dependent on military support from Angola, and financial support from friendly French commercial interests. Lissouba, Kolélas, Yhombi and other important figures had escaped into exile, whence they launched campaigns to undermine the Sassou government. In December 1998 the militia based in the Malebo Pool region and in Nibolek began serious efforts to seize power. Again, hundreds were killed and many thousands displaced. While Sassou's army and militia forces were able to rebut these assaults, some parts of the country fell into rebel hands. As the fighting continued in 1999, Sassou's grip on power remained uncertain.

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See also: **Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Independence, 1958–1979; Sassou-Nguesso, Denis.**

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
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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial

Although the nineteenth century was an epoch of great changes for the Congo, many of the critical historical transformations began well before external influences became decisive. The first half of the century witnessed the expansion of two great savanna kingdoms, the Lunda and the Luba, as well as of other related states such as the Kanyok, the Yaka of Kiamfu, and the Lunda of Kazembe. Along the southern limits of the great equatorial forest, the Teke (Tio) and Kuba kingdoms continued to exercise their control over large territories. New political configurations emerged on the savanna north of the forest edge as well. Generally less powerful than the kingdoms of the southern savanna, these included the Mangbetu, Zande, and Ngbandi chiefdoms. On the northern savanna, armed Sudanic peoples exerted pressure that resulted in the militarization and gradual southward displacement of many groups. This ultimately explains why the conquests of the Ngombe affected the distant Mongo living in the heart of the forest.

The nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic growth of long-distance commerce. For centuries, central Africa had been linked both to the Atlantic and the Indian oceans. But these links were achieved by a multitude of relays, and trade goods circulated as by capillary action. In the nineteenth century, commerce was increasingly organized into well-structured networks. Large caravans, sometimes composed of thousands of people, spread out across the continent along established itineraries controlled by groups linked to trade. As in preceding centuries, the slave trade remained the principal form of commerce. The European ban on the slave trade progressively redirected commercial interests toward ivory and other

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products such as rubber, palm oil, or beeswax. But because commerce in those products required porters and because European prohibitions had little effect on the internal African slave markets (Zanzibar and Angola especially), the slave trade survived until about 1910. Slaves continued to be exchanged for cloth, weapons, beads, and other manufactured goods.

Four great commercial networks dominated the nineteenth century. The oldest linked the Angolan coast with the southern savanna. The primary actors in this network came from the Portuguese colony of Angola and the African states of the Kasanje, Matamba, Ovimbundu, and Lunda. In addition, between 1850 and 1870, the Chokwe and the Luluwa entered and expanded this commercial sphere. The second network began in the Lower Congo and its hinterland, and reached the Malebo Pool, where the great Pumbu market was located. From there it continued up the Congo River and its tributaries for several hundred kilometers. Many groups were part of this system. The most important were the Teke, the Bobangi, and the Bangala. The third great network linked the Congo to the Indian Ocean. Although it was very old, and even though Kazambe's kingdom had attracted coastal merchants several decades earlier, this eastern system had not substantially extended into the Congo until after the 1850s. But by the 1880s and 1890s it had affected most of the eastern part of the region. Finally, beginning in the 1860s, a fourth circuit developed. More modest, it was established by merchants from modern-day Sudan who traded with people in northeastern Congo, principally in the Uele Basin.

The establishment of these extensive economic domains led to the diffusion of great trade languages. This was the case with Kikongo (in the Lower Congo region), Lingala (in the area above the Malebo Pool), and Swahili (in the east). These economic developments also led to the creation of markets, some of which became the first colonial posts that later evolved into modern cities.

The expansion of the commercial networks advanced in conjunction with an enormous movement of people and firearms that led to an unprecedented political upheaval. Therefore, in a matter of several decades, the Chokwe, seminomadic hunters from northern Angola who were little known before 1850, established their ascendancy over dozens of southern savanna groups. Even though they acted in small groups without any centralized political structure, they defeated all of the Lunda chiefdoms of the region and overran Musumb, the royal capital in 1885. Thanks to the support of their Luluwa allies, their commercial sphere reached well into the interior of Kasai. Only the Kuba kingdom remained relatively intact during the upheavals that spread through this region.

To the east, the sphere oriented toward the Indian Ocean also experienced radical transformations. About 1850, under the impetus of their leader M'siri, the Yeke, a group originating in Tanzania, settled in southern Katanga, where they seized the strategic location at the intersection of the trade routes leading to the two oceans. From 1870 to 1890, after being deeply integrated into the social fabric of the region, they undertook several wars of conquest against their Lunda and Luba neighbors. The Swahili Arabs linked to the Sultanate of Muscat-Zanzibar would eventually constitute the greatest challenge to European occupation. Starting from bases in the regions around Lakes Tanganyika and Mweru, they settled in the Maniema beginning in the 1860s. There they created two towns, Nyangwe and Kasongo, containing 30,000 and 60,000 inhabitants, respectively; even today these two remain important Muslim centers in the Congo. In 1874, Tippu Tip, the most famous of all of the Swahili Arab merchants, asserted control and unified the area into a nascent state. Under his influence, the Swahili Arab commercial domain penetrated deep into the interior to include the Aruwimi Basin, the lands far to the west of the Lower Lomami, and northern Katanga. His territory even reached eastern Kasai where he was assisted by his allies Ngongo Luteta and Lumpungu, and where he tapped into the active southern savanna Atlantic trade. For a long time, the Kivu frontier zone, along with the great interlacustrine kingdoms, remained outside this commercial sphere. But they did not escape the cultural influence imposed by the Swahili Arabs on the entire eastern part of the Congo.

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Congo was, with the exception of the area near the mouth of the Congo River, a territory unknown to Europeans. Between 1870 and 1885 the first great wave of explorations filled in this lacuna. The most notable voyages were those of Schweinfurth and Junker in the north, of Cameron in Maniema and Katanga, of Pogge and Wissman in the Kasai Basin, and of Henry Morton Stanley, who descended most of the Congo River in 1876–1877. Then, beginning in the 1880s, Catholic and Protestant missions followed the paths of the explorers, especially along the Congo River and in Katanga.

Throughout this period of exploration, the Belgian King Leopold II sponsored a series of ostensibly philanthropic or scientific associations. As a result, the Congo Free State was recognized during the Berlin Conference in 1885. Although theoretically this was a free-trade area, in actuality Leopold's intent was to transform the region into a Belgian colony. Increasingly, from 1880 onward, Europeans made treaties with indigenous chiefs and founded new posts legitimizing the ambitions of the king. Now all that remained for Leopold was to conquer the African powers in the region. This goal was realized by subduing the Madhist state in modern Sudan that threatened the northeastern part of the Congo Free State (just before and after 1890); by the conquest of the Yeke state (1891); and by the campaign against the Swahili Arabs (1892–1895). The great Luba and Lunda kingdoms, greatly destabilized by the slave trade, offered only weak resistance. Elsewhere, the Force Publique (the Free State's militia) engaged in campaigns against lesser states such as the Yaka (1889–1893) or the Kuba (1888–1889, and again in 1900) or against the armed resistance of groups not organized in states. The Congo Free State even had to contend with several rebellions of the Force Publique's African soldiers, who had turned against their European officers. For the most part, 1900 marked the end of extensive military operations.

The end of the nineteenth century was a crucial period for the creation and stabilization of the ethnic identities that exist in the Congo today. Up to this time ethnic identities were fluid and (except in the large kingdoms) often only referred to small groups. The political and economic upheavals and the European explorations of the nineteenth century led to the attribution of new identities to groups that earlier had not been known by the same ethnic name. Thus, the Bangala and the Mongo emerged in the forest. Two enormous groups, their names and identities were the convenient constructs of the period of exploration and early colonial rule. Elsewhere, ancient names became crystallized in a way that bore almost no relation to their more subtle and limited earlier usage.

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Congo Free State, 1885–1908

The Congo Free State, or the Congo Independent State (État Indépendant du Congo), has earned an infamous place in the history of colonial Africa. Established during the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, it was a colony without a metropolis, governed in an absolute fashion by King Leopold II of Belgium. The primary goal of Leopold and his European agents was profit maximization, and they soon turned the Congo into a veritable “heart of darkness.” Using fear and terror to compel Africans to collect wild rubber and other exportable commodities, the Congo Free State's economy became dependent on an ever-increasing spiral of violence. When news of the atrocities eventually reached Europe, Leopold was forced to cede his private empire to Belgium in 1908, initiating a new phase of Belgian colonialism that lasted until 1960.

The origins of the Congo Free State can be traced to voyages of the American explorer Henry Morton Stanley. During his unprecedented trip across central Africa in the mid-1870s, Stanley discovered tremendous commercial potential in the Congo Basin. The land seemed rich in natural resources, and along the river he encountered large African trading expeditions, in canoes filled with valuable ivory tusks and other goods. Stanley's well-publicized trip caught the attention of King Leopold II who, having failed to win a colony in Asia, now turned his attention to Africa. In 1876, Leopold created the Comité d'études du haut Congo (Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo, later renamed the International Association of the Congo), an ostensibly scientific organization that masked his true imperialistic motives. He secretly hired Stanley to return to the Congo to collect treaties from African leaders and to establish preliminary stations. Leopold's strategy ultimately proved successful: European delegates at the Berlin Conference recognized his territorial claims and endorsed the

creation of the Congo Free State, to be headed by Leopold himself. According to its charter, the Free State was to embody four basic principles: freedom of trade and navigation by all; neutrality in the event of war; suppression of the slave trade; and an improvement in the well-being of Africans. Under King Leopold's direction, however, these principles were soon ignored.

At the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, European traders from various nations wasted little time in launching their steamboats up the Zaire River and its tributaries in search of exportable commodities. Ivory quickly became the principal export, for it was plentiful, cheap, and highly prized in Europe. Although some African river traders attempted to block the advance of foreigners into their territories, many others contracted mutually beneficial commercial partnerships with the Europeans. Vast quantities of ivory were obtained from African traders in exchange for cloth, metal bars, beads, and other manufactured goods. Free trade in the Congo proved remarkably lucrative: between 1888 and 1890, European traders exported approximately 140 tons of ivory from the Free State, worth nearly seven million Belgian francs.

One individual not profiting from the Congo was King Leopold himself. On the contrary, he saw his personal fortune decline from 1885 to 1890, a direct result of the expenses incurred from early exploration, pioneering, and the numerous military campaigns required to exert control over the territory. Unsuccessful in his efforts to acquire assistance from private investors or the Belgian government, he became increasingly possessive of what he considered to be his personal colonial enterprise. In 1892 Leopold abandoned the original colonial charter and created a new economic order that would secure him the profits that he felt he so rightfully deserved. Claiming that all vacant land belonged to the state, he divided his colony into distinct commercial zones, each defined by monopolistic rights of exploitation. Huge territorial concessions were awarded to private commercial interests in return for capital investments and a significant share of the profits. To ensure his own success, Leopold created a large "crown domain" (*domain de la couronne*) as his own personal fiefdom. By the mid-1890s, nearly three-quarters of the Free State had been assigned to special interests, leaving only a small territory still open to free trade. Once the concessionary zones were established, Leopold initiated new policies to force large numbers of Africans into the production of exports, principally rubber latex tapped from the wild vines of the equatorial forest. In 1892, a rubber tax was instituted that left quotas and enforcement to company employees or government officials. To ensure maximum production and profits, European

rubber agents and their African auxiliaries were rewarded and promoted in proportion to the amount of rubber collected. Inevitably, the new system encouraged widespread abuses and horrific violence against Africans. Individuals who did not meet their assigned quotas were beaten, whipped, and tortured. Mutilations became a common punishment to heighten fear and to set an example for others. Recalcitrant villages were burned, and women were taken as hostages until rubber or other goods were procured. In addition to the shock and terror caused by such brutality, the demands for ever-increasing amounts of rubber and other goods disrupted normal subsistence activities, causing famine, illness, and depopulation in many regions. Although African resistance was common and extensive, it never succeeded in eliminating the Europeans or their unceasing demands.

For Leopold and his allies, the savage economic system paid handsomely. Rubber exports rose from 135 tons in 1890 to over 5,800 tons by 1900, a more than 40-fold increase. The crown domain earned the king an additional profit of approximately 70 million Belgian francs. But this success was short-lived, for the system proved self-destructive. Rubber production began a slow but steady decline after 1900, a result of the excessive exploitation and deliberate sabotage of wild vines by African workers. Moreover, missionary reports chronicling the ruthless system created an international outcry, resulting in the formation of the Congo Reform Association in 1904. After a series of investigative reports, King Leopold was compelled to relinquish his empire to Belgium in 1908.

The Congo Free State bequeathed a harsh and lasting legacy to the newly created Belgian Congo. For Africans, the severe deprivations associated with forced labor caused widespread social disruption, sickness, and, for many, a lasting suspicion of and hostility toward Europeans. For the colonizers, annexation produced no real departure in policy. While the most drastic features of Leopold's system were terminated, colonial profit making remained the preeminent concern. To this end the new administration reformed its policy of land concessions, took on the role of labor recruiter, and passed a series of laws that hindered African economic activity that might compete with European interests. As was the case in the Congo Free State, the economic and social welfare of Africans was largely neglected or ignored.

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See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Concessionary Companies; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Colonial Economy, 1908–1960.**

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Administration and Society, 1908–1960

The administration of the Congo changed little after it was handed over by Leopold II to Belgium. The Belgians' concerns with the Congo did not differ much from what Leopold II envisioned or, more generally speaking, what Europeans deemed necessary to take into consideration with respect to their African domains. A Belgian version of Lord Lugard's dual mandate was implemented, including one overriding concern which recognized that the colony had to generate profit for the metropolis. The riches of the Congo had been, after all, one of the major factors in persuading the Belgians to go along with the annexation. Another principle that presided over the takeover was the notion that Europeans had a *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission) of both Christianization and education to perform in Africa. Hence the colony was governed according to a colonial charter drafted in 1908 that allowed the king to retain a great deal of authority and influence over affairs in the Congo by appointing high-ranked officials and signing laws. On the local level, in most rural areas the people were ruled indirectly through the native chiefs, many of whom were put in place by the local colonial administrator. However, what best describes Belgian administration in the Congo is what many authors have termed the "colonial trinity." Three forces—the state, missions, and big companies—collaborated in the Belgian Congo to rule a territory 80 times larger than Belgium. Concessionary companies, such as Huileries du Congo Belge (palm oil), an extension of Unilever, La Forminière

(diamonds), Kilo Moto (gold), and L'Union Minière du Haut Katanga (copper) were not only capitalistic ventures but had a mandate from the colonial state to erect schools and hospitals, to build roads and railways, and to police the Congolese natives.

In 1911, Huileries du Congo belge (HCB) alone had been granted an area one-fourth the size of Belgium to create five concessions of wild palm trees. In the operation, HCB displaced thousands of peasants and stripped them of their plantations of cultivated palm trees. The conditions given by the colonial government amounted to a total development of the areas conceded. HCB had to create a network of paved roads and railroads and a postal and telegraph service that could be used and even expropriated by the colonial state in exchange for compensations. Furthermore, HCB was mandated to build health and education infrastructures for its workers and families. In 1926, these social achievements included 15 hospitals and 5 schools for 23,000 African workers and families as well as for 335 Europeans. On the transportation front the balance sheet seemed impressive as well: 650 miles of paved roads and 50 miles of railroad. What these figures did not reflect is that in order to create such infrastructures and still be able to pay the colonial government its annual dividend, HCB literally pauperized thousands of Congolese living and working within the concessions and established a tight social control system that deprived people of their freedom and humanity.

The missionary presence in the Congo also played an important role in creating an administrative network that facilitated political control and repression. In 1935, the Catholic and Protestant denominations held, respectively, 261 and 168 posts with 2,326 and 718 white clergymen dedicated to a purported population of 1,048,511 and 233,673 African believers. Of all of the denominations granted privileges in the Congo, the Catholic Church espoused the colonial civilizing mission ideology with such conviction that it played into the hands of the colonial state as an agent for pacification and civilization. Most other denominations, especially Protestant foreign missions, were held in suspicion and regarded as agents of whatever European country they emanated from. This allowed the Catholic Church to stretch a network of nearly 600 parishes serving more than 24,400 villages and small towns. In 1946, the Catholic Church could boast of 18,000 schools serving the needs of 800,000 pupils, 561 hospitals and medical centers, 19 printing houses, 24 newspapers, and 1,432 European priests.

Although instrumental in asserting the authority of the Europeans in Congo, the role of the concessionary companies and the religious missions was superseded by the activity of the colonial state agents. Public

indifference to colonial affairs paved the way to a colonial policy governed by bureaucratic conservatism, a blatant paternalism toward the Africans, and the interests of a minority. The vast majority of the population, whether Europeans or Africans, were not permitted political organization and representation in the colony until after World War II, when demands were heard and reforms made to gradually integrate Africans into the affairs of the colony.

African resistance to the Belgian colonial system took many forms. Africans perceived the imposition of European administration, business, and religion on their lives and customs according to their own interests. Responses varied from collaboration to open resistance, especially in areas where heavy taxation coupled with compulsory recruitment and low wages colluded into driving the population below poverty level. Armed resistance occurred among the Azande in the northeastern Congo, the Yaka and Pende in the southwest, the Luba in the southeast, and the Lele between the Lulua and the Loango Rivers. In a few cases religious movements took on overtones of political protests. Historians pay less attention to the use of popular cultures by Africans in many of the urban centers of the Belgian Congo to circumvent colonial prescriptions and voice their frustrations with the colonial system. Such domains include popular music, fashion, the use and abuse of alcohol, illegal migrations, and so on, which until the 1950s were perhaps the only means Africans could use both as a recreative outlet and a political tribune.

The 1950s constituted a major turning point, in that the Belgians had to rethink their ways of dealing with the Africans. For many years the Belgians had ruled the Congolese as though they were children, but as the gulf was narrowed by African education and what some have termed the political awakening of the Congolese, this policy was bound to change. Under the pressure of the *évolués*, the Congolese social and intellectual elite, “native councils” were set up at the territorial level on which Africans acquainted themselves, albeit remotely, with the colonial affairs. Some *évolués* were also invited to sit on various advisory boards such as the Fonds du Bien-Être Indigène, a social welfare organization, and the Office des Cités Africaines, concerned with native housing. These cosmetic changes, however, were far from satisfactory to the *évolués*.

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See also: **Concessionary Companies; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Colonial Economy, 1908–1960; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Evolués, Politics, Independence.**

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Colonial Economy, 1908–1960

When in 1908 King Leopold II relinquished his private domain of the Congo to a somewhat reluctant Belgian government, the economy of the area was already becoming a brutal system of exploitation—one of the distinctive features of Belgian colonization. This system of economic exploitation was based on compulsory labor. The colonial administration that took over after Leopold II brought about a few changes but furthered the exploitation of the Congolese population by introducing a new method of forcing people to work: taxes. The imposition of a heavy head tax forced able-bodied men to migrate to the working areas: plantations, mines, railway roads, ports, and white residential regions.

Although this economic activity triggered substantial development and modernization in major cities, it bore little direct relationship to the needs of the Congolese people. It benefited mostly foreign companies and shareholders as well as the Belgian state itself which had holdings in many of the companies.

During the period between the two world wars, the colonial government’s major economic policy was aimed at encouraging private foreign investment for the development of agricultural commodities for export. The Belgian government did also implement, as had the French in the neighboring French Congo, an open concessionary system by allowing large companies to exploit portions of the colony in return for promises to create infrastructures. Needless to say, the Belgian colonial government concerned itself very little with social infrastructure and the well-being of the Congolese population. Instead it granted the religious missions and the large concessionary companies permission to provide health and education to the population.

In order to curtail labor shortage and ensure adequate supplies of labor at low wages to private and state-owned companies, the colonial administration, known to the population as *bula matari* (“rock breaker”),

resorted to compulsory recruitment that was reminiscent of the brutal forced labor of the Leopoldian Congo. Restrictions were also placed on the establishment of foreign commercial activities that would have stimulated the farmers to produce surpluses that would have been turned into cash rather than take low-paying jobs on plantations and mines.

The extroversion of the economy of the Belgian Congo is best noted with reference to the transportation system, which was established for the sole purpose of extracting and evacuating goods out of the colony. Katanga was linked to Rhodesia by a railway from Sakania to Elizabethville. Another line was constructed from Katanga to Dilolo and connected at the Angolan frontier with the Portuguese railway from Lobito Bay. By the 1930s, over 2,500 miles of rivers and an equivalent mileage of railway and paved roads eased the evacuation of Congo's goods to Europe.

Congo's increasingly dependent economy suffered greatly during the turmoil caused by the Great Depression of the 1930s. In some places economic activities came to a standstill, and this resulted in huge layoffs of skilled and semiskilled workers.

The years after World War II witnessed the growth of the copper, gold, and tin industries, which had picked up during the war as part of the Belgian Congo's war effort in favor of the Allied forces. American and British armies demanded ever more rubber for the tires of hundreds of thousands of military vehicles, uranium (80 per cent of the uranium for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs came from the Congo mine of Shinkolobwe), and cotton for army uniforms. As before, the profits flowed out of the colony and coercive measures were customarily used to force workers to mine (*chicotte*, or flogging, was applied unmercifully to discipline the Congolese). Needless to say, working conditions in the mines were abysmal. Scores of workers died each year of brutality, disease, and despair to the extent that methods of recruitment differed little from those employed in Leopold's time. These conditions, as one would suspect, attracted few migrants even though male heads of households were hard-pressed to get cash to pay taxes. Recruiters from the mines ventured to remote villages accompanied by soldiers and used bribery on village chiefs as well as force whenever necessary to coerce people into migrating to the mines. Often local government administrators assisted company agents in recruiting and holding villagers through the imposition of penalties. Those who resisted were rounded up, chained, and taken by force to the mines. For every recruit who fled, a member of his family was imprisoned until he turned himself in to the recruiting agents. Fines and imprisonment were imposed upon workers for breach of contract.

World War II not only stimulated Belgian Congo's economy, but also resulted in a shift in foreign trade. Since ties with Belgium had been severed by the German occupation, new markets were found abroad and new industries were set up to supply the colony with consumer goods (clothing, tobacco, beer, furniture, radio sets, bicycles, sewing machines, etc.) previously imported, largely from Belgium. These new industries catered to the rising African middle class that consisted of Europeans' servants, teachers, qualified artisans, and foremen who had acquired their skills in the big mining and industrial companies. Also included were the Africans who had set up businesses on their own, operating bars or selling goods and crafts in small shops. The colonial government luckily recognized this growing group of relatively prosperous Africans and supported wage increases and steps toward the development of an African middle class.

At independence, many observers looked at Congo as one of the most thriving colonial domains. Behind this facade of a *colonie modèle* (model colony) there was an entirely different picture: Africans were confined to the most menial and unskilled tasks while more than 90 per cent of the high-skilled positions, managerial posts, and economic wealth continued to be monopolized by foreigners and expatriates. One can therefore argue that the roots of Zairian economic dependency and weakness are to be found in the colonial period that transformed, in a matter of 70 years, a territory of more than ten million inhabitants into a class-divided society and a fragile economic giant.

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See also: **Concessionary Companies; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Administration and Society, 1908–1960.**

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Evolués, Politics, Independence

The Belgian colonial project in the Congo was constructed around a policy of paternalism. Paternalism, with its overt emphasis in this case on the white man as father and the African as child, became the philosophical

framework (and justification) of the Belgian occupation of the Congo. This policy was articulated in governor general Pierre Ryckman's 1948 treatise *Dominer Pour Servir* (*Dominare to Serve*). One of the products of paternalism was the emergence of an elite social class. Called *évolués*, these were Congolese who had relatively advanced education and/or civil service jobs. The *évolués* were regarded as symbols of the "civilizing" mission. They were defined by the colonial government as those blacks in the midst of the transition from "traditional" tribal customs to Western "developed" culture, usually because of education or training at European firms. After a 1948 colonial decree, the *évolués* were awarded the *carte du mérite civique* (card of civic merit), which was granted to Africans who could prove that they were "living in a state of civilization." Many Africans declined to apply for the card and, by 1958, the colonial state recognized only 1,557 Africans as "civilized."

By mid-century, the *évolués* actively pressed for a greater voice in the colony's future. The changes Brussels begrudgingly instituted were relatively small and slow in coming. Still suffering from socioeconomic constraints, Congolese achieved limited access to higher education in the 1950s and promotion within a tightly regulated civil service. Furthermore, *La Voix du Congolais*, a nation-wide publication that became a forum for indigenous ideas and art, was established. Yet, most of these changes were largely reserved for the *évolués*, and not the masses. Moreover, because the colonial state only permitted "cultural" or "mutual self-help" indigenous associations, most of the political movements that emerged, such as the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), were firmly rooted in ethnic or regional identities.

Throughout the late 1950s, pressure for independence mounted and Belgian resolve weakened. The first tentative steps toward decolonization occurred under the 1954–1958 Belgian coalition government of socialists and liberals, who had succeeded in temporarily breaking the social Christians' hold on power. Yet, the changes that the Belgian colonial state allowed were frustratingly meager to the Africans when compared to the decolonization practices of England and France. The situation came to a head in January 1959, when anticolonial riots broke out in Leopoldville. In their wake, a more pronounced nationalist/proindependence discourse emerged in the Congo. The most popular articulator of these discourses was Patrice Emery Lumumba, a young politician from Stanleyville who attempted to make the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) a national party.

The Leopoldville riots shocked a sleepy Belgian populace, who had assumed that the nationalist movements sweeping across Africa would somehow bypass their colony. In the wake of the 1959 riots, the Belgian

government moved quickly to decolonize. In his annual New Year's address, King Baudouin (the grandson of Leopold II's nephew and successor, Albert I), announced that Belgium would give its colony the "gift" of independence "without undue haste." The Belgian government organized a series of roundtable meetings in Brussels with prominent Congolese leaders and eventually established a timetable for independence. The political structures put in place were similar to the Belgian parliamentary system, and national elections were held in May 1960. Lumumba emerged as the most popular of the numerous Congolese politicians, with his MNC winning the most votes but not an outright majority. In a gesture of national unity, Lumumba formed a coalition government, accepting the positions of prime minister and defense minister for himself, with his chief rival, Joseph Kasavubu of ABAKO, as president. Following independence, *évolués* quickly moved into positions of leadership.

On June 30, 1960, King Baudouin presided over the independence ceremony that transformed the Belgian Congo into the Republic of the Congo. The independence of the Congo was soon marred when, on July 5, 1960, several units in the Force Publique (the Congolese army) mutinied, demanding promotions, pay raises, and the removal of white officers. Belgian troops stationed in the Congo intervened and actively engaged the Congolese army and civilians. On July 9, 1960, the Belgian Council of Ministers dispatched additional paracommandos to the Congo, against the wishes of the Congo government. As a result, more Congolese troops mutinied and violence intensified. On July 11, Moïse Tshombe, the regional leader of the southern province of Katanga, announced his region's secession and asked for Belgian support. At Lumumba and Kasavubu's request, the United Nations (UN) responded by sending a multinational force to the Congo in order to "restore law and order." Sensing Western discontentment with Lumumba and with strong encouragement from his European advisers, President Kasavubu fired Prime Minister Lumumba on September 5, 1960. Lumumba responded the same day by firing Kasavubu, creating a standoff that had both leaders claiming legitimacy. The internal political situation was further muddled on September 14, when Joseph Mobutu announced a military coup and created yet another national government. Despite being under UN protection/house arrest, Lumumba managed to escape from Leopoldville and flee toward Stanleyville. However, he was captured en route by Congolese armed forces and imprisoned at Camp Hardy in Thysville, then flown to Elisabethville in Katanga, where he was handed over to the secessionist forces. Lumumba was beaten, tortured, and eventually murdered.

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See also: Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Mobutu, Zaire, and Mobutuism; Lumumba, Patrice.

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Mobutu, Zaire, and Mobutuism

Born on October 14, 1930, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu spent his early years as a journalist and as a student in Brussels. In 1958, he joined Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and was appointed state secretary when Lumumba became prime minister at independence. After the mutiny of Force Publique (the Congolese army) units on July 5, 1960, Mobutu was named army chief of staff at the level of colonel. On September 14, 1960, Mobutu announced he was "neutralizing" the country's political leaders and establishing a college of commissioners to run the country. The college returned power to the constitutional government in February 1961, after the assassination of Lumumba.

On November 25, 1965, Joseph Mobutu announced that he and his military supporters had overthrown the beleaguered government of President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe. Though ostensibly a military coup, Mobutu's government quickly took on civilian trappings, organizing a one-party state around the Mouvement Populaire de Révolution (MPR), which he formed in 1966.

In May 1966, the Mobutu government began the policy of renaming many of the country's major cities, replacing their colonial names with African ones (e.g., Leopoldville became Kinshasa). On October 27, 1971, he announced that the Congo would henceforth be known as Zaire. Mobutu proclaimed that all citizens of Zaire were required to change their names by adopting more "African" ones; those who refused to do so ran the risk of losing their citizenship. On January 12, 1972, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu changed his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Waza Banga.

These name changes were justified on the grounds of overcoming the colonial legacy, making the country more authentically African, and fostering a national identity. Mobutu's construction of a national identity for Zaire was further articulated in his *authenticité* campaign, which sought to move away from borrowed or imposed ideas toward an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous cultural beliefs and values. The most explicit goal of *authenticité* was to restore to the Zairian people a sense of pride in their own traditional culture that had been taken away by colonialism. Much of this entailed synthesizing different cultural traditions and beliefs into a single Zairian identity. In their invention of common Zairian traditions, the regime defined tradition as undemocratic, helping to establish Mobutu as an authoritarian ruler.

Mobutu's *authenticité* project was followed by introduction of *Zairianization*, or the "radicalization of the revolution." Announced on December 30, 1974, *Zairianization* was aimed at addressing the "scourges" eating away at Zairian society, such as excessive liberty and social injustice. *Zairianization* involved the nationalization of the economy, basically entailing the transfer of ownership of most foreign-owned small and medium-sized businesses to a small Zairian elite (usually close allies of Mobutu) who, often lacking managerial experience or interest, used these businesses for their own personal enrichment.

By the late 1970s, *Mobutism* was proclaimed the official ideology of the MPR and Zaire. Defined as the "thought and vision of Mobutu Sese Seko," *Mobutism* encompassed all policies and ideological thoughts of Mobutu, and represented a clear shift toward a cult of personality. One of the effects of this shift was a rise in anti-Mobutu sentiment among the dispossessed. Mobutu's regime was threatened twice when armed rebels invaded the southern province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) in 1977, and again in 1978. Mobutu was quick to claim that the governments of Angola, Cuba, and the Soviet Union were behind the invasions. He succeeded in acquiring material support from the governments of the United States, Belgium, France, China, and Morocco by playing on Cold War fears and economic concerns.

By the 1980s, Mobutu had constructed a political aristocracy that was less interested in providing security to its citizens than in extracting resources for its own enrichment. Mobutu's rule in Zaire became increasingly symbolic of what many observers labeled "kleptocracy" and the "criminalization of the state." The late 1980s were characterized by rising inflation, increased foreign debt, falling standards of living among the populace, and Mobutu's reliance on support from France, Belgium, and the United States. By the 1990s, Zaire was officially in shambles. Its formal

economy shrank more than 40 per cent between 1988 and 1995. Its foreign debt by 1997 was around \$14 billion. At \$117, its 1993 per capita gross domestic product was 65 per cent lower than its 1958 preindependence level. It has been estimated that Mobutu and his close friends pillaged between \$4 billion and \$10 billion of the country's wealth, siphoning off up to 20 per cent of the government's operating budget, 30 per cent of its mineral export revenues, and 50 per cent of its capital budget. Physically, Mobutu's control effectively ended a few hundred kilometers outside of Kinshasa, while the rest of the country operated through a web of complex power relations featuring regional "Big Men" with tentative ties to Mobutu's central government.

Responding to internal and external pressures, Mobutu announced the end of his own regime on April 24, 1990, and inaugurated a system of political pluralism. A National Conference was convened, but Mobutu retained control, artfully exploiting divisions in the opposition, co-opting dissidents, and occasionally unleashing the army. By the mid-1990s, however, Mobutu was dying from prostate cancer and he was spending more time in France and Switzerland, undergoing treatment, than he was in Zaire.

In the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, over 2 million Rwandans fled to refugee camps inside Zaire. These refugees were a mix of civilians, Interhamwe (the militia largely held responsible for the genocide), and members of the defeated Rwandan army (Forces Armées Rwandaises, or FAR). The refugee camps quickly became controlled by the Interhamwe and the FAR. Over the next two years, these groups (with the blessing of Mobutu's central government) reorganized and rearmed. Soon they began launching attacks from the camps into neighboring Rwanda. In response, the Rwandan government fostered a rebellion in eastern Zaire in August and September 1996. The rebels attacked the refugee camps, the Interhamwe, and the Forces Armées Zairoises (Zairian army). Orchestrated and assisted by the RPF regime in Kigali, the rebels quickly swept across the country.

Mobutu returned to Kinshasa on December 17, 1996, and tried to organize a counteroffensive in early 1997. As the rebels moved westward, they were joined by other anti-Mobutists. Their external supporters included the regimes in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Mobutu's counteroffensive collapsed as Kisangani fell to the rebels on March 15. By April, the rebels gained control of the mineral-rich provinces of Kasai and Shaba, thus robbing Mobutu and his power elite of a major economic lifeline. By May 17, 1997, Kinshasa had fallen and Mobutu and his entourage had fled. Soon afterward, Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaimed himself the new president and renamed the country the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. On September 7, 1997, Mobutu died from the cancer while in exile in Morocco.

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See also: **Cold War, Africa and the; Congo (Kinshasa): Post-Mobutu Era; Lumumba, Patrice.**

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Mineral Factor

Minerals have played a central role in the politics and economy of Congo/Zaire from its inception as the Congo Free State. Even earlier, copper from Katanga (renamed Shaba after independence) had been smelted and worked by Africans and fed into the continent's overlapping trading networks. The distinctive Katanga copper crosses found their way as far afield as China. Msiri, the last African ruler of Katanga, owed his political position at least in part to his control of the copper reserves. Europeans were more interested in gold. Prior to the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884–1885, Belgian king Leopold II had made a series of bilateral treaties with various European powers, setting the boundaries of the area he intended to control. In the aftermath of the conference, however, when required to specify the area in which he would guarantee neutrality, he moved the southern border of the Congo Free State several hundred miles south, to the Congo-Zambesi watershed, where he hoped to find gold.

Rumors of gold in Katanga also attracted the attention of Cecil Rhodes, who wanted to incorporate the region into British South Africa Company territory. In 1890 the two men sent rival expeditions to claim the territory; the Rhodes expedition lost its way. Shortly thereafter, the Belgian geologist Jules Cornet investigated the region's minerals, found little gold, and decided that the extensive copper deposits could not be

worked profitably. Despite the fact that Katanga's high-grade copper ores were very close to the surface and were highly oxidized and therefore relatively easy to smelt, this conclusion was by no means unjustified. Substantial investment was required not only to work the mines, but also for the construction of a railway to the coast, without which no significant mining activity could be successful. Leopold turned his attention back to trade in rubber, ivory, and palm oil, which paid well but required little or no capital investment on his part.

In 1895, George Grey, an Englishman with aristocratic connections, began exploring on the Northern Rhodesian side of the watershed in an effort to find a profitable investment opportunity for the Countess of Warwick, one of the Prince of Wales's mistresses. He made an illicit foray over the border and concluded that Cornet could have been wrong. Grey's employer, Robert Williams, a friend of Rhodes, began negotiating with Leopold and, once the dust of the Jameson Raid had settled, reached an agreement in 1900 to develop the region's copper resources. Leopold's continued reluctance to take the heavy risks involved in mineral development were reflected in the arrangement for the *Comité Speciale du Katanga* (CSK), the region's administrative body, to invest a maximum of £3 million annually only after Williams and his company, Tanganyika Concessions, had spent UK£5 million. The financing of deposits considered viable was to be shared equally, but the CSK would get 60 per cent of the profits, leaving Tanganyika Concessions the remaining 40 per cent.

With some evidence that the deposits could indeed be commercially viable, and as part of a wider scheme to ensure Belgian control over the Congo's resources, the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* was formed in 1906 to take over the enterprise. To provide the essential rail link to the coast Williams had in 1902 secured a Portuguese concession to build the Benguela Railway across Angola, while, as part of its wider plans, the Congo Free State in 1906 also formed the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga* (BCK) to link the mine area to the navigable portions of the Kasai and Congo Rivers. To serve the purpose more immediately, after protracted negotiations, agreement was reached to connect the Rhodesian rail system to the Katanga border, then to the mines via the *Chemin de Fer du Katanga*. Katanga traffic came to provide Rhodesian railways with a major source of revenue not only from the importing of equipment from Europe and the export of smelted copper but also from the carriage of large amounts of coal from the Wankie colliery to Katanga, which had no sources of coal suitable for smelting the copper ores.

Technical difficulties and some personal tensions meant that sustained copper production only became

possible in 1912, but from then on the metal became increasingly important for the Congo's economy. Between the two world wars, facing lower prices forced in part by new producers—one of which was Northern Rhodesia—coming into world markets, *Union Minière* refused to cooperate with cartel attempts to sustain prices by limiting output and substantially increased production. It was also in this period that they began to experiment with the use of longer-term stabilized labor, as opposed to short-term migrant labor, as most of their workers had previously come from Northern Rhodesia but were increasingly needed on the Copperbelt. From then on, with periodic difficulties arising out of changing world markets, *Union Minière* and its Belgian parent, the *Société Générale de Belgique*, grew increasingly wealthy.

It was a source of great disappointment to Robert Williams that the Benguela Railway, despite being the most direct route from Katanga to the coast, never fulfilled his initial expectations as the major outlet for Katanga copper. War and politics joined with financial difficulties to delay construction, and the line only reached the mines in 1928. By that time the BCK had also been completed and the Belgians preferred to use that route as much as possible, notwithstanding the added costs of transshipment from rail to river and then again to rail at Léopoldville. Although the Rhodesian rail network took the copper to the east coast and a longer sea route to Europe, that line also continued to be used, in part to ensure continued supplies of Wankie coal.

Katanga's copper became so significant for both the Belgian and Congolese economies that when the Congo became independent in 1960 the region seceded and formed a separate government under Moïse Tshombe, with support from Belgium and other Western countries. There was a strong expectation that Katanga's control over the copper supplies would give it the necessary economic base to maintain its independence. After the secession was brought to an end in 1963, *Union Minière* gave way to the state-owned *Générale des Carrières et des Mines*. Copper continued to provide nearly 40 per cent of the country's export earnings well into the 1980s, but world demand for copper has fallen in the face of competition from plastics and glass fibers in recent years.

Some gold was found at Ruwe, but the precious metal never met Rhodes's and Leopold's expectations. Other minerals found in Katanga have included mica, tin, and uranium, which was first identified in 1913. The first atomic pile built under the Stagg Fields Stadium in Chicago used uranium from Katanga, which also provided a substantial portion of the Western world's supplies of cobalt during the Cold War. After copper, however, the most economically and politically significant mineral found in the Congo has been the

diamonds of Kasai, part of the Congo that was also brought firmly into Leopold's Congo State ambit with the southward shift of his borders.

It was to exploit Kasai's extensive diamond deposits that the third major 1906 company, the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo was formed, though, as the company's name implies, there was also hope for the development of other economic resources. The major financial backing for this company came through the British financier Sir (Alfred) Chester Beatty. The proximity of the navigable section of the Kasai River, feeding into the navigable Congo, facilitated transportation and made it unnecessary to build a railway line to serve the mines. Diamond mining also required substantially less initial capital investment, and there was a much shorter delay between initial investment and first returns.

Kasai's diamonds are generally of industrial rather than gem quality, but they nonetheless quickly became and remained a major source of revenue for the Congo State and the Belgian Congo. For the independent Republic of the Congo/Zaire, diamonds were important not only for their direct export value but also because of the advantages accruing from smuggling them. In the early 1960s diamond smuggling was rampant, but the authorities did little to prevent it because that smuggling was considered a means of limiting the rise in value of the Congolese franc on the parallel money market. By late 1963, Congolese francs traded at more than 400 to the U.S. dollar on the free market as against an official rate of 65. Smuggled diamonds also helped finance the Kasai secession. This was more short-lived than that of Katanga, but Kasai continued to be a center of rebellion. Diamonds, legitimately exported and smuggled, have more recently played a major role in the civil strife surrounding Laurent's and Joseph Kabila's governments and the involvement in that conflict of foreign governments such as Angola and Zimbabwe.

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See also: Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Stanley, Leopold II, "Scramble."

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Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: National Conference and Politics of Opposition, 1990–1996

Following the end of the Cold War, Zaire lost both its strategic importance and the crucial international assistance that went with it. Due to a poor human rights record and generally bad governance, the country's leader, President Mobutu Sese Seko, bowed to both internal and external pressure and abolished the country's one-party state on April 24, 1990. The incumbent secretary general of the Economic Community of Central African States, Lunda Bululu, was appointed head of a restructured transitional government that was installed on May 4 of that year. Over the next year, the constitution was revised to permit the formation of trade unions and at least two additional political parties.

However, the euphoria generated by the prospect of a new political social order quickly evaporated as a result of Mobutu's continuing repression of opposition political activity. In particular, Mobutu's announcement that a limited multiparty system would not come into effect for at least two years led to a bloody confrontation at the University of Lubumbashi on May 11, 1990. It was reported that security forces killed more than 50 student demonstrators. Eventually Mobutu was persuaded by opposition pressure to announce, on December 31, both presidential and legislative elections. They were scheduled to be held in 1991, as was a referendum on another new constitution.

In 1991 a fragmented party system of over 100 parties emerged, with three main groups. First among these was the pro-Mobutu bloc, led by the Popular Movement for Renewal (Mouvement Populaire Renouveau, or MPR). It comprised, in addition, dozens of parties headed by Mobutu supporters. Second, there was the main anti-Mobutu bloc, led by three opposition parties: the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social, or UDPS), the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendants, or UFERI), and the National Christian Social Democratic Party (Parti Démocratie et Social Chrétien, or PDSC). Finally, there was a large number of what are best described as "pseudo-parties," often consisting of not much more than a handful of individuals with a lack of clear or consistent political orientations.

With broad popular support, the anti-Mobutu coalition insisted successfully on the formation of a National Conference. The conference was an indigenously generated contribution to the country's political institution building and regime transition, which convened for the first time on August 7, 1991. Its proclaimed purpose was to provide a transition mode, whereby both government and opposition forces, along with representatives of civil society groups, could meet in order to thrash out a consensual political way forward. Within the Conference, the UDPS, UFERI, PDSC, and groups from civil society formed the so-called Union Sacrée in July 1991, designed to be a democratic opposition platform. Headed by Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, the conference quickly became the main forum for the power struggle between the Mobutu camp and the opposition. It was, however, characterized by prevarication, principally from Mobutu and his government, and this led to a prolonged stalemate between the latter and the opposition.

At the end of September 1991, under pressure from the opposition, Mobutu not only appointed as prime minister Etienne Tshisekedi, a leading opposition politician, but also agreed to the formation of an opposition-dominated cabinet and diminished presidential powers. In addition, the conference adopted a transitional constitution that reinstated the separation of powers, and strengthened human and civil rights. It also drafted a new federalist constitution to be subject to a referendum.

President Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi and his government illegally in December 1992. Still retaining the loyalty of the security forces, Mobutu managed to remain in power by a complex strategy that involved seemingly to agree to reforms but without implementing them, repression of the opposition, instigation of mutinies in the armed forces, the fueling of ethnic grievances, and co-optation of prominent opposition leaders, such as UFERI leader Karl-i-Bond. In 1993, such was the conflict between pro- and anti-Mobutu forces that there resulted a duplication of political institutions: two governments, two parliaments, and two currencies. The political deadlock was finally overcome at the end of the year when the two legislatures merged into the transitional High Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la République, or HCR). Unlike the National Conference, pro-Mobutu forces dominated the HCR.

In April 1994 the transitional Parliament passed an interim constitution which not only recognized the principle of separation of powers and guaranteed basic human and civil rights but also permitted Mobutu to remain in power. Supported by France, a compromise candidate for prime minister, Kengo wa Dondo, was elected in June. In mid-December Kengo

announced that long overdue presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a constitutional referendum, would be held in July 1995; they were, however, postponed in May. As a result, a two-year extension of the political transition period was announced.

In February 1996 Kengo ousted 23 cabinet ministers, including all remaining opposition sympathizers, and filled their posts with his supporters. Meanwhile, the National Elections Commission was charged with preparing for a constitutional referendum in December 1996, presidential and parliamentary elections in May 1997, and local balloting in June and July 1997. However, before the elections and referendum could take place, Laurent Kabila, a veteran in the fight against Mobutu for over 30 years, formed a four-party military alliance, the Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des forces pour la Démocratie et la Liberation du Congo-Zaire, or AFDL). The AFDL was supported by Zaire's neighboring countries, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, as well as by the United States.

On October 29, 1996, Kinshasa declared a state of emergency in North and South Kivu as previously sporadic fighting between Rwandan and Zairean regular forces escalated into intense cross-border shelling. Kinshasa accused the Rwandan and Ugandan governments of attempting to take advantage of President Mobutu's absence. (Mobutu was convalescing in France following surgery for cancer.) Over the next few months, the AFDL forces made steady progress before eventually controlling the entire country. The victorious AFDL entered the capital, Kinshasa, on May 17, 1997.

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See also: Congo (Kinshasa): Post-Mobutu Era; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Mobutu, Zaire, and Mobutuism.

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Congo (Kinshasa): Post-Mobutu Era

Commander of the army Major General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (later, Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa



Dress rehearsal of the swearing-in of the new president Joseph Kabila, Congo, January 26, 2001. © Ludger Schadomsky/Das Fotoarchi.

za Banga) achieved power in 1965, following 75 years of Belgian colonialism and 5 years of civil war in Congo (Kinshasa). He promptly dissolved the civilian regime and proclaimed himself president of the second republic. Mobutu stayed in power for 23 years, until May 1997, when he fled the country for Togo, and eventually Morocco, where he died on September 7 of that year.

During his time in power, Mobutu laid the framework for the current form of government. He established what has been called a “kleptocratic” dictatorship, in which the constitution and separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government existed on paper only. The primary role of the government was to extract money from the land and people. On paper, Mobutu and his successors, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his son Joseph Kabila, answered to a bicameral parliament including a senate, chamber of representatives, and independent judiciary.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who seized power on May 17, 1997, cited civil war as a deterrent to democratic rule. He managed to operate the entire country with the help of only 12 men, comprising his interim assembly. Kabila, originally from the Katanga province, was the leader of anti-Mobutu rebels who marched across the country, capturing urban centers and eventually entering the capital, Kinshasa, in May 1997. In January 1999, Kabila dissolved his own party, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), and subsequently engaged in fighting several armed factions opposed to his rule. Until his assassination by one of his bodyguards on January 16, 2001, Kabila’s rhetoric included the goal of transferring power to the people through the use of People’s Power Committees, which were scheduled to begin operations in each province at some time in the future.

The late president’s son, Joseph Kabila, was sworn in as the country’s new president on January 26, 2001. The

younger Kabila promised that free and fair elections would take place in the near future. However, by the end of 2001 elections had not occurred, explicable in large measure by the continuing civil war. Initial celebrations at Mobutu’s ousting in 1997 had been followed by a civil war that involved five other African nations and led to over a million deaths by late 2001.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced war against the Tutsi in early 1998, despite the fact that they were the ethnic group that most supported his campaign against Mobutu and his regime. Because of the lack of civil rights and equality in the country, the Tutsi were not granted citizenship even if they could prove they were born there. The Tutsi goal was to overthrow Kabila and replace his government by a more democratic regime that would recognize their rights. However, the continuing conflict is about more than ethnic rivalries in the post-Mobutu era. It is also informed by decades of colonialism, Mobutu’s policy of divide and rule, and the push of Western multinational corporations to control the country’s natural resources, estimated to be worth billions of U.S. dollars.

The complex set of factors informing the conflict brought in neighboring countries: Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and Uganda. Each took sides, creating what some observers have called “Africa’s World War I.” After more than a year of often intense fighting, the Lusaka Peace Accords, designed to deliver a cease-fire, were signed in July 1999. However, this did not lead to a cessation of the conflict. The active engagement of neighboring Rwanda in the war continued to be provoked by the presence in Congo (Kinshasa) of armed Interahamwe militiamen and former members of the Rwandan armed forces, who had been responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Uganda also sought to protect its interests not only by occupying eastern areas of Congo (Kinshasa) in order to protect its borders from rebel encroachment but also by aiding opponents of the regime in Kinshasa. The nature of the war as a regional conflict, rather than a civil war confined to Congo (Kinshasa) was further made clear by extensive military support for the Kabila regime from Zimbabwe, Angola and, to a limited extent, Namibia.

Another attempt at a cease-fire was made in April 2000. The combatants agreed to stop fighting and, the following month, the then U.S. representative to the United Nations (UN), Richard Holbrooke, visited Kinshasa to prepare the way for UN observers and support troops. However, the introduction of peacekeepers was held up as opposing forces refused to withdraw from established positions in a way that would enable UN forces to be deployed. Later, in mid-August, the Southern African Development Community held an emergency summit in Kinshasa that tried, unsuccessfully, to try to break the deadlock. The failure

of the summit led Kabila officially to suspend the Lusaka accords, to call for direct negotiations with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and to reject the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

The war seemed to be going Kabila's way during the first months of 2000. Encouraged by his opponents' divisions, Kabila appeared to reject a negotiated settlement when in July he launched a partly successful offensive in Equateur Province against Uganda's allies in the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC). Buoyed by what he saw as progress, Kabila established a transitional parliament in Kinshasa that effectively excluded any form of political opposition since Kabila himself nominated all 300 members. But when, in August and September, government troops suffered a series of reverses at the hands of the MLC and the new parliament ruled out any political solution to the conflict, Kabila's intractable position became a major problem for both allies and opponents.

The key event in 2001 was Laurent Kabila's assassination in January. Surprising many observers, his son assumed power but was unable either to build a firm regime or to make sustained progress in the war. The year was marked by a continuing stalemate between the combatants, pronounced war-weariness among the country's inhabitants, and the failure of international attempts to reach a solution to the conflict.

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Coptic Church: See Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640.

Corruption and the Criminalization of the Postcolonial State

Corruption and the criminalization of the state in postcolonial Africa have posed numerous economic and political difficulties that still dog the continent today. *Corruption* is defined as the deliberate combination of public office positions with the process of accumulation of wealth. The *criminalization* of the state, on the other hand, is the use and institutionalization of the political or government apparatuses as instruments of

graft and as conduits of individuals' accumulation of wealth. In reality, corruption and criminalization presuppose that there is a correlation between political power sharing and the distribution of wealth in society. Perceived in the above context, the interaction of power with political practice has produced a crisis in governance of states where dominant social groups or the ruling elites have been engaged in activities of criminal nature. These activities include the generation of rents by those groups wielding political power in the international economic mode of dependency in which Africa is engaged.

Almost all countries of Africa have suffered corruption and witnessed the criminalization of the state in varying degrees since attainment of independence of most countries in the 1960s. A culture of institutional neglect and the systematic plunder of national economies and uncontrolled privatization of the state in Congo, Chad, Ghana, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Kenya, Cameroon, Guinea, Togo, São Tomé, and Madagascar, among others, bear testimony to the criminal nature of the postcolonial state in Africa. Leaders have been engaged in outright violations of constitutional laws, which are the cornerstone of good governance and economic management. The ruling elites have undermined judicial rules, thus effectively transforming the legal process into a permanent state of illegality. Such systems have concentrated power in the hands of a few personalities who have obliterated dissent opting for political unanimity.

The abundant literature on corruption and malpractices in the corridors of government indicate something is wrong with the process of governance if government officials are not constrained by countervailing forces or by legal institutions. There are incidents where legitimate organs of the state have been used to terrorize people into supporting criminal activities. There are also close interactions among power, war, an insatiable drive for accumulation of wealth, and illicit activities in political practice. This has given rise to illegal economic transactions in the governments of most African countries. Leaders in political positions have used violence as instruments and as strategies of wealth acquisition. The leaders have employed brutal torture and murder as techniques of power and mechanisms of domination; notable examples are Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokasa of central Africa, and Said Barre of Somalia.

Certain countries stand out as examples of how power has been abused in postcolonial Africa, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia. In these countries warlords have employed warfare as both instrument of political domination and avenue to wealth and riches. They have received arms from the international community, and they have used them to control power and

the nations' wealth. They have used such power to establish parallel economies (black markets and widespread smuggling, for instance).

The international community has indirectly supported the activities of warlords involved in conflicts in Africa because of the business relations they have with some of these warlords. Thus, the criminalization of the postcolonial state has been a result of a whole series of relationships and actions generated by the continent's insertion in the international economy of dependence. Diplomatic and military alliances and the control of exports of agricultural goods, oil, and external donor financing and aid are key themes. For example, diamonds, gold, and other mineral and natural resources from Sierra Leone have found ready markets in Western metropolises in exchange for small arms. The dominant social groups in the various countries of Africa have also readily participated in the political economy of dependence.

Some African political leaders have helped to construct and maintain economies of dependence because of the profits derived from relationships with Western nations. While it is true that the ideologies of democracy and humanitarianism dominated Africa in the 1990s, the same ideologies have also been used for material gain. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo/Zaire, the main opposition party, the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), helped itself to a share of available profit in the diamond business. The Kenyan main opposition was accused of receiving money from one leading money-laundering organization, Goldenberg International. The president of Kenya set up a commission of inquiry to investigate Goldenberg's activities; it became clear that the company was involved in cases of corruption at the state level. In Madagascar, Congo, and the Central African Republic, newly elected presidents in the 1990s sought parallel financing from organizations that clearly front for international money-laundering networks.

Postcolonial African leaders in single-party-dominated states equated the state with ruling political parties and sought to monopolize national resources. Notable cases in which one-party systems of government have been accomplices to state-instigated crimes are those of Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. In these countries, political monopolies have fostered patron-client relations and neopatrimonial networks, effectively institutionalizing corruption and nepotism.

Party functionaries have used state apparatuses and the positions they held in government to build vast business empires. In some cases they have created economies based on kinship and ethnic alliances. Such

economic conditions have produced self-made ethnic heroes out of plundered state wealth. Given the institutionalization of corruption and the criminalization of the state, the private sector has also been compelled over time to engage in corrupt activities rather than competitive activities in order to maximize commercial profits.

The relationship of powerful individuals to the state has largely enabled them to gain great wealth and exert significant influence over political affairs. Studies have shown (in Nigeria, for instance) that there has been more exploitation from contracts, licenses, and public jobs provided by state officials than in the labor market. Elsewhere in Africa, the family of the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, emerged as head of the most powerful and widespread private business in East Africa in the 1960s. Kenyatta's successor, Daniel arap Moi, followed suit by allowing his close associates to use their position in government to accumulate wealth. Corruption and the criminalization of the state led the third president of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, to set up several commissions of inquiry to investigate corrupt activities in all aspects of social and economic life.

There is evidence that at the peak of his autocratic rule, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire controlled between 17 and 22 per cent of the national budget as his personal funds. It was estimated that in 1982, while Zaire had a debt of about US\$5 billion dollars, Mobutu had US\$4 billion dollars tucked away in foreign bank accounts. In Egypt, the former finance minister Mohieddin El-Gharibu appeared in court in the early 2000s to answer charges related to tax evasion.

The difficulties caused by corruption and the criminalization of the state have become more acute with time, constituting a serious problem in postcolonial Africa.


HANNINGTON OCHWADA

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Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Colonization and Resistance

French policies toward Côte d'Ivoire were characterized by more than 200 years of hesitation and ambivalence.



Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).

Although first contacts had been established with the local population of Assinie in 1637 (the first missionary attempt), trade relations with this part of the West African coast had been rather casual after the destruction of a French fort in 1704. However, from 1840 onward, France became interested again in the littoral of Côte d'Ivoire and resumed contact in a search for new markets and out of fear of the dominance of English merchants. The initiative was sustained by French traders from Bordeaux who acted with the support of the French navy. Thus, in 1842, Captain Bouet-Willaméz signed a treaty with the King of Sanwi, and in the same year de Kerhaller and Fleuriot de Langle reached an agreement with Roi Peter of Grand-Bassam. Both rulers were paid an annual tribute and in return offered exclusive rights for French settlements and commerce. Similar contracts with chiefs of the other trading stations along the Ivorian coast followed in the next 25 years.

The French encountered a population familiar with European traders due to their longtime involvement in transatlantic trade. Assinie, Grand-Bassam, and Grand Lahou were important coastal trading stations that were linked with producers in the hinterlands through a relay system along the main rivers Cavally, Bandama, and Comoé leading to the northern markets of the trans-Saharan trade. This inner-African relay system was controlled by different ethnic groups with distinct economies, most of them belonging to decentralized acephalous societies, except for the various small-scale kingdoms of the Agni and Abbron. The trade network was controlled by local chiefs in the hinterland and

along the littoral by groups of wealthy middlemen of Afro-European origin. Inland producers as well as coastal traders and middlemen were determined to safeguard their interests against French intrusion into the hinterland. When Bouet-Willaméz tried to move up the Bandama with a gunboat, conflict erupted. An army of 1200 Ebie and Nzima soldiers attacked the French post in 1852; it took the French over six months to regain control. But despite their gaining the upper hand, Victor Regis, who had opened a trading company in Grand-Bassam, withdrew from the area as he realized that French products could not compete with English goods, which were favored due to their better quality and adaptation to African tastes.

This economic setback was a serious blow for future French engagement. In 1863, the minister of commerce decided to offer Britain Assinie and Grand-Bassam in exchange for Gambia. After Britain's refusal, it took the French government almost 20 years to formulate a new policy for its West African possession. The intention was to unify the French forts along the coasts and their territorial conquests in the Western Sudan, Chad, and Cameroon. This plan was very much in tune with the beginning of the "Scramble" that was already underway long before the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 officially recognized it. Taking a chance on the favorable circumstances, France declared "L'établissement Français de la Côte d'Or" on August first, 1889. It was annexed in 1893.

The new colony was placed under the leadership of the governor general in Senegal, who appointed a local resident to consolidate the new territory. Despite the treaties that Binger and Treich-Laplène had concluded with chiefs in the northern and eastern areas during the course of their explorations, France possessed isolated pieces of territory, which had to be joined together into a coherent colony. This became the task of the French military, which played an important role in the process of colonization.

Treich-Laplène, the first head of the colony, pursued a primary objective of political consolidation in the form of territorial conquest. The exploration and conquest of the hinterland was a main project. The easiest way to accomplish this was seemingly by moving along the main rivers as the (natural) gateway into the Western Sudan. The main obstacle was the powerful chief of Tiassale, Etienne Komlan, who controlled the main trade routes. Although the chief had accepted an unfavorable treaty in 1892, despite an earlier military success against the French army, he barred the way for Captain Marchand, who intended to regain the Western Sudan by traversing the Baule country. After Marchand had forced him to flee (after heavy resistance), he traversed the Baule country without any problems and founded colonial posts in Toumodi, Gbuekro (Bouaké), and Kotiakoffikro.

Of all of the African leaders that the French had dealt with, Samori Touré provided the strongest resistance. He had defeated the French several times with his well-organized army and was equally skillful in diplomacy.

In order to finance his imports of arms, including some of the most modern weaponry, he enslaved the weaker ethnic groups, like the Djimini and Tagbana, and sold them on the flourishing slave market in Tiegbo (near Bouaké) and Kotiakoffikro, enabling the Baule and Agni populations to the south and along the Comoé to buy slaves. It was therefore not at all in the interests of the Baule chiefs to support Marchand in his plan to attack Samori. The precarious situation became explosive when the Colonne Monteil, predominantly composed of Senegalese troops and sent as reinforcement, continued with the liberation of slaves and the looting of Baule villages. The Colonne was attacked from all sides and defeated by Samori.

French policy of an intended peaceful penetration had failed even before it had begun. At the end of the century, after eight years of intensive fighting, the colonial government was still in the initial stage of conquest. It took the government fourteen more years to suppress the last military resistance; over the course of that time the campaigns became ever more brutal, destroying whole villages. The failure of French politics to rapidly conquer their new colony implicated military as well as civilian governments, which were often at odds with each other. Another reason for its failure to come to terms with the local population was the decentralized structures of most Ivorian societies, whose web of strategic alliances they were unable to understand, being used to the hierarchically organized kingdoms in the Western Sudan.

For the African societies, the long-term resistance incurred heavy losses and a radical change in structure. Although their fluid political relationships helped them survive and continue the fight for nearly three decades, many chiefs altered their policies, changing from resistance to cooperation or vice versa. In the beginning of the struggle, the French had just been a single entity in a series of complex power plays. However, when it became clear that the French intended to stay, the political situation had to be redefined. Former enmities among groups were given up, and new alliances had to be defined in order to safeguard their economic interests, their military strength, and their sovereignty. Internal conflicts deepened as liberated slaves and discontented women sought to cooperate with the French colonizers. Although the French were successful in the end, that success was accompanied by economic devastation, social strife, and human loss.

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Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Colonial Period: Administration and Economy

Côte d'Ivoire became a French colony on March 10, 1893, and was subsequently also made part of the Fédération de l'Afrique Occidentale (West African Federation). An administration was put in place under a lieutenant governor, and the colony was divided into *cercles* (circuits). Following the military conquest, the burden of colonization made itself felt through various obligations, including a poll tax, compulsory service, portage, and military conscription. The creation of the Front populaire (Popular Front) government led to some improvements. During the 1930s, a communal movement struggled against the colonial regime, but the Vichy government put a stop to it.

After 1945, the colonial regime underwent a degree of evolution. The first Constituent Assembly, which included elected African deputies, enacted an important body of laws, among which the one known as the Loi Houphouët-Boigny (April 11, 1946) abolished forced labor. Nationalist parties made use of the local assemblies, and two "study groups" played decisive roles: the Comité d'études francoafricain (French-African Study Committee) and the Groupes d'études communistes (Communist Study Groups). Several labor unions were also established, including the Syndicat agricole africain (African Farmers Union), which gave birth to the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI; Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire) in 1946.

Of all of the political parties, the PDCI achieved the strongest position, and Félix Houphouët-Boigny became its uncontested leader. However, relations between the PDCI and the administration deteriorated in 1949–1950, and there was severe repression. Within the Rassemblement démocratique africain (African Democratic Rally), it apparently came to be thought that its connections with the Partie communiste français (French Communist Party) had served as the pretext for the repression. The breaking of the link was announced on October 18, 1950.

Development required an infrastructure. External trade was secured through the construction of wharfs, the most important being the one at Grand Bassam



Côte d'Ivoire: a house from the colonial period in Grand Bassam. © Melters/missio/Das Fotoarchiv.

(1901). The first attempts to create a port ended in failure, and the port was not opened until July 23, 1950. The prosperity of the colony increased rapidly from this moment on. The second element in the development of the economy was the railway (from 1904 on); by 1940 it was carrying 7,444,760 passengers and 263,753 tons of freight, and by 1948 the network had a total length of 10,850 kilometers. An airport was opened to traffic at Port-Bouët on April 26, 1952.

From the outset, the French concentrated on exploiting natural resources. There was a crisis in the rubber industry in 1913, and exports ceased, while the exploitation of the oil palm led to exports of palms amounting to 10,400 tons in 1938. Forestry developed in response to mechanization and the opening of the port, and exports reached 214,000 tons in 1956. Development was focused above all on cocoa and coffee. The first cacao plants were introduced in 1904; they were successfully cultivated, and by 1959 exports of cocoa had reached 63,300 tons. The cultivation of coffee had been introduced in 1881, but little progress was made until after 1945; by 1960, however, coffee exports had reached 144,000 tons. Bananas and pineapples appeared later: by 1958, the output of bananas was 46,000 tons, and the output of pineapples was 15,000 tons. Industrial fisheries developed after the opening of the port, reaching an output of 3,217 tons in 1960. The needs of the metropolis stimulated a rise in commercial traffic from 1945 onward, and territorial specialization was such that between 1940 and 1960 coffee and cocoa accounted for the bulk of exports.

The first rudimentary health service was created at Assinie in 1843, but a genuine service did not come into existence until after the decree of June 11, 1901. The Assistance Médicale Indigène (Native Medical Assistance) service was created on July 24, 1906, and the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance Médicale

(Native Societies for Medical Provision), allowing popular participation, were established on May 16, 1939. A Treichville satellite of the hospital at Abidjan became a hospital in its own right on December 31, 1953; similarly, the Bouaké ambulance service became independent in 1956. By 1957, the colony had 3 hospitals, 48 medical centers, and a total hospital capacity of 6,470 beds. The health service was particularly active in the battle against yellow fever, both along the entire coast and in the city of Bassam: the 1899 epidemic remains famous. The discovery of a vaccine led to the curbing of yellow fever from 1934 onward, but smallpox continued to appear every year. In addition to these two diseases, we should also mention trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), leprosy, and malaria. On January 30, 1939, the federal Service Général Autonome de la Maladie du Sommeil (SGAMS; General Autonomous Sleeping Sickness Service) conducted an exemplary struggle in the colony, in which the disease was prevalent at Man, Danané, Daloa, and Adzopé. Leprosy raged mainly in the north. From 1945, the struggle against disease was the responsibility of the Service Général d'Hygiène Mobile et de Prophylaxie (General Mobile Hygiene and Prophylaxis Service), following in the footsteps of the SGAMS. The European population suffered a great deal from malaria, while up to 1934 the medical community believed that Africans were incapable of contracting it. The distribution of quinine and the struggle against mosquitos began at that point, and the general health of the population started to improve.

Education was provided by missionaries from the early days of the colony. Secular education was introduced into the Fédération de l'Afrique Occidentale in 1903, but it did not reach Côte d'Ivoire until after the reorganization of July 6, 1911. The authorities decided that its purpose was to provide practical instruction that would help to promote economic development. More schools were opened between 1924 and 1944, and the number of pupils rose from 10,018 in 1937 to 24,961 in 1945. The higher elementary schools were transformed into modern colleges in 1947, the professional school in Abidjan became a technical college on November 12, 1947, and the teacher-training school at Dabou became a federal institution. The secondary classes in Abidjan were made into a *lycée* in 1953. Between 1954 and 1958, there was significant growth in the numbers of students enrolled, from 29,772 to 172,466. By the time that Côte d'Ivoire became independent, it had a relatively small elite, along with basic facilities that could have been more advanced, given that the territory was reputed to be a wealthy one.

The Framework Law of June 23, 1956, gave the territory a genuine executive government. The crisis of 1958 brought about a new relationship with the

Communauté, which Côte d'Ivoire joined on December 4, 1958. Its first government was formed on April 30, 1959, with Félix Houphouët-Boigny as prime minister, and on August 7, 1960, Côte d'Ivoire became independent.

DANIELLE DOMERGUE-CLOAREC

See also: Côte d'Ivoire: Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire; Houphouët-Boigny, Félix.

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Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Independence to the Present

Côte d'Ivoire acquired its independence from France reluctantly. Under Félix Houphouët-Boigny's leadership, Côte d'Ivoire attempted to push for a unitary community structure with ultimate sovereignty resting with France. Other French-speaking African leaders did not share Houphouët-Boigny's vision. For that matter, many Ivorians did not share it. The United Nations recognized Côte d'Ivoire as an independent republic on December 7, 1960. Houphouët-Boigny was elected president, and he remained the country's dominant political figure until his death in November of 1993.

The main objective of the framers of the Ivorian constitution was to endow the country with a set of legal institutions that would ensure national unity in an ethnically and regionally diverse nation. In this respect, the constitution of 1959 was designed to limit what the framers viewed as the inherent divisiveness of a parliamentary form of government. Thus, the emphasis was placed on a strong executive form of government.

Following the French Fifth Republic constitution, the framers of the Ivorian constitution sought to limit the range of legislative powers by clearly defining the areas of legislative authority. In addition to this, even within the limited legislative domain defined by the constitution, the National Assembly could set forth broad guidelines, leaving specific proposals to the executive branch in many areas. The National Assembly consisted of 147 deputies who nominally represented the districts from which they were elected. Since the legislative process was actually in the hands of the executive branch, the National Assembly was more of

an echo chamber for presidential wishes than an autonomous legislative body.

The most important institution in Côte d'Ivoire is the presidency. The constitution that was finally adopted in 1960 gave the president preeminence over the legislative and judiciary. The president is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage and is able to renew his term an unlimited number of times. After Houphouët-Boigny's first election in 1960, he was repeatedly reelected, with more than 90 per cent of the popular vote.

While the initial objective of the framers of the constitution was to give Côte d'Ivoire a strong executive branch, the institution became less important than the occupant. Houphouët-Boigny came to dominate the country's political system; he was able to utilize the broad powers provided him by the constitution to push through legislation without any significant opposition. Thus, there was no real separation of powers between the various branches of government. Power and decision making were in the hands of the president and the ministers whom he personally selected.

Considering the limited legislative role of the Ivorian National Assembly and the fact that its members all belonged to the same party until 1990, it would not be an exaggeration to say that its institutional and political role was limited. The situation of the National Assembly changed somewhat following the 1985 elections; 175 deputies, instead of 147, were elected to the assembly under new electoral rules. Before the elections the government had introduced a degree of competition in the selection of party leaders. The members elected in 1980 were more interested in servicing their constituency than had been the case with the handpicked deputies of past. While the National Assembly has not become a powerful legislative body, it now plays a much more important role in reviewing legislation submitted to it by the government than had previously been the case.

Until the reintroduction of multiparty competition in 1990, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire served as the political guardian for Houphouët-Boigny's regime. No other parties were permitted, and the country's major socioprofessional groups were obligated to associate themselves with the party. Nevertheless, in the postcolonial period, the party quickly lost its function as a mass mobilization machine. Rarely did it mobilize Ivorians for ideological purposes; its primary task was to ensure that opposition forces did not take root in Ivorian society.

More than 60 ethnic groups inhabit the country. They form six main divisions: the Akan, mainly in the southeast; the Kru, in the southwest; the Lagoon or Kwa, along the littoral; the Mande, nuclear and peripheral, and the Senufo throughout the north; and the Lobi in the

central regions. Also, because of the country's economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, a large number of non-Ivorian Africans live in the country, particularly immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, as well as smaller numbers of French and Lebanese.

Cocoa, coffee, and timber are the underpinnings of the Ivorian economy and postcolonial state. For cocoa and coffee exports, the state absorbed into its budget the differences between the price paid to rural producers and the price the crop was finally sold for on the international market. For the peasantry, the price was fixed in the early 1960s at 400 CFA, with little variation. Much of the surplus acquired by the state was used in the development of the country's infrastructure and the proliferation of state-owned industries.

After two decades of rapid economic expansion, the economy entered a prolonged crisis in the 1980s. As the economic crisis deepened, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and popular forces demanded economic and political reforms. Reluctantly, President Houphouët-Boigny introduced a number of changes in the early 1990s. First, as mentioned above, there was the introduction of new electoral rules. Second, the government attempted to decentralize decision making by creating municipal governments. Before 1980, there were only two municipalities, Abidjan and Bouaké. Afterward there were over 100 municipal governments. Finally, in 1990, Houphouët-Boigny appointed a prime minister, Alassane Ouattara, to manage the day-to-day affairs of the country.

Despite the efforts on the part of the Houphouët-Boigny regime to shore up its legitimacy by introducing institutional reforms, the economic situation in the country continued to deteriorate. In the early part of the 1990s, the government was forced by the international donor community to take drastic steps. In the spring of 1990, the government announced a series of draconian economic measures. First, the price paid to cocoa and cocoa producers would be reduced from 400 F CFA (8 FF) to 100 F CFA (2 FF); thus, for the first time in 20 years the price paid to rural producers had been changed. Second, a major reform of the public sector would begin, with the main objective of reducing its bloated numbers. Third, the process of privatization of the public sector firms would be accelerated. Finally, public and private sector employees would be required to take a cut in pay.

Faced with a social crisis that was increasingly bordering on open rebellion, Houphouët-Boigny made a number of concessions to the protesters. The austerity program would not be fully implemented. Multiparty elections would be permitted during the upcoming presidential election in the fall of 1990 and the government recognized the principle of freedom of association.

Houphouët-Boigny won reelection. By this time, however, he was nearly 90 years old; he would survive in office for only three years. Following his death, Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the National Assembly, succeeded him. The succession process had been prepared with a revision of the constitution in 1990, which stipulated that in case of death of the president, the president of the National Assembly would assume his office until the next scheduled presidential elections.

As successor, Konan Bédié faced the dual task of continuing the changes introduced under Houphouët-Boigny and establishing his own political authority. In accomplishing these tasks he adopted a strategy of regulated openness. At the political level, his strategy of regulated openness was similar to the limited political changes allowed by Houphouët-Boigny before his death. Konan Bédié sought to maintain control of the political process and limit the influence of opposition forces in the political process. His government alternated between co-optation and repression. Konan Bédié's strategy of regulated openness, however, did not work.

During Konan Bédié's presidency, ethnic tensions rose sharply. His government tried to define who was an Ivorian and who was not. The term *Ivoirité* (meaning the purported characteristics of an indigenous Ivorian) entered the political and social lexicon of the country, further exacerbating ethnic and regional divisions. These divisions manifested themselves in growing attacks on foreign migrant workers from neighboring Muslim states and increasingly strident efforts to block Houphouët-Boigny's successor from competing in national elections by claiming that he was not an Ivorian by birth. Attacks on Ouattara, a Muslim from the north, contributed to a widening rift between the country's predominantly Muslim north and mainly Christian south.

On December 24, 1999, the military took power from a civilian-elected government for the first time. Over the next two years, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a succession of crises: the ousting of the military leader of the December 1999 coup, Robert Guei; the election of Laurent Gbagbo as president; and acts of ethnic cleansing by the military against northerners and a failed attempt at national reconciliation. In September 2002 a bloody mutiny within the military resulted in the death of the former military ruler Guei and hundreds of other Ivorians, precipitating a civil war.

Once viewed as a beacon of stability in a region bedeviled by ethnic conflicts and civil wars, Côte d'Ivoire has entered a cycle of economic decline, ethnic conflict, and civil war similar to that of other countries in West Africa. Current president Gbagbo presides over a divided country that is desperately

searching for a way out of the stalemated civil war. Neither the predominately Muslim north nor the predominantly Christian south has the means to win the civil war outright; however, violence and the collapse of trust between different ethnic and religious communities have made reconciliation very difficult.

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See also: **Houphouët-Boigny, Félix.**

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Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire

At the time of his election as a deputy in the Assemblée constituante (French Constituent Assembly), Félix Houphouët (later Houphouët-Boigny), understood that he would have to have the support of an established political party. The first meeting of the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI; Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire) took place at Treichville on April 6, 1946. By 1949 the party had 350,000 members. Its organization was modeled on that of the Parti communiste français (PCF; French Communist Party); its highest organ was the party congress, which met three times, in 1947, 1949, and 1959. It was this congress that determined the orientation of the PDCI and chose both its executive committee and its officials.

The PDCI was thus well established before the Congress of Bamako, which created the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA; African Democratic Rally) and elected Houphouët-Boigny as its president. He had envisaged a single party for each colony: accordingly, the PDCI became the official section of the RDA in Côte d'Ivoire. The history of the PDCI thus came to be merged with the history of the RDA and the career of Houphouët-Boigny, who encouraged Africans elected to the assembly to divide themselves among the three parties in power. This was the origin of the RDA's affiliation to the PCF.

The Assemblée constituante achieved a great deal, and it was in this context that Houphouët-Boigny proposed the abolition of forced labor. The law to that effect was passed on April 11, 1946. The new French constitution did not meet the expectations of Africans, however, the sole concession to them being the creation of a territorial assembly, known as the Conseil général (General Council).

The political climate in the colony deteriorated. The second congress of the RDA was held June 2 through June 6, 1949, at Treichville, in the presence of several parliamentarians and journalists with links to the PCF, which had been in opposition since 1947. Following a series of incidents, 30 RDA militants, including 8 members of the executive committee, were arrested and imprisoned at Grand-Bassam. On July 24, 1949, Houphouët-Boigny denounced the repression. The PDCI-RDA launched a consumer boycott, and on December 22 of that year there was a women's march to Grand-Bassam. This action had profound repercussions: the colony reached the boiling point. Serious incidents occurred at Bouaflé on January 22, 1950, at Dimbokro on January 30, and at Séguéla on February 2, and during the night of January 27–28 Senator Biaka Boda was assassinated. The repression caused nearly 50 deaths and left 5,000 injured.

Only two alternatives remained: either to continue the struggle or to collaborate. Houphouët-Boigny understood that his communist connection gave the authorities their pretext; he therefore committed himself to breaking the connection. The first contacts were made by R. Saller, who met the governor, Paul Henri Sirieux. After informing the leaders of the PCF, Houphouët-Boigny announced the breaking of his link with them on October 17, 1950, causing a degree of turmoil within the RDA and in Côte d'Ivoire.

On October 6, 1951, at the Géo André Stadium, Houphouët-Boigny launched his appeal for a "union of all men of good will," a union that became a reality at the time of the elections to the Territorial Assembly on March 30, 1952. The PDCI-RDA took control both of the assembly and of the leading municipalities, while in France the RDA's parliamentary group had announced, on February 6, 1952, its affiliation to François Mitterrand's Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance (Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance). By the end of 1952, Houphouët-Boigny had apparently succeeded in convincing even the most reluctant to follow his new policy. Thus, 1952 marked a turning point: the PDCI-RDA had been transformed from a party of anticolonial struggle into a party of government.

The PDCI scored a crushing success in the legislative elections of January 2, 1956, though there were two islands of resistance, in the Bété country (Gagnoa)

and in the Agni country (Abengourou). It was as members of this newly elected legislature that several RDA deputies, including Houphouët-Boigny, joined the French government. Houphouët-Boigny enjoyed his greatest influence as a junior minister in Guy Mollet's government (February 1956), and as a minister of state, in charge of implementing the Framework Law, in Bourguès-Maunoury's government (June 1957). The PDCI won the majority of mayoralties in the municipal elections of November 18, 1956.

Union became a recurrent theme. As in 1951, on May 21, 1956, Houphouët-Boigny launched another appeal for union at the Géo André Stadium. This led to the absorption of the opposition into the PDCI-RDA. In the territorial elections of March 31, 1957, the PDCI won every seat, and, given its hegemonic position, it formed the first Council of Ministers of Côte d'Ivoire on May 15 of that year. Houphouët-Boigny had brought about the triumph of his ideas. Nevertheless, there was some turbulence within the party. There had been no party congress since 1949, and the leading positions had been filled by a simple process of cooptation. By 1957, Houphouët-Boigny combined the offices of president of the RDA, president of the PDCI, deputy of the French National Assembly, mayor of Abidjan, speaker of the Territorial Assembly, and chairman of the Grand Conseil (Great Council) of the Fédération de l'Afrique Occidentale (FAO; West African Federation), and minister in the French government. Within the PDCI, his position was that of supreme arbiter, to such an extent that nothing could be decided without his agreement.

At the beginning of 1958, the RDA demanded constitutional reform to reflect the political development of France's African territories. In the referendum held in September 1958, the PDCI called for a yes vote, and on December 4 of that year Côte d'Ivoire became a republic. The Territorial Assembly became a constituent assembly, and on March 26, 1959, it adopted a new constitution. On this occasion, Houphouët-Boigny defined his conception of opposition within very narrow limits. The PDCI congress had met beforehand, for the third time, from March 19 to 23; it had transformed the political bureau into the supreme organ and replaced A. Denise with J. B. Mockey as secretary general. This was the first sign of a crisis.

After the elections of April 1959, the new legislative assembly called on Houphouët-Boigny to take office as prime minister. He went on to form the first government of the republic. Through measures of both attraction and coercion, the PDCI was able to impose itself rapidly as a single party, despite the crisis of 1963.

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See also: **Houphouët-Boigny, Félix.**

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Cotton: See Sudan: Cotton, Irrigation, and Oil, 1970s.

Coups d'État and Military Rule: Postcolonial Africa

Coups d'état is a French phrase that means, literally, a "strike at the state." Such a strike takes place when force is used to bring about leadership change without regard to legitimate constitutional processes for accomplishing such change; they are, in that respect, unconstitutional. The military is usually behind coups d'état in Africa. Although military governments are generally unconstitutional, they have sometimes acquired legitimacy because of their success in dealing with problems facing the state.

Coups in postcolonial Africa date back to 1952, when Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement overthrew King Farouk of Egypt and established military rule. This was followed in 1958 by the coup of General Ibrahim Aboud in Sudan. The military increasingly became involved in state administrative affairs in the postcolonial era. In one country after another—in Benin in 1963 and 1965, Congo (Zaire) in 1965, Algeria in 1965, Ghana in 1966, Nigeria in 1966, and Sierra Leone in 1967, among others—the military overthrew the postindependence civilian governments and either installed themselves, or their preferred candidate, in power. The army mutiny in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), or DRC, in 1960 and the capture and handover of Prime Minister Lumumba to his enemies in 1961 are examples of the military becoming involved in politics without assuming full, formal control.

By the 1970s and 1980s, over half of the countries in Africa were either under military rule or had at one point been ruled by the military. For some countries (Nigeria, Ghana, and Burkina Faso), the number of coups exceeded five. Coup-installed regimes had varied colonial experiences and ideological leanings. Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara, Ethiopia under Mengisto Haile Miriam, and the DRC under Sassou

Ngesso sought to transform their societies through a socialist-Marxist ideology. Others, among them Zaïre under Mobutu Sese Seko and Somalia under Siad Barre, were staunchly capitalist in their orientation, and sought a capitalist revolution as the basis for bringing change. A third category of countries—Uganda under Idi Amin Dada and the Central African Republic (renamed the Central African Empire) under Jean Bedel Bokassa—were distinguishable mainly by the level of brutality that was associated with their rule.

The factors that explain the frequency of coups d'état and military rule in Africa are many and varied. They include the weakness of the postindependent state in Africa, the economic, political, and social problems that African states inherited from colonial rule, and their inability to successfully resolve such problems. Economic mismanagement and corruption by civilian governments and the personal ambitions of military leaders are other factors. The military was, and remains, one of the most organized institutions in Africa. In addition, the military is well equipped and has an important weapon that civilian governments do not have—namely, arms. These elements give the military an advantage over a civilian government when it comes to mobilizing people and resources to deal with a particular problem in a country.

Despite the rationalization of coups d'état and military rule as discussed above, military governments in Africa were not, generally speaking, any more successful than civilian governments in dealing with Africa's economic and social problems. Issues of poverty, unemployment, low incomes, weak communication infrastructures, poor educational systems, inadequate and poorly equipped health care systems, and ethnic conflicts were as rampant under military rule as under civilian rule. In many cases, the policies and behavior of military governments were similar to those of their civilian predecessors. Corruption and mismanagement did not go away; rather, they increased in some cases.

The military governments adopted the same tactics that their civilian counterparts used to maintain political control. Upon seizing power, most sought legitimacy for their leadership by adopting civilian institutions. Most adopted titles such as *president* rather than *general*. Most also turned the state into a one-party system, with their party as the sole party. Other instruments for political manipulation under civilian rule, such as the establishment of a patronage system of reward for supporters and punishment for opponents, noncompetitive elections, the suppression of dissent, and censorship to preempt perceived threats to their power were also used to institutionalize the military leaders' control.

In the early 1990s, most of Africa's military regimes were forced by worsening economic and social

problems, political unrest, and external pressure to liberalize the political system. Beginning with Benin in 1990, and continuing with Mali, the DRC, and Niger, many succumbed to pressure and introduced democratic reforms that brought about new constitutions and governments. Others (Ghana, Togo, and Guinea) were able to manipulate the electoral process and remain in power. By the late 1990s, coups and armed insurgency had again become a problem. New waves of coups overthrew governments in Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Niger.

Coups d'état are not a thing of the past in Africa. To the extent that genuine economic and political change remains illusive Africa's militaries may exploit the situation to stage a comeback to politics.

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Cromer: See Egypt: Cromer Administration, 1883–1907: Irrigation, Agriculture, and Industry.

Crop Cultivation: The Evidence

The most direct evidence for crop cultivation in the past comes from archaeobotany, the study of plant remains preserved on archaeological sites. Such remains are normally preserved in carbonized form, by ancient contact with fire, though desiccated remains are preserved due to the extreme desert conditions of more recent millennia. Archaeobotanical remains are often overlooked unless excavations have undertaken systematic recovery through water flotation and sieving. The evidence consists primarily of wood charcoal, derived primarily from fuel gathered from local trees and shrubs, and seeds from wild gathered food plants, harvested crops, and the weeds of cultivated land. Identification of these seed remains may be challenging due to incomplete preservation of distinctive features and the lack of established collections of modern botanical reference material. Ancient plant use can also be identified on the basis of impressions preserved

in pottery, when plant materials have been used as ceramic temper. At present, available archaeological evidence in Africa is still limited to relatively few sites over such a vast continent, but recent research efforts have provided a basis for inferring certain larger patterns of early cultivation.

Important additional evidence, and essential background information, comes from modern botanical studies, including genetics and biogeography. Through comparative botanical studies, with important potential contributions from modern genetic techniques, the wild progenitors of crops can be identified. As genetic techniques are applied, it becomes possible to narrow down modern wild populations most closely related to domesticated forms. The geographical and ecological distribution of these wild progenitors provides important clues as to where initial domestication is likely to have occurred. Modern distributions, however, are unlikely to indicate precisely where species first domesticated due to the effects of past climatic change which would have forced changes in the distributions of many species. Thus modern wild distributions must be adjusted based on inferences of how climate has changed. Thus in the early and middle Holocene periods, savanna environments were shifted much farther north into what is today the Sahara. The emergence of plant cultivation appears to have occurred after 3000BCE, as these distributions contracted southward toward those under modern conditions.

In the study of early agriculture, a distinction needs to be made between cultivation and domestication. Cultivation is a human activity, the planting of seeds from previous harvests normally on prepared ground, while domestication is an evolutionary state of the plant, morphologically altered from the wild form, usually to become more dependent upon human dispersal. A complete history of the beginnings of cultivation would therefore need to include evidence for the transition from wild gathering to cultivation and subsequent domestication. Evidence relating to wild plant-gathering traditions that are probably ancestral to plant cultivation comes from a number of sites in the Sahara desert, dating to 7000–4000BCE. During this early to mid-Holocene era, rainfall was higher, and much of the Sahara had savanna or sahelian vegetation. Archaeobotanical evidence indicates widespread traditions of wild grain harvesting, including a fairly diverse range of grass species. Sites in the western desert of Egypt (Nabta Playa, Dakleh Oasis, Farafra, and Abu Ballas) all include evidence that wild sorghum was among the grasses utilized. Sites in southwest Libya, in the Tadarat Acacus (Uan Tabu, Uan Afuda, Uan Muhuggiag, and Ti-n-Torha) indicate a range of wild grasses but lack evidence of sorghum use. Of interest from the Acacus is evidence for

domesticated watermelons, probably used for oily seeds, by about 4000BCE. Similar grass-harvesting is suggested by identifiable impressions on ceramics of the Shaheinab Neolithic tradition in the Sudanese Middle Nile region from the fifth to fourth millennia BCE. There is no evidence yet to tie these traditions of wild grass use to the beginnings of cultivation and subsequent domestication of these species.

The earliest evidence for cultivated crops in Africa comes from nonnative species, while the earliest archaeological finds of native Africa crops yet found are from India. In the Egyptian Nile Valley wheat, barley, lentils, and peas, all of which had spread from southwest Asia, were known by 4500BCE. These Near Eastern crops were the basis of agriculture in the Nile Valley at least as far south as the Third Cataract region by 3000BCE, and probably also in Mediterranean North Africa. Crops that must have been domesticated from Africa where their wild forms occur—including sorghum, pearl millet, cowpea, and hyacinth bean—occur archaeologically in India by 1800BCE and perhaps as early as 2200BCE, while finger millet of east African origin occurs by 1000BCE. These finds indicate that cultivation must have begun even earlier within Africa. The most important domesticate of the East African savanna, sorghum, is still poorly documented in terms of the beginnings of cultivation and domestication. Finds include the early Kushite/Napatan site of Kawa in Nubia from before 500BCE, and several in greater Nubia from the last centuries BCE and the first centuries CE. Thus evidence to link early wild sorghum use with the domesticated form that had spread to India in later prehistory remains elusive.

Within Africa, early evidence for the spread of pearl millet cultivation across West Africa dates to the first half of the second millennium BCE. Fully domesticated pearl millet has been identified from pottery impressions from Tichitt tradition sites in southwest Mauritania and Karkarichinkat, northeast of the Niger River Bend in Mali, while grains have been recovered from Winde Kiroji on the Middle Niger and Birimi in northern Ghana of the Kintampo culture. At another Kintampo site in central Ghana comes the earliest evidence for cowpea. Kintampo sites also indicate widespread exploitation of the oil palm. Both cowpea and oil palm represent a forest margin complex of crops that may have distinct origins from the savanna cereals. Early evidence for other Savanna grains, African rice, and fonio, both date to the first millennium BCE, though wild rice use is documented from Gajiganna, Nigeria, by 1200BCE.

More difficult to document are those species reproduced vegetatively, such as tuber crops and many important fruits. Tuber foods (such as yams or the ensete of Ethiopian forest zones) are cultivated and

utilized in such a way so as to not bring seeds into contact with preserving fire. Bananas and plantains, introduced to Africa in prehistory from lands across the Indian Ocean, are sterile hybrids with seedless fruits. For these species different approaches to identification are necessary, such as through phytoliths (microscopic silica bodies from within plant tissues) or through the anatomical identification of charred tissue (parenchyma) fragments. Phytoliths of banana and ensete leaves are highly distinctive, and banana phytoliths have been identified from an archaeological pit fill dating to the later first millennium BCE in Cameroon (Nkang). The anatomical identification of parenchyma tissues from tubers shows promise from studies of European, Pacific, and palaeolithic Egyptian material but has yet to be applied to tropical African materials. In the absence of archaeological evidence, historical linguistics has also provided inferences about past agriculture.

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Crowther, Reverend Samuel Ajayi and the Niger Mission

Samuel Ajayi Crowther (c. 1806–1891) was a nineteenth-century Anglican bishop and missionary. As one of the founders of the Niger Mission, the first Church Missionary Society (CMS) post in Nigeria, Crowther was instrumental in the development of Anglicanism in the country.

The Yoruba Wars of the early nineteenth century fed the Atlantic slave trade at the very time that Britain sought to eradicate it. Consistent with practices of the era, captives taken during the wars were sold to slave dealers. Ajayi had been such a victim. He was taken prisoner in early 1821, at approximately age 15, when the Muslims invaded Oshogun, his hometown. After being bought and sold numerous times, he was on the Portuguese slave carrier, the *Esperanza Felix*, off Lagos, when it was captured and impounded on April 7, 1822, by British naval forces on an antislavery

patrol off the West African coast. The British liberated the slaves that they discovered in impounded or interdicted ships. For most such captives however, liberation included being transported to Sierra Leone. Thus was the case for the young Ajayi.

Sierra Leone was a colony in transition in the 1820s. Fueled in large part by the depositing of liberated Africans there and by the immigration of former slaves from the Americas, especially the United States, it had a multiethnic population. A variety of economic opportunities were available in construction, commerce, and agriculture. Missionary groups, particularly the Church Missionary Society, actively sought to convert the indigenous people as well as liberated Africans—those rescued from slavery. On their arrival in the colony younger liberated Africans were enrolled in schools to be educated and “civilized.” Some received skilled training to be artisans.

Ajayi was trained to be a carpenter at the CMS mission school. His quick mastery of his vocational and religious instructions impressed his tutors and induced them to select him for more extensive educational instruction than was made available to most students. On Ajayi's baptism in 1825 the Reverend J. C. Raban gave him the name of an eminent patron of the CMS, Samuel Crowther, Vicar of Christ Church, Newgate. The following year, a Reverend Davy took him to England and enrolled him in Islington Parish School. He returned to Freetown in 1827 and became one of the first students to enroll in the institution that later became Fourah Bay College. He went on to teach at missionary and government schools.

Crowther was teaching at a mission school when CMS officials in Sierra Leone urged him to join the Niger Expedition being organized by Thomas F. Buxton. His account of the venture, published as the *Journal of the 1841 Expedition*, so enthralled CMS officials in England that they directed missionary officials in Freetown to send him to the CMS Training College in London. He was ordained in 1843 and immediately returned to Sierra Leone, where he was persuaded to join a party preparing to create a mission in Nigeria. Crowther was chosen in part because of his fluency in Yoruba. The CMS intended to establish its Nigerian headquarters at Abeokuta in the Yoruba heartland for more than evangelical reasons. It also wanted to contest the Wesleyan Methodist Society, the initiator of missionary enterprise in Nigeria with the opening of its first station on September 24, 1842, and Southern Baptists from the United States who alleged that Yoruba leaders had invited them to the area. The officials expected Crowther to immigrate to Nigeria, not merely to participate as a member of the expedition as before. Reluctant to uproot his family, he demurred at first, but eventually elected to go.

The initial party comprised teachers, artisans, interpreters, and three clerics: the Reverend C. A. Gollmer, Reverend Henry Townsend, and Crowther. It arrived in Nigeria in January 1845. While the mission party was in transit, Sodeke, the ruler at Abeokuta, died. The Yoruba custom of not conducting any major venture during an interregnum meant that Crowther and his associates could not relocate in Abeokuta until a new ruler was chosen. They therefore settled at Badagri instead. Even after the new ruler was chosen, an entire year passed before the first Abeokuta station was opened. In the meantime, Gollmer was selected to teach school while Townsend, the effective head of the mission, and Crowther embarked on “true” missionary work, seeking converts through evangelization. Growth was slow; the missionaries held that novices had to be thoroughly prepared before they could be fully accepted into the Church. Crowther conducted the mission’s first baptism, on February 5, 1848, for three converts, one of whom was his own mother. He later converted other relatives, including one of his sisters.

Crowther was active on a number of fronts. In 1851, during the height of the discussion over whether Britain should annex Lagos, Reverend Henry Venn, the CMS secretary, invited him to England and used him as a prime exhibit of African potential. To the likes of Lord Palmerston, the lords of the admiralty, and leaders of the House of Commons, African potential under British authority was writ large in the former slave captive. Crowther was a member of the 1854 expedition up the Niger in which Dr. William B. Baikie demonstrated the efficacy of quinine against malaria. Crowther also directed an antismallpox campaign. He became a linguist, producing significant works of grammar for the Igbo, Nupe, and Yoruba. His groundbreaking translation of the Bible into Yoruba established the standard followed by other speakers of English in translating scripture into other African languages. He did not hesitate to involve himself in factional conflicts if he perceived a possibility to advance Christianity. He supervised the mission’s expansion throughout much of Yorubaland, into areas to the south, and laid the foundation for its movement into the Hausa region to the north.

Crowther was consecrated bishop of the Niger Mission in June 1864. His advance up the ladder of authority and position brought conflicts between European and African missionaries of the Niger Mission into the open even before his nomination to the bishopric. A number of the Europeans firmly believed that only Europeans should hold leadership positions in the mission and in the Church. Townsend, the senior member of the mission, not only held that view but actively campaigned against any elevation of Crowther.

Although he was aware of the anti-African campaign, Crowther usually refrained from participating in efforts to rebut it even to the extent of not defending himself unless pointedly asked to do so by his superiors. That quality and his intellect contributed to the continued high esteem in which he was held by Henry Venn and other officials at the London headquarters of the society. Those officials could not ignore their European agents totally. Thus when made bishop, Crowther’s authority did not include any European missionaries or their territories. Later, management of financial matters and in such personnel areas as the appointing, transferring, and disciplining of African agents was withdrawn and given to young Europeans, some of whom were without any African experience and who made no effort to hide their anti-African racism. He died on December 31, 1891, following a stroke.

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See also: **Anti-Slavery Movement; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.**

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Currencies and Banking

The formal imposition of colonial rule over most of Africa after 1900 was preceded by centuries of commercial relations between the continent and the West. As the colonial powers began to occupy the continent from the late nineteenth century on, economic infrastructure such as banks and currencies had to be installed not only for commercial transactions but also

to ensure a smooth administration. This essay illustrates the development of colonial banking and currency systems in Africa with the example of West Africa.

The first commercial bank in British West Africa, the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA), was established in 1894 by a group of British businessmen led by the shipping magnate A. L. Jones. It operated in the British colonies of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, and later in Liberia. In French West Africa, the first commercial bank was the Banque du Senegal, established at St. Louis in 1854. It later gave way to the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale (BAO), founded in 1901. These banks held a virtual monopoly of banking in the respective colonial territories; it was only in 1926 that the Barclay's Bank was founded as a rival to the BBWA in the British colonies. This did not, however, threaten the BBWA's entrenched position in the banking business, as it handled the bulk of government and commercial accounts.

The BBWA and BAO played crucial roles as banks of issue in the respective colonial territories. While the former had a brief tenure from 1894 to 1911 (being superseded in 1912 by the West African Currency Board), the latter maintained its monopoly over French West African colonial monetary systems from 1901 to 1955. The two banks' commercial practices were, however, broadly similar. First, they aided capital flight from the colonies by investing colonial reserves in the metropolitan economies, apparently because the colonial economies did not provide as many favorable investment opportunities. Second, their primary interest, as reflected in their lending policy, was in fostering the growth of expatriate commercial interests. While they gave credit to the big expatriate firms, they discriminated against indigenous ones, which could not satisfy their deliberately stiff collateral conditions.

The attitude of these banks toward indigenous enterprise contributed to the rise of economic nationalism in colonial West Africa. Attempts were made by African nationalists to establish banks sympathetic to the aspirations of African businessmen. Although the celebrated attempt by W. Tete-Ansa and Herbert Macaulay to run the nationalist Industrial and Commercial Bank had failed by 1931, subsequent efforts bore fruit. In Nigeria, the National Bank of Nigeria, founded in 1933, was the first of the indigenous banks that were to thrive from the 1950s onward. But these only managed to secure a small share of the market in the colonies. The expatriate banks thus maintained their dominance of the colonial banking systems throughout the colonial period.

Commercial banking did not operate in a vacuum: it had been necessitated by the increasing volume of European currencies in circulation. These currencies,

too, antedated the formal establishment of colonial rule. By the middle of the nineteenth century, British and French coins had come to coexist with traditional currencies in the commercial systems of West Africa. As soon as formal colonial rule was imposed from 1900 onward, colonial governments sought to displace the precolonial traditional currencies and to replace them with those issued by themselves. This was achieved by prohibiting the use of traditional currencies, paying the staff of colonial establishments in the colonial coinage, and insisting on the payment of tax in the official legal tender.

Coinage of various denominations was issued. Coins were made of silver, aluminum, and alloy. Currency notes were later introduced, but they faced popular antipathy partly because the material was too flimsy and also because the notes, unlike coinage, did not have any intrinsic value. The colonial currency systems were generally characterized by the shortage of coins, especially silver, owing partly to the practice of the colonial subjects of hoarding or smelting them into ornaments, and partly because of the cost of minting arising from the worldwide shortage of silver. In any case, there was never a consistent supply of small-denomination alloy coins which were in high demand in retail transactions. One response to the perennial crisis in the colonial currency systems was the practice of counterfeiting by the colonial subjects, but this was ultimately suppressed by the individual and cooperative action of the British and French colonial administrations in West Africa. Be that as it may, traditional currencies remained popular in certain areas, such as Eastern Nigeria, where 30 million *manillas* (open bracelets, cast from copper, brass, or iron) were still in circulation up to 1949, about a decade before independence.

The colonial currency systems were tied to those of the metropolitan countries. This was in spite of the creation of separate currencies for the colonies: in 1912 the WACB began issuing a separate currency for British West Africa while in 1945 the Colonies Francaise d'Afrique franc was introduced with the formation of a currency board, Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer. Until then the colonial currencies were freely convertible with the metropolitan ones.

The introduction of colonial banking and currency systems in West Africa from the nineteenth century resulted in the expansion of the economy. They eased commercial exchange between the colonies and the metropolis, and also within and across colonial territories. Modern currencies also facilitated colonial administration, as they made tax collection and the transfer of money within and across colonies much easier. These colonial economic infrastructures enabled expatriate banks and currency boards to transfer capital from the colonies to the metropolis, particularly

by investing colonial reserves, including currency board earnings from seigniorage, in the mother countries.

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See also: Colonial Federations: French West Africa; Communaute Financière Africaine.

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Cushites: Northeastern Africa: Stone Age Origins to Iron Age

Paleontological research has placed humanity's earliest known ancestor, *Australopithecus Afarensis* (popularly known as "Lucy"), in the Horn of Africa more than a million years ago. Thus, the region of Northeast Africa, which includes the Horn of Africa, may have been the earliest cradle of humanity (Brandt 1992).

Early *Homo sapiens* are thought to have replaced hominids about 125,000 years ago in the Horn of Africa. Considerably later, at 25,000 years ago, a particular type of Stone Age industry with characteristic blades and flint tools developed in northern Somalia around the city of Hargeisa (Brandt 1992, p.29), but nothing is known about who made those artifacts. Likewise, there is no information on the identity of the Stone Age inhabitants of the Horn even during the later Stone Age, some 12,000 years ago. Thus, early archaeology does not offer us any information that is ethnic group specific in its early stages. In short, we cannot speak of Cushitic groups or Semitic groups in the region yet, but only of early human groups.

In the north, data "ranging from Acheulian sites to Neolithic rock art" was found in the twentieth century by a few searches. Some of the sites indicated successive occupations with radiocarbon dates between 18,000 and 40,000 years ago (Brandt, Brook, and Gresham 1983, pp.7, 14–15). However, search in that

area still lags behind that done in parts of the continent, especially the Nile Valley and West Africa. In the midst of the hills and valleys of the north, between Erigavo in the mountains and Las Koreh on the Gulf of Aden, an archaeological survey of limited scope in 1980 revealed "a series of caves and rock-shelters, many of which revealed surface scatters of Middle to Later Stone Age artifacts and fossilized bone" (Brandt, Brook, and Gresham 1983, p.8).

Rock shelters at Karin Hagin, a natural mountain pass approximately 70 kilometers southwest of Bosaso, contain extensive rock paintings (Brandt, Brook, and Gresham 1983, p.16); the important feature is a type of cattle, today extinct in the Somalian areas, but found in Egypt, called jamuusa. The paintings also depict goats. These paintings bear interesting stylistic similarities the rock art of Ethiopia and northeastern Africa in general.

The Cushites, in the past mostly called Hamites, are an indigenous people of Northeast Africa, who are found today as far south as past the Equator in East Africa proper. Both the terms *Cushite* and *Hamite* have been drawn from the Christian Bible; however, the latter term has been mostly abandoned. European anthropologists, in their attempts to devise a multitude of races and sub-races in Africa, have long argued about the provenance of Cushites and have sometimes treated them as a mongrel race born out of Caucasoid or white immigrants from outside Africa and dark-skinned or Negroid Africans. Thus, unluckily, we have seen Cushites called Black Caucasoids or Europoids (Seligman 1930). The fact is that divisions on the human spectrum are not clear, and choosing any number of features to establish human typologies means ignoring some other features. Furthermore, such definitions reflect nothing more than the biases of those doing the classifications and run counter to the fact that all human groups have always been mixing first with the immediate neighbors and then with groups farther afield through intermediate groups. In other words, all human groups are mixed groups. Additionally, such classifications do little to advance our knowledge of human dispersal in general, and in particular have led to erroneous assumptions about the provenance of the Cushitic peoples of Africa, as well as the greatest ancient civilization that sprang in Northeast Africa, ancient Egypt.

For as long as recorded history is available for the region (perhaps as far back as 7,000 years ago, during the late Stone Age), the Cushites have been an indigenous people of Northeast Africa. Yet little is known about their ancient past. Perhaps one of the reasons lies in the fact that researchers and archaeologists have mostly concentrated their efforts on ancient Egypt and the Nile Valley in isolation, and to the detriment of a holistic picture of the whole region and its people.

Linguistics explains what other languages may be related to those spoken by today's Cushites. Thus, we know that the languages of the Cushites are part of a larger family of languages currently known as the Afroasiatic "superfamily" of languages, which includes Ancient Egyptian, Semitic, Chadic, and Berber. Of these, the only group whose native speakers partly extend to Asia (through migration from the African side of the Red Sea) is the Semitic group. Thus, it is likely that the ancestors of the speakers of Afroasiatic languages originally inhabited northeastern Africa, especially on the Red Sea coasts, before spreading, with the Chadic group crossing into Western Sudan, while some Semitic groups crossed over the Bab el Mandab straits into the Arabian Peninsula.

After the Stone Age, and starting about 6,000 years ago, herding of domesticating animals became the main economic activity of the inhabitants of the lowland areas of the Horn along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In those early times, the mountains and coastal areas had a wetter climate, which facilitated animal husbandry (Brandt, Brook, and Gresham 1983, p.10).

According to recent, limited research in northeastern and eastern Africa, domesticated cattle, wheat, and barley were being grown and raised in southern Egypt more than 8,000 years ago, while sheep and goats became domesticated about 7,500 years ago (Brandt 1992, p.30). The different peoples of the region learned from one another, with those dwelling in the Nile Valley becoming agriculturalists and cattle herders-while those in the drier areas took up domestication of small stock such as goats and sheep. Groups in the highlands or plateau country, such as found in Ethiopia, adopted agriculture at about the same time. By the age of the Egyptian civilization, the populations of northeastern Africa were fairly well established along the Red Sea coast up to Egypt and down to Cape Guardui, in what is now Somalia.

While early Cushites have usually been described as essentially pastoralists, it is more likely that their activities depended on their environment; if the area was well watered, they practiced agriculture, whereas when the area was mostly dry they were pastoralists breeding sheep and goats. Early Cushites were also

societies where certain trades were practiced by caste groups; for example, metallurgy and leatherworking were practiced by only certain groups. Likewise, the practice of war was the domain of the warrior class, while the practice of religion was the domain of the priests. This same division of trades has survived up to our times.

Early Cushites left behind materials that await further research and study; among those are monumental shrines in the Horn of Africa. The best known of these is a series of monumental graves and raised cairns situated in northern Somalia, which extend to southern Ethiopia up to the Dawa River, where the ancestors of the Oromo settled. These monumental graves are unknown in the areas not associated with early Cushitic settlement.

The building of these monumental graves points to a highly organized and ritualized religion. This is more so because we know that pre-Islamic and pre-Christian Cushites were fairly monotheistic and believed in one sky god, Waaq. The *ahan*, or ceremony of grave building and burial, demanded that considerable efforts be put into it; it is still practiced among Somalis today.

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See also: Stone Age (Later): Sahara and North Africa.

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D

Dadog: *See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Southern Nilotes: Kalenjin, Dadog, Pokot.*

Dahomey: Eighteenth Century

The Aja are believed to have originally migrated to southern present-day Benin from Tado (Togo) in the twelfth or thirteenth century and to have founded the town of Allada. According to oral tradition, a dispute in 1625 between three brothers over the throne caused further migrations. One brother, Kokpon, took over Allada; another, Te-Agbanlin, founded the coastal town of Ajatche, renamed Porto-Novo by Portuguese merchants; and the third brother, Do-Aklin, moved inland and founded the town of Abomey. Here, the Aja gradually mixed with the local population to form the Fon ethnic group.

By the end of the seventeenth century, Do-Aklin's grandson Wegbaja (*r. c.* 1645–1685) and his successor Akaba (*r.* 1685–1708) had made Abomey the capital of a powerful state, Dahomey. The kingdom was an absolute monarchy, quite unlike the surrounding traditional kingdoms. Its king's divine powers were hereditary. It was central to his role to honor former monarchs and establish the omnipotence of the royal line unequivocally. Hence the national day of celebration, the Annual Customs, included numerous human sacrifices to inspire the proper degree of fear in his subjects and provide a communication path with ancestors.

At Annual Customs, kings assembled the entire population, offered sacrifices, conducted Vodun ceremonies, gave gifts, reviewed the previous year, and planned future activities. "Messengers," previously condemned to death, were dispatched to the council of former kings in the otherworld to consult them. Answers to the questions delivered by the messengers were received through divination or possession. At the height of Dahomey's power, the king's palace was


decorated with human skulls, as was his throne; human sacrifices occurred regularly.

The king was the unchallenged head of a rigidly stratified society. He granted and withdrew chieftancies at will. He governed through a centralized bureaucracy staffed by commoners who could not challenge his authority. Succession to the throne was by primogeniture. By 1708, under King Agaja, every Dahomean citizen knew that his life must be devoted to the service of his king.

Dahomey was organized for war not only to expand its territory, but also to take captives as slaves. At first, in the sparsely populated land, these were kept to work the royal plantations. Later, they were sold to Europeans in exchange for weapons. The army consisted largely of regulars renowned for their marksmanship. It included the famous Amazon corps, probably originally a palace guard.

While Dahomey flourished, the coastal kingdoms of Allada and Ouidah were prey to succession struggles, disrupted by competition between European traders who played one chief against another, and vulnerable to Dahomey's intention to expand toward the coast to claim its share of the slave trade.

When in 1724 Soso, the king of Allada, died, two brothers vied to succeed him. The loser asked Agaja for help. Agaja marched south with his army, but instead of restoring his ally on the throne occupied Allada and exiled both contenders. By this unexpected action, Agaja destroyed the traditional ties that had bound the peoples together. He asserted that force alone would henceforth determine the survival of kingdoms in the region. Yet Hufon, king of nearby Ouidah, still trusting the validity of traditional ties, took no preventive measures. In 1727, on a pretext, Agaja invaded. He met with little resistance and easily conquered and occupied Ouidah. His expansion caused the powerful Oyo empire, whose tributary Allada had become at the beginning of the




Dahomey, eighteenth century.

eighteenth century, to intervene and invade Dahomey. The war continued from 1726 until 1730.

Agaja resorted to all available tactics; he even burned down his capital and dispersed his subjects. But in the long run Oyo cavalry triumphed over Dahomey's guns. Agaja had to sign a peace agreement, accept Oyo's sovereignty, agree to pay an annual tribute, and move his capital from Abomey to Allada, the ancient Aja capital. In return, he was allowed to keep all of Ouidah, a substantial part of Allada, overall control of his internal affairs, and his army.

Agaja then concentrated on reestablishing relations with the Europeans. He wanted the slave trade to be a royal monopoly, because his sales were guided only by his need for guns; but the Europeans forced him to negotiate with them. They recognized him as head of the land; in return he took responsibility for the safety of Europeans and promised to cooperate with their traders. However, the Oyo invaded again because Dahomey failed to pay the proper tribute. Agaja fled, and died in 1740.

After a contentious succession, his son Tegbesu (r.1732–1774) became king. He found his treasury empty and concluded that it was preferable to trade than to make war. By 1750 the slave trade was efficiently organized, and it looked as if it would solve Dahomey's problems. While the other parts of the Oyo empire were disintegrating, Dahomey stood firm. Nonetheless, the end of the eighteenth century marked a decline. Slaves from Oyo were being diverted from Dahomey's ports, and Fon raids were unable to capture sufficient numbers of slaves in the depleted northern regions. At the same time European demand was



Engraving of a general view of the European trading forts and the royal palace in Xavier of Sabi in Dahomey (Benin). © Das Fotoarchiv.

dwindling, first as a result of the chaos created by the wars, and then in response to the abolition of the slave trade by Britain (1808). Dahomey's situation improved only after 1818, under King Guezo.

Dahomey has been denounced because of its human sacrifices and its large sales of slaves. Recently, however, historians have attempted to explain rather than judge. They point out that while Dahomean culture found human sacrifices acceptable, Dahomey also offered its citizens order and protection. It developed a complex system of government not without constitutional checks and balances; it had an effective bureaucracy, courts of law, professional fighting units; it guaranteed its citizens fulfillment of their spiritual needs, and access to means of livelihood. Historians also underscore that Dahomean culture legitimized the enslavement of conquered people as field hands and servants, and found it easy to move from there to selling a few "undesirables." This led to growing European demands. Fon leaders seem to have gone into the trade reluctantly, but they became dependent on it to obtain weapons. The inescapable alternative they saw was to enslave others or be enslaved.

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See also: **Allada and Slave Trade.**

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Dakar

Dakar, the capital of Senegal, is the westernmost city on the African mainland. It is located at the tip of the Cape Verde Peninsula, roughly midway between the mouths of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers. The rocky coast and steep drop-off along the eastern side of the peninsula provide a sheltered deepwater harbor, and as the closest point in Africa to South America, Dakar is the logical departure point for voyages across the South Atlantic.

Dakar was founded in the mid-nineteenth century after more than four centuries of European activity in the area. The original inhabitants were Lébou fishing people who lived in villages at Yoff, Ouakam, Ngor, and Hann on Cape Verde. After the Portuguese arrived in 1444, a succession of European traders occupied Gorée Island, located two kilometers to the east. In 1815, Gorée was restored to France by the Congress of Vienna, and in the early 1820s it provided a base for several failed attempts by private firms to settle the mainland.

Napoleon Bonaparte's 1851 accession to power launched a new stage in French imperialism. In 1857, the governor of Senegal, Louis Faidherbe, ordered the occupation of the promontory opposite Gorée Island, and on May 25 of that year a group of marines began to build a fort. Several residents of Gorée joined them by building homes and planting gardens to supply food to the garrison and the island. The Messageries Impériales chose Dakar as a regular stop on its route from Bordeaux to Rio de Janeiro and purchased land near the waterfront to stockpile coal. To accommodate the company's large ships, the French administration launched a program of port improvements from 1862 to 1866 that added two jetties and navigation lights at Cape Dakar and on two offshore islands.

During the next two decades, French imperial interest waned as the German threat grew. Dakar was poorly placed to serve the Senegalese interior, so commercial traffic shifted to the port of Rufisque, 9 miles (15 kilometers) farther east. Dakar stagnated until 1885, when the French connected it by rail to Saint-Louis, near the

mouth of the Senegal River. Although large ships used the Senegal River during the flood season, a sand bar limited access to the harbor at Saint-Louis, and once the railroad was completed, Dakar became the principal port for trade between Senegal and Europe. From 1885 to 1888, Dakar's population more than doubled, and it had nearly doubled again by 1891.

The French government financed a new round of improvements between 1892 and 1899. At first they simply extended one of the existing jetties and added more space for ships to dock. From 1899 to 1902, the administration constructed a naval base at the north end of the harbor, added a dry dock, and designated Dakar as the capital of French West Africa. Further construction from 1903 to 1910 increased the capacity of the commercial port to accommodate materials for railroad construction and increased exports of peanuts.

In 1902 the French selected Dakar as the capital of French West Africa. The governor general's palace and other administration buildings were completed by the end of the decade, including the École Pinet-Laprade, which provided technical training. The outbreak of World War I halted government investment, but private commerce flourished despite the war, and Dakar's population rose from roughly 24,000 inhabitants in 1914 to 32,000 by 1921.

Dakar's rapid growth provided an opportunity for French planners to test their theories about health in the tropics. In 1916, the authorities established a separate African neighborhood called Medina in an effort to reduce the effect of yellow fever epidemics. The French also opened a medical school in Dakar for "native doctors" and midwives in 1918, and schools for pharmacists and veterinarians in 1919.

After the war, the government united Dakar, Gorée, and the surrounding communities under a separate municipal authority. In 1924 harbor dredging resumed, and the refuse was used to create a zone for loading peanut shipments at the north end of the harbor. With the completion of the railway to the Niger Valley in 1923, the port of Dakar entered another period of rapid growth. Dakar's population reached 40,000 by 1924 and exceeded 92,000 by 1936.

As tensions in Europe increased, the administration improved the submarine base at Dakar, added concealed oil storage tanks, and constructed a floating dry dock in 1938. After France's defeat in 1940, Dakar's governor general Boisson remained loyal to the Vichy government and repelled an invasion by troops under the command of Charles DeGaulle on September 23 through 25. However, the Allies controlled the seas, making communication with Vichy France difficult, and Dakar's port became nearly idle as a result of the war. Despite attempts to restore trade by means of a road across the Sahara Desert, the local economy

stagnated, and Dakar eventually yielded to the Free French in November 1942 following the Allied invasion of North Africa.

As the largest urban center in French West Africa, Dakar was a focal point for labor unrest following the end of World War II. A strike by workers on the Dakar coal dock in November 1945 was the first in a series that culminated in the Senegalese general strike of January 1946. Dakar's workers, both European and African, became the most thoroughly unionized in French West Africa, and in 1947, African railroad workers in Dakar led a five-month railway strike that spread to the rest of the colonies. Dakar also became a center of political activity that propelled men like Mahmadou Lamine-Guèye, Leopold Senghor, and Mahmadou Dia into office.

Dakar expanded again after the war, as a large influx of rural migrants raised its population to more than 250,000 by 1952. New housing developments included Grand-Dakar and the SICAP neighborhoods north and northwest of Medina, while other African neighborhoods filled in the peninsula around Dakar. In June 1960, Dakar became the capital of the Mali Federation, and remained the capital of Senegal after the federation dissolved. The city is also home to the University of Dakar, the Institute Fondamental d'Afrique Noire, a major research facility on African history and culture, and Gorée Island, a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization World Heritage Site.

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See also: **Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque.**

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Dar es Salaam

Tanzania's largest city, main industrial center, and former capital, Dar es Salaam has over the past century acted as the principal link between African peoples of the territory and the wider world. Its historical importance as an economic and cultural entrepot has resulted in the emergence of a cosmopolitan modern city whose

population contains substantial South Asian, Middle Eastern, and European minorities as well as a diverse African population drawn from throughout East and Central Africa.

Located on a fine natural harbor, the site was selected by Seyyid Majid, Sultan of Zanzibar, in 1862 as a base to consolidate his hold on the East African coast and the caravan trade with the interior. After an initial burst of building, the settlement became known as Dar es Salaam or Dar Salaam (Haven of Peace, Abode of Peace). After the death of Majid in 1870, however, it was neglected by his successor, Seyyid Barghash. Nevertheless, fueled by an expanding trade in agricultural products with the predominantly Zaramo hinterland, Dar es Salaam continued to grow. By the mid-1880s the population numbered several thousand, including the indigenous Shomvi Swahili, whose village at Mzizima was soon to be engulfed by the town, alongside numerous Zaramo, Arab officials, soldiers and traders, and Indian merchants.

After a period of local resistance in the late 1880s, Dar es Salaam was subordinated to German and later British colonial rule, becoming in 1891 the capital of German East Africa (after 1920, Tanganyika). In subsequent years the kernel of the modern town was developed. A port was constructed on the western side of the creek on which the town is situated, and official and European residential buildings were erected to the north. Lutheran and Catholic churches were built on the creek front, and two urban hospitals were established. Adjacent to the port an Indian commercial and residential area emerged. It has constituted the principal business center ever since. In the colonial period, the town was divided into three zones that represented the principal residential areas for Africans, Indians, and Europeans. In the 1920s an open space (Mnazi Mmoja) was established between the predominantly African and the predominantly Indian and European zones. The heart of the African town grew up around Kariakoo (a corruption of "Carrier Corps," the British Army division that had camped there after World War I), to the west of the business center. After an initial burst during German rule, the African population grew relatively slowly, having reached about 18,000 by 1900 (it was only around 23,500 by 1937). It contained urbanized communities of Manyema freed slaves and Sudanese and Shangaan ex-soldiers alongside the more numerous, though less permanent, African migrants from upcountry (most notably the Zaramo from the immediate hinterland). Migrants to the town predominantly worked as temporary blue-collar laborers, though there was also a small, educated minority employed as clerks and petty officials. By contrast, the Indian community grew rapidly after the British assumed control, doubling between 1919 and 1939 from around 4,500 to around 9,000.

Dar es Salaam's political importance was reflected in the construction of numerous government buildings along the creekfront, many of which are still in use—most notably, the governor's residence. Meanwhile, its development as a major commercial center was confirmed by the construction of a central railway line that by 1914 connected it with Lake Tanganyika and all points in between, and after World War I with Lake Victoria. In the areas surrounding the town sisal and coconut plantations were established, but Dar es Salaam's main economic role was as an entrepôt for the rest of the territory.

From the late-1930s the African population began to grow at an ever-escalating rate, thus exerting considerable strain on the urban infrastructure. By 1957 the African population had reached almost 100,000. The town's physical expansion was prodigious, incorporating former villages on the urban periphery such as Buguruni and Kinondoni, as well as officially planned European (Oyster Bay), Indian (Upanga; Chang'ombe), and African (Ilala; Magomeni; Tembeke) suburbs. While housing construction boomed, however, the scale of rural-to-urban migration was also resulting in the emergence of shanties such as Mikoroshoni and Manzese, which exist up to the present.

The flow to the town was fueled by an upturn in the territorial and urban economies, which began in the mid-1940s and lasted for about a decade. Improved cash-crop prices, along with the extension of the docks, resulted in unprecedented levels of trade passing through the port. This prosperity was reflected in the commercial area, which in the years following the war was transformed in a construction boom. At the same time, secondary industries such as bottling and meat processing emerged for the first time. All of these developments, as well as an expansion of government employment (partly thanks to Dar es Salaam's elevation to municipal status in 1949), resulted in a growing demand for labor. Increasingly migrants, particularly from within the Eastern Province, were attracted by the opportunities offered by the town for earning money. Despite general prosperity, however, unemployment remained a persistent feature among the urban African population, and with the end of the boom in the early 1950s the position was dramatically exacerbated. While urban employment was actually contracting by the late colonial period, the rural-to-urban flow continued unabated and the symptoms of urban poverty became ever more apparent.

With the achievement of independence in 1961 the contraction in the urban labor market was reversed. Dar es Salaam's regional importance as a port grew, partly thanks to the completion of the Tazara Railway in 1975, which linked it to the Zambian Copperbelt. By the 1970s trade from as far afield as Zaire passed

through the port. Meanwhile, there was a considerable expansion in industry—mostly import substitution—in the town, and the new government increased public-sector employment. As a source of income within the territory (which, as Tanzania, included Zanzibar after 1964), employment in the capital grew ever more important. By 1979 it provided 29 per cent of employment and 40 per cent of wages earned in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam continued to attract large numbers of immigrants from the rural areas. The population mushroomed, continually exceeding expert projections; by 1988 it exceeded 1.6 million. Urban resources were stretched to the limit. While the number in employment grew, it was outpaced by rates of urban unemployment. By the mid-1980s, with the Tanzanian economy in crisis, the majority of urban households were reliant in one form or another on the informal sector to get by. Meanwhile, although Dar es Salaam expanded dramatically after independence, the bulk of this occurred unplanned. The scarcity of surveyed plots encouraged squatting by homeowners from all income levels. As a result, the city now sprawls out beyond Ubungo to the west, Mbezi to the north, and Mbagala to the south. A dramatic increase in the numbers living in unserved communities, along with the shortage of waged employment, has resulted in the corresponding growth of urban poverty and its associated problems.

Dar es Salaam in recent years has remained Tanzania's most important urban center (though no longer its capital, which was switched to the centrally located Dodoma in 1975). Its large population (around three million in 2000) provides an important market for domestically produced agricultural and industrial products. Its formal and informal economies provide the opportunity for millions to earn anything from a bare subsistence to substantial wealth. As the main transportation hub, commercial and cultural center, the home of numerous newspapers, radio and television stations, and the main university, it is the principle arbiter between Tanzania and the wider world. It continues to exert a disproportionate influence on Tanzanian society as a whole.

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See also: **Tanzania.**

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Darfur: *See Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur.*

Daworo: *See Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries.*

De Brazza: *See Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: De Brazza and French Colonization.*

Debt, International, Development and Dependency

A debt crisis afflicted Africa through the 1980s and 1990s. Debt to northern governments and banks and to multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rose from \$9 billion in 1970 to \$109 billion in 1980, \$270 billion in 1990, and \$321 billion in 1997.

The debt crisis has its roots in the 1970s, when there was a surplus of investment capital and international banks made ever-riskier loans. In the mid-1970s, real interest rates were negative and developing country finance ministers were chased by bankers who urged that they take out what were effectively free loans; many did.

The election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States in 1981 marked a dramatic change. Between 1979 and 1982, international interest rates rose 12 per cent. Suddenly, free loans were so expensive they could not be repaid; governments had to borrow more just to repay old loans.

At the same time, commodity prices fell sharply, and terms of trade fell dramatically. By 1988, African

exports only bought 64 per cent of the manufactured goods that they would have in 1980; by 1993 this figure had fallen to 60 per cent. If African earnings had remained at 1980 levels, the extra earnings between 1980 and 1995 would have paid the entire debt twice over.

As Africa provided the basic resources for an economic boom in the north, the crisis grew in the south. Per-capita African gross domestic product (GDP) fell from \$770 in 1980 to \$639 in 1994, according to the World Bank; government revenues were also hit. The result was an economic crisis across Africa. The industrialized countries responded with slow increases in aid—from \$10 billion a year in 1980 to \$17 billion in 1989 and \$21 billion in 1993. But more than one-third of that was food aid, loans, or technical assistance determined by donor governments. In the 1990s, grants averaged \$12 billion a year, according to the World Bank. While these grants have eased the debt crisis, they have not compensated for falling commodity prices. With a huge debt burden, spiraling interest rates, and falling commodity prices, African countries used a mix of three measures: diverting money from social expenditure to debt service; simply not paying loans as they fell due; and "rolling over" the loans by taking out new loans to repay old loans.

Of the \$321 billion in debt in 1997, \$57 billion was arrears that had not been paid. Indeed, half the increase in debt between 1988 and 1998 was simply the piling up of unpaid arrears. Several African countries were expected to pay more than one-fifth of the entire GDP in debt service but, not surprisingly, they failed to do so.

The result was a net flow of wealth from south to north, which has continued since 1980. Each year in the 1990s, African countries borrowed \$21 billion but paid back \$25 billion in interest and principal repayments—a net transfer of \$4 billion a year from Africa to the industrialized world. Each year unpaid debts grew larger and were added on to existing debts: total debt grew by nearly \$8 billion a year. In other words, the cost of the debt burden was \$12 billion a year—\$4 billion in payments and \$8 billion in increased debt. This is exactly what Africa received in grants, so aid really only filled the gap caused by the debt crisis.

Governments became increasingly dependent on aid to pay for social services, and that gave increasing power to the donor community, which began to impose political and economic policies. In the 1980s, the socialist bloc was an alternative provider of loans and policies, but with the end of the Cold War the victorious West was able to step up its demands for free market, neoliberal policies. This included a reduction in the role of government, privatization, and an increase in the role of the market. Water, health care, and

education were commodities to be paid for; government spending fell sharply; primary school enrollment rates fell between 1980 and 1990. Cuts in spending were demanded both on political grounds and in order to release money for debt service.

As the crisis deepened and debt grew, donors and creditors could impose further conditions. By 1990, all aid was conditional on countries having IMF and World Bank programs, and if the IMF ruled that a government was not following the program, aid stopped. Governments were forced to cut spending and keep up debt service payments under IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

The Cold War also had a direct impact on the African debt crisis, with both sides giving loans to its allies. But the West was much more extravagant in its lending. Nearly \$19 billion was lent to prop up the apartheid regime, \$13 billion to Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, \$13 billion to military dictators in Nigeria, and \$2 billion to Hastings Banda in Malawi. The majority-rule government of Nelson Mandela in South Africa was asked to repay the loans given to the apartheid state—in effect, Mandela was asked to pay the cost of his own previous imprisonment.

This caused a backlash in Africa, where there are growing calls to refuse to repay what under international law are known as odious debts. That is, if an oppressive regime borrows money and uses it against the interests of the people, then the debt should not be fall to a successor government. In 1982, early in the sanctions campaigns, U.S. banks were warned by the own lawyers that loans to apartheid South Africa might be ruled as odious and not be repaid, and lending did stop three years later. In 1999, the British House of Common International Development Committee used the term *odious debt* and called for cancellation of loans that had been made in the early 1990s to the genocidal government in Rwanda.

Recognition of the debt crisis and of the political nature of debt has grown since the crisis started in 1980. At first, each country had to negotiate each year with its creditors to roll over the loans it could not pay, or to obtain World Bank loans to repay commercial banks. In 1988, the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Toronto, Canada, agreed that bilateral debt—that is, aid loans and unpaid export credits owed to governments—could be rescheduled on concessional terms, and 1991 and 1994 G7 meetings agreed to actually cancel some bilateral debt. However, the only large debt cancellation was explicitly political. In 1990 the United States wrote off \$10 billion of Egypt's debt in exchange for its support of the first Gulf War.

By the mid-1990s the end of the Cold War had slowed the economic decline, and in some countries there was a small per-capita increase in GDP (the IMF

claimed this was due to adjustment policies, but this was disputed within Africa). But total debt was still growing much faster. Most African countries were only paying part of the debt service that was due, but still spending more on debt service than on education or health. Debt was proving a block to development; since debt service had the first call on export earnings, the debt overhang was also discouraging foreign investment.

The realization that there was no chance of this debt ever being repaid finally led the World Bank and IMF to propose, in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) to cancel some of the debt of up to 41 countries, 33 of them in Africa. This gained substantial publicity as an “exit” from the debt crisis, and was significant because it was the first time that the World Bank and IMF had agreed to cancel some of their own loans. But the HIPCI was soon shown to be ineffective. It was very slow, granting debt relief to only two or three countries a year, and it proved to only cancel the debt that countries were not paying in any case. Mozambique and Uganda, the first countries in Africa to be promised debt relief, ended up paying almost as much as they did before the HIPCI—and still spent more on debt service than health care.

In 1999 the G7 met in Cologne and promised further debt cancellation under the HIPCI. But the proposals were widely rejected, both in Africa and by the international Jubilee 2000 movement, which was campaigning for cancellation of the unpayable debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000. They said Cologne did not go far enough, and that the poorest countries would still have heavy debt burdens; that too many deeply indebted countries, including Nigeria and Morocco, were excluded from the HIPCI; and that HIPCI debt cancellation remained conditional on even stricter structural adjustment programs, which were seen to be increasing poverty and restricting growth. Thus, the African debt crisis continues into the twenty-first century.

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See also: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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**Defiance Campaign: See South Africa:
Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter,
Treason Trials: 1952–1960.**

Delta States, Nineteenth Century

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the political economy of the Niger Delta was dominated by the more prosperous middleman trading states of Bonny (Ibani), New Calabar (Kalabari), Nembe-Brass, Okrika, and Itsekiri. These states are key to an understanding of the consequences of Euro-African connections in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; they therefore captured the attention of Nigeria's pioneer historians in the middle of the twentieth century.

These pioneering scholars—K.O. Dike (1956) and G. I. Jones (1963) in particular—initiated discussions revolving around two overlapping themes in the history of the nineteenth-century Niger Delta. The first theme was the nature of the economic transition from the slave trade to “legitimate commerce” in palm produce, and the implications of that transition for the political stability of the Delta states. The second theme was the role of the British Consul, including the British Navy, in subverting the indigenous economic and political organizations before “formal” colonial rule was imposed in 1885. As a 1995 work edited by R. Law indicates, these themes are still generating considerable debate among historians of economic change in West Africa.

Furthermore, though these pioneering studies were primarily concerned with the economic and political forces of change in the Niger Delta, they also drew attention to another very potent aspect of change during the nineteenth century—the missionary factor. An extensive study of the implications of the missionary factor for the indigenous sociocultural and religious heritage of these Delta states was subsequently undertaken by two scholars in quick succession: Ayayi (1965) and Ayandele (1966). As with the study of commerce and politics, the need for a more in-depth understanding of the missionary factor in the Niger Delta has given rise to further case studies, including those authored by G. O. M. Tasié (1978) and W. E. Wariboko (1998).

In the centuries leading up to the economic transition (1600–1800), the middleman trading states in the Niger Delta had heavily relied on the foreign exchange accruing from the overseas slave trade to sustain their sociopolitical, cultural, and military institutions. This being so, the leaders of these states initially perceived the antislave trade movement of Great Britain, as translated through the British Consul to the Niger Delta, including the anti-slave

trade Naval Squadron in West Africa, as inimical to their immediate economic and political interests. However, their fear that ending the slave trade would be economically disastrous was unfounded for three reasons.

The prevailing high prices of palm oil, which made possible the huge profits between 1830 and 1850, provided adequate assurance that the “new” trade was equally a viable source of foreign exchange. It was also soon realized that the palm oil trade did not threaten to upset the existing production relations between the ruling merchant chiefs and the exploited servile members of their trading houses. Finally (and this is related to the above points) there was the realization that both forms of trade could be simultaneously pursued to maximize revenue. Hence the middleman states, notwithstanding the presence of the British Consul and Navy, tried to participate in both forms of transatlantic commerce between 1800 and 1850. As M. Lynn (1995) has argued, everything considered, the middleman states made a smooth transition with very little or no financial dislocation.

But what was the political relationship between those states that engaged in the slave trade beyond 1807 and the abolitionists in the Niger Delta during this phase of transition? Between 1848 and 1854, antislave trade treaties were signed between consul John Beecroft and the trading states. Thereafter, in all cases of treaty violation, one or all of the following sanctions were imposed on disobedient states and their potentates: naval bombardment of the city-state; and the denial or suspension of mutually agreed anti-slave trade compensation to the offending king. These actions to exterminate the slave trade marked the beginning of the agonizing chain of events that undermined the political sovereignty of the Delta states. Hence this period has been referred to as the “empire of informal sway” in the Niger Delta.

The second half of the century witnessed the advent of the Church Missionary Society in Akassa (1860), Bonny (1864), Nembe-Brass (1868), New Calabar (1874), and Okrika (1882). For the Niger Delta, this completed the coming together of the extraterritorial forces of change that worked concertedly to transform society. The missionary propaganda intended to culturally transform society was directed principally at the lineage or house institution (the basic socioeconomic unit of production and political organization in the Delta states). Because of the strategic relevance of the house to the overall survival of the trading states, the ruling traditional elite tried, unsuccessfully, to curb the influence of the missionaries. The success of planting the church, however perceived,

was in part due to the active support given to the exercise by the British Consul and the European merchants trading in the Niger Delta.

This period of intense missionary propaganda coincided with the protracted economic depression of the nineteenth century; but it was the latter that intensified competition between the trading states for greater shares in the palm oil export market. Between 1863 and 1882, for instance, New Calabar had to protect its interior palm-oil producing markets by fighting against interlopers from the competing rival states of Bonny, Nembe-Brass, and Okrika. The social and commercial relationship between the Itsekiri and Urhobo communities also reached its lowest level as the economic crisis fostered disputes over prices to be asked and given in the trans-Atlantic trade.

The second half of the century also witnessed the resurgence of mutual feuding between trading houses vying for economic and political supremacy in their respective states. For example, S. J. S. Cookey (1974) has shown that the renewed internecine struggles at Bonny between the two most dominant groups of houses led to the founding of Opobo in 1870 by Jaja of Opobo. Between 1881 and 1883, similar internecine conflicts also led to the breaking up of New Calabar. These feuds provided needed excuses for the consuls to interfere incessantly in the internal affairs of the affected states before “formal” colonialism was imposed at the end of the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885.

The 1885 British declaration of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in the Niger Delta notwithstanding, no proper administration was put in place; for this reason, the period before 1891 has been referred to as the era of the “paper protectorate.” However, with the establishment of the first full-fledged administration headed by Major (later Sir) Claude MacDonald in 1891, the coercive capacity of the evolving colonial state was strengthened to pursue the goals of the British “civilizing mission” to Africa. Shortly after the foundation of this maiden administration, the Niger Delta was politically renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate.

As defender of the civilizing mission the invigorated colonial state began to relentlessly denounce the kings of the middleman trading states as obstructionists to the attainment of the economic, sociocultural, and political goals of Britain in the Niger Delta. Among other things, obstruction to the civilizing mission meant resisting the planting of Christianity, with its alien spiritual and secular values, and—most important—resisting European trading companies seeking to establish themselves in the interior primary producing communities of Southern Nigeria.

The last point above was the greatest source of conflict in Anglo-African relations between 1885 and 1900. At close intervals during this period, the following

Niger Delta potentates and middlemen were denounced as obstructionists to the civilizing mission before being dethroned and exiled from their communities: Jaja of Opobo in 1887; Nana of Ebrohimi-Itsekiri in 1894; Koko of Nembe-Brass in 1895; and Banu Suku of Okrika in 1896. J. C. Anene (1966), among other historians, has shown that the manner in which these men were removed marked the zenith of the “gunboat diplomacy” introduced by the British Naval Squadron in the years leading up to “formal” colonialism. In 1900, shortly after the removal of these strongmen, the political map of the Niger Delta was redrawn by subsuming it as a part of the new protectorate of Southern Nigeria under Ralph Moor.

WAIBINTE ELEKIMA WARIBOKO

See also: *Anti-Slavery Squadron, Decline of Export Slave Trade, Nineteenth Century; Berlin West Africa Conference; 1884–1885; “Legitimate Commerce” and the Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.*

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Democracy: Postcolonial

The political frameworks bequeathed to the African continent at the beginning of the postcolonial era embodied an authoritarian-democratic paradox in which African leaders educated in authoritarianism during the colonial era were expected to perform like seasoned experts in democracy. Despite their almost complete disregard for the promotion of democratic values during the colonial era, departing colonial administrators hastily constructed multiparty political arrangements that purported to embody Western democratic ideals—such as systems of checks and balances—in which offices of the president, legislatures, and judiciaries would balance each other's power and check the emergence of authoritarianism. The relatively decentralized Westminster model of parliamentary governance was grafted onto the authoritarian structures of colonial rule in the former British colonies, and the more centralized Elysée model was similarly introduced into France's former colonies. For the most part, however, the so-called democracies left behind by the departing colonial powers represented largely untested and ill-suited political practices and procedures that in any case were not grounded in African traditions or political cultures.

Except in the unique case of Botswana, the first generation of African leadership resolved this paradox of independence by replacing the political systems left behind by the former colonial powers with more authoritarian forms of governance based on a centralization of power and personal rule. Even the most principled of African leaders invariably turned to a variety of authoritarian measures to enhance their political power and ensure political survival at the expense of competing political interests. Those actions taken included the staffing of administrations, militaries, and police forces with members of the leader's ethnic or clan groups, as well as with those of their principal ethnic or clan allies, and the rejection of "federalist" arrangements, such as constitutional amendments, that allowed for the political autonomy of groups or regions based on ethnic, linguistic, or religious claims. Another trend was the marginalization, or even disbanding, of independent parliaments and judiciaries that at best became "rubber stamp" organizations incapable of serving as a check on the powers of the executive. The imprisonment or exile of vocal critics from civil society, including labor unions, student organizations, and religious groups; and the outlawing of rival political parties was another representative action.

During the last decade of the twentieth century, however, dozens of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern and Southern Europe made transitions from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance,

prompting proponents of democracy to speak of the third wave of democratization in world history, the first two waves having occurred in the 1820s and 1940s. In the case of Africa, this third wave was sparked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of single-party regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union set powerful precedents for African prodemocracy activists who already had begun organizing against human rights abuses and political repression. Severe economic stagnation and decline in most African economies served as the internal spark for political discontent. The most notable outcome of this historic turning point, often referred to as Africa's "second independence" or "second liberation," was the discrediting of more than 30 years of experimentation with single-party political systems in favor of more democratic forms of governance based on multiparty politics and the protection of human rights.

The third wave of African democratization has fostered both optimism and pessimism. Optimism was initially generated by a host of early successes, such as the national conference experiment in Benin. This third wave culminated in what numerous observers have referred to as the South African "miracle": the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected leader of South Africa. Pessimism increasingly has been generated by the simple reality that several transitions to democracy have resulted in democratic decay, often ending in military coups d'état and a return to authoritarianism. In the case of Niger, for example, Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara Baré achieved the dubious honor of leading the first successful coup d'état against a democratically elected government in francophone West Africa since the beginning of the third wave of democratization. In a throwback to an earlier era of authoritarian rule and highly questionable democratic practices, Colonel Baré announced that there would be multiparty elections in 1996, presented himself as the "civilian" candidate of the ruling party, and subsequently won what international observers agreed to be a grossly flawed electoral contest. Less than three years later, Baré was assassinated in a military coup and replaced by Commander Daouda Malam Wanke. Needless to say, Wanke's promise of holding free and fair democratic elections in 1999 was greeted warily by the general population.

Even in those cases marked by a successful transition to more democratic forms of governance, newly elected leaders are confronted with the long-term challenge of ensuring the consolidation (institutionalization) of democratic practices in political systems still marked by democratic fragility. "The frequency of democratic breakdowns in this century—and the difficulties of consolidating new democracies—must

give serious pause to those who would argue . . . for the inevitability of global democracy,” explains Larry Diamond, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. “As a result, those concerned about how countries can move ‘beyond authoritarianism and totalitarianism’ must also ponder the conditions that permit such movement to endure. . . . To rid a country of an authoritarian regime or dictator is not necessarily to move it fundamentally beyond authoritarianism” (Diamond).

One means for assessing the consolidation of democracy is to examine the evolution of political rights enjoyed by African populations, including the ability to form political organizations free from government intrusion; the meaningful representation of ethnic, racial, religious and other minority groups in the political process; and the right to choose national and local political leaders through free and fair competitive elections. Although individual countries will obviously vary, the African continent as a whole has benefited from the steadily rising protection of political rights since 1989. It is important to note, however, that the establishment of a multiparty political system (most often cited by Western observers as the lynchpin of democratic practice) can actually undermine the process of democratic consolidation, especially when electoral arrangements make it difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition party to emerge victorious in national elections. In the case of Botswana, for example, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party has controlled the reins of power since independence in large part due to a political system that heavily favors the incumbent president and his ruling party.

It is precisely for this reason that some proponents of democratization argue that the true test of Africa’s newly established democratic systems is their ability to foster and survive the alternation of power between rival political parties. Benin stands out as a model of a newly established, multiparty democracy that has successfully weathered an alternation of power through the ballot box. The net political outcome of the 1990 national conference was the 1991 holding of “founding elections,” in which a technocrat, Nicéphore Soglo, was elected president. Mathieu Kérékou, the former Marxist dictator, graciously accepted defeat and retired from the political system, only to return five years later as the leading opposition candidate in the 1996 presidential elections. With Soglo’s reelection campaign severely hampered by the poor performance of the national economy and public perceptions of his disregard for the average citizen, Kérékou overcame the political odds and emerged victorious in the presidential elections. Dubbed the “chameleon” by friends and enemies alike, Kérékou returned to office serving as a powerful example of the further consolidation of democratic practices on the African continent.

A second means for assessing the consolidation of democracy is to determine the nature and depth of civil liberties enjoyed by African populations, including the right to freedom of speech and assembly; access to vigorous, independent media; constitutional guarantees of due process by independent judiciaries; freedom of religion and worship; and the general protection of individual rights regardless of one’s ethnicity, race, religious creed, or gender. Although individual cases will obviously vary, the African continent as a whole has also benefited from the steadily rising protection of civil liberties since 1989. It is precisely for this reason, argue optimists of Africa’s democratic prospects, that one can speak of the gradual strengthening of a democratic culture that increasingly will become self-sustaining.

The caution one must nonetheless exert when assessing the consolidation of newly formed democracies is clearly demonstrated by events in Zambia, a country that in 1991 made a successful transition from a single-party system headed by President Kenneth Kaunda to a multiparty political system under the leadership of President Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Eighteen months after achieving victory, Chiluba reinstated a “state of emergency” that had existed throughout Kaunda’s rule, and arrested and detained without charges at least 14 members of the official opposition, the United National Independence Party. Critics of the government’s actions drew parallels between Kaunda’s use of states of emergency during the 1970s and the 1980s to silence political opponents and Chiluba’s desire to curb rising criticism of his regime’s inability to resolve Zambia’s pressing economic problems. Most important, critics noted that the domination of Zambia’s parliament by Chiluba’s ruling MMD party (125 out of 150 seats) called into question the independence of the legislature from the executive, especially after Chiluba was successful in acquiring legislative approval for his harsh measures. Indeed, prior to the presidential elections of 1996, Chiluba oversaw the ratification of two constitutional amendments that harkened back to the authoritarian excesses of his predecessor and threatened to undermine the very democratic political system he sought to create. The first required that the parents of any presidential candidate be Zambians by birth; the second limited any presidential candidate to two terms of office. Since Kaunda’s parents were born in neighboring Malawi, and he had ruled Zambia for a total of 27 years (1964–1991), he was forced to withdraw from the race. Chiluba’s political maneuvering removed the only serious challenge to his rule and ensured his reelection.

Whether Africa’s third wave of democratization will result in further democratic consolidation or

democratic decay will largely depend on how the new generation of democratically elected elites respond to the authoritarian-democratic paradox. Will they graciously accept defeat and join the ranks of the loyal opposition, as was the case in Soglo's defeat in the 1996 Benin presidential elections, or will they increasingly turn to a variety of authoritarian tactics to maintain themselves in power at any cost, as Chiluba's manipulation of the 1996 Zambian presidential elections illustrates? Indeed, the response of the first generation of African leaders to this authoritarian-democratic paradox in the 1950s ushered in nearly four decades of single-party rule. The ways in which Africa's newly elected democratic leaders resolve these paradoxes during the decade of the 1990s and beyond potentially portend the creation of new forms of political rule destined to last well into the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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See also: **Political Systems.**

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Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment

The underlying basis for public planning in Africa is development. Almost all African states have as their primary objective the goal of raising the quality of life of their citizens. This goal—variously referred to as

development, modernization, or economic growth—has dominated discussions on Africa since the 1950s, when nationalist leaders in the various territories that make up the modern countries of Africa challenged colonial rule for independence. During the early years of independence, in the 1960s and 1970s, development remained the single most important goal of African countries. Now, in the twenty-first century and in the wake of independence, the various countries have continued to struggle to achieve a better quality of life.

African countries' approach to development was conditioned by the particular circumstances in which the countries found themselves at independence. In almost all countries the governments faced mounting expectations from a restless populace that saw in independence the only hope they had of transforming their impoverished conditions. People looked up to the government to satisfy their aspirations for a higher quality of life through the provision of better economic opportunities such as higher-paying jobs, social services, education, health care, and a reliable infrastructure. Despite their promises of improved economic and social conditions, most of the nationalist leaders soon realized that the new states did not have adequate resources for them to work with in satisfying the expectations and aspirations of their citizens. With its low earnings, tedious working conditions, and long hours, agriculture continued to be the principal source of income for most people. Because industries were few, most countries were deprived not only of the high wages found in the industrial sector but also of the economies of scale that industry generates. Due to such weaknesses in the postcolonial economies, taxes and export earnings, two principal sources of revenue for any state, were much too low to enable African states to meet the development needs of their citizens. In addition to public resource deficiencies, the private sector was either too weak or virtually insignificant because of the low level of private savings. This situation led most African governments to define their responsibility at independence not only in terms of protection, regulation, and the provision of basic social services but also in terms of resource mobilization and production. To perform such tasks required careful planning. Consequently, postcolonial African governments devised long range, five-year development plans that served as the mechanism through which they sought to plan and hasten the development of their societies.

Even though there was hardly a country in Africa that did not devise a five-year development plan as the basis of economic strategy, there were enormous differences in both content and style among the plans of the various countries. The basic component of a five-year plan is a broad statement of economic and social goals, the mechanisms through which to realize such

goals, and the list of activities and projects to be undertaken so as to accomplish the goals. Five-year plans included mechanisms through which the activities would be financed, and details of the amount of financing that would come from the government, the private sector, and/or from loans. Each five-year plan was usually divided into short-range annual plans. The five-year and annual plans were further divided into sectoral components—that is, activities in various specialized areas such as health, education, roads, agriculture, and telecommunications. The appeal of such plans for African nations was that they enabled the nations to mobilize resources despite a lack of capital, and to organize the use of such resources in an efficient manner.

Although all African states were involved in planning, they did not all adopt the same ideological approach to guide their respective societies toward economic and social development. One can identify three different ideological perspectives that were employed at one point or another by different countries in their planning processes. Some countries adopted an orthodox Marxist approach—that is, the state played an activist role by deciding, directing, and regulating economic policies, as well as engaging in the production and distribution of goods and services. Among countries in this category were Ethiopia (1976), the Democratic Republic of Congo-Brazzaville (1969), Somalia (1970), and Benin (1974). These countries' strategy was to bring about a complete transformation from what they saw as the corruption and ills of capitalism to a classless egalitarian system. Other countries, including Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Malawi, and Kenya, adopted a more capitalistic approach toward development. The state's role in the economies of these countries was theoretically detached and limited to regulatory activities. In practice, however, it still was very involved, although not nearly as much as the Marxist-socialist states. The third ideological orientation that guided economic planning in Africa was a variant of socialist ideologies. These ranged from the humanist socialism of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia to the communal socialism model (*ujama*) of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Many countries did not often profess a rigorous ideological orientation as a guiding principle. But even in such countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, the state often played a significant role in mobilizing and organizing production.

Through the process of planning, African governments became deeply involved in economic production, creating state-owned companies known as parastatals. Many nations also sought to eliminate foreign competition, through import substitution and high external tariffs for imports. Others took over

some foreign-owned companies through a process known as nationalization, while others reserved certain sectors of the economies mainly for nationals. African governments also became involved in providing subsidies to their nationals, to enable them to defray the cost of items ranging from grain to fertilizers or insecticides.

Despite the efforts at public planning for development in Africa, the economic situation in most countries in the region during the 1980s became worse. A fall in global demand for Africa's predominantly agricultural products due to the economic recession in most developed countries lowered prices and led to an economic slump in Africa. Because most countries had borrowed substantial amounts during the 1970s to finance their development, or to pay for oil during the global oil crisis of the 1970s, the stagnant economy led to a heightened debt problem. Interest on the debt itself took up sizable shares of most countries' export earnings. For some countries in the Sahel and in southern Africa, drought and wars exacerbated an already serious situation by further decreasing agricultural production, especially food crops. The overall consequence of the situation was a revenue shortfall of unprecedented magnitude. Meanwhile, expenditures kept on mounting, leading to massive deficit in most countries. In an attempt to focus global attention to the situation, the United Nations (UN) convened a special conference in 1986 on what became known as the African Economic Crisis.

Despite efforts on the part of the UN; other multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental groups; and African governments and nongovernmental organizations, the economic and social problems in Africa remained unresolved.

The African economic crisis that started in the late 1970s and early 1980s has continued into the new millennium. It has led many to question the wisdom of various aspects of public planning in Africa, especially those involving the state's engagement in various productive activities through parastatals. Other aspects of public planning such as subsidies, inefficient revenue collection, overvalued currencies, trade restrictions, poor governance, a bloated civil service, ill-informed economic priorities, and poor project choices have also been singled out for criticism. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required African countries to undertake reforms laid out in structural adjustments programs before they could receive funds from these two organizations. The adjustments required by the World Bank and IMF in Africa call for a restructuring and a complete restoration of a market economy with little government involvement to correct the imbalance between demand and supply.

By the early 1990s over 30 countries had accepted the World Bank's conditions. In all the countries, five-year plans were virtually derailed. Although some form of planning continues to be performed in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the plans are reactive, short range, and market driven rather than comprehensive or far reaching.

MOSES K. TESI

See also: **Cameroon: Independence to the Present; Ethiopia: Famine, Revolution, Mengistu Dictatorship, 1974–1991; Côte d' Ivoire (Ivory Coast): Independence to the Present; Kenya: Independence to the Present; Malawi: Independence to the Present; Nigeria: Agriculture, Irrigation, Rural Development; Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Democracy and Capitalism: 1990 to the Present; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

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Diagne, Gueye, and Politics of Senegal, 1920s and 1930s

Senegal was exceptional among the French colonies in Africa because in a small part of it—the Four Communes of Dakar, Rufisque, Saint-Louis and Gorée—French rule was already established by the early nineteenth century, and their African and half-African inhabitants,

as well as French ones, had privileges, including the vote, from 1833 on. Under the Third French Republic, there was a free and lively political arena in this multi-ethnic community called the *Originaires*. The communes (created in 1872 in Saint-Louis and Gorée, 1880 in Rufisque, and 1887 in Dakar) had their local councils, a general council for them was established in 1879, and there was a deputy in the French parliament, usually a European, until 1902 when the (partly African) Creole François Carpot was elected. Further inland, when French rule was extended (mainly from the 1880s) the Africans were treated as “subjects” without the rights of the *Originaires*, whose position was exceptional in twentieth-century French Africa. In fact, the French authorities became hostile to the Four Communes' privileges in the early twentieth century, some court judgments cast doubt on some of the privileges, and 2,000 of the 10,000 voters were removed from the register in 1906. However, with virtually complete freedom of the press and of political activity, Africans could respond to the feared threat to their position.

Galandou Diouf (1874–1941) was the first prominent African leader in the Four Communes, becoming a member of the General Council in 1909 with backing from the *Lebous*, who had a special grievance as the original inhabitants and owners of land in Dakar. In 1912 a mainly African party, the *Jeunes Sénégalais*, was founded in Saint-Louis (which had for a long time been the seat of the French administration of Senegal) by clerks, teachers, and others (*Originaires* held such posts all over French-ruled Africa). This party, which continued until 1921, called for better pay, more education, and other changes but—typical of such elite groups in Africa at that time—professed complete loyalty to the colonial power.

In 1914 Blaise Diagne (1872–1934), a Customs officer from Gorée, returned to the Four Communes and stood for election to Senegal's seat in the French National Assembly. He won in the second round and became the first man of pure African descent to serve as the deputy for Senegal. He promised to have the *Originaires'* position regularized, and found an opportunity to do so in World War I. The *Originaires* had been barred from joining the armed forces, besides being excluded from the compulsory military service imposed on France's African “subjects” in 1912. In 1915 Diagne persuaded the assembly to allow their enlistment. Then, in 1916, Diagne—who had become a deputy without being a French citizen—introduced a law passed unanimously by the assembly to declare that the *Originaires* were French citizens subject to the military service obligations of French citizens. Later Diagne was appointed by Prime Minister Clemenceau as a special commissioner for recruitment of more

Africans for the French Army in 1917–1918, and about 63,000 were recruited in French West Africa and 14,000 in French Equatorial Africa. Some Africans criticized Diagne for this, but he was reelected several times and remained a generally respected figure; Senegal's deputy for 20 years, he was even considered by some Africans of other French territories as an unofficial representative. He ran his own newspaper, called first *La Démocratie* and then *L'Ouest Africain Français*.

Having encountered considerable French hostility at first, Diagne signed an agreement in 1923 with the Bordeaux firms dominant in business in Senegal, under which he agreed to defend their interests in return for their support. Diouf, who served as mayor of Rufisque in 1921–1923, was for several years Diagne's close colleague, but later he disagreed with Diagne's policies and in 1928 stood against him in the candidacy for Senegal's deputy. Diagne won narrowly, amid allegations of rigging; soon afterward he served in the French government as deputy minister of the colonies, and went so far as to defend France's colonial forced labor policies before the ILO. Opposition, supported by the newspaper *Périscope Africain*, centered around Diouf, who was nonetheless beaten by Diagne again in 1932.

Diagne died in 1934 and Diouf was elected his successor. In the elections of 1936, which brought the Popular Front to power in France, Diouf was opposed by Amadou Lamine Guèye (1891–1968), a lawyer prominent in the Four Communes' politics, having been mayor of Saint-Louis in 1927; he had founded the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (PSS), separate from the French Socialists of the SFIO, in 1934, and had an impressive party organization like none seen before in Senegal, but he lost the election to Diouf. Later a new Senegal "federation" of the SFIO was formed but the PSS remained in existence. The Popular Front government, and Marcel de Coppet, who was appointed by it as governor general of French West Africa, did not challenge the continuation of the French Empire, but only started limited reforms of which one was the legalization of trade unions. Politics in Senegal, as before, remained within the framework of French rule. Change was to come after World War II, when Guèye's political career continued and he won particular fame as the author of the law of May 7, 1946, declaring all inhabitants of all the French colonies to be full French citizens.

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See also: Colonial Federations: French West Africa; Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, St Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque.

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Diamonds

Diamonds are a mineral resource of great value to a number of African countries; they have also featured prominently in several African conflicts—in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone—where control of the diamond industry has been a primary military objective and a means of financing a continuing war effort.

The main African diamond producers are Angola, Botswana, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa are producers on a major scale, though South Africa's diamond resources were in a steep decline by 2000. Namibia, with a relatively small output in terms of carats, is a lead country in the quality of its stones, of which more than 90 per cent are top-quality gems. Approximately half the world's diamond output (and a majority of gemstones) comes from the African continent.

South Africa, long seen as the world's leading diamond producer, has witnessed a steady decline in output since 1987 and by 1995 production had fallen below ten million carats a year, though gemstones still accounted for 9.8 per cent of exports for the year, and South Africa was then the world's fifth largest producer. The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1867 transformed the economic outlook of the region and led to the influx of *uitlanders* whose numbers swelled dramatically when gold was discovered on the Rand in the 1880s. Diamonds and gold provided the wealth that would allow South Africa to begin its industrialization. The development of the diamond mines and the construction of the railways to service them led to the use of migrant labor on a large scale, which was to become a major feature of the South African economy thereafter, creating a number of political and social problems. One result was to be the extension of white control over African lands that were turned into labor reserves to serve the mines and so became the structural basis for the later apartheid system.

Only after achieving independence in 1966 did Botswana discover and develop its huge diamond resources, which became the lead export, thereafter providing up to 35 per cent of government revenues and helping fund a remarkably steady economic performance, one of the best in Africa.

Namibia's diamonds were developed by De Beers, the Anglo-American conglomerate, in the period after World War I, and control remained with the South African company until independence in 1990. Although Namibia's output is relatively small, at about two million carats a year (it is the world's eighth largest producer by volume), output consists mainly of high quality gemstones and these, variably, may account for as much as 80 per cent of the country's export earnings by value.

Approximately 90 per cent of diamond production in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is alluvial, centered upon Eastern Kasai, and almost all the output consists of industrial diamonds. In 1995 diamonds accounted for 17.2 per cent of Zaire's exports. Until 1986, when it was overtaken by Australia, Zaire (now the DRC) was the world's leading producer of industrial diamonds (it also produced some gemstones) and in 1993 Zaire passed Botswana in total output. However, precise figures for the country's output are difficult to assess since diamond smuggling is carried out on an elaborate scale. Estimates for 1993, for example, pointed to US\$300 million worth of diamonds being smuggled out of the country every year. The country's one large-scale diamond producer, Societé Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) produced in excess of eight million carats a year in the 1980s and early 1990s before production declined, due to both smuggling and political problems. In 1993 diamonds became Zaire's principal source of foreign exchange while in 1994 output exceeded 18 million carats, although in real terms it was higher, the difference being accounted for by smuggling. At that time De Beers marketed all of MIBA's output, then valued at US\$400 million.

During the conflicts of the 1990s, diamonds exported through Uganda became the principal source of finance for the rebels. Apart from MIBA, the balance of production comes from artisan diggers whose output steadily increased during the 1990s as chaos engulfed much of the country.

In 1973 Angola's diamond output exceeded two million carats a year, but thereafter output declined sharply as a result of the postindependence civil war. It recovered in the 1990s, even though the production area was fought over by government forces and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Moçambique (UNITA). As in Namibia, a high proportion of Angola's diamonds (about 90 per cent) are gemstones. The main diamond producing area is Lunda Norte, and this was under UNITA control for much of the 1990s when the civil war continued to devastate much of the country. Diamonds then provided UNITA with an estimated income of US\$600 million a year; these were smuggled out through Zaire (DRC) and were sufficient to finance the UNITA's war effort.

Sierra Leone normally produces about 0.3 million carats of diamonds per year, apart from those that are extracted and exported illegally, but during the 1990s diamonds played a major part in that country's civil war. For example, during Valentine Strasser's term of office the South African mercenary organization Executive Outcomes was hired, originally in 1995 after the bauxite, rutile, and diamond mining areas had been overrun by the Revolutionary United Front, to guard the diamond producing areas. And one of the diamond companies, Diamond Works, whose employees were rescued by Executive Outcomes, had in turn hired Lifeguard (an affiliate of Executive Outcomes) to guard its exploration properties in Sierra Leone at a fee of US\$60,000 per month. In 1996 Executive Outcomes was found operating in both Sierra Leone and Angola guarding diamond mines.

The selling of diamonds has always been tightly controlled. In 1930 the major producers, led by De Beers, formed the Diamond Corporation to market the bulk of the world's rough diamond production. The corporation became known as the Central Selling Organization (CSO) and handled approximately 75 per cent of world output. In 1990 De Beers Centenary of South Africa and the Soviet (subsequently Russian) diamond monopoly Glavalmazoloto agreed that 95 per cent of their rough gem diamonds for export would be handled by the CSO. The agreement was maintained after the breakup of the USSR. The CSO provides a guaranteed market for producers and stockpiles diamonds during recession periods so as to stabilize the market—that is, keep prices high.

De Beers of South Africa is the world's leading diamond producer; outside of South Africa it has formed Debswana Diamond Company in partnership with the Botswana government, while in Namibia Consolidated Diamond Mining (CDM) was a subsidiary of De Beers until 1994, when the Namibian government and De Beers formed Namdeb Diamond Corporation on a 50–50 ownership basis.

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See also: **Angola: Peace Betrayed, 1994 to the present; Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Liberalization, Rebellion, 1980s and 1990s; Congo (Kinshasa): Post-Mobutu Era; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899.**

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Diaspora: Colonial Era

Before the colonial subjugation of the continent, millions of black Africans found themselves in other parts of the globe, due chiefly to the trans-Saharan and the Atlantic slave trades. Virtually everywhere the diaspora encountered color and political disabilities. These were extended to Africa during the colonial era that began with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 and ended by 1960.

From 1885 to 1912, the European nations shared Africa, with the exception of Abyssinia and Liberia. South Africa and Algeria were occupied much earlier. In spite of a compelling need for a permanent remedy, the diaspora in the Asiatic and Arab worlds hardly showed any concern on account of their absorption into the local culture after emancipation and conversion to Islam. Elsewhere the story was different.

Even before the colonial conquest was accomplished, the exiles in America summoned a congress in Chicago in 1893. Racism and the future of Africa dominated the discussion. Bishop Henry Turner, founder of the African Methodist Episcopal Churches in Sierra Leone and Liberia, urged the diaspora to return and regenerate the homeland.

In 1897 the African Association emerged in London through the initiative of an Afro-Caribbean barrister, Henry Sylvester Williams, with the goal of drawing members of the race closer together. A Pan-African conference convened by the association three years later was attended by 32 representatives, including W. E. B. DuBois. After the London congress, many a colonial African working or studying abroad continued to join forces with the diaspora to combat discriminatory practices and the excesses of imperial regimes. An early exemplar was Bandeje Omoniyi (1884–1913), a Nigerian enrolled at Edinburgh University. Although aware that private gain lay behind Europe's interference, he welcomed the ideas, techniques, and institutions being introduced by the adventurers, for these innovations were bridging the wide gap between backward Africa and preeminent Europe. It was no wonder then that he emphasized humane government, not immediate self-rule. Omoniyi's moderation notwithstanding, the British overlords felt outraged by his

links with socialist circles and articles in Scottish and West African newspapers.

Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian educated at King's College, London, also resented the color bar. To refute wrong opinions about his country, he wrote *In the Land of the Pharaohs* (1968). Next, in collaboration with the Gold Coast lawyer and nationalist, Joseph E. Casely-Hayford, he started and edited *The African Times and Orient Review*. Short-lived, it enjoyed worldwide circulation. Among its staff in 1912 was Marcus Garvey, then sojourning in England. The Jamaican used the opportunity to read extensively about Africa and to interact with colonial Africans.

About the same time, the Negro history movement, with roots in the nineteenth century, was revived in the United States by the Jamaican publicist John E. Bruce and the Afro-Puerto Rican Arthur Schomburg; they inaugurated the Negro Society for Historical Research.

These developments firmly engraved in the mind of Garvey the idea of a respectable "Negro national state." Returning to Jamaica in 1914, he launched the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and African Communities League. Two years later he moved to Harlem in New York City, where he brought out the organization's mouthpiece, *The Negro World*. The fact that it appeared in English, French, and Spanish with contributions by such mature writers as Duse Mohammed, John E. Bruce, and the Jamaica poet Claude McKay ensured penetration of the entire black world. The colonial masters in Africa felt the impact of Garvey's loud voice and hastened to silence it.

To *The Negro World* was added, among other enterprises, the Black Star Steamship Company and the African Orthodox Church, headed by Bishop George Alexander McGuire of Antigua. Garvey's church exercised enormous influence upon African separatist churches in southern and central Africa—notably, Simon Kimbangu's messianic movement, which spread from the Belgian Congo to neighboring French Congo and Angola.

From the UNIA'S branches bestriding three continents, delegates came to a convention held in Harlem in August 1920. Since the auditorium accommodated only 25,000 representatives the rest, numbering several thousands, overflowed into the surrounding streets. Garvey told the gathering that the 400 million black people in the world were determined to suffer no longer; if Europeans controlled Europe, Africa must be for Africans and their dispersed brethren. The time had come for black men to liberate and repossess their native land. After appointing Garvey provisional president of the African Republic, the convention adopted a Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World, embodying a comprehensive plan of action. Similar conventions took place between 1920 and

1925. Thus, though the colonial authorities prevented Garvey from visiting Africa, he aroused a very strong feeling of black solidarity among the masses there.

It was under the shadow of the assertive Garvey, whom he dismissed as either “a lunatic or a traitor,” that DuBois summoned Pan-African meetings in London, Paris, Brussels, and Lisbon in 1919–1923. Garvey proved bold beyond his strength. His very threats united the “great powers” against him. They forced Liberia, which had agreed to be a nucleus of the proposed Negro national state, to renounce Garveyism. With the agitator’s deportation to Jamaica in 1927 for alleged mail abuse, the UNIA sank into obscurity.

New associations surfaced. Of these the most militant in France was the *Ligue de la Defense de la Race Negre* (LDRN), led by a Guinean left-wing intellectual, Tiemoho Garan-Kouyate. The French government suppressed it because of its links with L’Etoile Nord Africaine, an anticolonial pressure group organized by Messali Hadj. It subsequently became the Algerian People’s Party. Far less radical than the LDRN was the *Negritude* movement initiated by Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal. They ran a journal (*L’Etudiant Noir*) and derived pride from the fact that, despite modern Africa’s failure to produce sophisticated technology, the continent developed relatively peaceful, contented, and humane societies. In Britain the West African Students’ Union and the League of Coloured People helped to keep the flag flying. Their leaders were, respectively, Ladipo Solanke, a Nigerian lawyer, and Harold Moody, a Jamaican medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, Italy’s fascist ruler, Benito Mussolini, was itching to avenge his country’s defeat at Adowa (Abyssinia) in 1896. In anticipation of the attack, the diaspora in Britain established the International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA) under the chairmanship of C. L. R. James, an Afro–West Indian writer. Throughout the black world, Italy’s unprovoked invasion in 1935 was seen as another rape of the continent. The failure of the League of Nations, of which Abyssinia was a member, to impose sanctions on the aggressor brought colonial Africans and the diaspora still closer together. In France the LDRN and L’Etoile Nord Africaine held joint meetings. Statements expressing solidarity with beleaguered Abyssinia were issued by them as well as by black workers in Holland and the French Caribbean.

Loss of confidence in the league also led to the transformation of the IAFA into the International African Service Bureau (IASB). George Padmore, a Trinidadian ex-communist, became chairman, while James now edited the Bureau’s *International African Opinion*. Other prominent members included Amy Jacques Garvey, ex-wife of the provisional president;

I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, and founder of the West African Youth League; Jomo Kenyatta, who would lead the Mau Mau Revolt in the 1950s; and Nnamdi Azikiwe, future president of Nigeria. The IASB vigorously opposed proposals to transfer the British protectorates of Swaziland, Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Basutoland (Botswana) to white-dominated South Africa.

Further impetus flowed from the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Since its principle of self-determination implied a repudiation of imperialism, dark-skinned patriots applied it to the homeland—contrary to the intentions of the charter’s signatories. Thus the Pan-African Federation (PAF) was founded in Manchester in 1944 with two Guyanese, Dr. Peter Milliard and T. Ras Makonnen, as president and secretary general, respectively; when Kwame Nkrumah arrived from the United States, he was made regional secretary. (He was soon to become president of the Gold Coast [Ghana].)

The next year, in keeping with its aim coordinating the scattered exertions of black peoples, the PAF called a Pan-African congress at Manchester, the most famous in the series. Trade unions, political parties, and cultural associations in Africa sent delegates. DuBois, and Padmore were also among the 200 participants. After the congress, freedom fighters in Africa maintained contact with the PAF, resulting in the overthrow of the imperialists.

The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the diaspora offered an effective challenge to racism and foreign domination the open quarrel between Garvey and DuBois and the hostile contemporary environment notwithstanding. Not only did the exiles’ numerous pressure groups serve as training grounds for budding nationalists; they also demonstrated the practicability of continental cooperation in Africa after the colonial era.

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See also: Commonwealth, Africa and the; Diaspora: Historiographical Debates.

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Diaspora: Historiographical Debates

The term *African diaspora* refers to the dispersal of people of African descent throughout the world, especially in those regions of the New World and Asia that were major destinations of the slave trade. In later times the definition of the diaspora has been expanded to include the voluntary movements of Africans and their descendants to Europe and the major metropolitan areas of North America. The term *diaspora* itself is a Greek word that was first used to describe the dispersal of the Jews after their defeat at the hands of the Babylonians. African and African American scholars adopted the term because of the obvious parallels between the two groups.

Although intellectuals concerned with Africans and people of African descent have observed the dispersal of Africans throughout the world as far back as the early nineteenth century, the actual term *African diaspora* was not used until the 1960s. Early predecessors to diaspora studies are numerous. They include scholars such as Robert B. Lewis (*Light and Truth: Collected from the Bible and Ancient and Modern History, Containing the Universal History of the Colored and Indian Race, from the Creation of the World to the Present Time*, 1844) and William Wells Brown (*The Rising Son; or the Antecedents and Advancement of the Colored Race*, 1876). These men were self-trained scholars who used the Bible and popular and classical historical references as the source of much of their information; they primarily sought to counteract the widespread prejudice and negative imagery directed against people of African origin. By the turn of the twentieth century, African descended scholars with formal academic training began to produce literature that dealt with the African diaspora in subject, if not by name. The most famous of these scholars was W. E. B. DuBois, who published *The Negro* in 1915; also significant was Carter G. Woodson, who wrote *The African Background Outlined* (1936). Both DuBois and Woodson were interested in questions of uplift, and DuBois in particular would be quite active in raising the consciousness that would eventually lead to the formal adoption of the concept of the African diaspora through his participation in the Pan-African conferences beginning in 1900.

In addition to African and African American scholars, a number of white scholars also began to work in the area of diaspora studies in the early twentieth century. One of the most significant of these scholars was Melville J. Herskovits. Herskovits was a student of the pioneering anthropologist Franz Boas, a man who had produced a significant body of work on the African diaspora himself; Herskovits's most important work was *The Myth of the Negro Past* (1941). The major thesis that he put forth was that African-descended people retained palpable "survivals" or customs, modes of expression, language, and artistic expression that are directly descended from their African ancestors. In reality, Herskovits's thesis was not materially different from conclusions that had been reached by earlier scholars, but his status as a prominent white scholar at a major university gave his ideas a level of exposure that black scholars could not attain. Although some scholars, especially the African American sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, were uncomfortable with Herskovits's conclusions, his ideas (with some modification) have become accepted as a basic conceptual framework in diaspora studies.

After World War II, the political situation in the world changed in such a way as to allow for a more open assertion of black identity, Pan-Africanism, and African nationalism. The first signal of this change was DuBois' reconvening of the Pan-African Congress after a hiatus of over 20 years. Unlike the congresses that had been held a generation earlier, which were held together by blacks from the diaspora, these meetings were soon dominated by Africans like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah who would lead their respective countries to independence within the next two decades. By the 1950s, the civil rights movement in the United States and the granting of independence to Ghana created an atmosphere in which people of African extraction developed a keen awareness of the problems that they shared throughout the world.

It was in this environment that the term *African diaspora* was first used. According to the historian George Shepperson, the term first arose at the International Conference of African Historians in Tanzania in 1965 by historian Joseph Harris, in a speech entitled "Introduction to the African Diaspora." The first book to use the term was *The African Diaspora*, edited by Martin Kilson and Robert Rotberg (1976). The actual use of the term represented a turning point in the field in that it signified an overt political consciousness that had been previously missing from much of the work in the field.

Specifically, some scholars, especially those from European backgrounds, had been taken on the aura of scientific disinterest in their study of African people around the world. This disinterest was generally

demonstrated by the avoidance of making any statements about their subjects that could be deemed overtly political. This approach was a source of tension between scholars. Those researchers who actively used their work to promote political and social change found themselves objects of derision by “neutral” scholars. St. Clair Drake gives the example of Herskovits, who despite being a hugely influential figure in diaspora studies, was quite hesitant to advise black students and was known to make disparaging remarks about the research of political scholars.

Also according to Drake, the formal recognition of the political implications of diaspora studies was not the only major change that developed in the 1960s. Drake argued that the 1960s also saw the end of what he termed “traditional” Pan-African interest in the diaspora. By “traditional,” Drake meant the tendency of diasporan blacks to look at Africa as a unit and to focus primarily on the struggle of Africa against foreign domination. This came about due to African nations gaining independence and then often suffering coups and bitter political rivalries in which blacks outside of those nations were often unable to clearly differentiate heroes and villains. Another significant drift in focus developed between those researchers who had a continental definition of Africa and those African scholars and politicians who developed a continental definition of Africa that allowed Africans to develop common ground between the states of Sub-Saharan and northern Africa. Obviously such a definition was problematic, for diasporan Africans have almost universally been identified by “racial” characteristics.

Although there are limits to the utility of the African diaspora as a category of study, the concept still has the ability to explain many otherwise unclear differences. One of the most readily apparent contributions of diaspora studies has been a clearer understanding of the nature of racism and discrimination in different societies. Western researchers who studied societies such as Latin America and the Islamic world often assumed that these cultural regions lacked the racism that is endemic in Northern Europe and English-speaking North America. The reason for this belief was due to the fact that these countries tended to lack the prohibitions on interracial sexual relations and social intercourse that were common in Anglophone regions.

A major scholar who has worked in the area of Africans in the diaspora is Bernard Lewis, whose major works are *Race and Color in Islam* (1971) and *Race and Slavery in the Middle East* (1990). Lewis notes in his work that Islam traditionally cites several injunctions made by Muhammad and Islamic scholars that insist on the equality of people before God. Lewis, however, shows that even these injunctions of equality suggest that often in Middle Eastern culture there was

the perception of Africans as different, and at least unattractive if not inferior. For instance, in the article “The African Diaspora and the Civilization of Islam,” Lewis mentions a saying that claims a man should value piety above beauty and wealth, even to the extent of marrying a blunt-nosed African woman. Similarly, Lewis quotes the Prophet Muhammad, who once said that authority should always be respected, even when coming from a black Ethiopian. What these sayings show, according to Lewis, is the recognition that many within Middle Eastern culture perceive Africans as unattractive and inferior even if their religion clearly states that such beliefs are improper.

Lewis also demonstrates that though Arab culture allowed interracial marriage, these marriages most commonly involved Arab men marrying African women, not African men being allowed to gain access to Arab women. This fits within the patriarchal pattern of Arab society in which the most important factor is male Arab ancestry and the perpetuation of bloodlines. Although not as explicitly racist as the practices of Western societies, the result was often quite discriminatory.

In the area of work on the social roles of Africans in Middle Eastern and Asian society, there has been considerable research done not only by Lewis but also by another notable scholar, Joseph Harris, whose most notable work is *The African Presence in Asia* (1971), which is primarily concerned with settlements of Africans in Iran and the Indian subcontinent, most of whom had been slaves or slave soldiers. The most interesting of these groups were the Sidis, the ruling caste on the island of Janjira, which is located in the Indian Ocean not far from Mumbai. The island of Janjira was quite important because of its strategic location on the trade route between India and other areas to the west. The Sidis were apparently the descendants of military soldiers who gained control of the island and held it until 1879 when it came under the control of Great Britain. During the period of their power, they were allied with the Mughul dynasty of India, which, like the Sidis, was Muslim. Another example of military slaves cited by Harris are warrior slaves of Gujarat who gained control of the government of that region during the sixteenth century.

Diaspora specialists in Latin America have also produced a significant body of work that demonstrates the great variety of experiences that Africans have participated in throughout the world. Most notable from the diasporan point of view are comparative works dealing with the experience of slavery in Latin America and North America. A noteworthy book in this field is Carl Degler’s *Neither Black Nor White* (1971), which compared the slave experience in Brazil and the United States. In this study, Degler makes many observations

that have since become standard when comparing the racial traditions of Brazil with those of the United States. Specifically, Degler notes that although Brazilian culture readily accepted the idea interracial mating and did not develop the rigid social distance that characterizes white and black interaction in the United States, the society is not without racial problems. Degler notes that Afro-Brazilians have never had equal access to economic or political power, and have therefore never been able to compete effectively with Brazil's white population. In addition to the work of Degler, another major scholar of the Latin American portion of the diaspora is Leslie Rout, whose most notable work is *The African Experience in Spanish America* (1976). Rout's work covers much of the same ground as Degler's, but deals with the entirety of Spanish-speaking people in America. The work is notable in that unlike many earlier historians, Rout demonstrates that racial discrimination against Afro-Hispanics was and is a major fact of their lives. Rout cites policies in Chile and Argentina that had the effect of reducing the African population to insignificance, and he also records instances of active oppression in tropical South America.

One of the most significant areas of recent diaspora research has been that of women's studies. Most studies of the diaspora have focused on men, either consciously or not. Although some studies, like Robert Farris Thompson's *Flash of the Spirit* (1983) and Joseph Holloway's *Africanisms in American Culture* (1990), were concerned with topics that were practiced and affected by women (such as quilting, clothing design, and religious expression), the books were not expressly focused on women of the diaspora. Recent studies like *More than Chattel* (1996), edited by David Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine, have moved to correct what had been a long-standing oversight. This collection of essays expressly focuses on women of the African diaspora during slavery. One essay of particular significance in this collection is "Africa into the Americas," by Clare Robertson, which surveys the literature on slavery in Africa with a special attention to matrifocality or social formations within which women take a dominant role in economic and food production within the household. Robertson is concerned with this question because scholars concerned with the African American experience have often cited African matrifocality as the reason behind female headed households in the United States. Another important section of this collection deals with the role diasporan women in rebellion and the culture of resistance.

Although the study of slavery is central to diaspora studies, scholars of the African diaspora rightly point out that slavery should not be seen as the sole focus of

the diaspora. In this vein, works dealing with more recent social and political phenomena should also be mentioned. An important work of diasporan political and social history is Wilson Jeremiah Moses's *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850–1925* (1978). This book is concerned with the development of conservative nationalism which primarily sought to bring about "racial uplift," which is usually defined as attempts to improve the moral and cultural standards of black people in addition to improving their material well-being. In the context of nineteenth-century African American intellectuals, this meant largely emulating the values of the dominant white culture while still fostering a pride in blackness and sense of historic pride in the accomplishments of the African race. Although most of the figures in this book are African Americans, they are figures like W. E. B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and Alexander Crummel—those who had a huge intellectual impact among people of African origin outside of America. At a certain level, one could make the argument that Moses's book really shows the origins of what became Pan-Africanism and by extension shows the foundations of the African diaspora concept. The connections that Moses makes between African American intellectuals and the diaspora are especially important for George Fredrickson's *Black Liberation* (1995), which compares the liberation ideologies of African Americans and black South Africans and is a sequel to Fredrickson's earlier *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (1981), a work that was concerned with the development of white domination in both countries. *Black Liberation* focuses on the efforts of black South Africans and African Americans to overcome the inequities of the systems in which they found themselves. Fredrickson notes that despite the obvious demographic differences of the both black populations relative to their white antagonists, the strategic and ideological questions that were raised by both groups of leaders tended to be quite similar. Obviously, as Fredrickson notes, the end result of the South African struggle has been profoundly different from the conclusion of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, but the parallels of mutual influence remain.

A scholar who has looked to the diaspora for political influence in another direction is Manning Marable, whose *African and Caribbean Politics From Kwame Nkrumah to Maurice Bishop* (1987) examines attempts to establish Marxist/Leninist regimes in both the Caribbean and Africa, with a particular emphasis on the efforts of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Maurice Bishop in Grenada. Marable focuses on the difficulty of translating Marxism, which was envisioned as a mass-based ideology, into a working reality in countries where there had been little or no tradition of

organized labor. Generally speaking, Marable sees Ghana under Nkrumah as less mass-based in its politicization than Grenada. Grenada, however, had the misfortune of being a small country with an political economy despised by its powerful neighbor, the United States.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, students of the diaspora have tended to be centered culturally in the West. Most of the writers, whether black or non-black, African American, Afro-Caribbean, or African, all tended to examine the diaspora from a Western perspective, especially that of the United States. One of the truly refreshing changes in the study of the diaspora has been the emergence of scholars who instead examine the diaspora from the vantage point of Africa or Europe. St. Clair Drake's *Black Folk Here and There* (1987) was an important precursor to this trend. In this massive, two-volume work, Drake attempts to trace some of the fundamental issues of western perceptions of blackness within the diaspora to their roots in ancient and medieval civilizations. In moving to historical periods long before the rise of the Atlantic plantation economy, Drake manages to substantially broaden the scope of intellectual inquiry for diaspora scholars.

A seminal work among Africa-centered diaspora scholars was Kwame Anthony Appiah's *In My Father's House* (1992), which is noteworthy in that one of its central ideas is an attack on unity based on blackness, a central tenant of Pan-Africanism. Appiah argues that for people coming out of an African tradition, blackness in itself had no intrinsic value. Instead, the unity of blackness was essentially a defensive response based on the discrimination that members of the African diaspora felt in their dealings with whites. Appiah spends much of the rest of the book examining other sources of identity. Whether or not he finds something as powerful as the idea of race is debatable, but his willingness to confront long held assumptions is noteworthy.

Paul Gilroy, a sociologist of black Britain, is also noteworthy in his efforts to broaden the scope of the diaspora. *The Black Atlantic* (1993) is significant in that he brings several new levels of understanding to traditional issues within the concept of the diaspora. Specifically, Gilroy is interested in applying the concepts of postmodernism to black culture. He is also interested in demonstrating the interconnectedness of contemporary black British culture to African American, Caribbean, and African cultures. Like many within the postmodern tradition, Gilroy looks to unconventional "texts" to demonstrate the ties between the regions of the diaspora. Specifically, he examines contemporary popular culture and music to show how the various regions of the diaspora have learned from each other.

Of all of the new generation of diaspora scholars, the one who may be coming closest to fully establishing

all links among people of African origin is Manthia Diawara. Although Diawara's *In Search of Africa* (1998) is more of a memoir than a formal academic monograph, it brilliantly demonstrates contemporary consciousness of the complexity of the diaspora. Diawara's method is to mix his own personal experiences with greater issues involving Africa and the diaspora. For instance, in the open chapter, he speaks of his class's reaction to Jean-Paul Sartre's "Black Orpheus," an essay that sees the *Négritude* movement as potentially a catalyst for a worldwide liberation movement instead of a narrowly black doctrine of consciousness raising. In later chapters, Diawara recounts his return to Guinea, the country in which he was born, and to Mali, the nation in which he grew to adulthood. In these chapters, he looks at the reality of Sekou Touré's legacy versus the lofty goals that Toure (Guinea's first president) had originally announced. He also examines questions like the impact of Western economic demands on the traditional production of art in Africa. As for the diaspora, Diawara examines African American writer Richard Wright's reaction to Africa in his book *Black Power* (1956), in which Wright demonstrates the seeming contradictory tendencies of black pride and a certain uneasiness with African culture. In later chapters Diawara examines other diasporan topics, from Malcolm X to hip-hop culture, for their impact on black people and the world.

Clearly the study of the African diaspora has continued to advance and expand since black writers first attempted to explain the history and role of African people in the world during the nineteenth century. The formal recognition of the diaspora concept itself in the 1960s was a major development, and the multiplying diversity of topics and perspectives from which the diaspora is being studied will guarantee the health of this discipline for the foreseeable future.

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See also: Du Bois, W. E. B. and Pan-Africanism; Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence; Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sekou, Era of; Négritude; Women's History and Historiography in Africa.

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Difaqane on the Highveld

Difaqane is the plural form of the SeSotho word *lifaqane*. Used in the 1820s to designate raiding parties moving south across the Orange River into Xhosa and Thembu territory, the word gradually shifted in meaning. The plural form came to be used by historians to denote an historical era: the entire period of turbulence and warfare that swept various parts of the South African Highveld in the 1820s and early 1830s. The Xhosa word *mfecane* evolved in the same way into *mfecane*. Most twentieth-century historians treated the words *mfecane* and *difaqane* as interchangeable. Some historians have claimed, on slight evidence, that the words meant “the crushing” or “the uprooting.”

Among the central events usually grouped under the heading of *difaqane* are:

- the migration, beginning in 1822, of Hlubi and Ngwane groups from Natal into the Caledon Valley, where they clashed with the Tlokwa, Sia, and other Sotho chieftaincies;
- the formation of the BaSotho nation under Moshoeshe I, based at his stronghold of Thaba Bosiu in the Caledon Valley after 1824, from which grew the modern nation of Lesotho;
- the migration from Natal of the warrior chief Mzilikazi and a group of armed followers who engaged in large-scale cattle raiding and warfare in the central and northwestern areas of the Highveld. After a period of residence on the Vaal River, Mzilikazi moved his capital first to the Apies River not far from modern Pretoria, and then pushed into territory northwest of modern Rustenburg formerly dominated by the Hurutshe people. Although Mzilikazi preferred to call his nation the *Zulu*, the name that eventually stuck with them was the word applied to them by their Sotho enemies: *Ndebele*;
- the formation by the warrior chief Sebetwane of a similar armed following, known as Kololo, composed of diverse Sotho/Tswanagroups, who raided widely in the western and northwestern regions before moving north across the Zambezi into modern Zambia, where he founded the Barotse kingdom;
- warfare among Tswana groups in the western and northwestern Highveld regions, chief among them the Hurutshe, Ngwaketse, Rolong, Fokeng, Ngwaketse, and Tlhaping;
- the consolidation of defeated sections of the Rolong and their eventual great migration to the Thaba Nchu area.

Historians once believed these events were causally linked in the following sequence: The rise of the Zulu

kingdom under Shaka drove the Ngwane and Hlubi onto the Highveld. This caused the Tlokwa under the Queen Regent ‘MaNthatisi to flee west, where they made war on the Sotho, the Rolong, and other groups. A vast miscellaneous horde of remnant peoples then raided in the northwest before attacking the Tlhaping capital, Dithakong, in June 1823, where they were defeated in thanks to timely assistance from Griqua riflemen. Taking advantage of these disruptions, Mzilikazi’s Ndebele imposed their rule across the entire central, northwestern and northeastern Highveld until they were driven north by the Voortrekkers in 1836–1837.

This version of the difaqane was subjected to intense scrutiny by historians in the 1980s and 1990s. A revisionist polemic launched by Julian Cobbing insisted that the entire concept of the difaqane/mfecane had been flawed from the start by the systematic exclusion of disruptive influences stemming from European activities on the eastern Cape frontier and the Delagoa Bay region. The gradual infiltration of mounted raiders with firearms after 1780 could be shown to have created waves of dislocation in the western regions, well before the arrival of Nguni regiments in 1822.

The idea of the difaqane as a purely African affair collapsed in the face of the revisionist assault. It proved impossible to disentangle the intrusion of Griqua and Voortrekker groups from discussions of warfare on the Highveld. The idea of Shaka as a first cause was discredited by research revealing that warfare in the hinterland of Delagoa Bay in the eighteenth century was probably related to the militarization of Ndwandwe, Ngwane, Qwabe, and Mthethwa groups. Shaka’s Zulu kingdom began to look like the result of these struggles rather than their instigator. Neither could eighteenth-century warfare in the northwestern interior be attributed to influences emanating from faraway Natal. Mzilikazi’s kingdom was shown to have been much smaller than earlier historians had imagined, and his conquests confined to a much smaller area.

Doubt has been cast as well on the loss of life that may have resulted from the wars of the 1820s. The common nineteenth-century estimate of one million dead has been comprehensively discredited. It justified European conquest by suggesting that Africans had practically exterminated themselves on the eve of the “Great Trek” of 1836, thus leaving the land empty and available for colonization. Prior to the arrival of guns, African warfare on the Highveld and surrounding territories was aimed at the capture of cattle rather than the destruction of opposing forces. Early European travelers who found deserted towns and homesteads failed to realize that Africans had been living there, tilling fields and keeping cattle for upward of a thousand years. Many ruins they attributed to warfare were actually part of the long history of settlement.

The most important consequence of the wars of the 1820s and 1830s was the relocation, not the extermination, of people. Scattered and defeated populations gathered around effective military leaders. New nations arose, many of whom proved able to defy the power of white colonists for decades. The most important of these were the Basotho under Moshoeshoe; the Zulu under Shaka and his successors; Mzilikazi's Ndebele; the Swazi under Mswati and Sobhuza; and the Pedi under Sekwati. The emergence of these kingdoms permanently altered the face of Southern Africa.

It seems likely that future historians will drop the concept of the difaqane as a useful way of thinking about early-nineteenth-century South Africa. As more is learned about conflict in the eighteenth century it becomes difficult to set the 1820s off as a special era. African warfare on the Highveld forms a part of a larger story including colonial wars against the Xhosa and the arrival of the Voortrekkers.

NORMAN A. ETHERINGTON

See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Mfecane; Moshoeshoe I, and the Founding of the Basotho Kingdom.

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Dinka: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak.

Diop, Cheikh Anta (1923–1986)

Historian

Accomplished archaeologist, historian, Egyptologist, writer and distinguished Pan-Africanist political thinker and leader, Anta Cheikh Diop emerged in the twentieth century as a cultural nationalist whose contribution to ideological debate helped to galvanize the struggle for independence in Africa. His emergence coincided with a time when the desire to locate Africa in its rightful place in history needed a solid cultural

basis. Diop's classical work on African cultural history, as well as his exposition of ancient Egyptian civilization as purely African, has earned him an esteemed reputation in African and international scholarship.

His educational career at the Sorbonne in Paris—an institution then noted for its radical intellectualism—left a decisive impact on the budding Africanist historian. From 1946 on, Anta Diop became actively involved in the growing African students anticolonial and Pan-African movements for independence in Paris. He was a founding member, and later secretary general (1950–1953) of the student wing of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain, the first French-speaking Pan-African political movement launched in 1946 at the Bamako Congress to agitate for independence from France. He was one of the organizers of the first Pan-African Students Political Congress in Paris in 1951. And in 1956 and 1959, he participated in the First and Second World Congresses of Black Writers and Artists, in Paris and Rome, respectively. These international congresses and movements were influential in the development of the African liberation movement.

With his deep insight into the vitality of traditional African culture, Diop commenced painstaking research into the history of African civilizations. This work was an important part of the growing intellectual debate on colonialism and racism. Diop's framework provided—and still provides—African studies with some general hypotheses for research and several epistemologies in which to locate intellectual discourse.

Diop concluded a doctoral dissertation in which he made a breakthrough in reclaiming Egypt for Africa from an uncompromising African perspective. He postulated that ancient Egypt was a black African civilization in origin, people, and character, and that from pharaonic Egypt, part of the African civilization spread to Europe via ancient Greece and Rome. According to this thesis, scholars from Europe were informed by the Greeks and Romans, who had themselves borrowed from pharaonic Egypt. Black Africa, as stressed by Diop, is therefore the intellectual and scientific principal source from which Europe studied arts, law philosophy, mathematics, and science. Diop further argued in his thesis that black Africa set the pace in several other fields of civilization. Presented at a time when the prevailing atmosphere in Europe maintained European cultural superiority over Africans, Diop's revolutionary thesis was rejected by the authorities at the Sorbonne. His work (published in 1974 as *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*) nevertheless garnered worldwide attention, establishing Diop as a distinguished scholar. Ever since, he has been associated with the reconstruction of the African past and the continent's place in world history.

In 1960, Diop was eventually awarded his doctorate by the Sorbonne, after a successful defense before a panel of multidisciplinary scholars. He returned to Senegal that same year, when his country became independent. In 1961, Anta Diop was appointed a research fellow at the Institut Fondamental d' Afrique Noire (IFAN) where he later set up a radiocarbon dating laboratory. At IFAN, he continued establishing his theory of ancient Egypt being the precursor of modern civilization. By 1980, Diop had become famous for his free-carbon-dating work for African scholars from whom he received archaeological specimens for identification and analysis. His own research culminated in the production of several books that were originally published in French, but are now available in English. These include *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa: The Domains of Patriarchy and Matriarchy in Classical Antiquity* (1978); *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State* (1978); *Pre-Colonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the political and Social System of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States* (1987); and *Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology* (1991). In all of these works Diop's commitment to, and search for, African dignity and self-empowerment through a reconstruction of the colonially fragmented African identity comes into clear focus. He was therefore not only making his historical research serve the politics of decolonization and nation-building, but was actually shaking the foundation of the Eurocentric historiography of Africa, which had for long dominated the academic world.

Meanwhile, in 1961 and 1963 respectively, Diop cofounded political opposition parties in Senegal as well as the Front National Du Senegal. With these he spearheaded opposition against the pro-French policies of the government of President Léopold Senghor. Following the dissolution the Front National and other opposition parties in 1965, Diop and his intellectual and socialist colleague regrouped and formed the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) in 1976. The RND established a Wolof-language journal, *Siggi* (and later renamed *Taxaw*, which means "rise up" in Wolof), of which Diop became editor. The journal became a platform for articulating the aspirations of the Senegalese. In 1979 the RND was banned while Diop was charged for breaches of law prohibiting his running of an unregistered political organization. The proscription order was lifted in 1981 by President Abdou Diouf, who succeeded Senghor.

Dedication and service of the type associated with Diop were bound to bring with them recognition, honors and distinction. In 1966, at the First World Festival of Black Arts held in Dakar, he was honored as an African scholar who had exerted the most profound

influence in Africa and international history in the twentieth century. He was subsequently involved in the organization of the 1977 Second World Festival of Black and African Arts and Culture in Lagos. Diop's struggle for an African school of history was realized in the 1970s with his invitation to join the committee responsible for writing *The General History of Africa*, sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. In 1980, he was appointed professor at the University of Dakar, where he taught ancient history. In 1982, he received the highest award for scientific research from the Institut Culturel Africain. In 1985 Diop was invited to Atlanta by Mayor Andrew Young, who proclaimed April 4 "Dr. Cheikh Anta Diop Day." Diop died in Dakar on February 7, 1986.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: **Egypt, Ancient; Négritude.**

Biography

Born in Diourbel, in west-central Senegal, on December 23, 1933; elementary education in Senegal. On completing a bachelor's degree in Senegal, went to France to do graduate work at the Sorbonne in 1946, successfully defending dissertation in 1960. In 1961, appointed a research fellow at the Institut Fondamental d' Afrique Noire. In 1980, appointed professor at the University of Dakar, teaching ancient history. In 1982, he received the highest award for scientific research from the Institut Culturel Africain. Died in Dakar on February 7, 1986.

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Diouf, Abdou (1932–)

President of Senegal, 1980–2000

Abdou Diouf, the second president of the West African nation of Senegal, came to power in 1981 after the resignation of Léopold Sédar Senghor, and served as

president until 2000. He was one of the few democratically elected leaders in Africa and maintained Senegal's tradition of civilian democracy.

A native of Louga, in northern Senegal, and of joint Wolof-Serer heritage, Diouf was educated at the University of Dakar and received a law degree from the University of Paris. Upon his return to Senegal, he held increasingly important government positions and became a protégé of Senghor, the country's first president since 1960. In 1964, Diouf was named secretary general to the presidency, and a key figure in the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS). In 1970, when Senghor reintroduced the office of prime minister, previously abolished during a constitutional crisis in 1962, he chose the little-known Diouf, then only 38 years old, above many senior civil service leaders and established politicians. The new prime minister was viewed by many as the embodiment of Senghor's attempt to establish a technocratically oriented administration with a low profile subordinate in the new office. Diouf quickly extended his rule into all facets of government through many changes in the cabinet. He was praised as an extraordinarily able and efficient administrator.

On December 31, 1980, Senghor, approaching his 75 year, stepped down from the presidency in favor of Diouf, who immediately lifted many of his predecessor's restrictions on political opposition parties. He also restructured his administration in ways that were generally credited with making it less corrupt and more efficient. Some reform-minded opposition leaders claimed that Diouf's reforms never went far enough, while others insisted that Diouf had to struggle against his party's old guard and entrenched interests. (Diouf, a Muslim, kept the critical support of the country's religious leadership, especially the Murids.)

In the 1980s, the opposition party, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais, initially saw its support steadily eroded and some of its members arrested on suspicion of having received money from Libya. Diouf launched an anticorruption campaign and reshuffled his cabinet in July 1981. The next month Diouf responded to a plea from Gambian president Dawda Jawara for assistance against an attempted overthrow. Senegal's intervention restored Jawara, and by the end of the year the two countries agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia, which stressed military coordination in foreign affairs and economic and financial matters. Diouf was named president of the confederation and Jawara was designated vice president. The promises of confederation were not realized, however, and the project was abandoned in September 1989.

In 1983, Diouf was elected president in his own right, with 82 per cent of the vote. After the election, Diouf took steps to replace the old-line politicians with younger men, and abolished the position of prime

minister. Many labeled the country a quasi- or semi-democracy because of the dominance of the PS and the lack of a viable opposition to Diouf. In 1985, Diouf was elected head of the Organization of African Unity. A deteriorating economy, a growing separatist movement in the southern Casamance province, and the failure of the Senegambian confederation posed the main problems. Protests and strikes by university students and the police in 1987 caused the government to crack down on opposition forces. In the 1988 elections, Diouf won with 73 per cent of the vote, but evidence of vote rigging and ballot box tampering sparked serious disturbances in Dakar. A state of emergency was declared and some opposition leaders were arrested. Diouf made some changes in his cabinet and reestablished the post of prime minister. Critics called for radical changes to make Senegal a genuine democracy whereas Diouf proceeded with incremental constitutional and electoral reforms.

Senegal continued to face serious economic problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the rebellion in the Casamance periodically flared up. In the 1993 elections, Diouf won with almost 60 per cent of the popular vote, and the PS again dominated the legislative elections. The 1993 elections, most likely the fairest and most monitored elections in Senegal's history, were not marred by violence but turnout was low.

Within a year, Diouf faced a serious crisis with the devaluation of the CFA franc by the French, which caused the most serious uprisings in Senegal since independence. Hundreds were arrested, including urban youth and many radical Muslims who called for an Islamic state in Senegal.

A serious issue that faced Diouf from the mid-1990s on was the separatist movement in the Casamance. Diouf refused to negotiate independence or even autonomy for the province, which is situated south of Gambia. The Diouf regime vacillated between negotiations with moderate leaders and harsh repression of suspected rebels. Senegalese intervention in neighboring Guinea-Bissau in 1998–1999 provided Diouf with an opportunity to weaken the rebels in the Casamance, many of whom received arms through Guinea-Bissau and took refuge there. However, while the crisis was resolved in Bissau, the situation in the Casamance began to worsen in late 1999.

Diouf lost the next presidential election, in 2000, to current president Abdoulaye Wade. Diouf now lives in France. In October 2002, he was elected secretary general of the International Francophonie Organization.

ANDREW F. CLARK

Biography

Born in Louga, in northern Senegal, in 1932. Educated at the University of Dakar, received a law degree from

the University of Paris. Named secretary general to the president, and became a key figure in the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS) in 1964. Named prime minister in 1970. Named president when Senghor stepped down from the office on December 31, 1980. Reelected president in 1982. Elected head of the Organization of African Unity in 1985. Reelected president in 1993. Lost the presidential election in 2000. Elected secretary general of the International Francophonie Organization in 2002.

See also: **Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict in; Senegal: Independence to the Present.**

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
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Djibouti: Nineteenth Century to the Present: Survey

The Republic of Djibouti, with a territory of 23,200 square kilometers, lies between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula on the strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. To the north and west of the Gulf of Tadjourah live the Afars; to the south are the Issas, who belong to one of the six Somali confederations, the Dir. In contrast to the Issas, the Afars have a tradition of state building, and since the fourteenth century four sultanates—Tadjourah, Rahaita, Awsa, and Gobaad—have emerged among them.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 transformed the Horn of Africa into a highly strategic region. The British, who already controlled the strait, had occupied Aden since 1839, and also occupied the islands of Perim and Socotora. In response, France had sought a port of call on the way to the Indian Ocean that would bring it into closer relations with Ethiopia. In 1857, Henri Lambert, who owned sugar plantations on Mauritius, opened relations with the Afars. After Lambert



Djibouti.

was assassinated in 1859, Napoleon III gave Commander Fleuriot de Langle the mission of punishing the assassins and making official contact with the sultans. This was the origin of the Treaty of Paris of March 1862, signed by an Afar representative and the French minister of foreign affairs, which recognized a French coastal zone to the north of Obock in exchange for a payment of 10,000 thalers. The French, particularly after their defeat by Germany in 1870, neglected Obock, where several Europeans attracted from Ethiopia established themselves. Their settlement, however, faced powerful military resistance from local Afar and Issa.

In 1883 the government of the French Third Republic decided to occupy Obock in order to end its dependence on Aden, where its fleet, mobilized for the conquest of Tonkin (northern Vietnam), had not been able to take on coal. From 1884 to 1888, the French governor, Léonce Lagarde, conducted a policy of active diplomacy, intended to establish French sovereignty over the perimeter of the Gulf of Tadjourah while maintaining good relations with the King of Shoa, Menelik II, who was the emperor of Ethiopia from 1889 on. Obock, which was neither a safe anchorage nor a terminus for the caravan routes, was displaced in 1896 by Djibouti, the new capital of a colony known, inaccurately, as the Côte française des Somalis (CFS; French Somali Coast).

By the end of the nineteenth century, the whole of the Horn of Africa, apart from Ethiopia, had been colonized. The territorial division carried out by France, Italy, and Britain imposed fixed frontiers on an area characterized by the mobility of pastoralists, cutting



Referendum about independence in Djibouti: anti-French graffiti, 1967. The French rigged the result in their favor by expelling thousands of Somalis before the referendum was brought to the polls. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

off the Issas from the Somali confederations, which were now controlled by the British and the Italians, and separating the Afars from their kinsmen in the Ethiopian Awsa and Italian Eritrea.

Between 1896 and 1977, colonial France developed Djibouti as a commercial port and stopover on the routes of empire. It was also a terminus for a railway line built by the Ethiopian Imperial Railway Company, which was founded in 1896 by Ilg of Switzerland, Chefneux of France, and Menelik II. The section, 311 kilometers long, that linked Djibouti with Dirre-Daoua began service in 1903. In 1917, it was extended to Addis Ababa by the *Compagnie du chemin de fer franco-éthiopien* (Franco-Ethiopian Railroad Company), which was owned by French investors.

Djibouti thus became the principal outlet for Ethiopia, which was then landlocked, and handled both its imports and its exports (coffee, hides, cereals, and the like). The CFS also exported sea-salt produced by the Salines de Djibouti, a company created in 1912. Revenue also came from the provisioning of vessels with water, ice, and fuel—coal at first, and then, after 1939, hydrocarbons. The contrast between the emptiness of the territory left to the nomads and the unique focus of development that attracted all the investment was thus reinforced.

World War II, which may be said to have started with the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935–1936), also affected the CFS; in 1938, Italy sought to paralyze it by opening up a route between Addis Ababa and Assab. Then, Mussolini threatened to annex it. The colony's governor, Nouailhetas, appointed in September 1940 by Marshal Pétain, made the CFS into a bastion of Vichy France. The British, supported by a handful of Free French, imposed a blockade on the CFS from 1941 to December 1942, and then liberated it.

After the war, the colony, along with the rest of the French empire, entered a new era, prefigured at the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. In 1949, France, hoping to make Djibouti into the “Hong Kong of the Red Sea,” introduced the Djibouti franc, a currency convertible into U.S. dollars; established a free port; and, using funds from the FIDES, completed deepwater port facilities. Despite these reforms, the port of Djibouti suffered from the competition of a rival port, Assab, as well as from the Arab–Israeli conflicts, which brought its operations to a halt in 1956, and then again from 1967 to 1975. Djibouti sank into a long-lasting recession, aggravated in 1960 by the closing of the salt works, its sole industrial activity.

The population increased, through both natural growth and immigration, from 45,000 inhabitants in 1945 to 250,000 in 1975. Young people demanded better educational facilities, since the schools were all inadequate: there were 600 school students in 1947, 6,500 in 1966, and 10,000 in 1973. The pastoralists, confronted with the vast and uninhabitable deserts, took refuge in the capital, a cosmopolitan city that had 20,000 inhabitants in 1947, 60,000 in 1967, and 110,000 in 1975. The labor market could not absorb them, so the colonial administration continued to be the main employer. By 1969, officials constituted 37.6 per cent of the active population and absorbed 57 per cent of the budget. Economic difficulties exacerbated intercommunal tensions.

While most of France's African territories gained their independence in 1960, the CFS developed along a different path. In 1946, within the framework of the Union française (French Union) and the Fourth Republic, voters in the CFS chose members of a local *conseil représentatif* (representative council), as well as representatives to join the legislature in France. Then, the framework law of 1956 relaunched political life by establishing, alongside the governor, a *conseil de gouvernement* (governing council), the members of which were nominated by those elected to the *assemblée territoriale* (territorial assembly). The vice presidency of this conseil went to Mahmoud Harbi, a member of the party *Mouvement pour l'Union républicaine* (Movement for a Republican Union).

When the referendum on the proposed *Communauté française* (French Community) was held in 1958, Harbi, a supporter of the notion of a Greater Somalia, campaigned for immediate independence. Faced with this challenge from the nationalist minority, the French authorities modified their attitudes, and began supporting the Afars, who were hostile to Pan-Somali ideas, as well as moderate Somalis. Harbi went into exile, and new political leaders appeared: Hassan Gouled, who was elected as a deputy to the French *Assemblée nationale* (National Assembly) in April 1959; Ahmed Dini, an

Afar who became Vice-president of the Conseil; and Ali Aref Bourham, who replaced Dini in June 1960.

From around the end of 1960, the antagonism between Aref, who wanted to maintain the link with France, and Gouled, who preferred to seek internal self-government, widened the gulf between the Afars and the Somalis. While Gouled, in Paris as a deputy, defended his cause, the Assemblée territoriale in the CFS declared in favor of the status quo, arousing strong protests from the Parti du Mouvement Populaire (PMP; Party of the Popular Movement), the heir to the nationalist ideas of Harbi, who had died in an airplane accident in September 1960. Members of the PMP suspected of being in league with the Republic of Somalia were arrested—notably, in 1964, when Mogadishu launched a powerful campaign, claiming the CFS as Somalian territory, within both the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ethiopia responded by seeking to annex the territory, invoking its historic rights.

As the Somali opposition within the CFS had been muzzled, the leadership of those opposed to the colonial authorities passed to Ahmed Dini and Abdallah Mohamed Kamil of the Union démocratique afar (UDA; Afar Democratic Union). Just before an official visit by the French president, Charles de Gaulle, the PMP and the UDA forged a strategic alliance based on two ideas: the removal of Ali Aref, and independence. On August 25, 1966, de Gaulle was met by demonstrators demanding independence. Opposition was transformed into violent conflict.

On September 26, 1966, France, hostile to the notion of independence by stages, announced that the voters would be consulted about whether or not to keep the CFS as part of the republic. This revived the nationalist opposition. Against this explosive background the army was mobilized to confront the Somalian and Ethiopian troops massing on the frontiers of the CFS. The referendum held on March 19, 1967, showed 22,555 voting yes and 14,666 voting no—that is, *in favor of* independence. This division corresponded to the ethnic makeup of the voters: Somalis agitated for independence, while the Afars agitated in favor of the link with France. The announcement of the results was followed by an outbreak of serious unrest, which led to the cordoning off of Somali districts, the expulsion of foreigners, and the building of a barricade around the capital, intended to control immigration by Somalia. France was strongly criticized by the UN and the OAU. In July 1967, the “territoire français des Afars and des Issas” (TFAI; French Territory of the Afars and the Issas) obtained internal self-government. Ali Aref remained president of the conseil, despite some opposition.

In December 1975 French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing distanced himself from Gaullist policy by

recognizing the right of the TFAI to independence. The TFAI set out on the road to independence just as the Horn of Africa was aflame with the “socialist” revolution in Ethiopia and the Ogaden War. Aref, still strictly cooperating with France, rallied to the idea of independence somewhat late, which did not please his critics, including Ahmed Dini and Hassan Gouled. It was these two men who founded the Ligue populaire africaine pour l’Indépendance (Popular African League for Independence). Aref, abandoned by Paris, left his post in July 1976.

On February 28, 1977, France convoked a round-table conference in Paris, at which the nationalists—both those from inside the TFAI and those who had fought for independence while residing in Ethiopia and Somalia—studied the modalities for achieving independence. The last remaining obstacles were removed at a meeting in Accra, sponsored by the OAU, from March 28 to April 1, 1977. Once African endorsement had been obtained, the Arab League provided a guarantee of the integrity of the future state.

A referendum held on May 8, 1977, produced an overwhelming majority in favor of independence. Legislative elections, held the same day, were won by the list of candidates of the Rassemblement populaire pour l’indépendance (Popular Rally for Independence). On June 24, the 65 deputies—33 Somalis, 30 Afars, and two Arabs—elected Hassan Gouled as president. The Republic of Djibouti, recognized within its colonial frontiers, was born on June 27, 1977. On July 2, the new state became the 45th member of the OAU; it also joined the Arab League (August 9), the UN (September 22), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (April 28, 1978). Djibouti, where Islam is the state religion, faced several challenges: it would have to enhance its shipping and commercial activities, based on the Djibouti franc, maintain its unity, and reduced the imbalance between the capital and the interior.

In November 1991, fighters from the Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy) confronted government troops, inaugurating a civil war. National reconciliation got under way from December 26, 1994, when Afars joined the government.

At the age of 83, President Gouled, the “father of the nation,” retired from politics. He was replaced by Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who was elected in April 1999 with 74 per cent of the votes. Djibouti, a haven of peace in an unstable Horn of Africa, moved toward an economic revival as the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998–2001) meant that Ethiopia’s trade was redirected through Djibouti. Since September 11, 2001, Djibouti, which counts Yemen and Somalia among its neighbors, has participated in the struggle

against international terrorism: within the framework of bilateral agreements, formerly with France alone but now with the United States and Germany as well.

Nevertheless, there are still some problems. Djibouti is deeply in debt, and the International Monetary Fund is demanding economic reform and budgetary stabilization. Development is hampered by a lack of energy resources, and by a demographic explosion, as the population grows by 6 per cent a year and Djibouti plays host to 120,000 refugees.

President Guelleh has launched some reforms that have had uneven results: they include the democratization of politics, the liberalization of the economy, and the creation of a free trade zone. Djibouti, which has now been independent for more than 25 years, seeks to play a diplomatic role. Since the Arta Conference in 2001, for example, the president has been active in the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

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See also: **Ethiopia: Early Nineteenth Century; Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution.**

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Domestication, Plant and Animal, History of

The advent of the domestication of plants and animals in Africa had significant social and economic ramifications for the continent's people, regardless of whether they became food producers themselves, or still retained their foraging lifestyle. Domestication for food production often leads to inequalities in access, since surpluses can be produced that can be controlled by individuals (chiefs) or corporate bodies (lineages), and used as a social and economic lever to increase authority over labor/production, and to gain status.

Since the eastern Mediterranean, including North Africa, could possibly be considered as a single biome (Smith 1998a), the two areas had many species in common. Considerable debate continues regarding the earliest appearance of domestic cattle in the Sahara. Wendorf (1994) argues on environmental grounds that the cattle bones found at Nabta Playa in the western desert of Egypt some 100 kilometers west of the Nile Valley and dated to around 9300 years ago, were domesticated. This would make them the oldest domestic cattle anywhere.

Contemporary with the sites at Nabta Playa, a number of caves in the Acacus Mountains of southwest Libya were occupied by hunter-foragers. In one of these caves, Uan Afuda, there is a thick dung layer, which could only have been accumulated from keeping wild Barbary sheep penned up (Di Lernia 1998). The large number of bones of this animal, as well as their depiction on the walls of several caves, suggests that the sheep were more than a meat source, and may have been used ritually. Thus, there were attempts to control wild animals by early Holocene hunters of the Sahara.

An alternative argument to indigenous domestication of African cattle relies more heavily on the earliest appearance of small stock in North Africa (Smith 1986), again at Nabta Playa, around 7500 years ago. Since the Barbary sheep are the only ovicaprids found in Africa, and they contributed no genetic material to the domestic sheep and goats found in the continent, all small stock found in Africa must have originated in the Near East. At this time the animals were entering an ameliorated environment in North Africa, and the grasslands of the Sahara opened up a niche that was filled by pastoral people. The diffusionist argument would say that this was also the time when domestic cattle, which had already been domesticated in the Near East, entered Africa.

Regarding plant domestication in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is little reason to doubt that the process was developed independent of outside influences, since many of the plants are completely different from the dominant grains of the circum-Mediterranean basin, such as wheat and barley, and required specialized propagation and harvesting strategies. The range of African plant domesticates is huge (Purseglove 1976), which reflects both the immense richness of Africa's flora, as well as the traditional knowledge of plant foods and pharmacopeia.

On the basis of the distribution of the wild forms of African domesticates, three areas of independent domestication can be suggested: the savanna grassland zone (including the Sahel and the Central Niger Delta); the savanna/forest ecotone; and highland Ethiopia. The first zone is a belt that stretches across Africa at its

widest point, from the Sudan to Mauretania. It is where major cereals would have originated, such as *Sorghum bicolor*, *Pennisetum glaucum* (pearl millet) and *Oryza glaberrima* (African rice). The second zone was probably the original source of many domesticates presently found farther south in the forests, such as the large yam, *Dioscorea rotundata*, the oil palm, *Elaeis guineensis*, and watermelon, *Citrullus lanatus*. The Ethiopian highlands are a unique ecosystem, and most of the domesticates are still only found there, such as *Eragrostis tef* and *Ensete ventricosum*.

The history of domestication of these plants is not well known, due to the poor preservation of plants in the archaeological sites of tropical environments. The earliest *Sorghum* found at Nabta Playa, dated to c.8000 years ago, is part of a floral “package” that includes a number of wild plant foods, such as *Ziziphus* and other grasses: *Panicum*, *Echinochloa*, *Setaria*, *Digitaria* and *Urochloa/Brachiaria*. This suggests that sorghum was also still “wild” (Wasylikowa et al. 1993). Although grain domestication may have been tied in with African herding societies, there is reason to believe that this was a late occurrence (Marshall and Hildebrand 2002). Even today herders harvest wild grains for domestic use (Smith 1980; Tubiana and Tubiana 1977).

Surprisingly, the earliest dates for domestic sorghum come not from Africa, but India, around 4000 years ago (Harlan 1993). This means that the grain would have been domesticated in Africa before this date. Domesticated pearl millet, while it may have the same time depth as sorghum, is only recognized after 3000 years ago at Dhar Tichitt in Mauretania from grain impressions in pottery (Munson 1976).

Of the forest domesticates, since yams are propagated by tuber cuttings, there are no seeds to preserve on archaeological sites (Coursey 1976). The antiquity of their origins as domesticates may be tied in with other plants, such as the oil palm, whose carbonized seeds have been found at a number of sites in West Africa associated with pottery. At one such site, Bosumpra, in Ghana, the oil-bearing fruit *Canarium schweinfurthii* gave way to *E. guineensis* around 5000 years ago (Smith 1975), so may be an indication of the age of this domesticate.

The age of the earliest Ethiopian domesticates still eludes us. All the radiocarbon dates for both plants and animals are late, with cattle bones producing the oldest dates of the last millennium BCE (Phillipson 1993). As Ethiopia is considered an early source of cattle into the rift valley of East Africa, possibly as early as 4000 years ago (Ambrose 1982), it would seem that there is still a great deal we do not know about early farming societies in the highlands.

The spread of bovines into the rest of Africa occurred as the Sahara dried up, around 4500 years

ago. Since the rainfall belt of the intertropical convergence zone was moving farther south, this aridification opened up the Sahel and parts of the savanna to pastoralists who hitherto had been excluded from these areas due to tsetse fly infestation (Smith 1979). Some of the West African breeds, such as the N'Dama and the West African shorthorn, show tolerance to Trypanosomiasis, the fatal disease transmitted by the tsetse, indicating a long period of association. These animals do not have humps, and would be directly descended from the *taurine* species of cattle. Cattle also entered East Africa, where they may have encountered other epizootic diseases transmitted via wild animals (Gifford-Gonzalez 2000), which delayed their southward movement to the rest of the Rift Valley by as much as 1,000 years. Small stock, which accompanied the spread of cattle southward, were probably less susceptible to these epizootic effects, so were able to move into the rest of southern Africa by the turn of the Christian era, reaching the Cape around 1900 years ago (Henshilwood 1996). Eventually cattle were also adapted to the southern lands (Smith 1998b).

Many of Africa's cattle today are of the humped variety. These are descended from *Bos indicus*, the Indian zebu, which were introduced to Africa, possibly via Arabia, before 1000CE (Blench 1993). Crosses of zebu and taurine cattle have produced two of southern Africa's most prominent breeds: Sanga and Afrikaner.

It is not known when camels first entered Africa. In fact, their early domestication is still a matter of conjecture. It is possible that they came initially during the early dynastic period of Egypt (Clutton-Brock 1993), but only in significant economically viable numbers during the Roman period in North Africa in the last centuries BCE. By this time, North Africa had attained the present degree of aridity, and these desert-adapted animals allowed communication throughout most of the Sahara by nomads. Introduction of the camel to East Africa probably was the result of contact between the Horn of Africa and Arabia within the last 2000 years.

Equids are common throughout Africa. No known domestication of zebras occurred, so all the donkeys of Africa are descended from the wild ass, *Equus africanus*. The earliest dated domestic donkey comes from Egypt c.4400 years ago (Clutton-Brock 1993). Domestic horses and war chariots are reputed to have been introduced to dynastic Egypt by the Hyksos between 1640–1530BCE, and later spread to West Africa where cavalry became important in military conquest and state formation (Blench 1993). Archaeological evidence for domestic equids south of the Sahara is sparse, and often confounded by the difficulty in separating the skeletal remains of zebras from domestic horses and donkeys.

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Donatist Church: North Africa

Persecution of the early Christians often elicited differing, and even rival, responses, exposing deeper tensions within the Christian community. Such was the case in Carthage, the chief city of Roman North Africa (near modern Tunis), during the Great Persecution initiated by emperor Diocletian in 303. The specific bone of contention was Caecilian's fitness to be bishop of Carthage, for some believed that one of his consecrators in 311–312, Felix, Bishop of Apthungi, had during the persecution committed the spiritually fatal offence of *traditio*, the "handing over" or "betrayal" of the Holy Scriptures on demand. Such surrender, as an act of compliance with an idolatrous pagan state, disqualified not only the *traditor* himself, Felix, but all who associated with him, from any Christian ministry. It was tantamount to apostasy. The gravity of the act no doubt owed something to African Christians' reverence for the sacred text itself, which was a more rare commodity in a manuscript age.

Underlying the opposition to Caecilian were deep-seated suspicions about the Carthaginian Church leadership's collusion with the persecuting authorities, or at least its distaste for intense devotion to the martyrs. Personal grievances and frustrated ambitions played their part, as did the Numidian bishops' affront at the exclusion of their senior bishop from Caecilian's hasty consecration. The anti-Caecilianists elected one Majorinus as counterbishop. He was succeeded in 313 by Donatus from Casae Nigrae (Négrine) in Numidia, and the schismatic movement had its name. Donatus led the movement with impressive vigor. Its growth was such that by approximately 336 he could preside over a council of 270 bishops, the largest number ever assembled for a Christian synod.

With the end of persecution, Emperor Constantine disbursed funds to help repair its damage. When these

were given to Caecilian's party in Carthage, the dissenters appealed to the emperor for adjudication of their claim to be the true church. Ecclesiastical and imperial enquiries vindicated Caecilian (and cleared Felix), and Constantine vainly attempted to coerce the Donatists toward unity (316–321). This policy simply confirmed the Donatists' conviction of the righteousness of their cause, for the saints of God had ever been persecuted by the church's enemies. Constantine's son and successor, Constans, again attempted bribery and repression in 347, in what became known as the Macarian persecution (from the name of the imperial official involved). It also evoked from Donatus the classic utterance, "What has the emperor to do with the church?" Donatus and other leaders were exiled, and relaxation of the anti-Donatist ban had to await the accession of Julian as emperor in 361.

Donatus died in exile in approximately 355, succeeded by another able leader, Parmenian, who served as (Donatist) bishop of Carthage until 391 or 392. He also provided intellectual weight for the movement. His (lost) work on Donatist ecclesiology merited a response from Optatus, Bishop of Milevis (Milev), which is a major source for the beginnings of Donatism (367; revised with an addition c.385). In the nonconformist layman, Tyconius, who flourished around 370–380, Donatism produced the ablest Christian mind in Africa since Tertullian and Cyprian. His *Book of Rules* was an early essay in Christian hermeneutics, which was incorporated by Augustine into his guide *Christian Teaching*. Tyconius's commentary on the Apocalypse of John can be partly reconstructed from the succession of later commentaries that it influenced. But his critique of some basic Donatist convictions resulted in his excommunication, though he never became a Catholic. He could be called a representative of Afro-Catholicism.

A number of different factors in the late fourth century conspired to undermine Donatism's ascendancy in North Africa. Parmenian's successor, Primian, was not his equal. His high-handedness contributed to internal Donatist divisions (especially with the Maximianists), which were not always dealt with consistently and in terms of Donatist principles. Support given by some Donatists to local revolts against Roman rule led by Firmus (372–375) and more seriously by Gildo (397–398) strengthened the hand of opponents who viewed Donatism as a threat to law and order. The emergence of the Circumcellions in the late 340s had encouraged this view. Although still not beyond scholarly debate, they were self-styled "warriors of Christ," given to violence as a means of redressing economic and social injustice. At once rootless peasants and devotees of martyrs' shrines (*cellae*), they were at least in part associated with Donatism and engaged in anti-Catholic thuggery.

It was finally the combined skills of Aurelius of Carthage and Augustine of Hippo in the early fifth century that precipitated Donatism's decline. Augustine's massive historical and theological refutation of Donatist claims was allied to state repression in the Edict of Unity of 405 (which declared Donatism heresy) and after the huge conference of the rival episcopates under an imperial commissioner, Marcellinus, at Carthage in 411. Greatly diminished through forcible reunification, Donatists nevertheless lived on, perhaps in some areas finding a common cause with Catholics under Vandal persecution. After the Byzantine conquest of North Africa (c.600), Pope Gregory I urged Catholic bishops to deal more energetically with Donatists, but only Islam finally ensured its demise.

Donatism is best understood in religious terms, not primarily as a nationalist or liberation movement fired by political or socioeconomic motives. It claimed the authority of the great martyr-bishop, Cyprian of Carthage, in refusing to recognize baptism given outside the church (which it restricted to its own ranks). Hence it rebaptized Catholics in pursuit of its pure community. In its rigorousness, glorification of martyrdom, apocalyptic rejection of an idolatrous state, and obsession with ritual holiness Donatism recalled the distinctive African Christian heritage from Tertullian's age.

The Donatist Church undoubtedly provided a vehicle for expressions of African particularism and social discontents. Yet there is little evidence of its special interest in Berber or Punic language and culture, and its demographic concentration in rural Numidia (a region north of the Sahara, generally correlating to the boundaries of modern-day Algeria) probably reflected more effective repressive measures in the cities. Certainly the campaign against Donatism provoked Catholicism into a somewhat un-African alignment with the Roman church and state.

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See also: **Carthage; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire; Religion, History of.**

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Dongola: See Soba and Dongola.

Douala

Douala, the largest city and a major seaport of Cameroon, is situated on the tidal Wouri Estuary, a good natural harbor used for centuries for trade with the West. The Duala people, after whom the city they founded is named, traded in slaves and then in palm produce with Europeans from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries; the Wouri Estuary was then called the Cameroons River after the crayfish (*camarões* in Portuguese) that swarmed there regularly. The Duala chiefs signed a treaty with Germany in 1884 that led to German colonization of the whole territory, which took the name of the Duala settlement, Cameroon (Kamerun). By then the Duala were divided into four main sections: the Bonadoo (also called Bell), Bonambela (also called Akwa), and Bonebela (also called Deido) on the south bank, and the Bonaberi on the north bank.

At first called Kamerunstadt by the Germans, the town was then called Douala after the name of the indigenous inhabitants (normally the French spelling is used for the city). Under the Germans the town was a center of missionary work, education, and some modern development. The Duala became a typical West Coast elite people, acquiring Western education, serving the Europeans in subordinate posts, but also feeling the weight of colonial rule and protesting against it. In the case of Duala the most famous protests were against a plan for segregation in which the Duala living along the southern bank of the estuary would be moved to new sites slightly inland. In 1914 the first phase of the plan was carried out; the Bonadoo were largely moved out of their homes, and their ruler, Paramount Chief Rudolf Duala Manga Bell, was executed. But then, after the outbreak of World War I, Douala was quickly captured by a largely British expeditionary force. After a short spell under mainly British administration (September 1914–April 1916) it then passed to French rule, along with most of Kamerun, and became the first capital of the French–mandated Territory of Cameroun.

The partial expropriation of the southern bank of the estuary was not reversed by the French, despite years of continued Duala protests accompanied by petitions for

self-government. The seized Bonadoo territory, especially the area named Bonanjo, was used for European offices. Some Duala still had homes there and many did in Akwa, Deido and Bonaberi, where many more privileged people (clerks, teachers, etc.) built masonry houses. Close to Bonanjo the expropriated Bell Duala built such houses in Bali in the 1930s. The area originally set aside for them, a little further inland, retained the name New-Bell, but though its land was under nominal Duala ownership it came, from the 1920s, to be peopled mainly by Africans from other parts of Cameroon. Douala was the main seaport of French Cameroon and the center of economic activity, though the capital was moved to Yaoundé in 1921. Business offices were established in Akwa in particular, where Africans unable to build modern houses were forced to move out (without loss of land rights) in 1937.

The population in 1939 was officially 34,002, including 17,871 Duala and 13,847 other Africans. In fact other Africans may have been a majority before then. There was a continual influx of other Cameroonians (Bassas, Betis, and especially Bamilekes) from the 1920s. This continued and amplified after World War II (when French Cameroon was taken over by the Free French in 1940 and Douala then became the capital again for a few years). Economic development, including extension of the port installations, caused the city to grow rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s. The Bamilekes became then, and have remained, the largest immigrant element in the city, soon far outnumbering the Duala and now the main ethnic group in the urban area. The expanding urban population of Douala was much involved in the nationalist politics of the 1940s and 50s, and in political unrest at times, as in 1955 and 1960. This happened again after multiparty politics returned, in 1991, when Douala was—as before—a main center of opposition to the regime in power.

A bridge over the Wouri, linking the main (southern) part of the city with Bonaberi, was completed in 1955. Since the German period, Douala has been the terminus of the country's two railways, one starting from Bonaberi. The airport, developed from small beginnings in the 1930s, became Cameroon's main international airport and remains so today.

In independent Cameroon, Douala has remained by far the most important port for overseas trade, handling over 90 per cent of the country's trade, as well as some trade with the Central African Republic and Chad. The port has been expanded and is still a major West Coast port although it now has problems (silting up of the estuary, and high charges). The economic capital of Cameroon, Douala is a hive of business activity of all sorts, including many industries whose main location is in the Douala-Bassa area east of the historic city center. The built-up area now extends to that district and to

the airport, covering former rural districts in between. The city has continually expanded and increased in population, with a regular influx of immigrants. For decades there have been immigrants from other African countries and now there are large communities of these, especially Nigerians. Most numerous however are the Bamilekes, who run most of the city's small and medium-sized businesses (taxi services, cinemas, bars, hotels, import enterprises, shops of all sorts) and who, in 1976, were estimated to number 215,460 out of a total Douala urban population of 458,426. The Duala are now a small minority, though they still own considerable amounts of land and their language is widely spoken. There are affluent areas like Bonanjo where a minority—farther enriched since the oil boom began in the 1970s (some oil being pumped in the Douala region)—live in comfortable conditions. The multiethnic general population lives crowded over other districts, served by several markets, shops, and services everywhere, and places of worship; there are numerous Muslims but the city's population is mainly Christian, the Catholic cathedral in Bonanjo (1934) being an important landmark.

A crowded, noisy and lively city, Douala has for long been well known for its relaxations and night life. However, the city has numerous social problems such as inadequate drainage (the land being flat and the rainfall heavy) and inadequate and expensive housing for large numbers. The present population of the city is well over a million.

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See also: **Cameroon.**

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Drama, Film: Postcolonial

African drama and film are driven and defined by the language, culture, and ethnic group of the individual artists. It is, however, at times these artists' protests of poor conditions and failed promises of independence that bring them national and international attention—not only as, for example, an Amharic writer, a Yoruban writer, or an Akan writer, but as one born out of the neocolonial realities of Ethiopia, Nigeria, or Ghana.

The salient question that artists pose throughout their work is how traditionalism and modernism should be balanced against the everyday dire realities of people as they struggle to survive the chaos caused by the historical trajectory of colonialism and postcolonialism.

In addressing this question, a canonical group of playwrights exists that seeks to reaffirm the greatness of Africa while demonizing the white man whose colonial imposition tempered this greatness. The plays *Chaka* by Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and *Kurunmi* by Yoruban writer Ola Rotimi are representative of this canon. Ebrahim Hussein of Tanzania also demonstrates the themes of this canon in his play *Kinjeketile*, which revises the history of the 1904 Maji Maji Uprising for dramatic effect.

In attempting to address postcolonial political issues in their work, many authors come into conflict with their governments. The clash between the individual artist and state authority can be seen in the lives of Wole Soyinka in Nigeria; the Gikuyu (now exiled) Ngugi wa Thiong'o from Kenya; and Amadu Maddy in Sierra Leone. The imprisonment, exile, and, at times, execution of artists demonstrate that aesthetic expressions carry with them great risks. Wole Soyinka, "the great protester," who has been recognized as the most prominent African playwright, is an example. His plays have been produced in Nigeria, London, and in the United States on Broadway. Soyinka and his contemporaries—most notably, Dexter Lyndersay and Ola Rotimi—have successfully worked to establish a viable Nigerian theater. But Soyinka's "protest drama," revealing the contradictions of modernism, has brought the ire and wrath of the Nigerian government upon him. Using satire and parody, his plays reveal how power corrupts absolutely and, thus, is the basis of chaotic society. Both his *Madmen and Specialists* and *The Man Died*, written in the context of the chaotic Nigerian civil war, and the abuse he received while imprisoned, clearly demonstrate the difficulty of artists using drama to clarify the many issues within postcolonial state formation.

On another level, these artists, as do most others, address the contradictions of using European dramatic forms by developing theatrical plays that have a peculiarly indigenous orientation, sensibility, language, theme, context, spirit, and values. In Nigeria, for example, university drama students, using the indigenous Hausa language and working with village actors, dramatized the annual Kalankuwa festival, which satirized the transitional process of military to civilian rule.

Even when the English language is used, these playwrights have done "great violence to standard English," according to the South African playwright Ezekiel Mphahlele. They have sought to contour the

language to indigenous semantic forms, opening up their dramatic work to audiences on the world stage. All African playwrights seek to create viable and legitimate works of dramatic art that will stand the scrutiny of critics of the West. The criticism that these plays and playwrights have received broaches various dimensions. Critics have examined the “functionality” of drama as it does or does not express real social structures within the collective African ethos. Does drama that addresses a social malaise restrict the writer to such “political questions”? Critics pose the question of whether such questions as *Négritude* should be a driving force that defines drama; as Soyinka sarcastically observes, “A tiger does not have to proclaim his tigrity.” In the context of the problematics of post-colonialism, is there such a thing as art for art’s sake?

Responding to the criticism from within and without, the Arab Theatre Conference was held in Casablanca in November 1966. Conferees from Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, and the United Arab Republic attempted to address various critical questions, problems, and issues in developing institutional drama. The growth of Arab drama can be seen in the work of Egyptian playwright Tewfik Al-Hakim, whose *The Tree Climber* was published by Oxford University Press; in Algerian playwright Mouloud Mammeri’s *Le Foehn* and Emmanuel Robles’s work, which have received international praise; and in the numerous works of Amharic playwright Tsegaye Gabre-Medhin.

Receiving critical praise in Francophone Africa are Bernard Dadie’s plays *Beatrice du Congo* and *Monsieur Thogo-Gnini*, which have continued presence in African theater today even though they were first performed in the early 1970s. In Cameroon, Guillaume Oyono-Mbia defined its national theater with his social comedy *Trois Pretendants . . . un mari*. South Africa’s Athol Fugard’s plays, which have been produced internationally, reveal the problems and issues that existed under the now collapsed system of apartheid. Kenya produced the promising female playwright Rebecca Njau, whose play *Scar* has been widely noted. In Ghana, two women, Efua Sutherland and Ama Ata Aidoo, established their works as creative revelations. Sutherland’s Ghana Experimental Theatre has worked to establish theater among the traditional masses through the Kodzidan (“story house”) in Ekumfi-Atwia.

Arguably, drama and film were transitioned through the works of the Yoruban/Nigerian playwright Hubert Ogunde, whose works were produced on film in the 1970s and early 1980s. But it was Ousmane Sembene’s 1963 film *Borom Sarret* that defined African cinema in the postcolonial period.

However, the rise of African film was first a struggle by Africans to extricate their film from the European neocolonialists who controlled production, distribution, and exhibition. Unlike the later dramatists who often clashed with the state, some early filmmakers thought that the state could help in alleviating foreign domination. Francophone filmmakers took the lead by organizing the Federation of Panafricaine des Cineastes (FEPACI) in Algiers in 1969. The FEPACI as a dialogic film festival sought to use film as a tool to mold mass revolutionary consciousness. By the 1960s, both Tunisian and Algerian filmmakers, with the support of state cinematic offices, had produced such classics as *L’aube des dammes* by Ahmed Rachedi, *Vent des aures* by Mohamed Lakhdar-Hamina, and *La voix* by Slim Riad. In Mozambique, the National Film Institute was established in 1975; it created the monthly film series Kuxa Kenema (“Birth of the Image”), which sought to mold a mass social consciousness. Film as political art was introduced in Nigeria by Ola Balogun with *Ija Ominira* (1977) and *Cry Freedom* (1981).

A turning point in independent African film occurred when young filmmakers met at the Quagadougou Festival in 1981 and established the oppositional Le Collectif L’Oeil Vert, which criticized the FEPACI for not doing enough to support and help develop a truly independent African film industry. Responding to this challenge, the FEPACI met in 1982 and produced “Le Manifeste de Niamey,” which restated their commitment to their first principles.

The tensions within African filmmakers combined with their creative energies to produce internationally recognized films. In 1967, Cannes awarded Lakhdar Hamina’s *Vent des Aures* a prize. This achievement was followed in 1969 with the prize-winning *Le Mandat*, by Ousmane Sembene, at the Festival of Venice. The ultimate legitimization of African cinema occurred at Cannes in 1975 when Hamina’s *Chronique des Annees de Braise* was honored with a major prize. Other prize-winning films during this period were Sembene’s *Xala*, Mahama Traore’s *N’Diangane*, and the Mauritanian filmmaker Med Hondo’s *Les Bicots Negres Vos Voisins*. Africa’s own acclaimed film festival at Ouagadougou conveyed prizes for the excellent *Djeli*, by Fadika Kramo Lancine of the Ivory Coast; and *Finye*, by Soulemane Cisse of Mali.

The Guadeloupean Sarah Maldoror established herself with the only fictionalized view of the Angolan liberation struggle in *Sambizanga*, while in the same year the Senegalese woman filmmaker Safi Faye addressed sexism of both the French man and the African man in her short Parisian based-film, *La passante*. The South African film *You Have Struck A Rock*, by Debbie

May, chronicled the resistance of black women to the pass system, and the Burkina Faso filmmaker Idrissa Ouedrago has won prizes for her work, including the noted *Tilai*. Cheick Oumar Sissoko's *Finzan* reveals how women are socially and sexually oppressed, but also how they gain their dignity via collective struggle. Kenya's Anne Mungai's *Saikati* (1992) explores the dichotomous world of rural and urban women.

All the African liberation movements produced documentary film to highlight and dramatize their struggle. The African-American filmmaker Robert Van Lierop, and other foreign directors produced films that chronicled ongoing wars of liberation. Sarah Maldoror's short film *Monangambee* illustrates the conflict between Portuguese colonialism and African revolutionary struggle. Glauber Rocha's *The Lion Has Seven Heads* constructed a Pan-African format of struggle by filming a story by which Che Guevara is "magically resurrected in Zumbi—the spirit of Amilcar Carbral."

Even greater international critical acclaim for African film came in 1987 when Souleymane Cisse's *Yeelen* won a prize at Cannes by exploring the interpersonal dynamics of father and son within the Bambara people of Mali. In 1992, the Ethiopian-born Haile Gerima's *Sanfoka* became a commercial success by advocating a Pan-Africanist connection between slavery in the Americas and the African return by those of the diaspora.

African postcolonial drama and film continues to develop and address broad issues and topics, and will tell complex stories that will clarify the past, elucidate the present, and give direction for the future.

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See also: Art and Architecture, History of African; Art, Postcolonial; Négritude.

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Drought, Famine, Displacement

Drought was the main cause of famine in Africa until the early 1980s. Since 1972, the continent has had to cope with a repetitive phase of climatic change that, as historians have demonstrated, is far from being exceptional in the light of Africa's long history. Nevertheless, during the past 30 years the role played by drought in its crises of subsistence has continuously become less important.

The memory of the major famines of the colonial era is preserved both in colonial archives and in memoirs. The earliest such famine authentically within living memory resulted from the catastrophic cycle of droughts in the closing years of the nineteenth century, which unfortunately coincided with the harshest phase of colonial conquest. One-third, or even half, of the population of tropical Africa was wiped out between 1880 and 1920. The main cycles of drought and famine occurred in West Africa during the twentieth century

- between 1900 and 1903 on the loop of the Niger;
- in 1913–1914, at the start of World War I; this was probably the greatest famine of the century, since the colonial administration still had neither the means nor the will to act against it;
- the drought and famine of 1931–1932, which coincided with the worldwide economic depression;
- the famine of 1941–1942, the effects of which were accentuated by the impact of war;
- the famines of 1954 and 1967, known as the *bandabari* ("turning the back," or "turning away") since, in a sign of the times, customary solidarities began to break down;
- the famine of 1973–1975, known among the Songhay as the *dabari-ban* ("nothing more to be done");
- the famine of 1984–1985, known as the *Ce-taafa*, which, according to residents of Timbuktu, was "comparable to that of 1913" (see Gado 1992).

Some famines directly linked to drought have occurred relatively recently, the result not of a single bad season but of a series of successive years of shortage that, by obstructing potential recovery year upon year, have eventually culminated in catastrophe. This is what happened in Ethiopia in 1979–1980, and again in Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984–1985.

There has been considerable progress in forecasting the hazards of climate, both on the national level and among the providers of international aid, since the long phase of drought in the years 1972–1975 and the period that followed it up to the early 1990s. Policies for prevention have been applied, for example, in Niger, which is far from exceptional in arranging for the systematic cultivation of rice. It has been supported

by substantial aid from China and the centralized warehousing of harvest surpluses in anticipation of bad years, which remain a possibility. Such arrangements have proved to be relatively effective. Hence, it is possible to observe a breaking of what used to be an inevitable linkage between drought and famine as long as other factors, such as warfare or an aberrant political regime, do not intervene.

Detailed study has shown that this change was heralded, around the end of the colonial period, by the famine that occurred in 1949 in Malawi (then known as Nyasaland). This famine undoubtedly began after a severe drought, but the way in which the catastrophe developed from that point on differed significantly from the way in which famines, caused by shortages and negligence, developed during the early years of colonization. The famine of 1949 resulted from a new agrarian structure and a new means of organizing labor, in the context of an accelerated growth in population. The farmers exported a significant proportion of their output, both of subsistence crops (in this case, sorghum) and of nonedible crops (cotton and tobacco), and were thus increasingly dependent on the market for their own subsistence. After the famine, many of them set out to plant manioc, a crop that matures relatively quickly, as a provision against the risk of future shortages. This famine was, then, no longer the result of the abandonment of subsistence cultivation in favor of cultivation for export. It represented instead a new division of labor. As the men departed for construction sites, mines, cities, and foreign countries, the women, left at home, took on the burden of rural labor. The victims of famine were no longer the same as before: the old, the infirm, the sick, and children were given aid by the authorities just as much as those earning their livings were. In short, from this time onward the colonial state took on the role formerly played by customary systems of solidarity. Yet it neglected the women who now formed the main agricultural labor force, forcing them to turn to older social structures that were no longer capable of meeting their needs. The welfare state undoubtedly alleviated suffering, but it did so more unevenly, in response to the degree of integration of individuals into the market economy. Thus it was that later famines came to differ from the “crises of subsistence” of earlier times (Vaughan 1987).

According to international statistics, in any “normal” year 100 million Africans (out of a total population estimated at around 800 million) are suffering from hunger or malnutrition. In addition, almost all famines are aggravated by human intervention, whether in the form of massive, authoritarian displacements of populations or in the form of warfare (often at the same time), which has the same effect.

Two types of migration have a more or less direct relationship with this desperately low level of nutrition: forced migration and migration to the cities. The displacements of population that are often the most lethal are directly linked to war—which means, mainly, civil war. The appearance of organized refugee camps should not allow us to forget either the masses of people whose fates are unknown, or the fact that massive transfers of population, generating famine, malnutrition, and massacre, always result in enormous numbers of fatalities: half a million in the war over Biafra, perhaps a million in Ethiopia, and certainly as many as that in Sudan, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Congo. These forced displacements are not necessarily due to military operations in the strict sense, but may be induced by authoritarian politics, as in Sudan. As a result, there are many different types of refugee (Salih 1999).

The most paradoxical of famines are those caused in the name of “development,” by “villagization” or by the construction of large dams, or even for the sake of protecting the environment, as in the case of national parks. Famines no longer result—at least not directly—from drought, but from the clumsy authoritarian measures taken to supposedly remedy drought. This was the case with the campaigns of authoritarian “villagization” undertaken in the postcolonial era by “socialist” regimes (Tanzania in the late 1970s, Ethiopia from 1981, Mozambique between 1977 and 1983, Somalia in 1988). In itself, the idea was not a bad one. In countries where settlements were utterly dispersed and there was a very low level of technology, the modernization of agriculture seemed to require the creation of cooperatives, bringing people together on terrain that was, sometimes, less dry; hence the forced removal of Ethiopians from the north to the south of their country. However, these projects were implemented in an authoritarian, precipitous, and unplanned manner, with hordes of starving farmers being sent off without having time even to gather provisions for the coming year. The results were catastrophic, as millions died.

As for migration to the cities, this followed a pattern similar to what had occurred during the colonial era. Life in the cities might be difficult, yet it seemed more likely to provide employment, however informal, as well as security (through education, health care, and so on). Since the attainment of independence, the exodus from the countryside has taken on unprecedented proportions all over the continent, as people depart to the cities of South Africa, the diamond mines of the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe, or the port cities of the Ivory Coast, where 36 per cent of the population consists of foreigners. Even a relatively small crisis of subsistence can aggravate this tendency, given the

rapid growth of populations and the increasing exhaustion of the land. Accordingly, movement toward the cities has accelerated ever since the long phase of drought in the 1970s, and on into the 1980s and 1990s. In Zimbabwe, for example, the drought of 1991–1992 had a drastic impact on an agricultural sector that had been developed mainly on the basis of maize and yet had been presented by many observers as a “success story.” Faced with a harvest of around one-fifth of normal output, 4.5 million people soon came to require aid merely to survive, and more than 2,000 tons of grain had to be imported as a matter of urgency. The agricultural crisis in certain countries, such as Lesotho, the Central African Republic, Zambia, or the countries of the Sahel, has been so extensive as to make a profound impact on the whole of the rural system of production, as well as on education. Imbalances have therefore been accentuated even further in favor of the cities, notably in Congo or Côte d’Ivoire. We find ourselves with this new paradox: drought and subsistence crises have increased the influx of poor people into the cities, and it is the cities that are expected to deal with the poverty that results from the fragility of the countryside. Given the relative lack of education among workers, the cities disintegrate under the swarms of illiterate laborers coming straight from the country, while rural area often find themselves short of workers. In such cities as Dakar or Lagos, where the growth of the so-called informal sector prevents the resolution of the structural problem of underemployment, the situation is becoming explosive. It appears that certain factors that used to be considered separately are now irretrievably interconnected: ecological hazards, demography, politics, and the cities.

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Dual Mandate: See Togo: Colonial Period: Dual Mandate, 1919–1957.

Du Bois, W. E. B. and Pan-Africanism

The life of William Edward Burghardt DuBois (1868–1963), the distinguished African American intellectual, partly mirrors the story of Pan-Africanism. Du Bois was born in Massachusetts in 1868 and died a citizen of the independent West African state of Ghana in 1963. By 1900, Du Bois had studied in the United States and Germany and written books on the history of the U.S. slave trade and a sociological study, *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899). He taught in various black colleges, but increasingly became disenchanted with scholarship. In his book of influential essays, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), DuBois described the “double consciousness” experienced by African Americans living in a white-dominated society. He also challenged Booker T. Washington’s conservative ideas on race and black education through artisanal skills. As a member of the Niagara Movement (1905), DuBois argued that racial discrimination should be confronted and that African American interests could best be promoted by the activities of an educated elite, what he called the “talented tenth.” Du Bois became actively involved in the struggle for African American civil rights. In 1910 he joined the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), becoming editor of its critical journal, *The Crisis*, which became an outlet for his radicalism and literary ideas, and earned him the title of “spokesman of the race.”

DuBois was also deeply interested in the African diaspora and Pan-Africanism, an interest reflected in his study *The Negro* (1915). In 1900 he had taken part in the Pan-African Conference that met in London. After World War I, DuBois helped to organize four Pan-African Congresses: in Paris (1919); London, Brussels, and Paris (1921); London and Lisbon (1922–1923); and New York (1927). These small gatherings, composed mainly of African Americans from the United States and the Caribbean along with white sympathizers, passed resolutions demanding an end to racial discrimination and the extension of democracy to the colonial empires. In late 1923 DuBois visited Africa for the first time.

Pan-Africanism had its origins in the late eighteenth century and arose out of the experience of enslavement and the black diaspora. It resulted in demands for repatriation to Africa and the cultural idea of a black world, and of one unified African people. Africa was often symbolically identified as Ethiopia, and “Ethiopianism” has a long legacy running through African American Christian organizations, Marcus Garvey’s “Back to Africa” movement, and Rastafarianism, which claimed the emperor of Ethiopia as a divine figure. For most of its history Pan-Africanism has been an idea espoused by black people outside Africa. As such, it contains strong elements of racial romanticism. In the late 1890s DuBois had spoken of “Pan-Negroism,” while Henry Sylvester Williams, from Trinidad, planned the Pan-African Conference of 1900 to represent members of the “African race from all parts of the world.”

Small “Back to Africa” movements existed in the Americas in the nineteenth century but the idea was given new life by Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican populist, who emigrated to the United States. In 1914 Garvey had founded the black nationalist United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The UNIA expanded rapidly in North America from 1918 to 1921, with its appeal as an international organization which encouraged racial pride and self-improvement, and a radical program denouncing colonialism in Africa and advocating black repatriation to the continent. Garvey bitterly denounced DuBois and the NAACP. The UNIA had a small following in Africa but its newspaper, *The Negro World*, was banned in most colonies as subversive.

In the interwar years Pan-Africanism was shaped principally from three directions; first, by Garveyism, which was also influential in the Harlem Renaissance, an African American literary and artistic movement focused on New York during the 1920s; second, by cultural ideas emanating from the Caribbean in the 1920s–1930s and generally known as *Négritude*, which argued that black people must regain their African culture; and third, by international failure to act against the Italian fascist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, which served as a political catalyst for black people both within Africa and throughout the diaspora.

World War I helped stimulate political consciousness in both Africa and the black diaspora. World War II had a much more profound impact, especially on Africa. A fifth Pan-African Congress met in Manchester, England, in 1945 and, as before, DuBois played a major part in organizing and presiding over its proceedings. However, unlike previous congresses which had been run by African Americans, the meeting was dominated by Africans, including nationalists such as Jomo Kenyatta, Obafemi Awolowo, Hastings Banda,

and Kwame Nkrumah, all of whom were all later to become political leaders in their own countries. The Manchester congress passed resolutions calling for the end of racial discrimination and for independence for the colonies. Some of the declarations denounced capitalist imperialism, one concluding with a rallying cry mirroring the Communist Manifesto: “Colonial and Subject Peoples of the World—Unite.” The fifth congress indicated a revived interest in Pan-Africanism, but perhaps more important, it marked a new and vital phase in the struggle against colonial rule that resulted in the large-scale transfer of power in Africa during the next two decades.

DuBois’s contribution to Pan-Africanist ideas was considerable. At Manchester he was honored as a founding father by the younger African and Caribbean nationalists. But after 1945 his influence began to wane as he was superseded by younger, more radical voices. DuBois was not always an easy man to work with. His career within the NAACP had been punctuated by often vigorous political controversy with fellow African Americans, a tension increased by DuBois’s growing interest in communism and his denunciation of colleagues’ conservatism over matters of race. In 1934 he resigned from the NAACP only to rejoin ten years later. Tensions continued as DuBois moved further to the left and in 1948 he was dismissed from the NAACP. DuBois then formed, with Paul Robeson and others, the Council of African Affairs, a socialist anticolonial organization. The growing hostility to communism in the United States in the early 1950s led to the now avowedly communist DuBois clashing with the courts and having his passport seized. In 1959 he emigrated to Ghana, where at the invitation of President Kwame Nkrumah, he became a citizen and also started work on editing an abortive *Encyclopedia Africana*.

Pan-African ideas had a strong appeal to some of the nationalist leaders in colonial Africa. The most outspoken advocate was Nkrumah, who led Ghana to independence in 1957. His thinking was partly influenced by George Padmore, originally from Trinidad and a former Stalinist, who argued in *Pan-Africanism or Communism* (1956) that the coming struggle for Africa depended on nationalist leaders resolving their communal and ethnic differences and embracing Pan-Africanism. Socialism was central to the Pan-Africanism of both Padmore and Nkrumah. Nkrumah’s book, *Africa Must Unite* (1963) was dedicated to Padmore and “to the African Nation that must be.”

This kind of idealism was based more on rhetoric than realistic politics. Good reasons could be advanced for African unity: only political unity would lead to economic strength and enable the continent to be truly free of colonial influence; the artificial frontiers imposed on Africa by colonial rule would be ended;

and a united Africa would wield influence along with other noncommitted powers in a world divided between East and West. But attempts to create even binational federations failed, as African leaders were divided by political and economic ideologies. At independence, the fragile unity of many new African states was threatened by internal ethnic, political, and religious rivalries, and there were also tensions with neighboring states. In 1963 the Organization of African Unity was created in Addis Ababa. Its founding members agreed to promote unity “by establishing and strengthening common institutions”; at the same time they pledged to uphold each state’s sovereignty and maintain the integrity of the inherited colonial frontiers. Lip service continued to be given to the ideal of African unity, though increasingly this was interpreted in terms of history and cultural heritage and not as a realistic short-term political ambition. A sixth Pan-African Congress, meeting in Dar es Salaam in 1974, revealed many of these divisions. A number of Pan-African organizations were created, but these mainly represent sectional (e.g. trade union) or regional interests within the continent. Closer economic cooperation is a sought-after goal, the Abuja conference in 1991 declared that it aimed to create a Pan-African Economic Community by 2025.

By the end of the twentieth century Pan-Africanism had little significance within Africa other than as rhetoric. The main proponents of Pan-Africanism were within the black diaspora communities, mainly in the United States. Such ideas were strengthened by the Black Power movement of the 1960s–1970s, with its strong political agenda and stress on cultural and artistic identification with Africa.

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See also: **Négritude; Nkrumah, Kwame.**

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Dube, John Langalibalele (1871–1946)

First President of the South African Native National Congress

John Langalibalele Dube, often called the Booker T. Washington of South Africa, was an educator, minister, newspaper editor, and the first president of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), the forerunner of the African National Congress.

In the 1900s, all over South Africa, *kholwa* (Christian converts, ardent exponents of the Protestant work ethic and the value of private property) were hampered in their quest for accumulation and acceptance. In response, they created a network of political associations, among them the Natal Native Congress, which John Dube helped found in 1901. It aimed to secure a nonracial franchise and freehold land tenure for Africans. Dube’s many activities led most white Natalians to regard him as a dangerous agitator in these years, and he was detained for alleged sedition during the South African War and was reprimanded for his articles during the 1906 Poll Tax rebellion in Natal. When, in 1907–1908, the Zulu king Dinuzulu was arrested and tried for allegedly inciting the rebellion, Dube’s *Ilanga lase Natal*, an English- and Zulu-language newspaper, defended him passionately.

The impending unification of the South African colonies spurred more unified black action, and Dube used the columns of *Ilanga* to urge British intervention against a union in which Africans would not be citizens. In 1909, he helped convene the South African Native Convention to oppose the color bar in the Act of Union, and accompanied a deputation to Britain to lobby against the legislation. Known at this time as Mafukuzela, “the one who struggles against obstacles,” Dube was elected first president general of the newly formed SANNC in 1912.

In 1913, the Natives Land Act, which restricted African landholding, and transformed rent-paying and sharecropping tenants into laborers, enabled the SANNC to mobilize a far wider constituency. In 1913–1914, Dube denounced the act, and led a SANNC delegation to Britain in an unsuccessful attempt to get it reversed. Nevertheless, by 1917 he had been ousted from the organization’s presidency, ostensibly because of his preparedness to accept the principle of segregation embedded in the act.

In the interwar years, Dube was part of a conservative establishment of wealthier *kholwa* landowners and professionals who felt increasingly threatened by rising radicalism among African workers, and what he termed the “socialistic” principles espoused by Africans on the Rand. In 1927 he refused to cooperate with the African National Congress under the

left-wing Josiah Gumede, and in 1930 threw his weight behind the conservative Pixley Seme as president, joining his executive administration. They soon fell out, however, and Dube retreated to his Natal base. Successive attempts to bring Dube and Natal back into the national fold failed, and by the 1940s Dube was too ill to remain active. In 1945 his designated successor, Abner Mtimkulu, was defeated in the elections for presidency of the Natal Congress by A.W.G. Champion, Dube's longtime rival and former leader of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in Natal. Champion now returned Natal to the national fold.

During the 1920s Dube attended the second Pan-African Conference in London called by W. E. B. DuBois and was clearly influenced by the latter's call for race pride and purity. These ideas affected Dube's thinking on his return to South Africa, and he now sought popular support through strengthening his links with the Zulu royal family. In 1924 Dube became deeply involved in the restructuring of the first Inkatha movement, which aimed to gain state recognition for the Zulu monarchy as the "mouthpiece of the Zulu nation."

At the same time, Dube participated in government-created native conferences and with white liberals in the Joint Council of Europeans and Non-Europeans in Durban. In 1935, despite his membership in the executive committee of the All-Africa Convention (which was formed to fight legislation designed to remove Cape Africans from the voters' roll), Dube supported the legislation, persuaded that it would secure extra reserved land for Africans. In 1937 and again in 1942 he was elected by rural Natal to the Native Representative Council created by this legislation, but when he retired in 1945, his seat was won by the then unknown Chief Albert Luthuli.

For all his ambiguities, Dube was one of the pioneers of African nationalism in South Africa and a man of considerable educational and literary achievement. In addition to his journalism for *Ilanga lase Natal*, he published *Isita Somuntu Nguye (The Enemy of the African is Himself, 1922)*, *Insila ka Shaka (Jeje, the Bodyservant of King Tshaka, 1933)*, and *Ushembe (1935)*, a biography of the independent leader and prophet who founded the independent Israelite Church in Natal. In 1936 he was the first African to be awarded an honorary degree by the University of South Africa, for his contribution to African education. He died of a stroke in 1946.

SHULA MARKS

See also: **Plaatje, Sol T.; South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910.**

Biography

Born 1871 at the American Zulu mission of Inanda. Educated at Inanda and Amanzimtoti Training Institute (later Adams). Sailed for the United States in 1887, and subsequently attended Oberlin College. Returning to Natal, married Nokutela Mdina, and together they began mission work among the Qadi. Returned to study at a theological seminary in the United States in 1896; ordained, and used the opportunity to collect money for a school planned for the Ohlange in the Inanda district. Returned to Natal in 1899 and was appointed pastor there at Inanda (until 1908). Opened Ohlange in 1901, the first industrial school founded and run by an African, and in 1903 launched *Ilanga lase Natal*, remaining its editor until 1915. In 1936 was the first African to be awarded an honorary degree by the University of South Africa, for contributions to African education. Died of a stroke in 1946.

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Durban

The coastal city of Durban (Zulu name, Tekweni) originated as the British trading settlement of Port Natal in 1824 and developed in the twentieth century into one of southern Africa's most important commercial ports, manufacturing centers, and holiday resorts. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the surrounding region was dominated by the Natal Nguni-speaking peoples and the Zulu kingdom that lay to the north. After Portuguese explorer Vasco De Gama noted, in 1497, that it afforded an ideal natural harbor and elevated bluff, European merchants arrived at the site to trade with African communities for skins and ivory. Thereafter, the white presence in Durban and its environs increased, culminating in the establishment of an urban society deeply divided by race and class.

Durban's early history was characterized by the ebb and flow of frontier relations among Boer Voortrekkers, English traders, and the majority Nguni. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the fledgling trading settlement, established by ex-Cape Colonists Francis Farewell and Henry Fynn, was dominated by African society and overshadowed by the emerging Zulu kingdom. Initially, the founder of the Zulu state, Shaka kaSenzangakhona, granted the white settlers permission to occupy the site and trade in the area subject to Zulu authority. In the early 1820s, African custom and law prevailed in Port Natal society as white settlers adapted to the local context and the majority African population, to the extent that they acted as "client" Zulu chiefs. As Shaka consolidated his control over the region through a process referred to as the *mfecane*, Nguni chiefdoms which were not subordinated to the Zulu dispersed, sending waves of refugees toward Port Natal. Tensions rose between the settlement and the Zulu state as the Zulu king perceived the burgeoning refugee population as a potential threat. Following Shaka's assassination in 1828, his successor, Dingane, faced two fronts of white expansion; one from Port Natal, and one from Boer Trekkers, who had recently fled the British-dominated Cape, and settled in the region.

Over the course of the next 20 years, Cape colonial and British imperial intervention supported the settlement's expansion. In 1835 an uneasy peace between the Port Natal settlers and the Zulu was established by the British missionary, Allen Gardiner, who laid the foundations for an organized permanent urban settlement and named it after the then governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. An initial alliance between the Trekkers and Durban traders against the Zulu led to military conflict as the Boers and traders sought to push the Zulu back. The Boers, however, asserted their hegemony over the region by establishing the Republic of Natalia after their victory over the Zulu at the Ncome River in 1838. In response, British troops occupied Durban in 1842. The early settler, Dick King, then saved Durban from Boer retaliation at the battle of Congella by making a now legendary ride to Grahamstown for relief. After the repulse of Boer forces, the Cape governor, Sir George Napier, annexed Natal on May 31, 1844, because of British concern over intensified Boer conflict with Africans which threatened to spill over into the Cape and the potential for the strategic port to fall into the hands of a foreign power.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Durban developed into a white-dominated city as the forces of settler capitalism transformed the urban space and the region. In 1846, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, diplomatic agent to the native tribes, implemented a system of segregation that limited African ownership of land to a

series of fragmented reserves. Thereafter, white settlement proceeded apace as land with the potential for sugar-cane cultivation came available. Demands for cheap labor grew as the port and merchant sectors of Durban expanded with the development of rail links to mining centers in the interior. These demands were filled with Indian immigrants, who later established themselves as market gardeners and merchants, and migrant African workers who established niches as dockworkers and domestic servants. Despite the upheaval of violent conflict in the region during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, Durban flourished. Indeed, these conflicts only served to stimulate the local economy and to galvanize white racist attitudes. A combination of a burgeoning white settler population and economic development culminated in Britain granting Natal, and its principle city, responsible government in 1893.

After the turn of the century, Durban became increasingly ordered and segregated along racial lines. Municipal authorities instituted the notorious Durban System, a pernicious structure of racist administration for urban Africans founded on the local government's monopoly over beer brewing and sales to African workers. Revenue from the monopoly paid for the intensified control of African lives in cramped barrack accommodations. Nevertheless, Africans and Indians established a vibrant presence in the city and it was home to some of South Africa's leading opposition politicians, including John Dube, A. W. G. Champion, and Mohandas Gandhi. During the 1920s and early 1930s, African society took advantage of a small legislative window of opportunity, prior to implementation of the Natives Law Amendment Act (1937), to purchase land on the fringes of the city. There, Africans established informal townships which grew into significant communities such as the Chateau and Good Hope estates.

By the end of the 1920s, however, racial tensions and oppression led to increased African resistance and opposition to the local white state. Africans responded to low wages, harsh working conditions, and egregious pass laws with a series of strikes that climaxed in the 1929 dockworkers' municipal beer hall boycott and a pass-burning demonstration in 1930. Both were brutally suppressed by the white authorities. During the later 1930s, the Durban government tightened control of Africans in the city, proclaimed the municipality a whites-only area and relegated Africans to a series of planned townships such as KwaMashu, Umlazi, and Chesterville. Thus, the city government segregated completely and made invisible the African presence outside the workplace.

In the apartheid years (1948–1991) African worker tensions intensified as the city's economy and population

grew rapidly, rising from 162,000 people (over half African) in 1950 to 395,000 in 1970 and topping 2.5 million today. Increased urbanization and industrialization in the 1940s heightened tensions not only between whites and Africans, but also between Africans and the minority Indian population. In 1949, unable to make an effective attack on dominant white society, impoverished Africans struck at the Indian merchants they believed were taking advantage of them and plunged the city into riots. This was a turning point for Durban society, as each ethnic group sought to define itself in opposition to the others during the height of the Apartheid era. During the 1970s, the city was the focus of national attention as widespread strikes presaged the “Durban Moment,” a period when local opposition groups set the pace for political change in South Africa. The catalyst for this united opposition to apartheid was the forced removal of informal African communities, such as Cato Manor, from the city and their “consolidation” into adjoining areas of the KwaZulu homeland. By 1984–1985 the tide was turning against the white minority government. African strike action intensified and African workers launched the Congress of South African Trade Unions in Durban’s King’s Park rugby stadium. Thereafter, Durban was often at the forefront of the struggle against apartheid.

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See also: **Natal, Nineteenth Century.**

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Dyula: See Juula/Dyula.

E

East African Community, the, 1967–1977

The East African Community, which formally came into existence on December 1, 1967, was largely a reorganization of an already existing customs union (also providing other services) between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, which shared a joint British colonial heritage.

This customs union had come under increasing strain since the three nations had achieved independence. The East African Treaty of Cooperation sought to make their association more amenable to all involved parties. The three countries were associated by means of a common market that included a uniform external tariff and free trade on imported goods, a common currency, and a number of shared services such as railways, ports, and airways which had been brought together under the former East African Common Services Organization (EACSO). The main problem that needed to be rectified, as seen by Tanzania and Uganda, was that both the common market and services operated to the advantage of Kenya rather than the other two members, and sometimes to their actual disadvantage. In essence, because Kenya was more developed, it attracted the most investment while also maintaining the majority of employment opportunities, as the headquarters of most were located in Kenya.

Attempts at reform during the early 1960s had not worked, and by 1965 the common market was in danger of collapse. A commission under an independent chairman, the Danish economist Professor K. Philip, drew up a new treaty of East African cooperation (EAC), which came into force in December 1967. Its most important features were a transfer tax, an East African development bank, and the decentralization of the various common services headquarters. The object of the transfer tax (an import duty) that the three could impose on each other was to protect new manufacturing industries from existing ones in Kenya; in effect,

the measure was designed to encourage the growth of new industries in the two weaker partners. Under the treaty each member had to appoint a minister responsible for community activities.

A factor that worked against the success of the community was the clear divergence, in both character and political beliefs, of the three heads of state. Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta was a generation older than both Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Uganda's Milton Obote. While Kenyatta was a conservative pragmatist, Nyerere was a dedicated socialist and something of an ideologue; meanwhile Obote was also in the process of moving to the political left. By 1970 a growing gap had developed between the moderate pro-Western policies of Kenya and the increasingly left-wing policies of the other two. One result of the 1967 Arusha Declaration in Tanzania, for example, was to persuade a number of Tanzanian civil servants to leave government service to go into the private sector, or seek jobs in the civil service.

The coup of January 1971, which ousted Obote and brought the unpredictable Idi Amin to power in Uganda, posed a potentially disastrous threat to the EAC. Tanzania refused to recognize the new government, and Nyerere declined to meet with Amin while giving political asylum to Obote. For most of 1971 the EAC was in crisis while the continuing (and growing) disparity in economic development between Kenya and the other two partners led to more or less permanent tensions between them. At that stage, the three determined to keep the EAC alive, as each considered dissolving the organization to be against their best interests. A row between Tanzania and Uganda centered on Amin's unilateral appointment of a new minister to the EAC without consultation as required under the treaty. Kenya attempted to mediate between the two nations.

The uneasy relations between the three led Zambia, which had opened formal negotiations in 1969 to join the EAC, to suspend its application. Kenya, meanwhile,

complained that generous Chinese aid to Tanzania to help finance the TANZAM (Tanzania/Zambia) railway was undermining the demand for competitive goods (that is, Kenyan products) elsewhere in the community. Heavy losses by the East African Airways Corporation were another cause for concern.

By 1973 the situation had demonstrably worsened. Amin's erratic policies were wreaking havoc with the EAC, disrupting community trade and damaging tourism, which was vital to all three members. At the same time, both Tanzania and Uganda were imposing restrictions on Kenyan manufactured goods. In Kenya's parliament a call was made to revise the treaty. Amin called for an East African Federation. Meanwhile, most of the joint services or corporations ran into trouble, and the East African Income Tax Department was dismantled. In 1974 Kenya refused to remit Harbour Corporation funds to the head office in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania accused Kenya of depositing funds in a secret railway account to avoid sharing the money with its partners. Relations between Kenya and Tanzania deteriorated to the point that in December 1974 Kenya closed all but one border post with its neighbor, accusing Tanzania of trying to ruin its trade with Zambia.

The crisis in the community came to a head in 1975. In August a treaty review commission was set up to alleviate the growing tension. However, the EAC finally collapsed at the end of 1976, after a seminar attended by community specialists and the review commission both failed to produce any acceptable remedy.

Instead, the primary issue became how to disentangle the various joint services. This was made no easier by the fact that some services, most notably East African Railways, had been woefully mismanaged. Kenya favored a free trade common market and the retention of the East African Development Bank. Uganda was most troubled by the collapse of the EAC because it had no access to the sea. Under Nyerere, Tanzania was always suspicious of the capitalist path pursued by Kenya.

The end came in December 1977, when President Nyerere attacked Kenya for trying to alter the structures of the EAC in its favor and for behaving as though the community was primarily Kenya's, while treating Tanzania and Uganda as poor relations. There was no precisely negotiated end to the community; rather, it disintegrated gradually, although in January 1978 a Swiss diplomat, Victor Umbricht, was selected to preside over the liquidation of the community's assets.

Perhaps the differences between the three countries, and the different political paths they pursued, were always bound to bring an end to such an association. The principal reasons for the growing disunity could be summarized under four headings: political deadlock

and mistrust, the disparities in gains and losses, the operation of the various joint corporations, and the imbalance in trade (trade restrictions between members had been increased through 1974).

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Eastern Africa: Regional Survey

Introduction

Eastern Africa, including northeastern Africa, is a region of considerable diversity in terms of physical geography, climate, ethnicity, and culture. It is also the cradle of humankind itself. While it is no straightforward matter to enclose the history of such a vast region within a single encyclopedic entry, the purpose of the present essay is to describe the key political, economic, and social themes that have defined the region's historical development. Geographical as well as chronological cut-off points are so often arbitrary, and sometimes misleading; but they are, for the sake of convenience and clarity, usually necessary. In the context of eastern Africa, it will be shown that, while there are discernible historical links between north-east and central-eastern Africa—most notably in the migration of Cushites and Nilotes from the Horn southward—the two areas are in many ways quite distinct in terms of patterns of change, and in particular in terms of political organization, population, and culture. Yet thematically they have much in common.

Perhaps the most important theme shared by polities and communities from the Red Sea coast to the more southerly shoreline of the Indian Ocean is the fact that the entire region has historically always had close links with the Middle East, and in particular the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. These links were strengthened with the rise of Islam, following which the Indian Ocean, with the Red Sea as a vital appendage, formed a vast arena of commercial and cultural interaction. This region of Africa has, therefore,

always looked to the east in terms of cultural and material exchange, just as Eastern Africa has historically been a natural area of interest to western and central Asians, both before and after Muhammad, and the socioeconomic consequences of the external relations thus developed have been significant and on-going. This basic historical fact has scarcely been altered by the opening of the Suez Canal in the late nineteenth century, or the European colonial experience in the twentieth.

Geography helps to explain patterns of human history across this vast region. The Ethiopian highlands, including parts of Eritrea, consist largely of volcanic material that breaks down to give a rich, deep soil; in general, rain falls abundantly and the cool uplands offer a favorable climate. This fertile highland area is a natural center of civilization, and for much of its history the region's rugged terrain engendered a certain degree of isolation from other parts of northeastern and eastern Africa, facilitating the growth of some of the continent's most distinctive cultures and polities. Between the highland area and the sea is the plain of Somalia, also linking up with Djibouti and coastal Eritrea, which is generally dry and torrid and incapable of sustaining a large settled population, instead being home predominantly to nomadic societies. Further south lies the vast plateau of central East Africa, which has its highest point in the Ruwenzori Mountains, sometimes described as the "spine" of Africa. To the east and south of the Ruwenzori ranges lies the Great Lakes region of eastern Africa: the main lakes are Victoria, Tanganyika, and Malawi, but there are many others. Much of the great plateau land of central East Africa is hot and dry, representing a challenge to cultivators, but there are important exceptions. The cool and fertile Kenyan highlands contain excellent farming country; the slopes of Kilimanjaro on the Kenyan-Tanzanian border and the Shire highlands south of Lake Malawi have similar advantages. The region between lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Kivu (the area of present-day Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) has abundant rainfall and the resulting fertility has made it another natural center of civilization.

Northeastern Africa to the Late Nineteenth Century

The movement of Semitic peoples across the Red Sea from the Arabian peninsula into the highlands of modern Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, sometime around the middle of the first millennium BCE, was a major stimulus to state-formation in the region. Intermingling with indigenous peoples, they developed Ge'ez, the ancestor of modern Tigrinya and Amharic, as a written language and created a centralized state in the northern highland area whose capital was soon fixed at

Axum in Tigray. Taking advantage of Red Sea trade through their port at Adulis, Axum had, by the third and fourth centuries CE, become the dominant state in the region, boasting effective military organization, remarkable stone architecture and considerable commercial wealth. It was also, from the mid-fourth century, that King Ezana (c.320–350), a Christian, is credited with the adoption of Christianity in what appears to have been the culmination of a long period of contact with Greek traders. Axum remained powerful until the seventh century, when its trading power was weakened by both Persia and, more significantly, the rise of Islam, while environmental degradation may also have occurred in the northern Ethiopian highlands. As Axum disintegrated, its agricultural peoples found themselves increasingly isolated from the Eurasian core of Christianity, with profound consequences for the region.

Axum declined, but Christianity and Semitic culture continued to flourish. In the centuries that followed the eclipse of the Axumite state, the Christian polity incorporated the Agaw-speaking Cushites, particularly those in the area of Lasta, into Christian and Semitic culture. Evolving as part of the political and military elite, the Agaw-speakers of Lasta seized control of the kingdom in the middle of the twelfth century, establishing what has become known as the Zagwe dynasty. The Zagwes were responsible for continued Christian expansion southward into Gojjam and Shoa, and for some of Ethiopia's most remarkable architecture, in the form of rock-hewn churches; they also presided over considerable commercial and religious interaction with Egypt and the Holy Land. Nonetheless, they were derided as usurpers, both by contemporary and subsequent chroniclers. They were overthrown in 1270 by a ruler claiming descent from King Solomon and Makeda, the queen of Saba. Thus established, or "restored," as the dynasty would have it, the so-called Solomonic line would continue to claim political and spiritual legitimacy through imaginative use of the Old Testament down to the twentieth century. Elaborate myths were subsequently developed around the idea of a continuous historic "Ethiopian" state with biblical connections.

The Christian kingdom of the central Ethiopian highlands enjoyed a period of military expansion through much of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, particularly during the reigns of Amda Sion (1314–1344) and Zara Yaqob (1434–1468), who must count among the region's most successful rulers. Yet even during the fifteenth century, resurgent Islam represented a new threat. Islam, of course, had increasingly enclosed the Ethiopian highlands for the past several centuries, but relations between Christians and Muslims in northeast Africa had been largely peaceful for much of the period between the seventh and

fifteenth centuries, notwithstanding periodic clashes mostly on the eastern Ethiopian plateau. Commerce had thrived between the Christians of the highlands and the Muslim merchants of the coast; relations with Egypt from the eleventh century onward had been good enough to allow highland Christians to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in safety. But conflict escalated in the fifteenth century, probably in large part related to commercial rivalry, and stemming from the growing hold of Islam over the pastoral Somali peoples in the eastern Horn.

In the early sixteenth century, the Muslim polity around Harar under the leadership of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim launched a full-scale invasion of the Christian highlands in the name of a jihad that came close to destroying the Christian church in the region. The latter ultimately survived, with the assistance of the Portuguese who had lent military aid and introduced the first European missionaries to the area; but so too did Islam, which continued to expand through the region. This occurred at least partly as the result of Oromo movement into the Ethiopian highlands from the southern plains, a fairly rapid migration that was made possible by the religious wars of the mid-sixteenth century.

The Ethiopian church, meanwhile, had developed some quite distinctive characteristics, based on the notion that the Christians of the region, surrounded by Muslim and pagan enemies, constituted a second Israel, chosen by God. This was closely intertwined with the Solomonic myth upheld by the ruling elite. Through the seventeenth century, meanwhile, the Christian kingdom steadily shifted its center of gravity northward, with a permanent capital established at Gondar and Tigray more fully incorporated into the state; in part this shift was occasioned by the expansion of trade through Massawa on the coast, under Ottoman suzerainty.

While the Red Sea, including much of the Eritrean coastline, remained under Ottoman control, centralized authority in the Ethiopian highlands had collapsed by the middle of the eighteenth century. The Solomonic rulers were reduced to mere figureheads, the idea of a great and unified Christian empire being merely part of the region's historic imagination. In some senses this may be seen as the culmination of a process stretching back several centuries. While central government had undergone periods of expansion and contraction since the collapse of Axum, the basis of political power had always been locally or provincially rooted, with autonomous districts and even small individual "kingdoms" paying periodic military, diplomatic, and material tribute as much to an idea (the Solomonic myth) as to an actual physical center of power.

From the mid-eighteenth century, provincial rulers became wholly independent and the ensuing century, known as the "Zemene Mesafint," or "era of the princes," witnessed regional conflict between them. Only with the rise of Tewodros (1855–1868), who claimed the Solomonic inheritance, was some degree of unity achieved in northern and central Ethiopia, although even this was accomplished through sheer force, while much of Tewodros's reign was spent suppressing insurrection. Tewodros himself committed suicide in 1868 in the face of a British expedition to rescue a number of European hostages; but the unification process begun by him was taken up by Yohannes (1872–1889), the first Tigrayan ruler of the Christian state for several centuries, and was completed by the Shoan king Menelik (1889–1913). Menelik created modern Ethiopia: not only did he defeat an Italian army invading from Eritrea in 1896, thus saving his state from the colonial experience endured by the rest of the region, but he actively participated in the carving up of vast tracts of land to the south and east, demarcating his new empire with the agreement of the European colonial authorities in the territories adjacent to it.

Central East Africa: Interior and Coast

The early history of the central eastern African interior is to a very large extent the history of migrations and population movements that occurred over three millennia or more. Throughout this period, it is possible to discern a gradual and complex evolutionary process in which people adopted new technologies, techniques and economic forms, always adding the innovations introduced by immigrants to the corpus of past knowledge and experience. Integration, both cultural and economic, was continuous, while at the same time economic specialization gave rise to a flourishing regional commercial network. The first discernible movement into the region occurred around 2000BCE, when domesticated cattle were introduced by Cushitic-speakers into the area of central Kenya. Over the next millennium, a new kind of economy emerged in which livestock were becoming increasingly important. Next came the Bantu-speakers, who moved into the area from the west and southwest over the ensuing centuries: these ironworking farmers spread through and beyond the Great Lakes region, developing diversified economic systems based on agriculture and pastoralism. Their successful spread through the region was directly linked to their ability to adapt to new environments, borrowing and utilizing the knowledge of indigenous peoples.

Major changes continued to take place in the middle centuries of the second millennium CE. Further migrations between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries,

suggested by increased cattle keeping and changes in pottery styles, seem to have had some bearing on the growth of a large number of small chiefdoms throughout the lacustrine region, among which a thriving commercial network developed. By around the middle of the fifteenth century, some of these chiefdoms had merged to form the state of Kitara, in southwest Uganda, which was initially ruled by a dynasty known as the Chwezi from their capital at Bigo. Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, a series of Nilotic migrations (so called because of their original use of Nilo-Saharan languages) entered the area from southern Ethiopia and Sudan. These had a major impact on state building and on the creation of new societies and cultures in the area, usually interacting with Bantu-speakers and adopting Bantu languages. The “western” Nilotes carved the new state of Bunyoro out of the former Kitara and appear to have been instrumental in the founding and growth of the kingdom of Buganda; they also probably originated the pastoralists groups of Ankole and of Rwanda and Burundi, areas in which they were known as Hima and Tutsi, respectively. The “southern” Nilotes, whose movement probably began rather earlier, moved into the highlands east of Lake Victoria, absorbing the Cushites and laying the foundations for the emergence of the Kalenjin and Dadog groups, while the “eastern” Nilotes, unusual in that they retained their own language and culture, originated the Karamojong and Maasai.

Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Buganda, with an economy based very largely on the banana plantation, became the dominant state in the lacustrine region, developing an effective and highly hierarchical administrative system, and articulating a developed sense of identity, expressed most effectively in the military context. It supplanted Bunyoro as the main regional power and expanded to control, directly or indirectly, a large area of modern southern, central, and western Uganda. Further south, in equally fertile climes, were the states of Rwanda and Burundi, in which the agricultural majority came to be increasingly dominated by a pastoral minority. These ruling elites were well established by the eighteenth century. The Tutsi of the highlands interacted with the local Hutu, at first trading cattle for food with the agricultural population; in time, however, the Tutsi clans developed a commercial relationship into a position of domination, lending cattle to farmers who offered herding services in return.

Political leadership in both Rwanda and Burundi came to be associated with ownership of cattle; live-stock owners became an aristocratic warrior elite, offering protection to their subjects from raids by rival clans. Elsewhere, largely decentralized but no less successful or dynamic, the pastoral Maasai expanded

across central Kenya and northern Tanzania, their age-set social structure and ideology of pastoral purity providing them with both the means to, and justification for, such expansionism. Yet they also interacted peacefully with the many smaller agricultural communities which were scattered across the Tanzanian plateau. Overall, central eastern Africa had, by the nineteenth century, developed remarkable economic and political, as well as cultural, diversity, which lent itself to both cooperation and conflict.

Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean coast was witnessing the rise of one eastern Africa’s most remarkable and successful civilizations, the result of dynamic interaction between coastal African culture and Islamic civilization. The east African coast had been known to Greek and Roman traders in the early centuries CE, but the expansion of Islam from the seventh and eighth centuries brought the region into a vast commercial network linked with Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and India. Both political refugees and merchants from the Islamic world began settling along the northern coast, their presence easing trading relations between the regions; Arab traders used the patterns of the oceanic monsoon winds to travel down to Mogadishu, Barawa, and the Lamu islands.

As trade expanded, larger numbers of Arabs settled in coastal towns, often located on off-shore islands, where they intermarried with local elites, and by the ninth century a number of market towns had been established, such as those at Lamu, Zanzibar and Kilwa. Trading links, moreover, existed between coastal settlements along the entire stretch of coast from Mogadishu to Mozambique. These were essentially African settlements linked to a thriving long-distance trade network that carried ivory, wood, slaves, and gold out of eastern Africa and brought glassware, pottery, textiles, and Islamic luxury goods into the region. The most important import of all, however, was Islam itself, which would become deeply rooted in coastal society.

From this vibrant commercial environment emerged Swahili coastal civilization. The term “Swahili” itself denotes both a language (basically Bantu, with Arabic influence) and a distinctive culture, describing a series of commercial city-states along the coasts of modern Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique. It can be discerned as having begun to emerge around the area of the Lamu islands between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. Its expansion was occasioned by increasing demand for eastern African gold and ivory as well as increased Arab settlement along the coast, particularly from the direction of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Islam was adopted by local ruling elites, into which Muslim settlers married, and a number of towns built mosques; Arab immigrants were drawn ever further south to the

expanding settlements of Zanzibar, Mafia, Pemba, and Kilwa. Kilwa was particularly successful, controlling the gold trade from the Zimbabwe plateau through its southerly settlement at Sofala. Other Swahili city-states (there were approximately forty of them of varying sizes by the thirteenth century) generated considerable wealth and functioned as self-governing political units ruled by prosperous African-Islamic dynasties, which accurately or otherwise usually traced their ancestry to the Persian Gulf area.

This "golden era" of Swahili civilization, however, was violently interrupted by the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean at the end of the fifteenth century. Searching for a new route to the commerce of the east, they stumbled on the thriving coastal trade, which they now sought to control, attacking one city-state after the other with characteristic brutality. Having seized control of the southern coast, the Portuguese built stone fortresses at Kilwa, Sofala, and Mozambique, providing bases for journeys to India and giving them control of the interior gold trade. Swahili resistance, however, continued in the north, centered around Mombasa, which was attacked repeatedly through the sixteenth century. The Portuguese finally overcame this resistance, building an imposing fortress, Fort Jesus, at Mombasa at the end of the sixteenth century. Fort Jesus became the center and symbol of Portuguese control in eastern Africa, a period of commercial dominance maintained by violence. This was also the period which witnessed, further north, the Portuguese moving into the Red Sea and opening relations with the Ethiopian highlands.

At the close of the seventeenth century, a fleet from Oman drove the Portuguese from most of their coastal settlements, apart from their southernmost colony of Mozambique, initiating a gradual recovery of Swahili commercial culture. Through much of the eighteenth century, Omani control of the Swahili coast was weak and decentralized, but toward the end of the century the Omani sultan began to strengthen his hold over the city-states and the trade networks which connected them. The main focus of Omani expansion and the center of their increasing authority was the island of Zanzibar, and it was to here that the energetic Sultan Seyyid Said moved his permanent capital in the 1830s. Seyyid Said presided over a substantial increase in the Omani Zanzibari sphere of influence, as well as the penetration of Zanzibari merchants into the interior: trading caravans had reached the Great Lakes region by the end of the 1840s. The nineteenth century thus saw intense commercial activity throughout central eastern Africa, with the states and societies of the interior becoming linked to the Indian Ocean commercial system; the system itself was dominated by Zanzibar until the partition of the region in the 1880s.

This had major consequences for vast areas of the interior. Omani-Swahili merchants had established permanent trading posts at Unyanyembe, in northern central Tanzania, and at Ujiji, on Lake Tanganyika, by the 1840s. These functioned as entrepôts drawing the region into long-distance commerce. Some traders penetrated beyond the lakes, such as Tippu Tip, who carved out a vast trading-raiding empire in the forests of the eastern Congo basin. These aggressive adventurers sought to take advantage of decentralized or acephalous societies; but further north, Buganda kept coastal traders under their control, notwithstanding the growing influence of Islam within the society itself, while commercial impulses gave rise to new and equally aggressive states. Mirambo among the Nyamwezi created a new state in northwest Tanzania in the 1870s that was highly militaristic and that aimed at breaking Arab domination of interior commerce and controlling Lake Victoria trade routes.

Slaves were the main export from the region: the East African slave trade had been escalating since the late eighteenth century, as demand for labor on Zanzibar, Pemba, and French-controlled islands in the Indian Ocean rose, and as the expansion of the Russian Empire closed off traditional sources of slaves to the Islamic world. Ivory was also important, with demand for African tusks increasing through the nineteenth century.

The overall impact on the interior was a rise in violence, the increasing militarization of African society, and considerable dislocation of people. The Yao, for example, became actively involved in slave raiding across southern Tanzania, northern Mozambique, Malawi, and eastern Zambia; the ravages of the slave trade later provided the British with an excuse, albeit largely disingenuous, for colonial intervention in this area. Buganda also responded aggressively to long-distance commerce, becoming the largest exporter of slaves in the northern lacustrine region and developing a fleet of canoes with the aim of controlling Lake Victoria; the Nyamwezi, finally, became famous initially as porters, and later as highly successful traders, adventurers, and entrepreneurs themselves.

Eastern African trade received a further boost following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Yet the commercial system was inimical to the region's long-term economic development: the slave trade was doomed, especially as Europeans sought to crush the slave traders in East Africa, both African and Arab. The commerce in ivory was also heading for disaster: too many elephants were being destroyed, and ivory resources were disappearing deep into the central African interior. On a fundamental level, these two trades were based on war and violence, with little hope of progress, and certainly involving no significant agricultural

development. Colonial occupation changed this pattern dramatically, establishing cash crops for export as the basis for the East African economy.

The Modern Era

Like every other region across the continent, eastern Africa was subjected to colonial invasion in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The advent of colonialism was preceded in many areas by the presence of missionaries (for example, those in Buganda and south of Lake Victoria), explorers, and consular officials. By the 1880s, Britain and Germany, by mutual agreement, had divided central eastern Africa: Britain took Kenya and Uganda, surrendering its traditional sphere of influence over the central Zanzibari coast to Germany, which acquired Tanganyika, Rwanda, and Burundi. Further north, the pastoral and agricultural peoples of the Horn, including Somalis, found themselves partitioned between Britain, France, and Italy; the last, a newcomer to the “Scramble,” also acquired Eritrea on the Red Sea coast. Menelik’s new empire-state (popularly referred to as Abyssinia, later Ethiopia) was an additional participant in the “Scramble” for this region, as already noted. Ethiopia’s independent status awarded it a unique role in the region’s modern history, particularly during the reign of Haile Selassie (1930–1974), serving as an inspiration to African nationalists across and beyond the continent, presenting itself as the guardian of ancient African civilization, and being regarded somewhat romantically (and, in general, sympathetically) by the West.

Responses to the European invasion varied from society to society. In some areas, resistance was more or less immediate. The Germans, for example, were confronted with stiff resistance from the peoples of southern and central Tanzania from the mid-1880s, while the kingdom of Bunyoro fought against the British almost as soon as the latter had established a permanent presence north of Lake Victoria. There was also strong resistance from Zanzibari-Arab coastal communities. Other societies sought to turn the European presence to their advantage; perhaps the most dramatic example of such “collaboration” was Buganda, which acted as the agent of British imperialism in southern and central Uganda through much of the 1890s, and later gave its name to the territory. In some areas, “primary” resistance—the initial attempt to defend sovereignty against colonial invasion—was followed by a phase of “secondary” resistance, involving spontaneous and popular revolt against the established colonial state. The most notable example of this is probably the “Maji Maji” uprising in southern Tanzania, lasting from 1905 to early 1907. At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that across huge swathes of eastern Africa, cumulative environmental crises had undermined

the ability of many states and societies to offer effective resistance to colonial invasion. Large areas of central eastern Africa had, through the nineteenth century, witnessed changing patterns of human settlement as a result of the slave trade, leading to a dramatic expansion of sleeping sickness. Then, at the end of the 1880s, a rinderpest epidemic swept from Eritrea down through Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, indeed continuing all the way to the Cape Colony by 1897. This great cattle disease devastated pastoral communities throughout the region, leaving them destitute and vulnerable at a time of foreign incursion.

The colonial experience differed from territory to territory. Kenya was singled out early on as a colony for white settlement, which had profound consequences for the territory’s subsequent development: massive land alienation would produce a mounting social crisis on overcrowded reserves and in the burgeoning slums of cities, while deep social divisions among Africans themselves, particularly the Kikuyu, would further complicate the struggle for economic and political representation. Uganda was more typical in that the cash-crop production of cotton was in the hands of African peasant producers, but the latter were still discriminated against by a marketing system controlled by foreigners, in this case predominantly Asians.

The key theme of Uganda’s colonial experience, however, was the favored treatment given by the British to Buganda, which dominated the territory at the expense of several other significant ethnic groupings. A similar situation arose in Rwanda and Burundi, where the Germans, followed after 1919 by the Belgians, deepened social divisions between Hutu and Tutsi by awarding the latter special political status. Tanganyika, under British control after 1919 through a League of Nations mandate, enjoyed rather greater unity through the further promotion and growth of Swahili as a territorial language. To the north, while modern Eritrean identity was to a substantial degree forged by its colonial experience, through the development of a light manufacturing economy and the emergence of discernible working and middle classes, Ethiopia continued to function very much along the feudal lines of the past. It found itself in a considerably weaker position in 1935 than in 1896, both diplomatically and militarily, and the Italian invasion ordered by Mussolini was this time successful, even if the triumph was short-lived.

In 1940–1941, British forces swept through Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Italian Somaliland, ending the Italian East African empire, while Ethiopia regained its independence. With United States and British backing, and with the acquiescence of a largely indifferent United Nations, Haile Selassie laid claim to and ultimately acquired Eritrea, first through a spurious “federation”

(1952–1962) and thereafter through direct occupation and administration. Eritreans responded with a war of liberation, and by the time Eritrea won independence in 1991 its armed struggle had the dubious honor of being the longest in Africa's modern history.

While Eritreans took up arms to end their peculiar form of "black-on-black" colonialism, much of the rest of eastern Africa ultimately achieved independence relatively peacefully, although nationalists in Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya had much in common. In Uganda and Kenya in the 1940s and 1950s, deep social, ethnic, and geographical divisions were reflected in the nationalist movements, just as in Eritrea in the same period the nationalist movement was unable to achieve a coherent unity. The nations of eastern Africa experienced the same problems in this period as their counterparts in other parts of the continent: the dilemma facing would-be nationalist leaders was the fact that while anticolonialism was the unifying factor for African independence movements, and independence the common goal behind which disparate groups might align themselves, colonialism itself had created states wholly artificial in composition and form, in which "nationalism" was often an abstract term introduced by essentially external circumstances. Ethnicity, regionalism, and, in some cases, religion were the defining elements in the expression of "nationalism." This meant that in the years preceding formal decolonization, there was in many territories as much concern among competing nationalist parties about the postcolonial balance of internal power as about the actual achievement of sovereign status.

Ugandan independence finally came about in 1962 through a compromise between the Buganda kingdom's monarchist party and the predominant party in the north, led by Milton Obote; but such deals proved temporary, and within a decade Uganda had succumbed to the brutal military rule of Idi Amin. Only after several years of bloodshed and civil strife has political tension eased to some degree. Tanganyika was able to more effectively unite under the leadership of the charismatic Julius Nyerere, who self-consciously played down the significance of ethnicity, while the territory also benefited from the linguistic unity provided by Swahili. Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, uniting with Zanzibar in 1964 to form Tanzania. Kenya's mounting social tensions erupted in the "Mau Mau" revolt of the early 1950s, which witnessed deep anger directed at both white settlers and members of the African elite. The British crushed the uprising with considerable brutality, at the same time imprisoning leading Kenyan nationalists such as Jomo Kenyatta, despite the fact that the latter was a largely moderate politician who had little in common with the "Mau Mau" radicals. The revolt itself did not succeed; but it

ultimately created a new political environment in which the British were no longer prepared to back the white minority and instead made way for African majority rule. Kenyatta led the country to independence in 1963.

While coups d'état and ethnic tensions have been common enough in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania have achieved relative, if uneasy, political stability. The worst instances of ethnic violence have occurred in Rwanda and Burundi, where colonialism, exaggerating precolonial divisions, has left a bitter legacy of ethnic mistrust and hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. Further north, Ethiopia and Somalia are among those African states that have experienced varying degrees of ideological revolution, rather more dramatic than Nyerere's failed socialist program in Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s. Somalia, the united former Italian and British colonies that achieved independence in 1960, enjoyed Soviet support after the advent to power of Siad Barre in 1969 and the emergence of a military-socialist state. But the Soviet Union soon switched its attention to Ethiopia, where a group of Marxist army officers overthrew the *ancien régime* of Haile Selassie in 1974 and proclaimed a Marxist revolution. Massive Soviet military aid was used to fight Eritrean and Tigrayan uprisings in the north and in Somalia in the south, the latter seeking the incorporation of the Somali peoples of the Ogaden. Ethiopia kept the Ogaden, but it lost Eritrea. The Marxist state of Mengistu Haile Mariam collapsed in 1991, leaving a new balance of regional power whose potential fragility was exposed by the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998.

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
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**Eastern Nilotes: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa:
Eastern Nilotes: Ateker (Karimojong); Nilotes,
Eastern Africa: Maasai.**

Eastern Savanna, Political Authority in

Between 1600 and 1800, the savanna areas of East Africa experienced diverse, often dynamic political development, and a gradual expansion of political systems linking wider networks of communities than ever before. These changes were often responses to increased social complexity spurred by a combination of factors, including the control of iron technology, increasing agricultural sophistication, and the growth of interregional trade. In some areas, increased complexity led to more hierarchical forms of authority, while in others it produced political segmentation into small chiefdoms. In many areas, people strove to maintain decentralized forms of organization, while at the same time incorporating more communities into a shared social and political framework. For the purposes of this entry, the eastern savanna can be roughly seen as two overlapping zones: a northern area of independent decentralized communities, stretching from Lake Turkana to the Maasai Steppe; and a southern area that included both decentralized villages and complex chiefdoms, occupying most of present-day Tanzania.

In the northern zone, a diverse array of languages, cultures, forms of subsistence, and micro-environments, gave rise to a highly decentralized and fluid arena of politics. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the area was occupied by a mosaic of communities, including early hunting-gathering peoples, Cushitic and Nilotic-speaking pastoralists, and Bantu-speaking agriculturalists. Political activity generally focused on localized institutions: the village, lineage, or age-set. Councils of elders made decisions instead of kings, chiefs, or bureaucrats, and many societies also sought guidance from ritual diviners and prophets. Individuals usually were not allowed to lay claim to land or other productive resources, so political influence accrued only to those who skillfully built up networks of allies and followers through manipulation of the structures of kinship, residence, and age. Kamba settlements, for example, were scattered across eastern Kenya and northeastern Tanzania and developed a range of subsistence strategies, from intensive agriculture to pastoralism and hunting, as each community learned to exploit its own micro-environment. In such a diffuse setting, politics retained a localized character,



East African savanna, c.1800

and individuals gained authority and leadership by distributing their wealth to attract followers and demonstrating exceptional character. It is important to note that technology, trade, and social organization were highly dynamic in the north, just as they were in the south, but that smaller political units rather than increased centralization were often the more appropriate way to deal with increasing complexity.

The northern zone was deeply influenced by the cultural outlook of migratory pastoralists, who moved into the area in waves over the course of several centuries. In the sixteenth century, Cushitic-speaking Oromo pastoralists began to expand from their Ethiopian homeland into the central highlands of Kenya. They brought a form of social organization rooted in small, scattered homesteads, linked by the ritual leadership of a prophet (*qallu*), as well as generation-sets and age-sets, which gave all Oromo males a common bond. It is likely that Oromo introduced many of these now-familiar institutions to the eastern savanna. But by the seventeenth century, another wave of pastoralists, Nilotic-speakers from the lands northwest of Lake Turkana, began to challenge Oromo for dominance in the central highlands. These newcomers, led by Maa-speaking communities as well as Kalenjin and Turkana, would eventually filter southward as far south as the Maasai Steppe, but they too adhered to a decentralized political ideology, with age-set organizations and prophetic ritual leaders. Many agricultural communities adopted forms of social organization from pastoralists as a means of facilitating relationships.

Kikuyu agriculturalists, for example, who settled along the highland ridges of central Kenya during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had territorial councils (*kiama*) of their own, but also initiated young men into age-sets parallel to those of the neighboring Maa-speaking peoples, with whom they also traded and intermarried.

The southern zone, in contrast to the north, was characterized by Bantu-speaking agricultural societies. Many of these, such as the Gogo, Hehe, and Fipa, remained decentralized until the nineteenth century, but others were organized under hierarchical systems of chiefship much earlier. In the northeastern mountains of Tanzania, these hierarchies became the most fully developed in all of the eastern savanna, with despotic kings, subchiefs, and classes of bureaucratic officials. Before 1500, these societies had been dominated by the families of blacksmiths, who gained prominence through their control of the production of tools and weapons. The blacksmiths performed ritual duties, but administrative authority remained in the hands of elders appointed by commoners.

During the course of the next three centuries, however, the region's population grew steadily, the result of a favorable climate with good rainfall and soil, combined with increasing mastery of iron technology. New systems of authority emerged to cope with this emerging social complexity. In the Pare Mountains, for example, the Washana clan of blacksmiths was overthrown at the beginning of the sixteenth century by the Wasuga clan. The founding ruler, Angovi, followed by his son Mranga and grandson Shimbo, established the centralized state of Ugweno, which functioned through an elaborate hierarchy with a paramount chief (*mangi mrwe*), governing councils (*chila*), ministers (*wanjama*), and district chiefs (*wamangi*). The Ugweno kingdom expanded to control all of the North Pare plateau and lasted until the nineteenth century. In the Usambara Mountains, a similar process of centralization took place in the eighteenth century, when Mbega consolidated his power, possibly by offering an organized defense against Maa-speaking pastoralists. The Kilindi dynasty continued to consolidate power under Mbega's son, Shebughe, and then his successor Kimwari, who ruled until the 1860s.

These highly centralized state systems, however, were exceptional cases among the agricultural societies of the southern zone. Most of these areas were much drier than the northeastern highlands and could not support as many inhabitants. A common form of chiefship in the southern zone was the institution of the *ntemi*. This broad term refers to the leaders of perhaps three hundred small chiefdoms stretched across the broad savanna of present-day western, central,

and southern Tanzania. The *ntemi* chiefdoms were generally independent but linked together through networks of kinship or clientship. These communities incorporated a steady stream of immigrants as people moved away from the crowded kingdoms of the northeast. While increasing complexity had produced centralization in Pare and Usambara, in the "*ntemi* region" political development often produced different results. Among the Nyamwezi of western Tanzania, the trend until the nineteenth century was toward segmentation, with chiefdoms splitting apart into ever smaller political units. In Ufipa differing factions contested the very notion of political legitimacy throughout the eighteenth century, as invading pastoralists advanced their style of leadership based upon personal effort at the expense of the existing dynasty based upon kinship relations. In general, the *ntemi* chiefships can be seen as dynamic, flexible institutions that responded in diverse ways to local and regional circumstances.

By 1800 the eastern savanna was home to an array of strikingly varied political systems, the result of steady demographic, technological, and agricultural change during the previous centuries. Throughout the region, political links had been forged that encompassed wide social and cultural networks. During the nineteenth century, however, economic and demographic changes would reach an unprecedented level, and these institutions would face entirely new and often overwhelming challenges. The penetration of Arab caravan trade and the rise of European colonial power brought slavery, guns, and a new commercial mindset to the region. In many cases these new ideas and tools would strengthen the institutions that had developed in the eastern savannah during the previous centuries, but just as often they would serve as catalysts for revolutionary change in local and regional political systems.

CHRISTIAN JENNINGS

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ECOMOG: *See* Liberia: Civil War, ECOMOG and the Return to Civilian Rule.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

A major aftermath of World War II was the reconceptualization and redefinition of economic development strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The immediate postindependence era witnessed the burgeoning of a more decisive economic nationalism, which questioned the existing dependent economic relationship of unequal partnership. For independence to be meaningful and development oriented, emphasis had to be on how best to strengthen the objective bases of national economies. It was against this background that attention shifted to regional integration as an alternative development strategy. Theoretical support for economic integration developed from the theory of “custom union” as practiced in the developed economies of the West. In a custom union, members enjoy a preferential tax on the intra-union trade, expanded trade creation prospects, and interactive trade diversion.

Economic planning on a state-by-state basis started in West Africa after World War II in 1945. The British Colonial Office requested that its colonial dependencies produce a Ten-Year Development Program that would be funded by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. The Nigerian (1960–1962) and Ghanaian (1963) plans fell short of expected achievements. The failure of similar planning exercises undertaken in the Francophone West African States under the auspices of Investment Fund for Social Development (FIDES) led to a search for a more viable development program. In 1959 France wanted to unify French territories in West Africa (UDAO) into a loose economic bloc. The Custom French Union for Africa did not succeed because of the rivalry between Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. By introducing value-added tax, Côte d’Ivoire destroyed the competitiveness of Senegalese manufactured goods in the trade area. The succeeding Union of French West African States (UDEAO) was an economic arrangement united by a council of ministers and a committee of experts.

The Mano River Union (MRU) marked the consummation of diplomatic collaboration between Liberia and Sierra Leone, dating back to the 1960s. Both countries had a relatively lengthy period of political stability, and share ethnic and cultural affinity, a common border, and similar economic potentials. The MRU was designed to be a custom union established to expand trade through the elimination of all forms of trade barriers and the creation of conducive climate for setting up joint industrial capacity for the common market.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the biggest economic bloc in contemporary West Africa. The arrangement encompasses all sixteen countries along the West African Coast, stretching from Mauritania to Nigeria, including of course the landlocked states of Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger as well as the islands of Cape Verde. From this geographical spread, ECOWAS is inclusive of the MRU. In 1967 twelve countries signed an agreement establishing ECOWAS, and an interim council of ministers that was to prepare a treaty embodying the principles of a common West African market and identifying priority areas for immediate implementation was set up. At the signing of a protocol creating the West African Regional Group in 1968, heads of state meeting in Monrovia were delegated in Nigeria and Guinea to prepare studies on the first set of priority areas. Liberia and Senegal were to study the specific requirements for a custom union. After 1968 there was a lull in the activities of the Union following the outbreak and intensification of the Nigerian civil war. However, there was a renewal of interest on the part of all stakeholders from 1975. By the beginning of 1975, arrangements for the summit of heads of states, at which the treaty creating ECOWAS would be signed, were finalized.

The aim of ECOWAS was set out in Article 2 of the treaty: it shall be the aim of the community to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in all fields of industry, transport and telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural sciences, commerce, monetary and financial issues and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering close relations among the members and of contributing to progress and development of the African continent. To achieve these lofty aims, the following steps and sequence were adopted:

- (a) elimination of custom duties and other charges of equivalent effect on imports and exports.
- (b) elimination of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among members;
- (c) establishment of a common tariff structure and commercial policy toward nonmember states;
- (d) elimination of obstacles restricting the free movement of persons, services and capital among member states;
- (e) harmonization of the agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects in the member states, notably in the fields of marketing, research, and agroindustrial enterprises;
- (f) evolution of common policy in, and joint development of transport, communication, energy, and other infrastructural facilities;

- (g) harmonization of economic, industrial, and monetary policies of members and the elimination of disparities in the level of development of members; and
- (h) establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation, and development.

Certain institutions were created to give effect to the goals of ECOWAS. Article 4 of the treaty established the authority of heads of ECOWAS member states as the supreme and final authority in the community. This organ meets once a year to approve and authorize decisions and policies recommended to it by the council of ministers. The Council of Ministers holds one of the biennial meetings just before the meeting of the heads of states to prepare the ground and formulate the agenda. Two ministers from each member state form the Council of Ministers, which is charged with the responsibility of directing the operations of the community in pursuance of the set goals as set out in the enabling treaty. There are four technical commissions:

- (i) Industrial, Agricultural, and Natural Resources Commission;
- (ii) Transport, Telecommunication, and Energy Commission;
- (iii) Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission; and
- (iv) Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.

They were created to assist the Council of Ministers in the discharge of duties to the community. The chief function of the technical commissions involves policy formulation and recommendations for implementation in the specialized and respective fields.

The ECOWAS secretariat is headed by the executive secretary who is assisted by two deputy secretaries, one for administration and economic matters, and the other who is the controller of finance. To promote even development, capacity building, industrial integration, treaty building, and industrial integration, treaty of Lagos provides for compensation losses arising from preferential tariffs as a result of intra-ECOWAS trade and location of ECOWAS enterprises. The fund for compensation, cooperation, and development was created to meet the financial demands of poor member states embarking on industrial projects. The sources of funding for the Lomé-based body include capital budgets of the community as well as foreign and interest payments on loans granted or attracted by the fund. Judicial resolution of disputes arising from conflicting interpretations of the treaty lay in the hands of the Community Tribunal.

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See also: **Colonial Federations: French West Africa.**

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Education in Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa

Education in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa varied over the course of the colonial period and by the nature of different colonizing cultures. The colonial period in Sub-Saharan Africa lasted about seventy-five years for most countries, with the colonizing powers including France, Portugal, Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Spain.

Within each colonial power, opinions diverged as to the role that formal education in African contexts had performed, could perform, or should perform in the future. Sharp contrasts in views often occurred within the Christian missions, between missions and the colonial offices, between the metropole and officials in the field, and within colonial political parties. Some of the debate centered on whether education should follow the Western model or should be adapted to the realities of African societies and cultures.

In general, the object of education in colonial Africa shifted from the spreading of European civilization (assimilation of Western ideas) to Africanization of education (or “development from within”). Most colonial powers in Sub-Saharan Africa attempted to “Africanize” schools after World War I (Sivonen, 1995). Teachers introduced subjects into the school curriculum which reflected the child’s natural environment and their own community, stories and folklore, tribal and traditional dances, and instruction in local handicrafts. These attempts were largely unsuccessful for various reasons: lack of desire to effect this transformation, limitations in resources, well-based African opposition, and social changes outside the schools. The period from 1918 to 1930 was marked by confusion regarding the aims of African education and government disinterest.

Overall, the pattern of educational provision during the colonial period was very uneven. Colonial education in Sub-Saharan Africa was elitist. The vast majority of

African people did not attend school at all, and most of those who did attend had only a few years of primary schooling. They were very unevenly distributed in terms of regions, sex, locality, ethnic, and social background.

Foreign missions (Christian and Islamic) with interests in Africa pioneered and dominated the educational sector for many years. Islamic religion had considerable influence on African education in western Africa, and some countries in eastern and central Africa. Islamic schools and universities flourished centuries before the arrival of Christian evangelism and colonialism. By the early 1950s, Sub-Saharan Africa held as many Christians of all denominations as Muslims.

The vast majority of schools and colleges opened during the colonial period were run (and mostly financed by) European or American missionary societies. The first schools resulted from coastal trading contacts in the fifteenth century, but most were established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the 1790s numerous Christian organizations formed themselves into missionary societies including the Baptist Missionary Society, the Edinburgh and Glasgow Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, and the Church Missionary Society. Others followed in the early nineteenth century, including the Wesleyan Missionary Society, the American Bible Society, and the Church of Scotland Missionary Committee. Throughout the colonial period, the development of missionary education was spatially uneven.

Bringing Christianity to the non-Christian world was the central objective of mission education in colonial Africa. The language of the Europeans was used as the medium of instruction. Schools inculcated students with Christian beliefs and attitudes on marriage (monogamy), lifestyle (a rejection of traditional beliefs and practices), and work (discipline). The missionary dominance of educational objectives limited the curriculum of most mission schools to the essentials of the Christian or Muslim life, while other schools followed a basic academic curriculum similar to those used in European schools at the time. Overall, the nature (as well as quality) of education offered by mission schools varied greatly, with different emphases placed on vocational training, literacy, obedience, and religious instruction.

The educational activities of these missionary societies had a profound effect on the long-term development of many African societies, particularly those not already under the influence of Islam. The value of missionary influences on education is highly contentious. Some researchers depict missionaries as noble altruists bringing enlightenment, literacy, useful new skills, and superior health care. Other writers portray them as

agents of an oppressive and exploitative foreign presence, alienating Africans from their traditional culture and beliefs by imposing inappropriate values, school curricula, ambitions, and expectations on unwilling and powerless colonial subjects.

In general, for most of the nineteenth century, mission education operated without much government intervention; then missionaries cooperated with colonial governments (to varying degrees) after 1900, and particularly after World War I. This mirrored a curriculum change from a purely religious education to a diluted semi-secular education, though the curriculum remained relatively narrow.

Missionaries and colonial governments did not always share the same aims. Colonial rulers tended not to give education a high priority. Education was viewed as a way of training people to meet colonial expectations rather than a way of bringing about social change or getting greater social equality and justice. Governments needed some local people to read and write in the European language, do numerical calculations, know European practices and traditions, and be trained in particular skills. Graduates assumed lower-ranking positions within the colony, trained as mechanics, nurses, teachers, tradespeople, and administrative assistants. Education was based on racial segregation. For example, in Kenya and Tanzania, different schools were established for Europeans, Asians, Arabs, and Africans.

The colonial rulers officially neglected education at the tertiary level. Only a few universities existed in colonial Africa, including the Lovedale Institution (South Africa), Gordon Memorial College (Khartoum), Makerere Government College (Kampala), Yaba Higher College (Lagos), and the Prince of Wales School and College, Achimota (Ghana). These university colleges have been criticized for a narrow curriculum, training an elite to occupy government positions, and exacerbating class differences.

The colonial approach to education varied by nationality. For example, the Portuguese and French systems aimed to create a very small class of officially "assimilated" Africans who were given an elite education (sometimes including a study period in Europe). The British developed secondary and higher education much earlier than the French, and were relatively more supportive of missionary education. Enrollment rates were generally much higher in British than in French territories, partly because missionary activities began earlier in the former, partly because most of the French territories in West Africa were highly Islamicized. British colonial administrations prohibited the expansion of missionary activities into Muslim areas, mainly to avoid conflict with the traditional

rulers of these areas. The French pursued a more aggressive policy against Islam which resulted in much bloodshed and the closing of many Quranic schools.

As the colonial period progressed, the various European administrations became more and more involved in education, both as builders of schools in their own right and as supervisors and subsidizers of mission schools. The main impetus behind this increasing involvement was not the desire to expand educational facilities for Africans, but the desire to restrict the expansion of schools, particularly of academic secondary schooling, which was deemed to be inappropriate to African needs.

Mungazi (1983) argues that the quest for education has influenced the struggle for independence in southern Africa. Prior to 1965 (when almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had obtained their independence), Africans began to ask for more education, particularly for higher education, and for a redefinition of the goals and purposes of education. There was general discontent expressed against colonial education, especially in British Africa. They demanded an educational system that reflected African conditions. After independence, Sub-Saharan African governments began to transform education to promote national awareness, economic productivity and political consciousness. Some countries, such as Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria, embarked upon free compulsory primary education.

Education in colonial Africa remains a contested subject. One approach holds colonial power responsible for an unthinking transfer of Western formal educational institutions into Africa, resulting in the destruction of the cultural inheritance of African peoples. For instance, Taiwo (1995, p.891) argues that indigenous modes of knowledge production were “profoundly altered for the worse,” if not “utterly destroyed” by “Islam, Slavery, Christianity, Colonialism, and Capitalism.” Certainly, indigenous African education was relevant and closely linked to the spiritual and material aspects of social life before colonization by European imperial powers. This educational process reflected the realities of African society and produced people with an education that equipped them to meet the material, spiritual, and social needs of the society.

The “modernization” approach, according to Kuster (1994), views education as a precious gift of civilization, benevolently bestowed on colonial subjects. For instance, Summers (1994) argues that in Southern Rhodesia “civilization” was a social ideal first developed by the missionaries, which then became the ideology of the ruling race as a whole.

The “underdevelopment” approach (according to Kuster [1994]) sees colonial education as an instrument of European cultural imperialism. Mugomba and Nyaggah (1980, p.1) argue that the colonial system of

education “both subordinated and relegated to a peripheral role the African educational systems and the existing political, economic, and social orders.” The newcomers introduced alternative theories of education and imposed a new set of educational institutions that either partly or completely replaced previous forms of learning. Colonial schools aimed to instill deference to the foreign authority, unquestioned acceptance of hierarchy, the full embrace of Christianity, and emphasized the “superiority” of everything European and the “inferiority” of everything African. African culture was synonymous with superstition and backwardness and uncivilized. The colonizer’s culture, history, religion, and way of life were thus promoted in the curriculum as well as in the discipline itself.

Some researchers argue further that education in colonial Africa was an effective means of achieving social control. Ajayi et al. (1996, p.28) argue further that education policies were “the most effective instrument for the colonial administrations to try to control the pace and direction of social change.” Yet others question the influence of education as a tool of social control and point to the small proportion of the population with access to schools.

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Education in Postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa

Education, cultural change, and development are closely entwined in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. The view that education is critical in developing Africa is pervasive. Since attaining independence, Sub-Saharan African countries have paid considerable attention to

the role of education in national development. They have viewed expenditure on education as the best possible investment for the future. Rather than perpetuating the colonial practice of educating an elite minority, African governments aimed to increase educational opportunities for as many people as possible. After achieving independence, governments gave very high priority to the expansion of education at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.

Enrollments in primary schools grew more than six-fold between 1960 and 2000, and secondary and college education expanded even more rapidly. Between 1960 and 1989 the number of children in primary schools increased from 12 million to almost 61 million in Africa south of the Sahara (excluding South Africa). Secondary enrolment jumped from almost 800,000 to 12 million. The numbers enrolled in postsecondary courses rose from 21,000 to 600,000. Prior to independence, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had no universities, and today every country has at least one university.

To make these gains possible, African countries have heavily invested in education. They have dispensed vast sums both in physical infrastructures (e.g., buildings, books, and supplies) and in human capital (e.g., teachers). While substantial amounts of foreign assistance were received for educational development, the bulk of resources has come from within.

With the expansion of educational facilities at all levels and the corresponding financial commitment, African countries have also reexamined the goals of education in relation to individuals' and their nation's needs and aspirations. Sub-Saharan African countries since independence have placed increasing emphasis on "education for development," particularly at the secondary and postsecondary level. This implies the orientation of the content and objective of education and training toward realizing the goal of economic and social advancement. Despite substantial progress to reform educational systems, post-colonial education in Sub-Saharan Africa continues some links to the colonial period in terms of curriculum and language of instruction.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed rapid educational expansion and expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Governments made particular efforts to improve school enrollment for girls. In the 1960s the percentage of girls aged six to eleven years enrolled in primary schools doubled (from 17 to 35 per cent) compared with an increase from 46 to 63 per cent for boys. The figures rose to 44 per cent for girls and 74 per cent for boys in the 1970s. In the 1980s, at the secondary level, only 11 per cent of girls and 20 per cent of boys aged twelve to seventeen years were enrolled in school.

Educational development across the various countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is markedly uneven. For example,

the adult literacy rate in 1990 ranged from 26 per cent in Lesotho to 82 per cent in Burkina Faso. Primary school enrollment rates range from 15 per cent of the primary school-aged population in Somalia to 100 per cent in Lesotho. In 1987 public expenditures on education (as a per cent of total public spending) ranged from 3 per cent in Nigeria to 25 per cent in Swaziland.

Educational development also varies enormously within each Sub-Saharan African country. Significant spatial variations in access to education first emerged during colonial times and still persist. Generally, urban areas have received proportionally more investment in education than rural areas, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels. For example, in Botswana, most schools are situated in the more heavily populated southeastern region, occupied primarily by Batswana. And, within this region, most schools are located in or near the larger towns along the main transportation route. The one university is located in the capital city, Gaborone. The desert peoples have historically had far less access to education than BaTswana, until at least the 1990s. Few schools existed within central and northwestern Botswana, where desert peoples continued to reside.

Particular issues surrounding education, cultural change, and development have intensified since the mid-1980s. Sub-Saharan African countries have been plagued by declining enrollment rates, reduced public expenditure on education, quality erosion, management inefficiencies, growing regional and gender biases, and low literacy rates.

Although Africa currently spends about 5 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on education, which is more than in any other developing region, the slow economic development combined with rapid population growth has hampered educational policies. In the 1990s, several Sub-Saharan African countries with weakened economies and debt undertook structural adjustment policies implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These countries reduced their per capita spending on education by 0.7 per cent a year in the decade up to 1996. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) declared the period 1997 to 2006 the Decade of Education. The Conference of African Ministers of Education, held in Zimbabwe in March 1999, approved a program of action with three objectives: access to primary education for all and a reduction in gender and urban/rural discrepancies, emphasis on the quality and relevance of education and vocational training, and a highly efficient staff through capacity building.

Despite the great improvements in education over the postcolonial period and the considerable efforts to introduce universal primary education, very few Sub-Saharan African countries have attained primary

education for all. In 1990, 71 per cent of the primary school-aged population was enrolled in primary school, 20 per cent in secondary school, and 2.4 per cent in a university.

For the region as a whole, the adult literacy rate in 1990 was 42 per cent. Adult illiteracy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa remain higher than in any other region of the world. The rural-urban and gender gap are still significantly wide in most countries, with rural girls being the most disadvantaged. One-third of adult males and one-half of females are illiterate. Female illiteracy rates remain significantly higher than those for males in every country of Africa south of the Sahara.

Opportunities for education at any level still remain limited, and educational opportunities for girls continue to lag behind those for boys. Although females make up more than half of the school-age population in most Sub-Saharan African countries, recent trends show that women account for only 44 per cent of primary school enrollments, 34 per cent of secondary school enrollments, and 21 per cent of university level enrollments (World Bank, 1988). When compared with their male counterparts, African women students also have higher attrition and repetition rates, and lower levels of attainment. It is commonly asserted that gender disparities in education in Sub-Saharan Africa are the direct result of economic difficulties. Logan and Beoku-Betts (1996) argue that they result from a complex interaction between economic factors, cultural and societal norms, and stereotypes of gender roles.

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Education, Higher, in Postcolonial Africa

Education in Africa during the colonial era was closely linked to religion and missionary activity. Belgian, British, French, and Portuguese colonial education

systems were almost all initiated and run by Christian missionary societies and churches. Major expansion of educational institutions only took place after World War II, when many colonial administrations introduced development and welfare programs in the colonies. Education featured prominently in some of these welfare programs.

Colonial governments increased both financial support and physical presence in the education system. For the first time, for instance, the Ugandan government appointed a special education officer charged with overseeing the development of girls' education. The missionaries became receding, supporting partners in education. In South Africa, the Extension of Universities Act (1959) led to the founding of open universities vis-à-vis the racially segregated ones. Out of these measures emerged University of Cape Town, University of Witwatersrand, and the University of South Africa. The five nonwhite universities of Zululand, Western Cape, Turfloop, Fort Hare, and Durban also came into being at this time. The University of South Africa in 1946 started outreach programs serving people of all races both within and outside South Africa.

The postwar period also witnessed an increase in universities and colleges in Africa. Among these were the University of Gold Coast (1947), College of Technology at Kumasi (1951) in Gold Coast, University College of Ibadan (1948), and Makerere University College. All these were colleges associated with the University of London system, as was the Royal Technical College of Nairobi in Kenya. There were also University Colleges founded in Dakar (Senegal) and in Antananarivo (Madagascar) in 1950, and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury in 1953. In the Belgian Congo, Lovanium University was established in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), and then the State University of Elizabethville was started in Katanga.

The focus of university education in many of these institutions, with the exception of a few such as Makerere Medical School and Royal Technical College in Nairobi, was generally the arts and humanities, with little emphasis on sciences, medicine, or vocational studies.

At the time of independence in the early 1960s, education in Africa had already been taken on board as a state responsibility, and with this, there was a corresponding decline in missionary control over the education sector. Many institutions of higher education, especially university colleges, started cutting links with the mother institutions overseas. Whereas in the preindependence period, Western universities tended to provide academic inspiration and control, in the postindependence period, many African universities sought independence as well and looked elsewhere (to the USSR and the United States, for example) for academic links

and inspiration, as they became established as full national universities. With this new measure of autonomy, there was noticeable change in administration, internal structures, and curricula. African universities became more dependent on the government for financial support. Increased government control in the daily administration of the university brought with it a corresponding decline in university autonomy. With increased government interference in university administration, student unrest was reported at several African universities, resulting in the death, at government hands, of scores of students on campuses in Zaire/Congo, Ethiopia, and Uganda.

The economic crisis which has hindered African countries since the 1980s has greatly affected both capital and academic developments at most African universities. While government funding appears to have increased tremendously (for example, assistance to the University of Ghana rose from 64 million cedes in 1980 to 2,465 million cedes in 1991, an increase of 5,000%), in real terms of the local currency value against the dollar, government funding had actually shrunk to incredibly low levels.

The 1960s and 1970s had reported very positive quantitative change in most African universities. Government budgets in the education sector had appreciably increased in most countries. Large investment in secondary education at independence had resulted in a phenomenal increased intake by the thousands at universities. For instance, Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, which had only 30 graduates at independence in 1960, admitted 10,000 university students in 1973.

In spite of increased intake, there were still more qualified candidates for university entry than what universities could manage to admit, especially in view of capital development stagnation. No additional lecture halls, laboratories, or student residences had been built since the early 1970s, but the demand for university education has kept rising annually. This demand has led to the founding of privately funded universities. From the 30 universities in 1960, there are now well over 100 universities in Africa, many of them private. Maintaining quality university education in the face of all these pressures is a struggle for most African universities.

Female student enrollment has remained low for a long time. A number of African universities are only now waking up to this gender imbalance, sometimes by slightly lowering entry requirements for girls. Changes are already observable, although gradual. In 1975 female university students totaled about 26 per cent; in 1985 the percentage rose to 28 and then to 31 in 1991.

After independence east, central and southern African countries experimented with regional university systems: University of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and

Tanzania); University of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, and the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These were commendable attempts at regional cooperation in this vital development sector basically intended to avoid duplication of costly university education programs. Unfortunately, these systems collapsed as nationalist passions in the participating countries flared up and factious tendencies tore these regional university systems apart. The East African Joint University Council in Kampala is the only remnant of this worthy system in existence today, still checking on academic and other standards within the East African public universities.

On the continentwide level, the heads of African universities founded the Association of African Universities in 1967 to promote and strengthen regional cooperation in research and university education, with its headquarters in Accra, Ghana.

With the break from mother universities in the West, many African countries began to question the Western-based university curricula. There has been extensive soul-searching about the role and identity of the "African University." Nonacademic and nonformal education programs, offered through extramural extension services, adult education, and short courses became quite popular in many African universities. Vocational and specialized professional courses were also offered at vocational and teacher training colleges. Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere led the call for the indigenization of education in Africa. University education, according to Nyerere, should "foster the social goals of living together, and working together, for the common good." This sense of commitment to community would counter university graduates' attitudes of "elitism, intellectual snobbery, and intense individualism" which were rather common among African graduates soon after independence.

Many African governments have, since the 1970s, shifted the overall focus of higher education to national economic and social development goals. There is now greater emphasis on science and technology programs at universities, although the greater enrollment is still in humanities and social sciences. The aim is to achieve a sixty to forty ratio in favor of science enrollment, so that a professional class, so badly needed in servicing development programs, which demand science and technological skills, can be available. It is, however, surprising that science graduates are affected by unemployment in the same way as their arts and social science counterparts. The question is whether African university programs are being designed to satisfy economic demands, or are simply giving theoretical training. Generally, higher education figures have been on the rise in most African countries since the early 1990s. Sub-Saharan African enrollment for 1995 was

1,750,684 (3.3 per 1,000 inhabitants), and public expenditure on education, as a percentage of total public expenditure for that region, was 16.7 per cent but represented 42 per cent per student as a percentage of GDP.

With the economic squeeze of the 1980s, the research function at African universities was one of the major casualties. Allocations for research in most universities are meager or nonexistent. Research output in African universities has therefore remained very low: in 1995 only 5,839 research papers were recorded as published from the region, and perhaps not necessarily all were presented by academics who were permanent residents of Africa. While there is no doubt about research potential among African academics, there are simply too many pressures, both social and economic, that mitigate against research. Those African scholars who have moved to universities abroad have managed to keep abreast of the “publish or perish” expectations affecting Western academics.

However, there has been a move to shift from fully government-funded higher education to a system where cost sharing will eventually become the norm. There are now more self-sponsored students than those on government scholarships, for instance at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda, one of the African universities that has embraced this bold shift to private sponsorship with a great measure of success. A new development of private universities is now taking root in Africa, and many governments are putting in place legal frameworks for the control and checking of standards of these new private institutions of higher education.

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Education: French West Africa

The first government school in French West Africa was opened by Jean Dard at Saint-Louis in 1816, but with the end of French settlement plans, the school closed and education was largely handed over to the missions for the rest of the century. The one exception to this was the creation by Governor Faidherbe (governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1861 and 1863 to 1865) of a secular government school for the sons of chiefs and other



A Catholic school in Cameroon in the 1930s. © Das Fotoarchiv.

notables in Saint-Louis in 1855, in the belief that education was a means of extending French influence and that a secular school was more likely to attract Muslims than missionary schools. However, it was only with the establishment of the Government-General of French West Africa that a concerted official attempt was made to organize education in the colony.

A series of decrees establishing a network of secular government schools was issued in November 1903, and at the same time the control of education was wrested from the missions, who were accused of providing an education that was too “bookish” in nature and insufficiently geared to the Administration’s perception of the colony’s needs. Official subsidies were withdrawn from mission schools, although they continued to operate in those parts of French West Africa, notably Côte d’Ivoire and Dahomey, where they were able to fund themselves.

The education system was designed to meet two objectives. The system was pyramidal in shape. First, there was “mass” education, which took place in the village schools. The curriculum was rudimentary (basic French, hygiene, and arithmetic), but its primary aim was to extend French influence among Africans in order to prepare them for work in the cash economy. Above them, situated in the main population centers, were the regional schools, which selected those Africans considered suitable for continuing their education beyond the first two years of primary school. In those urban centers where there were sufficient Europeans to justify their creation, urban schools following a metropolitan syllabus were opened. Second, there was “elite” education, which took place in the upper primary schools and for which those Africans considered suitable for further training were selected. Their aim was to select and train suitable Africans to meet the personnel needs of European firms and the colonial administration for lower level staff such as clerks, primary school teachers, and medical assistants. The intention was that each territory would ultimately have

one of these schools, although initially the only one to be created was the *École Faidherbe* in Saint-Louis. In addition, two other schools were created in Saint-Louis, which in theory recruited students from throughout the federation: the *École Pinet-Laprade*, which trained technicians, and the *École Normale*, which trained primary teachers and was subsequently transferred to Gorée Island, where it became the *École William-Ponty*. No provision was made for secondary or higher education for Africans.

The 1903 decrees remained little more than declarations of intent, however, until the arrival in Dakar of Georges Hardy, who was the energetic director of the education service from 1912 to 1919. It was during his period of office that the colony's public education system was truly put in place. He pursued a policy of adapted education. This meant that the education provided to Africans had to be practical in nature, as one of its key objectives was to make the African more productive by "teaching him to work"; the intellectual content of education had to be reduced, so as to put it within reach of "primitive" pupils; and great importance was attached to education remaining in close contact with indigenous society, so that it did not become an agent of social dislocation by producing rootless individuals who might then become a source of social or political unrest.

There has been an enduring belief that France was, fundamentally, assimilationist in its approach to education in West Africa. The use of the French language; the fact that education was under government, rather than church, control; the fact that French Black Africans appeared more *francisé* than their British African counterparts; and the widespread use of French teachers in schools, all these have been taken as signs that French colonial education policy was basically assimilationist. Other factors have contributed to this impression. Official republican colonial discourse, which accorded pride of place to the French "civilizing mission," lent support to the notion that France sought to export its metropolitan education system to Africa in the hope of creating "Black Frenchmen," and the achievements of French Black Africa's best-known *assimilé*, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who gained the highest French education qualification, the *agrégation*, in French grammar, have also lent credence to this view. In addition, this general impression was reinforced in the English-speaking world by the work of two British colonial experts, W. B. Mumford and Major G. St. J. Orde-Brown. The thrust of their study, published under the title *Africans Learn to Be French*, was that the objective of French education policy in West Africa was to create "Black Frenchmen." By World War I, however, the emphasis had in practice moved away from assimilation toward a policy of adapted education.

By the 1930s the colonial authorities felt that further measures to adapt education to the African situation were necessary. The education provided was still considered too bookish in nature. Moreover, with only some 40,000 pupils in French schools throughout French West Africa, plus approximately a further 6,000 in mission schools, which taken together represented less than 5 per cent of the school-age population of the colony, it was felt that the schools had not done enough to advance the education of the peasant masses. A further corrective to the "assimilationist drift" within the system was thus introduced, and the rural schools initiative was launched. This initiative, which lasted until 1946, was intended to increase the number of pupils passing through the French school system while reducing the amount of time individual pupils spent at school. All rural schools were to have a "school garden," and the curriculum emphasis was very much on rudimentary skills and on "teaching Africans to work." The rural schools were widely resented by African families and teachers, however, and their abolition was one of the early demands of the new political movements established in French West Africa after World War II, since they were seen by African *assimilés* and *évolués* as a way of maintaining Africans in a position of permanent inferiority to Europeans.

The emerging nationalist movement in French West Africa made the introduction of full metropolitan-style education for Africans, including secondary and higher education following a metropolitan curriculum, a key demand after the war. African students were also given grants to study in France. It was largely as a result of these post-war developments that the former colonies of French West Africa emerged at independence in 1960 with education systems which were closely modeled on the French metropolitan system.

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Education: North Africa (Colonial and Postcolonial)

Colonial educational systems in North Africa were designed to carry out a “civilizing mission,” which was a justification for European political domination, and to establish a modern basis for collaboration between Europeans and North Africans. Colonial educational policy created a cadre of North Africans educated in European languages and technical subjects, who then carried out many of the administrative duties in the colonies. Yet, the European system of education also nurtured among the North Africans the principles of constitutional government and civil rights, which colonial governments denied North Africans. Educational policy thus displayed fundamental contradictions within the colonial systems and was an important cause of nationalism.

Prior to the colonial period, education in North Africa was religious, based upon rote learning of the Qur’an at the primary level, as well as textual commentaries and legal precedents at the institutions of higher education, such as al-Azhar in Cairo (the longest-running continuous educational institution in the world), al-Zaytuna in Tunis, and al-Qarawiyyin in Fez. Learning within the Muslim institutions was distinct from a new, European model of schooling designed to instruct students in practical subjects for more mundane applications in business, government, and industrial or engineering projects. Beginning in the 1860s and 1870s, new schools organized on the modern principles were established by reformers such as Khayr al-Din in Tunisia and ‘Ali Mubarak in Egypt. The former established the Sadiqi College in Tunis, which offered courses in Arabic and Islamic studies, as well as Western languages and technical subjects.

A colonial educational system was established after the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881. It was completely French in its design (except for some courses in the history and geography of North Africa), and all courses were conducted in the French language. Since most of the indigenous population did not meet the French language requirements, the new schools mainly serviced the needs of Europeans. Graduates of Sadiqi College—known as the “Young Tunisians”—led a campaign for the expansion of the colonial school system, as the basis for a truly national system of education. Indeed, colonial regimes reversed some of the educational reforms begun by North Africans. In colonial Egypt, regulations ensured that only those Egyptians who graduated from schools of the European type were eligible for positions in the colonial administration. The

policy was designed to restrict modern education to a small minority of the population. Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century an entire generation of Egyptians imbued with Western ideas of social and political development studied in European-type schools and learned English and French rather than Arabic.

Educational policies in the other colonies of North Africa were similar in kind, if different in degree of impact. The Italian school system in Libya was designed to teach Italian language and culture, to the exclusion of Arabic and Muslim culture. The Sanusiyya, however, fostered a separate educational system that developed national resistance to the Italian occupation. In Algeria the colonial educational system was taught entirely in French, the curriculum was French, and the vast majority of those taught were Europeans. Among a population of 10 million, only 7,000 Algerians attended secondary schools in 1954. Nevertheless, the nationalist leadership emerged among those educated in secondary schools, notably Ait Ahmad Hocine, who was one of the founding members of the Algerian National Liberation Front. In Morocco the French Protectorate created one system for the European population and a separate system for the Moroccans, which was taught in Arabic in the primary cycle but strictly in French in the secondary cycle. The Moroccan nationalists were highly critical of this system, opening schools “free” of colonial restrictions in 1938. French in model, the free schools were also militantly anticolonial and therefore were suppressed by the French during the World War II. In general, Arab and Berber children were either excluded or segregated from the European-type schools during the colonial period; however, the small minority that entered these schools emerged as a nationalist leadership.

Men and women educated in European-type schools were highly critical of Muslim culture, notably on the issue of women’s emancipation. The campaigns of Egypt’s Feminist Union led to the admission of girls from middle-class families to secondary schools in 1925 and to Cairo University, which was chartered as a public institution in 1925. After the revolution of 1952 all Egyptians, male and female, were guaranteed a free education in primary and secondary schools, as well as the universities. Women particularly valued these reforms, since a university education meant that women could find regular employment outside the home.

The September Revolution of 1969 in Libya brought about a new educational policy that increased the obligatory period of education to nine years, which had some impact upon the customary seclusion of girls from public education. The Libyan reforms meant that literacy rates increased from 21 per cent in 1952 to 51 per cent by 1977. Similar advances were achieved

in other North African countries. For instance, the Tunisian educational system was made universally available in 1958, regardless of race, sex, or religion. In 1960 the new University of Tunisia absorbed the Zaytuna University, which had been a redoubt of conservatives during the colonial period. The brutal character of the Algerian war for independence meant that the educational system had collapsed by 1962; however, the percentage of the eligible population enrolled in primary schools doubled between 1960 and 1980, reaching approximately 90 per cent in 1980. The Algerian government also invested heavily in secondary education and a new university system. Such reforms indicated the concern of nationalists to overcome a colonial legacy of dependence upon European technical expertise. Curricula were remodeled to foster an “authentic” Arab and Islamic national identity to counter the effect of the “civilizing mission,” which had made the language of government, business, and education English or French, rather than Arabic.

Given the legacy of the “civilizing mission,” post-colonial educational reforms in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt represented a dramatic development of North Africa’s human resources. Yet, the expansion of the educational systems had the unintended result of creating a surplus number of highly trained personnel, which, when coupled with the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, resulted in a culture of disappointment and resentment. In spite of reforms, families continued to sacrifice the education of their daughters to ensure the education of their sons. On average only 40 per cent of North African women advanced to secondary schools in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Economic crises at the end of the century meant that educational services were strained, so that methods of instruction in primary schools were often not far removed from the rote learning of the traditional religious schools. At the same time, Muslim charitable institutions were revived to provide an alternative educational system at the primary level, which emphasized Muslim values and fed into the disenchantment with the postcolonial governments. Within the universities this phenomenon was most apparent, where Islamist groups organized associations that opposed some of the basic premises of the postcolonial political and social systems, including education, which had been rebuilt upon colonial and therefore Western foundations. Another result of economic crisis was that, in spite of the best efforts of national governments to create universal educational systems, parallel systems developed for the wealthier classes. Finally, the percentage of North Africans literate and educated at the end of the twentieth century was low in relation to other developing countries. Moreover, government investment in primary and secondary schools in North

Africa was relatively low, in spite of the fact that improvements in education were essential to engage in global communications and economic systems.

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See also: Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962; Morocco: Education since Independence; Tunisia: Khayr al-Din and Constitutional and Administrative Reform, 1855–1878.

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Egypt, Ancient: Chronology

The relative chronology of ancient Egypt is centered on a structure of dynasties, or royal houses, akin to the European Windsors, Hohenzollerns, Bourbons, or Habsburgs. These dynasties are taken from a history of Egypt, the *Aegyptiaka*, written in Greek by the Egyptian priest, Manetho, for the Macedonian king of Egypt, Ptolemy III, around 300BCE. This work is now lost, but excerpts survive in the works of later antique authors. Manetho divided the royal succession into thirty dynasties, and although there are numerous problems with his system, it is retained by Egyptologists to this day as the most straightforward way of delineating the progress of ancient Egyptian civilization.

These dynasties are usually grouped into periods and kingdoms corresponding to distinct phases in the country’s political or cultural evolution. Thus, the Old Kingdom embraces the third through sixth dynasties, the time occupied by the great pyramid builders, while the Middle Kingdom, comprising the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth dynasties, represents a reunification of

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Egypt.

the country, consolidation and cultural development, and its decline. The New Kingdom (the eighteenth through the twentieth dynasties) is the era of Egypt's imperial power in Asia, seeing the construction of an empire that extended from the Sudan to the Euphrates. The three Intermediate Periods, following each of the Kingdoms' periods, highlight centuries during which central authority was eroded, accompanied in some cases by foreign rule of parts of the country.

In addition to the Manethonic framework, we have a number of earlier, and thus far more reliable, king lists that help to confirm the ordering of rulers. These lists all date to the New Kingdom and comprise an administrative listing, giving full reign lengths as well as royal names (the badly damaged papyrus known as the Turin Canon), and four monumental offering lists, three of which place their contents in historical order. Of the latter, by far the best is that from the temple of Sethy I at Abydos; all of them, however, are incomplete and omit rulers for political and other reasons. Nevertheless, the lists combine with contemporary monuments and documents to permit the construction of our modern framework of Egyptian history.

The Egyptians did not employ an era-dating system such as BCE/CE (BC/AD), or AH, instead determining time by reference to the regnal years, months, and days of the reigning king. Thus, to ascertain the time between two events, the exact length of the reigns of all kings ruling between the events must be known. This information is only rarely available in a consistent manner, but in general a roughly reliable relative chronology can be formulated for most periods.

Putting absolute dates BCE to the dynasties thus reconstructed is often difficult and the subject of intense scholarly debate. Some astronomical events, recorded in monumental inscriptions and papyri, can be of some help, but all dates prior to 664BCE must be regarded as approximations only. The key is to identify events that can be dated with reference to an astronomical phenomenon, or by reference to another culture with an absolute and secure chronology. Unfortunately, both kinds of link are frequently more or less equivocal and dangerously subject to circular reasoning: there are examples where a Mesopotamian "fixed" date is actually based on an Egyptian "fixed" date, which is based on the original Mesopotamian "fixed" date, in turn based on an Egyptian "fixed" date.

Two main astronomical phenomena have been used to identify absolute dates; one is the new moon, the other the rising of Sirius, or Sothis. The former is used for refining dates where the basic time period has been pinpointed by other means, since it places an event within a cycle that repeats approximately every dozen years. Sothic dating is based on the fact that the Egyptian civil year had 365 days, and thus the "natural" year lost a quarter day each year, only coming back into synchronization every 1,460 years. Sothis was supposed to rise on New Year's Day, but gradually drifted away, and so any record of the rising of Sothis dated to a specific day, month, and year can be placed accurately within a 1,460-year cycle. Unfortunately, the result varies depending on where the rising was observed within Egypt, the accuracy of the observation; it also depends on the assumption that the calendar was never reformed to bring the Sothic and civil year into synchronism artificially. There is, however, no evidence for such a reform.

The main pegs used to establish an absolute chronology for ancient Egypt begin at 664BCE, when the beginning of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty can be fixed with reference to unimpeachable Assyrian data and is, in fact, the earliest absolutely fixed date in Egyptian history. All earlier dates are more or less problematic.

These begin with the biblical record (1 Kings 14: 26–35; 2 Chronicles 12: 3–4) of the plundering of Jerusalem by Shishak, dated to around 925BCE via Assyrian connections. Although objections have been raised (e.g., James 1991, pp.229–231), Shishak is almost certainly to be identified with Shoshenq I, founder of the Twenty-second Dynasty; depending on where the campaign is to be placed in his reign, the beginning of this dynasty can be fixed within the range 948/929BCE. On this basis, a lunar date under Rameses II can be used to place the latter's accession in the range 1304/1254BCE, with probability favoring 1279/1254BCE. Moving earlier, a dendrochronological date from the Uluburun shipwreck, containing an



One of the sources for the Egyptian chronology are lists of kings to whom offerings are being made. Here, in Sethy I's temple at Abydos, Prince Ramses (later King Ramses II) reads a prayer, some of whose beneficiaries' names are seen in front of him. These are arranged in chronological order and begin with Menes, unifier of Egypt, in the top line. The list runs all the way down to the time of Rameses' father, Sethy I, but omits the whole Second Intermediate Period and certain "undesirable" kings such as Akhenaten and Tutankhamun. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

object of the wife of Akhenaten places the end of his reign before 1300BCE; a Sothic date for Amenhotpe I has many problems, and may (or may not) place his accession at 1553/1526BCE. Before this we have but one dating peg, a Sothic date under Senwosret III, that places his accession around 1880BCE. All other absolute Egyptian dates are derived from these pegs, and are thus wholly dependent on dead reckoning.

Radiocarbon dating has thus far played little role in historic Egyptian dating, since its error range generally exceeds that of other techniques. However, determinations from the beginning of the First Dynasty place its foundation in the range 3350/3000BCE, comparing with the around 3150/3050BCE arrived at by means of dead-reckoning back from the accession of Senwosret III.

The chronology of ancient Egypt is broadly well-founded, but it must be emphasized that there remain considerable difficulties, and for the New Kingdom at least, dates may have to be lowered by up to half a century compared with the current consensus figures given in this encyclopedia.

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Egypt, Ancient: Predynastic Egypt and Nubia: Historical Outline

Early cultural and historical development in the Nile Valley is strongly dictated by its immediate environment. Natural landscape changes also marked basic cultural divisions. From north to south, these are Lower Egypt (the Nile Delta), Upper Egypt (between the Delta and Aswan/First Cataract), Lower Nubia (First to Second Cataract, spanning the modern Egyptian/Sudanese border), and Upper Nubia (Second Cataract to modern Khartoum and beyond to an ill-defined point along the White Nile). Lower Nubia and Upper Egypt are more thoroughly investigated, but work now has intensified farther north and south and into the present deserts. The Upper Nubian Nile intermittently has shifted course over time, chiefly westward to its present position although earlier positions remain only partially traced. Strictly speaking, the term "Predynastic" is applicable only to Egypt, but this section also considers Nubia up to the equivalent date. Absolute dates, invariably based on radiocarbon results and usually given as BP (i.e., before 1950), have varied considerably in the literature although now are much clarified by Hassan (1986). This section begins with the Neolithic "Revolution," following a short but intense arid period around the 6500 BP calibrated C14 date, when much of the Sahara essentially still was a cultivable grasslands; comparable conditions are some 500 kilometers or more farther south today. This arid phase caused some of the population to shift to the Nile floodplain, with whom the remaining desert peoples continued to interact. Saharan rock art also changes emphasis from hunting to farming scenes about this time, reflecting a change in their lifestyle.

It has only been recently realized that the main characteristic features of Predynastic Nilotic culture generally were assimilated from peoples outside it, in Egypt both from southwestern Asia and what is now the Sahara desert and in Nubia only from the latter. These features include cattle herding, farming, long-distance trade and communication, and perhaps even the beginnings of true sedentarism. Nonetheless, it was along the Nile that these activities precipitated the increasingly rapid developments that culminated in various

distinctive Nilotic cultures, aided by the one stabilizing feature these desert peoples did not possess: the annual Nile inundation. Politically, all four basic Nile regions progressed without abrupt change but at differing times from numerous small organizational units into larger “statelets” governed by increasingly powerful leaders, producing relationship dynamics that ultimately can be traced down even to modern times. We progress here, with the Nile, from south to north.

Upper Nubia in this period is becoming more understood but remains little known except for the Khartoum/Sixth Cataract region. Some differences are apparent in the few sites investigated beyond this area that suggest groups of related cultures. Pottery has been found in the Khartoum area at an earlier date than in Egypt, and even earlier farther south around Lake Turkana (northern Kenya), suggesting an expansion of this technology northward into Egypt rather than the reverse. The same is indicated for bone harpoon technology. The then-fertile Sahara grasslands were cultivated, although we are only now beginning to investigate beyond the Nile itself especially where its “palaeo-channels” (dried-up river branches) had then existed. Steady development toward sedentarism and an agrarian economy are indicated by domesticated barley and other crops, with large numbers of grinding stones and domesticated animals (cattle, goats, sheep, dogs) coming from beyond the Nile Valley. While settlements generally appear egalitarian, cemetery analysis shows an escalating population growth and developing social hierarchy, with a small elite class having inherited wealth and status. Stone tools and weapons became increasingly sophisticated, some being socially significant such as mace heads. Jewelry became more common, and brilliantly handmade pottery was elaborately decorated, suggesting both specialist production and technological innovation. Trading connections were widespread in all directions, with stones from the Tibeste region (modern Chad) and elsewhere, and shells from the Red Sea coast found in some, mainly elite, graves. The most extensively investigated Neolithic sites are Kadero and El-Geili near Khartoum, and El-Kadada near the Sixth Cataract. Investigation of peripheral areas has revealed other, related, sites such as Rabak (Early Neolithic) south of Khartoum and Kassala (Late Neolithic) farther into the desert from the present river, indicating a much larger population and cultural spread than had previously been recognized.

At the northern end of Upper Nubia, above (south of) the Third Cataract, investigations in the Wadi el-Khowi and especially at Kadruka have revealed numerous Mesolithic to Neolithic cemeteries and related poorly preserved settlements in what had been an extremely fertile floodplain abandoned when the course

of the river shifted west. These show again an increasing social stratification within agriculturally based sedentary communities having animal domestication, culturally related to the “Early Khartoum Neolithic” culture. A similar pattern of development is seen in the Wadi el-Howar leading westward to modern Chad, but with a seasonal seminomadic lifestyle and direct connections to both the Nile and those regions farther west. Survey along the Nile floodplain is beginning to indicate the development of formalized “statelets” that eventually became the Kerma culture.

Lower Nubia, spanning the modern border of Egypt and the Sudan, has only a very narrow and fragmented strip of cultivable land, resulting in a smaller population capacity having much greater reliance on fishing and hunting than farming or animal husbandry, and overwhelmingly on their middlemen role in the trade between Upper Nubia and Egypt. Despite intensive surveys before the successive Aswan Dam constructions flooded this entire region, neither settlement nor cemetery of the period was found, suggesting a far more nomadic lifestyle than elsewhere along the river. Three related but distinct cultures were identified by their lithic assemblages, the locally developed Abkan, and two others related to, and possibly belonging to immigrants from, those of Early Khartoum Neolithic farther south and “Naqada” in Upper Egypt. All span the Late Neolithic period, although Abkan does begin earlier. Not until nearly the end of the Egyptian Predynastic, with the early (Early and Classic) phases of A-Group culture in “Naqada II” times (see below), does occupational evidence become apparent. This also marks the beginnings of formalized political grouping(s) or even loosely organized “statelets” with increasing social hierarchy, ultimately based on trade wealth, culminating with the “royal” tombs at Qustul Cemetery.

The Egyptian, like the Nubian, deserts continued to be inhabited by peoples who apparently remained powerful and influential, and with whom the Nile Valley communities continued to interact. Nabta Playa, some 100 kilometers west of the Nile near Egypt’s southern border, provides overwhelming evidence of hierarchical social complexity and early public architecture by Late Neolithic times, before its occurrence along the Nile.

The wide cultivable floodplain along the entire length of the Upper Egyptian Nile assured the most favorable conditions for agricultural development and the introduction of initially semipermanent and later permanent settlements of rectangular buildings along its length. The lack of impedimenta in the river favored both considerable cultural unity and political development, with a social hierarchy already apparent in the Early Neolithic “Badarian” period (after the type-site of Badari) in communities of varying size and some

status graves. The “Naqada” period (after the type-site of Naqada, from where it also originated) is divided into three main phases: Naqada I (“Amratian”), II (“Gerzean”), and III (the period of Egyptian unification). Each phase follows its predecessor without abrupt cultural change; each is defined (and further refined) on the basis of its ceramics. Naqada I is essentially a technologically developed relative of the late Badarian culture, located farther south and with relatively little external contact beyond the deserts. It expanded south to Hierakonpolis and northward to Assyut, supplanting the Badarian culture. Naqada II penetrated farther, by its conclusion reaching north into the Delta and south at least to Aswan. Three apparently autonomous political states can now be distinguished, centered at Hierakonpolis, Naqada, and This (near Abydos). The Gebel Sheikh Sulieman rock inscription, dating to Naqada II, records a military incursion into Lower Nubia, probably by the Hierakonpolis ruler(s).

Steady social development, craft specialization, technological sophistication, and status-related unequal distribution of wealth are present already in Naqada I. All intensify dramatically in Naqada II, concurrent with a strong influx of foreign goods and influences from beyond the deserts (mainly southern Palestine and Mesopotamia), probably through increased contact with Lower Egypt and the Red Sea through the Eastern Desert. The famous “Painted Tomb” 100 at Hierakonpolis, undoubtedly a royal burial, dates to this period.

Lower Egypt has a similar riverine landscape although, instead of one long floodplain, the Delta’s numerous branches form an essentially triangular shape. Recent surveys have shown it to have been densely populated. Unsurprisingly, it was a sedentary agricultural society with domesticated animals, supported by fishing and limited hunting and, more importantly, considerable trade connections with Palestine and elsewhere. Its culture was quite egalitarian initially and for most of the predynastic era, to judge from excavated cemeteries and (mainly) settlement sites with oval, Palestinian-influenced underground housing. Major sites include Merimde (Early Neolithic, spanning the arid phase and early Naqada I), El-Omari (EN, about late Naqada I–early II) and Ma’adi (Late Neolithic, about Naqada II), and in the related Fayum B (earlier than Merimde) and subsequent Fayum A (EN) cultures. Lower Egypt is culturally distinct from, and technologically inferior to, Upper Egypt until near the end of the Predynastic when late Naqada II cultural material begins to appear in Delta graves and occupation strata, before actual political annexation in Naqada III.

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Egypt, Ancient: Unification of Upper and Lower: Historical Outline

Throughout the nearly 3,000 years of their dynastic history, the ancient Egyptians themselves viewed their homeland as “Two Lands,” the unification of which was the beginning of that history—and indeed the foundation for it. Kings and (later) pharaohs always bore the title of “King of Upper and Lower Egypt” and wore a “double crown” combining the originally separate “White Crown” of Upper Egypt (the Nile River Valley, south from modern Cairo) and “Red Crown” of Lower Egypt (the Nile Delta, to its north).

Both royal and “national” insignia combined symbolic representations of these two distinct geographical entities, and only rarely (and then for specific reasons) was one used without the other. Such dualistic motifs abound throughout ancient times, the most common pairs being the sedge plant (Upper Egypt) and bee (Lower Egypt), the lotus (UE) and papyrus (LE), and the vulture (UE) and cobra (LE) who represent the “Two Ladies,” the goddesses Nekhbet (UE) and Wadjet (LE) of the royal titulary. The combination of “black land” (agriculturally rich land alongside the river) and “red land” (the red-sand desert beyond it on either side) carried quite different connotations: Egypt (both valley and delta) was the “black land” inundated by the annual Nile flood, while the desert borderlands both flanking and protecting it from outsiders was not. Even during the three “Intermediate” periods of Egyptian history, when instability and loss of central authority divided Egypt into multiple smaller political units (some ruled by foreigners), the concept of Egypt as a unification of the “Two Lands” remained unshakeable and pervasive.

The process of unification is partly recorded in the ancient texts and artifacts, and partly reconstructed

from archaeological research. Ancient Egyptian tradition credits a king named “Menes” with actually uniting the two lands under a single ruler, and in the process becoming its founder king. He also founded the city of Memphis, just south of modern Cairo at the apex of the Delta and therefore at the natural junction of the Two Lands, which remained the administrative capital of the united Egypt even after the political capital had been transferred elsewhere. He did so by damming and diverting the Nile, in order to reclaim “virgin” land on which to build his capital. This tradition, recorded by Herodotus (II.4, p.99), can be traced back at least to the New Kingdom, by which time the political capital was firmly settled at Thebes far to the south.

Archaeological research, while not confirming the tradition in that no contemporary record of a king named Menes has ever been recovered, does provide a more complete picture of the unification and in some respects does not disagree with it. The ancient Egyptians themselves always mention Upper Egypt first, strongly suggesting it was from here that unification was initiated and that it ultimately conquered the Delta region. While far less excavation has been conducted in the Delta than along the river valley, reconstruction of the historical and political circumstances of the unification period has confirmed this suggestion. It is, however, far more complicated than tradition implies.

By the period we now call Naqada III, the multiple small “statelets” of the Naqada II period appear to have been consolidated and absorbed—by domination of one over another, or more peaceful political unification—into a smaller number of larger units along the Nile and in the Delta. Three “statelets” can be distinguished in Upper Egypt by Naqada II, centered at This (near Abydos), Naqada, and Hierakonpolis. The last, extensively excavated, site has revealed a major temple, large city, and several large cemeteries. Although the southern cultural sequence initially was developed at Naqada, it is from the stratified excavations at Hierakonpolis that its details are now defined. There may have been other smaller entities, the whole extending south at least to around the First Cataract and possibly beyond. Naqada III also is characterized by rapid administrative development, actually initiated in Naqada II with the earliest recognizable hieroglyphic writing. Large-scale public architecture such as mud-brick temples and royal tombs, achievable only through organized labor, becomes evident throughout the Nile Valley.

Cultural and probably economic dominance by the south preceded actual political control of Lower Egypt, as successive occupation layers of stratified Delta sites such as Minshat Abu Omar have revealed an escalating percentage of “southern” cultural material from late Naqada II into Naqada III equivalent-levels,

including the names of several southern predynastic rulers mostly inscribed on imported pottery. Native “northern” features are discarded, indicating a developing unified culture and interaction originating in, and dominated by, the south. A continuing escalation of social hierarchy is now found in the cemeteries, ranging from simple burials almost entirely lacking in grave goods to extremely wealthy elite and even “royal” tombs of elaborate construction and contents. In contrast, little if any northern material has been recovered from Upper Egyptian sites. This process probably took about two centuries to achieve, and concluded with political annexation of the Delta, at which point the ancient Egyptians considered the Two Lands united and Manetho’s dynastic period begins. The exact sequence of events, however, remains obscure.

The archaeologically attested individual usually credited as the “unifier” of the Two Lands is Nar(mer), who apparently was a dynastic ruler of This at the end of the fourth millennium, and the first of eight Dynasty I kings listed in regnal order on a sealing excavated in the Abydos royal cemetery where all chose to be buried. Nothing related to Nar(mer)’s reign has been found at Memphis, however, although he is widely attested in both Upper Egypt and the Delta, as well as the northern Negev. It was his successor, (Hor-)Aha, who transferred the political capital to Memphis (which already existed in the time of Ka, Nar(mer)’s immediate predecessor at This). (Hor-)Aha also campaigned into Lower Nubia, probably against the Qustul kings. The “royal tomb” at Naqada, originally associated with Menes, is now generally accepted as belonging to a woman named Neith-hotep, who probably was Nar(mer)’s wife (perhaps in a political alliance between the ruling families of Naqada and This) and the mother of (Hor-)Aha. Thus “Menes” probably is a conflation of the first two kings of the Two Lands. However, the names of other rulers before Nar(mer), who probably exercised only regional authority, also are known and are grouped generally as “Dynasty 0.” They may have played a substantial role in unifying some of the regional “states,” but we are unsure of events. Some southern “statelets” may have been later additions *after* annexation of Lower Egypt by Nar(mer). We also have virtually no knowledge of political divisions within Predynastic Lower Egypt, although several sites were extensive and presumably regional centers. Following its annexation, the agricultural “breadbasket” of the Delta seems to have become little more than a border buffer against the desert peoples and, in the northeast, a pipeline for trade goods from southern Palestine. When trade routes shifted at the end of Dynasty I, its large communities died out.

One of the most important discoveries at Hierakonpolis is a cache of objects uncovered in the temple in

the earliest excavations, many associated with the kings who span the unification period. One is a commemorative stone palette, where Nar(mer) is named and depicted on one side wearing what is recognizably the White Crown of Upper Egypt while bashing the head of a fallen enemy thought to represent Lower Egypt. On the opposite side, he wears the Red Crown of Lower Egypt viewing the decapitated bodies of his enemies, complete with standard-bearing entourage. Previously thought to commemorate the unification itself, reconsideration has suggested the initial directly historical interpretations of this palette and other evidence were somewhat simplistic; they are now seen more as visual statements of aspects of royal authority, rather than of specific historical events.

Although the Two Lands were unified, the iconography of this event (or series of events) developed over several generations. The titular “Two Ladies” name of the king does not appear before Den, the fifth king of Dynasty I, nor is the double-crown itself found before his immediate predecessor Djet, although both crowns appear separately on the Nar(mer) palette. Although the Red Crown is later symbolic of Lower Egypt throughout the remaining dynastic period, during Naqada times it belonged to the Upper Egyptian Naqada “statelet” rulers. The earliest instances of the White Crown appear even farther south, at Qustul, Aswan and Hierakonpolis, and it is associated with the Hierakonpolis rulers. A ceremonial stone mace-head depicts a Predynastic king, known to us as “Scorpion,” wearing the White Crown; he is not attested in the Thinite area and probably was a ruler of Hierakonpolis near-contemporary with Nar(mer).

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
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Egypt, Ancient: Old Kingdom and Its Contacts to the South: Historical Outline

The Old Kingdom is usually defined as embracing the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Dynasties (c.2700–2200 BCE), although it has been suggested that the Third Dynasty is perhaps better bracketed with the preceding First and Second Dynasties in the Archaic/Early Dynastic Period. The Old Kingdom is often characterized as the “Pyramid Age,” as it was during this period that the pyramid was developed and reached its apogees of size, craftsmanship, and sophistication.

The second half of the Second Dynasty seems to have seen civil war that was only ended by the last king, Khasekhemwy. His son and successor, Djoser, was regarded subsequently as beginning a new dynasty, and his reign seems to have marked a major step forward in the economic and technological development of the reunified country. He seems to have been the first monarch to exploit the turquoise mines of the



Ancient Egypt: Old and Middle Kingdoms.



Menkaure, penultimate king of the Fourth Dynasty and one of his wives, as shown in an unfinished statue from his pyramid complex at Giza. Now in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

Sinai peninsula, and built a chapel at Heliopolis, but the most striking manifestation of his activities is the Step Pyramid at Saqqara, his tomb, and the first monumental stone building in the world.

The succession after Djoser's reign is imperfectly known, and none of the immediately following kings were able to complete a pyramid. At the end of the dynasty, however, King Huni seems to have constructed a series of small ritual pyramid-shaped monuments around Egypt, together with a vast (and now all but vanished) brick pyramid at Abu Rowash. He was followed by Seneferu, founder of the Fourth Dynasty, and builder of no fewer than four pyramids, a small ritual structure and three more that were successively intended to be his burial place; he seems to have finally been interred in the Red Pyramid at Dahshur.

The reign of Seneferu marks a major upswing in the quantity of available historical data. Events recorded from Seneferu's reign include expeditions against Libya and Nubia, activity in the turquoise mines of the Sinai, and the import in a single year of forty shiploads of cedar. These seem to have come from the port of Byblos in the Lebanon, which was for centuries Egypt's principal trading partner in that area.

Seneferu seems to have been fondly remembered by posterity, but his son, Khufu, had a poor reputation in later tradition. This presumably centered on the sheer scale of his tomb, the Great Pyramid at Giza, the most massive free-standing monument ever built. On the

other hand, the amount of material and effort contained within Seneferu's four pyramids far exceeded that expended at Giza, with an apparently diametrically opposite effect on posterity's opinion.

Little evidence survives concerning the events of Khufu's reign, other than that he sent expeditions to the Sinai, and worked the diorite quarries that lie deep in the Nubian desert, northwest of Abu Simbel. For much of his reign the Vizierate was in the hands of his nephew, Hemiu. Many other members of the royal family are known from the huge cemetery of mastabas (tombs with rectangular bases, sloping sides, and flat roofs) that was laid out around the royal pyramid.

Khufu was succeeded by two of his sons in turn, Djedefre and Khaefre, and then Khaefre's son, Menkaure. Following the reign of the latter's successor, Shepseskaf, there was a change of dynasty, the Fifth being begun by Userkaf, possibly a grandson of Djedefre. The pyramids built by the new royal house were far inferior to those of Seneferu and his immediate successors, being smaller and less well built, but with much larger, superbly decorated adjoining temples.

The second half of the Old Kingdom seems to have been a period of fairly extensive state-sponsored foreign enterprises, both peaceful and otherwise. Under Sahure, Userkaf's successor, we have depictions of the return of ships from a voyage to Byblos; we also have the first recorded expedition to the territory of Punt, which lay on the coast of the Red Sea, apparently comprising parts of modern Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

During the Fourth Dynasty, the Vizierate had been largely in the hands of the royal princes; under the Fifth, this was no longer the case. Officials maintained royal links, occasionally marrying a daughter of the king, but no longer did kings' sons aspire to major posts in the administration, a situation that was to last until well into the New Kingdom.

A feature of the Fifth Dynasty kings is their building of a sun temple, as well as a pyramid. Most of these monuments lay in the area of Abusir, near the capital, Memphis. Sahure was succeeded by his brother Neferekkare, who was followed by his son, Neferefre, and then Niuserre. Of uncertain antecedents was Shepseskare, perhaps Neferefre's successor, who probably began a pyramid at Abusir that was barely begun. Their successors, Menkauhor, Isesi, and Unas, however, moved back to Saqqara, the last of them introducing religious texts to the walls of the royal burial chamber.

Exploitation of the minerals of the Sinai continued, as did other royal activities, but subtle changes are to be seen from the reign of Isesi onward. Most obvious is the end to sun-temple building, but there were also alterations in the system of ranking titles bestowed upon the nobility. Perhaps most significant was the recognition of the status of the provinces by the



The sculpted head of the wife of a noble of the late Fourth Dynasty. In contrast to her husband, the lady is shown with features that show clearly that she, or her ancestors, originated in Nubia or farther south. From tomb G4440A at Giza; now in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 14.719. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

appointment of more than one vizier, one of whom was based in the southern part of the country.

The last part of the Old Kingdom, the Sixth Dynasty, is characterized by the increase in the number and quality of the tombs built at provincial centers by local dignitaries, in particular by the provincial governors. The first king of the new dynasty was Teti, who was ultimately followed on the throne by his son, Pepy I. His long tenure on the throne saw expeditions sent south and east, the latter both to the mines of Sinai and further afield, into southern Palestine.

Evidence of the king's building activities comes from a number of sites: the remains of a chapel survive at Bubastis, with other elements coming from Aswan (Elephantine) and Abydos. Pepy I was succeeded by his elder son, Nemtyemsaf I, who may have previously served as his father's co-regent for a number of years. His relatively short reign saw the first of a number of African expeditions by Harkhuf, the governor of Aswan. The interest now being shown by the pharaohs in the lands to the south is illustrated by Nemtyemsaf's visit to Aswan in his ninth regnal year to receive a group of southern chieftains.

Nemtyemsaf's sudden death, when still a young man, brought his brother Pepy II to the throne while yet a child. Power seems to have lain in the hands of his mother and his uncle, the Southern Vizier, Djar. Under

their charge, the extensive foreign ventures of Harkhuf and other Aswan dignitaries continued apace, extending far into the African continent in search of trade items.

On three previous occasions, Harkhuf had visited the land of Yam, probably lying in the area to the south of modern Khartoum. His fourth journey took place not long after Pepy II's accession, and during it he acquired a dancing *deneg* (either a pygmy or a dwarf). This fact was included in the report sent ahead to the royal court while he undertook the northward journey back to Egypt. The idea of the *deneg* clearly delighted the boy pharaoh, who exhorted Harkhuf to return with his charge as quickly as possible. Harkhuf later reproduced the text of the king's letter on the facade of his tomb.

Other Aswan-based desert travelers included Sabni, who journeyed into Nubia to recover the body of his father, Mekhu, one of many who had found death while seeking the exotic products of the south. Tjetjy, Khui, and, one of the most important, Pepynakhte, also called Heqaib, can likewise be numbered among these early explorers. Heqaib made two military expeditions into Nubia, before being sent into the eastern desert to recover the body of a colleague who had been murdered while building a boat on the Red Sea coast in preparation for a trip to Punt. He succeeded in this task, as well as punishing those responsible for the killing. Of particular interest is the fact that in the years after his death, Heqaib became a god, worshipped in a chapel on the island of Elephantine, which drew royal patronage for many generations.

Having come to the throne young, Pepy II had a long reign, of either sixty-four or ninety-four years; if the latter is correct, it will have been the longest reign in human history. Pepy was, like his father and brother, buried at Saqqara, and was succeeded, by his son, Nemtyemsaf II. However, Nemtyemsaf II's short reign was followed by a series of rulers whose number and order are unclear.

It thus appears that within a short time of Pepy II's death, there was a major collapse in royal power, with a corresponding rise in provincial authority, leading ultimately to the effective breakup of the state. The following First Intermediate Period (7th to 10th Dynasties) was characterized by conflict, which was only resolved in the civil war that ended in the establishment of the Middle Kingdom around 2040 BCE, one and a half centuries after Pepy II's death.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Chronology; Egypt, Ancient: Middle Kingdom, Historical Outline.**

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Egypt, Ancient: Middle Kingdom, Historical Outline

After the demise of the Old Kingdom, Egypt had split into two separate polities, one based on Herakleopolis (Ehnasiya el-Medina) and the other on Thebes (Luxor). Intermittent conflict occurred between the respective Ninth/Tenth and Eleventh Dynasty kings, which only ended around 2040BCE, when King Montjuhotpe II of Thebes gained control of the entire country, thus establishing the Middle Kingdom. The king then began to extend his influence beyond its borders, undertaking police actions in the surrounding deserts and penetrating southward into Nubia.

It seems that the preceding period had witnessed the appearance of a quasi-Egyptian polity centered around the area of Abu Simbel, as the names of a number of kings were found in this area, together with those of their followers. Montjuhotpe's forces moved against this southern state, and by regaining control over the area below the Second Cataract laid the foundations for the campaigns of the kings of the Twelfth Dynasty.

Montjuhotpe II built extensively, in particular in the area occupied by the original Theban kingdom. Fragments of his works survive at a number of sites, but his most impressive monument is the mortuary temple he erected at Deir el-Bahari at Western Thebes, where the tombs of his family and officials were also constructed.

After a reign of over half a century, the king was succeeded by his son and namesake, Montjuhotpe III. He continued the work of his father, before being followed by a fourth King Montjuhotpe. Apart from the reunification of the country, the period is important for raising the town of Thebes from a minor provincial



Statue of King Auihra Hor, with gilt collar and inlaid eyes. The figure is naked and bears on his head the *Ka* hieroglyph. The long beard indicated divine status. Egypt, Middle Kingdom, Thirteenth Dynasty, 1700–1650BCE. Egyptian Museum, Cairo. Anonymous. © Werner Forman/Art Resource, New York.

center to the status of royal residence. It also marked the beginning of the ascent of the god Amun from local deity to all-powerful King of the gods, a process which was not to become complete for another four centuries.

Montjuhotpe IV was succeeded by his vizier (a high ranking official), Amenemhat, around 1994BCE; it is not known whether the transition was planned, or the result of a coup d'état. The latter option might be favored if a series of texts describing famine and other troubles have been correctly assigned to this point in time. In connection with this, it may also be noted that official propaganda rapidly cast Amenemhat in the role of the true reunifier of Egypt, thus carrying out a number of prophecies, allegedly made centuries before.

A key act of the new king was to transfer the royal seat from Thebes to a new site in the north, the city of Itjtawy. This remained the main residence of the king for the next four hundred years. Amenemhat I also founded a series of forts intended to protect the area north of Suez from incursions from Palestine.

In the king's twentieth regnal year, he appointed his son Senwosret I as his co-regent. Senwosret eventually became responsible for the leadership of military expeditions, in particular into Nubia, a region Egypt wished to bring back under its control. Other warlike activities extended into the Sinai and the Western Desert. Senwosret was returning from a campaign against the Libyans, ten years after his induction as co-regent, when Amenemhat I was assassinated while asleep in his bed.

Senwosret I interred his father in his pyramid at Lisht, near Itjtawy, where he was himself later also



Senwosret III was responsible for the full annexation of Lower Nubia to the Egyptian crown. Granite head from Karnak, now in the Luxor Museum, Luxor Egypt, J.34. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

buried. The long reign of Senwosret I saw Nubia occupied as far as the Second Cataract, with a presence extended further south. Extensive building took place, including the core of the temple of Amun at Karnak in Thebes, and various works at Heliopolis, in the north. Senwosret I's co-regent and successor, Amenemhat II, had led a Nubian expedition while yet a prince, and more expeditions are recorded on the great annalistic inscription produced during his lengthy occupation of the throne. Amenemhat II was buried at Dahshur, the principal necropolis of the dynasty.

Less is known about the next king, Senwosret II, but he seems to have been responsible for the large-scale development of the Fayoum, the oasis region, approximately 43 miles south of modern Cairo. There he also built his pyramid.

He was succeeded by his son, Senwosret III, who was to become one of the most important kings of the period, and worshipped as a god for many centuries after his death. Material dating to his reign is found at a number of locations, particularly in the southern part of Egypt. The king's statues are notable for their extremely naturalistic portrayal of features.

The reign of Senwosret III saw an increasing centralization of the administration, leading to a gradual withering away of the great courts of the local governors that had been a major feature of the preceding four centuries, as their leaders moved to work for the king at the national capital. There is relatively little evidence for Egyptian military activity in the direction of

Palestine during the Middle Kingdom. Senwosret III's expeditions into Nubia were, however, far more extensive, and marked the full subjugation of the territory by the Egyptian crown.

The intention was to establish a clear southern boundary for Egypt, and regulate its intercourse with the peoples who lived below it. This frontier was set at Semna, where a complex of forts was built to house Egyptian governors and garrisons. They incorporated huge bastions and other defenses, and contained a great number of military and civil structures. These included very large grain storage containers, most probably intended to provide supplies for campaigning soldiers temporarily camped in the area, rather than the permanent personnel. No Nubians were allowed north of the forts, one of which acted as a trading post, through which all southern trade had to be carried out. Although setting the frontier at the Second Cataract, the Egyptians regularly penetrated into the territory further south.

The eldest son of Senwosret III was Amenemhat III. He appears to have served as co-regent for a considerable period before the elder king's death. Unlike his father, Amenemhat III has left few memorials of military activities. Reforms in the national administration were continued. At that point, the country was divided into three administrative regions, controlled by departments based at the national capital.

The Fayoum region had received the attention of Senwosret I and II, but it was only under Amenemhat III that more extensive works were apparently carried out there. In particular, a dam was constructed to regulate the flow of the water into the lake, thus reclaiming a large fertile area, which was then protected by an earthen embankment. Amenemhat III had the turquoise mines of the Sinai worked. Other regions which saw Egyptian expeditions for the extraction of raw materials were the Wadi Hammamat and the diorite quarries of the Nubian desert.

It appears that Amenemhat III may have contemplated making his daughter, Neferuptah, his successor. However, she died prematurely, and he appointed as his co-regent and successor a man of apparently nonroyal birth, Amenemhat IV. The latter's independent reign was short, and he was succeeded by a daughter of Amenemhat III, Sobkneferu, the first female king in Egyptian history whose reign is supported by firm evidence.

At the end of Sobkneferu's four-year reign, the throne passed to a son of Amenemhat IV, Sobkhotpe I. With him the Thirteenth Dynasty began, around 1780BCE. The transition between the dynasties seems to have been peaceful, but in contrast with the long, well-documented reigns of the Twelfth Dynasty, the Thirteenth is characterized by kings for whom few records were kept, and with brief tenures on the throne. Fragments of buildings erected by kings of the dynasty are known from a range

EGYPT, ANCIENT: MIDDLE KINGDOM, HISTORICAL OUTLINE

of sites, in particular Thebes and Medamud, just to the north. The relatively small number of known royal tombs are concentrated in the area of Dahshur.

The Thirteenth Dynasty did not comprise a single family line, a number of monarchs having undoubtedly been born commoners. Coupled with the short reigns of many of them, this led to a theory that the real power was usually in the hands of a parallel dynasty of viziers. More recent work, however, has cast doubt on this interpretation (Ryholt 1997, 282–283).

The last fifty years of the Thirteenth Dynasty seem to represent a gradual decline. Although featuring some of the dynasty's longest reigns, a withdrawal from Levantine and Nubian commitments was accompanied by the establishment of independent or quasi-independent polities in the northeast Delta and a new state in Upper Nubia. Ultimately, the whole of northern Egypt fell under the control of an aggressive new line of Palestinian rulers, the Hyksos (Fifteenth Dynasty), ending the Middle Kingdom around 1650BCE, and beginning an era of conflict, the Second Intermediate Period, which would only end with the military victory of Egyptian forces, over a century later.

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
See also: **Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia.**

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Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia

While the Old Kingdom kings were content to trade with the inhabitants of Upper Nubia and the Middle Kingdom rulers ordered construction of massive



Ancient Egypt: New Kingdom.

fortresses along the Lower Nubian Nile in order to control access to the luxury trade goods from the Kerma peoples, the political events that gave rise to the New Kingdom in Egypt produced an entirely new policy to ensure the "Two Lands" would not be overrun by foreigners again: actual colonization and absolute control of Nubia as far south as possible. To this end, the New Kingdom pharaohs invaded the Nile corridor all the way at least to Kurgus between the Fourth and Fifth Cataracts, where several royal boundary inscriptions boast this achievement.

Self-laudatory royal monuments constructed after Egypt had taken control of the surrounding territory testify to the speed of this achievement. Initial royal policy apparently intended only to reconquer areas lost to the Kerma state at the end of the Middle Kingdom, which were considered Egyptian territory under foreign rule. Ahmose, founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty and of the New Kingdom, constructed a temple at Buhen and then appointed a governor-in-residence to administrate his regained estate. His successor Amenhotep I built another temple at Semna, the furthest point of Middle Kingdom control, and then looked beyond it and revised official policy to that of invasion and colonization of Upper Nubia, which had never been part of Egypt before but posed a standing threat. He wanted a buffer zone.

It was, however, his successor Thutmose I who actually broke through the Kerma frontier to take Sai, penetrated the Third Cataract, and by his second regnal year was able to proclaim that he had reached Tombos



First pylon, pylon of Rameses II, Temple of Amun, Luxor, Egypt. In front of the pylon is a 25 m high obelisk (its twin stands on the Place de la Concorde, Paris) and two colossal seated statues (thirteenth century BCE) of Pharaoh Rameses II (1290–1224 BCE), Nineteenth Dynasty, New Kingdom. Temple of Amun, Luxor, Egypt. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

(just north of Kerma itself) in a monumental rock inscription carved there. Sometime over the next decade, Thutmose again prominently carved his name on a boundary inscription at Hagar el-Merua near Kurgus (although the rest of the inscription remains problematic) that marks the farthest known point of actual Egyptian penetration. Egypt had conquered virtually all of Nubia in less than sixty years, and then held it all for another two and a half centuries, at least to the reign of Rameses II (19th Dynasty) whose name also is inscribed at Kurgus, before declining power at home again forced it to withdraw over the next century. The immediate effect of this invasion was virtual eradication of the native Kerma civilization and culture, which can be documented in the very short “Late” or “Post-Kerma” period of annexation. The city of Kerma was destroyed and apparently never regained its importance.

Following their conquest of Nubia, the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs began a massive program of construction, foundation, and suppression that continued for most of their occupation of the country. Amenhotep I first appointed a viceroy, titled the “King’s Son of Kush,” who ruled Nubia virtually as king but in the name of his pharaoh at Thebes. More than twenty-five successive viceroys held this title until the end of the Twentieth Dynasty with the aid of two deputies, one for Wawat

(Lower Nubia) based at Aneiba and the other for Kush (Upper Nubia) probably at Soleb. The first or second “King’s Son,” a man named Turi, already had been Ahmose’s governor in Buhen; this was a promotion both in rank and in territorial control. The sons of elite Nubian families were taken to Egypt to be educated at court before returning home to Kush and (usually) a royal appointment, in a classic policy of ensuring the loyalty of both their relatives at home and of the succeeding generations.

The pharaohs initially restored and enlarged those Middle Kingdom forts still strategically important, transforming them into fortified towns. They also founded entirely new fortified towns throughout both Upper and Lower Nubia as far as Napata at the Fourth Cataract, and strongly encouraged Egyptians and their families to emigrate. These towns continued to expand in both size and population, eventually outside their original walls, being protected by the strength of Egyptian control of the native population. Predominantly soldiers, civil servants, merchants and priests, these colonists established an Egyptian social structure and administrative bureaucracy there, whose main purpose was to ensure the continued flow into Egypt of “tribute” (cattle, slaves, gold) and exotic goods from even further south. As a result, the Nubian elite who also became part of this bureaucracy adopted a strong veneer of Egyptian customs, including use of Egyptian language and writing and bestowing Egyptian names upon their children. Although some native Nubian beliefs and customs continued, an “Egyptianization” of ideas, attitudes, and iconography dominated and indeed even overwhelmed them.

Enough continuity exists between the previous Kerma and subsequent Napatan periods of native Nubian hegemony to confirm that both custom and belief must have survived through the period of Egyptian rule, but it is hardly visible in either the archaeological or contemporary historical record. Apart from the “Egyptianized” elite and bureaucracy, we know little of the native Nubians themselves at this time. It is usually presumed that they may have been driven into one of two possible main occupations, either as agricultural laborers on the estates created by the Egyptian administrative system, or as pastoralists either in the service of these estates or in the hinterland. In either case, they are not discussed in the texts (but see below) and are not distinguished archaeologically after about the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

The pharaohs also constructed vast stone temples at several key sites (Soleb, Sedinga, Kawa, Jebel Barkal) in Upper Nubia, and numerous smaller temples all along the Nubian river, usually but not always in conjunction with their new and expanded settlements. Beginning in earnest with Thutmose II, this program of

temple foundation continued to a lesser extent under his successors and cumulated in the intensive building program of Rameses II (Dynasty XIX), the most memorable of whose seven temples is at Abu Simbel. Some glorified the pharaoh himself, his wife, or a predecessor. Official policy and the colonists themselves almost immediately imposed worship of the Egyptian gods on Nubia, to whom most of these temples were dedicated. They quickly dominated the older native pantheon, of which we know extremely little. Amun, supreme god of Thebes and of the empire, became the supreme god of Nubia in an adapted form, having some standard native Nubian features not found previously in Egypt, being represented as ram-headed with a sun-disc on his head. This policy of iconographical absorption, later used with equal effectiveness in the promulgation of Christianity worldwide, was so successful that Amun remained supreme (and others also introduced in the New Kingdom continued to be worshipped) in Nubia for more than a millennium after the Egyptians had departed.

All was not peaceful during their occupation, however. Numerous Egyptian inscriptions, records, and archaeological evidence survive as testimony to events. Unsurprisingly, the initial invasion was as bloody and repressive as we would expect. All New Kingdom pharaohs record the suppression of at least one and usually more native rebellions that continually opposed Egyptian rule and attempted to force withdrawal, especially from Upper Nubia. Nonetheless, these uprisings seem to have been viewed as comparatively minor annoyances, at least in Thebes. The pharaohs were far more interested in maintaining their Empire in the Near East against the greater threat posed by the Hittites and (later) the “Sea Peoples” and themselves against the Libyans. Egyptian forces heavily occupied both Nubia and the Near East, but it was the gold extracted from the eastern desert of Nubia that paid the majority of expenses required to maintain administrative and military control of the Levant as well as Kush. Nubia therefore was overwhelmingly important to Thebes, which continually sent out numerous exploratory missions into the eastern desert to find and quarry its gold; more than a hundred such mines are known to have been exploited in the New Kingdom. For this reason, the army rapidly and forcibly dealt with any hint of opposition to Egyptian rule by the archaeologically “silent” native population. In many ways, this period of Nubian history mirrors the policies and attitudes of Ottoman rule and European colonialism nearly three millennia later.

Following the reign of Rameses II, the pharaohs gradually experienced a lengthy decline in control of their empire, both internally against the increasingly powerful priesthood of Amun at Thebes, and externally against the “Sea Peoples” and Libyans who

steadily began to wear away at the northern and eastern borders of the empire. As more resources were required to combat these external enemies, Egypt began to withdraw again from Nubia as well as the rest of its conquered lands. The gold mines, no farther south than the Third Cataract, probably dictated the extent they were prepared to abandon, but eventually access to the mines became increasingly difficult to maintain in the Twentieth Dynasty and the “King’s Son of Kush” even moved his residence to Thebes.

Final abandonment coincided with the fall of the Twentieth Dynasty and beginning of the Third Intermediate Period of Egyptian history, when the Twenty-first Dynasty kings ruled only Lower Egypt from Tanis, and the high priest of Amun effectively controlled Upper Egypt from Thebes. Virtually all of Lower Nubia seems to have been abandoned by both Egyptians and the native Nubian population, while Upper Nubian occupation also is not archaeologically attested for some 350 years until the rise of the Napatan royal dynasty that eventually conquered Egypt.

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Egypt, Ancient: Ptolemaic Dynasty: Historical Outline

For five hundred years, Persian rulers had used Egypt as a source of troops for invasions of Greece. When Alexander the Great arrived in 332 BCE, Egyptians welcomed him, as the Persian rulers had cruelly oppressed them. The general in charge of the invading force was Ptolemy I, a member of Alexander’s inner circle of advisers. Egyptians called him *soter*, meaning “savior.”

Although Alexander initiated the construction of Alexandria, he did not live to see its completion. He left Egypt in 331 BCE and died of malaria in Babylon in 323 BCE. His kingdom was so vast that the Greeks split it into three smaller kingdoms. Ptolemy became ruler of Egypt and Libya. He rebuilt holy temples at Luxor and throughout Egypt. He also restored and



Jean Adrien Guignet (1816–1854), *Cambyses and Psammetich*. Persian King Cambyses II conquered Egypt in 525BCE and overthrew the Pharaoh Psammetich III of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty. Louvre, Paris. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

repaired walls destroyed by the Persians. On one temple relief, he offers gifts to Amun-Min, a phallic god. Ptolemy I made Alexandria his capital.

Ptolemy admired the wealth, luxury, industry, and intelligence of the Egyptian pharaohs. Rather than bury Alexander the Great at Vergina with the other great Macedonian kings, Ptolemy kidnapped Alexander's body and buried him in Alexandria. With Alexander's body under his control, Ptolemy consolidated his claim to rule and legitimated it. After defeating Antigonous at Gaza in 312BCE, he became satrap ("protector of the realm") of Egypt. Ptolemy added Palestine and lower Syria to his territory.

Ptolemy founded an Egyptian dynasty, known in his honor as the Ptolemaic pharaohs. They were efficient administrators and excellent businessmen. These rulers created a stable state and used the surplus agricultural products of Egypt as the basis of their wealth. They traded farm goods and mineral wealth, such as gold, to extend their influence beyond Egypt.

The Ptolemies founded a university, a museum, and two libraries at Alexandria, which attracted scholars throughout the ancient world. The Pharos lighthouse is one of the Seven Wonders of the ancient world. The Egyptian elite learned to speak and read Greek. Two-way cultural exchange took place. The Ptolemies admired Egypt's religion and culture and declared themselves pharaohs, or god-kings. They even adopted the Egyptian culture of royal incest and married their sisters so as to ensure the godliness of the royal line. They opened a canal to the Red Sea, and Greek sailors explored the east coast of Africa, trading with its population. The art of the time and region displayed a blend of Greek and Egyptian characteristics.

To maintain law, order, and stability the Ptolemies treated the Egyptian priesthood with respect (even if that respect rarely went beyond a superficial level), and

they maintained an excellent civil service. Their faces appeared on coins and their names on traditional cartouches.

In 285BCE, Ptolemy I abdicated his throne in favor of his son, Ptolemy II. Ptolemy II Philadelphus (309–247BCE) extended trade and made the Greek ruling class adopt more aspects of the local Egyptian culture. Alexandria briefly became the center of Greek civilization. He sent expeditions deep into the heart of Africa, as Psammeticus and other Egyptian pharaohs had long before.

Upon his death, his son, Ptolemy III Euergetes I, assumed leadership. His armies invaded Syria, India, and parts of Greece. Under him, the Ptolemaic dynasty attained great wealth and power.

Ptolemy XII Auletes, father of Cleopatra, made a decision that would drastically affect the course of Egyptian history. He turned to Rome, beseeching the empire's assistance in maintaining power in Egypt. Rome became the major force in Mediterranean affairs. Ptolemy XII ruled Egypt by paying Julius Caesar and Gabinius, the Roman proconsul of Syria, to give him three Roman legions to enforce his decrees. Upon his death in 51BCE, his seventeen-year-old daughter Cleopatra VII inherited the throne. As custom demanded, Cleopatra married her brother Ptolemy XIII, to produce a royal heir. Her brother planned to murder her, but she discovered the plot and sought refuge in Syria. There she gathered an army and returned to claim the throne of Egypt.

Simultaneously, Julius Caesar was embroiled in combat against Pompey for control of Rome. Caesar defeated Pompey at Pharsalus in 48BCE. Pompey sought asylum with his Egyptian ally Ptolemy XIII. Ptolemy XIII feared Caesar; so when Pompey landed in Alexandria, Ptolemy had him arrested and beheaded. When Caesar arrived, Ptolemy presented Caesar with Pompey's head, thinking that this would please Caesar. Pompey, however, was Caesar's boyhood friend and son-in-law. Appalled at Ptolemy's murder of Pompey, Caesar executed Pothius, as he had advised Ptolemy to commit the act.

Caesar learned of the dispute between Cleopatra and Ptolemy XIII. He ordered both to appear before him, to settle the dispute. Ptolemy's troops controlled Alexandria and had orders to kill Cleopatra on sight. Cleverly, Cleopatra had herself rolled up inside of a large rug and delivered to Caesar's palace. When the rug was unrolled, out fell Cleopatra. She captivated Caesar with her wit, charm, and sensuality. When Ptolemy arrived for the scheduled meeting the next morning, he found Caesar and Cleopatra sharing the throne. Ptolemy was outraged and unsuccessfully laid siege to the Romans on Pharos Island. Ptolemy drowned during the attack. To prevent defeat, Caesar

burned his fleet and the docks. However, he also accidentally burned down the great library at Alexandria, the greatest depository of knowledge in the ancient world.

To maintain her throne, Cleopatra married her brother Ptolemy XIV, but she remained Caesar's mistress. She bore Caesar a son named Ptolemy XV Caesarion. Caesar flaunted his affair with Cleopatra by moving her into one of his palaces in Rome where she lived for years. The Roman Senate grew concerned that Caesar had no male heirs by his Roman wife. They feared that Cleopatra would use this to encourage Caesarion to lay claim to Rome. In addition, Caesar captured Brutus, for he had served as Pompey's general in Egypt. Rather than kill him, Caesar chose to rehabilitate Brutus. Unknown to Caesar, Brutus sought revenge for Pompey's death and secretly opposed Caesar's rule. Brutus led a group of Roman senators in murdering Caesar. Cleopatra fled to Egypt, fearing for her life.

Anarchy gripped Rome following Caesar's assassination until Caesar's nephew Octavian Augustus, Marcus Lepidus, and Mark Antony divided Rome among them. Mark Antony ruled the Eastern Roman Empire, including Egypt. He called Cleopatra in to question her about Caesar's murder, and she seduced him, in an attempt to acquire power for herself and autonomous rule for Egypt.

Cleopatra and Mark Antony married and had three children, Cleopatra Selene, Alexander Helios, and Ptolemy Philadelphus. This outraged the Roman Senate. War broke out and Antony's forces were defeated in a sea battle at Actium, Greece. He retreated to Egypt with Cleopatra, pursued by Octavian Augustus and his army. Realizing defeat was imminent at Alexandria, Antony took his own life. Cleopatra allowed a poisonous snake, an asp, to bite her in 30BCE. In traditional Egyptian religion, the asp is the minister of the sun god and his bite confers divinity, as well as immortality. Cleopatra VII was the last pharaoh and the last member of the Ptolemaic dynasty to rule Egypt. When she died, the 3,000-year reign of the pharaohs ended. Egypt became a province of Rome and a pawn in a series of foreign empires for the next 1,900 years.

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See also: Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest and Occupation: Historical Outline.

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Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest and Occupation: Historical Outline

When Rome annexed Egypt in 30BCE, it was assuming control of an area with a coherent complex culture already 3,000 years old—far older than Rome itself. It was, however, an already occupied land; Egypt had been ruled by a series of Greek kings, the Ptolemies, ruling from a Greek city, Alexandria, since the conquest of the area by Alexander the Great in 332BCE. Rome itself had diplomatic ties to these Hellenistic rulers since 273BCE. Closer ties were established in the first century BCE when the dynasts Julius Caesar and Mark Antony interfered directly in Egyptian government through personal relationships with Cleopatra VII. Following his civil war with Antony and Cleopatra, Augustus, the first Roman emperor, annexed Egypt in 30BCE. In his own words “Aegyptum imperio populi Romani adieci” (“I added Egypt to the power of the Roman people”).

Rome ruled a land with layers of culture already in place; three hundred years of Greek rule had not destroyed the traditions, customs, language, and lifeways of the Egyptians. It overlaid them with an overclass of Greek administrators and merchants. Beginning in the Ptolemaic and continuing into the Roman period, Egypt maintained its character as a dual state. The largest component was the Egyptian population living in villages and rural areas. For them, Greek or Roman rule did not change life significantly. Traditional ways of life continued as did Egyptian architecture, language, and religion. Roman emperors were conceived of as new pharaohs and depicted in temples in the traditional trappings of Egyptian royalty. Greek culture, including architecture, philosophy, urban planning, and language, was largely a phenomenon of the urban



Portrait mask of a young woman with long plaited hair. Probably of Greek ancestry, her attire is Roman, contrasting with the Egyptian images of the four sons of Horus and the *Ba* bird at the back of the head. Romano-Egyptian, early second century CE. H = 58 cm. Christie's, London. Anonymous.
© Werner Forman/Art Resource, New York.

areas, notably of Alexandria. Rome adopted new governing systems to address the needs of this complex, multilingual, and multicultural land.

Augustus's policy preserved with minor modifications the administrative system of the Ptolemies, which had been in place for almost three hundred years, and created a unique governing system. To this he added Roman features including the census on a fourteen-year cycle, a new poll tax (*laographia*), and the establishment of a prefect (*praefectus Aegypti*) in place of the king. The Greek cities and inhabitants retained many of their rights of relief from taxes as well as local city councils. Local officials in Greek communities continued to be drawn from those of the highest level of Greek education and upbringing assuring a cultural, but not racial, hierarchy in favor of the Greeks over the native Egyptians. The relationship between Egypt and the remainder of the Roman world was also unique. Egypt, supplying as it did much of the grain consumed at Rome, was off limits to Roman senators and even prominent equestrians. The governor was himself an equestrian, keeping the rich prize of the province out of the hands of senators who might be potential rival emperors.

Egypt's vital role in maintaining Rome's stability led to much imperial attention, including extended visits including that of the emperor Hadrian in 130CE, when he founded Antinopolis, the only new city of

Roman Egypt, which combined Roman political and economic advantages with Greek cultural institutions. Other visits were undertaken by Septimius Severus in 199–201 and his son Caracalla in 215. These were not sightseeing tours, but inspection trips connoting imperial concerns and attempts to oversee administration of the province.

Such close inspection by imperial authorities was precipitated by problems in the province. The intermixture of different cultures was not peaceful or entirely successful. The result of this contact between Egyptian, Greek, Jewish, and, eventually, Christian communities was a succession of civil, political, and military disturbances that plagued Egypt, especially Alexandria, from the first century to the third century. The earliest wave of violence under Roman rule occurred in the reigns of Caligula and Claudius, 38–41CE, when Alexandrine Greeks, offended by the visit to Alexandria of the Jewish King Agrippa I, rioted against the Jews, driving them into one quarter, sacking houses and shops and killing those they caught on the streets. The *praefectus* sided with the Greek population, declaring the Jews foreigners and arresting and executing many of the Jewish council of elders. Delegations of Greeks and Jews appealed to the emperor Claudius, who ordered both sides to keep the peace, not to interrupt each other's festivals or observances, and the Jews not to draw reinforcements from Syria or Egypt outside Alexandria. Further outbreaks of violence occurred in 66 when the Jews threatened to burn down the amphitheater. The *praefectus*, himself an Alexandrian Jew, called in the army and 50,000 people were killed.

The final violence occurred in a Jewish revolt of 115–117 spreading over the provinces of Egypt, Cyrene (Libya), and Cyprus. More of an attack against the Greeks than against Roman rule, it was nevertheless answered by Roman troops. The response from the emperor Trajan and the *praefectus* was conclusive; the Jewish community of Alexandria was wiped out. In contrast, Greek culture continued its privileged place in Egypt into the third century: a papyrus from the 260s from Hermopolis preserves the welcome by a town clerk to a fellow Roman citizen returning from an embassy to Rome by quoting a line from the *Ion* of Euripides.

The end of "Roman Egypt" and the origin of the Byzantine period in Egypt is traditionally dated to the reign of the emperor Diocletian (284–305). The history of this period is largely known through the ecclesiastical writers whose interest is largely doctrinal. Nevertheless, evidence from Alexandria shows the profound changes that occurred under the Byzantine emperors. One was a change in the tax base of Roman government. In Egypt the new system of taxes, no longer based on the poll tax, destroyed the privileged

position of the Greeks and of other favored classes. Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans alike paid new property taxes. The effect on Alexandria was devastating. Greek institutions disappeared by the fourth century, and the cultural isolation of the Greeks ended in a merging of the Greek and Egyptian populations. Cities that once identified themselves as Greek communities became known as the seats of Christian bishoprics. Egypt remained a Byzantine province until 642, when it passed into Arab rule.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Ptolemaic Dynasty; Historical Outline; Egypt, Ancient: Religion; Egypt, Ancient: Social Organization; Egypt: Arab Conquest.**

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Egypt, Ancient, and Africa

Egypt is obviously a part of Africa, and yet this simple fact has been denied by Western scholars, who wished to relate ancient Egyptian culture to Near Eastern civilizations for quite a long time. The relationship between Egypt and Africa was accordingly seen as a one-way flow, as the spreading of cultural traits or elements of an "advanced" or "higher" culture over an "uncivilized" continent. This view has to be seen within the context of Western scientific tradition and, it is hoped, a matter of the past.

The actual knowledge about the relationship between ancient Egypt and Africa (with the exception of Nubia) is, however, still limited. Most of those cultural achievements of African peoples south of the Sahara, which in the past were regarded as indicators of an

advanced civilization—such as divine kingship, ironworking, inhumation rites, and the religious cult of the ram—have at times been attributed to an Egyptian origin. The basis of these hypotheses has usually been superficial comparisons between ancient Egyptian practices nearly five thousand years old and African cultural features of today. Over the decades quite a list of assumed correspondences has been compiled. Their scientific or methodological basis has to be regarded as shaky, and few of these diffusionist theories are currently accepted by Egyptologists or Africanists. Over the last few decades the debate on the relationship between ancient Egypt and Africa has become more and more controversial and ideologized. In the course of this development many of the above-mentioned ideas have been revived by Afrocentrists, who in some cases uncritically adopted what can be shown to be unscientific fantasies. Beyond possible common cultural traits the discussion on the relationship between ancient Egypt and Africa has focused on the question of the "racial" affiliation of the ancient Egyptians. Egyptologists and anthropologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tried to prove that the Egyptians could not possibly have had black skin, nor could they have belonged to the "Negro race." With the same vehemence, the African response, under the leadership of Cheikh Anta Diop, was compelled to show that the ancient Egyptians had been black as evidence for the African origin of the ancient civilization. Especially in Afrocentric circles, the issue of the race of the ancient Egyptians is still of great importance, although now the whole concept of race has been challenged by geneticists.

The discussion on the relationship between Egypt and Africa is, up to this day, dominated by ideology and prejudice. This seems to have prevented serious investigations in many fields, and the scientific findings are still poor. Linguistically, the Old Egyptian language belongs to the so-called Afroasiatic phylum together with Semitic in Asia and Africa, the Berber languages in northern Africa, Cushitic in northeast Africa, Omotic in Ethiopia, and Chadic in present-day Chad. The homeland of this linguistic phylum can be located in northeast Africa, presumably in present-day Sudan, and the settling of Egypt was therefore the result of migrations of these African people into the Nile Valley. From earliest times on the Egyptians explored and penetrated the regions south of their homelands. Trade with the south was well established in pre dynastic times and included ivory, incense, ebony and animal skins. The famous funerary biography of Harkhuf of the Sixth Dynasty mentions the import of a pygmy or dwarf, whose designation can be traced back to a Cushitic linguistic origin. It is likely that the ancient Egyptians were also attracted by the Chad region, which could be reached via ancient

valleys of the Nile and caravan routes that led to the west. However, no evidence for a westward exploration so far has been found.

Of periodic importance throughout the ancient Egyptian history was the country of Punt. As early as the fifth dynasty, the Egyptians referred to this African region where they obtained myrrh, electrum, aromatic herbs, ivory, and gold. The longest account of an expedition to Punt is found on the walls of Eighteenth Dynasty Queen Hatshepsut's temple at Deir al-Bahri, near Thebes. Here we find not only details of the expedition but also illustrations of the domestic life and the people in Punt. The name of Punt is recorded only in Egyptian sources, and nothing is known about the Puntites' names for themselves or their homelands. Accordingly, the debate on the geographical location of Punt, despite being over a century old, is still going on. There now seems to be some general agreement based on critical examination of the written and pictorial sources and supported by archaeological evidence that Punt can be located inland from the Red Sea coast. It is possibly related to the Gash delta cultures in eastern Sudan which show evidence of contact with the Ethiopian highlands and the Upper Nile valley. Early in the twelfth century BCE virtually all historical references to Punt cease and the trade seems to have died out.

Despite a fair amount of evidence for interrelations between ancient Egypt and Africa, it has only rarely been possible to tie African products, regions, or peoples mentioned in Egyptian sources with modern African designations. An intensification of linguistic and ethnoarchaeological research free from ideological bias might in the future close this unfortunate gap in our knowledge.

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See also: **Diop, Cheikh Anta; Punt and Its Neighbors**

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Egypt, Ancient: Agriculture

The earliest evidence for agricultural practice in Egypt, in the form of crops and livestock remains, found at sites in the Fayum Depression and the Delta

dates to approximately 5,000BCE. Farming and animal husbandry evolved quickly and became well established throughout Egypt between around 4,000 and 3,800BCE. Arable land was limited to the areas adjacent to and flooded by the Nile River and the oases. Additional cultivatable land was procured by basin irrigation and a loose system of canals, all dependent on the annual inundation of the Nile. The value of agricultural land, especially for taxation purposes, was based on its relationship to a water source. Thus, land that was directly on the riverbank and prone to flooding was of less value than land located at a slight distance from the river or near a canal. Land near the desert margin would, in turn, be of less value than land closer to the Nile and canals.

The Nile not only provided irrigation water but also washed out salts from the soil, and deposited rich silts at the approximate rate of 2.2 kilograms per square meter per year, providing an excellent soil composition for a rich variety of crops and virtually obviating the need for animal fertilizer. During the pharaonic period, basin irrigation with an accompanying canal system was augmented by water that was hand-carried in jars from the Nile to the fields. The *shadduf*, a simple water-raising device, is first visible in pictorial evidence from the New Kingdom (c.1450BCE); the *sakkia*, an animal-powered water wheel, and the archimedian screw were not present in Egypt until the Greco-Roman period (4th BCE onward). These last two tools notably increased the cultivatable land available in Egypt.

In ancient Egypt the Nile's ebb and flow, and thus the cycle of agriculture, provided the basis for the Egyptian and Coptic calendars. The first season was that of inundation, or *akhet*, which lasted approximately from June to October. During these months, fields lay fallow or under water, while more floodwater was collected in basins and canals for use throughout the year. The next season was *peret*, meaning "coming forth," and was the time for cultivation after the flood waters had receded. This lasted from October to mid-February. During this time the fields were prepared using ploughs and hoes, the seed was scattered, and in some instances trampled into the ground by herds of sheep, goats, and pigs. The final season, *shemu*, meaning "drought," was when crops were harvested and lasted from mid-February to June, with much of the activity taking place in April. It is unclear when the Egyptians started to grow two cycles of crops, but in the Roman period two harvests of many crops were common. The second crop was manually watered with water carried from the Nile as by *shemu* the water in the canals and basins had already been emptied. It was this agricultural wealth that made Egypt an attractive prize for the Roman Empire, and once part of the empire, Egypt became its main grain producer.

The majority of agricultural land belonged to the pharaoh and the temples, with both keeping exact records of its productivity, taxation details, and lease agreements. Nobles and other wealthy individuals also owned land. Land was frequently rented out to tenant farmers, and details of these transactions have been found on papyri from most periods of Egyptian history.

The main crops produced were cereals. The Egyptians produced wheat, most commonly emmer (*Triticum dicoccum*), although some scholars have also identified cultivated and wild einkorn (*Triticum monococcum*, *Triticum boeoticum*) and barley (*Hordeum*). These were used to produce bread and beer, and were the staples of the Egyptian diet. The grain was grown on large fields; however, vegetables were grown in small square plots that were easy to water. The types of vegetables, fruits, and herbs cultivated in Egypt changed during the course of history with new plants being introduced by trading, conquest, and immigrant groups. The list of vegetables included onions, leeks, garlic, peas, lentils, chickpeas, various types of beans, radishes, cabbage, cucumbers, cress, a kos-type lettuce, and perhaps some form of marrow. Fruit included grapes grown on arbors for eating or wine production, dates of different varieties, sycamore figs, figs, pomegranates, dom-palm nuts, *nabk* berries, persea, and melons. Apples, pears, apricots, and peaches were cultivated in the Greco-Roman period, and possibly earlier. Although olives were cultivated, they were not successful enough to form a significant part of the oil industry, which was dominated by sesame, castor, and flax. Flax (*Linum usitatissimum*) was used not only for oil but was also the primary material used in textiles. Herbs included marjoram, purslane, fenugreek, coriander, celery, anise, fennel, mustard, basil, cumin, and rosemary. Papyrus was cultivated in the marshlands of the delta for making paper and boats, as well as for its edible tubers.

Vegetables and fruits were all harvested by hand, although there is a tomb scene at the site of Beni Hasan showing apes being used to help in the harvest of figs. In addition to being farmed on a large scale, fruits and vegetables were often produced in vegetable gardens on wealthier estates.

Agricultural tools pictured on tomb walls as well as those recovered from archaeological contexts include ploughs (powered by cattle as well as by humans), hoes, clod hammers, and mattocks for ground preparation and maintenance. Wooden sickles with flint blades were used to harvest grains, while flax was harvested by being hand-pulled. Grain was threshed on threshing floors with animals, generally cattle, walking over the grain to separate the seed from its covering, or by being beaten by thick sticks. Winnowing fans and sieves were used to separate the grain from the chaff. Grain

was transported in baskets, and sacks were carried on donkeys and stored in mud-built granaries. Deities associated with agriculture include Nepri, the god of grain, Ernutet, the harvest goddess, and Sekhat-Hor, a cattle goddess.

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See also: **Herdning, Farming, Origins of: Sahara and Nile Valley.**

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Egypt, Ancient: Architecture

The basic building material of ancient Egypt was the alluvial mud of the river Nile. Mixed with some straw or other organic material, it could be shaped in moulds into bricks, which could be hardened in the heat of the sun. These could be used to produce anything from a shed to a temple or pyramid. In an arid climate such as Egypt's, mud brick can be incredibly durable, with walls from around 2700BCE still standing 10 meters tall at Abydos. Even after the adoption of stone as a monumental building material, mud brick still remained the principal material used, even for such structures as the royal palace. Stone only appeared as such things as doorjambs and column bases. This was because houses of whatever size were intended to last for a finite period; temples and tombs were meant to last forever.

Stone is first found around 3000BCE, when granite slabs were used to pave the tomb of King Den. Its use then increases until the beginning of the Third Dynasty,



The pylon of the temple of Luxor (late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Dynasties), showing typical features of a New Kingdom temple, with a pylon gateway, flanked by obelisks and colossal statues, and an approach lined with sphinxes. The temple was built of sandstone, the normal building material for temples in southern Egypt from the time of the New Kingdom on. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

around 2700BCE, when the world's first large stone monument was built at Saqqara. This is the Step Pyramid complex, constructed as the tomb of King Djoser, by the architect Imhotep. In many ways, the stone architecture mimics earlier forms, with stone blocks the size of mud bricks, and many imitations of plant-material framing and roofing. However, over the next century, the full capability of stone was recognized, with the use of blocks weighing up to fifteen tons being used in the construction of the vast pyramids and temples at Giza.

The high-quality masonry seen at Giza rapidly declines in the latter part of the Old Kingdom, with more modest structures built with smaller, roughly shaped blocks used for core-work, relying on casings for stability. Of course the loss of such casings to stone robbers has resulted in later pyramids being in far poorer state than the earliest ones.

The extensive use of stone for nonmortuary temples comes rather later than its use for tombs, Old and Middle Kingdom temples relying heavily on mud brick. New Kingdom and later cult buildings tend to have their inner areas of stone, but their pylon gateways are sometimes still of brick. Foundations are generally poor and made worse by the burying of foundation deposits under many pillars. Such buildings are essentially held up by their sheer mass, and once decay has set in, collapse is often the result. Today, a number of ancient structures have had to be taken down and re-erected from scratch on modern foundations.

The Egyptian temple was typically approached through a gateway, flanked by obelisks and massive tapering pylons. A colonnaded court would be followed by a high, pillared (hypostyle) hall, lit by clerestory

windows. Succeeding rooms would be less well-lit, with the floor rising and ceiling falling in level. The final sanctuary would be pitch black. The exception to this pattern were temples dedicated to the sun, which would be open to the sky.

Domestic structures vary considerably, from a peasant's hut, to the palace or mansion of an individual of the very highest status. The latter tend to center on a large, pillared, reception hall, out of which open the private apartments; many good examples are known from Tell el-Amarna, around 1350BCE. The focus on the reception room is also found in lesser, but still multi-room, dwellings; this reception room might house the shrine to the household gods, a platform that seems also to have been used by women who would squat on it to give birth.

Planned artisans' dwellings are known from Amarna, Deir el-Medina (New Kingdom), and Kahun (Middle Kingdom), while an ideal city layout may be inferred from Amarna, built from scratch by King Akhenaten as a new capital city. The latter featured a strong processional axis, onto which many of the public buildings faced. The latter were concentrated into the central part of the site, with mixed residential suburbs spreading north and south of the central city.

An integral part of any major settlement was its cemetery. Ideally, this should have lain to the west, the home of the dead, but this very much depended on the local topography. The latter would also largely determine whether the chapel element of tombs would be cut into a cliff face, or be a freestanding structure. In turn the latter could have the appearance of a miniature temple, or be a bench-shaped structure known as a mastaba, into the core of which the chapel might be



Sun-baked mud brick was the most ancient, and most widely used, building material in ancient Egypt. This is part of the funerary enclosure of Khasekhemwy, the last king of the Second Dynasty, at Abydos, and displays the characteristic paneled motif seen on many monuments of this period. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

built. The burial apartments (substructure) were almost always cut into the rock, approached either by a shaft or a stairway. They frequently lay below, or in proximity to, the chapel, but might lie a considerable distance away.

Kings' tombs follow the same basic pattern, the main differences being scale, and the fact that during the Old and Middle Kingdoms the tomb was surmounted by a pyramid, standing directly over the burial chamber, and immediately behind the tomb chapel (mortuary temple). The earliest pyramids are stepped, but from the beginning of the Fourth Dynasty become straight-sided, probably representing the sun's descending rays. Almost all are stone-built until the middle of the Twelfth Dynasty, when they adopt brick construction. In the New Kingdom, the mortuary temple, now devoid of an accompanying pyramid, was constructed over a kilometer from the substructure, which lay in a remote valley at Thebes, known as the Valley of the Kings.

Ancient Egyptian architecture remained in use for religious buildings well into the Roman period. In the nineteenth century there was a revival of the style in both Europe and the United States following the first major archaeological work in the country, with another revival in the 1920s, following the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Funeral Practices and Mummification; Egypt, Ancient: Religion; Egypt, Ancient: Social Organization; Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest and Occupation: Historical Outline.**

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Egypt, Ancient: Economy: Redistributive: Palace, Temple

The economy of ancient Egypt was based on agriculture. The ecology of the Nile, which every summer inundated the fields with silt-bearing water, ensured that farming was both simple and capable of producing considerable surpluses. It was upon the latter that ability to produce Egypt's stunning monumental civilization was predicated.



Men harvesting grapes. Detail of a wall painting in the tomb of Nakht, scribe and priest under Pharaoh Thutmose IV (Eighteenth Dynasty, sixteenth–fourteenth centuries BCE). Tomb of Nakht, Shaykh Abd el-Qurna Cemetery, Tombs of the Nobles, Thebes, Egypt. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

In theory, Egypt and all its resources were the property of the king, god's representative on earth. Thus, the palace (in essence, "the state") remained the ultimate economic center of the country. However, while the palace possessed estates, the vast majority of the land had, at some stage, been donated to individuals and institutions, the state benefiting through taxation.

Individuals would receive land initially as a grant from the crown in return for services rendered. It would then become the property of the family, being passed on through the generations, disposed of by sale, or incorporated into a funerary endowment. The latter involved the setting up of a kind of trust, the produce from the land being used to provide offerings for the mortuary cult of the person making the endowment, and to pay for a mortuary priest and the administration of the endowment. Such endowments formed an important part of the economy, akin to the chantries set up in medieval Europe.

Land held by individuals could be subject to complicated divisions and transfers, as shown by various surviving documents. Some long-running legal cases were felt to be so important that their outcome might be recorded in a tomb, for example in the tomb of Mose, who had been involved in wrangling that had stretched across several reigns during the late fourteenth and early thirteenth centuries BCE.

The major institutional landowners were, however, the temples. Kings wishing to show their religious devotion would allocate land to a temple, as well as manpower and other resources. The latter could include

booty from war and tribute from subject peoples, particularly during the New Kingdom, when Egypt's international power and status were at their height. Private individuals also made donations, all ostentatiously celebrated by the giver to ensure that his or her piety was fully appreciated by the divinity.

Temples ranged greatly in size and economic ramifications. Most sanctuaries were strictly local affairs, with their land-holdings equally constrained. However, deities with "national" roles—such as Ptah of Memphis, Re of Heliopolis and, in particular, Amun of Thebes—had huge temples, with estates spread throughout Egypt and Nubia. These ensured that the temples had pivotal roles in the economy, both as landlords and as users of the surpluses generated.

Apart from supporting the clergy, and providing the goods that were offered daily to the deity, these surpluses enabled the maintenance of an extensive body of craft specialists. These were employed in the construction, decoration, and maintenance of the temple and its furnishings. In the process, they became centers of excellence in the broad spheres of craft, technology, and literacy, and seem to have thus also served as centers for technical and literary education for those outside the sacerdotal sphere.

The state's share of these surpluses, and those generated by other institutions and individuals took the form of taxation. In exceptional cases, the king might declare a given person or institution exempt from tax. It has been argued that overuse of this power may have played an important role in the economic decline of Egypt in the later New Kingdom.

The redistributive economy is particularly well illustrated by the New Kingdom community of Deir el-Medina at Thebes. This village housed the workmen who built the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings, together with their families. It lay in a small desert valley and was entirely dependent on outside deliveries for food, drink and materials, provided by the state. Within the village, however, there was thriving trade, where goods and services were exchanged, as evidenced by many extant documents from the village.

Something that stands out from such material is that all trade was in the form of barter: coinage was not to appear until the very end of pharaonic times and was not common until the time of the Ptolemies. However, New Kingdom documents make it clear that there were by then notional units of account relating to metals that could allow the relative value of wholly dissimilar items to be reckoned. Back in the Middle Kingdom, (nominal) loaves of bread seem to have been used in a similar way.

Tax was levied by the state on all kinds of production. Texts relating to a biennial census of cattle, and later gold and land, date back to before the Old Kingdom.

Later depictions show officials measuring agricultural land to allow the calculation of tax liabilities. Collection was in the hands of local officials, much of the revenue taking the form of grain, which went to state granaries and formed the key medium for paying state employees of all kinds. Thus, the overseer of the granary of the Pharaoh held a pivotal role in the taxation process, although ultimate control lay with the vizier (prime minister).

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See also: Egypt, Ancient: Agriculture; Egypt, Ancient: Religion; Egypt, Ancient: Social Organization.

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Egypt, Ancient: Funeral Practices and Mummification

The continued existence of the body on earth formed an important part of the ancient Egyptian view of the necessities for the afterlife, and seems to have been the dead person's link with earth. From this conception stemmed the requirement that the body be preserved from corruption and disintegration, which led to the development of the elaborate practices of mummification.

Early bodies, buried in the sand, often experienced natural mummification. After the introduction of burial chambers around 3200BCE, artificial preservation was attempted by wrapping bodies in linen bandages, and sometimes additionally with plaster. This was supplemented during the Old Kingdom by the use of a mixture of salts known as natron, as well as the removal of the internal organs. The use of plaster was abandoned before the Middle Kingdom, a standard technique being developed for the highest status individuals by the New Kingdom. This began with the removal of the brain, lungs, and abdominal viscera (the latter two elements for separate preservation in "canopic" jars and chests); the body was then completely covered in natron for up to seventy days. Once fully desiccated, it



The Old Kingdom necropolis at Giza, showing a full range of tombs. In the background is the Great Pyramid of Khufu, and in the middle ground rows of *mastabas*. Finally, nearest the camera are the entrances to a number of rock-cut tombs. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

was entirely wrapped in linen, and equipped with a mask that fitted over the head; this would be placed inside the coffin. In some cases, the remains were enclosed in a rectangular sarcophagus of wood or stone, and placed in the burial chamber, along with the possessions of the deceased.

The designs of these mortuary containers changed considerably over time. The earliest coffins were rectangular, and very short, to reflect the early placement of the body in a fetal position. The coffins lengthened during the Old Kingdom, and gained a pair of eyes on one side; these were to allow the body, which lay on its left side, to “see” out. During the Middle Kingdom, mummy-shaped (“anthropoid”) coffins began to develop out of the masks that some mummies then wore. By the early New Kingdom, these had all but replaced the old rectangular type; they were usually of wood, or occasionally, stone.

The detail and decoration of these items display a constant evolution. The color schemes of the coffins, in particular, show changes over time. Likewise, the four canopic jars initially had human-headed stoppers, but by the middle of the New Kingdom switched to depictions of different creatures’ heads for each of the deities regarded as protecting the contained organs: Imseti—human (liver); Hapy—ape (lungs); Duamutef—dog (stomach); Qebehsenuf—falcon (intestines). These deities, along with the embalmer-god, Anubis, and the goddesses Isis, Nephthys, Neith, and Selqet, are also frequently found depicted upon coffins and sarcophagi.

The tomb ideally comprised two elements, the below-ground closed burial chamber (the substructure) and an above-ground offering place (the superstructure). The offering place might simply be the ground above the grave, an area in front of a simple stela, or a

large freestanding or rock-cut complex; this could be either above the burial place, or some distance away. At the superstructure, the family, friends, or priests left foodstuffs, or communed with the departed on feast days (similar tomb visits, with family picnics, continue in Egypt today).

The forms of the elements of the tomb complex varied considerably with time and place, but at all times the fundamental concepts remained constant: the burial apartment(s) centered on the corpse itself, and the chapel centered on a “false door,” the interface between the two worlds, through which the spirit could emerge.

Superstructure decoration usually focused on the earthly life of the deceased, including the individual’s preferred recreation activities. In contrast, in the fairly rare cases where it was actually adorned, the substructure concentrated on such compositions as the *Book of the Dead*, or on providing lists of offerings to the dead.

Egyptian funerary ceremonies began when the prepared mummy was retrieved from the embalmers and was taken, in procession with the tomb goods, to the tomb. The procession included the family and friends of the deceased, priests, and, if the deceased had been wealthy, professional mourners.

The spirit of the deceased individual faced an arduous journey into the afterlife. The spirit first had to overcome the obstacles placed in its way by the guardians of the various gates that lay between it and its goal, the Hall of Judgment. Aid in doing so was provided by a series of guidebooks to the hereafter, such as the *Coffin Texts* and the *Book of the Dead*. These supplied spells intended to combat the threats that lay between the dead person and resurrection. The final



The funeral procession of the vizier Ramose (late Eighteenth Dynasty), shown in his tomb chapel (TT55) at Thebes. The large shrine at the left of the top register contained the dead man’s body, before which a group of female mourners (bottom register) lament. Servants carry the furniture that formed an important part of the outfit of the burial chamber. Photo © Aidan Dodson.

part of the ordeal involved the weighing of the deceased's heart (regarded as the seat of intelligence and knowledge) against the feather of truth, order, and justice. If the scale balanced, the deceased went before Osiris and passed into eternal life in a realm essentially visualized as an idealized Egypt. If the heart proved heavier than the feather, it was fed to a monster called the Devourer, and the spirit of the deceased was cast into darkness. The guidebooks provided by the mourners contained spells designed to prevent such an outcome. These texts were generally written on papyrus and placed within the coffin, but they were occasionally written on the coffin itself or the walls of the tomb.

The spirit or soul was believed to have a number of aspects, including the *ka*, and the *ba*. The latter was depicted as a bird with a human head, which seems to have been the form in which the spirit traveled into the spiritual realm. The *ka* was conceived as having been created at the same time as the body, but surviving beyond the bodily death; it was to the *ka* that offerings were made during the burial rites.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Religion; Egypt, Ancient: Social Organization.**

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Egypt, Ancient: Hieroglyphics and Origins of Alphabet

Egyptian is part of the Afroasiatic phylum of languages, covering large areas of the Levant and the northern part of Africa. Examples include Agaw, Akkadian, Bedja, Hausa, Hebrew, Kabyle, Somali, Tuareg, and Ugaritic, all of which have a number of features in common. Egyptian has been, for all intents and purposes, a dead language for some centuries; its latest form, Coptic, was replaced as a daily vernacular by Arabic by the Middle Ages. It is still to be found, however, in the liturgy of traditionalist Coptic Christian churches.



A typical use of hieroglyphs on a stela of the Twenty-second Dynasty. This one was dedicated at the funeral of a sacred Apis bull. It is interesting that its author, Paseshor, uses it to recount his ancestry, which included many kings, and is thus useful for reconstructing the royal genealogy of the period. From the Serapeum at Saqqara; now in the Louvre, Paris, N481. Photo from A. Mariette, *Le Sérapeum de Memphis* (Paris: Gide, 1857), pl. 31.

Coptic is written in a modified version of the Greek alphabet; earlier forms were written in scripts based on hieroglyphs, which are first found around 3200BCE. Their first appearance is on individual pot markings from the prehistoric royal cemetery at Abydos, more coherent groupings being immediately following the unification of Egypt. Even then, however, the signs do not appear to write full sentences; rather they provide words to be read in the context of a central picture. The first “proper” hieroglyphic texts seem to date to the beginning of the Old Kingdom, after which progress seems to have been rapid. “Old Egyptian” is the term used to describe the first phase of the developed language. By the Middle Kingdom, it had evolved into Middle Egyptian, subsequent phases being known as Late Egyptian and Demotic. Middle Egyptian was regarded as the classic form of the tongue; it was still in use for some monumental inscription two thousand years after it had ceased to be the vernacular.

Almost all hieroglyphs represent an animate or inanimate object, and in their most elaborate inscribed form can be tiny works of art in themselves, and thus ideal for monumental and decorative purposes. However, they were less so for everyday purposes, and accordingly, from early on in Egyptian history, a distinct



Scribe with reed pen box measuring grain. Detail of a wall painting in the tomb of Mennah, scribe of the fields and estate inspector under Pharaoh Thutmose IV (Eighteenth Dynasty, sixteenth–fourteenth centuries BCE). Tomb of Mennah, Shaykh Abd el-Qurna Cemetery, Tombs of the Nobles, Thebes, Egypt. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

handwritten version of the hieroglyphic script developed, known today as hieratic. In its early phases it is little more than a simplification of the underlying signs, but by the Middle and New Kingdoms hieratic has taken on various distinctive attributes. Hieratic script was used for a vast range of religious and domestic purposes, its principal media being papyri and ostraka (fragments of stone or pottery used for casual jottings).

Hieratic remained the principal script for religious purposes, in particular the funerary books such as the *Book of the Dead*, down to the latest parts of ancient Egyptian history. However, for domestic uses, the handwritten script had continued to develop, and around 700BCE a fully distinct variety, Demotic, came into use. Although fully developed hieratic is far removed from the traditional hieroglyphs, the origins of many signs are still more or less visible. In contrast, demotic script is almost unrecognizable as a derivative of hieroglyphs and has a number of its own linguistic peculiarities.

Although hieroglyphs and their developments are based on pictures, only certain signs function as pictures of the things to which they refer. The vast majority represent one, two, or three of the twenty-four consonants of the Egyptian alphabet. The latter does not include true vowels, which, in common with modern printed Arabic and Hebrew, were not written and had to be supplied by the reader from his own knowledge of the language. This leads to problems when one attempts to vocalize a set of Egyptian words, for example to produce versions of personal names that are

acceptable to the nonspecialist reader. This is the explanation for the wide variety of spellings that are to be seen in print.

All ancient Egyptian words are made up of the sounds contained within the alphabet, and, indeed, there were signs that expressed every single one of them. Thus, in theory, any word could be written using purely alphabetic signs. However, in practice, this was not done, and there are over six hundred signs regularly used in writing. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Levantine development of a true alphabetic script was based on a knowledge of the alphabetic aspect of the hieroglyphic script. What may be the earliest alphabetic script, based on signs derived from hieroglyphs, Proto-Sinaitic, is known from the Egyptian-run mining settlements in the Sinai peninsula, dating to the Middle Kingdom/early New Kingdom. However, there are major difficulties with the interpretation of this script, and no definitive conclusions have been reached, even after some ninety years of study.

The hundreds of hieroglyphic signs fall into a number of categories. They include determinatives, needed to distinguish between words that, because they lack written vowels, are spelled in exactly the same way. Other important categories of sign are those that write two consonants, three consonants, or even a whole word (known as “bilateral,” “trilateral,” and “word” signs). The line between multilaterals and word signs is a fine one; indeed, some signs can fall under both headings, depending on the context within which they are used.

Knowledge of the ancient forms of the Egyptian language is now highly developed, and the majority of texts may be read with little difficulty. Research is therefore now directed toward understanding the underlying structures of the language, rather than basic meaning. However, until the 1820s, the hieroglyphic, hieratic, and demotic scripts were completely unreadable, knowledge having been lost since the middle of the fifth century, when the last known demotic text had been carved; the last dated hieroglyphic inscription was carved in 394.

During the intervening centuries, various more-or-less fantastic speculations were made, most based on the fundamental misunderstanding that saw hieroglyphs as pictures and not as phonetic signs. This misconception persisted even after an Egyptian-Greek bilingual text, the Rosetta Stone, was found in August 1799. It was not until the beginning of the 1820s that Thomas Young in the United Kingdom and Jean-François Champollion in France began to make real progress. It was the latter who finally was able to carry the task forward, producing the first grammar of the ancient Egyptian language, which appeared posthumously from 1836 to 1841.

AIDAN DODSON

See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Literacy.**

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Egypt, Ancient: Literacy

Literacy was highly prized in ancient Egypt and was a sure guarantee of a significant position in the state administration. Given the vast number of inscribed temples, tombs, and statues that were a part of the landscape of ancient Egypt, it is surprising that literacy was relatively uncommon in ancient Egypt. Counting the occurrence of titles found in tombs associated with writing and extrapolating from these, it seems that a very low percentage of Egypt's population was literate.

The percentage of literate people in Egypt changed over time, with a presumed increase in literacy occurring from the Early Dynastic to the Late Period. However, when calculating basic literacy, one must remember that the degree of literacy varies: some people might have been more adept at reading than writing, or vice versa (although this is more unusual), and some could perhaps do both, but at a rudimentary level, while others could merely sign their names. The titles associated with literacy skills implied a higher level of literacy than the minimum level of competence (i.e., to sign or recognize one's name). A higher level of literacy was a prerequisite for those who wished to hold a significant position in the Egyptian bureaucracy. Titles—such as scribe, overseer, doctor, or priest, and so on—described those who were fluent in reading and writing, as well as numeracy.

There were possibly a significant number of individuals, such as itinerant professional letter writers,

who were literate, but left little trace of their presence in the archaeological record. For example, the letters to the dead inscribed on papyri, or *ostraka*, and pottery vessels, might have been written by professional letter writers, such as are found in Africa and the Middle East today. Such people might have helped provide services for the illiterate, but might not have had the wherewithal to own rich inscribed tombs, and thus remain unmarked in the archaeological record. It has been suggested, however, that such services might have been rendered by low-level priests.

The site of Deir el-Medina, a Theban village, home of the New Kingdom workmen who carved and decorated the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings, is a rich source of inscribed material. Evidence from the site indicates that many draughtsmen, quarrymen, and carpenters were literate. However, this village of artisans might have been the exception rather than the rule. At this point, evidence from other well-preserved workmen's villages, such as the one at Tell el-Amarna, or the Middle Kingdom village of Lahun, does not provide parallels in the literacy levels or the inscribed finds of Deir el-Medina.

An increase in literacy over the course of Egyptian history might, in part, be due to the evolution of the language, as well as the composition of the population. In earlier Egyptian history (Old Kingdom), literacy was rare. The formulaic manner in which standard inscriptions (especially funerary) were expressed may suggest that many texts are derived from the oral tradition and could have been, with an initial prompting, "read," or at least recognized by a large portion of the population. The discoveries of schoolchildren's practice texts seem to indicate an increase in scribal schools after the First Intermediate Period. As the number of people to whom education became accessible increased, the literacy level rose. In the later part of Egyptian history—when demotic, the common cursive script, was used—it is quite probable that more members of the population were literate. Certainly, the amount of graffiti from the later periods of Egyptian history would support this, as the earlier graffiti consists primarily of crude petroglyphs, or vignettes virtually unaccompanied by text, while from the Late Period onward there is an increase in verbal graffiti. In fact, the largest number of texts are written in demotic; however, this might be due to an accident of archaeological discovery and preservation rather than to any real reflection of the amount of written material present at any one time.

The number of literary genres increased and diversified with time. It is unusual, however, that virtually no inscribed papyri (other than religious works such as the *Book of the Dead*) have been found in tombs. Given our knowledge that intact Egyptian tombs contained all that

the living presumed the dead might need in the after-life, it seems reasonable to assume that tombs might have contained works of fiction for light relief, or examples of the improving didactic literature of which the Egyptians were so fond. The majority of literary texts that have been recovered from ancient Egypt come from fragments found in temple areas and at town sites.

Both men and women were literate, although the majority of literate individuals were men. Despite the fact that elite women were literate, few held high positions in the bureaucracy (with the notable exception of the priesthood, which did employ female priests). Royal women and many noble women and priestesses were, presumably, able to read and write. In Egyptian literature, some women are depicted as being literate, and a major divinity and the patroness of writing is a goddess, Seshat. In general, women's literacy might have been of a more rudimentary nature than that of men. However, the evidence gleaned from many demotic documents suggests that nonelite women who managed their own properties, as well as those of their male family members when they were absent, were literate. A significant amount of the evidence of female literacy, especially from the nonelite classes, comes from Deir el-Medina. However, there is little evidence of schools where women were commonly pupils; thus it is possible that women were taught literacy skills in temples.

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See also: Egypt, Ancient: Hieroglyphics and Origins of Alphabet.

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Egypt, Ancient: Religion

In order to understand ancient Egyptian religion, it is important to take two points into account. The first is that ancient Egyptian religion was not separated from state affairs. Both religious and governmental fields were overseen by the king, who passed all matters onto his civil servants and the priests. The second is that the people in ancient Egypt were excellent observers of their environment. They watched the celestial bodies as well as significant factors of their surroundings, such as the annual inundation of the Nile, and they had profound knowledge about wild and domesticated animals. Therefore, every observation they made in this field was translated into a genuine mythological language.

Sources

Evidence of religion is mostly of funerary origin. Tombs and burial accessories of both common people and royal families exist. Besides the earliest and simple royal tombs at Saqqara and Abydos, there are monumental pyramids from 2630–1990BCE at Saqqara, Giza, Dahshur, Hawara, and Meidum, and for later periods the tombs in the Valley of the Kings on the west bank of the Nile near Luxor. The earliest collection of texts, the so-called Pyramid Texts, was written about 2340BCE directly on the walls in the interior of the pyramids. This corpus consists of a collection of different spells for the protection of the deceased king in the afterworld. During the New Kingdom (1550–1070 BCE) the royal tombs at Thebes convey diverse texts, which are called Books of the Netherworld, with comprehensive written material about ancient Egyptian ideas of the life after death. Those texts describe the nocturnal journey of the sun through the netherworld, the realm of the dead, from which he will rise in the next morning.

The private tombs are situated near the rim of the ancient sites at the borderline of the desert. They contain coffins made of wood, inscribed with another important and extensive collection of spells called the Coffin Texts (about 2100BCE) which are intended to protect the deceased against the risks of the hereafter. From the New Kingdom about 1500BCE onward the Book of the Dead, another collection of spells, takes the place of the Coffin Texts.

Another significant monument is the temple. Most temples are situated in Upper Egypt, while in Lower Egypt nearly all sites are destroyed. The earliest

well-preserved temples with wall decorations are from the Middle Kingdom (2000BCE). For the New Kingdom the complex of Karnak, the Luxor temple, the mortuary temples on the west bank of Thebes, and the temples of Abydos are the primary sites. In a much better condition are the temples of the Greco-Roman era (300BCE–300CE) at Dendera, Esna, Edfu, Kom Ombo, and Philae. As a rule, every wall or column of an Egyptian temple is decorated with reliefs. Typically they include scenes of the king making offerings to different deities. These scenes are carefully composed following a decorative program that is called “grammar of the temple.” All figures of a scene are inseparably connected with the integrated hieroglyphic inscriptions. Here the temples of the Greco-Roman time present more details in cult and other religious themes, because of the more extended inscriptions. The texts of the above-mentioned monuments and text-corpora include hymns, prayers, ritual texts and magical texts. But these texts may occur separate in other sources as well.

The Egyptian Pantheon

The genuine style of representing Egyptian deities and deified objects was developed very early and appears static during a history of nearly three thousand years. However, this does not mean that religious ideas and beliefs were unchanged and static throughout this period.

Only a few names and figures from deities and holy objects, so-called fetishes, are preserved from Predynastic and early dynastic times (3000–2500BCE), but the ideas people had concerning these objects are not transmitted.

The Pyramid Texts (about 2340BCE) show that Egyptian deities were divided into different categories. They worshiped cosmic or universal gods like the sun-god Ra or the moon-god Thoth. Other gods actually embodied space, like Nut, the goddess of the sky, the earth-god Geb or Shu, the air who filled the space between sky and earth.

In general, Egyptian deities are connected with a fixed place, where they were worshiped. Old Kingdom (2340BCE) texts show that the most important center of religion was Heliopolis; others were Memphis, Hermoupolis, and Abydos. Thebes, where the falcon-god Mont was first venerated, later became an important center, when Amun enriched the local pantheon in the beginning of the Middle Kingdom (2040BCE). Amun, who had a close connection to the kingship, became a universal deity, which means that there were also fluid transitions between universal and local deities. The majority of gods in Egypt are those with special tasks, like protection-gods, and their number was great

Over time, deity combinations became more important. In this way the name of the universal sun-god Ra was added to the name of another local-deity. Amun,

for example, became Amun-Ra, which meant that the local deity Amun acted as the universal sun-god Ra. Earlier scholars called such combinations syncretistic, but today this term is no longer used, since those deities did not actually meld together into a single being. The union could be loosened at any time. In a similar way different animals with their own characteristics are used to describe the quality of a god. Some gods had a close union with a specific animal.

Groups of deities were organized like structures in the society. Most of the cult places constituted during the New Kingdom a holy family, which consisted of a god, a goddess, and a divine child, but older and of greater significance was the father-son relationship, which played an important role in cosmological ideas as well as in the determination of the secular succession to the throne.

Egyptian Deities and Adjacent Cultures

Several near-eastern deities were worshiped in Egypt. Their names appear not only in Egyptian texts but also in texts of their home countries; thus it is not difficult to verify their sources. The situation with the gods of African neighbors was quite different. As far as is known at the time of this writing, gods of the Meroitic culture, like Sebiuemker, Apedemak, or the Lower Nubian god from Kalabsha Mandulis, were neither of Egyptian origin nor worshiped in Egypt. The source of Arensnuphis, who was worshiped in Philae and in the Nile Valley of Lower and Upper Nubia is still disputed, as are the origins of numerous local forms of Amun with their characteristic ram shape, which differs from the ram-icon in Egypt.

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Egypt, Ancient: Social Organization

The social organization of ancient Egypt is best envisaged as a pyramid with the pharaoh at its apex. All temporal power, and much spiritual power, ultimately rested with the Pharaoh. In his official capacity the pharaoh was regarded as supreme ruler and commander, a god on earth, as well as high priest of all the gods. He had a divine contract with the gods whereby he had to honor them by building temples, making offerings and prayers; in return they would endorse his



Slave girl dressing a lady for a feast. Detail of a wall painting in the tomb of Nakht, scribe and priest under Thutmose IV (Eighteenth Dynasty, sixteenth–fourteenth centuries BCE). Tomb of Nakht, Shaykh Abd el-Qurna Cemetery, Tombs of the Nobles, Thebes, Egypt. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

rulership and ensure the regularity of the Nile flood and the safety of Egypt, thereby maintaining cosmic order (*maat*). All branches of government including the military, the treasury, the priesthood, and the civil service were responsible to him. This view of the pharaoh and his court is well illustrated by the layout of the Giza necropolis with the pharaohs' pyramid located centrally, surrounded by the different-sized tombs of his family, courtiers, and officials. A separate Mortuary Temple was used to celebrate the cult of the pharaoh after his death, and in some instances during his lifetime. Only the Pharaoh's mother and his wives, obviously important in the hierarchy, also had pyramid tombs. The succession to the throne was patrilineal; generally the son of the chief wife was chosen as crown prince, although this was not an immutable rule. Although rare, female pharaohs existed at various periods in Egyptian history.

The vizier came below the pharaoh in the administrative hierarchy. In the earlier Old Kingdom (Third–Fifth Dynasties) most viziers were members of the royal family, either sons or brothers of the king, with one example of a female vizier. Toward the end of the Old Kingdom (Fifth–Sixth Dynasties) viziers came to be chosen from among nobles with fewer or no direct blood ties to the ruler. Like many courtiers and officials, viziers were often priests in addition to their other duties.

An understanding of the organization of the rest of society can best be gained from funerary contexts (size of tomb and title of owner), taxation and accounting records, and literary texts. Below the viziers came the highest officials who were nobles, many of whom were

blood relations of the Pharaoh (especially in the Third–Fifth Dynasties), followed by courtiers, and the highest local officials, such as provincial governors (*nomarchs*). Below this tier of society came lesser courtiers and high local officials, followed by an even lower tier of courtiers and lesser local officials. Under these were minor functionaries, followed by the semi-official margin, and the peasantry. It was possible for people to change their social status through personal ability, special services rendered to the Pharaoh, by the acquisition of wealth, or by marriage. A basic criterion for being an official was being literate; all officials were scribes together with whatever other title they held.

Bureaucrats from all levels were engaged in different types of work related to government and religion, often holding more than one title, including different priestly titles. As the government was supposed to regulate agriculture, collect taxes, administer justice, and maintain order at home and abroad, officials worked in a variety of departments in the general bureaucracy, treasury, military, and in temples. Temples were second only to the pharaoh in wealth and, consequently, had large bureaucracies of their own and powerful priesthoods. Priests often had to serve both the temple bureaucracy and the pharaoh, depending on the god they served and the position they held.

The military, with the pharaoh as its supreme commander, played an important role in Egyptian society, not only in providing a police force and an army for protection and conquest, but as a source of manpower used for mining and quarrying expeditions.

For the most part the officials were men, but several women had titles suggesting responsibility as well as independent means. Certainly royal women owned significant amounts of land and held important religious and secular positions, most notably that of regent. Noblewomen held positions such as overseer of weavers, as well as high priestly rank, while women of lower positions would work as weavers, maids, laundresses, priestesses, singers, dancers, and tradespeople. Egypt was unusual in the fact that women, regardless of rank, could own and dispose of property, divorce and marry. For the most part Egyptian marriage, consisting of a civil contract and not a religious service, was monogamous, although concubines were common. Children were highly regarded and came to adulthood during the period now considered puberty.

While merchants, craftspeople, and tenant farmers were not always directly involved with the administration, they intersected with it at several points as the pharaoh (or the temples) had ultimate control over most of Egypt's wealth. Permission to trade on a significant scale in Egypt and certainly abroad came from the administration. Traders plying the Nile as well as traveling abroad no doubt supplied Egyptians with

many of their luxury goods (in addition to what was brought into the country at different times as tribute or spoil of war). Foreigners frequently came and settled in Egypt, either as mercenaries, traders, or refugees. Most were Asiatics or Nubians, although Libyans and Bedouins have also made their mark in Egyptian society. The majority of immigrants adapted to Egyptian culture, taking Egyptian names and marrying into Egyptian families. Foreign divinities were frequently absorbed into the Egyptian pantheon, and foreign arts, motifs, and crafts assimilated and adapted by the Egyptians. There are occasional reports of tension between foreign and native groups, although for the most part the Egyptians were accepting of foreigners as long as they were peaceful and adaptable. Most slaves were foreign as well, and were often adopted and freed by their owners.

On the whole, Egyptian society was flexible, capable of assimilating people from a variety of backgrounds and providing scope for social mobility.

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Egypt: Arab Conquest (639–645)

The Arab conquest of 639–645 introduced the Arabic language and Islam to Egypt, which united Egypt with the rest of the Islamic world from 639 until the present. Before the Arab conquest, Greek was the official language of the administration and all written documents. The Arab conquest shifted Egypt's cultural alignment away from Europe and toward the East, that is, with the Arabian Peninsula.

The Prophet Mohammed unified a formerly divided Arabian Peninsula by converting tribal Arabs who worshiped many different gods under the banner of Islam and its one god, Allah. Shortly after Mohammed's death Mohammed's relative, Abu Bakr, succeeded him as caliph, or deputy. Byzantine Christians and Persians to the north offered stiff resistance to Arab plunderers. To overcome this resistance, Abu Bakr decided to occupy Christian territory. Arab armies headed north in 635.

The Arabs defeated both the Persian armies to the northeast and the Byzantine Christian armies to the northwest, especially those in Syria. Conquest of Syria was vital because missionaries and soldiers departed for Africa and the Middle East from Syria. It had large cathedrals and fortresses and was a Christian stronghold. To secure Syria the Arabs needed to capture Christian Egypt. Arab generals feared that Egypt's large, sympathetic, Christian armies could launch a counteroffensive and drive the Arabs out of Syria. Beyond its strategic importance, the Arab general Amr ibn al-As had visited Egypt and knew that its Christian population was fragmented and easy to conquer. He also wanted to gain control of Egypt's vast wealth. Egypt's agricultural surplus could feed expanding Arab armies, and Amr ibn al-As could use its wealth to attract new followers to Islam. The Prophet Mohammed made him a military commander and had sent him to Oman to convert its rulers. He succeeded, thereby winning the friendship and praise of the Prophet. Abu Bakr sent him to conquer Palestine (modern Israel); he not only vanquished it but converted its majority Christian population to Islam. It is, however, his conquest of Egypt that earned him his reputation as a brilliant soldier, an able administrator, and an astute politician.

He organized the system of taxation and the justice system still in use in many parts of Egypt to this day. He also established garrison cities to defend Egypt. Most important, Amr ibn al-As converted Egypt from an overwhelmingly Christian country into a Muslim nation, with small Coptic Christian and Jewish minorities.

Amr ibn al-As had 4,000 cavalry, armed with lances, swords, and bows and arrows. He crossed into Egypt from Syria on December 12, 639, at Al Arish. His army's objective was to capture the fortress at Babylon (Bab al Yun), a suburb of modern Cairo. The important town of Pelusium (Farama) fell to the Arabs after one month. The army next attacked Bilbays (El-Kantara), the garrison town protecting Cairo, which also fell after a one-month siege. When Amr ibn al-As reached the outskirts of Babylon, he stopped at the edge of Misri (Cairo) near Old Memphis until the caliph sent reinforcements. His rejuvenated army crushed the Byzantine Christian army at Heliopolis in 640. Misri, or Cairo, fell soon after, but the Christian soldiers defending the fortress at Babylon fought on bravely until their emperor, Heraclius, died. After this their morale suffered and they abandoned the fortress without a fight, sailing upriver to Alexandria. Amr ibn al-As's army next marched against Fayyum and subdued Middle and Upper Egypt before laying siege to Alexandria.

The Arab army was able to take Alexandria with little resistance, despite its heavy fortifications. Egypt's morale was low, and Dometianus, entrusted with defending the city, was more interested in fighting the Christians in Upper Egypt than he was in fighting the Arabs. Moreover, constant riots rocked the city as Christian factions warred against each other. The emperor Cyrus was forced to sign a peace treaty surrendering Egypt to the Arabs. Under Islamic law, a treaty (*sulh*) secured Egypt; thus, it could not be divided among the conquering soldiers in Amr ibn al-As's army. They had to take other lands by force to earn compensation for battle. This forced them to drive across North Africa and eventually into Spain.

Since Egypt was gained through treaty arrangements, its people were considered *dhimma*, or clients, and thus entitled to the protection of the ruler. Accordingly, Egyptian land could be taxed by Arab rulers. Increasing such taxes did not violate Islamic law. Therefore, the Treaty of Alexandria protected the Arab rulers from land claims made by their own army. Moreover, it headed off internal power struggles by forcing the army to expand into neighboring territory to win booty. This deflected attention from the vast riches gained by Arab leaders.

Muslim conquerors offered those whom they vanquished the choice of converting to Islam or remaining Jews or Coptic Christians. Converts qualified for

no-interest loans to start businesses and were given full citizenship rights. Those who remained Coptic Christians or Jews could continue to worship as they pleased, but they had to pay an additional tax. Many Copts converted, although others maintained their Christian faith and received fair treatment. Copts put up little resistance to the Arab invasion. The Coptic bishop of Alexandria was reinstated, exiled Coptic bishops were recalled home, and Copts were permitted to return to government posts held before the conquest. Amr ibn al-As then moved Egypt's capital from Alexandria to Al Fustat, today known as Old Cairo, to symbolize the uniqueness of his regime.

Arab governors appointed by caliphs who lived in eastern capitals ruled Egypt for centuries. Egypt's grain fed Arab urbanites and soldiers for generations and provided needed tax revenues. In time, most Egyptians accepted Arab colonialism. Most adopted the Muslim faith, often through intermarriage or trade. Arabic became the dominant language of the country. It was used in schools, government offices, and market transactions, and it replaced Greek as the national language. Continuous Arab immigration to Egypt facilitated the Arabization of Egypt, just as whites would later colonize South Africa. The Arab conquest of Egypt inseparably links its history with Arab world history.

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See also: **Arab and Islamic World, Africa in.**

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Egypt: Arab Empire (640–850)

The Prophet Muhammad died in the year 632. Seven years later, with ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab as the second caliph, the Arabs marched on Egypt, and in less than two years, the “cradle of civilization” had become a province under the Arab Empire (the caliphate).

Prior to the Arab invasion, Egypt had been ruled by foreigners for two millennium, and by 639, the granary of the Mediterranean was under the suzerainty and governorship of the then weak Byzantium Empire. ‘Amr ibn al-’As was the initiator and instigator of the conquest.

For a long time, Arabs had been interested in Egypt; its land was fertile, in contrast with the aridity of the nearby Arabian desert. Newly galvanized by Islam, the conquest of Egypt was relatively easy for the Arabs. There was little sympathy between the rulers and the ruled, with religious cleavage and exorbitant taxes. The Arabs, seen as liberators, were determined, while the Egyptians in general were docile, passive, and indifferent.

The Byzantine garrison at the fortress of Babylon capitulated to the Arab army on April 9, 641, and in September 642 Alexandria was occupied. The Arab pacification of Egypt was complete. The next two centuries saw the rule of Egypt by Arab governors beginning with its conqueror, ‘Amr ibn al-’As, and ending with ‘Anbasa. This period of Arab hegemony in Egypt was to be followed by a period of Muslim dynastic rule, although few of the rulers were Arab.

The 210 years of Arab rule in Egypt also marked the era of Arab ascendancy in the nascent Muslim world; starting with the Prophet’s *hejira* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina in 622, and the consolidation of the young Medinese community of Allah, followed by the rule of the caliphs, it saw the rise and fall of the Umayyad dynasty and ended with the founding of and the beginning of the decline of the Abbasid dynasty.

The empire was an Islamic historical and political phenomenon infused and imbued with the Arab idea and fueled by the message that they were determined, as commanded, to give to the world. However, by the mid-ninth century, the Arabs had lost their grip on the

empire and were themselves to be ruled by those they had conquered and Islamized.

A total of ninety-eight governors ruled in Egypt from ‘Amr ibn al-’As until the Turkish leader, Ahmad ibn Tulun, established an independent dynasty in 868. These governors served the caliphs first of Medina, the Classical Caliphate (632–661), and then of Damascus, the Umayyads (661–750), and then of Baghdad, the ‘Abbasids (750–850). The ‘Abbasid Caliphate was to retain its power precariously until the mid-thirteenth century. The average Umayyad governor ruled twice as long as the Abbasid counterpart. The latter were more frequently changed, a reflection of the instability in the caliphal capital.

The process of Arabization in Egypt started early. Most governors came escorted by thousands of Arab troops, who were highly privileged and settled in towns, thus frequently affecting Egypt demographically. The Arabs freely intermarried with the Copt women and thereby became increasingly indigenized.

Before his recall to Medina in 644, ‘Amr had set up a local government system with the center in his capital, Fustat. He absorbed officials of the supplanted government. The central administration did not bother the local levels of government as long as taxes were paid regularly. Agriculture was the highest priority. A special department was set up to oversee irrigation. The governor, himself appointed by the caliph, chose the war secretary, the exchequer, and the *qadi*, or justice secretary. This system was more or less adopted by subsequent governors.

By the mid-seventh century, Egypt had been consolidated under Arab rule. Byzantine menace or any external threat was ruled out. The Arabs under the Umayyads developed their naval power. Insurrection, however, abounded, especially under the Abbasids. It was a time of intensive schism in Islam, marked by the Malikite-Shafiite difference and the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. The Copts often agitated over what they regarded as excessive taxes. The rivalry for the throne between al-Amin and al-Ma’mun also helped to divide the Egyptians in their allegiance.

Anbasa, the last governor (852–856), oversaw a period of political turmoil; there was the Roman insurgency (Damiatta, 853) and the Nubian repudiation (854) of the annual tribute they had paid since the mid-seventh century. With the recall of ‘Anbasa in 856, there followed the exasperating rule of Turkish governors until Ahmad ibn Tulun restored order and established his dynasty.

This period of Arab conquest and rule was important not only in Egypt’s history but also in Islamic history. Egypt was imparted with more Arabic and Islamic characteristics. Egypt remained the food basket of the Mediterranean and was populated with an influx

of Arabs. A distinct Egyptian Arabo-Islamic milieu developed that would serve as the foundation of the Islamic intellectual and cultural heritage, which was to make Egypt the bulwark of Islam, when other centers of political and cultural Islam were in decline.

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Egypt: Tulunids and Ikhshidids, 850–969

After being ruled as a colony of the early Islamic empires for the first two centuries after the Arab conquest, Egypt experienced brief periods of autonomy under the dynastic rule of the Tulunids and then the Ikhshidids. Although these regimes never formally renounced their allegiance to the Abbasid caliphs, they built up independent armies, established total control over the resources of this rich land, and instituted hereditary rule, all of which the caliphs were powerless to stop.

Ahmad ibn Tulun became the governor of Egypt in 868 during a period of considerable turmoil in Samarra, then the capital of the Abbasid Empire. He was of Turkish origin, his father having been a slave who worked his way up to be a commander of the caliph's guard. After becoming governor, Ibn Tulun had to struggle for several years with the power of Ibn al-Mudabbir, financial director of Egypt since 861 and answerable only to the caliph. A revolt that broke out in nearby Palestine and Syria, however, offered a pretext for building a new army in Egypt, composed primarily of Turkish, Nubian, and Greek slaves and mercenaries. To pay for this army, Ibn Tulun took control of the revenues of the country, arranging for Ibn al-Mudabbir's transfer to Syria in 871.

The revolt quickly fell apart, even before Ibn Tulun intervened, but he was now in complete control of Egypt

and possessed a strong military force. His growing independence was facilitated by the fact that the caliph's brother al-Muwaffaq, the commander of the caliphal armies, was increasingly preoccupied with a massive revolt of East African slaves in southern Iraq, as well as continuing problems in the eastern provinces. Ibn Tulun never formally repudiated Abbasid authority, but with his new army and a distracted caliphate he was able to establish himself as virtually autonomous. In 877 al-Muwaffaq launched an abortive attempt to bring Egypt back under Abbasid control, but this only succeeded in convincing Ibn Tulun to strengthen his position. Claiming a desire to lead the jihad against the Byzantine Empire, Ibn Tulun occupied all of Syria up to the Byzantine frontier.

When Ibn Tulun died in 884, the succession of his son Khumarawayh was effected smoothly. Although al-Muwaffaq would once again attempt to forcibly reestablish Abbasid control, by 886 he had given up and a treaty was agreed upon that officially granted the governorship of Egypt to Khumarawayh and his descendants for a period of thirty years. His twelve years of rule saw peace and prosperity in Egypt, but the extravagance of his lifestyle and his lavish patronage of building projects, along with the expense of paying for a large standing army, overtaxed the state's resources. When Khumarawayh was murdered by one of his slaves in 896, the treasury was reportedly empty. He was succeeded by his sons Jaysh and then Harun, but they found it difficult to manage growing economic and political problems. The assassination of Harun afforded the caliph an opportunity to reassert control in 905, and Abbasid rule was reestablished for the next thirty years.

The new governors sent to Egypt continued to be Turkish generals, but their tenures were short. The one exception was Takin who served several terms as governor between 910 and 933, but he was repeatedly dismissed from that office with the changing fortunes of factional politics in Baghdad. Administrative continuity was instead provided by the al-Madhara'i family, financial officials in Fustat (Old Cairo) since the reign of Ibn Tulun. They would continue to play an important role in the country's administration well into the Ikhshidid period.

During this "Abbasid intermezzo," Egypt suffered from a series of internal disturbances and the near constant threat of Fatimid invasion. The Fatimids were an Isma'ili Shi'ite dynasty that had established itself in Ifriqiya (modern Tunisia) in 909, repudiating the authority of the Abbasid caliphs. They soon set their sights on Egypt and mounted major invasions in 913–915 and 919–921, though both failed after the intervention of Abbasid armies sent from the East.

A new period of autonomy began for Egypt in 935 with the appointment of Muhammad ibn Tughj, later

known as the Ikhshid. After having served as an Abbasid governor in Syria, his connections in Baghdad secured for him the governorship of Egypt. Immediately upon entering the province, Muhammad ibn Tughj had to face the prospect of yet another Fatimid invasion, but after this was beaten off in 936 there was not to be another major attack until that which ended Ikhshidid rule in 969. The lingering Fatimid threat, however, once again justified building up a strong army in Egypt, and increasing disorder in Iraq left the caliph with little leverage over yet another governor establishing an independent power base for himself. In 939 the caliph even acceded to Muhammad ibn Tughj's demand to be given the title *al-Ikhshid*, held by rulers in the Farghana region of Central Asia whence his grandfather had come. Furthermore, a treaty was negotiated in which the caliph granted to the Ikhshid and his heirs governorship over Egypt and Syria for thirty years, virtually the same arrangement the Tulunids had.

When the Ikhshid died in 946 he was succeeded by his son Unujur (d.961), but real power was thereafter in the hands of the regent Kafur, a Nubian eunuch who now took control of administrative and military affairs. Only after Unujur's brother and successor 'Ali died in 966 did Kafur take over in his own name, but he was the real power in Egypt throughout their reigns. Most of the Kafur era was a period of security and stability, if not prosperity. In 963–968, however, there was a series of poor harvests and consequent famine, and in the last years of the dynasty these economic problems were compounded by increasing political disorder.

When Kafur died in 968, a child grandson of the Ikhshid was installed in Fustat, but squabbling between financial administrators, military commanders, and members of the Ikhshidid family produced circumstances quickly exploited by the Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz. In July 969, after some heavy fighting, the Fatimid general Jawhar entered Fustat. For the next two hundred years the prayers in Fustat's mosques would be said in the name of al-Mu'izz and his successors. Nevertheless, the Fatimids soon transferred their capital to Cairo and it was upon the foundation laid by the Tulunid and Ikhshidid regimes that they built up their new Egypt-based empire.

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See also: **Egypt: Arab Conquest; Egypt: Fatimid Caliphate.**

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Egypt: Fatimid Caliphate

The Fatimids (969–1073) were an Isma'ili Shi'a dynasty that controlled Egypt and portions of North Africa and Syria in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The founder of the Fatimid dynasty, Ubayd Allah, claimed direct descent from Isma'il, whom the Isma'ilis regarded as the legitimate seventh imam in the line of Ali and his wife Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. As the legatees of the spiritual authority handed down through this line of descent, Ubayd Allah and his successors claimed to be the rightful leaders of the entire Islamic world. They therefore rejected the legitimacy of the 'Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, who belonged to the Sunni branch of Islam, and made a concerted effort to spread their influence by a combination of missionary activity and military conquest.

Isma'ili expansion was initiated in 902 when Ubayd Allah left his headquarters in Salamiyya, Syria, and moved to Ifriqiyya (present-day Tunisia), where Isma'ili missionaries had enlisted the support of the Kutama Berbers in advance of his arrival. Backed by



Cairo's Mosque al-Ahzar, the foremost center of theology in Islam and, with Moroccan Fez, the world's oldest university. Begun 970CE. The central court of the Fatimid period (969–1171). Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

the Kutama, Ubayd Allah created the first Fatimid State in 909. Al-Mu'izz, who was the fourth Fatimid caliph, expanded the Fatimid realm further. After several failed attempts by his predecessors, al-Mu'izz conquered Egypt in 969 from the Ikhshidids, a Sunni dynasty that was semi-independent of the 'Abbasids. Immediately following the campaign, al-Mu'izz's general Jawhar established a new Isma'ili capital "al-Qahira" (Cairo) near the city of Fustat. Al-Mu'izz relocated to the new capital in 973, leaving Ifiqiyya in the control of the Sanhaja Berber Zirids. Cairo thereafter functioned as the royal Isma'ili enclave. In 969–970 Mecca and Medina submitted to al-Mu'izz. Fatimid control over the Hijaz would last until the fall of the dynasty. Aided by Yaqub ibn Killis, a Jewish convert to Islam, al-Mu'izz centralized Egypt's system of tax collection and improved the functioning of the administrative departments (diwans), which dealt with the fiscal, military, and diplomatic affairs of the state. As was the case with previous Muslim dynasties in Egypt, Christians staffed many of these departments. In addition, al-Mu'izz withdrew the debased Ikhshidid coinage from circulation and replaced it with gold dinars of exceptional value. These coins, products of the gold mines of Upper Egypt, remained standard currency throughout the Mediterranean Basin for the duration of the Fatimid period.

During the reign of al-Mu'izz's successor al-'Aziz (ruled 975–996), the Fatimids expanded into Syria at the expense of the 'Abbasids and Byzantines. In an effort to enhance Fatimid military effectiveness, al-'Aziz introduced highly skilled Turkish horse archers into his army. These soldiers were recruited as slaves and trained in accordance with the barrack system developed by the 'Abbasids in the tenth century. The presence of Turkish troops was resisted by the Kutama Berber contingents, which were the original mainstay of the dynasty. Ethnic tensions within the Fatimid military were further complicated by the recruitment of black African troops. Despite divisions within the military, Fatimid power reached its greatest extent during al-'Aziz's reign, with Fatimid sovereignty recognized in North Africa, the Western Mediterranean, and the Red Sea.

Al-'Aziz was succeeded by al-Hakim (r.996–1020) whose policies differed in many respects from those of his predecessors. In contrast to the religious tolerance of previous Fatimid caliphs, al-Hakim adopted persecutory measures against Christians, Jews, and Sunni Muslims, going so far as to destroy synagogues and churches, including the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. This latter act angered both Eastern and Western Christendom and led to the First Crusade. Al-Hakim's reign was also marked by revolts on the part of Muslim subjects in North Africa and Palestine,

which the Fatimids managed to suppress. A number of Egyptian Isma'ilis considered al-Hakim to be the incarnation of God and when he mysteriously disappeared in 1020 they believed that he had entered into a state of occultation and would return at a later time. The Fatimid establishment accused this group, called the Druze, of extremism and disbelief. Most probably, al-Hakim was murdered at the behest of his sister, Sitt al-Mulk, who desired that al-Hakim's son, al-Zahir, ascend to the throne in place of the official designate. Sitt al-Mulk acted for a time as regent for al-Zahir (r.1020–1035) whose reign was marred by rebellion in Syria and famine in Egypt.

Economic decline and unrest continued into the long reign of the next Fatimid leader, al-Mustansir (r.1035–1094) whose caliphate marks the end of the classical Fatimid period. During his reign a series of low Niles plagued Egypt. Additionally, fighting broke out between the Turkish and black African slave soldiers. In an effort to bring the situation under control, al-Mustansir appealed for help from a Fatimid general of Armenian origin in Syria, Badr al-Jamali. Badr succeeded in putting down the rebellious troops in 1073 and for his efforts was awarded the title "Commander of the Armies." Badr was the first of a series of military commanders who would be the real rulers of the Fatimid state until its collapse in 1171.

Throughout the period of the early Fatimid state, Isma'ilis remained a minority in Egypt. Although the Fatimids made little effort to impose Isma'ili ritual on the general population, Cairo functioned as the main center of Isma'ili doctrine and the spread of Isma'ili propaganda in other lands. The famous mosque-university of al-Azhar was founded in 969 in part as a teaching center for Isma'ili missionaries. Al-Mu'izz commissioned the scholar al-Qadi al-Nu'man to systematize a corpus of Isma'ili law. Many Persian Isma'ilis, including the famous Nasir-i Khusraw, made pilgrimages to Cairo. However, the appearance of the Seljuq Turks who were militaristic champions of Sunni Islam in Persia and Mesopotamia in the mid-eleventh century restricted the success of the Fatimid mission in eastern Muslim lands.

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See also: **Egypt: Fatimids, Later.**

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Egypt: Fatimids, Later: 1073–1171

Starting in 1062, Fatimid Egypt experienced a long period of economic and political decline accompanied by the breakdown of civil administration, chaos in the multiethnic army due to incessant factional rivalries, and exhaustion of the public treasury. Matters came to a head when open warfare broke out near Cairo between the Turkish faction of the army aided by the Berbers, and the black Sudanese troops. The Turks prevailed and their commander, Nāsir al-Dawla, became the effective authority in Egypt, wresting all power from the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir. Egypt's problems were worsened by a seven-year (1065–1072) period during which the Nile River reached extremely low levels, causing widespread famine and aggravating the economic crisis, while the Turkish troops ravaged the land and even pillaged the Fatimid palaces. During these years—known in the historical sources as the “Days of Trouble” (*ayyām al-ḥitna*)—rioting was widespread, and led to the complete breakdown of law and order. At the same time, after al-Yāzuri, (d. 1058) numerous ineffective viziers followed one another.

Finally, al-Mustansir appealed for help to an Armenian general, Badr al-Jamālī, who already had a distinguished career in Syria in the service of the Fatimids. Badr accepted the caliph's summon on the condition of taking his Armenian troops with him. He arrived in Cairo in 1073 and, after ending the menace of the Turks, speedily restored order to various parts of Egypt. Badr acquired the highest positions of the Fatimid state. He became not only the “commander of the armies” (*amīr al-juyūsh*) but also the head of the centralized and hierarchical civil, judicial, and even religious administrations. He was also the first person to be designated as the “vizier of the pen and of the sword” with full delegated powers. In effect, Badr assumed the powers of a military dictator. Henceforth, with minor exceptions, real power in the Fatimid state remained in the hands of viziers who possessed military bases of power and acted independently, while the caliphs remained the nominal heads of state and as Ismaili imams also functioned as supreme leaders of the Ismaili *da'wa* or religious organization. A distinguishing feature of the Fatimid vizierate during its final century is that several viziers were Christians, notably Armenians.

As a result of Badr's policies, Egypt enjoyed peace and relative prosperity during his vizierate, coinciding with the remaining twenty years of al-Mustansir's

reign. Meanwhile, the Fatimids, like other Muslim dynasties, faced the growing menace of the Saljūq Turks who were laying the foundations of a new empire. By the end of al-Mustansir's reign, of the former Fatimid possessions in Syria and Palestine, only Ascalon and a few coastal towns like Acre and Tyre still remained in Fatimid hands. In North Africa, the Fatimid dominions were practically reduced to Egypt itself. Badr died earlier in the same year 1094 as al-Mustansir, after having arranged for his son al-Afāal to succeed him as vizier with all his prerogatives. A few months later, in December 1094, the Fatimid caliph-imam al-Mustansir died. The dispute over his succession caused a major split in the Ismaili community. Al-Afāal deprived al-Mustansir's eldest son and heir-designate Nizār of his succession rights and proclaimed a much younger son as caliph and imam with the title of al-Musta'li. Thus, al-Afāal guaranteed that al-Musta'li, who was also his brother-in-law, would remain a puppet in his hands. Nizār rose in revolt to claim his rights, but was defeated and executed in 1095. Subsequently, the Ismailis of Iran and Syria upheld Nizār's rights and severed their relations with Cairo and the Fatimid regime; they became designated as Nizārī Ismailis in distinction to the Musta'li Ismailis of Egypt and elsewhere who had acknowledged the Fatimid caliph al-Musta'li as al-Mustansir's successor to the Ismaili imamate.

During al-Musta'li's short reign, the Fatimids of Egypt faced the threat of the Crusaders, who had appeared in Syria in 1097. The Crusaders seized Jerusalem in 1099, after defeating a Fatimid army led by al-Afāal himself. In the midst of these entanglements al-Musta'li died in 1101. Al-Afāal now proclaimed al-Musta'li's five-year-old son as the new Fatimid caliph with the title of al-Āmir bi-Ahkām Allāh. During the first twenty years of al-Āmir's caliphate (1101–1121), al-Afāal remained the effective master of Egypt and concerned himself mainly with repelling the Crusaders. Nevertheless, Egypt was briefly invaded in 1117 by Baldwin I, king of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. On the assassination of al-Afāal in 1121, al-Āmir asserted his authority and did not appoint any vizier after al-Afāal's immediate successor, al-Ma'mūn, preferring to run the affairs of the state personally. When al-Āmir himself was assassinated in 1130, another succession dispute ensued while the Fatimid state embarked on its final phase of rapid decline with numerous periods of crisis.

A son, named al-Tayyib, had been born to al-Āmir a few months before his death. However, power was now assumed by al-Āmir's cousin 'Abd al-Majīd, who ruled officially as regent, pending the delivery of another child by al-Āmir's pregnant wife. Nothing

more was heard of al-Tayyib's fate. Soon afterward, al-Afāal's son Abū 'Alī Ahmad, nicknamed Kutayfāt, was raised to the vizierate by the army. Kutayfāt imprisoned 'Abd al-Majīd and declared the Fatimid dynasty deposed, proclaiming the sovereignty of the hidden twelfth imam of the Twelver Shi'ites whose reappearance as the eschatological Mahdi had been expected since 874. Kutayfāt ruled briefly as a dictator and adopted Twelver, instead of Ismaili, Shi'ism as the state religion of Egypt. In December 1131, Kutayfāt was overthrown and killed in yet another coup d'état organized by an Armenian general, Yānis, and the Berber faction of the Fatimid army. 'Abd al-Majīd was restored to power and initially ruled once again as regent, but three months later, in February 1132, he was proclaimed caliph and imam with the title of al-Hāfiz li-Dīn Allāh; and Ismailism was reinstated as Egypt's state religion. The proclamation of al-Hāfiz as imam, even though he was not a direct descendant of the previous imam, was supported by the official *da'wa* organization and by the majority of the Ismailis of Egypt. These Musta'lī Ismailis recognized al-Hāfiz and the later Fatimid caliphs as their rightful imams, and they became known as Hāfizīs. However, many Musta'lī Ismaili groups in Egypt acknowledged the rights of al-Tayyib and his "hidden" descendants to the imamate; they became known as Tayyibīs.

From the 1130s, rivalries also broke out between individuals and commanders who occupied and those who aspired to the office of vizier, such as the prolonged conflict between the Armenian Bahrām (d.1140) and the Sunni Muslim Ridwān who became viziers under al-Hāfiz. Like al-Hāfiz, who died in 1149, the last three Fatimid caliphs, al-Zāfir (1149–1154), al-Fā'iz (1154–1160) and al-Ādid (1160–1171) were also recognized as imams of the Hāfizī Ismailis, now located almost exclusively in Egypt. However, these Fatimids who died in their youths were no more than puppets in the hands of their scheming viziers. The Armenian Ibn Ruzzīk succeeded 'Abbās as the all-powerful vizier in 1154 and retained his position throughout the reign of al-Fā'iz, who was sickly and died at the age of eleven. Ibn Ruzzīk now placed a nine-year-old grandson of al-Hāfiz on the Fatimid throne with the title of al-Ādid li-Dīn Allāh. When Ibn Ruzzīk was assassinated in 1161, al-Ādid was obliged to confer the vizierate on Ibn Ruzzīk's son, Ruzzīk, who soon afterward met a similar fate. In the final years of Fatimid rule, the internal problems of Egypt were aggravated by the struggle between Shāwar, who had assumed the vizierate upon killing Ruzzīk in 1163, and Dirghām, who drove Shāwar out of office a few months later. Meanwhile, the Zangids of Syria and

the Crusaders were both entertaining the conquest of Egypt. The Franks had already entered Egypt in 1161 and forced Ibn Ruzzīk to pay them an annual tribute.

Shāwar fled to Syria where he sought the help of the Zangid ruler, Nūr al-Dīn, to regain the Fatimid vizierate. Nūr al-Dīn sent Shāwar back to Egypt with a force commanded by Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh, who took with him his nephew, Saladin, the future founder of the Ayyūbid dynasty. This was the first of three separate Zangid expeditions to Egypt. Dirghām was defeated in 1164 and Shāwar restored to the vizierate. His second term as vizier lasted some five years, a most confusing period in the closing years of Fatimid history marked by more Frankish and Zangid invasions of Egypt and Shāwar's vacillating alliances with Amalric I and Nūr al-Dīn, whose forces fought several battles in Egypt.

In 1169 Shāwar was killed at the instigation of Shīrkūh, who had led the third Zangid expedition to Egypt, again in the company of Saladin. Thereupon, al-Ādid appointed Shīrkūh to the vizierate; and when Shīrkūh died suddenly two months later, in March 1169, Saladin succeeded his uncle as the last of the Fatimid viziers. Saladin gradually prepared the ground for ending Fatimid rule in Egypt, an objective sought by the Sunni Nūr al-Dīn as well as the Abbasids. At the same time, he adopted anti-Ismaili policies. Saladin formally ended Fatimid rule in September 1171 when he had the *khuṇba* or sermon at the Friday midday prayer read in Cairo in the name of the reigning Abbasid caliph. Egypt had now returned to the fold of Sunni Islam. A few days later, on September 13, 1171, al-Ādid, the fourteenth and the last Fatimid caliph, died following a brief illness. The Fatimid caliphate, established in 909, thus came to a close after 262 years. On Nūr al-Dīn's death in 1174, Saladin acquired his independence from the Zangids and succeeded in founding the Ayyūbid dynasty.

FARHAD DAFTARY

See also: **Egypt: Salah al-Din/Saladin.**

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Egypt: Fatimids, Later (1073–1171): Army and Administration

During the middle of the eleventh century, the Fatimid empire endured an unprecedented crisis. Egypt faced a seven-year famine, disease, social unrest, and economic collapse, while military factions of Turks, Berbers, Arabs and Blacks struggled for power. In the hands of the ineffectual caliph al-Mustansir (r.1036–1094), it appeared that the Fatimid state was on the verge of disintegration. Some of the provinces of the empire gained independence—including Sicily (1036), Tunisia (1051), and the Hijaz (1088)—while others were conquered by rival states. The nominal and tenuous Fatimid suzerainty in Iraq was lost to the rising power of the Seljuk Turks after 1059, followed by the Seljuk conquest of Syria and most of Palestine (1064–1071), and an abortive Turkish invasion of Egypt itself (1077).

Complete collapse of the Fatimid state was averted by the rise to power of an Armenian mamluk (slave-soldier), Badr al-Jamali (r.1073–1094), who was summoned by al-Mustansir in 1073 to overthrow a Turkish warlord who had usurped power in Cairo. Badr al-Jamali defeated the Turks and restored order in Egypt. But, while retaining al-Mustansir as the nominal ruler of the country, he concentrated real power in his own hands as "Wazir [minister] of the Sword" and supreme "Commander of the Armies" (*Amir al-Juyush*).

In the century between the Fatimid conquest of Egypt (969) and the rise of Badr al-Jamali as wazir and warlord of Egypt (1074), the Fatimid caliphs directly controlled the administration of the Fatimid state, though day-to-day affairs were generally overseen by their ministers (*wazir*) and military commanders (*amir*). The Shi'ite Fatimid caliphs claimed descent from Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, and thus proclaimed a divine mandate to rule the Muslim world as the Prophet's legitimate successors. The propagation of Shi'ite Fatimid religious ideology was a crucial element of state policy before the coup of Badr al-Jamali. Succession to the caliphate remained within the extended Fatimid family, though which specific son should succeed was determined through nomination (*nass*) by the current caliph: succession did not necessarily pass to the eldest son.

Although wazirs had always served as administrators for the Fatimid caliphs, after Badr al-Jamali's coup, the caliphs were frequently mere puppets of the warlord wazirs, who controlled the state and frequently manipulated succession, often raising child-caliphs to the throne whom they could more easily dominate. Fatimid wazirs were generally Muslims, though several were



A rider and four warriors. Panel of woven Coptic textile. Fatimid period, eleventh century. Museum of Islamic Art, Cairo, Egypt. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

Christians and others nominal converts from Christianity or Judaism. Occasional power struggles between rival wazirs and generals, or between caliphs and wazirs continued throughout the twelfth century, resulting in numerous plots, assassinations, riots and armed conflicts, and creating an increasing problem of political stability in Egypt. Failed or disgraced wazirs could be imprisoned and tortured, have their property confiscated, or be executed or assassinated.

By medieval standards, the Fatimid administration was highly centralized and sophisticated with an extensive educated and (generally) efficient bureaucracy. The administration was divided into civil and military branches (the "Pen" and "Sword"), with organized hierarchies, ranks, pay scales, with special ritual, clothing, and insignia of power and authority. There were a number of different departments (*diwan*), including military, treasury, religious, missionary and judiciary. A hierarchical corps of eunuchs controlled the harem and personal life of the caliphs. Court etiquette and ritual included sophisticated and flamboyant pageantry, designed to enhance the state prestige and ideology. Agriculture, industry, and trade with the Middle East, India, Africa, and the Mediterranean flourished, and were encouraged by the state as important sources of revenue. In the periods of prosperity and stability cultural and intellectual life thrived under court patrons.

The rise of Badr al-Jamali (1073) and the domination of subsequent Fatimid caliphs by the military wazirs were accompanied by a transformation of the

army. The Fatimid army was organized into ethnic regiments, including Berbers, Blacks, Arabs, Turks, Daylamis and Armenians. The relative significance of each regiment shifted through time; after Badr al-Jamali, Armenian, Arab, and Black regiments predominated. Some elite regiments like the Hujariya and Ustads were multiethnic. Black soldiers—largely mamluks recruited from the slave trade from the Sudan and Swahili coast—numbered up to 12,000 and tended to serve as infantry. Interregimental rivalry was one of the factors contributing to the political instability of the twelfth century.

The Fatimid army included a professional officer corps and many permanent regular and elite regiments stationed in Cairo or in garrisons throughout Egypt. The army was administered by the Army Ministry (*diwan al-jaysh*), which oversaw salaries and land grants (*iqta'*). Regular reviews and inspections insured that training and equipment met official standards. A number of arsenals existed for the manufacture, storage, and distribution of arms, including the full range of medieval military technology such as mail, scale armor, horse armor, helmets, shields, pikes, lances, spears, javelins, swords, two-handed maces, slings, bows, and crossbows. The total army size ranged from 20,000 to 30,000, with a roughly equal division between infantry and cavalry. Field armies generally ranged from 5,000 to 10,000, with larger armies mobilized in special circumstances.

By the mid-twelfth century the efficiency of the army had seriously declined, through ongoing factional feuding and corruption, degenerating into anarchy and leaving Egypt susceptible to outside invasions by the Crusaders and Nur al-Din of Syria in the 1160s. This culminated in the usurpation by Saladin (r.1169–1193) and his abolishment of the Fatimid caliphate through his assassination of the last caliph, al-Adid (1171).

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See also: **Salah al-Din/Saladin.**

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Egypt: Fatimids, Later: World Trade

Egypt had always played a key role in regional trade networks in the eastern Mediterranean, the Nile Valley, and North Africa. In the early Islamic period, however, only a trickle remained of the important commerce once carried between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and Roman Egypt, it being instead shipped through the Persian Gulf and Iraq. Nevertheless, by the tenth century these patterns of trade had begun to shift once again. In the Fatimid period (969–1171) a newly vibrant "international" trade network developed which was shipping goods to and from Egypt, directly reaching lands as far apart as Southern Europe, the Yemen, East Africa, and India, and then by further links Northern Europe, Southeast Asia, and even China. Geographers writing in the late tenth century could already see that Fustat (Old Cairo) was replacing Baghdad as the Islamic world's great mercantile hub. By the later Fatimid period, Egypt had become the crossroads of an extensive long-distance trade system that would endure for centuries.

The credit for this remarkable commercial prosperity has sometimes been given to Fatimid economic policies, and these did provide many of the essential ingredients for a flourishing trade. The security of merchants' lives and property was generally guaranteed, and the Fatimids established a gold coinage of such a consistently high degree of fineness that it was widely accepted as currency. The government did reserve the right to purchase certain goods by preemption, and for reasons of both security and revenue it was heavily involved in the trade of particular commodities (especially grain, war materials, flax, and alum). Moreover, government officials were often personally involved in trade. Indeed, the Fatimid imams themselves and their relatives appear as commercial investors, partners, even ship owners. Yet, there was otherwise little state interference in the market, and Fatimid trade policies have often been described as *laissez-faire*. While customs dues provided the Fatimids with considerable income, they were not usually excessive, and rates could be surprisingly flexible when the purpose was to encourage trade with particular states or in certain types of merchandise.

It was, however, primarily a set of longer-term political and economic trends which proved decisive in

creating this flourishing commerce. First, Egypt benefited from a prolonged period of economic and demographic expansion in Christian Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The consequent growth in commercial activity, most dramatically seen in the Italian maritime states, produced early demand for Egyptian flax and alum for use in the textile industry. Likewise, there was increasing interest in other Egyptian products, like sugar, and in the luxury merchandise coming from the Indian Ocean world. In addition to considerable trade by land and sea with Spain, North Africa, Sicily, and Syria, by the late tenth century Egypt was also trading with Christian Europe via Ifriqiya (modern Tunisia), and there is already some evidence for Italian merchants from Amalfi active in Alexandria and Fustat-Cairo. Direct trade with Christian Europe intensified considerably in the eleventh century, and traders from Genoa, Pisa, and Venice gradually replaced the Amalfians. The Mediterranean trade brought to Egypt weapons and other war materials (iron, pitch, and especially timber), as well as silk, cotton, wool, finished textiles, furniture, cheese and honey and wine, olive oil and soap, coral for re-export to the Indian Ocean, hides and furs and leather, various metals, and slaves.

Meanwhile, Egypt's share in the Indian Ocean trade had been growing as the Persian Gulf routes were disrupted by political troubles and long-term economic decline in Iraq. This had begun as early as the ninth century, but by the eleventh century these routes had definitively shifted to the Red Sea. Trade went up and down the Nile to Qus or Aswan in Upper Egypt, and then across the desert to the Red Sea at Aydhab. This route had been operating on a regional scale since at least the ninth century, ferrying merchants and pilgrims across to Jedda and Mecca in Arabia. By the eleventh century, however, there was a burgeoning trade in merchandise from the Indian Ocean world coming via Aden in the Yemen, through the Red Sea and then Egypt, for transshipment to the Mediterranean. This commerce was dominated by spices, aromatics, perfumes, dyes, and gums, but also included pearls and gems, medicinal plants and drugs, metalwork, textiles, and ceramics. These were products coming from South Arabia, India, Southeast Asia, and even China, and there was also ivory, gold, and exotic wood from the East African coast. In exchange, merchants heading East carried Mediterranean and Egyptian products such as textiles, glass, metal vessels and ornaments, paper and books, coral, oils, silks, and even various foodstuffs, as well as copious amounts of gold and silver.

Fatimid Egypt's trade also continued or increased along other, less well-documented routes. Via the oases, caravan traffic connected Egypt with West Africa, particularly the kingdom of Ghana, which

served as an important source for the gold used in Fatimid coinage. Likewise, soon after the Fatimids came to power, they sent an envoy to Nubia. Although he failed in his mission to convert the king to Islam, he did manage to reestablish the famous baqt tribute-barter treaty which sent ivory, ebony, exotic animals, and especially slaves to Egypt in exchange for various commodities. These slaves were of especial importance for the Fatimids who used them not only as domestic servants, but also in their army. And commerce with the Muslim East continued, too, even after the arrival of the Crusaders at the end of the eleventh century. Egyptian merchants went to Palestine and Syria, both by land and sea, and they traveled further east, reaching Iraq and as far as Central Asia. Similarly, Syrian and Iraqi merchants are well-attested in Egypt, many choosing to settle there permanently as economic fortunes and the political situation in their homelands worsened.

By the later Fatimid period, Egypt had come to play a central role in several long-distance trade networks moving goods from lands as far apart as Europe and India, Ghana and China. This position as a crossroads of world commerce would persist for centuries, long after the end of the Fatimid dynasty, enhancing the power, prosperity, and prestige of the successive medieval Islamic empires centered in Egypt.

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See also: Egypt: Fatimids, Later.

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Egypt: Ayyubid Dynasty, 1169–1250

Ayyub, the eponymous ancestor of the Ayyubid dynasty, was a Kurdish mercenary, who in 1138 entered the service of the warlord Zengi (1127–1146) of northern Mesopotamia and was given command of the city of Baalbak in Syria. Ayyub and his son Saladin (Salah al-Din) continued their military service under Zengi's son and successor Nur al-Din (1146–1174). When Nur al-Din chose Ayyub's brother Shirkuh as commander of an expeditionary force designed to prevent Crusader dominance of an increasingly anarchical Egypt, Shirkuh enlisted his nephew Saladin as an officer under his command. In 1164, 1167, and 1168–1169, Shirkuh and Saladin intervened in Egypt, nominally to assist the Fatimid wazir and strongman Shawar against Crusader invaders and Fatimid rivals. Their first two campaigns ended in strategic stalemates, but in their third invasion Shirkuh and Saladin defeated the Crusaders; thereafter Shirkuh was installed as Fatimid wazir, or minister, to be succeeded after his death a few weeks later by his nephew Saladin (March 1169).

Saladin (1169–1193), the real founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, spent the next two years securing his own power base in Egypt, in part through the destruction of the Fatimid Sudani regiments of black mamluks in chaotic street fighting in Cairo; by 1171 he felt secure enough to overthrow al-Adid, the last of the moribund Shi'ite Fatimid caliphs, restoring the country to allegiance to the Sunni caliph of Baghdad. Although nominally still a vassal of Nur al-Din of Syria, Saladin undertook an increasingly independent foreign policy, becoming openly independent upon Nur al-Din's death in 1174. Over the course of the next decade, he consolidated his power in Egypt and defeated Nur al-Din's weak and divided successors, conquering Syria and northwestern Mesopotamia (1174–1183), while his generals conquered Libya and Yemen (1173). By 1183 Saladin was the strongest ruler in the Middle East, allowing him to turn all his attention toward jihad against the Crusaders. This struggle culminated in 1187 at his decisive victory at Hattin, followed by his reconquest of Jerusalem and most of the Crusader kingdom. The complete destruction of the Crusaders was forestalled by the arrival of the Third Crusade

(1189–1192), which retook Acre and the coast of Palestine, but ended in stalemate outside Jerusalem, followed shortly thereafter by the death of Saladin (1193).

The Ayyubid state from 1193 to 1250 can best be understood as a confederation of rival principalities ruled by the extended Ayyubid family, generally under the hegemony of three sultans of Egypt: Saladin's brother al-Adil (1200–1218), his son al-Kamil (1218–1238), and the latter's son al-Salih (1240–1249). When faced with a serious outside threat—such as a Crusader invasion from Europe—most of the rival princes united, only to again fall into bickering when the threat was removed. Saladin himself laid the foundation for this instability when, true to contemporary Near Eastern concepts of succession, he divided his empire among kinsmen, with brothers, sons and other relatives receiving semi-autonomous fiefs and principalities. With the feuding and incompetence of Saladin's sons weakening the state, Saladin's brother al-Adil (1200–1218) organized a coup, declared himself Sultan of Egypt, and established hegemony over the rival Ayyubid princes. Thereafter, although there was some expansion of Ayyubid power in northwestern Mesopotamia, for the next half century the Ayyubids generally remained on the defensive, facing two major enemies: Crusaders and Mongols.

In general, Ayyubid policy toward the Crusaders in the thirteenth century was one of truce, negotiation and concession. However, Crusader aggression aimed at recovering Jerusalem brought three major invasions. The Fifth Crusade (1218–1221) attacked Egypt and temporarily conquered Damietta, but was defeated at Mansura in 1221. Under the emperor Frederick II the Sixth Crusade (1228–1229) capitalized on an ongoing Ayyubid civil war and succession crisis, in which the Ayyubid princes of Syria and Palestine were allied against al-Kamil of Egypt. To prevent a simultaneous war against these rebellious Ayyubid princes and Frederick's Crusaders, al-Kamil agreed to cede a demilitarized Jerusalem to the Crusaders (1229). This respite provided the opportunity to force his unruly Ayyubid rivals into submission and establish himself firmly on the throne of Egypt. The last Crusader invasion of Egypt, the Seventh Crusade under Louis IX of France (1249–1251), also invaded Egypt, culminating with a great Ayyubid victory over the Crusaders at Mansurah (1250). But the untimely death of the sultan al-Salih at the moment of his triumph created a succession crisis resulting in the usurpation of power by mamluk generals, founding the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt (1250–1517).

Following the Mamluk usurpation of Egypt, supporters of Ayyubid legitimacy rallied around al-Nasir Yusuf (1236–1260), the grandson of al-Adil and ruler of Damascus and Syria. His failed attempt to invade Egypt in 1251 was overshadowed by the threat of the

Mongols from the east, who destroyed Baghdad (1258), invaded Syria (1259), and captured and brutally sacked Aleppo, and conquered Damascus (1260). Al-Nasir was captured and put to death along with most surviving Ayyubid princes in Syria. The Mamluk victory over the Mongols at the battle of Ayn Jalut (1260) allowed them to add most of Palestine and Syria to their new sultanate.

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See also: Egypt: Fatimids, Later; Salah al-Din/Saladin.

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Egypt and Africa: 1000–1500

From Egypt, Islamic influence extended in three directions: Through the Red Sea to the eastern coastal areas, up the Nile Valley to the Sudan, and across the western desert to the Maghrib.

The Arab conquest, and the southward expansion of Islam from Egypt, were arrested by the resistance of the Christian kingdoms of Nubia. By the tenth century, however, a peaceful process of Arabization and Islamization was going on in northern Nubia as a result of the penetration of Arab nomads. Muslim merchants settled in the capitals of the central and southern Nubian kingdoms, al-Maqrura, and 'Alwa. They supplied slaves, ivory, and ostrich feathers to Egypt. From the eleventh century, a local Arab dynasty, Banu Kanz, ruled the Nubian-Egyptian border. For four centuries they served both as mediators between Egyptian and Nubian rulers and as proponents of Egyptian influence in Nubia. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, they assumed control of the throne of Nubia after they had married into the Nubian royal family.

Arab revolts in Upper Egypt were endemic during the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods. The trained Mamluk

troops defeated the Arab tribes that were forced to move southward, thus intensifying the process of Arabization of Nubia. Since the second half of the thirteenth century the Mamluk sultans had frequently intervened in the internal affairs of the Nubian kingdoms, and gradually reduced them to the status of vassals. In 1315 the Mamluks installed as king a prince who had already converted to Islam. This was followed two years later by the conversion of the cathedral of Dongola into a mosque. The Christian kingdom became practically a Muslim state. Christianity lingered on until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Once the barrier formed by the Nubian kingdoms had been broken, waves of Arab nomads coming from Upper Egypt pushed beyond the cataracts, and spread westward into the more open lands of Kordofan and Darfur, and as far as Lake Chad. In 1391 the king (mai) of Bornu, 'Uthman ibn Idris, wrote to Barquq, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, concerning harassment by Arab nomads, who captured slaves including the king's own relatives. These slaves were sold to Egyptian merchants, and the king of Bornu asked the sultan to return the enslaved people.

With the decline of Christianity in Nubia, Ethiopia remained the only Christian power in Africa. There were close contacts between Ethiopia and Egypt throughout the Mamluk period. There was some awareness of the fact that the Ethiopians controlled the sources of the Blue Nile. The Ethiopians were concerned with the fate of the Christian Copts in Egypt, and when in the middle of the fourteenth century the Patriarch of Alexandria was arrested the Ethiopians retaliated by seizing all Muslims in their country and drove away all the Egyptian caravans. The Mamluks released the patriarch, and trade was resumed.

Beginning in the Fatimid period in the tenth century, Egypt developed trade with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Muslim seamen from Egypt and Arabia established commercial centers along the Red Sea and Africa's east coast. Ivory and spices were exported via Egypt to the Mediterranean trading cities. Ethiopian slaves were in great demand in all Muslim countries. In the fourteenth century Egyptian economic influence was paramount in Zeila and other ports which were the starting points for trade routes to the interior. Muslim principalities emerged on the fringes of Christian Ethiopia, and the Egyptian rulers sought to be their protectors. Students from southern Ethiopia had their own hostel in al-Azhar. The Egyptians did not venture beyond Zeila, and there is no evidence for direct contacts between Egypt with the rest of the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Still, the role of Egypt in the development of Muslim trade all over the Indian Ocean must have indirectly influenced also the rise of Muslim trading towns on the East African coast. At the end of the

period surveyed in this article the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean and broke the monopoly of Egypt as the commercial intermediary between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

Between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries Egypt absorbed huge numbers of black slaves from various parts of Africa, mainly from Nubia and Ethiopia. During the Mamluk period there were also slaves from central and western Africa. Black eunuchs in the service of the Mamluks were exported to Egypt from West Africa. Nupe (in present-day Nigeria) might have been the site where eunuchs were castrated.

According to Ibn al-Faqih (writing shortly after 903), there was a busy route connecting the Egyptian oases of the Western Desert with Ghana. But, according to Ibn Hawqal (writing between 967 and 988), this route was abandoned during the reign of Ibn Tulun (868–884) “because of what happened to the caravans in several years when the winds overwhelmed them with sand and more than one caravan perished.”

In the middle of the thirteenth century, a hostel was founded in Cairo for religious students from Kanem. In the second half of the thirteenth century, two kings of Mali visited Cairo on their way to Mecca. But the most famous pilgrim-king was Mansa Musa, whose visit to Cairo in 1324 left such an impression in Egypt that all Egyptian chronicles, as late as the middle of the fifteenth century, recorded the event. The huge quantities of gold that he spent affected the exchange rate between gold and silver.

After the exhaustion of the Nubian gold mines of al-'Allaqi, Mamluk coins were minted from West African gold. According to al-'Umari (writing in 1337), the route from Egypt to Mali once again “passed by way of the oases through desert country inhabited by Arab then by Berber communities.” Early in the sixteenth century, Leo Africanus said that the people of the Egyptian oases were wealthy because of their trade with the Sudan. Another route passed through Takedda and Gao. Egyptian merchants visited the capital of Mali, and some of them bought from a profligate king of Mali, Mari Jata II (1360–1373), a boulder of gold weighing twenty qintars. In return for gold, Mali was a market for Egyptian goods, particularly fabrics. Mamluk brass vessels found in the Brong region, north of Asante, are silent witnesses to the trade with Egypt. The flow of gold to Egypt diminished somewhat in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because of competition by Italian merchants in the North African coast, who channeled the gold to the Italian cities that were hungry for gold.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, the growth and refinement of scholarship in Timbuktu may largely be explained by influence from Cairo, then the greatest Muslim metropolis. Scholars of Timbuktu, on

their way to Mecca, stayed for some time in Cairo, and studied with its distinguished scholars and Sufis. The Egyptian scholar who had the greatest influence in West Africa was Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445–1505). In his autobiography al-Suyuti boasted about his fame in West Africa. Indeed, his *Tafsir* is still the most widespread Koranic exegesis in this part of the world. He corresponded with West African rulers and scholars.

In 1492 Askiya Muhammad led a religiopolitical revolution in Songhay that made Islam the cornerstone of the kingdom. Four years later, in 1496–1497, Askiya Muhammad visited Cairo on the way to Mecca. In Cairo he met Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, from whom he learned “what is permitted and what is forbidden.” It was probably al-Suyuti who introduced Askiya Muhammad to the ‘Abbasid Caliph, who lived in Cairo under the patronage of the Mamluk sultans. The ‘Abbasid Caliph delegated authority to Askiya Muhammad that gave legitimacy to his rule. Twelve years earlier, in 1484, al-Suyuti was instrumental in arranging a similar investiture by the ‘Abbasid Caliph to the king of Bornu ‘Ali Gaji (1465–1497).

Al-Suyuti’s teaching mitigated the uncompromising zeal of the North African radical al-Maghili, who sought to become the mentor of Sudanic kings at that time. Al-Suyuti saw no harm in the manufacture of amulets and ruled that it was permissible to keep company with unbelievers when no *jizya* was imposed on them. Al-Suyuti’s pragmatic approach, representing the conservative tendencies of the alliance of scholars, merchants, and officials in Mamluk Egypt, contributed to the elaboration of an accommodating brand of Islam in Timbuktu of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.


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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty: Baybars, Qalawun, Mongols, 1250–1300

The Mamluk dynasty rose to power in Egypt through a series of crises forced upon the Ayyubid dynasty by exterior threats. The Mamluks themselves were slaves purchased in large quantities by Sultan al-Salih Ayyub (r.1240–1249), who were then trained as soldiers, converted to Islam, and then manumitted. The Mamluks



Egypt under the Mamluks, c.1250–1500.

formed an elite corps of soldiers with loyalty only to their former master. With the Mongol invasions of the Kipchak steppe, in what is now Russia, large numbers of Turks were readily available.

The first exterior threat that led to the rise of the Mamluks was the Seventh Crusade led by King Louis IX (1226–1270) of France in 1249. As the army of King Louis invaded Egypt, al-Salih Ayyub died. His son, al-Mu'azzam Turan-shah (r.1249–1250) was not immediately present, and the Ayyubids of Egypt were briefly without leadership. Meanwhile, King Louis's army had halted at the fortified city of Mansurah. His vanguard swept away all opposition and entered the city before becoming trapped and annihilated by the defenders led by the Bahriyya regiment of al-Salih's Mamluks. The Muslim forces led by the Mamluks soon surrounded the Crusaders and King Louis. Facing the potential annihilation of his disease-ridden army, King Louis surrendered.

Upon victory, Sultan Turan-shah arrived and became the ruler of Egypt in 1249. The Bahriyya Mamluks, along with other Mamluks desired more power in the government due to their efforts at Mansurah. Turan-shah, however, disagreed and only placed his own Mamluks in positions of powers, thus alienating his father's Mamluks. In retaliation, Rukn al-Din Baybars, who also led troops at Mansurah, and other Mamluk leaders staged a coup and assassinated Turan-shah in 1250, three weeks after the victory at Mansurah.

The Mamluks then elevated al-Mu'izz Aybak al-Turkmani (1250–1257) to the throne. During the reign

of Aybak, a power struggle between the Bahriyya and other regiments ensued, resulting in the flight of most of the Bahriyya to Syria and to Rum (modern Turkey). After Shajar al-Durr, Aybak's queen, assassinated him in 1257, the victorious faction, the Mu'izziyya led by Kutuz, elevated Aybak's son, al-Mansur 'Ali (1257–1259) to the throne though he was only fifteen. Nevertheless, he served as a figurehead while the Mamluk leaders waged their own power struggles behind the throne.

The second crisis that led to the firm establishment of the Mamluk dynasty was the invasion of the Mongols. After destroying the Abbasid Caliphate based in Baghdad in 1258, the Mongol armies led by Hulegu (d. 1265), a grandson of Chinggis Khan (1162–1227) marched into Syria, capturing Aleppo and Damascus with relative ease by 1260. There was little reason to think that the Mongols would not also invade Egypt after they consolidated their Syrian territories.

Their arrival prompted a change in policy among the Mamluks. Sultan al-Mansur 'Ali's reign came to an end as al-Muzaffar Kutuz (1259–1260) became the ruler under the rationale that it was better to have a seasoned warrior rather than a child. In addition, the Bahriyya regiment led by Baybars came back to Egypt to join the Mamluk army against the Mongols. After executing the Mongol envoys, Kutuz decided to go on the offensive rather than await the Mongol advance. His decision was well-timed as the bulk of Hulegu's army had withdrawn from Syria, and only a small force remained under the Mongol general Ket-Buqa, whom Kutuz and Baybars defeated at the battle of 'Ayn Jalut.

Kutuz's glory was short-lived, however, as Baybars staged a coup against him during their return to Syria. Rukn al-Din Baybars Bunduqari (1260–1277) thus was elevated to the Mamluk throne of a kingdom that now consisted of Egypt and Syria. Baybars immediately began to secure his throne by moving against the Ayyubid princes of Syria as well as dealing with any dissenting Mamluk factions. Furthermore, although the Mongol Empire dissolved into four separate empires and became embroiled in a civil war, the Mongol Il-Khanate of Iran and Iraq remained a very dangerous foe.

To counter this, Baybars arranged an alliance with the so-called Mongol Golden Horde, which dominated the Russian lands to the North, who also fought the Il-Khanate. In addition, Baybars focused his offensive campaigns against the Mongols allies in Cilicia or Lesser Armenia and against the Crusader lord, Bohemund of Antioch (1252–1275) and Tripoli. Baybars's invasions of their territories effectively neutralized them as a threat.

Not all of the Crusaders allied with the Mongols, as did Bohemund. Initially, Baybars left these in peace while he dealt with more urgent threats. He, however,



The Sultan Barquq complex was built in 1384 by the first tower or Burgi Mameluke sultan who ruled from 1382 until 1399. This complex includes a cruciform *medersa*; a *khanqa*, which offered living quarters for the Sufi mystics; and a tomb of one of the sultan's daughters. Cairo. © Mich. Schwerberger/Das Fotoarchiv.

was very active in ensuring their downfall. Through diplomatic efforts, he was able to divert another Crusade led by King Louis IX to Tunis with the help of Charles D'Anjou, the king's own brother. Charles D'Anjou enjoyed profitable commercial and diplomatic relations with Egypt and did not want to dampen them with an invasion. Without the assistance of another Crusade, those Crusaders who remained in Palestine could only defend their territories. Baybars quickly relieved them of a number of strongholds including Crac des Chevaliers, Antioch, Caesarea, Haifa, Arsuf, and Safad. He also crowned his military career with a second defeat of the Mongols at Elbistan in 1277.

Baybars died in 1277. His military success was due to not only generalship but also to his use of diplomacy to gain allies, which in turn prevented the Mongols of Iran from focusing their efforts on him. Much of Baybars' reign focused on securing Syria from the Mongols, which led to his efforts against the Crusader states, and Cilicia. Furthermore, in Egypt he solidified the power of the Mamluks, allowing their rule to continue after his death.

Baybars's son and successor, al-Malik al-Sa'id Muhammad Barka Khan (1277–1279), however, did

not have the opportunity to equal his father's deeds. Although appointed as joint sultan in 1266, and secretly elevated to power on his father's deathbed, another coup soon developed in which another Mamluk emir named Qalawun committed regicide, as had the previous rulers, and soon rose to the throne in 1279.

To secure his power, Qalawun (1279–1290) purged the al-Zahirriya, or Baybars' own Mamluks. He then quelled any internal revolt. Qalawun, like Baybars, however, still had to contend with the Mongols. Abaqa (1265–1282), the ruler of the Il-Khanate of Persia sent another army into Syria in 1281. This force, however, met a similar fate as those before it. Qalawun's army emerged victorious and routed the Mongols.

This victory allowed Qalawun to turn his attention against the remaining Crusaders. Through diplomacy and force, Qalawun steadily reduced the Crusader castles one by one. By 1290 only Acre and few minor castles remained in the hands of the Crusaders. Though he laid siege to Acre, Qalawun would not see the fall of this remaining stronghold, as he died in 1290.

Qalawun, however, was somewhat more successful than Baybars at establishing a hereditary succession. His son, al-Ashraf Khalil (1290–1293) continued the siege and captured Acre in 1291. This victory allowed him to firmly establish himself on the throne. After this, al-Ashraf swept away the remaining Crusader footholds and ended their two hundred year presence in Palestine.

Regicide, however, was an ever-present threat in the Mamluk sultanate. When al-Ashraf attempted to replace the Turk-dominated Mamluk corps with Circassian recruits, the Mamluks rebelled again. Qalawun had actually initiated the introduction of Circassians, but al-Ashraf's continuation of it and arrogance prompted another rebellion. Though al-Ashraf Khalil died under the sword in 1293, his Mamluks, known as the Burjiyya, successfully gained control of Cairo and the sultanate allowing the Qalawunid dynasty to continue in name, if not in actual power.

The uncertainty of the Mamluks' legitimacy as rulers that surrounded the Mamluk kingdom and the threat of the Mongols in the Middle East hampered the Mamluks' interests in Africa. Trade with North and Sub-Saharan Africa remained a constant. Furthermore, the Mamluks did maintain and stabilize their rule in southern Egypt by quelling the Beduin tribes. As the threat from the Mongols and Crusaders diminished, the Mamluks began to become more involved with other powers to the south and west.

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Literature

Literary production during the Mamluk Sultanate was massive in scope. Authors from diverse backgrounds produced works across the gamut of genres and in different languages, supported in part by the patronage of the Mamluk elite. While much of the literary output of any medieval Muslim society defies easy categorization into the genres or modern literary analysis, the Mamluk era is known today for its works of poetry, history, and for what may be called, popular entertainment.

Arabic poetry was produced in vast quantities, although the *diwans* (collected verses) of many poets remain unedited. Thus our knowledge of this key aspect of Mamluk literary culture remains spotty and uneven in coverage. Classical poetical types such as *fakhr* (self-praise), *ghazal* (love poetry), *hamasah* (personal bravery), *hija'* (invective), *madih* (panegyric), *ritha'* (elegy), and *wasf* (descriptive) were all well represented as well as less traditional styles such as the highly rhetorical *badi'* and the colloquial verse known as *zajal*. Interest in Mamluk poetry, however, has often been affected by later aesthetic trends. Techniques such as *tawriyah* (forms of word-play resembling double entendre), for example, were quite common in Mamluk poetry.

The popularity of ornamentation and literary devices among Mamluk-era poets no doubt contributed to their being classified by earlier Western scholars as “merely elegant and accomplished artists, playing brilliantly with words and phrases, but doing little else” (Nicholson 1969, pp.448–450). Some modern Arab literary critics, meanwhile, dismiss this poetry as “decadent, pallid, worn out, and lacking authenticity” (Homerin 1997, p.71). These views, while still encountered, are under increasing challenge by recent scholars who approach the material on its own terms as well as viewing Mamluk poetry as a vast and rich source for the study of Mamluk-era life and culture.

Major poets include al-Ashraf al-Ansari (d.1264); Al-Afif al-Tilimsani (d.1291) and his son, known as al-Shabb al-Zarif (d.1289); al-Busiri (d.1295), well-known for his ode to the Prophet; Safi al-Din al-Hilli (d.1349);



The sultan rendering justice. Miniature from *The Fables of Bidpai: The Book of Kalila and Dimna* (Arabic translation of the *Panca-Tantra*), fol. 100. Fourteenth century. National Library Cairo. Anonymous. © Giraudon/Art Resource, New York.

Ibn Nubatah al-Misri (d.1366), particularly well-known for his use of *tawriyah*; Ibn Abi Hajalah (d.1375); Ibn Makanis (d.1392); Ibn Malik al-Hamawi (d.1516); and the female poet ‘A’ishah al-Ba’uniyah (d.1516). While technically an Ayyubid-era poet, the work of ‘Umar Ibn al-Farid (d.1235) was well known and extensively cited after his death, and should be mentioned as representing the blending of poetry with mystical (*sufi*) concerns.

The Mamluk age is commonly celebrated for its prolific production of historical works. The major cities of the Mamluk sultanate were centers of learning and commerce, and in no small part the revenues of the latter supported the producers of the former. As a result, the Mamluk era is well recorded in many contemporary chronicles, regnal histories, celebrations of cities and other locales, biographical compilations, and other historically oriented texts. These works are in a variety of styles, ranging from ornate rhymed prose to straightforward narratives containing significant amounts of colloquial language. The authors of these texts were as varied as the texts themselves. Histories were written by Mamluk soldiers, government clerks, and the learned class of the ‘*ulama*’ (those learned

in the Islamic sciences). To cite a minimum of examples, Baybars al-Mansuri (d.1325) was a Mamluk officer who participated in many of the military events he later discussed in his writings. Al-Maqrizi (d.1442) was a jurist and disappointed civil servant who frequently poured vitriol and criticism on the ruling Mamluk elite in his many works. Ibn Taghri Birdi (d.1470), the son of a major Mamluk amir, wrote histories reflecting the sympathies and insights made possible by his close association with that same ruling elite. Polymaths such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d.1449) and al-Suyuti (d.1505) produced important historical works as but a small part of their vast *oeuvre* addressing many topics. Finally, in a similar situation to that of Mamluk poetry mentioned above, many important historical works, such as much of the chronicle of al-Ayni (d.1451), remain in manuscript form.

While often looked down upon by the literary elite past and present, the Mamluk period produced significant works of what may be termed popular entertainment. Apparently performed or recited in public spaces, these works are increasingly studied for what they tell us about the lives and attitudes of the lower social classes absent from the majority of the Mamluk historical works. In particular, the texts of three shadow plays by Ibn Danyal (d.1311), otherwise known as a serious poet, have survived. They are populated with a rogues' list of characters and while clearly works created for entertainment, give a glimpse of the seamier side of Mamluk Cairo as it was perceived by their author.

Much more well known are the tales known by the title *Alf Layla wa Layla*, commonly rendered as the "Thousand and One Nights," or "the Arabian Nights Entertainments" (or some combination thereof). These stories, ranging from a few paragraphs to hundreds of pages in length, are far from the collection of sanitized and selective children's stories with which many modern readers are familiar. They are a complex conglomeration of many tales that likely took an early shape among the professional storytellers of the Mamluk domains. As Muhsin Mahdi has shown, the earliest known manuscript of the *Nights* dates from late Mamluk Syria. It contains both the famous frame-story of the cuckolded and murderous King Shahriyar as well as the first thirty-five stories told by his latest wife and potential victim Sheherazade to postpone his deadly intentions. While some of the stories are clearly of earlier origin, and many are set in the golden past of the Abbasid Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid, descriptive details in many of these thirty-five tales and the later accretions reveal their Mamluk context. Their potential for providing insights into Mamluk-era life has been demonstrated by Robert Irwin.

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army and Iqta' System

Although the phenomenon of using slaves as soldiers had antecedents in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, the formal institution of military slavery in the Islamic world had its origin in the Abbasid caliphate in the ninth century, when al-Mu'tasim (833–842), distrusting the loyalty of some regiments of his army, came increasingly to rely on his personal slaves for protection, eventually expanding his slave bodyguard to an alleged 20,000 men, garrisoned at Samarra. From the ninth through the eighteenth centuries the Mamluk soldier-slave corps formed an important part of the armies of many Islamic dynasties, including the famous Janissaries of the Ottoman sultans. It was in Egypt, however that the mamluk military system reached its apogee, under the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517), when Egypt was ruled for a quarter of a millennium by an aristocracy of slave-soldiers.

Mamluk is an Arabic term meaning "possessed" or "owned," and generally refers to military slavery. (Military slaves were also sometimes called 'abd or ghulam.) During the Mamluk dynasty the major source of recruitment was Turkish nomads from the steppes of Central Asia, who were viewed as exceptionally hardy, loyal and warlike, and who had learned basic skills of archery and horsemanship during their nomadic youth on the steppe. During the early Mamluk dynasty the majority of the mamluks came from Kipchak tribes; after the reign of Sultan Barquq (1382–1399), recruitment focused on Circassians. However, during different periods of the dynasty, smaller numbers of Mamluks were recruited from a number of additional ethnic

groups, including Mongols, Tatars, Byzantines, Russians, Western Europeans, Africans, and Armenians.

Mamluks began their military careers as young nomad boys on the steppes of Central Asia, who were captured as slaves during military campaigns or raids. Slave merchants would select boys in their early teens with the proper physique and skills, transporting them to the slave markets of Syria or Egypt. There, agents of the sultan would purchase the most promising candidates, enrolling them in a rigorous training program. The new Mamluk recruits were taught Islam, and at least nominally converted, while engaging in multi-year military training focusing on horsemanship, archery, fencing, the use of the lance, mace and battle-axe, and many other aspects of military technology, tactics and strategy; several dozen military manuals survive detailing all aspects of Mamluk military science and training. Emphasis was placed on skill at mounted archery; Mamluk warriors represented an amalgamation of long-established Islamic military systems with a professionalized version of the warrior traditions of steppe nomads.

The displaced young teenagers soon became fiercely loyal to their new surrogate families, with the sultan as their new father and their barracks companions as their new brothers. They came to realize that, despite their technical slave-status, the Mamluk military system provided them a path to wealth, power, and honor, and, for the most fortunate and bold, even the sultanate itself. Upon completion of the training program, which lasted around half a dozen years, young Mamluk cadets were manumitted and began service in the army, the brightest prospects being enlisted in the *Khassikiyya*, the personal bodyguard of the sultan. Mamluks were distinguished from the rest of society by ranks, titles, wealth, dress, weapons, horse riding, special position in processions, and court ritual—they were renowned for their overweening pride in their Mamluk status. The Mamluks thus formed a military aristocracy, which, ironically, could only be entered through enslavement.

Armies were organized into regiments often named after the sultan who had recruited and trained them—for example, the Mamluks of the sultan al-Malik *al-Zahir* Baybars (1260–1277) were the *Zahiriyya*. Successful soldiers could be promoted from the ranks. The Mamluk officer corps was divided into three major ranks: Amir (“commander”) of Ten (who commanded a squad of ten Mamluks), the Amir of Forty, and the highest rank, “Amir of One Hundred and Leader of One Thousand,” who commanded one hundred personal Mamluks, and lead a 1000-man regiment in combat. There were traditionally twenty-four Amirs of One Hundred, the pinnacle of the Mamluk army, who formed an informal governing council for the sultanate; some eventually became sultan.

The Mamluks had a formal and highly organized system of payment based on rank and function, overseen by a sophisticated bureaucracy. Remuneration included monthly salaries, equipment and clothing, food and fodder supplies, and special combat pay. Many Mamluk officers and soldiers were given land grants known as *iqta'*, both for their own support and to pay for the maintenance of additional soldiers under their command. Such grants were carefully controlled and monitored by the bureaucracy, and amounted to regular payment of revenues and produce of the land rather than a permanent transfer of ownership; the grant of an *iqta'* could be withdrawn and redistributed.

At its height, the Mamluk military system was one of the finest in the world, with the Mamluks of Egypt simultaneously defeating both the Crusaders and the Mongols in the second half of the thirteenth century. During most of the fourteenth century, however, the Mamluks faced no serious outside military threat, and their military training and efficiency began to decline. During this period the major fighting the Mamluks engaged in was usually factional feuding and civil wars associated with internal power struggles and coups. When faced with the rising military threat of the Ottoman Turks in the late fifteenth century, the Mamluks initiated military reforms, which ultimately proved insufficient. The Mamluks were also unsuccessful at efficiently integrating new gunpowder weapons into a military system dominated by a haughty mounted military aristocracy. The Mamluks were decisively defeated in wars with the rising Ottomans (1485–1491, 1516–1517), who conquered Egypt in 1517, overthrowing the Mamluk sultanate.

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Plague

In the middle of the fourteenth century a destructive plague swept through Asia, North Africa, and Europe, devastating nations and causing serious demographic decline. Cities and buildings were laid waste, roads and way signs were obliterated, settlements and mansions became empty, dynasties and tribes grew weak. The entire inhabited world changed.

Thus wrote Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah* (v.1, p.64). The famous North African scholar spent the last decades of his life in Mamluk Cairo and saw firsthand the effects the early occurrences of the plague had on the lands and people of the Mamluk Sultanate.

The phrase “Black Death” was not used in the medieval Islamic world. In the Mamluk sources, the devastating and recurring pandemics were usually referred to by the common Arabic nouns *ta'un* (plague) or *waba'* (pestilence). From the initial outbreak of 1347–1349 to the end of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, there were approximately twenty major epidemics that affected large areas of Mamluk Egypt, occurring about every eight to nine years. Mamluk Syria seemed to be slightly less afflicted, with only eighteen epidemics over the same period. Given the descriptions of symptoms and the general mortality reported, it seems clear that the disease was that linked to the plague bacilli *Pasteurella pestis* or an earlier variant thereof. Buboes, for example, were frequently referred to as “cucumbers” (*khiyar*) in the sources. Michael Dols has argued convincingly that during several of the outbreaks a total of three forms of the disease—the pneumonic, bubonic, and septicemic—struck simultaneously. The outbreak of 1429–1430, for example, was especially severe and was called in some sources the “great extinction.” The accompanying epizootics among animals frequently mentioned suggests a variant form, or perhaps an accompanying and as yet undetermined agent.

While demography for this period is inexact, it seems probable that the population of Egypt suffered a prolonged and aggregate decline of approximately one-third or so by the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Egypt's population remained at levels lower than its pre-plague years into the Ottoman period. The plague did not afflict all segments of society equally. Reflecting the bias of the sources, we know more about the impact on the cities of Egypt than we do on the rural areas. It is common to encounter statements like the following in the chronicles: “the plague caused death among the Mamluks, children, black slaves, slave-girls, and foreigners” (Ayalon, p.70). The evidence suggests that the Royal Mamluks were especially hard hit, perhaps due to their recent arrival in Egypt, and previous lack of exposure to the plague. The cost of replacing these expensive recruits no doubt contributed to the increasing economic strain on the Mamluk regime during the fifteenth century.

The recurrent nature of the pandemic had other negative repercussions on the regime. While there is no evidence for a complete breakdown of either government or religious administrations, we read of confusion and disruption in land-holding, tax-collecting, military endeavors, the processing of inheritances, and the filling of vacated offices, not to mention the looting of abandoned properties and other civil unrest. Economic ramifications took the shape of price disruptions, labor shortages, decreased agricultural production in both crops and livestock, and an overall decline in commerce. Many modern scholars argue that the demographic decline brought about by the plague is the main contributing factor to the economic difficulties of the fifteenth century, and that the policies adopted by the Mamluk regime in that century are best understood as reactions to, not causes of, that decline.

Normative societal reaction to the plague was shaped by the '*ulama'*, those learned in Islamic knowledge. The guidance provided by this communal leadership was shaped primarily by those *Hadiths* of the prophet Muhammad related to disease epidemics, and featured these main points. First, the plague was both a mercy and a martyrdom for the believer, but a punishment for the unbeliever. Second, a Muslim should neither flee nor enter a plague-stricken region. And third, there was no interhuman transmissibility of the disease; it came directly from God (medieval Arabic medical terminology did not distinguish between contagion and infection). Other reactions on the part of the populace were condemned as innovation. The recurrent stressing of these points in the numerous *pestschriften* that survive, along with contrary reports in the chronicles, would seem to indicate that these policies were not always followed to the letter.

Nevertheless, it is clear that religion shaped both the individual and communal response to the horror and unpredictability of the plague, as seen in the poignant passage by the Mamluk-era author Ibn al-Wardi, who died in 1349, during the latter stages of the first outbreak:

I take refuge in God from the yoke of the plague. Its high explosion has burst into all countries and was an examiner of astonishing things. Its sudden attacks perplex the people. The plague chases the screaming without pity and does not accept a treasure for ransom. Its engine is far-reaching. The plague enters into the house and swears it will not leave except with all of its inhabitants. "I have an order from the *qadi* (religious judge) to arrest all those in the house." Among the benefits of this order is the removal of one's hopes and the improvement of his earthly works. It awakens men from their indifference for the provisioning of their final journey. (Dols 1974, p.454)

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See also: **Ibn Khaldun: Civilization of the Maghrib.**

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Historical Outline


In January 1517 the *mamluk* sultan of Egypt, Tumanbay, was defeated by the Ottoman sultan Selim I. The Ottoman conquest ended a sultanate that had ruled independent Egypt since 1250. The Ottomans were militarily superior, having cannon and arquebus in the hands of well-organized infantry troops, the Janissaries. The *mamluk* forces, mostly cavalry, had already been defeated in a battle in Syria. The occupation of Cairo by Selim reduced Egypt to a tributary of the Ottoman

Empire, symbolized by the removal of the caliph, the spiritual head of the *mamluk* sultanate and of the Islamic world, to the imperial capital of Istanbul.

The Ottoman conquest capitalized on rivalries among the *mamluks*, which had become evident during the Ottoman conquest of *mamluk* Syria in 1516. By supporting Khayr Bey of Aleppo against his rivals in Cairo, the Ottoman sultan ensured Ottoman supremacy, and in September of 1517 Khayr Bey was appointed the sultan's viceroy in Cairo. The viceroy initially was known by the traditional *mamluk* title of *malik al-umara'*, or commander of the princes, as well as residing in the Cairo citadel in a style very much like that of the previous *mamluk* sultans. Moreover, he reprieved the remaining *mamluks*, who continued to hold land as a type of feudal assignment, or *iqta'*, in the twelve administrative districts of Egypt, each of which was headed by a *mamluk* bey.

Upon the death of Khayr Bey in 1522 the *mamluks* revolted, resulting in a series of reforms decreed by the Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, according to the prescriptions of Sultan Sulayman al-Qanuni. Sulayman codified laws for imperial administration across the empire, designed in part to regularize land revenue. In Egypt the reforms ended the system of land assignments and replaced the *mamluk* assignees with salaried officials, *amins*. The laws of 1525 established a political constitution that gave Egypt some degree of self-government, specifically through the *diwan*, or assembly, which contained religious and military notables, such as the *agha*, or commander of the Janissary troops. The Janissaries were the most important of the seven imperial regiments stationed in Egypt, including another infantry regiment, the Azaban, and two troops of bodyguards or attendants of the viceroy. There were three cavalry units, one of which was composed of *mamluks*. The *mamluks* were also given high positions that carried the rank of bey, such as the office of commander of the pilgrimage (*amir al-hajj*), treasurer (*daftardar*), command of the annual tribute caravan (*hulwan*) to Istanbul, and military commands with the rank of *sirdar*. On the side of the imperial officials, the newly drawn fourteen districts of Egypt were placed under the authority of an Ottoman *kashif*, who stood above the *amins*. The formal constitutional structure of 1525 remained intact until the end of the eighteenth century, when Ottoman power in Egypt declined.

Ottoman rule in Egypt depended to a large extent upon maintaining the prestige of the imperial troops. The imperial troops and officers were paid salaries, but the introduction of American silver in the Mediterranean commercial system in the sixteenth century reduced the value of Ottoman currency. The imperial cavalry units revolted against an investigation by the viceroy into Egyptian finances in 1586. This was



North Africa under the Ottomans, c.1650.

because the cavalry depended upon illegal taxes to supplement their reduced incomes. In this instance, the troops toppled the viceroy. A second revolt in 1589 resisted a proposed reorganization of the troops. These troubles were followed by an epidemic, and in 1605 the viceroy of Egypt, Ibrahim Pasha, was murdered by his troops. In 1607 the viceroy Muhammad Pasha investigated and suppressed an illegal tax levied by the cavalry. Finally, after a revolt of the imperial troops in 1609, the viceroys turned to the beys whose power was independent of the regiments. As a result, in the seventeenth century the power of the *mamluk* beys increased in relation to the seven imperial troops.

The foremost regiment, the Janissaries, established their power bases in the cities, particularly through influence over commercial wealth, while the *mamluk* beys invested in landholdings. Personal landholdings were revived with the development of the *iltizam* system, another form of land assignment that gave the *mamluks* tax-collecting privileges. The revival of quasi-feudal landholdings undermined the authority of the *kashifs*, a position that in any case was often given to *mamluk* beys. Consequently, the *mamluks* were able to reassert their corporate strength when, in 1631, the beys removed the viceroy, Musa Pasha, and replaced him with a *mamluk* bey who acted as interim viceroy. This set a precedent recognized by the sultan.

By 1660 the distinction between the constitutional roles of the imperial troops and *mamluk* beys had become blurred, for instance, a conflict among the leading *mamluk* factions, the Faqariyya and the Qasimiyya, also involved the Janissary and Azaban troops. At that time the Faqariyya and Janissaries allied and established an ascendance not broken until the great insurrection of 1711. At this point, although the constitutional system remained intact in theory, real power passed to the leading member of the ascendant *mamluk* faction, the Qazdughliyya, who carried the unofficial title of *shaykh al-balad*. Through the eighteenth century, individual *mamluks* built power bases independently of the Ottomans. ‘Ali Bey ruled as *shaykh al-balad* from 1757 to 1772. He was said to have wanted to revive the *mamluk* sultanate in Egypt, and

challenged the authority of the Ottoman sultan when he invaded Syria in 1770.

Although the viceroys were not effective arbiters of power in Egypt, the Ottoman troops in Egypt had some success in influencing Egyptian politics and economy. Evidently, the Janissaries were integrated into the leading *mamluk* families through their role as patrons of merchants and artisans. As a result, patronage, rather than formal constitutional procedure, became the usual method of raising revenue and consolidating political power. The decline in the power of the Janissaries in the first half of the eighteenth century is largely the result of their inability to control economic resources, particularly the essential spice and coffee markets. These were undermined by the development of European colonies specializing in their production. By the second half of the eighteenth century Egypt no longer paid an annual tribute to the Ottoman sultan, while ambitious *mamluks* based their autonomous power on new forms of revenue collection that weighed heavily on the Egyptian population. As a result, at the end of the eighteenth century Egypt was practically independent from the Ottoman Empire, while in political, social, and economic tumult. The period of declining Ottoman power in Egypt, therefore, mirrored events in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, where regional warlords reasserted their autonomy from the middle of the seventeenth century, until Sultan Selim III began modernizing reforms at the end of the eighteenth century.

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Mamluk Beylicate (c.1600–1798)

The beylicate institution revolved around a number of prestigious appointments to the Ottoman government of Egypt. The holders of these appointments held the rank of *bey*. The most important appointments were command of the pilgrimage, *amir al-hajj*, and treasurer, *daftardar*, as well as the distinctive title of *shaykh al-balad*, which was applied to the *bey* who had established his political supremacy over his peers. The supremacy of the beylicate was enabled by the formation of *mamluk* households, led by men who won political power through the military, commerce, or landholding. The households were factions composed of officers, merchants, and other notables, as well as freed slaves (the meaning of the term *mamluk*). Politics involved contests to control households, the most important being the Faqari, Qasimi and Qazdughli households.

The political role of the households begins in the early seventeenth century, with the rise of the Faqariyya, led by Ridwan Bey al-Faqari. Ridwan Bey succeeded to the office of *amir al-hajj* when, in 1631, the *beys* deposed the Ottoman viceroy, Musa Pasha, because he executed one of the *bey* commanders. From 1640 Ridwan had the support of the Sultan Ibrahim. After 1649 Sultan Mehmed IV and his viceroy Ahmad Pasha attempted to reduce the growing power of the Faqariyya by blocking Ridwan's hold on the command of the pilgrimage. But factional strength was more enduring, and Ridwan held the post until 1656. Yet, upon Ridwan's death, the viceroy gave the command of the pilgrimage to Ahmad Bey, the head of the Qasimiyya household.

The Faqariyya had the support of the Janissaries, who profited from protection money taken from the Cairo merchants. As a result, the Janissary officers were resented by the other imperial troops, and in 1660 the Azaban infantry troop allied with the Qasimiyya against the Janissary officers. The Faqariyya *beys* fled, and the factional ascendancy passed to the Qasimiyya. Yet, Ahmad was not allowed to attain the autonomous power of Ridwan, and in 1662 he was assassinated by a supporter of the viceroy. Until 1692 the Qasimiyya *beys* ruled with the support of the Ottoman viceroys, who attempted to bring about some reform to the system of hereditary estates, or *iltizams*. However, Ottoman reform only tended to divide Egyptian society between urban factions dominated by imperial troops, particularly the

Janissaries, and rural society under the control of the *mamluks*. It was in this period that the *iltizam* system was firmly entrenched, with the *mamluks* converting state lands into private domains while the Janissaries converted their control of the custom houses into *iltizam* hereditary rights in 1671. Thus, in the seventeenth century there was increasing competition between factions for control of resources.

In 1692 the Faqariyya, led by Ibrahim Bey, increased their influence over the Janissaries by winning over the Janissary officer Kucuk Mehmed. But when Kucuk attempted to cancel the Janissary system of protection money in Cairo, he was assassinated by Mustafa Kahya Qazdughli, probably with the support of the Faqariyya faction within the Janissaries. The Faqariyya political and economic dominance lasted until 1711, when an imperial decree against military patronage of economic ventures resulted in another factional war. The "Great Insurrection," as it was called, pitted the Qasimiyya and the Azabans against the Faqariyya, who were divided. The defeat of the Faqari household also meant the end of Janissary dominance in the cities. Consequently, the authority of imperial troops declined and political power passed to the *beys*.

After 1711 the preeminence of the beylicate was recognized by the unofficial rank of *shaykh al-balad* ("lord of the country"). The Qasimiyya head, Isma'il Bey, ruled as *shaykh al-balad* until 1724 when he was assassinated, as were his two successors. However, during the long rule of Isma'il, the two *mamluk* households were reconciled. The outcome is evident in the formation of a new household, the followers of alQazdughli. This household rose to prominence by controlling appointments to the Janissaries and Azabans. With the imperial troops now controlled by one household, rivalry between the Azabans and Janissaries was no longer a feature of Egyptian politics. Meanwhile, the Qazdughliyya also placed its followers in the beylicate. As a result the political power of the beylicate became supreme, and the heads of the household alternated holding the posts of *amir al-hajj* and *shaykh al-balad*.

In 1754 an insurrection of the Janissaries resulted in the assassination of Ibrahim Kahya Bey, the head of the Qazdughliyya. 'Ali Bey, a *mamluk* follower of Ibrahim, became the *shaykh al-balad* in 1757 and began a period of innovation. He created a personal retinue by elevating his supporters to the beylicate and destroying his factional adversaries. According to the chronicler 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Ali Bey wanted to make himself the sultan of Egypt. Therefore, he created an army of mercenaries with modern firearms. To raise revenue to pay for the army, he imposed extraordinary taxes on the Egyptian peasants, landlords, and merchants. He also confiscated the properties of his rivals. These innovations were accepted by the Ottoman authorities in return

for a pledge to pay off the Egyptian deficit to the imperial treasury. Although challenged by opposition groups in Upper Egypt, ‘Ali Bey held power long enough to meet his obligations to the sultan. After these were fulfilled in 1768, he deposed the viceroy and took the office of interim viceroy, *qa'im al-maqam*. Established as the absolute ruler of Egypt, he turned to conquest, defeating a local warlord in the Hijaz, where he appointed an Egyptian *bey* as viceroy. In 1771 ‘Ali Bey defeated the Ottoman troops defending Damascus, thus establishing the previous frontiers of the *mamluk* sultanate.

The innovations of ‘Ali Bey were premature. He could not stand independently of both the Ottomans and the *mamluk* households. The Ottomans won over one of his closest supporters, Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab. At the same time, his *mamluk* rivals who had sought refuge in Upper Egypt, particularly members of the Qasimi faction, allied with the Hawwara, a tribal group in Upper Egypt. Therefore, a combination of factors, but particularly the political rivalries of the beylicate itself, brought about a coalition of forces that defeated ‘Ali Bey in the battle of 1773.

The period from 1773 to 1798 was a time of economic, social and political upheaval, occasioned to a degree by the innovations of ‘Ali Bey. According to the chronicler ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, it was a period when the *beys* practiced expropriation and oppression, levying excessive taxes that ruined cultivation and forced the peasants to take flight. Similarly, merchants were extorted, which caused inflation and brought the markets to ruin. Three Quzdughliyya *beys*, Isma’il, Murad and Ibrahim, contested for power in this period. In 1778 Murad and Ibrahim, followers of Muhammad Bey, forced Isma’il to flee Egypt. Ibrahim, the *shaykh al-balad*, shared power with Murad. Murad employed Greek technicians to develop a navy and artillery. To raise the necessary revenues, Murad seized the customs and forced the merchants to sell their grain through his monopoly. This was an important innovation, indicating the development of mercantilist economies by the *mamluk beys*.

When the *beys* reneged on the obligation to organize the pilgrimage in 1784 and 1785, an Ottoman force under Hasan Pasha intervened and Ibrahim and Murad fled to Upper Egypt. Although an Ottoman restoration under Isma’il was promised, the two rebels profited from a severe epidemic in 1791 which claimed the life of Isma’il and weakened the Ottoman regime in Cairo. Murad and Ibrahim returned to Cairo, defeated the Ottoman forces, and signed an agreement with the Ottoman sultan in 1792. However, the innovations of the *beys* of the latter half of the eighteenth century shattered the structure of the beylicate and imperial authority. They also increased the involvement of foreigners in the Egyptian economy and society, particularly the French, who sought control of the Egyptian export economy. Therefore, Egypt was

in a very much weakened state when Napoleon invaded in 1798.

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt (1798–1801)

The French expedition to Egypt initiated the modern period of European colonialism in Africa, because it was spurred by strategic, economic, and scientific interests. The strategic importance of Egypt lay in its position on the route to Asia. After 1798 Egypt would be the scene of continual competition by the European powers for influence and political control, particularly between Britain and France. Egypt was of economic importance to France as a source of grain. Moreover, French merchants had been able to market luxury goods in Egypt during the course of the eighteenth century. French and Egyptian commercial relations had suffered during the reign of Ibrahim, who forced the French merchants out of Egypt in 1794. As a result, a commercial lobby in France wanted French intervention in Egypt to secure free trade. The scientific objectives of the expedition were to study ancient and Islamic Egypt, probably to enable colonial occupation. Scientific expertise was certainly indispensable to the project of conquering, administering, and colonizing Egypt. Finally, the expedition exposed Egyptians to modern Europe, beginning a period of interaction that would transform Egyptian culture, society and politics in the nineteenth century.

Napoleon’s strategy was to drive toward Britain’s empire in India, instead of the proposed invasion of England. The French fleet landed Napoleon’s army near Alexandria on July 1, 1798, and broke local resistance on the following day. Napoleon advanced

toward Cairo against the *mamluk* commander, Murad Bey, who fell back and was defeated decisively at Imbaba on July 21, at the so-called Battle of the Pyramids. The *mamluk* commander, Ibrahim, retreated with the Ottoman viceroy to Syria. Shortly afterward, Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile. This victory won the British the support of the Ottoman Sultan, who formally declared war on France in September 1798.

The French conquest of Egypt required an occupation of the Delta and the pursuit of Murad, who adopted guerrilla tactics in Upper Egypt. Aswan was taken in February of 1799 and at the same time Napoleon began his campaign into Palestine. But in neither case were the *mamluk* forces entirely defeated, as Murad engaged in a continual resistance and Ibrahim joined Ottoman forces in Syria. The French conquest also relied on propaganda, with Napoleon's publicists using revolutionary dogma to attempt to win the support of the Egyptian middle classes against what was described as *mamluk* tyranny. Equally, it was hoped this would neutralize the Ottoman sultan, to whom the French declared their friendship. The propaganda was produced by specialists in Arabic and printed as bulletins from a press established at Bulaq. The Egyptians nevertheless regarded the expedition as an invasion, rejected the dogma of the revolution, and viewed the scientific works with interested suspicion. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti recorded his impressions in his chronicles. From his testimony it appears that the Egyptians resented the foreign presence, viewed Orientalist interest in Arabic texts as cultural interference, as they did the conversion of French officers to Islam, such as in the case of General Jacques Menou.

The expedition nonetheless marks the end of an era, as the *mamluk beys* never again established their political and social dominance. Having disbanded the old aristocracy, Napoleon turned to the Egyptian notables, marking the *ulama*, or religious elite, for special favor. The purpose was to rally support for the French regime, and so Egyptian notables were given high positions in the administration. A system of representative assemblies was organized for the localities, as well as the general assembly, *al-diwan al-'umumi*, which was convened in September 1798. Napoleon claimed that the natural leadership of Egyptian society was the '*ulama*' and that the creation of assemblies would accustom them to ideas of representative government. Yet, '*ulama*' and merchants were already established as a national leadership, having led several protest movements against the misrule of the *mamluk beys* in the last years of the eighteenth century. Similarly, there was a revolt in October 1798 against the French regime led by the '*ulama*' of Cairo. The French brutally suppressed the revolt, executing some members of the

'*ulama*' and dissolving the general assembly. Nevertheless, the French occupation seems to have consolidated the political role of the urban notables and strengthened the national leadership.

In spite of the political experiments initiated by Napoleon, the French regime in Egypt was principally concerned with the collection of tax. The economist Jean-Baptiste Poussielgue created the Bureau of National Domains to administer the former *iltizam* estates, which were declared state property after the flight of the defeated *mamluks*. The bureau was directed by French officials, *payeurs*, who conscripted Coptic tax collectors, *intendants*, and the heads of the villages, shaykhs, to collect tax at the local level. Under Napoleon's successor, General Kleber, even more radical reforms were begun as the French regime became more entrenched and adopted a defensive posture in late 1799. The provincial districts were reorganized into eight *arrondissements*, administered by the *payeurs*, *intendants*, and shaykhs. At the same time a multitude of existing taxes were abolished and replaced with a single, direct tax payed in cash. Finally, land registration was begun and peasants were given individual property rights. This amounted to an abolition of the Islamic and customary laws of Egypt, bringing to an end a quasi-feudal social order. At the same it began a process of modernization that prefigured much of the subsequent history of Egypt.

After the retreat of the French army from Syria in June 1799, the Ottoman and British armies advanced, landing in Abuqir, where Napoleon defeated them on July 15, 1799. Yet, Napoleon failed in his grand design to control the Middle East and the Mediterranean. He escaped to France the same month. Kleber attempted to negotiate an evacuation of Egypt, withdrawing his troops first from Upper Egypt. At the same time the *mamluks* infiltrated Cairo and organized another revolt with the support of Ottoman agents and the Egyptian notables. The revolt lasted a month, through March and April 1800. It was crushed only when Murad Bey gave his support to Kleber. On June 14, 1800, Kleber was assassinated and succeeded by General 'Abdullah Jacques Menou, who rejected negotiation in favor of strengthening the French position in Egypt. It was during this period that the more radical administrative reforms were carried through in Egypt. But Menou suffered a military defeat at the hands of a combined Ottoman and British force on March 8, 1801 at Abuqir. Under siege in Alexandria, he capitulated to the allied command in August 1801 and departed for Europe on British transports in September.

The man widely credited with founding the modern Egyptian nation-state, Muhammad 'Ali, was an officer in an Albanian regiment of the Ottoman army. His first lesson in politics began the last chapter of *mamluk*

Egypt, when the Ottomans attempted to destroy the *mamluk* commanders after the French departure in 1801. In this instance the British secured the amnesty of the *mamluks*. After he seized power in 1805, Muhammad 'Ali finally eliminated the *mamluks*. But his political ascent relied upon the support of the Egyptian notables. The French expedition strengthened the position of the notables, but it also provided the blueprints for future attempts to strengthen the state. These were taken up by Muhammad 'Ali, who adopted Napoleon as his exemplar and brought about the modernization of the system of landholding, the military, and the administration.

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See also: **Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849.**

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Nubia, Red Sea

After waves of pastoral incursions between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, Nubian society was reduced to Lower Nubia, the area between Aswan and the third cataract. Upper Nubia adopted an Arab identity through Arabic and Islam; it also came under the sway of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar. Another result was that Nubia was no longer the important intermediary between African and Mediterranean commercial systems. The trade in gold, ivory, and slaves was in the hands of the Islamic sultanates of Dar Fur and Funj. Consequently, the economy of Nubia declined, as the pastoralists encroached upon the Nubian farmers of the Nile valley. When the Ottomans annexed Nubia in the sixteenth century, all trace of the prosperous societies of the Christian kingdoms had been erased.

Although Nubian traditions claim that Nubia was conquered during the reign of Selim I, it seems that the conquest took place between 1538 and 1557, during

the rule of his successor, Sulayman the Magnificent. The conquest was staged from Upper Egypt in an expedition that might have come after an appeal made by the Gharbia, an Abdallabi or Ja'ali ruling group. The appeal was made to the Ottoman sultan by the Gharbia against their adversaries, the Jawabra. The campaign was led by Ozdemir Pasha, a *mamluk* officer, who was perhaps directed to engage in a campaign against Funj, which had expanded from the confluence of the White and Blue Nile to Lower Nubia. It is likely that a battle took place at Ibrim and the defeated Jawabra fled southward to Dongola. According to Abdallabi traditions, the Funj defeated the Ottoman troops in a subsequent battle. This reputedly took place at Hannik, near Kerma, probably in the early seventeenth century. In any event, Hannik became the southern boundary of Ottoman Nubia.

The Ottoman ruler of Nubia was given the rank of *kashif*, a *mamluk* term for the head of a province in Egypt. Therefore, Ottoman Nubia had a status similar to an Egyptian provincial district. The Ottoman tax system was imposed, but Ottoman *firmans*, or decree laws, exempted the cavalry from having to pay tax. So, just as the *kashifs* established a hereditary ruling house, the cavalry evolved into a privileged aristocracy, known as the Ghuzz. The *kashifs* and Ghuzz resided in several castles, notably those of Aswan, Ibrim and Say, although there were several others.

The *kashifs* were the appointees of the Ottoman authorities, nominally responsible to the Egyptian viceroy, who paid them a salary. Equally, the *kashifs* were obliged to pay an annual tribute to the viceroys. Tax was collected from the Nubians by a display of superior force, during regular tours of the Nubian villages. Therefore, the *kashifs* created their own private armies, composed of members of the ruling lineage and slaves. The Nubians paid their taxes not in cash but in sheep, grains, dates, and linen. This provided the *kashifs* with trade merchandise, enabling them to count their wealth in cash as well as in slaves. The European traveler Burckhardt observed at the beginning of the nineteenth century that Nubian subjects were victims of slave raids if their conversion to Islam could not be proven. The *kashif* ruling lineage also intermarried with the local, Nubian lineages, providing another means to increase the size of the ruling house, as well as its properties, which were extorted from the Nubian lineages.

By the eighteenth century, the Nubian *kashifs* ruled as independent monarchs of the Upper Nile Valley, much like the *mamluks* in Egypt. The annual tribute to the Ottomans was not paid, and emissaries of the sultan could not expect free passage through Nubian territory. The Ottoman connection remained only as a theoretical guarantor of the privileged position of the

kashifs and the Ghuzz in Nubian society. As a consequence of the warlike nature of these elites, the Nile Valley above the first cataract was an insecure trade route and caravans were forced to take the arduous desert routes. The inclusion of Nubia in the Ottoman Empire did, however, enable Nubians to migrate to Egypt, which has since become a common feature of Nubian society. Nubians fled southward also, to escape the *kashifs* and to engage in trade. Some went on a seasonal basis to engage in caravan trade among Egypt, Funj, and Darfur, or found employment in Egyptian markets and industries on a permanent basis.

The Ottoman period in Nubia continued the process of Islamization in Nubian society. The Ottoman elite became integrated into the lineage systems established by the Arab nomads, resulting in social stratifications in which the Nubians were a subject peasantry. The *kashifs* and Ghuzz, meanwhile, lived in the quasi-feudal style of a military aristocracy, much like that established by the medieval Christian kings.

A similar process occurred in the Red Sea after the Ottomans occupied the *mamluk* port of Suez, where they built a fleet to control the lucrative Red Sea trade to India. Trade had already been intercepted by the Portuguese, who landed emissaries in the Red Sea, near Massawa, in May 1516 and April 1520. The first Ottoman expedition to the Red Sea brought the Ottomans to Yemen in 1538. Afterward, Ozdemir Pasha descended from Upper Egypt to the port of Suakin on the Red Sea to forestall the Portuguese advance. The port of Massawa was taken in 1557. By 1632 the Ottomans had shut the Red Sea ports to all Europeans, while the Portuguese contained the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea. At the same time, Africa became a battleground between Christians and Muslims in the Horn. The Muslim Imam, Ahmad Gragn, was defeated by Christian Ethiopia with Portuguese assistance in 1543.

The Ottoman province of Abyssinia, or Habesh, was situated in the region between Suakin and Massawa. Ozdemir Pasha built fortifications and a customs house at Massawa and left the port under the command of the *agha* of a Janissary troop. Suakin became the center of Ottoman power in the Red Sea, with a garrison of Janissaries under a governor with the rank of *sandjak bey*. When the Red Sea lost its important commercial importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the decline of the spice and coffee trade, Ottoman authority on the African coast evaporated. The ports fell under the nominal authority of the pasha of Jidda. By the mid-eighteenth century even this connection was severed when the *aghas* discontinued their nominal payment of tribute to Jidda.

The Red Sea ports were foreign enclaves on the coast of Africa, engaged exclusively in trade between the interior of Africa, India, and the Ottoman Middle

East. The ports therefore coexisted with the surrounding societies, composed of mixed African and Arab populations. Several lineages of the Beja constituted the ruling groups in these predominantly pastoral societies. In 1671 the Beja besieged the port of Suakin, and in 1694 the caravan trade to the interior from Massawa was intercepted. Before long the Beja were exerting their political authority in the ports. The heads of a royal line of the Beja, the Bani Amir, became the rulers, *na'ibs*, of Massawa. The Bani Amir participated in the government of the port, controlled caravan traffic, and took a share of the customs duties collected by the *aghas*. By 1769 the *na'ibs* were the rulers of Massawa, sharing customs duties with Abyssinian rather than Ottoman authorities. In Suakin the Ottoman officials relied on the support of another Beja lineage group, the Hadariba, who enforced their right to a share in the customs duties of the port by controlling the movement of caravans to the interior. The head of the lineage became the ruler of Suakin, known as the *amir* (emir), while the *aghas* controlled the customs house. This arrangement lasted into the nineteenth century.

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See also: Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Trade with Africa; Funj Sultanate, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries; Nubia: Relations with Egypt (Seventh–Fourteenth Centuries).

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Egypt under the Ottomans, 1517–1798: Trade with Africa

When the Ottomans took Egypt in 1517 they were placed at the crossroad of African, Indian, and Mediterranean commercial routes. In 1538 the Ottoman navy was launched from Suez to Aden by the Egyptian viceroy, Sulayman Pasha, to control trade in the Indian Ocean. However, the Portuguese defeated the Ottoman fleet in the Indian Ocean, and the Ottoman presence in the Red Sea became of importance principally for trade to Yemen and to Africa. The Red Sea

port of Massawa placed the Ottomans in contact with the commercial sphere of the African state of Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia). When Nubia was taken sometime after 1538, the Ottomans established a frontier with Funj on the Nile.

By far the most important trade with Africa was through the states of Funj and Darfur. The ruling lineages of these states adopted Islam in the early seventeenth century, probably to enable better trade relations with Ottoman Egypt. The principal trade route to Egypt from the Sudan was along the Forty Days' Road, the Darb al-Arba'in, which by-passed the unsettled regions of Nubia. Darfur caravans followed this route from Qubayh to Asyut in Upper Egypt. Funj caravans followed several routes from Qarri or Shandi to Ibrim, where the caravans converged to form a caravan that went on to Isna in Upper Egypt. This line could also connect with the Darb al-Arba'in at Salima by crossing the Nile at al-Damir. At Asyut and Isna the caravans were taxed by the Egyptian authorities and some merchandise was sold, but the merchants moved onward to Cairo where the remainder of merchandise was again taxed and sold in the markets. The caravan merchants remained in Cairo for six to eight months, purchasing goods for shipment to Sudanic Africa. The circuit was completed when the next Sudanic caravans arrived. Another route to Egypt was by way of Cyrenaica, in Libya, which was also traversed by caravans coming from Darfur. There were also east-west routes, from the Funj town of Shandi to Suakin on the Red Sea, and from Shandi and Sennar westward to Darfur.

Caravan trade required a high degree of organization. As many as five thousand people made up the Darfur caravan, with at least as many camels. As a result, the Darfur caravan was organized on an annual basis as a state monopoly. This allowed the sultans to raise revenue through customs, accumulate slaves for their armies, and to reward their followers with luxury goods. The caravans of Sennar appear to have been less of a state-led concern because several caravans were organized independently; however, the Funj sultans also relied on customs duties for revenue and slaves for their armies.

The intermediaries between the sultans of the Sudan and the Egyptian viceroys were merchants. The Darfur caravan was accompanied by five hundred merchants who were known as the *jallaba*, an ethnically mixed group who were predominantly from the Upper Nile Valley region. Many came from Arab-Nubian lineage groups, such as the Ja'ali, the Juhayna, and Abdallabi. The *jallaba* were responsible for financing the caravans as well as paying the customs duties to the authorities. Many Sudanic cities were simply commercial crossroads, as was Sennar, the capital of Funj, where customs were collected and merchandise was exchanged.

The lesser towns of Qarri and Shandi were also commercial markets. The capital of Darfur, al-Fashir, was the seat of the sultans, whereas the *jallaba* were probably responsible for creating a city that specialized in commerce. This was the town of Qubayh, just north of the capital.

The trans-Saharan caravans also required the cooperation of the Saharan and Nile Valley nomads, who controlled the desert routes. The nomads demanded a customs duty for providing the caravans with protection and acting as guides and camel drivers. The Arab-Nubian lineage group, the 'Ababda, guarded the Funj caravans to Upper Egypt. In 1798 the 'Ababda collected three gold pieces for every slave and one and a half for every camel. The protection of caravans through nomadic territories was regarded as a prescriptive right. As a result, any caravan without its designated protectors was subject to plunder. Trade with Africa therefore required cooperation between the representatives of the states in the north and the south, merchants, and the pastoralists who lived on the peripheries of the states.

The slave trade was certainly the most important commerce. Perhaps as many as six thousand slaves passed along the Darfur routes annually, with Funj delivering approximately five hundred. The slave trade was legal. The capture of non-Muslim Africans, a practice sanctioned by Islam, provided the nomadic pastoralists with an important item of exchange and thus access to markets. Slaves were normally non-Muslims living on the southern borders of the Sudan. Darfur's source of slaves was in the Bar al-Ghazal region, in the Nuba mountains, or among the Shilluk and Dinka people. In the case of Funj, Abyssinia provided a number of slaves. The Abyssinian slaves were predominantly women. They sold for as much as sixty gold pieces in 1798. On average, slaves sold for thirty-five gold pieces in the Cairo markets in 1798, although eunuchs, aged between eight to ten years, sold for double or triple that amount. In the Darfur caravan approximately four-fifths of the slaves sold were women. Slaves were purchased by Cairo merchants or by slave merchants of Istanbul; however, many were purchased by the *mamluk* households of Cairo. The Egyptian governors at Isna and Asyut imposed a tax of four gold pieces for each slave imported. In Cairo there were further taxes amounting to one and a half gold pieces. As with Darfur and Funj, the slave trade was a significant source of income for Ottoman Egypt.

Besides slaves, the caravans supplied camels, gold, senna or cassia, tamarinds, gum, natron, alum, ebony, ostrich plumes, elephant tusks, tiger skins, and hippopotamus whips (*kurba*). As European demand increased in the eighteenth century, ivory and ostrich plumes became increasingly profitable. In 1798 the

usual tax on a camel load by the Egyptian authorities was two gold pieces, but for camels carrying ostrich plumes the rate was five and a half gold pieces. In exchange the southbound caravans carried Indian muslins, Syrian and Egyptian silks and cottons, and in the later period, inexpensive European cottons. Luxury items included European firearms and swords, lead, gunpowder, copper, as well as rice, sugar, perfumes, spices, horses, glass, velvet, writing paper, and coffee.

Cairo was the primary market for African merchandise. The Janissaries controlled the Cairo customs houses of Old Cairo and Bulaq as tax farms, which enabled them to take two-thirds of the revenue as private income. Alexandria was the conduit for African and Egyptian merchandise to Europe. Rosseta and Damietta launched transports to Syria and Asia Minor. All of these ports were controlled by the Janissaries, who monopolized most of the revenues collected. Europe was a market for ivory, ostrich plumes, gum, tamarind, senna, and gold. Istanbul received animal skins, gum, tamarinds, senna, and African slaves. However, slaves, the most significant item of trade, were mainly traded in North Africa.

The Ottoman province of the Hijaz in the Arabian peninsula was another market for African products. In this case the trade was connected with the annual pilgrimage. The African sultans provided tribute to be delivered to Mecca annually. The Darfur tribute caravan joined with the great Egyptian convoy in Cairo. With the rise of the Sudanic Sultanates the flow of pilgrims also increased and, like those from the Maghrib and West Africa, the pilgrims engaged in trade along the way. Although pilgrim traffic followed the caravans to Egypt, Suakin also provided an alternate route, both for pilgrims from the Sudan and from West Africa. Ottoman trade with Africa therefore followed a pattern set during the Islamic conquest of Africa, when commercial contacts encouraged the Islamization of African societies.

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See also: Funj Sultanate, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries; Sahara: Slavery: Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: Imperial Expansion

In 1805 the Ottoman sultan named Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) the pasha (governor) of Egypt. In 1811 the sultan sought Egyptian military assistance against the Wahhabi rebellion in Arabia. It was to Cairo that Istanbul again turned for assistance when the Greeks rose in revolt, in 1821, to back their demand for independence from the Ottoman Empire. Egypt was able to effectively respond to these requests because Muhammad Ali had, from the first, set a high premium on an efficient military establishment. This army enabled him to create his own empire and ultimately defy the sultan.

The campaign against the Wahhabis gave Muhammad Ali control of the Hijaz (the key Islamic holy cities, Mecca and Medina). This success gave impetus to Muhammad Ali's imperialist designs. His 1819 treaty with the imam of Yemen, along with his control of Arabia, ensured Egypt's dominance of the east coast of the Red Sea. A revolt by Yemen-based Albanian soldiers prompted an invasion of the territory in 1833. The Egyptian forces easily defeated the rebels and by 1838 controlled the entire Arabian coast.

Motivated by the need for conscripts for his military and the need for gold, Muhammad Ali invaded Sudan in 1820. Within a year, much of Sudan was under Egyptian jurisdiction and became the foundation of his empire. In 1822 Khartoum was founded as the headquarters of Egyptian operations; in 1830 the first Egyptian governor of the Sudan was installed there. The military success did not yield the 20,000 to 30,000 conscripts Muhammad Ali had anticipated. Many Sudanese died resisting the Egyptians; transportation difficulties resulted in the deaths of many thousands more before they reached Egypt; and of the 20,000 who reached Aswan, only 3,000 remained alive by 1824. The hopes for minerals were similarly disappointed. The Egyptians were more successful in improving agricultural productivity in Sudan, for Egypt's benefit. Not only did Egypt control all external trade, considerable quantities of Sudanese products were also sent there. There was also the high taxation on Sudan, again for Muhammad Ali's coffers.

From Sudan, Egyptian domination was extended to include Suakin and Massawa. This undertaking established Muhammad Ali's power over the entire Red Sea and linked his two colonies, Arabia and Sudan. In the operations against the Greeks, Muhammad Ali encountered serious complications. European countries supported the Greek demand for independence. To head off a confrontation with the Europeans, the pasha

urged the sultan to accede to Greek self-determination; this was declined. In June 1827, the Egyptian forces took Athens, Crete, and the Morea, only to be defeated by a combined Anglo-French force. For his efforts, the sultan gave Muhammad Ali jurisdiction over Crete.

Muhammad Ali recovered quickly enough from the defeat in Greece to invade Syria in November 1831. There were several incentives for this adventure: conscripts for the Egyptian army; an additional and lucrative source of minerals and agricultural wealth, especially timber for military and non-military ships; control of two major Islamic cities, Damascus and Jerusalem; and simply, the incorporation of Syria into Egypt's steadily expanding empire. Muhammad Ali had previously invaded Ottoman territories at the behest of the sultan; in Syria he was fighting Ottoman forces and thus clearly defying the sultan for the first time. By May 1832 Egypt had overrun Syria; by 1833 they were in Konya, inside Anatolia, where the sultan's army was battered. With the way to Istanbul totally open, Muhammad Ali's soldiers advanced to Kutahia, a day's march from the capital.

After the Konya debacle, the sultan (Mahmud II) sought but failed to secure British military assistance; he then sought and received Russian assurances of support. Nonetheless, Britain favored the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This and the realization that he was in no position to confront the Europeans influenced Muhammad Ali's decision to restrain his men from marching to Istanbul from Kutahia. The settlement that followed in May 1833 made Muhammad Ali the overlord of the Hijaz, Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, Aleppo, Syria, and the passes of the Taurus Mountains at the gates of Anatolia.

Britain, which had been using the Red Sea and its overland stretch at Suez for mails and passengers to and from India since 1820, was worried by Muhammad Ali's dominance of these regions. In 1839 Britain occupied Aden at the southwestern tip of the Arabian peninsula, driving a wedge between Muhammad Ali's Arabian and Sudanese possessions. This British move encouraged the sultan's attempt, in June 1839, to expel Muhammad Ali from Syria; an attempt that was easily repelled by Egyptian forces. Shortly thereafter, the sultan died, and the entire Ottoman fleet surrendered to Egypt. Egypt had become the strongest power in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Britain, meanwhile, coordinated the response of a jittery Europe.

Besides the European consensus that Muhammad Ali's ambitions threatened the Ottoman Empire, Britain was particularly concerned about the strategic importance of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and surrounding countries, and Russia's growing influence in Istanbul. On July 27, 1839, Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria delivered a note to Istanbul. This

was intended to forestall direct Cairo-Istanbul negotiations that could further Muhammad Ali's imperial ambitions, a distinct possibility given Istanbul's very weak position. In July 1840 Britain convened a conference in London. The conference gave Muhammad Ali an ultimatum to withdraw from Syria, Adana, Crete, and Arabia. When he refused, a British force landed at Beirut in September, defeated the Egyptian army there, and forced them to withdraw to Egypt. Muhammad Ali was thus compelled to accept the conditions of the European coalition. By the Treaty of London, he lost his Syrian and Arabian colonies. On 1 June 1841, the sultan issued a *firman* (decree) that named Muhammad Ali governor of Egypt for life and granted his male descendants hereditary rights to office; retrenched the Egyptian army to 18,000 in peacetime; and stipulated that all treaties between the sultan and the European countries would apply to Egypt. These restraints curbed Muhammad Ali's imperial drive for the remainder of his reign.

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Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy

Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) came to Egypt as part of the Ottoman force sent to expel the French who had occupied the country in 1798. With the French evacuation in 1801, the Albanian soldiers became one of the major power brokers in Egypt. It was against this background that Muhammad Ali emerged as a formidable political figure. In 1805 the Ottoman sultan had to name him the pasha (governor) of Egypt. The pasha's ferocious campaign against the Mamluks in 1811–1812 finally secured his position.

Muhammad Ali hoped to bring Egypt up to par with European countries. A strong army, trained, equipped, and organized along Western lines, he believed, was essential in this regard. This was to be the pivot of most



The Mohamed Ali Mosque in Cairo. Completed in 1830, it was built as a half-scale replica of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. © Das Fotoarchiv.

of his policies. He invaded Sudan in 1820 to secure conscripts for his army. As this did not materialize, he turned to the Egyptian peasantry. To train their Turkish officers, a military school and a navy war college were respectively established at Aswan and Alexandria, both with European instructors.

Education, health services, agriculture, land ownership, and the tax system were all overhauled by Muhammad Ali. The educational system had previously operated along religious lines: Islamic, Coptic, and Judaic. Concerned with quickly producing the personnel needed for his programs, Muhammad Ali established state-run Western schools to train accountants, administrators, and for languages and translations. For the same reason, students were sent to Europe for advanced studies.

The Abu Za'bal, a military hospital, opened in 1827. Renamed the Qasr al-Aini hospital after it moved to Cairo in 1837, it served as a medical school. In 1837, it trained 420 medical students, many of whom went to France for specialization. In 1832 a school for midwives was opened in Cairo, to create a female medical corps. In 1837 a hospital was opened in Cairo for civilians. There were also free clinics in the major cities.

Egypt's agriculture had traditionally relied upon the annual flood of the Nile. Muhammad Ali improved on this by constructing new, deep canals and by regularly maintaining the old ones. This increased the cultivable land by 18 per cent between 1813 and 1830 and made all-year irrigation and farming possible, especially, in the Nile Delta. There was also the introduction (in 1821) and spectacular increase in the production of long-fibered cotton, which was highly valued in Europe's textile industries. These innovations resulted

in higher agricultural output and a buoyant export commodity trade.

Muhammad Ali inherited a system of land ownership and taxation (*iltizam*, or tax-farming) system that benefited specific elites (the villages haykhs, religious leaders, and the Mamluks). In return for a fixed tax, they were granted tax rights over land. The tax was extorted from the peasants who cultivated the land; and the tax farmers were entitled to keep any excess beyond the set tax. This system and the tax exemption enjoyed by religious lands denied the state of considerable portions of the land tax and gave the tax-farmers a lot of leverage over the peasants. In 1816, tax farming was eliminated; taxes were now paid at the village level.

Under Muhammad Ali, the state controlled agricultural production as well as internal and external trade. The peasants were forced to grow crops sold only to the government at fixed prices, which were well below the market price. They then bought their foodstuffs at prices much higher than the original sale prices while the export commodities were sold abroad at substantially higher returns. Muhammad Ali himself controlled the bulk of Egyptian imports, and there was a state monopoly on grain exports.

Because of the agricultural, land, and tax reforms, higher taxes, state control of trade, and considerable expansion in international trade (notably with Europe), public revenues rose phenomenally and funded expansive military, social, and infrastructural (especially, communications and transport networks) projects. Intent on replicating Europe's industrial revolution, Muhammad Ali established a formidable military-industrial complex producing armaments, uniforms, footwear, and frigates as well as sugar refineries, rice mills, tanneries, and textile industries, all dependent on European machinery and technical expertise.

Through Muhammad Ali's reforms, Egypt became the most powerful and wealthiest of the Ottoman provinces. This outcome and his imperialist expansion, from Kordofan to the Red Sea and the Aegean Sea, troubled European countries. In 1838 London persuaded Istanbul to sign a treaty banning monopolies in the Ottoman Empire. This was important because taxes and profits from the sale of monopolized goods accounted for three-quarters of Egypt's revenue. Equally devastating was the 1841 Treaty of London that eliminated Muhammad Ali's empire in western Asia and also curtailed the size of the Egyptian army, the bedrock of his reforms. From then, the pasha lost the zeal and incentive for reform.

In the end, Muhammad Ali did not achieve an industrial revolution, nor did he bring Egypt to the same political and military status as the European powers. Even without British intervention, his policies were

self-destructive. There was hardly any effort to win mass support for his policies. Instead, the confiscation of agricultural products, high taxation, and conscripting peasant labor for public works alienated the masses. Besides, Egypt lacked adequate financial resources (especially, after the 25 per cent decline in the export price of cotton in 1833) and skilled personnel to sustain the reforms; moreover, many of the Europeans in Muhammad Ali's service lacked the expertise they claimed, leading to bad management and the failure of many projects. And there was the endemic bickering between Turko-Circassian officials and their Arabic-speaking subordinates.

The peasantry paid a very high price for whatever counted for Ali's successes. It is also true that since the military and the civilian bureaucracy were dominated by Turko-Circassians, the indigenous Arabic-speaking Egyptians were very much marginalized by Muhammad Ali's rule. Indeed, to him, Egyptians were simply serfs, only useful for his ambitions. Nonetheless, he endowed Egypt with the structural foundation which transformed it into a "modern" state.

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Egypt, North Africa: Scramble

The "Scramble" for Africa south of the Sahara did not begin in North Africa. The Maghrib had been an integral part of the Mediterranean world for three millennia until suddenly disrupted in 1830 by the invasion of the French. No longer able to seek conquests in Europe after the Napoleonic wars, the restored monarchy under Charles X sought to revive the empire by invading Algeria in 1830. The Arabs and Berbers rallied under the leadership of 'Abd al-Qadir (Abd el Kader) to oppose the French. Born into a prominent family from western Algeria in 1807, he studied in Medina and after returning to Algeria mobilized the Sufi brotherhoods

and declared a jihad in 1832 against the Christian French. After fifteen years of unremitting resistance he was forced to surrender after 100,000 French troops of the *Armée d'Afrique* under General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud had laid waste to Algeria. The campaign exhausted French imperial ambitions, but it provided training for French officers, the *officiers soudanais*, who thirty years later seized vast amounts of sahel and savanna in western Sudan for imperial France when the British were occupying the fertile valley of the Nile.

British interests in Africa were transformed by Isma'il ibn Ibrahim Pasha (1830–1895), the khedive of Egypt from 1863 until his deposition in 1879. His determination to modernize Egypt by public works and personal palaces was symbolized by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It reduced the long journey around Africa to a quick passage beside it. Profligate spending made possible by exaggerated cotton revenues during the American Civil War provided the resources for imperial adventures in Ethiopia and the Sudan. In 1875 and 1876 Isma'il sent two military expeditions to Ethiopia whose disastrous defeats confirmed his bankruptcy and left Massawa, the Ethiopian port of entry on the Red Sea, to the Italians.

Europe was not about to abandon its investments in Egypt whether cotton, railways, or the canal. In 1876 British and French advisers, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, were thrust upon Isma'il to restructure his debt that by 1878 could not be refinanced without reducing his autocratic powers. Isma'il refused, and in 1879 he was forced into exile leaving the government to European financial advisers. Led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi ('Arabi) Pasha and his Egyptian officers, the army intervened in September 1881 with the support of liberal nationalists, Muslim conservatives, and the great landlords to regain Egyptian control of the government. Anti-European riots in Alexandria were followed by the British naval bombardment on July 11, 1882. On July 19 Urabi announced he would seize the Suez Canal. On August 16 a British expeditionary force under General Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Suez and on September 13 destroyed the Egyptian army at Tall al-Kabir to accelerate the "Scramble" for Africa.

The British were reluctant to occupy Egypt, but Suez could not be secured without an administration in Cairo that would protect the foreign investments and their nationals that could not be entrusted to the defeated Egyptian nationalists. The khedivate would be retained, but acting upon the advice of its consul-general, Sir Evelyn Baring (latter Lord Cromer), the British would remain to cleanse the government of corruption, release the *fallahin* (peasants) from injustice, and produce surplus revenue for the European bondholders and public works for the Egyptians. His program to regenerate Egypt for stability in Cairo and

security at Suez was dependent, however, on the presence of British troops at the canal and British officials in the Egyptian administration that by 1889 had become more permanent than temporary.

In 1882 Egypt lost its independence to Great Britain. In 1885 Egypt lost its empire in Sudan to Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd Allah who had proclaimed himself the expected Mahdi in 1881 to relieve Sudan of religious and administrative corruption by the Turkish rulers from Egypt. His appeal united the disparate Sudanese ethnic groups into the *Ansar* (followers) who systematically annihilated every punitive expedition sent against them. Having occupied Egypt, the British also acquired responsibility for the defense of its empire in the Sudan against the Mahdists seeking freedom from the same oppression that the British used to justify their conquest of Egypt.

To resolve this dilemma the British government sent Charles George "Chinese" Gordon to Khartoum with ambiguous instructions that became irrelevant when the *Ansar* besieged the city. Gordon organized a tenacious defense, but at the approach of a British relief expedition the Mahdi ordered his *Ansar* to storm the city on 26 January 1885. Gordon was beheaded to become an instant English martyr that ignited the determination of his fellow officers, the British public, and its politicians to seek revenge for his death and the humiliation of a great power by savage Sudanese. Gordon became the moral motivation for the reconquest of Sudan in the "Scramble" for the Upper Nile.

The triumph of the Mahdi was short-lived. He died on June 22, 1885, but his legacy, an independent Mahdist state, was consolidated by his successor, the Khalifa 'Abd Allah Muhammad Turshain. Four years later, in June 1889, Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister, reluctantly accepted the arguments of his consul in Cairo that the regeneration of Egypt to secure Suez would require a more permanent British presence that would be dependent upon control of the Nile waters. This decision determined the beginning of the "Scramble" in northeast Africa that reverberated far beyond the Nile basin. Thereafter Lord Salisbury assiduously pursued diplomacy in Europe to neutralize all competitors whose pursuit of African territory might jeopardize the Nile flow.

In 1890 Salisbury concluded the Anglo-German (Heligoland) treaty that transferred British sovereignty of a tiny but symbolic island off the North Sea coast to Germany in return for German claims to Lake Victoria. In 1891 he concluded the Anglo-Italian agreement by which Britain would ignore Italian pretensions to seize Ethiopia in return for a commitment not to interfere with the flow of the Blue Nile. The Nile waters, Cairo, and Suez appeared secure for Britain until January 20, 1893, when the new khedive, Abbas II, sought to assert

his independence that was promptly frustrated by a demonstration of British military power. On the same day Victor Prompt, the distinguished French hydrologist, coincidentally delivered a lecture at the Egyptian Institute in Paris that inspired France to challenge Britain for control of the Nile waters and ultimately Cairo and Suez. The French advanced up the rivers of the Congo basin toward the Upper Nile at Fashoda and through the highlands of Ethiopia. The prospect of a French empire from the Atlantic to the Red Sea was irresistible.

During the beginnings of the "Scramble" for northeast Africa, Britain had encouraged Italian imperial ambitions as a potential ally in the Mediterranean and to frustrate French designs in Ethiopia. Emperor Menelik skillfully manipulated each, acquiring weapons from the French to defend Ethiopia against the Italians and neutrality from the British when they refused to accept his exorbitant claims to the Nile below his highlands. On March 1, 1896, Menelik had assembled at the village of Adua 100,000 men, 70,000 of whom were equipped with rifles accompanied by forty-six pieces of artillery and 20,000 spearmen. The Ethiopians decimated the Italian expeditionary force advancing through deep valleys under General Oreste Baratieri. The Ethiopians lost 17,000 killed and wounded. The Italians lost 7,000 killed, wounded, and captured and their dream of an African empire.

Four months later, on June 25, 1896, Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand left France for Africa and Fashoda. Three other French expeditions were being assembled in Addis Ababa under the scrutiny of Menelik to march to the Nile. The "Race to Fashoda" was the end of the "Scramble" for Africa begun by the deposition of the Khedive Isma'il in 1879, but after thirty years Nile control for Suez and the empire could no longer be achieved by a naval demonstration in the harbor of Alexandria. To secure the Nile waters from the French, the British government approved a railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria and when construction was delayed authorized a military expedition from Uganda that never reached Fashoda. The final solution was to send General H. H. Kitchener up the Nile to defeat the Khalifa and confront the French at Fashoda. On September 2, 1898, his Anglo-Egyptian army of 25,000 men defeated the 70,000 *Ansar* the Khalifa had mobilized on the plains of Karari outside Omdurman. Kitchener had completed the revenge for the martyrdom of Gordon in 1885 to the satisfaction of Queen Victoria and the British public. On September 19, Kitchener and his flotilla met Captain Marchand and his 125 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, beleaguered at Fashoda, to the satisfaction of Lord Salisbury and the security of the Nile waters and Suez. Marchand withdrew on instructions from a French government

humiliated at the end of the “Scramble” for the Nile, if not all of Africa.

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Egypt: Urabi Pasha and British Occupation, 1879–1882

Urabi Pasha Ahmad (c.1842–1911) was an Egyptian soldier and nationalist politician who is regarded as the first hero of modern Egyptian nationalism. Leader of the anti-European nationalist movement in Egypt before the British occupation of the country in 1882, Urabi Pasha was one of the first Egyptians of indigenous descent to rise to officer rank in the foreign-dominated Egyptian army. He was himself the son of a peasant or *fellah* who, like other Egyptian *fellahin* (as the peasants were called), had suffered heavily under the foreigners before and after joining the Egyptian army. Apart from him and very few other Egyptian officers, all top positions in the Egyptian army were monopolized by the Turks, Albanians, and Circassians who enjoyed higher pay and rapid promotion.

Since the sixteenth century, Egypt had been subjected to various foreign influences, namely the Turks, the French, and the British. The Turkish conquest of 1517 had made Egypt a province of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, British interest in Egypt began to be prominent at the end of the eighteenth century when the French, under Napoleon, invaded and occupied the country. For commercial and strategic reasons the British did not want the French to dominate or administer Egypt, as French control was likely to become a springboard for an attack on conquest of British India and to threaten British trade in the Middle East and Far East. By the 1870s, when Urabi Pasha appeared on the scene as the embodiment of the growing spirit of Egyptian nationalism with the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians,” he was given solid support by every segment of Egyptian society.

Mounting Egyptian indebtedness to foreign financiers, emanating largely from projects initiated and executed by Khedive Ismail, coupled with his incompetent management of Egypt's finances, had virtually caused Egypt to lose its independence. At the peak of

its financial crisis, representatives of Britain and France were sent to Egypt in 1878 to investigate and regulate the country's financial situation. When the representatives clashed with Ismail, he dismissed them, generating a reaction from the powers, who made use of their influence with the sultan of Turkey to depose the khedive, a request which the former granted. Following the removal of Ismail as ruler of Egypt, his son Tawfiq was immediately installed. Tawfiq could not ameliorate the situation and became a puppet of Britain and France, who manipulated him at will. The two powers acting together compelled Tawfiq to place Egyptian finances under joint Anglo-French control on the grounds that Egypt could not be relied upon to fulfill its obligations to its European creditors. This development provoked a powerful reaction that ended the joint control scheme or device, and set in motion a chain of events that culminated in outright British occupation of Egypt.

The Egyptian elite class began nationalist agitation through the press and the General Assembly for the removal from office of Tawfiq and a number of corrupt Turkish officeholders. These educated Egyptians denounced British and French interference with the domestic affairs of their country, and insisted that if allowed to control their country's financial affairs, they could fulfill Egypt's international obligations. However, since the British and French were unwilling to surrender their control of Egyptian finances, they remained resolute in preserving the power of the Khedive in order to continue to control the country through him. As the nationalist agitation increased, it spread to the army, whose senior officers were themselves disenchanted.

Urabi Pasha and his Egyptian officer colleagues spearheaded an opposition directed against the Europeans and Khedive Tawfiq, his autocratic government, and the Turko-Egyptians—people of Turkish descent—who monopolized the land, the wealth, the offices, and administration of the country by reducing Egyptians to servitude.

Urabi Pasha drew his support from the diverse elements of the Egyptian population, with the prevailing situation in the country reinforcing the support. His background as a *fellah* who suffered similar injustice as other *fellahin*, the sale of the Egyptian share of the Suez Canal to the British in 1875, the setting of a dual control or international commission to handle Egyptian finances, and the corrupt and oppressive foreign officeholders, all enhanced the nationalist cause. Petitions continued to pour in to Urabi Pasha from Egyptians who had suffered injustice and sought redress for their grievances.

On May 20, 1890, Colonel Urabi and his colleagues, Colonels Ali Bey Fehmi and Abdul-Al, presented a

petition to Khedive Tawfiq on the subject of Egyptian grievances, for a redress of the lopsidedness regarding pay and promotion for the rank and file of the Egyptian army as well as the reinstatement of those earlier dismissed from the force. The khedive summoned his Council of Ministers, which decided that the three colonels should be arrested and tried by court martial. When the news reached Urabi and his colleagues, they defiantly offered themselves for arrest. Before the court martial could decide their fate, however, a regiment of their soldiers arrived and freed their popular officers. Strengthened by this triumph, and the increasing powerlessness of the khedive, Urabi presented more demands, including constitutional reforms, and the control of the national budget by Egyptians themselves, as against the Anglo-French control of the fiscal policy of Egypt. Britain and France objected in strong terms, jointly sending a stiff note in which they stated that the only authority they recognized was the Khedive. Tawfiq, however, had become powerless in the face of the immense popularity then being enjoyed by Urabi. Continued nationalist agitation compelled the dismissal of the minister of war, Osman Rifki and in his place Urabi Pasha was appointed, while another nationalist, Mahmud al-Barud, was appointed prime minister.

It became clear then that Urabi and his nationalist counterparts were in firm control. The British and the French were naturally alarmed at this unusual development and feared the nationalists were working toward overthrowing the khedive, declaring Egypt a republic, and refusing responsibility for the discharge of the debts that the khedives had incurred. Both powers, under pressure from their citizens with financial interests in Egypt, intervened and mounted a naval blockade outside the port of Alexandria. This action provoked Egyptian nationals in Alexandria, and during the violent disturbances in June 1882 the British consul was injured and about fifty Europeans were killed. This episode provided an excuse for armed intervention by Britain, which decided that a show of force was necessary if the collapse of European authority in Egypt was to be prevented. Meanwhile, Urabi had started fortifying Alexandria in preparation for the next show of power.

The British became anxious about the security of Europeans in Egypt. France had recalled its fleet from Alexandria to deal with a revolt in Tunisia, so Britain had to act alone. On July 11, 1882, the British navy bombarded Alexandria, but when they could not quell the nationalist riots, troops landed. On September 13, the British forces led by General Garnet Wolseley defeated Urabi's forces at the celebrated battle of al-Tal al-Kabir. Two days later, Urabi himself was captured in Cairo. He was exiled to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) where

he remained until 1901, when he was pardoned and allowed to return to Egypt. Urabi died on September 21, 1911. Meanwhile, from 1882 to 1922, Egypt became an integral part of the British Empire.

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See also: **Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922; Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Historical Outline; Suez Canal.**

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Egypt: Cromer Administration, 1883–1907: Irrigation, Agriculture, and Industry

In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt. British reasons for military intervention included the suppression of a nationalist revolt led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi, protection of the rights of Egypt's legitimate ruler, Tawfiq, protection of the Suez Canal (and hence the route to India), and, perhaps most important, protection of British financial interests in Egypt. Though the occupation of Egypt was the result of long-term developments (including a mounting external debt and gradual separation from the Ottoman Empire), the immediate effect was the establishment of British control over the Egyptian administration. From 1882 to 1907, British control of Egypt manifested itself in the person of British agent and consul general, Sir Evelyn Baring (made Lord Cromer in 1891).

Though the nominal head of Egypt were the khedives Tawfiq (until 1892) and Abbas II, Cromer remained the effective ruler of Egypt until his resignation in 1907. Cromer's rule was neither official nor direct; the Cromer administration is often referred to as the "veiled protectorate." Based on his own philosophy of colonial rule, developed in part during his service in India, Cromer placed primary emphasis on the need for a strong, sound financial system in Egypt. In his

view, native rulers were tyrants; British rule, therefore, brought much-needed reforms and fair government. Since Cromer believed that the basis of successful reform must be economic, his administration in Egypt concerned itself with strengthening the Egyptian economy through the improvement of irrigation and agriculture and the building of industry.

Egypt's system of canals and irrigation had deteriorated markedly from Roman times until the French invasion in 1798, but during the nineteenth century Muhammad 'Ali and his successors revitalized irrigation and agriculture by deepening canals, building dams, and expanding the cultivation of cotton. According to British officials, however, the irrigation system had been expanded on a less than scientific basis: canals had the wrong slope or capacity and were closed at improper times, channels were filled with silt, drainage was inadequate and confused, and the much-touted Nile barrages, begun by French engineers, had fallen far short of expectations. In 1884 a group of Anglo-Indian engineers, led by Colin Scott-Moncrieff, began reorganizing Egypt's irrigation system. Dividing Egypt into five irrigation districts, Cromer's engineers unblocked old canals, separated drainage from irrigation channels, cut new canals, and repaired the barrages. The result of the first year's efforts was a 30,000 ton increase in the cotton crop. Further irrigation efforts followed: the eastern Delta Canal was dug, river banks in Upper Egypt were raised and canals there enlarged so as to ensure an adequate supply of river water for irrigation even in seasons of low Nile floods, and more barrages were built in the Delta and in Upper Egypt.

Irrigation policy was tied not only to finances but also to control over Sudan. Plans were afoot to build a dam at the first cataract of the Nile in 1894 at the time when Anglo-Egyptian forces were about to embark upon the reconquest of Sudan (following the Mahdist revolt and the death of General Charles George "Chinese" Gordon in 1885). In Cromer's view, the new dam would help generate the income needed to retake and administer Sudan. Although the British government was hesitant to provide the funds for the dam, loans made by financier Sir Ernest Cassel allowed the dam to be built; it was completed in 1902. The successful reconquest of Sudan in 1898 afforded further irrigation possibilities; by 1904 British administrators had decided that the White Nile would provide for Egypt's irrigation needs, while the Blue Nile would be geared toward providing for Sudanese agriculture (on the theory that whatever helped Egyptian agriculture generated further income that could be used to develop Sudan).

Although these changes in irrigation resulted in a dramatic increase in cultivated land, they came at a price. Soil quality diminished as soils were exhausted from continual use and perennial irrigation, pest

problems increased, and a rising water table caused by continued inadequate drainage combined to reduce yields during Cromer's administration. Despite the emphasis placed on irrigation as a way of increasing agricultural yields and hence national income, general agricultural policy under Cromer was not well developed. Cromer discouraged the formation of a governmental ministry or department of agriculture (the Ministry of Agriculture was not founded until 1914), and few efforts to improve agricultural techniques were undertaken. Agriculture was increasingly funneled toward the production of Egypt's primary export crop—cotton—and away from cereal crops for domestic consumption. Overall, irrigation policy was well intended and designed to increase cultivatable land; its unfortunate effects on soils and the overall lack of a coherent supporting agricultural policy limited its long-term benefits.

As Egyptian agriculture was undergoing a transformation, industry was undergoing changes as well. Industry during the British occupation developed along two lines: industries related to agriculture and those producing luxury goods for the urban elite. Industries based on agriculture (e.g., the processing of cotton, sugar, and tobacco) flourished with a union of governmental and private firms dedicated to the creation of a modern export sector. With few exceptions, large-scale industry in Egypt during this period was owned and operated by Europeans, and the majority of debts and shares of industrial concerns were held outside Egypt. Despite the growth of such industries, most manufacturing in Egypt remained traditionally organized, labor-intensive, and Egyptian-owned. At the same time, guilds were being replaced with small-scale wage labor, as the government either officially abolished guilds or simply began referring in its regulations to occupations without recognizing any guild structures. During Cromer's time in Egypt, little attention was given to the development of heavy industry, and the government took steps to prevent the development of a modern textile industry. In short, industrial policy, like irrigation and agricultural policy, was formulated with an eye toward maximizing revenue for the British-led government and for foreign investors in Egypt.

Cromer retired from his post in 1907 following the "Dinshaway incident," in which a British officer was killed in the village of Dinshaway and brutal sentences were imposed on the villagers in consequence. Reaction against the sentences swept through Egypt and Britain; pressure mounted for a more accommodating British policy in Egypt. Though Cromer had been out of Egypt during the sentencing, he nonetheless astutely realized that change was in the air and retired to England, where he spent his remaining time writing, serving in the House of Lords, advocating free trade, and presiding

over the 1916 Dardanelles Convention. He died in 1917, his Egyptian post having been taken over by Sir Eldon Gorst.

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Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood

In the late nineteenth century, and throughout the course of the twentieth century, Egypt was the scene of important developments in reformist and politicoactivist forms of Islam. These forms included the Salafiyya, a purely intellectual trend, which aimed at the renewal of Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood, a social movement, which began as a religious and philanthropic organization but eventually adopted a distinctive political agenda.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood was influenced by the Salafiyya's intellectual orientation, especially its emphasis on the pious traditions of Islam's early generations, its focus on activism and social reconstruction has prompted many contemporary scholars to label it an Islamist group. Islamism, according to these scholars, is characterized by the efforts of concerned Muslims to establish the Shari'a, or code of Islamic law, within the secular nation-state. As elsewhere in the Islamic world, Islamism in Egypt has adopted both moderate and radical means to attain its primary goal of creating a polity governed by Quranic principles.

The origins of the Salafiyya are closely associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), whose efforts to reform Islam were prompted by the West's political and cultural domination of Egypt and other countries of the Islamic world. In order to once again make Islam a dynamic force in the world, these men sought to rid the Muslim community of intellectual stagnation, blind adherence to tradition, and non-Islamic elements, which had crept into Islam through the vehicle of Sufism. In their view, the key to reform was to be found in the practice of *ijtihad*, the individual effort to discern God's will directly through the investigation of Islam's two primary sources of guidance, the Quran and the Sunna (the normative custom of the Prophet Muhammad).

Although the Salafis upheld the principles enshrined in these two sources as valid for all times and

places, they also believed that they should be applied in a manner consonant with the social and scientific requirements of modernity, for only thus could the general interest of the community be served. Thus, according to the Salafis, Islam emphasized the virtues of consultative government and encouraged the study of nature. The Salafiyya intended its program to bridge the growing gulf between the Westernizing and traditional sectors of Muslim society.

The teachings of the Salafiyya inspired the Muslim Brotherhood, which combined the message of Islamic reform with a willingness to mobilize the Egyptian population against the Western cultural influences favored by many within the ruling establishment. Founded in 1928 in the British-occupied Canal Zone by Hasan al-Banna, a primary school teacher, the brotherhood adopted a political strategy that was moderate and gradualist. Rather than take control of the state by direct political action, it sought to influence the direction of politics by "awakening" Egyptians to authentic Islam, which, its propagandists claimed, "lay dormant within their souls." In time, the Brothers hoped, the Quran would be adopted as Egypt's "constitution." During its heyday in the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed one million members and sympathizers, who were organized, throughout the country, in some two thousand branches. However, in the mid- and late 1940s some members of the brotherhood adopted a radical stance in response to gains made by the Zionists in Palestine, and to the heightened mood of anti-regime sentiment in Egypt itself. In 1948 a Muslim Brother assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, Nuqrashi Pasha, an action that precipitated the retaliatory killing of al-Banna by security police a few months later.

With the encouragement of their new leader, Hasan al-Hudaybi, the Muslim Brothers supported the 1952 coup d'état of Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers, with whom they had forged close links in the previous decade. When it became clear, however, that the officers intended to establish a secular regime, rather than one governed by the Shari'a, they withdrew their support. In 1954, in response to an attempt on his life by a Brother, Nasser banned the movement and imprisoned its leading members.

In 1971 Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, released many of the prisoners and granted the Brotherhood a degree of official legitimacy. In so doing, he hoped to use the organization as a counterweight against Nasserists and leftists, whose political influence he was eager to diminish. Abandoning the confrontational politics of the 1940s and 1950s, the Brotherhood resumed the original, Salafi-inspired strategies of social conversion favored by its founder. In addition to publishing weekly journals and magazines, the Brotherhood has,

since the 1980s especially, infiltrated labor syndicates and professional organizations, and has petitioned the government to grant it political party status, a request that has repeatedly been denied.

Some Muslim Brothers, however, were forever radicalized by the prison experience of the 1950s. Sayyid Qutb, a literary intellectual who joined the Brotherhood in 1953, articulated the Islamists' ill will toward the Nasser regime in a series of writings composed during the period of his incarceration. In these works he equated the moral universe of Nasser and his followers with that of the Jahiliyya, the condition of ignorance and cultural barbarism that existed among the peninsular Arabs prior to the advent of Islam. Released from prison in 1965, Qutb was immediately implicated in another alleged Islamist conspiracy against the government and hanged in August 1966. Although Qutb himself never explicitly called for armed action against Egypt's secular establishment, his writings nevertheless provided ideological inspiration for the underground Islamist cells, which since the 1970s have waged campaigns of violence and terror against the powers that be.

One such organization, the Jihad movement, assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 on account of his close relations with the West and Israel. In the 1990s, the Islamic Group attacked groups of foreign tourists, in addition to government officials. The Mubarak government struck out against this latter movement with extreme force, with the result that in 1998 its leadership called a halt to violence.

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See also: 'Abouh, Muhammad

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Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922

In Egypt the term “nationalism” was first used to refer to the native officers' movement, led by Col. Ahmad 'Urâbî, against Egyptian government policies that favored officers of Turkish, Circassian (Caucasus region), or other foreign extraction. In 1881–1882,

Egyptians formed several societies, usually lumped together as the “National Party,” that demanded constitutional rule, fought the Anglo-French Dual Control, and resisted Britain's invasion of Egypt to protect the Suez Canal and the rights of European creditors. The invasion triumphed, 'Urâbî was arrested and exiled, and the party was disbanded.

In the early years of Britain's military occupation, there was little overt resistance, because Egypt's viceroy, Khedive Tawfîq (r.1879–1892), suppressed it. Nationalism revived after the succession of his son, 'Abbâs Hilmî II (r.1892–1914). Various European and Near Eastern palace functionaries urged the young khedive to resist Britain's consul general in Cairo, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who was Egypt's de facto ruler. Although Cromer's access to military reinforcements from Britain intimidated the khedive's backers, there arose in his place an informal opposition movement that also called itself the “National Party.” Its leader was Mustafâ Kâmil, a French-trained lawyer who initially served as a liaison between 'Abbâs and potential European and Ottoman backers. As he became better known, Kâmil founded a daily newspaper, *al-Liwâ* (“The Banner”), a boys' school, and a political party open to all Egyptians seeking to end the British occupation. The revived National Party appealed to students, young professionals, and seekers of government jobs who felt their access was blocked by the influx of British subjects serving in Egyptian ministries. Most Egyptians were enraged by the 1906 Dinshawây Incident, in which several peasants were hanged, flogged, or jailed for assaulting British officers who entered the Delta village of Dinshawây to shoot pigeons, which Egyptians keep as barnyard fowl. The Nationalists also wanted Khedive 'Abbâs to grant them a constitution with an elected parliament to whom his ministers would be responsible, reducing the power of British advisers in the Egyptian government. Soon after Kâmil became president of the National Party, he died in 1908 at age thirty-three. The large-scale demonstrations of grief at his funeral testified to his support from the Egyptian people.

Soon after Kâmil's death, the Nationalists elected their party's vice president, Muhammad Farîd, as its new leader. Although less charismatic than his predecessor, Farîd was high-principled, financially independent, and determined to continue the independence struggle. In addition to organizing party branches throughout Egypt, he also set up workers' night schools and consumer cooperatives and lent support to the growing trade union movement. He continued to court European support but also strengthened ties with the Ottoman government and hired Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azîz Jâwîsh, an Islamist writer, to edit *al-Liwâ*. Jâwîsh soon antagonized both the Copts and the

British and, although popular with many Muslim students, moved the National Party toward extremism, terrorism, and pan-Islam. When a Nationalist murdered Egypt's prime minister, Butros Ghâli, in 1910, the Egyptian government (abetted by its British advisers) curbed the Nationalists. Within two years, both Farîd and Jawîsh, having served prison terms, sought refuge in Istanbul. The National Party, with many of its newspapers banned, went into eclipse.

Concurrent with the Nationalists were two other self-styled Egyptian "parties": *Hizb al-Umma* ("Party of the People") and *Hizb al-Islâh al-Dustûrî* ("Constitutional Reform Party"). The *Umma* Party, composed of landowners and intellectuals, advocated a gradual winning of independence, to be achieved by cooperation with Britain in educating the Egyptian people and showing them the rights and duties of citizenship. It upheld Egyptian interests and denounced pan-Islam, shunning both Khedive 'Abbâs and the Ottoman Empire. The *Islâh* Party, however, upheld the khedive's rights and advocated Islamic unity. Neither was as popular as the National Party.

When World War I began, Britain severed Egypt's ties with the Ottoman Empire (which in November 1914 joined the Central Powers), deposed 'Abbâs, declared a British protectorate over Egypt, and barred all nationalist activity for the duration of the war. Although Egypt's cabinet ministers, legislative leaders, and people did not want these changes, Britain's military presence, augmented to protect the Suez Canal after an Ottoman-German attack in 1915, squelched all opposition. Wartime conditions led to price inflation, restrictions on the acreage allotted to growing cotton, martial law and tight controls on civil liberties, conscription of Egyptians for the campaign to take Palestine and Syria from the Ottomans, and requisition of draft animals and foodstuffs from the peasants.

During the war Egyptians hoped that the British would withdraw their troops as soon as it ended, or that they could persuade Britain's allies to back their cause. The idea of sending representatives to the postwar talks may have come from Sultan Fuâd (r.1917–1936). The proposed delegation's charter members were Sa'd Zaghîlûl, 'Alî Sha'râwî, 'Abd al-'Azîz Fahmî, Ahmad Lutfî al-Sayyid, 'Abd al-Latîf al-Makabbâtî, Muhammad 'Alî 'Allûba, Hamad al-Bâsil, and Sînût Hannâ, most of whom had belonged to the *Umma* Party. They opened their campaign with a visit by Zaghîlûl, Fahmî, and Sha'râwî to Britain's high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, in November 1918, two days after the armistice, stating their desire to go to London to negotiate with the Foreign Office for an end to the British Protectorate. A similar request was made the same day by Premier Husayn Rushdî and 'Adlî Yakan. The Foreign Office replied that it was too busy preparing

for the Paris Peace Conference to meet even an official Egyptian deputation, let alone Zaghîlûl, who was convening Egyptian legislators, demanding complete independence, and proposing to head a delegation to the Peace Conference. When Britain challenged the credentials of Zaghîlûl and his friends to represent Egypt, his followers set up a committee to gather contributions and circulate petitions, authorizing their *wafd* (delegation) to speak for the Egyptian people. Wingate banned political meetings, and the Interior Ministry seized some of the petitions, but Rushdî and 'Adlî resigned from the cabinet when the Foreign Office refused to see even them. Zaghîlûl and his backers sent memoranda to the conference, President Wilson of the United States, the representatives of the Western powers in Egypt, and foreign residents.

Although the Wafd's main aim was to achieve Egypt's complete independence by peaceful means, Britain's failure to gauge the Wafd's popularity led to repressive measures in March, including the internment of Zaghîlûl and three of his associates, sparking the nationwide 1919 revolution, in which all classes and religions joined in opposing the British; even women took part in demonstrations. London appointed General Allenby to replace Wingate as high commissioner and authorized him to take any measures necessary to restore order. Allenby suppressed the violence but also declared Zaghîlûl free to go to Paris. The other Wafdists drew up a covenant, chose Zaghîlûl as president of the Wafd, and bound themselves not to negotiate in its name with persons of political standing without his permission. Formally organized like a European political party, the Wafd delegated many powers to its leader. Once Zaghîlûl was free to go to the Peace Conference, the other seventeen members of the Egyptian delegation met before their departure to form a central committee to gather funds and information on Egypt's situation. It became the nerve center of Egyptian resistance to British rule. When Britain dispatched the Milner Mission to Egypt, the Central Committee set up a boycott and demonstrations against it.

The Wafd's hopes of addressing the conference were dashed when the U.S. government formally recognized the British Protectorate. Unable to make its case directly, the Wafd's members issued manifestos and met other delegates, seeking supporters for independence. In 1920 Lord Milner and Zaghîlûl held informal talks on the Egyptian question without reaching an agreement. New disturbances erupted in 1921, and the British again exiled Zaghîlûl. Some of the men who had left the Wafd formed the Constitutional Liberal Party (similar to the *Umma* Party) and drafted Egypt's 1923 Constitution. Once it took effect, the Wafd reconstituted itself as a party to run candidates in the first parliamentary elections, but many Wafdists continued

to see themselves as standard-bearers of Egyptian nationalism rather than as a partisan movement.

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See also: World War I: North and Saharan Africa; World War I: Survey

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Egypt: Monarchy and Parliament, 1922–1939

On February 28, 1922, the British unilaterally declared Egypt an independent and sovereign state, after having failed to negotiate a treaty with the nationalist delegation (Wafd). The declaration also limited Egypt's sovereignty by reserving the issues of imperial communications, defense, foreign interests and minorities, and Sudan for further negotiations. The British declaration also initiated a new political constitution by establishing the Egyptian monarchy, while allowing the Egyptians to define the details of the new political system in a constitutional commission. The constitution was drafted as a compromise between conservative monarchists and liberal constitutionalists, who alternately held power between 1922 and 1923. A Liberal-Constitutional Party formed in 1922, with the support of the British high commissioner in Egypt, Edmond Allenby; however, the monarchists did not form a party until 1925. In the meantime, the Liberal-Constitutional Party was the main political opposition to the Wafd.

The Wafd rejected the declaration of 1922, as well as the liberal and monarchist governments that supervised the drafting of the constitution of 1923. The constitution defined civil and political rights and created a parliament that consisted of two chambers elected by a male suffrage. The chamber of deputies had the power to initiate legislation, which had not been the case in earlier assemblies, such as those formed in 1866, 1883, and 1913. In addition, the majority party in the chamber had the right to form a government. Therefore, the constitution was dubbed the liberal constitution. However, the final stages of the drafting of the constitution

secured special privileges for the monarchy. King Ahmad Fu'ad had the right to appoint two-fifths of the senate and enjoyed the right to dissolve parliament, write legislation in the absence of parliament, veto parliamentary legislation, and control appointments to the ministry of religious trusts and personnel at the national mosque, al-Azhar. Consequently the leader of the Wafd, Sa'd Zaghlul, declared the constitution a "feudal and medieval text."

Nevertheless, the constitution created the political arena in which monarchists and nationalists contested for power in the interwar years. The Wafd Party gained legitimacy as the leading national party at the polls, taking 90 per cent of the vote in the first elections of 1923. The Liberal-Constitutional Party was defeated and afterward served in numerous coalition governments, oscillating between the nationalist Wafd and monarchist parliamentary blocs. Political contests revolved around the issues of treaty negotiations with the British and the constitutional role of the king. When the premier, Sa'd Zaghlul, failed to reach an agreement with the British Labour government on treaty negotiations in 1924, a conservative faction within the Wafd Party seceded to the monarchists. As a result, Zaghlul moved to a more radical, nationalist position on treaty issues to rally support and confront the king. To do so involved a confrontation with the British also, who now depended upon the king as a counter to the nationalists. Dramatically, the Wafd failed in its contest with the king and the British after the assassination of the British commander of the Egyptian army in Sudan by unidentified assailants in November.

Blame fell on the nationalist government of Zaghlul, who was forced to resign. Afterward, the parliament was dissolved, and Allenby and the Conservative foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, worked with the king to organize a monarchist party, named the Unity (Ittihad) Party. The elections of March 1925 gave the Wafd 54 per cent of the vote, which showed that the monarchists could, by vote rigging and patronage, secure a significant section of the electorate. Yet, the first vote within the parliament defeated the monarchist government. Rather than bow to the deputies, the king exercised his constitutional right to dissolve the parliament and appoint a government that included Ittihad and Liberal-Constitutional ministers.

King Fu'ad was key to this coalition because only the king had sufficient powers of patronage to draw support away from the Wafd and neutralize the Liberals. For example, prominent Liberals aligned with the monarchy in 1925, including Isma'il Sidqi, who accepted the post of Minister of the Interior, while 'Adli Yakan and Husayn Rushdi accepted royal appointments to the senate. Royal patronage of this type resembled the style of politics practiced by the khedives

of nineteenth-century Egypt. Consequently, the king could count upon the support of politicians bred in the culture of autocratic rule before 1922. Politicians such as Sidqi, 'Adli, and Rushdi were distrustful of the populist politics of the nationalists; therefore, the monarchy seemed to them, as it did to the British, as the last line of defense against a more radical nationalist alternative.

The split in the monarchist and liberal coalition in September 1925 was caused by a conflict of political principles between those in favor of royal autocracy and those defending the idea of constitutional monarchy. Fearing a reinvigorated monarchy, many Liberals allied with the Wafd against the monarchist Ittihad Party in preparation for the third round of elections in 1926. To win over the Liberals and disarm colonial interference, the Wafd leadership adopted a more moderate tactic based on constitutional precedent. Zaghlul published a declaration supporting a convention of the dissolved parliament on November 21, according to article 96 of the constitution. The parliamentarians met and condemned the dissolution of parliament in 1924, agreeing on the convention of a national congress on February 15, 1926. This forced the monarchist government to schedule elections, which were held in May. The Wafd took 70 per cent of the seats and the Liberals 13 per cent. However, a Liberal, 'Adli Yakan, led the coalition government instead of Zaghlul. When Yakan resigned in 1927 another Liberal, 'Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, led the government from April 1927 until March 1928. In the meantime, the Wafd Party suffered the loss of its leader in 1927. While Zaghlul had taken an increasingly moderate position in his relations with the British and the monarchists after 1925, his successor, Mustafa al-Nahhas, adopted a confrontational stance when he briefly held office in 1928. The king dismissed Nahhas, dissolved parliament, and selected a Liberal, Muhammad Mahmud, to rule in the absence of parliament from June 1928 until October 1929, when 'Adli took the premiership and supervised elections that brought the Wafd back to power in 1929.

The political divide between monarchists and nationalists explains the shifting balance of power between king and parliament. The return of an elected Wafd government with 90 per cent of the seats in parliament in 1929 resulted in a renewed contest between the monarchy and the parliament. As in 1924, the major issue was the question of treaty negotiations and the constitutional powers of the king. The Wafd's negotiating tactics alienated the British, who therefore tolerated the king's dissolution of the parliament and suspension of constitutional government in 1930. The king's instrument in this experiment in autocratic rule was Isma'il Sidqi, who rewrote the constitution in 1930 to make the ministers responsible to the king. As well, the electoral law was redrafted to restrict the

franchise to a few, particularly the provincial landholding notability.

Sidqi created a People's Party (*Hizb al-Sha'b*) to muster votes in the elections of 1931, which were boycotted by the opposition parties and marred by violence. The parliament of 1931 consolidated the monarchist bloc, but lacked legitimacy. Sidqi reacted to violent attacks against his regime with decrees that silenced the press and gave the police emergency powers. These measures resulted in some prominent monarchists, such as 'Ali Mahir, breaking with the government. By 1933 Sidqi had lost the king's confidence and therefore resigned the premiership in September. Parliament was dissolved and the 1930 constitution rescinded. Afterward, the king ruled supreme through the ministries of 'Abd al-Fattah Yahya and Tawfiq Nasim.

In 1935 the Wafd convened a congress of opposition parties that called for a return to constitutional rule. The king appointed 'Ali Mahir to the premiership and restored the constitution of 1923. In April 1936 King Ahmad Fu'ad died and was succeeded by his son, Faruq. Elections were held in May and the Wafd took a majority of the seats in parliament. The premier of the Wafd government, Nahhas, successfully negotiated a treaty with the British in 1936. Meanwhile, 'Ali Mahir moved from the premiership to the head of the royal cabinet, where he sustained the autocratic vision of monarchy by exerting royal patronage through the normal channels, such as al-Azhar and the senate, as well as patronizing the military and an extreme right-wing organization, Young Egypt (*Misr al-Fatat*).

The last contest between an elected Wafd government and the monarchy in the period before the World War II revolved around the question of royal patronage over the military officers. Consequently, the place of the officer corps in politics was debated, as was the question of whether the allegiance of the officers belonged first to the king or the elected government. This debate, provoked by the issue of whether ultimate authority belonged to the king or parliament, also involved debates on the form and setting of the official coronation ceremony in 1937. The monarchists wanted the coronation to take place in a religious setting and the oath to follow a religious rather than secular formula. The resulting controversy brought about the dismissal of Nahhas from the premiership in December 1937. During the election of 1938 the Wafd Party split again, and the new Sa'dist Party formed a coalition government with the Liberal-Constitutional Party. Indicating the continuing role of the monarchy in politics, Mahmud was dismissed by Faruq in August 1939, and the prominent monarchist, 'Ali Mahir, was appointed to the premiership.

To conclude, during the interwar period the monarchy adopted a policy that stressed the advantages of

authoritarianism over the instabilities of parliamentary politics. But parliament was nevertheless the new arena of politics. Under these conditions, the monarchy could not establish its supremacy over the dominant parliamentary party. The king patronized prominent politicians, but their shifting coalitions undermined the formation of a cohesive political opposition to the Wafd. Isma'il Sidqi and 'Ali Mahir introduced new tactics through constitutional and electoral revisions, as well as patronage over extraparliamentary constituencies, such as religious and military personnel. However, the revolution of 1952 indicated that neither religious nor military organizations could provide the monarchy with a sound base upon which to secure the dynasty as the symbol of a sovereign Egypt. Indeed much of the rivalry of the Wafd-led parliaments and the monarchy in the interwar years revolved around this fundamental issue of what the symbols and bases of political authority should be in modern Egypt.

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See also: **Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922.**

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Egypt, World War II and

In 1922 Great Britain officially recognized Egypt's independence. This granting of independence, however, was not total; Britain attached four reservations to Egyptian independence that year. Britain reserved for itself the rights of security of imperial communications, protection of religious minorities and foreigners, a continued role in Sudan, and, perhaps most significantly, defense of Egypt from outside attack. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty reduced some British rights in Egypt (e.g., it abolished the office of high commissioner,

set a date for abolishing the capitulations and consular courts, and gave the Egyptian government jurisdiction over non-Egyptians), but the agreement did not address the issue of Sudan and it reaffirmed British rights to defend the Suez Canal and to station troops in Egypt in the event of war.

When war came in 1939, Britain, within its rights according to the 1936 treaty, used Egypt as its main base in the Middle East. The British also forced King Faruq to sever relations with Hitler's Germany, and censorship was imposed. The use of Egypt as a major Allied base did have some short-term economic benefits, however. Expansion of industry and increased opportunities for employment resulted in bank deposits in Egypt almost tripling from 1940 to 1943. Yet neither the immediate economic profits of the war nor the fact that Britain was within its treaty rights to station troops in Egypt resulted in much support for the Allied cause. The massive influx of foreign troops was disruptive to Egyptian society, and it reminded the people that the country was not truly free. In fact, many Egyptians sympathized with the Axis, and throughout the Middle East, Arabs began to see the Axis as potential liberators. In February 1942 the strength of British influence and the weakness of the king were brought to light in a way no Egyptian could forget.

Prior to 1942 a series of prime ministers had been appointed and dismissed by the king. Prime ministers were either mildly pro-Axis or carefully neutral, but none were pro-British. When Husayn Sirri showed signs of Allied sympathies by severing relations with Vichy France in 1941, the king dismissed him. At this point, the British decided to put an abrupt end to pro-Axis governments. Former Prime Minister Ali Maher, known for his Axis leanings, was arrested and charged with espionage. More seriously, in February 1942, the king was given a choice by British Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson (by then Lord Killearn): either appoint a pro-British prime minister (meaning a prime minister from the nationalist Wafd Party) who would uphold the 1936 treaty or give up the throne. To demonstrate the seriousness of the British position, Lampson ordered British tanks to be stationed outside Abdin Palace, where the king was deliberating his next move, and went armed into the palace to hear Faruq's decision. Faruq, a practical man in this instance, decided to save his throne, and the Wafd was brought back to power, just as German forces (under the command of Erwin Rommel) were preparing to invade.

Rommel had come to North Africa in 1941 as the commander of the German Afrika Korps. Initially sent to assist the weak and almost defeated Italian army in Libya, Rommel's successful attacks earned him the nickname the "Desert Fox" and a promotion to field marshal from Adolf Hitler. In 1942 Hitler, who had

never seen North Africa as an important theater of war, nonetheless commanded Rommel to invade Egypt and take Cairo. Although Rommel had repeatedly requested rest for his troops and warned Hitler that supply lines were weak, the invasion began. Rommel's troops met with initial success but were defeated by the British at the battle of el-Alamein, about sixty miles outside the coastal city of Alexandria.

The British victory at el-Alamein did not generate much enthusiasm in Egypt, however. The incident at the Abdin Palace had aroused widespread contempt for the king, resentment against the Wafd, and further hatred of the British. Whereas the Wafd previously had been seen as the party of the nation, the incident discredited it in the eyes of many nationalists and it was seen increasingly as the party of the British. The economic benefits brought by the onset of the war began to dissipate, and this too resulted in widespread discontent. Though some Egyptians profited from the war, most (including the peasantry) suffered. Inflation was rampant, poverty rates rose, wheat shipments in Cairo in 1942 were attacked by starving mobs, and unemployment skyrocketed after the withdrawal of Allied forces after the war.

The poor economic conditions and unpleasant political situation during the war increased the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, a socioreligious group originally founded in 1928. The Brotherhood became increasingly political by the 1930s; by the 1940s it had transformed itself from a religious reformist movement to a militant opposition group. Wartime conditions also fostered the growth of two other alternative political movements: the communists and the Young Egypt Party (*Misr al-Fatat*). Until 1942 the communist movement in Egypt had been fairly weak, its popularity confined largely to non-Muslim intellectuals. The Soviet Union's entry into World War II, combined with Egypt's economic deterioration, gave the communists greater (though still relatively limited) prominence. The Young Egypt Party was founded by Ahmad Husayn before the war and was initially modeled on Italian and German fascist groups. Called by the nickname "the greenshirts," Husayn's organization gained adherents during the war. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the organization changed ideologies, first becoming the Islamic Nationalist Party and then adopting socialism as its philosophy. Like the communists, though, Husayn's group in all its manifestations never succeeded in gaining enough support to pose a credible threat to the government.

Immediately after the war and in part as a result of its effects, more attention began to be paid to the idea of social and economic reform in Egypt. In the wake of massive unemployment, inflation, and greater awareness of the plight of the peasantry (some 1.2 million of

whom had had to file for tax exemption due to poverty in 1942), more debates were held, speeches made, projects and plans formulated, statistics kept, and studies conducted into social and economic conditions, particularly in the countryside. Urban workers' strikes became more commonplace, in part due to the efforts of the communist movement, and demonstrations frequently became violent. Even though various government agencies sought to address the social and economic crises of the nation that the war had highlighted and though some progress was made, significant changes did not come until several years after the war, when, in 1952, a military coup under the direction of Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser overthrew the corrupt and ineffective government of King Faruq and began instituting a series of domestic social and economic reforms.

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Egypt: Printing, Broadcasting

Egypt has had a periodical press since Napoleon founded *Le Courier de l'Égypte* and *La Décade égyptienne* in 1798. The official journal, *al-Waqâi' al-misriyya*, began publication in 1828. The introduction of the telegraph and steamships into Egypt aided the dissemination of news. The first privately published Arabic newspaper was 'Abdallâh Abû al-Su'ûd's *Wâdî al-Nîl* (1866). Many daily, weekly, and monthly periodicals, both in Arabic and in European languages, followed, reaching an early peak during the 'Urâbî revolution of 1881–1882. The British occupation briefly halted the growth of the press, but by 1895 Arabic newspapers and magazines were burgeoning. Mustafâ Kâmil showed in publishing *al-Liwâ* that journalism could inspire nationalist resistance to British rule. Periodicals also appeared, such as *al-Hilâl* and *al-Muqtataf*, which promoted the spread of science. Others advocated feminism, moderate reform (e.g., *al-Jarîda*), and support for the khedive (e.g., *al-Muayyad*) and for the British (e.g., *al-Muqattam*). Martial law in World War I closed many newspapers and magazines, but in 1919 journalistic activity

resumed, aided in part by the introduction of the linotype typesetter and wireless telegraphy. Political parties played a major role in the growth of newspapers, with *al-Akhbâr* and later *al-Misrî* serving as organs for the Wafd Party and *al-Siyâsa* for the Constitutional Liberals.

Fearing that journalistic license would threaten public order and its own control, the Egyptian government tried to limit what journalists could print. In its 1881 Press Law, the regime was permitted to suppress an Egyptian newspaper or periodical "in the interests of order, morality, and religion" on the interior minister's orders after two previous reprimands or on a decision by the cabinet without any prior warning, in which case the offending paper could also be fined £E5 to £E20. The law was rigorously enforced at first, but newspapers discovered that foreign owners or editors could claim immunity from the law under the Capitulations, and so the government stopped trying to enforce it in 1894. Its revival in 1909, directed against the excesses of the nationalist press, aroused protests by Egyptians and foreigners, who again used the Capitulations to impede its enforcement. The cabinet stiffened press laws as part of its efforts to clamp down on opposition after Prime Minister Butros Ghâlî was murdered in 1910. Severe limitations on press freedom were imposed during World War I and lifted slightly after the 1919 revolution. The Press Law was reactivated by 'Abd al-Khâliq Tharwat in 1922, by Sa'd Zaghâlûl in 1924, and by Muhammad Mahmûd in 1929, often to curb press criticism from rival parties.

The 1952 revolution, which brought Jamâl 'Abd al-Nâsir to power, led to ownership of the press by the government or by mobilizational parties controlled by the state, such as the National Union from 1958 to 1962 and the Arab Socialist Union from 1962 to 1978. The number of daily newspapers declined, but their circulation was greatly expanded, in part by keeping down the price of an issue. Their content became propagandistic and subject to state censorship, but the major dailies, especially *al-Ahrâm*, published works by leading short-story writers, poets, and scholars. Literary and academic journals also flourished during the Nâsir era, but fell into desuetude under Sâdât. Religious periodicals have grown in popularity, but the literary and political content of Egypt's periodical press has declined. Foreign-language publications decreased with the flight of foreigners from Egypt under Nâsir but revived during the presidency of Husnî Mubâarak. Political and religious censorship still hobbles journalistic creativity in today's Egypt.

Radio transmission was introduced into Egypt by the British armed forces during World War I. By the late 1920s, some private citizens in Alexandria and Cairo owned radio receivers and even transmitters, but the government closed all private stations in 1931 and

in 1932 chartered its own system. In 1934 the Cairo studios of the Egyptian Broadcasting Service, built by the Marconi Company with BBC help, were formally opened. Because foreigners owned a large percentage of the radio receivers in Egypt, the initial formula of 70 per cent Arabic and 30 per cent foreign-language programs did not work well, and special stations were set aside for European broadcasts. The early Arabic broadcasting stressed Qurân reading and Arab music, European shows were mainly BBC relays, and all programs were kept free from politics and advertising. By 1937 Egyptian broadcasts could be heard in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. The Egyptian government took over the ownership and management of the service in 1947. By 1950 Egyptian State Broadcasting was transmitting programs in Arabic, English, Greek, and Italian, and there were 260,000 radios in the country. This number would increase by 1975 to 4.9 million radio sets and to an estimated 16.4 million in 1990. In 1982 Egypt's home service was broadcasting in Arabic, English, French, Armenian, German, Greek, Italian, and Hebrew. Its foreign service included broadcasts in twenty-eight languages (many of them African); this figure reached thirty-two in 1991. Egyptian state radio was notorious during Nâsir's presidency for its tendentious broadcasts, inspiring Arabs in other countries to oppose their own governments. Since 1970, however, government stations broadcast mainly Arabic music, some situation comedies, informational programs, and hourly news. There are regional programs designed for specific areas of the country. A new commercial radio service, provided by the Société Égyptienne de Publicité, opened during the 1990s.

In 1960 Egypt became the third Arab country to begin television broadcasting. Nâsir used television as well as radio to reach the people, many of whom were illiterate. The culture ministry installed public television receivers in cities and villages, although Egyptians flocked to buy private sets as soon as they became available. It is estimated that 550,000 television receivers were in use in 1970, 1.1 million in 1978, and 5 million in 1990. In 1991, the Egyptian television organization had two main and three regional channels, presenting forty-two hours combined of daily programming. News, music, educational programs, and situation comedies (American as well as Egyptian) predominate, but religious programs are growing more popular. State-owned television faces competition from videocassettes and from rooftop dishes capable of receiving signals from satellites transmitting other countries' programs. A privately owned television channel, Nile TV, began broadcasting in the 1990s.

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See also: **Press: Northern Africa.**

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Egypt: Nasser: Foreign Policy: Suez Canal Crisis to Six Day War, 1952–1970

Gamal Abdel Nasser's tenure of power in Egypt, from the military coup d'état that he initiated in July 1952 until his death in 1970, was punctuated by both remarkable foreign policy triumphs and shattering failures. Many of them reverberated well beyond the Middle East, even involving Egypt in momentous Cold War confrontations. That the Nasser government would involve itself in foreign affairs was entirely predictable. Nationalist struggles to force the British army of occupation to evacuate Egypt and Egypt's military defeat in the war against Israel in 1948 had undermined the legitimacy of Egypt's parliamentary leadership and inspired the young military officers to seize power in 1952. Once in office, Nasser and his fellow officers made it obvious that their primary goal was the achievement of full-scale political independence. This desire exceeded even their well-publicized proposals to promote economic development and rid the country of its grinding poverty and lack of education. Achieving political independence meant, first and foremost, removing the large British army, numbering nearly 100,000 men, that was housed in a massive military base along the Suez Canal.

The British, often with the backing of the United States, were not eager to withdraw. From the outset of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, they had turned the country into the strategic and military lynchpin of their empire. Withdrawal, in a very real sense, meant loss of imperial greatness. In addition, the British were anxious to press Egypt into a British-dominated Middle Eastern military alliance, designed to thwart the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union in an area of crucial importance to Europe and the rest of the Western world because of its large oil resources. Yet, on October 19, 1954, under constant threats of guerrilla attacks on their forces, the British agreed to evacuate their forces, thus securing for the Nasser regime its most cherished goal: political independence.

Within a matter of a mere four months from the date at which all British soldiers were to be withdrawn from Egypt, British troops, in league with French and Israeli

forces, were on their way back into the country. The ostensible reason for the invasion of the country at the end of October and the beginning of November 1956 was Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. Nasser's actions followed the British-American–World Bank announcement that the West would no longer be willing to finance one of Nasser's favorite projects: the construction of a huge hydroelectric and irrigation dam south of the already existing Aswan dam. In reality, other factors produced the invasion. A number of British officials in the Tory Party, including Prime Minister Anthony Eden, wanted to reassert imperial ambitions. They had come to regard Nasser as a threat to British interests throughout the Middle East. The French were enraged at Egypt's support of the Algerian war of independence while the Israelis feared Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world and his agreement in 1955 to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc, which they feared that Egypt would use against them.

The tripartite invasion proved to be a military and political disaster for its initiators and a stunning success for Nasser. Condemned by the world community, including the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union, the British and French governments had no choice but to call a halt to their military operations along the Suez Canal zone before they had been brought to a conclusion. The Israeli forces had swept through the Sinai virtually unchecked and reached the east bank of the Suez Canal, but like the British and French, they, too, had to abandon their military plans and to withdraw their forces from Egyptian soil. Without engaging in any sustained military action, Nasser and the Egyptians had achieved an incredible political triumph. They had repulsed once great European imperialist powers and foiled the Israeli plans to undermine the regime's legitimacy. Nasser basked in the region's praise as his reputation for astute political leadership and his championship of pan-Arabism gained numerous new followers.

Nasser's promotion of Pan-Arab goals was put to the test sooner than he anticipated and would have liked. In February 1958, as communist elements were becoming a more powerful force in the Syrian state, leading Pan-Arab politicians and military officers to approach the Egyptian leadership with a proposal for the unification of their two countries. While believing that the time was not yet ripe for a union of Egypt and Syria, in part because Egypt was preoccupied with its own internal development, Nasser agreed to the creation of the United Arab Republic because he feared that without such a union Syria could fall into a state of anarchy or drift into the Soviet camp.

Nasser's fears that a political unification of Arab countries was premature proved entirely correct. The

main reason for the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in September 1961, however, was the overbearing attitude of the Egyptian leaders to their Syrian counterparts. In what was meant to be a union of equals, Egypt dominated the Syrian leadership. Hence, when, in July 1961, the Egyptian government introduced a series of radical socialist laws into Syria, conservative, pro-capitalist elements in that country could tolerate Egyptian authority no longer. Supported by aggrieved civil servants and a discontented Syrian military leadership, they ousted the Egyptian civil and military leaders and reclaimed their country's autonomy. The break-up of the UAR did not, however, cause Nasser to abandon his Pan-Arab aspirations. In 1962, the Egyptian army intervened in a Yemeni civil war, sending upwards of 50,000 troops to support the new republican regime there against the monarchy that it had overthrown. The war dragged on for five years and the Egyptian forces suffered great loss of life.

Nasser's reputation, tarnished in Syria and Yemen, suffered a nearly fatal blow in the Six Day War in 1967. In 1956, when the Israeli forces withdrew from Sinai, the United Nations agreed to place military observers along the Israeli-Egyptian border as a way to defuse the tensions between the two countries. The presence of observers brought the desired reduction of tensions until 1967, when, under pressure from other Arab countries and provided misinformation by their Soviet allies about Israeli intentions to attack Syria, the Egyptians demanded the withdrawal of the UN observers, threatening to close off the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. The United Nations complied, and immediately the Middle East was thrust into a crisis. Unwilling to wait for diplomatic interventions or to expose their peoples to attacks from Arab military forces, the Israelis launched a preemptive military strike against Egypt on June 5, 1967, destroying virtually the whole of the Egyptian air force on the ground. In the few days of ground warfare that followed, Israeli armored and infantry divisions overran Sinai all the way to the east bank of the Suez Canal. The Israeli Defense Forces also seized the Golan Heights, and, when toward the end of the war Jordanian troops entered in support of their fellow Arab countries, the Israelis took East Jerusalem and the entire west bank of the Jordan River, previously in the hands of the government of Jordan.

It is hardly any wonder that the Six Day War has gone down in Arab history as the *nakba*, or the "catastrophe." The Arab armies were soundly defeated, and the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan lost vital territories to the Israelis. The Egyptian military performance was so abysmal that President Nasser publicly offered his resignation. Even though the people of the country turned out in huge numbers to demand that

he withdraw the resignation and remain their leader, his reputation as a shrewd man of affairs, able to manipulate the major powers and enhance Egypt's place in the world, was never repaired. It was only his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, who won back Sinai from the Israelis.

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Egypt: Nasser: High Dam, Economic Development, 1952–1970

The Egyptian military leaders who seized power in 1952 were committed to promoting the economic development of the country. In their view (confirmed by numerous statistical indicators), the country had lagged badly behind economically. Countless Egyptians were living in a state of acute distress, and one of the reasons that the Free Officers—whose acknowledged leader was the young Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser—had ousted the parliamentary regime and sent the much maligned King Faruq into exile was to provide new economic initiatives. The entire Egyptian elite, including those who were removed from power and those who now occupied the seats of authority, recognized that Egyptians would have to diversify their economy and make industry as vital a part of the country's production as agriculture.

The Egyptian economy has always depended upon the Nile waters, without which the country would be little more than the easternmost extension of the Sahara desert. Hence, not surprisingly, plans for the economic diversification and industrialization of the country were linked to a more efficient use of the Nile River. Prior to the nineteenth century, Egypt relied on the annual Nile flood for its agriculture, but beginning with the modernizing ruler Muhammad Ali (1805–1848), hydraulic engineers had begun to build dams across the Nile capable of carrying irrigation waters from run-off canals, so that cultivators would be able to harvest two and three crops per year where they had once grown only one. This system, called perennial

irrigation, led to a large increase in cultivable lands during the nineteenth century and made it possible for Egypt to become the world's leading exporter of high-staple cotton. But it was clear by the end of World War II that Egypt needed to make even more efficient use of the Nile waters and to use any dam or dams that it constructed to generate cheap and large electrical supplies for industrialization. The country already had a large dam at Aswan, dating from the turn of the century, which had been heightened in the 1930s and equipped with electrical generating capacity. But with a rapidly expanding population, more irrigation water and more abundant electricity were desperately needed as the country entered the post–World War II period.

Of the many different plans laid before the government, the one that had the greatest appeal to the Egyptian rulers (civilian and military alike) was that put forward by a Greek engineer, Adrian Daninos, who proposed the construction of a massive dam just south of the one standing at Aswan that would be capable of holding back enough of the Nile waters to introduce perennial irrigation throughout the entire country, and even to reclaim land from the desert. The dam would also be equipped with a series of electricity-generating turbines, yielding abundant and cheap supplies of electricity to light the whole country and spur its industrial development. For many intensely nationalist Egyptians, the most attractive feature of the Aswan dam scheme was that it would be constructed inside Egypt. Hence, its water would be stored in Egypt, under Egyptian control, rendering Egypt independent of other Nile riverine powers for its economic well-being.

Egypt lacked the financial resources, estimated at more than \$500 million and destined to grow, as well as the technical capabilities to construct the dam on its own. The leaders looked to the outside for help, and at first received a warm welcome from the United States and Great Britain. In July 1956, just as the Egyptians were preparing to sign an agreement with the United States, Britain, and the World Bank for the financing of the dam and for its construction by Western electrical and hydraulic firms, the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announced that the United States, Britain, and the World Bank had changed their minds and were no longer willing to finance the building of the dam. The official reason that he offered for the change of mind was that, given Egypt's record of financial profligacy, the country would not be able to handle such a big project with its attendant high level of indebtedness. In reality, Dulles had decided to punish the Egyptians for having purchased arms from Czechoslovakia in 1955, and to demonstrate to other countries that the United States would not tolerate overtures to its Cold War opponents. Nasser's riposte occurred on July 26, 1956, when he announced his

decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and to use the receipts from the canal traffic to finance the building of the dam. Shortly thereafter, he signed agreements with the Soviet Union for the necessary financing and technical assistance for the dam.

The Soviet Union did oversee the construction of the Aswan dam, which was not finished until January 15, 1971, shortly after Nasser's death, at a total cost of close to \$1 billion. As Nasser and the other Egyptian leaders had hoped, the dam spurred the industrialization and economic progress of the country, but in decidedly Soviet-influenced directions. The program of industrialization carried out during the Nasser years drew heavily on Soviet models rather than Western ones and involved state interventions in the country's economic activities. Following the British-French-Israeli invasion of 1956, the government nationalized those business companies that had been owned by British, French, and Egyptian Jewish citizens. In 1961 it took over Belgian-run firms, and then steadily throughout the 1960s, the state increased its control over all branches of the industrial sector. By the time of Nasser's death, virtually all of the country's large-scale business firms in industry, finance, and commerce were state-owned. The Nasser government also carried out substantial land reform schemes in the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in the redistribution of large landed estates to small holders and setting the ceiling of any individual holding at fifty feddans (roughly 50 acres). By grouping nearly all Egyptian cultivators into state-dominated agricultural cooperatives, whose members were required to grow those commodities determined by the state and to sell their produce to state-owned purchasing and distributing firms, the state also became Egypt's primary economic agent in the agricultural sector. At the time of Nasser's death in 1970 the private sector had become so weakened that it operated only in small-scale business operations.

Nasser's economic programs did achieve many impressive goals. Income was substantially redistributed. From a country that had been characterized by gross disparities in wealth between a tiny landed and business elite and a large, impoverished peasantry and unemployed or partially employed urban population, the country now provided educational and occupation opportunities for an expanding middle class. Yet its state-run industries were highly inefficient. They failed to break into the international markets as the advocates of industrialization had hoped. The new Aswan dam had permitted the expansion of arable land, but a large segment of the Egyptian peasantry still lived at or even below the poverty line. In short, the Nasser years had enabled Egypt to keep pace economically with a population expanding at the high rate of close to 3 per cent per annum and even to provide better social services

for more of its people, but they had not launched the country into the kind of sustained economic development that Nasser and the other young military officers who had seized power in 1952 had envisioned.

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See also: Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy; Suez Canal.

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Egypt: Sadat, Nationalism, 1970–1981

In the aftermath of the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt in 1952 by the Free Officers, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt reemerged as an important actor on the world stage. As one of the major figures in the post–World War II nonaligned movement, Nasser emerged as a spokesperson of the aspirations of millions in the Arab world and Africa by championing Pan-Arab and Pan-African anti-imperialist sentiments. Even when faced with problems of his country’s exploding population and limited natural resources, Nasser refused to let his government become dependent on a single superpower. Instead, he implemented a policy of developmental socialism geared toward total self-sufficiency (*iktifaa dhaati*).

However, by the time of his death in 1970, many Egyptians had begun to question some aspects of Nasser’s policies due to the country’s mounting debts spurred by enormous military spending and increasing economic problems. Anwar al-Sadat, who had been one of the original Free Officers and had served as Nasser’s vice-president from 1964 to 1967 and again from 1969 to 1970, assumed the reins of power in accordance with constitutional procedure.

Immediately upon taking office, a new phase in Egyptian politics was ushered in by Sadat. He introduced a “revolution of rectification,” which involved new political, economic, and foreign policy initiatives Sadat believed were needed to correct the errors of his predecessor. A master of timing, Sadat took bold steps at unexpected times to advance Egypt’s regional and international image.

Egypt had been renamed the United Arab Republic in 1958 when Egypt and Syria, inspired by radical Arab nationalism, formed their ill-fated union. Sadat, anxious to jettison the ideological and political baggage of radical Arab nationalism, created the compromise name, the Arab Republic of Egypt, in 1971.

The first major act by Sadat was the expulsion of 15,000 Soviet advisers in 1972, even though they were training his army and supplying all his military equipment. His objective was to reduce Egypt’s dependency on a single foreign power. As he calculated, the United States was eager to come to his aid.

In October 1973 Sadat ordered his forces to cross the Suez Canal in a surprise attack that broke through Israeli defense lines in occupied Sinai. With Syrian forces invading Israel from the east, through the Golan Heights, the coordinated attacks drove the Israelis back with heavy casualties on both fronts. Even though the Israelis eventually regrouped and won back most of the lost ground, Sadat had shattered Israel’s image of invincibility.

The October 1973 war did offset the legacies of the 1967 war. The October confrontation was seen by Egyptians as a conflict that was forced upon them in order to remind the international community that the Middle East problem needed urgent attention. It was not a war that Egypt fought for conquest. Instead, it was a war designed to change political perceptions. In the process, the Egyptians restored their national honor by regaining some of their territory and by avoiding defeat.

The sense that the 1973 war restored Egypt’s honor had a powerful impact on Sadat’s capacity to enter into negotiations with Israel. By declaring victory, Sadat was able to convince his fellow Egyptians that the next phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be fought on the diplomatic front. Relying on the United States to promote an honorable peace settlement with Israel, Sadat, over the next six years, became the leading champion of peace in Egypt and in the Arab world.

In November 1973, Sadat addressed a hushed meeting of the People’s Assembly and declared his intention to visit Israel and launch his peace initiative. His successes in foreign policy, leading to the 1979 Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, boosted Sadat’s prestige in the international community. Sadat’s status as peacemaker was confirmed that same year when he and Menachem Begin of Israel were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

In 1974 Sadat launched a new program for postwar economic recovery he called *infitaah* (“opening”). It was an open-door policy designed to end Nasser’s state-run socialist system. Foreign investors were encouraged with tax exemptions to invest in Egypt; foreign experts were enticed to bring their technological knowledge to

help develop industries; and modest measures were implemented to relax official constraints imposed on management of the public sector and the small private sector, particularly in construction, finance, and tourism. For Sadat, *infitaah*, properly implemented, would be the economic miracle Egypt needed.

However, *infitaah* did not bring back the free market. Instead, it slowly prepared Egypt for such an eventuality. Rather than withdraw, the government continued to weigh heavily on the economy and the productive process in general. The private sector was kept out of large areas of industrial activities. In addition, government expanded rather than decline; government expenditure went up sharply, and public employment increased precipitously.

By the end of the 1970s, only a few foreign banks had opened overseas branches in Egypt. Consequently, foreign investors responded slowly and in a limited way. Afloat with cash from external sources, the consumer goods market boomed and conspicuous consumption sullied *infitaah*. Another major development was that the Egyptian economy rapidly moved toward a rentier system: that is, an increase in revenue from foreign aid, remittances from expatriates, Suez Canal fees, tourism, and oil royalties.

In 1976 Sadat launched what seemed to be an initiative for a multiparty system when he declared that three ideological “platforms” would be organized within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). With Sadat’s personal support, the centrist group, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization (EASO), won a vast majority of the seats in that year’s parliamentary election. Nevertheless, Sadat refused to allow the formation of independent parties. As a consequence, the three organizations never took root as genuine vehicles of political participation. Violent clashes over increased prices of basic commodities in January 1977 forced Sadat to allow parties to be formed. As the opposition by these parties became too strong for Sadat, he clamped down on such groups as the New Wafd Party and the leftist National Progressive Unionist Party.

In July 1978 Sadat inaugurated the national Democratic Party (NDP) and later allowed a leftist party to organize as an official opposition. In April 1980, both the EASO and the ASU were abolished. The functions of the old ASU were now being carried out by the newly created Advisory Council. In the September 1980 elections, Sadat’s new NDP won all 140 seats, with the 70 remaining posts being appointed directly by Sadat. Like his predecessor, Nasser, Sadat wanted to create a political organization but was unable to tolerate the loss of political power that would ensue if these parties were to become vehicles for mass participation.

Sadat’s increasingly authoritarian rule, as well as his abandonment of socialism and foreign policy

initiatives, made him a marked man for many opponents. And in 1981, he was assassinated at the age of sixty-three. Earlier that year, Sadat had had about 1,600 people arrested in what was dubbed a massive crackdown on religious unrest. However, in addition to religious leaders, many journalists, lawyers, intellectuals, provincial governors, and leaders of the country’s small but growing political parties were also arrested. Since many of those arrested were not even connected with any fundamentalist Islamic movement, most Egyptians believed that Sadat had overreacted. At that point, he had lost the support of his people. In contrast to Nasser’s funeral, Sadat’s saw only few tears. Most of the people who attended Sadat’s funeral were foreign dignitaries, as most of his fellow citizens opted to stay home.

ABDUL KARIM BANGURA

Biography

Anwar al-Sadat was born into a family of thirteen children in 1918 at Mit Abul Kom, a village in the River Nile delta forty miles to the north of Cairo. Graduated from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1938. Joined Gamal Abdel Nasser and other young military officers in the Free Officers, a secret organization that worked to overthrow the Egyptian monarch and rid the country of British influence. Imprisoned during the 1940s for his revolutionary activities. After the successful coup, held a series of important government positions, including serving as vice-president of Egypt from 1964 to 1967 and again from 1969 to 1970. On October 6, 1973, Sadat and government leaders were reviewing an armed forces parade in Cairo to mark the eighth anniversary of the Crossing (i.e., the October 1973 war) when a group of young military men belonging to *al takfir wal hijra* (“Repentance and Flight from Sin,” a secret group that advocates the establishment of a pure Islamic society in Egypt—by violence, if necessary) assassinated him.

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Egypt: Mubarak, Since 1981: Agriculture, Industry

Hosni Mubarak inherited the “Open-Door Economic Policy” from his predecessor, President Anwar al-Sadat. The economic opening was a measure intended to encourage the private sector of the economy, particularly foreign, Arab, and Western investment and export-led growth. When the Arab states withdrew financial aid after the peace with Israel in 1979, the United States became the main source of aid, amounting to \$20 billion between 1979 and 1987. U.S. aid was negotiated through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which applied pressure on Egypt to induce economic liberalization; for instance, the system of state subsidies on domestic food prices was first targeted in 1977. The logic was to bring market forces to bear upon the prices of agricultural commodities, which would in theory stimulate the development of profitable agricultural development in Egypt. It also meant increasing the cost of food for the average Egyptian household. In 1977 this resulted in a popular revolt, the first of a series of warnings that Egyptian society would not accept a complete dismantling of the socialist inheritance. After the revolt, price controls were reintroduced. From 1981 Mubarak avoided disruptive economic reforms, but with an economic downturn in 1986 the IMF and the United States Agency for International Development made further aid conditional on liberal, economic reform. Begun in 1990, the “Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program” only became effective after the IMF halved the Egyptian debt to \$20 billion in 1993.

Egyptian indebtedness was the result of state-led, public sector development, the armaments build-up from the Nasser through the Mubarak eras, and the inability of agricultural production to keep pace with the rise of population. In the 1980s and 1990s agricultural production increased at a rate of 2 per cent while population increased at a rate of 2.7 per cent annually. While the Aswan Dam increased the size of arable land from six to eight million feddans (a feddan is about an acre), Egyptians inhabited only 4 per cent of their overall territory. With a population of nearly 70 million at the end of the twentieth century, Egypt had one of the highest birth rates in the world, increasing at a rate of one million every ten months. It was necessary for Egypt to import 80 per cent of its food in the 1990s.

In 1994 structural adjustments to improve productivity in the rural sector began to reverse Nasser’s land reforms, perhaps the most significant legacy of the socialist era. But the rural peasantry, which constituted three-quarters of the population in 1952, was a much smaller percentage of the population at the end of the century. Population increase, however, meant that overall greater numbers lived off the scarce land resource, approximately half the total population at the end of the century.

An important legacy of the Nasser era was a developmental strategy that favored the urban sector and heavy industry over the rural sector of the economy. This developmental bias had a negative impact upon Egypt’s agricultural sector; as a result, there was a relative decline of the once lucrative cotton industry. By 1980 cotton accounted for only 14 per cent of Egypt’s total export earnings, falling from 66 per cent in 1960. Oil replaced cotton as the major export from the 1960s, accounting for 58 per cent of Egypt’s export earnings in 1980. The development of the oil refining industry had been a cornerstone of Nasser’s development policies and provided Sadat and Mubarak with an important source of foreign currency. But the oil industry did not favor the development of an integrated domestic economy; hence the term rent was applied to income from oil, as it was to the revenues of the Suez Canal. By the 1980s these two types of rent provided Egypt with \$4 billion annually, before the price of oil collapsed in 1986. The other important sources of foreign currency were tourism, remittance payments of migrant workers in the oil-rich Arab states, and foreign loans. Privatization was applied first of all to the tourist industry, which brought revenues of \$1 to \$2 billion before the tourist industry collapsed in 1997. Oil, tourism, and migrant labor indicated Egypt’s growing dependence upon foreign markets in this period.

Egyptian dependency was compounded by the concentration of domestic, private sector development in industries of short-term returns, such as tourism and real estate development, as opposed to long-term industrial or agricultural development. Likewise, domestic savings were unproductive because private sector developers and investors preferred to invest profits safely overseas. The remittances of Egypt’s migrant workers represent a different but no less unproductive economic trend, because their savings were invested in the Islamic investment companies, which eschewed “usurious” banking and financial institutions. Similarly, state revenue went into subsidies for agricultural commodities rather than more productive development. Therefore, the economy continued to be characterized by state-led redistribution of subsidized food, which strangled producers and importers on the “open,” private sector market. But the Egyptian food processing

industry flourished, profiting from the protected market created by the subsidy system. The armaments industries also profited from the expertise and assistance of the United States, Egypt's major strategic ally, as well as the market for arms created by the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

One of the most heavily populated regions in the world, Egypt had a demography complicated by rural-to-urban migration, a signal feature of twentieth-century Egypt. Urbanization served as a release for impoverished, rural Egyptians. Moreover, educational policies favored urbanization, because industrial development was stressed at the expense of the traditional, rural sector. Cairo's expansion was phenomenal: a population increase of fifteenfold in the course of the twentieth century against a twofold increase in the rural sector. At the end of the twentieth century, half of Egypt's population was urban, and Cairo accounted for 70 per cent of that urban population. Rapid urbanization did not bring social improvement. Forty per cent of Cairo's population lived below the poverty line at the end of the 1980s. The Egyptian authorities invested in food subsidies and urban infrastructure to alleviate the problems of massive urbanization. Yet, even while consuming 45 per cent of Egypt's food supply, Cairo's food requirements in the mid-1990s could hardly be met. Likewise, Cairo's consumption of water exceeded the drainage capacity of the system. The incapacity of Egypt's infrastructure indicated that overpopulation and urbanization were the most pressing problems facing the Mubarak government at the end of the century.

Mubarak adopted structural adjustment policies in the 1990s to bring about economic liberalization, a policy favored by the international lending agencies. The reforms of the 1990s brought a new sales tax, the elimination of tariffs, a decrease in the size of the public sector economy, and the elimination of subsidies on some agricultural commodities. Structural adjustment certainly did not benefit the millions living in the urban slums. In general, the reforms decreased the real income of an average Egyptian household. Particularly among the middle classes tied to public-sector wage scales, there was a real decline in living standards. At the same time, a new generation of university graduates faced almost certain unemployment as structural adjustment decreased the size of the public sector. On the other hand, the new bourgeoisie that arose with the economic opening was a privileged minority, earning on average ten times the salary of an employee in the public sector. As a result, although debt reduction after the Gulf War provided Mubarak with some relief from these economic and social tensions, economic and demographic trends indicated that Egypt's ability to meet society's basic needs was greatly reduced.

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See also: **Egypt: Sadat, Nationalism, 1970–1981; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

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Egypt: Mubarak, Since 1981: Politics

Hosni Mubarak acceded to power after the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. Sadat's legacy to his successor was multifold. He created a "boss-state" in which the president had extensive executive powers and the remnants of a populist base in the Arab Socialist Union, the ruling party. But Sadat also initiated a policy of "democratization," reflected in the new name given to the ruling party in 1979, the National Democratic Party (NDP). Democratization resulted in the formation of an active opposition, including the New Wafd, Liberal, Socialist-Labor, and Communist parties, as well as the unofficial Islamic, political opposition. The opposition parties and Islamic groups rallied together against Sadat's foreign policy initiative, the negotiated peace with Israel in 1979, based on the Camp David Agreement of 1978. After Sadat's assassination by a radical Islamic group in 1981, Mubarak encouraged the political participation of the opposition parties while attempting to establish links with moderate Islamic organizations. The peace with Israel was a cold one, as Mubarak sought to appease domestic and foreign opponents and end Egypt's isolation in the Arab world.

The National Democratic Party (NDP) was an extension of the government and bureaucracy, which by the mid-1980s employed three million people. President Mubarak, who had been a military officer, maintained close links with the military and appointed officers to key positions in the bureaucracy, security, defense, and foreign affairs. But just as Mubarak lacked the charismatic style of Nasser or Sadat, his appointees to key positions were often faceless officials, giving his regime a lackluster reputation. Likewise,

while the NDP was a controlling factor in Mubarak's authoritarian regime, it did not have a popular base. However, democratization did provide a means to implicate the upper and middle classes in Mubarak's authoritarianism. The reactivated New Wafd Party allowed a new bourgeois class, which developed with the economic opening to foreign investment, to participate in parliamentary politics alongside the NDP. Similarly, Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brothers, the largest Islamic organization in Egypt, to gain control of university associations, mosques, and professional associations. The Muslim Brothers infiltrated the medical association in the late 1970s, and afterward the engineering and legal associations. Control over the legal association was significant because it had formerly been a bastion of liberal opinion, as well as one of the bases of the NDP. But, by allowing the Muslim Brothers to operate within the associations, Mubarak hoped to integrate moderates into the authoritarian, political structure.

The Islamic movement had a popular base through educational and charitable programs. Although these had the tacit approval of the government until the 1990s, they tended to place the Islamic issue at the center of political discourse and therefore challenged the secular foundations of the government. Since it was illegal to form an Islamic political party, in the 1984 elections the Muslim Brothers ran candidates as members of the liberal and secular New Wafd Party. By 1986 the Muslim Brothers had split with the New Wafd, but dominated the membership of the Socialist-Labor Party. When the New Wafd and liberal critics of the regime challenged the constitutionality of Mubarak's electoral and parliamentary laws, new elections were held in 1987. Yet, the Muslim Brothers emerged as the largest opposition group in parliament. The 1987 election campaign also marked the revival of the radical Islamic groups, beginning with attacks on bars, video-rental shops, and members of the Coptic community.

Mubarak's absorption of the Islamic opposition through democratization was unsuccessful because the democratic process did not stimulate a real increase in political participation. A government emergency decree forbade public assemblies, except during elections, and electoral results were manipulated to ensure the election of the NDP. As a result, the important parties boycotted the elections of 1991. In 1992 a radical Islamic group assassinated a prominent, liberal critic of the Islamic movement, Faraj Fuda. When the security forces raided the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers, they claimed to have established links between the Muslim Brothers and the radical Islamic groups. Emergency powers and military tribunals provided Mubarak with a means to dispense summary judgment, imprison, and in some cases execute suspected opponents of the regime.

The radical Islamic groups then turned their fire directly at the government by adopting the tactic of "tourist-terrorism," which attacked the economic base of the regime. The violence culminated in the massacre of 58 tourists at the Hatshepsut Temple opposite Luxor in November of 1997.

Mubarak's repression of the Islamic opposition was supported by liberal intellectuals and politicians, in spite of the apparent disregard for Egyptian judicial processes and international conventions on human rights. On the other hand, the politicians of the Socialist-Labor Party, as well as the Islamic hierarchy at al-Azhar mosque, declared their moral support for the radicals arrested and tried at the military courts. While the Islamic issue politicized and deepened divisions within Egyptian political society, the Islamic groups continued to build popular support. The Islamicists communicated in an Islamic vocabulary that appealed to the Muslim majority, but perhaps more important, to the impoverished. The network of Islamic schools, hospitals, and public services challenged the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime, because Islamicist-run services were provided in social sectors beyond the reach of the government. In 1992 Mubarak sent 14,000 soldiers into the Cairo slums to arrest radicals. This was followed by a massive development project to provide slum residents with paved roads, an effective sewage system, schools, and electricity. The United States Agency for International Development provided tens of millions of dollars to fund this type of urban reconstruction, which had obvious political objectives. While the regime attempted to win popular support, the democratic system itself became more obviously a veil for the autocratic character of the regime. All the political parties participated in the elections of 1995. The results returned record numbers of NDP candidates as Mubarak increased the number of seats in parliament to satisfy his own supporters. The elections were also the most openly corrupt. Regardless, it was generally agreed that by the time of the presidential referendum of 1999 (won by Mubarak) the Islamic opposition had been crushed. However, the fundamental constitutional issues were not resolved. Indeed, the Islamic issue was hardly muted. Meanwhile, the liberal opposition leaders demanded that a "third way" be found between the Islamic and authoritarian alternatives.

Foreign policy provided Mubarak with a more solid pillar to legitimate his rule. Sadat's peace with Israel in 1979 isolated Egypt and united the other Arab states: Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization. Nevertheless, by 1981 international relations were transformed by the Iran-Iraq War, which divided the Arab states, notably Syria and Iraq. At the same time Saudi Arabia made a proposal for a negotiated peace with Israel, along lines

similar to Camp David. Mubarak emphasized Egyptian stability, which was highly valued by the Arab Gulf states, the United States, and Western Europe. In this international context Egypt rebuilt its stature as a regional leader. For instance, the decision to support the international coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War tended to legitimize Mubarak's foreign policy. It also enhanced his role as a broker in peace negotiations between the Arab states, the Palestinians, and the Israelis. In sum, foreign and domestic crisis in Egypt was allayed, ensuring the survival of Mubarak's regime into the twenty-first century.

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Egyptology: From Herodotus to the Twentieth Century

The Greek historian Herodotus is usually considered the first Egyptologist, in that he included Egypt in his *Histories*, mostly derived from Egyptian priests and their temple records. The Egyptian priest Manetho compiled a history of Egypt, the *Aegyptiaka*, using similar records some 150 years later, on which is based our arrangement of the Egyptian kings into thirty (-one) dynasties. One of these pharaohs, Amenhotep III (Eighteenth Dynasty), already had conducted "excavations" at Abydos over a thousand years earlier, in search of his ancestors and to ascertain "correct" religious ritual. In more general terms, the ancient Egyptians recorded and revived their own history in an effort to understand themselves and their past, especially in times of uncertainty and for propaganda purposes.

The Romans perceived Egypt as an ancient land, and several histories, geographies and other studies were devoted to its analysis, among the most important

being the *Bibliotheca Historica* of Diodorus Siculus and Strabo's *Geography*. The introduction of Christianity altered perspectives, but both Eusebius of Caesarea and Sextus Julius Africanus included an Egyptian history in their respective *Chronicles*. For over the next millennium, however, ancient Egypt became little more than a source of magic, superstition, and lost knowledge that was incompatible with Christian doctrine.

Serious investigation began in the sixteenth century, chiefly focused on recording monumental structures. Ancient artifacts were collected as "exotica" and mummies were gathered for "medical" purposes. The inquisitive scholarly travels of antiquarians made up a significant branch of Egyptology at this point. By the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, numerous attempts already had been made to translate the ancient hieroglyphic (Greek for "sacred carving") inscriptions. In 1822 Jean-François Champollion finally broke the code using the parallel Greek text of the trilingual inscription on the "Rosetta Stone," which enabled Egyptian history to be studied from direct contemporary sources for the first time, rather than relying on the Classical authors who wrote a millennium and more later.

Now in the British Museum, the Rosetta Stone was the preeminent discovery of Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign (1798–1801) when he included numerous *savants* to document the country itself. The resulting *Description de l'Égypte* (1809–1826) fired European imagination and began a flood of activity that was the true beginning of Egyptology as a discipline in its own right. Active acquisition and excavation were conducted on behalf of wealthy private individuals and newly founded public museums, which employed "professionals" (some of whom even became so) such as Giovanni Belzoni (1788–1823) to enhance their collections. By 1850 numerous treasure-hunting "excavations" had produced the Egyptological nucleus of most museums, and then professional museum Egyptologists to administer them. Work focused on accurate observation, recording and copying of both monuments and minutiae, and the resulting publications such as the *Denkmaeler aus Aegypten und Aethiopen* (Monuments of Egypt and Ethiopia, 1849–1859, Karl Richard Lepsius) and *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians* (1837, Sir Gardner Wilkinson) remain fundamentally important even today. Our detailed typologies and analyses of the monuments, art and artifacts, founded in these early studies and based on art historical and other principles, still continue to illuminate ancient Egyptian attitudes and religion, as well as its chronology.

The Egyptian Antiquities Service was founded in 1858 by the Khedive Saïd, who appointed Auguste Mariette (1821–1881) as its first director. Egyptian antiquities legislation was initiated, and the Museum in

Cairo was founded to house recovered material. Various academic organizations were founded abroad to support research, fieldwork, and publication, such as the Egypt Exploration Fund (later Society) in 1882 in England. Recognition of the importance of accurate “scientific” excavation and its dissemination followed more slowly, to be realized in the person of W. M. Flinders Petrie (1853–1942), beginning in 1880. The “Father of Egyptology” developed his methodology while excavating throughout Egypt, and almost immediately publishing his results, for the next half-century.

Work on Egyptian language and chronology, especially in Germany, developed an historical framework through translation and detailed study of the records, while Egyptian prehistory was revealed by excavation. Egyptology as an organized discipline, working under official auspices and encompassing all its historical phases, was firmly in place by the beginning of the twentieth century. The massive *Wörterbuch der Ägyptische Sprache* (Dictionary of the Egyptian Language, 1926–1953, Adolf Erman and Hermann Grapow) and *Egyptian Grammar* (1927; 1950; 1957, Sir Alan Gardiner) remain unsurpassed as fundamental research tools, based on decades of collaborative analysis. More recent research in collating private documents of the time has done much to clarify problematic periods of Egyptian history for which few official records survive, to the extent that Manetho’s history is now considered redundant, although his dynastic framework continues in standard use.

The Aswan Dam constructions and enlargements (1898–1902; 1907–1912; 1929–1932; 1960–1961) initiated a series of surveys in Lower Nubia and spurred further less concentrated work elsewhere, partly due to the potential wealth of information revealed by such broad-based investigation. The twentieth century saw research emphasis gradually turn from the excavation of major individual monuments to settlements and then problem-oriented regional surveys, investigating Egypt’s “ordinary” majority as well as its minority elite. Concurrently, investigation expanded beyond the Nile Valley itself to encompass the surrounding desert and its oases, initiated largely by Ahmed Fakhry (1905–1973). Even more recently, research also has extended beyond Egypt’s borders to view Egyptian civilization within its wider Mediterranean and African setting, investigating cross-influences and relationships with neighboring cultures and civilizations, in all directions, and challenging previously held “Egypto-centric” perspectives.

While Howard Carter’s (1874–1939) excavation of the tomb of Tutankhamun (1922–1932) deservedly caught public imagination, those done by generations of other excavators at Amarna (since 1891), Abydos (since 1895), Hierakonpolis (since 1899) and now Tell

el-Dab’a (since 1966), among other sites, have been far more revealing. “Museum excavation” (reanalysis of older site records and stored material), as well as renewed excavation at “old” sites, interdisciplinary research, and increased specialization have begun to illuminate many aspects unconsidered by the original excavators, and to broaden the results of new investigations elsewhere. Use of technological advances in other fields (e.g., satellite photography, forensics, computer simulation) and constantly improving archaeological techniques have revised many traditionally held interpretations and allowed excavation in previously untenable regions, such as the Delta where much current work is being conducted, and from which perspective historical events can now be reconsidered for new insights. While specialists become more specialized, Egyptology increasingly views itself as a collaborative interdisciplinary effort and in a global perspective.

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Empire: See Colonialism: Ideology of Empire: Supremacist, Paternalist.

Engaruka: See Sirikwa and Engaruka: Dairy Farming, Irrigation.

Environment, Conservation, Development: Postcolonial Africa

A cursory glance at African environments reveals environmental problems/disasters, weak remedial measures, and ubiquitous ecological threats and challenges. Critical to policymakers has been the issue of how to get Africa out of the vicious cycle of poverty and



Two students feeding the biogas digester. In the digester, grass, water, and excrement are transformed into biogas and manure. The biogas is stored in tanks and used for cooking and lighting. Benin. © Enrico Bartolucci/Das Fotoarchiv.

environmental degradation, thus making sustainable development a viable option.

That Africa has been in a state of ecological crisis is not debatable. In Morocco, unsound environmental policies and practices have led to environmental degradation. Farming, overgrazing, and vegetation destruction in marginal lands brought in their wake soil erosion, devegetation, and desertification. Raw sewage contaminated water supplies. Other environmental hazards still confronting Morocco include the pollution of coastal waters and the siltation of reservoirs. Egypt has also encountered environmental problems of high magnitude. The country experienced desertification, increased soil salinization below the Aswan High Dam, marine degradation, and oil pollution. Urbanization and windblown sand led to loss of agricultural land, while intensive irrigation and water-logging engendered soil erosion. Agricultural pesticides, raw sewage, and industrial effluents have caused water pollution. In addition, poor water sanitation has contributed to an increase in water-borne diseases, and population growth has depleted natural resources. Nigeria has also experienced environmental problems such as desertification, deforestation, and soil degradation; poor waste management techniques, oil pollution, and threats to biodiversity have been contributors. The developments in Kenya have been deplorable. There, the problems have been those of desertification, soil erosion, water pollution, and threats to wildlife

populations as a result of poaching. In South Africa, serious environmental problems have been droughts, desertification, soil erosion, acid rain, river pollution, and air pollution.

Africans in both governmental and nongovernmental circles have been part of the global environmental protection movement. On April 22, 1972, they joined their counterparts in marking the first earth day. Promotion of ecology, respect for life on earth, and the dangers of pollution were stressed. In 1972 the United Nations met in Stockholm, Sweden, for a conference on the environment. The outcome of the conference was the establishment of the United Nations environment program (UNEP), which included the Earthwatch, a program designed to monitor the physical and biological resources of the earth. In 1987 negotiators meeting in Montreal, Canada, presented a protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer there. Industrialized nations were asked to reduce “greenhouse” gas emissions like CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons 11 and 12) and halon, while African states and other developing countries were granted deferrals in such reductions. Developing nations were also promised reimbursement for “all agreed incremental costs” if they complied with the protocol.

Africans also took their seats at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The contents of agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development reflect adequately the aspirations of Africans. Of particular note are principles 7 and 8, which emphasized their earlier call for a new international economic order (NIEO) and their desire for positive developments from the north-south dialogue, such as technological transfer and redistribution of world wealth. The Earth Summit produced pacts on global warming and biodiversity. In 1994 the fifty-three-nation United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development met. It reported that countries were failing to provide the money and expertise necessary for the facilitation of the Rio plans. In December 1997, delegates from 166 countries met in Kyoto, Japan, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference to negotiate actions against global warming. African states participating at the conference insisted that industrialized nations had caused, and were still causing, most global warming, and demanded that the industrialized world bear the brunt of economic sacrifices necessary for the cleanup of the environment. In Bonn, Germany, in 2001, officials from about 180 countries gathered to address the vexing problem of global warming. Carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse” gas emissions were once more identified as culprits for receding glaciers and the rising sea level.

It is pertinent to note that African states have been parties to many international agreements on the

environment. They signed agreements that they felt would best serve their specific national environmental needs. These include agreements on climate change, biodiversity, endangered species, hazardous wastes, marine dumping, nuclear test bans, ozone layer protection, tropical timber, desertification, whaling, and marine life conservation.

Internally, African states took certain measures to combat environmental degradation. Agencies and ministries were established to monitor the environment and to execute ecological and conservation programs. In Nigeria, for instance, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) responded to fifteen alerts on toxic chemical in 1994. In the same year, 31,689 metric tons of consignment were inspected to ensure their compliance with FEPA hazardous waste management regulations. A total of 97.7 metric tons of hazardous chemical and recycled wastes were intercepted by FEPA in industrial compliance monitoring in the same year. At the corporate business level, it is important to note the activities of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. The SPDC's environmental spending for 1998 stood at \$177.6 million. The company's objective continued to be an end to pollution via facilities and infrastructure upgrades, site remediation, waste management, and environmental studies, as well as an end to gas flaring. Already, the Alakiri flowstation and gas plant has met external certification standards by the International Standards Organization (ISO 14001 standards), and validation per the European Union Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) standards.

In the final analysis, in spite of the efforts of African states, in collaboration with external actors, to address the problem of environmental degradation, to conserve natural resources, and attain the goal of sustainable development, the state of the environment remains perilous. Nothing speaks more eloquently of the ugly situation of the environment than the fact that seventeen African countries are currently facing food emergencies due to difficult weather conditions, persistent civil strife, and insecurity. That the remedial measures did not yield the desired results is partly due to the fact that, in some cases, policies were not based on scientifically proven blueprints. The problem was further compounded by eco-politics and official corruption.

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See also: Debt, International, Development and Dependency; Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment; Geography, Environment in African History; Industrialization and Development; Mining, Multinationals, and Development; Rural Development, Postcolonial.

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Epidemics: Malaria, AIDS, Other Disease: Postcolonial Africa

One of the greatest challenges facing Africa is the continuing scourge of deadly epidemics and debilitating disease. According to statistics compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO), a high proportion of Africa's population suffers from a wide variety of illnesses. These include well-known tropical maladies, such as malaria, sleeping sickness, and schistosomiasis, as well as more globally widespread afflictions, such as cholera, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. The high incidence of disease in Africa is partly attributable to environmental conditions. Numerous viruses, bacteria, and parasites thrive in the tropical forests and river valleys, as do the flies and mosquitos that often transmit illnesses to humans. More important, many of Africa's diseases and epidemics are a consequence of widespread poverty. Poor sanitation, contaminated water supplies, malnutrition, and inadequate health care all contribute to the continent's high rate of chronic illness, low life expectancy, and outbreaks of serious epidemics. Although disease prevention efforts have scored some victories, in most cases Africans continue to suffer and die from illnesses that have been successfully controlled or treated in more developed and wealthier regions of the world. Moreover, frequent sickness and high rates of mortality further impoverish families and nations, making them even more vulnerable to future episodes of illness and disease.

Of all tropical diseases, malaria is one of the most serious and widespread. WHO estimates that approximately 270 to 450 million cases occur annually in Africa,



AIDS testing in a hospital in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1999. © Friedrich Stark/Das Fotoarchiv.

and it is difficult to find a family that has not been stricken by the illness. Malaria is caused by four species of *Plasmodium* protozoa that are carried by the anopheline mosquito, which is endemic to most regions of the continent. Children are particularly vulnerable, and in some regions of Africa, as many as half may die from malarial infection before reaching the age of five years. For survivors, malaria can impair physical and mental development and may cause anemia and progressive damage to the liver and other organs. Even when malarial symptoms are less severe, its impact can be great. Outbreaks typically occur during the rainy seasons, the time of greatest agricultural activity in Africa. The loss of farming labor due to fevers and sickness may seriously jeopardize crop production and family income, causing malnutrition, impoverishment, and a greater susceptibility to more serious attacks of malaria and other illnesses. Efforts to control mosquito populations through the use of insecticides have generally been ineffective, and pharmaceutical treatments are often unavailable or too expensive for most households. Additional mosquito-borne illnesses, such as yellow fever and dengue fever, also afflict large numbers of Africans in both rural and urban areas.

Two additional insect-borne diseases, sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) and river blindness (onchocerciasis), are transmitted to humans via fly bites. Sleeping sickness is generally restricted to rural areas, particularly in the forest and wooded savanna regions. Long a scourge of cattle and humans alike, the illness is caused by two forms of *Trypanosoma brucei* parasites, both carried by the tsetse fly (*Glossina spp.*). Without treatment, the disease is commonly fatal, although symptoms are difficult to recognize, making early diagnosis difficult. Intensive efforts to reduce tsetse fly infestation, through the clearing of brush and

the use of insecticides, succeeded in bringing the illness under control in many areas by the early 1960s, but the disease reappeared in the 1970s, with periodic flare-ups in west and central Africa. In 1996 some 30,000 new cases were reported, and an additional 55–60 million inhabitants of tsetse fly-infested areas may also be at risk. Sleeping sickness contributes to rural poverty by reducing the work force, cattle production, and the use of animal labor for farming. The loss of cattle herds may also lead to malnutrition, poorer health, and a greater susceptibility to other illnesses and diseases.

Efforts to control river blindness have been more successful. This illness is caused by a filarial worm carried by a small black fly commonly found in the river valleys of west and central Africa. Once a major illness affecting more than 30 million people in West Africa, river blindness was also a major contributor to rural underdevelopment, as residents fled from the fertile river valleys where the black fly was most prevalent. Beginning in the mid-1970s, African nations and international agencies began an effective program to reduce the black fly population, bringing river blindness largely under control and allowing the resettlement of river basins. The current challenge is to provide African nations the ability and resources to maintain the control programs to prevent a recurrence of the disease.

Major diseases spread by contaminated food and water include schistosomiasis, cholera, typhoid, and meningitis. Schistosomiasis (also known as Bilharzia) is a seriously debilitating disease caused by parasites of the genus *Schistosoma* that live in fresh water snails. They enter the human body through the skin and lay their eggs, which often pass back into the water through human waste. The parasitic infection is very painful. It may also cause progressive damage to internal organs, contributing to an early death. For Africa as a whole, it has been estimated that about half the population suffers from schistosomiasis, and in some areas (particularly in the lake and river regions of southern and eastern Africa, and the Nile River Valley), it is estimated that nearly everyone over the age of two is infected. The best preventions against schistosomiasis are clean water supplies and efficient sanitation, but these simple controls—as well as the medicines available for effective treatment—are generally far too expensive for most African countries. In fact, the threat of schistosomiasis may actually be on the rise, as irrigation schemes inadvertently draw water from contaminated rivers and lakes.

Additional illnesses on the rise are cholera and meningococcal meningitis. Cholera is an acute diarrheal illness caused by the infection of the intestine with the bacterium *Vibrio cholera*. It is most commonly

transmitted by the ingestion of contaminated food or water, often through municipal water supplies. Persons with severe cases of cholera can die within a few hours due to loss of fluids and salts. Meningococcal meningitis is an inflammation of the lining surrounding the brain and spinal cord, caused by several different bacterium and viruses. In instances where it invades the bloodstream, meningitis can be carried to other organs, including the eyes, heart, lungs, and the central nervous system. Although both of these illnesses have largely disappeared in developed nations, serious epidemics still occur regularly in many regions of Africa.

Of all major illnesses, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is currently the most serious threat to public health and social welfare in Africa. Since the disease was first recognized in the early 1980s, an estimated 34 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa have become infected, a figure which represents about 70 per cent of the world's total cases. More than 11 million Africans, a quarter of them children, have already died as a consequence of AIDS, and the death toll is expected to increase for the foreseeable future. In Africa the primary mode of transmission is through heterosexual intercourse, and surveys have uniformly found the greatest rates of infection in young adults, between the ages of fifteen and forty-five. HIV is also spread perinatally (mother-to-fetus), and as of 1998, there were an estimated 1 million infants and children living with HIV/AIDS. Although all African countries have reported AIDS cases, the epidemic is particularly severe in eastern and southern Africa. In some countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, HIV infection may affect up to 25 per cent of adults.

The high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Africa can be attributed to a variety of factors. Some studies suggest that the virus may have originated in central Africa, and that it spread undetected until fairly recently. Others have found the viral strains of HIV found in eastern and southern Africa to be more virulent than those prevalent in other regions of the world. Another significant factor may be the high incidence of other sexually transmitted diseases, such as gonorrhea and syphilis, which facilitates viral transmission from one individual to another. Social dislocation and economic distress have also contributed to the scope and scale of the epidemic in Africa. Urbanization, rural impoverishment, labor migration, and regional warfare have induced dramatic social changes that, in some cases, have fostered the spread of disease.

Efforts to limit the AIDS epidemic have had mixed results. In the absence of an effective vaccine and lacking the resources to provide the drug therapies available in developed nations, Africans have focused their attention on public awareness and education. In some countries, such as Uganda and Senegal, sustained prevention

efforts have yielded reduced rates of HIV infection. But in many other nations, the results have been less successful. In Zimbabwe, for example, AIDS education has succeeded in raising knowledge and awareness of the disease, but risk-reducing behavioral change has lagged behind. Personal denial of risk continues to undermine disease prevention strategies, and the continuing stigma attached to AIDS prevents many sufferers from seeking care and support. As the epidemic increases, so too do other infectious diseases. Particularly worrisome is the merging dual epidemics of AIDS and tuberculosis. People whose immune defenses are weakened by HIV infection have become more vulnerable to other microbes, including the tuberculosis bacillus. In some regions of southern Africa, tuberculosis rates have doubled in the last decade, and approximately one-third of all AIDS deaths are directly attributed to it.

In many African nations, sickness and poverty have become firmly intertwined. Illnesses impair family productivity, creating diminished income, malnutrition, and overall increased impoverishment. In such conditions, individuals may be forced to rely more heavily on unsanitary water or food supplies, or to engage in riskier personal behaviors, such as prostitution, in order to survive. But such measures also increase susceptibility to more sickness, thus continuing the cycle of illness and poverty. A similar trend is observable at the national level. In countries most severely affected by the AIDS epidemic, businesses report dramatically reduced profits as a result of worker absenteeism, caused by sickness or attendance at funerals. Overall, lowered business and family productivity decreases national income, resulting in fewer resources available for health care, improvements in water and sanitation, and consistent insect eradication programs. In a continent already struggling to achieve economic development, malaria, schistosomiasis, HIV/AIDS, and other major maladies seriously hinder efforts to promote social stability and economic growth.

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
Equatorial Africa: See Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa; Iron Age (Early): Farming, Equatorial Africa.

Equatorial Guinea: Colonial Period, Nineteenth Century

The colony that became known as Spanish (after 1963, Equatorial) Guinea took final shape only in the early twentieth century. In the first stage, the islands of Fernando Po (renamed Bioko after independence) and Annobon passed from the Portuguese to the Spanish sphere in 1778. Spain made an initial claim to an area of on the mainland, including parts of modern Nigeria, in 1855; this was whittled down to just over half its original size at the West African Conference of Berlin and fixed at roughly 10,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometers) in 1901, when the boundaries of Río Muni were finally determined. However, Spain effectively occupied this small enclave only in the mid-1920s.

In 1827 Britain became the first European power to establish a physical, albeit unofficial, presence in Fernando Po, which it used as a base to curb the West African slave trade. In the 1840s, the position was regularized when Spain appointed John Beecroft, later British consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra as its governor over the island, based at Santa Isabel (now Malabo). The first native Spanish governor took office in 1858, to be followed by settlers and Jesuit missionaries. By this time, the island had become an important entrepôt, attracting a mixed population of freed slaves and West African creoles, who settled among the indigenous Bubi and started to produce palm oil for export in the 1840s. However, cocoa, introduced in 1836, became the mainstay of the economy, transforming the island after World War I into a leading continental producer. At times, the industry attracted critical international attention. In the 1920s, the treatment of Liberian migrant workers caused an international scandal and the abrupt termination of their supply in 1930. Thereafter, Nigeria became the most significant provider of labor for the Fernando Po plantations, along with Fang workers from the Río Muni, mainland, part of the colony.

In contrast to this, Río Muni had been treated from the start as an “exploitation” colony, unsuitable for white settlers, initially producing wild rubber and ivory, and when the market for these commodities collapsed, hardwoods for the European market. The actual administration of the mainland area was only finally set in place in the 1920s and operated on a very limited budget, making extensive use of the Fang traditional authorities in a rough and ready form of indirect rule. The vast majority of the Fang were termed *menores* (“minors”), made subject to a different legal system from Spanish citizens, and required also to



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perform obligatory labor on plantations and other enterprises. A small number (only about one hundred by the mid-1950s) became *emancipados*, with full rights: a privilege that entailed the acceptance of Christianity and Spanish culture, and the rejection of traditional values. It was a system that offered more to the Westernized creoles and Bubi of Fernando Po (collectively known as the *Fernandinos*) than to the Fang peoples of the economically stagnant and generally neglected mainland. However, the value of these privileges was undermined by General Franco’s seizure of power, after his victory in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939): for the next twenty years, his regime restricted the evolution of political institutions to the local level, and filled them with hand-picked appointees. Black nationalist protests to the United Nations in the mid-1950s were met with official bans on public meetings, the imprisonment of dissidents and reports of their abuse while in detention. Also, the Franco government encouraged European planters to settle in Fernando Po, leading to the gradual displacement of black cocoa producers on the island. However, in contrast to the mainland, the Franco regime succeeded in retaining support there, a circumstance it was able to exploit to its advantage in the early 1960s, when Madrid decided that a limited degree of political advance along carefully controlled channels should be staged.

This process began in 1960, when provincial assemblies were set up in Fernando Po and Río Muni, with political arrangements that favored pro-Spanish and/or conservative elements in the colonial society. Also, for the first time Spanish Guinea was awarded six seats in

the Spanish Cortes, all earmarked for supporters of the colonial regime. In response to this, the mainland politician Atanasio Ndongo set up MONALIGE (Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial) in 1963, winning widespread support in Río Muni. Subsequently, he was edged out by the former civil servant Macías Nguema, who took the party along a more radical path. The growth of MONALIGE on the mainland alarmed the *Fernandinos*, whose traditional support for the colonial power was influenced also by their minority status within the colony (10 per cent of the population), their relative wealth, derived from cocoa production, and the scope of their existing representation in the evolving political structures. They initially opposed a Spanish proposal to give the colony autonomy in 1963 but were won around by an offer of representation in excess of their numbers in a General Assembly for the colony as a whole, and parity with Río Muni on the Governor's Council. Finally, in response to growing international criticism, the Franco regime decided to end its formal control over the colony and convened a constitutional conference in 1967 to prepare for a handover of power. The islanders demanded their own independence, but once again were brought around by an allocation of representation well in excess of their population (15 out of 36 Assembly seats) and similar concessions. In the following year, Macías Nguema won the presidency of Equatorial Guinea on the second ballot and ushered in the era of independence on October 12, 1968.

Although the constitutional road to independence had taken only eight years, it had started from scratch after many years of political repression, and the roots of the new representative institutions were correspondingly shallow, as the rapid move of the Macías Nguema regime towards personal dictatorship was to show. Moreover, the two sections of the new state lacked any fundamental integration, much less a common identity.

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Equatorial Guinea: Independence to the Present

The comparatively rapid advance of Equatorial Guinea (Río Muni and the islands of Fernando Po [now Bioko] and Annobón) to independence, after many years of

authoritarian rule under Franco's Spain, provided insufficient opportunity for the development of a nationalist movement at the grassroots level. It facilitated the emergence of a leader, Francisco Macías Nguema (1924–1979), whose record of repression and violations of basic human rights was matched only by those of Idi Amin and the “emperor” Bokassa. Twenty years of government under his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo have seen some limited improvement, but the country still suffers from the dual legacy of colonial and postcolonial despotism.

A former court interpreter under the colonial regime, Macías Nguema was regarded as a “safe” prospect for Spain in the presidential elections preceding independence on October 12, 1968. But within a few months, he had dismayed his former masters by expelling their ambassador and the local Spanish military force, leading to a mass exodus of white settlers. A reign of terror followed, targeting political opponents such as would-be separatists on Bioko Island and dissidents within the ruling party, and manifesting itself in public executions, kidnappings, killing of exiles, “disappearances,” and the massacre of whole villages. By 1974, over two-thirds of the original 1968 Assembly members had disappeared. Fegley has estimated that at least 20,000 people were murdered under the Macías regime and at least 100,000 fled the country (about a third of the total population). In 1970 Macías set up PUNT (Sole National Workers' Party), outlawing other political parties; two years later, he declared himself president for life, head of the nation and party, commander in chief of the army, and grand master of education, science, and culture.

Macías distanced himself further from his colonial past by embarking on an idiosyncratic “authenticity” program, involving an anti-Christian campaign that led to the banning of the Roman Catholic Church in 1978, and forbidding the use of Christian names. In its place, he encouraged the traditional Bwiti cult of his Fang group. Other features included the advocacy of traditional medicine and closing down of hospitals, the dismissal of six hundred teachers and the proscription of the term “intellectual” as signifying an alien polluter of African values. The by now habitual excesses accompanied the program: in one incident, a secondary school head was executed and his body exposed after a slashed portrait of the “President for Life” was found in his school entrance. In his final year, Macías seems to have abandoned traditional values as well, possibly influenced by the Eastern-bloc contacts he had started to cultivate, and declared Equatorial Guinea to be “an atheist state.”

Meanwhile, the once thriving economy was experiencing severe problems, many of the regime's making. In 1975 police assaults on Nigerian embassy staff at

the capital Malabo resulted in the eventual withdrawal of 35,000 Nigerian laborers from the Fernando Po cocoa plantations; they were replaced by Fang laborers, drafted from the mainland under the Compulsory Labor Act (1972), who lacked their skills and failed to sustain production. Ironically, Macías's economic mismanagement made his country more, rather than less, dependent on Spanish financial support, while he continued to blame Spanish imperialism for his plight.

By the later 1970s, Macías was fast losing his faculties and showed unmistakable signs of mania; he was reported to have talked to people he had killed as if they were in the same room with him. However, his authority was total, buttressed by relatives and members of his Esangui clan in positions of trust. It was employed ruthlessly against anyone who dared to complain, much less criticize him. In June 1979, he eventually overreached himself, when a younger brother of his nephew Teodoro Obiang was murdered after protesting about his army pay being in arrears. This threat to the inner circle of power moved Obiang to gather several relatives together and stage a successful coup. After a brief military trial, as it was clear that some of the plotters had been implicated in the excesses of the previous regime, Macías was executed at the end of September 1979.

Obiang's military government took rapid steps to normalize relations with Spain and the Roman Catholic Church, to be rewarded with a papal visit in February 1982. Also, it tried to reach an accommodation with the United Nations Human Rights Commission, which had started investigating the abuses of the Macías regime, in response to Anti-Slavery Society protest, in August 1976. In March 1980, the UN Secretary-General approved the appointment of an expert to help the Obiang government restore human rights. Although lacking the paranoia of his uncle, Obiang's human rights record has been far from perfect, with authenticated cases of extrajudicial murder, torture, and the denial of basic rights to accused persons, compounded by the continuing absence of an independent judiciary and the use of military tribunals to hear cases involving national security. In one such case, a defense counsel was given four hours to prepare a case for an alleged participant in an attempted coup.

Other features of the previous regime have continued, including Esangui clan domination of political structures, and the overriding political and economic authority of the governing Equatorial Guinea Democratic Party (PDGE). Its authority was unaffected by the end of one-party rule in 1992. Elections in 1993 were boycotted by the main opposition parties, while the 1999 elections witnessed short-term detentions of opposition candidates, the alleged removal of known opponents from the voters' roll, and reports that the

secret ballot, introduced for the first time in 1999, had been nullified by the lack of privacy in polling booths. Prior to the establishment of multiparty politics, Obiang had taken the precaution of obtaining immunity from prosecution for alleged offenses committed before, during and after his term of office, but this has remained untested. In the 1996 presidential election, he received 98 per cent of the votes cast in a contest again characterized by charges of fraud and intimidation. However, the 1990s were more propitious in other ways for Equatorial Guinea. In 1994 substantial reserves of offshore oil were brought into production, even though the UN Human Rights Commission reported that the benefits accrued to the ruling elite rather than to the people.

After a further crackdown on opponents, Obiang was elected unopposed in the 2002 presidential election, while the oil bonanza gave Equatorial Guinea the highest economic growth rate in Africa.

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Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797)

Abolitionist

Of Ibo origin, Olaudah Equiano was born in a village near modern Onitsha in about 1745. At approximately eleven years of age, he was kidnapped by slave merchants, and after passing through a number of black owners, was eventually transported to the New World, one of three million Africans extracted from Africa by British slavers in the eighteenth century. He was given the name Gustavus Vassa, probably with ironic purpose, after the Swedish king who had won freedom for his people from Danish rule. It was a name he continued to use after he was emancipated, although usually qualified in print by the words "the African." Spared the brutality of plantation savagery by his own abilities and the fortune of having relatively humane owners, he survived a wide variety of experiences in the West Indies,

the American mainland, and England (where he was baptized a Christian in 1759), gaining skills as a domestic servant, barber, sailor (including a period of service in the Seven Years War against France) and as a trader on his own account. His entrepreneurial activities enabled him to accrue sufficient capital (despite frequent cheating by white customers) to secure manumission in 1767.

Equiano settled in London later that year and made a living over the next ten years as a sailor, visiting the Mediterranean and Levant, the West Indies (again), and the Arctic, in one of the abortive attempts to find the North West Passage. He took part in a similarly abortive settlement scheme on the Mosquito Coast of modern Nicaragua. In October 1774, he had a religious experience, receiving a vision of Christ that convinced him that he had been redeemed by divine grace. In 1777 he entered domestic service in London. One employer, impressed by his Christian devotion, suggested missionary work in West Africa, but the Church of England, then unenthusiastic about such work, refused him ordination.

A return to sea in 1784 brought him to Philadelphia, where he made contact with its large free black community, an experience that led to his eventual involvement in the Sierra Leone scheme, inspired by Granville Sharp, with whom Equiano had been in contact since the early 1770s. In 1786 the British government appointed him “Commissary of Provisions and Stores for the Black Poor to Sierra Leone,” a post that in practice placed him in the position of trying to satisfy his employers’ interests and those of the black settlers themselves. His efforts to safeguard both against the dishonesty of the (white) official in charge of the expedition led to his unjust dismissal in March of the following year.

In 1789 Equiano published his autobiography, *The Interesting Narrative*, under his birth name, relegating his slave name to a subtitle. It achieved massive sales, helped by its author’s promotional travels around the country, and ran to nine British editions, the last in 1794, when the tide turned against the abolitionist cause following the French revolutionary terror and Saint Domingue slave revolt.

The Interesting Narrative provides a first-hand account of the violence that underpinned the plantation system: the rapacity of slave traders, the inhumanity of the Middle Passage on slave ships, the savagery of plantation owners, and the treatment of black people (freed as well as enslaved) by whites in the West Indies and American colonies. At the same time, it paints a picture of traditional life in Africa somewhat removed from the idealized and Arcadian notions of many contemporary abolitionists; for example, Equiano refers to the existence of domestic slavery and local warfare in Ibo society. His autobiography is suffused with his

passionate and profound evangelical Christianity, attacking slave-owners and slave-traffickers as “nominal Christians” who fail to do to others what they wish to be done to them, corrupted by avarice and wickedness. It forms a worthy supplement to John Wesley’s sermons against the evils of slavery. Above all, it is a personal statement by one who had lived the life of a slave. It is written from his own experience; his often-quoted description of the “red faces” of white slavers and the “large furnace” on the ship that took him away from Africa (chap. 3) is etched with the sharp instrument of childhood recollection.

The Interesting Narrative brought Equiano considerable fame in his lifetime. The Prince of Wales (later George IV) and the Duke of York were among its fans. It provided Equiano with a sufficient return to make his final years ones of comfort. On April 7, 1792, he married a white woman, Susanna Cullen, who predeceased him by a year. He died in London on March 31, 1797, and thus did not live to see the Atlantic slave trade abolished. His fame lingered a little thereafter, and then virtually disappeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when chroniclers venerated Wilberforce and his white colleagues for their crusade against slavery and the slave trade, but ignored the contribution made by Equiano and other former black slaves such as Ignatius Sancho and Ottobah Cuguano. The rising interest in black history since the 1960s (especially in the United States) has rectified this imbalance. It has led to the rediscovery of Equiano and his book, which has won “an iconic status” (Walvin 1994) in black diaspora studies. It has also furnished future ages with an authentic and first-hand account of the black experience at the height of the British plantation system in the late eighteenth century.

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Biography

Born in a village near modern Onitsha in about 1745. Kidnapped by slave merchants in about 1756. Regained his freedom and settled in London in 1767. Appointed “Commissary of Provisions and Stores for the Black Poor to Sierra Leone” by the British government in 1786. Dismissed from the post in 1787. Published his autobiography, *The Interesting Narrative*, in 1789. Married Susanna Cullen in 1792. Died in London on March 31, 1797.

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
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Eritrea: Ottoman Province to Italian Colony

Before being unified by the Italians in 1890, Eritrea was formed of different regions that were peripheral areas of diverse imperial states. The presence of the Ottomans dates back to the sixteenth century, when the region that later became known as Eritrea was contended by Ethiopian emperors, the sultan of Harar, known as Ahmed Gran, who occupied the provinces of Seraye, Hamasien, and Akalai Guzai in the highlands, and the Ottomans in the coastal areas. Ahmed Gran was defeated by the Portuguese and the Ethiopian emperor who also drove the Ottomans out of the coast. Nevertheless, the Ottomans reacquired the port of Massawa and neighboring zones in 1557 and established a more secure rule until the nineteenth century. Their control was limited to the coastal area ruled by the *na'ib*, deputy of the Turkish commander who was responsible for the collection of taxes. However, in the nineteenth century, the Egyptians profited from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and in 1865 they occupied Massawa and the coastal region. The Egyptians were also able to control the areas of Keren and the Senheit in the west. Thus, two-thirds of Eritrean territory came under Egyptian bureaucratic control. Egyptian influence in a vast part of present-day Eritrea led to collisions with Ethiopian emperor Johannes IV, who succeeded in holding the central highlands. The Hamasien, Akalai Guzai and Seraye regions were connected to the Ethiopian empire to which they paid taxes until the arrival of the Italians in the region. In the nineteenth century the Dankalia region was under the control of local aristocratic rulers.

In 1869, after the opening of the Suez Canal, the Italian shipping company Rubattino purchased the bay of Assab. In 1882 the bay was taken over by the Italian state and declared an Italian colony. Three years later the port of Massawa was incorporated, owing to British diplomatic assistance, and it soon became evident that Italian expansionist policy in the Red Sea was directed toward the acquisition of the Ethiopian highlands' fertile lands. Ethiopia had been always the real objective of Italian colonialism. With the hope of finding more inhabitable lands, the Italians entered the areas located to the northwest of Massawa through military action or stipulating agreements with those local chiefs who were the rivals of Yohannes, emperor of Ethiopia. Italian penetration inland led to an immediate military



Eritrea.

reaction by Emperor Yohannes' troops who defeated a force of five hundred Italians at Dogali in 1887. Later on, Italian penetration into the highlands was facilitated by a period of deep economic and political crisis of the Ethiopian Empire, due to famines, epidemics, and the death of Emperor Yohannes.

In January 1890 the possessed lands in the Red Sea were unified into a political entity called Eritrea. Italy immediately undertook a policy of land alienation against local peasants, particularly between the years 1893 and 1895. However, the colonial administration had to abandon this policy, which caused tensions and rebellions especially in rural areas. Indeed, in 1894 one of the strongest revolts took place in Akalai Guzai, led by *Dejazmach* Bahta Hagos, who had been previously allied to the Italians. The control of rebellious areas became the Italian reasoning behind the invasion of the northern province of Ethiopia, but in 1896 the Italians were defeated by the army of Ras Alula at Adwa.

Italian colonialism in Eritrea lasted almost sixty years, from 1882 to 1941, and during this period it redefined its purposes and designs several times. After the disastrous consequences of the policy of land alienation, Italian administration adopted a policy of consolidation of its colonial rule. The period until the mid-1930s witnessed a gradual transformation of Eritrea. The Italian *colonia primogenita* (first-born colony) of Eritrea was given the first administrative structure and divided into *commissariati* (districts) ruled by Italian officials. Land concessions were given to local and Italian people in both the highlands and lowlands. In the lowlands "capitalist concessions" were introduced.

While the cereal-cultivation of the highlands had to satisfy the consumption needs of the entire population, the cultivation of the lowlands, mainly coffee, was produced primarily for exportation. The construction of primary and secondary roads was also a priority, and a railway was built connecting Massawa to Tesseney. In the urban environment, especially in the capital, Asmara, public works were developed, and the service sector expanded with the opening of shops, restaurants, bars and various businesses which led to mass urbanization.

With the conquest of Ethiopia, Eritrea became the logistical base for the entire Italian Eastern Africa empire and witnessed radical transformation over a very short period. The road network was extended, and a fledgling industrial sector grew rapidly to satisfy the needs of the ever-growing Italian community. According to an economic census of 1939, in Eritrea as a whole, there were more than 2,000 industrial firms involved in construction, transport, repair workshops, chemicals, brick production, furniture, cinematography, graphics, leather tanning, textiles and electricity. Most of them were of course concentrated in the capital Asmara, where the first class of Eritrean entrepreneurs developed. The town of Asmara alone recorded a population of 120,000 in 1934–1941, the Italian community making up half of this figure. Nevertheless, throughout the colonial period recruitment in the colonial army as *askari* (“native” soldier) represented the most stable source of income for the local population. It was calculated in 1939 that out of approximately 617,000 men and women, 40 per cent of men joined the colonial army. *Askari* were recruited for the expansion into Somalia and Libya where opposition to colonialism persisted until 1932.

In the sixty years of Italian domination, a rigid racial policy was applied by the colonial administration. It was only in the 1930s, however, with the massive arrival of Italian settlers, that a regime of apartheid was imposed by the fascist government and institutionalized by laws and governmental decrees that impacted mainly upon the urban milieu of Asmara. During the World War II, Italy had to confront the British army, which entered Eritrea in 1941. Having no design for a future role in Eritrea, the British Military Administration that existed there until 1952 did not really change the structure of Italian colonialism, even if it abolished the regime of apartheid imposed by the Italians.

FRANCESCA LOCATELLI

See also: Ethiopia: Italian Invasion and Occupation: 1935–1940; Massawa, Ethiopia, and the Ottoman Empire.

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Eritrea: 1941 to the Present

Eritrea, a country of about 119,400 square miles, with a population of about 3.5 million, is located at the southwestern coast of the Red Sea. Modern-day Eritrea, like most African countries, is a creation of nineteenth-century European colonialism. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Italy was lagging behind in the colonial scramble. The only area open for colonial occupation was the Horn of Africa. Italy first gained a foothold in Eritrea in 1869 when an Italian company bought the Assab Port from a local chief in the name of the Italian government. On January 1, 1890, Eritrea was declared an Italian colony.

Under Italian occupation, Eritrea was converted from a peasant and nomadic state to an industrial and commercial center intended to sustain Italy's colonial ambition in East Africa, while supplying Italy with raw materials and agricultural products. Italy's colonial philosophy was one of maximizing capital returns through exploitative use of fertile lands and local labor. There was little concern for the welfare of Eritreans.

In order to accomplish its exploitative goals, Italy built roads, bridges, canals, railways, cable roads, and a vast administrative bureaucracy. At the end of World War II, Eritrea (along with South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria) was one of the few industrialized centers in Africa.

Great Britain took possession of Eritrea in 1941, after Italy was defeated in the Horn of Africa. The British Military Administration (BMA) governed Eritrea until 1952. After 1945 the conditions under which the BMA maintained responsibility were stipulated by the United Nations: the administration was to assist Eritrea in the process of making an orderly transition from an occupied territory to full self-determination.

Under British rule, Eritrea experienced political development but suffered economic setbacks. To fulfill the requirements of the “requisitioning” clause of its mandate, the BMA impoverished Eritrea by dismantling and disassembling Eritrean industrial capital. Requisitioning caused massive hardship and economic dislocation.

The British administrative culture, which was based on liberal democratic values, however, promoted political mobilization and freedom of the press. Labor unions in the urban centers, particularly in Asmara, and Massawa were allowed to flourish. Most of all, the BMA opened up opportunities for mass education. Under Italian rule education was limited to the fourth grade level; by contrast, the British introduced primary and secondary education in earnest.

The ten years of British administration had an important effect on the country's political consciousness. The period paved the way for organized political participation, and, for the first time, Eritreans were exposed to the possibilities of political freedom. The dissemination of ideas through the lively press, spearheaded by able Eritreans, boosted political awareness. The urban middle class who served earlier as functionaries of the Italian and British bureaucracies organized themselves into political parties advocating competing programs. Three major political parties emerged during the British occupation: the Muslim League, the Liberal Progressive Party, and the Unionist Party. As the British mandate was approaching an end in 1952, Eritrean political identity was crystallized as a liberal progressive system.

At the end of the British occupation in 1952, Eritrean federation with Ethiopia as mandated by the UN took effect. The federation created an Eritrean parliamentary government with responsibilities for domestic affairs such as police power, education, and health. The mandate called for the Eritrean people to exercise their wish for complete independence or to opt for union with Ethiopia. Complete control of foreign affairs, interstate commerce, the ports, railroads, the national currency, and defense rested on Ethiopia.

Before the referendum could be consummated as planned, Ethiopia maneuvered the Eritrean parliament's activities and subverted the federal provisions, in effect, reducing Eritrea to a mere province of the empire in 1962. Disgruntled Eritreans who resented Ethiopian intervention in Eritrean politics agitated against the Ethiopian government and called for Eritrean independence. In 1961 the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), an underground urban organization, had been born to campaign for Eritrean independence. This organization developed into a guerrilla force calling itself the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).

ELF scored military successes against the Ethiopian occupying troops, but it failed to crystallize common ideological programs for Eritrea. The ELF started as a nationalist force, but gradually a large segment of its following harbored conflicting ideologies. Some were Pan-Arabists while others were radical Marxists and nationalists. An internal split resulted in the violent defeat of the Pan-Arabist movement at the hands of the

Marxists and the nationalists. In 1977 the Marxists and the nationalists formed a new front called the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) under the leadership of Issayas Afewerki. In a subsequent showdown between ELF and the EPLF, the ELF was driven out of Eritrea into the refugee camps of Sudan in 1980.

The EPLF started as a nationalist front with radical Marxist inclinations. Its military and political policy relied on strict hierarchy and intense military discipline. Its military energy and discipline enabled the organization to score spectacular victories against the Ethiopian forces. One of these military feats was the 1987 AfaAbbet victory where one-third of the Ethiopian force stationed in Eritrea was defeated. Overnight, Ethiopian troops were forced to abandon their positions in the Eritrean lowlands. They were garrisoned in Asmara, Massawa, and Decamare. In 1990 the EPLF liberated Massawa and encircled the Ethiopian garrison in Decamare. Even though the Ethiopian troops outnumber EPLF forces nearly five to one, the Eritreans were unstoppable. After several months of withering assaults, the Decamare garrison was soundly defeated. On May 24, 1991, EPLF forces marched into Asmara on the heels of a confused Ethiopian retreat. With the capture of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, the thirty-year war of liberation came to an end. EPLF immediately called for the implementation of the referendum that Haile Selassie's government had undermined in 1962. On May 24, 1993, Eritreans voted for complete independence through internationally supervised referendum.

Ethiopia, under a newly installed regime, became the first country to officially recognize Eritrea's independence.

In May 1998 new border conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia climaxed in a full-scale war, resulting in massive carnage. The conflict was formally ended by the brokering of a peace deal in June 2000. However, both nations suffered the loss of thousands of soldiers.

TSEGGAI ISAAC

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Essawira: See Morocco: Sidi Muhammad and Foundations of Essawira.

Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries

The spread of Islam in the southern and eastern parts of the Ethiopian region was closely associated with trade. Initially, Muslim merchants established bases at the coast from where they could travel inland, setting up temporary trading posts under the protection of local chieftains. Gradually, as the nomadic peoples occupying the coastal lowlands adopted Islam, if only superficially, these trading posts became permanent settlements. Muslim traders were then able to move further inland, following the course of the Awash River, into Shoa and the kingdoms of the Sidama people in the west. It is unclear exactly when Islam reached these regions but according to tradition a sultanate, ruled by the Makhzumi dynasty, was founded in southeastern Shoa in 896. It was eventually conquered by Ali ibn Wali Asma in 1285 and incorporated into Ifat, which became the paramount Muslim state of the region.

In this way, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, a string of Muslim states circled the southern and eastern borders of the Christian Ethiopian kingdom. Situated on the northern side of the Awash River was Ifat and to its south-west lay Fatagar. On the southern side, the most westerly state was Hadya with Dawaro situated to its east. Further to the south lay Sharka and Bali. Adal, at this time, was a vague term used to refer in general to all the Muslim lowlands east of the Christian kingdom and, more specifically, to the Muslim state of Awssa, situated on the lower course of the Awash River in the Danakil lowlands.

Relations between the Muslim states and the Christian kingdom at this time are often represented in terms of religious enmity and war. The situation was, however, far more complex. While armed conflict did occur, it was seldom directly the result of religious issues, although the call to arms was usually couched in religious terms. The main reasons for military action were territorial expansion, political aggrandizement, and commercial rivalry, especially since the Islamization of the eastern side of the Ethiopian region had effectively cut off the Christian kingdom from direct access to the lucrative southern trade routes and the port of Zeyla. But, despite this focus of contention, there was also considerable cooperation in the field of commerce. Although control of the trade routes to Zeyla was in the hands of the rulers of Ifat, supply and demand for many of the trade items passing along them was generated by the Christian kingdom so that the two were, in effect, bound together by commercial interdependence. On the other hand, while Muslim and Christian could coexist peacefully enough, relations between the Muslim states were plagued by commercial



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competition, internal political disputes, and poor communications, which prevented them from joining together to pose a serious military threat to the Christian kingdom.

The situation was further complicated in the border regions by the fact that the local populations were only superficially Islamized or Christianized. In general, they continued to adhere to their own traditional religious beliefs and could not be relied on to offer military support in case of conflict. Consequently, when fighting did occur, it took the form of limited border raids while more extensive operations, like the conquest envisaged by Muhammad Abu Abd Allah at the very end of the thirteenth century, were short-lived.

The status quo changed during the reign of the militaristic Ethiopian king, Amda Tsiyon (1312–1342). His expansionist policies inevitably led to confrontation with Ifat over control of the trade routes to Zeyla, and, in 1328, tensions finally erupted into war. The Christian side was victorious. The Walasma ruler of Ifat, Haqq ad-Din, was taken prisoner, and Ifat itself was crushed and together with neighboring Fatagar was reduced to a tributary state under the rule of Sabr ad-Din, one of Haqq ad-Din's brothers. Sabr ad-Din, however, quickly renewed plans to attack the Christian kingdom, drawing support from Hadya and Dawaro, as well as from disaffected Agaw regions far to the north. Conflict again erupted in 1332, and again the Muslim forces were defeated, with the result that Amda Tsiyon placed all the hostile Muslim states under one tributary ruler, Jamal ad-Din, yet another of Haqq ad-Din's brothers. The Christian advance then continued

eastward, provoking a hostile response from the ruler of Adal, who was also defeated.

The campaigns of 1332 represented a major victory for Amda Tsiyon. The expanding Christian realm, now an empire, had gained the advantage in relation to the Muslim states. Important new tribute-paying territories had been acquired, and control of the southern trade routes had been secured. But the victory was not permanent. In 1376 Ifat rebelled yet again, first under the leadership of Haqq ad-Din II and then under Sa'd ad-Din II, who was eventually forced to take refuge at Zeyla where he was killed in 1415. This event marked the end of Ifat and the emergence of Adal, with a new capital at Dakar, as its successor.

Throughout the fifteenth century, Adal's incursions into Christian-held territories continued to be of concern to the imperial rulers. During the reign of Zara Yaqob (1434–1468), for instance, the sultan of Adal, Ahmad Badlay, launched a series of campaigns into the predominantly Muslim border provinces of the empire. His death in battle in 1445 brought the venture to an end, and Adal was forced to pay tribute in return for peace. This outcome seemed yet again to confirm the ultimate paramountcy of the Christian empire, but the balance of power between the two was, in fact, beginning to change. The region of Adal was far too large and inhospitable for the establishment of direct imperial control and, following the reign of Zara Yaqob, the weakening of imperial government at the center enabled the subjugated peripheral regions to grow more openly rebellious. In comparison, as the power of the empire waned, Adal grew stronger and the way was paved for the Muslim conquest of Christian Ethiopia in the sixteenth century.

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See also: Adal: Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, Conflict with Ethiopia, 1526–1543; Religion, History of.

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Ethiopia: Aksumite Inheritance, c.850–1150

The civilization of Aksum lasted for the first thousand years of the Christian era. Aksum was a major power of the Red Sea region. It had extensive commercial, diplomatic, and cultural contacts with the Hellenistic, Roman, and Indian Ocean world. It ruled over Yemen. It had a formidable navy, and during the time of King Kaleb (sixth century), sent an expedition to Yemen to repress an uprising against Aksumite rule.

In the eighth century, Aksumite power began to wane. The rise of Islam in the seventh century negatively affected Aksum's role in the Red Sea trade, although it did not stop it completely. During the ninth century, the Aksumite kingdom was confined to the highlands of southern Eritrea, Tigray, Lasta, and Angot. During the same time, some Christian Aksumites moved from Tigray south to Amhara and northern Shawa. In about the middle of the tenth century, a woman identified in the Ethiopian Christian tradition as Yodit Gudit ("Judith the monster") or Esato ("the fiery one") rose to prominence and put an end to the tottering Aksumite state. It seems clear that Aksum, already weakened by successive Beja attacks from the northwest, could not stand Yodit's onslaught. However, her identity is a matter of speculation. It has been suggested that she was from the kingdom of Damot located just south of the Blue Nile gorge or that she was a queen of the Falasha (Ethiopian Jews).

There is a dearth of historical material dealing with the period of the tenth to the twelfth centuries. This was the period between the end of Aksum and the rise of the Zagwe. Reflecting on the bygone days of Aksum's glory, and as if to compensate for their isolation from the outside Christian world, Ethiopians tenaciously held to their Christian religion. Turning to the Old Testament, they rendered Ethiopia as the Second Jerusalem.

Aksumite civilization was reinvigorated in the newly-founded Agaw dynasty, the Zagwe dynasty (c.1150–1270). The seat of the Zagwe dynasty was Lasta, south of Tigray, with its capital at Adafa. It was the immediate inheritor of Aksum's heritage. Aksum left a legacy to Christian Ethiopia in general and to the succeeding Zagwe dynasty in particular. Chief among its legacies are Christianity, architecture, rock-hewn churches, script, literature, and statecraft.

According to Ethiopian and foreign sources, Christianity was introduced into Aksum during the fourth century by Frumentius, a Greco-Phoenician, who became the first head of the church in Ethiopia.. He was instrumental in the conversion of the king of Aksum,

Ezana, who became the first Aksumite king to be converted to Christianity. Aksumite Christianity was derived from Egypt. It followed two of the dominant traits of Coptic Christianity: the monophysite creed (which holds that Jesus Christ had a single, divine nature), and monasticism. Christian Aksum passed on these two legacies to posterity, which still identify Ethiopian Christianity.

In the sphere of architecture, post-Aksumite Ethiopia inherited a distinct Aksumite style of architecture, including the construction of rock-hewn churches. Aksumite architecture used stone, timber, and clay materials. Aksumites built many rock-hewn churches. Two famous ones are the Church of Degum-Sellasse in Guerealta and the Church of Maryam of Berakit, both located in the Aksum area. Of all the heritage bequeathed by Aksum to posterity, none has been as influential to the Zagwe period as the remarkable rock-hewn churches of Lalibela. These churches, built by King Lalibela, have no equal in Christian Ethiopia. They are testimony to what the Zagwe inherited from their Aksumite predecessors as well as the innovative genius of the Zagwe themselves.

The Ge'ez script, also known as the Ethiopic writing system, is one of the most important achievements of Aksumite civilization. The script initially contained consonants only. Some were written from right to left, while others were written in the boustrophedon (plow formation), in which the first line runs from right to left, the second from left to right, and the third back to right to left, and so on. The Ethiopian linguist and scholar Kidane Wald Kifle, in his Ge'ez-Amharic dictionary, *Matshafa Sawasaw Wages Wamazgaba Qalat Haddis*, argued that it was with the introduction of Christianity into Ethiopia that the script took the form it has now, with the addition of vowels and the practice of writing from left to right.

In literature, ecclesiastical works predominated. In statecraft, while some aspects of Aksumite civilization were retained, other new elements were also introduced. The Aksumite state was a tributary state, as were all succeeding states in Ethiopia.

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Ethiopia: Zagwe Dynasty, 1150–1270

The period of Zagwe rule in the central Ethiopian highlands was one of the most remarkable in the region's medieval history. The dynasty presided over an energetic Christian expansion through the central Ethiopian plateau, as well as a period of notable commercial and cultural interaction with Egypt and the Middle East; it was also responsible for the creation of some of Ethiopia's most stunning architecture. All of this notwithstanding, however, the Zagwes have been disparaged by the region's subsequent chroniclers, being represented as usurpers of power from the legitimate "Solomonic" line. The Zagwes sought legitimacy by creating the myth that they descended from Moses. They also attempted to assert moral authority with their remarkable architecture. Neither, however, has impressed Ethiopia's royal chroniclers, who have in general depicted the Zagwes as transgressors with no "Israelite" connection, while even Zagwe rock-hewn architecture is actually supposed to have been the work of angels.

Our knowledge of the entire Zagwe period is in fact somewhat limited, while the circumstances of their rise to power are unclear. The Zagwes were originally Agaw-speakers, with their home base in the province of Lasta, an area which had long been part of the Christian kingdom, and which was strategically located to take advantage of north-south trade and communication links. They belonged to an increasingly successful military and political class that had become assimilated into Semitic and Christian culture in the centuries following the decline of Axum, during which period they were integrated into post-Axumite ruling elites. They seized power around 1150 (or 1137, according to Ethiopian tradition), but there is little evidence to suggest that their emergence represented a "revolution" as such, or that there was a dramatic episode at the time of the first Zagwe ruler's accession. It seems, rather, that the assumption of royal powers by the Lasta political class was the culmination of a sociopolitical process dating back at least two centuries and did not represent a significant break with the past. As the state expanded, Christian military leaders, chosen either from among the royal family or those close to it, were appointed as territorial governors with considerable local powers; many members of the Zagwe court were drawn from Lasta and held high ecclesiastical and administrative positions, while military leadership and economic power were also probably awarded to such courtiers. The territorial expansion of the state

was attended by Christian missionary activity and, backed by a substantial army, Christian settlement and control were pushed southward, particularly into Gojjam and onto the Shoan plateau.

There was a significant growth in the kingdom's external relations during the era of Zagwe rule. The rise of Fatimid Egypt led to renewed commercial activity along the Red Sea, and the Ethiopian highlands benefited from such trading links. The slave trade in particular expanded, although gold and ivory were also important exports. Textiles and other luxuries from the Islamic world were imported by Muslim merchants through Massawa on the Red Sea coast. In addition to this increased commercial interaction, the Zagwes also strengthened their links with the Egyptian Coptic Church, and strong trading relations between the Ethiopian region and Egypt enabled pilgrims from the highlands to pass through Muslim territories on their way to Jerusalem. Such contacts brought the region once again to the attention of Europe, where in the twelfth century stories began to circulate about a remote but devout and wealthy "kingdom of Prester John."

Visits to the Holy Land may also have been, partly at least, the inspiration behind the remarkable rock-hewn churches of the period. While a tradition of carving churches out of solid rock already existed, the Zagwes raised the architectural form to new heights. The third ruler in the dynasty, Yimrha, is credited with initiating the program of building rock-hewn churches, but it is Lalibela with whom some of Ethiopia's most outstanding architecture is associated. Around the beginning of the thirteenth century, undoubtedly the peak of the Zagwe state, Lalibela presided over what appears to have been an attempt to reconstruct Jerusalem in the central Ethiopian highlands. The stunning results are an indication of the strength of Christianity in the region and represent the Zagwes' determination to demonstrate the primacy of their political and religious order. This was also a period in which, in spite of the links with the Egyptian church, the Ethiopian church developed its own particular characteristics, centered around the idea that it was an outpost of Christianity surrounded by infidels, and that the Christians of the region were God's chosen people. The increasing influence of the Old Testament gave rise to the perception that the Christian kingdom was Israel's true successor.

Despite its considerable achievements, weaknesses in the Zagwe state had begun to appear by the early thirteenth century. Unable to forge regional unity, the Zagwes were also undermined by their own repeated succession disputes, and such internal conflicts encouraged the emergence of anti-Zagwe movements among the Semitic-speaking Tigrayans and Amhara. The most powerful challenge ultimately came from the Christian community in Shoa, which had grown

prosperous from the eastbound trade routes and which had the support of the church. The Shoan rebellion under Yekuno Amlak started around 1268 and, after a series of battles across Lasta and Begemidir, the last Zagwe king was killed in 1270, whereupon Yekuno Amlak declared himself ruler. In order to assert its own legitimacy, the new dynasty developed the myth that they descended from King Solomon and Queen Makeda of Saba; the "Solomonic" line claimed that it was now "restored," following the Zagwe usurpation, but it seems fair to say that only insofar as the monarch was once again a Semitic-speaker can Yekuno Amlak's advent to power be considered a "restoration." While the Zagwes were thereafter generally denigrated, Lalibela himself was subsequently canonized by the Ethiopian church, and Zagwe influence continued to be felt in terms of both the architectural and administrative styles of a kingdom, the success of which owed much to Zagwe innovation.

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See also: **Lalibela and Ethiopian Christianity.**


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Ethiopia: Solomonid Dynasty, 1270–1550

In 1270 a new dynasty came to power in Christian Ethiopia. Founded by Yekuno Amlak, it is traditionally known as the "Solomonid" dynasty because its kings were said to be descended from Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. The advent of this new dynasty is also traditionally referred to as a "restoration," to distinguish it from the preceding Zagwe dynasty, which was claimed to be illegitimate, and to associate it with the renowned rulers of the ancient kingdom of Aksum.

The early decades of the new dynasty were not especially auspicious. Yekuno Amlak's assumption of power was not universally accepted, and after his death a series of disputed successions destabilized the kingdom. It was only when his grandson, Amda Tsiyon (1312–1342), became king that his dynasty was finally able to consolidate its paramountcy within the heartlands of the Christian kingdom and to extend its authority over neighboring regions. Indeed, such was the expansion of the Christian state at this time that it can accurately be termed an empire.



Ethiopia, thirteenth–sixteenth centuries.

Amda Tsiyon's expansionist policies inevitably brought him into conflict with the Muslim states flanking the southern and eastern borders of his realm, and his reign is principally remembered for the campaigns he waged against them. It is important, however, to stress that relations between the two were not always hostile. They were also characterized by a considerable amount of commercial cooperation, which was profitable to both sides. Furthermore, although Amda Tsiyon's military successes ensured that the Christian state gained and maintained the upper hand in relation to its Muslim neighbors, these victories were not in themselves decisive. The Muslim states, benefiting from their contacts with the wider Islamic world, proved to have a remarkable capacity for recovery, and Amda Tsiyon's successors found themselves facing much the same problems. Only in the sixteenth century, when the Muslims, led by Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, declared a full-scale jihad (holy war), did the power struggle between the two reach a crisis point. Between 1529 and 1543, Muslim troops overran almost the entire Christian empire. It was, at least in part, as a result of the growing contacts between Christian Ethiopia and European Christendom, especially the Portuguese, who had dispatched an embassy to Ethiopia in 1520, that the beleaguered king, Galawdewos (1540–1559), was finally able to reverse the situation. With the help of a small, but well-armed, Portuguese contingent, the Christian forces drove the Muslims out of the central highlands. After this destructive conflict Christians and Muslims did not confront each other again in a major war.

Another important theme was the revival of the Ethiopian church, which brought Christianity to the recently subjugated parts of the empire. In many of these areas, however, the process of Christianization was superficial, and the local populations continued to adhere to their old religious beliefs and practices. This gave rise to a religious syncretism or "mixed Christianity" that was at variance with the ordinances of the Alexandrian patriarchate in Egypt but that the poorly organized Ethiopian Church was unable to tackle.

In the central regions, religious life was marked by increasingly bitter theological disputes, particularly over the observance of the Sabbath. The northern-based monastic movement founded by Ewostatewos (c.1273–1352) advocated the observance of the two Sabbaths (Saturday and Sunday), which had been proscribed by the Egyptian church. They were opposed by a strong anti-Sabbath party within the Ethiopian church, especially by the monastic order founded by Takla Haymanot (c.1215–1313) with its base at Debra Libanos in Shoa. The ensuing persecution of the followers of Ewostatewos resulted in their leading an existence almost entirely independent of both the Ethiopian church and the Alexandrian patriarchate, to whose power and prestige their persistent defiance posed a direct and highly embarrassing challenge.

By the reign of Zara Yaqob (1434–1468), the Sabbath controversy was threatening to tear the Ethiopian church apart. Accordingly, in 1450, the king convened the Council of Debra Mitmaq, which attempted to resolve the schism. The issue was decided in favor of the observance of the two Sabbaths, and a reconciliation was effected between the opposing parties. Zara Yaqob also initiated a program of religious reforms, aimed especially at stamping out the "mixed Christianity" of the peripheral regions, with limited success.

The revival of the Ethiopian church was accompanied by a blossoming of Ethiopian literature. Many of the works produced were translated from Arabic, such as the *Senkessar*, a compilation of the lives of the saints. Others were original, including the *Metshafa Berhan* (Book of Light), which is attributed to Zara Yaqob. This deals, in particular, with the Sabbath controversy and expounds the king's religious reforms, offering guidance to the Christian community, refuting heresies and attacking non-Christian practices. Another important literary genre was the royal chronicles, beginning in the reign of Amda Tsiyon with an account of his campaigns against the Muslims. These provide a remarkably rich source for the study of Ethiopian history. But the most important work of this era, although not an original Ethiopian composition, was the *Kebra Nagast* (Glory of the Kings), which was adapted to exemplify Ethiopian concepts of royal legitimacy, linking it not only to an Old Testament heritage, through

descent from Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, but also to a New Testament heritage through relationship with Christ.

Thus, under the descendants of Yekuno Amlak, the fundamental characteristics of the Christian Ethiopian state had been established. It had become an expansionist military power, the distinctive nature of Ethiopian Christianity had been defined, and in the political sphere the appropriation of concepts of royal legitimacy, given expression in the *Kebra Nagast*, and the closer identification of church with state, had greatly enhanced the prestige and power of the monarchy. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Muslim conquest, the Solomonid state was to prove surprisingly vulnerable—so much so, in fact, that it was almost completely destroyed.

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See also: Aksum, Kingdom of; Ethiopia: Aksumite Inheritance, c.850–1150; Ethiopia: Zagwe Dynasty, 1150–1270; Lalibela and Ethiopian Christianity; Religion, History of.

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Ethiopia: Shoan Plateau, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

The era of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed escalating conflict between the Christian state of the Shoan plateau and the increasingly powerful Muslim polity around Harar to the east. Muslim power expanded dramatically into the central and northern Ethiopian highlands and came close to extinguishing the Christian kingdom altogether during an invasion in the early and mid-sixteenth century. The events of the period may be seen as fundamentally shaping the subsequent religious, political, and ethnic history of the region, with the ultimate strengthening, despite the bloody clashes between them, of both Christianity and Islam across much of present-day Ethiopia.

The Christian ruler Zara Yaqob (1434–1468) sought to build on the conquests of his predecessors by creating a more stable and unified kingdom, and by encouraging the further expansion of Christianity, especially in the south. He built a more permanent capital at Debra Berhan in Shoa, and was responsible for reviving the custom of coronation at the town of Axum. In political terms, however, his reign was noted for its brutality and authoritarianism, and in attempting to impose a greater degree of unity he faced the same problems of provincialism which confronted both his predecessors and his successors. In terms of the church, similarly, Zara Yaqob tried to impose orthodoxy, codifying religious practice and attempting to give order to monastic evangelization. The kingdom expanded mainly southward, a combination of military conquest and missionary activity being employed to this end. Christian monasteries were systematically built as centers of conversion. In reality, however, little success was achieved in converting the population of newly conquered districts, particularly in the far south of the kingdom. But there were also commercial considerations behind such expansionism, as the kingdom sought to take advantage of trading networks to the east of the Shoan plateau. This would ultimately bring them into conflict with the Muslims in the area.

Zara Yaqob's death was followed by a relaxing of centralization, in large part because of provincial reaction to the unifying principle; even the capital at Debra Berhan was abandoned. The power of monarchy was undermined to some extent by the fact that the average age of kings at their accession in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was eleven. This general weakening of the Christian kingdom coincided with the revival of Muslim power to the east. Following Christian military successes in the fourteenth century, Muslim power had relocated to the Harar plateau, where the kingdom of Adal was established. Adal took great advantage of its commercially strategic position between the central Ethiopian highlands and the port of Zeila and united the existing Muslims of the area while converting large numbers of Somalis to Islam. The latter would prove a crucial source of military manpower. The newly unified Islamic state also benefited from Ottoman support, manifest mainly in the import of firearms. Through the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, conflict escalated between Christian and Muslim polities, serving to greatly disrupt the commercial system which both sides ultimately sought to control.

The Muslim army commander Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (otherwise known as Gran, "the left-handed") became effective leader of Adal in 1526. Declaring a jihad, he embarked on a systematic attempt to finally destroy the Christian kingdom of the highlands, which by now had

become highly decentralized, particularly in southern areas such as Shoa. Invading the kingdom in 1529, Ahmad's forces swept through the Christian highlands, razing churches, seizing captives, and destroying King Lebna Dengel's already fragile administrative infrastructure. Muslim governors were appointed over conquered areas, and many converts to Islam were made. Ahmad was further assisted by the fact that, in addition to the Christian kingdom's weak administration, large numbers of recently conquered Cushitic subjects of the Christian state were only too happy to give expression to their grievances, emanating from the extortions of alien overlords. In areas such as the Shoan plateau, the Christian aristocracy lived virtually independent of central government, and governorships which earlier had been appointed had become in effect hereditary. Ahmad exposed the fundamental weaknesses of the Christian polity.

Ahmad defeated a substantial Christian army at the Battle of Shimbira-Kure in 1529. Over the ensuing decade, the Christian forces were on the defensive, Lebna Dengel constantly retreating to avoid capture and desperately attempting to organize effective resistance as the Muslim army, relying on the zeal of their Somali recruits and the firearms acquired from the Turks, swiftly occupied large areas of the highlands, from Shoa to present-day Eritrea in the north. Out of desperation, Lebna Dengel appealed to Portugal for support against the common enemy of Islam. Lebna Dengel himself did not live to see the outcome of his appeal, but the Portuguese, who had had contact with the Christian state since at least the early 1520s, responded positively, providing a well-equipped force which marched inland from the Red Sea coast and joined up with the remnants of the indigenous Christian army. By this time, Ahmad's forces were severely overstretched, and there had been little effective consolidation of Muslim conquests, while some Somali soldiers, satisfied with their booty, had already begun to return home. Making effective use of his new Portuguese allies, King Galadewos (1540–1559) defeated the Muslim army in 1543; Ahmad himself was killed, whereupon the transience of his "empire" was demonstrated, as the Muslim forces began to disperse eastwards.

Galadewos recovered much of the Shoan plateau through the 1540s and early 1550s. Yet prolonged conflict had depopulated large areas and created a power vacuum in the southern highlands: this facilitated the incursion into the region of Oromo pastoralists from the grasslands adjacent to Lake Turkana. Their rapid occupation of the southern third of present-day Ethiopia was to have profound consequences for the subsequent development of the area. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Oromo, many of whom converted to Christianity and adopted settled agriculture,

had become a significant sector of the population. Others moved onto the Harar plateau where they converted to Islam and became politically as well as demographically prominent. Meanwhile the Christian kingdom, under Sarsa Dengel (1562–1597), sought consolidation and gravitated northward, a move which was at least partly occasioned by the commercial opportunities offered by the Ottoman Turks at Massawa. Both Christianity and Islam had survived the bloody clashes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

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Ethiopia: c.1550–c.1700

From contemporary sources, the picture that emerges of Ethiopia at the beginning of the sixteenth century is one of internal political stability and prosperity. This picture was to change drastically from the late 1520s as a result of many developments which took place in the country during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These developments included efforts at centralization of power in the hands of the monarch at the expense of the provincial nobility, territorial expansion, attempts at consolidating the power of the state in the conquered areas, political integration, and cultural assimilation of conquered non-Semitic peoples and areas into the culture and religion of the Semitic core. These efforts achieved varying degrees of success during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Other developments took the form of threats to the survival of the Christian empire, its culture and institutions. The threats came from both internal and external sources. The internal sources included rebellious and separatist tendencies of the regional nobility and the unyielding spirit of the conquered or incorporated peoples. External threats came from the Muslim communities to the east of the Ethiopian plateau and from the Jesuit missionaries from the Iberian countries. A further source of threat was the movement of the

Cushitic Oromo into central and northern parts of the Christian empire.

By about 1550 Ethiopia had recently emerged victorious, thanks to a Portuguese military expedition of 1541–1543, from the most devastating phase of the protracted wars with the Muslims of Adal led by Ahmad Gragn. Gragn's death in 1543 led to the collapse of Adal's hold over Ethiopia, but that did not mean the immediate end of the Muslim threat to the Christian empire, for the wars continued intermittently throughout the 1550s, 1560s, and 1570s. In the 1570s further crushing defeats of the Muslims neutralized the Muslim danger, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century the Muslims were no longer a threat to Christian Ethiopia.

Jesuit missionary activity in Ethiopia took place in the period 1557 to 1632. While it lasted, it threatened not only the unity of the state but also the existence of the Ethiopian Orthodox church as a national institution. By drawing emperor Susneyos into their fold, the Jesuits undermined the traditional ties between the state and the church because the emperor was traditionally the supreme head of the national church and was expected at all times to support and defend the church.

The period c.1550–c.1700 also saw the migration of the pastoral Oromo into the heartlands of the empire. The Oromo migration altered the demographic picture of highland Ethiopia with the infusion of large numbers of Oromo into the population; it also affected the politics of the empire because, with time, the Oromo began to participate in the politics of the empire at both the imperial court and in the provinces with far-reaching consequences.

Another development in the period 1550–1700 related to the Christian church. Like the state, the Ethiopian church faced a number of challenges that undermined its unity and impaired its effectiveness. The Muslim invasion, the Oromo migration, and the Jesuit missionary activity all posed problems to the church as a national institution. One of these problems was theological disputes, derived in part because the Jesuits challenged several aspects of the monophysite doctrines that were followed by the Ethiopian church. Following the expulsion of the Jesuits and the reconciliation between church and state, emperors Fasiladas (1632–1667) and Yohannes (1667–1682) called a number of councils of church leaders to discuss doctrine. At these councils different interpretations were given to some of the issues in dispute. The disputes were between ecclesiastics from the two leading monastic orders in the empire, the Order of Tekle-Haymanot based at Debra Libanos in Shawa and the Order of Ewostatewos based in Tigre. These disputes led to protracted religious and political schism involving the nobility in the provinces and even the emperor.

This situation continued beyond the seventeenth century into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Warfare was a major feature of the history of Ethiopia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Campaigns waged in the first half of the sixteenth century were mainly to resist the invasion of the Muslim soldiers from Adal, but with their defeat subsequent campaigns were directed at restoration, reconstruction, and consolidation of the empire. To these ends campaigns were undertaken to repulse Turkish inroads into the maritime districts of Tigre province against the Agaw, Falasha and Nilotic peoples in the north and northwest, the Sidama and the Oromo in the south. Campaigns by emperors Susneyos, Fasiladas, and Iyasu I (1682–1706) finally pacified these areas.

Some of the campaigns waged during the period 1550–1700 were directed against centrifugal forces in the empire. A number of the rulers of this period, especially Gelawdewos, Sarsa Dengel, Susneyos, Fasiladas, and Iyasu I, tried to strengthen imperial authority and centralize political power at the expense of the regional governors by reforming the military and administrative systems in the empire. The reform efforts were invariably opposed by the regional nobility and therefore did not achieve the expected results.

Another development of the period was the transfer of the imperial capital to Gondär by emperor Fasiladas in 1636. Gondär became the permanent capital for the next 200-odd years. Until then the location of the royal court of Solomonid Ethiopia was dictated by the political and or military situation in the empire.

The economy of Ethiopia during this period, as indeed in the centuries before and after, was based on agriculture. The land tenure system in Ethiopia was very complicated and differed, in its specific details, from one province to another and sometimes even within the same province. Basically there were two types of land tenure system: *rest* ownership and *gult* ownership. *Rest* land tended to be owned by families rather than individuals and therefore heritable within the family. *Gult* land, on the other hand, was not inheritable. The holder was entitled to a share of the land's production but did not technically own the land. In terms of land tenure, there were two classes: the land owner/holder class and the landless tenant farmer class (*gabbar*). The former did not participate directly in working on the land but lived off the labor of the *gabbar*.

Besides agriculture, trade, both local and international, was of considerable importance. The emperor participated in the trade through royal agents and also, along with the ruling class, derived revenue from it through taxation. For many centuries Ethiopia traded with Arabia, India, and the Mediterranean world via the Red Sea port of Massawa. Also trade routes developed from the Gulf of Aden to the interior of the Horn

of Africa. Despite military turmoil in the area during this period three main trade routes between the coast and the plateau were in use throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were also overland trade routes to Egypt through northern and northwestern Ethiopia. All these international trade routes linked up with internal routes which radiated from southwestern Ethiopia; this area was the main source of nearly all the trade goods originating from Ethiopia.

Trade goods from Ethiopia included slaves, ivory, gold, wax, civet, and coffee; these were exchanged for military items such as swords, helmets, spearheads, muskets, and nonmilitary luxury goods like silk brocades, cushions and carpets. The trade was mainly by barter; goods were exchanged for gold, salt bars (*amole*), iron, cloth, and other items. The value of these media of exchange varied from one province to another depending on distance from source of supply. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an indigenous mercantile class did not develop in Ethiopia. For this reason the long-distance trade was in the hands of aliens, mostly Muslims for whom the Islamic religion and the Arabic language served as major assets in dealing with merchants from the Muslim world.

R. H. KOFI DARKWAH

See also: Ethiopia: Portuguese and, Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries; Ethiopia: Solomonid Dynasty, 1270–1550.

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Ethiopia: Portuguese and, Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Ethiopia established relations with Portugal. There were three aspects to this relationship; diplomatic (1520–1526), military (1541–1543) and religious (1557–1632).

In 1520 a Portuguese diplomatic mission was sent to Ethiopia to establish friendship with its ruler. This was in response to an Ethiopian diplomatic mission sent to the Portuguese in 1512 by Empress Eleni. The background to the Portuguese mission was the

European desire to form an alliance with the fabled Prester John, identified at this time with the king of Ethiopia. This alliance was aimed at opposing Muslim control over the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean trade route to the East. With the revival of trade on this route from the fifteenth century, its control by Muslim Turkey became a matter of great concern to Christian Europe, especially Portugal, which by the early sixteenth century had established a trading empire in the East. The sixteenth century also saw the founding of the Jesuit order by Ignatius Loyola, with the goal of resisting Muslim expansion into the Christian world through intensive Catholic missionary activity. Thus commercial interests and a religious crusading spirit combined to pit Christian Portugal against Muslim Turkey in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the lands bordering these international commercial waterways.

The Portuguese diplomatic mission to Ethiopia in 1520 paved the way for subsequent military and religious contacts. After a stay of six years the embassy returned to Portugal. From then, periodic correspondence passed between the rulers of the two countries. One such correspondence was from Emperor Lebna Dengel of Ethiopia (1508–1540) to King John III of Portugal (1521–1557) asking for military help in his war against Ethiopia's Muslim neighbors. A Portuguese military expedition was sent to Ethiopia in 1540.

The military expedition from Portugal consisted of approximately 400 armed troops. In two engagements in 1541, the Muslim forces were defeated, but the Muslim leader won a crushing victory over the Portuguese in 1542. However, in another engagement at Wayna Daga in Dembiya in February 1543, a combined force of the Portuguese remnants and of the new emperor Gelawdewos (1540–1559) inflicted a devastating defeat on the Muslim troops, leaving their leader, Gragn, among the dead on the battlefield. Gragn's death led to the disintegration of his army and the collapse of his Muslim administration on the highland. In this way the Portuguese expedition helped to save the Christian kingdom from total extinction and ensure its continued survival.

The third element in the Ethiopian-Portuguese relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was religious and, like the Muslim jihad of Gragn, also threatened the survival of orthodox Christian Ethiopia. This was the attempt by Jesuit missionaries, with the support of Emperor Susneyos (1607–1632), to convert monophysite Ethiopia to the Roman Catholic faith. The diplomatic and military relations between the two countries drew the attention of the Jesuit missionaries to Ethiopia. Some priests had accompanied both the embassy of 1520–1526 and the military expedition of 1540–1543, but serious missionary activity began in

1557 with the arrival in Ethiopia of Andre de Oviedo, appointed bishop of Ethiopia two years earlier. The Jesuit interlude lasted from 1557 to 1632. The Ethiopian emperors of the sixteenth century were sensitive to the disruptive effect the Jesuit activities could have on the established culture of the Ethiopian church and state. For this reason Jesuit missionary efforts received no official encouragement throughout the sixteenth century.

During the reign of Emperor Susneyos (1607–1632), however, the Jesuit missionary activity received official backing from the emperor. Susneyos is portrayed by scholars as a great admirer of learning, and contemptuous of the ignorance and shallowness of the Ethiopian clergy. He was believed to have been attracted to the Jesuits by their learning. Guided by the Jesuit leaders Pedro Paez and Alphonso Mendez, Susneyos encouraged his royal soldiers and court nobles to become Roman Catholic. In 1625 he himself converted to the new faith. He then proceeded to suppress the sacred customs and practices of the Ethiopian church and replaced these with Roman Catholic practices. It has to be remembered that most of the traditional customs that the Jesuits condemned were not just religious practices but in fact formed part of the very basis of the society. To abolish them therefore was to undermine the very foundations of the Ethiopian society. For this reason the emperor's pro-Catholic policy alienated his subjects, clergy, nobility, and ordinary Christians alike. Opposition to the emperor's religious policy expressed itself in widespread rebellions throughout the empire; the country was thus plunged into a bloody civil war, which in the end forced the emperor to reverse his policy and restore the customs and practices he had prohibited. Thus frustrated Emperor Susneyos abdicated his throne in favor of his son Fasiladas.

Fasiladas (1632–1667) restored the Ethiopian church and expelled the Jesuits from the country. Ethiopian converts who persisted in the Catholic faith were persecuted. These measures brought the immediate danger from the Jesuits to an end, though its ripples were felt in the country for the next two centuries. This was because the Jesuit intervention gave a new dimension and intensity to already existing theological disputations in the Ethiopian church. These doctrinal controversies threatened unity in both church and state right into the nineteenth century.

The Jesuit presence in Ethiopia was, however, not all negative in its consequences. Among its positive impacts especially during the time Pedro Paez was bishop (1603–1622) was the stimulation of theological discussion, a challenge that forced the Ethiopian clergy to reach out to the people by operating in Amharic instead of Geez, the official church language, which was hardly understood by the mass of the people.

Shortlived though this was, it stimulated constructive debate between Coptic and Catholic clergy.

Another positive impact connected with the theological debate was the upsurge of literary production by the Ethiopian clergy. Among these were historical accounts of the reigns of emperors Galawdewos (1540–1559), Sartsa Dengel (1563–1597), and Susneyos (1607–1632), as well as *History of the Galla* by the monk Bahrey; there were also theological works, which included *Fekkare Malakot* (Explanation of the Divinity), *Mazgaba Haymanots* (Treasury of Faith), *Sawana Mafs* (Refuge of Soul), and *Haymanot Abaw* (Faith of the Fathers). The first listed of these works discusses the problem of the knowledge of God, while the rest focus on the arguments of the Coptic clergy in favor of the monophysite belief.

Another aspect of the impact was artistic, visual, and architectural in nature and took the form of paintings of church murals and book illuminations depicting religious stories. Many of these were produced in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; many of them were modeled on foreign ones but adapted to the Ethiopian traditional style of art.

Notwithstanding its positive impact, the Jesuit interlude in Ethiopia is remembered for the divisive destructive civil wars into which it plunged the country in the early decades of the seventeenth century.

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See also: Ethiopia, c.1550–c.1700; Ethiopia: Shoan Plateau, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.

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Ethiopia: Eighteenth Century

In 1700 Ethiopia was in a period of cultural revival and political vigor. In 1800 it was fragmented and in cultural and political crisis. The middle decades of the century witnessed the political dominance of one of the remarkable women in all of Ethiopian history, the empress, or *yetégé*, Mentewwab.

The century opened with the last years of the reign of Emperor Iyasu I, also known as “the Great.” Iyasu had come to the throne in 1682, inheriting it from his father and grandfather in peaceful succession. He was an active, reforming ruler, and very involved in church questions. In 1705 he led a large military expedition south of the Blue Nile, attempting to reassert both Ethiopian rule and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity in the Gibé region. The expedition was a failure. Not long after, in 1706, he was deposed by one of his sons and then murdered. His death, and the manner of it, introduced a fifteen-year period of confusion and uncertainty.

The Gibé River bounded a number of small kingdoms, with roots centuries back into the past. For hundreds of years it had acted as a collecting point for some of the region’s most valuable exports—in those years slaves and the musk of civet cats. It had also provided generous tribute in gold to the Ethiopian emperors. With the Oromo migrations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its earlier kingdoms disappeared. Iyasu’s expedition was designed to re-assert imperial dominance in the region and it failed, leaving the Gibé almost 150 years of autonomous political development. In the course of the eighteenth century, while the fate of the Ethiopian court in Gondär waxed and waned, a number of the Oromo societies of the Gibé slowly developed monarchical institutions. These little states were keenly oriented toward trade, but their rulers also showed themselves equally interested in the wealth which could be extracted from the land. By the end of the eighteenth century, there was a cluster of five states in the Gibé, the best known of which was Jemma.

Iyasu was succeeded by three sons, a brother, and a nephew. Several of them met violent deaths. Gondär, the capital city, was wracked by violent controversies over Christian theology. Bandits and thieves reappeared in the countryside. Three different pretenders laid claim to the throne.

This unstable period came to an end with the succession of Emperor Bäkaffa, a harsh and violent man, in 1721. Bäkaffa, in turn, was succeeded in 1730 by a son, Iyasu II (often known as “the Little,” by contrast with his grandfather). Iyasu II ruled for twenty-five years, following which the throne passed peacefully to his son, Iyo’as, who reigned for another fourteen years. The real power in the country during the reigns of Iyasu and Iyo’as was Iyasu’s mother, a consort of Bäkaffa called Mentewwab. In a step unprecedented in Ethiopian history, Mentewwab had herself co-crowned with her son and then with her grandson. Behind a façade of demure femininity, Mentewwab had a firm grasp on the organs of state, which she controlled through a web of male relatives. Mentewwab’s era saw

a second revival of the arts, following that of the seventeenth century, most notably in painting. The empress was an active manipulator of land and founder of churches. Her most important foundation was Débré Séhay Qwesqwam, a magnificent church in Gondér, which set an example of church foundation which was followed for the rest of the century.

In 1752 the Ethiopian court entertained three Franciscan missionaries, but when their presence became publicly known, they were expelled. Ethiopia was still suffering under the trauma created by the Jesuit intervention of the early seventeenth century. Iyasu’s nephew, Yostos (r.1711–1716), had harbored three Roman Catholic missionaries, who, when their presence was discovered, were stoned to death.

Ethiopia found it difficult to deal with foreign Christians in part because its own Christian community was so divided. From the 1660s onward a series of increasingly acrimonious councils were held to resolve questions of Christian doctrine provoked by the preaching of the Jesuits. These controversies were important in the assassination both of Iyasu the Great and of his son and successor. There were two main parties in the seventeenth century, but, in the latter years of Mentewwab, a third party joined them. Church quarrels took on political significance through the regional attachments of their leaders in the great monasteries. Orthodox Christianity, one of the constituents of the Ethiopian state throughout the Solomonic period, was no longer a source of unity, but rather of division and conflict.

The era of Mentewwab ended violently. The empress herself was shunted aside into retirement, but her grandson, Iyo’as, was assassinated in 1769. The year is conventionally taken as the start of the “Era of the Princes,” a period likened by the Ethiopian chroniclers to the era of the biblical judges, “when there was no king in Israel.” Emperor followed emperor, made and unmade by powerful regional nobles, none of whom proved strong enough to impose his will on all the others. Emperor Téklé Giyorgis, who ruled no fewer than six times between 1779 and 1800, received the nickname “Ender of the Kingdom.” From about 1780 to 1855, when the period ended, the nominal Solomonic rulers were shadow kings, without dignity, wealth, comfort, or substance.

The kingdom was now in the hands of the great lords. Some of them descended from provincial lineages of considerable antiquity. The dominant group, however, was of Oromo origin. Mentewwab had married her son, Iyasu, to an Oromo woman from the province of Wéllo, on the eastern side of the highlands, and on coming to the court she brought her relatives with her. They proved unsuccessful in the civil wars of the 1770s and 1780s, but another Oromo group, led by

one Ali, from a neighboring territory, did prevail. From the 1780s to the 1850s Ali and his descendants dominated the Ethiopian kingdom from their new capital at Débré Tabor.

DONALD CRUMMEY

See also: Ethiopia, c.1550–c.1700; Ethiopia: Early Nineteenth Century; Massawa, Ethiopia, and the Ottoman Empire.

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
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Ethiopia: Early Nineteenth Century

Ethiopia entered the nineteenth century more divided than it had been for many centuries. The Solomonic kings who traced their dynasty back to 1270 and beyond it to biblical origins were now powerless puppet kings, without authority. Instead of a national royal court, the country was now ruled by a number of competing regional lords, whose relations were precariously balanced and who often fell to fighting the one with the other.

The church was similarly divided. Controversies over the nature of Christ had arisen in the seventeenth century, in the aftermath of a twenty-year period of intensive exposure to Portuguese Jesuit missionaries. These controversies slowly formed themselves into distinct schools, each of which was particularly strong within one or other of the country's two major monastic traditions. Many church councils were held during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to resolve the controversies, but without effect. In 1763 a third sectarian party appeared. These theological divisions undermined the authority of the bishops of the church and reinforced the divisive competition of the regional lords. For three decades this state of division and weakness had few strategic consequences. However, in the 1830s Ethiopia began to feel the pressure of a modernizing, expanding Egypt; and Ethiopians soon became aware of the transformations which were taking place in Europe, which presented both opportunities and challenges to their country.

In 1800 the most powerful man in Ethiopia was *Ras Gugsä*, a representative of the *Wérréshék* dynasty, which had originated on the eastern edge of the plateau in *Yéjju* province, and whose power drew on the neighboring, Muslim province of *Wéllo*. The *Wérréshék* were Christians, but as their collective name (*shék* = *shaykh* or *sheikh*) and the names of some of their rulers



Ethiopia, nineteenth century.

(Ali) suggest, they were much influenced by Islam. Conservative Christians viewed this as a threat to the country's cultural legacy. The *Wérréshék* ruled from Débré Tabor in the central highlands, and they controlled the puppet rulers of Gondér. Their dominance was challenged by a number of rivals. The most enduring were to the north and the south. To the north the rulers of Tigre province maintained a degree of independence, as, to a lesser extent, did the rulers of Gojjam to the south. Both Tigre and Gojjam viewed themselves as Christian heartland. Still other rivals appeared in the regions to the west and north of Gondér. One prince of the early nineteenth century, *Däjjazmach* Maru, created a very large fiefdom which was known for many years after his death as *YäMaru Qemes*, "What Maru tasted."

These regional rivalries came together in two climactic battles: at Débré Abbay in southwestern Tigre in 1831 and at Débré Tabor in 1842. Tens of thousands of men participated in these battles in which the principal weapons were spears and swords. Cavalry was important and firearms were also used. However, in these years Ethiopians were still using outdated muskets, of uncertain reliability and effectiveness. Both these battles involved all the major lords of the day, and, although both the *Wérréshék* ruler and his Tigre rival died at Débré Abbay, neither of them fundamentally shifted the balance of power. However, Ethiopian rulers were increasingly turning to external sources to buttress their positions and promote their ambitions. Preparing for the Battle of Débré Abbay, *Däjjazmach* Webé arranged for the patriarch of

Alexandria to send him a bishop, *Abunä Sélama*, who made propaganda on his behalf, denouncing the Wérréshék as Muslim usurpers. The gambit failed and Webé lost the battle.

Webé's overture to Egypt was not the only action involving Egypt in Ethiopian affairs. In the 1820s Egypt had conquered Sudan, and their enlarging rule there brought them in the mid-1830s to the Ethiopian borderlands. Frontier tussles created alarm in some conservative Christian circles in Ethiopia and a general awareness that the strategic isolation which Ethiopia had known for two hundred years was now coming to an end.

Europeans were also now making themselves known again in Ethiopia. Portuguese Jesuits had been of great influence in the years from 1603 to 1632. They had succeeded in converting the royal court, which plunged the country into bitter civil war. In reaction, the Jesuits were expelled and contacts with Europeans were strictly controlled. However, by the early nineteenth century those controls no longer obtained. Sustained contact between Ethiopia and western Europe started in 1830 with the arrival of the Protestant missionary Samuel Gobat and in 1839 with the arrival of the Roman Catholic missionary Justin de Jacobis. While neither of these missionaries had striking evangelical success, both became involved in promoting relations between their respective protecting powers, Britain and France, and Ethiopia. The number of European travelers climbed steadily through the 1830s and 1840s, some of the travelers producing reports of value even today. Various Ethiopian lords protected and promoted the travelers in the hopes of benefiting from their knowledge and contacts.

Given the multiple rivalries involved (Ethiopian lords with one another, European powers with one another) and Egypt's continual growth as a regional power, the situation was one of increasing danger for Ethiopia's national integrity and independence. A number of Ethiopian lords began to think of promoting themselves as new national leaders. For example, *Däjjazmach* Webé, undaunted by his failure in the Battle of Débré Tabor, aspired to make himself king (*negus* in the Amharic). While this would not fully have restored the Solomonic order, it would have placed him on a footing that none of his rivals could claim. This ambition, too, was frustrated.

The period of disunity ended suddenly. *Däjjazmach* Kassa, one of the lords of Ethiopia's western frontier, who had confronted directly the Egyptians, and who was connected to the heirs of *YäMaru Qemes*, in a dramatic series of battles between 1852 and 1855, defeated all the other great lords of the central highlands. His last victim was Webé, and, immediately following his defeat of Webé, Kassa had himself crowned as

Téwodros II, in the church that Webé had probably built for his own coronation. But unlike Webé, Kassa was crowned as king of kings, thereby claiming the Solomonic legacy.

DONALD CRUMMEY

See also: **Ethiopia: Eighteenth Century.**

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Ethiopia: Tewodros II, Era of (1855–1868)

Emperor Tewodros fought his way to the throne and, ultimately, proved unable to find a peaceful basis for his rule. He committed suicide at his fortress retreat of Mäqdäla rather than surrender to a British expeditionary force sent to free Europeans he had taken as hostages. By that point, his effective rule had been limited to the immediate vicinity of his army.

His rise to power and his early years of rule were dramatic. In a succession of battles starting in 1852, he defeated all the major lords in Ethiopia, and following the last of those battles had himself crowned by the bishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, *Abunä Sélama*. The suddenness and completeness of his rise amazed contemporaries. So, too, did the aura of reform with which he surrounded himself. His chosen throne name referred to a medieval prophecy that foretold the coming of a king called Tewodros, who would do mighty deeds and usher in an era of prolonged peace. His early reforms were morality-based. He attacked the decadence into which Ethiopia had fallen during the previous century. He also promised to restore Ethiopia's national institutions, monarchy and church, and to recover ancient national territory. The British consul in Ethiopia, Walter Plowden, gave a secular interpretation to the reforms, claiming that the emperor intended to "end the feudal system," to institute a regular system for paying for his administration and army, and to open relations with Europe in the interest of importing European technology.

Tewodros did pursue European technology. In 1856 he received the first of a small group of Protestant missionaries. He installed them at a place called Gafat, not

far from Débré Tabor, where he frequently resided himself, and set them to road building and metal casting. His interest increasingly narrowed to military technology. The missionaries forged for him a giant mortar, which he dragged across country to Méqdéla, where it may still be seen.

The emperor's complex relations with the church demanded time and attention. The church was central to his vision of a renewed Ethiopia, but it was in need of leadership. Normally it was headed by one bishop, a Copt appointed by the patriarch of Alexandria, and its faith was the faith of Alexandria. However, following a seventeenth-century encounter with European Roman Catholic Jesuits, new schools of thought began to develop within the church. These eventually crystallized into three parties, the smallest of which identified itself with the bishop. Relations between the parties were often rancorous and occasionally violent. As a result of his efforts to impose Alexandrian doctrine, Sélama had been roughly expelled from Gondér in 1846. One of the emperor's first political acts in 1854, even before he was crowned, was to recall the bishop from his exile to the national capital, Gondér. Together they pronounced uniformity of doctrine and an end to sectarianism. Tewodros also gave Sélama a degree of administrative authority within the church, which none of his predecessors had enjoyed for a long time.

These happy relations between church and state did not last long. By 1856 emperor and bishop had fallen into public acrimony. The issue was church land. During the Gondér period (1632 to late eighteenth century) a good deal of land had passed into the hands of the church as grants from national and regional rulers. These grants were endowments for individual churches intended to provide an income to support the material needs of the churches, as well as the upkeep of the clergy. Some of these lands had previously been under military tenures. The emperor wanted to recover the lands to generate the revenues necessary to support his army. On this issue there could be no agreement between the emperor and the bishop. It appears that around 1860 the emperor tried to limit to each church the amount of land necessary to support the minimal number of clergy required to perform the Mass. For some churches, which had well over two hundred clergy attached to them, this meant quite a reduction. It is unclear what practical effect this measure had, although it did deeply alienate the bishop from the emperor and must have turned the clergy into very active opponents of the crown.

The emperor needed a large army, because establishing and maintaining his rule proved difficult. Shortly after his coronation he embarked on an expedition through the provinces of Wéllo and Shéwa designed to bring these two provinces back under imperial control. They presented different problems. The

province now known as Wéllo had, in the thirteenth century, been the homeland of the Amhara people and the Solomonic dynasty. However, migrations and settlement of the Oromo people in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries resulted in the prolonged alienation of the province from national control and its conversion from Christianity to Islam. Wéllo was also the base for the dynasty which controlled the central provinces during the late decades of the period of national division. Shéwa, by contrast, had survived as a Christian, Amhara territory, but beyond imperial control, because of the buffer created by the Oromo. In the short term, the expedition was a resounding success, but it was a long-term failure. Tewodros seems never to have had a firm grip on Wéllo and frequently had to return there for bitter campaigning. Given his distractions with the church and the continuing problems of control in Wéllo, other provinces also raised the banner of rebellion, and the reign of Tewodros, far from being the prophesied millennium of peace, was turning into a period of violence.

The emperor continued to hope for productive, progressive relations with Europe, particularly Britain, but when the British neglected to respond to a formal overture of his in 1862, he began to make hostages of the British-protected foreigners in Ethiopia. The result was the British expedition that created the circumstances of his death in April 1868. He left behind an Ethiopia divided and unreformed.

DONALD CRUMMEY

See also: **Ethiopia: Johannes IV, Era of; Ethiopia: Menelik II, Era of.**

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Ethiopia: Johannes IV, Era of (1868–1889)

Three great emperors ruled Ethiopia in the second half of the nineteenth century: Tewodros II (1855–1868), Johannes IV (1872–1889), and Menilik (1889–1913). Their policies revived the imperial power and authority.

Emperor Tewodros's death in 1868 was followed by a power struggle from which *Dajazmach* Kasa Mercha of Tigre province emerged victorious, thanks to the firearms he received from Lord Napier after defeating Tewodros, and was crowned as Emperor Johannes IV in January 1872. He remained emperor until his death in March 1889.

Johannes' reign was marked by reforms and warfare against both internal and external threats to his government and country. In domestic political affairs Johannes' goal was to strengthen imperial authority against provincial nobles and maintain the hegemony of Tigre, his native province, in the country. In religious matters Johannes was an ardent supporter of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, encouraging unity of religion and uniformity of doctrine. His foreign policy aimed to safeguard the sovereignty of his empire. His strategies for achieving his aims differed in some important respects from those employed by Tewodros. For example, unlike Tewodros, he did not seek to achieve his domestic political objective through centralization of power. Instead he established a loose federation in which, in return for recognition of his suzerainty and payment of tribute, considerable autonomy was given to the provinces of Shawa and Gojjam. However, to realize his domestic political and external objectives Johannes engaged in many military campaigns against both domestic and external foes.

Johannes spent the first three years of his reign consolidating his authority in Tigre. He needed a strong united Tigre as the power base of his imperial government. This involved him and his faithful general, Ras Alula, in campaigns against ambitious local nobility and troublesome district governors. Typical examples of such people were *Dajjach* Walda Mikael Solomon, governor of Hamasen, *Dajjach* Dabbab Araya, Johannes' own cousin, and *Dajjach* Sebhat Aregawi of Agame. By 1875 Johannes had secured his authority in Tigre, Amhara, Bagemder, and the rest of the northern heartland of the empire. He had also received the allegiance of Ras Adal Tasamma, ruler of Gojjam province, whom he later elevated as *negus* Takla Haymanot.

Between 1875 and 1878 Johannes made at least two attempts to secure the allegiance of Menilik, the ruler of Shaw, but on each occasion he had to abandon the projected attack to attend to threats to his authority in Tigre. Menilik was the greatest domestic threat to Johannes' position as emperor; he was the strongest ruler in the empire besides Johannes and had imperial ambitions himself. Although from 1868 to 1872 he did not compete seriously for the throne, mainly because of his relative military weakness against the other contestants, he styled himself "King of Kings" and was

believed to be conspiring with Egypt and later Italy against Johannes. Moreover, he conquered Wallo province to the north of Shawa and expanded his territory southward into Oromo-occupied areas. These conquests increased Menilik's power and resource base within the empire. Menilik's imperial ambitions threatened Johannes' position.

In 1877 Johannes marched to Shawa to force the province into submission. This time he was successful. In March 1878 Menilik made a formal submission to Johannes, recognized the emperor's suzerainty, and agreed to pay tribute. In return Johannes officially crowned Menilik as *negus* of Shawa and confirmed his conquests in Wallo and the south.

However, Menilik did not abandon his imperial ambitions. He intensified his conquests in the south; at the Battle of Embabo in June 1882, Menilik defeated and captured the *negus* of Gojjam, with whom he had competed for the southwestern territories. This was a setback for Emperor Johannes, who in 1881 had crowned Ras Adal of Gojjam as *Negus* Takla Haymanot of Gojjam and Kafa to counterbalance the growing strength of Menilik. Johannes imposed peace on his two rival subjects and confiscated from Menilik not only the Gojjamese weapons he had captured but also the province of Wallo. But as a conciliatory gesture Johannes married his (young) son, Ras Araya Sellasie, to Menilik's (even younger) daughter, Zawditu in 1883. From then until his death in March 1889 Johannes lived in a state of uneasy peace with Menilik.

In 1878 Emperor Johannes, as a strong supporter of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, convened a religious conference to settle doctrinal disputes within the church. The conference affirmed one Ethiopian Orthodox Church, imposed doctrinal uniformity by recognizing the *Qarra Haymanot* (two-birth) doctrine as Orthodox teaching, and decreed that within five years all non-Christians in the empire should convert to Christianity. A year later, Johannes ordered the expulsion of Catholic missionaries from Shawa.

In his dealings with outside powers, Johannes' main concern was to safeguard the independence and frontiers of his empire against foreign encroachment. Such encroachments came from Egyptians, Italians, and Mahdist Sudan.

In 1868 Egypt took over from the Ottomans the Red Sea port of Massawa and others in the Gulf of Aden and began to expand into Ethiopian territory, occupying Bogos and other areas. This brought Egypt into conflict with Emperor Johannes. In 1875 Egypt sent three expeditions into Ethiopia, one from Massawa towards Tigre and two from the Somali coast towards Harar and Shawa respectively. The one to Harar successfully reached and occupied the town in October, but the one to Shawa ended disastrously before reaching

its destination. The one from Massawa led to two battles at Gundat in November 1875 and Gura in March 1876, both of which Johannes won. After 1876 uneasy peace existed between Ethiopia and Egypt until the Treaty of Adwa (1884) led to Egyptian withdrawal from Massawa, Bogos and other occupied areas in the Red Sea and Somali territories.

Johannes' efforts to establish friendly relations with European powers yielded little positive results. Italy, for example, had colonial ambitions in the Red Sea and Somali region and was secretly encouraged by Britain to occupy Massawa in 1885 on the withdrawal of the Egyptians. From Massawa the Italians, like the Egyptians before them, advanced inland occupying places in Ethiopian's coastal district. This brought them into conflict with Ras Alula, Johannes' governor of the district, who annihilated Italian troops at Dogali in January 1887. The Italian problem was not resolved before Johannes died in March 1889.

Mahdist Sudan was another intruder against whom Johannes had to defend his western frontiers. After their overthrow of Egyptian rule, the Mahdists launched a jihad against Christian Ethiopia. Between 1885 and 1889 a number of battles were fought between the two countries on their common border areas. In one such battle, fought at Matamma in March 1889, Ethiopia was victorious, but Emperor Johannes was mortally wounded; he died from his wounds a few days later.

Probably the least innovative of Ethiopia's three great nineteenth-century rulers, Johannes nevertheless oversaw modest reforms. For example, in the area of scientific medicine, mercury preparations for treatment of syphilis and vaccine inoculation against smallpox were introduced during his reign. In other areas, modern firearms came into more extensive use during his reign. Johannes successfully asserted the authority of the imperial government at home, restored unity to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and managed to hold foreign intruders at bay. In these and other ways Johannes prepared the ground for Menelik's successful reign.

R. H. KOFI DARKWAH

See also: Ethiopia: Menelik II, Era of; Ethiopia: Tewodros II, Era of.

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Ethiopia: Menelik II: Era of

The nineteenth century in Africa began with processes of African state formation throughout the continent and ended with European colonial conquest. Africans could neither sustain their newly created states (such as the states born out of the Mfecane in Southern Africa) or rejuvenated ones (like Egypt), nor keep European imperialism at bay. By the time Africa was under the colonial occupation of seven European powers at the beginning of the twentieth century, only Ethiopia and Liberia remained sovereign African states. Sliced and mutilated by France and Britain, Liberia entered the twentieth century as a diminished sovereign state. Ethiopia, under the leadership of Emperor Menelik II, not only withstood the colonial onslaught of Italy by coming out victorious at the Battle of Adwa, but doubled its territory by the beginning of the twentieth century.

Menelik's Ethiopia consisted of three major parts that were brought under his overall authority. First was the Ethiopia of the Ge'ez civilization marked by the tripartite distinction of *beta mangest* (house of state), *beta kehenat* (house of clergy), and *gabbar* (tribute-paying peasant). The second component of Menelik's Ethiopia was the southern highlands, the area inhabited mostly by the Oromos, who practiced mixed economy of agriculture and pastoralism. Some Oromos had become Muslims while others have had their own "traditional" religion. Lastly was the hot lowlands of eastern Ethiopia inhabited by Muslims, mainly the Somali. It was these three major areas, alongside the cultural complex of southern Ethiopia and the long region bordering the Sudan, that were brought under central rule by Emperor Menelik.



The mountains near Adowa, Ethiopia. © Das Fotoarchiv.

There are three main reasons that enabled Ethiopia to withstand the colonial onslaught: religion, statehood, and diplomacy. In the sphere of religion, the established Judeo-Christian culture, and the sense of uniqueness and of being God's chosen people, together with the ideology of a monophysite Christian island surrounded by religious enemies, helped cement a distinct unifying identity. This Christian nationalism was critical in mobilizing the population against foreign invasion.

Declarations of war mobilizations against foreign invasions invoked three sacred causes to die for: religion, land, and wife. The enemy was described as one that came from afar to destroy the religion, occupy the land, and defile the honor of wives. The view that Ethiopia is the land of a unique Christianity, a second Jerusalem, was a powerful force in cementing national consensus for mobilization against foreign invaders, including the Italians at the Battle of Adwa. Another key factor was that Ethiopia possessed the longest indigenous history of statehood in Africa. This state was based on a professional class of armed men specializing in the art of war-making, the *watadar* or *chawa*. Also, Menelik's genius in the diplomatic and military field helped Ethiopia avert the colonial "Scramble." By playing European powers off against each other, and by importing a large quantity of arms from various sources, Menelik was able to create the largest and best-equipped army in Africa. At the 1902 military parade held in Addis Ababa to commemorate the Battle of Adwa, 600,000 troops armed with modern weapons were present. Of these, 90,000 belonged to the imperial standing army. There were an additional 100,000 troops that did not participate at the parade, bringing Ethiopia's total military strength to 700,000. Menelik's Ethiopia was the best-armed and most organized African state of its time. It was this formidable force that saved Ethiopia from falling victim to the "Scramble."

Of the many accomplishments of Emperor Menelik II, his victory over the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in March 1896 stands out. The victory came in the midst of the great famine, *kefu qan* (bad times), that killed many people and consumed over 90 per cent of the cattle population. The rinderpest epidemic introduced into Massawa in 1885 by the Italians ravaged the cattle population of the eastern part of Africa from the Red Sea to South Africa.

As king of Shawa, Menelik was on friendly terms with the Italians. After the death of Emperor Yohannes IV on March 10, 1889, at the Battle of Matamma (against the Mahdist forces), Menelik signed the Treaty of Wuchale with the Italians on May 2, 1889. Controversy soon emerged on the interpretation of article 17 of the treaty. While the Amharic text reads that Menelik could, if he wished, call upon the services of the Italian authorities in his communications with

other powers, the Italian version made this obligatory, thereby making Ethiopia in effect a protectorate of Italy. The Italians crossed the river Marab, the boundary separating their colony of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and occupied the town of Adwa in January 1890. The Italian move was meant to put pressure on Emperor Menelik to accept their interpretation of the Treaty of Wuchale. Menelik refused to accept the Italian interpretation. Finally, on February 12, 1893, Menelik denounced the Treaty of Wuchale. He declared national mobilization on September 17, 1895. On March 1, 1896, the Battle of Adwa took place, the result of which was a spectacular Ethiopian victory over Italian forces. After Menelik's victory at Adwa, the Italians signed the Treaty of Peace on October 26, 1896, at Addis Ababa which annulled the Wuchale treaty. In the treaty, the Italians recognized the independence of Ethiopia. Menelik recognized the Italian colony of Eritrea. The Marab River was reaffirmed as the boundary separating Italian Eritrea from Ethiopia.

Ethiopia was transformed under Emperor Menelik. The major signposts of modernization were put in place. Schools, hospitals, roads, railway lines, telephones, a postal system, telegraphs, banks, hotels, and a ministerial cabinet were established during his reign. Menelik II was a modernizer, following in the footsteps of the early modernizer and unifier of Ethiopia, Emperor Tewodros II (r.1855–1868). The political map of today's Ethiopia is Menelik's creation.

TESHALE TIBEBU

See also: **Ethiopia: Tewodros II, Era of; Mfecane; Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640.**

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Ethiopia: Italian Invasion and Occupation: 1935–1940

The Italian attempts to invade Ethiopia date back to the end of the nineteenth century, following the establishment of the first Italian colony, Eritrea. Over-ambitious colonial plans led Italy to an excruciating defeat at Adwa in 1896, which forced the Italian government to radically change its political attitudes towards Ethiopia and to

undertake a more reliable and realistic colonial policy. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Italian “empire” was limited to Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia.

However, the advent of the fascist regime in Italy in 1922 represented the beginning of a new phase for Italian colonialism. Expansionist ambitions toward Ethiopia were caused by the need to solve the problem of an ever-growing population and increasing unemployment in Italy, which tripled between 1926 and 1928. The myth of the Italian “race,” the cult of the motherland, and a perceived Italian moral duty to construct an empire rooted in Roman times constituted the foundations of Mussolini’s ideological framework, which he used to justify his colonial policy. The fascist regime prepared the colonizers through the activities of government bodies, institutions, and organs of propaganda that were set up with the aim of forming a “colonial consciousness,” which Italian policy had been so far lacking. In 1935 with Mussolini’s motto “imperialism is the eternal and unchangeable law of life,” Italy inaugurated her new colonial campaign.

As early as December 1934, Italy occupied a territory fallen within the Ethiopian side of the borderline between Ethiopia and Italian Somalia. This event, known as the “Walwal incident,” is considered the starting point of the Italo-Ethiopian war, and occurred with the implied consent of France and Britain. In autumn 1935, military operations were carried out in northeast and southern Ethiopia. On May 5, 1936, Italian troops entered Addis Ababa, thanks to their superior numbers, to a widespread use of mustard-gas, which had been banned in 1925 by the Geneva Convention of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and to the weak policy of the League of Nations. In May 1936 the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, chose exile in Bath, England. Reactions to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia were worldwide, from African countries to Europe. Among international public opinion, Ethiopia was seen as the only independent African country and became the symbol of the Pan-African movement.

It was only through the constant use of violence and repression that the Italians seemed to be able to control the situation in Ethiopia. Indeed, widespread Ethiopian resistance generated frustration and strain among the Italian soldiers. Fear and “shame” of the possibility of losing Ethiopia was to such an extent that Mussolini ordered Graziani, the viceroy, to establishing a “regime of absolute dread.” That year (1937) was one of the most difficult and violent years for the Italian army in Ethiopia. It culminated with one of the cruelest episodes in Ethiopian history: the attempt on Graziani’s life in February 1937. During a ceremony, Viceroy Graziani was wounded by seven hand grenades thrown by the partisans. The executors of the plot were two Eritreans, Abraham Deboch and Mogos

Asghedom, working for the Italian administration. Fascist reprisals came immediately: many huts in Addis Ababa were set ablaze, people killed in the streets, many partisans arrested and deported in the Italian prisons or executed. Furthermore, many partisans’ heads and corpses were publicly displayed in order to terrify the population. It has been calculated that in three days approximately 3,000 to 6,000 people were killed in Addis Ababa alone. The attempt on Graziani’s life is widely regarded as the turning point in the history of Ethiopian resistance; for it marks the beginning of a stronger and more organized guerrilla warfare, mostly concentrated in the regions of Shawa, Gojjam, and Bagemder and armed mainly with ammunition captured from the enemy and provided by deserters. Particularly remarkable was the participation of Ethiopian women in the resistance, also caused by a reaction to the fact that the rape of women and girls was a systematic policy of domination for the fascist army.

In 1941 Ethiopia was liberated, thanks to the Ethiopian resistance movement and the intervention of the British army. As a matter of fact, Mussolini’s entry into World War II as Germany’s ally clarified the composition of the two fronts involved in the war. Britain and Italy were actually enemies and the necessity of attacking the enemy everywhere led to important changes in British policy regarding the “Ethiopia case.” Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been living for a long time completely isolated in Bath, was now considered as an ally, and full military support was provided to allow him to lead the liberation war against the fascist occupation. On May 5, 1941, exactly five years since the Italian occupation of Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie entered the capital victorious and was welcomed by thousands of Ethiopians.

In the five years of occupation, the Italian impact on the socioeconomic structure of Ethiopia was of marginal extent, and guerrilla warfare prevented the Italian colonial administration from implementing the fascist projects of mass Italian settlement, construction of infrastructures, and exploitation of natural resources. The results of five years of occupation basically consisted of the development of a top-heavy bureaucracy and system of corruption. As reported by historians Del Boca and Barhu Zewde, the viceroy Duca d’Aosta himself defined this bureaucracy “formed as 50 per cent by unsuited people and 25 per cent by thieves.” Corruption seemed to be the deepest rooted and widespread phenomenon in the Italian Eastern Africa Empire, and it favored big public and private companies and the military and civil ruling-class.

FRANCESCA LOCATELLI

See also: **Eritrea: Ottoman Province to Italian Colony; Haile Selassie I.**

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Ethiopia: Land, Agriculture, Politics, 1941–1974

Ethiopia gained back its independence from Italian occupation on May 5, 1941, five years to the day of the fall of Addis Ababa to the Italian fascist forces. Ethiopian society prior to the revolution of 1974, and even more so in the pre-Italian occupation period, consisted of three social orders: the *Beta Mangest* (House of State), *Beta Kehenat* (House of Clergy/Church), and *Balagar* or *Gabbar* (peasant or tribute-payer).

The land tenure system in Ethiopia consisted of three different arrangements. In the Christian north and north-central parts of the country, the *rist* system of landholding was predominant. In the southern highlands, large landed property and widespread peasant tenancy were prevalent. In the eastern and western lowland borderlands, nomadic and communal land ownership patterns, respectively, prevailed. In terms of population ratio, most of Ethiopia was either under the *rist* system or large landed property alongside peasant tenancy.

The *rist* system was an arrangement in which Christians of both sexes had the right to claim, possess, inherit, and pass on to their children land by virtue of belonging to the same cognatic-descent kin group. This right entitles anyone born into the kinship network of the lineage pedigree to possess a piece of the land that belongs to the kinship. Those belonging to the kinship were called *zemed* (relatives). As *zemed*, they were entitled to land sharing. Muslims and craftspeople (weavers, tanners, smiths) were excluded from belonging to the *rist* arrangement; instead, they became tenants paying rent to the Christian *rist* owners.

In the southern highland regions, in the aftermath of the military conquest during Menelik's time, the *naftagna* (gun-bearers) became landlords with extensive holdings turning the peasantry into tenants of the warrior class. The relationship between the military overlords and the peasants came to be known as the *naftagna-gabbar* system. These *naftagnas* eventually transformed themselves into big landed property owners, thereby turning the peasants into tenants.

In both the *rist* and large landed property holdings of the highlands, there was also an arrangement called *gult*. *Gult* was the right of tribute appropriation from peasants granted by the emperor to the various ranks of the warrior class, the church, and other people in return for military, administrative, and religious services rendered to the emperor by the *gult* grantees. *Gult* was

granted on a temporary basis and could be revoked anytime by the emperor when the grantee failed to live up to the patron-client social norm. In some cases, especially *gult* grants to the church, *gult* became *rist* called *rist-gult*.

In the post-Italian occupation period, *gult* rights, especially in the southern regions, were transformed into large private property holdings. Known as *gasha meret* (shield land), former notables who were granted extensive landholdings as *gult* now became agrarian entrepreneurs transforming their land into capital. Accordingly, large estates of coffee plantations and large farms replaced the earlier arrangement of tribute extraction from the *gabbar* (tribute-paying peasants).

The transformation in land tenure relations as a result of the *naftagna* becoming large landed estates resulted in the extensive commercialization of both land and labor. Alongside the rise of an agrarian capitalist class emerged a part-time proletarianized labor force, while those who could not find employment in agriculture left the countryside and headed for the towns. Peasants were evicted from the land to give space for coffee plantations, cattle ranches, and large farms. Small peasants were further squeezed from competition from large farms. Accompanied by periodic droughts, the net result of commercialized agriculture was extreme rural poverty. In regions like the Awash Valley, foreign firms like the Dutch HVA were offered large tracts of land for sugar plantations and a sugar factory at Wonji. The seminomadic inhabitants of the area were evicted, adding more to the problem of rural poverty.

Peasant discontent grew as a result of land alienation. When extreme rural poverty is added to natural calamities like the 1972–1973 drought, the result was mass famine that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

The transformation in land tenure relations in Ethiopia during the period 1941–1974 took place simultaneously with that of a political and military transformation in the state structure. After the restoration to his throne on May 5, 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie continued with an increased tempo his earlier policy of state centralization, which had been temporarily disrupted during the Italian occupation.

In an attempt to undermine and eventually destroy the political and military power of the regional notables, the *telek sawach* (“big men”), the emperor pursued a policy of transforming the once-formidable regional notables from being political, economic, military powerhouses into being economic powers with reduced political weight and no military force of their own. In old Ethiopia before Haile Selassie, each regional notable had huge *gult* holdings, an army of his own, and rules over his regional domain. Although this triple power depended on the good will of the *negusa*

nagast (“king of kings”), the latter was also careful not to upset the balance of power between himself as the overlord of the whole country and the many regional notables under his rule. The state modernization process that Haile Selassie carried out for the first time in Ethiopian history took away the regional armies of the notables and created an all-Ethiopian armed forces under his direct command. Haile Selassie awarded the notables with important government posts and grants of large tracts of land. What they did not have were military forces of their own. The emperor appointed provincial administrators called *endarasie* (“like myself”) who were in charge of ruling the provinces in the name of and on behalf of the emperor. Thus the big men were reduced to mere shadows of their former selves. The position they were appointed to could be taken away from them anytime by the emperor, no questions asked. The process was known as *shum/shir* (appoint/demote), and it was an age-old practice in Ethiopian political history.

Overall, during the period between the restoration of Ethiopian independence in 1941 and the revolution of 1974, Ethiopian society was transformed in ways never before attained. The pace of social change was slow; nevertheless, it was constant. The emperor, who was perhaps one of the most progressive princely notables pushing for the modernization of Ethiopia, was found later to be the principal obstacle in the path of Ethiopia’s progress. The revolution of 1974 that deposed Haile Selassie was meant to clear the way for the development of Ethiopian society along modern lines.

TESHALE TIBEBU

See also: Ethiopia: Italian Invasion and Occupation: 1935–1940; Haile Selassie I.

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Ethiopia: Famine, Revolution, Mengistu Dictatorship, 1974–1991

The year 1974 was a turning point in modern Ethiopian history. It was the year of the Ethiopian revolution, which brought down Emperor Haile Selassie I,

the last Christian monarch of the oldest Christian monarchy in the world. As world-renowned as Haile Selassie was, the country he ruled was one where a handful of men monopolized power and wealth while the majority lived in poverty.

The 1973 Wallo famine precipitated the downfall of Selassie. The government attempted to downplay the famine and hide it from the public, as officials were busy preparing for the eightieth birthday celebration of the emperor, to be observed July 23, 1973. The famine and the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted in higher gasoline prices, increased discontent against the imperial order. From February 1974, there were spontaneous protests, demonstrations, and strikes in many parts of the country, as individuals from all walks of life joined in demanding justice and equality. The most serious challenge to the imperial order came from the military. Starting with the arrest of senior officers in Nagalle, dissent in the army spread rapidly.

The Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM), both inside the country and abroad, played the most critical role in exposing the injustices of the monarchical order. Informed by Marxist ideas, students challenged what they called a semifeudal, semicolonial system. They condemned the ruling classes and the Western powers that supported them, primarily the United States. They identified feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism as the three main enemies of the Ethiopian people. The students advocated a Chinese-style revolution as the panacea for the ills of the society.

It was on the fertile ground of protest plowed by the ESM that the *Dergue* (council or committee) came into the historical scene. The *Dergue* was a council made up of 120 men elected from the various branches of the armed forces. Through the summer of 1974, the *Dergue* assumed *de facto* state power, arresting key government officials and making the newly formed Endalkachaw cabinet ineffective. On September 12, 1974, the *Dergue* deposed Selassie and assumed state power under the name Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). It declared its rule provisional and promised to go back to its barracks once the “cleansing” of the old order was accomplished. That was not to be. With its slogan *Ityopya Teqdam* (Ethiopia First), the *Dergue* called all citizens to rally behind its version of a bloodless revolution. In March 1975, the *Dergue* carried out its most radical measure: the nationalization of all rural land. Rural land became state property, while peasants were granted usufructuary rights. Shortly afterward, urban land and extra houses were also nationalized. Major foreign-owned firms had been brought under state control earlier.

In its seventeen-year rule (1974–1991), the *Dergue* went through an ideological transformation, from *Ityopya Teqdam* to scientific socialism. *Ityopya Teqdam*

was an ideology of military state nationalism articulated by the *Dergue* elite. Scientific socialism grew out of the influence of Marxist organizations, principally the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON, in the Amharic acronym). In its foreign policy, the *Dergue* supported radical movements like the PLO, ZANU, and the ANC. It closely allied itself with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. In the last year of its rule, however, the *Dergue* retreated from scientific socialism.

Within the PMAC, General Aman Andom was appointed head of state and chairman of the *Darg*, while Major Mengistu Haile Mariam was elected first vice chairman of the *Dergue* and Colonel Atnafu Abate second vice chairman. Mengistu had Andom and another official, Tafari Banti, killed. Some sixty top officials of Haile Selassie's government were executed in November 1974. Mengistu killed other high-ranking *Dergue* officials, including Abate. Mengistu ruled as a dictator, eliminating adversaries and crushing opposition.

The *Dergue* was faced with major challenges to its rule, including Eritrean and Tigrayan nationalism, the rise of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the Somali invasion of 1977. The *Dergue* engaged in military warfare with Eritrean, Tigrayan, and Somali nationalist armies, while also conducting a campaign of terror against EPRP and its sympathizers. (The EPRP, a Marxist political party, called for the replacement of the *Dargue* by a Provisional Peoples Government (PPG) composed of all sectors of society, including the military. It called the *Dergue*'s regime a fascist dictatorship.) "Revolutionary Motherland or Death" was the slogan used against Eritrean and Somali nationalism, while the urban campaign of terror against the EPRP was meant to eliminate "anarchists and counter-revolutionaries."

The *Darg*'s urban terror campaign relied on *natsa ermeja* (unlimited action). It referred to the right granted to security forces to shoot anyone they suspected of being a counterrevolutionary. Legal procedure was disregarded. The Urban Dwellers Association (*qabales*), created after the nationalization of urban land and extra houses in 1975, played a key role in carrying out the terror campaign, alongside the security forces and the AESM cadres. Thousands of young people died during the campaign. Corpses of the young were left in public places like squares, churches, and mosques, and parents were denied the right to mourn for their dead children. In some cases, parents paid "bullet price" to get the bodies of their deceased children back. Mass terror and fear gripped the nation from 1977 through 1979.

Ethiopia was wracked by disaster and civil unrest throughout the 1980s. In 1984–1985, another famine gripped the country. This was the worst famine to

affect Ethiopia in the twentieth century, and hundreds of thousands perished. The Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was formed, under the leadership of Mengistu, while the official name of the country was changed to the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987. In May 1991, the Eritrean and Tigrayan movements entered Asmara and Addis Ababa, respectively. Two years later, Eritrea became a sovereign state. Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe in defeat in May 1991.

TESHALE TIBEBU

See also: **Haile Selassie I.**

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Ethiopia: Civil War and Liberation (to 1993)

Ethiopia existed in a state of continual warfare from 1961 to 1991, due to the secessionist war with Eritrea, the insurrection of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, and the second, lesser insurrection of the Oromo people in the south and east of the country. In addition to these three insurrections, Ethiopia was embroiled in the 1977–1978 Ogaden War with Somalia.

British forces had liberated Eritrea and Ethiopia from Italian occupation in 1941 when Haile Selassie returned from exile to resume his throne in Addis Ababa. In September 1952 the United Nations decided that Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia; by 1958 it had become clear that Haile Selassie meant to integrate Eritrea into Ethiopia, and this led Eritrean opponents of integration to form the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).

The first shots in what was to be a thirty-year Eritrean war of liberation were fired in September 1961. Resistance to the central government during the 1960s was spasmodic and uneven. At the end of the decade, a split in the leadership of ELF led to the formation of a more radical movement, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The two movements cooperated during much of the 1970s, but their differences gradually grew more pronounced, and following some brutal fighting between them (1979–1981), the EPLF emerged as the main Eritrean liberation movement in 1981, replacing the ELF, which later disintegrated.

A revolution in Addis Ababa, meanwhile, had transformed Ethiopia into a Marxist state. The Sahel drought of 1973 had a deep impact on Ethiopia and government mishandling of drought relief measures hastened the downfall of Haile Selassie. Hewas was forced to abdicate in 1974 and was replaced by a military Dergue. Haile Mengistu Mariam emerged as its leader and soon turned to the USSR for military assistance (Moscow had switched its support from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1975). By that year ELF forces, which numbered between 15,000 and 25,000, controlled most of Eritrea. By 1977, which turned out to be a climactic year, Ethiopian forces had been confined to four towns in Eritrea; however, at that point the differences between the ELF and EPLF exploded into warfare just when an Eritrean victory seemed possible. Meanwhile, in July 1977 Somali forces crossed the Ethiopian border and by November were besieging the town of Harar, only to run out of military supplies. The Cubans, who had been supporting the Eritrean war of secession, switched their allegiance to the Ethiopian government, sending 16,000 troops to fight the Somalis in the Ogaden War, while the USSR airlifted an estimated \$1 billion worth of arms to the Mengistu government. As a result, by March 1978, the Somalis had been forced to withdraw and Mengistu could turn his full attention to the war in Eritrea.

A second nationalist insurrection, by the people of Tigre province, would eventually ensure the collapse of the Mengistu government. Tigre had long been a part of the Ethiopian Empire in which it had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. A Tigrayan, Yohannis IV, had been emperor from 1871 to 1889. Haile Selassie had faced several Tigrayan revolts during his reign, and after his downfall in 1974 the Tigre People's Liberation front (TPLF) was formed. The TPLF became significant in military terms at the end of the 1970s, when the war against the Eritreans was reaching a climax. In alliance, the TPLF and EPLF together would present a formidable challenge to the Mengistu government through the 1980s.

By the early 1980s the Tigrayan revolt was widespread and the TPLF was inflicting heavy casualties upon the Ethiopian army, while the TPLF and EPLF were coordinating their tactics. By 1988 government forces only controlled the Tigre regional capital of Makele, while the TPLF commanded 20,000 battle-hardened troops.

A third more spasmodic and limited insurrection had occurred among the Oromo peoples of the south (who represent 40% of the population) although they were more scattered and less coordinated than either the Eritreans or Tigrayans. From 1963 to 1970, under the leadership of Wako Gutu, they had revolted under the banner of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). They

sought better treatment by the central government rather than secession, and in 1970, when Gutu himself accepted a government appointment, the first revolt came to an end. A second Oromo revolt followed the fall of Haile Selassie, but this was dependent on Somali support and petered out following the Somali defeat of 1978.

At the beginning of 1989 the TPLF formed a coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement, and in combination with the EPLF mounted the last major campaign of the war. The combined forces of the EPRDF and EPLF swept all before them in the early months of 1991, and the collapse of the Mengistu regime came in May. Mengistu fled Addis Ababa to Zimbabwe and the EPRDF forces entered the capital. Meles Zenawi, the Tigrayan leader who had also commanded the EPRDF, became interim president of Ethiopia. The EPLF established an autonomous administration in Asmara and the EPLF leader, Issaias Afewerke, formed a provisional Eritrean government. The EPLF refused to be a part of the interim government in Addis Ababa, emphasizing that it saw the future of Eritrea as separate from that of Ethiopia. The EPRDF had agreed that the EPLF should hold a referendum on independence from Ethiopia, and this was held in April 1993, monitored by the United Nations. There was a 98.2 per cent turnout and a 99.8 per cent vote in favor of independence. On May 24, 1993, Eritrea became formally independent and was recognized as such by the international community. Issaias Afewerke became its first president. Asmara became the capital of the new state, which had a population of 3.5 million.

During 1991 and 1992, the EPRDF asserted its authority over the whole of Ethiopia. A new constitution was drafted, while about 100 political parties emerged. Elections to a constituent assembly were held in 1994, and the EPRDF and its allies triumphed. It was the first stage in the creation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which came into being following elections to a new federal parliamentary assembly of May 1995.

GUY ARNOLD

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Ethiopia: 1991 to the Present

A new chapter in Ethiopia's history opened when the Dergue was overthrown in May 1991 by the peoples of Ethiopia, led by the armed forces of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The former military dictator Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, and the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa, forming an interim government. Faced with the immense problem of bringing peace and economic reconstruction to the war-torn country, the EPRDF called a National Conference of over twenty organizations in order to immediately establish a Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The National Conference also approved a National Charter guaranteeing basic democratic rights and outlining the main tasks of the TGE: to establish peace, democracy, and economic development in Ethiopia. Meles Zenawi, the leader of the EPRDF was elected president of the TGE and chairman of the transitional Council of Representatives.

The TGE was a coalition of political organizations led by the EPRDF and initially included the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), another opponent of the Dergue. However, the OLF refused to relinquish the armed struggle in accordance with the aims of the National Charter, despite its role in the new government, and finally withdrew from the TGE in June 1992, vowing to continue to fight for the creation of an independent state of Oromia. It has remained one of the most determined opponents of Ethiopian governments since 1991, and in 1999 launched military attacks on Ethiopia from neighboring Somalia.

One of the first measures taken by the TGE to bring peace to the country was the successful demobilization and retraining of the Dergue's army, one of the largest in Africa, and its replacement initially with EPRDF fighters and subsequently with a new army drawn from all of Ethiopia's nationalities. The Ethiopian government, with international assistance, also began the process of bringing to trial those who had committed human rights violations under the regime of the Dergue. After lengthy preparations the first 'war crimes trials began in 1995.

One of the most important tasks of the TGE was to establish modern democratic structures and procedures in a country that hitherto had known no popularly elected democratic government or legislature and where democratic freedoms had been severely restricted. Within a few years over sixty different political parties and a free press were established, and although there have continued to be some allegations of human

rights abuses, Ethiopia has made a remarkably rapid transition to a multi-party democracy.

Regional elections, held in 1992, established locally elected representatives for communities and districts throughout Ethiopia. From 1993 a lengthy process was begun to involve the population in drafting a constitution. Countrywide debates were held even at village level on the draft constitution, and in June 1994 a Constituent Assembly was elected. This body finally ratified the new constitution in December 1994. General elections monitored by international observers followed in May 1995, at which the EPRDF won a landslide victory. Meles Zenawi was elected prime minister of the renamed Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The constitution established a new federal structure for Ethiopia, with a great amount of autonomy for the nine states. These regional states have their own constitutions, can levy taxes, and have budgetary and other responsibilities. The federal structure took into account the cultural and ethnic diversity of the country, and the people in a particular region are even able to choose the official state language. The states are able to safeguard and foster the identities, languages and cultures of the many Ethiopian nationalities that were previously ignored or suppressed. The nations and nationalities are also represented, according to the size of their population, in the House of Federation, one part of the bicameral parliament, and the constitution accords every nation and nationality in Ethiopia the right to self-determination including the right to secession.

When the Dergue was overthrown, Ethiopia was on the verge of bankruptcy, its foreign currency reserves were barely adequate to finance imports for one month, and its foreign debt was nearly \$9 billion. Large parts of the country were short of food, and there was massive dislocation of people due to the many years of war. The TGE therefore acted quickly to liberalize and rapidly develop the economy. Ethiopia was forced to join the Structural Adjustment Program, but unlike other African governments it presented the World Bank with its own plans for economic reforms and continued negotiations for some eighteen months until satisfactory agreement was reached. Ethiopia's governments have maintained their opposition to privatizing some key areas of the economy and have refused to make land a commodity. From 1992 to 1996 the Ethiopian economy grew yearly at the rate of 7.6 per cent. Inflation fell to less than 1 per cent by 1996, and much of the foreign debt has been canceled. In May 1995 the EPRDF government introduced a Five-Year Plan aimed at creating an economic infrastructure throughout the country and at developing the health service, education and in particular agriculture. In 1997 Ethiopia actually became self-sufficient in food and began exporting maize to neighboring countries,

although problems of drought and famine still exist in some areas of the country.

The TGE quickly established good relations with Ethiopia's neighbors and signed agreements of friendship and cooperation with the neighboring countries of Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya. Ethiopian governments have continued to play an important role in efforts to bring peace to Somalia and hosted many of the meetings that culminated in the formation of the National Salvation Council of Somalia in January 1997. Initially, Ethiopia also had good relations with Eritrea and fully supported the independence of Eritrea and the right of the Eritrean people to decide their own future in the referendum held in that country in April 1993. There were also strong economic ties between two countries; until 1998, they shared the same currency. However, in May 1998 Eritrean military forces invaded border areas of Ethiopia. Despite efforts by the Organization of African Unity and other countries to mediate, a state of war has existed between the two countries since that time.

HAKIM ADI

See also: Ethiopia: Famine, Revolution, Mengistu Dictatorship, 1974–1991.

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Ethiopianism and the Independent Church Movement

By the late 1800s white missionaries' ingrained paternalism had become evident to their African congregants. The white missionaries' persistent denial of church leadership roles to Africans resulted in "Ethiopian" breakaways. For aspiring pastors from a prospering mission-educated middle class, Scripture translation had encouraged the Protestant "open Bible" approach, providing their early Africanism with a biblical lineage in the symbol of an unconquered imperial Ethiopia.

Inspired by African-American examples, this religious independency also incubated a political reaction

to the mounting oppression of Africans countrywide after 1900. Ethiopians became key organizers, in particular against white settler interests impeding the emergence of their class. Meanwhile in the slums and hostels, a grassroots reaction to migrancy's hardships was spreading, taking charismatic and utopian forms in "spirit" or "indigenized" healing churches.

No independent churches appeared before 1880. By the early 1900s, with industrialization and labor migrancy taking hold, about twenty had been founded, all Ethiopian reactions to mission rooted in the early nineteenth century Xhosa prophet Ntsikana. Thousands of mission converts had sided with the rebels during the last Cape Frontier War (1879). Ethnic sentiment resulted in the first such church, founded in 1884 by the Wesleyan Nehemiah Tile, being only an ethnic "Thembu Church." But in 1892, another Wesleyan, Reverend Mangena Mokone, fathered Pan-African Ethiopianism by forming the first nationwide nonethnic indigenous church, Ibandla laseTopiya, the Ethiopian Church.

Under James Dwane, another Wesleyan who became leader in 1896, the church came under American Methodist Episcopal influence, becoming their fourteenth district and soon expanding to over 10,000 members. However, in 1900 Dwane, a Gcaleka Xhosa from a chiefly line, broke away to found an Order of Ethiopia that confined itself to his ethnic community. Again, when P. J. Mzimba, United Free Church of Scotland pastor, left in 1898 to form the African Presbyterian Church, only his fellow Mfengu followed him.

By 1893, however, a Pan-African vision had largely infused Ethiopianism, so that it began securing widespread support among different ethnicities. By 1902 its name was in use with everyone from urban workers to chiefs and headmen, to the mission bourgeoisie and wealthy peasantry, to denote "a whole range of the black man's efforts to improve his religious, educational and political status in society" (Chirenje 1987). For whites hostile to its perceived political agenda, it meant the entire indigenous church "peril": Natal's governor attributed the 1906 antipoll tax uprising of Bhambhatha not to oppressive taxation policies, but to "Ethiopian agitators" and their program of "Africa for the Africans."

When the 1910 Union and 1913 Land Act made South Africa a "white man's country," Ethiopians moved directly into political activism. The churches waned accordingly, but although Ethiopianism's classical period had ended by the 1930s, intellectuals seeking a broader African nationalist ideology continued to invoke its notion of spiritual nationhood, and Mussolini's 1935–1936 invasion of Ethiopia gave impetus to its Pan-Africanism.

Although the Ethiopians upheld some African customs (chiefly polygamy), they had remained largely

orthodox, only covertly African in ethos compared with the charismatic indigenous spirit churches that emerged around 1900. Zionism came to South Africa when an American teaching (from John Dowie's Zion City, Illinois, theocracy, founded 1896) that prayer alone could heal persuaded Pieter le Roux, Afrikaner missionary to the Zulu, to break from the Dutch Reformed Church. Among postconquest Zulu converts, sentiment against diviners was already strong, so that Le Roux's congregation followed him, although when he broke from Dowie in 1908 to join a Pentecostal mission, they remained "in Zion," and were soon introducing innovations (prophecy, trance-dancing, use of white robes, and healing staves).

"In Zion" signified a New Testament church carrying on John the Baptist's work. Where Ethiopians longed for a free Christian African nation under a "Lion of Judah," the mythological focus for this new religion of the poor was the Holy Land itself. Cosmological events such as Halley's Comet of 1910 were regarded as portents, and during the devastating Spanish Influenza of 1919, many stricken laborers felt they had died and been with Jesus, who returned them as his envoys to the troubled earth.

Before World War II, the "Zion City" type of spirit church arose on the Dowie model, prioritizing land purchase and capital accumulation in order to achieve a degree of separation from a profaned world and working toward communal self-sufficiency. Often allied to their local royalty, these movements' leaders used alternative readings of the Bible to revitalize moribund traditional forms and values. What Ethiopian secession was to the literate elite—namely, a response to political and economic dispossession—these Zion City "homes" were for the rural underclass and their chiefs. But following the state's 1921 massacre of Enoch Mgijima's Israelites, although Zionism spread in the poorer areas, it remained politically quiet.

After the war, in response to intensified urbanization and its privations, the "Zion-Apostolic" church type appeared, drawing Rand migrant worker and rural pauper alike into small prophet-led healing bands. Here the powers of both the Holy Spirit and ancestor spirits operated within a context of richly indigenized liturgy and biblical symbolism. Low wages and unemployment were met with prayer-healing and speaking in tongues, while taoo observances and purification rites protected the group.

Protestant missiologists (Sundkler 1961) at first proclaimed the Zionist church a mere "syncretist sect" and a "bridge back to heathenism." Anthropologists counter (Kiernan 1992) that the Zionist prophet is in fact a genuine Christian replacement of the diviner, his ritualizations having "inculturated" divine healing to African needs.

Ethiopian-type churches formed the majority of African-initiated congregations until the mid-twentieth century, but by 1970 the charismatic churches of Zion were almost twice as numerous. They presently number between 3,000 and 6,000 congregations. Despite continuous influence from American Pentecostals arriving since the 1910s, those who today call themselves Christian Zionists have become a minority; a range of New Jerusalem charismatics currently "raid Christianity from without, capturing features selectively" (Kiernan).

ROBERT PAPINI

See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches.**

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Europe: Explorers, Adventurers, Traders

Between about 1770 and 1880, exploration of Africa made possible accurate maps and publishable information on the continent. Although Portuguese navigators had charted the coasts by 1500, the interior remained almost wholly unknown to Europeans up until the late eighteenth century. Maps were available earlier, based on classical, Arab or Portuguese information, but such material was discarded by the great French cartographer D'Anville in 1749. Serious exploration involved a few private adventurers, seldom traders, more frequently Christian missionaries, but, most important, official or quasi-official expeditions often led by servicemen. Malarial fever, rapids on rivers, and, occasionally, unwelcoming people demanded reasonably

well-organized endeavors. At least until the 1870s, geographical societies, especially the Royal Geographical Society of London (RGS), missionary societies, or governments claimed to be motivated by science or religion and eschewed any political designs. Nevertheless, explorers directly or indirectly served those who wanted to change Africa, by acquiring its resources or access to its markets, by ending the slave trade, or by introducing the Gospel. The explorers responded by describing a continent in need of Europe's expertise, technology and moral superiority, whether or not this implied political change. Africans themselves made the expeditions possible by acting as porters, interpreters, and guides. The reception of explorers depended on the current local political situation.

The Scottish landowner James Bruce traveled in Ethiopia from 1768 to 1773 and visited the source of the Blue Nile. In 1788 a group of aristocrats founded the African Association to achieve for Africa what Captain Cook had for the Pacific. Interest centered on the kingdoms of the Western Sudan, as stories of its wealth and magnificence had long filtered through to Europe. This region was watered by the Niger. Whether it flowed west to the Atlantic, east to the Nile, or into the sands of the desert was unknown. The Association's first expeditions followed Saharan trade routes from the Mediterranean, with the first German explorer of Africa, Friedrich Konrad Hornemann, reaching Bornu before dying in 1800. The alternative starting point was the Atlantic coast, from which the young Scottish surgeon and child of the Enlightenment, Mungo Park, reached the Niger in 1796, "glittering to the morning sun, as broad as the Thames at Westminster and flowing slowly to the eastward." Park was sent back in 1805 to find out where it actually flowed by a government concerned to forestall any French activity and to aid the search for markets. He died at Bussa, far down the river in 1806 but his fate was long unknown.

René Caillé began a long French association with the western part of the region when, in 1827, he reached the (to Europeans) mysterious city of Timbuktu. Meanwhile, British expeditions from the Mediterranean pushed toward the middle of the Niger; Hugh Clapperton gained Sokoto but not the river in 1824. He died on a return trip, but in 1830 his former servant, Richard Lander, showed that the Niger debouched into the Gulf of Guinea. Attempts were now made to send steamboats up the river and a British-financed German, Heinrich Barth, completed the exploration of the Sudanic kingdoms in the early 1850s.

In South Africa there was progressive settlement by Afrikaaner farmers from the Cape along the south and east coastal regions, while on the plateau inland, travelers such as Gordon, Paterson, Burchell, and the

missionary Robert Moffat penetrated to Botswana by the 1840s. Moffat's son-in-law, David Livingstone, reached the Zambesi in 1851. Livingstone came to believe that he must open up a new route to the interior for commerce and the Gospel; the Zambesi seemed to be the answer. He reached the west coast at Luanda in 1854 and then, in his greatest feat, crossed the continent to the mouth of the Zambesi in 1856 having visited the Victoria Falls on the way. Livingstone's *Missionary Travels and Researches* of 1857 was to be one of the best-sellers of the century combining, as it did, excellent science, exciting adventures, exotic scenes, and a strong moral message.

Like the Niger, the Zambesi did not prove an easy route inland for steamboats as Livingstone himself discovered between 1858 and 1864 when the government sent him to lead an expedition to follow up his ideas, much to the dismay of the Portuguese, as their Dr. Lacerda (in 1798) and Majors Monteiro and Gamitto (in the 1830s) had penetrated the region northward of the Zambesi. Although Livingstone reached Lake Malawi in 1859, his steamboat could not get to the lake or far up the Zambesi.

Meanwhile, rumors of other lakes further north and news of snow-covered mountains seen by the German Lutheran missionaries Johann Ludwig Krapf and Rebmann of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) had attracted enormous interest, not least because somewhere in the region, it was surmised, must lie the source of the Nile. The RGS sent Richard Burton with John Speke from the east coast to discover Lake Tanganyika in 1858. Speke diverted north to find Lake Victoria and claimed it as the Nile source. This he proved in July 1862 and then followed the river down to Egypt. Samuel Baker reached Lake Albert in 1864. However, he accidentally shot himself dead before a scheduled debate with Burton. Doubts existed about Speke's Nile claims; they were still unresolved in 1873 when Livingstone died, in public eyes a martyr to the slave trade but actually seeking the Nile further south. He was really at the sources of the Zaire (Congo). Verney Cameron, sent to find Livingstone, met his body but went on to cross the Congo basin in 1874–1876. It was Henry Stanley, made famous after finding Livingstone in October 1871, who solved the remaining problems in 1874–1877. Having confirmed Speke's Nile source, he followed the Zaire to the Atlantic. Well-financed, Stanley was ruthless and efficient. The milder Joseph Thomson traveled peacefully through Kenya in the early 1880s.

Attempts were now being made to follow up the explorers' work. Egypt tried to found an empire on the upper Nile, and Emin Pasha was stranded there after the Mahdist revolt. The greatest effect was on King Leopold of the Belgians who set up an "International

Association,” ostensibly to reform Africa. He employed Stanley who, in 1886–1890, proceeded up the Zaïre and through the great forest to “rescue” Emin Pasha. The Ruwenzori range and other new features were put on the map, but essentially, this was an imperialist venture in the developing contest between Belgian, British, and German interests.

Even if indirectly, the explorers did shape situations and attitudes as Africans came to terms with the encroaching Western world. On the whole, popular accounts of the exploits of explorers and missionaries tended to underestimate the difficulties of introducing European technology and trade, while ignoring or dismissing the interests and abilities of the people they encountered.

ROY BRIDGES

See also: **Livingstone, David; Stanley, Leopold II, “Scramble”; Timbuktu.**

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Europe: Industrialization and Imperialism

Of the many developments that took place in Europe during the nineteenth century, two had far-reaching consequences for Africa in particular and the non-European world in general: European industrialization and imperialism.

The industrialization of Europe was the result of the Industrial Revolution, a term generally used to refer to the rapid economic and technological innovations which transformed Europe from an agrarian and mercantile society to an industrial society. The Industrial Revolution started in Britain in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and continued there steadily until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century, when it reached its peak. From Britain it gradually spread to Western European countries and the United States. The most notable features of the Industrial

Revolution were the changes that came about in the production of goods and in the distribution of the produce. These changes led to the replacement of handcraft production with production by machines.

In Britain the innovations began with the introduction of machines in the textile and wool industries; other innovations took place in power production with the invention of the steam engine, and in iron manufacturing. Inventions and improvements in one area impacted, and resulted in, corresponding improvements in other areas. For example, initially machines were made of wood; improvement in the iron industry resulted in the replacement of wooden tools with iron tools which improved the quality of machines used in the factories. Similarly, invention of the steam engine and the harnessing of steam power resulted in efficient operation of machines, and also made it possible to locate industries virtually anywhere. Moreover, the steam engine was applied to the transportation sector and resulted in the development of canals and railways which made possible cheap and fast freight transportation. The combined effect of these various innovations was massive increases in manufactured goods, which in turn led to other economic and social changes in areas such as finance, markets, labor, and urbanization among others. By the 1850s, as a result of its lead in the Industrial Revolution, Britain had become the “workshop of the world,” and a major world power.

As the Industrial Revolution spread to other European countries and the United States, it had similar economic and social consequences. This impacted relations between European nations, particularly in the search for markets and raw materials for the expanding industrial output as well as for capital investment. The resulting competition went beyond the boundaries of Europe into overseas territories in the form of European imperialism in Asia, the Pacific region, and Africa.

There is dispute among scholars as to the precise meaning of the term “imperialism,” as well as its origins, nature, manifestation, and consequences. The word is used here to refer to European expansion into areas of the world previously not inhabited by Europeans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resulting in empire building or the acquisition of overseas colonies by the major European powers.

With reference to Africa, European imperialism took place from the 1870s to about 1914 and lasted until the 1960s in most parts of Africa, the 1970s and 1980s in the remaining areas. This is not to say that Europe did not have interest or territorial holdings in Africa before the 1870s, but such holdings as there were, except in a few isolated spots such as Algeria and the southern tip of Africa, were mainly trading or coal-ing and refueling posts. The Europeans did not directly rule or govern these holdings and did not have to do so

in order to safeguard their interests or exert influence. From the 1870s, however, competition among European nations for colonies in Africa intensified to such an extent that by 1914 virtually all of the continent, except Morocco and Ethiopia, had been parceled out as colonies/protectorates among the main European powers (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Belgium). These colonies were directly governed or administered by the European powers through structures set up by them in the colonies.

Scholars are not agreed on the motives behind European imperialism in Africa. Some scholars have pointed to economic motivation and have argued that the search for new and guaranteed markets for the ever increasing output of European industries, new sources of raw materials to feed the industries, new areas for capital investment, and cheap and reliable labor force was the driving force behind colonial acquisition. Others have pointed to noneconomic reasons and have argued that nationalism, the pursuit of international power, security, and strategic—even humanitarian considerations—were the primary motivation. These seemingly divergent views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. All these factors were at play in varying combinations at different times in the calculation of the various imperial powers. While the economic motives were probably foremost in the thinking of the imperial powers none of the other considerations can be ruled out as either unimportant or irrelevant. Imperialism was a complex phenomenon, as were its motivation, its nature, its manifestation and its impact on the colonized territories. Each of the various motives was connected in one way or another with the industrialization of Europe.

The nineteenth century was not only a century of European industrialization and imperialism but also of nationalism in Europe, a phenomenon as complex and difficult to define as imperialism. There was a connection between all three phenomena, as each added to and reinforced the others. For example, industrialization sharpened the nationalist sentiment among leaders and other opinion makers in various European nations

and either led to or intensified competition among the nations in terms of political power, overseas trade, international stature and national security among others. This kind of competition was a major factor in unleashing European imperialism on Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century.

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See also: Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Farming: Stone Age Farmers of the Savanna

Farming in much of Sub-Saharan Africa is based on management of animal herds, together with cultivation of a range of indigenous savanna crops. These savanna crops include a wide range of small-seeded grasses (various millet species), sorghum, African rice, as well as pulses native to the savanna-forest margins (cowpea, hyacinth bean, Bambara groundnuts). These species, however, represent numerous distinct domestication events in different regions across the Sub-Saharan savanna belt. The full process of the domestication of these species, from their wild exploitation by foragers to cultivation and morphological change, is incompletely documented.

Important precursors to savanna farming are to be found in the foraging societies of Sahara under wetter conditions, 7,000–4,000BCE. Sites from the Western Desert of Egypt (such as the Nabta Playa cultural complex) and southwest Libya (the Early Acacus to Early Pastoral tradition) provide ample evidence for the exploitation of wild harvested grasses. With the exception of wild sorghum from sites in western Egypt, the grasses exploited at this time were not

species subsequently domesticated, but their exploitation attests to a delayed-return foraging economy that probably included storage, an essential prerequisite for the development of cultivation. These societies began to manufacture pottery, much of which shared dotted-wavy line decoration, which suggests wide-ranging contacts among these mobile societies. It is also among these hunter-foragers of the Saharan grasslands that pastoralism became established. The spread of sheep and goats of Near Eastern origins occurred rapidly by the sixth millennium BCE, while cattle that spread during this period may have derived from indigenous domestication in the eastern Sahara as much as a millennium or two earlier. These societies would have been seasonally mobile and focused on perennial oasis water sources in the dry season, where use of cached wild grains would also have been important. As climate change caused the desertification of the Sahara, such groups would have been increasing forced southwards or into the Nile Valley. Evidence from Nabta Playa in southern Egypt and from southwest Libya both indicate that the desert had been abandoned by around 3,000BCE.

It is during this period of aridification that food production was adopted in the Sudanese Nile Valley. While the Early Khartoum tradition, which included dotted-wavy line ceramics, had subsisted by fishing, hunting, and foraging, the Shaheinab Neolithic, which emerged in the region north of Khartoum from around 4,000BCE, added evidence for domestic herd animals. Evidence from ceramic plant impressions and common quernstones attest to the use of wild grains, including wild sorghum. These communities were seasonally mobile, exploiting the Nile during the dry season and ranging into adjacent savannas during the wet season. Increasing reliance on pastoral production by these communities provided a basis for systems of wealth and hierarchy, which is evident in burials

beginning in the later fourth millennium BCE. While some scholars have argued that it was among these communities that sorghum was first cultivated, the available evidence is inconclusive, and these archaeological traditions end around 3,000BCE without subsequent evidence for settlements with cultivation in this area. The earliest finds of domesticated sorghum are not until the first millennium BCE on sites well established by sedentary farmers further north in Nubia. From the third millennium, the village to urban tradition of Kerma emerged, but it remains unclear whether this was based solely on the production of introduced wheat and barley cultivation in the Nile flood plain or also included summer cultivation of sorghum.

In West Africa, semisedentary communities of cultivators emerged in the early second millennium BCE among pastoralists who had retreated south from the drying Sahara. One such tradition emerged in the palaeolake and wadi systems of southeast Mauretania in the Tichitt Tradition. Here ceramics begin around 2,000BCE and incorporate chaff-temper from the local processing of domesticated pearl millet from around 1700BCE. Large communities are indicated by stone remains of town and village sites with large domestic compounds focused on water sources. While summer cultivation and storage probably focused on these settlements, pastoral mobility remained important, as indicated by surface scatters of campsites. In the Niger bend regions, the sites of Karkarichinkat South and Winde Koroji indicate established village farming traditions with pearl millet by the mid-second millennium BCE. Further south in northern Burkina Faso, the sites of Orusi and Ti-n-Akof indicate the establishment of millet cultivation and pastoral production on stabilized sand dunes of northern savanna. Genetic evidence suggests that southwest Mauretania and these Niger bend sites could relate to two distinct domestications of wild pearl millet populations. The currently available dates from these sites, however, provide only the minimum age for the end of the domestication process, as equivalent or slightly older dates are available beyond the wild pearl millet range, including finds from India.

The Kintampo culture, known archaeologically from Ghana, indicates the adoption of savanna agropastoralism among forest margin hunter-gatherers. Evidence for domesticated pearl millet from around 1700BCE, as well as domestic fauna, at Birimi in northern Ghana attests to the importance of millet cultivation among some groups, while Kintampo sites further south in Ghana lack millet but have yielded abundant evidence for oil palm exploitation from the forest edge environment as well as probable early cowpea.

Pastoralism, possibly accompanied by some crop cultivation, also spread eastward and southward from

the Sudan from the mid- to late third millennium BCE. The Nderit ceramic tradition of the Lake Turkana region is associated with evidence for domesticated sheep and goats, while contemporary Eburran tradition hunter-gatherer sites further south have produced small quantities of ceramics and sheep/goat bones. The slow spread of domestic fauna in this region during the second millennium BCE is due in part to the presence of disease threats to domesticates, as well as established hunter-gatherer adaptations. In the mid-first millennium BCE, Pastoral Neolithic societies were much more widespread and domesticates had begun to spread into southern Africa. On present evidence it is unclear the extent to which cultivated crops played a role in these eastern African food production economies. Similarly requiring further research is the establishment of food production in more coastal East Africa, where some sites with ceramics may also date back to as early as the mid-third millennium BCE. In the uplands of Ethiopia, evidence from Gobedra and Lake Besaka for domesticate cattle dates from the mid- to late second millennium BCE, while early crop evidence remains elusive. In southern Africa domestic livestock were adopted among Khoisan-speaking groups, perhaps in Namibia and the Zambezi River Valley in the last centuries BCE, with subsequent dispersal southward. Later iron-using farmers made a more noticeable impact. Evidence for plant cultivation comes from the third century CE, when pearl millet is known from Silver Leaves in eastern South Africa.

The patchy evidence for early farmers in African savannas contrasts with traditional models of the beginnings of farming developed from Near Eastern archaeology. While in the Near East sedentary hunter-gatherers took up cultivation, then animal domestication and then pottery, in Africa ceramics first occur among mobile foragers, and animal herding preceded plant cultivation and sedentary settlement.

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Farming: Tropical Forest Zones

The history of farming in Africa's tropical forest zones is a persistent research challenge. Direct archaeological evidence, especially of plant remains but also of animal bones, is rare, and many of the species of particular importance would be difficult to identify archaeologically even if they were present. As a result, our understanding of past farming in these zones remains extremely patchy and is inferred largely from indirect evidence, ethnographic models, and historical linguistics.

A number of important crop species are native to the forests or forest margins of Africa, and their modern distributions provide clues to their regions of origin. There are several tuber species, which have played a limited role in agriculture outside the forest or forest margin zones. African yams (*Dioscorea cayenensis* complex and *D. bulbifera*) are taxonomically complex and could have multiple domestications across Africa. Other tubers like the hausa potato (*Plectranthus exculentus*), yampea (*Sphenostylis stenocarpa*), and piasa (*Solenostemon rotundifolius*) are all likely domesticates of the west-central Africa forest zone. In addition to possibly native yams, the forests of southwest Ethiopia provided early cultivators with ensete, cultivated for its starchy "stems." While guinea millet (*Brachiaria deflexa*) is native to the West African forest margin, other cereals cultivated in the forest zone, such as pearl millet and sorghum, were introduced from savanna agriculture. In Ethiopia, finger millet, tef, and the oilseed noog may have been domesticated in forest margin zones.

Important pulses of West Africa include cowpea, Kersting's groundnut, and Bambara groundnut, while in East Africa the hyacinth bean is a probable forest margin domesticate. Important tree crops include the akee apple (*Blighia sapida*), the oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*), and the incense tree (*Canarium schweinfurthii*) in West Africa. Additional crops include okra (*Abelmoschus esculentus*) and the fluted gourd (*Telfaira occidentalis*). Both West Africa and Ethiopia also have native stimulant species, with cola nuts and robusta coffee in West Africa and arabica coffee and chat in Ethiopia. Many species important to the agriculture of this zone today have been introduced from overseas. Bananas and probably taro/cocoyam and Asian yams were introduced in antiquity from across the Indian Ocean, while cassava/manioc, the sweet potato, and peanuts/groundnuts were introduced in post-Columbian times from South America.

None of the livestock that are important in the forest zone are native but were introduced via savanna zones.

The ungulates (sheep, goat, and cattle) all show special adaptation to this environment through dwarfism, which can be identified through metrical analysis of archaeological bone, and provides an intriguing parallel to human pygmy groups in this zone. As with other parts of equatorial Africa, the presence of endemic tsetse flies in this zone creates a potential disease barrier to the successful colonization by pastoralists.

The origins of agriculture in the west-central African forests lie in the interaction between native hunter-gatherers and early savanna agropastoralists. Such interactions appear to be represented by the Kintampo archaeological culture of Ghana. Lithic traditions and distinctive artifacts known as "terracotta cigars" suggest development of this ceramic-using tradition from local precursors. The northern range of this tradition is found in the savannas of northern Ghana from the early second millennium BCE, where pearl millet was cultivated, as indicated at Birimi. Further south, in more wooded environments, archaeobotanical evidence points to use of wild fruits, including incense tree nuts and oil palm, as well as pulses, including cowpea. Kintampo sites have produced evidence for cattle and goats, and some of the goat remains have been attributed to a dwarf breed. Linguistic evidence suggests that among the early cultivators of these forest crops were Benue-Congo speakers.

It was a subsection of the Benue-Congo language, the Bantu languages, which appear to have been spread by the early cultivators in central Africa, a process which could have begun as early as the second millennium BCE, although hard evidence for dating this process is elusive. Anthropogenic impacts on vegetation in West Africa are more readily apparent from the early to mid-first millennium BCE, which suggests that food-producing populations had reached some critical mass. Bantu speakers spread in two directions: eastward along forest margins, where other language groups may also have practiced agriculture and millet cultivation was added to the tuber crops, while another direction was south and east in central Africa carrying yam cultivation and livestock, while practicing fishing and mollusk collecting. The northern savanna route brought them to the great lakes region, where savanna food-producers were probably already established, and where the addition of ironworking promoted more intensive food production.

During the Iron Age, characterized by Urewe ceramics into the first centuries CE, the vegetation in this region registers the impact of widespread agriculture. Here perhaps in this period dwarf, humped cattle may have been adopted, which included genetic input from Indian zebu. The dispersal in the forest zone is thought to have followed river corridors, the west coastal zone, and possible savanna corridors favored for forest margin cultivation. Population densities are likely to

have been limited in part due to disease factors, and symbiosis of specialized hunter-gatherer groups may have been important. The minimum age for dispersal may be provided by the Ngovo tradition, with ceramics and groundstone axes, known from the lower Zaire River south of the central Africa rainforest, and dating from the end of the first millennium BCE, although present faunal data lacks livestock. Further south in Namibia and Zimbabwe to the east, livestock may have been adopted by Khoesaa-speaking communities in the last centuries BCE. Among the widespread words in Bantu languages are words for banana and possibly taro/cocoyam. Evidence for banana in the form of archaeological phytoliths comes from Nkang, Cameroon, from the mid- to late first millennium BCE. This indicates that bananas had spread westward from the East African coast by this time.

Early farming in equatorial Africa was a complex mosaic and raises important issues about the interaction between different systems of food production, persistent hunting and gathering, and between different cultural traditions. Developments drew on traditions from the African savannas, as well as species introduced to Africa via long-distance Indian Ocean trade

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Fatagar: See Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries.

Fatimid Caliphate: See Egypt: Fatimid Caliphate.

Fatimid Empire: Maghrib, 910–1057

Early in the tenth century, Abu Abdallah, a Shi'ite propagandist, instigated an uprising against Ifriqiya's Aghlabid rulers. After defeating them in 910, he gave

his support to Ubaidallah al-Mahdi, a messianic figure whose goal was to establish Shi'ite control throughout the Muslim world. By claiming the title of caliph (successor to Muhammad), Ubaidallah openly challenged the legitimacy of the Abbasid family, which had held the position for over a century. To stress their descent from Fatima, Muhammad's daughter and the wife of Ali, whom the Shi'a acknowledged as Muhammad's true heir, Ubaidallah and his family called themselves Fatimids.

The Kutama Berbers who had formed the nucleus of Abu Abdallah's army fell out with the Fatimids when the new rulers refused to allow the plundering of the province. Other Fatimid practices also disillusioned potential allies. The taxes needed to finance a large army proved burdensome, and the new regime's insistence on such Shi'ite tenets as the primacy of the descendants of Ali irked the egalitarian Berbers. Their disillusion boiled over into open revolt when Ubaidallah ordered the assassination of Abu Abdallah in 911.

Other opponents of the Fatimids—among them merchants aggrieved by the dynasty's acquisition of control over their lucrative trade routes and an Aghlabid pretender in Sicily—joined the rebels. Ubaidallah quelled the uprising with the assistance of Berbers whose loyalty was bought with promises of looting. The ensuing sack of the religious center of Qairawan, whose leaders had shown no inclination to renounce Sunni traditions, assured the Fatimids of the enduring enmity of that city. Nor did Shi'ite Islam make significant gains among the population at large. The hostility of Qairawan and the Fatimids' desire to carry their revolution beyond Ifriqiya explain Ubaidallah's decision to construct a new capital, Mahdiyya, on a peninsula on the province's eastern coast. Thus the Shi'ite rulers replaced Qairawan, originally founded to facilitate expansion farther west, with a coastal city looking eastward to the Muslim heartlands where the Fatimids hoped to organize their ideal state.

Nevertheless, the Fatimids did not ignore the lands to their west. Campaigns to bring other areas of the Maghrib under their rule provided an outlet for the militancy of Ifriqiya's Berbers and enhanced the Fatimid economy by securing control over additional North African termini of the trans-Saharan trade in the mid-tenth century. But the determination of the Umayyad rulers of the Iberian peninsula to halt Fatimid expansion turned much of the Maghrib into a battlefield contested by Berber proxies of both the Fatimid and Spanish Umayyad dynasties.

A resurgence of Kharajism, an egalitarian Muslim doctrine that had earlier attracted considerable support in North Africa, coincided with this period of Fatimid expansion. A populist figure named Abu Yazid led a Kharaji insurrection in the vicinity of Tozeur shortly

after Ubaiadallah's death in 934. The Fatimids arrested Abu Yazid, but he escaped and renewed the rebellion a decade later, capturing Tunis and Qairawan. His failure to take Mahdiyya broke the revolt and he was executed in 947. Abu Yazid's death ended the Kharaji threat in Ifriqiya, but the difficulties he had caused spurred the Fatimid leaders to begin planning the complicated process of transplanting their regime to the east.

Successful military thrusts into the Nile Valley enabled the Fatimids to transfer their capital to the newly created city of al-Qahira (Cairo) in 969. They did not, however, renounce their interests in the Maghrib, but appointed Buluggin ibn Ziri, a Berber tribal leader and long-time Fatimid ally, as governor of the area. His primary task was to hold the line against the Spanish Umayyads and their Zanata Berber allies. Buluggin and his successors engaged their former masters in a cat-and-mouse game, testing the limits of their independence. The Fatimids were unwilling to incur heavy expenses in curbing Zirid ambitions, but neither were they prepared to hand over their former territories to their vassals. Instead, they encouraged the Kutama Berbers to revolt, preventing the Zirids from focusing too sharply on their relationship with Cairo. On Buluggin's death in 984, his relatives divided the extensive Fatimid inheritance. His son Hammad received the lands of the central Maghrib west of Ifriqiya, where he carved out an independent state by the early eleventh century. Hammad's kinsmen in Ifriqiya resented his ambition but recognized that he provided them with a barrier against Zanata and Spanish Umayyad attacks.

As the threat of direct Fatimid intervention in North Africa waned, the Zirids found themselves in control of a thriving agricultural and commercial economy. Their commitment to maintaining stability in Ifriqiya and effectively controlling the caravan routes won them the support of urban artisans and businessmen dependent on agriculture and commerce for their livelihoods, particularly those of Mansuriyya, a suburb of Qairawan, which became the Zirids' economic and political hub. Early in the eleventh century, however, the trans-Saharan trade began to decline. The Zirids proved unable to provide the same measure of stimulation for this trade as had the Fatimids, who demanded its gold and other luxury items to finance their ambitious plans and its slaves to fill the ranks of their army. Equally responsible for the trade's decline, however, were the rise of the Almoravid confederation in the western Maghrib and the continuing Sub-Saharan commercial interests of the Fatimids themselves, both of which diverted caravan routes from Ifriqiya.

Spurred on as much by these economic considerations as by political motives, the Zirid ruler Muiz formally severed his links with the Fatimids in 1049. Ifriqiya no longer figured prominently in the Fatimids'

plans, but they were enraged by the disloyalty of their vassals. To punish them, they forced a number of Arab bedouin groups to move from Egypt to the Maghrib, fully aware that so massive a nomadic influx would wreak havoc there. In a pitched battle at Haidaran, northwest of Qairawan, in 1052, the bedouins routed the Zirid forces. Five years later, they sacked Qairawan, finalizing their hold over the interior of the province. The Zirids retreated to the coastal fortress of Mahdiyya, from which they maintained a tenuous grip on Ifriqiya's coastal regions for the next century.

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Federations and Unions, Postcolonial

The pace of independence of African colonies in the 1950s and 1960s ensured that the structure of some colonial unions and federations continued into the new era relatively intact. Others, formed for the administrative convenience of the appropriate European power, were broken up into their constituent parts, which then became sovereign entities. Differing attitudes to federal structures also determined the form, means, and success of unions and federations in each of the imperial systems of Africa.

The oldest federal structure in imperial Africa was the Union of South Africa, created in 1910 out of the self-governing British colonies of Cape Colony and Natal and the recently annexed former Afrikaner republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal. Designed along the lines of the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, it nevertheless vested dominant authority in the Union Government in Pretoria and relatively little in the states. This tendency to centralization was reinforced in the republican constitutions of 1961 and 1984, although some provincial autonomy was restored in the postapartheid

constitution in 1996 that increased the number of states from four to nine.

Elsewhere in British Africa, unions and federations were attempted with more limited success. Nigeria, unified under one administration in 1914, was an obvious test case for a federal structure during the colonial administrative reforms of the 1940s and 1950s. The “Richards” and “Macpherson” constitutions of 1947 and 1951 gradually extended the powers of regional assemblies and of the central legislature. Full internal self-government followed in the constitution of 1954, leading to a federal independent constitution in 1961. Nigeria’s repeated difficulties with military rule and the secessionist Biafran regime of the late 1960s saw a tendency toward centralization at the expense of the states, a pattern familiar in many parts of the continent.

The post-1945 era saw two further efforts to create colonial federations out of geographically contiguous colonies in British Africa, neither of which survived the transition to independence. Efforts to bring about “partnership” between the European and African inhabitants of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland resulted in the Central African Federation of the three colonies, which lasted from 1953 to 1963. The dominance of the federal government by the small white minority (as well as the preponderance of white-minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia economically and politically) raised the ire of African nationalists in all three territories. The federation was dissolved pending the independence of the three as separate states in 1964–1965. A similar experiment had long been posited for Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, where the idea of multiracial “partnership” was also attractive to officials. However, federation only went as far as the East African High Commission of 1948 to coordinate common services; suspicion of further integration, the Mau Mau crisis, and Tanganyika’s unique position as a United Nations (UN) Trust Territory made any federal plans impossible. The three states achieved independence in 1961–1963, and in 1964 Zanzibar joined Tanganyika to form Tanzania.

In general, British efforts to maintain some degree of regional autonomy within newly independent states amounted to quasi-federal constitutions in Kenya, Uganda, and Ghana, but in all cases these were denounced within a short time by the national leaders in the name of “national unity.” Within British Africa, only Nigeria retained its federal structure beyond the early years of independence.

Federal structures were organized by the French at the turn of the century to ease their administration of the vast territories acquired in Sub-Saharan Africa. French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) each had a resident governor general and centralized administrative apparatus, and a governor and other

officials at the level of each constituent territory (Mauritania; Senegal; Guinea; Côte d’Ivoire [Ivory Coast]; Dahomey; Sudan: Upper Volta; Niger: AEF: Congo; Oubangui-Chari; Chad). In the Fourth Republic constitution of 1946, each territory was granted a local assembly and was represented in the French National Assembly. This territorial autonomy was further enhanced by the *loi cadre* (enabling law) reforms of 1956, although executive authority at the federal level remained in the hands of the governors general. The short-lived Gaullist French Community arrangements of 1958 accelerated the pace toward independence, which came in 1960, at which time the AEF and AOF ceased to exist. The new republics that emerged from French Africa were for the most part unitary states with a strong executive presidency, although Mali (formerly French Sudan) and Senegal did form a brief federal republic in the aftermath of independence. This collapsed in August 1960 because of the very different populations and political cultures of the two territories. Elsewhere, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Chad, and the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroon formed a customs union.

Cameroon was a separate case because prior to independence it was a League of Nations Mandate (later UN Trust Territory) administered by France, although a smaller portion adjoining Nigeria was administered by Britain. Part of British Cameroon joined independent Nigeria in 1960, whereas the southern part was federated with now-independent French Cameroon in the following year. The two parts made up the Federal Republic of Cameroon with separate parliaments and ministries in addition to the federal government structure until a May 1972 referendum abolished the federation in favor of a United Republic.

In the former Belgian Congo, a federal constitution was promulgated in May 1960 in which the six colonial provinces would enjoy certain autonomies. Ultimate power lay with the central government, and in the disintegration that followed, provinces gained power that was affirmed in a new federal constitution in 1964. This was short-lived, and in October 1966 President Mobutu Sese Seko abolished provincial autonomy.

In order to settle the fate of the former Italian colonies after World War II, the UN attached Eritrea to Ethiopia in a federal arrangement in 1952. Eritrea enjoyed its own democratically elected government and constitution and was in theory equal to Ethiopia at the federal level until the territory was formerly annexed into a unitary state by Ethiopia in 1962.

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See also: **Colonial Federations: British Central Africa; Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa; Colonial Federations: French West Africa.**

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FIDES: See Fonds d'Investment pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES).

Firestone: See Liberia: Firestone.

FNLA: See Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974.

Fon: See Aja-speaking Peoples: Aja, Fon, Ewe, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.

Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES)

Created by a law of April 30, 1946, the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES [Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development]) was established to finance and coordinate the provision of facilities for the French overseas territories. It was placed at the service of France's new colonial policy after World War II, becoming the favored financial instrument by which a large part of French public-sector investment in these colonial territories was transmitted between 1946 and the attainment of independence by the former colonies.

Indeed, this radical change in policy on public-sector investment was the major innovation in the French colonies after the war. Breaking with the principles implicit in the *Pacte Colonial* (Colonial Pact), which had imposed self-financing on the colonial territories, the metropolitan power now accepted that it would have to invest public-sector capital directly into its colonies. This injection of capital was carried out within the

framework of plans for modernizing and providing infrastructure for the *Union Française* (French Union) as a whole. In this way, a new vision of colonial development was formulated, within the context of the post-war emergence of "technocrats," so that there was a transposition to the overseas territories of the French planning system inaugurated by the Monnet Plan; and this within the broader framework of the Marshall Plan, which secured an inflow of capital aimed at reconstruction.

FIDES was, therefore, a crucial financial organism for the colonial "New Deal." While a related organism, the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer (CCFOM [Central Fund for the French Overseas Territories]) was responsible for the provision of loans to such territories, FIDES provided direct grants. In doing so, it broke away from the logic that had been accepted before the war, when the colonies had been expected essentially to develop their own infrastructures with borrowed funds.

In fact, legally speaking, FIDES was simply one account held at the CCFOM, which was entrusted with the management of its funds, but the bulk of resources originating from the public sector and allocated for the implementation of infrastructure and development programs were transmitted through FIDES. Its leading personnel took part in drawing up, financing, and carrying out infrastructure plans and submitted long-term programs to the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer (Ministry for the French Overseas Territories), the government body that had responsibility for FIDES.

From the beginning, the moneys received by FIDES came from several sources, including both budgetary allocations by the metropolitan government and contributions from each of the colonial territories. In practice, it was the metropolitan power that, taking the insurmountable problems of local budgets into account, provided the bulk of the moneys for FIDES from the beginning of the 1950s. As a result, it may be said that these postwar investments prefigured the policy of bilateral aid that was to be developed between France and its former colonies once they had gained their independence.

FIDES conducted its operations through two principal divisions, the *section générale* (general section) and the *section d'outre-mer* (overseas section). The former was responsible for distributing state grants for studies and research of general interest and was authorized to take shares in public-sector companies, or companies with mixed public-private ownership, that operated in the colonies. The overseas section allocated grants to the whole range of specific development programs, such as those for roads, bridges, health facilities, educational institutions, town planning, and housing.

The definition and distribution of these investments was entrusted to a Guiding Committee, which was in effect the executive of FIDES. The committee was chaired by the minister for the French overseas territories, and its members included the director of the CC-FOM, leading officials from the *Ministères du Plan et de l'Economie* (Ministries for the Plan and the Economy), individuals from the world of business, and a small number of parliamentarians. This committee had all the powers of decision over the financing and implementation of FIDES programs, and it followed that the local assemblies and governors lost some of their prerogatives: infrastructure policy for the colonies was essentially defined in Paris.

In addition, the work of FIDES was largely beyond the control of the French parliament. FIDES was not required to observe the strictly annual framework of the budgetary process, and the parliament, having allocated block credits to it, had no right to anything more than a fairly distant supervision over the allocation of its capital. Increasingly, therefore, the colonial domain seemed to be a sector set apart from the French government machine, even though, in principle, the local colonial authorities took part in drawing up its plans.

Two plans for modernizing the colonies were brought into operation between 1947 and 1959. One historian, Jacques Marseille, has calculated that, in real terms, the volume of capital invested in French Africa during these years was larger than the total invested throughout the sixty-five years preceding them. The investments by FIDES, in cities and countryside alike, produced significant results: hospitals, educational institutions, roads, ports, hydraulic and electrical infrastructure, and many other forms of infrastructure were introduced during the 1950s.

The infrastructure drive mounted by France between 1946 and 1959 appeared to be a delayed, if determined, attempt to modernize its colonial territories. However, many of the schemes that were implemented were no more than investments in catching up, which were incapable of meeting the needs of fast-growing populations. FIDES was also criticized for doing a great deal to serve the interests of French enterprises, which were certain to find protected markets in the colonies. Moreover, little of the capital provided by FIDES was devoted to industrialization or to lasting development; many of its investments helped to accentuate the indebtedness and dependent status of the colonies, for they did not promote self-sufficient development.

Following the attainment of independence by the colonies, the *Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération* (FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund]) was created in 1960 as a channel for French bilateral aid. FAC was cast in

the same mould as FIDES and took over most of its characteristics.

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Forest Peoples: Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast): History of to 1800

The western end of the Upper Guinea forest block, unlike the east, has yet to yield evidence of early civilization. Scholars believe that for a long period, only isolated human groups subsisting by hunting and gathering were found in the western forests. Further development, beginning with permanent settlement, rice cultivation, and ironworking, are attributed to the growth of interregional trade—malaguetta pepper grown in the forests of present-day Liberia found its way to medieval Europe via trans-Saharan networks—and immigration from the savanna and eastern forests. The region remained a periphery of African states and empires, especially the Mande civilization of the upper Niger basin, until Europeans arrived on the coast in the fifteenth century.

Data on the early history of the region are scarce. Excavations at Kamabai rock shelter in northern Sierra Leone yielded iron artifacts dating from the eighth century, the earliest yet known for the region. These artifacts were deposited with a new type of pottery found throughout the savanna. This pottery has been excavated from other sites in Sierra Leone and western Liberia, and its appearance suggests that savanna trading empires were penetrating the western end of the region by this time. Iron tools must have facilitated forest clearance, allowing shorter fallow cycles and higher population densities. Present-day techniques of rain-fed rice agriculture, which require heavy seasonal labor inputs, may therefore have developed as a result of these trading contacts, spreading southward and eastward across the region. Indeed, some groups living at the eastern end of the region, notably the Gagou of the Côte d'Ivoire, combined hunting and gathering with a secondary dependence on low-intensity root-crop agriculture as recently as the late nineteenth century.

Data on sickle-cell gene frequencies lend further support to the view that agriculture is long established in the west of the region (Sierra Leone) but a more recent development in the east (southeast Liberia-Côte d'Ivoire). The sickle-cell gene confers immunity to malaria. High rates of exposure to malaria may select

for the gene, and this is more likely to occur among densely settled farming populations than isolated bands of hunters and gatherers inhabiting closed-canopy forest. Sickle-cell gene frequencies among modern populations of the region are substantially higher in the west than in the east. Furthermore, several modern groups, notably the Mende of Sierra Leone and Guéré of Côte d'Ivoire, have legends that their ancestors met a race of dwarfs when they first settled. No other evidence of an aboriginal race of West African pygmies has emerged, but the strongly bimodal distribution of heights among modern forest populations has led some scholars to argue that this reflects the intermarriage of short forest aborigines with taller immigrants from the savanna.

Linguistic evidence lends further support to the view that external agents played a key role in the historical development of the region. Today, representatives of three language families are present. Speakers of Kwa languages (Dei, Belle, Gbassa, Krahn, Grebo, Kru, Bété, Dida, Guéré, Agni-Baoulé, and the lagoon peoples) preponderate in the east (Côte d'Ivoire-eastern Liberia), while speakers of Mel languages (Temne, Bolem, Bom, Krim, Kissi and Gola) cluster in the west (Sierra Leone-western Liberia). Speakers of Mande languages form a middle cluster. They include representatives of Northern (Kono, Vai), Southern (Mano, Gio), and Southwestern (Mende, Kpelle, Gbandi, Loma, Dan, Gouro, and Gagou) Mande linguistic subdivisions.

Scholars have argued that local Kwa speakers, whose languages are related to those spoken in the Lower Niger basin, represent a vanguard of westward migration along the Guinea coast. This may in fact have involved shifts in language use as well as physical movement of people and may be linked to trade network expansion generated by state formation in Lower Guinea (Igbo Ukwu, Ife, Benin) and later, among the Akan of Asante. The Mande speakers are likewise seen as descendants of immigrants from the savanna and/or local populations drawn into savanna trade networks. Indeed, the Kono and Vai, speaking languages closely related to those spoken in the Upper Niger basin, may represent the ethnolinguistic imprint of an ancient trading system linking that region to the coast. The Southwestern Mande group may be the product of an even older and more geographically diffuse penetration from the area around Mount Nimba.

The Mel languages are specific to the Upper Guinea coast. Ancient stone figurines (*nomoli*) have been unearthed by local farmers in areas either currently inhabited by Mel-speaking Bolem and Kissi, or from which these peoples may have been displaced by Mande-speaking groups in the recent past. Some scholars have suggested that these figurines may be all

that remains of a lost forest civilization, of which the Bolem and Kissi, and perhaps Mel-speakers generally, are modern descendants. However, modern inhabitants of the region have no knowledge of the origin and purpose of these figurines.

It is significant that ethnographic data point to extensive and historically deep-seated processes of cultural convergence within the region. Even groups speaking unrelated languages tend to share the same cultural features. These include institutions that either facilitate social accommodation between groups of diverse origin (e.g., Islam, Mande, and European linguistic creoles, Mande clan names and secret societies), or reflect such accommodation (e.g., bilateral kinship). Historic forest culture seems to have focused less on conserving local identities and traditions than on building communities from whatever human and material resources were at hand.

The arrival of Europeans led savanna states to extend their power and influence toward the coast. Some forest groups (the Kissi in particular) were probably subject to intensified raiding in response to the European demand for slaves. In general, however, frontier conditions persisted in the Upper Guinea forests throughout the Atlantic trade era. European traders tapped into a regional trade and alliance system already built upon complex accommodations between local African rulers and resident agents of external commercial and political interests.

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See also: Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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Francophonie, Africa and the

La francophonie is defined as the unique and distinct group of countries that identify with a greater, French-speaking community of nations whose cultural center is France. Twenty-five countries from all regions of the African continent constitute the African portion of *la francophonie*: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) in central Africa; Djibouti in East Africa; Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean; Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa; and Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo in West Africa.

The preservation and further strengthening of *la francophonie* remains one of the bedrock principles of most francophone African countries. The resilience of this cultural attachment is demonstrated by the continued importance of French as at least one of the official languages of government activity, as well as by the self-classification of local elites as comprising part of a larger French-speaking community. The most vigorous proponents of this culturally based foreign policy during the early years of the postcolonial era were President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, and President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, the leaders of the two most economically and politically influential countries in francophone West Africa. Although the once-privileged status of French is gradually being eroded in several countries by "national languages" movements intent upon making indigenous languages more integral to government business, as well as by the increasing number of elite children who are learning English as a second language both at home and at universities abroad, the commitment of francophone African elites to the linguistic component of *la francophonie* remains strong.

The foreign policy dimension of *la francophonie* is best demonstrated by the regular Franco-African summits attended by the presidents of France and their francophone counterparts throughout Africa. Launched in Paris, France, on November 13, 1973, these summits have been described as the "centerpiece" of Franco-African cultural relations, primarily because they are perceived as "family reunions" designed to strengthen already close personal relationships between the French president and his francophone African counterparts. The careful nurturing of close, high-level personal ties is the cornerstone of each gathering; moreover, it is

equally important in regard to the day-to-day decision making related to French foreign policy toward Africa. In addition to the eleven Franco-African summits (1973, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1994, and 1998) that have been held in France, nine additional summits have been held on francophone African soil: Central African Republic (1975), Senegal (1977), Rwanda (1979), Congo-Kinshasa (1982), Burundi (1984), Togo (1986), Morocco (1988), Gabon (1992), and Burkina Faso (1996).

The worldwide francophone summit also serves as an important diplomatic platform for the promotion and strengthening of *la francophonie*. As is the case with the more regionally focused Franco-African summit, francophone African nations perceive the hosting of this conference as an important diplomatic achievement. It is precisely for this reason, for example, that President Nicéphore Soglo successfully sought to make Cotonou, Benin, the site of the sixth summit, which was held in December 1995. The holding of the meeting in Cotonou not only conferred a significant amount of prestige on President Soglo, but in essence served to anoint Benin's special status as the most successful case of democratic transition in francophone West Africa. It is important to note, however, that the worldwide summit does not serve as intimate a role as its Franco-African counterpart due to the attendance of non-African francophone states and the existence of leadership tensions between France, Canada, and to a lesser degree Belgium.

A firm commitment to regional cooperation and economic integration serves as an important pillar of *la francophonie*. One of the most important rationales for regional integration—the promotion of self-reliant development capable of reducing dependence on foreign bodies and sources—nonetheless has served as a point of dissension among francophone African countries due to its obvious focus on France as the former colonial power. During the 1950s, for example, two extreme versions of this argument were evident: President Houphouët-Boigny embraced the strengthening of economic ties with France, leading some to denounce him as "more French than African," with the Guinean president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, emerging as the most critical opponent of what he perceived as the perpetuation of French neo-colonialism in Africa. The majority of francophone African leaders placed themselves in between these two positions, although with a strong tilt toward maintaining close ties with France.

The inclusion of thirteen former French colonies and Equatorial Guinea in the franc zone serves as one of the most enduring economic outgrowths of *la francophonie*. Created in 1947, the franc zone constituted a supranational financial system in which France served as the central bank and a common currency, the Communauté

Financière Africaine (CFA) franc, was tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury. By wed- ding its fiscal policy to the franc zone, France sought to preserve monetary stability and French influence throughout francophone Africa. The negative implica- tions of deferring monetary policy to France was sharply felt for the first time in 1994, when French poli- cymakers took the extraordinary step of devaluing the CFA franc by 50 per cent. The sensitivity associated with France's decision to undertake such a drastic measure with no forewarning was clearly demonstrated at the 1996 Franco-African summit held in Burkina Faso. The only significant point of dissension at this summit occurred when French President Jacques Chirac sought to allay the fears of his franc zone coun- terparts by proclaiming that France would never again devalue the CFA franc, even though the further imple- mentation of the Maastricht Treaty calls for the creation of a common European currency in 1999. The response of the assembled franc zone leaders was both guarded and lighthearted, with President Pascal Lissouba of Congo-Brazzaville taking the lead in demanding that Chirac place this promise "in writing," a clear reference to earlier promises obviously not kept when France devalued the CFA franc in 1994.

The role of France is critical to any complete under- standing of francophone Africa's relationship to *la francophonie*. Indeed, France is the only former col- onial power that has sought to maintain and expand its presence throughout Africa, most notably in francoph- one Africa. Regardless of whether France has been led by the socialists of François Mitterrand or the more conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle or Jacques Chirac, French policy makers consistently have claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justify placing francophone Africa within France's sphere of influence. The implicit assumption of what has been described as the French version of the Monroe Doctrine is that francophone Africa constitutes France's *domaine réservé* (natural preserve), and therefore is "off limits" to other great powers.

France's self-appointed leadership role as the cul- tural center of *la francophonie* has been the target of rising criticisms among some francophone African countries. Questions have emerged not only from a new generation of democratically elected francophone African elites less enamored of past French support for their authoritarian predecessors, but from traditional, often authoritarian allies who fear that a diminished France will be either unwilling or unable to maintain previous commitments. Equally important, France's financial support for *la francophonie* appears to be waning, and at best seems diminished by priorities elsewhere. The policy-making elite is preoccupied with the implications of European integration and the

enlargement of the European security zone. The French public is particularly prone to question French finan- cial commitments to maintaining *la francophonie* in Africa in an era of economic stagnation at home. The uglier side of this public shift is growing intolerance for francophone African immigrants (most notably those from North Africa) who historically have looked upon France as the land of opportunity.

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See also: Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa; Colonial Federations: French West Africa; Colonialism: Inheritance of: Postcolonial Africa; Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 1905–1993; Senghor, Léopold Sédar.

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Freetown

The capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown has a population of 2.5 million residents (2002 estimate), up from ap- proximately 1 million just a decade earlier, a result of mass immigration to the city during the nation's civil war. This seaport city is located on the northern tip of the country's Western Province, four miles from the estuary of the Sierra Leone River. It has a tropical cli- mate, with temperatures averaging 80 degrees Fahren- heit (27 degrees Centigrade) and rainfalls totaling 150 inches (381 centimeters) a year. Initially comprising freed slaves, Maroons, Nova Scotians, and liberated Africans, Freetown's population now includes large numbers of other ethnic groups from the provinces as well as foreigners.

In 1779 two Scandinavians, Carl Bernhard Wadström and Anders Johansen, initiated the idea of building a refuge for freed black slaves in Freetown. However, Granville Sharp, an English philanthropist and aboli- tionist, became the first person to implement such a

plan when he settled about 400 freed slaves on land where Freetown now stands. The settlers suffered from hunger, disease, and warfare, and the settlement almost perished. In 1791 Wadström and Johansen decided to work with the British-owned Sierra Leone Society and took part in its second attempt to establish a functioning settlement in Freetown. The town plan for that second try was drawn by the two Scandinavians, who also calculated the cost of the houses to be built.

In September 1794 the Freetown settlement was attacked and destroyed by a French naval squadron. After it was rebuilt, it was again attacked in 1801 and 1802 by the neighboring Temne in alliance with some dissident Nova Scotians.

Due to its excellent natural harbor, the Freetown port was seen as an easy target by ships plying the west coast of Africa at the height of the transatlantic slave trade. After the British Parliament made the slave trade illegal in 1807, it declared the Sierra Leone peninsula (Freetown and its environs) a British Crown Colony the following year. Freetown was used by the British naval squadron as its base of operations against slave ships as well as the seat of the British Mixed Commission Courts. The Vice-Admiralty Court, which was set up in Freetown in 1808, tried the captains of slave ships captured by the British naval squadron patrolling the west coast of Africa. The squadron's operations were hampered because it could not legally examine foreign ships for slaves, unless permitted by treaty with the foreign countries involved. Nonetheless, it did manage to free many slaves from the slave ships of many nations and settled the recaptives in the colony.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Freetown was gloriously described as the "Athens of West Africa" for its highly westernized buildings, services, enterprises, educational institutions, and civic life. And in both World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945), Freetown was utilized as a major naval base by the British.

The glorious image of Freetown was drastically altered in January 1999 when a contingent of rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had engaged in a protracted civil war with various Sierra Leonean civilian and military regimes for eight years, attacked the city. The attack resulted in more than 5,000 deaths, about 7,000 newly registered refugees in neighboring Guinea, and tens of thousands being prevented from crossing into Guinea and Liberia by troops from regional governments of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOMOG) and by the RUF rebels. An estimated 65 to 85 per cent of the capital was destroyed after the slaughter, looting, and arson that took place.

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See also: **Sierra Leone.**

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Fulani: See Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Cattle Pastoralism, Migration, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Origins; Sokoto Caliphate: Hausa, Fulani and Founding of.

Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Origins

The Fulbe are one of the most widespread ethnic groups in West Africa and have played a prominent role in West African history. Known primarily for their expertise as cattle pastoralists, the Fulbe, over the past 1,000 years, have spread across 2,000 miles of savanna, from Senegambia in the west to Cameroon in the east. They are easily the most significant pastoralist group in all of West Africa. They were also the single most instrumental black African group in spreading Islam, the dominant religion, throughout much of the savanna region of West Africa. Today they

number about ten million in many different countries. They are still the dominant pastoralist group in the Sahel and savanna regions of West Africa.

Because of their widespread geographic distribution across anglophone and francophone countries, the Fulbe have been known by a variety of names in the literature. Arbitrary distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim, and nomadic and sedentary Fulbe have caused variations in terminology. Even today there is considerable confusion about what term to use, and who is actually Fulbe. All Fulbe speak the language of Fulfulde, which has numerous dialects, depending on location. The Fulbe of Senegambia call themselves *Haalpulaar'en* (speakers of Pulaar, the local dialect of Fulfulde). In addition, Fulbe in Futa Toro are often called Futankobe or Futanke, while those of Futa Bundu are known as Bundunkobe. During the colonial period, the French divided the *Haalpulaar'en* of Senegal into "Toucouleur" or "Tukolor," whom they considered primarily agricultural and centered in Futa Toro, and "Peul" or "Peuhl," using the Wolof term for primarily pastoral peoples inhabiting the upper river region and the Casamance. The French also mistakenly labeled the so-called Tukolor as radical anti-French Muslims and considered the Peuls as docile non-Muslims.

The government of Senegal, many Senegalese, and some scholars continue to differentiate between Tukolor and Peul to the present, inaccurately treating them as separate ethnic and linguistic groups. Many Senegalese, especially the Wolof, refer to the Fulfulde language as Tukolor. Guinea Fulbe are often called Pula Futa, after their center of concentration in Futa Djallon. In northern Nigeria, the Fulbe are called Fulani, borrowing the Hausa term, and in Sierra Leone and Gambia, the Malinke term, Fula, is most often used to refer to local Fulbe. In Niger, the Fulbe are labeled Woodabe, or "red" Fulbe, because of their apparently lighter complexion than other groups. Some Europeans, especially in anglophone regions, divided the Fulbe into "town" Fulani, who mostly farmed, and "cattle" Fulani, who were more pastoralist and usually non-Muslim.

Hence, a people with an essentially similar language, culture, and identity are found in the literature under a confusing variety of names. Scholarship now confirms that all these groups are essentially Fulbe, and that the term *Fulbe* (or *Fuulbe*) is the most accurate designation. The term *Haalpulaar'en*, which many Fulbe use for themselves, is also acceptable.

The origins of the Fulbe have caused considerable speculation among early European ethnographers and have continued to puzzle later Western anthropologists, linguists, and historians. Fulbe oral traditions suggest an origin in Egypt or the Middle East, a common theme in West African Muslim traditions. According to these origin myths, the Fulbe then

migrated westward until they reached the Atlantic Ocean. They then moved south into the highlands of central Guinea. Based on these traditions, some early ethnographers ascribed an Egyptian, Arab, or even Jewish origin to the Fulbe who appeared to be lighter-skinned, taller, and more "Caucasoid" than other West African groups. Some commentators claimed that the Fulbe were not African at all but a Semitic people. These ethnographers also concluded that the Fulbe spread from North Africa and then east to west, finally drifting southward in a deliberate and calculated pattern.

Linguistic evidence suggests that the Fulfulde language belongs to the West Atlantic subgroup and is closely related to Wolof and Serer, both spoken originally in western Senegambia. Therefore, the modern Fulbe and their language, Fulfulde, originated in Senegambia, probably in the northern river area of Futa Toro. The original Fulbe may have descended from a pastoral group inhabiting the Western Sahara in the Chadian wet phase 5,000 to 10,000 years ago, before moving into the Mauritanian Adrar as the Sahara dried up. Later they may have gradually filtered down to the lower and middle Senegal River valley, the area known as Futa Toro, and intermarrying with local groups. From Futa Toro, the Fulbe most likely spread into the Sahel zone along the Senegal and Niger Rivers, and then further east. They also migrated south from Futa Toro into the upper Senegal River valley, the upper Casamance region, and eventually into the Futa Djallon highlands of Guinea. Existing landowners throughout West Africa had no reason to treat the pastoralists as competitors for resources and did not hinder their spread. Occasionally clashes did occur between the migratory Fulbe and settled farmers, but more often the interaction was peaceful cooperation. It is also likely that the Fulbe migrated to areas that were suited to cattle herding and that did not require considerable defense from farmers. The migratory process was not a single set mass movement but a series of short and long-distance moves, sometimes temporary and sometimes permanent, occurring at various intervals over hundreds of years.

The Fulbe have always maintained a strong sense of identity separate from other West African groups. They have consistently been aware of their occupational specialty and distinctive appearance. In fact, many Fulbe may feel "racially" superior to their agricultural neighbors and have incorporated some of the early European ideas about a North African or Middle Eastern origin into their traditions. The Fulbe have also emphasized their independence and mobility, in comparison to their settled neighbors.

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See also: **Futa Jalon; Futa Toro.**

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Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Cattle Pastoralism, Migration, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The search for the origin of the Fulani is not only futile, it betrays a position toward ethnic identity that strikes many anthropologists as profoundly wrong. Ethnic groups are political action groups that exist, among other reasons, to benefit their members. Therefore, by definition, the social organization, as well as cultural content, will change over time. Moreover, ethnic groups, such as the Fulani, are always coming into, and going out of, existence. Rather than searching for the legendary eastern origins of the Fulani, a more productive approach might be to focus on the meaning of Fulani identity within concrete historical situations and analyze the factors that shaped Fulani ethnic identity and the manner in which people used it to attain particular goals.

The people whom historians identify as Fulani entered present-day Senegal from the north and east. It is certain that they were a mixture of peoples from northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. These pastoral peoples tended to move in an eastern direction and spread over much of West Africa during the tenth century. Their adoption of Islam increased the Fulani's feelings of cultural and religious superiority to surrounding peoples. That adoption became a major ethnic boundary marker.

Toroobe, a branch of the Fulani, settled in towns and mixed with the ethnic groups there. They quickly became outstanding Islamic clerics, joining the highest ranks of the exponents of Islam, along with Berbers and Arabs. Fulani Sirre, or town Fulani, never lost touch with their relatives, however, often investing in large herds themselves. Cattle remain a significant symbolic repository of Fulani values.

The Fulani movement in West Africa tended to follow a set pattern. Their first movement into an area tended to be peaceful. Local officials gave them land grants because their products, including fertilizer, were highly prized. The number of converts to Islam

increased over time. With that increase Fulani resentment at being ruled by pagans or imperfect Muslims increased.

That resentment was fueled by the larger migration that occurred during the seventeenth century, in which the Fulani migrants were predominantly Muslim. These groups were not so easily integrated into society as earlier migrants had been. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, revolts had broken out against local rulers. Although these revolts began as holy wars (jihad), after their success they followed the basic principle of Fulani ethnic dominance.

The situation in Nigeria was somewhat different from that elsewhere in West Africa in that the Fulani entered areas that are more settled and developed than those in other West African lands did. At the time of their arrival, in the early fifteenth century, many Fulani settled as clerics in Hausa city-states such as Kano, Katsina, and Zaria. Others settled among the local peoples during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the seventeenth century, the Hausa states had begun to gain their independence from various foreign rulers, with Gobir becoming the predominant Hausa state.

The urban culture of the Hausa was attractive to many Fulani. These town or settled Fulani became clerics, teachers, settlers, and judges and in many other ways filled elite positions within the Hausa states. Soon they adopted the Hausa language, many forgetting their own Fulfulde languages. Although Hausa customs exerted an influence on the town Fulani, they did not lose touch with the cattle or bush Fulani.

These ties proved useful when their strict adherence to Islamic learning and practice led them to join the jihads raging across West Africa. They tied their grievances to those of their pastoral relatives. The cattle Fulani resented what they considered an unfair cattle tax, one levied by imperfect Muslims. Under the leadership of the outstanding Fulani Islamic cleric, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, the Fulani launched a jihad in 1804. By 1810 almost all the Hausa states had been defeated.

Although many Hausa joined dan Fodio after victory was achieved, the Fulani in Hausaland turned their religious conquest into an ethnic triumph. Those in Adamawa, for instance, were inspired by dan Fodio's example to revolt against the kingdom of Mandara. After their victories, the Fulani generally eased their Hausa collaborators from positions of power and forged alliances with fellow Fulani.

For the fully nomadic Fulani, the practice of transhumance (the seasonal movement in search of water) strongly influences settlement patterns. The basic settlement, consisting of a man and his dependents, is called a *wuru*. It is social but ephemeral, given that many such settlements have no women and serve simply as shelters for the nomads who tend the herds.

There are, in fact, a number of settlement patterns among Fulani. Since the late twentieth century, there has been an increasing trend toward livestock production and sedentary settlement, but Fulani settlement types still range from traditional nomadism to variations on sedentarism. As the modern nation-state restricts the range of nomadism, the Fulani have adapted ever increasingly complex ways to move herds among them. Over the last few centuries, the majority of Fulani have become sedentary.

Those Fulani who remain nomadic or seminomadic have two major types of settlements: dry-season and wet-season camps. The dry season lasts from about November to March, the wet season from about March to the end of October. Households are patrilocal and range in size from one nuclear family to more than one hundred people. The administrative structure, however, crosscuts patriline and is territorial. Families tend to remain in wet-season camp while sending younger males—or, increasingly, hiring non-Fulani herders to accompany the cattle to dry-season camps.

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
See also: Hausa Politics: Origins, Rise Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers; ‘Uthman dan Fodio.

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Funj Sultanate, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries

The Sinnar sultanate dominated much of the northern Nile Valley Sudan from about 1500 to 1821, last in the long sequence of precolonial kingdoms that comprise one of the world’s most ancient and resilient traditions of civilized statecraft. At its greatest extent the sultanate extended from the Ottoman Egyptian border at the Third Cataract southward to the Ethiopian highlands and the Sobat River, and from the Red Sea westward across the Nile to include the Nuba Mountains and Kordofan. The sultanate arose from the ruins of the medieval Nubian kingdoms of Makuria and Alodia after more than a century of troubles during which invaders from Egypt introduced Islam and Arabic



Funj sultanate, sixteenth–seventeenth centuries.

speech to the Nubian world; the kings of Sinnar thus embraced Islam as religion of state and Arabic as language of administration while reestablishing their realm according to traditional African principles. In addition to a northern and central core of Nubian speakers the sultanate came to incorporate wide eastern, western and southern peripheries of ethnically diverse subject peoples.

The hereditary ruling elite of Sinnar, the Funj, defined themselves as offspring through the female line of a remote legendary ancestress. A royal court of titled high officials elected the king from among the sons of Funj noblewomen by previous rulers. Unless a nobleman won the hand of a princess his status died with him; the quest for and the bestowal of noble Funj wives thus constituted a fundamental idiom of statecraft. There arose a hierarchy of noble status and governmental offices within which each successful lord owed political responsibilities to the superior from whom he received a Funj wife as well as his title and office, while remaining forever socially subordinate to his maternal uncle. For example, it was the king’s maternal uncle’s responsibility to execute him if rejected and deposed by the royal court. Subordinate lords in turn donated female kin of Funj descent as wives to their superiors; thus the king had about 600 noble wives, a senior nobleman about 200, and a lesser lord about 30.

Sinnar was primarily an agricultural society; most forms of wealth derived from the land, which in theory belonged to the king. The pyramid of kinship relations among the Funj nobility also served to structure the territorial subdivision of the realm into major provincial

and subordinate district governates. The monarch, having reserved some estates as a personal demesne, apportioned the bulk of the realm to a number of his kinsmen as provincial governates; they in turn reserved demesnes and subdivided their provinces as district governates among their kinsmen. Lesser lords not only obeyed and served their superiors politically but also paid tribute to them in the form of quality goods derived from their estates such as cloth, tobacco, gold, ivory, horses, medicines, spices, and perfumes. Superior noblemen redistributed among their subordinates exotic forms of wealth acquired through activities monopolized by the central government, notably slaves taken through judicial process or warfare and foreign luxury goods imported from abroad by royal trading expeditions. Subjects were legally bound to the estate of their lord, whom they supported through the delivery of substantial levies upon grain cultivation and animal husbandry supplemented by a wide variety of fees and obligations payable in kind or in labor services. Strict sumptuary laws maintained social distance between noblemen and subjects, and severe forms of deviance such as leaving one's estate without permission or being the offspring of an illicit mixed liaison were punished by enslavement.

Over most of its history the Sinnar sultanate enjoyed peaceful relations with its neighbors, but a chronicle of decisive events must inevitably highlight the exceptions. During the sixteenth century Sinnar struggled to contain the ambitions of the Ottoman Empire, both along the Nile in the north and, with the collaboration of imperial Ethiopia, at the Red Sea coast. The seventeenth century witnessed a deterioration in relations with Ethiopia as the Funj pressed southward up the Blue Nile to annex the gold-producing land of Fazughli; major Ethiopian invasions were repulsed in 1618–1619 and again in 1744. During the eighteenth century an increasingly bitter struggle developed between Sinnar and her Fur-speaking western neighbors over the vast gold-producing region of Kordofan that lay between the respective heartlands of the two kingdoms. First the Musabba'at, a defeated and exiled faction of the royal family of Dar Fur, settled in Kordofan and used it as a base for attempted re-conquest of their homeland; after 1785 the Dar Fur sultans themselves struck eastward to impose their rule at the expense of both Funj and Musabba'at. By the early decades of the nineteenth century Sinnar was exhibiting signs of internal weakness that attracted renewed acquisitive attention from the Turkish government of Egypt.

The Funj kingdom reached its apogee during the reigns of the great seventeenth-century monarchs Rubat I, Badi II, and Unsa II, who opened diplomatic and commercial relations with the Islamic heartlands, established at Sinnar the first fixed urban capital for

their hitherto-agrarian realm, and built this new city into a large and cosmopolitan metropolis through the dispatch of royal caravans to attract foreigners with valuable goods and skills. Yet these more intimate contacts with the outside world could not fail to expose features of Funj society, notably noble matrilinearity and royal dominance over foreign commerce, that would inevitably appear controversial from a Middle Eastern cultural perspective. As the eighteenth century passed, intrusive alien concepts found ever-larger native constituencies: demographically superfluous male Funj princes, individuals who aspired to Islamic piety and learning, governors excluded from royal trade, and would-be merchants themselves. Cultural dissidence expressed itself in the rise of towns, whose numbers increased from one in 1700 to about thirty by 1821, and in accelerating political chaos; royal matrilinearity was abandoned in 1719, a military strongman reduced the king to a puppet in 1762, and by 1800 the urbanized fragments of the old agrarian realm had lapsed into interminable civil war. Many dissidents welcomed the Turkish invaders from Egypt who swept over the kingdom in 1820–1821, and the remaining defenders of the old order were easily overwhelmed.

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See also: **Nubia: Banu Kanz, Juhayna, and the Arabization of the Nilotic Sudan.**

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Futa Jalon to 1800

Futa Jalon, or Djalón (also spelled “Foutah Djallon” in countries of French expression) is an extensive mountainous area located in Guinea, with outlying areas reaching into Sierra Leone and Liberia. With an average height of 3,000 feet (914 meters), Futa Jalon forms the second highest land in West Africa, the highest being Mount Cameroon.

The first settlers of the kingdom were a group of Susu who migrated to the west coast of Africa from the

banks of the Falama River, a southern tributary of the Senegal, arriving in Futa Jalon about 1400. These migrants had been part of the Soninke kingdom, which was itself part of the kingdom of Ghana, until 1076 when the Almoravids overran the Soninke capital. Before and during the nineteenth century, Futa Jalon was renowned for its jihads (holy wars), its trade, and its educational institutions.

The jihad in Futa Jalon can be traced back to the reign of the great king of the Songhai Empire, Askia Mohammed. Upon returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1497, Askia attacked and forcibly converted to Islam his neighbors: Fulani/Fulbe/Peul, Koranko, and Mandingo. His successors continued his crusade; and before 1559, they had already begun to drive the Koranko back across the Niger toward Sierra Leone where they soon occupied the eastern provinces of Limba country. The last act of this jihad began just before 1600 when the Muslims of Futa Jalon, who were Fulani and Mandingo, drove the remnants of the Mende, across the frontier into Sierra Leone.

In about 1725 Alpha Ba of Koranko, proclaiming himself *alimamy*, instead of taking the usual title of military leaders who were known as *siratiks*, declared a jihad against the non-Muslims of Futa Jalon, mainly Susu and Yalunka. When he died, the holy war was continued under the theologian and soldier, the former Alpha Ibrahima of Timbo (the capital of Futa Jalon), usually referred to as Karamoko Alpha. By 1786 the Muslims had fought from Futa Jalon to the headwaters of the Moa River in the southeastern region, but encountered no Mende people. The fighting in the Niger district must have driven the Mende south. By the end of the eighteenth century, Futa Jalon had become an Islamic state.

The war dispersed many Susu, converted or unconverted, south and west. Small groups settled among the Limba, at first peaceably, conquering them later, or driving them east. Other Susu groups moved to the coast to dominate the Baga, Temne, and Bulom north of the Scarcies River. Susu immigrants whom Temne kings allowed to build a town opposite Port Loko at Sendugu gradually wrested power from the Temne. Eventually, the Sanko family, Muslims of Sarakulé origin, replaced them altogether.

At first, the Yalunka accepted Islam. However, as the Fula grew powerful, the Yalunka renounced the religion, fought against them, and they were driven from Futa Jalon. The Yalunka found their new capital Falaba in the mountains near the source of the Rokel River. The rest of the Yalunka went further into the mountains to settle among the Koranko, Kissi, and Limba.

Some Muslim adventurers in Futa Jalon also dispersed. The Loko invited a Mandingo from Kankan to be their king. A Fula styled *Fula Mansa* became the ruler of Yoni country south of the Rokel River. Some Temne

living in the area fled to found Banta country near the Jong River; they became known as the Mabanta Temne. Non-Limba kings ruled the Limba. Muslim Mandingo traders also spread through the country, singly or in groups, from the hinterland. Interested mainly in trading, they also spread the teachings of Islam.

It did not take long for the Europeans to notice the lucrative trade in Futa Jalon. At first, many in England, especially the African Association founded (with William Wilberforce a member) in 1788 to encourage exploration, knew very little about the interior of Sierra Leone. However, early in 1794, James Watt and Dr. Thomas Winterbottom's brother, Mathew Winterbottom, set off for Futa Jalon, sailing up the coast to the Rio Nunez, then overland to Timbo. The residents of Futa Jalon received them warmly and sent a delegation with them to Freetown to arrange regular trade. The following year, Watt and John Gray, the Sierra Leone Company's accountant, traveled up the Karamanka and Bumpé Rivers to visit a Muslim Mandingo king who wanted to trade with the Freetown Colony.

While Christian Europe was gaining a foothold on the Freetown peninsula, Islam was still spreading south and west from Futa Jalon. The Baga, Bulom and other coastal peoples along the Northern Rivers—Malakori, Bereira, Rio Pongas, Rio Nunez, and their sluggish, interpenetrating tributaries—were gradually conquered by Muslims from Futa Jalon. They settled at Forekaria, which became known as “Mandingo country.” Meanwhile, the French on Gambia Island sent the Bunduka, a group of aristocratic Fula, into Temne country as trading agents. The Bunduka stayed and won themselves the Mafonda chiefdom, which is situated south of the Small Scarcies River.

The Freetown colony's small trade with the interior in gold, ivory, and hides depended on the Fula caravans being able to pass safely along the paths to the coast. In 1820 the king of Futa Jalon wrote requesting that Governor Sir Charles MacCarthy, whose fame had reached the interior, mediate in a war in the Northern Rivers that inhibited their trade outcome. Early in the subsequent year Dr. Brian O'Beirne, an army surgeon, was sent to Timbo with a friendly message, overland from Port Loko, to open a new trade route. He traveled on horseback through Limba country, returning the same way, encouraging traders in Futa Jalon to do the same.

The end of the Temne wars in 1840 prompted the Fula to revive the gold trade with the colony. When Freetown merchants suggested sending a mission to Timbo, the government would only contribute £200. Instead, Governor Dr. William Fergusson persuaded them to subscribe themselves. Three recaptives, Carew, Wilhelm and William Jenkins, subscribed. Cooper Thompson, the Christian Missionary Society linguist, led the mission, starting off in December 1841

with his twelve-year-old-son. They were well received upon their arrival in Timbo.

In 1863 French Governor Louis-Léon César Faidhèrbe embarked upon linking the Senegal to the Niger in order to secure the entire West African hinterland for France. By the time Dr. Valesius Skipton Gouldsbury, administrator of the Gambia, reached Futa Jalon in 1881, he found French agents had preceded him. The king of Futa Jalon denied having sold the French land, but in France it was claimed that Futa Jalon was now under the aegis of France. Expecting to earn profits from their investment in Futa Jalon, the French declared a virtual monopoly in that territory's trade. The British government was forced to extend its influence inland, not by assuming administrative responsibilities, but by trade treaties.

In 1873 Dr. Edward Wilmot Blyden, one of the most erudite of educated Africans at the time, traveled to Timbo and signed a treaty with the king for a £100 annual stipend and tried to reconcile him with his non-Muslim neighbors at Falaba. Blyden urged the British government to extend its influence over these inland kingdoms, highlighting the French encroachment, and suggesting that a consular agent be stationed in Timbo.

Governor Sir Samuel Rowe had planned to encircle the French and unite Gambia to Sierra Leone through the interior. In 1879 he sent messengers to Timbo, ignored (and stipend unpaid) since Blyden's visit. Rowe also urged Gouldsbury to take an expedition in 1881 up the River Gambia, overland to Futa Jalon, and on to Freetown.

That Futa Jalon had an excellent reputation as a place for higher learning is hardly a matter of dispute. In 1769, as a king in Sierra Leone sent one son to Lancaster to learn Christianity, he also sent another son to Futa Jalon to learn Islam. Mohamadu Savage, the Muslim Aku leader at Fourah Bay, bought ships for the sole purpose of trading. Instead of allowing his children to attend Christian school, this wealthy man sent them to Futa Jalon to study. Harun al-Rashid of Fourah Bay, educated at the Grammar School (as Henry Valesius King), continued his studies at Futa Jalon and Fez. He later went to Mecca, the first pilgrim from the colony to do so. Upon his return from Mecca, al-Rashid, with the title of *al-Haji*, taught Arabic for one year at Fourah Bay College. He then worked as a private teacher until his death in 1897.

With an admiration for Islam, William Winwood Read (author of books such as *Savage Africa; The Last Negroes; The African Sketch-book; and The Martyrdom of Man*) was quite pleased when he got to know Mohamed Sanusie, an Aku Muslim and highly respected product of Futa Jalon education, who showed him a collection of Islamic works composed in Futa Jalon and other parts of West Africa. Sanusie served as

an interpreter for the colonial government. He was highly skilled in Arabic, able to speak it fluently and to write it sufficiently well. Blyden himself thought that Sanusie's Arabic library was very respectable. His English, moreover, was excellent, and he knew the Bible better than most missionaries knew the Qur'an.

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See also: **Fulbe/Fulani/Peul.**

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Futa Jalon: Nineteenth Century

The Futa Jalon was a Muslim theocracy located in West Africa that extended from Côte d'Ivoire to Mauritania and Mali. It contributed to the Islamic renaissance in West Africa during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. From a political standpoint, the first half of the nineteenth century in Futa Jalon was characterized by a deep crisis of succession, starting toward the close of the eighteenth century after the demise of the forerunners, Karamoko Alfa and Almami Sory Mawdho. While some (the *Alfaya*) acknowledged the right of succession of the descendants of Karamoko Alfa, the constitutional monarch, others (the *Soriya*) upheld the claims of the descendants of his successor, Almami Sory Mawdho, in view of the vital role the latter played in the consolidation of the state. This ultimately led to a compromise consisting of a bicephalous system, whereby two *Almami* were appointed to run the federation: one from *Alfaya* and the other, from *Soriya*, ruling alternately for a two-year mandate.

This early compromise, however, was only effective at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, when the *Hubbu* uprising in Fitaba southeast of Timbo threatened the kingdom with disintegration.

Hence, much of the first half of the nineteenth century was dominated by internecine wars between the two parties. The effect of this protracted war was the emergence of a state of anarchy that weakened the central power, tarnishing its image in the eyes of the orthodox theocracy. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, enforcement of the law helped secure the stability of the central organ of power, which, as a result, wielded greater control over the provinces, particularly those located in the “Rivers of the South” area, and engaged in new conquests, the most important of which was the Ngabou, which was the most powerful centrally organized state in the region. The only instance of failure occurred during the war against the *Hubbu* dissidents, who would not have been conquered without Samori Touré’s intervention in the early 1880s.

The nineteenth-century Futa Jalon lived on a subsistence economy with a predominance of agriculture and animal husbandry, drawing most of its labor force from the slave class. This economy satisfied most of the country’s needs, along with a dynamic foreign trade with Sudan and the Atlantic coast that benefited the ruling class. Though well organized, its tax system was implemented so abusively that it gave rise to the insurrection that became known as the *Hubbu* movement.

Nineteenth-century Futa Jalon witnessed a consolidation of the changes initiated in the eighteenth century, including the passage from a patriarchal, egalitarian type of animist society to a hierarchical one dominated by the aristocracy that emerged from the Islamic conquests. Underlying the social order were religious considerations that made a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, the former enjoying the full rights of free people and the latter being subjected to slavery. This differentiation led to the division of society into two main groups: the *rimbhè*, designating the order of free individuals, and the *jiyabhè*, referring to the slave class. Each class had its internal hierarchy depicting relations of inequality and exploitation. As regards the division of labor, there emerged a society where some (members of the aristocracy) concentrated the administration of political power and religion—court life, holy wars, intellectual and spiritual life—whereas those in the lower class (ordinary free men, artisans and slaves) were committed to manual labor and services. In this regard, nineteenth-century society in the Futa Jalon was a hierarchical, non-egalitarian, and segregationist society.

In the field of religion and culture, the nineteenth century is said to have witnessed the golden age of Islam in the Futa Jalon. It was the century of great scholars and the growth of Islamic culture. All the disciplines of the Quran were known and taught: translation, the hadiths, law, apologetics, the ancillary sciences such as grammar, rhetoric, literature, astronomy, local works in

Pular and Arabic, and mysticism. Nineteenth-century European visitors were highly impressed by the extent of the Islamization, which was visible in the large number of mosques and schools at all levels, the degree of scholarship, the richness of the libraries, and the widespread practice of Islamic worship. All this seems to have been facilitated by the use of the local language, *Pular*, as a medium of teaching and popularization of Islamic rules and doctrine. This intense intellectual and religious activity made Futa Jalon a leading religious center in nineteenth-century West Africa. In the same way as it attracted disciples from all parts of the region, its own scholars visited the Moorish shaykhs or renowned scholars in Futa Toro, Macina and Bhundu to supplement their education.

European interest in Futa Jalon was intensified during the course of the nineteenth century. The process that started from the end of the eighteenth century with the Sierra Leone Company continued throughout the nineteenth century and ended with actual European occupation of the region. Visits to the region were made mainly by French and English emissaries under various pretexts. Fascinated by reports about the country’s real or alleged wealth, these European powers sent explorers, followed by trade missions with thinly disguised political motives, and finally, the conquerors who took advantage of the internal squabbles caused by the fight for succession to overrun the country in 1896.

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Futa Toro

Futa Toro is the region situated along the middle valley of the Senegal River in West Africa, immediately south of the Sahara Desert. The north bank lies in Mauritania, while the south bank is in Senegal. The Senegal River was a link, not a divide, between the north and south banks. The river also served as the central focus of the region, linking east and west.

Futa is the general name that the Fulbe, the area’s dominant ethnic group, gave to the areas where they lived, while Toro is the province with the oldest identity in the middle valley; it lies in the western portion around the towns of Podor and Njum. The area never extended more than approximately ten miles on either bank of the river, and stretched for about 250 miles

along the length of the Senegal River. The linguistic evidence strongly suggests that Futa Toro may be the birthplace of the Fulbe people, and many Fulbe oral traditions cite Futa Toro as their homeland. The Fulbe of Futa Toro and elsewhere in the river valley now call themselves *Haalpulaar'en*, or “those who speak Pulaar,” the local dialect of the Fulfulde language. In Wolof, French, and general Senegalese usage, the Fulbe of Futa Toro are called *Toucoulleur*, derived from the name of the ancient state of Takrur (or Tekrur).

Futa Toro's predecessor was ancient Takrur, situated on both banks of the middle Senegal River and contemporary with the Ghana Empire. Takrur may have been founded as early as 100CE, reaching its height in the ninth and tenth centuries. The dominant ethnic group was Fulbe (sometimes called Fulani or Peul), with minority populations of Wolof, Berber, and Soninke. The rulers apparently became Muslims in the 1030s. The region was situated just beneath the Western Sahara and on trans-Saharan caravan routes, which were developed well before the tenth century.

The state also had the advantage of being on a river that flowed from the south, permitting people to live very close to the desert edge. Berbers operated the trade routes through the desert to Morocco, exporting some gold from Bambuk, further up the Senegal River, which was exchanged in Takrur. The people also grew millet and cotton and manufactured cotton textiles, which were traded to the desert nomads. While Takrur received some salt from desert traders, most of its salt came from the evaporating salt pans at the mouth of the Senegal River. Takrur defended itself successfully against several Moroccan raids in the eleventh century but was in decline by the twelfth century, owing primarily to local power struggles and competition for resources.

Several dynasties and groups attempted but failed to rule the middle valley after the decline of Takrur. The main obstacle was the length of Futa Toro along the river. In the period from about 1490 until 1776, however, most of Futa Toro was ruled by the Denanke dynasty founded by Koly Tengela Ba. Futa Toro came into limited contact with Portuguese traders in the early sixteenth century, supplying some slaves, usually captives from non-Muslim states, for the transatlantic slave trade. Later the French, who used the Senegal River as a trade conduit into the interior, became Futa Toro's dominant European trading partners. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Futa Toro, like its predecessor Takrur, was often the subject of raids by Moroccan forces eager to expand the influence of their state and acquire the wealth in gold and slaves from the Western Sudan. Futa Toro was able to maintain its independence from invading armies, but the constant attacks weakened the central state. By the sixteenth century, the Denanke rulers and a significant portion of the population were

Muslims. A clerical diaspora from Futa Toro helped spread Islam throughout Western Africa.

The inhabitants of Futa Toro practiced mixed farming, combining agriculture and livestock herding. The summer rains watered the highland crops and raised the river level, which spilled over the banks of the middle valley. After the waters receded in December, the moist floodplain could then be planted with millets, sorghum, and maize for a dry season harvest.

This double harvest made Futa Toro a food-exporting region and also drew migrant farmers from the surrounding areas. Cattle raising was also an important part of the Fulbe of Futa's early economy and identity. Fulbe herders practiced seasonal migration, staying near permanent sources of water in the dry season, then moving out with the rains, and finally returning when the water holes and pastures dried up. Futa pastoralists moved in regular patterns, either to the steppe north of the river and close to the Sahara Desert, or south into the steppe called the Ferlo between Futa Toro and the Gambia River. In Futa Toro, two groups of Fulbe emerged, including sedentary farmers and migratory herders. The herders were dependent on the farmers of all ethnic groups for agricultural goods and water during the dry season while the herders supplied milk and meat for the farmers. Raiding periodically disrupted the exchange of goods and services, but cooperation generally characterized farmer-herder interactions. There was also some fishing and craft production, especially leatherwork, blacksmithing, and weaving. Finally, *griots* or praise singers lived at court and performed many diplomatic and judicial functions in addition to their public performance. Much of what is known about the early history of Futa Toro derives from oral traditions preserved by *griots*.

In 1776 indigenous Muslims, led by Suleyman Bal, took advantage of the weak Denanke dynasty and launched a successful and influential Islamic revolution, creating the *almamate* of Futa Toro. They instituted a new ruling class, the *torodbe*. The most effective *almamate* ruler, Abdul Kader Kan, extended the borders of Futa to the west and southeast. However, the defeat of his forces by the Wolof state of Kajoor, signaled the decline of the *almamate* until its dominance by the French in the mid-nineteenth century.

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See also: **Fulbe/Fulani/Peul.**

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Futa Toro: Early Nineteenth Century

Three changes marked the history of early nineteenth-century Senegal: the decline and end of the Atlantic slave trade, the continuation of a Muslim religious revolution, and the development of commodity production. These events were all related and contributed to the making of modern Senegal.

At the beginning of the century, there were two European island bases in Senegal: St. Louis in the mouth of the Senegal River, and Gorée in what is now Dakar harbor. Both had been bases in the slave trade for centuries, but during the eighteenth century, slave exports from Senegambia declined while the sale of gum and supplies for shipping became more important. As part of its struggle with Napoleon Bonaparte, Britain occupied Gorée in 1803 and St. Louis in 1809. Thus, when Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807, the act was implemented in Senegal. Before Senegal was returned to the French, the restored French monarchy had to agree to abolition. France did not enforce its abolition ordinance rigorously until 1831, but the Atlantic slave trade was effectively over in Senegambia. This created difficulties for the Wolof and Sereer states that bordered the French ports. They all had strongly militarized state structures in which slave raiding and slave trading played an important role.

Islam was well established in Senegal, but from at least the seventeenth century there were deep divisions between an orthodox Muslim minority that supported schools and maintained strict standards of religious observance and a more lax majority. The courts were marked by heavy drinking and conspicuous consumption. The majority of commoners mixed Islam and traditional religious observance. Muslims first turned to resistance in 1673, when a Mauritanian *marabout*, Nasr Al Din, led a jihad directed both at the warrior tribes of Mauritania and the Wolof states south of the border. Nasr Al Din's appeal was in part to peoples threatened by slave-raiding. With the aid of the French, the traditional elites defeated Nasr Al Din, but some of his disciples founded a state in upper Senegal, Bundu, and his ideas remained important.

The *torodbe* clerics of the Futa Toro maintained ties with Bundu, with their Wolof brethren and with the Fulbe elites that were creating a Muslim state in the Futa Jalon of central Guinea during the eighteenth century.

The Futa Toro was a narrow strip of land on both sides of the Senegal River, which was vulnerable to attack by Mauritanian nomads. The insecurity engendered by these raids and the inability of the *denianke* rulers to protect local populations led people to turn for leadership to the *torodbe*. Their victory in 1776 was followed by a prohibition of the slave trade down the Senegal river and in 1785, an agreement under which the French promised not to sell Muslim slaves. The French also agreed to generous customs payments to the new Futa state.

The first *Almamy*, Abdul Kader, tried to extend his control. He defeated the Mauritanian emirates of Trarza and Brakna, but when he sought to extend his control over the Wolof states of Kajoor and Waalo, he was defeated and taken prisoner. The battle gave rise to a ballad that is still sung by Wolof bards. Though Abdul Kader was freed, his defeat also ended the Futa's efforts to impose its version of Islam on its neighbors. By time he died in 1806, the *élan* was gone from the revolution, and the Futa was transformed into a state dominated by a small number of powerful *torodbe* aristocratic families. The egalitarian ideals of the revolutionaries remained alive. Umar Tall, a young cleric of modest *torodbe* origins, left the Futa in about 1827 to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. He returned only in 1846 to recruit support for a new jihad.

With the end of the export slave trade, the commercial populations looked for new commodities to trade. In St. Louis, local merchants expanded the gum trade. Gum was used in France to provide dyes for high quality textiles and to produce medicines. Between 1825 and 1838, gum exports came close to tripling. The gum was produced by slaves from acacia trees in southern Mauritania. The trade thus provided a continuing market for slaves. Slaves were also imported into Mauritania for herding and the cultivation of dates. Other parts of the river produced a grain surplus, which fed St. Louis, the Moors, and their slaves. These linkages also seem to have stimulated the cultivation of cotton, the mining of gold, and the production of textiles and gold jewelry.

Gorée survived on a trade in wax and hides. Its salvation came when French chemists determined how to use peanut oil to make a high quality soap. In 1833 a small purchase was made in the Gambia. In 1841 a little over a ton was purchased in Senegal, a quantity that rose in 1854 to about 5,500 tons. These changes strained social relationships. Peanuts were a smallholder's crop. The cultivation of peanuts in the Wolof states and grain in the Futa Toro provided ordinary farmers the resources to buy weapons and consumer goods. The most industrious peasants tended to be Muslim. At the same time, there were intermittent conflicts all over Senegal. In 1827 Njaga Issa revolted against Kajoor. A year later, Hamme Ba in the western Futa Toro revolted, and in 1830, the *marabout*, Diile Fatim Cam, revolted in Waalo.

All of these revolts were suppressed, but they reveal tensions that were to erupt in the second half of the century. In 1852 Al Hajj Umar Tal began a jihad that eventually created a series of Umarian states across the western Sudan. He did not succeed in incorporating his native Senegal in his domains, but only because a new French governor, Major Louis Faidherbe, appointed in 1854, established French control over key areas on the mainland and blocked Umar's efforts to incorporate the Futa Toro in his state. The second half of the century saw increased conflict as Muslim forces established their hegemony in much of Senegambia, but were eventually forced to yield political control to the French.

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See also: **Futa Jalon: Nineteenth Century.**

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Gabon: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial


Three main events dominated the history of Gabon in the nineteenth century: the French establishment in the Gabon estuary, the French exploration of the Como, Rembwe, and Ogooué Rivers, and the Fang migrations throughout the Ogooué basin. The French occupation of the Gabon estuary started with a treaty signed by the French naval officer Bouet-Willamez and the Mpongwe leader Denis Rapontchombo in 1839. The signing of this treaty allowed France to have access to a small piece of land in the left bank of the Gabon estuary, and in return Rapontchombo benefited from French “protection.” This establishment was used by France as a basis to combat the slave trade in the west coast of Africa. In 1842 American missionaries established a mission at Baraka, and a year later the French post was moved to the right bank of the Gabon estuary, with the agreement of Mpongwe chiefs. The French helped Roman Catholic missionaries to settle in the Gabon estuary in 1844.

This new establishment became known as the *Comptoir du Gabon* (Syndicate/Cartel of Gabon) and was used by the French not only to capture slave ships, but also to challenge the British and German domination of trade in the region. But the creation of this post led to tensions between the people of Glass and the French navy. After settling these tensions with Britain and suppressing the rebellion in the village of Glass, France became engaged in the organization of its *comptoir* between 1845 and 1859. This organization was marked by the construction of the Fort d’Aumale, which in 1850 was moved from the seashore to the Okolo plateau, an elevated site considered more hygienic. Nonetheless, this French establishment experienced difficulties, as food was not abundant, disease was rampant among French colonists, and the *comptoir* faced a shortage of manpower. French commerce

was unable to compete with British trade, which was flourishing. As an effort to spread the French culture, the village of Libreville was created in 1849, to resettle fifty recaptured slaves from the slave ship *Elizia*. Libreville later became the capital of the French Congo and the capital of independent Gabon.

Despite these early difficulties, the French became engaged in territorial exploration, marked by the signing of treaties with local populations in the Gabon region. These treaties stipulated the abandonment of sovereignty by local leaders and provided commercial and political advantages to France. Between 1845 and 1885, France organized a much more aggressive territorial expansion to widen its zone of influence. In June 1846 Pigeard explored the Como and Rembwe and signed a treaty with the Mpongwe and Seke chiefs. In 1848 a treaty was signed between the naval officer Roger and the Bakele chief Kianlowin, and in 1852 the Benga of Cape Esterias and Corisco were placed under French “protection.” In 1853 Baudin explored the Como area and established direct contacts with the Fang. In 1862 Payeur-Didelot reached and signed a treaty with the Orungou chief Ndebulia. The same year Serval and Griffon du Bellay explored the Lower-Ogooué and established relations with the Orungou, Vili, Galwa, and Bakele population of the interior. In 1873 Alfred Marche and the Marquis de Compiègne, after exploring lakes Onangué, Oguemoué, and the lower-Ngounié, explored the Ogooué River and reached Lopé in 1874. They experienced firsthand the hostility of the Fang-Meke when arriving in the mouth of the Ivindo River, and returned to the Gabon estuary.

But the most famous explorer of all was Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza. He made his first exploration trip to the Ogooué River in November 1875. Accompanied by Ballay, he reached the Alima River in 1878 and returned to the Gabon estuary. Between 1879 and 1882 de Brazza made another exploratory trip in the Ogooué



Gabon.

Region and founded the post of Franceville in 1880. Between 1883 and 1885, he was asked by the French government to make a third trip on the Ogooué River, known as the Mission de l'Ouest Africain (Mission of West Africa). This mission opened up the Ogooué and Congo basin to French influence. In 1886 de Brazza was nominated Haut Commandant du Congo-Français (High Commander of the French Congo). The same year his brother Jacques de Brazza left the post of Maddville (Lastourville) to explore the Ivindo region in the northeast.

In 1888 Paul Crampel visited the north and north-western part of the Ogooué and reached the Ntem River, while Alfred Fourneau explored the northern Gabon in 1889. The upper Ogooué was explored by agents of the Société du Haut-Ogooué (SHO), such as Bravard and Chaussé, at the end of the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, the whole Gabonese territory had already been explored by Westerners. Their explorations allowed the French to come into contact with local populations and sign treaties of sovereignty with them, thus permitting French domination over the entire Ogooué River basin.

While the French penetrated interior regions, the Fang left their northern settlements to migrate in different areas of the Ogooué River basin. These Fang were trying to position themselves as middlemen in the growing trade that was taking place not only in the coastal areas, but also in strategic economic zones throughout the Ogooué basin. Trading with the Europeans was very important to the Fang, because European manufactured goods were necessary for dowries and provided prestige

in society. Leaving the Woleu-Ntem region, the Fang migrated in the Gabon region where they occupied the Como and Rembwé regions between 1840 and 1860. At the time of their occupation Ningue-Ningue island was the main trading center.

Leaving the Crystal Mountains area, the Fang moved to the mid-Ogooué River between 1860 and 1875. They were attracted to the region by Hatton and Cookson factories installed in Samkita. Some of these Fang clans moved to the Lower-Ogooué in the southern lakes between 1875 and 1900, where English, German, and American firms were active. The Fang-Mekey attracted by trade in 1875 settled in the Ndjolé post, while the Fang-Nzaman who occupied the Ogooué-Ivindo moved toward the trading center of Lopé between 1860 and 1900. The Fang came into contact with the Kwele, occupied the Djaddié, and established trading contacts with other Fang clans in the Lower-Ivindo and the Okande of Lopé. During these migrations the Fang displaced other ethnic groups across the Ogooué River basin. But throughout the nineteenth century, trade in the Ogooué region was dominated by the English, German, and American firms, which forced the French authorities to reorganize commerce by creating concessionary companies, which became active in Gabon at the beginning of the twentieth century.

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See also: **Concessionary Companies.**

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Gabon: Colonial Period: Administration, Labor and Economy

Throughout the nineteenth century, trade in the Ogooué River basin was mainly dominated by British firms. The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by an aggressive policy of the French colonial authority to reverse the situation by introducing concessionary companies. This economic regime allowed the creation of forty companies throughout the French Congo, while ten companies divided the whole Gabonese territory

into zones of exploitation. The largest was the Société du Haut-Ogooué (SHO), and the smallest was the Société du Bas-Ogooué (SBO). These companies did not make any serious investment in the country. They simply became involved in the exploitation of natural resources, such as rubber and ivory. In order to increase revenues, concessionary companies submitted local populations to cruel and brutal exploitation. Local products were purchased at a low price, while the value of manufactured goods was overestimated by company agents.

These abuses and injustices did not encourage the local population to work for concessionary companies. Rather, they led to widespread revolt in many parts of the country. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, these revolts prompted the colonial administration to implement administrative structures to assert full control over the territory. Forced labor was introduced to coerce native people to work for concessionary companies, which would allow them to gain money to pay for a head tax. In 1905 five *régions* were created and subdivided into *cerles* and *postes*. In 1909 these terms were abandoned and the country was divided into twenty *circonscriptions*: sixteen were civilian and four were military. When French Equatorial Africa (AEF) was created in 1910, Gabon was headed by a lieutenant governor who was under the authority of the general-governor who resided at Brazzaville (Congo). This political reform was followed with a clearer territorial organization, because *circonscriptions* were divided into thirty-eight subdivisions. Although this territorial and administrative division was still unstable in 1920, it, nonetheless, allowed the French colonial administration to exercise control over the population of Gabon. This control was increased by a better organization of colonial troops, the national guards and the militia, which were enforcing the law throughout the land. One of these laws was the *indigénat*, which allowed colonial administrators to jail the natives without trial for fifteen days and make them pay a 100 franc fine for any minor offense. While the French colonial administration asserted its control over local populations, it also defined Gabon's southern border with Leopold II, king of Belgium and the Congo Free State (1918), and agreed with Spain and Germany on the northern border (1919).

The timber industry eventually replaced the disastrous concessionary regime. The rise of the timber industry along the lagoons, the coast, and lakes near Lambaréné, and the upper Komo and Rembwe regions salvaged the colonial economy, attracting thousands of wood-cutters from the southern and eastern regions of Gabon. These woodcutters cut down the trees and chopped the logs, which were then floated down creeks and rivers. They were mainly transported from the

interior to the coast, particularly Port-Gentil and Cape-Lopez, which had main ports from the timber export. World War I disturbed the timber industry. It was only after the war that the timber exploitation started again, attracting thousands of men from the Ngounié region, and activated the economy of towns such as Lambaréné, Port-Gentil, and Libreville. Labor conditions were particularly difficult because of the fact that the timber industry was not mechanized. The cutting of the trees and sawing of logs were done by hand. The most arduous task was the moving of logs over rough forest clearings to reach the Decauville rail, which was transporting lumber from inland to the coast (1927–1930). Up to seventeen men were employed in moving a single log. This was dangerous and accidents were frequent. Labor recruiting also provoked the neglect of village plantations, thus causing food shortages. The timber industry experienced a period of crisis in 1930 and picked up again between 1932 and 1939. Administrative demands for labor to work for infrastructure projects like the building of the roads often led to serious crisis. This forced the colonial administration to recruit workers in Chad and other parts of French Equatorial Africa.

After World War II, administrative and territorial reorganization was introduced in Gabon. Gabon was now going to be headed by a governor and no longer by a lieutenant governor, which had been a designation retained since 1910. This governor was assisted by territorial administrators. The Gabon territory was divided into nine regions, which were subdivided into districts. In 1946 the Upper-Ogooué region was attached to Gabon, giving to the country its present international boundaries. While these administrative and territorial reconfigurations were taking place, labor unions were fighting for better working conditions for the people of Gabon. Together with nationalist leaders, such as Jean Hilaire Aubame, Paul Gondjout, and Léon Mba, these trade unions fought to obtain the end of forced labor and the end of the worst abuses of colonialism. These developments were also accompanied by important changes in the timber industry; for example, the Decauville rails were abandoned. It was now the Grumier tractor trail that carried and cut the logs, which made the transportation of the logs a year-round activity. The French colonial administration also built the largest timber factory in the world (CFG), which attracted thousands of workers in Port-Gentil.

The colonial economy was reinvigorated by the exploitation of oil wells of Ozouri and the exploitation of manganese, uranium, and iron in the 1950s. These natural resources gave a new momentum to the Gabonese economy and provided support for the expansion of roads and ports. These economic changes

completely transformed the nature of labor in Gabon during the colonial and postcolonial periods.

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See also: Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa; Concessionary Companies.

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Gabon: Colonial Period: Social Transformation

Social transformation during the colonial period (1843–1945) resulted mainly from the policies and practices of the French administration and the responses of the indigenous peoples to them. To a lesser extent, transformation came about through the interaction of Western traders and Christian missionaries with the Africans.

The French occupation brought under a single administration several hundred thousand Africans scattered sparsely over an area half the size of France. Three quarters of this territory were covered by dense tropical rainforest, and most of the rest by grasslands. The Africans lived in several thousand villages usually composed of extended families and their slaves. Only the Fang people, who formed perhaps 30 per cent of the population and were spreading out over the northern half of the country, ordinarily possessed few slaves and did not pursue inter-group warfare to obtain slaves. Most of Gabon's forty or so different Bantu-speaking peoples lived from hunting, gathering and subsistence farming.

Many of the interior peoples were linked by commercial networks to coastal peoples, such as the Mpongwe along the Gabon River estuary in the north, the Orungu at the mouths of the Ogooué River near Cape Lopez, and the Vili and others in the far south, all of whom became middlemen traders between Western manufactures and inland residents.

Between 1815 and 1830, the estuary and Cape Lopez exported several thousand slaves annually to the New World. Although these numbers were small in comparison to the slave trade in the Niger and Congo river basins, the ensuing labor shortages and the constant disruption resulting from warfare and raiding had destructive results for the African societies. During the 1860s and 1870s, France put an end to the slave trade.

Though it did not attempt to abolish domestic slavery immediately, it sought to prevent mistreatment of slaves and to cooperate with private agencies in their liberation.

The economic and financial dimensions of French rule, however, had mainly negative social consequences. From the 1840s on, the French administration used military force to take control of the main trade routes from the coasts through waterways into the interior. After the introduction in 1865 of the steamboat on the Ogooué River, whose watershed covers 80 per cent of the country, Western traders gained access to most of the commercial networks. The African middlemen were eliminated. Some became agents for the large French, British, and German firms that now dominated commerce. The French met strong and often prolonged resistance from the peoples who had previously controlled trade through their lands. The French also encountered opposition when, during the 1880s, they began to impose burdensome head taxes, food requisitions, and forced labor on all able-bodied adults. Even more devastating were official attempts at economic development through monopolistic concessionary companies between 1893 and 1914. The toll of flight, death, and destruction led to a demographic decline from which Gabon did not begin to recover until the mid-1950s.

During World War II, French recruitment of soldiers and porters led to neglect of food crops, particularly among the Fang of the far north, where thousands died from famines between 1918 and 1920 while several thousand more, weakened by malnutrition, succumbed to Spanish flu epidemics. These situations, along with the perennial health problems of the equatorial regions, caused further demographic stagnation. Thus the census of 1921 showed a population of 389,000, and that of 1959 only 416,000.

In the meantime, the timber industry had become the most important employer of African wage labor as well as the largest source of public revenue. Although the timber camps provided employment for thousands of men, their absence from home for months at a time hindered food production while spreading venereal diseases and malaria.

The most common route for African advancement during the colonial period was not economic activity but acquisition of a Western-style education. American Protestant and French Roman Catholic missionaries, who arrived in the estuary in the early 1940s, educated a new class of literate Mpongwe and Fang youths who became employees of Western companies and the colonial administration. Smaller numbers became catechists, teachers, pastors, and priests. Girls also received instruction, including in health care and sanitation. As a result of the imposition of a French primary curriculum

in 1883, the Americans transferred their mission to French Protestants in 1893. The first public schools enrolled 457 pupils, Protestants 680, and Catholics 2,100, for a total of 3,237 pupils, that is, less than 1 per cent of the population.

French policy discouraged postprimary instruction for fear of creating an unemployable intelligentsia. French colonial education after 1900 produced a tiny elite strongly attached to the French language, culture, and lifestyle but critical of colonialism and desirous of equality with the French. By 1945 a majority of the Africans had become at least nominal Christians, with Catholics outnumbering Protestants three to one. A revived Fang sect, Bwiti, syncretized both Catholic and traditional elements.

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Gabon: Decolonization and the Politics of Independence, 1945–1967

World War II was a turning point in the history of Gabon. The French held the Brazzaville Conference (January–February 1944) that initiated the decolonization of French black Africa. There they decided to promote self-rule for the Africans, and rapid economic and social advancement through assimilation rather than separation from France.

As a result, the French provisional government headed by General de Gaulle (1944–1946) and the two Constituent Assemblies (1945–1946) abolished many of the oppressive aspects of colonial rule such as forced labor, the prestation (labor tax), travel controls, and the indigénat (administrative justice). The constitution of

October 1946 offered Africans greater participation in their own administration, but under the continued domination of France. Voting at first was restricted to a tiny fraction of Africans, mainly the educated elite and war veterans. A system of two electoral colleges gave the few thousand Frenchmen living in the territory one-third of the representation.

Between 1946 and 1956 the electorate was widened to include all adults. In 1956 the French lost special representation. By 1956 pressures throughout Francophone Africa for self-government and independence, together with the failures of French integrationist policies in Indochina and North Africa, led France to abandon the policy of assimilation. As a result, Gabon experienced a rapid decolonization generated almost entirely by forces elsewhere, including by this time British Africa, whose territories were achieving self-government and independence. Thus, in April 1957 Gabon acquired a legislative assembly and an executive council. In March 1959 it became an autonomous republic entirely outside the new Fifth French Republic but a member of the French Community, which controlled its external affairs. Then on August 13, 1960, Gabon gained independence, and in 1961 the community ceased to function.

The reforms of April 1957 had monumental importance for the future of Gabon. They allowed Gabonese representatives not only to legislate and direct executive departments but also to seek separation from FEA. Gabon had been administratively attached to Congo (Brazzaville) since 1886 and to all of FEA since 1910. Taxes on Gabon's timber became FEA's largest source of revenues. The funds were used for infrastructure, such as the Congo-Ocean Railway (1921–1934), and public facilities in Brazzaville, while Gabon lacked even all-season roads, among other things. The Gabonese leaders were able to end this drain in 1957 and prevent continuation of the federation after the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958. Henceforth, Gabon was able to use its growing revenues for development of its own economy and society.

Between 1946 and 1958 France spent \$25 million, mainly for infrastructure to permit expansion of production, particularly timber production, as well as for improved ports and airfields, and a plywood factory. Lesser sums went toward schools and a hospital. From the 1950s France sought investments from Western nations to develop Gabon's manganese, petroleum, and iron industries (which proved unviable for lack of transport). The French also aimed to provide primary schooling for both sexes and further education for the most talented. The curriculum was that of France, entirely in French, with African material added. Primary enrollments increased from 9,082 (1945–1946) to 50,545 (1959–1960). In 1959–1960 there were 2,036 secondary students. During 1957–1958, 87 Gabonese

studied in French universities. At independence only a handful of Gabonese had completed the entire secondary programs or higher education. This situation meant that independent Gabon continued to depend upon French personnel to staff the higher levels of the bureaucracy, economy, and education. The country would also depend on France for investment capital and development aid.

From 1945 to 1947 leaders emerged from the educated elite to compete for public office. They organized political parties based in Libreville that had ties with notables in the nine provinces. The most important leaders were Jean-Hilaire Aubame (1912–1989) and Léon M'Ba (1902–1967). Aubame served as the African voters' deputy to the French National Assembly (1946–1958). He had support from the far northern Fang, Christian missionaries and administration. M'Ba led the Estuary Fang and originally had ties with the far Left. From March 1952 M'Ba was an important figure in the Territorial Assembly, first elected mayor of Libreville in November 1956, then executive council head, prime minister, and president of the republic (1961–1967). M'Ba gained national office in 1957 because French lumbermen shifted their support to him.

President M'Ba believed that Gabon could not survive as an independent state without French aid and assistance as well as protection. As prime minister he negotiated the fifteen cooperation agreements of July 15, 1960, which provided for these needs but perpetuated dependence and French control of the economy. Following difficulties with a parliamentary system of government, Gabon adopted a system modeled after that of de Gaulle's Fifth French Republic, with M'Ba as president, in February 1961. After repeated conflicts with other leaders of his own party and of Aubame's, M'Ba pressured them in 1963 to join a single party under his direction. His actions provoked resistance and in their turn repression and new conflicts, which culminated in a military coup, February 17–20, 1964. Although the coup toppled M'Ba, De Gaulle sent troops who restored him to power. M'Ba was thus able, despite growing popular discontent, to establish a regime that eliminated opponents, violated civil liberties, and ended Gabon's democratic experiment.

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Gabon: Bongo, Omar, and the One-Party State, 1967 to the Present

Omar Bongo (b.1935) became president of Gabon on November 28, 1967, following the death of President Léon M'Ba, who had selected him for that position on recommendation of agents from French President de Gaulle's office. Bongo was chosen because he was expected to protect French interests in Gabon while promoting reconciliation and stability in the aftermath of M'Ba's troubled presidency. As a member of the Téké, a small people in the southeast, he stood outside the ethnic rivalries (Myènè vs. Fang, intra-Fang) that had long troubled political life. Though young, he had a sound education in business administration and a decade of government experience, including several years in M'Ba's office. Yet he had not been personally involved in the rivalries or repression of the M'Ba presidency. Bongo released M'Ba's opponents from prison, allowing them to reenter government service or return to private life. Thereafter, in March 1968, in cooperation with an assembly composed only of member from M'Ba's party, Bongo established a single party, the Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG). He justified such action on the grounds that the existing parties represented ethnic and regional interests that hindered effective government and national unity. Although during the early years of Bongo's presidency a good deal of discussion and debate took place within the PDG, ultimately the president made the important decisions himself.

While the single-party system gave Gabon new stability, it also provided the president and ruling class a means for perpetuating themselves in office without much regard for the needs of the people. Revolt would have been futile, because France was ready to intervene militarily, under the defense cooperation agreement, to keep Bongo in power. Beginning in April 1969, Bongo began to curb the independence of the trade unions; by 1973 he had forced them to join a single federation under government control. Illegal strikes, work stoppages, and slowdowns periodically revealed the workers' dissatisfaction. Criticism by a handful of Marxist professors and students at the new university in Libreville concerning the undemocratic nature of the regime and financial corruption resulted in 1972 in harsh prison terms for the offenders.

Greater possibilities for the ruling class to enrich themselves resulted from a period of economic expansion that coincided with Bongo's accession to the presidency. Based on petroleum, manganese, uranium, and timber, that expansion multiplied the revenues hitherto available to the government. Between 1973 and 1985, revenues mainly from increased petroleum at higher prices increased eighteen-fold. Assuming that oil reserves would ultimately become depleted, the government used the bulk of the additional funds to promote development that would decrease dependence on petroleum. To this end, between 1974 and 1986, it constructed the Trans-Gabonais Railway between Owendo on the estuary, where a new port was built, and Franceville on the upper Ogooué River. It thereby sought to reach the forest and mineral riches of the interior. The government also created forty-six corporations, in seventeen of which private investors held shares, in order to give Gabon greater control of its industrial and commercial sectors. Unfortunately, most of the businesses proved a drain on the treasury because of nepotism, financial corruption, and mismanagement.

The political elite also diverted funds from public works and services, as well as income from 25 per cent of petroleum sales. As a result, by the late 1980s 2 per cent of the population held 80 per cent of all personal income. The elite had transferred to foreign bank accounts 28 billion French francs, a sum double the national debt created by their actions.

After a prolonged downturn starting in 1986 halved government income, froze salaries, and increased unemployment, popular discontent burgeoned. By 1990 three-fifths of the population was living in cities, mainly in Libreville and Port-Gentil, center of the timber and petroleum industries. They had relocated there to obtain better opportunities for salaried employment, health care, and education, and because of regime neglect of agriculture.

Popular demonstrations and strikes between January and June 1990 forced the Bongo regime to ease some financial restrictions. Bongo then summoned a national conference to deal with the country's problems, which led to the return of a multiparty system and freer exercise of the freedoms of speech, communication, and association. In May 1990 the death of an opposition leader in suspicious circumstances sparked violence that led to French military intervention to protect French citizens and petroleum facilities in Port-Gentil. Intervention had the effect of propping up the regime until its forces could regain control of the situation.

Although opposition parties functioned throughout the 1990s, they never maintained a united front against Bongo and the PDG. The Bongo regime, through vote-rigging, repression, and support from both Center-Right and Socialist regimes in France, won the parliamentary

elections of 1990 and 1996, and the presidential elections of 1993 and 1998. The rigged election of December 1993, together with the French-initiated devaluation of the franc by 50 per cent in January 1994 sparked protests in the cities, during which as many people were killed as in the French intervention of 1964. The regime thereafter granted modest salary increases and placed controls on soaring prices of basic commodities, 85 per cent of which were now being imported.

During the 1990s the new Rabi-Kounga oil field, south of Port-Gentil, provided additional revenues for the state budget, 40 per cent of which went toward the international debt. France continued to aid Gabon by canceling and rescheduling debts while loaning funds to support its Structural Adjustment Program. The IMF's insistence that Gabon privatize state corporations and eliminate diversion of petroleum revenues threatened to reduce the wealth and influence of the ruling class. At the same time ordinary citizens were discouraged by the continued decrease in living standards and the impossibility of peaceful political change.

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
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Gaddafi: See Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi; Libya: Gaddafi (Qadhdhafi) and Jamahiriyya (Libyan Revolution).

Gambia, The: Nineteenth Century to Independence

By 1800 the British were the dominant European traders on the Gambia River, but individual merchants, rather than the government, maintained the British presence. The area was politically dominated by Wolof and Mande kingdoms on both banks of the river. Nine Mande kingdoms dominated the southern bank of the river, while five kingdoms with large Wolof populations controlled the northern bank. Each of the Mande



Gambia.

states was ruled by a king, or mansa, who had advisers and an armed force to defend the state as well as keep order within the state. Inhabitants included Mande, Wolof, some Diola and Serer, as well as some Fulbe, especially in the kingdoms on the upper Gambia River. To the north of the Gambian region were the large Wolof and Serer kingdoms, which were increasingly dominated in the nineteenth century by the French, who sometimes intervened in the affairs of the kingdoms on the northern bank of the Gambia River.

The abolition of the slave trade by the British in 1808 meant that a part of the British navy needed harbor facilities in West Africa, and the mouth of the Gambia River was chosen as the site. In 1816 Captain Alexander Grant purchased the sand banks of Bamboo Island, later named Saint Mary's Island, adjacent to the south bank of the river, from Tumani Bojang, the Mande king of Kombo. The garrison constructed administration buildings, harbor facilities and a barracks, forming the nucleus of the town of Bathurst (later Banjul) named after Lord Henry Bathurst, the British Colonial Secretary. Wolof merchants as well as newly liberated African slaves increased the local population. In 1821 the new Crown Colony's administration was given to the governor of Freetown, Sierra Leone, and the colony was attached to the British West African Federation. In 1823 the acquisition of MacCarthy Island and some other concessions from local Mande rulers augmented the colony's size and population. The establishment of the new colony had some economic impact on neighboring Mande and Wolof kingdoms, but no political or military implications. The African states traded on a

small scale with the British, but maintained their independence. In the early 1830s the British introduced peanut cultivation, which soon spread to neighboring kingdoms. Within a decade, peanuts had become the colony's dominant export, and the British presence increased.

The most important changes in the nineteenth century, however, developed out of conflicts between the traditional Wolof and Mande kingdoms and Muslim reform leaders, beginning in the 1850s and lasting until about 1900, and affecting all areas of the Gambia River. These so-called Soninke-Marabout wars (which is a misnomer, as they did not involve the Soninke) destroyed most of the existing kingdoms and created several new states, dominated by Muslims. The British did not intervene to support the traditional Mande and Wolof authorities. The conflicts were part of a series of Muslim reform movements that swept across the entire Senegambian region in the second half of the nineteenth century, destroying traditional ethnic polities and establishing new states with an Islamic identity. Most of the Gambian population also adopted Islam during this turbulent period. The most famous and influential Muslim reformers were Ma Ba, Alfa Molloh Balde, and Fode Kabba Dumbuya, all of whom created new states in the Gambia River area. Many of the conflicts involved nearby areas under French control, and the reform leaders often took refuge on the other side of the border. Ma Ba, in particular, envisioned a united theocracy in Senegambia, but this was never achieved.

During the conflicts, the British intervened militarily in a few instances when their economic interests appeared threatened, but most of the conflicts occurred in areas beyond the British sphere of influence. The wars interfered with trade along the river, causing some decline in revenues. The British Parliament increasingly questioned the wisdom of investing in such a region, and some encouraged selling the territory to the French, who were aggressively expanding their control over Senegal and were interested in acquiring the Gambia River area.

Despite some calls in Britain for selling the area to the French, a conference in 1889 finally secured French agreement to British control of the Gambia River and eventually the establishment of the present-day boundaries. In 1894 the colony was declared a Protectorate. By 1900 Britain had imposed indirect rule on Gambia, dividing it into thirty-five chiefdoms, although the real power remained with the governor and his staff at Bathurst. The area was divided into the colony and protectorate areas, depending on the distance from Bathurst. Obviously, the British presence was felt most strongly in the colonial area around Bathurst. While there was some sporadic resistance to British rule, the inhabitants were exhausted from the recent conflicts and apparently welcomed peace.

Because of their limited presence and financial resources in the colony, the British did not interfere in local political or religious matters. Muslim authorities cooperated with colonial officials, and peasants grew peanuts to pay their taxes. In 1906 slavery was officially abolished throughout the area, but this had little impact on peanut production, which continued to expand rapidly.

Colonial economic policy in Gambia centered on the production and export of peanuts. The administration sought to collect taxes and duties on trade, and to maintain peace and stability to encourage peanut production. Gambia was Britain's smallest and poorest colony in West Africa and received very little development assistance. The taxable value of peanuts was barely sufficient to meet local government costs. Some harbor and transportation and communication improvements were made in Bathurst, and some missionary groups set up schools. The rest of the protectorate was sorely neglected, with no all-weather roads, and only one secondary school and one hospital. The river continued to be the main link between Bathurst and the remainder of the protectorate, and also the main transport route for peanuts from interior to coast. Even on the river, transport facilities remained basic.

After World War II, European colonial powers began to take small steps toward decolonization. In Gambia, however, political parties were slow in forming, and moves toward greater autonomy were very gradual, especially when compared to the other colonies in British West Africa. Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, received full independence in 1957, and Nigeria became independent in 1960, with Sierra Leone following in 1961. These three countries achieved independence after long preparations and well before Gambia. There was some question about the viability of Gambia as an independent country, given its lack of resources, tiny land mass, and geographic location as an enclave within French-speaking Senegal, which many assumed would take control over the area and incorporate it into an independent Senegal or Senegambia. There was also the lack of an educated elite who could eventually take over the reins of power. For the majority of people in the area, their ethnic solidarity was considerably stronger than any sense of national identity or allegiance to a political party. Chiefs still dominated local political affairs.

Even after some concessions to greater Gambian participation in government in the 1950s, the governor and higher administrative officers, all British, wielded tremendous power. The protectorate was dominated by district officers and officially sanctioned chiefs who benefited from the status quo and were reluctant for change. The constitution was revised in 1954 and again in 1960, allowing for political parties to contest elections, but without setting a timetable for independence.

Several small political parties were formed in Gambia in the 1950s, most notably the Protectorate People's Party, established in 1959 by David Jawara and his associates. The results of the 1960 elections caused a stalemate in the government, and Jawara and his partners resigned, calling for more constitutional changes. New elections in 1962 were won by Jawara and his renamed People's Progressive Party. The party won 62 of the vote and Jawara became prime minister. In 1963 Gambia became self-governing, and discussions began on the method and date for complete independence. While opposition parties sought a new election at independence, Jawara and his party convinced the British that new elections were not necessary. On February 18, 1965, Gambia became an independent country within the British Commonwealth, with Jawara as prime minister. In 1966 Jawara was knighted and changed his name to Dawda Jawara. Gambia became a republic on April 24, 1970.

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See also: **Diouf, Abdou; Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict In.**

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Gambia, The: Independence to Present

At independence in February 1965, the Republic of The Gambia was headed by Prime Minister Dawda Jawara and dominated by his political party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Jawara had converted to Islam in 1965 and changed his name from David to Dawda. He was knighted in 1966, and thereafter was commonly known as Sir Dawda Jawara. The name of the capital, Bathurst, was changed to Banjul in 1973. The Gambian economy, as it had been during colonial rule, was based on the production and export of peanuts. The new government, with its limited resources, embarked on a program of development, including the construction of the trans-Gambian all-weather road, improved river transport, and the encouragement of rice cultivation. Jawara faced little political opposition, owing primarily to the lack of divisive national issues.

He consolidated his power and in 1970, voters approved his plan to make The Gambia a republic. Jawara became the first president, with extended powers. He was handily reelected in 1972 and again in 1977, with the PPP winning over 70 per cent of the popular vote in both elections.

During the 1970s, Jawara emerged as an articulate leader and a voice of moderation in Africa, active in several international organizations while maintaining a democracy. The economy, however, was in crisis. The Gambian agriculture, already marginal at best, was severely affected by the Sahelian drought of the 1970s, especially in the middle and upper river areas. Peanut production declined, as did the international price for peanuts. More youth began to migrate to Banjul in search of employment, contributing to a declining labor force in the rural areas and increased unemployment in the urban center. The country had to depend on large amounts of foreign assistance and substantial loans to meet its budget. There was increased talk of a merger with Senegal, but Jawara and others felt that The Gambia would be overwhelmed by its considerably larger French-speaking neighbor. The two countries discussed joint economic development programs, although Senegal, with its southern province of Casamance physically isolated on the other side of The Gambia, was more eager to cooperate.

In July 1981, while Jawara was in Britain, an attempted military coup d'état disrupted the general stability of the country. The rebels briefly seized power in Banjul. Jawara called on a 1967 mutual defense treaty signed with Senegal and with the aid of Senegalese forces, he was returned to power. Over 600 people died in the aborted coup attempt. The Senegalese troops were then asked to stay to maintain order and discourage any further unrest. In the rebellion's aftermath, Jawara and President Abdou Diouf of Senegal agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia in late 1981. The two countries pledged to integrate their foreign policy as well as economic and military resources, but maintain their independence in most other areas. Diouf was named president, with Jawara designated vice president. An executive and legislature were also set up, but progress toward further integration was slow, with each side blaming the other for lack of progress. Many Gambians felt they were simply being absorbed by Senegal and were relieved when the arrangement began to dissolve. The confederation was officially abolished in 1989.

By early 1985, The Gambia again faced serious economic troubles. Foreign aid donors began to refuse requests for further funds. Food and fuel shortages, common in the rural areas, began to affect Banjul. The government declared a series of austerity measures in line with structural adjustment programs of the International

Monetary Fund. Reforms included abolition of price controls, elimination of interest rate and credit controls, floating of the exchange rate, privatization of several state-owned enterprises, and a more disciplined fiscal and monetary policy. The reform program improved The Gambia's overall economic outlook, and foreign assistance once again returned to the country. For the vast majority of peasant farmers, however, there was virtually no change in their harsh economic plight. Bad harvests and falling prices for peanuts continued throughout the 1980s. Jawara and the PPP easily won reelection in 1987 and 1992, although opposition parties gained some support.

In July 1994 a group of young officers from the Gambian National Army, led by Captain (later Colonel) Yahya Abdul Jammeh, staged a bloodless coup d'état which successfully overthrew the Jawara government. The Senegalese government did not intervene as it had done in 1981. Jawara went into exile in the United Kingdom. The new military government justified the coup by citing the corruption and malpractice of Jawara and the PPP, as well as The Gambia's economic troubles. The military leaders continually promised a return to civilian rule once corruption had been rooted out of government. The government ruled by proclamation, and dissent was brutally repressed. Political activity was banned until August 1996, and elections were held in late 1996 and early 1997. Four political parties officially contested the elections. Jammeh, who had retired from the military, was elected president with over 55 per cent of the vote, and his political party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), dominated the national assembly. A new constitution came into effect in January 1997. The return to civilian rule improved The Gambia's international reputation and aid organizations once again assisted the country. The Gambia has worked on improving relations with Senegal, although a portion of the border on the upper river remains disputed. The next national elections were held in 2001; President Jammeh was elected to another term. In the January 2002 parliamentary elections, the APRC won all but three seats.

The Gambian economy continues to be characterized by traditional subsistence agriculture, primarily in peanuts, which employs 75 per cent of the labor force. Fisheries and tourism are also foreign exchange earners, although tourism declined precipitously with the 1994 coup. Since 1998, however, The Gambia has enjoyed consistent growth. In July 2002 the government presented a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, in which it outlined plans for economic diversification and the implementation of a supplementary technical assistance program in the years to come.

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Gambia, The: Relations with Senegal

The Gambia, except for a short coastline on the Atlantic Ocean, is an enclave surrounded by Senegal. It is a strip of land 15 to 20 miles wide on either side of the Gambia River and extends for 295 miles into the interior. The Gambia River begins in Guinea-Conakry, then flows through Senegal before reaching the country of The Gambia. The nation's unusual size and shape are a direct result of nineteenth-century territorial compromises between Britain and France, and in particular the Anglo-French Convention of 1889, which officially established the borders between the two colonies.

Prior to independence in 1965, there was some discussion of establishing a political union, or at least a closely cooperative alliance, between Gambia and Senegal in order to increase the economic prosperity of both countries. One of the reasons Great Britain agreed to the colony's eventual independence was the belief that The Gambia would amalgamate with Senegal. A treaty of association was signed in the early 1960s, but no serious progress was made toward closer association besides a mutual defense treaty signed in 1967. The ruling Gambian party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) feared domination by French-speaking Senegal, with its very close ties to France. In addition, with the improvement in The Gambia's economic outlook in the late 1960s, there was no urgency for closer union with Senegal. The Sahelian drought of the 1970s hit Senegal much harder than The Gambia, further contributing to The Gambian reluctance to move toward closer integration. Continued smuggling from The Gambia, where prices were lower, into Senegal benefited The Gambian traders, but it did not cause a serious rift between the two countries. Occasionally, border searches were increased, but the smuggling continued, and there were no confrontations between the two nations.

Relations between the two countries were dramatically altered in July 1981 when a coup against President Jawara was initiated by a group of self-proclaimed African Marxists. The rebels briefly took control of the government, and Jawara fled to Dakar. Jawara, citing

the 1967 defense treaty, was restored by Senegalese troops. President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, who had come to power only one year before with the resignation of Leopold Senghor, feared the creation of a radical Marxist regime in The Gambia. The coup in The Gambia, if successful, likewise posed a threat to the Diouf regime.

By December 1981 Senegal and The Gambia had signed an agreement to create the Confederation of Senegambia, which went into effect in February 1982. A joint executive was declared, with Abdou Diouf as president and Jawara as vice president. The confederation was a clear victory for Diouf and Senegal, although the coup had encouraged some Gambians to consider the prospect of a closer union with their neighbor more favorably.

The confederation agreement was an ambitious document, creating the theoretical infrastructure for a single government. A common federal legislature was planned, with Senegal controlling two-thirds of the seats. A Senegambian council of ministers, dominated by Senegalese, and the confederal assembly met for the first time in January 1983. The two nations agreed to recognize and respect the unique aspects of each country. They also pledged to consult and cooperate on economic, defense, communications and foreign affairs policies. A gendarmerie equipped by France and trained by Senegal replaced the defunct Gambia Field Force. Other attempts at integrating defense and security forces mainly resulted in an increased Senegalese military presence in The Gambia. The proposed economic and financial integration was slow in forthcoming, with each side blaming the other for lack of progress.

By the mid-1980s, Gambian politicians had begun to revert to the rhetoric of the 1970s, claiming Senegal was absorbing The Gambia and forcing the country to give up its independence, the English language, its ties to Britain, and its cultural identity. Plans to finance and construct a Trans-Gambian Highway and bridge exacerbated tensions. The Gambians saw the project as benefiting only Senegal, which sought to link its southern province of the Casamance with the rest of Senegal by building a highway through The Gambia and a bridge across the river. Ferries were being used, and the roads through The Gambia linking Senegal and the Casamance were in serious disrepair. Senegal wanted The Gambia to pay most of the costs, since the project would occur on Gambian soil, but The Gambia strongly resisted. The project never moved past the planning stages; Diouf was increasingly preoccupied with domestic political and economic problems and did not force the issue. The confederation was not working as planned, and by the time it was abandoned in September 1989 it had ceased functioning. By necessity, Senegal and The Gambia maintained cordial relations and many economic links, but there were no further efforts at unity or closer integration.

Relations between The Gambia and Senegal reverted to their previous cordial but stagnant state until July 1994, when a group of young officers from the Gambian National Army, led by Captain (later Colonel) Yahya Abdul Jammeh, staged a bloodless coup which successfully overthrew the Jawara government. Jawara, who was in the United Kingdom, vowed to return to power but he remained in exile. Senegalese troops did not intervene as they had done during the 1981 coup. Apparently, the Senegalese government did not fear the new military regime in Banjul, which promised to root out corruption and to hold elections in the near future. Senegal remained neutral throughout the coup and transition period. There were some tensions over poorly defined borders in upper Gambia, but there were no confrontations. The new government did not shut down the ferries across the river and insisted it sought good relations with Senegal. In elections in 1997, Jammeh, who retired from the military, was elected president. Relations between Gambia and Senegal remain cordial. During the 1998–1999 rebellion in Guinea-Bissau, when Senegalese troops intervened, The Gambia was instrumental in coordinating peace talks and the withdrawal of Senegalese troops. There is no discussion of a renewal of the confederation or closer political ties in progress.

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See also: **Diouf, Abdou; Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict in.**

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Gandhi: *See* **South Africa: Gandhi, Indian Question.**

Gao: *See* **Songhay Empire, Gao and Origins of.**

Garamantes: Early Trans-Saharan Trade

At the beginning of the first millennium BCE, the Maghreb was inhabited by sedentary Berber groups, the ancestors of the Moors of western regions, the

Numids of current eastern Algeria and High Plains, the Getulians of the Predesert, and the Garamantes of the Fezzan. Two important events precipitated the inclusion of the Maghreb into the world of the Mediterranean empires: the founding of Carthage around 750BCE by Phoenicians from Tyre and that of Cyrena in 631BCE by Greeks from Thera.

Carthage occupied the rich coastal plains of present-day Tunisia and Tripolitania but had no interest in spreading westward or southward, toward mountains or desert steppes. Its domain was on the seas, off Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, Andalusia, and in her ports along the African coast up to Gibraltar and Mogador. Its power eventually led to the clash with Rome: the Punic Wars concluded in 146BCE with the destruction of Carthage.

Cyrena, although erected on African soil, was an ordinary Greek city, famed only for its chariot-racing. As it exploited the narrow coastal strip of Cyrenaica and Marmarica, it was continually embroiled in conflict with raiding desert nomads and occasionally Egypt. It remained independent until its conquest by Alexander (331BCE) and was incorporated into the Roman Empire in 96BCE.

Toward the beginning of the Christian era, the whole coastal Maghrib and Egypt were Romanized.

The Garamantes are already mentioned in the fifth century BCE by Herodotus. He describes them as people chasing the "Ethiopians on their four-horse chariots," which attests that the Garamantes, like all their Mediterranean contemporaries, used horses and chariots. The Garamantes were sedentary agriculturists, mainly settled in the fertile Wadi el-Agial, a huge oasis, and throughout the whole southwestern corner of present-day Libya, between Tibesti and Ghadames. The Romans regarded them as half-legendary, nevertheless disquieting, "an ungovernable tribe," as Tacitus writes, "unceasingly engaged in brigandage actions against its neighbors," too distant to be conquered. Germa (the Garamantes' capital city) had a stormy relationship with Rome. Sometimes the Garamantes attacked Mediterranean cities, and Rome frequently launched punitive expeditions against them. In other periods, peace prevailed. The Garamantes were still in existence as a political unit, independent from Rome and Byzantium, at the time of the Islamic conquest around 640.

During the first millennium, the climactic episode of the Actual Arid Phase was being established south of the Maghrib. The break between the Sahara and Egypt was absolute, as the Libyan Desert was a daunting barrier. However, from the Mediterranean countries some innovations found their way to the central Sahara. The horse and the chariot were introduced there. Some technical markers (two-pole chariots, trigas,

and quadrigas) give a clue for dating this innovation: all the Saharan chariots date to after 700BCE. This is the time of the "Horse Period" or "Caballine Period" in the Saharan rock art sequence. Another new item, the throwing spear, was now replacing the bow, the traditional weapon of the Saharan neolithic groups. Some centuries later the sword and the shield also appeared.

But the major novelty is certainly the introduction of the camel, shortly before the Christian era. The dromedary had been domesticated in the Middle East, then introduced into Egypt by the Assyrians when they conquered Egypt in the seventh century BCE. From there the animal reached first the Maghrib, where it was used as a draught animal for agricultural labor, then the central Sahara. It is plentifully represented in the "Camel Period" of the rock art. The Saharan populations quickly realized the importance of this "ship of the desert."

During the first centuries of the Christian era, keeping horses in a severe desert became too difficult. They could be maintained only in some regions, on the Sahelian fringes (Air, Adrar des Iforas, Mauritania) or in the Maghrib countries. Anywhere else the camel replaced the horse as a pack animal. Above all, it made raids easier to carry out.

It was also toward the beginning of the camel period that caravan trade was being established. At this time, typical African products, such as the Guinean gold from Bambuk, began to regularly arrive at the Mediterranean coasts, and items of Punic origin then arrived in southern Morocco or Mauritania. The beginning of this trans-Saharan trade could only happen after the introduction of the camel into central and western Sahara.

The rock art of the central Sahara (that is, of the current Tuareg country) shows no discontinuity in the evolution from the horse period to the camel period, and the latter continued until the present. Therefore, the introduction of the horse, the chariot, the throwing spear, the camel and writing can be attributed to the Tuareg or their immediate ancestors, who were already settled in the central Sahara, at least since the beginning of the first millennium BCE. This is at variance with oral traditions of the Tuareg, which claim that they arrived at Air already Islamicized.

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See also: Carthage; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire; Rock Art, Saharan; Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Garang, John, and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Party (SPLA)

John Garang de Mabior was born into a family of Tuic pastoralists, of the Dinka people of the Upper Nile in South Sudan in about 1945. In 1968 he joined the Anyanya movement, which fought the first round of civil war between north and south Sudan (1955–1972). When the first north-south war ended in an agreement signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, between the then-president of Sudan, Jaafer Nimeiri and the southern rebels, the Anyanya forces were absorbed into the Sudan Peoples' Armed Forces, and Garang was made a captain. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed by President Nimeiri as deputy director of Military Research in the Sudan Army General Head Quarters in Khartoum.

In 1981 Garang was awarded a doctorate in agricultural economics by Iowa State University. Upon return to Sudan, he took up teaching positions at Khartoum University and at the Sudan Military College, in addition to his post at the military research unit. At both institutions, his radical ideas about the political participation (or lack thereof) of what he called "the marginalized areas" inspired many students.

During his tenure at the Sudan Military College and the Army General Head Quarters, Garang moved up to the rank of a colonel in the Sudan army, although he was growing increasingly dissatisfied with Nimeiri's government policies concerning the south. Plans to exploit southern oil resources, maltreatment of southern labor migrants in the north, extraction of forest reserves by military personnel working in the south, the policy to redesign the north-south boundaries, mass imprisonment of southern politicians, and attempts to undermine the Addis Ababa agreement, all drove Garang to formulate his ideas into a different brand of nationalist thinking.

Garang advocated a system of dispersed authority. He believed that the political leadership should not be concentrated in the capital, especially in such a vast and diverse country like Sudan. He argued that the political leadership in such a country should be widely distributed geographically in order to stay in touch with the people at large. Such thinking appealed to groups in underrepresented regions such as the Nuba, the Fur, the Nubians of the far north, the people of the southern Blue Nile, and the Beja of eastern Sudan.

On May 16, 1983, Garang joined an army revolt against the central government. The revolt occurred in the southern town of Bor and was led by Kerabino Kuanyin Bol, another former Anyanya soldier and a high-ranking officer in the Sudan army. The revolt was a result of consultation among the former Anyanya officers in the Sudan army who were disenchanted with Nimeiri. These officers, along with some politicians, realized that the people of the south had reached a stalemate in their struggle to implement the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. Many southern army officers were disappointed with the agreement and claimed they were coerced into signing it by their superiors, chiefly Joseph Lagu, head of the Anyanya movement. They argued that they could not trust the northerners and that a return to war was inevitable.

Toward the end of 1983, Garang and colleagues founded the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) with Garang as the commander-in-chief, and its political wing, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) under his chairmanship as well. The liberation struggle was launched with a different ideology. Unlike the first round of north-south war, which called for secession, the SPLA postulated the goal of liberating the whole country and creating a "New Sudan" that would be freed from any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or culture.

Garang insisted that the idea of independence for the south must be dropped, which earned him favor among moderate people in the north and the support of other countries that oppose the breakup of Sudan. Garang was the first to propose the idea that the conflict in Sudan should no longer be referred to as the "southern problem," as the south was not the only region that suffered from northern domination and injustice. In order to implement a lasting solution, the conflict had to be viewed as a national problem and could only be resolved in the context of a constitutional conference involving all sectors of the society, its political organizations, and its trades unions. To force Nimeiri's government into recognizing the importance of such a conference, he called upon all the people of the "marginalized areas" to take up arms in order to end the dictatorship and to set up a "united democratic secular Sudan."

Garang's ideas were perceived as tantamount to a reversal of Arab-Islamic domination in favor of a more African identity for the country. Garang rejected the popular southern wish for secession and instead declared a socialist liberation movement, in a bid to win external support from socialist/communist nations. His pro-unity stance, however, was eventually perceived by many both within and outside Sudan as a euphemistic disguise of separatist aspirations.

Garang popularized his line of thinking through an SPLA manifesto, which portrayed the SPLA as a

socialist organization attempting to enforce unity, but only in a state built upon the recognition of its diversity and equal representation of all cultural groups. To this end, he sought the help of Haile Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia with arms and training. Help also came from Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Both men were quietly pleased by the revival of the southern Sudanese civil war, which they viewed primarily as an insurrection against Nimeiri. Within a few months and well into the middle of 1980s, thousands of young Nuer and Dinka, the two largest ethnic groups in the south, flocked to western Ethiopia for military training. The SPLA trained and deployed many battalions that captured scores of towns in Upper Nile and Equatoria, victories that resulted in more recruits from different ethnic groups in the south. In 1984 the SPLA set up a radio station in Ethiopia to broadcast into Sudan called Radio SPLA. Garang gave his first radio address on March 3, 1984, calling "upon all the Sudanese people to abolish the divisions among them that the oppressor has imposed through the policy of divide and rule."

With more gains on the military front came political achievements in the north, and the public became more agitated against Nimeiri's government. While Nimeiri was visiting the United States in 1985, a popular uprising occurred in Khartoum and his sixteen-year military rule was brought to an end. The SPLA, under the leadership of Garang, took much of the credit for the fall of Nimeiri. A transitional military council took power and called on Garang to return to the country to participate in a government to be elected after the transitional period, but Garang rejected the request, arguing that overthrowing Nimeiri had not translated into a change in the system. His beliefs were confirmed shortly afterward, when Sadiq al Mahdi came to power in 1986 as prime minister through an elected government. Elections were not held in much of the south due to war, and the Khartoum government recruited militia forces to destabilize the civilian population in the south. The SPLA regarded the so-called democratic period as another northern dictatorship, and the war raged on until a military coup brought an Islamist government to power in June 1989 headed by President Lieutenant General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Since then the government has put significant pressure on the SPLA and Garang, despite the fact that it is the first government in Sudan to come under heavy international pressure for its dismal human rights record, terrorism, and religious intolerance.

Under the leadership of John Garang, the SPLA is considered by the majority of the people of the south, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile as the only hope in ending their perceived domination by the Islamist, Arabized north. This support helped the SPLA survive a near-fatal split in August 1991, when a group

of commanders, disgruntled with Garang's leadership, broke away with an attempt to overthrow him. The coup was rebuffed and the splinter group formed a separate organization called the SPLA-Nasir, under the leadership of Riek Machar, while Garang's group became known as SPLA-Mainstream. Since 1991 SPLA-Nasir has evolved into various organizations including SPLA-United, the Southern Sudan Independence Army (SSIA), and finally the Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). In 1996 Riek and his Nuer followers signed an agreement with the northern government.

As of 2004, Garang's SPLA controls most of the south, including some territory in central and eastern Sudan.

JOK MADUT JOK

See also: **Sudan: Nimeiri, Peace, the Economy; Sudan: Sadiq Al-Mahdi Regime, 1980s; Sudan: Civil War: 1990s.**

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Gaza State: See Soshangane, Umzila, Gungunhane and the Gaza State.

Gender and Migration: Southern Africa

Much of the academic literature on labor migration in southern Africa that has emerged since the late 1970s has been devoted almost exclusively to the movement of men (e.g., Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman 1991; Jeeves 1985). The word "migrant" typically denoted a male person. The titles of these studies indicate that the literature on migration has focused primarily on migration to the South African mines, a system of migrancy that was exclusively male. However, as Belinda Bozzoli pointed out in her seminal 1983 article, there was an intimate connection between male migration to the mines and female migration to other sectors. She emphasized, in addition, that male migration had a profound impact on the status of rural women and that underlying the dominant historiography was a set of subtle assumptions and misconceptions about the "place" and the role of rural women. The paradoxical

image of women as both essential producers (laboring in the fields and nurturing future generations) and as morally degenerative agents was questioned. In the 1980s, therefore, with the growth of feminist approaches, there was a concurrent growing awareness that a historiography devoid of women leads to distorted views of society, and that the evolution of entire academic paradigms focused solely on men's experiences is profoundly androcentric.

This realization triggered a shift from studies focused exclusively on men's migration to studies of men's migration that mentioned women. More specifically, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a barrage of studies on the effects of the (male) migrant labor system on women in the rural areas. Unfortunately, the "add-women-and-stir" methods of this literature did not seriously challenge or undermine the male bias of previous research. Men were assumed to be the migrants while women were passive victims "left behind" in the rural areas. Women were typically portrayed not as active participants in social change, but as victims of the migrant labor system. These victims suffered from both economic insecurity (male migrants' irregular remittances and rural impoverishment) and social dislocation (the breakdown in the traditional family structure, a high prevalence of depressive illness, and the growth of female-headed households). Women were also viewed as essentially passive, an assumption rooted in colonial discourse and perpetuated in these studies.

Women migrants, studied primarily by feminist scholars, entered the academic literature in southern Africa in the 1980s as a separate and legitimate focus of analysis. Researchers analyzed gender (the social construction of men and women and masculinity and femininity) rather than sex (the biological differences between females and males). They recognized that gender was an essential tool for unlocking the migration process. Feminist scholars criticized the gender-blindness of the migrant labor literature. These (mostly female) scholars have called for a new research agenda with women situated at the forefront of the analysis.

Migrant labor had generated an extensive literature and a plethora of theoretical approaches drawn from other contexts. Western feminist theory had not been systematically applied to the study of migration and relatively little of the literature addressed feminist theoretical concerns. In contrast, much of the new 1980s literature on women's migration in southern Africa was written by white, Western, well-educated women, very familiar with the Marxist and socialist feminism of the 1970s and early 1980s. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was this variant of Western feminist theory that was particularly evident in early theorizing about women's migration. The African literature was more

noted for its empirical strengths than its theoretical sophistication, as field studies got underway on women migrants throughout southern Africa.

Feminist analysis of gender and migrancy in southern Africa has, for the most part, adopted either a socialist or a Marxist feminist theory rather than any of the other strands of Eastern feminism (such as radical, liberal, postmodern, or poststructural feminism). Marxist feminists view the female migrant as part of a vast “reserve” pool, forced to move to acquire cash to meet the needs of the state. Wages paid to women in the formal sector are unfairly low since it is assumed that they are either unmarried, or their husband will earn the wages. Socialist feminists perceive (migrant) women’s oppression stemming from both capitalism and patriarchal gender relations. Further, they argue that this oppression can be challenged through collective political struggle against capitalism and patriarchy. Poststructural and postmodern approaches to migration and gender tend to explore issues of identity and power, on the understanding that social identities such as gender identities serve as an important influence on peoples’ migrant behavior. Some studies (e.g., Cockerton 1995) examine how, through the migration process, migrants challenge and reconstruct their gender identities. In her analysis of female migration in Africa, Wright (1995) identifies a common thesis (or even trope) of female migrancy:

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the best endeavors of chiefly and colonial powers alike, a small but very visible number of African women did migrate, breaking out of their role in the rural hinterland. In many cases women were seeking to escape the oppression of male control, which had reached an intolerable intensity in their lives (Wright, p. 786).

Women’s migration is typically understood as flight from male control or patriarchal oppression, a function of male controls, the (male) migrant labor system, or men in general, but some research challenges these assumptions. Although a growing number of studies on women migrants in southern Africa adopted feminist insights in the 1980s, this was less true of research on men migrants. Little of the extensive literature on the (male) migrant labor system or migrant men uses gender as a critical tool for untangling the migration process.

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Geography, Environment in African History

The history of Africa, like that of any other continent, has been fundamentally shaped by geographical and environmental influences, just as Africans, like people elsewhere, have in turn shaped the landscapes and ecological contexts in which they live. Historians have debated the character and relative influence of this human–environment relationship, moving over the course of decades from a set of crude assumptions and stereotypes, to a more subtle and nuanced view of environmental history. Environmental history combines the techniques of two academic disciplines, history and ecology (or biology in a broader sense), using the data of “hard” science to interpret the past as it relates to human interactions with the diverse landscapes they inhabit. Environmental historians try to “read” landscapes; that is, they try to collect information about humans and their environments at given points in time, and then detect the historical dynamics affecting these ecological relationships.

During much of the twentieth century, the debate on African environmental history alternated between two extremes. On one side were scholars who conceived of a primitive precolonial Africa, where people lived in a constant state of war against nature, until they were introduced to modern agriculture and industry through the imposition of Western science and technology. This view, which developed from the writings of colonial observers, has proved resilient, appearing in modified forms to the present day. Other scholars argued that precolonial Africans lived in harmony with their surroundings, and that colonialism robbed them of their natural wealth and abundant resources. A modified form of this “Merrie Africa” thesis, that precolonial Africans had successfully tamed their harsh environments before the colonial intrusion, was especially popular during the nationalist phase of African historiography. But most scholars now agree that both of these views are simplistic, because they neglect the fact that humans have always lived in constantly changing relationships with their environments. Learning how to “read” landscapes properly, then, requires both an understanding of ecological relationships and the ability to interpret them within a dynamic historical context.

The current, more nuanced view of African environmental history has been deeply influenced by the work of pioneering non-Africanist environmental historians, such as Alfred Crosby, whose work traces the global biological impact of European expansion, and William Cronon, who has detailed the effects of colonialism in North America. One of the earliest Africanist works to signal the development of environmental history as a discipline in its own right was John Ford's 1971 book on trypanosomiasis, an exhaustively researched account of the spread of the tsetse fly continentwide during the colonial era. Since then, more localized studies have added greatly to the subtlety and depth of environmental history, such as the work of James Fairhead and Melissa Leach on the Guinean forests, James McCann on Ethiopian agriculture, and William Beinart on South Africa. Perhaps most impressive in range and depth has been the work on East Africa's environmental history, which began in earnest with the 1975 conference of the Historical Association of Kenya, "Ecology and History in East Africa," and since then has attracted a strikingly large number of scholars, including David Anderson, James Giblin, Helge Kjekshus, Peter Little, Gregory Maddox, Thomas Spear, and Richard Waller. James McCann has attempted to synthesize these localized studies from a continentwide perspective, perhaps an indication of similar efforts to come.

Environmental historians ground their work in an understanding of ecology, the study of relationships between organisms and their surroundings, or environments. Ecologists previously thought of "good" environments as having some sort of internal balance or stability, but these days it is widely accepted that all environments are constantly changing, and not necessarily in one particular direction or towards any culminating "climax" state. A crucial component of current ecological thinking is biodiversity, meaning the number and variety of species and habitats in an environment. Biodiversity involves both the total number of species in an area and their complex interactions; like the environment itself, biodiversity is constantly changing. Biodiversity is an unusual quantitative concept because it is impossible to quantify with any sort of precision, but ecologists generally agree that greater biodiversity is an important indicator of a healthy environment.

Human beings are an integral part of this biodiversity. We now know that humans have dramatically modified their environments for thousands of years, in ways that both positively and negatively affect biodiversity. Human activity makes a significant impact upon soil composition and vegetation patterns, as well as the distribution and diversity of animal populations. Humans modify their environments through subsistence practices such as hunting, gathering, fishing, herding, and farming; through increases and decreases

in population size and density; and through technological development, such as the use of iron tools. Many of the landscapes once considered "natural" are actually the result of human modification: the great African savannas, for instance, would simply be overgrown woodlands without the continual grazing of cattle and the occasional brush-fires set by human inhabitants to maintain the rolling grasslands.

In some obvious ways, humans are subject to overriding geographical and environmental influences beyond their control. In Africa these influences include long-term and short-term fluctuations in climate. Over very long time spans, Africa, like other continents, has been shaped by slow climate changes, such as alternating eras of heavy or sparse rainfall, which have produced dramatic changes in African landscapes. For example, researchers in the Sahara Desert, which now covers almost a third of the continent's surface, have unearthed tools, jewelry, paintings, and fossilized agricultural products, indicating that the desert was once a rolling grassland that supported substantial human populations. Over the past four thousand years, long-term climate change has produced the desert we see today, slowly but significantly altering the human history of the entire continent.

In addition to these long-term influences, short-term climate variations can impose stark limitations on human communities, spurring them to adapt creatively in order to survive. Most of the African continent is characterized by a "bimodal" seasonal pattern: the year is divided into wet and dry seasons, rather than the four seasons of the earth's more temperate zones. Thus, while many parts of Africa receive nearly as much rainfall as European countries, the precipitation in Africa tends to occur within the span of a four-month rainy season, leaving a lengthy dry spell during which riverbeds can often dry up completely. African communities have adapted to these dry conditions in creative and diverse ways. Agriculturalists rotate their crops in a careful pattern to conserve water and soil, and pastoralists maintain a high level of mobility in order to make use of a wider zone of watering points and grasslands. Such human adaptations are usually the result of individual decisions in response to immediate concerns. Over the long term, a series of such decisions often develops into a noticeable historical trend, an incremental process with eventual large-scale effects.

Other geographical considerations have also influenced the history of human migration and settlement in Africa and exploration outward from its periphery. The rift valleys that scar the eastern half of the continent have guided north-south migration for thousands of years, and the deep lakes in those valleys have been focal points of human settlement since earliest times. Likewise, the oceans have shaped the direction of

human movement. The Atlantic Ocean, whose trade winds blow in a steadily southward direction, made sailing near the western coast of Africa quite difficult, but the more favorable monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean have allowed East Africans since ancient times to maintain contacts with Arabia, India, and even China. From this point of view, Africa is not historically an isolated continent, but rather has been interacting with the broader world for an extraordinarily long time.

This interaction involved not only the exchange of trade items and intellectual ideas, but also an ecological exchange of plant and animal species dating back at least thirty million years. Africans incorporated many species from elsewhere and made them their own. Domesticated cattle were adapted to local African environments perhaps seven thousand years ago, and not long after that wheat and barley were worked into African agriculture. Perhaps two thousand years ago, Africans borrowed bananas from Southeast Asia and made them a staple of many African diets. More recently, important crops such as manioc (cassava) and maize (corn) were brought to Africa from across the Atlantic Ocean. African peoples used all of these ecological exchanges to dramatically modify their landscapes and the biodiversity of their environments.

Africans also interacted with their environment through the different ways in which they organized their social and economic lives. Precolonial Africa consisted of a vast network of communities in diverse environmental settings, linked together by markets, urban centers, and far-flung trading routes. In addition, different communities were often linked by ties of reciprocal obligation, through kinship or marriage alliances. All of these economic, political, and social connections provided ways by which Africans could cope with environmental adversity and shape the landscapes they inhabited. During times of severe ecological stress, such as famines or outbreaks of disease, these complex networks of human interaction were often disrupted and restructured, so that environmental history is closely intertwined with the history of African political and social institutions. Historians have even suggested that the development of many of Africa's powerful empire states, such as Mali, Aksum, and Great Zimbabwe, might have been deeply affected by the influence of long-term climate changes. At the same time, these kingdoms in turn played a large part in modifying, sometimes dramatically, the environment of precolonial Africa.

The development of the Asante Empire in central Ghana illustrates many of the ideas introduced above. Akan kingdoms predated Asante in the frontier area between the Upper Guinea forest along the coast and the interior savanna. Akan settlement and state building

were fueled by two processes that dramatically altered the ecology of the area: the refinement of a forest fallow system of agriculture; and the heavy involvement of Akan in the emerging Atlantic mercantile system from the sixteenth century onward. The Akan forest fallow system involved the removal of the high forest canopy to let sunlight down onto fields, combined with careful management of the succession of forest regrowth to improve farming conditions. At the same time, the Atlantic exchange was transporting humans, food crops, and diseases among Africa, Europe, and the "New World." One byproduct of this exchange was that Akan farmers began to experiment with cassava and maize imported to West Africa aboard Portuguese ships from the Americas. These new crops proved well suited to forest agriculture, and soon provided the foundation for an expanding population. The Asante Empire, which rose in the eighteenth century, built upon these earlier legacies, so that by the reign of Osei Bonsu in the early nineteenth century, the landscape of central Ghana was hardly "natural" at all, but rather the result of careful human manipulation over the course of several hundred years.

The environmental history of precolonial Africa is not merely the result of the impacts from large-scale kingdoms and empires. Stateless, decentralized societies have also played an important role in shaping Africa's diverse landscapes. The broad savannas of East Africa, for example, are largely a product of human manipulation. Pastoralists have been in East Africa for at least four thousand years, and the continual grazing of their cattle, combined with occasional brush fires, has helped to maintain the grasslands that support wildlife. The Maasai, who came to prominence during the nineteenth century, practiced a highly sophisticated form of transhumant pastoralism, in which small groups of stock-owning families move in seasonal and yearly cycles across a wide stretch of land. Maasai range management techniques included the rotation of grazing patterns, the use of dry-season reserves, and the use of special grazing areas near homesteads for calves. They were keen observers of their environments, recognizing distinctions between several types of grasses and their nutritional value for livestock, and using trees and other plants for fencing, medicine, building materials, and a variety of other purposes. The Maasai also established wide-ranging trade linkages, acquiring agricultural produce, iron implements, clothes, and ornaments in exchange for goods produced from their cattle.

Coinciding with the colonial expansion into Africa in the late nineteenth century, a catastrophic wave of disease and famine swept across the eastern side of the continent. These disasters set the context in which many of the early colonial conquests were undertaken, and deeply influenced their outcomes. Between 1888

and 1892, for example, a triple disaster of rinderpest, drought, and infestation by locusts and caterpillars swept across Ethiopia, demolishing the country's agricultural system and leading to a time remembered as the "Great Famine." The Italians took advantage of the famine to advance unopposed into northern Ethiopia, but Emperor Menelik rallied his people by radically altering the form of agricultural production and distribution, eventually defeating the Italians and bringing several southern peripheral areas under Ethiopian control. In this case, environmental disaster had actually led to a consolidation of African state power and military strength. In other areas, such as the Mahdist state in Sudan, quite the opposite occurred: the ecological disaster crippled any possibility of military resistance to the colonial intrusion.

During the colonial era, Africans continued to interact with and modify their environments as they had before, but they were now acting within the overarching political context of colonial administration. European imperialists came to Africa with their own ideas of what Africa should look like, and when reality did not meet their expectations, colonial policy was often enacted to reshape Africa into the romantic image of the continent held by Europeans. At the same time, colonial administrations were primarily concerned with economic profit, and environmental policy had to be crafted to best suit maximum production. Within the new structure of power created by colonial occupation, Europeans to a certain extent were able to take over the role of modifying African landscapes, but without the benefit of the detailed environmental knowledge and experience Africans had gained during the past several centuries. Colonial policies and European cultural attitudes relating to wildlife conservation, forestry, agriculture, and soil erosion were often inherited by subsequent independent African governments and development agencies, and continue to affect Africa's environments to the present day.

CHRISTIAN JENNINGS

See also: Neolithic, Pastoral: Eastern Africa; Rinderpest and Smallpox: East and Southern Africa.

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German South West Africa: See Namibia, (Southwest Africa): German Colonization, 1893–1896.

Ghana Empire: Historiography of Origins

As long as Leo Africanus and Luis del Mármol Carvajal were the principal sources for early West African history, European scholars believed that state-formation in Sudanic Africa had been initiated by North African Arabs together with the Saharan Berber nomads who had conquered much of the region in the late eleventh century. In 1821 the British geographer James MacQueen, for example, described Ghana as the richest and most important kingdom that the Arabs ruled in the interior of Africa. This picture began to change when medieval Arabic sources for West African historical geography became available to European scholars. These sources proved that the kingdoms of Sudanic Africa were much older than Leo Africanus and Mármol had claimed. Friedrich Stüwe, who published in 1836 a study on the long distance trade of the Arabs in the Middle Ages, suggested (relying in this matter upon the recently discovered work of al-Bakrī) that black Africans had established their first kingdoms, such as Ghana and Takrur, independently before their contacts with the Islamic civilization through trans-Saharan trade in the tenth century.

The medieval Arabic sources are, however, silent concerning the actual founders of Ghana and the other early kingdoms of the Sudanic zone. These sources merely confirm that the kingdom of Ghana existed at the time of the Arab conquest of North Africa in the late seventh century and that it was already then ruled by a pagan black monarch. Therefore, William Desborough Cooley, who established the modern historiography of Western Africa, left the question on the origins of Ghana unanswered. Cooley seems to have shared implicitly Stüwe's view that the state formation in Sudanic Africa had begun independently, for he believed that black

Africans had, in a remote past, extended their domination much deeper into the Sahara than nowadays. Moreover, Cooley considered that the Berber nomads of the Sahara were incapable of establishing and maintaining any large political units.

The first European scholar to seriously speculate on the origins of Ghana was Heinrich Barth who had found a copy of *Ta'rikh al-Sūdān* during his travels in Hausaland. According to this chronicle, the earliest state in Sudanic West Africa had been the powerful empire of Kayamagha, which, according to Barth, was the Ghana of the medieval Arabic authors. This identification seemed plausible because the capital of Kayamagha was called "Gana." Twenty-two rulers had reigned in the empire of Kayamagha before the *hijra* (622) and twenty-two after that. No other dates are given for Kayamagha. On the basis of this information Barth concluded that the empire of Kayamagha (that is, ancient Ghana) had been established around 300. The founders of Kayamagha had been (according to *Ta'rikh al-Sūdān*), "white," although nothing was known of their ethnicity. Barth concluded that they had been either the Berbers of the Sahara or the Fulani. The first choice was supported by al-Bakrī's mention of the matrilinear inheritance followed by the kings of Ghana. The matrilinear inheritance was typical for the nomads of the Sahara, and Barth believed that it was introduced to the black kings of Ghana by their Berber ancestors. The latter choice, the Fulani, was backed by the indisputable fact that the Fulani had recently conquered much of Sudanic Africa from Senegal to the borders of Bornu, thus proving their skill in forming large political units. Furthermore, the Fulani were not considered true blacks; although European scholars could not agree on their ancestry, all agreed that they were more intelligent and civilized than other peoples of western Africa, thanks to their claimed Semitic inheritance.

Belief in the non-African origins of Ghana strengthened at the turn of the nineteenth century. There were three reasons for this. The first was the new ideology which emphasized the inequality of races. According to the colonial historians, the seeds of civilization in Sub-Saharan Africa had been planted by more advanced "white" peoples from the Mediterranean (at present this task was carried on by the colonial powers), whereas the blacks were capable of only serving their "white" masters. The second reason was the discovery of West African oral historical traditions, following the colonial conquest of Sudanic Africa. Many of these traditions trace the origins of the ruling Sudanese dynasties either to the companions of Prophet Muhammad or to Jemeni warriors. The purpose of these genealogies was to link the dynasties to the sacred history of Islam, but the colonial historians, who were eager to find white founders for the ancient Sudanese empires, took the

oral traditions literally, as if the genealogies were historical records. The third reason was the more general hypothesis of cultural diffusion in world history. It was believed that no nation could civilize itself, but it had to learn the basic elements of civilization—such as agriculture, pottery, and metallurgy—from outsiders. The cultural diffusion could only take place through migration. Of course, there had to be a place where the basic elements of civilization were developed for the first time. According to European historians, this cradle was Mesopotamia, whence civilization had gradually spread to other parts of the "Old World."

Following this ideological context, several fantastic theories on the origins of Ghana were proposed by Western authors. In 1896 the French reporter Felix Dubois (1862–1943), who followed in the footsteps of the French army from Senegal to Timbuktu, searched for the origins of the Sudanese civilization in the Nile Valley. He toyed with the idea that Jenne might originally have been an ancient Egyptian colony. Dubois's hypothesis sounded reasonable. Already Heinrich Barth had considered it possible that the Niger bend area had received its civilization from ancient Egypt. Evidence for Dubois's hypothesis on the connection between the middle Niger Valley and Egypt were the architectural parallels that Dubois found in the houses of Jenne and the tombs of pharaonic Egypt.

Dubois's hypothesis was elaborated by the British journalist Flora Shaw (Lady Lugard, 1852–1929) who in 1905 wrote that Ghana was established by a white people whose ancestry was in Mesopotamia and Persia. She assumed that this people descended from the soldiers who had belonged to the unfortunate army that Great King Cambyses of Persia sent to conquer Ethiopia in 525. Her hypothesis was in accordance with the theory, which she considered the most logically supported, that the Fulani originated from India.

In 1906 the French lieutenant Desplagnes published a book in which he claimed that the founders of Ghana were descendants of Carthaginian settlers. A proof for his hypothesis was the resemblance between the two names, "Ganna" (as he called Ghana) and the Punic family name of "Hanno." Another proof was the custom among the Bozo and the Sorko, who were considered to be the oldest inhabitants of the Niger inland delta, of burying their dead in vast jars; a similar custom had also existed in Carthage. Furthermore, the old men of Hombori had told Desplagnes that red conquerors from the east had brought the civilization to the middle Niger Valley.

The most popular theory on the founders of Ghana was expressed in 1912 by Maurice Delafosse in his influential *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, which dominated the historiography of western Africa until the early 1960s. According to Delafosse, ancient Ghana had been established by a group of Jewish refugees who escaped

the Roman revenge from Cyrenaica after their unsuccessful revolt in 117. Led by their chief Kara, the refugees arrived in the Niger inland delta in about 150. They were the ancestors of the present Fulani. Having finally settled in the western Sahel, the descendants of Kara subjugated the local blacks and established the empire of Ghana around the year 300 (actually the city of Ghana had been established by the blacks around 200BCE). This empire flourished under the Judeo-Syrian dynasty until the year 790, when the black subjects revolted and massacred their Semitic lords. During this chaos, Kaya-Maghan Sissé, the ruler of the neighboring kingdom of Wagadu, conquered Ghana. This conquest finally created the black empire of Ghana, which is familiar to us from the medieval Arabic sources. Delafosse cited no explicit sources for his story of the Judeo-Syrian founders of Ghana, which is, in fact, a skillful construction based on Fulani oral traditions concerning their Middle Eastern origins and on various unconnected hypotheses expressed in previous works dealing with the early history of Sudanic West Africa. Delafosse's hypothesis survived, as it corresponded exactly with the ideology of colonialism.

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Ghana, Empire of: History of

The ancient kingdom of Ghana was founded in the western part of the savanna region of West Africa. Arabs who conquered North Africa in the seventh and


eighth centuries referred to the area as *Bilad-al-Sudan* ("Land of Black People"), hence the modern name of Sudan.

The largest group of indigenous inhabitants, the Soninke, was involved in subsistence farming and pastoralism. They grew a variety of crops, but the primary food crop was millet. The location of the kingdom, between the fertile upper sections of the Senegal and Niger Rivers, facilitated farming.

Given that most of the West African savanna was free of the tsetse fly, the Soninke practiced pastoralism, keeping cattle, sheep, and goats for their meat, milk and skins. Ghana was also endowed with plentiful mineral deposits, especially iron ore and gold. Ghana was the first state in the western Sudan to acquire iron technology.

By at least 400, the Soninke had acquired knowledge of iron smelting. The Soninke were therefore able to produce iron implements such as hoes, knives, axes, and iron-headed arrows.

However, the most important mineral in terms of Ghana's power as a kingdom was gold. It was produced in the Wangara region in the southern part of the Kingdom. This was alluvial gold that was washed down from the highlands by the Niger and Senegal Rivers and their tributaries. From the Wangara region, gold was transported by porters to Kumbi-Saleh, the capital town of the kingdom further north. In Kumbi-Saleh, gold was sold to North African traders, the Berbers and Arabs, who transported it to North Africa. Some of this gold was sold to consumers in North Africa and the rest was exported to Europe and the Middle East.



Ghana Empire, eighth–twelfth centuries.

Ghana was widely known because of its large deposits of gold, which made ancient Ghana a rich kingdom.

The kingdom's location in the savannah region enabled it to develop commercial relations with both North Africa and the forest region in the south, and thus play a major role in the trans-Saharan trade. Since Ghana was located in a plain, traders found it easy to traverse its territories during their trading activities. The western trans-Saharan trade route, which started from Sijilmasa in Morocco and passed through Taghaza and Awdoghost in the Sahara desert, had Kumbi-Saleh as its southern terminal. Goods from North Africa were exchanged for goods from the forest region further south in the towns of Ghana. Using revenue collected from the trans-Saharan trade, the rulers of Ghana were able to meet the expenses of administering the kingdom.

Kumbi-Saleh was both the capital and main commercial center of Ghana. It was located in the south-eastern part of the modern state of Mauritania, and lay about two hundred miles north of Bamako (capital of modern Mali). It was composed of two sections lying about six miles apart. One of these sections was called "Al Ghaba" ("forest"), due to the thicket around it. This section, where the majority of the Soninke residents lived, was primarily made up of grass-thatched huts with mud walls. The government was located in this section; the *Gāna* (king of Ghana) lived here in a stone palace fitted with glass windows and surrounded by a fence, thus showing the influence of North African Muslims, who had introduced this style of building. The Soninke employees of the government of Ghana lived in this section of the town as well.

Although Ghanaian monarchs had not embraced Islam before 1076, as they practiced traditional religions, they allowed a mosque to be constructed near the palace for the use of Muslim ambassadors and North African Muslims who were employed as civil servants at the court because they were literate in Arabic and thus helped the kings communicate with the outside world.

The other section of Kumbi-Saleh was known as the Muslim section. It was composed of well-constructed stone buildings; their architectural style was introduced by North African Muslim traders. This was the commercial and educational center of Kumbi-Saleh. It had many Quranic schools and about twelve mosques. Young Muslim converts were taught Islamic theology as they read and wrote in Arabic and recited the Qur'an. This neighborhood was the center from which Islam spread to other parts of Ghana and western Sudan. The North African Muslim traders interacted freely with Muslim traders from other African regions and took African women as wives or concubines, converting them and their offspring to Islam.

Kumbi-Saleh played a major role in the trans-Saharan trade. It was one of the leading commercial centers in the western Sudan. Goods from North Africa and the Sahara desert were exchanged with goods from western Sudan and the forest states further south. The Arab and Berber merchants from North Africa brought goods such as mirrors, horses, silk cloth, glasses, palm dates, razor blades, and salt and exchanged these goods with the Soninke and other southern African traders. The southern African traders provided goods such as gold, kola nuts, ostrich feathers, and slaves. Some of the slaves offered for sale at Kumbi-Saleh had been captured during the wars of conquest, as the Soninke of Ghana invaded the neighboring territories, and the rest were captured during the raids in the forest states. The commercial transactions that were conducted in Kumbi-Saleh were based on barter trade.

The North African traders used some of the Soninke in Kumbi-Saleh as their agents for carrying on trade throughout the year. The Soninke agents made arrangements for the accommodation of the North African traders during their stay in Kumbi-Saleh. In addition to this, they ensured that the North African traders maintained good relations with the rulers of Ghana. The Soninke agents advised the North African traders to give gifts to the rulers of Ghana so that the latter would not interfere with trade.

However, the trans-Saharan trade was not always beneficial to Ghana, for it provoked resentment and envy from its neighbors. For example, the Saharan Berbers based at the town of Awdoghost, north of Kumbi-Saleh, were envious of Ghana's prosperity. They wanted to control the trans-Saharan trade and make Awdoghost the southern terminal of the western trans-Saharan route instead of Kumbi-Saleh. It was partly with the aim of controlling the thriving trans-Saharan trade that in 1076, a group of Saharan Berbers called the Almoravids invaded Ghana, sacked its capital, and imposed their control over the kingdom. The chaos that followed the Almoravid invasion disrupted trade and weakened Ghana's position as a major participant in the trans-Saharan trade. Active trade henceforth shifted further east, where there were strong governments to offer protection to traders and their merchandise. The Almoravids ruled Ghana until they were finally driven out by the Soninke in 1087.

SEWANYANA SENKOMAGO

See also: Sahara: Salt: Production, Trade; Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade; Yusef ibn Tashfin: Almoravid Empire: 1070–1147.

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Ghana (Republic of): 1800–1874


By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the people of the Gold Coast were connected through the intricacies of trade and the political structure of Asante. The only area free of Asante suzerainty was the Fante region, but this changed in 1807, when Asante conquered the area. The major areas under Asante rule in the north included Banda, Bron, Dagomba, Gonja, Guasso, Gyaman, Nkoransa, Nsoko, and Takyiman; in the southeast there were the Ga and Adanme, and in the eastern region were the Assin, Sehwi, Denkyera, Wassaw, and Nzima.

In 1807 Asante finally conquered the Fante states in order to gain a direct trade access to the coast and to punish the Fante for providing shelter for two Assin chiefs, Kwadwo Tsibu and Kwaku Aputae. The Asante consolidated their defeat of the Fante in further engagements in 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1814–1816. Following these campaigns, Fante chiefs who were deemed disloyal to Asante were replaced by ones who were favorably disposed toward Asante.

Following Asante's conquest of the Fante, the Fante provinces were expected to pay tribute and taxes, but with the encouragement of the British, the Fante refused to pay and to acknowledge Asante authority. Fante unwillingness to accept Asante rule, and the reluctance of the British to hand over the notes on the castles to Asante, and to pay rent for the land on which the castles were situated, led the British to dispatch missions to the



The Cape Coast slave fort in Ghana. © Henning Christoph/Das Fotoarchiv.



Ghana.

Asantehene in 1816 and 1819. According to the treaty resulting from these mission, Asante retained sovereignty over the Fante, but the British assumed administrative and judicial jurisdiction over the Fante. When Britain failed to ratify the treaty, the Asantehene ordered his ambassador to leave Cape Coast, the seat of British government on the Gold Coast, and placed it under blockade in 1821. In this same year, the administration of British forts and possessions on the Gold Coast were transferred from the African company of merchants to the British governor of Sierra Leone, Sir Charles MacCarthy. The governor who arrived on the Gold Coast in March 1821 provoked hostilities with Asante by his lack of understanding of the Asante problem and his failure to recognize the position of the Asantehene. Conflict between the British and Asante resulted in an invasion of the southern states in 1824.

MacCarthy lost his life in an encounter with the Asante in 1824. Later in 1824, Asante suffered serious setbacks in their conflict with the British and their allies and suffered serious reversals that culminated in heavy defeat in 1826 in the Battle of Katamanso. The victory of 1826 secured independence from Asante for the southern states of the Gold Coast. The period following Asante's defeat marked a period of decline and disintegration for the state and the growth of the power of Asante war chiefs.

While Asante's relations with the southern provinces of the Gold Coast were more chaotic, Asante kings achieved a measure of stability in the north and were

able to maintain tributary arrangements and trade regulations. For most of the nineteenth century the major northern provinces of Asante-Banda, Bron, Dagomba, Gonja, Guasso, Gyaman, Nkoransa, Nsoko, and Takyiman maintained some association with it in line with the vigorous northern policy that was laid during the reign of Asantehene Osei Kwadwo (1764–1777) and further developed by Asantehene Osei Kwame (1777–1798). The Asantehene Osei Bonsu (1800–1823) also pursued a rigorous northern policy and advanced Asante trading interests in the north.

The year of Asante's invasion to the coast was also the year the British abolished the slave trade. Although the slave trade persisted after abolition, it made most of the trade on the Gold Coast illegal and the Europeans on the coast—Great Britain, Holland and Denmark—and their African partners had to find alternate trading staples. The interest of Holland and Denmark in the Gold Coast during this period was declining. Denmark was to leave the country in 1850 and Holland in 1872. Thus much of the active interaction of the people during this period was with the British. Following the abolition of the slave trade, Europeans focused their economic activities on the natural products of the country and hoped that trade in staple items like gold dust and ivory would increase. The European traders also made efforts to establish plantations and to encourage the indigenous people to grow and export cotton and coffee. But it was not until the last two decades of the nineteenth century that the bulk of the plantation efforts yielded results.

In 1828 the British settlements on the Gold Coast, which had been administered by the monarchy, were relinquished and entrusted to a committee of London merchants. Much of the responsibility for administering the settlements fell upon George Maclean, who was appointed governor in 1830. The significant political and economic expansion that took place under Maclean can be regarded as an important phase of British involvement on the Gold Coast. Maclean negotiated a peace treaty between Asante and the coastal states, and this peace led to trade expansion and prosperity. Fante traders traveled inland to Asante, and Asante state traders under the direction of the *Gaasewahene* who functioned as head of the exchequer and the *Batahene* or chief of trade, ventured south and north to trade. Some of the southern states like Akuapem and Krobo were also able to expand their palm oil plantations, and the export of palm oil increased. The British crown resumed the control of the Gold Coast settlements in 1843 following investigation of British merchants trading with Portuguese and Spanish slave ships.

The growing trade and prosperity on the gold Coast from the 1830s resulted in the rise of an African merchant

class that actively participated in the import and export trade. This trade was enhanced by London merchants like Forster, Smith, and Swanzy, which sent quantities of goods on credit to correspondents on the Gold Coast to be sold on commission. The formation of the African Steamship Company in 1852 for trade in West Africa both regularized and shortened the journey between England and the Gold Coast. By the 1850s, however, the prevailing system of credit and intense competition from European traders began to affect the commercial operations of the African merchants, and a large number of them went bankrupt.

While the economic and political power of Africans declined, the power of the British on the Gold Coast increased. In 1850, the British separated the administration of the Gold Coast from that of Sierra Leone; this created a need for increased government staff and greater expense. It was the need to meet the increasing expense of the government that led to the Poll Tax Ordinance in 1852. In spite of opposition from educated, urban Africans, the ordinance went into effect. Efforts to collect the taxes resulted in riots, and in 1854 there were riots in Accra that led to the bombardment of Labadi, Teshi, and Christiansburg. In the Krobo area, they refused to pay the tax, which led to a fine of £8,125 which was to be paid in oil to an African agent who had paid the original fine. The increase in British authority was also resisted by some of the coastal chiefs like Chief John Aggrey of Cape Coast. When in 1866 Aggrey wrote protesting British interference in his affairs, he was arrested, deposed, and exiled to Sierra Leone.

In 1863 developments on the Gold Coast were affected by the resumption of hostilities between Asante and the British. The immediate cause of the hostilities was the refusal of the British to hand over two Asante fugitives. The disastrous campaign that the British waged against Asante shook the confidence of the people of the southern states. The war with Asante in 1863 brought the question of defending the southern states to the fore. Rumors of a British departure following the parliamentary select committee of 1865 report made the problem of defense urgent. The British did not withdraw in 1865, but following an exchange of forts between the English and the French, educated Fante and their chiefs met at Mankessim to form the Fante Confederation. In spite of hostile British attitude toward the movement, the Fante drew up a document for self-government and self-defense. However, another war between the southern states in 1873–1874 shifted the focus of the people to preparation for war. When the war ended in 1874, Britain declared the southern area of the Gold Coast a protectorate and abolished domestic slavery in the country.

EDWARD REYNOLDS

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Ghana (Republic of): Colonization and Resistance, 1875–1901

Although Europeans have been in contact with the peoples of Ghana since the late fifteenth century, the actual colonization of that country did not really begin until the 1830s, during the administration of George Maclean, who was appointed by the committee of British merchants operating on the coast. The process, however, proceeded by fits and starts. Indeed, it was not until July 1874 that, after inflicting a decisive defeat on the Asante, Great Britain decided to convert the area south of the Pra-Ofin confluence into a British crown colony and protectorate. From that time, the colonization of the country went through two phases, from 1875 to 1890 and from 1890 to 1901.

The first phase of colonization of the country (1875 to 1890) proceeded in the same reluctant, hesitant, and almost absent-minded manner as before. From 1874 to 1879, Britain demonstrated a certain amount of enthusiasm for colonization, with the annexation of the coastal areas east of the Volta as far as Anlo and Aflao, and inland as far as Agbosome, mainly with a view to checking the smuggling that was going on in those areas. This enthusiasm soon dried up. However, in 1884, in response to the sudden annexation of the coast of Togo by Germany signaling the beginning of the “Scramble” for West Africa, Britain rushed east of the Volta to conclude treaties with the Ewe states of Anlo, Mafi, Vume, Tefle, and Krepi in 1884; Akwamu in 1886; and Anum in 1888. Britain also signed an agreement with Germany in 1888 declaring the area from Yeji to Yendi to the northeast as a neutral zone. In 1890 Britain and Germany signed a treaty that divided Eweland into two, the eastern half including Anlo, Some, Klikor, Peki, and Tongu falling to the British and becoming part of the Gold Coast Colony, while the rest of Eweland fell to Germany and became Togo. In 1899 the neutral zone was also finally divided, splitting the kingdom of Dagomba into British and German zones.

Nothing illustrates the reluctant and hesitant nature of British colonization during this period better than the fact that, in spite of its invasion and conquest of Asante in 1874, Britain left the region alone. For the most part it was not until 1889 that, partly to checkmate

French expansion northward and eastward from Côte d’Ivoire, and partly to prevent the revival of the power of Asante, Britain sent its first mission to conclude treaties of protection with Gyaaman and Atebubu, states north of Asante, in 1889 and 1890, respectively. It followed this up with a mission by the Fante, George Ekem Ferguson, in April 1892 who succeeded in concluding similar treaties of protection with the chiefs of Bole, Daboya, Dagomba, and Bimbila between 1893 and 1894, and others with Mossi, Mamprusi, and Chakosi chiefs. In 1895 the British rushed north in a very hot race with the French to occupy Bole in the northwest and Gambaga in the northeast. The Anglo-German treaties of 1885 and 1890 defined the eastern boundaries of Ghana, while the Anglo-French treaties of 1889 and 1898 delineated the present northern and western boundaries.

Even more hesitant and reluctant was the British colonization of Asante. It was not until 1891 that Britain really embarked on the colonization of Asante with an offer of a treaty of protection. When this was firmly rejected, it was not until 1894 that British repeated that offer and undertook to pay the Asante chiefs a monthly stipend if they would agree to accept a British resident in Kumasi. But this was also firmly rejected. In 1895, however, alarmed by the possibility of a French occupation, and more especially by the successful outcome of the negotiation for an alliance between Prempe, the Asantehene, and the great Mandingo leader, Almami Samori, the new secretary of states for colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, an arch-imperialist, ordered the invasion and conquest of Asante. The British army entered Kumasi in January 1896 without firing a shot since Prempe had decided not to fight to save his kingdom from utter destruction and the Golden Stool from sequestration. In spite of this, he was arrested together with his mother, father, brother, and some Kumasi chiefs and exiled first to Sierra Leone in 1896 and then to the Seychelles in 1900. This ended the territorial colonization of the country.

The Ghanaian traditional rulers and their peoples did not sit down unconcerned to watch their sovereignty and culture being trampled upon, but they resorted to all sorts of strategies first to oppose the imposition of colonization, including direct confrontation armed conflicts and rebellions. Thus, from 1874 onward, the Anlo rebelled and attacked the British forces under Glover, but they were defeated and forced to sign a treaty to accept British occupation. But they continued the resistance to the exercise of British jurisdiction in their area. In 1878 the people of Denu burned down the factory of Messrs Alexander Millers Brothers and Company. In 1884–1885, with the assistance of Geraldo de Lima, a great trader, the Anlo again rebelled and led

by their chiefs Tsigui of Anyako and Tenge Dzokoto, they attacked the police escort sent to arrest de Lima and released him. But he was recaptured and detained at the Elmina Castle from May 1885 to November 1893. With an army of 3,000, the Anlo attacked the district commissioner of Keta fourteen miles west of Keta during which he was seriously wounded and two Hausa soldiers were killed. The armed rebellion, nevertheless, continued until 1889 when it was suppressed. The people of Tavieva also took up arms in 1888 to prevent being subjected to the rule of Peki by the British.

But the most determined and protracted resistance during the period was put up by the Asante. As has already been pointed out, when the British abandoned their hesitant attitude and offered protection to the Asantehene in 1891, Prempe turned the offer down firmly but politely. When the British repeated this offer in 1894, Prempe again rejected it and sent a delegation to England to plead his cause of ensuring the continued sovereign existence of his kingdom. This powerful delegation left Kumasi in November 1894 and arrived in England in April 1895. Though it remained in London till November, the British government refused to receive it. Indeed, it was while the delegation was in England that the secretary of state ordered the invasion and conquest of Asante. As indicated already, although Prempe refused to put up any resistance, he was arrested with others and exiled first to Sierra Leone in 1896 and to the Seychelles in 1900.

It was this most unexpected arrest and above all the highly provocative and irreverent request by the governor for the Golden Stool, that sacred symbol of the soul and unity of the Asante on which even the Asantehene never sits, to be surrendered to him so that he could sit on, which touched off the Asante rebellion of 1900 under the leadership of Yaa Asantewaa, the old queen of Edweso of about sixty years of age, to expel the British from Asante. This rebellion began with the siege of the governor in the Kumasi fort in April with a force of 6,000 men that lasted till June when the Governor was compelled to leave the fort for the coast “to hazard death from rebel bullets in preference to death by starvation,” and he and his detachment fought their way through rebel forces before he reached the coast in July 1900.

Using the new method of stockades, which they built all over the place, the Asante were able to harass and resist all the relief columns and reinforcements sent into Asante from the coast. It was not until November that the rebellion was suppressed. Yaa Asantewaa and the other rebel leaders were arrested and deported to join Prempe in the Seychelles where Yaa Asantewaa, then very old, died on October 17, 1921. Having crushed this rebellion, the British completed the colonization of the country with the passing of three orders-in-council

in September 1901 constituting Asante, Northern Territories, and the Crown Colony and Protectorate into the British colony of the Gold Coast, now Ghana.

In the areas south of the Pra where colonization had been entrenched since 1874, the traditional rulers and their people also put up strong resistance but not to drive out the imperialists but to oppose or reform or seek participation in the new colonial measures and institutions that were introduced for the administration and economic exploitation of the country such as new legislative and executive councils, native jurisdiction ordinances, land bills, and direct taxation. The strategies that they resorted to here consisted less and less of armed conflicts and more and more of peaceful rallies, demonstrations, the press and literary campaigns, and petitions and demonstrations to the local colonial administration or to the home government in London. These strategies were originally organized at the local level by the traditional rulers, but from the 1860s onward nationally by the protonationalist movements and societies formed and led by the traditional rulers and the rising educated and professional elite. These movements included the Fante Confederation and the Accra Native Confederation of the 1860s and early 1870s, the *Mfantasi Amanbuhu Fekuw* (Fante National Society) of the 1880s, which was converted into the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS) of the 1890s. Using newspapers such as the *Gold Coast Times*, the *Western Echo*, the *Gold Coast Chronicle*, and through petitions such as the one sent by the *Mfantasi Amanbuhu Fekuw* to the colonial secretary in 1889, and deputations sent to London in 1898 by the ARPS, the societies demanded representation on the legislative council. They vehemently opposed the introduction of direct taxation, and the appropriation of all so-called empty lands by the government as well as the condemnation of African culture-names, dressing, religion, and traditions. These protonationalist movements only won a few concessions such as direct taxation, land ownership by Ghanaians, and token representation on the legislative council, but they could not fundamentally alter the exploitative, unrepresentative, and culturally arrogant aspects of colonization until the 1950s and 1960s.

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Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Administration

As British authority increased on the Gold Coast (the colonial name of Ghana) in the 1860s, administrators were intolerant of any challenge to their authority, as evidenced by Governor Conran's deportation of King Aggrey of Cape Coast in 1866 and Governor Ussher's deportation of King Kobena Gyan of Elmina in 1872. At the same time, they recognized the need for local authority figures if they were to carry out even limited sanitary improvements in the coastal towns. The war against the Asante in 1873–1874, and the need for porters further underscored the need for chiefly support. Neither did British administrators want to alienate the chiefs and have them make common cause with the “educated natives” of the coast to challenge British rule as had happened during the short-lived Fante Confederation from 1868 to 1873. Most of all, they recognized that there were not enough British judges to maintain law and order. Traditionally, this was one of the chief's main functions.

In 1878 there was a first attempt to pass an ordinance “to facilitate and regulate the exercise in the Protected Territories of certain powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities,” but in anticipation of chiefly protest over the lack of stipends to be paid to them this legislation was never implemented. The gold-mining boom in the Tarkwa area made it imperative to recognize some sort of native authority, and in 1883 Governor Rowe enacted the 1878 legislation with the major modification that decisions by native tribunals could be appealed in the British courts. Initially this ordinance was applied to only six head chiefs in the Protectorate area outside the coastal settlement. Even so there were many officials who felt that it was only a short-term expedient and that the chiefs would eventually lose their power.

However, the Supreme Court's ruling in the 1887 case of *Oppon v. Ackinie* that the Supreme Court ordinance had “in no way impaired the judicial powers of native kings and chiefs, and that...[no] other ordinance had taken them away” boosted chiefly power. King Ackinie, who had appealed the decisions of lower courts, was a chief in the protectorate, but the long-term significance of this ruling was that the distinction between the colony and the protected territories was breaking down. At the turn of the century there were also a number of governors who had served in some of Britain's Far Eastern colonies who were enthusiastic supporters of what Governor Sir William Maxwell described as “decentralization.” The annexation of Asante and the orders in council that defined the boundaries of

the Northern Territories, Asante, and the Gold Coast Colony allowed the governor to claim that the ambiguous relationship with the chiefs that the bond of 1844 had defined had been superseded by a new arrangement which signified that chiefly powers were not inherent but derived from the Crown. Indicative of this attitude was the government's creation in 1902 of a new department known as the secretariat of native affairs “to secure greater consistency in the administration of native affairs.”

Apart from the issue of inherent jurisdiction, the equally controversial issue was which arm of government should have control over the chiefly courts, the judiciary or the political administration, and who would be responsible for the codification of “customary law.” The struggle over these issues delayed the passage of a new native jurisdiction bill until 1910. Significantly, this bill extended chiefly courts to the entire colony, defined their jurisdiction, and established the fees and fines they could charge, and most importantly placed these native tribunals, as they were called, under the supervision of the district commissioners. Appeals from them went first to his court or to the provincial commissioner's court if land was in dispute.

The attractiveness of government recognition was a powerful incentive for chiefs to seek inclusion under the terms of the new Native Jurisdiction Act. The recognition of the chiefly order also provoked a response from the educated elite, who felt that the government was following a divide and rule policy. In 1916 Governor Clifford appointed three chiefs, or what were now officially referred to as *amanhin*, from the colony's three provinces to the Legislative Council and exacerbated these tensions. Further attempts to define the relationship between head chiefs and their subordinates met with considerable opposition, and not until the administration of Sir Gordon Guggisberg was legislation passed that sought to increase the integration of the chiefly order into the colony's administration. The incorporation of the chiefs of northern Nigeria into colonial administration played an important role in influencing what many historians have considered this second “interventionist” phase of indirect rule in the Gold Coast. The return of the exiled Prempe I to Kumasi in 1924 also stimulated an indirect rule policy for the Ashanti region. In addition, the policy was extended to the Northern Region, but here there was considerable difficulty finding suitable native authorities among people who were predominantly noncentralized.

In 1925, as part of the colony's new constitution, three Provincial Councils of head chiefs were established, and they were given the right to elect six of their members to sit on the expanded Legislative Council. As an indication of the greater role that the Guggisberg administration intended the chiefs to play,

they were given the opportunity to introduce a new native administration ordinance. This 1927 ordinance strengthened the powers of head chiefs by giving their courts more civil and criminal jurisdiction, made them responsible for hearing stool disputes, and defined more precisely the question of their “inherent versus derived jurisdiction.” It was extremely controversial and accentuated the rift that had been developing between what was then called the “intelligentsia” and the “natural leaders.” The leadership of the Cape Coast-based Gold Coast Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society became the most uncompromising opponents of the new ordinance and tried to prevent chiefs from attending the Provincial Councils.

Native affairs in the 1930s were characterized by bitter struggles to control chiefly positions, with the native tribunals an important prize. To prevent this and to better regulate the financial affairs of the native states, the government tried to establish state treasuries, but not until 1939 was it able to enact the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance. Shortly afterward the native tribunals were subjected to a highly critical examination and were restructured as native courts by the Native Courts Ordinance of 1944. They had to be constituted by order of the governor, they were graded into four categories, appeal was to the Magistrates’ Courts, their number was reduced, and more than 50 per cent were no longer presided over by chiefs.

This new native authority system, however, enjoyed only a short life as the pace of constitutional change quickened in the early 1950s. The British government decided to abandon the policy of indirect rule in favor of local elected government. Local authorities were to have chiefs as presidents, but the post was merely ceremonial.

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See also: Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Economy; Ghana (Republic of): Colonization and Resistance, 1875–1901.

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Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Economy

From the earliest period of European contact (fourteenth century), the economy of Ghana was based on gold and kola nuts. During the colonial period, cocoa farming and mining became the major industries, aided by the transport development of the early twentieth century. The result was a revolutionary transformation of the economy during the colonial period.

From its humble beginnings in 1858, cocoa became the major export of Ghana by 1911. The Basel missionaries imported cocoa seedlings from Surinam in 1858 for propagation, but the experiment was a futile exercise. A second experiment by Tete Quashie, who returned from Fernando Po with cocoa beans and planted them at Mampon-Akwapem in 1879, yielded better results. This experiment attracted other farmers, and in 1885, 121 pounds of cocoa were exported overseas. Governor William Griffith also promoted cocoa cultivation by starting a nursery at the Aburi Botanical Gardens in 1890 to produce seedlings for distribution.

Cocoa cultivation spread rapidly throughout Akuapem and Akyem Abuakwa (1890); Asante and Brong Ahafo (1900); and other parts of Ghana after 1912. Production rose from a modest 80 pounds in 1891 to 88.9 million pounds by 1911, as energetic farmers from Akwapim migrated in bands to buy land elsewhere for cocoa production. In 1906 the industry got a further boost when William Cadbury started buying cocoa for chocolate production. Even though from 1911 onward farmers experienced hardships due to cocoa diseases, by 1951, cocoa production had risen to 300,000 tons, almost two-thirds of the country’s export earnings.

This phenomenal development of the cocoa industry was an exclusively Ghanaian enterprise. The capitalistic outlook and equipment of kola farmers were transferred to cocoa production. Paradoxically, the success of cocoa was a constant source of anxiety for the colonial government. Consequently, the industry did not receive direct sustained support.

Wartime licensing created problems for cocoa farmers who suspected attempts by European purchasing companies to prevent them from shipping their cocoa directly to Europe and the United States. From 1914 growers associations were formed to fight for better prices and to ship cocoa directly to Europe and the United States and to circumvent middlemen. From 1929 cooperatives were formed for the same purpose. The struggle between farmers and middlemen led to the famous cocoa “hold-up” in 1937. A “Buying Agreement,” which combined twelve cocoa purchasing firms,

was perceived by farmers as an attempt to introduce monopolistic conditions into cocoa purchase. On the other hand, the 1948 Gold Coast disturbances arising out of the directive to cut down cocoa trees was a by-product of the fear that the colonial government was attempting to destroy the cocoa industry. Though not necessarily valid, farmers perceived the directive as a manifestation of the systematic opposition of the colonial government to the progress of the cocoa industry.

The changes that were taking place affected trade as well. Until the 1860s and 1870s, import-export business was a joint activity of Ghanaian merchant princes, businessmen, and overseas firms. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, European, Syrian, and Lebanese firms gradually took over the business sector of the country. After the consolidation of British rule over Asante in 1900, many overseas firms opened branches in Asante and later, the northern regions. Ghanaian businessmen continued to participate actively in the import-export trade, but the depression of the 1920s and European competition in the 1930s and 1940s drove many out of business. Trade in the colonial period consisted of the export of agricultural products and importation of textiles, liquor, machinery, tobacco, sugar, beads, building material and provisions.

These developments went hand in hand with the development of mining in Ghana. The gold trade had been the centerpiece of European commerce with West Africa. Gold was obtained mainly through the traditional methods of washing or panning and light digging. In the 1860s, the first steps were taken toward modern mining when one Thomas Hughes of Cape Coast used heavy machines in Western Wassa. The Wassa chief purportedly stopped him from further operations after he struck a very rich gold vein in 1861.

In 1877 the French trader J. Bonnat made another attempt at introducing machinery into gold mining. He formed the African Gold Coast Company, acquired a concession in Tarkwa in 1878, and commenced operations first at Awudua and later at Tarkwa. Encouraged by reports of gold finds, Ghanaians working by themselves or in partnership with Europeans rushed to Tarkwa, but by 1882, most of the mining companies had collapsed, leaving only six in business.

A mining revolution occurred in Ghana when E. A. Cade bought a lease at Obuasi from three Fante businessmen (J. E. Ellis, J. E. Biney, and J. P. Brown) in 1895 and formed the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC) in 1897 to operate what became one of the richest gold mines in the world. By 1901 foreign capitalists reorganized the gold industry, which had been in African hands. The success of AGC set off another gold rush in other parts of Asante and Akyem. Aided by the Sekondi-Tarkwa railway line (1898), gold production expanded dramatically between 1901 and

1911—from 60,000 ounces in 1901 to 280,000 ounces in 1911—becoming the second most important export earner for Ghana.

A geological survey in 1914 revealed quantities of manganese deposits near Nsuta. The Wasaw Exploring Syndicate, later the African Manganese Company, started mining the Dagwin-Nsuta deposits and made the first shipment of ore in September 1916. Production increased from 30,000 tons in 1918 to 527,036 in 1937.

The first major diamond deposits were found at Abomosu, and, in 1920, the newly formed Diamond Fields of Eastern Akim Limited exported the first ores from the Birim Valley near Kibi. Several European companies joined the search for diamonds at Atiankama, Akwatia, and Oda near Kade. In 1922 diamonds were also found at Bonsa but since the deposits were not large enough for commercial mining, Ghanaians flocked to the area and started digging and panning. From a few hundred carats in 1923, diamond exports reached over 750,000 carats in 1933.

The expanding economy and the concomitant increase in cocoa production and mining necessitated improvement in roads, harbors, and railways. Consequently, an inspector of roads was appointed in 1890. Added to this, in 1894, the Trade Roads Ordinance empowered chiefs to recruit their people to provide labor for six days in each quarter. Proposals for a light tramway from Cape Coast to the river were abandoned after the Wolseley expedition of 1874. Governor Brandford Griffith, the British Chamber of Commerce, and several Gold Coast towns similarly abandoned other schemes for railway lines despite suggestions in the 1890s. The biggest revolution in transportation was the construction of a deep-water harbor at Takoradi and the construction of railway lines. In 1898 the West Coast railway line was begun at Sekondi. The line reached Tarkwa in May 1901, Obuasi in December 1902, and Kumasi in October 1903. In 1904 the railway line carried 91,000 passengers. In 1912 the Eastern Line from Accra ended at Mangoase. The Accra-Kumasi (started in 1909 and abandoned during the war) was completed in 1923, and by 1956, Takoradi was linked to Accra by rail. The rapid development of mining and railways brought about a considerable inflow of capital and encouraged exports between 1892 and 1910. Motor cars had been introduced in 1909, but it was not until the use of the light Ford chassis that a veritable transportation revolution took place in the Gold Coast.

In Ghana during the colonial period, the economy was marked by revolutionary changes in cocoa farming, mining, trade, and transportation.

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See also: **Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Administration; Ghana (Republic of): Colonization and Resistance, 1875–1901.**

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Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Guggisberg Administration, 1919–1927

In the summer of 1928, Brigadier-General Gordon F. Guggisberg was assigned the governorship of British Guyana. Just eight months after arriving at his post, he became ill and was returned to England, where he died in 1930. From 1919 through 1927, however, Guggisberg served as governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana), and in the history of that country, he is described most favorably. In fact, in the most detailed biography, the author R. E. Wraith described Guggisberg as the “founder of the modern Gold Coast as surely Nkrumah was the founder of the modern Ghana.”

There are important factors to which the administration’s success can be attributed. Guggisberg’s prior experience in the colony where he first arrived in 1902 for the survey of the Gold Coast and Ashanti has been cited. Seconded by the Royal Engineers to this special employment under the Colonial Office, he traveled the territories and under the aegis of the Mines Survey Department, he worked toward addressing the problem of mapping the Gold Coast. In 1906 he was appointed director of survey. Later survey work in southern Nigeria brought Guggisberg additional African experiences. Furthermore, Governor Hugh Clifford, whose position Guggisberg inherited in 1919, was said to have laid solid foundation upon which his successor could make rapid progress. For example, there was the “Clifford Constitution of 1916” by which the first Africans were allowed on the legislative council. Furthermore, the administration discussed the need for a deep-water harbor, laid some rail lines to the gold-mining regions, and also supported the establishment of elementary schools by the various Christian missions.

While the dedication with which England, and therefore the Clifford administration, assessed colonial affairs may have been retarded by World War I in Europe (1914–1917), Guggisberg arrived at his appointed post at war’s end. In addition to past African experiences, the new governor inherited a budget surplus to finance parts of his development ideas. Most important, however, it was his professional training as Royal Engineer and Surveyor that allowed him the ability to understand the ramifications of the construction programs he advocated. Guggisberg was convinced that progress in the Gold Coast was dependent on the good physical health of its people. It was in light of this that the first comprehensive medical institution at Korle Bu was undertaken. Also, to exploit resources of the colony for the financing of the many construction projects, the government saw the need for an improved transportation system. The existing school system was also thought to be inadequate to sustain future developments. In his agenda for education, Guggisberg saw a central role for the colonial state. This was a radical departure from previous administrations that had not seen any need for the colonial government to become an aggressive provider of education let alone to waste resources in the funding of postelementary schooling. Guggisberg’s Prince of Wales College for boys and girls, now Achimota College, was indeed a grand trophy of the government’s educational policy.

Only a month after arriving at his post in 1919, Guggisberg presented a ten-year program in which his development policies were outlined. Many have lamented about how previous British governors resisted pressures to open up the hinterlands.

Thus, the start of rail construction in the beginning of the 1900s was considered overdue; nevertheless, to aggressively pursue the expansion of road, railway services, and a deep-water harbor in the colony as Guggisberg did was indeed radical. In a September 1919 *Preliminary Report on Transportation in the Gold Coast Colony*, the newly appointed governor made his vision clear to the Colonial Office. Hence, under his stewardship, a deep-water harbor at Takoradi commenced; over 230 miles of railway were laid, and about 260 miles of tarred roads were constructed. As a result of this opening up of the hinterlands, the colony was able to increase its exports of timber, gold, manganese, and cocoa with relative ease than in previous years. The benefits of Guggisberg’s construction policies were evident by 1927 when 82 per cent of the colony’s foreign earning came from cocoa exports alone.

Central to the policies of the government was the conviction that Africans in the Gold Coast were capable of becoming involved in the administration of the colony. Most important, the governor was of the view that developments must be applicable to local needs. It

was for this reason that he advocated technical education as well as the study of the local vernaculars. Those who were suspicious of the insistence on this kind of education, however, accused him of advocating an inferior education for Africans compared to that which could be earned at London. The accomplishments of students from Achimota College, nonetheless, have proved otherwise. This same practicality was evident in the manner the governor sought to place Africans in responsible administrative positions.

While the 1916 Clifford Constitution allowed “three paramount chiefs and three other Africans” on the Gold Coast legislative council, the 1925 changes introduced by Governor Guggisberg made it possible for the number of Africans in positions of responsibility to increase. For example, at the time of his appointment as governor, there were only three Africans holding positions in the civil service, but the number increased to thirty-eight by 1927. The administration, supported by a network of provincial and district commissioners, made it a responsibility to improve the native courts. Detailed record keeping was encouraged at all levels, and to ensure fairness in the enforcement of laws, the district commissioner’s courts abrogated to itself the right to review cases from the native courts. Entries in the diaries of Duncan-Johnstone, the district commissioner of Ashanti-Akim, are indicative of the efforts made to bring progress to the people at all levels of society. In fact, an effective native administration system was perceived as critical to the goal of involving Africans in the management of their own affairs. Hence, the 1925 legislative changes allowed the establishment of provincial councils of chiefs. From these councils, elected members served on the colony’s legislative council. While the process made it possible for educated personalities as E. J. P. Brown, T. Hutton Mills, and J. Casely Hayford to become legislative council members, Guggisberg preferred reliance on traditional chiefs—a policy that was consistent with the British colonial idea of indirect rule.

But for the stability and administration of the colony, the governor was conservative and deliberate in certain policy matters. For example, even though a Kumase council petition seeking the return of the ex-Asantehene from the Seychelles was submitted in 1919, the governor recommended that the former King Prempeh I be allowed back at a later date (1924) and only as a private citizen. Two years later, however, the former Asantehene was installed as Kumasihene. The governor’s caution was with regard to the effective introduction of his policy on native administration. But this occasional conservatism notwithstanding, the government laid a solid foundation for the “Africanization” of the Gold Coast administration and gave impetus to the rise of nationalism in the Gold Coast. It was not surprising then that

the Gold Coast (Ghana) was to become the first colony in black Africa to gain political independence from colonial rule in 1957.

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See also: Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence; Nkrumah, Kwame.

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Ghana (Republic of): Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence

On March 6, 1957, the people of Ghana gained their independence. As the first European colony in Sub-Saharan Africa to win its freedom, Ghana launched a march to self-government and independence that proved a catalyst for the overthrow of European imperialism throughout much of Africa. Capturing this larger significance of the achievement, the new prime minister, Kwame Nkrumah, told the jubilant independence day crowd, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent.”

Ghanaian nationalists won their independence in a largely peaceful, democratic, and constitutional process following World War II. The success of this approach reflects the country’s history, the tactics of

the independence movement's leadership, and the character of the British colonial reaction.

The growth of modern Ghanaian nationalism sprang from deep historical roots. One source was resistance to British imperialism by Ghanaians under their traditional leaders. The Asante, for example, provoked by the unreasonable demands of the British governor, rose in revolt in 1900 under the leadership of Yaa Asantewaa. Military force had contained this primary resistance to colonial rule, but colonialism itself produced a second fount of discontent: a Western-educated African middle class. Small in numbers, but often articulate, this group included lawyers and journalists capable of challenging the British authorities with their own ideals, such as a people's right to self-determination. J. E. Casely Hayford, a member of this new elite, organized the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920. This movement, often seen as a predecessor to modern nationalism and Pan-Africanism, faltered because of the physical separation of Britain's colonies, lack of a strong mass base, and political competition between the traditional and Western-educated elites.

After World War II, British officials still regarded the Gold Coast, as Ghana was then known, as a "model colony." They believed harmony could be achieved in a system that shared power largely between British officials and the chiefs, with a secondary role for the Western-educated middle class. In 1946 Governor Sir Alan Burns introduced a new constitution that actually established an African majority on the legislative council, but time had run out for Britain's gradualist measures. New forces were about to remake the colony's politics.

In 1947 members of the colony's Western-educated elite established the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Its leaders, such as J. B. Danquah, were mostly lawyers who sought self-government in "the shortest time possible" and greater representation for their class on the legislative council. As general secretary for the party, they recruited Kwame Nkrumah. After twelve years overseas, Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast, having lived the life of an impoverished foreign student in the United States and Britain. In a remarkable political achievement, he became head of the government in four years.

Nkrumah's success rested in part on his ability to expand the appeal of the nationalist movement. Soon discontented young people, especially those with limited Western educations but few employment opportunities in colonial society, became some of his most enthusiastic supporters. He also gained essential backing from cocoa farmers who were angered by the colonial administration's efforts to control their crop's swollen shoot disease by cutting down affected trees.

To these elements of his coalition he added support among low-level civil servants, teachers, market women, and the working class.

In 1948 the heavy-handed British response to protests in Accra radicalized politics in the colony. High prices had led to a consumer boycott of foreign-owned stores, when a British officer fired on the veterans' march to the governor's residence. Rioting broke out and spread to other towns. With Cold War fears of communism on their minds, British officials arrested the top six leaders of the UGCC. The British soon released them, but their detention already had made them popular heroes and increased the membership of the party. With one exception, however, the leaders were men of property and unlikely revolutionaries. They were willing to accept the initiative of the new British governor, Sir Arden-Clarke, to work out a moderate program of constitutional reform.

Nkrumah, the exception, broke with this gradualist approach of his colleagues, whom he now denounced as men of "property and standing." In June 1949 he launched the rival Convention People's Party (CPP). Its clear and uncompromising slogan, "Self-Government NOW," soon captured the imagination of the masses. The following January, he initiated a campaign of strikes and boycotts, known as "positive action," designed to force the colonial administration to concede immediate self-government. Nkrumah's subsequent arrest and sentence to three years in jail transformed him into a martyr.

When elections for the new Legislative Assembly were held in 1951, the CPP swept the elected seats, winning thirty-four out of thirty-eight. Recognizing this undeniable victory, Arden-Clarke performed an amazing about-face, releasing Nkrumah from prison and asking him to become leader of government business. Nkrumah and his followers had adopted white caps as symbols of solidarity with India's nonviolent struggle for freedom. When they emerged from prison, they proudly inscribed P.G., for "prison graduate," on their caps.

Over the next six years, Nkrumah pressed for and won increasing powers of self-government leading to independence. The British responded in a largely cooperative fashion to this transfer of power. The CPP won elections in 1954 and 1956, providing Nkrumah with the ability to establish a unitary state rather than the federal constitution preferred by some of his regional opponents. After independence, Nkrumah's government would be marred by authoritarian tendencies and economic mismanagement, but as a nationalist leader and visionary Nkrumah has remained a hero of African liberation.

The choice of the country's new name at the time of independence in 1957 referred back to the medieval

West African empire of Ghana and reflected pride in the state's African identity. From Mali to Zimbabwe, other African nationalists would follow this example. Many also would recognize the lessons and achievement of the Ghanaian struggle: the popular support for an uncompromising demand for freedom, the power of a mass party, and the vision of independence achieved.

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See also: Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Sub-Saharan Africa; Nkrumah, Kwame.

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Ghana, Republic of: Social and Economic Development: First Republic

At the time of independence from Britain in 1957, Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) was one of Africa's wealthiest former colonies. Ghana's economy and society were widely seen to embody characteristics that were considered advantageous for modern economic development, including: a high per capita income by the standards of Sub-Saharan Africa, an impressive number of existing and potential export commodities (cocoa, gold, diamonds, manganese, bauxite), and a good transportation system of roads and railways. With respect to human resources, Ghana's relatively well-developed educational system had by the 1950s produced a large number of educated people. The new state was endowed with an efficient, professional public service bureaucracy. In short, Ghana's developmental prospects were considered favorable.

During the late 1950s the economy grew quite rapidly, with over 5 per cent growth in gross national product (GNP) annually between 1955 and 1960. Prices were relatively stable and the cost of living was rising only slowly. Between 1960 and 1966, following an attempt at state-led, "socialist" economic growth, the economy performed much more poorly, while living standards for most Ghanaians declined. Led by Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government, the country's failure in this regard

was attributed to the government's program of centrally planned economic and social development. This was ironic given that the victory of Nkrumah and the CPP in 1957 had appeared to represent the epitome of Africa's anticolonial revolution, a triumph of the principle of self-determination and racial equality over the baleful effects of European tutelage and paternalism. But the government, disappointed by what it saw as slow progress, attempted to transform Ghana into an industrialized country by state-led development strategies. To the government, "socialism" implied central planning in order to ensure that the entire resources of the state, both human and material, were employed in the best interests of all Ghanaians

Such planning involved a strong commitment to state-led industrial development, protected by high trade barriers to speed up the growth process so that Ghana might "catch up" both with the West and the Soviet Union. The strategy involved extensive state intervention both in extractive industries and agricultural production. However, the economic grounds for reallocation of resources through state intervention in Africa were unproved, and, over time, the lack of success of such policies became clear. Under the regime of state-led growth, private capitalist investment was discouraged, whether Ghanaian or foreign. Ghanaian enterprises were limited mainly to small-scale concerns. The direct participation of the state in production was to be achieved by setting up new enterprises rather than by nationalizing private concerns, and socialist goals to be achieved by maximizing the growth of the public sector. Legislative controls in a number of strategic areas—including imports, capital transfers, the licensing of industrial production, the minimum wage, prices, levels of rents, trade union activities—were used to try to effect state-directed growth, but with limited success. In sum, Nkrumah's government not only failed to transform Ghana into an industrialized, socialist state but under its control the economy declined rapidly, paving the way for the country's descent into penury.

Six years of central planning (1960–1965) resulted in severe shortages of basic commodities, soaring price inflation, plummeting real incomes, and producer prices for Ghana's highly important cocoa farmers. Politically the period saw the incarceration of hundreds of the government's political opponents and a crackdown on the opposition press. Nkrumah and the CPP government's ousting from power in February 1966 seemed to be welcomed by most ordinary Ghanaians. The very ease with which the regime was overthrown belied the contemporary conventional scholarly view of the CPP as a strong, well-organized mass party. It appears that the CPP's organizational and mobilization capacity was based on little more than patrimonial

authority, built on a network of material incentives and rewards that provided the motive force for the political system. CPP leaders were by and large a gang of opportunists who combined a rhetorical identification with the longings of ordinary Ghanaians for economic well-being with a near total surrender to the graft and corruption within which they immersed themselves.

But in this environment of politics as a means to reward, Nkrumah enjoyed a virtual monopoly of power. Assisting him were a cabal of foreign socialists who saw him and his regime as an instrument of their own designs to create a worldwide socialist-revolutionary movement. Partly as a result of their influence, Nkrumah was led to proclaim the pursuit of socialist development strategy, with predictably disastrous results given the political and economic realities of Ghana.

The major policy shift toward increased state control and regulation of the economy from the early 1960s owed a great deal to the urgent political need to satisfy the aspirations of the ruling party's supporters, to offset burgeoning urban unemployment, and to speed up industrialization as the only way, the government believed, to increase national income speedily. The results, however, were disappointing. Per capita GNP grew by only 0.2 per cent a year between 1960 and 1965, much slower than the rate of population increase at around 3 per cent per annum. As a result, many people's living standards declined quite badly during the first half of the 1960s.

The central figure in the formulation of development strategy was Nkrumah himself, a man whose personal ideology was influenced strongly by Leninism. Nkrumah had three main goals: Ghana's political independence, economic growth providing the means for his country's development, and Africa's overall political and economic unity. It was necessary for the continent's international standing, he argued, to form a third power bloc after the United States of America and the Soviet Union and their allies. Nkrumah believed that Ghana's underdevelopment and reliance on the export of cocoa beans were attributable to the structure of imperialist monopoly capitalism. To break free from this stranglehold required not merely political independence but also economic self-reliance, a goal that necessarily implied, to Nkrumah's way of thinking, a socialist development strategy. If Ghanaians were to be delivered from poverty, inequality, ill-health and ignorance—in other words, if development was to be achieved—then this desirable set of goals could not be accomplished on the basis of a backward, dependent economy. Instead, Ghana's trading and raw material-producing economic structure had to be transformed into a productive unit capable of bearing a superstructure of modern agriculture and industry, entailing public

ownership of the means of production, the land, and its resources; through such a transformation, progressive, industrialized, socialist Ghana would be forged.

African political and economic unity was conceived as an integral part of Ghana's industrialization program in that the "essential industrial machine which alone can break the vicious cycle of Africa's poverty can only be built on a wide enough base to make the take-off realistic, if it is planned on a continental scale" (Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p.167). In this respect, Nkrumah was a kind of African developmentalist Trotsky, in as much as he believed in the necessity of permanent revolution to achieve his goals. African unity was the political framework within which the process of erasing neocolonialism from the continent could proceed, while socialism symbolized the new order that had to replace the imperialist system of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and apartheid. Together Pan-Africanism and socialism would coalesce into a progressive ideology for building a new Ghana and a new, post-colonial Africa. For both political entities, the new political system had to be "scientifically" formulated and vigorously propagated.

Many Ghanaians believed that Nkrumah spent too much time and energy struggling for a nonachievable goal—African unity—and not enough in ensuring Ghana's well-being. Certainly, the economic policies his government adopted after 1960 did not achieve their goals. Import-substitution industrialization was a failure, often providing substandard goods at inflated prices. The government spent more than it could afford on prestigious public buildings, state-owned enterprises, such as Ghana Airways and the Ghana National Construction Corporation, and on providing employment for the growing number of Ghanaians. The country's currency, the cedi, was maintained at an artificially high rate of exchange in order to offset excessive public spending and so encouraged imports and discouraged exports. The Cocoa Marketing Board paid such low prices to cocoa farmers for their produce that output declined greatly, while government used the surplus extracted to finance public expenditures that primarily benefited the urban areas. To meet accelerating deficits on both domestic budgets and the balance of payments, the CPP government borrowed heavily abroad, resulting in a high level of public debt.

The military and police officers who overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 proclaimed that they had felt compelled to oust him and his government because of the combined weight of economic failure—so serious that Ghana's development was severely stunted for decades—and a political repression which, in the way that it silenced and imprisoned opponents, had all the hallmarks of the Soviet system that Nkrumah professed to admire. Following the coup, the CPP was

banned and disbanded. Nkrumah fled to Guinea, eventually dying in Romania in 1972.

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See also: **Nkrumah, Kwame.**

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Ghana, Republic of: Coups d'état, Second Republic, 1966–1972

On February 24, 1966, the civilian administration of the Convention People's Party (CPP) that ruled Ghana under the leadership of President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup d'état. Colonel E. K. Kotoka, Major A. A. Afrifa, and the other coup leaders established the National Liberation Council (NLC) to rule the nation, until the beginning of the second republic in 1969.

Knowing very well the ramifications of this first military interference in civil administration, Major Afrifa (later to rise to the rank of general) wrote in defense of the security forces in staging the coup. He blamed Kwame Nkrumah for the politicization of the armed forces when Ghanaian troops were sent to the Congo in the early 1960s. According to Afrifa, the Congo crisis, as well as the nationalist struggles in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) for which preparations were underway to send more troops, were internal affairs in which Nkrumah had no right to intervene. The president was described as overly ambitious in his quest to become the first head of a dreamed United States of Africa.

On the domestic front, Nkrumah was accused of dictatorial behavior. The introduction of the 1958 Preventive Detention Act, which allowed political opponents to be imprisoned without trial, was among the examples cited. The establishment of the republican constitution of 1960 also placed enormous power in the hands of Nkrumah as president. Because of changes in the constitution, the president was able to force opponents such as K. A. Busia into exile. Another challenger, J. B. Dankwa, was detained and died in 1965 as prisoner. Because of these acts, the president

was accused of recklessly endangering the nation at the same time as he blocked all constitutional means to challenge his powerful grip over national affairs.

While acknowledging that the CPP used repression to consolidate power, intellectuals of the left such as Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer explained Ghana's problems differently. In their *Ghana: End of an Illusion*, they pointed to the inability of the administration, in the first half of its tenure (1957–1961), to reconstruct the economic institutions left to it by the colonial government. By nurturing a neocolonial economic system in the immediate postindependence years, Ghana lost critical momentum to becoming truly free. While Fitch and Oppenheimer thought of the 1961 socialist "Seven Year Plan for Work and Happiness" as the more realistic policy for the nation's self-sufficiency, the scholars were of the view that Ghana's break with its colonial past was tentative.

Notwithstanding such opposing interpretations, the coup leaders found Nkrumah's economic centralization as outlined in the seven-year plan to be problematic. Those socialist policies were reversed by the NLC, and pro-Western private sector initiatives were pursued with vigor. In fact, in his *Ghana under Military Rule, 1966–1969*, Robert Pinkley argued that Ghana's economic problems were seen by the NLC to be symptomatic of a larger predicament—political dictatorship of the former administration. The answer laid in the establishment of a duly constituted civilian administration.

Only three days after seizing power, the NLC announced its intentions to return power to an appropriately elected government. In the meantime, however, Nkrumah's Preventive Detention Act was revoked, and the NLC solicited public opinions on governance. During the three years it remained in office, the military governed with the support of a network of advisory committees, numerous commissions, and committees of inquiry. A commission was also created to submit proposals for a constitution under which the nation was returned to civilian administration in 1969. But while the NLC commitment to reestablish constitutional rule may have been impressive, it must be noted that the effort to address national problems through committees and commission was responsible for the emergence of many powerful pressure groups with which the next administration had to contend. Furthermore, under NLC rule, military and police officers were increasingly appointed to public positions hitherto held by civilians—the official politicization of the Ghana Armed Forces had indeed occurred.

The constitution of the second republic was approved in August of 1969. Under this liberal arrangement, the president acted as a ceremonial head of state. The prime minister was the head of government and had the power to select his own ministers. A house

of chiefs was also approved. In all, powers that were hitherto held by the president became broadly distributed. Thus, when the second republic commenced in October 1969, it was agreed by many that a parliamentary democracy had again been established in Ghana.

Elected as prime minister in the 1969 election was K. A. Busia, who also served in the earlier years of the first republic as leader of the opposition United Party (UP). As head of the ruling progress Party (PP), Busia's international acclaim as scholar per excellence as well as his pro-Western leanings were thought to bring external support in solving Ghana's mounting economic problems. Above all, with 105 of the 140 parliamentary seats in PP control, the ruling party was expected to rapidly address national problems. In fact, with democracy reestablished, the public's attention turned to the nation's dire economic conditions which they required the government to address in the shortest possible time.

To create more jobs and open up the private sector to citizens, the government ordered the expulsion of all illegal aliens from Ghana just a month after taking office. American and European creditors were also called upon to consider new arrangements by which Ghana could address its foreign debts. In its efforts to restructure the public sector, the administration purged 568 employees from the civil service. University students, who had enjoyed free tuition and board under Nkrumah's liberal education policy, were also asked to pay for their schooling. In July 1971 the government introduced an austerity budget that called for the removal of benefits but raised taxes. The inability of the government to convince the nation that these were necessary actions led many to question the logic of such policies. Two of the nation's powerful pressure groups, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC), protected the economic actions vehemently. In certain circles, Nkrumah was missed.

In response to the emerging crisis, any direct or indirect mention of Nkrumah and the CPP was outlawed by the administration. Firm actions were also announced to prevent the TUC from protesting the austerity budget by strike actions. While many may have been frustrated or even disappointed by the harsh economic conditions that prevailed in the country, the announcement on January 13, 1972, that the military had seized power took most by surprise. Listing the economic crisis and the decline in benefits for the armed forces as justification, Colonel I. K. Achaempong and his National Redemption Council abolished the constitution of the second republic and began the next phase of military rule in Ghana.

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See also: **Nkrumah, Kwame.**

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Ghana, Republic of: Acheampong Regime to the Third Republic, 1972–1981

On January 13, 1972, Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong toppled the government of Kofi Abrefa Busia. He had been planning a coup six months into the Busia administration. Whatever Acheampong's plan might have been, it was clear that the country, under Busia, was facing major difficulties, including huge foreign debts, shortages of goods, and a declining agricultural sector. Busia's attitude toward the Trade Union Congress and the National Union of Ghanaian Students alienated these groups. Busia cut military personnel and their allowance, and in December 1971 devalued the Ghanaian cedi by 48.6 per cent and imposed a 5 per cent national development levy on the people. Acheampong charged the Busia administration with corruption, arbitrary dismissals, economic mismanagement, and the implementation of policies designed to lower the army's morale.

Acheampong was born in Kumasi on September 23, 1931. He enrolled in the army in March 1959 after officer cadet training at Mons, England. He was the commanding officer of the Fifth Battalion of the Ghana army at the time of the coup. Acheampong's time in office can be divided into the periods 1972–1974 and 1975–1978. Acheampong initially set up the National Redemption Council, which consisted largely of the people who had planned the original coup, but in 1975 he introduced the Supreme Military Council, which was made up of the commanders of the various military services.

The early years of the Acheampong regime proved to be very popular, even though there were people who felt that there was no justification for the coup. During the first phase of his administration he abolished some of the harsh economic measures introduced by the Busia administration. He revalued the cedi and restored some benefits to the military and civil servants. He tried to correct the image of the beggar nation which had been created by the Busia administration. His speech “Yentua” (We won’t pay), which repudiated some of the country’s debts, was well received.

One of Acheampong’s early major achievements included Operation Feed Yourself and Operation Feed your Industries, which were aimed at increasing the production of local food crops like rice and maize and cash crops like rubber, sugar cane, cotton, groundnuts, and cashew. Rice production rose from 11,000 tons in 1971 to 61,000 tons in 1973, and maize production from 53,000 in 1971 to 430,000 tons in 1973. The program died out after 1975, however, when the government was confronted with severe economic difficulties. There was a drop in the export of cocoa, gold, timber, and diamonds, and the low prices the government paid farmers for their cocoa crops led to large-scale smuggling to the neighboring countries of Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. These problems were compounded by the rise of oil prices, droughts, and bush fires.

The country experienced dramatic economic decline two years into the Acheampong regime, and a period of unprecedented corruption ensued. The profiteering, cheating, and corruption that the country witnessed between 1974 and 1979 became known as *kalabule* (from the Hausa “kere kabure,” “keep it quiet”). Chits were issued, especially to young women, who obtained import licenses; they often resold the licenses for over three times the value. These corrupt women who obtained licenses maintained an ostentatious life style. Besides *kalabule*, the country experienced a period of high inflation; the inflation level, which was 10.1 per cent in 1972 rose to 116.5 per cent in 1977. In 1974 the money supply rose by 2.4 per cent and in 1976 by 44.3 per cent. Faced with such a grim economic situation, many Ghanaians, especially academics and professionals emigrated to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Europe, the United States, and other countries. The country also began to experience unprecedented strikes and industrial unrest. Among the most formidable opponents to the government was the People’s Movement for Freedom and Justice, which included leaders like General A. A. Afrifa, William Ofori Atta, and Komla Gbedemah. The Third Force under Dr. J. K. Bilson, and the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship under Kwame Safo-Adu and Victor Owusu also opposed the Acheampong regime.

On September 23, 1976, the Ghana Bar Association met in Kumasi and called for a return to a civilian and

constitutional government no later than 1978. The Bar Association also demanded the abolition of military tribunals and unlawful detentions. It was clear at this point that Acheampong could not hold on to power, and so in January 1977, he proposed a system which he called Union Government (UNIGOV). This government was to be composed of soldiers, policemen and civilians. The army would be dominant, however, and Acheampong would have had a significant role. Despite opposition from students and professional associations, there was civilian support from the organizers’ council, patriots, the African Youth Command, and others. In the vote on Union Government held at the end of March 1978, only 43 per cent of the people voted, and, despite obvious manipulation on the part of the Acheampong regime, there was only a 54 per cent majority voting for the measure.

Massive strikes followed the Union Government vote, and on July 5, 1978, Lieutenant General FWK Akuffo staged a palace coup and forced Acheampong to resign and retire from the military. Akuffo’s government, known as the Supreme Military Council II (SMC II), was doomed from the beginning because the military was totally discredited in the view of the people at this point. The SMC II under Akuffo released people who had been detained during the referendum, but the new government did not have support for UNIGOV and strikes continued. With growing opposition, the government set up a constituent assembly in December 1978 to draw up a constitution and lifted the ban on political parties on January 1, 1979. Akuffo’s SMC II, which included civilians, tried to deal with Ghana’s declining economy. In September 1978 the cedi was effectively devalued by 58 per cent, and in March 1979, new cedi notes replaced the old ones. Although bank accounts were exchanged on the rate of one to one, currency notes were exchanged for a fraction of their value.

From January to March 1979, the constituent assembly drafted a new constitution with an executive president and a 140-member national assembly. Elections were scheduled to be held on June 18, 1979, but on May 15, 1979, there was an attempted mutiny led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings. Rawlings was imprisoned and put on trial for treason, but on June 4, 1979 the lower ranks rebelled, sprang Rawlings from prison, and overthrew Akuffo’s SMC II.

Rawlings set up an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which launched a so-called house cleaning exercise to tackle profiteering and corruption, especially within the military. Eight prominent military men were publicly executed by firing squad, including three former heads of state: Acheampong, Akuffo, and General A. A. Afrifa.

In spite of this, the elections went on as scheduled. The election proved to be a contest between two main

parties, the People's National Party (PNP) and the Popular Front Party (PFP), which had a lot of the United Party (UP) and Progressive Party (PP) tendencies. The PNP under H. Limann won seventy-one seats, and the PFP under Victor Owusu won forty-two seats. The rest of the seats were taken by other smaller parties like the United National Convention, the Action Congress Party, and the Social Democratic Front.

Limann beat his rival Owusu in the election for president on July ninth. On September 24, 1979, Rawlings handed over power to the newly elected government of Hilla Limann, which established the third republic of Ghana. The third republic would be overthrown in twenty-eight months on December 31, 1981, once again by Jerry Rawlings.

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Ghana: Revolution and Fourth Republic, 1981 to Present

On New Year's eve, 1982, Lt. Jerry John Rawlings launched the December 31 Revolution, formed a new government—the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), to replace the PNP (People's National Party)—and vowed to establish a new system of “popular democracy.” To this end, Peoples Defense Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) were formed as the basis for grassroots mobilization programs for development. Rawlings called for a revolution that would transform the social and economic structure of Ghana. Citizens Vetting Committees (CVCs) were set up to probe tax evasion by the rich, corruption in state corporations, banking, and the civil service. Finally, tribunals were set up to provide quick and simple alternatives to the complex and expensive legal system that purportedly served the elite and the rich. On May 15, 1982, the December 31 Women's Movement was founded to involve women and mobilize their support for the revolution.

The PNDC embarked on participatory activities like land clearing, community work, and desilting drainage to mobilize Ghanaians for self-help projects. It also

focused on revenue collection, antismuggling, and anticorruption operations. Various groups—students, radical intellectuals, workers, trade unionists, and farmers—became the vanguard of PNDC support. On the other hand, opposition to the PNDC coalesced around the Ghana Bar Association, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Protestant Christian Council, and a London-based campaign for democracy group who opposed the “revolutionary organs” as facades for extrajudicial dictatorial power.

In 1982–1983 some PDCs and WDCs were accused of acts of terrorism and profiteering. Power to the people in some cases became power to the brutal and violent in society as people used the PDCs and WDCs to settle scores. In addition, there was indiscipline, rowdiness, and arbitrary use of power by soldiers, border guards, and policemen during the early years of the revolution.

The anticorruption, antismuggling stance of the PNDC, and the stress on accountability and probity in public affairs, appealed to students who, in an unprecedented move, offered to help carry cocoa and other agricultural commodities from remote farming communities to the ports for export. In a little over six weeks, hundreds of thousands of bags of cocoa were carted to the Tema port for export. The students also participated in mass education, to educate people about the aims and objectives of the Revolution. The success of the student task force provided a lot of credibility to the government in its first crucial months in office.

In an attempt to alleviate the plight of workers, the PNDC introduced a system of price controls and seized goods of traders who flouted the price control laws. These activities created serious shortages of basic consumer goods, and empty shelves became the most common sight in many department stores. The excessive abuse of power by soldiers and policemen in enforcing price control laws shocked the nation, but the abduction and murder of three high court judges and a retired army major in early July 1982 caused serious consternation. The three judges had apparently undone punishments meted out by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in 1979. The perpetrators were tried, and Amartey Kwei, a PNDC member, was executed in one of the most politically and emotionally charged trials in Ghana.

The initial anti-Western, anti-imperialist rhetoric of the PNDC government gave way in 1982 to negotiations with Western donors. In a period of shortages in foreign exchange, industrial raw materials, basic consumer commodities, hyper inflation and economic stagnation, the PNDC began negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some revolutionary organs such as the June Fourth Movement and the New Democratic Movement were opposed to the size of the devaluation and the nature of the IMF package.

Students also opposed the IMF package, especially since it called for downsizing the whole educational system, a reduction in funding for education, and retrenchment of both academic and nonacademic staff at the universities.

The 1982 Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was designed as a program for reconstruction and development to improve infrastructure and increase production especially in agriculture and industry. The finance secretary, Kwesi Botwey, announced a four-year program of prepricing for imports due to the high domestic cost of production and the over-valuation of the cedi. The ERP was launched in a tough 1983 budget at a time when the economy was crippled by shortfalls in agricultural production due to scanty rainfall, and a gradual desiccation of the Sahel which caused an inflow of immigrants from Sahel into Ghana. The government drew attention to the critical state of the economy, foreign exchange scarcities, an unprecedented drop in export earnings and fall in production, and flooding of the economy by excess money supply about thirty times the amount in circulation. The latter led to a withdrawal of the largest currency denominations, the fifty-cedi note.

In the midst of these crises, professionals and skilled personnel left the country in large numbers, thus exacerbating a problem of brain drain that had started half a decade earlier. The economic problems of the time were exacerbated by the expulsion of about 1.2 million Ghanaians from Nigeria. In spite of ECOWAS protocols, the Shehu Shagari government ordered “illegal immigrants” out of Nigeria, and against a backdrop of transportation problems, oil shortage, and lack of spare parts, the PNDC undertook a two-week repatriation exercise on a scale unprecedented in the nation’s history. Utilizing Ghana Air Force and Airways planes, Black Star Line Vessels, and an armada of haulage trucks, the government repatriated Ghanaians stuck in Nigerian ports and other border crossings between Nigeria and Ghana.

The PNDC also implemented a number of educational reforms designed to make education more socially and economically relevant to the Ghanaian situation. A new education structure “6:3:3:4” years (primary, junior secondary school, senior secondary school, university) was adopted in place of the former “9:7:3” system. However, the piecemeal manner that attended this reform was opposed by faculty, students, the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), and other professional bodies that accused the government of hurriedly implementing the junior secondary school reforms to meet the demands of donor countries like England. Clashes erupted between students protesting against the ad hoc reforms and the security agencies culminating in the closure of the country’s universities.

In 1983 the universities were closed for a year due to confrontations between students and government. In 1986 and 1987 student–government clashes flared up again. The PNDC commissioned a University Rationalization Study as part of its education reform program, and the Committee recommended a new tertiary system of education made up of three groups: universities and university colleges, the polytechnics, and similar institutions (two new universities at Winneba and Tamale subsequently were created). To finance the new system, the URC recommended the privatization and commercialization of some university activities and services: health, sanitary, catering, and transport facilities for students and staff. In addition, student halls were to be converted into self-financing hostels. It also recommended different types of financial support for students, such as scholarships and loan schemes for all students, but the amounts indicated were deemed to be woefully inadequate by students. Universities were closed down and some students were dismissed from the universities for participation in those demonstrations.

The ERP began to yield results as signs of economic recovery began to show in 1984. The government paid higher prices for exports, and inflation fell from 120 per cent in 1983 to 10.4 per cent in 1985. Economic activity was revived in all sectors, especially mining and the timber industry, and the government was able to implement phase two of the economic recovery program: divestiture of state corporations and institutions that were a drain on the economy. This was closely followed by the introduction of “forex bureaus,” a system of weekly auction of foreign exchange, designed to cripple the black market for foreign currency. At the same time the government undertook a major rehabilitation of the communications infrastructure of the country—notably the ports of Tema and Takoradi, major trunk roads, bridges, and railway lines. Tata buses and railway engines and coaches were imported from India to augment public transportation and rail services. A Malaysian company currently holds majority shares in the telephone system in Ghana.

In 1990, when the government paid off in full the \$600 million of foreign exchange arrears that had accumulated before the ERP, Ghana became the “darling boy” of the International Monetary Fund and international donor agencies pledged more money. Cocoa, timber, and mining output all continued to increase. The PNDC also pursued an active policy of diversification of the economy and encouraged the production of non-traditional exports such as banana, pineapples, shea butter, lime, and yam. Unfortunately, life continued to be difficult for the average Ghanaian, and the government launched the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1989 to help with local community initiatives. It later grew to

incorporate supplementary feeding programs for new mothers in remote areas.

The PNDC took steps toward the institutionalization of parliamentary government when it lifted the ban on political activity in 1992. Between May and November, 1992, an array of clubs and friendship societies metamorphosed into political parties: the New Patriotic Party (led by Professor Adu Boahen), the Progressive Alliance (National Democratic Congress, National Convention Party and Egle Party, led by Jerry Rawlings), the NIP (led by Kwabena Darko) and the PHC (led by Hilla Limann). In spite of a report of fairly contested elections on November 2 by observer groups from the Commonwealth, the Carter Center of Emory University, and the Organization of African Unity, the opposition parties accused Rawlings of rigging the elections to secure victory. Thus, the fourth republic was inaugurated amid a cloud of uncertainty.

The NDC continued the program of recovery (ERP II) launched by the PNDC. Mass infrastructure programs have been continued, including road construction, rural electrification, free press (private television, radio and newspapers), and improvements in the transport, telecommunication, and mining sector. The popularity of these projects can be gauged from the fact that, in 1996, Rawlings and the NDC won another general election—a victory the opposition grudgingly conceded. Nevertheless, life continues to be difficult for the average Ghanaian, as school fees are high, health services are expensive, and salaries are low.

EDMUND ABAKA

See also: Rawlings, Jerry John; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Giriama: See Kenya: Mekatilele and Giriama Resistance, 1900–1920.

Globalization, Africa and

Political independence and the formation of nation-states swept the African continent in the 1960s. A central goal of the governments of the new states, and of the handful of previously independent countries, was to implement a development policy that would integrate the national economies into the global system of trade and finance in a manner to foster the structural transformations associated with economic modernization. As this process unfolded through the second half of the twentieth century, one could identify several important themes: (1) attempts to industrialize largely agrarian economies, (2) to reduce dependence on primary products by extending industrialization into the export sector, and (3) via the first two to facilitate national sovereignty in policy making. The last was especially important, both ideologically and practically, because prior to the 1960s most of the continent had been directly or indirectly dominated by colonial powers, which organized and implemented a strategy of integration to the world market designed primarily to serve the needs of those powers.

As the tables on page 584 demonstrate, the levels of development in North Africa and the Sub-Saharan region were quite different. In the mid-1960s the per capita income of the North African countries averaged about 14 per cent of that of the developed market economies (i.e., the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries), while the average for the Sub-Saharan countries was less than 4 per cent. Notwithstanding the higher average level of income and economic development in the North African countries, their degree of industrialization was only slightly higher than the Sub-Saharan average in the 1960s. To varying degrees, governments of the Sub-Saharan countries sought to foster structural change through industrial policy, frequently (and inaccurately) called "import substitution."

Through a combination of import restrictions, partial or complete state ownership, and encouragement of foreign investment, governments attempted to stimulate manufacturing, which had been so singularly underdeveloped during the colonial period. The strategy anticipated a long transitional period during which primary product exports would finance the import of machinery and inputs for manufacturing. If policy were successful, this period would be followed by a shift to manufactured exports as the sector matured and became internationally competitive. From the perspective of the end of the twentieth century, one can judge industrial policy to have been unsuccessful for

the sub-Sahara as a whole. While some progress was made in raising the share of manufacturing in national income through the 1970s, by the 1990s it was only marginally greater than twenty years before. In part this lack of success can be attributed to weaknesses of industrial policy in many countries. Lack of success was also the consequence of a regional shift in the strategy of world market integration in the 1980s. In North Africa a significant increase in industrialization was achieved in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, though not in the oil-exporting countries (Algeria and Libya). The manifest failure of the oil economies in North Africa to use effectively their petroleum revenues to transform their economies was an outcome characteristic of the entire continent (e.g., Cameroon, Gabon, and Nigeria), though in the case of Angola this might be attributed to war rather than economic policy.

Along with unsuccessful industrialization went a failure to diversify exports. In the mid-1960s, 93 per cent of exports from the Sub-Saharan region were primary products (agriculture, mining, and petroleum), and the share hardly changed to the end of the century. For the petroleum exporters of North Africa, the result was the same. In Morocco and Tunisia the primary product share fell below 50 per cent by the end of the 1990s. With these exceptions, at the end of the century the countries of the continent were integrated into the world trading system in much the way they had been at independence.

For the Sub-Saharan countries, along with a failure to achieve structural change of domestic economies went a dependence on official development assistance. In the 1980s and 1990s, "foreign aid" accounted for just over 8 per cent of national income, a percentage considerably more than double that for Latin America and Asia. Because of the higher per capita income of the North African countries, their aid inflows were less, with the exception of Egypt, whose large inflows reflected U.S. geopolitical priorities. While the Sub-Saharan region received relatively low private capital inflows, the region accumulated considerable debt through official flows. From about 5 per cent of export earnings, debt service rose to 13 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s. Because of the concessionary nature of official lending, the level of debt service understated debt accumulation, which by the 1990s had reached 90 per cent of national income.

This debt accumulation reflected an increasing dependence of the Sub-Saharan countries on official development assistance, and an increasing involvement of international agencies in domestic policy formation, both occurring in the context of a general crisis of development in the region. During the 1960s, the per capita income of the Sub-Saharan countries as a whole increased at slightly over 2 per cent per annum. While this was less than for all other developing regions

(including North Africa), it represented an improvement upon performance during the late colonial period. In the 1970s growth rates across the region declined to hardly more than 1 per cent. This decline in growth was associated with falling export earnings, despite a substantial increase in export prices from 1972 through 1981. The slowdown in growth, the result of structural constraints to export expansion in the Sub-Saharan region, overlapped in the early 1980s with the international debt crisis, which primarily affected the Latin American countries. In response to the debt crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank initiated programs of policy-based lending, in which short-term balance of payments support was conditional upon governments adopting a specific set of policy conditionalities (stabilization and structural adjustment programs). These conditionalities involved what came to be called "neoliberal" policies, deregulation of domestic markets, and liberalization of foreign trade.

The problems of the Sub-Saharan region were quite different from those of the highly indebted countries; that is, the former was not characterized by debt insolvency, high inflation, or severe balance of payment disequilibrium. Nonetheless, the IMF and World Bank programs were applied to the region much as they had been designed for the highly indebted countries. By the end of the 1980s, virtually every Sub-Saharan government had entered into policy-based lending with both the IMF and the World Bank, and in several countries policy making was shaped by multilateral conditionality virtually without interruption during the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania). Thus, in the Sub-Sahara, more than any other region, the autonomy of economy policy was constrained by external intervention during these two decades.

The evidence suggests that the stabilization and structural adjustment programs were not successful in rejuvenating growth in the Sub-Saharan countries. After slow per capita growth in the 1970s, incomes fell in the 1980s, and again in the 1990s. On average, per capita incomes in the Sub-Saharan region at the end of the century were approximately at their level of the mid-1960s. To a great extent, falling per capita incomes in the region during the 1980s and 1990s were the result of a severe deterioration in the international terms of trade. From 1981 through 1992, the composite price index of Sub-Saharan exports fell almost 100 per cent compared to the index of imports. The stabilization and adjustment programs were not well designed to cope with such a problem. Trade liberalization, their principal focus in the trade field, if it would stimulate exports at all, would tend to do so for products currently exported, rather than stimulating

new exports. To achieve the latter would require investment expenditures, both by the private and public sectors, to adjust the production structure to changing demand in the world economy. Over the period of policy-based lending the growth rate of investment was negative, an outcome associated with such lending programs in other regions as well.

At the end of the twentieth century, the world economy was quite different from what it had been four decades before, when most African countries gained independence. In terms of trade and financial flows, the continent did not adjust to world market changes. This was especially the case for petroleum-exporting countries. Almost two decades of market-oriented policies across the continent had not, apparently, altered the manner of integration into the world market, either for petroleum exporters or for the other countries. At the end of the century African governments remained in search of a successful strategy of world market integration, in a global context considerably less favorable to their autonomy and development than at the time of independence.

JOHN WEEKS

See also: Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment; Oil; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

Indicators of Development and Integration into the World Economy, the Sub-Sahara, 1960–1997*

Indicator/ decade	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Growth of				
Per Capita Income (PCY)	2.2	1.1	−.7	−.9
PCY as % of Developed Countries	3.4	2.7	2.2	1.6
Manufacturing as % of GDP	7.6	9.3	11.1	10.3
Exports as % of GDP	25.4	26.6	27.7	28.7
Primary Products as % of merch- andise exports	93.1	90.0	88.3	90.3
Foreign Direct Investment As % of GDP	na	.8	.6	1.4
Official Development Aid as % of GDP	na	na	8.1	8.1
Debt Service as % of Exports	na	4.8	13.5	13.0
Debt as % of GDP	na	17.3	44.8	69.8

*South Africa excluded.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999 (CD-ROM)

Indicators of Development and Integration into the World Economy, North Africa, 1960–1997*

Indicator/ decade	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Growth of				
Per Capita Income*	3.0	4.0	1.7	1.0
PCY as 0% of Developed Countries*	13.7	15.7	13.6	8.6
Manufacturing as % of GDP*	10.9	11.2	13.2	17.5
Exports as % of GDP	25.8	30.8	31.0	33.1
Primary Products as % of merchandise exports	77.2	77.0	74.6	64.7
Foreign Direct Investment as % of GDP	na	.4	.8	1.1
Official Development Aid as % of GDP	na	4.8	2.4	3.1
Debt Service as % of Exports*	na	14.8	30.9	29.7
Debt as % of GDP*	na	32.0	63.8	60.0

*No data for Libya.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999 (CD-ROM)

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Gold: Akan Goldfields: 1400 to 1800

A vital segment in the economic history—and even of the political and social history—of what is today Ghana can be conveyed in terms of gold. Though mining for the glittering yellow metal in West Africa is undoubtedly of great antiquity, no one will ever know for certain when the first grains of gold were mined from the hills or gathered from river sands by the people of the Akan forest zone and adjacent savanna regions.

Modern research confirms that gold from the Upper Volta River region was one of the three main sources for the trans-Saharan gold trade from at least the fourteenth century onward; and there is speculation that knowledge of the overland trade and of mining itself could have been brought south to the Akan region in medieval times by Manding peoples from the bend of the Niger. Scattered references in early Portuguese sources provide information on the coastal ports where gold first was traded to Europeans, for example, Axim in the district of Ahanta, Samaa (Shama) in the kingdom of Yabi, and Acomane (Kommnda). In addition, Afuto (Fetu), Fanti, Agonna, and Accra were clearly identified as early gold-exporting coastal towns; but we have scant information on the locations of interior gold mines, let alone details on exactly how the gold was mined, partly because Akan chiefs kept such information secret from interloping adventurers. By the late seventeenth century, as state formation evolved, European travelers were regularly listing Wassa, Denkyera, Akyem, Asante, and Gyaman as the main Akan gold mining kingdoms; but these same sources stated that some gold retrieval took place in almost every Akan state.

The major gold-bearing zone in Ghana begins approximately forty miles inland from the southwestern coast and extends in a rectangular form for about two hundred miles in a northeasterly direction through the heart of the forest zone to the Kwahu Escarpment. Gold in Ghana can be classified according to three main types: (1) alluvial or placer gold; (2) hard rock, also known as lode or vein gold; and (3) subsurface soil and outcrop gold. The most important geological strata are the Birimian and the Tarkwaian, both formed in the Precambrian period; and it is in these strata that the major intrusions of gold have occurred. Of lode or vein gold deposits there were basically two types in Ghana: (a) banket formations and (b) quartz reef formations. Most of the richer banket deposits of the Wassa-Fiase state in southwestern Ghana, particularly Tarkwa and Aboso, were found in one of the basic Tarkwaian substrata known as the Banket Series, whereas the main quartz reef gold formations, found mainly in Asante and also in the Heman-Prestea west of the River Ankobra, derived mainly from the older and deeper Birimian strata. Much of the quartz vein gold existed in a free state and could be easily milled; but some was embedded in sulfide ores which required complex mechanized techniques for separation.

Early European sources attest that the Akan were “a nation of born gold finders”; and recently gathered evidence demonstrates that the search for and mining for gold occupied much more time in the life of Akan men and women in many locales than was formerly recognized by historians. Thus, the main economic pursuits

of the peoples of Wassa in the southwest and of Akyem in the eastern Gold Coast were listed as farming, hunting and fishing, trading, foraging, and gold mining, with the latter predominating. Traditional gold mining tended to be a seasonal activity, with alluvial or placer mining taking place mainly during the rainy season along the seashore and the banks of streams, with pit or reef gold mining concentrated in the dry months of the year between the planting and harvesting seasons, when the water table was low. Akan gold miners were amazingly skilled and inventive. The perfection of gold-finding techniques (one of which was known as “loaming”), the cracking of rock by fire-setting, indigenous development of specialized iron tools, and the digging and reinforcement of deep shafts, with occasional timbering and lagging, were among their many innovations over the centuries. The most common form of mine was the open pit or shaft, dug from the top or side of a hill; and these might assume a variety of shapes and sizes, with some running as deep as 200 feet. There were clear-cut divisions of labor among Akan miners, mainly along lines of sex: underground mining for gold embedded in quartz or banket reefs was almost exclusively a male activity; while panning for river gold, plus pulverization and separation of reef gold in the final stages, were mainly the tasks of women and young girls. Slaves were sometimes used in mining, but mainly as adjuncts to the small family work unit, rather than as the components of a separate and central slave-based mining work force.

Gold mining, and the overland as well as the seaborne gold trades, were also important for state building among the Akan. It is generally recognized that the earliest Akan state was Bono-Manso in the Brong-Ahafo region northwest of Kumase. Early gold mining sites were located near the present-day villages of Bamboi, Jugboi, and Wasipe on the eastern side of the Black Volta River. It was from Bono-Manso that the system of divine kingship and the use of the golden regalia—the sword, the mace and, above all, the royal throne (or stool)—evolved and diffused southward to later developing Akan states. Of the people of the central forest zone who first brought gold dust to Europeans on the coast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the most important were the Accany (the term is almost synonymous with “traders”), who came from the heartland territory known by the same name. And their original homeland, in the basin between the Pra-Offin and Birim Rivers, is generally regarded as the seedbed for southern Akan state formation.

There continues to be some scholarly debate over the degree of involvement and intervention by precolonial Akan kings and chiefs in the actual mining process. The scholarly consensus is that the main connection between mining and the state lay in revenue

collection, and that digging, crushing, and panning were carried on mainly by solitary individuals, or by family labor under direction of the head of household. Kings and chiefs could skim off a portion of the proceeds from family mining, either under the traditional *abusa* share system (a kind of seigniorage) or through a system of corvee, or compulsory labor, in which villages would be expected to work on a certain day of the week or month on behalf of the king or local ruler. In theory all nuggets discovered by miners became the property of the state. The resplendent yellow metal—in the form of ingots, gold dust currency, ornamentation for the ruling class and jewelry for ordinary people—became the touchstone for the commercial wealth, social status, and the measurement for state power among the later great kingdoms of the Akan forest zone, including Akwamu, Denkyera, Wassa, Gyaman, Akyem, and, above all, Asante. Taxes in gold dust on the estates of all deceased persons, court fines and fees on slaves purchased for shipment to the coast, a tax on every subordinate chief paid in proportion to the increase in his gold ornamentation, and a customs duty paid in gold by all traders returning from the coast provided (along with profits from the trade in slaves and kola nuts) the main foundations for the enormous economic surplus of the great Asante kingdom. Added to this were the great sums derived every year from the tributes levied, paid partly in gold, but also in slaves, and other products, imposed on conquered states within the “Greater Asante” Empire.

Any attempt to put forward estimates, either for the gold exports, let alone, annual gold production of the Gold Coast/Ghana during particular centuries, faces innumerable difficulties. Over the years, several scholars have ventured broad estimates on the total amount of gold exported from the Gold Coast since the beginning of the European contact to about 1900. Timothy Garrard, in a conservative reckoning, puts the figure at 9,350,000 ounces from 1871 to 1900, with an average at 21,750 ounces per year. But such figures derive from the customs reports of European importing countries only, and they fail to account for smuggling and the wide variations between bumper years to decades when scarcely any gold exports were reported at the coastal stations. The overseas shipment of gold took a sharp drop in the early 1700s, and the export of slaves replaced it for the remainder of the century as the number one export from the Akan coast. Exports of gold overseas from traditional mining picked up again in 1850 and continued fairly steady until the end of the nineteenth century. As such guesses do not include the immense quantities of gold retained for local internal use, whether as jewelry, as gold dust currency for saving, for the overland trade, or skimmed off as taxation by the state, the annual amount of gold actually

produced by Akan indigenous farmer-miners can never be known.

RAYMOND E. DUMETT

See also: **Akan and Asante; Asante Kingdom.**

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Gold Coast: *See* Ghana (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Administration

Gold: Mining Industry of Ghana: 1800 to the Present

The modern gold industry of the Gold Coast and Asante commenced with the gold boom of 1877–1883, which, although called a European “gold rush,” was in fact orchestrated in large part by a coterie of educated African coastal merchants hoping to attract new capital to a stagnant mid-nineteenth-century West African economy based mainly on the export of palm products. Three of the African leaders of these pioneering efforts at mechanized mining were Ferdinand Fitzgerald, Dr. James Africanus Horton, and most importantly W. E. “Tarkwa” Sam, a trained mining engineer, known as the father of the Ghanaian mining industry. Unfortunately, mechanized mining during these pioneering decades was plagued by a number of difficulties, including poor sanitary and health conditions, for both Africans and Europeans, rudimentary extraction machinery, lack of engineering skills, inexperienced management, insufficient capital, and inadequate support by the colonial government. Transportation was the main problem. Until 1900, huge machines weighing several tons had to be fragmented into sections of 100 to 200 pounds for conveyance forty to fifty miles up-country by a combination of canoe transport up the Ankobra River and human portage overland. Out of some thirty-seven registered companies, ten engaged in active mining operations, and just three produced substantial quantities of gold. Until 1898 successive British governments refused to fund railways on grounds of expense. The result was frequent breakage and extreme malfunction of those machines that even reached their destinations.

The decision of the British imperial government to build a railway from the port of Sekondi northward

to the mining centers of Tarkwa (Wassa state) in 1901, to Obuasi in Asante in 1903, and to Prestea in 1910 constituted major turning points in the creation of a modern mining industry. Establishment of this modern transport infrastructure, which made possible the installation of the most up-to-date heavy machinery, was followed by a second gold rush and speculative investment euphoria, known as the “jungle boom,” even greater than that of twenty years earlier. As early as 1901, some thirty-three companies had exhibited an interest in as many as 2,325 separate concessions in the Gold Coast and Asante. By 1904 at the end of the boom a total of 3,500 concessions had been leased out to more than 200 companies, with a total invested capital of over four million pounds sterling. The main beneficiary of the government railway was the giant Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC), founded by Edwin A. Cade and Frederick Gordon, with strong backing from London investors. During its peak years of twentieth-century production, the AGC returned over eight ounces of gold for every ten tons of ore that was excavated.

Gold production for all the mines of the Gold Coast and Asante remained high and steady from 1905 through 1919 with an average of 300,149 ounces valued at £1,275,070 per year. The major decline and slowdown came less during the two world wars than in the 1920s. Total gold output accelerated again in the early 1930s, owing to a fall in the gold price of the major world currencies. Gold Coast production reached its highest levels in the first four years of World War II, when there was a heavy demand for gold for a wide variety of uses related to war-related production. From 1930 to 1950, gold production averaged 557,519 ounces, valued at £2,363,529 per annum for all mines. During this same twenty year period, the size of the Gold Coast African mines labor force grew from 7,165 in 1930–1931 to 31,072 personnel. Of this total, about 50 per cent were recruited from the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and the neighboring French colonial territories of Upper Volta and Côte d’Ivoire. With this expansion came trade union organization.

The modern organizational structure of gold mining in Ghana dates from the 1960s when, following Ghana’s independence in 1957, a majority of Ghana’s gold mines—with the notable exception of Ashanti Goldfields—having become unprofitable operations, were absorbed into the new Ghana State Mining Corporation. In 1969 the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was taken over by the Lonrho Group, a major multinational conglomerate. Subsequently, a joint management agreement was reached between the AGC and the Ghana government concerning direction, investment strategies, development, and the distribution of profits.

RAYMOND E. DUMETT

See also: **Ghana: Nationalism, Rise of, and the Politics of Independence; Gold: Production and Trade: West Africa.**

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Gold: Production and Trade: West Africa

Gold was an important staple in the trans-Saharan trade. The lure of gold spurred the Portuguese exploration down the African coast. But long before the Portuguese began exploring, gold from West Africa had reached Europe and the Middle East through the trans-Saharan trade. The exact location of gold mines often remained a secret, because middlemen tried to prevent foreigners from reaching them. Gold and gold mining were also traditionally associated with legend and myth. For example, when Mansa Musa (1312–1337), the ruler of the Sudanese kingdom of Mali, visited Egypt, he described two plants in his country whose roots contained pure gold.

Although gold from West Africa had reached Europe and the Middle East for centuries, its flow from West Africa dramatically increased from the middle of the eighth century. From the eighth century until the



Lobi women washing for gold, southwest Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), 1930s. This work was done entirely by women, each of whom was paid one franc per day. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

twelfth century, most of the gold coming from West Africa remained in the Muslim world. In the centuries before 1200, Western Europe had abandoned gold as the basis for its currency, as most of the gold at the time had been drained through an adverse balance of trade with the East. However, from the second half of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century, European countries returned to the gold standard, and the demand for, as well as the volume of gold, once more increased.

Gold from West Africa came from four principal fields: Bambuhu, between the Senegal and the Faleme Rivers, Bure on the Upper Niger, Lobi, southeast of the Bure fields, and the Akan gold fields in present-day Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

The Bambuhu fields were mined when Ghana was at its apogee. The king of Ghana ruled that gold nuggets found in the mines of his country should be reserved for him and his people could have only the gold dust.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries Sudanese traders ventured south and opened the Bure gold fields. This shift of gold sources in effect coincided with the decline of Ghana. Ghana had actually controlled the gold fields, but it turned out that whenever the area of production was conquered and controlled, gold production in the area declined or stopped completely.

The rise of Mali in the thirteenth century was associated with the development of the Bure gold fields. The king of Mali did not control the gold fields, however, for fear that gold production would be interrupted. Mali was content to extract tribute from the gold-bearing regions. It was gold from this region that the Mali ruler Mansa Musa (1312–1337) distributed on a lavish scale during his pilgrimage to Mecca. Mansa Musa reputedly arrived in Egypt with camels loaded with gold bars and bags of gold dust. He spent and gave away so much gold that it depressed the currency exchange for twelve years.

The kings of the Songhay Empire, which was further away from the Bure and Akan gold fields, did not control the production of gold either, but they too benefited from the gold passing through their empire.

The gold that was produced and traded in West Africa was also used as currency in the commercial centers of north Africa and the western Sudan. Even in the sixteenth century, commercial centers such as Jenne and Timbuktu continued using gold as currency for larger transactions. Before the fifteenth century, gold and the production of gold were in the hands of Africans and African merchants.

When the Portuguese arrived on the west African coast during the fifteenth century, they sought to secure a share of the gold trade that had previously reached Europe through the north African ports on the Mediterranean Sea. In 1448 the Portuguese built a fort at

Arguin, hoping that it might divert some of the trans-Saharan gold trade to the adjacent African coast, but very little gold flowed to that trading post. When Portugal reached the area of Senegambia in the 1450s, it was able to secure some gold coming mainly from the gold fields of Bure and Bambuhu. In fact, it was their interest in gold that led the unsuccessful effort by the Portuguese to interfere in the affairs of the Jolof by attempting to unseat Bumi Jelen as their ruler in the late fifteenth century. The Portuguese interest in gold further led them to establish the first European post in the African interior, in Bambuhu, in the sixteenth century. The English also advertised the Gambia region as the source of the gold trade in the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the French focused their trading plans on the Senegal on both gold and slaves.

In 1471 when the Portuguese reached the Gold Coast, Mande merchants were already active in the area and the Portuguese found themselves competing with the Mande for the gold from the Akan gold fields. Despite the presence of the Mande, the Portuguese did profitable business in gold and maintained a monopoly on this trade for one hundred and fifty years, until they were dislodged by the Dutch. Their desire to protect the gold trade led the Portuguese to build the Elmina castle. Not only did the Portuguese build a castle, they also brought slaves from the area of Benin to the Gold Coast to work in the mines.

Annual Portuguese gold exports from the Akan gold fields between 1481 and 1521 are estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 ounces. There was, however, a drastic decline after 1550. Gold mining was a peacetime activity, and the competition from the slave trade and the method of procuring slaves no doubt affected gold exports. Export volume was further affected when most of the alluvial layer was exhausted and deep mining was required. In the Akan area, it was clear by the second decade of the eighteenth century that the so-called Gold Coast had become primarily concerned in slave trading. Gold exports declined after 1550 and did not recover until the middle of the nineteenth century.

EDWARD REYNOLDS

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Goré: See Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Goré, and Rufisque.

Gore-Browne, Stewart (1890–1967)

Politician

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne was one of the most important settler politicians in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). He led the white Legislative Council between 1939 and 1946, and represented African interests in the Legislative Council until 1951. He was a firm believer in the African nationalist cause, as evidenced by his sponsorship of legislation favorable to Africans.

Gore-Browne was active in settler politics, but with a keen interest in the affairs of the African population. When he was elected to the Legislative Council, he immediately demonstrated a clear understanding of the Africans, especially those in the rural areas. He was opposed to racial segregation and championed the cause for cooperation between the races in the running of the country as early as the late 1930s. It was on the basis of these views that, in 1938, he was selected to represent African interests in the council. Gore-Browne used his new position to initiate the creation of Urban Courts and African Advisory Councils, first on the Copperbelt and later in the rest of the urban areas of the country. The African Advisory Councils gave Africans in Northern Rhodesia an opportunity to participate in local urban politics.

He learned to speak *iciBemba* very well and was therefore able to communicate with the local people in the Northern Province. This gave him the advantage of being able to discuss problems and political issues with Africans in a language they understood. He also ensured that Europeans listened to educated Africans as well as African chiefs. Because of his position as representative for African interests in the Legislative Council, and also because of his interest in the affairs of Africans, he often spoke to African Welfare Societies and deliberately encouraged the development of nationalist movements. He genuinely sought to integrate the two nations while fighting against the oppression of Africans. Throughout his political career he worked for a steady increase in African political, social and economic rights.

Although he was considered a friend of Africans and one who understood them, he sometimes made mistakes and proposed ideas which were opposed by Africans. In 1948 he proposed the partition of Northern Rhodesia into an African-controlled area and a European area. His argument was that Africans would attain self-rule in their area without European opposition. The idea was not acceptable to Africans because the proposed African area was the lesser developed, while the

European area included the Copperbelt and other areas along the line of rail. His proposal angered African nationalists who saw him as serving European interests. Undoubtedly, Gore-Browne was inspired by the existing white rule in Southern Rhodesia. African nationalists, including Kenneth Kaunda, condemned his attitude. African nationalists at a meeting in July at Munali School confirmed their opposition to the renomination of Gore-Browne as representative for African interests in the Legislative Council.

Yet Gore-Browne was usually in conflict with Europeans because of his desire to see African self-rule in Northern Rhodesia. Europeans who favored amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia were not happy with his call for African self-rule. Gore-Browne found himself in a position where neither the African nationalists nor European settlers were happy with him. He further alienated African nationalists when he called for African self-rule within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. His support for the creation of the federation, which he believed to be a compromise that would help both races, made African suspicious of his motives.

In 1961 Gore-Browne officially joined the United National Independence Party (UNIP), led by Kenneth David Kaunda, who was to become the first president of the Republic of Zambia. As a member of UNIP, in April 1962 he accompanied Kaunda to New York where Kaunda delivered a speech to the United Nations' Commission on Colonialism. When Legislative Council elections were called for October 1962, he stood on a UNIP ticket but was not elected despite African support. As Zambia was approaching independence, Gore-Browne was again very close to African nationalists, especially given that he was one of few European settlers who officially joined the nationalist party.

Gore-Browne remained in Zambia after independence until his death on August 4, 1967. President Kaunda declared a state funeral for Gore-Browne in honor of his support for the African nationalist cause.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation, 1953–1963; Zambia: Nationalism, Independence.**

Biography

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne (1890–1967) was born into an upper-class British family in Great Britain. He first came to Northern Rhodesia in 1911 as an army officer with the joint Anglo-Belgian Commission, which set the Congo-Rhodesian border. After the commission's work he returned to Britain, but in 1921 he returned to Northern Rhodesia and started a farm at Shiwa

Ng'andu in the northern part of the country among the Bemba people. As a wealthy landowner, he married Lorna Goldman, with whom he had two daughters. Together in the late 1920s and early 1930s, they developed the estate at Shiwa Ng'andu. They divorced in 1950. Gore-Browne died in Zambia on August 4, 1967.

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
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Great Lakes Region: Growth of Cattle Herding

Cattle herding was to become one of the major social divides in the later kingdoms of the Great Lakes region, and the supposed basis for twentieth-century rivalries between Tusi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi and Hima and Iru in southwestern Uganda.

The evidence for the origins of cattle herding in the Great Lakes region is meager. Livestock had definitely been introduced to East Africa by 2000BCE, and many sites have been excavated in the Rift Valley, being given the name of the (Savanna) Pastoral Neolithic. These were stone tool and pottery-using societies, which maintained both smaller livestock and cattle.

In the entire Great Lakes Region itself, prior to 1000, the evidence for livestock is restricted to two sites from Rwanda, associated with Urewe pottery, with unspecified finds of cattle teeth. This absence is partially an issue of bone preservation. Histories based on the comparative linguistics of the region do shed considerably more light on the issue. The initial iron- and pottery-using, Bantu-speaking farmers, who emerged from the forests to the west in the first millennium BCE, would not have had access to either cattle or grain agriculture. It is no coincidence that the Urewe settlement is confined to the forested margins of Lake Victoria and the highlands of the Western Rift. While sites with Urewe pottery represent virtually the only



The Great Lakes region, c. 1800.

archaeologically recognized phenomena for this time period, comparative linguistics indicate that the drier interior areas, termed the Karagwe Depression, would have been inhabited by stone tool-using pastoralists, speaking both Sudanic and Cushitic languages. Most notably, the words for cattle, sorghum, and finger millet in Great Lakes Bantu languages today can all be demonstrated to have either Sudanic or Cushitic origins. The linguistic record further indicates that in the ensuing 1,000 years of contact, up to around the year 500, these societies assimilated into a single society with a multilingual base.

From around 800 there are radical changes apparent in the linguistic record. Shifts of population are evident with major relocations in the drier interior grasslands. New terminologies for political authority indicate that there were also developments toward more centralized leadership, based on health and ritual healing. Most significantly, there is an “explosion” of terms associated with specialized cattle herding. In particular, these represent a proliferation of terms used to differentiate horn shapes, skin colors, and skin patterns; elements that are key in the emphasis and maintenance of recent pastoralist culture. The linguistic record indicates that this development of pastoralist tendencies came from within the Great Lakes region and were not the product of a migration or invasion by pastoralists from far to the north. For instance, all the new terms for describing cattle have demonstrably Great Lakes Bantu roots.

Archaeological evidence for these developments has been derived from the site of Ntusi, southwestern Uganda. From 1000 to 1400 a large settlement flourished

at this site. The animal bone remains recovered from throughout the occupation of the site indicate a uniform preference for cattle over small livestock and wild animals, with between 80 and 90 per cent of assemblages comprising cattle. Furthermore, mortality profiles for these cattle, based on tooth eruption and wear and on long-bone fusion criteria, indicate that the assemblages are dominated by young animals, suggesting large herds and relatively sophisticated livestock management strategies. While this archaeological data clearly indicates a new habitation of the central grasslands—and there is a uniform change in pottery use throughout the Great Lakes region associated with this new settlement—these changes can be interpreted as representing radical changes in political and economic structures rather than a simple migration into the region of a new population. Importantly, the occupation of Ntusi is not simply pastoralist; it also had a visible and extensive agricultural contribution. This is evidenced by grain-harvesting knives, grinding stones, storage pits, and by pottery that can be directly associated with the cooking of grains. Most notably, one location at Ntusi appears to have been a livestock enclosure associated with several houses, but also storage pits, grinding stones, and harvesting knives. Furthermore, 33 per cent of the pottery assemblage recovered from this location can be associated with grain preparation. What this evidence indicates is that in the fourteenth century, agriculture and cattle-herding were still in association at the household level, and that the exclusive and specialized pastoralism, and therefore the pastoral elites, of the later kingdoms had not yet emerged.

On the basis of this archaeological evidence it can be argued that gender roles would also have changed, with the emphasis on cattle herding leading to a lessening of female contribution to select household economies. This suggestion is further strengthened by the evidence for altered gender roles and values that appear at this time in the linguistic record. Such gender relations culminated in the total exclusion of women from pastoralist production.

These conclusions on political authority and social divisions concur with recent revisions of history based on oral traditions. These revisions emphasize the late development of kingdoms from chiefdoms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the formalization of social divisions, in part based on economic practice. It is from these times that pastoralist ideologies will have emerged, establishing the ethnic differences between pastoralists and agriculturalists and promoting exclusive pastoralist diets. These ideologies would also have helped to formulate new constructions of history which projected the authority of cattle-keepers into the past.

The association between cattle keeping and political authority is well demonstrated at two later archaeological

sites. Both Bweyore, a seventeenth- and nineteenth-century Nkore capital, and Ryamurari, an eighteenth-century Ndorwa site, consist of a main enclosure with large middens ringing their lower edges and with smaller enclosures radiating out from these centers. Each enclosure clearly emulated a cattle kraal, and the animal bone from the sites appears to have been dominated by cattle remains. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the kings who inhabited such capitals ultimately stood above the pastoralist-agriculturalist divide and in their rituals emphasized both livestock and agriculture.

Thus, the combined archaeological, linguistic and historical evidence currently suggests that the growth of cattle herding was a gradual process, which took place over a long period of time and which had its roots within the Great Lakes region.

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Great Lakes Region: Karagwe, Nkore, and Buhaya

Karagwe, Nkore, and Buhaya formed small neighboring states to the major kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda in the Great Lakes region. Karagwe and Nkore were individual polities, while Buhaya refers to an area along the western side of Lake Victoria in which seven small states were recognized: Kiamutwara, Kiziba, Ihangiro, Kihanja, Bugabo, Maruku, and Missenye.

Although this entry only deals with the period up to the end of the eighteenth century, it is essential to recognize that the earlier histories of these polities and the detail with which they have been recorded are a direct product of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history and the circumstances which befell them. Nkore (Ankole in

colonial times) found itself within the British Protectorate of Uganda and became a cornerstone of Protectorate policy, being one of the four main kingdoms and enjoying a considerably enlarged territorial status under the Protectorate than it had done in precolonial times. It was also served well by various missionaries, ethnographers, anthropologists, and historians. Buhaya was moderately well served, partly through expedient politics in the early colonial era and the siting of the regional colonial administrative center in Bukoba. By contrast, Karagwe fell from being one of the most powerful of the nineteenth century states in the Great Lakes, a position it had largely attained through its domination of early Indian Ocean–Great Lakes trade routes, to total collapse and obscurity by 1916. Writers on Karagwe have been sporadic and have failed to provide the rich array of texts that are available for Nkore, its northern neighbor. In independent Tanzania, under Nyerere, there was little place for such overtly unequal, precolonial political formations.

Not surprisingly, the earliest farming settlements appeared in the wet coastal littoral of Buhaya, on the western shores of Lake Victoria. Archaeological research has indicated extensive activity, most notably in terms of iron smelting, from the last few centuries BCE. These societies exploited the extensive rainforests that were available at the time and, after initial cultivation of yams and other forest crops, presumably became proficient in the exploitation of bananas. Linguistic and archaeological evidence in Karagwe and Nkore on the other hand, indicates occupation around the beginning of the second millennium, based upon the increasing exploitation of cattle, supported by grain crops. From these bases, the core elements of the polities undoubtedly developed, although there is little evidence, as yet, to document the process.

The actual origins of the dynasties that came to dominate are also unclear, being dependent on the interpretation of oral traditions. At face value, in all areas, dynasties claimed origin back to the Cwezi persona, Wamara. Subsequently, power fell into the hands of Ruhinda, and descent was directly drawn to him by many of the royal clans, known as Abahinda. Reinterpretations of these oral traditions suggest that characters such as Wamara and Ruhinda may well have been charismatic chiefs, who, after their deaths, became important spirits controlled by mediums tied to political power. Shrines to Wamara and Ruhinda were specifically associated with the manipulation and control of fertility.

A further integral component of these polities was clans. Each polity was an amalgamation of clans, and each clan contributed important components to the polity. Clans involved in the polity at an earlier stage tended to be regarded with a higher status. Clans were also associated with specialized activity, such as cattle-herding,

iron-smelting, and regulating rituals. The royal clan sat atop this confederation and carefully maintained the status quo, by allocating particular offices to specific clans and by accepting wives for the king from the different clans. Thus, the mother of the king and her clan were very powerful in each individual reign, and this power helps to explain the regularity of succession disputes revealed by oral traditions. Particularly in drier Karagwe and Nkore, there was also an increasing importance in the distinction between cattle-herding Bahima and farmers. In later years, these economic pastimes became almost mutually exclusive and were the foundations of class formation. It is significant, however, that although kings generally leaned toward pastoralism as an ideal lifestyle, even in the later centuries the king stood above the cattle–agriculture dichotomy, practicing rituals which were integral to both economic forms. Most notably, every month kings conducted the New Moon rituals which ensured the fertility of the land and the fecundity of cattle. Furthermore, at least some kings were also regarded as iron smiths (but not smelters). The best-known example of this was the incorporation of iron-working hammers into the royal regalia of Karagwe, generally associated with *Omukama* Ndagara in the early nineteenth century.

These fairly simplistic reconstructions, of course, mask the major tensions and conflicts that existed within these states. An insight into such political intrigue has been provided by the historical work focusing on the Kaijja shrine, within the Maruku kingdom, twenty kilometers south of Bukoba. The site is the *gashani*, or jaw-bone shrine, of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century king, Rugomora Mahe, who is said to have occupied the site and to have overseen iron-working there. The site is also an important shrine to the Cwezi spirit, Wamara. All the Buhaya states record a change from Hinda to Bito rulers around the seventeenth century, referring to the extension of Bito dynastic influence from Bunyoro. Significantly, Rugomora Mahe was an early Bito ruler, and his association with the shrine is interpreted as an integral part of the ritual conflict between Hinda followers and their spirits, and the new Bito rulers. At broadly similar times oral traditions in Karagwe and Nkore record incursions and even lengthy occupations by forces from Bunyoro, but emphasize ultimate victory over the invaders.

In Nkore, it has been possible to identify sites associated with political authority, extending several centuries back into the past. The locations of these sites indicate that the early core Nkore area was in a restricted highland area, Isingiro, twenty kilometers south of the modern center of Mbarara. The suggestion is therefore that these were initially very localized political formations, some of which gradually expanded. Military power was initially realized in terms of numbers.

The Buhaya states were all small and do not appear to have had a significant military capability. Karagwe does appear to have had military strength, and this may have been due to its greater population size. Nkore, from its small base, does not appear to have had expansionist pretensions, or more importantly, capability, until key changes in its military organization. The creation of permanent levies of troops, known as *Emitwe*, allowed both the conquest of territory such as Mpororo and Buhweju and also the protection of its increasing herds from powerful neighbors to the north.

It is important to emphasize that, in their early stages, all these polities were small and vulnerable. In particular, they appear to have been susceptible to succession disputes, which seem to have been the main cause of conflict. More detailed histories of significant changes in structure and organization only really begin to emerge toward the end of the eighteenth century, when some polities started looking beyond their frontiers for new territories and resources to control.

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See also: Buganda: To Nineteenth Century; Bunyoro; Nyerere, Julius; Uganda: Colonial Period: Administration, Economy.

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Great Lakes Region: Kitara and the Chwezi Dynasty

The Chwezi are an enigmatic people, their legacy marked by a blend of myth and history. Their legends are so well woven and compelling as to make them seem authentic, yet the little available evidence, at least at this time, does not seem to bear out the historical myths that surround them.

The Chwezi are legendary figures said to have ruled over a vast empire known as Bunyoro-Kitara in the interlacustrine region of East Africa, with a short-lived dynasty lasting from 1350 to 1500. This empire is thought to have covered the territory extending from Bunyoro in western Uganda, as delineated by the southern banks of the Nile, to the central Nyanza district of Kenya among the Wanga people. Then, within the north-south latitudes, the empire is said to have stretched from the Albert Nile in the north covering all the Sesse Islands and then on to the kingdoms of northwestern Tanzania of Ukerewe, Usukuma, Karagwe, as well as Rwanda and Burundi to the southwest of Uganda and finally into the Mboga region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In some sources, writers have even argued that Bunyoro-Kitara could have covered the whole of modern Uganda and parts of southern Sudan.

Many theories have been advanced, all attempting to establish the identity and nature of the Chwezi. They are said to have been of a relatively light complexion and to have arrived from "the north." Some writers have described the Chwezi as having been of Caucasian stock, an off-shoot of Caucasian Egyptians, who had sailed up the Nile into the interlacustrine region, especially into Bunyoro and Buganda. Some of these claims mesh well with explorer Hannington Speke's "hamitic hypothesis" of a highly civilized Caucasian group which colonized the blacks of Central Africa and set up the well-organized interlacustrine kingdoms, which the early explorers encountered in the nineteenth century. However, this hypothesis has been discredited since the 1970s.

For the origins of the Chwezi, legend provides a link between the Chwezi and the Batembuzi rulers through Nyinamwiru, a daughter of Bukuku from the Batembuze period. This tradition mentions a dynasty of only three Chwezi kings. These were Ndahura, his half-brother Mulindwa, and his son Wamara. The Chwezi took over the kingdom from equally mystical figures, the Batembuze (pioneers), through a matrilineal connection, the mother of Ndahura having been a Mutembuzi clanswoman, daughter of Bukuku from the Batembuze period.

A dynasty with three rulers (two brothers and a son) could only cover two to three generations, covering perhaps fifty or sixty years at most of Chwezi rule. Yet oral tradition has claimed a period of about 250 years for the Chwezi's rule. This is not possible; the available facts simply do not match the claimed time span.

The end of the Chwezi rule over Bunyoro-Kitara, which occurred around 1500, is as unclear as the beginning. Legend conveniently explains that the Chwezi simply "disappeared" from Bunyoro-Kitara because of a bad omen that had been cast against them. However,

not wanting to leave a political vacuum, they sent word to descendants of Kyomya (a Muchwezi) with Nyatwor, a Mukidi woman, to come to Bunyoro-Kitara and “take over the kingdom of their Batembuze forefathers.” These descendants were the Babiito who, we now know, are of Lwo origin, from across the Nile River in Acholiland and Lango.

The Palwo of Pawir in the Karuma falls area (Otada, or Sir Samuel Bakers’ BaChopi), who are unmistakably Lwo, have direct ethnic links with the Babiito of Bunyoro. The Palwo Babiito themselves belong to the Lobiito clan. Both families in Bunyoro and Karuma (Otada) participate in each other’s royal installation ceremonies and cannot complete their own rituals without the participation of the other.

The turbulent years of Amin rule in Uganda adversely affected research in all fields. The history of Uganda has therefore not been revised or reassessed in light of new evidence since the hotchpotch reconstructions of the colonial administrator-cum-missionary-cum-anthropologists from a mixture of myth and fiction. Many of these imaginative reconstructions have already been recycled into “historical traditions” and are being passed on as part of authentic oral tradition. Bunyoro-Kitara history is similarly riddled with many such untested hypotheses.

A number of sites such as Kibengo, Kagogo, Kansonko, Bigo bya Mugenyi, and Mubende Hill all in western Uganda have been named as centers of Bachwezi’s power. Chwezi are said to have lived and ruled from Bigo bya Mugenyi, a two-square-kilometer earthworks site in Mawogola county, near Masaka. There is, however, no evidence to support the presence of a powerful monarchy at Bigo bya Mugenyi, apart from the earthworks, the constructors of which must have had access to vast labor reserves. Many archaeologists working in the region have been seriously questioning the authenticity and existence of the Chwezi.

The Chwezi’s mysterious departure and the seemingly peaceful takeover of their kingdom by the Babiito is also suspect. Popular rulers, as we are told the Chwezi were, normally simply do not up and leave without resisting or being defended by their loyal subjects. But present Bunyoro traditions strongly support this peaceful withdrawal. It is a version which proves that the current Babiito rulers of Bunyoro were the natural inheritors of the Chwezi kingdom, a convenient justification or legal charter of their take over of Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom.

The reality of the Chwezi is apparent today in the Chwezi cult, *Embandwa*, a spirit possession cult. The *Embandwa* cult has a pantheon of gods including Mugasa, Mulindwa, Wamala, and Ndahura. These are now recognized, revered, and accepted in the entire Lake Victoria littoral and in the lake archipelago. People in these areas have always sought—and still seek—assistance for various ailments and wishes from these

powerful gods through a number of spirit mediums. Some of these mediums are resident at specific shrine locations, others are constantly itinerant, while some ordinary people in western Uganda, northwestern Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi occasionally suffer possession by these Chwezi *embandwa*.

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Great Lakes Region: Ntusi, Kibiro, and Bigo

Large archaeological sites have been recognized in western Uganda since the beginning of the twentieth century. These sites, which in some cases feature extensive ditch systems, were associated with oral traditions relating to Bacwezi—variously recognized as spirits, heroes, or historical characters—and in particular the sites were linked with the now discredited construct of the Bacwezi Empire. More recent archaeological work, in combination with revisions of history derived from oral traditions, indicates the importance of examining the archaeological record separately from other sources and generating robust archaeological constructs before comparing the diverse results.

Archaeological survey and excavation now show that the area in which these sites are found was not previously occupied by the early farming Urewe tradition. All of these sites are associated with roulette-decorated pottery which appeared at around or slightly before 1000. This new pottery tradition seems to have been widely adopted across the entire Great Lakes region but can be interpreted as reflecting a new organization of society rather than a migration of a new population into the region, an interpretation consistent with the reconstruction of history based on comparative linguistics.

The earliest of these new sites for which comprehensive evidence has been produced is Ntusi. Radiocarbon dates from the site indicate occupation between 1000 and 1400. The site covers an area of one square kilometer.

Although it is impossible at present to determine how much of the site was occupied at any one point in time, excavations suggest that many parts of the site were occupied in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Archaeological survey of the Mawogola area, immediately around Ntusi, revealed the presence of numerous smaller sites. The size difference implies a hierarchy resulting from political dominance of Ntusi over its hinterland. The range of located sites suggests a comparatively small polity with centralized power but little administrative delegation of this power to local centers. The polity has therefore been interpreted as a small chiefdom.

All the Mawogola sites reveal a preponderance of cattle in the animal bone remains recovered. The outlying sites and certain locations at Ntusi itself are interpreted as cattle enclosures. Furthermore, mortality profiles of these remains indicate that the majority of animals slaughtered were very young, suggesting the presence of large herds and relatively sophisticated herd management strategies. An important component at all sites is also, however, evidence for agriculture. Grinding stones, storage pits, harvesting knives, and pottery damaged in cooking grain, all testify to the considerable significance of agriculture in the subsistence economy.

Best known of the western Ugandan sites are those with ditch networks. There are three principal sites in this category: Bigo, Munsa, and Kibengo. Bigo was investigated in the late 1950s. It comprises a network of ditches extending more than ten kilometers in length across several hillsides on the southern side of the Katonga River, only thirteen kilometers north of Ntusi. The radiocarbon dating for the site is problematic but suggests occupation in the fifteenth or sixteenth century and later. The features and artifacts produced in the excavations were little understood at the time but begin to make more sense in the light of recent archaeological work. The economy appears to be similar to that at Ntusi, with a mixture of cattle herding and agriculture.

Recent work has concentrated on the other two earthwork sites, Munsa and Kibengo. These two sites are situated in wetter terrain to the north and northwest of Bigo. Both sites again indicate a mixture of herding and grain agriculture in their subsistence strategies. Extensive excavation at Munsa has revealed that the main hilltop, around which the ditches concentrate, saw a range of different activities from 1200 to 1500. These activities include extensive burials, an iron-smelting furnace, and a huge pit, possibly for centralized grain storage. This careful work at Munsa indicates that there are likely to have been complex histories at all sites, which are unavailable to us due to the limitations of radiocarbon dating.

In all three cases the ditch networks remain enigmatic. They are clearly not simple defensive systems,

since there are many points of ingress and often the inside bank of the ditch is markedly lower than the outside. The ditches, which are up to four meters in depth, may have been designed to keep cattle in, or alternatively to keep cattle or wildlife, such as elephants, out, possibly to protect crops. When freshly dug into the bright red subsoil, the ditches stand out very clearly within the well-vegetated green landscape. No doubt this visual impression was important. It is also worth noting that at Kasonko, six kilometers northeast of Bigo, a ditch system was created around a hilltop that has no obvious archaeological deposits, and so these sites were not always occupied. There is, therefore, little that can be said definitively about these earthworks. It has been noted that Kibengo, Munsa, and Bigo are located roughly equidistant from one another, approximately fifty kilometers apart, which suggests competing centers of similar influence. Again, the archaeological interpretation has been that these sites represent the centers of small chiefdoms that flourished and then disappeared prior to the kingdoms which arose later in the millennium. Elements of ritual and authority also seem to have been an important component at these centers.

A very different kind of site has been examined at Kibiro, on the shores of Lake Rwitanzige (Albert). Historically, Kibiro has been an important salt-producing center, and salt is still produced there today. Salt production is self-sustaining since it relies on salt-bearing springs saturating soil marked off in "gardens," water being poured through this soil, and finally the solution being boiled and reduced. Archaeological investigations have indicated that there has been continuous settlement at the site since the thirteenth century. Given that Kibiro lies in the rain shadow beneath the imposing escarpment of the east side of the lake, crop production is as unlikely to have been possible in the past as it is today. It is therefore likely that from the very beginnings of the settlement, apart from lake fish, communities would have been dependent on trading salt to acquire their subsistence needs.

Historical work has suggested that precolonial markets in the Great Lakes region would have featured trade in a wide range of produce including iron, salt, pottery, barkcloth, dried bananas, and grain. While many of these products are not likely to be preserved on archaeological sites, some early evidence for trade and exchange can be adduced. On a grand scale, the settlements at Ntusi and Kibiro represent populations moving into previously marginal areas and exploiting new forms of resources—cattle and salt—both of which would ultimately have required support from societies in other parts of the region. The presence of trade is also indicated by the recovery of glass Indian Ocean trade beads at Ntusi, Kibiro, Munsa, and Bigo and cowrie shells at Ntusi and Kibiro. These items are present in small

quantities and they do not indicate direct contact between the Great Lakes region and the coast. Rather they can be seen as a testament to the attractive power of the Great Lakes markets, sucking in items from distant locations.

These archaeological sites therefore confirm that important advances in the regional political economy had occurred by the middle of the second millennium, with both the development of chiefdoms and the flourishing of trade and exchange. These conclusions tally well with reconstructions of oral history for the area, which emphasize the existence of short-term, charismatic leadership during this period. Comparative linguistics also indicate new forms of centralized authority at this time.

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Great Rebellion: See Madagascar: Great Rebellion, 1947–1948.

Great Trek: See Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa.

Great Zimbabwe: Colonial Historiography

Great Zimbabwe was first seen by a European who recorded his experiences in 1871. Karl Mauch immediately identified the site as King Solomon's biblical Ophir (1 Kings 9: 26–28). Mauch was a German traveler

who had imbibed myths of a golden Ophir lying in the African interior. Stories of interior wealth had long circulated, disseminated by the Portuguese, who had established themselves along the East African coast and the Zambezi River from the fifteenth century. Myths of Great Zimbabwe's non-African origins were established in canonical form by Rider Haggard's 1886 novel *King Solomon's Mines*.

From the late nineteenth century, the British overtook the Portuguese in myth making, as in colonizing. So amazed by the sophistication of Great Zimbabwe were the new colonizers that, inspired by Rider Haggard's acquaintance, Cecil John Rhodes, they (like Mauch) denied Africans credit for such monumental architecture. Rhodes's motives for colonizing were commercial and imperial. Consequently, mythmaking about Great Zimbabwe, which Rhodes's pioneers visited in 1890, spread quickly by commercial promotion of settler enterprise.

Inspired by what they took for Great Zimbabwe's extraneous origins, Rhodes's settlers, known as Rhodesians, called the hill ruin at Great Zimbabwe the Acropolis (after ancient Greece), and the valley ruin—following their suppositions about Near Eastern religious ceremonies in the valley—the Temple. Despite evidence to the contrary adduced by archaeologists David Randall McIver (1906), Gertrude Caton Thompson (1931), and Roger Summers (1958), local belief in Great Zimbabwe's exotic origins remained an article of settler faith.

Early attempts to prove Great Zimbabwe's alien pre-Christian origins led Rhodesians to dig up and discard evidence of the site's indigenous builders. Despite such destruction, archaeological finds at Great Zimbabwe included Persian bowls, Chinese celadon dishes, and Near Eastern glassware. As Rhodesians contended, these items indicated ancient, outside settlement prior to the arrival of local Africans (c.400). In fact, such twelfth- to fifteenth-century goods (radio-carbon techniques settled disputed datings after 1945) merely validated the Shona-Indian Ocean trading links that brought luxury items to Great Zimbabwe.

Another interesting insight on amateur settler interpretation of Great Zimbabwe lies in the sequencing Rhodesians gave to the site's dry stone walling. To them, walling styles ran chronologically from coursed and dressed, to dressed and piled-and-wedged. In other words, from "best" to "worst," showing how native labor degenerated as imagined alien influences weakened. This interpretation matched colonial fears of white degeneration by interracial contact. Randall McIver, however, illustrated how Great Zimbabwe's walling progressed from piled-and-wedged, to dressed, and then on to dressed and coursed. Thus, the actual progression was from simpler to more complex styles,

thus revealing how African builders at Great Zimbabwe mastered the materials available to them.

Nonetheless, Rhodesians erroneously attributed hill and valley ruins to Phoenicians, Jews, and Arabs: anyone, in fact, but the site's historical Shona builders. "Shona" is the popularly accepted name for related peoples speaking mutually intelligible languages, subdivided into Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, and Karanga peoples living in Mozambique as well as Zimbabwe. Fifteen miles from Masvingo (once Ft. Victoria), Great Zimbabwe lies in a Karanga, Shona-speaking area.

Attracting as it has polemical dispute, Great Zimbabwe has drawn attention away from the multiplicity of Zimbabweans ("houses of stone") scattered across south-east Africa. These lesser Zimbabweans reveal the extent of interregional trading in precolonial southern, eastern, and central Africa. Today's archaeologists concern themselves with this inland-coastal trading network of which Great Zimbabwe was a part, a fifteenth-century network reaching to the Kongo kingdom (modern Angola) and across the Indian Ocean to China and India.

Rhodesians, however, needed to believe that Great Zimbabwe was unconnected to indigenous African genius. They had come from South Africa into what became Southern Rhodesia (1890–1965), Rhodesia (1965–1979), and finally majority-ruled Zimbabwe to make their fortunes. Of mixed South African and British stock, they believed themselves to be opening up central Africa to civilization. Such was their credo until Rhodesia disappeared with Zimbabwean independence (1980). In the dim light of racial prejudice and archaeological ignorance, most whites found it inconceivable that Africans could have built Great Zimbabwe.

A host of local diggers—Theodore Bent, R. M. Swan, and R. N. Hall—bolstered early mythmaking about the site that became a defining characteristic of colonial worldviews. In his book *The Ruined Cities of Ancient Rhodesia* (1906), Hall argued that Phoenicians were responsible for Great Zimbabwe's construction. Ancient Semites had provided the organizational skills and the intelligence without which the Shona could never have built their architectural marvels. Such myths mutated throughout the colonial period (1890–1979), as Rhodesians directing African labor had a vested interest in perpetuating them.

The stakes were raised after 1965 when, from a desire to protect rather than reform their racially privileged lifestyles, whites declared themselves independent of the British Commonwealth, whose scientists and historians had long proclaimed Great Zimbabwe's African origins. Now more than ever, colonial myths about Great Zimbabwe exemplified for whites what outside genius might achieve in Africa.

Such white defiance of archaeological evidence and political liberation provoked a defiant African response.

To African nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Great Zimbabwe proved what most whites sought to deny: that blacks had, could, and would create a great nation. From the early twentieth century, there never was any doubt about the site's African origins: colonial mythmaking was believed by those who needed or wanted to believe it.

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See also: **Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia.**

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Great Zimbabwe: Origins and Rise

Great Zimbabwe is the name given to the largest site of ruins in Africa, covering a span of approximately 1800 acres. Evidence from Portuguese travelers in the sixteenth century reported that Shona kings lived in these stone fortifications, which were the center of a flourishing gold trade across the Indian Ocean. The monuments were built between 1100 and 1450, when they were abandoned due to multiple factors, including a long drought, internecine warfare, and an influx of a warlike people who plundered and destroyed everything in their wake.

The site is also intimately associated with the independence of the modern nation of Zimbabwe. The national shrine on the hill complex was the home of the spirit mediums whose main duty was to act as the conscience of the Zimbabwe confederation and to preserve the traditions of the founding fathers, Chaminuka, Chimurenga, Tovera, Soro-rezhou, and others. Different clans shared in this sacred trust, beginning with the Dziva-Hungwe priesthood, which by lineage was more ancient than the Shona themselves and in whose country Chigwagu Rusvingo had set up the confederation of Zimbabwe. The Hungwe totem bird (fish eagle) has been the symbol of the Zimbabwe state since it gained independence in April 1980.

Eurocentric colonial scholarship assumed that Great Zimbabwe could not have been built by the Shona people,

despite the testimonies of the Portuguese travelers who confirmed the Shona as the builders.. Even those who were sympathetic to the African origin of the monument, because of their inadequate grasp of the African cultures, did not quite appreciate the significance of the facts at their disposal. European scholars placed undue emphasis on the economic development at Great Zimbabwe and tried to explain all other developments as corollaries to that central development.

There is plenty of oral evidence for the idea that the first builder saw the inadequacy of a kingdom built entirely on an economic foundation. The genius of the succeeding developers was that power was based not entirely on force or on economic enterprise, but on religion. Great Zimbabwe became a center of the divine. The system of checks and balances, whereby the *Monomotapa* (king) lived in the hill complex, while the priests lived nearby in the cave complex, were blurred in favor of a priestly monarchy. Although the two authorities were separate, to the common man the Monomotapa was a divine ruler who presided over harvest festivals and rain making ceremonies.

The first white men who visited southern Zambesia (now Zimbabwe) were the Portuguese, in the sixteenth century. The colonial Europeans arrived in the nineteenth century. By that time, the Shona civilization had deteriorated beyond recognition from the days of its medieval splendor. It was unthinkable then to entertain the idea that the Shona were the builders of these ancient monuments.

The most vexing question for the early European travelers and archaeologists was the origin of these edifices. One of the arguments advanced by R N. Hall, author of *Great Zimbabwe Mashonaland, Rhodesia: An Account of Two Years Examination Work in 1902–4 on Behalf of the Government of Rhodesia* (1969) in favor of a Himyartic (Arab) origin was that the Karanga were not associated with the gold and copper artifacts found at Great Zimbabwe. Hall wrote that he saw gold scorifiers in the lower floors of the ruins and that these were produced and worked “by very old Kafir (black) people” and that the Portuguese records clearly showed that the “medieval Makalanga, not only produced gold but manufacture it, especially into gold wire” (p.3).

Despite the evidence, Hall could not conceive of a situation in which the simple Shona-Karanga, who were then “blessed” by British rule, could have been the originators of a once flourishing civilization. His own archaeological research had shown that, even as far down as the fifth layer of occupation, the artifacts were no different from those of the Shona-Karanga found at the top layer. This is the argument on which Dr. Randall-Maclver was to base his native origin theory later.

Archaeological evidence at Great Zimbabwe shows that settlements there can be traced to as far back as

200BCE. We know that the Khoi and the San preceded the Shona by thousands of years. Professor R. Dart has argued convincingly that the tambootie tree, found in the wall of the Great Zimbabwe, shows evidence, thanks to carbon dating, of human life much earlier than the generally accepted date of 1200. Oral evidence points to the fact that the Shona occupied Southern Zambesia much earlier than 1200.

Written records about the Shona can be found in the journals of the Arab traveler Ibu Said (1214–1286), who wrote about a “Soyouna” (i.e., Shona) people inhabiting southern Zambesia. Another traveler and geographer, by the name of Janson, recorded on his 1639 map of Zambazia the name of people living there as “Sajona.”

When the Shona crossed the Zambezi on their southward migration around 1000, they settled in the iron district of Wedza. Because of the religious significance of Great Zimbabwe, which came from the prestige of the Hungwe spirit mediums and the Dzimbahwe fortress, it was fitting that all the future kings of this dynasty resided at Great Zimbabwe. The name Mwene-Mutapa means “owner of the land,” a title assumed by all Zimbabwean kings resident at Great Zimbabwe. From Great Zimbabwe, the Mwene-Mutapa family spread its influence to the Limpopo River in the south and to the Zambezi River in the north. In some cases they subjugated neighboring tribes, left them intact, and named a “royal” representative as chief. In other cases they intermarried. They dominated the whole of Zambesia to such an extent that no chief was legitimate until confirmed in office at Great Zimbabwe.

By 1490 Great Zimbabwe had been deserted. The direct descendants of the builders of Great Zimbabwe can still be found in the district of Mwenezi on the border with South Africa; they are called the BaVenda. These people trace their lineage beyond the BaRozi mambos to the Mwene-mutapa. They also practice ancient rainmaking rituals and circumcision, formerly associated with Great Zimbabwe but not practiced among modern-day Shona.

The BaVenda continued to build enclosures well into the twentieth century. The tradition today is that their art dated from the great king at Dzimbahwe. BaVenda architecture is very similar to that of Dzimbahwe, very often placed in inaccessible places. The BaVenda built their fortresses and divided them into two sections, the political and the sacrificial shrine. The BaVenda priests go up to their fortresses and there pray for rain, the same procedure followed at Great Zimbabwe. Occasionally, the BaVenda have placed a gigantic monolith at a village entrance, for no specific reason but merely to imitate their ancestors. These monoliths are very common at Great Zimbabwe.

The BaVenda possess beads and divining bowls similar to those found at Great Zimbabwe. A motif on

a divining bowl at Great Zimbabwe shows a sacred bull, a crocodile, spindle whorls, a lizard, and some doll-like figurines. Similar motifs can be found on wooden BaVenda bowls. While the flourishing civilization of Great Zimbabwe has long since come to an end, its legacy thrives even today.

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See also: Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Leopard's Kopje, Bambandyanalo, and Mapungubwe; Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Toutswe Mogala, Cattle, and Political Power.

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
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Guinea: Colonial Period

Guinea is a crescent-shaped country, the result of the arbitrary amalgamation of various regions by colonial conquest. The practice of dividing Guinea into four geopolitical regions dates to this period, but it also reflects both precolonial features (states and peoples) and the very process of colonial conquest. The four regions comprise coastal or lower Guinea, the highlands of Futa Jalon, Upper Guinea, and the forest region.

Initially an administrative dependency of Senegal, thus known as the “Rivières du Sud” (“Southern Rivers”), French Guinea became a colony with its own governor in 1893. Its territory was progressively broadened, beginning in the 1860s, with commercial expansion on the coast. In 1896, after more than a decade of negotiation and protectorate treaties with the Muslim state of Futa Jalon, the military conquest of central Guinea took place. Starting in 1882, severe fighting erupted between the forces led by Samori Touré and the French military. Over the next decade, parts of Touré’s former empire were gradually annexed into French Sudan. In 1899 this region was incorporated in French Guinea. Due to long-lasting resistance in the numerous forest chiefdoms, the eastern extremity remained under military control as late as 1911–1912.

After some hesitation and compromises with former paramount chiefs, such as Alpha Yaya Diallo, head



Guinea.

of Labé Province in the Futa Jalon, the administration of Guinea adopted the policy applied elsewhere in French West Africa: the colony was divided into administrative units known as “circles.” Africans were used as intermediaries serving as “chefs de canto” (a new administrative position) and as village headmen. Former chiefs who demonstrated their loyalty to French authority were kept in power, especially in Central Guinea. However, the power of these auxiliaries was controlled, and their tasks included collecting taxes, recruiting manpower for forced labor or military service, carrying out judicial responsibilities, and transmitting economic policy to the local level.

As elsewhere in colonial Africa, most borders were arbitrary. Of greatest significance for their impact on the local population were the boundaries between French and foreign territories, for they disrupted established trading and social networks. As a result of the crescent shape of Guinea, some regions were much farther from the capital, Conakry, than from two other international harbors: Freetown, Sierra Leone and Monrovia, Liberia. This has an impact even today in terms of smuggling or cross-boundary strategies. A coercive policy was therefore necessary to attract exports from far-away regions to Conakry. This was effected through the construction of roads and a railway, and the imposition of taxes and high customs duties.

Agriculture (mainly cash crops) was the basis of the economy and the main source of revenue until the 1950s, when some mineral ores began to be exported in significant quantities. Guinea went through successive economic cycles. The first product to be exported

on a large scale, and one of the driving forces behind the colonization of the hinterland was wild rubber, from central and upper Guinea. Collecting the latex required long hours of hard work. A railway line alleviated the difficult task of portage: it linked Conakry to Mamou (about 186 miles from the capital) in 1908 and reached Kouroussa in 1910 and Kankan in 1914 (a total of 414 miles). Rubber exports peaked in 1909–1912, with 1,700 to 2,100 tons per year. Rubber provided an average of 73 per cent of Guinea's exports by value between 1892 and 1913. After the turn of the century, Guinean wild rubber was in competition with plantation rubber from Indonesia and later Brazil. After two crises in 1907 and 1911, the market for wild rubber collapsed in 1913. The following year, exports dropped to 914 tons, representing only 28 per cent of exports by value. Despite low prices, rubber continued to be exported, as it represented the only product for some regions, and hence the only means of procuring sufficient funds to pay taxes.

The rubber cycle was followed by a long depression, until the colony started to export bananas from lower Guinea in the 1930s. This production was encouraged by the government through preferential customs duties. The introduction of refrigerated ships in 1935 accelerated the process. Most plantations were European-owned: the expatriates benefited from their access to capital and from the support of an administration that recruited manpower through forced labor. Some Africans were nevertheless able to enter the banana industry. Exports grew steadily: 114 tons in 1920, more than 20,000 in 1933, and 52,800 tons in 1938. Guinea was the main banana producer in French West Africa, with 80 per cent of total exports. Exports reached a peak of 98,000 tons in 1955 but then declined because of a leaf disease. Besides this main product, Guinea also exported palm products, cola nuts, hides, and cattle, and, after World War II, coffee and pineapples. The exploitation of minerals started in the 1950s, although some diamonds had been exported from the forest region as early as 1936. Iron ore was extracted near Conakry beginning in 1953, by the *Compagnie Minière de la Guinée française*, with partial American capital. It peaked at 1 million tons in 1957, but mining ceased in 1966. Bauxite was to become the main export after independence, but exploitation only started in the early 1950s, at three different mines: Kassa (1952–1974), Kindia-Friguiabgé, and the main site, Fria-Boké. In 1958, bananas and coffee still provided 80 per cent of exports by value.

Colonization brought with it severe social disruption. Slavery was a major problem, particularly in Futa Jalon. There, slaves were estimated at more than 50 per cent of the population, as opposed to 40 per cent in the colony as a whole, according to a 1904 report. The formal

abolition of this status in 1905 did not change immediately the captives' social position. Former slaves were the first to be sent to the army or to forced labor projects, and their ex-masters used Islamic religious knowledge to dominate them. But colonization also implied demographic movements between the hinterland and the capital city or other new economic regions, such as the coastal region (*basse-côte*). The urban population was estimated at 6 per cent in 1958, half of which was concentrated in Conakry (80,000 to 100,000 people). The total population grew from about 1.8 million in 1910 to 2.6 million in 1956. Population growth accelerated after 1945, although medical equipment was still deficient with three hospitals (two in the capital) and ninety-nine dispensaries. The education system was also underdeveloped.

Colonization introduced changes in the relationships between elders and family members of lower social status, especially “younger brothers” who could seek wage labor and therefore partly escape the elders' authority. The absence of cash crops combined with French-imposed taxation pushed young men to migrate to more promising economic zones, such as the groundnut fields of Senegal in the 1920s–1930s, or the diamond mines of Sierra Leone from the 1940s.

Formal political activity was highly restricted until 1946, as in other French colonies. Political parties and trade unions were not authorized; only a few associations promoting leisure or solidarity, sometimes on a regional basis, were allowed. Some of these associations later became the starting point for larger unions, such as the “Union du Mandé” or the “Union forestière.” Other forms of political expression existed, including exodus to neighboring countries, and strikes among the few wage workers (dock workers, civil servants). In 1946, associations—political parties, labor unions, and cultural groups—were authorized. The nation witnessed the birth of many political parties at that time. Some representatives from Guinea helped found the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) party in Bamako in 1946, and the following year the Guinean branch was started; it was renamed the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) in 1950. Under the leadership of Sekou Touré, who became its secretary general in 1952, the party grew rapidly. (In 1945 Touré had initiated the first trade union, followed by a confederation a year later.)

Other parties were also formed, some, such as the *Union Franco-Africaine*, under the auspices of French colonizers, who hoped to control the election results. After 1945 several legislative elections were held, and the first municipal elections occurred in 1956. In that year Sekou Touré became the first mayor of Conakry. The PDG was first successful in the forest region and upper Guinea, later along the coast. Central Guinea,

the last region to vote for the PDG, was long dominated by two local parties, the *Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée* and the *Bloc Africain de Guinée*. The first semiautonomous government, formed in 1957 as a result of the *loi cadre* (a decree instituting decentralization and devolution for French-administered regions) was headed by Sékou Touré. Saéfoulaye Diallo, number two in the party, was elected president of the Territorial Assembly, which immediately took significant measures, such as the abolition of headmanship in December 1957, replacing this unpopular institution with elected councils.

Responding to President Charles de Gaulle of France on August 25, 1958, Sékou Touré proclaimed in a speech that his country preferred poverty in freedom to opulence in slavery. The PDG advocated a “no” vote in the referendum of September 28, 1958. As a result, an overwhelming 95 per cent rejected the French Community. Independence was proudly declared on the second of October, abruptly severing all links with France. Guinea was the first French Sub-Saharan colony to achieve independence.

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See also: Guinea: Decolonization, Independence; Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sékou, Era of.

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Guinea: Decolonization, Independence

Guinea, a country in West Africa, is the result of the colonial partition of that region at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. After nearly sixty years of French rule, the decolonization of Guinea took place within the wider context of the disintegration of European colonial dominions in Africa and Asia after World War II. It should be emphasized that this decolonization process was, to a large extent, contingent upon this favorable context, which prevailed in the wake of the war, and accounts, to a large extent, for the speed with which the colonies succeeded in ridding themselves of the subjection they suffered.

Political awareness in Guinea, as in other French African colonies, was facilitated by a series of reforms

initiated by France from 1944 to meet the expectations of the colonial people. These reforms were in keeping with the recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference of January–February 1944, at which the French colonial authorities in Africa fully realized the need to bring about changes in their colonial approaches, while paradoxically asserting their desire to safeguard the existing colonial order. These reforms included granting the colonies certain rights and freedoms, such as union rights, the right of association, the right to vote and to participate in the local and metropolitan houses of representatives, the latter being newly established institutions.

In Guinea this new political context found expression in the creation of ethnic or geographically based associations (S. K. Kéita 1978, vol. 1, pp.171–172). It was also translated into the emergence of political and ideological parties and circles. The activities of these associations gave rise to a brisk nationalistic trend. Of the parties that came into being between 1946 and 1954, three engaged in the competition for political leadership in the territory: the *Bloc Africain de Guinée* (BAG), the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG), and the *Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée* (DSG). Until 1956 Barry Diawadou's BAG, backed by the colonial administration and drawing the bulk of its membership from the feudal class and the influential members of society, defeated the other political parties at the successive polls. Nevertheless, since then, the PDG, the Guinean section of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) under Sékou Touré, pulled itself up to the first position, the hostility of the colonial authorities notwithstanding. This process was crowned with the latter party's momentous victory at the territorial elections of March 31, 1957, winning fifty-seven out of the sixty seats in the colony's territorial assembly, a feat that afforded it preeminence in the country and pushed the competing parties to the background.

The PDG owed this new position on the political scene to several factors. One such factor was the economic and social situation prevailing in Guinea at the time of the colony's political awakening. It was an underdeveloped state, compared to its other neighbors in French West Africa. This state of underdevelopment showed mainly in the predominance of trade in raw commodities and the scarcity of industries. This condition contributed to the radicalization of the nationalist movement in Guinea. The PDG realized that it could politically turn the situation to its advantage.

Another factor was the particularly inspiring topics discussed during the PDG's campaigning with regard to the colony's economic situation. These topics were mainly focused on the castigation of the old and new methods of colonial exploitation and suppression

meted out to the people. The PDG was also boosted by a sound organization at the national and local levels, buttressed by a highly efficient trade union movement, and the exceptional oratory skills of its leader, Sékou Touré.

In April 1957, when the French government promulgated the decrees on enforcement of the Gaston Deferre Outline Law, which granted the colonies a semiautonomous status, the PDG had already secured such a strong position that it was readily called upon to form the first government. Sékou Touré became vice president, with the position of president going to the colonial governor. The PDG efficiently consolidated its positions by carrying out the reforms the people were yearning for. It settled its scores with the feudal class by abolishing traditional chieftaincy (Niane D. T. 1998, p.81). This increased its popularity as compared to the contending parties, the BAG and the DSG, which, though weakened, still remained active on the political arena.

It was against this background that French President de Gaulle put forward a proposal to the French colonies in Africa. They could opt for full independence, or accept the French offer of the creation of a new community, at a referendum to be held on November 28, 1958. Unlike in most of the colonies involved, in Guinea the referendum was held in a context where the full implementation of the Outline Law revealed its weaknesses with regard to the Guineans' quest for self-rule. From January 1958, Sékou Touré was of the view that the opportunities offered by the proposed reforms had elapsed. Consequently, de Gaulle's initiative was generally welcomed by the political actors, including those considered to be siding with the colonial administration. They took an official stand in favor of independence, even before the PDG and its leader made their views known on September 14, 1958, at the party's convention.

Of all the French colonies in Africa, Guinea alone voted for independence, which was proclaimed on October 2, 1958. This result was the outcome of the concurrent action of all the political forces on the scene, particularly the PDG, whose control over the country was so strong that, in the view of the colonial governor on the eve of the referendum, any voting directive issued by its leadership would unquestionably be followed by 95 per cent of the electorate, whatever that directive might be (Kaba, p.87).

Guinea's example was contagious and resulted in the independence, in succession, of the other African countries, which cost France its painstakingly fashioned community.

ISMAEL BARRY

See also: **Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sékou, Era of.**

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Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sékou, Era of

Two distinctive and contrasting symbols can summarize Ahmed Sékou Touré's (1922–1984) Guinea: independence and the Boiro Camp. Political leader of decolonization, hero of the first colony to achieve independence in French Sub-Saharan Africa, Sékou Touré, like Kwame Nkrumah, was among the most eminent African leaders to oppose imperialism. He was welcomed in Guinea after the military coup in 1966 and was named vice president. But after the enthusiasm of independence and high hopes for the future of the country, things changed, through a combination of internal factors, external pressure, and Sékou Touré's own personality. Sékou Touré became a dictator, eliminating opposition to his power and resorting to the worst methods of oppression, while radicalizing his discourse and practice in terms of both local and foreign policy. Three schematic phases can be distinguished in Touré's regime: initial accommodation and negotiation (to c.1965), radicalization (c.1965–1975) and, from around 1975, a gradual softening of his hard-line policies.

Independence was proclaimed on October 2, 1958, and Guinea was admitted to the United Nations in December 1958. Guinea's then-representative was Diallo Telli. After holding various other high official positions, including being the first secretary general of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), he would become a target of Sékou Touré's suspicion, and one of the most famous victims of the Boiro Camp, the concentration camp located in a Conakry suburb.

A series of plots, real or faked, starting in 1960, was followed by increased repression. The repression peaked after the November 22, 1970, attempt by Portuguese and exiled Guinean forces both to liberate Portuguese soldiers (Guinea was a strong supporter of the liberation movement of Guinea Bissao and Cape Verde [PAIGC]) and overthrow Sékou Touré. Many people were arrested, including several ministers and ambassadors, high military officers, and Monsignor Tchidimbo, the archbishop of Conakry. Following a trial in January 1971, eight people were publicly hanged under the Tumbo bridge, in Conakry. Altogether 10,000 to 30,000 people were victims of the regime.

After the massive "no" vote in the 1958 referendum, France left with all its technicians and equipment and

withdrew its aid, trying to block Guinea's international contacts. Responding to the rigid French attitude, Guinea established its own money in 1960, the Guinean franc or *sily* (the elephant), symbol of the party and its leader. The *sily* was nonconvertible, which gave the state an efficient means to control the economy. Diplomatic relationships with France were finally terminated in 1965. They were reestablished only ten years later, on July 14, 1975. Guinea turned to the Eastern bloc, to the Soviet Union and to China, for diplomatic and economic support (trade agreements were signed as early as 1958–1959). But, by 1961, some distance had been taken from the Soviet Union, accused of perverting the student movement. As a general rule, Guinea always tried not to depend too heavily on one partner, as demonstrated by its economic policy.

Guinea had rich assets: various ecological regions, sufficient water supply, mineral resources, and skilled labor. During colonization, this potential had not been fully utilized, but new projects were underway in the 1950s such as the exploitation of bauxite and iron and the building of a dam on the Konkouré river (finally inaugurated in 1999). In 1958 Guinea was the third colony in French West Africa in terms of economic value. These assets attracted foreign investment: French (despite the political problems), American, and Soviet. Investment was mainly aimed at the exploitation of bauxite: at Fria (the French Company Péchiney combined with North American capital), Boké (American-controlled international consortium), Kindia-Friguiabgé (a joint venture between the Guinean State and the Soviet Union), and from 1952 to 1974 at Kassa. Because of its nationalistic orientation, Guinea was partially able to impose its own terms and negotiate more favorable contracts. The example of the transformation of bauxite in Guinea itself illustrates this policy, but the aluminum factory in Fria, an intermediate stage in the processing of aluminum, shows the limits of negotiation with international trusts. Despite the agreement, Guinea failed to have an aluminum factory built to take advantage of the surplus value created by this industrial stage. The production at Fria went rapidly from 185,000 tons in 1960 to 460,000 two years later and 700,000 in the 1980s. A 145-kilometer-long railway was built from Fria to Conakry while the harbor of Kamsar was the outlet for Boké mines whose exports started in 1973. Guinea was the second largest world bauxite producer, and this product was responsible for over 90 per cent of its hard currency earnings. Diamonds were another important resource, whose small-scale exploitation was strictly controlled and even forbidden in 1975–1980, in order to prevent smuggling toward Freetown.

Resorting to Marxist phraseology, Sékou Touré applied a policy of nationalization and centralization. The

1962 congress of the PDG proclaimed the adoption of the noncapitalist mode of development. The regime aimed at creating a unified Guinean nation, without class or ethnic divisions. The nationalization of industries, which started in 1959, was broadened with the passage of a new fundamental law in 1964 which repressed corruption and private enterprise. Guinea was basically an agricultural country (although most of its monetary resources came from mining), and there, too, a similar policy was applied: collective farming was organized and received much public financial help. (The final stage was the FAPA, or *fermes agro-pastorales d'Arrondissement*, in 1978.) Students spent one year at the end of their curriculum working in the countryside and “educating” the masses. In addition, foreign trade was nationalized and private trade forbidden for some time.

The state also controlled all political and intellectual activity. Some parties spontaneously rallied to the PDG, but most of them were forbidden, resulting in the establishment of the one-party state. As a result, the whole country was organized under the leadership of the PDG. In 1967 Guinea was divided into 7 “Commissariats généraux de la Révolution,” 33 administrative regions, 350 districts, and at the village or neighborhood level 2,500 “Pouvoirs révolutionnaires locaux” (PRL). The organization of the party (in which membership was compulsory at the age of seven and required the payment of dues, a substitute for direct taxation) reproduced the same scheme. Attending party meetings was also an obligation. The party aimed at controlling all activities; it organized the population, mainly the workers (CNTG/Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée), the youth (JRDA/Jeunesse de la Révolution démocratique africaine), and women (URFG/Union révolutionnaire des femmes de Guinée). The state also controlled public opinion through the school system and censorship of the media.

Mottos espousing revolution, anti-imperialism, and egalitarianism were particularly attractive in a country characterized by discrimination, be it by age, gender, or socioeconomic status (slaves, castes). Campaigns were organized against so-called mystical practices. Feudalism, in Marxist terms, was attacked: the old chief system, used by colonization, was abolished in 1957, and captivity, which still existed in indirect ways, was repressed in an attempt to change attitudes. This was mainly aimed at the Fula aristocracy and led to multifold repression. But despite his Marxist discourse, Sékou Touré was able to gain the support of Muslim leaders and to attract Arab capital. A Friday mosque was built on the outskirts of Conakry.

In the mid-1970s, Guinea gradually opened up again and balanced its relations between the Western and the Eastern bloc. Trade and agriculture were progressively liberalized, and reconciliation was proclaimed with

several European and African countries. As a result, the borders reopened and negotiations started with the European Economic Community (Guinea signed the Lomé Agreement) and international organizations (IMF). Sékou Touré assumed again the figure of a Pan-Africanist and nonaligned leader after he personally attended the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Monrovia in 1978 (where Guinea reconciled with Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire). Previously, in 1968, he had encouraged the founding of the Organization of the States Bordering the Senegal River (Organisation des Etats riverains du Sénégal) whose treaty had been signed in Guinea; but it broke up in 1971 because of conflicts between Guinea and its neighbors following the 1970 Portuguese aggression. Similarly he favored the foundation of other regional organizations (Gambia River, Mano River, Niger). He also served as mediator for various conflicts (Chad, Western Sahara). This role was supposed to attain its apogee with the organization of the twentieth OAU summit in Conakry in 1984. Sékou Touré's death interrupted the preparations.

Sékou Touré's regime, which lasted almost unchallenged from 1958 to his natural death on March 26, 1984, had profound consequences for Guinea. It accelerated a migration process started under colonization. This resulted in the exodus of about 25 per cent of the total population, and the death or flight of most intellectuals. At the same time the radicalization of the ideology created economic problems in a country whose resources were promising. After some hesitation and competition between Prime Minister Béavogui and Ismaël Touré, Sékou Touré's half-brother, the army took over on April 3, 1984, under the leadership of Colonels Lansana Conté and Diarra Traoré who formed the CMRN (Comité militaire de redressement national). The second republic was proclaimed, and the PDG and its institutions were abolished.

ODILE GOERG

See also: **Guinea: 1984 to the Present; Nkrumah, Kwame.**

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Guinea: 1984 to the Present

During the night of March 25, 1984, the president of Guinea, Sékou Touré, "Responsable Suprême de la Révolution" (Supreme Chief of the Revolution), died

at age sixty-two of a heart attack in a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio. His death provoked a harsh struggle for succession and an atmosphere of political insecurity. One week later, the Guinean army seized power by force in order to avoid civil war. An official statement, read on Radio-Conakry during the morning of April 3, proclaimed the creation of a Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN; Military Committee of National Recovery), and so dissolved the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Democratic Party of Guinea), of which Sékou Touré had been the political leader. It also dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the constitution. The army's eruption onto the political scene ousted the two potential successors of the deceased president, Lansana Béavogui, who, since 1972, had been the prime minister for Sékou Touré, and Ismael Touré, the half-brother of the ex-president. The CMRN, composed of eighteen members, set up a new government with Colonel Lansana Conté (born in 1943 in Loumbayah-Moussayah), the former chief of the land forces at its head. The statement "Guinean People, you are free now!" was repeated endlessly on national radio.

Sékou Touré was undoubtedly the "homme africain décisif" (decisive African man) as described by Aimé Césaire (an avant-garde poet born in Martinique in the French Caribbean and advocate of *négritude*). Famous for the "no!" he gave General Charles de Gaulle in 1958, he led the country to national independence and opposed colonialism. However, his socialist regime had been marked by his acutely personal and harsh form of dictatorship. Sékou Touré left behind him a country facing a number of problems. The national economy was undeveloped and unproductive, while corruption was rampant. The Guinean state was forced to rely on its centralized and omnipotent party. Favorably disposed toward Malinké populations, the regime had encouraged ethnic rivalries and the emergence of a corrupt bourgeoisie. Isolated from the international scene but remaining close to Communist countries, Sékou Touré had led a paranoid government obsessed with plot and conspiracy. (Between 1960 and 1984 Sékou Touré fabricated thirteen plots to legitimize the elimination of his opponents.) Human rights and individual freedom were both highly controlled, and thousands of opponents of the regime (intellectuals, officers, and traders) were killed or tortured in the Boiroit Camp. These political acts of violence led many Guineans to flee their country, resulting in a broad Guinean diaspora around the world.

In the aftermath of April 3, the CMRN inaugurated the second republic and initiated a decollectivization policy. Taxes on production were suppressed and the production cooperatives were closed. The new government fostered a liberal policy and committed itself to

the development of the private sector. In 1985 the Guinean franc replaced the sily, the monetary unit of Sékou Touré's regime. Guinea attempted to escape its economic isolation; agreements were signed with the International Monetary Fund, and in 1986 the first Structural Adjustment Program was established. At the same time, the CMRN promised to lead the country to democracy. The Boirot Camp was closed, and a committee was commissioned to write the *Loi Fondamentale* (Fundamental Law) recognizing a multiparty system. Parties such as the Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès (Party of Unity and Progress), the Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (People's Assembly of Guinea), and the Union pour la Nouvelle République (Union for the New Republic) entered the political arena. In 1993, for the first time in Guinean history, presidential elections were held: Lansana Conté received 50.93 per cent of the vote and established the Third Republic.

However, these promising changes took place in an atmosphere of increasing economic precariousness, political insecurity, and corruption. Since 1984, the economic situation has remained fragile despite the natural richness of the country, and the educational and juridical systems are equally insecure. Health care is generally inaccessible, and administration is inefficient. During the 1990s, Guinea suffered the repercussive effects of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, receiving a huge influx of refugees from the two countries (500,000). The situation in the early 2000, is threatened by heightened political tensions colored by ethnic rivalries. General-President Lansana Conté is accused of privileging people from his own ethnic group, the Susu. In February 1996, when Malinké Diarra Traoré was arbitrarily relegated from the position of prime minister to that of state minister, a few officers launched a coup. The rebellion failed, but only after the officers had successfully bombarded the national palace.

After the 1998 presidential elections, Alpha Condé, the leader of the RPG (Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen), was accused of conspiracy and thrown in jail for more than two years. The border conflicts between Guinea and rebels from Sierra-Leone and Liberia, who are supposedly allied with Guinean opponents plotting against the regime, allowed the government to reinforce its politicomilitary control over the population.

General President Lansana Conté—nicknamed “fori” (the “old man”)—has been in power since 1984. A referendum, which was denounced by the opposition parties, was held on November 11, 2001, and a 98 per cent majority was obtained in favor of the removal of the two-term limit, which would have forced him to retire in 2003. According to the opposition, the vote was in flagrant disregard of the constitution and essentially ensures that he will remain president for life.

DAVID BERLINER

See also: Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sékou, Era of; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.


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Guinea-Bissau: Nineteenth Century to 1960

With approximately twenty-five different populations living within a territory of about 14,000 square miles, the history of Guinea-Bissau is primarily regional. However, four factors have affected the country as a whole and have in some way contributed to its shaping: colonial conquest, the end of the slave trade, the rise of the peanut trade, and the fall of the Gabounke Empire.

From an administrative point of view, Portuguese Guinea consisted originally of two *capitanias* (Cacheu and Bissau) joined as districts in 1852, yet annexed to Cape Verde until 1879, at which time it became administratively independent. Besides Cacheu and Bissau, “Guinea” was composed of the enclaves of Ziguinchor on the Casamance River, Bolor at the mouth of the Rio Cacheu (to counter French advancement),



Gabon.

Ganjarra and Fa (minor trading posts), Farim and Geba (commercial gateways to the Mandinka trade), and the island of Bolama, a source of dispute with Britain until 1868.

Honório Pereira Barreto (1813–1859) was made the first true governor of colonial Portuguese Guinea in 1845. The first half of the nineteenth century was marked by the repeated insurrections of the *grumetes* (a term used originally to designate the sailors working on the Portuguese ships and later extended to all acculturated individuals), as well as by the uprisings of a garrison composed primarily of convicts. The Portuguese clashed frequently with neighbors (Papel, Manyak, Bi-fada) and were the target of systematic piracy from the Bijagos. It was only from 1880 on, and with great difficulty, that colonization began to spread beyond the trading posts. The process of colonization was completed by 1920 for continental Guinea and by 1935 for the islands of Bijagos.

Until 1800 Cacheu and Bissau were the main slave entrepôts on the Southern Rivers, from which more than four thousand slaves were exported yearly. From 1810 on, England coerced Portugal into accepting a series of treaties to end the slave trade and included, in 1842, its assimilation to piracy. Although slavery was abolished in 1858, the newly liberated slaves continued working for their masters until 1874, when a new decree set them effectively free. In the late 1840s when the slave trade ended, the Guinean economy was dominated by slave traders who were associated with *Nhara* (women of matrilineal communities who played an intermediary role between African societies and the European merchants). Consequently, when the local economy shifted from slave to pelt and peanut trade, Bissau, but especially Cacheu and Ziguinchor, missed out on the opportunity to participate in this economic transformation. The French, meanwhile, developed the post of Sédhiou. From there, the French Resident composed the first long text concerning Guinea (E. Bertrand-Bocandé, “Notes sur la Guinée Portugaise ou Sénégal méridionale,” *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, 1849).

The introduction of peanut cultivation was a major event. Peanuts became the major export item of Guinea until overtaken by cashew nuts in the early 1980s. Peanut cultivation began in the Bijagos Islands in about 1840 and spread to Grande de Buba and Foreah around 1847. These previously neglected regions thus experienced a sudden development that ended abruptly when warfare erupted in 1868. The end of the slave trade dealt the final blow to the animistic Mandinka Empire of Gabu, confederating forty-seven provinces during the nineteenth century. Challenged for more than fifty years by the theocratic Pulaar (or Fula) state of Fuuta Jalon (present-day Guinea Conakry)

mainly for the control of commercial networks, the Gabu Empire did not substitute the slave trade by the exploitation of its labor force. The Fula were soon engaged largely in peanut production, while the Gabunka ignored it. By the time the slave trade reached its end, the Fula had created the *runde* (villages of slaves dedicated to the production of peanuts), whereas the noblemen and soldiers of the Gabunka Empire, unable to adapt to the new situation and deprived of resources, became looters. In 1851 the Fula gained a hold on several Gabunka provinces. Blockaded in Kansala sometime between 1864 and 1867, the *Mansa-Ba* (emperor) and his followers committed suicide by igniting their remaining barrels of powder. This was the end of the great Gabu.

The fall of the empire brought about a state of violence that was to last approximately thirty years. The Gabunka, the FulaKunda, and Balanta migrated en masse to the south, where the Biafada accepted them in exchange for a yearly tribute, which they refused to pay shortly thereafter. This led to the war of Foréah, which broke out in 1868 and lasted for the next twenty years, leaving the Biafada chiefdoms defeated. Competing constantly for control, these chiefdoms previously submissive to the confederation were now in permanent conflict—a situation from which the Portuguese profited by supporting one group or another, according to their own interests.

The agreement signed by the Portuguese and the French in 1889 exchanged the zone of the Cassini River (over which the chiefs had accepted a French protectorate in 1857) for the area of Ziguinchor, which, although dominated by French merchants, had been the seat of a Portuguese mission since 1770. Between 1888 and 1905 five campaigns were launched to establish the borders. Casamance, Naloutaye, and Foréah were henceforth divided lengthwise.

With the advent of the Portuguese Republic (1910), da Silva Gouveia was elected the first deputy of Guinea in 1911. In 1912 Governor de Almeida Pereira created a department of public works and a postal service. He banned the arms trade and built the first road suitable for automobiles.

Thirteen days after the rebellion of Madère against the dictatorship of Salazar (April 4, 1931), the governor was expelled by a junta, which promptly disappeared when the uprising was crushed on May 4.

Exportation remained almost entirely in the hands of foreign enterprises until the advent of the *Estado Novo* when, by means of the exportation taxes that he had put into effect in 1927, Salazar established the quasi-monopoly *Companhia Uniao Fabril-Gouveia*. Thus, by 1930, 70 per cent of all exports were bound for Portugal. In 1943 the capital city was transferred from Bolama to Bissau. In 1951 the term “colony” was

dropped in favor of “overseas province,” and the Colonial Act was revoked. However, the low level of education among the colonists (30% were illiterate), coupled with the inability of the fascist regime to mobilize capital, contributed to a state of economic stagnation.

GÉRALD GAILLARD (TRANSLATED BY NARDA ALCANTARA)

See also: Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Abolition: Philanthropy or Economics?

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Guinea-Bissau: Cabral, Amílcar, PAIGC, Independence, 1961–1973

Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973) was born in Guinea in 1924. His parents had emigrated from Cape Verde during one of the periodical famines striking the islands, only to return in 1931. Cabral set off for Lisbon in 1945 to study agricultural engineering. There he met Agostinho Neto and Mario de Andrade, future leaders of the Liberation Movement of Angola. Cabral and de Andrade created the *Centro de Estudos Africanos* in 1951 with the aim of “reafricanizing the mind.”

With a degree in engineering (granted in 1950), Cabral was hired by the National Institute of Agriculture to conduct the agricultural census of Guinea. Parallel to his study of the agrarian social and economic structures, he created the African Peoples’ Sports and Leisure Association (1954). The association was banned by the colonial authorities, and Cabral was exiled to a sugar cane plantation in Angola, with permission to visit his family once a year. During one of these visits, on September 19, 1956, Cabral and five other Cape Verdians, including Aristide Pereira (future president of Cape Verde), Luis Cabral (Amílcar’s half-brother), and Fernando Fortes, created the African Party for Independence (PAI), renamed two years later PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde).

Although Guinea and Cape Verde were politically and economically interdependent, the inhabitants had never subscribed to the idea of unifying their territories as the PAIGC anticipated.

In 1959 the workers of the port of Bissau (Pidgiguiti) gathered in a general uprising. A shoot-out ensued with fifty-eight deaths officially reported. This event

surprised the leaders of the PAIGC who had considered it possible to attain independence without armed conflict, as had been the case with the English and French colonies south of the Sahara.

Cabral returned to Bissau, and during the meeting of September 19, 1959, the leaders of the PAIGC decided to engage the rural masses and start an armed offensive. The group led by Rafael Barbosa, Aristide Pereira, and Fernando Fortes remained in charge of expanding the influence of the party in the countryside, while the group with Cabral, Carlos Correia, and Francisco Mendes went to Conakry to establish a party school. Cabral taught history, geography, and international relations and at the same time engaged in intense diplomatic negotiations to obtain arms.

However, the Portuguese would adamantly refuse a peaceful transition to independence. In the case of the French and English colonies, the nineteenth-century scheme of progressive assimilation was given up not only because of the political history (the role played by Africa in World War II) but also for economic reasons. For France and England, the transition to neocolonialism appeared then more profitable than the integration of their colonies in the metropolis. This was not the case of Portugal, a country which had not participated in World War II and had a less progressive economy.

In 1962 three independence movements based in Dakar united to form the FLING (Nationale Front for the Liberation of Guinea) and proposed a negotiated decolonization. The PAIGC took a more aggressive position, initiating a series of attacks before declaring open conflict in February 1963. Six months later, the southern regions of Geba and Corubal were liberated, and a new front opened in the north of Bissau. The objective was the strengthening of the PAIGC in order to challenge the position of the FLING, which had already been recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Operating from military bases in the liberated zones, they systematically destroyed the production of peanuts and the warehouses of the Portuguese company *Companhia união fabril*.

The military brilliance of Cabral was based in his immediate understanding of which societies the movement had to approach first. The Balanta, for instance, with a horizontal social structure were of a more revolutionary tendency, while the Fula, the Mandinka, and the Biafada, vertically and hierarchically organized, were not. In 1964 Portugal mobilized three thousand men to take the island of Como, a strategic platform necessary for the eventual recovery of the south. After seventy-five days of combat, however, the expedition had to acknowledge defeat.

In the midst of intense combat, the PAIGC held its first congress at Cassaca in February 1964. The party founded regional organizations such as village committees,

schools (164 between 1964 and 1973) and “people’s stores.” These stores bought rice from the farmers at a higher price than the Portuguese offered and sold tools at a lower price. Outstanding students were sent to Conakry to be trained as intellectual leaders of the party. The Congress also handled complaints about the behavior of commanders. Following an inquiry, several were imprisoned or executed. The Organization of African Unity recognized the PAIGC in 1965 as “the only organization fighting for the people of Guinea.” By 1966 the party controlled two-thirds of the territory.

The Portuguese, with some 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers, brought together the villages still under their control. They bombed the liberated regions, destroying the rice paddies of the Balanta, but the conflict only intensified.

Originally opposed to armed struggle, and supporting the anti-PAIGC organizations, Léopold-Sédar Senghor (president of Senegal) authorized the creation of a center for casualties of war in 1967, in Ziguinchor. Later, he accepted the existence of military bases. However, one of the main bases was in the south. The southern zone was placed under the leadership of Nino Vieira (future president of Guinea Bissau) and was supported by the forces of Guinea Conakry, under the command of Lanzana Conté (who in turn was to become president of Guinea Conakry).

The year 1970 was marked by important diplomatic accomplishments for the PAIGC. Cabral met with several heads of state, including Pope Paul VI.

General Antonio de Spinosa, appointed in 1968, declared that “subversive war cannot be won by military force” and launched a campaign for “a better Guinea.” He opened 160 schools in strategic villages and made promises to the opponents of the PAIGC. Spinosa stabilized the military front and undertook operations such as the attempt to assassinate Sékou Touré (then president of Guinea) in 1970.

In 1972 the PAIGC called for elections in the liberated zones, which led to the formation of the first national assembly. Shortly afterward, on January 20, 1973, Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in Conakry by a naval officer of the PAIGC. To this day no light has been shed on this affair. Beginning in 1973, the Soviet Union provided the PAIGC with anti-air missiles, henceforth changing the military odds.

On September 24, 1973, the National Popular Assembly (ANP) led by Nino Vieira proclaimed the independence of Guinea-Bissau—“an African nation forged in combat”—in Madina do Boé, near Kandafara. The United Nations immediately recognized the new state. The large cities, however, remained under Portuguese control and had to be maintained with imported rice. The colonial war had taken a heavy toll on

the Portuguese nation, which maintained 35,000 young men overseas who were no longer willing to die in a distant country. It was precisely within the garrisons of Guinea that the Movement of Captains was born that overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship on April 25, 1974. Portugal recognized the independence of Guinea in September and that of Cape Verde in 1975. The PAIGC held control of the state for a long time. Luis Cabral ruled the country until 1981, when his government was overthrown by his army chief Joao Vieira. Although elected to the presidency in 1994, he was ousted four years later after he dismissed his own army chief, a series of events which set off a civil war. Foreign intervention led to a truce. Elections were held in 2000, resulting in the election of Kumba Yalla as president.

GÉRALD GAILLARD

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Guinea-Bissau: Independence to the Present

Final victory over Portugal in September 1974 brought no solutions to increasingly entrenched ethnic, political, and economic problems in Guinea-Bissau. Independence compounded factionalism in the vanguard party, the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), the government, and the army. Political ambition in the context of a one-party state relied on the development of strong clientelist bonds, as an erstwhile revolutionary army moved into a government and administration position. Corruption became endemic.

A central issue was the future relationship between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Although Cape Verde achieved independence following elections in June 1975, there was no settled plan for unification of the two countries. As a result, a Cape Verdean, Aristides Pereira, occupied a dual role as head of state of Cape Verde and PAIGC secretary general. Luis Cabral, half-brother to the assassinated former leader of the PAIGC Amílcar Cabral, assumed the presidency of Guinea-Bissau. The PAIGC’s most successful military leader, Joao “Nino” Vieira, became commissar of the armed forces and, later, prime minister. However, non-Cape Verdeans

remained very much in the minority in the upper echelons of the party, the government, and the armed forces.

The party proved incapable of controlling the new government. Party workers found difficulty assuming peacetime administrative procedure. Public servants had often worked for the Portuguese and were not naturally sympathetic to the PAIGC. Individual commissioners or ministers soon became preoccupied with assuring funds, usually from external sources, for their ministries. Links with the party structure assumed secondary importance. As the PAIGC demobilized, the ministries manifested an impulse toward *clientelismo*. Although ministers remained as part of the PAIGC, party and government moved apart on a functional and organizational level.

At the same time, the party was distancing itself from its grassroots support. At independence the party leadership and many middle-ranking personnel moved to Bissau. As well as a perceived need to exercise command in a city that the PAIGC never took by force, militants felt that their long sacrifices in the bush warranted a period of relative urban comfort. Village committees suffered from a lack of resources and commitment. Electoral exercises were conducted in 1972 and 1976, but neither was an authentic process. Elections were held to reassert party authority in those regions hostile to the PAIGC during the war of liberation, to give the impression of legitimacy in the country, and, thus, to increase economic aid for Guinea-Bissau in the international community, especially the European Union. An increasingly authoritarian environment prevailed. Mass organizations, created at independence, were emasculated.

The level of disaffection throughout the country was unsustainable. The agent for change was Nino Vieira, who benefited from a long-standing anticolonial alliance with the largest ethnic group, and the backbone of the army, the Balanta. By 1979 Vieira and Luis Cabral had built up rival power bases. Vieira won support from the army and in rural areas, while public servants in the towns were behind the resident. Balanta and Papel backed Vieira and Cape Verdeans Cabral. In a tense political environment, Cabral resorted to authoritarian methods. Vieira's removal as army commander, followed by the incorporation of prime ministerial powers in the hands of the resident, prompted the army to move. Vieira assumed power on November 14, 1980.

All top-level government officials of Cape Verdean origin were dismissed or demoted. Relations between Praia and Bissau were severed in January 1981. The PAIGC in Cape Verde reformed as the Partido Africano da Independencia da Cabo Verde (PAICV). The PAIGC in Bissau maintained its original title but expelled all members of the PAICV, including Pereira. Coup attempts or rumors of coup attempts, the arrest of alleged conspirators and their rehabilitation, execution,

and imprisonment became a recurrent cycle during the Vieira era. Balanta faith in Vieira soon dissipated. A growing perception that insufficient Balanta were receiving high-ranking posts in the army and government led to a series of conspiracies. Vieira responded in 1985 by arresting a swath of alleged conspirators, in the most part Balanta. After a dubious judicial process, six people were executed.

Factionalism endured. Vieira's retention of power was based on the recasting of the PAIGC as a hierarchical, vanguard party. The containment of infighting continued to require a deft political touch. Individuals were removed and resuscitated as Vieira attempted to countercheck each faction. There were increasing calls for genuine democracy. Elections in 1984 were manipulated, and 1989 elections saw voter numbers drop to 53 per cent of the registered electorate. Economic liberalization, initiated in 1983, led to a structural adjustment program financed by external aid totaling \$46.4 million. In a climate of political conditionality, émigré opposition groups grasped the opportunity to agitate for pluralism in Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau embarked on a constitutional transition process in 1991. Defunct and exiled parties were revived and new parties formed. Elections were held in two rounds in July and August 1994. The PAIGC won a clear majority in the National Assembly. Vieira narrowly defeated Koumba Yalla of the Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) for the presidency. Yalla objected, citing voting irregularities, and the country descended into economic and political disarray. Entry into the Franc Zone in 1997 resulted in a sharp rise in food prices and a reduction of purchasing power, causing widespread unrest.

A secessionist rebellion in neighboring Casamance, led by the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), influenced relations with Senegal throughout the 1990s. Vieira attempted to allay Senegalese fears that the MFDC was receiving weapons and support from Bissauan sources. In June 1998 veteran army commander Ansumane Mané was dismissed for alleged arms trafficking. A large majority of the disaffected army and veterans of the war of liberation rallied behind the popular Mané, who proclaimed himself leader of an interim military junta. A civil war that precipitated the destruction of Bissau, significant carnage, and large-scale internal displacement ensued. Vieira requested, and received, military support from Senegal and Guinea. For Senegal the intervention was an opportunity to assault MFDC rear bases. The conflict also saw a brief return to colonial power politics, with France supporting Vieira and Senegal, while Portugal gave tacit backing to the rebels. However, by October, loyalist forces were contained in a small area of central Bissau. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered a ceasefire and peace agreement.

In March 1999 Senegalese and Guinean troops were replaced by a 600-strong ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) acting as a peacekeeping interposition force, which ultimately proved ineffectual. On May 6 Mané launched a final assault on the loyalist stronghold. Vieira was forced to seek asylum in Portugal.

The speaker of the National Assembly and member of the PAIGC, Malam Bacai Sanha, was appointed interim president, and a government of national unity was installed. Guinea-Bissau's first authentic elections were conducted in November 1999 and January 2000. Kumba Yalla, a former teacher, defeated Sanha for the presidency, and the PAIGC lost its preeminent position in parliament to the PRS. Although Mané kept his promise not to undermine the process, the military junta retained the potential to influence the governance of the country. With a view to conciliation, the National Assembly tabled a bill in April 2000 proposing the creation of a national security council, to include members of the junta, whose members would hold ministerial rank. In 2001 the junior members of Yalla's governing coalition deserted their posts in protest because they claimed they had not been consulted about a reshuffling of the cabinet. Guinea-Bissau remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

SIMON MASSEY

See also: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict in.

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H

Hadya: *See Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries.*

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Haile Selassie I (1892–1975)
Emperor of Ethiopia

Ethiopian monarch from 1930 to 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie, the 225th ruler of his country, was the son of *Ras* (Prince) Makonnen, the cousin of Emperor Menelik II. He was a direct descendant of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, hence his epithet, “Conquering Lion of Judah.” Originally named Ras Tafari Makonnen, he bore that name until 1930, when the empress died and the thirty-eight-year-old prince was crowned *Negusa Negast* (King of Kings), Emperor of Ethiopia and the Elect of God with the title of Haile Selassie I, meaning “*Might of the Trinity.*”

Before he became regent in 1916, Ras Tafari was an educated and experienced administrator. His early education was provided by private lessons at the royal court and under French Jesuit missionaries, followed by formal schooling at Menelik School in Addis Ababa. The Emperor Menelik II recognized his intelligence and appointed him governor of Gara Muleta province in 1906 at age thirteen. At fourteen he became governor of Selalie, at sixteen governor of Sidamo, and governor of Harar in 1910. As governor of Sidamo and Harar in particular, which were then Ethiopia’s richest provinces, Ras Tafari tried to introduce a program of cautious modernization, economic development and social transformation without damage to the sovereignty, culture, and tradition

of his country. His ideas were challenged by the powerful conservative forces of oligarchy; yet despite stiff opposition, he did much to reduce feudal influence.

In 1923 Ras Tafari engineered the admission of Ethiopia into the League of Nations (and later, to its successor, the United Nations). In 1924 he outlawed domestic slavery and slave trading in Ethiopia and attempted to expose his country to modern economic forces by granting concessions and monopolies to various nationalities. In that year, he visited several European countries to secure foreign investments and financial assistance for his developmental plans in Ethiopia, as well as better terms for his country’s export and import through Djibouti. He promoted education by encouraging promising young Ethiopians to study abroad. He allowed French, Swiss, German, Belgian, and American teachers and doctors to open schools and hospitals in Ethiopia. In 1928 Ras Tafari signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy. The convention provided for economic cooperation with regard to import and export through the Italian port of Aseb, as well as road construction linking Aseb with Dassieh in the northeast of Ethiopia to be jointly owned by Italy and Ethiopia. Following the death of Empress Zewditu in 1930, Ras Tafari took over full power as head of state in Ethiopia.

As emperor, Haile Selassie embarked on further modernization schemes. Within a year of his ascension, he introduced a modern constitution, appointed ministers, and created a parliament of two deliberative chambers. Though the parliament had only advisory functions, it served as a forum for criticizing his regime.

Emperor Haile Selassie’s remarkable success at introducing socioeconomic reforms and establishing a universally respected independence and equality with other nations frustrated Italy’s imperial ambitions. By



October 18, 1935: Emperor Haile Selassie I in the field with his troops in the war against the Italian invasion. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

the early 1930s, Italy under Benito Mussolini had sought to conquer Ethiopia, to make up for an earlier defeat at the Battle of Adowa in 1896 and to establish a North African empire. In 1934 Italian forces were repulsed at the border wells at Walwal in Ogaden Province of Ethiopia. Mussolini used this incident as a pretext for war, portraying Ethiopia as the aggressor. Haile Selassie's trust in collective security, under the aegis of the League of Nations, was betrayed on October 3, 1935, when Italy, in violation of international law, attacked Ethiopia. Italy was victorious against the ill-prepared and virtually helpless Ethiopians and on May 2, 1936, Haile Selassie left Addis Ababa for exile in Jerusalem, and then London. He remained abroad until 1940, when Italy joined the Axis side in World War II and Ethiopia's government in exile joined with the Allied forces. With the support of the Allies, the Italians were driven out of Ethiopia and on May 5, 1941, the emperor returned to Addis Ababa in triumph.

On his return, Haile Selassie immediately established a bilateral relationship with the United States, from whom he secured military and technical assistance with which he strengthened Ethiopia's independence. By 1945 he had firmly established the supremacy of the central government, and in the 1950s established the federation of Eritrea. Ethiopian's constitution was revised in 1955 to provide for the direct election of the Assembly of Deputies by the people; in 1957 the first general elections took place. He introduced a program for the extension of education to university level, improvement of transport and communication, massive industrialization, and the development of more opportunities for employment.

Meanwhile, after the end of World War II in 1945, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie had become an active participant in international affairs. The country became

a staunch supporter of the United Nations, and Ethiopian troops formed part of the United Nations contingent in Korea in 1950 while a similar contribution was later made to the Congo. When the United Nations economic commission for Africa was established in 1958, Addis Ababa became its permanent headquarters. From the early 1960s, Africa became the focal point of Haile Selassie's foreign policy. He played a leading role in the movement for African unity by convening the first conference of African heads of state at Addis Ababa in 1963, at which the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed. Similarly, he visited many African capitals, participating in successful mediation of interstate disputes such as the Algerian-Morocco border war of 1963.

As the years went by, there was serious domestic political opposition, sometimes violent, to the authority of the aging emperor. Economic development in Ethiopia slowed due to a lack of capital, technical know-how, and adequate personnel. Haile Selassie's approach to educational, political, and economic reforms was deemed slow and overly cautious by the country's young intelligentsia. The hostility generated by the growing impatience culminated in an attempted coup, which his loyal troops successfully crushed. Following incessant inflation, coupled with serious drought and famine in the 1970s which claimed several thousands of lives, students, workers, and segments of the army became increasingly restless. From January 1974, there were violent demonstrations. Thereafter, army officers under the chairmanship of Major Mengistu Maile Mariam gradually took over, and on September 12, 1974, they deposed the emperor. Haile Selassie died in Addis Ababa while under house arrest on August 27, 1975.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: **Ethiopia.**

Biography

Haile Selassie I was born in 1892. Appointed governor of Gara Muleta province in 1906. Became governor of Selalie in 1907, governor of Sidamo in 1909, and governor of Harar in 1910. Regent and heir apparent to the throne from 1916 to 1930. Following the death of Empress Zewditu in 1930, he was named Emperor of Ethiopia.

Left for exile in Jerusalem and then London on May 2, 1936, following Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. He returned on May 5, 1941, after joining the Allied forces and forcing Italy out of Ethiopia. Deposed by army officers led by Major Mengistu Maile Mariam on September 12, 1974. Died in Addis Ababa while under house arrest on August 27, 1975.

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Hailey: An African Survey

It is impossible to study the colonial question without becoming aware of the immense influence exerted by Lord Hailey. Undoubtedly, Lord Hailey was one of the most important personalities connected with British imperialism and colonialism in Africa in the twentieth century. He was a typical colonial bureaucrat who had served the crown as governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces in India. During the 1930s, Hailey launched a massive research study on Africa and its problems in relation to colonialism. The outcome of this study was the publication of *An African Survey*, a major treatise on British colonial rule in Africa, in 1938, which made him a noteworthy historical personality in the era of colonialism in Africa.

Hailey's *An African Survey* refers, essentially, to the body of reports that Hailey compiled on colonialism in Africa, in which emphasis was placed on the need for political change, economic reforms and development, and above all, a review of the "indirect rule" system, which was the prevailing system of local administration in British Africa colonies. To appreciate the importance of Lord Hailey's *An African Survey*, it is important to note that scholars of British imperial disengagement from the African colonies have tended to categorize it as part of the evidence of independent metropolitan initiatives on the need for colonial reforms in the immediate prewar years (late 1930s). In this regard, *An African Survey* is often seen as belonging to the category of intellectual and liberal tradition calling for a review of the system of managing African colonies during the interwar and World War II years. Others in the category of Hailey's *An African Survey* included the desultory minutes and opinions expressed by colonial office staff responsible for overseeing the African colonies, such as O. G. R. Williams, Andrew Benjamin Cohen, and Sir Charles Jeffries, among others.

Yet the strength of *An African Survey*, as far as the history of European colonialism in Africa is concerned, lies in its status as a singular, sustained effort by a respected British technocrat to itemize, and then bring into sharp focus, the major projects that he

believed the colonial administration should undertake in the aftermath of the then-looming war. Not surprisingly, Lord Hailey's *An African Survey* has been categorized by many scholars of this period of British policy in Africa in the same class as the *Report of a Commission of Inquiry* (headed by Lord Moyne), published in 1938, on the labor problems in the West Indies. Together with the Moynes Commission Report, Hailey's survey provided one of the earliest indictments of the colonial system, pointing out many of its inadequacies. In the aftermath of the publication of *An African Survey*, Lord Hailey continued to publicize his interest in colonial affairs, especially the need to reassess the strategy of managing British African colonies and bringing some modicum of reforms to these areas.

A particularly significant aspect of *An African Survey* was the meticulously thought out conclusions offered by the author, which suggested a great intellectual engagement with the pressing issues at hand. Hailey traveled extensively across Africa and served on the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, which, in the interwar years, managed some of the dependent territories in Africa, and elsewhere. The importance of Lord Hailey's *An African Survey*, therefore, lies in the fact that it was a major synthesis of a kaleidoscope of information on the resources and opportunities, as well as the socioeconomic problems, of emergent Africa in the first decades of the twentieth century. Clearly, *An African Survey* devoted considerable attention to British administration of its colonies, yet it said much for the way and manner in which other European colonial powers managed their colonies in Africa. Since the end of World War II, Hailey's *An African Survey* has remained a major reference material for scholars interested in the general history and fortune (or misfortune?) of colonialism, especially in British African colonies in a postwar world.

KUNLE LAWAL

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al-Hajj Umar. See Tukolor Empire of al-Hajj Umar.

Hamdallahi Caliphate, 1818–1862

The jihad that created this caliphate occurred in Macina, in the fertile region of the Niger River bend, in the early nineteenth century. Macina was then controlled by Fulani overlords, vassals of the Bambara of Segu. The government was animist in practice, although the ruling king (*ardo*) of Macina was a Muslim. At all levels of society, Islam was amalgamated with traditional African beliefs. Reformers preached a jihad that would restore genuine Islam. They also promised to put an end to the oppressive rule of Segu, liberate slaves if they converted, free pastoralist Fulani from the cattle tax and merchants from market taxes, which, they pointed out, were illegal under Qur'anic law. They attracted a large following. Encouraged by the success of earlier Islamic jihads in the Western Sudan, several Macina marabouts vied for leadership. It was Ahmadu Lobbo who succeeded in overturning the ruling Fulani dynasty and transforming Macina into a powerful Muslim state.

Ahmadu was born in 1775. He spent his youth tending cattle and studying Islamic law. He drew inspiration from another follower of the Qadiriyya brotherhood, Uthman dan Fodio, creator of the neighboring Sokoto caliphate, but maintained his independence from him. Between 1810 and 1815, with ardent support from Fulani pastoralists, Ahmadu won a long war against Segu. The jihadists then captured Djenné (1818). Next, the Fulani Sangare clan revolted against the *ardo* and invited Ahmadu to rule. Other Fulani chiefs quickly declared loyalty. Ahmadu, realizing that they were motivated by self-interest rather than religious conversion, overthrew them one by one. In 1823 he defeated the Fulani of Fittuga (1823) who wanted to launch their own jihad. In 1826–27 he conquered Timbuktu and established a Fulani garrison in the city. Thus, the power of the Macina caliphate extended from Djenné to Timbuktu.

Ahmadu's caliphate was remarkably well organized. The shari'a (Islamic law) was applied to all aspects of life. Ahmadu formed a governing council of forty scholars with executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Important issues were taken up by this council. Since convening a body of this size was cumbersome, he selected two especially outstanding scholars to consider state business prior to submitting it to the council. He furthermore appointed administrators, selected for their high moral standards, to keep a watch on public servants. Courts banned many non-Islamic practices. Punishments were severe. Conversion and education were emphasized. State-sponsored schools were founded throughout the caliphate. Yet, under this

autocratic regime, the needs and rights of individuals and groups within the caliphates were protected.

While mainly concerned with the regulation of cities, Ahmadu also provided for his own pastoral Fulani, who had formed the bulk of the fighting forces during the jihad, and arranged to give them military protection during their annual migration with their herds. He also encouraged them to settle. Slaves who had participated in the jihad were freed; those who did not remained slaves, while more slaves were captured in raids across frontiers and in suppressing rebellions. They were made to cultivate fields for the state, enabling Macina to produce large quantities of grains and vegetables and guarantee a sufficient food supply. Ahmadu founded his own capital, which he called Hamdallahi ("Praise God"). Its mosque was unadorned. An area near the council's meeting hall was reserved to lodge those without means of support. Standards of hygiene were high. Clerics concerned not only with crimes but also with private morality were in charge of policing the city.

Through a combination of diplomacy and force, Ahmadu was able to preserve the frontiers of the caliphate from external aggression. He also succeeded in maintaining peace internally, though the austerity of the rules he imposed brought him into conflict with Djenné and Timbuktu. Here merchants incurred financial losses because Ahmadu's stand against luxury and practices forbidden by Islam, such as the use of alcohol or dancing, strictly enforced by the Censor of Public Morals, made the city less attractive to visitors, and because the wars between Macina and Segu cut them off from gold supplies.

Djenné lost much of its importance when Ahmadu built his own new capital nearby. Timbuktu, on the other hand, persisted in fighting for a measure of self-determination. The Kunta inhabitants, who had produced many great religious leaders themselves, considered Ahmadu an upstart, and led a number of uprisings against him. In the 1840s the governing council of Hamdallahi starved Timbuktu into submission.

Ahmadu died in 1844, and was succeeded by his son Ahmadu II (1844–52), and then his grandson, Ahmadu III (1852–62). Ahmadu II was less skillful than his father had been, and problems soon surfaced. Timbuktu rebelled and succeeded in gaining control of its internal affairs. Ahmadu III deepened the crisis by replacing old respected religious leaders with younger, more liberal men. The caliphate was permeated with intrigues when al-Hajj Umar, leader of the Tukolor jihad, attacked.

Umar, stopped by the French in his northward empire-building drive, had turned east against the kingdom of Segu. So far Umar's victories had been against animists, but his attack on Segu created a confrontation with Macina, a major Muslim power. He had hoped that Macina would align itself with him

against Segu, but Ahmadu III refused, arguing that the Segu kingdom lay within Macina's sphere of influence, and that the responsibility for converting it was Macina's alone. Besides this political dispute, there was also a doctrinal disagreement. Umar, representing the Tijaniyya brotherhood, argued that Macina's scholarly Qadiriyyi elitism did not spread Islam efficiently. Umar's invasion of Segu provoked a violent reaction from the Macina Fulani, who joined forces with the Bambara and Kunta Berbers against him. In 1861 Umar defeated Segu and in the following year marched against Macina. He won, destroyed Hamdallahi, took Timbuktu, and put an end to the Hamdallahi caliphate.

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See also: **Mali (Republic of): Economy and Society, Nineteenth Century.**

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Harare

Harare (formerly Salisbury) is the largest urban center in, and capital city of, Zimbabwe. It is the seat of government and the administrative center for three Mashonaland provinces. It is a focal point of rail, road, and air transport, and has an international airport.

White settlers occupied Harare in September 1890 and named the settlement Fort Salisbury, after Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, then prime minister of Great Britain. In occupying this site, the settlers displaced Chief Gutsa, a Shona leader. The area for settlement was chosen because of the Mukuvisi River's adequate supply of water, reliable rainfall, a considerable expanse of fertile land for cropping, grazing, and hunting, an easily defensible site because of the surrounding hills, and significant supplies of traditional building materials.

The original town center was around the Kopje area, but this formally moved to the Causeway area in 1910. The first buildings were of a pole and dagga nature.

Salisbury got its first newspaper on June 27, 1891, and first magistrate Major Patrick Forbes arrived in the same year. Also, 1891 saw the settlement's first formal town plan and the establishment of a "location" for Africans, about a kilometer south of the Kopje at the site of the present-day residential area of Mbare (called Harari at that time).

Municipal administration came in the form of the Salisbury Sanitary Board, which was established in 1892 with a mandate to provide water and dispose of sewage. It was also to maintain and regulate streets and traffic, deal with obstructions, noises, filth, pollution of water, and fires. In 1897, when Salisbury's white population was well over 1,000, the Sanitary Board gave way to the Municipality of Salisbury. The latter formally established Harari African township, away from the city center because Africans were considered "bad neighbors" for whites.

Although the telegraph line from South Africa had reached Salisbury in February 1892, it was not until August 1897 that the town, now with its first mayor, had its first telephone put into operation. In the same vein, it was only on May 1, 1899, that the railway line from Beira reached Salisbury, well after Bulawayo had received the line. In fact, by the end of 1899, Salisbury, with its population of 1,600 whites, was still essentially a village. Although it was the capital of Southern Rhodesia, it lacked basic amenities, such as electricity, which Bulawayo already had. In 1902 Salisbury was linked by rail with Bulawayo. In 1913 and 1914, it witnessed the opening of the Cleveland Dam and the attendant provision of diesel-generated electricity for improved water and electrical supplies.

In 1935 Salisbury was elevated to city status. This occurred in the wake of the passage of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, which prohibited blacks from acquiring land outside the "reserves." The act contained a provision that set aside land for African townships, which were to be run by advisory boards with consultative, not decision-making, powers.

The city expanded considerably after World War II due to two primary factors. First, the successful development of the manufacturing sector brought with it a significant amount of financial investment. Second, Salisbury became the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This led to a marked increase in development in the Salisbury city center. Since they were providing essential labor services for the colonial administration, Africans were provided with housing in areas like Highfield in 1935, Mabvuku in 1952, and Mufakose in 1959. These residential areas were conveniently situated close to industrial areas to ease labor provision. However, the breakup of the federation in 1963 and the subsequent Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 brought about a recession

and the flight of capital, negatively impacting Salisbury's development. UDI attracted sanctions from the international community, further slowing the city's development. The intensification of the struggle for independence did not make matters any better for Salisbury. The city's situation was worsened by an influx of people from the war-torn rural areas, straining Salisbury's ability to provide basic services.

Since the 1969 Land Tenure Act had sanctioned the "right" of housing for Africans in "white" areas like Salisbury, provision of housing for the growing black population in the 1970s was augmented by the creation of more residential areas like Glen Norah and Glen View. Toward the end of the 1970s, some Africans started moving into "white" suburbs, as some of the houses had been vacated by whites fleeing the war.

From 1980 the independent Zimbabwean government set out to redress the imbalances including those involving the city of Salisbury. In the health sector, the former African residential areas, now high density residential areas, were provided with more clinics, at least one per area. In keeping with the postcolonial government's policy of education for all, Harare City Council built primary and secondary schools. It undertook more or less equitable waste collection and disposal in the city. More residential areas were established, including eWarren Park, Kuwadzana, Hatcliffe, Budiriro, and Sunningdale, in the 1980s. The water supply situation was stable, with Lake Chivero, the Manyame River, and Cleveland and Seke dams providing adequate water, except in the drought years of 1983–84 and 1991–92. The city faces the increasing problem of "squatters" and "street kids." Public transport remains inadequate, but more worrying is the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Race, however, is no longer as divisive an issue as it was in the period up to 1980.

GOVERNMENT CHRISTOPHER PHIRI

See also: **Zimbabwe.**

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Harris, William Wade (c.1865–1929)

Religious Leader

William Wade Harris was a prominent religious leader in twentieth-century West Africa. His formal entry into the Episcopal Church opened up opportunities for Harris. Less than a year after his confirmation, he became a part-time unpaid teacher's aide at the boarding school operated by the Episcopal Church at Half Graway. A few years afterward he became a salaried employee of the church, as assistant teacher at the school and catechist at the mission. In 1907 he was appointed head of the school, a position he continued to hold long after he became the interpreter for the Liberian government for the Graway area the following year. Seemingly emboldened by his improved social and economic status, Harris became involved in political affairs. Some traditional authorities asked him to intervene with the government on their behalf. At other times, he interceded with national and local leaders on his own volition. He became sufficiently politically prominent to gain audiences with Liberian President Arthur Barclay and other high officials. Before long however, his activities got him into difficulty with the president, who had Harris arrested in 1909 during a roundup of alleged plotters against the state. He spent more than three years in prison following his conviction.

Harris underwent a religious transformation while he was incarcerated. According to him, an angel, who anointed him "the last prophet" and instructed him to prepare the world for the imminent coming of Jesus Christ, visited him. On his release from prison, the prophet set out on his "duty" as commissioned by the angel. Between 1912 and 1920 he walked across much of the coastal regions of Liberia, the Côte d'Ivoire, and the then British Gold Coast preaching to those who would listen. His message was simple: followers of traditional religions should abandon their fetishes and take up the true religion, the message of Christ. He baptized those who accepted his message. For himself, he requested only food and shelter. He converted an estimated 200,000 West African practitioners of indigenous religions. A separate campaign in Sierra Leone in 1916–17 and continuous work in Liberia between 1920 and 1922 swelled the number of his converts by tens of thousands. He also spawned a number of apostles who took his message deep into the interior of the Côte d'Ivoire and won thousands of converts.

The volume of his conversions was truly remarkable, especially in the Côte d'Ivoire, the site of more than half of the conversions. Harris was in the Côte d'Ivoire from September 1913 to January 1914 and again from August 1914 to January 1915. On the intervention of the Society of African Missions (SAM), French authorities arrested him for preaching without a license and ordered his expulsion. However, upon discovering that he had been successful in getting indigenes to abandon traditional religions, stop drinking alcohol, and work their fields or seek paid employment, the lieutenant governor ordered his release. With its base of returning Africans, Liberia had started with a Christian base that was expanded upon by American missionaries. The Gold Coast also had a strong Christian presence, the results of the work of Anglican and Methodist missionaries. In contrast, the Christian community in the Côte d'Ivoire was meager even after two decades of continuous effort by the SAM, a French Roman Catholic order. The first Protestant missionary, Rev. H. G. Martin of the Wesleyan Methodist Society, arrived in the Côte d'Ivoire shortly before the outward voyage of Harris.

Harris had not intended to create a new denomination. At home in Liberia, he expected his converts to join the existing Christian community. Markedly, he did not direct them to do so. Guided by his intention to return to his family in Liberia, he directed the followers in the Côte d'Ivoire "to go to the Christian Church." Roman Catholic missionaries and some converts interpreted "Christian Church" to mean Catholic, while Wesleyan missionaries and some of the Harris converts decided that it meant the Wesleyan Methodist Church. Thus some of the converts flocked to the Catholic Church while others turned to the Wesleyan Church. However, after clerics and missionaries of the two denominations insisted that the converts had to be instructed properly in the tenets of their respected religion and to be baptized before they could be accepted fully into the faith, the vast majority of the converts banded together and created the Harriste Church. Many had associated baptism with a rite of passage, and as with other such rites with which they were more familiar, a person could experience it only once. In Liberia, the prophet's continued evangelization kept his followers under his direction. Eventually, that community also evolved into the Harrisite Church. It views itself as the true Christian Church and continues to exist as a vibrant sizeable denomination in both countries.

ASHTON WESLEY WELCH

See also: Côte d'Ivoire; Liberia; Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Colonial Africa: Prophetic Movements.

Biography

Born to Grebo parents in Liberia. In his early teens, moved from his parents' home in Glogbale to live with the Reverend Jesse Lowrie in the nearby town of Sinoe. Tutored in Grebo and English and baptized. Returned home as an adolescent but soon left again to become a crew boy working on ships along the West African coast. Attended Anglican services during stopovers in Lagos. Married Rose Badock Farr in 1884. Confirmed in the Protestant Episcopal Church. Died 1929.

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
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Hausa Polities: Origins, Rise

The Hausa states were found between the Niger River and Lake Chad, between the kingdom of Bornu and Mali. Immigration and conquest mark Hausa history. The Hausa people themselves are a conglomerate of a number of different people who have been incorporated into the "original" stock through conquest or merger. A common language, Hausa, and a common religion, Islam, tend to blend the people into a more homogeneous group. Hausa tradition states that there are seven "true" Hausa states, the "Hausa bakwai," and seven derived or illegitimate states, the "Hausa banza." Tradition further states that all Hausa people derived from the Hausa bakwai, the "true" seven states. Daura, founded by Daura, a woman, is the senior city among the Hausa states. The Hausa origin myth recognizes this seniority by noting that the culture hero Bayajidda, the son of the king of Baghdad, arrived in Daura after visiting Bornu. A snake had made its dwelling place in the town well, making it difficult for people to drink from it. Bayajidda managed to kill the snake, and he took the queen in marriage as his reward. Their marriage produced a son, Bawo. In turn, Bawo fathered six sons of his own. These sons founded the six true Hausa states: Daura, Katsina, Zazzau (Zaria), Gobir, Kano, and Rano. Bayajidda had another son, a child with his first wife, Magira, a Kanuri. That son founded Biram, the seventh state of the Hausa bakwai.

HAUSA POLITIES: ORIGINS, RISE



Hausa states, thirteenth–eighteenth centuries.

History does not yet yield an exact date for the migration and merger of peoples that led to the development of the Hausa people. What is known is that the seven kingdoms resulted from a mixture of newly arrived foreigners and local people because of urbanization in northern Nigeria. Capital cities became centers of power and rule. These new cities were walled and fortified and marked the rise of kingship in the region. Over time, these kings controlled trade in the region along the Niger River in what became northern Nigeria. The Habe rulers turned to Islam to aid their government organization. However, until the Fulani jihad of the nineteenth century, the Habe continued to worship their traditional gods. The Habe reign lasted until 1804 when the Fulani conquered the area.

The Hausa states specialized in various crafts and trade goods. Kano, for example, was known for its dyed cotton fabrics and so-called Moroccan leather, while Zaria specialized in slave trading. Slaves, who were generally captured warriors, built the walled towns, which enabled the Hausa to resist their various enemies and protect their control of much of the trans-Saharan trade. Katsina and Kano became centers of caravan routes. Hausa traders established *sabon gari* (strangers' quarters) all over Nigeria. These *sabon gari* helped the Hausa to set up efficient trade networks, securing access to markets in other parts of West Africa.

The Hausa organized areas surrounding their walled capitals into residential clusters of wards or hamlets. Each of these political and residential units had a head. In turn, the wards were part of a village which itself was under the control of a village head. Villages were organized and controlled under the

leadership of a titled official who held the land under the Emir or chief. The official lived in the capital where he could serve the Emir and be under his control. Fiefs were attached to particular tribes and were granted by the emir, or head of the state. The fief holder chose officials to administer the lands under his care. These officials were responsible to him. The village chief was the most important local administrator. His responsibilities included collection of taxes, recruiting men for military service, organizing road labor, and settling minor disputes.

Hausa trading centers became the center of a new urban Muslim Hausa culture, succeeding pre-Hausa states, and the Mbau kingdoms that formed part of a series of shrines, which featured fairs at which disputes were mediated. These early kingdoms seem to have been formed around 1500, around the time the Habe rulers converted to Islam. Islam certainly enabled the Hausa to oversee the flowering of a powerful culture whose height was about the middle of the seventeenth century. Kano and Katsina became centers of Islamic scholarship and trade, profiting from the rivalry between Morocco and the Ottoman Empire. From the mid-seventeenth century on, the Hausa states were engaged in a series of military conflicts, ending with the victory of the Fulani in the nineteenth-century jihad.

FRANK A. SALAMONE

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Hausa Polities: Urbanism, Industry, and Commerce

There are several myths and theories relating the origin of the Hausa people. According to one, the founder of the Hausa came from Iraq; this myth highlights the source of Islam, across the Sahara. Other theories maintain that the Hausa moved to their land following the desertification of the Sahel regions. One more theory argues that the Hausas originated from the Lake Chad region and subsequently spread westwards. Hausaland eventually developed into an area marked by highly urbanized city-states. The *hausa bakwai*, or original Hausa cities, include Biram, Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Rano, and Zazzau. The later settlements include Jukun, Gwari, Kebbi, Yoruba, Nupe, Yoruba, Yawuri, and Zamfara.

The earliest immigrants to Hausaland arrived from the Sahel regions. They inhabited the Fulbe settlements in Hausaland from the fifteenth century. Tuareg followed in the footsteps of the Fulbe. People from Bornu and Songhay also settled in small communities. Arab traders, settling primarily in cities, were another group.

Families (*gidaje*), under chiefs (*maigari*), formed small rural communities (*kauyuka*). These constituted the villages, which were permanent settlements, headed by the *sarkin gari* or village chiefs. The *birane* or district capital was in most cases a walled city of a considerable size that functioned as the seat of political power and the center of commercial activities. These centers were generally understood to include regions of authority, usually called *kasas*. At the head of the *kasa* was the ruler or *sarki* who, in theory, had absolute power, and was considered as sacred in the early period. This was not necessarily a hereditary position, as a council of the nine, or the *Tara*, most often elected someone to the post. In Kebbi, soldiers rose to this position, while in other places it was generally filled by a member of the local aristocracy. The *sarki's* authority was exercised through a body of officials, comprised of family members and town officials. Guilds, immigrants, and Islamic scholars had their own representatives and exercised some forms of authority and influence over the *sarki's* decisions that related directly to them.

Present-day Hausaland includes vast resources of iron ore and stretches over a region characterized by fertile and rich soil. While the former factor encouraged the development of refined iron-working, leading to the production of excellent weapons, tools, and utensils, the latter fact enabled a rich agricultural program. The produced goods included crops like millet, sorghum, rice, maize, peanuts, cotton, and indigo.

By far the largest component of Hausa society was the free peasants, living in the *kauyuka*, centered in the villages or the *garuruwa*, which were scattered around the *birane*. They were the primary agriculturists and formed the largest body of taxpayers, contributing the *kudin kasa*, or land tax. As in the economic and social structure of the society, the family came to represent the unit of taxation too.

Although some ethnic groups were enslaved, usually as a result of wars on the frontiers, slavery was not widespread, although palace slaves were found in major cities. The first slave settlements seem to have originated from Fulbe herders who bought or captured slaves and formed agricultural estates driven by slave labor, possibly as early as the eighteenth century. Based on the available evidence, it is currently assumed that Hausaland never became a slave-exporting region, with the exception of Kawar and Zawila, which participated in the slave trade probably in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries.

Craftsmen were usually centered in either the *garuruwa* or the *birane*. By the sixteenth century, highly specialized groups of artisans were formed who eventually came to be represented by guilds in local political affairs. Makers of leatherwork, saddles, sandals, and jewelry were all represented.

The Hausa traders (*bahaushe*) and trading networks penetrated the Western Sudan, distributing domestic products like textiles, fabrics, hides, and salt, as well as handicrafts and slaves. They imported European goods, and the natural stimulant of kola nuts. The regional trade, represented to a great extent by the *bahaushe*, used caravans and relied on a regular network of markets. Their role in urban development was key, as they came to form in many places the prosperous and established middle class.

The upper echelons of society included the nobility, the city governments, and the representatives of integrated ethnicities like the Fulbe. These, however, never formed a universal class of rulers and authority was maintained through various bodies of institutions. Taxation was levied on all elements of the society, including the free peasants and the herdsmen paying to the nobility, while the craftsmen and traders paid direct and indirect taxes (custom duties or the *kudin hito*) to cities. Most high-ranking officials, governors, and dignitaries regularly received gifts from all elements of the local society. The turbulent inter-city rivalries brought about frequent raiding and pillaging of the neighboring *kasa*. The captured slaves, horses, and cattle were incorporated into local economies, although, as has been noted, the sale of slaves was rare.

By the early nineteenth century, even the economically strong states of Kano and Katsina had grown politically weak. They were integrated into the largest state in the modern Western Sudan, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was the result of the Fulbe jihad.

LÁSZLÓ MÁTHÉ-SHIRE

See also: **Rumfa, Muhammad.**

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Hausa Polities: Warfare, Nineteenth Century

The Hausa had ruled much of what became Northern Nigeria since before the thirteenth century. In the

1790s, however, a Fulani Muslim teacher, Usman dan Fodio (1751–1817), disputed with the rulers of the northern city of Gobir. The dispute concerned their practice of Islam. dan Fodio argued that the rulers, following common Hausa practice, had mixed “pagan” practices with Islamic ones and did not adhere closely enough to Islam.

dan Fodio was the leading Fulani Muslim leader in Gobir, the northern most Hausa state and the most militant of the states. The political situation at the time was quite sensitive. The Taureg’s had become a dominant military force in the region, and the Gobir rulers had turned south to spread their power, spreading into Zamfara and Kebbi.

The dissolution of the Songhai Empire left a power vacuum, and the Fulani pastoralists rushed into the area. The Muslim Hausa rulers of Gobir hired dan Fodio as a court cleric. However, he used that position to gain control over a Muslim community he developed away from Gobir. He enforced the strict principles of the Qadiriyyah on his followers. Gobir’s kings realized that dan Fodio’s community threatened their power. They tried to control the group but dan Fodio declared himself an independent Muslim ruler (*amir al-mu’minin*) or, in Hausa, *sarkin musulmi*.

dan Fodio gathered a large following of Fulani pastoralists, who had their own feud with Gobir’s rulers concerning the cattle tax (*jangali*). A number of Hausa commoners (*talakawa*) also participated in the holy war or jihad. The jihad moved relentlessly through all of the Hausa states and captured the walled cities (*birni*) of the Hausa, sweeping south into the Nupe and Yoruba areas.

In 1804, then, the Fulani launched their jihad against the Hausa people of Gobir, Zamfara, Kebbi, and Yauri. By 1808 the Fulani had defeated the Hausa peoples of Gobir. The Fulani leader Shehu (Sheik) Usman dan Fodio divided his conquest into two areas. He knew that he was more a scholar than a political leader. Therefore, he turned over the day-to-day control of the eastern part of the empire to his son Muhammad Bello. Bello ruled from Sokoto while dan Fodio’s brother Abdullahi was given the western area. Abdullahi settled in Gwandu.

In 1809, then, dan Fodio made his son, Muhammad Bello, emir of Sokoto and overlord of the eastern emirates. When his father died in 1817, Bello became leader of the faithful (*sarkin musulmi*) and first sultan of Sokoto. This control made him both the spiritual and political leader of the Fulani Empire, and the empire reached its highest political and spiritual point under his direction.

The Hausa, or Habe, made numerous attempts to overthrow the Fulani usurpers. Muhammad (1817–37), however, was able to turn the Hausa attempts back and rally the Sokoto Empire behind him. For example,

the southern area of the empire in Yauri was the scene of a number of revolts. Nevertheless, Bello managed to quell them with his uncle’s help from Gwandu. In 1853 Sokoto further consolidated its power by joining the British in a trade treaty, one the Fulani strengthened in 1885. Although Bello and his successors opposed British domination, the British defeated the Fulani in 1903.

FRANK A. SALAMONE

See also: ‘Uthman dan Fodio.

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Health: Medicine and Disease: Colonial

Disease and medicine played an important role in the process of European colonization of Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Until the mid-nineteenth century, when the activities of the European merchants were limited to the coastal regions, the image of Africa that emerged from European travelers’ accounts was that of the “white man’s grave” because of the high rates of mortality and morbidity from infectious and parasitic diseases, including yellow fever, malaria, typhoid, typhus, and cholera. The main underlying assumption was that the Africans were believed to have inherited or naturally acquired immunity against several diseases because, although they too died from these diseases, they often exhibited mild to moderate symptoms.

The development, after 1871, of the exploration movement by various European geographical societies using faster ships increased the incidence and prevalence of infectious and parasitic diseases. The 1878 yellow fever pandemic, which struck most Atlantic societies ranging from West Africa to Brazil and New Orleans, shut down the French administration in Saint-Louis during the summer months and early fall. Subsequent malaria, yellow fever, and cholera epidemics slowed down European commercial activities along the coast and the exploration of the interior of Africa.

Colonial wars during the “scramble for Africa,” through the movement of troops and refugee populations, spread viruses, parasites, and bacteria from contact with previously isolated or unexposed people.

Colonial medicine was linked to the colonial state itself and early on focused on preserving the health of the European troops and civilians and the natives who were in contact with them in various capacities (interpreters and other employees, prostitutes, and prisoners) in urban centers, mining compounds, plantations, and missions. But doctors did not have a clear understanding of the etiology and epidemiology of many diseases and, until the mid-nineteenth century, remedies and cures were mainly based on either misinformation or incorrect assumptions. No surgery could be safely performed before the invention of antiseptics (1864). The *modus operandi* of the major scourges was not known until 1880 for typhoid fever, 1881 and 1901 for yellow fever (vector and virus), 1882 for tuberculosis, 1883 for cholera, 1892 for malaria, and 1894 and 1898 for plague (organism and vector). Only vaccination against smallpox, despite technical problems of transportation and preservation and popular opposition, had some success. Quinine prophylaxis became more effective only with the implementation of vector control measures in the 1890s.

In the absence of effective cures for these diseases, health officials adopted an environmental approach to disease causation and explained the causes of most diseases in terms of contagion and miasmas generated by decaying matter in the tropical environment because tropical Africa was perceived as disease-stricken. Doctors also attributed high mortality to the living and working conditions of the African poor, including overcrowding, unhealthy living conditions, “offensive trades” (slaughtering, tanning, dyeing), inadequate waste disposal, and cemeteries. These miasmatic theories led to strategies of avoidance and segregation (evasive measures, temporary camps in more salubrious locations) as protective measures against disease threats. Military garrison and prisons became the primary sites of medical observation and experimentation. Thus, at the time of growth of the sanitary movement in Europe, colonial officials defined health problems as engineering problems that called for engineering solutions.

Despite its early weaknesses, colonial medicine struggled to establish itself as the official or legal medicine among the Africans who continued to rely on their own theories and perceptions of health and disease. Doctors, missionaries, and administrators waged a propaganda war against indigenous healers, diviners, and other rainmakers, perceived as the main obstacle to the progress of Western medicine, and they eventually drove healers underground.

The bacteriological revolution or the germ theory of the 1880s–1890s provided doctors with a more scientific approach to public health and with the means of social control through the control of crucial techniques (drugs, spectacular surgical interventions), access to “taboo” areas, and participation of physicians in the decision-making process involving the administration of the colonial society. Colonial officials used medicine as a key tool in their “civilizing mission.” Missionaries, who saw disease as a tangible manifestation of the evil, approached cure as just the first step in the long process of conversion. The germ theory also inspired policies of separation between white residential areas and “native” quarters in colonial cities.

The expansion of the colonial state in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also contributed to the spread of disease, mortality, and morbidity. In Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, for example, the forced collection of rubber and ivory in remote rain forest exposed people to new strains of infectious agents. Sleeping sickness spread along the major waterways and took epidemic proportions. The forced peasant cultivation of commercial crops at the expense of subsistence agriculture led to malnutrition, which compromised people’s immune systems and made them vulnerable to diseases. In Southern Africa overcrowding, low wages, poor diets, and unsanitary conditions resulted in the spread of tuberculosis among labor migrants, who brought the disease to rural areas. Nowhere were social tensions and resentments greater than in the colonial cities, whose growth resulted in serious health problems of sewerage, breeding places for mosquitoes, and garbage collection. However, improvements in sanitation, working and living conditions, and nutrition led to the reduction of mortality and morbidity.

World War I disrupted the existing disease control programs. War effort, including labor conscription, the collection of forest products for export, and forced cultivation of cotton and rice, affected the health of millions of Africans and reduced their resistance to malaria, influenza, typhoid fever, and plague, which killed millions of people. Although during the interwar period better public health measures and the development of medical services reduced the incidence of disease and mortality, World War II saw the deterioration of public health conditions.

In the 1940s and 1950s medical advances, especially the widespread use of sulphur drugs and antibiotics, and the research undertaken in the discipline of “tropical medicine” helped reduce the incidence of infectious and parasitic diseases and improve living conditions among the urban residents and an increasing number of rural Africans.

KALALA J. NGALAMULUME

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Health: Medicine and Disease: Postcolonial

In nearly every statistic, Africans, especially in the sub-Saharan regions, fare worse than any other peoples in rates of mortality, life expectancy, access to clean water and health care. Africa is not a naturally diseased continent, but it is a continent with a great deal of poverty, and Africans' poor health has primarily been a result of poverty. People's health status, the diseases to which they are subjected, and the medical systems upon which they can rely are greatly dependent on their economic status. Africans have suffered and continue to suffer and die from diseases and illnesses which in other places would be preventable and treatable. Infectious and parasitic diseases account for the majority of illness and mortality, and consequently adults in Africa are more likely to die from malaria or tuberculosis while adults in industrialized countries die more often from cancer and heart disease. As a result of economic difficulties African governments in the late 1990s were spending less than ten dollars U.S. per person annually on health.



Nurses in the missionary hospital of Kikoko, Kenya, 1999 © Andrea Kuenzig/Das Fotoarchiv.

Even small amounts of money properly directed can have a significant impact on public health. Unfortunately, the public health and medical systems in most of Africa in the immediate postcolonial period were continuations of the colonial systems and were exactly opposite of what was most needed. Rather than focus on public health, disease prevention, and primary care for all citizens, health policies privileged clinics and hospitals whose purpose was curative medicine. Some countries have continued this focus: as of the late 1990s Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Togo all spent over 80 per cent of their national health budgets on hospitals (Turshen, 1999, p.15).

Under the leadership of the World Health Organization, African countries dedicated themselves to a program of Primary Health Care (PHC) with an optimistic goal of Health for All by 2000. The key concept of the PHC initiative has been to move away from hospital-based medicine and toward rural clinics and effective public health measures. Health policy planners in the 1990s, recognizing the influence of indigenous practitioners, tried to incorporate traditional healers, herbalists, and traditional birth attendants into health care efforts and public health campaigns. As a result of policy changes and the impact of antibiotics and immunizations, between 1960 and 1990 the infant mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa fell by 37 per cent while the life expectancy increased by twelve years to fifty-two.

African governments and international agencies have recognized the importance of a population's health for the overall development of African countries, but the multiplicity of projects and programs has left a mixed record. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1980s were proclaiming themselves dedicated to health for development, they were also insisting that as a component of structural adjustment programs some African countries limit medical care. Large development projects like dams, while intended to be development motors, have often had the unintended consequences of aiding the spread of water-related diseases such as schistosomiasis and malaria.

Projects that focus on individual diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections, tuberculosis, and smallpox, often come at the detriment of attention to overall health problems, but they have had quite positive effects. International efforts resulted in the eradication of smallpox by 1980, and impressive gains toward the eradication of polio and dracunculiasis/Guinea worm are being made. In the meantime research continues on the development of vaccines to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS. The problem of HIV/AIDS requires special mention, as the pre-eminent health and development problem facing the continent. By 2002 infection rates in Southern Africa



Ogunlola, a well-known Benin natural healer, and his helpers mixing a lotion; the fat used is shea butter (from the shea nut). He mixes three plants into the fat—his own recipe for curing a variety of skin diseases. Porto Novo, Benin, 2000. © Henning Christoph/Das Fotoarchiv.

in particular had reached astronomical levels, including 20 per cent of adults in South Africa, and over 30 per cent of adults in Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho. The response to HIV/AIDS by African countries has been mixed, with some leaders like Presidents Moi and Mbeki being slow to deal with the problem. In contrast, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda dedicated his government from the late 1980s to broad public information and prevention efforts that led to a decrease in infection rates, the only country in Africa to show this kind of success. Organizations like UNAIDS, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have assisted African health professionals with prevention campaigns, but the cost of drugs for HIV/AIDS limits treatment options.

There are some notable regional differences in health status across the continent. Health conditions for people in North Africa are the best on the continent, excepting the effects of the Algerian violence in the 1990s and the continuing problem of schistosomiasis in Egypt that has been exacerbated by the Aswan High Dam. Across sub-Saharan Africa people in East Africa have enjoyed lower adult mortality and higher life expectancy at age fifteen than people in West or Central Africa. Southern Africans also have lower life expectancies than East Africans, due in large part to the influence of South Africa. South Africa is only just beginning to overcome the legacy of apartheid on health for the majority of its citizens, and the majority of the African population continues to suffer the worst health, with poor housing, unsafe working conditions, and fewer resources for medical care. In addition, countries surrounding South Africa have higher rates of adult male mortality due to illnesses, especially tuberculosis, contracted by migrant laborers who work in South Africa and then return home infected.

In spite of some positive trends on the continent many troubles remain. The biggest difficulties are in areas where armed conflicts continue: the Lakes region of Central Africa and the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo; Liberia and Sierra Leone; and Sudan. The unrest in these regions is destroying people's ability to farm and has a detrimental impact on their livelihood and health. Hunger and even starvation often result. Troops and refugees moving across wide areas spread disease with them and cause further disruption. Refugee camps are breeding grounds for cholera and other intestinal diseases, while the weakened state of the refugees leaves them vulnerable to common infections. Africans also have some of the same health problems as the rest of the world, including with alcohol, recreational drugs, and tobacco, and the highest rate of mortality from motor vehicle accidents in the world.

Even in relatively stable countries there exist segments of the population whose health suffers and who have less access than others to health care. In most countries the rural populations are at a distinct disadvantage in public health and health care programs. Urban areas are more likely to have sanitation systems and safe water, although these became strained by the large urban growth of the 1980s. Larger cities have also boasted the most extensive health care facilities. Many politicians used government resources, including health care, to reward urban voters, robbing people in the rural areas of their share of medicine and health care.

Women and children have been and continue to be the most vulnerable to illness, and yet the least likely to receive the health care they need. Since women are more likely than men to be mired in poverty they are more susceptible to nearly all health problems and are less able to pay for medical care. Many women are left in the relatively unhealthy rural areas without support while men head to the cities to find work. Women are also hit harder by food shortages and famines, and illness among any in a community increases the burden on women because they are the primary caregivers for sick family and neighbors. Maternal mortality, including deaths from unsafe abortions, is higher in Africa than anywhere. In sub-Saharan Africa "a woman has a 1 in 21 chance of dying of pregnancy-related causes during her reproductive life, compared with 1 in 54 in Asia and 1 in 2,089 in Europe" (Graham, p.106). Recent studies have begun to point attention to domestic violence, rape, and female circumcision/genital mutilation as health issues affecting women across Africa.

African children still suffer from the highest under age five mortality in the world. While diseases like diarrhea, measles, HIV/AIDS, and malaria continue to take their toll, it is recognized that a major underlying cause of high child mortality is overall malnutrition. Researchers are also coming to recognize that special

problems exist in deficiencies of protein, iron, vitamin A, and iodine. One response to infant malnutrition has been to promote breastfeeding of children for at least the first six months of life. Breastfeeding has many benefits, helping to protect infants from disease, and as a healthy and safe alternative to expensive, incorrectly prepared commercial infant formulas. One problem with breastfeeding in the last decade has been the recognition of HIV transmission via breast milk. However, given the benefits of breastfeeding, mothers in regions with very high HIV infection rates are urged to continue breastfeeding even with the possible transmission of HIV to the child. Better than any other example, this demonstrates the difficult decisions Africans make daily in their struggle for healthy lives.

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Herding, Farming, Origins of: Sahara and Nile Valley

Africa developed original forms of neolithization, rather than mere diffusion of models from the Middle East. Cattle were locally domesticated, and at least as early as in the Levant, from the aurochs, which were living throughout the whole northern Africa since the beginning of the Quaternary (the current geological period of the last 2 million years). For ovicaprids the issue is less sure, however, imports from the Middle East seem very unlikely. Moreover, the early type of the Saharan sheep is an archaic one, and linguists point out that some very old roots for naming ovicaprids can be found in (reconstructed) African languages from the Afro-Asiatic and Nilo-Saharan blocks. Pastoral nomadism in order to exploit the steppe seems to be a local invention of the Saharan people. As for cultivated plants, the southern Sahara and the Sahel adopted

particular African species (millet, sorghum, yam, African rice). Even ceramic was invented in Africa around 8500BCE,¹ approximately 1500 years before it was adopted in the Middle East.

Nile Valley: Egypt and Nubia

Early evidence is lacking for Lower Egypt, where the living sites have been overlaid by recent alluvial deposits. But in Upper Egypt and in Egyptian or Sudanese Nubia, many sites dating from the very end of the Palaeolithic toward 15,000 to 10,000BCE can be found. Their flints are of microlithic type (a type called "epipalaeolithic" or "Late Stone Age") and diverse. Some social features already point to the neolithic way of life. This is called the "Nilotic Adjustment," a broad-spectrum economy notably characterized by semi-sedentism. The sites were specialized—some in collective hunting of the hartebeest or the aurochs, others in bird-hunting, fishing, or in intensive gathering of wild cereals—and people seasonally returned to the same place for the same activity. The notion of "territory" was emerging. The territory now allowed the local accumulation of capital, either material, technical, linguistic, or spiritual, which constituted the identity of an ethnic group spatially confined. It seasonally exploited, with its own culture, the diverse resources of a unique biotope, but with exclusive rights in it. As a consequence, a new social phenomenon developed: war, in the modern meaning, between important groups able to conquer or defend the more advantageous biotopes.

After 10,000BCE, a dark age of several millenia occurred. During the "Great Wet Phase" of the early Holocene (or, the last 10,000 years) the Nile flooded, the alluvial flat was under water, and the sites of the "Nilotic Adjustment" were often swept away. But around 6,000BCE, sedentary groups appear again, population densities are obviously increasing, the first ceramic sherds are visible in the assemblages, and toward 5,000 to 4,000BCE real villages suddenly come to light, fully neolithized, totally sedentary, and with cemeteries. The villagers raised various domestic animals, such as cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, and pigs. On the sites of Lower Egypt, wheat, barley, and flax were commonly cultivated, as illustrated by the presence of charred grains, store pits, sickles, and threshing tools. Near 3,800BCE the urban phase (the "Amratian" phase) began, with the foundation of Hierakonpolis in Upper Egypt. This initiates the predynastic period, which will end around 3,000BCE, with the advent of the first pharaohs.

Sudan

As the Great Wet Phase came to an end, the whole southern Sudan was interspersed with lakes and permanent rivers, as were also the whole southern Sahara

and the Sahel. Sites were numerous, and the inhabitants were already sedentary or quasi sedentary with a frequent return on the same place. Fishers, mollusk, and land turtle gatherers, and hippopotamus hunters were living there. The archaeological remains include harpoons and fishhooks, as well as pottery from 6,000BCE onward. The latter is usually linked with gathering of wild cereals. However, neither trace of domestic animals nor cultivated cereals has yet been found. These sites have been given the collective name of Aqualithic. According to some linguists, the Aqualithic could have been the origin of the linguistic block of the Nilo-Saharan.

In the upper layers of these Sudanese sites, around 5,000 to 4,500BCE, the first domesticated animals appear. This is the period known as the Shaheinab Neolithic.

Sahara

In the Sahara, the long climatic episode of the Postaterian Hyperarid Phase came to an end around 12,000BCE. At that point, animals repopulated the desert, and toward the beginning of the Holocene, approximately 9,000BCE, humans returned as well. This is the starting point of the Great Wet phase. Until its end, around 6,000BCE, water sources were numerous, and much of the Sahara became a steppe that could be easily traveled in all directions. Traces of hearths or small campsites are found, even in the large plains. However, the living sites are more numerous in the massifs, which received more rain. Hunting was becoming very specialized, often focused upon a single species: mainly the Barbary sheep (*Ammotragus lervia*) or the hartebeest. The collection of wild cereals was increasing, attested to by the abundance of heavy or small grinding stones and pestles. Sedentism was becoming the rule, as in the villages excavated at Amekni (Ahaggar), Ti-n-Torha (Acacus), and Nabta Playa (Egyptian Western Desert), with sometimes constructions in durable materials. Pottery appeared here very early: as soon as 8,500BCE at El Adam (Egyptian Western Desert), and Tagalagal (Air), and around 8,000BCE at Amekni, Ti-n-Torha, and Wadi Akhdar (Gilf Kebir, Egypt).²

These early sites, characterized by the presence of pottery but a lack of domestic animals, are grouped by Francophone researchers into a unit named “Saharo-Sudanese Neolithic,” which includes the many sites of the Aqualithic in the southern Sahara. Both terms are the names, not of a discrete ethnic group, but of a somewhat artificial set of sites that have some neolithic features in common, notably a frequent pottery with decorations impressed before firing.

After the Great Wet phase, a short arid period occurred, followed by the Neolithic Wet phase (c.5,000–3,000BCE). Many sites from the Atlantic up to the eastern Sahara bones of cattle and ovicaprids, both surely domestic, have been found. This period also marks the arrival of rock art throughout the Sahara. Contrary to previously held views, which claimed that the beginnings of the Saharan rock art would go back to preneolithic or even palaeolithic times, the earliest schools date only from the Neolithic Wet phase.

Between approximately 3,000 and 1,500BCE, a severe arid episode occurred: the Postneolithic Arid phase. It put an end to the Saharan pastoral societies. A short wet period around 1,000BCE allowed some Berber groups to reoccupy the massifs. Afterward, aridity steadily increased, and the actual desert became established. During the first millennium BCE, a prestigious domestic animal, the horse, was introduced from an unspecified Mediterranean region, but only for a few centuries. The horse was used for pulling chariots, mainly for racing. More significant was the introduction of the camel, shortly before the beginning of the Common Era. This animal brought a radical transformation in the relations between populations, whether through peaceful exchanges or war.

In terms of cultivated plants, only the palm tree was exploited at an early stage, as illustrated in rock art dating to the Neolithic Wet phase. Even in the oases, the earliest traces of cultivated cereals only go back to dates approaching the first millennium BCE, and evidence is scanty. It seems likely that wheat and barley were cultivated in the Wadi el-Agial (Fezzan), as was millet at Tichitt (Mauritania), and sorghum, millet, and African rice at some sites in the Sahel.

ALFRED MUZZOLINI

Notes

1. All 14C dates in this entry are “calibrated” (i.e., translated into usual calendar years).
2. For French-speaking researchers the criterion of the Neolithic is pottery, for English-speaking researchers it is food-production, i.e., domestic animals or cultivated plants. The two criteria do not necessarily coincide.

See also: **Egypt, Ancient: Agriculture; Egypt, Ancient: Predynastic Egypt and Nubia: Historical Outline; Hunting, Foraging; Iron Age (Early): and Development of Farming in Eastern Africa; Iron Age (Early): Farming, Equatorial Africa; Iron Age (Early): Herding, Farming, Southern Africa.**

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Herero: See Namibia (Southwest Africa): Nama and Herero Risings.

Hieroglyphics: See Egypt, Ancient: Hieroglyphics and Origins of Alphabet.

Historiography of Africa

Historiography, in the strict sense, is concerned not with what happened in the past, but with what people believed happened in the past, and most especially, what historians have written about the past. The historical study of Africa has witnessed several phases, notably precolonial, colonial, postcolonial, Marxist, and postmodernist historiographies. These divisions are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.

Precolonial Historiographies

The study of African history dates back to the beginning of history writing itself. Herodotus (484–c.424 BCE) visited Egypt and wrote about Egyptian civilization in his seminal work, *The Histories* (c.455 BCE). Similar references to Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Maghreb occurred in the works of other classical writers such as Pliny, Strabo, and Ptolemy. These writings, however, had their limitations. They were eclectic and perfunctory, byproducts of occasional journeys, military incursions, and maritime voyages. Besides, the authenticity of their sources and conclusions remain doubtful and questionable. The most valuable of these early accounts was *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (The Voyage of the Indian Ocean), written by an Alexandrian Greek around the year 100. It provided

the most comprehensive and illuminating report on the east African coastal trading cities of Azania before the Islamic era.

The advent of Islam brought literacy to many parts of Africa. Notable Islamic scholars like al-Masudi (950), al-Idrisi (1154), and Leo Africanus (1494–1552) all left accounts about African societies that they visited or heard about. Our knowledge of Sudanese empires would be much less comprehensive, but for the works of scholars like al-Bakri (1029–1094) on Ghana, ibn Battuta on Mali, and ibn Fartuwa on Borno, to mention just a few. Added to these are works in African languages, such as Akan, Fulfulde, Yoruba, Hausa, and Swahili, written in the Arabic script.

Although the Arabic writers were generally better informed than their classical forbears, their writings had major limitations. They depended mainly on current data and were thus more valuable on contemporary events than past ones, on which they carried out no systematic investigation. Since they obtained much of their information by chance or through hearsay, their accounts were haphazard, presenting a static picture of society, with no attempt made to analyze change over time. Furthermore, since they left no references, it is impossible to check the authenticity of their sources and thus the plausibility of their accounts.

The singular exception was ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332–1406), who proposed a cyclical concept of history and developed a theory of historical criticism and comparison that was superior to any of his time, thus ranking him among the leading historiographers of all time.

From the fifteenth century, European explorers, traders, sailors, missionaries, and other travelers provide the first dated evidence. Most of these accounts were firsthand observations; a few, like those of Dapper on Dahomey, were compiled from the observations of others. In places like Ethiopia, where an indigenous literacy tradition had flourished for close to two millennia, European missionaries simply plugged themselves into the preexisting traditions of historiography in the indigenous Ge'ez and Amharic languages. In 1681 Job Ludolf, a leading European Orientalist published his full-scale history, *Historia Aethiopia* (History of Ethiopia), at Frankfurt, Germany, the same year that Oliveira de Cadornega produced his *History of the Angola Wars*. While most of these works focused largely on contemporary situations, they contain a great deal of history. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, enough information existed on African history in the records and libraries of Europe for works such as *Universal History*, published in England in the mid-eighteenth century, to give Africa its fair share of space in world history.

The publications of these works occurred at a time when a major shift was taking place in the attitude of

Europeans toward non-European peoples. Centuries of social and economic progress led to a European conception of history in which Europe was the only region of the world that mattered. The most quoted representative of this view was Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Writing in his influential book, *Philosophy of History*, he stated categorically that Africa “is not a historical continent,” because “it shows neither change nor development,” and that its inhabitants were “capable of neither development nor education. As we see them today, so they have always been.”

In nineteenth-century Europe, under the influence of the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), history ceased to be merely a branch of literature to become a science based on the rigorous analysis of written sources. For Europe, with a plethora of written sources, this was not an issue. However, for much of Africa, where written sources were either entirely lacking or, where they existed, very weak, the possibility of history was thus foreclosed. It is not surprising then that when Professor A. P. Newton was invited in 1923 to give a lecture by the Royal African Society of London, on “Africa and Historical Research,” he had no hesitation in promptly informing his august audience that Africa, had “no history before the coming of the Europeans,” because, “history only began when men take to writing.” Whatever past Africans might have had, before the arrival of white men on their shore, he continued, can only be gleaned “from the evidence of material remains and of language and primitive custom,” and such fancies are outside the concerns of historians. Denied recognition and validity in the exclusive club of historians, the study of the African past was thus relegated to archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists, and others. While these disciplines would significantly contribute to the understanding of the African past, they had their limitations. With regard to archaeology, Africa, especially beyond the Nile River valley civilizations, was not an attractive field for archaeological research. This was due to the fact that archaeology as practiced in Europe at this time focused on discovering more about literate societies such as Greece, Troy, and Egypt, which were already well known from abundant written sources. Such societies were not known to be many in Africa. When eventually the archaeologists, such as Louis Leakey and Raymond Dart, became actively involved with Africa, they were preoccupied with finding the origin of man, discovering the missing link in the chain of human evolution. Their concern was more geological than historical. The past that interested them was so distant in time, sometimes dating to two or three million years ago, as to be almost entirely irrelevant to the history and cultures of the peoples and societies of today. Similarly, the existence of a wide variety of

groups, cultures, and languages on the continent made Africa a major attraction to anthropologists and several of them soon became actively engaged there. Nevertheless, most of these works suffer major limitations as means for the understanding of the African past. In the first place, anthropologists’ main concern was with the timeless ethnographic present. Their representation of the past was often narrow and perfunctory, meant to provide mere background information for the present day societies being studied. More damaging to scholarship was that their writings were often highly speculative and hypothetical, more a reflection of the prevailing prejudices of the European society of their time, than an accurate interpretation of the data. They propounded theories of civilizations and of the direct correlation between race, language, and culture that could not be supported by the available evidence.

The most pernicious of these was the Hamitic hypothesis, which has been soundly refuted. Simply put and as stated by its leading proponent, C. S. Seligman, it espoused the superiority of light-skinned peoples over dark-skinned ones. It argued that “the civilizations of Africa are the civilizations of the Hamites,” meaning that all the major advances and innovations in Africa, such as in the areas of iron working, kingship, pastoralism, and architectural forms, were the works of the “better armed as well as quicker witted” conquering Hamites vis a vis the dark and thus (in their view) inferior “agricultural Negroes,” who had invented little but were always being impacted upon by their light-skinned and thus superior pastoralist-invaders and rulers. The anthropologists’ ethnocentrism, their concern with exotic societies, usually presented as static and unchanging, their readiness to always seek for external explanations and their contempt for oral traditions combined to weaken the usefulness of their work in the attempt to understand the past of Africa. In the same vein, the linguists, who pioneered the study of African languages, were also infected with the same virus that plagued the works of the anthropologists. Unable to transcend the racial and cultural prejudices of their time, they bequeathed to posterity conflicting classifications of African languages that were as eccentric as they were pernicious. These, then, were the scholars and the presuppositions that dominated European-colonial historiography.

Indigenous Historiography and the Era of Decolonization

Partly in response to this attempt to remove Africans from history and partly as expressions of local initiatives and identities, a tradition of indigenous written historiography developed in many parts of Africa. The most famous of these new works was Samuel Johnson’s

History of the Yorubas (1897). The measure of Johnson's influence can be seen even today; it is still virtually impossible to carry out any major study of Yoruba history before the colonial period without due reference to his work. Another was Carl Christian Reindorf's *A History of the Gold Coast and Asante*, published in 1895. In Buganda, Appollo Kagwa produced *The Kings of Buganda* in 1901.

These works had many things in common. Their authors were either ministers of the new religion of Christianity or had been much influenced by it. Moralistic in tone and political in orientation, these works were written for a narrow literate elite. Nevertheless, by focusing on individual communities and groups, emphasizing cultural glories and personal initiatives, they reaffirmed the authenticity of oral sources and rejected the colonial monolithic vision of African history.

The triumph of nationalism following the end of World War II added new impetus to this attempt to affirm the authenticity of African history. In England, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) was established at the University of London in 1948 to meet the growing demand for teaching and research on African history. That same year, Roland Oliver was appointed by SOAS to its first lectureship in African history. Working with Joseph Fage, who joined him at SOAS in 1959, and with the aid of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, Oliver started the *Journal African History (JAH)* in 1960, the same year the *Cahiers d'études Africaines* began its long history as the premier Francophone scholarly journal on Africa. The *JAH* became immediately the combined manifesto and charter for the field. In 1965 Oliver and Fage started editing the eight-volume *Cambridge History of Africa* (1975–1986). By dedicating much of the first volume to the prehistory of the Lower Nile, they ensured that the civilization of ancient Egypt would be seen for the first time in its African context. At about the same time (1963), UNESCO accepted the recommendations of the International Congress of Africanists (1962) and of the OAU (1963) to undertake the writing of a multivolume *General History of Africa*, which would be written from an African-centered perspective and would focus on African peoples rather than European activities in Africa.

From England the study of African history spread rapidly to Europe and the United States. In France the growing interest in African study led to the establishment of the *Institute Français d'Afrique Noire* in Dakar in 1938. Beginning from 1958 with a series of publications, Jean Suret-Canale, the Marxist geographer, would do in France what Basil Davidson was doing in England: establishing and popularizing the idea of the possibility and validity of the African past. In the United States, the anthropologist Mervin Herskovits,

based at Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois, espoused the study of the African culture. Other scholars, European immigrants, or Americans converted from other specialties, would soon distinguish themselves as pioneers, such as Jan Vansina on oral tradition and Philip Curtin on the slave trade.

Variants in Regional Historiographies: North and Southern Africa

Prior to the nineteenth century, historical writing in North Africa centered on the chronicle of local events, dynasties, and geneologies as well as on hagiographies of rulers and saints. The most valuable exception to this provincial outlook was Ibn khaldun.

By 1800, after centuries of European pressures, a widening of historical imagination began to occur. The onset of French imperialism, which began in Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco in 1912, would inaugurate a new era of Maghrebian historiography, conceived to legitimize French conquest, which was presented as liberation from Turkish oppression and as the triumph of Christian civilization over barbarism. Through the journal, *Revue Africaine*, published at the University of Algiers from 1856 onward, the precolonial history of the Maghreb was presented as one characterized by political regression, economic backwardness, and destructive warfare in contrast to the progressive era of state building and law and order inaugurated by French colonization. In his eight-volume *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord* (Early History of North Africa) published in Paris from 1913 and 1928, Stéphane Gsell, pioneered the study of ancient history in which French colonialism was presented as the successor to Rome. Maghrebian history was presented as a mortal struggle between the *bled el-makhzen* (the territory of the state) and the *bled es-siba* (the territory of dissidence). The Arabs, Greeks, and Romans represented the former and the Berbers the later; now the French represented the former and the Maghrebian resisters the later. Most European writers glorified the civilization of ancient Egypt but denigrated the Maghreb, which a French writer described in 1958, as "one of those rare Mediterranean countries which made no original contribution to civilization" (J. Despois, *L'Afrique du Nord*, 1958). The only discordant note in this seemingly monolithic colonial discourse was Charles-Andre Julien's *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord* (1931), but its critical and liberalist perspective ensured its unpopularity during this period.

During the era of decolonization (1956–1970), Maghrebian historians, inspired by the successes of the nationalists, rejected several of the premises of French colonial historiography, casting doubts on its sources, questioning its explanations for economic and political

decline, and challenging its understanding of pastoral and Islamic societies. They criticized the *bled al-makhzen/bled es-siba* dichotomy and, like their peers to the south, argued for a new approach focused on “modes of production” in an essentially feudal society.

A multidisciplinary area-study approach that drew inspirations from modernization theories became dominant. The post-1970 period was one of disillusionment, a consequence of the pathetic failure of the nationalist and socialist governments all over the region. Analysis of issues shifted emphasizing the “relations of exploitation” and “underdevelopment” paradigms. As in other parts of Africa, the pervasiveness of dependency, and the persistence of traditional structure and values, led to the decline of the modernization paradigm and of the area-study approach. New questions were asked and grappled with the meaning of the Maghreb (occident, west): who should write its history, and on whose terms and for what purpose? How should the history of North Africa be articulated in relation to the Arab, European, and African worlds? As the issue of identity and religion came to the fore, with militant Islam triumphing in Iran and warring in Algeria, the end result was that North African intellectuals became ever more integrated into the “Arab” and “Islamic” world and more distanced from “Africa.” In the last three decades of the twentieth century, North African historiography grew and expanded with hardly any cognizance of relations to other African peoples, and with practically no reference to the massive continental scholarship to the south.

In Southern Africa, the pioneers of colonial historiography were Alexander Wilmot, John Chase, George Theal, and Harry Johnston. Their writings were pro-empire and pro-British settlers. Afrikaners were presented as obscurantist oppressors of the indigenous peoples. This orthodoxy was soon challenged by a series of publications by Afrikaners documenting British injustices and the accumulative grievances of the Boers. Most notable of these were S. J. du Toit, *The History of Our Land in the Language of Our People*, published in Afrikaans in 1877 and the scathing criticism of British policies to the Afrikaners by J. C. Smuts, *A Century of Wrong*, published at the end of the Anglo-Boer war (1899–1900).

In the succeeding decades, more historical works would appear. The main features of these histories are clear. Almost without exception, they all focus on the South African white settlers, their conquests, and industrialization. The African majority was regarded as non-population, a part of the landscape to be occupied, used, dispossessed, and discarded. Its history was either completely ignored or, as in C. F. J. Muller’s *500 Years: A History of South Africa* (1969), relegated to a 20-page appendix in a 467-page book.

In the rare cases where African societies received attention, their history was distorted. Their ways of life were presented as monolithic, static, and unchanging. Overworked clichés such as listless, impudent, fractious, thieving, savage, harmless, docile, and others were applied to describe black Africans. The oppressive, dehumanizing, and racist nature of white rule was often ignored, while its debt to the indigenous population, most especially the Khoisans, was rarely acknowledged. The publication of the two-volume *The Oxford History of South Africa* (1969, 1971), edited by Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson, signaled, especially among historians resident outside apartheid South Africa, a new departure in the representation of the south African past.

Postcolonial Africanist Historiography

Upon independence, one of the immediate challenges facing the new African elite was to achieve in the historical field what they had achieved in the political one: restore Africa to history and history to Africans. Achieving this required, and still requires, reasserting once and for all the authenticity of nonwritten sources, establishing the historicity of African societies before the coming of the Europeans, and seizing the initiatives in the rewriting and teaching of African history from an African perspective.

Within Africa, the new radical approach was pioneered by a crew of newly trained young historians working mostly in the recently established University Colleges on the continent. They produced a stream of historical works during the 1960s and 1970s that remarkably demonstrated that Africans were not a “people without history.” By amassing (and utilizing) a wealth of data on ancient civilizations and powerful kingdoms in Africa, they showed that African societies like other societies had well-developed historical consciousness that were conceptualized, preserved, and transmitted through oral traditions, as well as, in some cases, through hieroglyphics or Arabic writings. The most influential of these schools of history was the Ibadan History Series, published under the leadership of Kenneth Dike and Jacob Ade Ajayi. Similarly, the Legon History Series, based at the University of Ghana, published a number of pioneering works on the history of the Akan-speaking peoples and their neighbors. In East Africa, Terence Ranger and a coterie of scholars such as Alan Ogot, Arnold Temu, Isara Kimambo, and others made significant progress in the study of pre-colonial history. The works of these scholars were ably complemented by those of others based outside of Africa, such as Basil Davidson, John Hunwick, Ivor Wilks, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Shula Marks, and Robin Law. With regard to prehistory, a chain of

archaeological discoveries by and writings of Leakey, Desmond Clark, Peter Shinnie, and others have significantly improved our understanding of early man, while pushing further back the antiquity of the African past.

In addition to turning colonial history on its head, these scholars also made significant impact in the area of methodology. By combining the techniques of the anthropologist, the historical linguist, the oral historian, the archaeologist, the paleontologist, the plant geneticist, the art historian, and others, they demonstrated the complexity and multidimensional nature of the African past, while setting a new charter and providing a new guideline for the recovery and reconstruction of the history of nonliterate societies everywhere. The groundbreaking work, *Oral Tradition* (1961), by Vansina, the result of his fieldwork among the Kuba of equatorial Africa, became a classic, the standard work in the field, widely used and cited by scholars working in and on many societies all over the world. Despite the vigorous assault mounted by the structuralists, inspired by the writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Luc de Heusch in France, on the validity of oral traditions as sources, they were continually relied upon in the reconstruction of the African past. For the African of the newly independent nations, the affirmation that African peoples and societies were just like those of Europeans, in the sense that they created states, empires, and kingdoms, built civilizations, invented writings, practiced democracy and commerce, had religion and art, filled him with confidence for the present and hope for the future.

Nevertheless, while it is important to underscore the achievements of these pioneer Africanists, their contribution must not be overemphasized. As an ideological response to western historiography, the new Africanist history succeeded in destroying the picture of tribal stagnation and lack of initiatives in Africa, but beyond this it did not go far enough. Its definition of what constitutes history was still defined in Western terms. It proved that Africa had a history and deserved the respect of others because it did what Europeans did and had what Europeans had. This approach led to the privileging of large-scale societies and the denigration of small-scale ones. The former were considered more advanced along the stages and path of human progress, while the later variously described as stateless or acephalous and presented as “anachronisms” and “survivals,” considered to be at the lowest level of social evolution. Thus, we now know more about rulers rather than the subjects, about cities rather than the country. Moreover, a perusal of the published titles showed that in the early years, the major attraction was interactions with Europeans and on the post-1800 period, on which a plethora of missionary and colonial archival written sources exist. In spite of Vansina, only

a few scholars like Ogot in East Africa or Eberé Alagoa in West Africa focused on topics requiring exclusive use of oral traditions.

The nationalistic need to promote patriotism, national unity, and nation building in the newly independent states, led to a focus on unity rather than discord in the selection and analysis of data. In their sustained search for a useable past, the nationalist historians moved roughshod over the terrain of evidence, extrapolating firm evolutionary trends, ignoring awkward facts, or dismissing them as extraneous and anomalous. The problem was not one of deliberate distortion. It was, rather, a problem of conscious selection determined by value-laden criteria of what history should be taught to meet the needs of the new nations and which history should rather be forgotten. In this brave new world, badly in need of models, archetypes, and heroes, everything hinged on interpretation. The rebels of the colonial era became protonationalists, those who fought European conquests like Jaja of Opobo, Urabi Pasha of Egypt, and Samori Toure of the Madinka became the first nationalists; slavery became a “form of social oppression”; slave raids and conquests became state formation efforts; and authoritarianism became a strategy of nation building. In the attempt to emphasize Africa, the new history dismissed European colonialism as a mere episode in the long stretch of African history, a view that failed to underscore how consequential and far-reaching has been the transformation occasioned by this “brief” encounter with the West. Similarly, in spite of pretensions to the contrary, this was still history from above, focused largely on the male and ruling political elites, with little acknowledgement of the role of women and the importance of gender and class. By concentrating on narrow political themes, the new history ignored social and economic forces.

Era of Disillusionment and the Onset of Marxist Historiography

The sociopolitical crises of the 1960s also created a major crisis in Africanist historiography. The failure of the new African political elites to deliver on the promises of independence, the rampant corruption, the gross economic mismanagement, the political instability, the social malaise, as well as the resilience and pervasiveness of the force of neocolonialism, resulted in a profound sense of disillusionment that had major reverberations in the perception of the African past. The idea of progress in history began to give way to a feeling of nihilism; the optimism offered in the works of scholars like Omer-Cooper and Ajayi began to turn to pessimism; and where there had been consensus, discord and confusion began to reign. In a queer paradox, the term “Africanist” became a term of opprobrium. In

place of the celebration of the African achievement, came stinging indictment of the new ruling elite and their neocolonialist collaborators. The experiments with European economic and political models had not worked; Europe could no longer serve as the epitome of historical progress and self-definition. The golden age of Africanist historiography had come home to roost.

With the preoccupation with the dual problem of continuing poverty and dependency, a new historiography inspired by the ideology of development came to the fore. The most powerful statement of the new Marxist school was issued with the publication of Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* in 1972. Rodney's thesis was as radical as it was far-reaching. In the preface to the book, Rodney stated, unequivocally that "African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries." The new theory of the development of underdevelopment insisted that the West had gained an undue advantage through its domination (by means of the slave trade and colonialism) by which it had crippled and continued (through neocolonialism) to compromise Africa's ability to progress. Confronted with the problem of defining what constitute "class," Coquery-Vidrovitch suggested that since classes were unknown in precolonial Africa, the terms "mode of production" and "relations of exploitations" should be applied to the African experience, even though the specific features and varieties of these expressions remained in dispute. This new school focused on colonial rather than precolonial history, except as a background to understanding the present. It is also reductionist in two ways. First, while it illuminates widespread patterns, it obscured specific and concrete historical situations and failed to account for the wide range of varieties in African social and economic formations. Second, its sweeping generalization led it to ignore or even deny the relevance of African cultural makeup in the formation of their class and historical consciousness. These weaknesses would, among other factors, draw African scholars to the works of Antonio Gramsci, in whose recognition of the centrality of the manipulation of cultural norms in the maintenance of power hegemony and relations of oppression, they found more plausible.

Nevertheless, with its much greater elucidatory models and its materialist insights, the success of the Marxist approach to the study of the African past can be seen first in provoking a more critical and more holistic approach to the study of colonialism and African relations with the West, and second in the broadening of the field of historical production to areas that were shortchanged by the nationalist-liberalist approach.

The works of Claude Meillassoux on *Maidens, Meal, and Money* (1981), Lucette Valensi's innovative *Tunisian Peasants in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century* (1985), Judith Tucker's trailblazing *Women in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (1985), Charles van Onselen on sharecropping in apartheid South Africa (*The Seed is Mine*, 1996), Steven Feierman on peasant intellectuals, John Iliffe's *The African Poor: A History* (1987), Isichei's groundbreaking survey, *A History of African Societies to 1870* (Cambridge, 1997), as well as the price-winning Heinemann Social History of Africa series, edited by Allen Isaacman and Jean Hay, continue to attest to the resilience of this new and vigorous attempt to write history from below.

The eclipse of a Marxist-inspired view of history did not mean an end to the crisis in Africanist historiography. The discovery by the embattled historical materialists during the late 1980s of Michael Foucault, with his insistence on the centrality of ideology in the imposition and maintenance of hegemony, once again jolted the field and challenged the attempt to dismiss Marxist interpretation as a mere "superstructure" or "false consciousness." The result was a series of introspective essays by leading historians on the continuing crisis in the field. Most notable among these essays, some of which began to appear in the *African Studies Review* from 1981, were written by Fredrick Cooper on the economy, John Lonsdale on social processes, Bill Freund on labor (1984), Sara Berry on agriculture (1984), Ranger on religion (1985), Joseph Miller (1980) and Bogumi Jewsiewicki (1989) on historiography, and Isaacman on rural protests (1990). Similarly, Abdallah Laroui's *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (1976) underscored the continuing soul-searching and crises of identity among North African scholars, many of whom began to advocate a more rigorous exploration of "Maghrebian Islam" as an antidote to the continuing realities of neocolonialism and dependency.

Postmodernist Historiography

The widespread mood of introspection, combined with the resurgence of ideological underpinnings of historiography and power relations, led to the emergence of a new approach, "deconstruction" or "postmodernism." In its basic form, the new theory states that the past or consciousness of it does not exist by itself, except as an ideological product of the present, whose power relations and realities it reflects. And even if the past exists, it is directly unknowable, since only traces of it are accessible to readers for their interpretation, "invention," or "deconstruction," a process that can never be truly objective, since it is constrained by the individual's necessarily subjective experience and perceptions. In such

a situation, the line separating fact from fiction is very thin and the search for consensus is both hypocritical and dangerous, an attempt to create a false hegemony in the subjective and conflicting myriads of views constituting the archaeology of knowledge. The application of these ideas to oral traditions led to their dismissal by anthropologists as nothing more than subjective expressions of contemporary realities. As this debate intensified, and as notable scholars of African history like David Cohen and Ranger began to subscribe to the postmodernist thesis, others like Joseph Miller suggested that oral traditions be viewed as valuable expressions of African mentalities, rather than as objective mirrors of a collective, historical past.

Following in the wake of the anthropologists and the literary critics were the philologists and the philosophers. The most notable of these was Valentine Mudimbe, a Zairian, driven into exile in the United States by the terror campaigns of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1981. In a series of essays, of which the most influential was *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (1988), he argued that the ideas and interpretations of African scholars were the product of Western academic discourse, whose notion of what constitute scientific knowledge lacked any universally acceptable validity and should be rejected. It is yet to be seen how significantly the postmodernist view will affect the research and writing of African history; nothing so far has come to indicate that its impact will be as threatening as the materialist approach, whose ferocity it has somehow muted.

Afrocentricity

In the meantime, in the United States, following closely in the literary and ideological traditions of *négritude*, espoused by Aime Césaire and Leopold Senghor, and of Pan-Africanism, espoused by Marcus Garvey and William E. B. Du Bois, African Americans from the 1960s onward began to associate themselves more closely with Africa. This growing interest led to the formulation of a new theoretical approach to the study of Africa, Afrocentrism, or Afrocentricism. The new approach was conceived as a radical critique of the dominant Eurocentric epistemology, with its tendentious claim to universality and its representation of the African experience as by-product of European experience, and as tangential to the historical process. Afrocentrism insists that for a form of historical discourse to have meaning and relevance to Africa, it must assault Eurocentric intellectual hegemony and discard its modes of explanation, and become Africa-centered, meaning it must make African ideas, interests, and presuppositions the core of its analysis. Furthermore, especially

as enunciated by its leading exponent, Molefi Kete Asante, the new approach must have as its intellectual foundation and source of inspiration the civilization of ancient Egypt, in the same way as Greece and Rome serve as the basis of European scholarship.

The cultural and intellectual appropriation of ancient Egypt did not begin with the Afrocentrists. Cheikh Anta Diop, the Senegalese historian and Egyptologist, was the first to set out, in a series of works, the most notable of which was *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality* (1974), to prove that the “ancient Egyptians were Negroes,” and that “ancient Egypt was a Negro civilization.” More recently, the Afrocentric claim was strengthened by the publication of Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785–1985* (1987). Bernal argued that Eurocentric scholars have over the years deliberately refused to acknowledge that ancient Greece derived a lot of inspiration from ancient Egypt. Consequently, he agreed with Diop that since Europe owes its civilization to Africa, the black world should reject its current representation “as an insolvent debtor” to the West and should see itself as “the very initiator of western civilization.”

The postulations of these ideas have generated heated controversies among scholars. Few will argue with the need for African studies to be African-centered, but many have warned against replacing a discredited theory of white supremacy with an equally disreputable black supremacy discourse. The growing popularity of the Afrocentric tenets among African Americans is largely a function of the continuing relevance and salience of race in Africa’s struggle for respect, equality, and empowerment in the Americas, nearly a century and a half after the formal abolition of slavery. On the other hand, the perfunctory interest shown by most African scholars in the debate is indicative of the limited relevance of race to their current preoccupation with other more pertinent sociopolitical challenges on the continent. There is also the fear that privileging ancient Egypt as the reference point for validating African culture will be to subscribe to a Eurocentric definition of what constitute civilization, and its assumption that ancient Egyptian civilization was superior to that of black Africa.

Conclusions: “What History for Which Africa?”

The combination of all these challenges has strengthened the development of African historiography. Old themes are being reinterpreted, while new and neglected issues are receiving attention. There is a new emphasis on the study of biographies, an approach to the study of the past that was part of the

casualties of the assault on the nationalist historiographical focus on “great men.” The study of women, their role in industrialization and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, the intersection of gender and Islam in western and northern Africa, the impact of structural adjustment programs on women, and the need for a fully gendered history of men has received attention. The study of peasants as farmers and as intellectuals, of historical demography, of liquor and leisure, of the history of health and diseases as well as of climate and ecology show how far scholars have gone to push the boundaries of African historical universe.

In South Africa, the end of apartheid and the onset of majority rule in the mid-1990s, led the Afrikaners to begin to repudiate their own history, while the debates continue as to how the past of this troubled region of Africa should be written as it strives to heal its wounds and reconcile its peoples. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union as well as the failure of socialist experiments in Africa started to elicit revisionist responses from neo-Marxist historians of Africa. The resurgence of ethnosectarian crises and violence in multiethnic nations like Rwanda, Algeria, and Nigeria and in monoethnic countries like Somalia has led to the questioning of earlier assumptions about “tribalism” and has resuscitated ethnicity as a major specialty in African study.

More pertinent to the future of the profession is the fact that the gnawing economic and political problems facing most African countries today have led to the migration of many talented scholars from Africa to the United States, in search not so much of “greener pastures” but of security and freedom. With Europe increasingly turning its back on African studies, scholars in North America are now taking the lead in determining the agenda and future directions of African historiography. The emergence of many robust subfields and specialties, and the seemingly bewildering fragmentations, especially from the 1980s onward, should be seen as a sign of growing strength, though this should not be allowed to degenerate into abstruse specializations, resulting in tunnel vision and arcane isolation. The greatest danger, at least before a turn around is witnessed in the fate of the African continent, will be for scholars of African history, now mostly based in Western institutions, to continue to write “esoteric” or “academic” history, meant principally to be read by their peers in the West, a history oblivious to the needs and realities of Africa and totally inaccessible and thus irrelevant to the Africans themselves. Today the study of the African past may appear to be in a state of flux, but this should not necessarily be seen as a sign of crisis or as an untoward development. After decades of progress, occasional pause for critical questioning

and soul-searching to assess progress and chart a new course in response to our understanding of the past, the challenges of the present and our hope for the future—is a welcome and necessary development.

FUNSO AFOLAYAN

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Historiography of Western Africa, 1790s–1860s

The foundation of European historiography of Western Africa was laid in the sixteenth century by Leo Africanus and Luis del Mármol Carvajal. According to them, the inhabitants of Sudanic West Africa had been uncivilized until they were subjugated by “King Joseph” of Morocco, reflecting the historical Almoravid ruler Yūsuf bin Tāshfīn (d. 1106). Subsequently the “Land of the Blacks” was divided up among five “Libyan” tribes, referring to Berbers, nomads of the Sahara, who converted the Africans to Islam and taught them various useful skills, including agriculture and commerce. The Libyan tribes ruled until they were driven to the desert by Sunni Ali (c.1464–92), who established the Songhay Empire in the Niger bend area. He was succeeded by his general

Abuacre Izchia (Askia Muhammad Ture, 1493–1528), who reigned the powerful and prosperous “Empire of Timbuktu.” This interpretation of West African history before the Portuguese discoveries was repeated in all European works describing Africa.

Interest in West African history started increasing in Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century. There were two reasons for this. One was the more widespread interest in African geography and nature; the interior of the continent was still an unknown territory. This interest culminated in 1788 in the founding of the African Association, which equipped many explorers to unveil the secrets of West Africa, the greatest of which were considered to be the course of the Niger and the mysterious Timbuktu. Although most of the explorers proved to be unsuccessful, the reports sent by Simon Lucas, Daniel Houghton, Mungo Park, and Frederick Horneman contained significant new information.

Another reason for increased interest in Africa was the contemporary development of Oriental studies in Europe. The earliest example of medieval Arabic sources for African geography to become available in Europe was the “Book of Roger,” written in 1154 in Sicily by al-Idrīsī. Its abridged Arabic version was printed in 1592 in Rome; a Latin translation of the same text appeared in 1619 in Paris. al-Idrīsī described the conditions of Sudanic Africa as they were in his time. European readers, however, were incapable of combining his information with the existing picture of West African geography, as they had no clear ideas on the exact locations of the towns and kingdoms al-Idrīsī described (such as Ghana, Takrur, Wangara, and Awdaghust), which were not mentioned by Africanus and Mármol. Other medieval Arabic sources for African geography, which were available to eighteenth-century European scholars, were extracts from the works of Abū ‘l-Fidā’, Ibn al-Wardī, al-Mas’ūdi, al-Bakuwī, and al-Maqrīzī. A critical study of al-Idrīsī’s description of Africa was published in 1791 by Johannes Melchior Hartmann.

The first European writer who tried to reconstruct the history of Sudanic West Africa with the help of Arabic material was Francis Moore, who spent five years on the Gambia. Moore’s journal, *Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa*, appeared in 1738. Moore believed that the kingdom of Ghana, described by al-Idrīsī as the paramount kingdom in the “Land of the Blacks,” was the same as the kingdom of Yany on the upper Gambia River. This identification was based on the phonetic resemblance between the two names, Ghana and Yany. Otherwise Moore repeated the story of King Joseph and the five Libyan tribes, which he took as historical fact.

The “Question of Ghana”—that is, its location and existence—reentered public debate some fifty years

later. In 1790, James Rennell (1742–1830) completed a short essay, *Construction of the Map of Africa*, in which he attempted to summarize the existing knowledge on the interior geography of West Africa. Rennell followed the seventeenth-century cartographic tradition of placing the Ghana of al-Idrīsī to the east of Timbuktu, where it was identified, on the ground of phonetic resemblance, as the kingdom of Cano described by Africanus and Mármol. (European geographers were still unaware of the existence of the real Kano in Hausaland; the location of Cano was based on Leo’s description of the fifteen kingdoms that he placed along the imaginary West African branch of the Nile.) Rennell returned to the subject eight years later in his more detailed paper, *Geographical Illustrations of Mr. Park’s Journey*, in which he elaborated his hypothesis about the location of Ghana. He believed that the Ghana of al-Idrīsī was the mighty Ogané, whose domination was recognized (according to the sixteenth-century Portuguese author João de Barros) by the king of Benin near the Atlantic coast. Thereafter, Ghana had declined and eventually became a province of the kingdom of Katsina. The paramount state of the West African interior was the kingdom of Timbuktu; this was confirmed by Mungo Park who had reported that its ruler possessed “immense riches.” Of ancient Mali, Rennell wrote hardly anything. This is understandable, for the available Arabic sources did not mention Mali at all, and the descriptions of Melli by Africanus and Mármol suggested that it was a kingdom of minor importance. According to Rennell, Melli was to the east of Timbuktu.

The key that makes medieval Arabic sources for the history of Sudanic West Africa understandable is the *Book of the Routes and Realms*, written in about 1068 in Islamic Spain by al-Bakrī. The importance of this book is that al-Bakrī is the only Arabic author who described ancient Ghana and its location in details. A copy of his book was acquired in Tripoli by the Swedish consul Jacob Gråberg af Hemsö. A brief French translation of al-Bakrī’s description of Ghana appeared in 1825. It was followed in 1831 by a much longer French translation based on a manuscript copy preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale, covering the entire Sudanic Africa and the Maghrib. An Arabic edition was published in 1857. A new French translation appeared in 1858–1859, which finally made al-Bakrī a popular source among European historians of Western Africa.

The first scholar to use the work of al-Bakrī was Friedrich Stüwe, whose study on the long distance trade of the Arabs during the ‘Abbasid period was published in Germany in 1836. The emphasis in Stüwe’s study is on Arab commercial enterprise in Eastern Europe and Asia, but it also deals with the development of trans-Saharan trade. Stüwe was,

however, incapable of finding the correct parallels between current geographical knowledge of the West African interior—which had increased considerably on account of the journeys of exploration by René Caillié, Dixon Denham, Hugh Clapperton, and the brothers Laing—and the information provided by the medieval Arabic authors. The greatest weakness in Stüwe's study (and certainly the reason why it was so rapidly forgotten) was that he stuck to the old hypothesis of Ghana being identified as the city of Kano in Hausaland. Stüwe combined the few dates he could glean from the works of al-Bakrī and al-Idrīsī with the interpretation of West African history by Leo Africanus. He correctly noticed that Ghana had been the paramount kingdom, but it had declined during the Libyan domination. The most original part in Stüwe's book was his hypothesis that Islam had spread in Sub-Saharan Africa peacefully through the trans-Saharan commercial contacts. This hypothesis was contrary to the tradition that it was the Libyan conquerors that introduced Islam and the basic elements of civilization to the blacks. Of ancient Mali, Stüwe said nothing (nor could he, as he had no relevant sources available to him).

The honor of establishing the modern historiography of West Africa belongs to William Desborough Cooley (1795–1883) whose *Negroland of the Arabs* appeared in 1841. It is difficult to say how Cooley had become interested in this subject, even though he had already distinguished himself by producing several publications on the geography of Eastern Africa. We may assume that Cooley was influenced by his friend Pascal de Gayangos, a Spanish Orientalist, who owned a large collection of Arabic geographical manuscripts. Another reason might have been that the recent European voyages to Timbuktu, Bornu, and Hausaland, together with the appearance of the works of al-Bakrī and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (an abridged Latin translation in 1818; an abridged English translation in 1829), had made speculation on the early history of West Africa fashionable. It is noteworthy that the three pioneering works, written by Stüwe (1836), Cooley (1841), and Wappäus (1842), were published almost simultaneously.

Cooley's aim was to establish the historical geography of Sudanic Africa on a solid basis by carefully examining all the available Arabic material and by comparing it to the existing European knowledge of the area. Cooley abandoned all the previous hypotheses concerning the locations of Ghana and Mali; that is, he gave up Leo Africanus who had dominated European geography of Sudanic Africa for three centuries. The real novelty was Cooley's method, which he referred to as the "principle of rectification of sources." In practice this meant that the interpreter of sources had to understand not only the language of the original text

(not to mention the other languages through which the information had been transferred) but also the theoretical and other preconceptions of the original author: today, this would be called contextual consideration.

Following his method, Cooley preferred to rely upon Arabic manuscripts rather than their often inaccurate and abridged translations. This was possible with the help of his learned friend Gayangos. The basis of Cooley's sources was the works of the three Arabic authors: al-Bakrī, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, and Ibn Khaldūn. The importance of al-Bakrī is noted above; the importance of Ibn-Baṭṭūṭa is the fact that he provides us with an eyewitness account of Mali in the 1350s, whereas Ibn Khaldūn provides us with a chronology of Malian rulers from the mid-thirteenth century to the year 1396.

Cooley managed to make order out of the early history of Sudanic West Africa and this is what makes his work valuable. His work provided what was then the only reasonably reliable account of the West African empires and his readers had a good cause to doubt that African society was a changeless barbarism. Although Cooley's conclusions on the locations of the Sudanese kingdoms and cities were later proved to be false (he placed Ghana to the west of Lake Faguibine, Takrur close to Jenne, and Awdaghust in the oasis of Mabrouk), his chronology for the history of ancient Ghana and Mali is still accepted with minor corrections. Cooley also established several important hypotheses, such as the three conquests of Ghana by the Almoravids (1076), the Susu (1203), and Mali (1240). The fact that some of these hypotheses are erroneous is not Cooley's fault: in relation to the available sources his reasoning is sound. We can only blame the succeeding generations of historians of Western Africa who did not bother to evaluate the reliability of Cooley's hypotheses, despite possessing much a broader body of evidence.

In 1842 the German geographer Johann Eduard Wappäus (1812–79) published his study, which bore a title almost identical to that of Cooley's, *Untersuchungen über die Negerländer der Araber*, although the latter part of this book examines the Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese overseas trade in the late Middle Ages and the subsequent Portuguese discoveries. Wappäus was aware of Cooley's *Negroland*, for he refers to it in his preface. Nevertheless, he had apparently received Cooley's book too late to be able to discuss its contents properly in his own study. On the other hand, Wappäus praised Stüwe's *Handelszüge* for being the first serious study in this field, even if he considered it gravely mistaken in many details. In reality, Cooley's *Negroland* made Wappäus's work outdated even before its publication.

The Arabic sources used by Wappäus were almost the same as those familiar to Cooley, although he relied upon printed translations only. Wappäus considered

al-Bakrī to be the most important source for Ghana, which (according to Wappäus) was the existing city of Jenne in the middle Niger valley. Sufficient proof for this identification was the congruence between al-Idrīsī's information about the riverine location of Ghana and René Caillié's recent description of Jenne. Regarding the early history of West Africa, Wappäus said surprisingly little. There is no clear chronology in his work, nor could there be, since he did not know Ibn Khaldūn's universal history, *Kitāb al-'Ibar* (Arabic and French editions were published in 1847–1851 and 1852–1856, respectively).

Another early German interpretation of early West African history was written by Friedrich Kunstmann, whose lectures on the subject at the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences were published in 1853 with the title *Afrika vor den Entdeckungen der Portugiesen*. There is nothing that suggests that Kunstmann knew Cooley's *Negroland*, although he cited Wappäus and hence he must have seen the latter's reference to Cooley in the preface. Likewise, *Negroland* was unfamiliar to the American Reverend J. Leighton Wilson, who claimed in his *Western Africa: Its History, Condition and Prospects* (1856) that black Africans were quite unable to establish any large political organizations, with the exception of Ashanti and Dahomey.

Cooley's ideas were developed further and popularized by the German explorer Heinrich Barth (1821–1865) who traveled in Bornu and Hausaland in 1849–1855 and spent nearly a year in Timbuktu. Barth's journal, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, was no bestseller, but the few European scholars interested in African geography and history recognized its value. Barth's information about West African history is both in the main text and the numerous appendices, which are attached to each of five volumes of his journal. The most important is the "Chronological Table of the History of Songhay and the Neighboring Kingdoms" in volume four. This lengthy table follows the history of Western and Central Sudan from 300 to 1855 without any major interruptions. Most of Barth's information about Ghana and Mali is taken directly from Cooley, but Barth was able to supplement the latter's chronology with his own speculations about the origins of Ghana and with a few details on the decline of Mali in the fifteenth century. Barth's greatest achievement, however, was that he uncovered the history of the two other great Sudanese empires that had been flourishing in the sixteenth century: Songhay and Bornu. This was possible because Barth had managed to obtain some copies of the hitherto unknown Arabic chronicles written by local Muslim scholars. The most important of these chronicles were a list of the kings of Bornu and the *Ta'rikh al-Sūdān*, written in about 1652/55 in Timbuktu by 'Abd

al-Rahmān al-Sa'di, which describes the history of Songhay Empire under the Askia-dynasty. German translations of these two sources appeared in 1852 and 1855, respectively.

If Barth's journey to the African interior completed the ancient European exploration into Timbuktu and Niger, his chronological table did the same for the historiography of the ancient Sudanese empires. Nineteenth-century Africanists were content with his conclusions for the next five decades. It was impossible to add anything new to Barth's table of early West African history by using the existing Arabic and European material. It also appears that speculation about the history of Sudanese empires became a less popular and intriguing topic after the emphasis in European exploration of Africa shifted from the Niger to the Nile. Only the discovery of local West African oral historical traditions and the beginning of the first archaeological excavations in the western Sahel at the turn of this century brought about significant changes in historiography.

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Further Reading

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History, African: Sources of

Four periods emerge in considering the periodization of written sources of African history. The first is from about 1580BCE, the beginnings of historical records in ancient Egypt, to the seventh century of the common era, that is the pre-Islam antiquity. The second is the period dominated by Arabic documents from the seventh to the fifteenth centuries. Third, the period from the late fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries saw the predominance of European works on Africa. Finally, in

addition to Arabic and European works, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Africans in most parts of the continent increasingly kept their own records in Arabic and European languages, and even in their vernaculars using Arabic script for example Kiswahili, Hausa, Fulfulde, and so on, and later the European script.

These written sources of African history were produced in many different languages of their authors. The historian of Africa may, therefore, require linguistic versatility in order to succeed in a research because of the diversity of the languages of the sources. But to the rescue of such researchers, translations, for instance, of important Arabic, or Greek sources into English or French, as well as French into English and vice versa, are continually being published. A few examples of such translations will suffice here: (1) Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, edited by H. A. R. Gibb (1929), Arabic text and French translation by C. Defremery, and B. R. Sanguinetti, *Voyages d'ibn Battuta* (Paris, 1922), volumes 1–4, reprinted with preface and notes by Vincent Monteil, (Paris, 1969); (2) Abd al-rahman ibn Khaldun, *Kitab ta'rikh al-duwal al-Islamiyya bi l-Maghrib min Kitab al-'ibar*, translated by M. G. de Slane as *Histoire des Berberes et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1925–1956), volumes 1–4.

Pre-Islamic Antiquity

(c.1580BCE–Seventh Century)

In Egypt, the cradle of civilization in Africa, written sources are found in the form of hieratic papyri and ostraco for the pre-Islamic antiquity. They include archival materials dealing with the official and private life of Egyptians and even stories and novels during the New Kingdom (c.1580 to 1090BCE). The British Museum has some extensive collections of these documents some of which have been published as *Select Papyri in the Hieratic Character from the Collections of the British Museum* (London, 1860). This papyri tradition continued up to the end of the Pharaonic period (332BCE) and even beyond only in Egypt.

External narrative sources shed some light on events in Egypt and the Nile from the seventh century BCE. The authors were historians, travelers, and geographers. The sources include some Greek and Latin works of Aristodemus, Herodotus, Polybius, and Strabo. The *Natural History* by Pliny the Elder gives information about Ethiopian trade, trade routes, and other aspects of the Ethiopian world. These narrative sources should be used with caution as some of the foreign authors did not write as eyewitnesses, nor crosscheck their data.

More accurate information about Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa, and even the east coast appeared in the years after the advent of Christianity. The most outstanding include: Ptolemy's *Geography* (c.140

edited by Y. Kamal as *Monumenta cartographica Africae et Aegypti* (16 volumes, Cairo/Leyden, 1926–1951); *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (c.230), edited by F. Muller as *Geographi Graeci Minores* (Paris, 1853), and *Topographica Christiana* (c.535) by Cosmas Indicopleustes who traveled as far as Ethiopia and Socotra Island. His work appears in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* (vol. 38), which should be consulted along with the same editor's *Patrologia Latina* (H. Djait, 1981).

Unlike Egypt, ancient Maghrib produced no autochthonous writers before the romanization of the area. The result is that for the history of the Maghrib before the Roman period, scholars depend on archaeology, epigraphy, and some references in Herodotus, and other Greek writers. The conflict between Carthage and Rome, the Punic wars, attracted non-African historians and geographers who wrote about the Maghrib in Greek and Latin. Many of such works by Greek and Latin authors are useful sources for Maghribi history of the period extending from 200BCE to 100CE. Among them, Polybius is acclaimed the chief source because of the quality of information and details in the *Pragmateia*. Others include Strabo, Sallust, Caesar (*Bellum Civile* and *Bellum Africum*), and Ptolemy's *Geography*. As North Africa became romanized, African-Roman writers sprang up. Among them were Tertulian, Cyprain, and Augustine. Although they produced Christian works that were colored by religion, and should be approached with caution, they are important sources for their respective times.

The western Africa south of Maghrib, that is, the Sahara and West African area, was not actually covered in the writings of the ancient Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans. Even the authenticity of the Carthaginian document, *Periplus of Hanno*, is in doubt and serious debate among scholars; some see it as "entirely spurious" and with jumbled borrowings from earlier writers, and others as "enigmatic." The information about the area in the written sources probably refers to the southern extremity of Morocco and it is peripheral in the documents. Herodotus has some references to their silent trade in gold with Carthaginians. Polybius made more accurate reference to the area as interpolated in Elder Pliny's *Natural History*; while the Alexandrian geographer, Ptolemy, in his *Geography* gave a revised resume of his predecessors' information and provided antiquity with more reliable data on names of peoples and places in the western coast of the Sahara, Fezzan, and Lybian desert.

Written Sources from the Seventh Century Onward:

External Narrative Sources in Arabic

During the period between the ninth and the fifteenth centuries, external sources of African history were predominantly written in Arabic, making those centuries

to be sometimes referred to as “the era of Arabic sources.” Although the Arabic materials were in decline from the sixteenth century, yet they continued to be the main source for the history of Muslim areas of Africa such as North Africa until the colonial era. They were, however, supplemented by Spanish, Portuguese, and Ottoman Turkish sources.

No Arabic chronicles appeared before the ninth century when the great histories (*ta'rikhs*) of the Islamic world made their debut. These were focused on the East as center of the Islamic world. Egypt, the Maghrib and the Sudan received peripheral coverage in the great *tarikhs* with the exception of the *Ta'rikh* of Khalifa b.Khayyat (d.c.862CE). Khalifa provides very important information on the conquest of the Maghrib. H. Djait's critically annotated inventory (1981) of these Arabic sources has shown that the history of Egypt and the Maghrib are well covered in the Arabic works of the tenth through fourteenth centuries.

The historian of black Africa would depend more on geographical and travel works than on the chronicles of Arabic writers for valuable information especially for areas which had come under Islamic influence. The most important geographers in the period from the ninth to the eleventh centuries were al-Ya'qubi (d.897), Mas'udi, ibn Hawqal, and al-Bakri (1040–94). Yaqubi traveled widely in the Islamic world, especially Egypt and the Maghrib, and in his *Tarikh* and the *Kitab al-buldan*, a geographical compendium, he provides a great deal of information about Egypt, the Maghrib, and the black world: Ethiopia, the Sudan, Nubia, the Beja, and Zandj. Mas'udi's *Fields of Gold* provides information on Zandj and the east coast of Africa. Ibn Hawqal, who visited Nubia and possibly the western Sudan, provides useful information in his *Kitab surat al-ard*, especially about the trans-Saharan trade.

Three of the Arab geographers of the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, al-Bakri, al-'Umari (d.1336), and Ibn Battuta (1304–1368/9) distinguished themselves by the high quality of their information. Al-Bakri lived in Cordova and produced his *Masalik wa'l-Mamalik*, which Arabists and Africanists hail as providing materials for detailed study of the political, economic, and religious aspects of the Sudan and its relation with the Maghrib. Likewise, Djait has described al-'Umari's *Masalik al-Absar* as “the major work” for Islamized black Africa, the “main source for the study of the Mali kingdom” and “the richest Arabic account” of fourteenth-century Ethiopia and its Muslim states. Similarly, the work of the Moroccan Ibn Battuta is hailed as the most valuable source for the history of the Maghrib and the Sudan. His *Voyages d'ibn Battuta*, already mentioned above, represents a firsthand account of a direct observer during his travels in China, Ceylon, the East

African coast as far as Kilwa in 1329, and from the capital of old Mali kingdom back to North Africa via Timbuctu, Gao, and the central Sahara.

In the period from the sixteenth century onward, Arabic chronicles, annals, and geographical and travelers' reports continued to be produced, but at a very reduced level both in quantity and quality. Egypt, for instance, produced only two great historians between the sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries: Ibn Iyas (d.1524) brought the history of Egypt from under the Mamluks to the beginning of Ottoman control, while al-Jabarti (d.1822) covered the twilight of Ottoman control of Egypt, the French conquest and occupation under Napoleon (1798–1801), and the rise of Muhammad Ali. European travelers' accounts also become important and abundant during this period. The most important is *Description de l'Egypte* (24 vols., Paris, 1821–24), compiled by the scientific staff of the French invaders. These volumes have been acclaimed as “an inexhaustible source for every kind of information on Egypt,” (I. Hrbek, 1981) and that in spite of the anti-Islamic bias, the European accounts of travels in Muslim Maghrib and Egypt provide many interesting insights and observations not to be found in the indigenous works.

It was only in Morocco that the decline of Arabic narrative sources did not take place from the sixteenth century to the present. Detailed histories of the Moroccan dynasties continued to be chronicled up to the present. Hrbek (1981) has produced a list of many distinguished historians of Morocco, placing al-Zayyani (d.1833) as the greatest since the Middle Ages, and al-Nasiri al-Slawi (d.1897), who wrote a general history of Morocco, as having used both traditional and modern methods as well as archival sources. Al-Nasiri al-Slawi's geographical work also provides valuable information for social and economic history.

Genealogies of various Arab groups in the eastern Sudan, in addition to the biographical dictionary of Sudanese scholars, the *Tabaqat* by Wad Dayfallah, form the main source of the history of eastern Sudan. The *Funj Chronicle* is a publication of oral tradition in the early nineteenth century, the beginning of local historiography in eastern Sudan. Among the useful travelers' accounts are narratives of al-Tunisi (1803). In his *Voyage au Ouaday*, al-Tunisi narrated his visit to Wadai and also reported on the Darfur. He wrote in Arabic translated into French by Dr. Perron (Paris, 1851). European travelers of the eighteenth century with useful narratives about the eastern Sudan include James Bruce (1773) and W. J. Browne (1792/8). Many more travelers followed in the Sudan in the early nineteenth century in search of the Nile and left narratives, some of which are the earliest written sources about the upper reaches of the Nile.

External Narratives in European Languages

Some European nations maintained ascendancy at various periods in the African enterprise and during such periods, nationals of the predominant European nation produced most of the narratives. The Portuguese who pioneered the European enterprise in Africa wrote most of the narratives in the sixteenth century. Those narratives, maps, sea route surveys, and other navigational aids were produced to assist their nationals to know the African situation and thus participate more actively to maintain Portuguese monopoly in the African business. This explains why Portugal imposed strict censorship on any Portuguese work that could help its trade rivals. This censorship, according to F. Wolfson (1958), accounts for the scantiness of Portuguese narratives that survived. The competition of other nations to participate in the African enterprise also led to translations of early narratives into the languages of other Europeans. For instance, Olfert Dapper, a Dutch medical doctor and historian published his narrative in Dutch language in Amsterdam, 1668, and in 1670 J. Ogilby published the English translation *Africa* in London, while the French translation, *Description de l'Afrique* was published in Amsterdam in 1686. The seventeenth-century authors of the European narratives on Africa were predominantly Dutch, French, and British; the eighteenth-century, British and French; and the nineteenth century, mainly British, German, and French. Other nations of Europe participated in producing the narratives to some minor extent.

The most relevant of the authors and their works can be gleaned from various historical anthologies now available: Thomas Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology* (London, 1975); Freda Wolfson, *Pageant of Ghana* (London, 1958); G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, *The East African Coast: Select Documents from the First to the Earlier Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1962). Even collections of some of these early narratives are also available, for example, A. and I. Churchill, *Collection of Voyages and Travels* (3rd ed., 1744–46, and the ones by Hakluyt Society, London. While the collections ease the researcher's problem of location and accessibility of the materials, the translations solve his language problems by providing the materials in more popular languages.

The British contribution is very impressive in the nineteenth century with the *Narratives and Journals* of the various expeditions into the interior of Africa undertaken by Mungo Park (1805), Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton, Richard and John Lander, Macgregor Laird and Oldfield, William Baikie, Heinrich Barth, Allen and Thompson, David Livingstone, H. M. Stanley, John Speke, Mary Kingsley, and other minor ones.

Like the Arabic narratives, these European ones provide some absolute chronology and thus solve one serious problem of African history. Moreover, one main aim of most European travelers, explorers, traders, missionaries, and officials was often the promotion of trade. Thus the narratives are reliable as sources for economic history in dealing with such issues as available trade goods, routes, and markets, sources of supply, variation in price levels, and types of currency, African consumption habits, control of trade, production techniques, and so on. It is reasonable to conclude that the reconstruction of the history of some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa would have been nearly impossible without the European narrative sources. Their weaknesses are normal problems that historians know how to resolve. The Christian missionaries made so many contributions through their narratives that they require further mention here.

During the period from the fifteenth century onward, especially from the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries participated in the African enterprise to convert Africans to Christianity. But in many cases, they were ill-equipped to understand and report meaningfully on African religion and systems of government. Some rather concerned themselves with exposing what they regarded as "errors" and "barbarisms" of African religion, and as "marvels" and "crudities" of African culture. Apart from such negative problems of the earliest periods, the Christian missionaries provide positive sources of African history. From the nineteenth century in particular, those of them who had stayed long enough and learnt the local languages, or understood the African society, contribute data for social history of some African communities as well as for the study of African languages, some of which the missionaries helped to reduce into writing for the first time. For example, Archdeacon T. Dennis of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in Southern Nigeria translated the Christian Bible into Igbo language, while H. Goldie's Efik-English dictionary is still a standard work today also in southern Nigeria.

Internal Narrative Sources

Africans have been producing narrative materials from the beginning of Egyptian historical writing in the form of hieratic papyri, ostracum, and demotic. Later on romanized Africans such as Tertullian, Cyprain, and Augustine (*d.*430) also produced in Latin written works on the Roman Church with some sidelights on North African problems. From the ninth century, Arabized Africans in Egypt and the Maghrib including Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, and others wrote their narratives in Arabic.

But Sub-Saharan Africans did not produce written histories until the sixteenth century. From then onward, the writing of history in the form of Arabic chronicles, biographies, and the sort began in earnest in the Sudan and the East African coast, that is, in parts of Africa that had been under prolonged influence of Islam. Later they also produced similar works in African languages, such as Hausa, Fulfulde, Kanuri, Swahili, and so forth, using Arabic script. Two centuries later, precisely from the late eighteenth century, Africans from the non-Islamized areas also started writing their own histories in European languages, and later finally in their own languages using the European script, a result of the educational efforts of Christian missionaries. A survey of these works written in Arabic and European languages shall deal with what materials they produced and of what relevance as sources of African history. Already fuller inventory of such written sources is available (Hrbek, 1981).

The autochthonous African writers provide the black African views. Such works came from the scholars from the Jenne and Timbuktu seats of Islamic learning from the sixteenth century. The first notable one was *Ta'rikh al-Fattash*. It was the work of three generations of Ka'ti family of Jenne that was started by Mahmud Ka'ti about 1519 and subsequently enlarged and edited by one of his grandsons. It provides a compendious history of the Songhay empire of Gao down to the Moroccan conquest in 1591, plus other events of earlier periods recorded from oral traditions. A more comprehensive history of the same empire, *Ta'rikh al-Sudan*, by the Timbuktu historian, al-Sa'di appeared later, covers the same period, and carries the narrative down to 1655. There is also the biographical dictionary of the learned men of the western Sudan compiled by the Timbuktu scholar, Ahmad Baba (*d.*1627) and published in Fez (1899), and Cairo (1912).

In Central Sudan, Ahmad Ibn Fartuwa provides useful works on the campaigns of Mai Idris Aloma of Borno including the expedition against the Bulala about 1575, translated and edited by H. R. Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs* (3 vols., Lagos, 1928). Another of Ibn Fartuwa's works was also translated and edited by H. R. Palmer as *History of the First Twelve Years of the Reign of Mai Idris Aloma* (1926).

The tradition of chronicle writing did spread from Timbuktu and Jenne toward the south and west. In those areas local chronicles, clan genealogies, king lists, biographies, and religious books by Muslim scholars started to emerge from mid-eighteenth century. They were written in Arabic or in local languages. *Kitab al-Ghunja*, the chronicle of Gonja kingdom in northern Gold Coast (now Ghana), is an outstanding example of the spread of the tradition to the south. And in Futa Toro and Futa Jalon such works have been

collected by Gilbert Vieillard and kept in the IFAN library in Dakar (Hrbek 1981).

The nineteenth century saw a resurgence of literature in central and western Sudan in Arabic and the local languages such as Hausa, Fulfulde, Kanuri, Mandara, and so on, written in Arabic script. For example, the social and intellectual life in the Hausa states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be reconstructed from the numerous works of the leaders of the Fulani jihad in northern Nigeria. Some chronicles and king-lists of Hausa cities and Borno compiled in the later nineteenth century from earlier documents and oral tradition provide information for the history of those areas. The *Kano Chronicle* is a valuable source for Kano and the neighboring states.

Similarly, the East African coast shared the same tradition of chronicle writing in Arabic language or Swahili written in Arabic script. Of importance as sources of history are the chronicles of individual coastal towns such as the *Chronicle of Pate* and the earliest known *Kitab al-Sulwa fi akhbar Kulwa* ("The Book of Consolidation of the History of Kilwa" or simply, *Chronicle of Kilwa*). The author stated that he was commissioned by the sultan of Kilwa to write the history of Kilwa. It may have been written in 1520 or 1530 and a summary of the work in Portuguese language was printed in 1552.

The ability to read and write in European languages developed first among Africans in diaspora and those exposed to the liberal education policies of Christian missionaries especially in western African coastal communities, and in southern Africa. By 1750s some Fante had received Christian education, and even became missionaries themselves. Such men as Jacobus Capitein and Philip Quaake (1741–1816) published English narratives of little historical significance. It was the African liberated exslaves from Freetown, Liberia, and Europe that blazed the trail in producing narratives of historical importance in European languages, for instance, Ottobah Cugoano's *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species* (1787), Olaudah Equiano's *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vasa, the African* (1789), to mention only a few. They wrote mainly for a European audience against the slave trade and on the conditions of Africans in Africa and in Europe and to justify African culture.

Of equally high value as sources of African history are the nineteenth-century narratives of black Africans in European languages: those of African-Americans; a Liberian, Benjamin Anderson; Samuel Crowther's description of his journeys up the River Niger as part of Niger expedition of 1854 and 1857; and African leaders Edward W. Blyden and James Africanus Horton in

their explanation and justification of African culture as well as their proposals for the political development of West Africa.

Thus from the late nineteenth century other indigenous black African writers followed in the production of histories of their own countries. The first historian of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) a Ga missionary, Rev. Carl Christian Reindorf, compiled the history of his country in 1895 mainly from traditional sources. His *History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti* (1895) is invaluable for information on the early history of the people of Gold Coast and Ashanti including the reconstruction of the Ashanti defeat at Dodowa in 1826. About the same time Rev. Samuel Johnson (1846–1901), who migrated from Sierra Leone to Lagos, later Ibadan, and finally as a CMS pastor in Oyo, completed *The History of the Yorubas* in 1897, but it was not published in Lagos until 1921. This work was based mainly on Oyo traditions only in its earlier sections as the author was an eyewitness of the events of the later nineteenth century. It has since been the main source for early Yoruba history. These works started the “chain of African historians, at first amateurs (in majority missionaries), later professionals” (Hrbek, 1981).

In South Africa indigenous written sources of African opinion against white racial domination also emerged in the nineteenth century. Apart from written petitions and complaints of Africans against their plights now preserved in South African archives and in London, vernacular newspapers also emerged in the nineteenth century: the weekly *Isidigimi* was published between 1870 and 1880 critical of European policies and their negative impact on Africans. John T. Jabavu’s vernacular newspaper *Imvo Zabantsundu* (The Voice of Black People) since 1884 discussed African plight under white domination. Jabavu (d.1921) also published *The Black Problem* (1920), like that of the self-educated African journalist, S. T. Plaatje, author of *Native Life in South Africa before and since the European War and Boer Rebellion* (1916). These African voices in South Africa continued to be heard in increasing volume and Christian missionary activities and records were also in support of African rights. From the early twentieth century precisely in January 1912, the South African Native Congress (later African National Congress, ANC) was formed by the indigenous elite with more organized protest against the settler dominance.

Archival Sources

Archival sources of African history appeared first in ancient Egypt. The *Select Papyri in Hieratic* . . . , already mentioned, includes some civil service and legal reports, accountancy records, private letters, and

the like, covering the period from 1580BCE to the end of the Pharaonic Egypt 323BCE and even beyond. During the Christian era, the Greek and Coptic papyri appeared, and the Arabic papyri from the Muslim era. From the twelfth century CE, Egyptian archival sources became more plentiful especially under the Mamluks. But they still took the second place after narrative sources for historical reconstruction as they remained scattered and insufficient for creating a coherent picture of the past. Some of the European treaties, contracts, and letters, preserved in government and private archives in Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Barcelona, which deal mainly in European business relations with Egypt and the Maghrib, have been published and studied: *L. Mas-Latrie, Traites de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant des relations des chretiens avec les arabes d’Afrique septentrionale au moyen-âge* (Supplement, 1872, 1866, 1872).

The Maghrib produced its own archival materials from the Almoravid era. New light has been thrown on the institutions and ideology of the Almoravid and Almohad empire movements by some of their official records published and edited by H. Mu’nis and A. M. Makki as *Lettres officielles almoravides*; and al-Baydaq’s *Documents inedits d’histoire almohade* (translated and edited by E. Levi-Provencal, 1928). North Africa continued to produce more archival records in Arabic and Turkish in the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, now preserved in Cairo, Tunisian, and Algerian archives. Some have been translated and published: R. le Tourneau, “Les archives musulmanes en Afrique du Nord” in *Achivum*, volume 4 (1954). The administrative and judicial documents of independent Morocco have been preserved in Moroccan archives while other related materials in some European archives have been collected and published: by Henri Castries, *Les Sources inedits de l’histoire du Maroc* (24 vols., 1905–1951).

From the nineteenth century onward archival sources became as abundant for North Africa as in European countries. They now occupy the first place as the primary and more objective sources for historical reconstruction, pushing the narrative sources to the second position. Thus archival sources in Arabic and also European languages for North African history defy enumeration.

For black Africa only a few isolated correspondences of the pre-nineteenth-century period in Arabic are now known: the 1578 dispatch from the Ottoman sultan to Mai Idris Aloma of Borno preserved in the Turkish archives; and the ones from the sultan of Morocco to Askiya of Songhai and to the Kanta of Kebbi. There was also the letter from Borno to Egypt dated 1391.

In the nineteenth century there was an explosion in diplomatic and administrative activities in the Sokoto caliphate between the caliph and the various emirs and

in the Borno Empire. Archival materials in Arabic from Muslim leaders in the Sudan such as al-Hajj Umar, Samori Touré, Rabih, among others, are to be found in the archives of West African countries. Despatches were also exchanged between the various empires, for instance between Sheikh al-Kanemi of Borno and Muhammad Bello of Sokoto on the justification for the Fulani jihad against Borno, a fellow Muslim empire.

Archival materials in European languages have been accumulating since the sixteenth century. They are now too numerous for an inventory. And they are scattered all over the world in archives, libraries, and private collections to which access is extremely difficult in terms of time and resources. To make the existence of these archival sources known to researchers in African history, the International Council of Archives is preparing a series of guides to source materials in public and private repositories as well as in libraries and museums. It is planned that the series in twelve volumes will cover archival records in Africa South of the Sahara, western Europe and the United States of America. This project for the *Guide to the Sources of the History of Africa* will certainly expose more valuable sources to researchers. Other categories of catalogs and lists of archival sources have been provided to ease the work of the researcher and also enrich African history: missionary documents from the Portuguese and some other archives collected by A. D. Brasio, *Monumenta missionaria africana* (9 vols., Lisbon, 1953); G. E. Metcalfe, *Great Britain and Ghana Documents of Ghana History, 1807–1957* (1964). The need for more catalogs and inventories is still being felt.

It should also be noted that every independent African state has now established government archives in which materials left by former colonial governments are preserved. Since some records may be missing in such archives in Africa, researchers should use them in combination with the archives in the metropolis in Europe in order to get a fuller picture of the events. The national archives in Africa should also publish lists of the holdings of their repositories, catalogs of major subject matters and other search aids. They could also arrange international cooperation with archives of related countries in the line being taken by the Portuguese and Zimbabwean archives to publish the original and English translation of all Portuguese documents concerning South-East Africa. African history would benefit from such combined effort between, for instance, Nigerian and Portuguese archives; or the Cameroonian and German archives could collect and publish all German documents concerning the Cameroons in original form with French and English translations as Cameroon is a bilingual state. South Africa is in a unique historiographical case.

Similar combined efforts between South African and Dutch archives will be fruitful for producing a true history of Africans in South Africa. Some official documents of the Dutch colonial period are now kept in archives in South Africa, in London, and The Hague, though some are still not accessible. Extracts of journals and other documents have also been edited and published by D. Moodie as *The Record: or A Series of Official Papers Relative to the Conditions and Treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa* (1960). Also useful are the records published by G. M. Theal as the *Basutoland Records*, 3 volumes (1883), *Records of the Cape Colony*, 36 volumes (1897–1905), and *Records of South-Eastern Africa*, 9 volumes (1898–1903).

Pictorial and Film Evidence

Pictorial and film sources of history can be categorized as written sources. Nonliterate societies cannot produce them, though some external narrative sources from the sixteenth century such as William Bosman's *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea* (1705) provides some maps and drawings. The main pictorial and film sources are for the contemporary period, when Africans have acquired the capability to produce and use them as source for research into and teaching of African history. Such sources include all types of photographs, the photostat, microfilm, the moving pictures, old maps, sketches, and drawings.

The illustrative old maps, pictures, sketches, and drawings are also published in some old narratives of early travelers, explorers, geographers, historians, and missionaries like the ones in William Bosman's *Description . . .*, or A. and I. Churchill's *Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1744). These provide their own factual data about the architecture, market scenes, dressing styles, means of transport, settlement patterns, and so on, of those centuries for social history.

Films, like pictures, depict the reality of anything: situations, activities, and the portrait of individuals. Films are useful visual aids in teaching history using projectors and the screen before the class. The profiles of important late political figures, such as, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, Leopold Seda Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and the like, will benefit much from the use of films in teaching them. The various kinds include newsreel, documentary, and feature films.

The quality of the pictorial and film evidence, however, is the problem. They are usually produced by journalists, businessmen, cameramen, editors, and other technologists, who may at best produce only pop history films. Though that quality is still history all the same, academic historians should as much as possible be involved in the making of history films and

historical programs on radio and television to improve the quality. An advisory committee of experts for history and programs will certainly help to improve the situation. The premier and conventional source for writing history remains the contemporary written sources both narrative and archival types. But in Africa, as already stated, there was a dearth of such sources. For the Sudan and the coastal parts of Africa no written documents for history writing were available until from the Portuguese period, and for most parts of the hinterland areas until the colonial period. Moreover, those available written sources were produced by non-Africans. Most of the authors were not familiar with Africa and the Africans, nor did they write without bias and superiority complex against Africans. There is, therefore, the necessity to seek for historical information about especially precolonial period of African history from other sources: oral, archaeological, artifacts, as well as from other disciplines like linguistics, anthropology, geography, and literature.

Oral Sources

An oral source of history can be defined as evidence transmitted through the word of mouth whether it has already been committed to writing, or even published. The two most important types of oral sources are oral tradition and oral history. Oral history is one of the sources for the study of contemporary history. The evidence is collected through interviews in which informants speak of their own experience about the recent past whether as participant, eyewitness, or not. For example, the study of recent topics such as economic or political development, or military intervention in politics in any country, must derive very valuable evidence through oral historical research by means of interviews of participants and activists in the events. Such participants give more useful information, comments, and elucidations in oral interviews than a researcher would be able to glean from their private published diaries, memoirs, and other papers, which persons publicize after they may have rationalized their roles in those events.

Oral traditions, on the other hand, could be defined as the form in which man relates by word of mouth the past of his people, the rulers, and the ancestors, as far back in time as possible, or simply, a testimony about the past transmitted orally from one generation to another. Oral traditions are of two main types: the factual or historical traditions, and the literary and philosophical types. The historical traditions deal mainly with origins, migrations, settlement, the establishment of dynasties, chronicles of each reign, genealogies, praise names, and so forth, of each king or great chief, and certain laws and customs. They deal with remote and

recent past but are more reliable when they give account of events of last few centuries. The factual traditions are very useful as sources of African history after they have, like the written sources, undergone the historian's usual critical examination.

The literary and philosophical traditions may include proverbs and sayings, songs and lyrics of various are-grades, guilds, or those of religious organizations such as the sacred verses of the gods, divination poems, funeral dirges, liturgies and sacred hymns. They are useful for, among other things, the religious history, the worldview and culture of the people. Myths and legends have both factual and literary aspects but are less reliable as sources of history.

Some major traditions in the Nigerian region include the Oduduwa tradition of Yoruba origin, the Bayajidda of the origin of Hausa states, the Eri tradition of Igbo origin, the Tsoede among the Nupe, and the Ogiso and Oranmiyan among the Bini. These are mainly in the area of myths and legends, and many of them have variants in the question of details. The most outstanding of these traditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is the "traditions of Sundiata of Mali," collected and published by Djibril T. Niane in *Presence Africaine*, translated by G. D. Pickett and published by D. T. Niane as *Sundiata: An Epic of Old Mali* (London, 1965).

The use of oral sources has a long history. Oral evidence was used as a valid source of history even among ancient European writers. Latin and Greek historians, such as Homer in the *Iliad*; Herodotus, the "father of history"; and Thucydides (c.455–c.400BCE), made extensive use of oral sources in their works. Similarly, medieval western European historians, like their Islamic counterparts, also relied on both written and oral sources. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the use of oral sources was no longer in vogue among European historians. Compilers rather collected and published edited texts of charters, treaties, and so on, especially in England, France, and Italy.

The use of oral sources, however, continued among the oral societies. Oral tradition was the mode in which preliterate Africans recorded their past. It was the only important source of history for them. Those of them who learned to write in the European languages continued to base their works of history on oral sources; for example, Carl Christian Reindorf in Ghana, Apollo Kagwa in Uganda, Samuel Johnson in Nigeria, and others. In the 1950s and 1960s trained Africanist historians joined them in the use of oral sources. Even European colonial officials appreciated the place of oral traditions during their prolonged contact with oral societies of Africa. They subsequently joined in producing works they regarded as history sourced mainly from oral evidence they collected during colonial service.

With the publication of Jan Vansina's *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (1965), the case for oral evidence as a valid historical source became further strengthened. Since then more scholarly works on how to further refine the technique for dealing with oral sources of history have continued to be published: for instance, the works of Jan Vansina, Yves Person, P. D. Curtin, D. Henige, D. F. McCall, E. J. Alagoa, and others in that regard.

Some of the scholars have shown that oral traditions are very important and "essential source" of African history. They are in general agreement that the traditions require cautious and careful scrutiny, for they have structural problems and limitations that make them fundamentally subjective. Hence the use of oral traditions as valid historical source has many detractors. To save the situation the exponents insist that oral traditions should be analyzed with the general rules of textual criticism, both external and internal, as in the case of written documents, and even more. It remains, therefore, to survey briefly some of these problems and limitations of oral traditions: chronology, collection and evaluation, as well as preservation and publication.

Chronology The greatest problem of oral traditions is its lack of absolute chronology. This is one of the major reasons for the unjust scorn in which detractors hold oral traditions as valid source of history. For history deals with every issue or change in time perspective and without that time dimension history will look like sociology. But oral traditions have only relative chronology, distinguishing events in terms of reigns of kings, great chiefs, or queen-mothers; genealogies, and generations of age-grade; or occasionally notable natural disasters such as epidemic (the Spanish influenza of 1918), or periodic natural phenomena such as eclipse of the sun, or volcanic eruptions. Where these events are recorded in other sources especially written with specific dates, such relative chronology of oral tradition becomes absolute chronology. However, this is unusual since the sponsors of oral traditions are oral societies, unless the exact dates were written down by literate visitors of the community.

Historians have, however, endeavored to work out a system of absolute dating for oral traditions. The most popular method has been "to work out a mean length of reign from the dated portion of a king-list" (E. J. Alagoa, 1972), or length of a generation, and then apply the average to the rest of the king-list by projecting the average length of reign backward in time to determine the possible date of each reign, at least approximately. Alagoa used average reign-length of 13.6 years for the Ijo kings, a close figure to the mean reign of 13 years obtained for 71 African dynasties. He still warned that the result is estimated absolute dating. The

social, political, and cultural factors affecting the length of reigns such as succession and interregnum problems, distortions of the lists, and such other limitations of oral transmission, may have made the list fundamentally unreliable, since these factors may not have been constant over the years. Hence it has been suggested that such calculated dates should be indicated with a siglum showing a wide span, thus around 1650CE and not just 1650 (J. Vansina, 1981).

It must, however, be stated that the relative chronology was usable and satisfactory to oral societies as it provided a sequence of events for each kingdom but not useful in recording the relationship between such events and ones in the traditions of other kingdoms, or with ones in the written sources. Historians are still actively involved in the efforts to rescue their oral tradition from its lack of absolute chronology since history is not possible without time dimension.

Preservation and Publication The preservation of oral traditions is in fact more important than their publication. Every oral tradition collected should be processed, indexed, and preserved in the documentation centers, libraries, or archives in their countries of origin. Traditions recorded on tapes should also be indexed, transcribed, and preserved. Publication should be for the interest of the international world of scholars and other users. What should be published are not the enormous volumes of the traditions collected but detailed catalogs and lists of the holdings of the preservation centers. The catalogs and lists may include the index numbers, topics, informants' names, and other particulars, as well as brief abstracts of the oral traditions, and any other notes to enable scholars to evaluate the traditions and as guides to the locations of the preservation centers.

Auxiliary and Related Disciplines

History has auxiliary relationship with a number of independent disciplines, which, in one way or the other, contribute information and techniques for the historian's reconstruction of the past. The African past, which lacks most of the conventional sources of history, relies on those other disciplines for evidence especially about the pre- and protohistoric eras. The related and supportive disciplines to history include archaeology, linguistics, anthropology, geography, political science, economics, psychology, and even literature, that is, the social sciences.

These disciplines are not sources of African history per se. Rather, depending on the theme of the research, the historian borrows relevant information from the discoveries, inferences, and conclusions of experts in the related disciplines for solving historical problems.

For instance, the inferences and conclusions that the archaeologists arrive at from the study of excavated materials, archaeological surveys, and so forth, make useful evidence for the historian researching into the same, or a related community. Historians also adopt some appropriate tools or methods of some of the related disciplines in historical analysis.

The economic historian, for instance, needs some knowledge of certain economic tools, such as principles and theory of economics, for clear and intelligible conclusions about human social and economic affairs in the past. The traditional historian borrows, for instance, the “location theory” of economics for analyzing the consequences in profitability of, say, the brewery industries established in two different towns, one rural, and the other urban locations. With its locational advantage of larger home market, the urban industry survived better. Some knowledge of the principles of political science enables the historian to explain group relations in modern institutions of civil government. The knowledge of, for example, group behavior in psychology helps the historian to understand and analyze historical issues such as revolutions, character of labor union leaders, and so on.

Borrowing from the social sciences and others by the historian is clearly demonstrated by Thomas C. Cochran who is said to have consulted economists, sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists for his study, *Railroad Leaders, 1845–1890: The Business Mind in Action* (1953). The historian should have broad knowledge and interests, but if he has to be an expert in all the auxiliary disciplines necessary for his research, his work will be delayed beyond measure, and little time would be left for his main work of studying and writing history. Hence he borrows from other experts but also acquires enough rudimentary knowledge of the auxiliary disciplines in order to understand their conclusions and to borrow intelligently from them.

Archaeology The most intimately related discipline to history is archaeology. It has already served the interests of history especially about ancient Rome, Greece, the Orient, and in recent times Africa, more than any of the other auxiliary disciplines. Archaeology is the method or science of studying through excavation and examining and describing the material remains of man in the past, and thereby making relevant inferences about his social, economic, and technological achievements. Apart from the contemporary period and the recent past, archaeology covers the whole of human past beginning from the early man.

Excavation is the most essential task of the archaeologist. It is the skilled digging up of material remains of earlier man from the soil where years have buried

them. These materials are the artifacts—the remains of man himself and of everything man had produced and used usually in a vanished culture or civilization. The artifacts include his physical remains such as his skeleton, teeth, and hairs; his tools, weapons, pots and remains of his habitation, houses or huts, and other structures; as well as his objects of art and religious rituals, and so forth. When the archaeologist has carefully unearthed the artifacts, he classifies their types, the frequencies, distribution, and sequence. He studies the artifacts and produces his archaeological or excavation report.

Artifacts are probably the most important source of human history especially for the millennia between the origin of man and the invention of writing and record keeping, about 6,000 years ago. The use of artifacts has enabled archaeologists to acknowledge that Africa was probably the cradle of mankind. Only the artifacts are available as sources of history for that very long period of human existence, since oral traditions do not go far back to more than four or five hundred years even where their preservation and transmission methods are exceptionally good. The writing of history, sourced only from artifacts is, therefore, the task of archaeologists who are very familiar with, and facilitators of artifacts.

Even for African history during the later period after the invention of writing and record keeping, artifacts are still very relevant. Where other sources of history such as written records and oral traditions are available, artifacts still help in filling the gaps in the evidence, and to supplement, corroborate, or authenticate the data from those other sources and vice versa, or to revise existing conclusions for a fuller picture of the human past to emerge.

A glaring instance of revision of conclusions through the result of excavations is the controversy over the origin of the stone buildings of Great Zimbabwe. Europeans had assigned the construction to exotic, non-African, forgotten “whites” probably Phoenicians and some others. Excavations in the 1900s and another in the 1920s by professional archaeologists revealed that the site was the headquarters of an indigenous African state. But the controversy and speculations based on the now discredited “Hamitic hypothesis” raged on, until the recent excavations of Roger Summers and Kenneth Robinson plus “carbon dating have fully confirmed . . . that these stone buildings were the work of Iron Age Africans,” (R. Gray 1970). That was a case of the science of archaeology using artifacts to restore African initiative. The excavations at the ancient Ghana site of Koumbi Saleh (Mauritania) and at Lake Kisale (Katanga/Shaba, Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo) have corroborated and validated the oral sources that located them (J. Vansina, 1981).

Thus artifacts enable historians to get a fuller picture of the human past, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where artifacts remained almost the sole source of history until the European written sources appeared from the sixteenth century, though areas that came under Muslim influence (the Sudan and east coast of Africa) experienced written sources much earlier. In the case of Egypt, the dry climate favors the survival of even perishable objects of wood, bone, and the like, made by the early man, as well as the almost indestructible artifacts made of stone and pottery. Consequently, early Egyptian written records of hieratic papyri and ostraco also survived. And with detailed information from these written sources and the artifacts, Egyptologists have reconstructed the history of ancient Egypt. The east coast of Africa, like the Sudan, has external written sources from the first millennium CE and some later Swahili documents written in Arabic script. Neville Chittick (1968) has used information from these written sources including the eyewitness accounts of early Portuguese visitors supplemented with artifacts excavated from some coastal trading towns to reconstruct a history of "The Coast Before the Arrival of the Portuguese."

In most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, archaeological investigations are yet to accumulate enough data for meaningful reconstruction of the past, be it prehistory or protohistory of the various regions. Hence Thurstan Shaw (1971) has assessed his pioneer study of "The prehistory of West Africa" as an "outline summary of the rather disjointed information" about the subject matter, because of the dearth of archaeological data. He suggests further archaeological research and accumulation of data as the only way out.

Archaeology brings with it its own set of difficulties. For instance, the location of archaeological sites often depends very much on chance and this helps to slow down the progress of the research. Archaeology in itself is an expensive discipline because of the amount of money and time required for the team to excavate a known site and to fully study and report on it. There are also a few archaeologists in Africa outside Egypt and North Africa. The number, however, is increasing as fully trained ones are being attached to the universities, research institutes, and antiquities commissions in various African countries. But some are not committed, while some governments, foundations, and even philanthropists are yet to realize the importance of archaeological research for history, and so encourage its execution with handsome grants.

The use of artifacts has also given rise to other subsidiary sources of African history: numismatics, epigraphy, and chronological systems. Numismatics is the study of coins and coinage, as well as their description and classification according to countries of origin and

periods. The legends on coins often afford useful historical data especially on chronology of reigns, dynasties, or significant events, as well as indicating the directions of trade links. Although numismatic data do not supply details, they have afforded insights into the history of Greece and Rome, for example, and their empires as far afield as the Greek kingdoms set up in northwestern India by Alexander the Great. (Garraghan, 1946) However, they are not an important source for Sub-Saharan Africa, with the possible exception of the East African coast, where even coin-hoards have been found, and Gao in Sudan, and probably along the fringes of Muslim influence.

Epigraphy or science of inscriptions made on stone, or statue, and so forth, is another aspect of archaeology. It studies inscriptions on artifacts and their physical characteristics and makes collections of their text according to language, country, and period. It is important for the ancient history of literate societies such as the Orient, Greece, or Rome, and to a little extent, in Egypt, Maghrib, and Axum. G. W. B. Huntingford has even used the inscriptions of Ezana, king of Axum, who was converted to Christianity in the fourth century CE to reconstruct part of the history of the kingdom of Axum and Ethiopia. (R. Oliver, 1971). Like numismatics, it is not important as a source of the history of black Africa. However, epigraphical sources could be obtained in the Sudan as a *tarikh* is reported to have been found in the walls of Koumbi Saleh (D. McCall, 1964).

Archaeological systems of chronology constitute a very important source of African history. Both archaeology and history all over the world experience great difficulties in knowing exactly when different events took place in the past. Archaeology has devised stratigraphy that yields relative chronology: items deeper in the earth stratum are older than those above them in the same soil. Some idea of the date could also be worked out through dendrochronology: the counting of tree rings; and from objects imported to Africa and found in excavations such as clay pipes for tobacco smoking, glass beads, or Chinese porcelain.

The best-known method devised by archaeology and its subsidiaries, however, is the radiocarbon fourteen (C14) dating. If bone, wood, charcoal, or shell from an excavation is dated by this method, and $1,400 \pm 120$ years before the present is obtained, the two possible chances are that the actual time lies between 1,520 and 1,280 years ago. This is the archaeological discovery of absolute dating; though far from being exact, historians adopt it. Archaeologists have a new method for dating pottery shards: the thermoluminescent dating. This system also depends on physics and is very promising as it uses one of the commonest artifacts: pottery (T. Shaw 1970).

Linguistics In their degree of support to history, linguistics is next to archaeology. Linguistics is the scientific study of the development of languages including such items as their rate and pattern of change and divergence in time and space, their borrowing and diffusion patterns, their relationships and classification, and so forth. Linguistics contributes valuable data to the historian who is researching on the prehistoric era. According to P. Diagne (1981), it “supplies history with at least two kinds of data; first, linguistic information properly speaking; and secondly, evidence which might be termed supra-linguistic.”

Similarly, in his “Linguistics as an Instrument of Prehistory” Morris Swadesh (1959) explains some ways linguistics can contribute to prehistory: it establishes common origin and subsequent divergence of languages, inferring that originally united peoples later separated some thousands of years ago; it also suggests prehistoric culture contacts, physical environments, and contents of such pristine cultures through conclusions and deductions from diffused features and reconstructed old vocabularies especially culture words (such as horses, or iron, or chief, or chicken, etc.) among languages.

These possibilities of linguistics raise the hope that it is a very essential source of African prehistory, and that in collaboration with archaeology and oral tradition, it would help solve the problem of scarcity of evidence for the prehistory of Africa. But the full realization of this hope is being hampered by the present problems of linguistics in Africa. For instance, only a few language experts are interested in the enormous fields of research in African languages. There are also the good deal of controversies, arguments, reservations, and even outright rejection of reconstructions, deductions, and other results of research in African languages, especially on the issue of African linguistic classification among linguists themselves. These hinder some historians from the use of such data. Moreover, the results of research could be ideologically distorted and thus falsified. The Hamitic hypothesis is a case in point, whereby some European scholars seek to explain interesting achievements and cultural features in black Africa in terms of external influence. For instance, C. G. Seligman, C. Meinhof, and others present Bantu as a mixed language “descended of a Hamitic father and a Negro mother” (Diagne, 1981).

In the light of these problems, historians make use of linguistic data with caution and careful consideration. They often make allowance for the provisional nature of the evidence, and the possibility of revising the conclusions, when, and if, a consensus is reached among linguistics on a particular issue, or further research provides a more solid evidence. Take for example the issue of Bantu “homeland” and expansion. In

reconstructing this prehistory of the Bantu-speaking people of Central and Southern Africa, Roland Oliver (1966) has used mainly the research reports of linguistic authorities (Joseph Greenberg 1955, and Malcolm Guthrie 1962) together with some cultural and additional evidence, while archaeology also provides the chronology. He recognized the possibility of revision when he states that he had relied on “evidence available in 1966.” Similarly while using linguistic evidence to reconstruct the migrations and early inhabitants of the “Windward Coast” that covers the coasts of the states of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, Christopher Fyfe (1965) also calls attention to the “argument among them” (linguists) over language grouping in the area.

Thus by combining evidence from linguistics, archaeology, oral tradition, and anthropology our knowledge of the preliterate period of African history is being expanded, especially where the linguistic evidence is not contentious. I. A. Akinjogbin (1971) for instance, has on the strength of solid evidence from linguistics, religion, social, and economic organization firmly declared that the Aja and the Yoruba form “one distinct cultural area.”

Anthropology Apart from anthropology and perhaps geography, other social sciences offer peripheral support as sources of African history. Anthropology is the scientific study of man especially his racial and tribal development, customs, manners, arts, religious beliefs, and other cultural traits. Like ethnologists, early anthropologists originally presumed, on the basis of their ethnocentric considerations, that Europeans pioneered civilization, and therefore, are in the van of human progress while the “primitive natives” of Oceanian, Amazonia, and Africa bring up the rear. Anthropology thus became a tool for European colonizers to study their colonial victims and achieve greater understanding and control. As colonialism transformed the “primitive natives” into producers for the world markets, anthropologists began investigating the original structures in African societies without preconceived ideas such as the Hamitic hypothesis. Joseph Ki-Zerbo’s (1981) warning that “if it is to be useful to history, anthropology must avoid theoretical reconstructions in which ideology outweighs concrete facts” is timely enough for the historian to use anthropological information with caution.

Anthropology is a source of African history. Historians borrow from the reports of the field investigations and the synthesis of anthropologists on particular African societies. Such borrowings help historians in fuller understanding and analysis of social and political relationships, events, and the cultural traits of the people under study especially for the preliterate era

and the early period when written documents are available. In researching into the history of an African people, for instance, one should wish to study, first, the general works in anthropology and even ethnography of Africa such as E. E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes (eds.), *African Political Systems* (1940); A. U. Richards (ed.), *East African Chiefs* (1960), and so forth; and second, any monographs on the particular area of study, for example, the Bantu: J. F. M. Middleton, *The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya* (1953); R. P. P. Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy* (translation by Colin King, 1959); J. H. M. Beattie, *Bunyoro, an African Kingdom* (1960), and so on; or the Asante: R. S. Rattray, *Ashanti* (1923); *Religion and Art in Ashanti* (1927); A. W. Cardinall, *In Ashanti and Beyond* (1927); K. A. Busia, *Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (1951).

It is with the knowledge acquired from the study of such appropriate anthropological sources that the historian will be in a position to proceed in the research: first, to understand and adequately write about the early political or economic structures of the people under study as may be required in the research report; and second, to appreciate how some modern institutions of government such as the chieftainship may have actually functioned in the past, and be able to explain their transformations, for example, in terms of the arrival of immigrant rulers, evolution from within the system, or the impact of colonialism. Proper understanding of the dynamics of political, economic, and kinship organizations will equip the historian with more evidence to understand and perhaps discredit the Hamitic hypothesis on state formation in West Africa (R. Horton, 1970) or any other ideological distortions.

The library study of the anthropological materials should be enough for the historian to pick up the required background knowledge of the people being studied. For the historian cannot afford the time to undertake the anthropological fieldwork by himself as it takes too much time; since the task requires the student to live among the people being studied for two or more years, celebrating with them as a member of the society and collecting details for the monograph. Moreover, the monographs on many parts of Africa are not in short supply as many were produced by colonial government anthropologists, ethnographers, and other scholars.

Geography The main branches of geography contribute data in some degree to the historical study of the development of man. The physical geography, which deals mainly with topography, climate, and potential wealth in soil, minerals, flora, and fauna, makes the maximum contribution to history, followed by human geography with minimal contribution from the other branches. However, all the branches of geography

contribute their illustrative devices (maps, diagrams, and tables), which the historian borrows to make history more real and understandable. The maps, for instance, set the historical events in their real context on the ground, and thus aid the student to report the historical findings with precision. Hence, most national and regional works in history begin with an introductory chapter on the "land and people" with maps and relevant illustrations.

The elements of physical geography provide data for the understanding of the influence of geography on man and his social evolution, for example, grassland and woodland vegetations encourage more population increase and human mobility than the humid forests; the desiccation of the Sahara from about 3000BCE may have caused the flight of the Saharan peoples into Egypt and southward into the more humid forest regions; the desiccation eventually left the great sandy barrier between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, making black Africa to miss out in the diffusion of the fertilizing innovations of copper and bronze metallurgy and the wheel, which reached Britain by the first half of the second millennium BCE. (T. Shaw, 1971). The open woodlands south of the Congo forests into which the Bantu migrated and settled is believed to have favored the increase of their population which in turn may have encouraged their further migration into the rest of southern Africa.

Nevertheless, other contributory factors apart from the geographical influences must be taken into due consideration. Whatever favorable geographical conditions do exist for expansion, or growth, or the like, or may have induced migration, the actual movement or actions that favored growth arose also from the free will decision of the population, who, for example, built the irrigation channels in Egypt, or took the decision and undertook the movement to new sites.

Literary Sources Among the literary sources of history are novels, plays, and poems that introduce historical facts and persons often with fictitious names. The aim of the literary authors is primarily to stimulate emotional enjoyment, aesthetic pleasure, and entertainment. To achieve such aims, the dictum "facts are sacred" no longer applies, rather exaggerations of events and characters, fictitious details, and the like, to stimulate the sensibilities of readers or the audience are employed. As such, these literary types, like such other discourses as funeral orations, eulogies, and public declarations of diplomats, are not strictly sources of factual data for the historian. One should not trust or take the words of a novelist, poet, or playwright about an event unless such event is confirmed by sources of factual data.

The historian should, however, study many such historical novels, poems, and plays (if any is available) on the subject and period of his research. From such wide reading one would derive not the factual data for his research report, but the general insight, picture, and balanced estimate of the period about which the works were written. Such insight could even suggest to the historian more themes and issues to be investigated from the sources of factual data like government records, commercial company papers, and so forth. The historian could, however, use any vivid example from novels, poems, and plays to illustrate and support the factual data.

A few examples will suffice here. A historian researching into the life of Africans under the policy of racial discrimination in South Africa will have many literary sources to study for the general picture of color bar in the country. Peter Abrahams' pioneer novel, *Mine Boy* (published by Faber and Faber in London, 1946, and first published in the African Writers Series in 1963), was one of the first books to depict the miserable lives of blacks in the racially segregated, white-dominated country. *Tell Freedom*, his autobiography about his childhood and youth in the slums of Johannesburg (published by Faber and Faber, 1954) also depicts the wretched lives of blacks in South Africa even more boldly. These and other novels, poems, and plays will provide the researcher with the general picture. For the factual data for the research, he turns mainly to the archival sources, and the external and internal narrative sources on South Africa already mentioned above.

Again the main themes of most novels, poetry, and plays published in the African Writers Series are European colonial encounters with Africans and their impact on African societies. Most poets, novelists, and playwrights in that series create in bold relief the picture of the devastation of African institutions and traditional societies in the colonial encounter in which life is falling apart. But historians from the sources of factual data are enabled to emphasize continuity and change, or even continuity of African institutions under colonialism. However, some works in the series written as biography or autobiography such as Elechi Amadi's *Sunset in Biafra, A Civil War Diary* (1973) should be treated as a source of factual data, not for mere entertainment; however, data from such sources should be subjected to proper criticism before use.

Conclusion

There are certain problems that still impede research and publication in African history. Research is seriously hindered by some difficulties in getting reliable sources of information. Some of the sources discussed

in this essay are not readily available for scholars to consult nor are they all easily accessible. In addition, the problems of language of the narrative as well as archival sources, which are scattered throughout many European cities, have been mentioned. Some solutions have already been suggested such as translations from the obscure or dead ancient languages to modern international languages and the retrieval of publications, microfilm, and electronic to African states. Even most of the auxiliary sciences such as archaeology, linguistics, and the like, which provide their results of research as the historians' data, are yet to accumulate enough data on various parts of Africa for solid historical conclusions to be based on them.

The result of the problems of sources is that certain periods and regions in African history are unpopular among research scholars. For example, while the history of Africa since the colonial era is popular to all including young researchers even for doctoral studies, the history of Africans before that period is unattractive to research scholars. Sometimes the earlier periods from the period of emergence of European narratives on Africa from the sixteenth century are only cursorily treated as introductory in the colonial studies.

The publishing policy of selective acceptance of jobs for publication is the most serious impediment to publication of monographs in African history. Most publishers are ready to publish textbooks, examination notes and aids, and the like whose markets are fully assured, while they reject serious historical monographs whose market, they argue, is usually restricted. The only possible exceptions to this policy are university presses. Some publishers even frown at the detailed documentation that historians stick to in historical works. But history does not worship documents as such. It only insists on full documentation because it deals with human reality in the past. This makes it mandatory that the sources of information on which historical statements are based should be fully stated to facilitate verification.

The most serious modern problem impeding research and publication in history is underfunding. This is a result of the short-sightedness of the educational policies of mainly some third world countries in Africa that look down on history and other humanities while promoting almost only science-and-technology-based disciplines. Proper funding of research and publication in African history by governments and philanthropic individuals and organizations will go a long way in removing most of the hindrances. It will enable more sources to be collected in Africa, thus making them available in better-equipped libraries of the universities and research institutes and the state archives; adequate research grants would be available, and

university presses would be able to publish research reports. Thus, more research scholars would be attracted to participate in the field of African history.

JOSEPH B. C. ANYAKE

See also: Crowther, Reverend Samuel Ajayi and the Niger Mission; Equiano, Olaudah; Ibn Battuta, Mali Empire and; Ibn Khaldun: Civilization of the Maghrib; Livingstone, David; Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Yusuf ibn Tashfin: 1070–1147. Almoravid Empire: Maghrib:

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Hominids: See Humankind: Hominids, Early, Origins of.

Horton, James Africanus Beale (1835–1883) **Sierra Leonean Scientist and Patriot**

Medical doctor and researcher, army officer, administrator, geologist, mining entrepreneur, banker, and political scientist, Horton grew up in a society in which skin color was no barrier to advancement. Senior official posts, including that of governor, were held at this period by men of African descent. In London, the War Office, alarmed by the high mortality rate among army medical officers in West Africa, decided to recruit Africans. Horton was chosen with two others (one died in England) to study medicine at King's College, London. From there he went on to Edinburgh University where in 1859 he graduated with a doctorate. He at once published his doctoral thesis, *The Medical Topography of the West Coast of Africa*, adding on the title page the name "Africanus" (Beale, his former headmaster's name, he had already adopted), to identify himself as an African.

Horton and his fellow student William Davies were then given commissions in the army. He was posted to the Gold Coast (Ghana) where he spent most of his army career. In the early years he was ill treated by his fellow officers, who resented his presence and persuaded the War Office not to appoint any more African medical officers. But it could not be denied that he carried out his military duties efficiently,

including service in the Anglo-Asante wars of 1863–64 and 1873–74. He also acted regularly as an administrative officer in the districts where he was stationed. Wherever he went he conducted medical, botanical, and geological research.

During this time, the British government was considering a political reorganization of the West African colonies, and possibly a withdrawal from them. Horton began formulating his political ideas in a brief pamphlet published in 1865. In 1866 he went on leave to England, and there published three books; two were medical: *Physical and Medical Climate and Meteorology of the West Coast of Africa* (1867) and *Guinea Worm, or Dracunculus* (1868). The third was his best-known work, *West African Countries and Peoples* (1867). He subtitled it *A Vindication of the African Race* and began by contesting the theories of white racial supremacy that were then becoming prevalent. These he refuted empirically and showed to be groundless. There next followed a blueprint for the political reorganization of West Africa. He envisioned its peoples developing as self-governing nations and outlined appropriate constitutions for each, based on his own estimates of their political and economic potential. They included those under not only British rule but the Yoruba country, already under Christian missionary influence, and even his own ancestral Igbo country, still virtually unknown to Europeans. They would at first be under British protection but ultimately form a united West Africa, with its own government and legislature, a proposal for which he has been hailed as a pioneer of Pan-Africanism. For his plans to succeed, the rich, neglected, economic resources of West Africa would have to be developed, and the proceeds spent on sanitary and health measures as well as providing universal education.

On return, he was able to make a start toward putting his plans into practice. The Fante peoples were becoming dissatisfied with the British authorities, and in 1868 the leading chiefs and businessmen formed a “Fanti Confederation” to protect their interests. Horton saw in their initiative the nucleus of his self-governing West Africa and sent the Colonial Office a series of letters, published as *Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold Coast* (1870), urging that the confederation be officially recognized and drafting for it a constitution, which was adopted in modified form. However, the British authorities refused to recognize the confederation, and its members fell to quarreling; within a couple of years it had dissolved.

Horton gave up political writing. In 1874 he published a comprehensive medical reference work, *The Diseases of Tropical Climates and their Treatment*, with a revised edition appearing in 1879. His activities

had now become increasingly entrepreneurial. Using his knowledge of geology, he located potential goldfields, obtained mining concessions from chiefs, surveyed a potential railway line to link them and, with an associate in London, floated companies to exploit them. In 1880 he retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and returned to Freetown, where he had bought a large mansion, to devote himself to his business interests. He also opened a bank. His years of service had been regularly punctuated with illness. His health worsened, and on October 15, 1883, he died of the infectious disease erysipelas.

Horton married twice: in 1862 to Fannie Pratt, daughter of a wealthy recaptive, who died in 1865, and again in 1875 to Selina Elliott, a member of one of the old Freetown settler families. He left an elaborate will, endowing with his substantial fortune an institution to provide scientific and technological education in Freetown. But for the next thirty years his relatives contested it, the value of his mining investments collapsed, and his institution was never founded. Meanwhile his dreams of West African self-government were swept away by the racially stratified colonial rule of the early twentieth century. Only in the era of decolonization was his work again recognized. His emphasis on the need for governments to invest in economic development, public health, and education, and his pioneer Pan-Africanism fitted the policies and aspirations of the new African states; he was recognized belatedly for his achievements and vision.

CHRISTOPHER FYFE

See also: **Du Bois, W. E. B., and Pan-Africanism; Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism.**

Biography

James Africanus Beale Horton was born on June 1, 1835, in Sierra Leone, at Gloucester village, in the mountains above Freetown. His parents, James and Nancy Horton, were Igbo captives, among the thousands captured by the British navy from slave ships in transit across the Atlantic and liberated in Sierra Leone. His father was a carpenter who, like most captives, took a European name and became a Christian. He attended the village school and in 1847 was given a scholarship to the Church Missionary Society Grammar School in Freetown. In 1853 he left for Fourah Bay Institution (later College) to study for the Anglican ministry. He published several books and is generally considered a pioneer of Pan-Africanist thought. He died of the infectious disease erysipelas on October 15, 1883.

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Houphouët-Boigny, Félix (1905–1993)

President and Politician

Félix Houphouët-Boigny was the dominant political figure in Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa until his death in November 1993. Born into a chiefly Baoulé family in Yamoussoukro on October 18, 1905, Houphouët-Boigny followed the typical path of someone from a prominent African tribe in the French colonial system. Unlike the vast majority of his countrymen, he received a primary and secondary education. Between 1925 and 1940, he traveled throughout Côte d’Ivoire as a practitioner of pharmacy medicine.

In 1940 he became a district officer in the colonial administration. He was also a planter of cocoa and coffee. In fact, by the 1930s, he was one of the country’s largest cocoa producers. He rose to political prominence with the creation of the *Syndicat Agricole Africain* (SAA)—the country’s first African led rural union. Elected as Côte d’Ivoire’s deputy to the French Constituent Assembly in 1945, he was instrumental in getting the French parliament to abolish a forced labor law that was hated widely by Africans, especially farmers who were deprived of needed labor because of the law. With this success, he, along with other prominent members of SAA, launched the country’s first independent political party, the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire* (PDCI), which became part of a larger federation of parties in French-speaking West Africa, *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*.

While the PDCI-RDA was initially positioned on the left with the support of the French Communist Party, Houphouët-Boigny broke with the Communists in 1950 and became one of France’s staunchest supporters in West Africa. He served first as a minister attached to the French prime minister’s office between 1956 and 1957 and then minister of health in 1957 to 1958. From 1958 to 1959, he was minister of state in three successive French cabinets, those of Pflimlin, De Gaulle, and Debré. Even after Côte

d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny maintained extremely close ties with the country’s former colonial power.

The constitution that was adopted in 1960 gave the president preeminence over the legislature and judiciary. The president is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage and able to renew his mandate an unlimited number of times. Félix Houphouët-Boigny was elected president. In subsequent elections, he was reelected with more than 90 per cent of the popular vote. Along with the presidency, he headed the ministries for foreign affairs (1961), the interior, education, agriculture (1963), and defense (1963–74).

Houphouët-Boigny’s main objective was to keep full control over the political dynamics in the country. He was able to do this by utilizing the broad powers provided to him by the constitution and one-party rule to push through legislation without any significant opposition. Thus, there was no real separation of powers between the various branches of government. Power and decision making was in the hands of the president and the ministers that he personally selected. He used his broad powers to satisfy the political elite with patronage positions in the bureaucracy and party. He diffused potential ethnic tension by maintaining a rough balance among the country’s major ethnic groups in his appointments to the cabinet, and when necessary, he jailed or exiled opponents.

Probably more than any other postcolonial African leader, Houphouët-Boigny continued to seek legitimacy of his personalization of power from the public. Unlike Sekou Touré in Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana who explicitly developed their own ideological systems as a guide for their countrymen and other Africans in a broader Pan-African context, Houphouët-Boigny never explicitly set out to directly expose his thoughts. For example, he never advocated a form of “Houphouëtism” in the way that Touré and Nkrumah did. He refused to have his thoughts published and disseminated to the masses and publicly disavowed any official cult of personality.

Despite these apparent limitations on fostering a cult of personality, Houphouët-Boigny cultivated a highly personalized image of himself as the father of the Ivorian nation. He reinforced the country’s close identification with him by the holding of periodic national dialogues. These were occasions for the president to invite the nation’s major socioprofessional groups together to listen to their complaints about the government, social issues, and economic concerns. More specifically, as Michael A. Cohen in *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa* noted, they permitted the president “to emphasize the difference between himself and members of his government.” This strategy worked as the

following comment indicates: “The ministers don’t mean anything. It is the President who acts.”

The same thing was true for the country’s only political party. Until the reintroduction of multiparty competition in 1990, the PDCI served as the political guardian for the Houphouët-Boigny regime. No other parties were permitted and the country’s major socio-professional associations were obligated to associate themselves with the party. The party quickly lost its function as a mass mobilization machine. Rarely did it mobilize Ivorians for ideological purposes; its primary task was to ensure that opposition forces did not take root in Ivorian society.

After decades of spectacular economic growth under his leadership, the economy declined in the 1980s. As the economic crisis deepened, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and popular forces demanded economic and political reforms. Reluctantly, President Houphouët-Boigny introduced a number of changes in the early 1990s. First, as mentioned above, new electoral rules opened the system to multiparty politics. Second, the government attempted to decentralize decision making by creating municipal governments. Before 1980, there were only two municipalities, Abidjan and Bouaké. Afterward there were over 100 municipal governments. Third, in 1990, President Houphouët-Boigny appointed a prime minister to manage the day-to-day affairs of the country. And finally, he revised the constitution and designated the speaker of the assembly as his successor.

In search of immortality, Houphouët-Boigny built the world’s largest basilica in his birthplace, Yamoussoukro, which had become the nation’s capital in 1983. On the stained glass in the basilica, one can see Felix Houphouët-Boigny, a fervent Catholic, ascending to heaven.

DWAYNE WOODS

See also: Côte d’Ivoire.

Biography

Born into a chiefly Baoulé family in Yamoussoukro on October 18, 1905. Studied pharmacy at the elite William Ponty School in Dakar, Senegal. In 1940 he became a district officer in the colonial administration. Elected as Côte d’Ivoire’s deputy to the French Constituent Assembly in 1945. As a minister attached to the French prime minister’s office between 1956 and 1957, as minister of health from 1957 to 1958, and as minister of state in three successive French cabinets. Elected president in 1960. Also headed the ministries for foreign affairs (1961), the interior, education, and agriculture (1963), and defense (1963–1974). Died 1993.

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Human Rights: Postcolonial Africa

Human rights concepts are notoriously subjective, and their interpretation is at the core of recent controversies in Africa. Despite lapses, in general Western governments are usually judged by Western observers to have better human rights observance records than virtually all African states. Why should this be the case? Many African governments would, in fact, deny that this is the case and, when charged with a poor human rights regime, might argue that their society’s conception of rights is different from, rather than inferior to, that of the West. Consequently they would contend that, where human rights are concerned it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare like with like. In addition, some African governments have sought to defend what many (not only Western) observers have judged to be arbitrary or harsh treatment of individuals by arguing that such actions are occasionally justified in the name of the collective (or national) good.

Because of their nature, human rights have long since ceased to be the exclusive preserve of individual governments. Over time, human rights concerns have become of universal significance. Since the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) has sought to promote human rights observance with the aim that regional institutions are needed to oversee improvements in human rights regimes in individual countries. The Organization of African Unity adopted the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) in 1981, with a commission based in Banjul, Gambia, established to promote improved human rights in the continent. However, while citizens in some African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon, have sought to establish national organizations to seek compliance with the ACHPR, its provisions have remained substantially unenforced for two decades in many continental countries.

Despite slow progress, the existence of the ACHPR highlights the desirability of a better human rights regime in Africa. It also suggests signs of a gradual shift from the principle that state sovereignty must be safeguarded, irrespective of its consequences for

individuals, groups, and organizations, toward a presumption that citizen preferences must be taken into account. A continental search for enhanced respect for the autonomy of the subject, as well as for a more extensive range of human rights, is helping create a new set of ordering principles in political affairs in Africa. It is hoped that this development will, in time, delimit and curtail the principle of state sovereignty itself when the latter is used to abuse human rights.

It is often argued that the end of the Cold War in 1989 ushered in conditions favorable to a new respect for universally recognized human rights, and the emphasis on such rights in the new world order rhetoric of the early 1990s reinforced this impression. Moreover, since the superpowers had, for Cold War reasons, been supporters of African regimes that had notoriously violated their own citizens' rights, for example, the governments of Congo (Kinshasa) and Ethiopia, then the removal of this structural condition appeared favorable to a general improvement in human rights for Africans. In addition, determination on the part of the international community to implement war-crime tribunals, for example following the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, was symptomatic of the rediscovered universalism that had first been encouraged in the aftermath of World War II. Further evidence of a move in this direction was the greater emphasis on human rights issues in North-South relations. Not only was liberal democracy triumphant in the Cold War competition, but the West became increasingly assertive in demanding change in political behavior in Africa and elsewhere in the South. Political conditionality—the imposition of political tests of multiparty democracy and human rights performance—emerged as a major element in Western thinking. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the European Union aid policies were contingent upon African governments' having a certain concern for political and human rights norms. These developments augmented the development of international law that, over time, has placed African individuals, governments, and nongovernmental organizations under new systems of legal regulation.

Another important issue in relation to human rights in Africa is the relative position of individual and collective conceptions of human rights. Individualistic conceptions of human rights have long been dominant in the West, while collective interpretations have long been to the fore in most African countries. However, it must not be overlooked that there are many numerous cultures, traditions and religions in Africa making it impossible to talk meaningfully about a unitary "African" culture. However, despite this diversity, Africans, it is sometimes claimed, have traditionally been more prepared to accept authoritarian governments and are less concerned with political and civil

freedoms than people elsewhere. "African" notions in this regard are said to be primarily characterized by societal concern with collective rather than individual rights. The result is said to be that individualistic conceptions of human rights in Africa are products of Western history and derive in part from experiences of European colonial rule. To a large degree, individualistic values are said not to have been widely respected by Africa's precolonial societies but rather introduced into the region following the instigation of colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At the same time, however, Africans are thought not to be traditionally more tolerant of arbitrary power. Events since the early 1990s, when many African countries adopted multiparty political systems, served to cast serious doubts not only on the assumption that Africans are more tolerant of authoritarian government than people elsewhere but also that African conceptions of human rights are not concerned with individual rights. In general, the poor performances of authoritarian African governments in relation to both human development and democracy are believed to have been instrumental in stimulating challenges to nondemocratic rule and to demands for more and better human rights.

The social importance of Islam cannot be denied in North Africa. Islam is rooted in the emphatic importance of collective over individual rights; in other words, there is a high regard for social solidarity within North African Muslim countries. The Muslim community (the *umma*) is a compact wall whose bricks support each other. While the role of the individual is not merely to act so as to ensure the community's preservation, it is also to recognize that it is the community that provides for the integration of human personality realized through self-abnegation and action for the good of the collectivity. As far as girls and women are concerned, if they do not wish to court social opprobrium they must act within norms of behavior sanctioned by Muslim conventions.

In Islam, the language of collective duty seems more natural than that of individual rights. Because of the primary importance attached to obedience to God, in Islam rights are seen as secondary to duties. Rules of conduct were laid down by God fourteen centuries ago through his mouthpiece, the Prophet Muhammad. Since then, Muslims have sought to serve God by thorough obedience to divine rules. The consequence is that if rights are thought of as "freedoms," then in Islam, true freedom consists in surrendering to the divine will rather than in some artificial separation from the community of God. Human rights remain subordinate to and determined by duties.

Governments of North African Muslim countries typically claim divine sanction for their existence and for what they do; that is, their rule is God's will and

their policies are, implicitly, sanctioned by God. This is, of course, a potential justification for harsh or arbitrary rule, which has been used to justify denials of democracy, freedom of speech, and harsh treatment of women. There is, however, an emergent trend among some educated Muslims and revisionist *ulama* (theological teachers) questioning the poor position of women and of non-Muslim minorities in some North African Muslim countries, such as Egypt. These are social areas, it is claimed, that have seemed for a long time to be outside the Islamic critical gaze. The Islamic revisionists believe that many Muslims confuse some inherited traditional cultural values with Islamic values.

Despite Western concern with human rights abuses in North Africa—with the position of females and minorities especially criticized—there are several reasons why it is unlikely that individual rights will soon take precedence over collective rights in North African Muslim countries. First, their societies are mostly conservative. Second, incumbent political elites do their best to ensure the continuity of the status quo. Since independence, political elites in North Africa, often in alliance with the military, have striven to modernize their political systems, while retaining a tight grip on power. The avowed aim in, for example, Tunisia and Egypt, has been to build nation states along Western lines. As a result, the status of Islam was at least temporarily downplayed and religious professionals were either incorporated into the state elite or, if not, their power was neutralized. The result was a modernist superstructure balanced uncomfortably upon a substructure deeply rooted in traditional beliefs, with Islam the cement holding the social system together. Elsewhere, in the region's more socially and religiously traditional countries, such as Morocco, governments have sought to deepen their Islamic credentials and to limit the spread of Western ideas.

The core dynamic relating to human rights in both Muslim North Africa and elsewhere in the continent lies not in differing cultural approaches but in the processes of social change and economic development, which create new political realities and tensions. The most important tension seems to be not between Western and Islamic or African values but between modernization and tradition. There is some (limited) evidence that, in Africa, demands for political reform and economic growth have helped create added space for groups and political movements to seek a new human rights culture. However, the important dynamic is not necessarily between Western and African or Islamic values. Most regional governments view opposition groups with suspicion and, even under their own laws, regional regimes are prone to commit human rights violations.

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Humankind: Hominids, Early, Origins of

The first hominid fossil was found in Asia (*Homo erectus*, from Java, 1891; China, 1929), but Raymond Dart's 1924 description of the first specimen of *Australopithecus* (*A. africanus*) moved human origins to Africa. The Leakeys' 1959 find at Olduvai Gorge, "Zinjanthropus" ("East African man"), was a nonancestral robust australopithecine (now "paranthropine" *Paranthropus boisei*). But two years later the site produced the earliest protohuman: *H. habilis*, dated to 1.8 million years ago (hereafter *mya*) and believed, from hand bones evidencing a precision grip, to be the first tool maker, though not found in association with tools. Soon after *H. erectus/ergaster* (1.4 *mya*) was discovered. Among other finds between Eritrea and Gauteng about 4 > 1.5 *mya*, most important was "Lucy" (*A. afarensis* 3.2 *myo* from Hadar, Ethiopia), not fully bipedal and with apelike skull but accepted as a distant Homo relative.

Before the 1990s, eight African hominid species before *H. erectus* were known from the period 5 > 1 *mya*; thirteen are now described. Finds from beyond the eastern Rift (from Chad, 1995, a new australopithecine *A. bahrelghazali*) seem unlikely to invalidate the "East Side Story" of origins: the oldest fossils still come from East and southern Africa during periods of climate change within the past six million years.

"Find of the century" was 1992–1993's earliest part: bipedal hominid *A. ramidus* from 4.4 *mya*, producing a new genus, *Ardipithecus* ("earth ape"), possibly an early offshoot of the human lineage lacking any known descendants. (2001: fragments dated 5.2 > 5.8 *mya* have suggested a subspecies, *A. ramidus kadabba*, very close to the human-chimpanzee divergence dated

5.5 > 6.5 *mya* by molecular studies.) The early 1990s' find at Kanapoi dated 4.2 > 3.9 *mya* was named *Australopithecus anamensis* ("Lake [L. Turkana] australopith"), primitive enough to be distinct from *A. afarensis*, and too close in time to *A. ramidus* to be its descendant.

Kenyanthropus platyops ("flat-faced Kenya man," found 1995) introduces more complexity to the origins puzzle: at 3.5 > 3.2 *mya* it is contemporary with *A. afarensis* but flatter-faced with smaller teeth, indicating a different adaptation (possibly a sister species to *A. ramidus*). It shares no key features with the earlier *A. anamensis* but strongly resembles a primitive Homo, *H. rudolfensis* (2.5 *mya*), to which it may therefore be ancestral if it is not an entire new genus as proposed—*Kenyanthropus*—which would bifurcate the human lineage.

The most recent find is the "Millennium Ancestor" (announced in 2000), *Orrorin* ("original man") *tugenensis*, at six million years ago, from when molecular clocks show apes and hominids diverging. One and a half million years older than *A. ramidus*, its partial bipedalism and modern teeth make it a possible "earliest hominid," though it could be ancestral to humans, to chimps, to a common ancestor of both, or just an extinct side branch.

"Find of the millennium," announced in 2000, was the near-complete Sterkfontein australopithecine skeleton named "Little Foot." At 3.3 *mya*, it is pene contemporary with Lucy, though its longer arms, short legs, and divergent big toe suggest it was possibly a more arboreal sister species to a more terrestrial *A. afarensis*. Still debated is whether early Homo is descended from *A. afarensis*, *A. africanus*, both, or neither. *A. africanus* has a larger brain and more human teeth and face, meaning Lucy may be ancestral to the robust hominids. *A. garhi* ("surprise pith") from Bouri, Afar (1997), is a "scaled—up *afarensis*" except for brain size; at 2.5 *mya* it is on the Homo threshold, thus possibly the link between the graciles and Homo, but its morphological mix (long forearms, big molars) suggests another possible ancestor of the paranthropines (see below).

These multiple discoveries have created confusion, replacing the hierarchical ladder model created by the Lucy discovery with a "tangled bush" image denoting several evolutionary experiments underway. It is probable that not all of the known australopithecines are our ancestors, and at least possible that none is.

The mid-Pliocene cooling/drying turnover pulse of 3 > 2.4 *mya* opened extensive new savannas, and the woodland-adapted "gracile" human ancestor becomes an opportunistic omnivore, leading to increased stature and larger brain size than the contemporary big-toothed, massive-jawed "robust" genus (now "paranthropines" [near-men], *Paranthropus aethiopicus*, *P. robustus*,

P. boisei). These largely vegetarian but non-massive woodland browsers, with dish-shaped faces and skull crests, diverge from the graciles *c.* 2.7 *mya*. Possibly also toolusers, they were long coeval but a "deadend" side branch, extinct by 1.1 *mya*.

No clear dividing lines show between some of the later gracile australopithecines and early Homo (now called "habilines" following the definition of humanity by tool making). But the habiline stock has been controversial; *H. habilis* is a very complicated "mixed bag," widely variable in brain and body size; few agree on what traits define it. Some are unsure whether it belongs in the genus Homo or Australopithecus; others believe all habiline specimens should be assigned to either australopithecine or *H. erectus*, or subdivided into large and small taxa: the eponymous small *H. habilis* (brain 500–650 cm²), the large called *H. rudolfensis* (brain 600–800 cm²) represented by the 1972 find "1470" at Koobi Fora (L. Rudolf), 1.9 *mya*. The subsequent find of *H. rudolfensis* in Malawi (Uraha, early 1990s) makes this species the oldest habiline yet (2.4 > 2.1 *mya*), and the best candidate for the oldest stone tools, apart from hominids that may be associated with artifacts found in the Gona sediments (Omo, Ethiopia, 1997) dated 2.6 > 2.5 *mya*. (Before this, the Leakeys' Olduvai finds, 1.8 million years old and designated Olduvai, were among the oldest tools known.) Though so far only cranial remains are known, *H. rudolfensis* may be a "missing link"—first member of the genus Homo on a path to modern humans—or, a more Homo-like australopithecine with no direct bearing on the evolution of *H. sapiens*. The Uraha find may also help resolve questions about East-South hominid links, Malawi being the one region to provide a link between the Plio-Pleistocene faunas of East and South Africa.

The initial stage of *Homo* emergence may therefore have seen a number of short-lived experiments producing several contemporaneous habiline forms and two or more successive species ancestral to early and later *H. erectus*, with only one later becoming human. But recent postcranial finds of *H. habilis* show a body too primitive (apelike long arms, short legs) for an *erectus* ancestor.

Key anatomic changes leading to moderns were cranium enlargement, lightly built face, changes to hands and teeth, and reduced sexual dimorphism. These occur in the stressful Plio-Pleistocene transition 2 > 1.5 *mya*, when *H. ergaster* (an early form of *H. erectus* geographically confined to Africa) emerges about 1.9 *mya*, with a modern skeletal anatomy very different from habilines but a smaller average brain size than *H. erectus* and more flaring brow ridges. He is nevertheless considered by some to be directly ancestral to *H. sapiens*, with *H. erectus* a dead end. The most

complete early Homo skeleton yet discovered, the 1984 “Nariokotome boy” from West Turkana, 1.6 *mya*, is probably *H. ergaster*. As an open savanna adaptation, the species is built for covering great distances: long torso and limbs and narrow hips for a striding gait facilitate his dispersal from East Africa’s mountain valley systems from about 2 *mya*, then radiation into Eurasia 1.8 > 1.5 *mya*.

Within Africa, no clear dividing lines show between *H. ergaster* and archaic *Homo sapiens* such as *H. heidelbergensis*, who is thought to have left Africa around 800 *mya*. A cranium find from Eritrea about 1 *myo* is a mix of *erectus* and *sapiens* characters. Though Acheulean tools are found everywhere, the African fossil record from 1.5 *mya* > 500 *mya* is largely empty (the so-called million year gap) with a dearth of archaic *sapiens* specimens. All the finds—from Kabwe, Ndutu, Bodo, Ngoloba, Omo 2, Eliye Springs, Saldanha, Florisbad, and Jebel Irhoud—have modern characteristics (larger, more rounded crania, higher foreheads, smaller brow ridges), but these are highly variable until 200 *tya* (thousands of years ago). Nor do grades show between archaic and modern *sapiens*: several “late archaics” flourished 150 > 100 *tya*, after which anatomical moderns are everywhere.

The “genetic African” Eve hypothesis (all moderns descended from a single woman c.200 *tya*) was shown to be statistically flawed in 1992, but the “Out of Africa” explanation of modern origins, though challenged by the “multiregional model” (moderns arose gradually in many global regions), is still supported by the fossil record, and by current genetic studies showing Africans have greater diversity than any other continental population—meaning modern man has lived in Africa longest, arising 200 > 100 *tya*.

New dating techniques show gracilization and brain size increase in extreme southern Ethiopia (the Omo skull, 100 *tya*) and the eastern Cape coast fossils from Klasies River mouth 120 > 100 *tya*, which are supported by finds of early moderns at the Equus and Border Caves (the latter with first evidence of symbolism—grave ochre and ornament—at 100 > 80 *tya*). Faunal material from the Klasies, Die Kelders, and Blombos caves and from Hoedjiespunt supplies evidence of a shore-based diet in the Late Pleistocene.

Anatomically modern humans were evolving in coastal southern Africa and the Rift Valley when Eurasia was inhabited by archaic hominids (including Neanderthals). Africa is therefore cradle of not only the first hominids and first Homo but also the first true humans.

There is little consensus presently on human origins, other than that four hominid genera existed (*Ardipithecus*, *Australopithecus*, *Paranthropus*, and *Homo*, the new *Kenyanthropus* making five), and that considerable species diversity may mean that many

evolutionary experiments occurred in the last 5 *my*, with parallel evolution bringing diverse lineages to different stages at different times.

For skeptics, reconstructions of ancestor-descendant relationships are implausible because each new fossil presents a mosaic of features, meaning that such relationships are perhaps unlikely ever to be determined. For now at least, naming ancestors is therefore to be avoided, and instead a simple division maintained between hominids of archaic aspect (*Orrorin*, *Ardipithecus*, *Australopithecus* including *Paranthropus* and *Kenyanthropus*) and those of modern aspect (the *Homo* spectrum, including archaics).

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See also: **Olduwan and Acheulian: Early Stone Age.**

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Hundred Years’ War, 1779–1878

The frontier between the Cape Colony and Xhosa chiefdoms was the first arena in which white colonists partially dispossessed Bantu-speaking Africans. The relations involved are conventionally described as the Hundred Years’ War, but they were far more complex than merely a series of armed conflicts between colonists on the one side and Africans on the other. Throughout the extended periods of peace on the frontier, there were mundane exchanges

of commodities, labor and even political allegiance between those of different “ethnicity,” and even during the episodes of warfare, alliances were forged between groups of colonists and Xhosa as well as Khoi. It was only as colonial imperatives shifted toward agrarian capitalist expansion in the mid-nineteenth century that the balance of power swung against the Xhosa’s continued autonomy.

Dutch-speaking colonists occupied the Zuurveld, between the Bushmans and Fish Rivers, from the 1770s. During the first two frontier wars (1779–81 and 1793), these sparsely settled farmers acted in a loose alliance with the Xhosa chief Ndlambe, who was seeking to establish his authority over the Zuurveld chiefs. In 1795, however, Ndlambe’s nephew Ngqika rebelled in order to claim authority in his own right. Ndlambe was able to escape Ngqika’s control only by moving west of the Fish River himself. As the Zuurveld filled up with increasing numbers of both colonists and Xhosa, differences between colonial and Xhosa modes of authority, for the first time, became critical.

In 1778 the Dutch authorities had attempted to negotiate a discrete border between colonial and Xhosa territory. Through a treaty reached with the Gwali chiefs, they settled on a line partially following the Fish River. Despite the fact that other Xhosa chiefdoms did not consider themselves subject to this treaty, both Dutch and later British colonial governments thereafter assumed that they were entitled to exclusive control of the Zuurveld. The mercantilist Dutch showed little enthusiasm for exercising such control, but after 1795 British authorities adopted a more forceful approach. The “Third Frontier War” (1799) was the result of a British governor deciding to convert a theoretical claim to the Zuurveld into an exclusive occupation. British action was directed particularly against the Gqunukhwebe chiefs, but facing a simultaneous uprising of Khoi servants, the governor was forced to concede the Xhosa’s continued presence.

With a struggle being waged between Ndlambe and Ngqika, and between Ndlambe and the other Zuurveld chiefs, it proved impossible for either Xhosa or colonial authorities to prevent an escalation in mutual cattle raiding. Frustrated in their attempts to administer a zone of political instability and conflict, British officials represented the Xhosa as being imbued with a “thirst for plunder and other savage passions.” Arising from this construction was the more fervent desire to separate colonial and Xhosa territory. In 1809 small chiefdoms along with individual Xhosa farm workers, were expelled to the east of the Sundays River, but it was in 1812 that the “Fourth Frontier War” was launched by British, colonial, and Khoi troops. Those Xhosa chiefdoms long established in the Zuurveld, together with the Ndlambe, were forced across the Fish

River. The expulsion threw the Ndlambe on top of the rival Ngqika in congested lands just across the frontier. Far from desisting, members of both chiefdoms now intensified their raids against the colony.

Faced with the prospect of “endless expense without compensatory returns,” Governor Somerset attempted to cultivate Ngqika as a colonial ally. At the same time he pressured Ngqika into vacating further land between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers. This “neutral territory” was to be maintained purely as a buffer for the colony. But it soon became known as the “ceded territory” and colonists were permitted to move into it. Certain Xhosa chiefdoms were also “tolerated” within it on the condition of their “good behavior.” In order to retain Ngqika as a colonial client, the British authorities went to war again in 1818–1819 (the “Fifth Frontier War”), when Ndlambe defeated Ngqika’s forces. A British commando came to Ngqika’s aid, and Ndlambe’s soldiers, spurred on by the war doctor Nxele, almost overran the British garrison at Graham’s Town. Only the arrival of Khoi troops saved the defenders and allowed colonial forces to effect Ndlambe’s surrender.

Between 1809 and 1820, Xhosa grievances against the British colony had steadily mounted. A balanced, if sometimes violent, interaction between isolated colonists and Xhosa chiefdoms had been possible in the late eighteenth century, but British officials’ attempts to instill “order” had brought cumulative land loss, frequent humiliation, and greater competition for scarce resources to a number of Xhosa chiefdoms. The establishment of 4,000 British settlers in 1820 was to precipitate a further shift in the overall balance of power. The “1820 settlers” had taken passages to the Cape in order to improve their material situation, not knowing that the colonial authorities required them as a defense against Xhosa “intrusion.” By the 1830s they were broadly united around a program of colonial expansion. Alienated by Xhosa raids, and enthused by the profits to be made from wool production, many settlers envisaged the Xhosa’s territory becoming sheep farms. Settler spokesmen directed propaganda against the “irreclaimable” Xhosa in the press and criticized the “futile” efforts of missionaries to civilize them, while local officials occasionally expelled Xhosa chiefdoms from the “ceded territory” on the pretext of continuing raids.

Ngqika’s son, Maqoma, was especially enraged by arbitrary acts of expulsion and re-admittance. In 1829 his followers were decisively expelled from the Kat River area and a humanitarian “experiment” was carried out on their land. Khoi and “Bastaards” were assigned cultivable plots with the aim of generating a loyal and productive peasantry—which would also act as a buffer against Xhosa raids. “Hostile” frontier chiefdoms were provoked yet more by colonial commandos

which were allowed to “reclaim” cattle reported stolen from the colony by raiding the first kraal to which the tracks were traced. In 1834 it was Maqoma, in alliance with other chiefs, who launched the “Sixth Frontier War” or “War of Hintsas.” (Hintsas was a Gcaleka paramount who was first taken captive after entering the British camp to negotiate, and then killed and mutilated by colonial troops.) For Maqoma the war was an attempt to reclaim lost land and reassert Xhosa independence. However, not all the frontier chiefs were behind him. The Gqunukhwebe now assisted the British forces, while Khoi troops, especially those recruited from the Kat River settlement, did most of the colony’s fighting. In 1835 British forces also persuaded thousands of “Mfecane” refugees, who had accepted clientship under the Gcaleka Xhosa, to turn against their patrons. Together with Xhosa who chose to desert their chiefs, these new allies became known as the Mfengu. Some were favored with land grants within and just beyond the colony and others encouraged to take employment with colonists.

During the 1834–1835 war, spurred on by settlers, Governor D’Urban declared the annexation of Xhosa territory up to the Kei River. However, the military proved unable to effect the expulsion of the “hostile” Xhosa from within the new territory, and in 1836 a humanitarian and economically minded Colonial Office instructed that the Xhosa chiefs’ autonomy be restored. Nevertheless, British settlers continued to agitate for colonial expansion. Attempts by the Colonial Office to pursue a policy based on treaties with the chiefs were undermined by exaggerated settler complaints of Xhosa raids and, when a minor incident involving the “rescue” of a Xhosa prisoner took place in 1846, the next assault on Xhosa independence was launched.

During the “Seventh Frontier War,” or “War of the Axe” (1846–1847), Xhosa territory up to the Kei was annexed once more and named British Kaffraria. The Cape government was determined to extend its military power over the Xhosa while allocating much of their land to settler capitalists. Converted to a free trade economic policy and disillusioned with humanitarian policies, the Colonial Office now proved willing to endorse the scheme. By 1850 settler pressure on the land and labor of both the Kat River Khoi and Xhosa chiefdoms were sufficient to create the conditions once more for mass “rebellion.” Between 1850 and 1852, Xhosa from British Kaffraria united with Khoi from the Kat River Settlement in a final effort to resist subordination within a settler-dominated, capitalist system (the “Eighth Frontier War,” or “War of Mlanjeni,” a Xhosa war doctor). After the “rebels”’ defeat, British military control was tightened and settler land grabbing further encouraged within British Kaffraria. When, from 1856 to 1858, the cattle-killing movement

spread through the Xhosa’s remaining “locations,” Governor Grey was able to use the ensuing famine and the dramatic decline in British Kaffraria’s Xhosa population in order to increase dependency on colonial wages and consolidate settler landholding.

Although the Rharhabe Xhosa were effectively colonized in the wake of the cattle-killing, the conquest of the Gcaleka to the east of the Kei River was delayed, taking place only in the context of South Africa’s mineral revolution. In 1877 British authorities intervened in a struggle between Gcaleka and some of the colony’s Mfengu clients, precipitating the “Ninth Frontier War.” Despite an uprising in British Kaffraria in support of the Gcaleka, the colonial state was now able to bring the entire Xhosa people within the imperial framework on which South Africa’s industrialization would be based.

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See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Cape Colony: British Occupation, 1806–1872; Nonqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing, 1857.

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Hunting, Colonial Era

Hunting served as a fundamental component of European colonialism in Africa. During the early colonial reconnaissance of the nineteenth century, hunting was a basic necessity for explorers, missionaries, and settlers trying to survive in an unfamiliar and challenging environment. As Europeans began to establish themselves and push more deeply into the interior during the mid-nineteenth century, a group of rugged professional hunters emerged, taking prominent positions in local trading networks and entangling themselves in local politics. In Ndebele-land in Central Africa, for example, white hunters first appeared during the 1850s and began to arrive in large numbers by the 1870s. The Ndebele kings solicited the hunters for diplomatic favors, firearms, and ammunition, in return for granting them access to the area's rich game. The white hunters wasted no time in decimating elephant populations, to such an extent that hunters were forced within twenty years to shift from their preferred method of hunting on horseback, to tracking the few remaining elephants on foot through the dense brush to which they had retreated. Frederick Selous, perhaps the most famous white hunter of them all, made his first fortune in Ndebele-land. Selous became the real-life model for Rider Haggard's literary hero Allan Quartermain, anticipating by a few decades the peak of British cultural fascination with the heroic image of the white hunter.

During the consolidation of European rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, hunting continued to serve practical purposes. Colonial troops sent to "pacify" African resistance were regularly provisioned with whatever wildlife they could shoot. Individual colonial pioneers, such as Frederick Lugard and Frederick Jackson in East Africa, used profits from their impressive hunting ventures to finance the extension of British colonial influence into the interior. When the railways of East, Central, and Southern Africa were being built, colonial engineers wrote into their financing calculations the practice of shooting game to feed their laborers. Once the railways were completed, tourists then used the trains as mobile hunting platforms, gunning down animals as they rolled by. At the same time, Africans were now beginning to acquire guns for themselves, and found themselves in economic circumstances which often necessitated hunting for food. During the 1890s wildlife became noticeably scarce, and by the turn of the century the devastating impact of hunting was so obvious to anyone who cared to look, that colonial administrators began to take seriously the idea of establishing game reserves.

The cultural mythos surrounding "the hunt" evolved simultaneously with the consolidation of the colonies. As the wars of "pacification" settled into the

routine of administration in the early twentieth century, a new cultural phenomenon emerged, that of the recreational hunting safari. The hunting safari became a status symbol for upper-class men who could afford to hunt at their leisure, a lifestyle glamorized by countless juvenile adventure stories, as well as popular novels such as Isak Dinesen's *Out of Africa* (1937) and Ernest Hemingway's *The Green Hills of Africa* (1936). This "Golden Age" of hunting between world wars drew prominent men from around the world to enjoy their own safaris, and merely compounded the devastating effects of earlier colonial hunters on Africa's wildlife. Perhaps the most celebrated safari was that of Theodore Roosevelt through East Africa in 1909, guided by Frederick Selous. In the course of this single journey, Roosevelt's entourage killed more than ten thousand animals for shipment home to the Smithsonian.

This new kind of hunting sportsman was no less involved with colonial domination than the earlier imperialist who hunted out of necessity, an unfortunate connection that would deeply affect the rise of the conservation movement in Africa. White hunters such as Roosevelt and Selous were portrayed as free individualists, adventurous and masculine, the very embodiment of European triumph over the "Dark Continent" and its peoples. Since the early days of British imperialism in India, hunting in the colonies had been explicitly linked to military training, and young boys were taught to see themselves growing into heroic soldiers for the empire. Lord Baden-Powell, the founder of the Boy Scouts, touted the virtues of the hunt in South Africa as preparation for combat against Africans. In some ways, whites held hunted game animals killed through ritualized sport in higher esteem than African casualties of colonialism, killed in response to their anticolonial resistance. The establishment of game reserves in colonial Africa during the early twentieth century was closely linked to the desire that these wildlife sanctuaries would also provide whites with sanctuary from the harsh political realities of colonialism in Africa.

Thus, the wildlife conservation movement that grew during the early the twentieth century maintained, on the one hand, a professed concern for "natural" environments, and on the other, a deep-seated refusal to acknowledge African rights or involvement in their own lands. Colonial conservationists began to bolster their attitudes with pseudoscientific arguments, and many hunters made a great show of pretending to be naturalists on their safaris, dutifully collecting and classifying the various species they shot. But despite this intellectual posturing, the primary goal of early conservationists was clearly to protect and restrict the practice of hunting as the domain of white sportsmen. The separation of Africans from hunting was supported by colonial law,

which criminalized African hunters as poachers, even when hunting seemed to be a necessary measure. When cyclical droughts struck African communities, Africans often were not allowed to hunt for food as they had during times of famine before colonial rule, sometimes producing tragic results. The conservation movement in Africa would not fully outgrow its colonialist background until the late twentieth century, and even today, many of the attitudes that shaped colonial conservationism still inform policy decisions on environmental issues.

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Hunting, Foraging

The hunting-foraging model is the earliest form of human food production. Until about twelve thousand years ago, with the possibility of cultivation, it was the only means of survival and therefore deserves unique recognition as mankind's earliest adaptation to the world in which we live. The ability to hunt-forage meant survival for humans from their very conception, and it is, therefore, not only the first but also the most important adaptation of all. Hunting-foraging has over time existed in all possible environments and not just in areas of geographical necessity, as has been frequently argued. The presence of such a lifestyle in deserts and mountainous regions, for example, used to be taken as evidence that early man was simply not sufficiently advanced to live otherwise. However, we now know of many instances of its wide usage in areas where agriculture was also present, the concurrent presence of pastoralists and agriculturalists in East Africa being a good example.

In Africa today there are estimated to be half a million people who are, or consider themselves to have been recently, hunters or foragers. Of these there are no more than about 30,000 who actually live primarily by these means. These groups have always had some contact with settled peoples. The dwindling numbers are more often due to the loss of traditional hunting grounds, through the spread of agricultural, and should not be taken as a sign of any inherent or fundamental flaw in the means of production itself. That said, it is equally true that the world's population today is too

large for hunting-foraging to be globally viable. That possibility probably disappeared perhaps as long as 10,000 years ago, the result of three interrelated factors: the rise of cultivation, the growth of cities, and significant rises in population, made possible as a result of the first two factors.

The future survival of those groups who continue to pursue this mode of living is, for largely the same reasons as above, not entirely up to them but will rather depend on how they are perceived and treated by their respective neighbors and national governments. Positive images are often patronizing, with hunter-foragers being seen as "purer" due to their lack of material possessions or their perceived closeness to nature. They are also often characterized as harmless, peaceful, innocent "savages." The negative images can be surprisingly close to the supposed positive ones, where simplicity and closeness to nature are substituted for primitiveness, ignorance of the modern world, and backwardness.

The fact that hunter-foragers have traditionally lived outside of any central authority leads to their being viewed with a great deal of suspicion, as being diametrically opposed to systems of bureaucracy. If they cannot be found, they are hard to count, and hard in consequence to tax or conscript should the need arise. They tend to fall through (or ignore) the net of any government policies or plans, whether agricultural, educational, or developmental. The suspicion that exists between settled and wandering peoples is mutual however, and based on a long history of conflict that appears to stretch back as far as their first encounters.

The attitude of some national governments to their nonsettled citizens has been criticized by the wider world, largely through the successful efforts of pressure groups to raise awareness of the plight of these peoples. It is as yet unclear whether these unprecedented levels of interest will lead to any long-term benefits in the preservation of these ways of life. One positive result has been to highlight the fact that the hunter-forager mode of living is not necessarily entirely negative and indeed may actually be able to be of benefit to a country, most notably in the area of working otherwise marginal land.

The flexibility and diversity of hunter-foragers are two elements that have ensured their survival into modern times, in addition to proving to be one of their weaknesses. They enjoy the advantage over sedentary peoples of being able to move quickly if they come under threat, due to invasion or crop failure, for example. This freedom and lack of centralized control also means that concerted efforts on the part of an organized opposition should, in time, be able to defeat the more loosely affiliated and less militarily organized force.

The greatest threat to the continuing viability of hunter-foragers, and an area of perpetual conflict between settled and nonsettled peoples, is the question of land rights. The acuteness of this issue grows annually as population increases place greater demands on available arable land. The problem revolves around legal ownership of land as applied across Africa today—legal systems adapted from non-African backgrounds. A significant number of African cultures traditionally held land as a common resource, rather than as something subject to private ownership. To European colonists this rather suggested that the land was not owned and, therefore, they were entitled to claim it for themselves. Independent governments across Africa have adopted this model, which means that hunter-foragers do not own any land, regardless of long term, seasonal usage or occupancy. Land instead is seen as belonging to the country, over which the government has full control to do with as it sees fit.

The strongly felt distrust that exists between settled peoples and hunter-foragers, who are largely seen as unnecessary in a modern setting, or an embarrassing remnant of some primitive past, leaves the future

existence of the relatively small number of these nonsettled people in a great deal of doubt. The modern world, with its view of land ownership, national borders, and pressures resulting from population increases, does not sit well with the needs of hunter-forager populations. The best chance for their future survival would seem to be decisions made at a national, country-by-country level, that accord them a legal status they have never before possessed.

EAMONN GEARON

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I

Ibadan

The capital of Oyo State in Nigeria, Ibadan is situated in the southwestern part of the country. It is the chief urban center of the Yoruba people (one of the three principal ethnic groups in Nigeria), and the largest indigenous city in West Africa.

Ibadan is an ancient city in the history of the Yoruba, and its rise to prominence has been gradual. The town was initially a small settlement into which people from the Yoruba subgroups of Ijebu, Ife, Oyo, Egba, and Ijesha settled in the nineteenth century, to form the nucleus of the modern city. Several factors contributed to its rise to prominence, the most salient of which was the collapse of the Old Oyo Empire, the most powerful Yoruba state. This was followed by a fratricidal warfare that engulfed all of Yorubaland. With its military might, Ibadan rose to fill the power vacuum created by Oyo's collapse. It checked the southward advance of the Muslim Fulani jihadist forces from Sokoto, which had penetrated Yorubaland through Ilorin, a northern Yoruba town, at the celebrated Battle of Osogbo in 1840. Similarly, in 1862 Ibadan successfully crushed Ijaye, its archrival, in the struggle for supremacy. By 1877, however, revolts by eastern Yoruba groups against Ibadan's tyranny and oppression precipitated an anti-Ibadan coalition in a confederacy called Ekitiparapo, culminating in the Kiriji War. It took the intervention of the British in 1886 to restore peace. In 1893 the British imposed a treaty that formally absorbed Ibadan, like other Yoruba states, into the British colonial system.

In spite of hindrances to Fulani expansion into Yorubaland that followed the nineteenth-century Sokoto jihad, Islam wielded (and still wields) a considerable influence in Ibadan. Christianity also became a remarkable force of change in the town from the second half of the nineteenth century.

Since the original population of Ibadan was drawn from several parts of Yorubaland, especially from the late 1820s, the town evolved an open social and political system in which title and rank depended largely on a man's strength and talent, rather than on heredity. This system, which attracted many people with administrative and military skills, has to a large extent continued to this day in the appointments and promotion of candidates within the political sphere.

Ibadan has undergone a consistent process of urbanization over the course of the last 150 years. The establishment of British rule in the 1890s, after which the city was made a seat of government in the new colonial dispensation, gave it a cosmopolitan outlook that aided its sociopolitical and economic development. After World War II, Ibadan began to witness tremendous growth, which created massive socioeconomic problems in the areas of housing, transportation, and employment.

Throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. However, Ibadan's location near the boundary between the tropical rain forest and the savannah made the town an ideal center for trade and commerce, with several large markets coming into existence. The city's commercial development gathered momentum with the construction of railway lines from Lagos, reaching Ibadan in 1901, and extending to Kano, in northern Nigeria, in 1912. The increasingly cosmopolitan nature of Ibadan has, over the years, necessitated the establishment of a number of businesses and banks, handicrafts, manufacturing, and service industries.

The University of Ibadan, established in 1948, was the first university in Nigeria, and still retains its stature as one of Africa's foremost centers of academic excellence. There are a number of specialized institutions, such as the National Institute for Horticultural Research and Training, the Cooperative College, Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria, the Nigerian

Cereal Research Institute, the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Ibadan. There is also a branch of the National Archives located within the premises of the university.

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, Ibadan has retained its political position as the headquarters, first of the western region, then the Western State, and currently Oyo State. As the seat of government, it houses administrative as well as federal ministries, parastatals, and agencies such as army, police, fire services, and the central bank. Ibadan, which initially had a central city council, is now divided into five local administrative units: North, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and Southwest.

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See also: **Education, Higher, in Postcolonial Africa; Nigeria.**

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Ibn Battuta, Mali Empire and

By 1324 Mali had acquired a reputation as a fabulously wealthy empire, ruled by a generous and pious sultan, Mansa Musa, who, ruling some one hundred years after Sundiata, followed the great leader's example. He extended the borders of his empire in all directions, incorporating the trading cities of Gao and Timbuktu into the empire, extending his control over the salt-rich lands of the Taghaza region to the north, expanding eastward to the borders of the Hausa lands and westward into the lands of the Fulani and the Tukolor.

In addition to military conquest, Mansa Musa sent diplomatic agents to lands further away, such as Morocco and Egypt. He also strove to secure Mali's place in the world of Islamic learning by importing scholars from Egypt and establishing them in major cities and towns in Mali and by building numerous mosques in the empire. But it was perhaps Mansa Musa's conduct in Cairo, on his way to perform the *hajj* (pilgrimage) in

Mecca during the summer of 1324, that made him and his empire famous. Arriving in Egypt with an entourage that numbered in the thousands and included wives, slaves, soldiers, court officials, and one hundred camels bearing loads of gold to cover expenses, the sultan of Mali spent so lavishly that he singlehandedly caused the price of gold in Cairo to fall significantly; tradition has it that it was depressed for years afterward.

In 1325 another traveler set out for Mecca with the same objective; this man was Abu 'Abdallah Ibn Battuta (1304–c.1369), a Moroccan scholar who became one of the most noted travelers of the fourteenth century. His trip to Mecca began a long series of voyages for Ibn Battuta, who faithfully recorded his observations on the governments, peoples, and lands he visited, making his writings immensely valuable to historians, and in some instances, the only available documentation of certain periods in certain countries. Ibn Battuta seemed to travel for the sheer pleasure of it; his studies under respected scholars and Sufi saints in the Middle East and his judicial training not only made him an attractive and interesting visitor to the courts and palaces he visited but also qualified him for certain governmental posts throughout the Islamic world. After traveling to Mecca, by way of North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, the young scholar journeyed to Iraq, Persia, East Africa, Oman, the Persian Gulf, through central Arabia, to Delhi, Asia Minor, west Central Asia, China, Ceylon, the Maldives, Burma, Sumatra, and Granada. Not until 1353 did he make his final voyage, this time by camel caravan across the Sahara desert to the empire of Mali.

It is unclear why Ibn Battuta decided to journey to Mali. Some scholars argue that Ibn Battuta undertook the trip at the behest of the Marinid sultan Abu 'Inan; others suggest he may have been seeking an appointment and the favor of yet another Muslim ruler, as he had done so many times in his travels; still others believe Ibn Battuta wished to see the Muslim lands of West Africa simply because they were an important part of the Islamic world that he had not yet visited.

Ibn Battuta's initial impressions of Mali were not positive. Arriving in the northern-most town of Walata, he was offended by the behavior of the local governor, who spoke to him through an intermediary, rather than addressing him directly. He was also taken aback at what he perceived as the scantiness of the welcoming meal, a bowl of millet with yogurt and honey, remarking that after this meal "I knew for certain no good was to be expected from them and I wished to depart." Ibn Battuta did not depart, however, but stayed on in Mali for almost a year. He continued to be, at times, shocked, dismayed, and disappointed in the customs of the people of Mali, particularly with respect to gender relations. The traveler was appalled to find his

judicial colleagues in Mali freely speaking with and inviting to their homes women who were not relatives, and even more so by seeing their wives conversing with strange men.

The Moroccan jurist was also critical of the continued adherence to Malinke traditional practices, such as the humility with which the subjects treat the ruler, dressing in rags before appearing at the palace, hitting the ground with their elbows, and throwing dust on themselves; the strange feathered costumes of the poets; the custom of slave women, female servants, and occasionally even the daughters of the sultan appearing in public naked; and the consumption of the meat of animals considered unclean (such as dogs) and the meat of animals not ritually slaughtered. He was also disgruntled by the sultan's failure to offer him what he considered proper hospitality to a man of his stature. He dismissed the sultan's original hospitality present ("three circular pieces of bread, a piece of beef fried in gharti, and a calabash of sour milk") with laughter and deprecating comments at "their weakness of mind and their magnifying of the insignificant." When several months elapsed without the sultan offering the traveler any further recognition, Ibn Battuta chastised the sultan, saying that his image among other Muslim rulers would not be good when it was known how he treated foreign guests. At this, the sultan presented his guest with a house and an allowance. However, this was not enough to prevent Ibn Battuta from labeling Mansa Sulayman "a miserly king."

Ibn Battuta's observations on the country were not wholly negative however; on the contrary, he praised the order and safety of the country under Mansa Sulayman. He also praised the sultan as a just and fair ruler, noting that "their sultan does not forgive anyone in any matter to do with injustice," and saying that when a foreigner dies in Mali, the sultan does not appropriate the foreigner's property, but rather guards it until a "rightful claimant" arrives. He also remarked on the elegance and attractiveness of the palaces and mosques of the capital city (whose exact location is not known). He was also favorably impressed by the piety of the sultan and of the people, the wearing of clean white clothes for Friday prayers, and the attention paid to memorizing the Quran. After leaving the capital city, Ibn Battuta had more positive experiences. He lavishly praised the good character and generosity of the local rulers he encountered and was very pleased with the abundance of food and the fertility of Gao.

Ibn Battuta began his return trip after staying in Gao for about a month; he arrived in Fez in early 1354. After reporting on his journey to the sultan, the sultan commanded that he remain in Fez and record his travels and experiences. With the help of his secretary, Ibn Juzayy, the report was prepared in the space of about

two years and given the title "A Gift to the Observers Concerning the Curiosities of the Cities and the Marvels Encounters in Travels." Little is known about the traveler's life after this work was completed. He appears to have been appointed as a judge (*qadi*) in some provincial town, where he lived out his life in relative obscurity until his death in 1368 or 1369. Ironically, his chronicles, so valued by the modern historian, received little attention until some five hundred years after his death.

Mansa Sulayman, the ruler of Mali during Ibn Battuta's journey there, succeeded his brother Mansa Musa as ruler when the latter died around 1341. Mansa Sulayman presided over the empire's twilight years. Like his brother, Mansa Sulayman was known for his piety and religious leadership and under his effective leadership, Mali's trans-Saharan trade continued to flourish. However, after Mansa Suleyman's reign ended, the empire began a slow decline. By 1400 various parts of the empire began rebelling against central control (such as Gao), others became targets of invasion (such as Walata and Timbuktu, taken by the Tuareg). By the mid-sixteenth century, Mali was no longer an important political, economic, or cultural center in West Africa.

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See also: Mali Empire; Mansa Musa, Mali Empire and.

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Ibn Khaldun: Civilization of the Maghrib

One of the outstanding figures of medieval Muslim culture, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun was an incisive witness to the political fragmentation and warfare that followed the late-thirteenth-century collapse of the Almohad Empire in North Africa. Born in Hafsîd, Tunis, in 1332 to an Arab family with roots in al-Andalus, his career as a scholar, teacher, and judge was spent in the service of various regional princes.

His youth coincided with the domination of Tunis by the Marinids, a Zanata Berber dynasty based in what is currently Morocco, who sought to recreate the vanished glory of the Almohads. Taking advantage of opportunities provided by the conquest, Ibn Khaldun left the troubled environment of Tunis for Fez, the Marinid capital, where he eventually entered into the service of the Marinid ruler, Abu Inan. Soon after his arrival, however, Ibn Khaldun was implicated in a conspiracy to aid the exiled Hafsids *amir* of Bijaya regain his throne and as a consequence was imprisoned for two years (1357–1358). Following his release, he spent two decades serving courts at Granada, Bijaya, and Tunis, and in each case involved himself in dynastic intrigues.

Weary of the turmoil of Maghribi politics, and eager to distance himself from his enemies, he made his way to Mamluk Cairo in 1382, where his scholarly reputation gained him postings as head of the Sufi *khanqah* (convent) of Baybars and chief *qadi* (judge) of Egypt's Maliki legal school. Although Ibn Khaldun remained in Egypt until his death in 1406, he relinquished neither his Maghribi identity nor his fundamental concern with the trajectory of North African politics and society.

In 1375, while still in the Maghrib, Ibn Khaldun temporarily withdrew from public life and settled among the Awlad Arif at the castle of Ibn Salama, in what is now the Oran province of Algeria. There he composed the first draft of his justly famous *Kitab al-Ibar* (Book of Exemplaries), which analyzed and documented the history of the Islamic world up to his own time, especially the history of the medieval Maghrib. The work is notable for its Introduction (*al-Muqaddima*), which claims to put forward principles capable of elucidating the nature of the dynastic state, the prime object of its author's investigations. Following the political wisdom common to his age, Ibn Khaldun begins the *Muqaddima* by explaining how human beings must form communities and appoint chieftaincies in order to survive and prosper. He distinguishes between two types of social organization: primitive, which is the state organized according to modes of natural livelihood, such as agriculture and animal husbandry, and civilized, which is the state based upon characteristic forms of urban life. According to Ibn Khaldun, civilized society has its origin in its primitive counterpart: out of teleological necessity, primitive society is bound to develop into more complex forms of social organization. He explains the transition from primitive to civilized society as a function of 'asabiyya, identified with tribal consanguinity, and often translated as "group solidarity." The primitive community which demonstrates the greatest 'asabiyya will, in accordance with man's aggressive instincts, overcome other communities in a snowballing effect that terminates when its dominion finally comes to encompass a region

characterized by civilized urban life. The process is strengthened if a powerful religious message is grafted onto the 'asabiyya of the expanding tribal core. This is what allowed, for instance, the Arab armies under the caliph Umar to defeat the superior forces of Byzantium at the Yarmuk. The ventures of the North African Almoravids and Almohads were each similarly propelled by a combination of 'asabiyya and religious zeal.

However, according to Ibn Khaldun, the attainment of civilized life also leads to its decline, in that luxuries and riches, once irresistible attractions for the primitive community, now work to weaken its 'asabiyya. The process of decline begins when an element within the dominant group detaches itself from the grand 'asabiyya and establishes a centralized administrative bureaucracy protected by a cadre of slave soldiers recruited from the outside. Decline continues as the courage and moral rectitude of the original tribal grouping is progressively eroded by the temptations of the city, and by the emergence of new distinctions of wealth and status. In consequence, the civilized state becomes prey for the next fresh group of tribesmen, with origins in the countryside, who possess 'asabiyya in its uncorrupted form.

The cyclical theory of history put forward in the *Muqaddima* was closely linked to the fourteenth century political fragmentation of the Maghrib, of which Ibn Khaldun had firsthand knowledge. According to Ibn Khaldun, dynasties have life spans of no more than three generations, or 120 years. The Maghribi dynasties with which he had been associated must have appeared to him to be approaching the final decadent stages of their existence.

Ibn Khaldun's appreciation of a nonreligious impulse (i.e., 'asabiyya) as the motive force of history and politics was unique in the medieval Islamic world. Ibn Khaldun was aware of having created a new science and prides himself as the first to have treated culture ('*umran*) as a subject of inquiry. The *Muqaddima*'s sociological focus prompted some scholars in the contemporary period to regard Ibn Khaldun as having anticipated modern ideas regarding state formation. Studies, however, have shown how Ibn Khaldun's study was based firmly upon the intellectual resources of his own culture, including political wisdom literature, the positive sciences of religion, and the deductive logic of peripatetic philosophy. He is, therefore, no founder of the social sciences, but rather a medieval man who combined aspects of his intellectual milieu in a way unique to his times.

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Biography

Ibn Khaldun was born in Hafsids, Tunis, in 1332. He moved to Fez and was employed by the Marinid ruler,

Abu Inan. He was implicated in a plot to overthrow Inan and reinstate the exiled Hafsid *amir* of Bijiya and was thus imprisoned from 1357 to 1358. For the next twenty years, he served in the courts at Granada, Bijaya, and Tunis. In 1375 he settled among the Awlad Arif at the castle of Ibn Salama and wrote the first draft of *Kitab al-Ibar* (Book of Exemplaries). In 1382 he moved to Mamluk Cairo, where he was named head of the Sufi *khanqah* (convent) of Baybars and chief *qadi* (judge) of Egypt's Maliki legal school. Ibn Khaldun died in Egypt in 1406.

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Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers

Ibn Khaldun (1332–1405), a noteworthy figure in the history of Islamic thought, was the only medieval Muslim historian to have encompassed within a single sweep the history of the Berber peoples of North Africa. His narrative of Berber history is contained in his *Kitab al-Ibar* (Book of Exemplaries), a dissertation on the history of the world, written in the late fourteenth century, is notable for the theoretical discussion contained in its introduction (*al-Muqaddima*). The narrative portion of the work, which includes along with the Berber materials a discussion of Arab history, aroused less interest among European Orientalists than did the *Muqaddima*. It did, however, find an early translator in the Baron de Slane, who from 1852 to 1856 published extracts under the title *Historie des Berberes et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale* (History of the Berbers and the Muslim Dignitaries of North Africa). For many decades de Slane's translation remained the principle source in Europe for the history of the medieval Maghrib.

Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunis in 1332 into an old Arab family, which, prior to arriving in the Maghrib in the thirteenth century, had lived for many generations in al-Andalus. He spent his career as a scholar and served several North African princes before finally migrating to Egypt, where he died in 1406. Between 1375 and 1379 he abandoned his royal connections and lived

in relative solitude at the castle of Ibn Salama, in what is now western Algeria, where he composed the first draft of *Kitab al-Ibar*. His main purpose in composing the work was to record the histories of those peoples of the earth, especially in the Islamic world, who had attained state power, which for him was the prime criterion for historical significance. In the *Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldun treated this subject discursively by analyzing the social and economic forces underlying the development of the state. In the narrative portions of the work he did so by tracing the fortunes of the various Muslim dynasties that, up to his own time, had dominated the Maghrib's political landscape. While Ibn Khaldun may, in part, have written his Berber history in order to flatter the Berber princes whom he served, his chief encouragement in doing so came from the Berber peoples' attested ability to unite and to prosper politically. As Ibn Khaldun says in *Kitab al-Ibar*, the Berbers "belong to a powerful, formidable, and numerous people; a true people like so many others the world has seen—like the Arabs, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans."

In *Kitab al-Ibar*, Ibn Khaldun followed the established Muslim practice of tracing the genealogies of the world's peoples to the progeny of Noah. He relates to his readers the claim that the Berbers are the descendants of Ham and, more recently in history, of the Canaanites, who were said to have migrated to North Africa in antiquity. He goes on to relate how these transplanted Canaanites subsequently divided into two, mutually antagonistic, tribal moieties, the Butr and the Baranis, each of which is said to have spawned the Berber tribal groupings known to history. Although Ibn Khaldun was as aware as any modern day anthropologist that the contents of genealogical schemes were notoriously unreliable, he also understood the function of genealogy in providing social collectivities, such as the Berbers, with a sense of their integrity and historical continuity.

Of those Berber peoples purportedly descended from the Baranis, Ibn Khaldun devotes considerable attention to the Sanhaja, among whom he distinguishes four major divisions, or "classes," each of which represents a chronological moment in the history of the grouping. The first of these is represented by the Zirid dynasty, which, in the eleventh century, ruled what is currently Tunisia in the name of the Fatimid caliph. The second class is that of the Almoravids, who carved out a religiously inspired empire encompassing the western Sahara, the extreme Maghrib and al-Andalus in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The Almoravids are followed by the Almohads, who supplanted the Almoravids and extended their rule to encompass Tunisia. The fourth and final class comprises the Hafids of Tunis, under whose dominion Ibn

Khaldun was born. Juxtaposed to the Sanhaja is the other major Berber tribal grouping, the Zanata, the first class of which includes the tenth century movement of Abu Yazid, followed by a second represented by the Abd al-Wadids of Tlemcen, and a third consisting of the Merinids of Fez, in Morocco. The Abd al-Wadids and Merinids, Ibn Khaldun tells his readers, each emerged in the wake of the Almohad decline.

On the authority of the medieval Arab historians Ibn Muyassar and Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Khaldun relates at the beginning of Book IV of *Kitab al-Ibar* the story of how the eastern Maghrib had been invaded by Arab nomadic tribes, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulyam, in the mid-eleventh century. The nomads, he goes on to explain, were sent in 1051 by the Fatimid caliph in Cairo, in order to punish his rebellious Zirid vassal, al-Mu'izz Ibn Badis. According to Ibn Khaldun, the Arab nomads swarmed over the eastern Maghrib like locusts, and destroyed a region once renowned for its agricultural and urban prosperity. Some modern historians have attributed to the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym an important role in the arabization of the Maghrib. Recently, however, critical scrutiny of *Kitab al-Ibar* and other Arabic sources has determined that the processes of arabization and decline in the eastern Maghrib were consequences of general pattern of political decentralization and Arab infiltration, which the Arab nomads accelerated but did not initiate.

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See also: **Maghrib.**

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Ibn Tumart, Almohad Community and

Our knowledge of the early life of Ibn Tumart, religious reformer and founder of the Almohad movement, is patchy. He is thought to have been born in or around 1075, in a remote village of the Anti-Atlas whose dwellers belonged to the Hargha tribe, one of the branches of the Masmuda confederation. References to his activity prior to his journey to the East in search of

enlightenment seem to be legendary fabrications spread by his acolytes to enhance his reputation. Not even the accounts relating to his studies in the East during his pilgrimage to Mecca are entirely reliable. He is said to have studied with a number of leading scholars both in Baghdad and Damascus. Claims that he encountered Al-Ghazali, whose teachings later exerted enormous influence on his doctrines, are, however, spurious. Ironically, it was by following one of Al-Ghazali's most famous teachings, regarding the need to fight against immoral behaviors (*taghyir al-munkar*), that Ibn Tumart achieved widespread recognition. His activity as a moral censor began as soon as he decided to return to the Maghrib. After receiving a rather lukewarm response in towns like Bougie (where he was joined by 'Abd al-Mu'min, first Almohad caliph), Fez, and Meknes, he ended up in Marrakesh. His public sermons in the Almoravid capital, full of admonitions and rebukes to the moral laxity prevalent at the time, soon provoked animosity among the judicial hierarchy. Fearing reprisals, Ibn Tumart and his followers fled Marrakesh and settled in the village of Tinmal, in the High Atlas, in approximately 1125. The embryonic religious community later known as the Almohads was thus formed.

Ibn Tumart's doctrine is both eclectic and sophisticated, in contrast to the ideological simplicity often attributed to the Almoravids. It incorporates elements of some of the intellectual trends then dominant in the Muslim East. Its main tenet is the reaffirmation of the oneness of God (*tawhid*), a feature so central to Ibn Tumart's thought that it was ultimately used as a designation for the religious movement it spawned: the "Unitarians" or Almohads (*muwahhidun*). This insistence on the oneness of God was probably a response to the literal interpretation of the Quran advocated by the Almoravids and, according to Ibn Tumart, its most damaging corollary, anthropomorphism. In this regard, he adopted the Mu'tazilites' position and favored an allegorical exegesis of the sacred text. He advocated a return to the traditional sources of Islam, Quran and *hadith*, in an attempt to end the restrictive legalism of the Maliki school of jurisprudence. He condemned the excessive reliance on legal manuals (*furu'*) and adopted Zahiri views in legal issues, supporting both the use of traditional sources and, when necessary and always with extreme caution, judicial consensus (*ijma'*) and reasoning by analogy. In sum, Ibn Tumart's ideology evinces the strong influence of the theological doctrines of Al-A'sh'ari (d.935) with which he became acquainted during his stay in the East.

Ibn Tumart strove for religious legitimacy, and Almohad propaganda reflects his continuous efforts to resort to popular imagery to convey his message. He took advantage of the millenarian expectations latent

among the peoples of southern Morocco and claimed to be the Mahdi, or “awaited one,” a figure of redemption thought to emerge in times of moral decadence in order to restore justice and punish idolaters. The fact that he referred to the ruling Almoravids as polytheists (*mushrikun*) was not, therefore, fortuitous. He cultivated an image of himself that often resembled an exact replica of the Prophet Muhammad. He made up a family genealogy that linked him directly to Muhammad (a somewhat far-fetched idea, as both his name and mother tongue clearly showed his Berber origins), and he retreated to a cave during times of tribulation and referred to his followers as “companions” (*ansar*), in imitation of Muhammad. He also claimed to possess infallibility (*isma*) and to be immune from error.

In spite of its complexity, the Almohad program of moral reform gained numerous followers among the Masmuda of the High Atlas. Its universalist scope remained purely nominal and the movement was always ethnically based. The transformation from a group of religious dissidents to political adversaries was rapid. From his hideout in Tinmal, Ibn Tumart devoted his energies to providing his movement with a solid organization and military capability. Its structure was hierarchical, based on categories of command of descending order: the privy council (*jama'a*) that included the first “converts,” like ‘Abd al-Mu‘min; an advisory assembly (*ahl al-khamsin*) comprising the leaders of the main tribes; the so-called *talaba*, a group of propagandists also in charge of instruction and military training and the “rest of the community” (*kaffa*), organized in groups of ten to increase their cohesion and efficiency in the relentless skirmishes launched against the Almoravids.

The Almohads’ military strategy was aimed at occupying the capital, Marrakesh, as quickly as possible. Its proximity to the Atlas Mountains, from where they raided the plains, gave them an advantage. After several clashes, Aghmat was taken in 1130, leaving Marrakesh dangerously exposed. The first expedition against the capital ended in defeat. Ibn Tumart died in August of the same year, but his death was kept secret in order not to demoralize the Almohad army. After three years, the stratagem was no longer viable, and ‘Abd al-Mu‘min secured the support of the main Almohad grandees and was recognized as Ibn Tumart’s successor, adopting the title of caliph.

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See also: ‘Abd al-Mu‘min: Almohad Empire, 1140–1269; Maghrib.

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Identity, Political

The colonization of Africa by the major European powers in the late nineteenth century was caused by many factors, political, economic, and nationalistic. Colonial hegemony brought on by colonization was partly constructed on the idea of race difference, the assumption was that blacks were inferior and needed new tools and ideas to uplift themselves. The advent of anthropology helped to provide many middle- and upper-class Victorians with scientific justification for believing that they had a divine duty to “civilize” Africans. The idea of race was made respectable by reports of missionaries and gentlemen explorers and travelers of the nineteenth century.

Once colonial rule was established, class and race became inseparable.

Race constituted a group identity that had certain predetermined advantages. Nowhere was this more manifested than in the settler colonies of South Africa, Algeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Wages, residential locations, as well as access to education and health care facilities were determined by one’s race. While the foundation for a segregated South African society was laid in the decades before and immediately after the dawn of the twentieth century, it was the victory of the Nationalist Party in the 1948 election that led to the adoption of apartheid, that is, racial segregation, as the official government policy. As a result, the South African apartheid regime classified all the people in South Africa into the following “racial” categories: Caucasians, Asians, Colored, and Black. Each race had its own place in the society. The significant point to note here is the way the apartheid regime defined and constructed the idea of race for the purpose of control of the majority by the minority. Furthermore, it is also instructive that the regime created a distinctively capitalist nation whose economy was based officially on racial oppression and exploitation.

In Algeria the victorious French armies imposed French civic codes on the Muslim society. In British colonial Kenya, the Devonshire Declaration of 1923 upheld the view that Kenya was primarily an African country, but the British had the authority to hold and govern the country in trust for the Africans. This view was the cornerstone of the principle of the British trusteeship mandate by which it justified its governance of the country until Africans would be “guided” to independence.

In all these cases Africans were dispossessed and considered in the new milieu to be inferior to the Europeans. Colonialism was a system that buttressed race thereby exerting pressure on all Europeans in the colonies to maintain a pretense of race preeminence and class snobbery so as not lose face in front of the Africans.

Besides race, ethnicity was another critical group identity in the colonial plan and scheme of governance. Ethnicity represents a sense of collective identity that rests on claims of common descent, shared attributes such as language and cultural traditions, as well as territoriality and political organization. In the context of most African societies ethnicity was not unchanging identity. Before the onset of colonialism, ethnic groups in Africa were involved in fruitful mingling and migration. In the process ethnic identity went through constant redefinition as some communities split and were either absorbed by the dominant groups or simply moved away into new terrain to assume new identity. What is important in the history of evolution and development of most ethnic groups in Africa is not how they are, but how they came to be. Most communities operated on the notion that their continuity and long-term survival depended less on its purity or single origin than on its ability to accommodate and assimilate diverse elements. Ethnicity, then, may represent one of the most accessible and easiest levels of discourse on the complex issue of identity, in both colonial and postcolonial Africa, but it is not the most accurate, nor is it explanatory.

With the onset of colonialism and institutionalization of the colonial state, African societies were forced to exist within defined boundaries and borders of the artificial construct of nation-state. The construction of the borders of the African colonial state was so arbitrary that some communities, clans, and even lineages were torn apart and placed under different nation-states. In the same vein, many and varied societies, with little in common, were lumped together, given new names, and depicted as ethnic groups. Ethnicity in the colonial system became relational markers of differences between groups. It served the colonial state as its premier instrument of divide and rule. Ethnicity was used to emphasize differences in culture, economy, and politics among the various communities. Terms that were hitherto merely expressive of ethnic identity became transformed into stereotypical prisms of ethnic differences. Indeed, the colonial state nurtured and promoted ethnic schism by privileging myths in which some communities were adulated as superior and enlightened, while others were dismissed as indolent and inferior. This sowed the seeds of rivalry, hatred, and destruction that flowered in the postcolonial period. In essence, the colonial state nurtured ethnic and racial

parochialism for the purpose of maintaining order by emphasizing difference. Individual identities were sacrificed at the altar of group identities, race, and ethnicity.

African elites have confronted the variables of race and ethnicity in many different ways, both in the colonial and postcolonial period. While colonial powers promoted Western education and developed health care facilities, these developments occurred against the backdrop of African political marginalization and cultural disinheritance. Some of the Africans who had acquired Western education attacked racist ideas and presented significant historical evidence on the consequences of African civilization and contributions to human progress. In the French colonies, this critique of colonialism and race coalesced into the Negritude movement. The movement spearheaded by Leopold Senghor of Senegal emphasized pride in African culture but not the dismantling of the colonial system.

However, in some cases, particularly after World War II, the critique of preferential treatment based on race led to the formation of nationalist movements, which challenged and sought to change the status quo. The African elite found out that the colonial pecking order prevented them from assuming certain positions in the colonial public service, denied them access to state resources, and confined them to eternal subjugation. Since racism endowed the settler with class-race cohesion, the African elite mobilized the masses in their determination to dismantle colonialism. In essence, African elite viewed colonial oppression and exploitation as situations reinforced by race difference. Africans were united by their common desire to attain independence. In the course of struggle for independence, ethnicity was temporarily suppressed, and they rose above ethnic parochialism in the determination to present a united and formidable front against the colonial state. The attainment of independence and dismantling of colonial rule signaled the end of race as a dominant factor in the domestic politics of postcolonial African countries. The paradox, though, is that no sooner had the independence been won than ethnicity resurfaced as a destructive force in African politics. The end of colonial rule unleashed forces of cultural, ethnic, economic, and national intolerance with untold suffering to the citizenry. The critical issue in postcolonial Africa has been the persistence of ethnicity as a portent force in national politics.

African elites inherited the colonial state structures intact. The institutions of governance had been anything but democratic. Furthermore, few political parties were developed on the basis of interests that transcended ethnic interests. The African elite and leadership focused more on using the inherited state apparatus and structures to accumulate wealth and reward their cronies and less on democratizing the political

institutions for better governance. As a result, the African elite perpetuated the colonial state's authoritarianism as well as agenda of divide and rule by using ethnicity to rally members of their ethnic groups in support of self-centered narrow political and economic interests. Thus ethnicity in the postcolonial period has been used within the wider political field as an instrument in the exercise of power and accumulation of wealth as well as a mechanism for rallying members of an ethnic group to support their elite in their struggles on the national stage.

In the wake of weak economies and fragile institutions, the competition for access to state resources has intensified ethnic tensions leading to military coups, political instability, and incessant civil wars. Ethnicity has become the crushing burden that most postcolonial African states have to contend with. This is not to imply that ethnic conflicts were nonexistent in Africa before European colonization. Nothing could be further from the truth. The contention is that the intensity of ethnic conflicts that have characterized most African countries in the postcolonial period have been destructive and severe in the extreme. Also, the unbridled competition for access to state resources within the boundaries of the nation-state is a unique phenomenon that can be partly attributed to colonialism since the boundaries of the nation-state are fixed. Power struggle and competition for resources usually takes place within the defined boundaries of the nation-state. When rivalry gets out of control the stability of the state is compromised. And in cases where members of an ethnic group were split and live in two or three adjacent nation-states the turmoil spills over to those countries as well. Furthermore, when the state collapses or its institutions are mobilized by the elite and directed against members of a rival group, the consequence is usually catastrophic in terms of human lives lost and the number of people who are displaced from their homes. Indeed, Africa has the largest number of refugees. The situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa best exemplifies the intricacies of the legacy of colonialism, ethnicity, power struggle, and competition for resources and international economic interests in postcolonial Africa.

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See also: **Martial Races.**

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Ife, Oyo, Yoruba, Ancient: Kingship and Art

Yorubaland is made up of a collection of people who are bound together by a common cultural heritage and language (there are dialectal variations from one group to another). They include the Ife, Oyo, Ijebu, Remo, Awori, Egba, Ijesa, Ekiti, Ilaje, and Ondo. The Yoruba have their original homeland in western Nigeria. These Yoruba-speaking people appear to have adapted to a sedentary lifestyle quite early in Sub-Saharan Africa when compared to many other parts of the continent.

From about the tenth or eleventh century, the Yoruba seem to have evolved a political system that became sophisticated over time and bore similar peculiarities across the area of western Nigeria. The similarity of the political system has generally been attributed to the fact that nearly all the states and kingdoms developed by the Yoruba people claim common ancestry and descent from Ile-Ife (Ife for short).

To the Yoruba, the origin of the world is Ile-Ife, from which all the people of the world dispersed. Ife in ancient and contemporary Yoruba societies is unique because it is believed that a successful linkage of ancestry to Ife automatically confers legitimacy on any Yoruba traditional ruler. Ife is held to be the cradle of Yoruba civilization. It played a key role in the evolution and development of political centralization, with its auxiliaries, which included many sociopolitical and economic chieftaincies. The concept and principle of political centralization seem to have evolved quite early in Ife and diffused to other parts of Yorubaland subsequently. Essentially, the great strides in the area of centralized government have been attributed to a

great historical personality, Oduduwa, who in contemporary times is referred to as the purveyor of Yoruba civilization.

To Ife, therefore, is granted the acknowledgement of the beginning of kingship and the institution of monarchy as it is found today in different parts of Yorubaland. Yet scholars are agreed that if the real growth of monarchy, with its additive of checks to prevent absolutism, were to be located, the search must focus on a later kingdom, founded by a group that migrated from Ife and established to the far northwest of the cradle, and which is generally agreed to be its successor. This was the kingdom of Oyo, which seemed to have reached a peak of political centralization in the twelfth or thirteenth century.

Although an offshoot of Ife, Oyo's importance lies in its original development of the principle of checks and balances as a key component of any political structure. While the central political authority of the Oyo kingdom resided with the *alaafin*, his exercise of his theoretically absolute powers was moderated by the institution of the *oyomesi*. The *oyomesi* was the cabinet, which also doubled as the legislature, and could challenge an *alaafin*'s decree. The *oyomesi*, a seven- or eight-member political oligarchy with a *bashorun* as its head could (and actually did on a number of occasions) even force an *alaafin* into exile or advise him to commit suicide.

The powers of the *oyomesi* could be moderated by the military, which was headed by the kingdom's military leader, the *are-ona-kakanfo*, who could lead his troops to challenge any undue affront or disobedience to the person and office of the *alaafin*. There is evidence that such moderating influence was exercised during the Oyo kingdom.

Similarly, the Oyo kingdom developed the institution of *ogboni*, a quasijudicial body of elites who reserved the power to pronounce judgment on individuals convicted of crimes. In a way, therefore, Oyo evolved as a society with many of the paraphernalia of modern political administration, with emphasis placed upon the separation of powers. These ideas were soon transferred to many settlements that were founded by former members of the Oyo community, or conquered by Oyo's forces. Oyo collapsed when the value placed upon separation of powers eroded, as powerful individuals began to exercise overbearing influence on the system that had sustained the kingdom over the centuries.

It is important to note that at Ife, Oyo, and throughout Yorubaland, the evolution of a political civilization also brought considerable socioeconomic and cultural growth. An important dimension of this was the development of art and artistic traditions. Yorubaland remains a rich zone of African arts of considerable antiquity;

these are enormous in quantity and vary in forms and materials.

Different parts of Yorubaland have yielded considerable archaeological materials that testify to the great antiquity of Yoruba arts. Ife and Oyo, especially, have rendered considerable evidence of a glorious artistic past. In Ife, for instance, there developed an art industry that specialized in the use of clay or bronze to produce figurines. Ife artists developed an early expertise in bronze and terracotta works, as well as in wood and stone carvings and glass beadwork. The Yoruba are probably the most prolific wood carvers in West Africa, and this has contributed to the greatness of Ife art. Many wood artifacts unearthed at Ife, which are associated with religious worship, seem to constitute the bulk of precolonial traditional Yoruba wood works.

Stone carving discovered at Ife indicate, also, that they served similar historical and religious purposes as the bronze and terra cotta works earlier mentioned. Stone works certainly predated metal works in Ife. Stone carvings discovered have revealed that Ife experts carved human, fish, animal, reptile, and bird figures. Glass beads excavated at Ife were a translucent bluish-green color, quite distinct from the coral beads which are of more recent and contemporary development.

The great arts of Ife have been examined not only in relation to later Yoruba sculptures but also to other sculptural traditions of West Africa, particularly seemingly older ones from areas such as the Nok area to the north of Ife (Central Nigeria). In fact, the antiquity of Ife art has been brought to world attention since the 1910 excavation by the German ethnographer, Leo Frobenius, which contributed immensely to the global knowledge of Ife art and the fame of the Yoruba race.

Similarly, Oyo developed similar arts and improved upon the traditions seemingly inherited from Ife, although there is also evidence of a contemporaneous development with Ife art. Yet, apart from stone and metal working, which have been generally acknowledged as the legacy of the Yoruba, the Oyo also developed a respected expertise in calabash carving, which still exists today.

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Ifriqiya: *See* **Aghlabid Amirate of Ifriqiya.**

Igala: *See* **Igbo and Igala.**

Igbo and Igala

The Igbo are the third largest ethnic group in Nigeria and share borders with the Igala, Idoma, Ogoja, Edo, Efik, Ibibio, and the Ijo of the Niger Delta. The origins of the Igbo are shrouded in myths and legends, but oral traditions and archaeological evidence suggest that they have lived in their present abode for several millennia.

Their social and political organization was not uniform; there were variations from one location to another. Many communities were segmented, while others were centralized. Igbo communities west of the Niger were generally chiefdoms with titles and chieftaincy paraphernalia. East of the Niger, towns such as Onitsha, Oguta, Arochukwu, and Nri had monarchical institutions, with an *eze* (king), as the overall head of the particular community. A large part of Igboland had title associations. Men and, in some cases, women were either conferred with titles or they bought them from existing title members. Initiation into these associations conferred on members some privileges and obligations in society. People from Nri town were involved in the conferment of titles and cleansing of villages when abominations were committed and epidemics afflicted the communities. Age-grade organizations and the deities acted as centralizing agencies in Igbo communities.

The Igbo displayed dynamism in their technology and their quest to improve their situation and environment. They learned ironworking, which helped them overcome the difficulties of the forest environment. They engaged in other crafts and industries as well. The smiths, carvers, weavers, and potters produced farming, hunting, and fighting implements, household items, and utensils. Weaving and pottery were usually undertaken by women. The mainstay of the Igbo economy, however, was agriculture, as attested to by Olaudah Equiano, the Igbo ex-slave, and other observers in the eighteenth century. Land was held in sacred trust by the elders and heads of the families on behalf of their people.

The people also engaged in local and regional trade. Markets were held during the cycle of a four-day week (the days being designated as *orie*, *afor*, *nkwo*, and *eke*). There was a temporal and spatial organization of markets in Igbo communities to reduce the incidence of clashes and the cost of both collection and distribution of goods. An Igbo group that took full advantage of the trading activities were the Arochukwu people. They charted trade routes throughout the length and

breadth of what later became southeastern Nigeria and established many settlements and colonies. In order to have a free flow of trade, they entered into covenants (*igbandu*) with the leaders of the communities they passed through or settled in. Their famous oracle, *Ibiniukpabi*, also provided them with additional safe conduct.

One of the principal neighbors of the Igbo were, and still are, the Igala. Their geographical position brought them into contact with the Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, and the Jukun, among others. Idah, the capital, is situated on the Niger. The Igala evolved a centralized political organization at the head of which was the king (*ata*). There are divergent views on the origin of the Igala monarchy, deriving it variously from Jukun, Yorubaland, and Benin. The king ruled with a number of officials and exercised control over appointments to the headships of the provincial royal subclans, but his own office was subject to the control of the “king-makers” (*igala mela*) who controlled the election of a new king and saw to the smooth transfer of power in rotation among the ruling houses. He was attended by non-hereditary officials (*edibo* and *amonoji*).

The *ata* was not only a ruler; he was the embodiment and earthly representative of the ancestors. He played the role of intermediary between the living and the dead through daily prayers, offerings, and sacrifices. Contrary to the picture painted by some European visitors in the nineteenth century, the *ata* was not an autocrat. The checks and balances of Igala’s political setting militated against despotism. In fact, an *ata* was assassinated in the first half of the nineteenth century for showing signs of autocracy.

The strategic location of Igalaland in the forest-savannah interface meant that both forest and savannah crops could and did flourish in the area. Their traditional economy was based on farming, although they also engaged in hunting, fishing, and canoe building. In spite of the riverine network, the bulk of the people lived inland away from the Niger whose control was vested in the heads of three leading riverine clans. These heads acted as the *ata*’s chief lieutenants on the Niger, maintaining peace, providing canoes for the *ata*’s service and acting as intermediaries between the king and the alien groups that used the Niger. Indeed, the Niger was, for centuries, a major channel of communication between the Igbo and the Igala. Up till the mid-nineteenth century, Igala appears to have controlled the Lower Niger up to the Onitsha/Asaba sandbank, while the west Niger Igbo kingdom of Aboh controlled the region to the apex of the Niger Delta.

Contact between the Igbo and the Igala appears to originate in antiquity. As neighboring communities, there are traditions of wars and skirmishes as well as of trade and other peaceful links. Igala sources speak of

the conquest of some northern and riverine Igbo towns by a legendary war leader and giant, Ogboni Onojo. There are earthworks and moats (*okpe Igala*) on the Nsukka escarpment reputed to have been constructed as a defense against Igala raids. On the other hand, the peaceful Igbo-Igala contacts are mirrored in the traditions of Onitsha people; their folklore claims that Igala fishermen ferried the first Onitsha immigrants from the west of the Niger to the east bank, where the people now settle. There are also claims that some Igbo communities were founded by scions of the Ata or Igala fishermen. Nri oral tradition asserts that it was a Nri or Umueri prince that founded the Igala kingdom. The Achadu, the head of the kingmakers, is said to have been an Igbo hunter who rescued the Igala people from the menace of a dangerous snake. In order to reward this gallant Igbo hunter, he was made the consort of the predynastic female *ata*, Ebelejonu, and the head of the kingmakers. These Igbo and Igala traditions underscore centuries of social, political, economic, and cultural ties between the Igala and the Igbo border towns as well as those on the Niger.

The long interaction between the Igbo and the Igala is manifested today in the vocabulary, masquerades, and facial marks prominent among Nsukka (Igbo) people.

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See also: **Equiano, Olaudah; Niger Delta and its Hinterland.**

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Igboland, Nineteenth Century

The Igbo of southeastern Nigeria were a culturally heterogeneous group. Igboland was not a centralized state but consisted of a very large number of independent and relatively small polities, united by the Igbo language, customs, and life style, and by a network of trade routes and markets that had developed centuries before.

Nineteenth-century Igboland was shaped by the decline in the Atlantic slave trade; trade in palm produce; European penetration and the activities of the trading firms, missionaries, and colonizers; and wars and

subjugation of the people. During this time, trade in slaves overshadowed every aspect of Igbo life. The means of capturing slaves or enslavement generated fundamental insecurity, increasing militarization of life and continuous war in the region. The increasing European activities also generated tension and open conflicts. Most important Igbo wars were fought in the nineteenth century partly because of the above factors and partly due to the increasing use of firearms. As the century progressed, and population pressures increased, wars over boundaries became more frequent.

Abo and Osomari were the leading slave raiders on the Lower Niger in the nineteenth century when the Niger route saw the transportation of an increasing number of slaves, the victims of the Islamic jihad from the north. Abo evolved a canoe-house system that was similar to that of the city-states of the Delta. The king of the town and his leading chiefs recruited slaves to man the canoe-houses equipped with firearms. In 1831 the Lander brothers captured at Asaba were sent to the Abo king, Obi Ossai, who released them after a ransom was paid. Other famous slave dealers were the Aro, Nike, Bende, and Uzoakoli who got most of their supplies from communities that engaged in wars and kidnapping.

The mid-nineteenth century saw the beginning of European penetration of the hinterland. Igboland witnessed extensive European activities, which were resisted by most Igbo states. This resulted in hostility, which escalated into open conflicts and wars following the granting of a royal charter in 1886 to the National African Company (subsequently, Royal Niger Company, or RNC). The royal charter gave the company right to administer the Niger from Abo northward to Nupe until 1900, when the charter was revoked and the British Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were established. Between 1892 and 1899, the RNC with its constabulary forces embarked on many punitive expeditions against the Igbo. From the 1890s, the Aro defiantly fought back British efforts to penetrate into the hinterland and resorted to anti-British intrigues with other local communities such as the Ikwo, Izzi, and Ezza, and against local groups friendly to the British. In 1898 the Ekumeku mounted ruthless reprisals against the European and their local agents in the western Igboland.

While the external slave trade declined, export of palm produce witnessed a vast increase. Export of slaves ceased at most Delta ports in the 1830s, but the last slave ship left Brass in 1854. The growth of the palm oil trade existed simultaneously with internal slave trade. The internal slave trade continued among Igbo groups, who were geographically disadvantaged with regard to the new trade in palm produce. The continued trade in slaves, as well as the decline in external

trade, had implications for the Igbo and their society. One was an increased number of slaves to be absorbed internally. Slaves became cheaper. There was a tremendous influx of Igbo slaves into the Delta resulting in increased number of the Igbo in places like Bonny, Calabar, and Brass. The Delta became increasingly Igbo in terms of population and language. There was also an increased incidence of human sacrifices due to this loss of the external outlets for slaves. These dehumanizing treatments meted to slaves resulted in series of slave revolts in Igboland. For instance, in the mid-nineteenth century, a large number of slaves left the town of Abara-Uno and settled at Abara-Ugada, an independent settlement. Osomari and Abo also witnessed a series of slave migrations during this period.

Palm oil and kernel production was labor-intensive and was performed mostly by women and children. From the 1830s and throughout the colonial period, Igboland's major export became palm produce (initially, palm oil, and later, palm kernel) needed by the industries in Europe. Igboland became an economic satellite of the European industrial economy, a dependent monoculture. In the 1870s the demand for palm oil declined and palm kernels were processed, used first for soap, later for margarine and residue for cattle feeds by Europe's growing industries. Igboland also provided a market for European industrial products.

To meet the labor demand, the incidence of slavery and polygyny increased in Igboland. Palm produce, a bulky commodity could only be transported by canoe in nineteenth-century Igboland. Thus, its trade was confined to areas with navigable waters and links with the Delta. Trading factories were opened up along the Niger in Abo in 1843, Onitsha in 1857, Asaba in 1863, Osomari in 1877, and Oguta, Atani, and Aguleri in 1884. Oguta Lake was discovered by the RNC in 1885, and it served as an inland port and a base for palm produce from the interior. Oguta was linked to both the Niger and the Delta by navigable waterways. Ohambele, Azumini, Akwete, and Owerrinta developed to become major palm produce markets as a result of the Imo River, which linked them to the Delta. Individual producers carried their palm oil in calabashes to these collecting centers where they were sold.

Following a fall in oil prices and foreign firms' attempts to retain their profit margins by cutting prices, a chronic conflict of interest ensued between the firms and the Igbo producers, who resorted to collective action of trade stoppages. The firms responded through collective action of forming amalgamations in the name of the Royal Niger Company. With full monopoly and authority to administer Igboland, the RNC became more ruthless and formed the worst government in the history of the Igbo (1886–99). Its attempt to establish botanical gardens to increase the range of products for

export failed. Thus, the 1870s witnessed sporadic outbreaks of violence, deep-seated and endemic hostility, and even wars between the trading firms and the local people. Trading factories at Abo, Oko, Alenso, and Osomari were attacked by the local people. These states were silenced by the British naval force, including Abo, which was bombarded twice in 1862 and 1893, Onitsha in 1879, Atani in 1880, and Aguleri in 1892.

Other economic activities of the Igbo included smithing, salt manufacture, pottery, cloth weaving, carving, mat making, basket weaving, soap-making, and food processing. Most of these crafts and industries were governed by guilds, which exercised control over methods and standards of production and prices and entry into the industry. Iron technology, an important industry, was associated with the Awka, Udi, Nkwerre, Abiriba, Afikpo, and Nsukka. Smiths produced a wide range of agricultural tools, war implements, household utensils, tools and monetary objects, as well as objects used for rituals and ceremonies. Notable cloth-weaving areas were Nsukka, Abakaliki, Akwete, and the Aniocha and Oshimili areas in western Igboland. Apart from Abakaliki, where men wove, weaving in other areas was done by women.

Salt production was associated with women in Igboland and was limited to the Okposi, Uburu, and Abakaliki areas. Salt served as food, medicine, and currency. The industry was adversely affected by an influx of imported salt into Igbo markets.

Carving was a very lucrative occupation among the Northern Igbo of Umudioka near Awka. Carving products included stools, doors, panels, wooden utensils, and other domestic property, as well as products used for ritual purposes and as insignia. Leather and ivory works were important in Abakaliki, Nsukka, and Anambra areas.

Pottery was another local industry associated with women. The Inyi, Nsukka, Ishiagu, Unwana, Isuochi, Okigwe, Udi, and Umuahia achieved regional recognition as pottery specialists. The sizes, designs, and shapes of the earthen wares depended on the purposes for which they were intended. These included household utensils, musical instruments, and ritual objects. This industry suffered as a result of the importation of more durable European enamel substitutes.

From the mid-1880s, the process of colonial conquest began in Igboland. No Nigerian people resisted colonialism more tenaciously than the Igbo. The conquest of Igboland took over twenty years of constant military action. In 1891 the Oil Rivers (later, renamed in 1893 the Niger Coast) Protectorate was established. In 1896 the officials of this government began the penetration of southern Igboland, which the Igbo resisted. The Igbo fought with capguns, dane guns, matchetes, and occasionally rifles, suffering from a chronic shortage

of ammunition, and a British unlimited supply of sophisticated weaponry. Igboland lost its sovereignty to the British colonizers in 1918, when the last Igbo group were subjugated.

Igboland witnessed a decline in the influence of its oracles—Ibiniukpabi, Agbala, Igwekala, and Kamalu—which was attributed to the activities of the Christian missionaries.

The Christianization of Igboland began in 1841 with the work of Simon Jonas, a Sierra Leonian of Igbo parentage, at Abo. The first Christian mission in Igboland was established at Onitsha in 1857 by the Church Missionary Society (CMS), under the leadership of Rev. John C. Taylor. In 1885 the Roman Catholic Mission followed. The Presbyterians built their first station in 1888 at Unwana. This period also saw the emergence of Igbo missionaries who helped in spreading Christianity throughout Igboland. Schools were established. The CMS was the first body to provide any form of postprimary education in Igboland. In 1895 it established the Onitsha Girls School. In the late nineteenth century, it opened a training school for catechism at Lokoja, which was later moved to Asaba, then to Iyienu and finally to Awka in 1904.

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See also: Nigeria: Colonial Period: Christianity and Islam; Royal Niger Company, 1886–1898; Yoruba States: Trade and Conflict, Nineteenth Century.

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Igbo-Ukwu

Situated about twenty-five miles southeast of Onitsha in eastern Nigeria, Igbo-Ukwu was an accidental discovery. In 1938 a man digging a cistern struck a hard object, which turned out to be a highly decorated bronze bowl. Further digging revealed many more bronze materials that eventually came to the notice of the colonial district officer and Professor Thurstan Shaw, a Cambridge archaeologist.

In December 1959 and February 1960, Shaw carried out excavations on two sites. In April 1964, Shaw investigated a third site. These sites were located on farmland owned by farmers with the surnames Isaiah, Richard, and Jonah; thus the sites were code-named Igbo-Isaiah, Igbo-Richard, and Igbo-Jonah respectively.

Igbo-Isaiah yielded a bronze roped pot, a tusk holder, a pile of iron knives, a copper spiral snake ornament, some globular pots, bronze bowls, an ornate pedestal pot, and thousands of beads of different types. This site also yielded a bronze bell, an elephant head pendant, some copper chains, and many other small bronze objects. It was the cultural richness of this site and the ornamental nature of the finds that made Shaw refer to it as a storehouse of regalia.

A few meters west of the first site was Igbo-Richard. The discovery of a human skull and limb bones made it clear that his site was a burial chamber. At the top of this chamber was a shrine identified by shaped piles of pots and broken pottery shards. Prominent among the artifacts found in the burial chamber were a decorated copper plate, a crown, three elephant tusks, decorated copper roundels, a copper fan holder and a bronze horseman hilt. About 100,000 beads were recovered from the chamber. The contents of the burial chamber suggested that the individual buried there had been a rich and prominent member of a society.

Igbo-Jonah was adjacent to Igbo-Isaiah, on its eastern side. This site yielded a copper chain with about one hundred links, two iron blades, two cylindrical bronze staff ornaments, fifteen bronze wristlets, and a small bronze bell. Found intact in this site was a giant globular pot with five strap-like handles decorated with projecting bases, concentric grooves, and decorated with snakes and tortoise.

The Igbo-Ukwu site has been dated to approximately the ninth century, although this date is by no means certain, and remains contested and controversial. As the ancestors of the present-day Igbo, the people of Igbo-Ukwu are currently considered the earliest smiths of copper and its alloys in West Africa. The art of metalworking is still widespread among the Igbo and Igboland.

An examination of Igbo-Ukwu, and a general ethnoarchaeological study of the area, suggest that the culture of the ancient predecessors of the Igbo was associated with the traditional chieftaincy institution, the *Eze Nri*. This figure was the priest-king of one of the clans, the Umuer. The find therefore signifies a concentration of wealth, a specialized metalworking industry, skilled metalworking specialists, and extensive trade. The Igbo-Ukwu discovery stands as a good example of indigenous processes of trade expansion,

social stratification, and urbanism in Igboland in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries.

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Ikhshidids: *See* **Egypt: Tulunids and Ikhshidids, 850–969.**

Ila: *See* **Tonga, Ila, and Cattle.**

Ile de France: *See* **Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth Century.**

Imbangala: *See* **Angola: Ambaquista, Imbangala, and Long-Distance Trade.**

IMF: *See* **World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

Imperialism: *See* **Europe: Industrialization and Imperialism.**

Indentured Labor: *See* **Mauritius: Indentured Labor and Society, 1835–1935.**

Independent Churches: *See* **Angola: New Colonial Period: Christianity, Missionaries, Independent Churches.**

Indian Question: *See* **South Africa: Gandhi, Indian Question.**

Indigenous Religion: *See* **Religion, Colonial Africa: Indigenous Religion.**

Indirect Rule: *See* **Ghana; (Republic of) (Gold Coast): Colonial Period: Administration; Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, and “Indirect Rule.”**

Industrialization and Development

In the year 2000 Africa remained the least developed region of the world, following forty years of varying development policies that broadly commenced with the beginning of the independence era in 1960. At that time, newly independent African states faced three options: expanding and increasing the range of their primary agricultural and mineral exports, focusing on industrialization to create the means for sustained growth, and promoting tourism. Unfortunately, most of the approaches adopted, with every kind of advice from aid donors and international bodies such as the World Bank, hindered rather than promoted industrialization.

Much effort was initially put into maximizing the export of raw materials in order to earn the means with which to industrialize. Agreements with the former metropolitan powers and other pressures from advanced economies tied the newly independent countries to the industrial world as suppliers of raw materials, with the result that little industrial or other development took place.

The next strategy attempted was import substitution, with emphasis placed upon the creation of industries to produce basic manufactures required for development. One aspect of this policy, which proved costly and counterproductive, was to establish plants for the assembly of imported knocked-down kits, for example, for vehicles. Peugeot did this in Nigeria. In fact, these assembly plants did not provide the expected employment, nor did they contribute much to African industrialization by providing real skills. If anything, such substitution policies impeded development, while the end products were often more expensive than direct imports would have been since they ignored the laws of economy of scale.

However, there were exceptions. South Africa and Egypt had reasonably developed infrastructures and a range of relatively sophisticated industries, while the oil-producing states of Algeria, Libya, Gabon, and Nigeria were in the best position to create new industries as a spin-off from the petroleum sector. Some processing of raw materials, usually agricultural, took place in countries like Kenya, Malawi, or Côte d’Ivoire—although fruit canning, for example, hardly represented an industrial leap forward.

The failure to achieve industrial breakthroughs during the 1960s—a decade of reasonable growth for Africa, when it might have been expected that surplus labor would be removed from the agricultural sector

and attracted into industry—meant that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed something of a reverse shift back to agriculture. Ironically, sanctions against Zimbabwe, or Rhodesia, following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, led the illegal government to embark upon a policy of forced industrial self-sufficiency wherever this was possible, although this was usually only achieved at high costs.

Throughout these years, the failure to attract major investments was compensated for, in part, by inflows of aid from both bilateral donors and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. On balance, however, the negative effects of this aid have far outweighed its positive contributions. Aid inflows have been more than matched by outflows of resources in the form of repayments, debt servicing, and repatriation of profits by multinational corporations. International aid debts have imposed intolerable burdens upon some of the world's poorest countries. And perhaps worst of all, African countries, or at least their governments, have become dependent upon aid, and turning to the international community to solve problems has taken the place of making hard and unpopular decisions.

The general pattern of industrialization in Africa has followed the same lines throughout most of the continent: the development of the mining industries, which, in most cases, had been created by the colonial powers, the establishment of oil-related industries to service the petroleum sector, an emphasis upon the production and export of agricultural and mineral raw materials, and, where conditions made it attractive, the development of tourism.

The yardstick for measuring industrial output is manufacturing value added (MVA) and by world standards, Africa's MVA is minuscule. In 1996 South Africa had an MVA equivalent to \$25 billion, which was \$10 billion higher than any other African country. Egypt came next with an MVA equivalent of \$15 billion, with Morocco in third place at \$5.5 billion. These three were followed by four Arab African states (Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan) with MVA equivalents to \$3 billion each. They were followed by Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire with MVA equivalents of \$2 billion each, and in tenth place came Zimbabwe, with an MVA of \$1.5 billion. During the 1990s a few other African countries had a high rate of industrial growth (13% in Uganda, for example) but they were beginning from very small bases. In 1997 Africa as a whole accounted for less than 1 per cent of world MVA, as opposed to Latin America at 5 per cent, Asia (excluding China) at 8 per cent, North America at 27 per cent, and Western Europe at 31 per cent. In 1997, apart from South Africa, the rest of Africa's MVA came to \$54 billion.

Only South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Egypt stand out from this dismal performance. Industrial

development in South Africa took off in the post-1945 period, although later it slowed as a consequence of the country's apartheid policies. The end of apartheid and the decision of the African National Congress to embrace an open market approach to industrialization opened up the prospects of much more rapid development. South Africa, in any case, had the advantage of the most advanced infrastructure on the continent. Egypt, too, possesses a reasonable industrial and commercial infrastructure but both countries have a long way to go if they are to compete effectively outside the continent with their industrial products.

In 1999, in response to this lack of industrial development, a UNIDO sponsored conference backed by the African Development Bank (ADB), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was held at Dakar in Senegal. This was the Conference for Industrial Partnerships and Investment in Africa (CIPIA); it pinpointed the crucial need that was to attract external investment for the continent's industrialization. UNIDO, meanwhile, had been involved in creating integrated industrial development programs for African countries and at the end of the century was involved in doing so in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The failure of Africa to industrialize is reflected in the statistics of the 1990s: thirty countries containing half the continent's population had per capita incomes of less than \$350, while only seven countries containing 10 per cent of the population had per capita incomes above \$1,000.

As globalization accelerates, African countries face ever more daunting economic challenges; if they are to succeed they need to achieve sustainable industrialization. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, few countries had even begun to industrialize on anything like the scale that would make them competitive with the rest of the world.

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See also: African Development Bank; Mining; Multinationals and the State; Oil; Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism; Tourism.

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Industry: See Colonial Imports versus Indigenous Crafts.

Ingombe Ilede

Ingombe Ilede is an Iron Age prehistoric site on the highest point of a ridge of the same name, on the left bank of the Lusitu River, a tributary of the Zambezi River in southern Zambia. In the local Tonga language the name means “the place where the cow sleeps or lies down.” The ridge itself is named after a fallen baobab tree in the immediate vicinity of the site, which resembled a cow lying down. The site was discovered while digging foundations for a water tank in 1960. It was then excavated by J. H. Chaplin, of the National Monument Commission, that same year. Then in 1961 and 1962 Brian Fagan of the Livingstone Museum carried out further excavations at the site. Altogether over forty-nine burials of adults, infants, and adolescents were discovered during these excavations. The burials were associated with several grave goods ranging from gold beads, glass beads, copper bangles, cotton cloth, copper crosses, iron gongs, hammerheads, tongs, hoes, razors, spokes, and bangles. Several pottery shards from 1,447 vessels were also excavated from the site. Several other items like animal bones, carbonized seeds of sorghum, grind stones and rubbers, fish bones, and shells were also excavated.

The site was first settled between the late seventh and the late tenth centuries, then abandoned and resettled in the early fifteenth century. Most of the graves and their goods date to the fifteenth century.

The earlier occupation of Ingombe Ilede was carried out by mixed agriculturalists with characteristic pottery styles, appearing for the first time in the area. The pottery of this period has two dominant vessel types: a recurved, straight-to-inward-sloping vessel with a band of oblique stamping on the upper neck, a space, and then stamped triangles or hatching on the upper shoulder, or with single and multiple stamped bands on the neck with or without stamped triangles;

and a hemispherical vessel with a stamped band below the rim. This pottery type occurs at several other contemporary sites in southern Zambia such as Sebanzi and Kangila in the Kafue River valley, and Ndonde, Isamu Pati, Kalundu mound, and Matobo on the Tonga plateau to the south. The pottery at these sites could be forerunners to that dating from the fifteenth-century site at Ingombe Ilede. Ancestral pottery of this assemblage was discovered at Naviundu near Lubumbashi in the Democratic Republic of Congo dated to the fifth century, perhaps evidence of the origin of this assemblage in Zambia. During this early period, the communities responsible for these ceramics seem to have been decentralized, and possessing goats but not cattle—a typical feature of economies in the forest areas of the Congo at that time.

The fifteenth century occupation of Ingombe Bede was marked by several practices: agriculture, live-stock-breeding (both goats and now cattle), hunting, fishing, food-gathering, and extensive trading. An exceptional array of iron tools and implements were found at the sites, some ceremonial in nature and some basically utilitarian. Evidence of trade at the site includes copper cruciform ingots, bars, and wire forms, gold beads and bracelets, glass beads, and amulet-holders, lead, cloth, and ivory. Characteristic pottery vessel forms of the period were flattened sphere-shaped, shallow vessels with filled comb-stamped triangles mostly pendant, straight-necked vessel forms with filled comb-stamped triangles in the necks, necked vessels with everted rims with filled comb-stamped triangles or comb-stamped chevron lines on the necks, straight-sided beaker vessels with zig-zag or chevron comb-stamped bands below the rim. There were also vessels with filled comb-stamped single or multiple triangles just below the rims, and hemispherical shallow vessels with bands of filled comb-stamped triangles or diagonal forms. Pottery of this type forms an important component of the ceramics of early Tonga (sixteenth through eighteenth centuries) communities in a wide area along the Kaftie River valley and on the plateau to the south. Its decorative motifs continue to appear present-day Tonga ceramics. Its origins, however, seem to be firmly placed among the earlier assemblages in the area, such as Gundu and Fibobe.

It is this fifteenth-century settlement of the site, associated with extensive trading and symbolic items, that has made it significant in the later Iron Age prehistory of Zambia. Skeletons buried with gold ornaments, copper crosses, iron gongs, and metal working tools such as anvils and hammers are widely recognized as symbols of leadership among western Bantu peoples. Most burials, however, did not depict such

grave goods, a symbol of commonality. The site therefore portrays a stratified society, with members of a wealthy elite buried among members of the lower classes, a new development at that time among Later Iron Age people in Zambia.

No other site in Zambia depicts evidence of gold ornaments at that time as does fifteenth-century Ingombe Ilede, perhaps an indication of wealth acquired through trade with communities in Zimbabwe, south of the Zambezi where gold mining was common. Copper crosses of the type found at site bear close resemblance to those at Kipushi site in the Copperbelt area of Zambia. There, the growth of copper mining and trading appeared earlier, concurrent with the local rise of centralized states in that area. The presence of copper crosses at Ingombe Ilede is perhaps an indication of the spread of a centralized state concept to the Zambezi area. The rise of Ingombe Ilede seems also to coincide with the demise of Great Zimbabwe, a major trading focus south of the Zambezi, an indication that the focus of trade was now the Zambezi valley. The Zambezi became a commercial channel to the east coast, as suggested by the presence of Indian glass beads at the site.

Its geographic position, in a valley rich in animal life and ivory (from elephants), and its close proximity to mines producing copper in the north and gold in the south, with rich local salt deposits, made Ingombe Ilede an unrivaled trading post of the fifteenth century. Portuguese documents of the sixteenth century identified the Ingombe Ilede group as Mbara, who according to oral traditions were either of Tonga or Soli origin, who are matrilineal western Bantu. In subsequent centuries slavery and the ivory trade became more prominent than gold and copper in the valley, but Ingombe Ilede was no longer the focal point of trade. Today the area continues to be settled by matrilineal Gwembe valley Tonga peoples, with loosely centralized kingship systems, who tend cattle and goats and grow subsistence crops (maize) and commercial crops (cotton). Most of them were translocated from the valley upon its flooding by Kariba Dam water in the late 1950s.

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See also: **Sena, Tete, Portuguese, and Prazos.**

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Iqta' System: See Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army and Iqta' System.

Iron Age and Neolithic: West Africa

In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, most notably the Bantu-speaking regions, the beginning of ironworking appears to have been associated with a pronounced cultural discontinuity. This was not the case in West Africa—a generalization that remains true whether ironworking is seen as a local development or one stimulated by external contacts.

In West Africa there appear to have been two successive and distinct economic transitions. The first of these saw the widespread adoption of cultivation and, particularly in more northerly areas, herding. Herding and cereal cultivation were both probably established in what is now the southern Sahara before they were adopted in West Africa proper. Desiccation of the Sahara between the fourth and second millennia BCE may well have contributed to these developments. In the West African forest, however, especially in what now comprises eastern Nigeria and Cameroon, the propagation of yams is now of great economic importance; the date of origin of this practice is not yet known and there is no reason to assume that it was necessarily subsequent to the inception of cereal cultivation in more northerly latitudes. The archaeological evidence indicates that there may have been some movement of people into West Africa from the north around the second millennium BCE, but that otherwise there was much continuity of population from hunter-gatherer stages of the "Late Stone Age."

The same appears largely true of subsequent periods. Despite the fact that well-developed ironworking seems to have appeared in several areas at more-or-less the same time (although variation in the radiocarbon calibration curve at this crucial period renders precision unattainable), it was many centuries before it was adopted throughout West Africa. Little significant change in population seems to have accompanied this process.

Discussion of these phases of West African prehistory is hindered by use of confusing terminology. The conventional terms "Late Stone Age" and "Iron Age" carry the implication that they refer to finite periods of time. The concepts of gradual transition, of overlap, and of disparity between neighboring regions or populations are incompatible with the logical use of these terms. Occasional use of the term "Neolithic" to denote those parts of the "Late Stone Age" where there is

evidence for cultivation and/or herding and/or pottery and/or ground-stone artifacts has added to the confusion. Recognition of the essential continuity at this time in West Africa has led some writers to refer to a “Stone to Metal Age”; this has not been widely adopted and has proved of very limited benefit. It seems best to avoid the use of such general terms altogether (e.g., Phillipson 1993).

Remarkably little concerted archaeological research has yet been undertaken in West Africa to investigate this general period. Most investigations have been on a small scale, focusing on individual occupations. The reconstruction of comprehensive regional sequences is correspondingly difficult. The best sequences so far available are those from the plains of northeasternmost Nigeria bordering on Lake Chad, and in northwestern Cameroon.

In the alluvial plains of northeastern Nigeria settlements comprising wooden-walled buildings with clay floors were present from at least the second millennium BCE. The inhabitants herded cattle and goats, being engaged also in fishing and hunting. In the local absence of stone, many tools were made of bone. It is not until early in the first millennium CE that there is clear evidence for the working of iron, despite the much earlier attestation of this practice in other parts of Nigeria. By this time, if not before, sorghum was cultivated on the Lake Chad plains. Throughout this long sequence, the locally produced pottery showed steady stylistic development, with no discontinuities such as might suggest breaks in the sequence.

The Cameroon sequence is longer but less complete. At the Shum Laka rockshelter near Bamenda, chipped-stone hoelike implements (perhaps used for forest clearance) and stamp-decorated pottery were in use as long ago as 5,000 BCE. Somewhat more informative are village sites located in a former forest clearing at Obobogo near Yaounde. By at least the first millennium BCE flat-based pottery and ground-stone axe or hoes were in use alongside flaked stone artifacts. Nuts of oil palm and canarium were preserved, and iron probably came into use around the fourth century BCE. Once again, there is evidence for strong local continuity through the time that these cultural innovations took place.

It is also pertinent to consider evidence for continuity from the earliest West African metal-working societies into more recent times. The so-called Nok Culture provides a convenient starting point. Its sites are concentrated on the Jos Plateau to the north of the Benue-Niger confluence. There is evidence for the working of iron from about the mid-first millennium BCE, as at the Taruga settlement, but most discoveries have been made without archaeological context during tin-mining operations. Highly distinctive terracotta figures, mostly

anthropomorphic, have been discovered and dated between the mid-first millennium BCE and the mid-first millennium CE. The style of these figures appears ancestral to the later terracottas and cast bronzes of Ife, to which the later castings of Benin probably owe their inspiration. The elaborate Benin heads of the early nineteenth century depict associated items including ground-stone axe or hoes that were preserved as magical when discovered in the earth in several regions of West Africa. Here, and in the continued use of wooden digging sticks at the New Yam Festival, is further evidence for cultural continuity in West Africa from before the use of metal into recent times.

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See also: Urbanization and Site Hierarchy: West Africa: Savannah and Sahel.

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Iron Age (Early) and Development of Farming in Eastern Africa

In Eastern Africa, the Early Iron Age (EIA) is generally associated with the first appearance of settled, iron-using agricultural communities. Historical linguists believe these communities were also the first speakers of proto-Eastern Bantu (also referred to as “Mashariki”) to have occupied the region, having spread, originally, from a proto-Bantu “homeland” in northern Cameroon or southern Nigeria. The date of inception of the EIA varies across Eastern Africa, with the earliest sites being situated in the interlacustrine zone. Archaeologists have sought to classify the various EIA communities principally in terms of formal and stylistic variations in the different types of pottery found across the region. Since at least some of the chronologically later types are found further south and/or east of the earliest dated EIA ceramics, this has tended to reinforce a view that the expansion of early farming communities across the region was, principally, as a consequence of population growth and subsequent settlement migration and that, in turn, this provided the primary mechanism by which Eastern Bantu languages were introduced into southern and east-central Africa.

Depending on the locality, most of the region stretching from eastern Zambia to the East African coast had been settled, at least in part, by early farming populations by the year 500, and in some cases several centuries earlier. In certain areas, most notably along the eastern Rift, the establishment of Bantu-speaking, agricultural populations was never fully realized, and the economic exploitation of these zones remained very much in the hands of the stock-keeping and hunter-gathering populations that were already well established prior to the appearance of farming. It is conventional to think of the pastoral groups as being derived, essentially, from the various stock-keeping speakers of proto-Cushitic languages who entered the northern end of the eastern Rift at sometime between 3,000 and 2,000 BCE, and the hunter-gatherer populations as descendants of different Later Stone Age, proto-Khoisan populations. However, most scholars recognize that this is a gross over-simplification of what must have been a much more fluid pattern of population distribution. Thus, for instance, the influence of Central Sudanic and Eastern Sahelian speakers on the EIA Mashariki populations during the last millennium BCE is clearly attested by the presence of a wide range of Sudanic and Sahelian loanwords in Eastern Bantu languages for livestock, items of material culture, cereals, and various economic practices. Equally, exchange and interaction between the so-called EIA, LSA, and Pastoral Neolithic (PN) communities during the last few centuries BCE and the first half of the first millennium, can be demonstrated archaeologically at a number of sites. However, although such data call into question the value of earlier attempts at simple, one-to-one correlation between the presumed language affiliations and subsistence strategies of different groups, the Bantu migrationist paradigm still dominates many archaeological and historical interpretations of the emergence of farming communities.

From an archaeological perspective, the earliest dated sites associated with the adoption of iron metallurgy and crop cultivation are those on which Urewe ware, previously known as "dimple-based" pottery, occurs. The term is derived from the type site of Urewe, situated in Siaya District close to the Yala River in western Kenya, where examples of this type of EIA pottery were discovered by Archdeacon W. E. Owen (and his seminary students) in the early part of the twentieth century, and later described and classified by Mary Leakey. Additional reconnaissance in the vicinity led to the discovery and partial investigation of several other sites with similar ceramics, including Yala Alego, Ulore, Mbagga, and Seludhi. Subsequent research throughout the region has demonstrated that Urewe ware had a fairly wide distribution across much of Rwanda, Burundi, and neighboring parts of southwestern Uganda and northwestern Tanzania.

Based on present evidence, the earliest sites all lie to the west of Victoria Nyanza and are especially concentrated around Buhaya in Tanzania and the Kivu-Rusizi River region in Rwanda-Burundi. Radiocarbon dates from a number of sites in these areas suggest an initial appearance between the eighth and sixth centuries BCE. The earliest Urewe sites on the eastern side of Victoria Nyanza, on the other hand, all appear to be younger by a factor of 700 to 1,000 years. Recent systematic surveys have also shown some areas to be devoid of Urewe sites, such as Mawogola, southern Uganda and Karagwe in northern Tanzania, despite their proximity to areas with a high density of Urewe sites. It is also evident from recent surveys that Urewe sites show a preference for particular topographic settings and habitats, notably the better watered areas such as riverine or lacustrine environments and along the intersection between submontane forest and woody savanna. Moreover, with their demands for fields and fuel, EIA populations ultimately altered the distribution of forests, and may well have induced a number of other environmental changes, at least in some areas such as Buhaya where this activity appears to have been particularly intense.

It is generally assumed that EIA populations were mixed farmers, who placed more emphasis on farming than on herding. Due to the acidic nature of the soils on which many Urewe ware sites are found, faunal remains survive only rarely. An important exception is the Gogo Falls site in South Nyanza, where Urewe ware pottery possibly associated with cattle bones, were recovered from a horizon above an earlier PN, Elementitan midden. Urewe ware sites are also closely associated with the first appearance of iron-working in the Great Lakes region, and considerable research efforts have been directed at elucidating the origins and nature of this technology. Of these, the most wide-ranging studies have been conducted by Schmidt and colleagues in Buhaya, the eastern part of the Kagera region of northwestern Tanzania. In particular, the accumulated archaeological evidence from the many smelting furnaces excavated at sites such as KM2 and KM3, near Kemondo Bay, in conjunction with the results of experimental and ethnographic studies, indicate that EIA smelters had a sophisticated knowledge of the physical and chemical processes involved, and by the first millennium were capable of generating furnace temperatures sufficiently high enough to produce carbon steel.

As indicated above, typological links have drawn between Urewe ware and other Iron Age ceramics across eastern and south-central Africa. Multidimensional analyses of these assemblages suggest that two broad facies can be identified. Following the most recent studies by Huffman, these are referred to as the

Nkope (formerly Highland) and Kwale (formerly Lowland) Branches of the Urewe Tradition (formerly Eastern Stream). Kwale ware is named after the type site in the Shimba Hills southwest of Mombasa located by Robert Soper in the 1960s and dated to the third century. Other, broadly contemporary sites with Kwale-type pottery have been found in similar areas of good grazing and permanent surface waters in the hills immediately inland from the Kenya-Tanzania coast, and in the Usambara-Pare corridor.

Recent surveys further south along sections of the Tanzanian coast indicate that early farming communities had also settled the central coastal hinterland, as at the site of Limbo, and the lower stretches of the well-watered valleys of the Ruvuma, Wami, and Rufiji by the second or third century, and possibly even earlier. In general terms, pottery from these sites share affinities with Kwale ware proper, although as more sites have been investigated it has become clear that there were probably several local spatial and temporal variants. Around the sixth century, a new pottery style emerged in this area, and elsewhere along the East African littoral as far north as southern Somalia and on the offshore islands of the Zanzibar archipelago. Known by a variety of terms, of which Tana Tradition (TT) and Triangular Incised Ware (TIW) are the most current, this pottery type has been found in the basal levels at a number of the early trading settlements, including Shanga in the north and Kilwa in the south, that began to emerge along the East African coast from the eighth or ninth century. Partly because of this, some scholars have begun to equate the appearance of TT-TIW pottery with the emergence of a distinctive Swahili identity. This hypothesis is complicated, however, by the fact that TT-TIW pottery has also been found in the lower levels of some of the *kayas* (sacred, forest-protected homesteads) occupied by Mijikenda communities who have different histories and linguistic origins from the Swahili.

Inland of the main distribution of Kwale wares, much less research has been conducted on the spread of early farming communities. The main pottery variant in west-central Tanzania, known as Lelesu ware, although broadly contemporary with the main Kwale variant, is generally regarded as part of the Nkope Branch. Further south, around Kalambo Falls in northern Zambia, several sites with deep pits containing settlement and ironworking debris indicative of an early farming presence by the early fourth century, have been excavated. Nkope wares, some of which share certain similarities with the early coastal ceramic traditions, are also present on various sites in Malawi by the third century. As with the evidence from northern Zambia, while these early dates are suggestive of a fairly rapid southerly spread of pioneer farming,

renewed fieldwork in these areas could help to resolve a wide range of issues concerning the cultural origins of these communities.

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Iron Age (Early): Farming, Equatorial Africa

The equatorial region of Africa remains one of the least known in archaeological and historical terms. This area of dense forest threaded through with great river systems has presented a physical, political, and conceptual barrier to scholars for many years.

The majority of current knowledge of the Iron Age of the equatorial region was the result of a groundbreaking field project, the River Reconnaissance Project (RRP), initiated and led by M. Eggert. Between 1977 and 1987, when the deteriorating political and economic situation caused this project to be abandoned, small teams explored various river systems within the inner Zaire basin, examining river banks and the forest fringe for archaeological evidence. They successfully recorded the first systematic body of archaeological data from the equatorial region, analysis of which enabled Wotzka to compile the first ceramic sequences. In justification for the potential bias introduced into this survey by the restriction to rivers and their immediate hinterland, Eggert (1992, 1993) has convincingly argued that these waterways have always presented a natural network of communication routes and that today they constitute a major element of the traffic network. He has suggested that the first settlers took advantage of this ready-made system to penetrate deep into the rainforest region, only then additionally exploiting the hinterland.

The antiquity of human activity in the forests has always been a subject of debate, and it had been claimed that farming populations only settled this area in the last millennium. Much of this argument has revolved around the issue of foraging, or hunting and gathering, in the tropical forest environment. It has been argued that the tropical environment cannot support a purely

hunting and gathering lifestyle, and that some form of relationship with an agricultural community is essential for survival. This claim remains disputed. The ceramic typology compiled by Wotzka and associated radiocarbon dates have, however, pushed back this occupation of the region by pottery producing and thus, by inference, potentially farming groups to the last half of the first millennium.

Although there are instances of foraging groups using ceramics in some parts of Africa, it is generally assumed that the production and use of ceramics of the quality and on the scale revealed by the RRP is characteristic of a food-producing society. However there is, as yet, very little actual evidence of the food plants or subsistence methods employed by these early Iron Age communities. It is particularly difficult to identify past food crops in the equatorial environment. The warm, wet conditions that ensure rapid decay of organic matter, and the reliance upon tubers and plantains—crops which have, until recently, been largely archaeological unidentifiable—have resulted in a lack of evidence. Recent developments in the study of phytoliths, minute particles of silica derived from plant cells, are seen as possessing great potential for future research. Phytoliths are characteristic of different species and survive after the plant has decayed. In Cameroon very early evidence for the use of Musaceae has been identified by these methods and has added to the expectation that early food crops could also be identified in the equatorial forests.

The antiquity of the production of plantains or bananas in Africa has been a controversial issue because of the lack of archaeological data. The edible banana, a plant that originated in Asia (wild inedible bananas are found in Africa), is thought to have rapidly become the staple food crop in the equatorial forest some 1,500 to 2,000 years ago, its far greater suitability to the tropical forest environment than either root or cereal crops allowing the first settlement of the forest zone in any great numbers. However, this argument has been based upon the study of cultural lexicons (the names given to different bananas in different languages) and of the various types and distributions of cultivars; it has not derived from archaeological evidence. The early radiocarbon dates obtained in Cameroon suggest that the banana may have been a food crop grown by the first Iron Age rainforest settlers.

The yam is today a dietary staple in many equatorial communities, although it too is not a true native of the tropical forests. Wild yams originated in the savanna yet may already have been grown, together with the banana, by these earliest equatorial farmers. Again, it is hoped that the study of phytoliths will provide archaeological evidence for such a practice.

Eggert (1996) reports that excavations conducted by the RRP found associations between early ceramics

and the oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) and the fruits of a wild tree, *Canarium schweinfurthii*, associations that have been recorded in other parts of central Africa. He stresses that, while it cannot be assumed that the oil palm represents a farming complex, it must nevertheless be seen as an important food crop, and may have been the main source of dietary fat.

The RRP was also successful in identifying evidence for early ironworking in the equatorial forest. At the site Munda, which lay on the Likwala-aux-Herbes River, a bowl-like, slag-containing feature was partly excavated and was interpreted as a bloomery furnace. Partially lined with clay, it had been subjected to intense burning and contained elements of the earliest pottery identified by Wotzka of a Northeast tradition (which he named the Pikunda-Munda horizon). It was also superimposed upon a shaft containing the same pottery. Four radiocarbon dates obtained from the excavation dated the features to the end of the last millennium BCE and the beginning of the first millennium CE (106BCE to 420CE). This would suggest that the earliest Iron Age settlers of the equatorial forests, in addition to producing a variety of good quality pottery and beginning to cultivate a variety of food crops, were also working and using iron.

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Iron Age (Early): Herding, Farming, Southern Africa

Based on present evidence, it seems likely that the initial introduction of animal husbandry and seed plant cultivation into Southern Africa took place on its northern margins, in the drainage zones of the Okavango and Zambezi Rivers, while portions of coastal Moçambique received food crops from Asian sources. Proximity of the inland zones to earlier experience of these economies in Central Africa was no doubt crucial, as was that of the coastal sites to seafaring trade. Prior developments in the entire region had prepared its inhabitants for

domesticated economies. About 15,000 years ago, Late Stone Age peoples had developed hunting-fishing-gathering economies adapted to the highly diverse local ecologies of the subcontinent. These peoples are thought to have been the ancestors of proto-Khoisan speakers, whose descendents speak the extant Khoisan languages.

About 2,000 years ago, cattle and sheep were introduced from the north and incorporated into these local foraging economies. A distinctive pottery called Bambata—thin and decorated with a comblike tool, and also found to the north—accompanied this introduction of livestock. The economy that emerged is best thought of as pastro-foraging, with wild foods continuing to be as important as before. Sites with these characteristics are thinly spread across the northern parts of Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. These sites begin to fill the geographical vacuum that has existed between Central Africa and the Cape coast where domestic animals dating before the year 500 have previously been known to be present at Die Kelders, Nelson's Bay, and Byneskranskop. We can be confident that people who spoke a Khoe variant of proto-Khoisan played an important role in this transfer because the cattle pastoral vocabulary of most southern African herders—including most southeast Bantu-speakers—is derived through a Khoisan intermediary. In addition, terms for cattle have undergone a regular sound shift from proto-Khoisan in Khoe languages, indicating that they have not been re-borrowed in recent times.

We do not know if the appearance of Bantu-speaking peoples coincided with this first introduction of cattle and pottery. But it is clear that such peoples were moving down from central Africa shortly thereafter. A large number of sites were established by these people during the seventh to the eleventh centuries in the Limpopo and Zambezi valleys, and on the eastern hardveld of Botswana. They brought horticulture (sorghum, millet, cowpeas, and perhaps melons) as well as iron and copper metallurgy with them. They also introduced goats into the region, and probably different varieties of cattle; both hump-backed (*Bos indicus*) and flat-backed (*Bos taurus*) varieties appear in early archaeological sites while long- and short-horned taurines are reported in early European records. Humped cattle originated in India and are known to have been introduced into East Africa before the common era began; their presence in southern Africa (along with that of chickens, southeast Asian in origin) reinforces other evidence (the presence of coconuts and bananas, also Southeast Asian, somewhat earlier in East Africa) suggesting that domesticated animals and plants were brought into the region through complex social and economic networks rather than by migrations of detached peoples. Cattle, sheep, and

goats remains at some of the larger sites make up 80 per cent of the faunal assemblage, the remaining 20 per cent being of hunted wild animals. At large sites in the interior, dung vitrified by burning, as much as 150 centimeters deep, marks the presence of kraals, evidence that sizable herds were kept.

Houses of the kind still commonly made in the region of a cowdung-clay plaster applied to wattle frames are preserved at some places. Iron and copper tools and ornaments are abundant, most if not all of which were manufactured locally. Finally, glass beads along with cowrie and conus shells are found at the largest sites; before 1000 the greatest number are found in Botswana. This is certain evidence that before that date agro-pastoral peoples in the interior participated in exchange networks that reached the east coast of the continent.

In Botswana, where the majority of pertinent data have been recovered, a tripartite hierarchy of settlements may be discerned in terms of site size, location, length of occupation, proportion of exotic trade items, and relative numbers of domestic stock; social stratification of the inhabitants seems to be clearly indicated. Toutswemogala and Bosutswe, the largest of these sites were situated on hilltops, were occupied (perhaps with interruptions) for over 500 years, and contain very large kraal deposits as well as many trade items. Second level sites, such as Taukome and Thatwane, are also on hilltops but have much smaller kraals and appear to have been occupied for only 200 to 300 years. At the tertiary sites, all on the plains surface, kraals are very small or absent, stone artifacts typical of the Late Stone Age are numerous, and hunted animal remains usually approach in number those of domesticates. This is in contrast to the larger sites where stone artifacts are virtually nonexistent and hunted animals comparatively few; foraging appears to have been more important at these smaller settlements compared with larger centers. A fourth, solely foraging, level probably exists, but its remains will be very difficult to find.

A further indication of social stratification is provided by analysis of the age at slaughter of cattle at these sites. At Bosutswe, as also at the later, much larger chiefdoms established at K2 and Mapungubwe in the Limpopo valley, prime young-to-middle-adult animals were killed in far higher proportion than were juvenile and aged animals. These animals are most desirable as food, but they are also the reproducing cohorts of a herd. In contrast, juveniles (probably yearling bull culls and runts) and old, postreproductive animals were most often slaughtered at Taukome; this is the slaughter strategy practiced in rural Botswana today by subsistence farmers who emphasize herd size maintenance at the expense of meat production. It

appears that, at this early date, members of an elite social stratum were already able to extract prime food resources—along with a surplus product distilled in value as exotic trade goods—for their own use from subordinate classes. Many, if not most, of the prime animals slaughtered at Toutswe and Bosutswe must have been obtained from lower ranked locations, for a sustained off-take of breeding stock would lead quickly to reduction of a resident herd to unsustainable numbers. It may be appropriate to think of tertiary site herders as cattle managers for centralized elites rather than cattle owners in their own right.

The process of social differentiation may be traced in languages as well as materials. Kizulu, Isixhosa, and Sindebele (and Sesotho to a lesser extent), while Bantu in structure and basic lexicon, incorporate many click consonants and a large vocabulary from Khoisan sources. However, the fact that Bantu languages, though radically altered, continued to be spoken while Khoisan languages declined (sometimes losing their clicks) and Bantu social forms became the norm for all suggests that Bantu-speakers, though increasingly absorbing Khoisan persons and cultural elements into their social units, were politically hegemonic in the eastern region.

The history of pastoralism in the western half of the region has a similar chronology although it differs in a number of significant social and economic details. Bantu peoples arrived at roughly the same time, bringing essentially the same economic suite; they too encountered Khoisan pastro-foragers. Again subsequent processes are visible in linguistic as well as material form: the Bantu language, Shiyei, incorporates a large click inventory of Khoisan origin and, therefore, the Wayei people of the Okavango Delta must have a long history of intimate association with Khoisan peoples. But here similarities give way to differences, the most salient being that until recently Khoisan social forms were predominant in much of this area from the Kunene-Okavango to the Cape. This is strong evidence that, in contrast to the east, during the early centuries of association ideological values and political power were the prerogatives of Khoisan peoples and Bantu were drawn into their social networks through marriage and other kinds of alliances rather than the reverse.

Divuyu, the name given to an agro-pastoral occupation of the Tsodilo Hills during the seventh and eighth centuries, is a fully developed Early Iron Age site rich in ceramics as well as iron and copper tools and ornaments. Sheep and goats were mainstays of the economy, but cattle appear to have been rare and to have been kept elsewhere and possibly were obtained from Khoisan. Divuyu ceramics have design affinities to sites roughly contemporary with it in central Angola. They also appear to be related in design to the site of

Madingo-Cayes north of the Congo. Two marine shells of Atlantic Coast origin and two iron pendants were found at Divuyu; the pendants are virtually identical to specimens of the same age found in Shaba Province, Zaire. These items indicate that exchange systems with the coastal and interior areas from which they had recently moved were maintained by Divuyu peoples. Thus, during the middle of the first millennium, this northern margin of the Kalahari was already actively part of a wider sphere of production and exchange extending throughout a large portion of the Angolan and Kongo river systems. Fish bones and river mussel shells found at Divuyu are further evidence for such exchange. Relatively small communities of Bantu- and Khoisan-speakers appear to have intermingled throughout this entire region on relatively equal terms. Economic and linguistic—and therefore, social—transfers appear to have flown freely among these communities with the result that pastoral economies became well established in the Kalahari.

Nqoma, also in the Tsodilo Hills, the main components of which are dated to the ninth to eleventh centuries CE, followed Divuyu. Cattle, some of which were of a hump-backed variety, were paramount in the economy, but sheep and goats were also common. Sorghum, millet, and possibly melons were grown, but wild nuts and berries, along with wild faunal remains, indicate that foraging continued to be important. Dung-clay houses were constructed and an elaborate variety of ivory, iron, and copper ornaments, along with iron tools were made on the site. Nqoma people would also have controlled the specularite mines found in the Hills. Glass beads and marine cowrie and conus shells provide firm evidence that Nqoma was an important local center in intercontinental trade networks that extended from the Indian Ocean coast. Fresh water mussels and fish continue to have been imported from Okavango communities.

Another site, Matlapaneng, northeast of Maun on the eastern side of the Okavango Delta, is contemporary with Nqoma. Cattle, sheep, and goats were kept here and sorghum, millet, and cowpeas were grown. Matlapaneng had all the material characteristics of Nqoma, but there are two quite significant differences between them. Matlapaneng is not nearly so rich in metal ornaments or East Coast trade goods; in this respect, it resembles the secondary sites of the eastern hardveld, such as Taukome, rather than Nqoma. In addition, Matlapaneng ceramics are largely allied with those of the hierarchical east, and this must mean that their social, economic, and political ties were in that direction rather than northward as those of the Tsodilo sites had been until this time. It appears that the dominant centers of the hardveld, Toutswe and Bosutswe, were extending their economic interests into the western

sandveld at this time; indeed, some Nqoma ceramic motifs display eastern influence, evidence that these interests were penetrating deeply into the west. It would seem that this was the beginning of hegemonic domination from the east that was consolidated by about 1000.

A series of smaller sites is assignable to the general time span of the eighth through eleventh centuries. At CaeCae, ceramics, iron, and cattle are contemporary with Nqoma and Matlapaneng. At the nearby sites, Qubi, Magopa, and Qangwa similar ceramics as well as iron occur in small quantities. All of these shards appear to have come from small bowls or dishes. Just across the border in the NyaeNyae area of Namibia, similar ceramics may be related. In the Delta area, small undated components containing ceramics similar to those of Matlapaneng are present at Lotshitshi and near Tsau.

A hierarchical site structure may be discerned in the foregoing description, a structure that is not unlike that described for the eastern hardveld during these same centuries, but one that is not so elaborate. Nqoma appears to be at the apex of this western settlement hierarchy and seems to have been occupied (perhaps intermittently) for about three hundred years. Nqoma yielded a predominately pastoral fauna with an even higher proportion of cattle to sheep and goats than found at the larger centers in the east; it contained moderate numbers of exotic trade items. In addition, Nqoma has the richest (both in quantity and variety) and most elaborate metal ornament inventory presently known for any site of its time in the entire southern African region.

At CaeCae, on the other hand, although occupation debris is found throughout an area of more than a square kilometer, settlement seems to have occurred in small clusters similar to present-day homesteads in the area, which also are spread over more than a square kilometer. There is no way to determine how many of these clusters may have been occupied simultaneously, but it is unlikely that aggregate occupation area at any given time would have exceeded 2,000 square meters. The other sandveld locations, though known only by isolated, small test excavations, appear to be similar in most respects. Contemporary levels at Lotshitshi are also in this range. As already noted, ceramics and metal occur in very small numbers in these sites, cattle are known from CaeCae, Lotshitshi, and Toteng, but exotic trade items are absent from all current inventories.

It appears that an elite was established at Nqoma that was able to exercise sufficient hegemony over the inhabitants of secondary settlements to appropriate to itself the overwhelming preponderance of imported goods (glass beads and marine shells) that entered the western sandveld as well as the bulk of locally

manufactured surplus product (metal and ivory ornaments) that was not exported. Some local products must have been exported, for we may assume that imports were desired, thus were expensive and had to be obtained for value; otherwise, they would be more widely distributed among many sites. It seems likely that Nqoma elites were also able to extract the required exchange value from their subordinates, probably from as far afield as CaeCae, Qubi, and the other sandveld communities, to judge from the presence of contemporary ceramics at these sandveld places.

Thus, in the earliest well documented period (600–1000) of agro-pastoral penetration into the Kalahari, a regional differentiation of settlement organization and an associated difference in social formations can already be discerned in the archaeological record. In the east there was clearly an appropriation of indigenous Khoisan forager, and possibly pastro-forager, systems by Bantu-speaking peoples who colonized the area in numbers and quickly established a hierarchy of settlements around their central towns. The smaller, tertiary, sites in this organization accurately reflect in their size and content the domains of pastro-foragers whose position in the imposed social hierarchy into which they were incorporated was economically subordinate to that of pastoral elites. It appears that by the end of the first millennium CE eastern Kalahari communities were differentiated socially and economically in a manner similar to that of historically known and contemporary social formations found in that same region. This picture conforms to what is known for the rest of the eastern half of southern Africa.

In the western half of the subcontinent, full agropastoralist economies with iron working and transcontinental exchange networks were introduced at the same time as in the east. Bantu-speaking peoples were surely involved in the process in the northern peripheral zones where transmission must have taken place, and there is some historical evidence to suggest that they penetrated much farther south. But Bantu hegemony as it now exists was not reestablished in the western Kalahari until mid-nineteenth century, and at first only to a limited extent. It appears, rather, that early agropastoral economies were transferred among indigenous pastro-foragers, who could only have been Khoisan speakers, and entering Bantu-speaking herding and horticultural ironworkers. Mechanisms for these transfers are not yet entirely clear but probably followed long established lines of interaction and then became internally differentiated according to local conditions. Forager and herder polities were less hegemomically structured in this area than in the east, as they are known not to have been in historic time until disrupted in the nineteenth century, first by Tswana state expansion and then by European capitalism.

As trade with the Indian Ocean grew in scale, however, and gold became a major export from the interior while fine India cloth was imported to places like Ingombe Ilede on the Zambezi River (and possibly Toutswe, where clay figurines of women appear to be wearing wrapped loin cloths of woven material rather than hanging skins), the nearer peoples on the eastern highlands of present day Zimbabwe reorganized trading networks to their own benefit. The routes to the ocean from the west were truncated beginning in the eleventh century by Mapungubwe followed by the developing Great Zimbabwe and Khami states, which established major outposts in the eastern hardveld of Botswana. From then on, the western half of the subcontinent was reduced to the status of producer rather than receiver in the Indian Ocean trade, a status from which it emerged, and then only briefly and partially, with the establishment of Portuguese trade on the Atlantic coast.

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Iron Age (Later): Central Africa

Outside of the Upemba Depression, little is known of central Africa during the Late Stone Age. The following is more reflective of the scattered and disparate nature of archeological research, than any coherent image of Late Stone Age societies in central Africa.

Southwest Africa

This area principally covers two present-day nations, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola; the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) is also slightly covered by this region.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a series of pottery traditions associated with the Late Iron Age are found in Lower Congo and in Kinshasa. These are represented by the objects classified under the name Group II, found in, among other places, Dimba cave and the Kovo cemetery, as well as at Kingabwa (in Kinshasa).

Dated from the eighteenth century, Group II pottery includes both tall and squat vessels. The clay is generally thin-walled, light-colored, and rings clearly when tapped. The decoration is embossed, with triangular or lozenge shapes. At Dimba, the pottery is accompanied by metal goods. At Kingabwa, in addition to objects displaying Group II stylistic characteristics, a whitish ceramic is found, notable for the richness of its decoration. The ceramic has also been found at Mafamba in the Republic of the Congo, at Bandundu, in the vicinity of the Kwango River, and near Lake Mai-Ndombe (all in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

The geographical location of the ceramic and the Group II pottery indicates that the Kinshasa area on Malebo Pool served as the crossroads of interregional trade for Mafamba in the Republic of Congo, as well as for various locations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In Angola the site of Mpangala I at Mbanza Soyo, near the mouth of the Congo River, has yielded pottery shards associated with the bones of wild game and seashells. Unfortunately, there is no firm dating available for these artifacts. At Kamabanga to the south of Luanda, a pottery with fine decorations has been exhumed: the animal bones and remains associated with it include zebra, buffalo, warthog, clams (*Anadara senilis*), fish, and domestic cattle. Kamabanga dates from the period when the Early Stone Age gave way to the Late. To the south of Luanda, the deposits grouped under the name Captiously II have yielded a thick bed of shells surrounding a pot filled with honey, the site dating from the eighteenth century. To the east of Luanda, the station of Cabbies has provided abundant pottery representing a mixture of elements from two phases of the Iron Age.

Northwest

In addition to the whitish ceramic already mentioned, other traces of the Late Iron Age have been found throughout the Democratic Republic of Congo: on the plateaus (notably the Mbé Plateau), in the zone of high hills (the site at Masamasa), in the forest at Chailu and in the Niari valley (Ntadi Yomba shelter), and in the

Copperbelt. Archeological remains consist essentially of smelting debris (iron and copper) plus terra cotta (vases, pipes, etc.), low smelting furnaces, broken tuyeres from the bellows, and glass beads. Available dates range from the ninth to the nineteenth century: the oldest from the plateaus, the most recent from the high hills.

In Gabon iron ore was smelted in the Léconoie area in the Upper Ogooné during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Several Late Iron Age sites exist in Cameroon, particularly Fundong in the Grassfields and Mbongué, the latter yielding ceramics and palm nuts. Fundong's remains are generally smelting debris.

Southeast

This district coincides with the southern part of Katanga. Leaving aside the Upemba Depression, evidence of the occupation of these lands during the Late Iron Age has come from the Kafubu River, from Kipushi (on the Zambian side of the watershed and the modern border), from the Kamoia stream, and from the Lubumbashi area along the Lubumbashi, Lwano, Naviundu, Kilobelobe, Luowoshi, and Karavia streams. The as-yet undated ceramic from around Lubumbashi differs little from that of Kipushi on the frontier of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, dated between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. This consists generally of shards decorated by impression with a comb, string, or metal bracelets. The Lubumbashi sites, like Kipushi, also share other traits, such as the fabrication of small crosses in molds and the presence of iron and copper slag. In Lubumbashi, furnaces and tuyeres have been found for copper and iron smelting and making bracelets. At the Kafubu, the ceramics are associated with *dagga* (worked clay), attesting to the construction of dwellings. The findings along the Kafubu, at Kipushi and around Lubumbashi belong to the complex called either "Copperbelt" or "Chondwe."

The inhabitants of the site along the Kamoia smelted both copper and iron in the sixteenth century. Copper was used for small crosses and beads, iron for tools such as knives. The Kamoia crosses resemble those found at the Upemba Depression in their miniature size and their form (in an irregular H). Ceramics have been found, but their fragmentary condition makes them difficult to correlate with any defined tradition. Lastly, the presence of upper and lower grindstones alongside the pottery and metal objects suggests that the inhabitants practiced agriculture.

East (Kivu, Burundi, Rwanda)

Mikweti, in the Kivu area of the Democratic Republic of Congo, is presently the only site in the eastern

region belonging to the Late Iron Age. A problem remains, nonetheless. By the carbon date of 1870–80, the Mikweti deposits belong to the Late Iron Age, but by its pottery it is tied to the Early Iron Age. It evokes, for example, the basal cavity of Urewe ware and is characteristic of the Early Iron Age in the interlacustrine region.

Burundi, and especially Rwanda, are rich in recent Iron Age sites, including in Rwanda the caves of Cynkomane and Akameru, the sites of Masanganio, Murunda, Mucucu II, Nyirarubona, Bugarama and Kandolo, and in Burundi that of Miramba II. In both countries, the pottery is characterized by rouletted pattern and smelting with the use of low furnaces.

Remains collected at Cynkomane and Akameru include wild game as well as domestic livestock. The first category includes rodents, elephant, sitatunga, and duiker. Domestic livestock included chicken, cow, sheep, and goat with a majority of bovine stock; among the smaller livestock, sheep predominate over goats.

Whether or not agriculture was practiced in the region has not yet been determined in a conclusive way. However, since there are indications of agro-pastoral activity during the Early Iron Age, one can suppose that both continued in the Late Iron Age, with agriculture based on eleusine and sorghum. The consumption of cereal grains was likely to have been accompanied by use of inorganic salt, such as was the case in the Early Iron Age.

Conclusion

Data from the Late Iron Age in Central Africa is unequal and fragmentary; there are still far too many gaps in the knowledge, and uncertainty. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that by this period, human populations made pottery, produced charcoal, smelted iron and copper, built housing in thatch, hunted, farmed, raised livestock, and fished. Moreover, these groups carried out long-distance trade. Despite worldviews including much that could be called superstitious and non-objective, the evidence implies a minimum of socio-economic organization auguring well for the emergence of large states in the region, such as the Kongo and Teke kingdoms.

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Iron Age (Later): Central Africa: Luangwa Tradition

“Luangwa” is the designation given to a pottery tradition practiced by diverse ethnic communities in Zambia. Among these are the Ambo, Cewa, and Nsenga in eastern Zambia, the Lala in central Zambia, the northern Lunda, Ushi, Chishinga, Bwile, Shila, Mukulu, and Ngumbo along the Luapula River valley, the Bisa and Bemba in northern Zambia, the Lenje and Soli in central Zambia, Tonga and Ila of southern Zambia, the western Lunda and Kaonde of northwest Zambia, and the Lamba and Lima of Copper Belt Zambia.

Geographically, the Luangwa tradition spans the entirety of Zambia, from the borders with Angola in the northwest, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the north and Tanzania in the northeast, into Malawi in the east, and Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the south. The name “Luangwa” is derived from the Luangwa River, which was central to the distribution of this pottery tradition. The above-mentioned ethnic groups (excluding the Cewa) with which the tradition is associated are all matrilineal communities who originated in the region of the Democratic Republic of Congo at varying periods in the past. In these communities, pottery is invariably made by women.

The distinguishing characteristic of this pottery is its almost total dependency on comb-stamped decorative motifs and combinations applied above the necks and on shoulders of necked pots and near the rims of shallow bowls, globular pots, beakers with straight sides, and gourd-shaped vessels. The most common decorative motif consists of horizontal bands of diagonal comb-stamping, commonly made with light incisions. Single or interlocking triangles of diagonal comb-stamping in parallel rows, a single row, a vertical zigzag pattern, pendant triangles or intertwined triangles and panels are also very common, especially in central and southern Zambia. In northern Zambia diagonal or crossed incisions and false relief chevrons also occur as regional variations. In the south, incised chevrons are also present.

According to the available archaeological dating, ancestral pottery of this tradition makes its first appearance in southwest Zambia in the mid-sixth century, in northwest Zambia from the twelfth century; in southern and central Zambia from the eighth century, in eastern Zambia from the eleventh century, and in most of northern Zambia from the seventeenth century. Archaeological sites associated with the Luangwa tradition in Zambia are: Nakapapula (eleventh century),

Fibobe (ninth/tenth centuries), and Twickenham (seventh to ninth centuries), all in Central Zambia, Ingombe Ilede (fifteenth century) and Gundu (eighth to eleventh centuries) in southern Zambia, Namakala (sixth century) in southwest Zambia, Kumusongolwa hill (twelfth century) in northwest Zambia, and Chondwe (twelfth century) in the Copper Belt.

In its earliest incarnations in Zambia, the tradition existed side by side with other pottery traditions practiced by cattle-keeping, patrilineal, Bantu communities. Its practitioners gradually, however, assimilated into these communities, as evidenced by some decorative motifs derived from the Bantu works, discovered in more recent Luangwa tradition pottery.

The Luangwa tradition manifests a strong continuity of style throughout most of the area in which it was produced. It also portrays regional variations as noted above, which are due to various factors such as its age and specific location. In the north, where it first appeared in the seventeenth century, it shows great uniformity, although because it assimilated other pottery traditions in the area, it displays incorporated elements from those traditions. In the south, parts of central, Copper Belt, and eastern Zambia, where it has an especially long presence, it has evolved some exclusive features and also incorporated aspects from other traditions in those areas.

When the Luangwa tradition originated, its practitioners were mixed agriculturalists who herded and maintained goats and sheep. Gradually, they incorporated cattle as they acquired the holdings of neighboring peoples. This occurred especially in south, central, and eastern Zambia. In the north, where the tradition's practitioners arrived more recently, they owned very few cattle but large numbers of goats. The northern peoples composed highly centralized societies with strong kingship systems, unlike in the south, where the tradition's adherents retained their original decentralized system, with its weak kingship system. In the east and parts of central Zambia, kingship systems were gradually introduced by Luangwa practitioners who were new arrivals to earlier, decentralized communities. Today these areas also have strong, highly centralized systems. In the northwest, the Luangwa tradition communities either evolved or arrived with centralized kingship systems which persist to date.

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Iron Age (Later): Central Africa: Peoples, Forest

The equatorial forest was long outside the research interests of archaeologists. In part this was due to conceptions about the peopling of the forest and savanna south of the Equator, centered on the notion that pygmies and bushmen were the first and only inhabitants before the Bantu migrations. The lack of interest was also due in part to the fact that the forest was considered unlikely to yield adequate returns from research. Archaeological research carried out since 1970 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Cameroon put an end to this neglect.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Ashes and pottery have been found in Matupi Cave in the Ituri, with polished stones, iron slag, tuyeres from furnaces, and unusual pottery near the Buru Stream in the Uele. While the Matupi ceramics are not yet studied thoroughly, they are dated to the thirteenth century; the Buru site is dated to the seventeenth century. Elsewhere in Ituri, the Malembi, Nduye, and Epulu sites indicate that pottery, stone tools, and iron coexisted for a time, then only the pottery and iron technologies continued on to the present day. The pottery labeled as Mukubasi has not yet received absolute dating or been published. Clay was also used to make beads; iron was used, among other things, to produce knives and needles. The consumption of *Elaeis* (oil palm), *Canarium*, and mollusks is attested throughout the Ituri, but clear proof of agriculture is lacking. The burial of the dead with grave goods has been demonstrated.

In the western part of the forest, the most recent phase of the Iron Age began with the pottery tradition known as Bondogoid, that is, the "Bondongo group." This is characterized by pots with a pronounced shoulder, dating from 1000 to 1400. Form and decoration grew more and more simplified through the Bokone phase (around 1600), with the tendency continuing on to the present style. Bondongo potters exported their goods to the Malebo Pool (modern Kinshasa). Their diet included plantains, yams, *Elaeis*, and *Canarium*, although it is not known which were gathered in the wild and which were cultivated.

Central African Republic, Gabon, and Cameroon

One single decorative technique unites the three modern countries. The Late Iron Age has been identified at

Tazunu Butume in the Bouar Region and in Ouhan Taburo. The pottery of Tazunu consists of shards decorated with a wooden roulette and is accompanied by metal knives and bracelets, iron slag, and tuyeres. The population that produced it fished, hunted palm rats, porcupines, antelope, and birds, gathered land snails, and farmed sorghum and yams. The sites from the Ouhan have yielded a pottery called Nana Modé, composed of cooking pots and storage jars with convex bases and decorated with a wooden roulette. One of the sites contains, in addition to the shards, a skeleton in bent position and two iron objects. The population group to which the skeleton belonged is unknown.

The Lopé Game Reserve in Gabon has yielded a pottery from the eleventh century composed of pots and bottles, of fairly fine lines and decorated with a basketry roulette. The base is convex, the neck angular. Iron ore was smelted at Léconi on the upper Ogooué in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Finally, the Angondjé and Group IV industries belong to the most recent period. Group IV is composed of crude pottery, without decoration, and with a beveled rim. The Angondjé industry includes tuyeres, cylindrical terra cotta beads, as well as recipients with a small flat lip; the decoration is impressed with a comb or incised with a stick; the bases are flat or convex. Angonjé ware has been dated from 1000 to 1500, and Group IV from 1500 to 1900. The pottery from the second phase of the Iron Age at Shum Laka in Cameroon is from the eighteenth century; containers are decorated with a roulette of braided or, rarely, twisted fiber.

Negroids, Pygmoids, and the Late Iron Age in the Rain Forest

The forested portions of Central Africa are inhabited today by pygmoids and negroids. No human remains of any age have yet been recovered in the equatorial forest. On the other hand, archaeological work has greatly increased the volume of artifacts and structures, some of which argue for the occupation of the forest since the Late Stone Age not only by pygmoids but also by other groups, including negroids, particularly since it is well established that humans have occupied the northern fringes of the forest for a very long time. Moreover, the presence of negroid groups east of the Democratic Republic of Congo and in East Africa, Zambia, and Malawi dates from the Late Stone Age, thus long before the period of Bantu expansion.

Human skeletons found in the forest and associated with Late Stone Age artifacts are rare and not yet attached to any known human groups. Nothing can thus be proved about which group among the pygmoids and negroids was responsible for the last phase of the Iron Age in the forest. However, pygmoids are often neither

potters, smiths, nor farmers; negroid populations, on the other hand, generally know all three technologies, thus encouraging an attribution of the Late Iron Age to the negroids (taller black farmers) rather than to the pygmoids (hunter-gatherers). These negroids were probably Bantu-speakers.

The African forest is now beginning to speak about its human occupation through archeology. Nonetheless, if several answers have been, there still remain many more questions. This is especially true for the Late Iron Age, a crucial period if we wish to better understand both early and contemporary African societies.

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Iron Age (Later): Central Africa: Upemba Basin

Also known as the Upper Lualaba Valley, the Upemba Basin in Katanga has known three cultural traditions during the Late Iron Age: classic Kisalian, Katotian, and Kabambian. These three traditions have been identified on the basis of six abandoned cemeteries.

Classic Kisalian

This culture probably began around the eleventh century. Grave goods include fine and diversified ceramics, personal adornment items in limestone, ivory, and mollusk shell; glass beads, and cowries. They also include tools, arms, and decorative objects in iron and copper, such as lance points, fishhooks, harpoons, knives, necklaces, and bracelets.

The metal and ivory objects as well as the pottery reflect the great technical mastery and skill of Kisalian artisans. For example, they drew, twisted, and braided iron and copper wire; such mastery implies the existence of a social and political organization promoting the development of specialists. Funeral ritual connotes the existence of a certain social stratification and of human sacrifice. The cowries are evidence of trade with the Indian Ocean; the copper goods show exchange with the copperbelt of southern Katanga.

The population along the river was very dense. Nonetheless, this demographic achievement was limited by a high level of infant mortality. The growth of the population would have been primarily due to the

availability of protein from fishing in addition to the usual resources from agriculture, herding goats and chickens, and hunting (primarily antelope and hippopotamus).

The Katotian

While the classic Kisalian flourished on the north side of the basin, the Katotian developed on the southern side from the twelfth century. The Katotian culture distinguished itself with group burials containing as many as seven bodies per tomb. Grave goods are made up of iron weapons and tools (points, fishhooks, hoes, fancy axes, anvils, bells), as well as ornaments in iron or copper, jewelry in ivory, achatina shells, or iridina mother-of-pearl. The grave pottery is remarkable for the vertical neck of the containers.

The anvils, bells, and decorated axes are among the indicators of hierarchical ranks in Katotian society. The seashells witness trade with the Indian Ocean coast. The inhabitants of Katoto were also in contact with the Kisalian culture, for Kisalian ceramic is found in Katotian tombs and vice versa. Moreover, Katoto had trade links with the Atlantic Ocean for *conus* shell.

The food supply was derived from hunting, fishing, and agriculture.

Kabambian

Classic Kisalian culture prospered until the period of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, when it was replaced by the Kabambian.

Kabambian funerary goods include copper and iron objects: crosses, pins, fishhooks, knives, awls, bracelets, lance and arrow heads, and bells. In addition, glass beads are found as well as ornaments in ivory and stone (malachite, granite, etc.); cowries, other marine shells, and ceramics are well represented. Kabambian ceramics are characterized by their red slip on the interior surface of the upper part of the pottery. The clay and the finish are similar to classic Kisalian, but the walls of the pottery object are thinner.

The Kabambian population maintained a similar density to that of the classic Kisalian period. On the other hand, metal objects became less numerous. With the exception of one bell with clapper, no symbol of political power has been excavated from the Kabambian culture. Interregional trade increased through the period, and the commercial expansion translated in the decreased size of copper crosses, a decrease that corresponded to the standardization of the cross as a currency. However, crosses were not the only currency, for the copper pins and cowries must also have known the same use. The Kabambians traded with the southern Katanga copperbelt to obtain copper objects as well as with the Indian Ocean for their cowries and glass beads.

The Kabambian culture developed into a vast political-economic formation known to European ethnographers during the last part of the seventeenth or the early eighteenth century as the Luba state system.

The Upemba Basin has known three cultural traditions during the New Iron Age. The study of the grave goods associated with these traditions has permitted sketching the general lines of sociopolitical organization, economic systems, and conceptual worlds. This makes the Upemba Basin one of the best known regions of Central Africa at the dawn of large African political constellations: namely, states, empires, and political models.

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See also: **Luba.**

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Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Cattle, Wealth, Power

In many parts of the East African interior today, and particularly in the area that lies between the Great Lakes, cattle carry a disproportionately high value and have become inherently linked to social prestige and political power. In certain areas cattle ownership has been restricted to elite ruling classes. This is not a new development. In the mid-nineteenth century, the first Arab and European traders to travel into the interior recorded the existence of complex kingdoms and states in the Great Lakes region and, in the Rift valley and highlands, successful specialist pastoral groups, in all of which cattle played a pivotal role. Moreover, the many breeds of cattle found throughout the region today, and the more spectacular examples like the magnificently horned Ankole cow, speak of many generations of selective breeding.

There is archaeological evidence for the presence of domestic cattle in East Africa from a very early date (at least the third millennium BCE). It is agreed that the many breeds of cattle found today originate from the introduction of unhumped cattle (*Bos taurus*, originally from Eurasia) and humped cattle (*Bos indicus*, originally from Asia) into the region, but it is also thought that the "Sanga" breed (sometimes called *Bos africanus*), a large, long-horned breed of which the Ankole cow is one example, is of very ancient African origin.

Cattle were exploited in the region long before the first appearance of the settled, food-producing communities in the Great Lakes region that are seen as marking the start of the Early Iron Age in the first millennium BCE. It is not yet apparent whether these first food producers were also cattle keepers (there is very little faunal evidence from this early period) but the increasingly important role played by cattle becomes evident in the Later Iron Age. An important factor throughout this period has been the numerous challenges and opportunities that the adoption of cattle has presented to East African communities. Throughout the region, large areas of ranker grasses and bush are home to the tsetse fly (*Glossina* spp.) and the brown ear tick (*Rhipicephalus appendiculatus*), carriers of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and theileriosis. Some degree of environmental management could control these threats, but their presence did determine the areas in which cattle keeping could flourish. Predators, such as hyenas and the large cats, demanded constant vigilance and protective measures. Successful cattle rearing, however, enabled new economic and social developments, leading eventually to economic and political centralization and the creation of a social elite.

The only comprehensive archaeological study of the role of cattle in the Iron Age, and the earliest evidence for the intensive exploitation of cattle, comes from Reid's work at the site of Ntusi in western Uganda (1990, 1996). He analyzed a considerable faunal assemblage from this site, dating from the eleventh century to the fifteenth century, and was able to identify herd-management strategies that involved large quantities of immature animals. At its height in the fourteenth century, Ntusi had grown to cover an area of approximately 100 hectares (247 acres), and clearly dominated its hinterland. Excavations at the site recovered glass beads and cowry shells, objects that had traveled along complex trade routes from the distant East African coast and clearly indicate the economic importance of the site. Survey of the grasslands around Ntusi revealed a number of much smaller sites that Reid identified, following excavation, as single livestock enclosures. Faunal evidence at these sites showed the culling of animals at a younger age than at Ntusi. Reid has concluded that the control of cattle was central to the Ntusi economy, with more mature animals being removed from the small outlying settlements and taken to the dominant site at Ntusi. Cattle were clearly linked, at this early date, with both economic and political power, but there is not yet any evidence for the restriction of cattle to elite social groups suggesting this was a later development.

The evolving role of cattle in the East African Iron Age has also been explored by Schoenbrun (1998), who has supplemented his own exhaustive study of

historical and comparative linguistics with evidence from environmental studies, ethnography and archaeology to create a dynamic picture of past power relationships. He has associated the gradual development of cattle mastery, evidenced by the emergence of cattle color and horn shape terminologies, with the emergence, first of technical expertise and new social relationships, and later of social, economic and political inequality, conclusions which concur with the archaeological picture suggested by Reid.

Several large earthwork sites dating from the Iron Age are found in modern Uganda, and their large size is seen as suggesting some degree of centralized political and social control. Radiocarbon dates have only been obtained for two of these sites, Bigo and Munsu: fifteenth to the nineteenth and fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries, respectively. Bigo, the largest site, consists of some 10 kilometers (6 miles) of ditches, with depths of up to 4 meters (13 feet), and encloses approximately 300 hectares (741 acres). While these earthworks appear to have been built as barriers and enclosures, many of them are not defensive as the interior is often lower than ground outside the ditches and Reid has suggested that they may have functioned as enclosed pasturage. This idea is also echoed in the oral traditions attached to Bigo, which claim that Mugenyi, one of the legendary Cwezi, kept his cattle here.

In the western highlands evidence for the presence of past cattle keepers can be seen scattered across the landscape in the form of groups of small, saucer-shaped depressions, approximately 10 meters (33 feet) in width. These groups may contain anything from 5 to 50 hollows. These depressions have been interpreted as the remains of former cattle pens, or stockades, and their use has been tentatively dated to the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, an increase in aggression and a new exploitation of iron weaponry has been linked with the rise of the Maasai, a successful confederation of pastoralist groups which occupies the area today.

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See also: **Great Lakes Region.**

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Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Labor, Gender, Production

The present lack of historical and archaeological evidence from the East African interior makes it particularly difficult to examine the very many relationships between labor, gender, and production which must have existed in the Iron Age. The first written accounts of this region date from the mid-nineteenth century, when Arab and European traders first penetrated the East African interior. These relatively modern records are supplemented by a rich body of oral history and traditions, the antiquity and meaning of which are the subject of continuing debate. Studies, such as Peter Schmidt's (1997) of the Haya in northwestern Tanzania, have employed a multidisciplinary approach to the oral records, examining them in association with archaeological and ethnographic data and have suggested that some of these traditions may indeed be of great antiquity and may help to explain aspects of the region's past.

The archaeological record of the East African interior is also patchy and, perhaps because of colonial concerns, much earlier work was concerned largely with prehistory and the very distant past. Increasingly, however, archaeologists are examining Iron Age material and attempting to examine issues of labor and production, of which gender must be seen as an integral element.

Rachel MacLean (1998) has suggested that the division of activities between different sections of the Early Iron Age (EIA) community may enable us to see the presence of these groups in antiquity. In the area to the west of Lake Victoria the archaeological record, supplemented by palaeoecological data, gives direct or indirect evidence for the appearance of five new activities in the EIA communities that settled the area: the production of ceramics and the working of iron, and land clearance, agricultural production, and pot cooking (cooking in a ceramic vessel). Today these activities are not undertaken indiscriminately by all members of the community, and in most cases there is a restriction to a particular gender. Although it is simplistic to project modern patterns of labor division back into the past, it is almost certain that labour division did occur. MacLean argued that iron production and pot cooking were, in this context, inherently gendered activities, being considered male and female aspects of interlinked pyrotechnologies. In addition she suggested that land clearance, which in this area is today a male

activity establishing a male interest in future food production, and agricultural production, today a female activity establishing control of the food supply, may have been so in the EIA. Schoenbrun (1998) has also made similar suggestions following his analysis of comparative and historical linguistics in the region.

Such approaches to past labor and gender relations have been criticized, but they do at least begin to see the Iron Age community as a multifaceted one in which different identities, and ultimately differential access to economic, political, and social power, were functioning. Schoenbrun's work, which draws upon environmental studies, ethnography, and archaeology to supplement his linguistic arguments, has also begun to suggest a dynamic picture of past power relationships in which the control and restriction of different resources and activities resulted in the complex relationships that exist today.

From the end of the first millennium, there is archaeological evidence for increasing economic specialization. At Kibiro, on the eastern shore of Lake Albert, Graham Connah (1996) has uncovered evidence for salt production from the twelfth or thirteenth century until the present day. Today salt production is a female activity, the areas in which the salt-rich mud is extracted and processed are known as the women's "salt gardens." Men engage in fishing and other specialized, gender specific tasks. Again, it would be naive to suggest a simple continuity of labor division, but it is interesting to note current practice and to speculate that labor division along gender lines was a valuable economic strategy throughout the Iron Age.

There is also evidence from across the region for the presence of pastoralist groups. At Ntusi, a site dating from the eleventh to the fifteenth century located in the western grasslands of Uganda, Andrew Reid (1990) has suggested that the control of cattle was central to the economy. Ntusi itself grew to some 100 hectares (247 acres) at its height in the fourteenth century and appeared to be obtaining large numbers of relatively mature cattle from the many small sites that lay scattered throughout its hinterland. Although cattle clearly played a dominant role in the economy, evidence for agricultural production was also common at these sites (crops included sorghum and finger millet), ceramic production and use was occurring, as was iron production. There is also some evidence for the manufacture of ivory beads. Increasing economic specialization would suggest that some forms of activity specialization were also developing, ultimately resulting in the social and economic inequalities evident in the later kingdoms.

Schmidt's (1997) study of recent Haya ironworking methods, the symbolism surrounding the technological process, and the role of iron, ironworkers, and ironworking in recent Haya society presented a

detailed picture of a technology viewed as explicitly gendered; the smelter being male and the furnace female. He was able to interpret the symbolic landscape of the Kyamutwara capital of Rugamora Mahe (dated by radiocarbon to the seventeenth century) using the insights gained from his ethnographic work, and to identify, through excavation, ironworking features dating from the third century BCE indicated by these traditions. Kyamutwara was located in northwestern Tanzania, on the western shore of Lake Victoria. This work suggests that iron production may have been similarly gendered, certainly in the Later Iron Age kingdom of Kyamutwara, and possibly also in the EIA. Schmidt argues that control over iron production and the symbolism associated with iron production enabled new dynasties to gain both economic power and political legitimacy in Kyamutwara.

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Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Societies, Evolution of

The communities that were living in the East African interior at the beginning of the first millennium appear to be a mix of foragers, or hunter-gatherer-fishers, simple farming communities, and nomadic pastoralists. The archaeological record of the East African interior indicates that a major cultural and economic change occurred across the region toward the end of the first millennium and the beginning of the second millennium—a change that marks the division between the periods archaeologists have labeled the Early Iron Age and the Late Iron Age (EIA and LIA). The most archaeologically ubiquitous marker of this change is a widespread change in pottery styles. In the Great Lakes

region this was marked by the new use of roulettes to decorate pottery. Roulettes are made either of carved wood, or twisted or knotted plant fiber, and are rolled across the surface of a wet pot to create an impressed, continuous design. There are, however, other new developments, including the construction of large earthworks in what is now Uganda, monuments that suggest the evolution of more complex societies. When Arab and European traders were finally to travel into the interior of East Africa in the mid-nineteenth century they recorded a number of complex states or kingdoms lying in the Great Lakes region, sophisticated political entities that they had to recognize as truly indigenous African developments. The evolution of these entities from their simple Early Iron Age beginnings continues to be a little known subject.

It has been argued by Peter Schmidt (1997) that the roots of these complex societies lie in the early iron-producing communities that lived and worked on the northwestern shores of Lake Victoria, in Buhaya. The size of these communities and the complexity and scale of their iron industry has been disputed, but it is plausible that the control of important resources such as iron may have enabled the development of economic and political inequality from which the Later Iron Age kingdoms developed. The kingdoms encountered by the first traders were, in many cases, exercising control over iron production, and in some, such as Karagwe (which lies to the west of Buhaya), and in Rwanda, the working of iron was intimately and symbolically linked to royal power.

The control of cattle, and the symbolic value placed upon them, was also common to many of these nineteenth-century societies; indeed, in Karagwe the royal insignia included several iron cows representing the association of both these resources with political control. Andrew Reid and John Sutton's excavations at the site of Ntusi, in southern Uganda, indicated that from its beginnings in the eleventh century the production of cattle was central to its economy. At its height, in the fourteenth century, Ntusi covered an area of approximately 100 hectares (247 acres) and clearly dominated its hinterland, yet Reid argues that the control of cattle by a small elite had not yet emerged at Ntusi, which therefore had not reached the socio-political complexity of the later kingdoms.

The large earthwork sites—the most notable of which is Bigo with some ten kilometers (6 miles) of ditches, up to four meters (13 feet) in depth—attracted the attention of the first archaeologists to work in the region. These earthworks appeared to have little association with the later kingdoms but were associated, or were associated by archaeologists, with oral traditions of the Cwezi, a mysterious group of royal heroes and godlike characters who ruled the region in antiquity. The

Cwezi remain controversial figures, hovering between myth and distant historical reality, but their influence on archaeology has been actual. The early excavations in Uganda, and particularly the excavation of Bigo by both Shinnie and Posnansky, were attempts to verify the truth of the Cwezi traditions and the function of these earthworks remains poorly understood. The ditches are not defensive, little cultural material has been recovered from large areas of the sites, and only Bigo and Munsa have produced radiocarbon dates (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries and fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, respectively). Reid has suggested that they may have been used for either agriculture or pasturage.

The control of a third resource, salt, is also known, both historically and archaeologically. At the site of Kibiro, on the eastern shore of Lake Albert, Connah has uncovered evidence for occupation and salt production beginning in the twelfth or thirteenth century and continuing to the present day. The recovery of glass beads and cowry shells, imported luxury goods, suggests the economic importance attained by Kibiro during the Iron Age. At some unknown date Kibiro became incorporated into the Bunyoro state and played such an important economic role in the region that the British launched several punitive expeditions to destroy it at the end of the nineteenth century.

Survey work by Peter Robertshaw (1994) in western Uganda has also indicated a period of social and economic change. He has identified the appearance of settlements from at least the twelfth century in areas previously unoccupied by iron-using communities, indicating a shift from the wetter, more fertile margins of Lake Victoria where the EIA settlements were clustered. He has also found some evidence for the appearance of larger sites, site hierarchies, and defensive locations by the fourteenth century, all factors that would indicate increasing social tension.

Reid has argued that the archaeological evidence shows a period of increasing regional diversification and economic specialization, economic changes that would have required or initiated the creation of new forms of physical storage, social support, and extensive trade networks. In turn these social changes would have been fundamentally linked to the political changes that resulted in the development of the politically complex, economically specialized kingdoms recorded in the nineteenth century. These archaeological arguments are paralleled by the linguistic arguments of David Schoenbrun (1998), who has suggested the evolution of increasingly complex forms of power in the region from the eighth century onward. The possible social changes first evidenced by a widespread change in pottery decoration finally culminated in the development of a mosaic of inter-related and incontrovertibly East African states.

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Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Salt

One consequence of the adoption of agriculture in Africa, as elsewhere, was an increased demand for salt as a dietary supplement. A variety of different sources came to be exploited. The purest of these, natural rock salt, has a fairly limited distribution in Africa, being found only at a few places in the Sahara. Other sources include sea salt; naturally occurring salt crusts produced by solar evaporation; brine springs; salt impregnated soil; termite runs; and various salt-bearing plants. With the exception of natural salt crusts, some form of processing is necessary before the salt can be utilized. Typically, this involves either the straining of brine or other salt-rich solutions, or their evaporation by boiling or exposure to solar energy.

The practice of extracting salt from plants may have been quite widespread among early African agriculturists, and was possibly one of the commonest methods used. The technique is well documented ethnographically for Malawi, where a wide range of reeds, sedges, swamp grasses, and other waterside plants were used, as well as some dry-land trees and shrubs. The technique here, as elsewhere on the continent, entailed the production of a salt-rich ash by burning appropriate plant material. Water was then strained through this and the resultant brine boiled until the water had evaporated. Perforated ceramic vessels, various kinds of baskets, and woven mats were employed as strainers.

A somewhat similar technology was used to process salt-rich earth, such as that found around the margins of salt pans and hot springs. Salty earth was first collected and placed in perforated pots or gourds with water, which filtered through to a vessel placed underneath. The filtrate could then be used either directly for cooking, or evaporated over a hearth, with more and more brine being added to the boiling pot until the vessel was completely filled with salt. Since the pots had

to be broken to extract the salt, the resultant mounds of shards of salt-boiling vessels (*briquetage*) can make this type of extraction sites highly visible in the archaeological record. Around the Ivuna salt pans, near Lake Rukwa in southern Tanzania, for example, up to seven meters (21 feet) of deposits containing a mass of pottery, food bones, the remains of house floors and other debris, as well as several burials have survived. Dating to between the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, the extent of these deposits suggest salt extraction was being undertaken here on quite an intensive scale, most probably for long-distance exchange, although only a handful of imported glass beads were recovered from the excavations.

Examples of perforated pots that could have been used in the domestic production of salt have also been found on various archaeological sites in the region. One of the earliest examples comes from the fifth-century site of Kapwirimbe in Zambia; others are known from the eighth-century site of Dakawa in east-central Tanzania, and from various sites around Lake Malawi, including the eighth–eleventh century sites at Namaso Bay, the mid-eighteenth-century site at Nfera Lagoon, and the Later Iron Age site of Kyungu at the northern end of the lake. Typological similarities between the pottery from this latter site and that recovered from Ivuna, suggest cultural links between the two areas, although Kyungu was occupied significantly later than Ivuna.

Salt extraction was also undertaken on an even larger scale at a number of locations in eastern Africa. In western Uganda, the salt works at Katwe, near Lake Edward, and Kibiro on Lake Albert were especially important during the nineteenth century when they fell within the boundaries of, respectively, the Toro and Bunyoro kingdoms. In both cases, the trade in salt made important contributions to the economy of the state, and the maintenance of centralized authority. Of the two, Kibiro was probably the more significant; the long-distance trade in salt from here may have been instrumental in the massive expansion of the Bunyoro state during the seventeenth century. Even so, although Kibiro was under Bunyoro authority and its inhabitants liable to pay tribute to their king, the local population was able to retain control over the resource. Most of the actual production was left to women, and probably organized on a household or kin-group basis. Each woman was allocated her own space, and once ready the salt was made up into small loads to be carried to local markets.

At Katwe, salt was extracted by trapping brine from hot springs in specially constructed clay-line hollows and evaporating the water. In the 1920s, salt was still being taken overland by porters to Ankole and Toro on a regular basis. At Kibiro, up to three meters (10 feet) of deposits associated with salt working spanning the

last 700 to 800 years have survived. Extraction, as at Ivuna, involved filtering deposits of saline earth, but with an additional, and unusual, feature: the re-use of the saline earth. This involved spreading the earth from each filtration over “salt-gardens.” After a number of days, the earth would absorb salty moisture from the underlying salt-rich deposits and was thus readied for repeated use. It is conceivable that it was the development of this technique that made the industry sustainable for so long.

Another important salt-trading center during the nineteenth century was Uvinza, in western Tanzania. By the end of the century production was on a massive scale, with different sections of the labor force being engaged in carrying and boiling the brine; making pots; cutting and fetching firewood; and packing salt. In 1898 German records suggest that annual output had reached 350,000 kilograms (345 tons) and that up to twenty thousand individuals were engaged in the industry. Much of this workforce was made up of seasonal itinerants, who traveled from as far afield as Burundi. Salt was exchanged locally for food and fuel, but the main stimulus for the growth of the industry from at least 1850 onward was the expansion of the long-distance caravan trade between the coast and the interior. Once obtained, the traders would exchange the salt for food as well as cloth, ivory, iron hoes, and other commodities along the caravan routes. The three Vinza chiefs who controlled the springs also profited from this trade by levying a tax amounting to one-tenth of the annual output and charging road tolls and ferry charges.

Excavations at several of the brine springs at Uvinza have uncovered a number of clay-lined, U-shaped pits used to trap the brine. Many of these also contained hearth stones and the remains of broken salt-boiling pots, and virtually all of them can be dated to the nineteenth century. However, traces of earlier Iron Age ceramics, some dating to as early as the fifth century, were also recovered from lower horizons. It is likely that these remains were also associated with earlier salt processing activities and its subsequent exchange, although details of the techniques used during these phases have yet to be determined.

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See also: **Sahara: Salt: Production, Trade.**

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Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Trade

In Eastern Africa, archaeological evidence indicates that long-distance exchange networks existed well before the establishment of settled farming some 2,000 to 2,500 years ago. Thus for example, many Late Stone Age and Pastoral Neolithic sites located to the west and east of the Rift Valley contain stone tools made from obsidian that originated from sources up to 150 kilometers (95 miles) away, around Lake Naivasha. With the emergence of farming, the level of trade seems to have intensified, and by the mid-first millennium, at least three distinct exchange arenas were in operation. These were the maritime trade along the East African littoral and with other lands bordering the Indian Ocean; various east-west trading links between these coastal communities and those occupying parts of the interior; and, the north-south trade between different groups in the interior. Each sphere had different origins and, at least initially, was concerned with the circulation of different products. Ultimately, however, all three were linked to each other, and, through other external ties, to the economies of the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

In the early centuries of its development, trade between the coast and the interior probably took the form of a series of loosely organized networks along the main river valleys and other suitable routes. Movement of people was probably over relatively short distances to barter for goods from neighboring communities. The goods themselves could easily have passed from one market to another, thereby moving steadily further away from their point of production. This type of “down-the-line” exchange probably accounts for the finds of limited numbers of exotic items, such as cowrie shells and trade wind beads, on Iron Age and earlier sites in the interior. In exchange, ivory, rhinoceros horn, leopard and other skins, and perhaps iron were among the main items being sent to the coast, and, with the exception of iron (which would have been used locally) then on to markets in Persia, India, China, and Europe. Slaves were another important export at various times. It is estimated, for example, that between the seventh and ninth centuries some fifteen thousand were shipped to southern Iraq to assist with the drainage of the Shatt al-Arab marshes; a proportion of these would have come from the interior.

It is likely this early trade also incorporated different “spheres of exchange,” such that subsistence goods, especially foodstuffs, but also items like pottery and perhaps salt and iron, while being exchangeable for one another could not be exchanged for scarcer or

more prestigious items. In the interior, the latter would have included items only available from the coast, but also finer pieces of metalwork made from copper, iron, and gold. The display and/or consumption of such items probably played a prominent role in signaling elite status and more generally as symbols of power. However, whereas access to these long-distance trade routes was an integral component of the rise to prominence of centers such as Sanga, Ingombe Ilede, and Great Zimbabwe in southern and central Africa, it seems to have been of less of a contributory factor in the interlacustrine zone, even though examples of coastal imports have been from sites, such as Ntusi and Munsu, in this area. Instead, intensification of grain and cattle production, and economic diversification in other areas—such as salt production on Lake Albert at Kibiro, and ironworking further to the south—and control of the local trade in these products seem to have been more important.

From around the fifteenth century onward, however, various communities in the interior began to take a more prominent role in the organization and control of long-distance trade with the coast. In the immediate coastal hinterland, the Mijikenda and subsequently the Akamba and Zigua were among the most important traders; whereas in the south it was the Yao and Makua, and in the central and northern parts of the region the Nyamwezi, Banyoro, and Baganda achieved greatest dominance. A major focus of this later trade was the supply of ivory and slaves to Swahili and Arab traders on the coast. Elephant hunting parties became a common feature across the region, and members of these different communities began to venture well beyond the territorial boundaries of their own societies. Yao trading parties, for example, went as far as Central Africa in search of ivory and slaves, while Akamba expeditions traveled from their homeland in what is now southern Kenya to the areas around Kilimanjaro and the Usambara-Pare Mountains and also northwest as far as Mount Kenya and the Laikipia Plateau.

As the volume of trade increased, it became more market oriented in nature with greater emphasis being placed on the realization of profit, rather than the use of exchange as a means to establish and reinforce social relationships. Furthermore, whereas most trade in the earlier centuries had been essentially between individuals or communities seeking to satisfy local needs created by the uneven distribution of natural resources, trading expeditions became steadily more organized and subject to control by local chiefs, many of whom rose to even greater prominence during the height of the nineteenth-century caravan trade.

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See also: **Neolithic, Pastoral: Eastern Africa.**

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Characteristics and Origins, South of Zambezi

The Iron Age prehistory of southern Africa has traditionally been divided into two periods, the Early Iron Age and the Later Iron Age. Chronologically, the division was put at the year 1000. Culturally, it was based on a number of changes observable in the archaeological record, including economic, social, and political organization. Because of this, the two periods were seen as bracketing separate cultural phenomenon and interpreted as reflecting new population movements into southern Africa from the north. In fact no new population movements into the region took place. The cultural changes that took place around the turn of the millennium and the origins of the Later Iron Age in southern Africa are seen mainly as a result of local developments, although scholars offer different explanations.

Using ceramic typology, archaeologists have recognized the earliest Later Iron Age communities as represented by the Leopard's Kopje Tradition, which divides into two main phases, Phase A and Phase B, as well as a north and south geographical division. Phase A is best known from the site of K2 just south of the Limpopo River. In the north it is best known from the sites of Leopard's Kopje and Mambo in the Matebeleland region of southwestern Zimbabwe. Phase A is dated around the tenth or eleventh century.

The north-south geographical division of Leopard's Kopje continues into Phase B, with Woolandale in the north and Mapungubwe in the south. This phase is broadly dated to the twelfth or thirteenth century. In northeastern Botswana, the Leopard's Kopje Tradition has been identified at such sites as Mmamagwe and Bobonong. Further to the north in Zimbabwe are several other Later Iron Age cultural units such as Gumanye in south-central Zimbabwe, Harare in central Zimbabwe, and Musengezi in the north. Their relationship to the Leopard's Kopje Culture is unclear.

There are two main views that dominate the explanation for the appearance of these cultural entities during the early part of the second millennium. One view sees the Leopard's Kopje culture as originating

from the Early Iron Age cultures around the Lydenburg area in the southeast in South Africa, which then spread out into the different parts of the region. It has been argued that this was the result of the build up of cattle and human populations that then forced people to expand northwards. This was termed the Kutama Tradition after the Shona word “*kutama*,” meaning migration. This movement saw the establishment of ancestral Shona speakers in the Shashi-Limpopo area and parts of Zimbabwe. However, there are no clear antecedents of the Leopard’s Kopje Tradition in the presumed area of origin, and the evidence for climatic changes leading to cattle and human population buildups remains inconclusive.

Alternative explanations emphasize internal change among the local Early Iron Age communities. Some scholars see the transformations as the result of changes in social organization from matrilineal to patrilineal society. This should explain for example the change in the ceramics from the more complex styles of the Early Iron Age to the simpler ones of the Later Iron Age in the region. Early Iron Age ceramics are of better quality and more elaborately decorated because, it is argued, they were made by male specialist potters for wider distribution. On the other hand, Later Iron Age ceramics were made by women for local household use, hence their diversity and simplicity. The sociocultural transformations that characterize Later Iron Age societies discussed below are thus interpreted as a reflection of this major change in the social systems. It has been observed that the explanation that argues for population movements is inconsistent with the archaeological evidence such as that from the site of K2. Here, the evidence suggests that the features characterizing Leopard’s Kopje originated from the local Early Iron Age Zhizo culture, with no intrusive elements from the south.

More recently, the change from the Early Iron Age to the Later Iron Age has been viewed in terms of change in ideology amongst the local early farming communities. This ideological change is argued to have been occasioned by new economic conditions rather than by population movements. The archaeological record indicates that the early farming communities possessed an ideology of equality. This is partly evident from the spatial organization within and between sites. The ideology is evident for a greater part of the first millennium. However, as cattle herds increased and as long as distance trade developed towards the end of this millennium, this ideology changed to one that allowed or encouraged inequality, resulting in economic and social differentiation in society.

Although some archaeologists have recently argued that Early Iron Age societies at such sites as

Broederstroom in South Africa show indications of social complexity, the evidence for this is rather limited. Most archaeologists believe that they were small-scale egalitarian village communities. The Later Iron Age is characterized by greater material diversity and increasing cultural complexity that saw the growth of stratified societies either at the chiefdom or state level of organization in the region. Some of the changes that signaled the development of this period include a shift in settlement location from low-lying river or stream or valley locations to hilltops. The construction of stone walls on hilltops is another important change in spatial behavior. While some of the stone walls were functional, many, especially the later ones such as at Great Zimbabwe, are generally agreed to have been symbols of the power and prestige of the ruling classes.

One of the most important developments in the Later Iron Age was economic growth. Although changes are traceable back to the terminal stages of the Early Iron Age, two notable economic transformations are noted during the early part of the second millennium. First, there is considerable increase in cattle herds and their growing importance in social and ideological terms. Sites such as K2, Toutswe Mogala in northeastern Botswana, and later, Great Zimbabwe, have yielded vast quantities of cattle bone compared to any other domestic animals. In this regard, it would appear that cattle acted as important avenues to social and political power. Their importance in marriage transactions among contemporary southern Bantu people probably dates back to this period. As a source of social and political power, their possession no doubt saw the entrenchment of sociopolitical stratification in different parts of the region. Another important economic development was the increase in the volume of external trade. Several sites have yielded large quantities of exotic trade goods such as glass beads in a variety of types and colors as well as ceramics. These were traded via the Indian Ocean coast and have been sourced from as far away as Persia and India. Possession of rare goods from distant sources also contributed significantly to the growth of social stratification and the rise of complex social formations in the region. Indeed, for some archaeologists, the introduction of external trade was the single most important factor in the growth of complexity in the region. Others however prefer to examine this process in much broader terms involving other factors.

However the process is explained, what is notable is that the Later Iron Age communities were characterized by the development of stratified societies. Initially, these were in the form of large chiefdoms such as Toutswe in Botswana, and what appear to have been several small chiefdoms associated with the Musengezi Tradition in the northern part of Zimbabwe.

With time, we see the development of a succession of state systems in the form of the Mapungubwe State with its capital at the site of Mapungubwe. This was succeeded by the Zimbabwe State with its center at Great Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was in turn succeeded by the Torwa State based at the site of Khami in southwestern Zimbabwe and the Mutapa State in northern Zimbabwe. These complex systems are all characterized by a similar ceramic style that emphasized graphite burnishing and the construction of capitals of elaborate dry stone buildings in a variety of styles. The capitals share a similar spatial arrangement called the Zimbabwe culture pattern. In part, this spatial organization divides into binary opposites such as high-low and inside-outside as symbolic representations of status. It is also argued that the systems shared a similar ideology based on the manipulation of symbols of gender and power linked to the world of the ancestors.

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See also: Iron Age (Early): Herding, Farming, Southern Africa.

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Toutswe-mogala, Cattle, and Political Power

One of the most complex states in Later Iron Age southern Africa arose in the region today covered by modern Botswana, starting in approximately 900.

The state is a political form more stable than that of the chiefdom. It is normally characterized by a new political and economic order, in which one group is able to hold power over the entire society for several generations, avoiding the tendency to fission common in chiefdoms. States maintain power through the idea of symbolic consensus created through a common ideology and the successful resolution of conflict through force if necessary. The transition from a society organized around chiefdoms to one that can be characterized as a state was probably achieved through the accrual of wealth in cattle, which gave rise to a more differentiated and complex set of social relations.

This occurred in a few cases in southern Africa towards the end of the first millennium. One of the first states in this tradition is often referred to through its association with its principal site, Toutswe-mogala. Its society is sometimes referred to as the Zhizo tradition.

Until about the middle of the first millennium, Botswana was not extensively populated by farmers. Although Botswana is currently beset by severe environmental degradation, mostly as a result of overgrazing, about 1,100 years ago the climate in the east was marked by more rainfall and was consequently more capable of supporting livestock. Around the year 700, pastoralists began to move into the area in greater numbers, taking advantage of the ability of local pasturage to support larger cattle herds. Here they came into contact with the Khoisan people already resident in the area, some of whom were themselves cattle keepers. By 900 a stratified and hierarchical society was emerging on the fringes of the Kalahari Desert, linked regionally to other emergent states like that at Mapungubwe.

Toutswe-mogala society was organized into settlements of different sizes. The evidence for this comes from aerial photographs that show changes in vegetation and ancient accumulations of dung. As a result of this, archaeologists have been able to plot the existence of three different kinds of settlement. The smallest range is between 100 and 5,000 square meters in size. These sites have small kraals (cattle pens), or no kraals at all. They contain Later Stone Age artifacts, and the remains of wild animals, likely hunted as food supplements. These sites appear not to have been reused and were probably abandoned after one generation.

Other sites, like those at Taukome and Thatsane, range in size up to 10,000 square meters. They contain kraals, and show evidence of having been occupied for between 200 and 300 years. It is thought that these sites supplied cattle to the larger central site at Toutswe-mogala, which is calculated to have been 100,000 square meters in extent. Toutswe-mogala was occupied for approximately 500 years until the fourteenth century. The site was home to a very large kraal.

Excavated artifacts and material include shells from the Indian Ocean and glass beads made in Arabia. These are evidence for Toutswe mogala's links with greater southern African society. All the sites contain pottery similar in style to that found in Zimbabwe and Northern Province, South Africa, for the period between 680 and 1300, indicating cultural affinities between the groups resident in this area, as well as contact with the Mapungubwe state.

The bones of mature cattle of reproductive age have also been found in the deposits at Toutswe mogala. These provide one source of evidence about the importance of the site. These bones would indicate that Toutswe mogala was an important and rich state because its rulers could afford to kill their most valuable cattle. This would only be possible if mature cattle of reproductive age were a resource in great abundance.

The power of Toutswe mogala developed firstly out of the accumulation of wealth in cattle. The ability to control the breeding and distribution of cattle gave the elite of the emergent state access to stores of wealth. These stores of wealth could be used to barter for more wealth or to secure the allegiance of outer lying groups. Few trade goods and no gold have been found in the deposits at Toutswe mogala, indicating that these goods did not play a role in the accumulation of wealth, unlike the case at Mapungubwe. Being further away from contact with the east coast than the Mapungubwe state, Toutswe mogala did not gain its wealth from trade.

The focus on cattle in Botswanan society at this point, together with the evidence of hierarchical settlement patterns, points to a social system with features of the Central Cattle Pattern. Cattle would have held both symbolic and literal wealth, and society would have been organized around a structure of oppositions which gained their meaning from references associated with cattle. The meaning of cattle was carried over into the successor societies to Toutswe mogala. The power of the state diminished during the thirteenth century, probably as a result of overgrazing and drought and the state went into a decline.

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Leopard's Kopje, Bambandyanalo, and Mapungubwe

By the ninth century, Arab traders from Yemen and the Persian Gulf, as well as local Swahili coastal traders, had extended their trade networks down the east coast of Africa, as far as Chibuene on the Mozambican coast. Their presence was to have a significant impact on developments in the interior of southern Africa, prompting the growth of the first complex state in the region, a precursor to Great Zimbabwe. The most important site linked to this state has been found at Mapungubwe, on the south side of the Limpopo River (the South Africa/Zimbabwe/Botswana border) in the Limpopo River valley. However, there are a number of sites linked to this state, and their evolution reflects the growing importance of trade with the east coast.

The Limpopo valley region was inhabited from the second century, probably by ancestors of modern Shona-speakers. However, it was not settled extensively by Iron Age farmers until the eighth century, when climate changes made more extensive farming possible. When larger settlements were formed they were characteristic of the Central Cattle Pattern, with stone huts and kraals (cattle pens). One of the earliest sites excavated for this period is Schroda, close to Mapungubwe and dated to the ninth century. Archaeological deposits at Schroda contain imported glass beads and ivory, import and export goods that point to the development of a trade with the east coast, if only indirectly.

From the tenth century, sites in the region became more complex, showing evidence of larger cattle herds and a new pottery style. This is evident at Leopard's Kopje (dated to 980), near modern Bulawayo. The site's name is often used to refer to a Later Iron Age phase covering the period between 1000 and 1300, which includes the period when the Mapungubwe state was in its ascendancy. These shifts are taken to indicate the beginnings of more complex social structure in the area, prompted by a developing trade in gold.

Gold was present in alluvial and surface deposits on the Zimbabwean plateau. However, the local people disregarded it, until Arab traders on the East African coast expressed an interest in it, and the demand for gold became apparent. The start of this trade can be dated accurately, because it was reported by the Arabian chronicler, Al-Masudi, in 916.

By the end of the tenth century, people of the Leopard's Kopje tradition had settled at Bambandyanalo (known in some of the literature as K2) at the base of Mapungubwe hill. The large amount of cattle bones

found confirms the importance of cattle to this society. The presence of imported glass beads indicates a flourishing trade with the coast. The beads are found throughout the deposits for Bambandyanalo and Mapungubwe, attesting to the importance of trade until Mapungubwe's decline. At Bambandyanalo there is also evidence of specialized craft working, resulting in ivory bracelets and spindle whorls.

By 1075 a small part of the settlement had relocated to the top of Mapungubwe hill. It is thought that the Mapungubwe rulers and religious elite occupied the hill as a direct result of growing hierarchical distinctions in Mapungubwe society, the literal placement of different classes at the top or bottom of the hill reflecting symbolic status. Thereafter, livestock and the majority of people lived at the bottom of the hill. Remains from the top of the hill include richly endowed burials and evidence of successive phases of building that incorporated more elaborate stone walling than at Bambandyanalo. (Mapungubwe's famous gold rhinoceros was found here.)

Some of the information about Mapungubwe is gathered from the skeletons (over 100) buried in the complex. These skeletons comprise the largest collection of Iron Age human remains found to date in southern Africa. Most were buried in flexed positions, together with material goods such as beads, bangles, and pottery shards.

Mapungubwe has been identified as the center of a state that emerged on the southern bank of the Limpopo at the end of the tenth century, and which extended its rule over the Zimbabwean plateau and into modern Botswana. Smaller settlements, with layouts similar to Mapungubwe, are to be found around the bases and summits of hills of the surrounding region. This pattern of a hierarchy of settlements, modeled on the main settlement, is similar to that of Toutswe mogala.

Shifts in the nature of power relations at Mapungubwe have been linked to control over external trade. The precondition for the emergence of the state would have been control of internal resources, such as cattle. Thereafter, those groups who controlled the production and distribution of trade items like gold and ivory would have been able to accumulate the resources necessary to assert power over others. This would have encouraged the emergence of a more hierarchical social system. Social stratification is necessary for the emergence of states, which are more permanent social arrangements than chiefdoms. States also rely on additional means as sources of authority. The continual rendering of tribute, necessary for the reproduction of the state, was achieved through social contract. This was achieved through the creation of a symbolic order binding the state together. This, in turn, called into existence the need for a religious elite. Analyses of the

use of space at Mapungubwe indicate that its leaders combined secular leadership with sacred power. States of this kind are also characterized by a social division of labor, which was present at Mapungubwe through the evidence of specialized craft working.

By the thirteenth century, the Mapungubwe state was in decline, probably as a result of its loss of control of the gold trade. Arab traders were locating themselves further north along the east coast and trading directly with a newly emergent state on the Zimbabwean plateau. This state became known as Great Zimbabwe.

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See also: Great Zimbabwe: Origins and Rise.

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Highveld, Emergence of States on

Toward the end of the first millennium, a number of major shifts occurred in southern African history, signified in the archaeological record by a break in ceramic traditions, different settlement patterns, more settled dwellings, more extensive cattle-keeping, and the initial development of more complex social formations. This forms the start of the period known as the Later Iron Age. Previous to this date, the highveld (which covers central South Africa) had seen little concerted occupation by the Early Iron Age mixed farmers, because the highveld soil was not suited to Early Iron Age farming techniques. The northern highveld was the first part of this region to be occupied, during the eleventh century. The occupation of the southern highveld occurred from approximately 1400 onward.

The move to the highveld occurred as a result of an increased dependence on cattle-keeping. This shift is visible in the remains of fossilized dung and the presence of cattle pens (kraals) that are prominently positioned

in the settlements built by the new inhabitants of the highveld. The absence of trees on the highveld meant that its inhabitants had to build in stone. As a result, the area is characterized by different types of stone remains, the presence of which has made it significantly easier to reconstruct the history of these areas because of the durability of the ruins (coastal dwellers built dung and straw huts).

Highveld settlements consist of huts and kraals built out of stone, some linked together by dry-stone walling. The settlements exist in both relatively simple and complex forms (referred to as Type N and Type V): a few huts and one central pen, or several huts linked together by intricate walling. The kraals are always in the middle of these settlements. Their central position points to the importance of cattle-keeping in these societies.

This importance is echoed in the modern ethnographic record. The study of modern cattle-keeping societies and the arrangement of their homesteads has allowed anthropologists to show symbolic links between settlement patterns and social arrangements. The front of a settlement was for public, secular, and dangerous activity, the back for private, religious, and safe activity. Women's huts were on the left-hand side and men's on the right-hand side. The position of huts also reflected the status of its occupants. The use of space reflected a particular worldview. This is sometimes called the Central (or Bantu) Cattle Pattern. Some archaeologists have suggested that the presence of archaeological ruins showing this pattern is evidence for similar social relations in Later Iron Age societies, including those at Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe.

Remains of large, densely populated settlements dominate the west Highveld, while smaller settlements are more characteristic of the east. Smaller Type N remains have been linked to societies who were resident in the Highveld from the fourteenth century onward. Type V settlements dominate the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Highveld farmers subsisted on agriculture, herding, and hunting. They used items made from iron, copper, pottery, and ostrich egg shell. The absence of evidence for iron smelting at such sites points to trade in iron from places on the edge of the Highveld in Mpumalanga province, South Africa. It is likely that iron was exchanged for cattle. Copper was re-smelted locally.

Highveld societies were hierarchically organized and ruled by chiefs. A chief would command the allegiance of the senior homestead heads in his region, cementing their support through the distribution of cattle and the provision of access to land. Homestead heads, in turn, commanded the labor and resources of their homesteads. Homesteads were often polygynous. Alliances between homesteads were cemented through

marriage and bridewealth exchanges (*bohali*), where a young man acquired a wife through the payment of cattle made on his behalf by his father or senior male relatives. These societies were patriarchal, although unlike among the more southerly herding societies in southern Africa, women could become chiefs. This social pattern appears to have been present to some degree since the fourteenth century, if the record of settlement patterns is reliable. Its longevity is attested to by similarities in the layout of homesteads dated to this period and to the nineteenth century.

These settlements can be linked to the ancestors of the Sotho-Tswana people, a term developed to encompass a range of diverse peoples. Sotho-speakers consist of the Northern (Pedi) and Southern Sotho (Basotho), while the Tswana are today found in Botswana and North-West Province, South Africa. The history of some of these communities can be traced in the oral traditions of contemporary Sotho communities. From the nineteenth century, these records are supplemented by the recorded evidence of missionaries and other Europeans in the interior.

The major Tswana chiefdoms had emerged by 1600, including the Hurutshe and Kwena. A process of fragmentation led to the development of a number of smaller polities, which had amalgamated into larger units like the Rolong and the Thlaping by the eighteenth century. In 1806 the Thlaping capital was estimated to contain 10,000 to 15,000 people and, according to the English traveler John Barrow, it was as large as contemporary Cape Town. Furthermore, it had "a well-developed administrative order, and a strong 'king' who owned large herds and regulated trade, supervised rainmaking and other rites, controlled the allocation of land and public meetings, and derived considerable wealth from tributary labor and the spoils of the hunt" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, p.27). The size of these towns is confirmed in the archaeological evidence, where they are referred to as Type V settlements.

Denser settlement in the west can be explained by the more arid conditions of the region. These chiefdoms were bigger than any other contemporary ones in southern Africa. The emergence of large Tswana chiefdoms by the late eighteenth century is given as evidence for the development of states on the southern Highveld. A state was a more complex form of political organization than the chiefdom, more stable, and long lived. Tswana chiefdoms consisted of a hierarchy of social forms, beginning with the homestead. A number of homesteads formed a family unit. A number of family groups made up a ward, which was governed by a hereditary headman. These headmen had considerable authority but ultimately deferred to the chief. The need to exploit environmental resources efficiently is provided as the reason for this concentration of authority

in the person of the chief. However, state formation did not proceed beyond this level.

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Southeastern Lowveld, Emergence of States on

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, African societies in the region between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean went through a series of wide-ranging and sometimes violent political and social transformations. In certain parts of the region, the ruling groups of particular chiefdoms were able to bring neighboring chiefdoms under their domination on a wider scale than seems to have been the case beforehand. Inside these expanding polities, rulers worked to establish a greater degree of authority over their adherents. As late as the mid-eighteenth century, there had been several hundred independent chiefdoms in the region, most of them not more than a few hundred square kilometers in extent and with populations of not more than a few thousand. The powers that chiefs were able to exercise over their followers were relatively limited. By the 1820s the region was dominated by a handful of much larger emerging states, some of which covered several thousand square kilometers and numbered scores of thousands of inhabitants. The kings ruled with a strong and sometimes despotic hand.

It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that colonial historians, both white and black, began trying to put together coherent accounts of these changes. As sources, they used mainly scraps of African oral histories recorded by European traders, travelers, officials, and missionaries. For several decades their explanations of events placed strong emphasis to the doings of “great men,” particularly the Zulu king Shaka, whose supposedly widespread conquests in the 1810s and 1820s were seen as the prime source of a chain reaction of population movements and political violence that had led to the consolidation

of numbers of large kingdoms over much of southeastern Africa. From the 1940s a new generation of academic writers began to explore the possible effects of more “structural” factors, such as human population growth, the expansion of external trade, climatic and environmental change, and the introduction of a new crop in the form of maize. The paucity of evidence kept their hypotheses very much at the level of speculation.

In the 1960s and 1970s historians of the region began to make more systematic use of two major sources of evidence. One consisted of Portuguese documentary records housed in archives and libraries in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and Lisbon. The other was the rich collection of African oral histories that had been made early in the century by Natal colonial official James Stuart and which had been available to the public in a Durban library since the late 1940s. At the same time, historians inside and outside southern Africa began to subject to more critical scrutiny many of the assumptions about the history of African societies that had been entrenched in the literature since colonial times.

Since the last decades of the twentieth century, a number of historians have edged toward accepting the expansion of international trade through Delagoa Bay as the most likely prime cause of the emergence of African states east of the Drakensberg. The evidence is clear that from the 1760s onward, European and Indian merchants were buying increasing quantities of ivory from chiefdoms at the bay in exchange for cloth, beads, and brass. By the 1790s American whalers were docking at the bay in increasing numbers and, it seems, trading for cattle as provisions. Foreign goods had been circulated in the region by Portuguese traders since the mid-sixteenth century but never in the quantities that now became available. Historians who favor the “trade hypothesis” argue that increasing competition for these highly prized commodities between and within chiefdoms at Delagoa Bay and in its hinterland was a prime cause in stimulating both the territorial expansion and the political centralization which were taking place at this time.

The available evidence indicates that among the first chiefdoms to begin expanding its power was that of the Maroteng, who lived three hundred kilometers to the northwest of Delagoa Bay. The polity, which they eventually dominated, became known as the Pedi kingdom. At much the same time a cluster of rival statelets emerged around Delagoa Bay itself. The largest of these seems to have been the Mabhudu or Maputo kingdom to the south of the bay. Further south still, in the northern parts of what is now the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa, the Nxumalo and the Nyambose were consolidating their hold on what became the Ndwandwe and Mthethwa kingdoms respectively. In the vicinity of all these budding states, there emerged

numbers of smaller and more loosely organized amalgamations of chiefdoms, often formed in defensive reactions against the expansion of their more powerful neighbors. Among them were the polities dominated by the Dlamini in what is now southern Swaziland, the Hlubi in northwestern KwaZulu-Natal, and the Qwabe on the coast north of the Thukela River in central KwaZulu-Natal.

Rivalries between developing states seem to have been most pronounced in the region to the south of Delagoa Bay. By the 1810s a confrontation was building up between the Ndwandwe under Zwide kaLanga and the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo kaJobe. Both chiefs were actively expanding the territories under their authority, partly, it seems, to acquire areas of good agricultural and grazing land, and partly to extend their control over trade routes to Delagoa Bay, where the Portuguese had recently established a small garrison. Portuguese interventions in the politics of neighboring chiefdoms, aimed largely at controlling the trade in ivory and at trying to expand a trade in slaves, may also have affected relations between the Ndwandwe and the Mthethwa. In the late 1810s the rivalry between them broke out into warfare. The upshot was that the Mthethwa were defeated, Dingiswayo was killed, and his kingdom rapidly broke up.

The disintegration of the Mthethwa polity opened the way for the emergence of a new local power in its place. This was the Zulu chiefdom, previously a minor polity whose ruler, Shaka kaSenzangakhona, had been subordinate to Dingiswayo. Through a combination of diplomacy and force, Shaka was able to establish himself as the leader of a defensive alliance of smaller chiefdoms against the Ndwandwe. His subsequent success in warding off several Ndwandwe attacks may have been a factor in triggering the breakup of the Ndwandwe kingdom, which for some time seems to have been experiencing increasing internal political tensions. The main Ndwandwe house under Zwide moved off northward into southern Swaziland and subsequently further northwest into what is now the Mpumalanga province of South Africa, where it began to reconsolidate its power. Other sections that hived off to the northwest and northeast formed the nuclei of what subsequently became the Ndebele, Gaza, Ngoni, and Jele kingdoms.

These events left the way open for Shaka to extend his authority northwards into Zwide's former territories. By the early 1820s the emerging Zulu kingdom dominated most of what is now KwaZulu-Natal, though, contrary to the common stereotype, Shaka's power rested on shaky political foundations throughout his reign.

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See also: **Mfecane.**

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Ethnicity, Language, Identity

Southern African societies can be distinguished on the basis of a range of characteristics, including language, ethnicity, political affiliation, and cultural identity, some of which still have currency. These group identities do not always overlap and all these identities have a discernable history. Many of these identities emerged in the Later Iron Age (c.1000–1800). None of these identities has remained unchanged since this period, while some forms of political identification no longer exist.

All African languages in southern Africa fall into two groups. The Sarwa (Bushman) of Botswana speak a language that, together with historically recorded Khoekhoen dialects, formed one group. The other group consists of Bantu-speakers, whose languages have their origin in the Niger-Congo region of Africa many thousands of years ago. Today this family consists of about three hundred languages, spoken by roughly 200 million people. Speakers of these languages reached Africa's southernmost tip approximately two thousand years ago.

In southern Africa, most Bantu-speakers are members of one of two language groups: Sotho and Nguni. Among the former are speakers of South Sotho, currently spoken in South Africa and Lesotho; Tswana, currently spoken in South Africa and Botswana; and North Sotho, or Pedi, which is spoken in South Africa. Nguni languages include Xhosa, Zulu, Swati, and Ndebele, spoken in South Africa, Swaziland, and Mozambique. Contemporary speakers can trace their ancestry to a number of chiefdoms whose residence in

particular regions dates back to the Later Iron Age. During that era, several different chiefdoms spoke the same language; language units generally extended beyond social and political boundaries.

Chiefdoms were the most common form of political organization and one of the most easily distinguished social units, in southern Africa. Their presence is attested to by oral history, European travel narratives, and archaeological evidence. A chiefdom is generally defined as a group of people who comprise an independent polity, having a distinct territorial base, principles of hierarchical arrangement based on lineage (often male-descent based), and reliant on subsistence agriculture together with some craft specialization. There is often ambiguity and little consensus about what this term means. Some anthropologists see chiefdoms as “segmentary societies,” referring to political integration derived from relations between descent groups whose status with respect to each other is defined precisely and hierarchically. Other anthropologists stress the limited authority of kin groups, pointing to the fact that the chiefdom refers to a group constituted by political ties, where the chief exercises authority over all who live within his territory. Membership of a chiefdom may have been linked by ancestry, but it only had meaning when it acted as a political unit.

It is possible to trace the history of southern African chiefdoms back to the middle of the last millennium. Contemporary Xhosa-speakers are the descendents of a number of powerful chiefdoms that occupied the southernmost part of southern Africa as independent units until European conquest in the nineteenth century. These chiefdoms, the Rharhabe and the Gcaleka for instance, trace their ancestry back to the rule of Chief Tshawe in the sixteenth century. Tswana-speaking chiefdoms were descended from political units based on descent, whose history can be traced back to the fourteenth century. All Tswana ruling families can be linked to three founding ancestors from this period. Out of one of these emerged the Kwena chiefdom, one of the most powerful during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the eighteenth century, the Ngwaketse and the Ngwato chiefdoms, beginning processes of consolidation common to most Tswana chiefdoms, broke away from the Kwena. Today, no traditional chiefdoms survive as independent political entities.

In some historical writing, the concept of a chiefdom is often collapsed into the notion of a tribe. During the colonial era government officials, missionaries, and anthropologists divided African people into conveniently sized groups to facilitate the process of study and rule. The boundaries of these groups were defined according to a common culture, language, and territory. The result was the “invention” of tribes—units that

would not have recognized themselves as cohesive entities before this process of description occurred. Colonial powers considered tribes to be a primitive form of political organization and to be culturally and racially inferior to Europeans. Subsequently, the concept of a tribe formed one of the cornerstones of apartheid policy in South Africa. Government ethnographers drew up lists of the different tribes living in South Africa, ascribed to them particular characteristics, and used these to justify separate development. The term has now fallen into disuse because of its association with a retrogressive artificiality.

Ethnicity or ethnic self-identity is also a means for distinguishing groups. Ethnic affiliations go beyond the political to refer to a shared cultural identity. Characteristics of ethnic groups include cultural affinity (language, values, rituals, traditions), the idea of a common historical origin, and the idea that these features distinguish the group from other ethnic groups.

In contemporary use, ethnicity also includes some notion of hierarchy. This notion of hierarchy means that ethnicity provides the conceptual basis for groups to assert asymmetric relations against others. The focus on common historical origins often leads to political mobilization of a conservative type. The Inkatha Freedom Party (the Zulu nationalist party in South Africa) stresses political mobilization at the expense of other groups on the basis of a common cultural identity. This identity draws on the symbol of the Zulu warrior, supposedly triumphant during the nineteenth century, in order to appeal to its male members and to craft Zulu unity.

It is possible, to some extent, to trace ethnicities into the past. Groups used culture, language, and history to distinguish themselves from one another, as is evident from the nineteenth century. However, the reconstruction of the content of particular ethnicities is difficult to detect further back into the past. Archaeologists have made some progress in this respect, as is the case with the detection of social relations characteristic of the Central Cattle Pattern as far back as the first millennium. It is also difficult to determine the value of an ethnic identity to, for instance, seventeenth century Tswana chiefdoms.

Ethnicity, therefore, is perhaps a problematic concept to use when attempting to define Iron Age group identities. Definition on the basis of shared cultural characteristics may be easier. Culture, however, is also problematic given the tendency of archaeologists to talk about the existence of distinct cultural entities in the past, on the basis of the distribution of ceramics of a similar type. The past, then, becomes populated by cultures, rather than people.

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Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Peoples

Before the arrival of the Dutch in 1652, southern Africa remained the home of diverse and numerous indigenous groups who were hunters and wanderers. The mid-seventeenth century to the close of the eighteenth century, however, witnessed the growth not only of a settlement of Europeans of various nationalities but of a totally new and unique society of different races, colors, and cultural attainments, fashioned by conflicts of racial heredity and the apposition of unequal social groups.

The Indigenous Peoples

The first known inhabitants of southern Africa up to the Iron Age era were the Bushmen (or San) and Hottentots (or Khoikhoi), both of who lived by hunting or fishing and gathering of wild foods. They are collectively called the "Khoisan" peoples—a term used by linguists to classify their languages of Khoi and San. The other indigenous groups are the larger Bantu group of peoples.

The Bushmen The Bushmen or San were to be found in the area of the Kalahari Desert of present-day Namibia, and in the interior of the Orange Free State and the Cape Province. Pockets of them were located in Angola. It is widely believed that the Bushmen had lived in southern Africa for at least a thousand years before the arrival of the Dutch. The origin of the Bushmen is not specifically known. However, available evidence indicate that their original homes were to be found somewhere in East and Central Africa, and that probably because of local pressure with the powerful tribes in the area, they were forced to migrate further south. It was in the region of southern Africa that they finally settled.

The Bushmen were probably not the first group of people to have lived in southern Africa.

Be that as it may, the way of life of the Bushmen was very rudimentary and in many respects similar to that of the early man of the Late Stone Age. The Bushmen were basically nomadic hunters and gatherers of food and their social organization was suited to that life. Their itinerant way of life in a semidesert country did not make it easy to provide food for a large number of people in a small area; hence they lived in small groups known as hunting bands that were constantly on the move after herds of wild life. Each unit or band shared a common life and had a definite area within which its members moved. They jealously guarded such area, and had little or no contact with others. At a particular point during the Iron Age, the Bushmen had a considerable part of the southern Africa region as their hunting grounds. This is established from the fact that their skulls, stone implements, and rock paintings are found in most parts of southern Africa, and as far north as Uganda.

The Bushmen had high regard for their way of life and culture and resisted changes even for material rewards. Apart from ornamental materials such as beads and hunting instruments, they kept no private properties.

The Bushmen clothes were animal skins. They had no permanent houses but slept in temporary shelters in branches of trees and caves which they usually decorated with beautiful pictures of hunting scenes and animals. Marriage among the Bushmen was essentially endogamous.

The political life of the Bushmen was equally rudimentary. With no clearly defined clans but only hunting parties, they had no particular chief or other formal system of government but older men took whatever decisions were necessary after due consultation with one another.

It is instructive to note that in spite of their primitive nature, the Bushmen were known to exhibit remarkable artistic talent and abilities. They were noted to be very skilled in rock engravings and paintings. They chose as their subjects hunting and battle scenes, domestic life, cattle raids, and scenes from their mythology.

The Hottentots The Hottentots, also known as the Khoikhoi, belong to the same family of Khoisan people of southern Africa. They probably came from the region of the Great Lakes in Central Africa. Like the Bushmen, the Hottentots worshipped the moon and personified natural forces, particularly those connected with water and rain. Similarly, they practiced no agriculture while enriching their diet by hunting and gathering. Besides, each Hottentot group laid claim to a particular area of land as its tribal territory.

Despite these similar features, there are considerable differences between the cultures of the two Khoisan peoples. The Hottentots were pastoralists who kept cattle and sheep, and these in fact mirrored the prosperity of their owners. There are indications also that those of them living along the coast and river basins engaged in fishing. Their standard of living was evidently higher than that of the nomadic Bushmen particularly with the relative availability of food supplies and the much treasured sheep and cattle. Besides, while the Bushmen still made use of stone implements, the Hottentots knew how to smelt iron and copper. This variety of economic activities ensured that the Hottentots were organised in bigger political units than the Bushmen. Their political organization was more advanced, the basic political unit being the tribe. The tribe consisted of a number of related clans with the chief of the central or senior clan as the overall tribal chief.

Their dwellings were simple and not of a permanent nature, though more permanent than those of the Bushmen. Houses were built of materials that could easily be transported during the frequent movement from place to place in search for pasture.

Although the Hottentots had a definite sense of territorialism, the necessity to move along in search of water, better pastures, and better homes was a great limitation on tribal cohesion and unity. Internal conflict over grazing land, more often than not, led to political fragmentation.

It is worth noting that while the Hottentots and Bushmen were neighbors, the relations between the two peoples were often hostile. The Bushmen extremely resented the intrusion of the Hottentots on areas they regarded as their own. They resisted this by killing the Hottentots' animals or kidnapping them. In retaliation of such brutality of the Bushmen, the Hottentots too made attempts to wipe out the Bushmen.

The Bantu By about 1600 both the Bushmen and Hottentots had been submerged in most parts of southern Africa by a third and much more numerous group, known as the Bantu. Bantu is a general name given to a vast group of peoples who speak several hundreds of different but related languages. Among them are the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi, Twana, Venda, Ndebele, and Nguni. Others include the Sotho, Herero, Ambo, Thonga, Shona, Rozwi, Kalanga, Ndwandwe, Ngwane, Qwabe, and Mthethwa.

The Bantu-speaking peoples who could be broadly divided into two groups—namely, southern and central Bantu—had been settling in the region south of the Limpopo from about the fifth century, spreading out gradually over the years to occupy most parts of Southern Africa. Their movement and spread into southern

Africa was part of the wider expansion of Iron Age culture. The Bantu intermarried with other peoples, established a basic pattern of settlement, and developed a wide variety of cultures and political systems. Most of the later Iron Age communities appear to have shared a common culture, with very little or no variation.

The southern Bantu depended heavily on agriculture as their principal means of livelihood. They accumulated cattle as a major expression of wealth and power in their societies. The material standard of living of the Bantu-speaking peoples was generally simple. Usually, the family possessed a few simple tools, some mats, cooking pots, and clothes made of animal skins. Their construction of building and shelter was equally simple. Among the cattle-keeping tribes, the cattle enclosure was the center of every settlement and grain was carefully stored to last until the next harvest.

Despite their simple material standard of living, the social organization of the Bantu was rather complex. They had a strong belief in law and a respect for traditional ways, with complicated rules that governed the conduct or behavior of individuals. They held the belief that the spirits of their ancestors took a close interest in, and exerted a considerable influence on their daily life. Consequently, the spirits of the ancestors were constantly venerated before important decisions were taken.

The Bantu lived in larger groups than the Bushmen and Hottentots and their tribes contained several thousand members. This was due partly to the fact that they were predominantly farmers and cattle rearers who needed a more settled life. However, they too sometimes shifted their homes to find new land and grazing ground. At any rate, the governmental apparatus of the Bantu differed slightly one from the other. The southern Bantu operated tribal system of government. At the head of each tribe was a hereditary chief, *nkosi*, who was the supreme head of the community. The *nkosi* came from the central clan and had the last word in all political matters. He was the final judge in all legal disputes. He was the link between the community and its ancestors and took the lead in all important ceremonies. The *nkosi* was assisted by officials called *indunas*, among whom there was a senior *induna* who performed many functions including deputizing for the *nkosi* with full powers, when the *nkosi* was unavailable.

The Arrival of European Immigrants

The first contact of Europeans with southern Africa could be dated back to the late fifteenth century, when Portuguese sailors and adventurers visited the coastal areas of the region. Such early contacts were, however, merely exploratory. From the mid-seventeenth century onward, large areas of Southern Africa began to

experience invasion and conquest by groups of Europeans. European interest in this area was encouraged by the Dutch East India Company, which arrived at a settlement at Table Bay, on the site of the present-day Cape Town, in 1652. The initial desire of the company was to utilize the Cape as a cheap and efficient means through which it intended to support its needed base to control entry to the Indian Ocean as well as to supply its ships sailing to and from the East Indies. When the Dutch East India Company at last took action to establish a permanent post at the Cape, a new element was added to the pattern of southern African peoples. It was soon decided that farmers growing crops for their own profit would perform the task more efficiently than company servants working for salaries. Consequently, a small number of the company's men were released from their service agreements and given land on which to set up as free burghers growing crops on their own account for sale to the company. The nucleus of the future white population in southern Africa in general, and South Africa in particular, had thus been created.

The territorial expansion of white settlement in southern Africa took place at the expense of the indigenous people. With the increase in white population, more immigrants sought their means of livelihood in agriculture, leading to more rapid expansion of the settler enclave. The indigenous southern African peoples continually resisted the white advance. Inevitably, conflicts erupted. Such conflicts and clashes characterized the history of southern Africa up to the close of the eighteenth century, and beyond.

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Iron Age, Origins: See Metalworking: Origins of Ironworking.

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Islam in Eastern Africa

Archaeological and documentary evidence suggests that the first appearance of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa occurred on the East African coast. Mosques dating to the eighth century have been discovered at Shanga, in

the Lamu Archipelago, and at Mtambwe Mkuu on Pemba Island. The latter site probably corresponds to the Muslim settlement of Qanbalu, frequently mentioned in Arabic sources dating from the eighth to the tenth centuries. Historians and archaeologists have found coins from the coast issued in the names of Muslim rulers, as well Islamic burials in several locations, which further indicate that the origins of Islam in East Africa date from the late first millennium.

It was not until after the eleventh century, however, that Islam began winning significant numbers of converts among coastal East Africans. Mark Horton found evidence that, despite an early appearance at Shanga in the Lamu Archipelago, it was not until the eleventh century that Muslims became a majority there. The same appears to have held true for a handful of other northern and central coastal sites. Conversion progressed very unevenly along the coast, making its greatest gains at the major commercial centers like Shanga, Manda, Mombasa, Pemba, Zanzibar, and Kilwa. An Islamic presence developed much more slowly in the dozens of less dynamic urban and rural Swahili towns and villages that appeared between 1000 and 1500. Islam made no significant or permanent advances among inland East Africans until the nineteenth century.

Like elsewhere on the continent, "conversion" to Islam in East Africa until the late nineteenth century carried a number of meanings. While there were those who resisted Islamization and the power of Muslim rulers outright, and those who eventually converted to the full written tradition, most Muslims combined imported Islamic with local African beliefs and practices. For example, conversion did not rule out continued veneration of the spirits of the hearth, home, and clan. Available evidence suggests that, while coastal Muslims won converts among their trading partners inland from Sofala, once regular trade was discontinued after the sixteenth century, converts reverted to local beliefs. Ibn Battuta reported hostilities between the sultans of Kilwa and their non-Muslim neighbors, and later Portuguese accounts bore witness to similar confrontations.

Even in the major coastal centers, scholarship appears to have remained at a generally low level until the nineteenth century. Although commercial contacts with the Red Sea religious centers were frequent, pilgrimage was not widely undertaken; hence, books remained rare (and in Arabic only) and few were trained in the advanced sciences. There is no evidence that the Sufi brotherhoods played a significant role in East Africa before the late sixteenth century.

Despite official Portuguese persecution, between 1500 and 1800 Islam continued to win converts and experience intellectual growth in East Africa. As in its previous phase, commercial contacts provided the key

stimulus. Present evidence suggests that the Inquisition was somewhat active in East Africa during the seventeenth century. However, as in the case of trade, local Muslims found ways of circumventing Portuguese interference. Channels of trade and communication through Mogadishu with the Hijaz and Hadhramawt were maintained. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw Arab sharifs and scholars settling in the region of Pate and Lamu. Subsequent remigrations of these Hadhramawt scholarly clans southwards brought new standards of literacy and learning along the coast as far as the Comoro Islands and Madagascar.

The seeds for greater and more widespread attention to the universal written law (Shari'a) were sown with the rise, in both numbers and influence, of Umani Arabs, who immigrated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Helping to cement this change were renewed Hadhramawt immigration, assertions of Busaidi control, and later British colonial policies. As long as Umanis remained Ibadis, they remained aloof from local practices. Inevitably for most, conversion to Shafi'ism came and with it, attention to the stricter standards of religious observance that were common among the Arab social elite. Sultan Barghash's (1870–1888) creation of a system of official *qadis* (judges) to enforce the Shari'a was a further, decisive development. In the 1890s British administrators imposed the policy of "indirect rule," endowing Islam with the undeclared, augmented status of an official religion enforceable by "native administrators" and judges. Simultaneously, however, throughout East Africa the colonial administrations gradually decreased Muslim officials' salaries and curbed their powers of sanction.

The years of the Zanzibar sultanate and colonial rule were also the era of the first significant spread of Islam inland. Again, this development occurred in the wake of trade that was a part of the wider development of the region in the nineteenth century. In the last 150 years, Islam moved out from the coastal urban centers and won converts among inland rural Africans. This seems to have been true especially in Tanganyika and eastern Uganda. Prior to this, sufi brotherhoods (*tariqas*) like the Qadiriyya and the Shadhiliyya had succeeded in winning many converts among the urban lower classes on the coast. This phenomenon repeated

itself during the years of colonial administration, where *tariqa* shaykhs, representing their religious orders, turned up in increasing numbers at key villages along the main travel lanes. There, they converted large numbers to their religion and the particular sodalities they represented. In Mombasa, where the Mazrui virtually monopolized qadiships and resisted rival shaykhs, the *tariqas* were not successful in their conversion attempts. Islam, therefore, was far less successful in penetrating the Kenyan interior than the interiors of Tanganyika, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and the Congo. In Uganda, Islamization largely (though not exclusively) remained restricted among the Buganda elites.

In the late twentieth century, there was a slowing of Islam's advance in East Africa. Intense rivalries with Christian and traditionalist religious communities contributed to this. More relevant has been the slow response of Muslims in the past to changing conditions and opportunities, especially in education. Further difficulties have arisen from the undefined place of religious communities in modern, secular nations.

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See also: Law, Islamic: Postcolonial Africa; Religion, History of; Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Islam.

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Ivory Coast: See Côte d'Ivoire; Houphouët-Boigny, Félix.

J

Jabavu, John Tengo (1859–1921)

South African Newspaper Editor and Politician

John Tengo Jabavu was born in 1859 near the Methodist mission school of Healdtown in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony. Both his parents were Mfengu (or Fingo), which was a Xhosa-speaking group that had been closely associated with European colonial officials and missionaries since the Cape-Xhosa War of 1835 when some of them allegedly took an oath to “become Christians, educate their children, and be loyal to the government.”

Typical of the industrious reputation that the Mfengu had acquired in the eyes of colonial society, Jabavu’s father alternated between working as a mason and on road construction while his mother was a laundress and a seller of maize meal. When Jabavu turned ten, he began herding his family’s cattle but shortly thereafter began attending school at Healdtown. In 1875 he obtained a government certificate of competency from nearby Lovedale, a missionary high school and teacher training college. At the age of seventeen he became a teacher and Wesleyan Methodist lay preacher in the colonial town of Somerset East. It was also here that Jabavu’s interest in journalism was sparked when he worked in the printing shop of a local newspaper and began sending letters to the editor of the “Cape Argus,” a major Cape Town newspaper, some of which were published under a *nom de plume*. In 1881 Dr. James Stewart, head of Lovedale, offered Jabavu the editorship of *Isigidimi samaXhosa* (The Xhosa Messenger), which was an official missionary publication aimed at the emerging community of African Christians. While working in this position, Jabavu continued his own studies and taught classes in Xhosa and Latin, and in 1883 he became only the second black South African to matriculate.

Jabavu fell out with Stewart when the former began publishing articles in *Isigidimi*, which were critical of

some white politicians who had been elected by African voters (the Cape had a qualified nonracial franchise up to 1936) but did nothing to advance their interests. In 1884 he worked as a canvasser among the Xhosa people for James Rose Innes who was elected to the Cape parliament. Later in the same year, Jabavu obtained financial sponsorship from Richard Rose Innes, a King William’s Town lawyer and brother of James Rose Innes, and some white merchants from the same town. As editor of *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Views of the Bantu People), Jabavu published the first independent newspaper aimed primarily at an African audience. With articles in both Xhosa and English, Jabavu’s paper supported white English-speaking “liberal” politicians such as Rose Innes, whom he considered “friends of the natives.” He tended to oppose the Afrikaner Bond, which was supporting proposed laws that would make it more difficult for Africans to vote.

Jabavu was also involved in the formation of early African political organizations in the eastern Cape. He was vice president of the Native Education Association (NEA), which was formed in 1880. Although originally a teachers’ organization, Jabavu transformed the NEA into a political group that registered African voters, protested pass laws, and insisted that African jurors be allowed to sit in court cases involving Africans. However, by 1887 the NEA had returned to its role as a teacher organization because of a lack of success with political aims and division within its ranks. Responding to the 1887 Voter Registration Act, which eliminated 20,000 potential African voters, Jabavu became head of the executive of the first regional African political organization, Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabantsundu (Union of Native Vigilance Associations). This would be a coordinating agency for the various local “iliso lomzi” (literally, “eyes of the house,” or vigilance associations). In practice, the 1887 Imbumba did not meet again until 1898, and

Jabavu's local vigilance association in King William's Town became a de facto executive of the other associations throughout the Ciskei region. In 1892 Jabavu declined to protest the Franchise and Ballot Act, which further raised the qualifications of the franchise to the detriment of Africans, because some of his white "liberal" allies such as James Rose Innes were members of Cecil Rhodes's coalition government, which had passed it. Disillusioned with Jabavu's leadership, other members of the emerging African elite of the eastern Cape such as Walter Rubusana, a Congregationalist minister, formed the South African Native Congress (SANC) in 1891. Jabavu refused to attend the inaugural meeting, believing that the members of this new organization were too inexperienced to be effective in Cape politics.

In the Cape election campaign of 1898, Cecil Rhodes, leader of the Progressive Party, was determined to regain the premiership, which he had lost because of the unsuccessful Jameson Raid. After failing to gain Jabavu's support, Rhodes sponsored the creation of another Xhosa language newspaper called *Izwi Labantu* (Voice of the People), which was based in East London and operated by SANC members such as A. K. Soga and Walter Rubusana. At this time Jabavu changed his usual political stance and began favoring the Afrikaner Bond because its leader, J. H. Hofmeyer, had hinted that the party might change its opinion on "native policy." While the Bond won the election, Jabavu's support for them alienated him from many Xhosa people.

From August 1901 to October 1902, *Imvo* was closed by the government because Jabavu had published pacifist articles in response to the Anglo-Boer War.

Recovering some of his lost popularity, Jabavu became part of the 1909 delegation—which also included his old rival Rubusana—that went to London to protest the clauses of the proposed Union of South Africa that excluded blacks from the national parliament and failed to safeguard the Cape's nonracial franchise. However, the officials of the British government refused officially to meet the delegation.

When the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed in 1912 (renamed the African National Congress in 1923), Jabavu refused to join because of the presence of many of his SANC rivals in its ranks. Instead, Jabavu formed his own South African Races Congress that was made up primarily of Mfengu from the eastern Cape and was not successful.

Perhaps Jabavu's greatest political mistake was his support for the Natives Land Act of 1913, which prevented Africans from acquiring land outside a system of designated reserves. He probably did this because the bill had been introduced by J. W. Sauer who had been a supporter of the Cape liberal tradition and African voting rights. Sol Plaatje, a Tswana newspaper

editor and member of the SANNC, attacked Jabavu for dishonestly inventing support for the Land Act in order to please his masters in the ruling South African party.

In 1910 Jabavu had criticized Walter Rubusana's candidacy in the Cape elections, as he thought it would drive whites to further curtail African political participation. Rubusana won the Thembuland constituency and became the first African to sit in the Cape parliament. However, when Rubusana was up for reelection in 1914, Jabavu ran against him, thereby splitting the African vote and allowing a European, A. B. Payn, to win. Jabavu was now discredited, and his political career came to an end.

Jabavu was also active in establishing a university for Africans. Although Rubusana was the first to form a group with this aim, the Queen Victoria Memorial Fund, he and his supporters were considered too radical by the white establishment. Therefore, when Jabavu and other moderates became involved in the Inter-state Native College Scheme, they received support from white missionaries and the government. This led to the founding of the South African Native College (later the University of Fort Hare) in 1916 near the Lovedale institution. That same year D. D. T. Jabavu, J. T. Jabavu's son and only the second black South African to obtain a university degree, became the first lecturer at what some people called "the College of Jabavu."

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See also: **Dube, John, Langalibalele; Plaatje, Sol T.; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910.**

Biography

Born in South Africa's eastern Cape region in 1859. Earned a teaching certificate from Lovedale mission in 1875. After working as a teacher, he became editor of the Lovedale based newspaper *Isigidimi samaXhosa*. In 1883 he became the second black South African to matriculate. In 1884 he became editor of the first independent African language newspaper in South Africa, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, with financial support from white liberal Cape politicians. He was instrumental in forming some of the first African political organizations in the Cape such as the Native Educational Association in 1880 and the *Imbumba Eliliso Lomzi Yabansundu* in 1887. Through his newspaper and involvement in political organizations, he opposed many laws that attempted to make it more difficult for Africans to qualify for the Cape's nonracial franchise. In 1909 he was part of a delegation that went to London to protest the proposed Union of South Africa as it did not safeguard that same franchise. In 1912 he refused to join the new South African Native National Congress (later renamed

the African National Congress) because many of his rivals were in it. Perhaps his greatest mistake was supporting the notorious Natives Land Act of 1913. In 1914 he ran for election to the Cape legislature in the Thembuland constituency but lost because the African vote was split between himself and Walter Rubusana. He was also instrumental in the opening of the South African Native College (later the University of Fort Hare) in 1916. He died in 1921.

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Jaga: See Kongo Kingdom: Jaga Invasion to 1665.

Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899

The nineteenth-century struggle for supremacy in South Africa between British imperialists and Boer republicans culminated on October 11, 1899, with the outbreak of the South African War (Second Anglo-Boer War). British suzerainty over the landlocked, impoverished Boer republic of the Transvaal had seemed reasonably in hand until September 1886, when the world's richest gold deposits were discovered there. Suddenly the agrarian republicans, who had only a generation before migrated into the African interior to escape British rule and culture, gained international economic and political power at British expense.

Cape Premier Cecil Rhodes quickly responded by using railways as tools of imperialism. His agents attempted to purchase the Delagoa Bay railway concession from the Portuguese, whose short section the Transvaal's projected eastern line needed to connect at the frontier to reach the British-free port of Lorenzo Marques. He promoted the construction of a north-western line that threatened to leave the Transvaal out

of much northern traffic. When in 1891 the Transvaal became virtually bankrupt, Rhodes offered to help President Paul Kruger. In return for a two-year railway monopoly on traffic to the gold fields, the Cape loaned the Transvaal funds to construct its southern line from the Vaal River to Johannesburg, which opened in September 1892 and connected the gold fields to Cape ports via the Orange Free State. The Sivewright Agreement gave mine owners access to heavy mining equipment, restored investor confidence, and enabled the Transvaal to float the Rothschild loan to complete Pretoria's eastern line. Its opening in January 1895 and the Transvaal's success at aggrandizing colonial animosity between the Cape and Natal, of which the latter was constructing the rival Durban-Johannesburg line, were major victories for railway republicans.

As the Sivewright Agreement drew to an end in late 1894, the Cape began a railway and customs rate war. The Transvaal retaliated by raising railway rates on its 51-mile section of the Cape ports-Johannesburg line. The Cape circumvented this increase by offloading some goods onto ox wagons at the Transvaal's Vaal River border. These goods were then transported across the drifts (shallows) and delivered directly to Johannesburg merchants without traversing a single mile of the Transvaal's southern line. Kruger was furious.

When Kruger closed the drifts to ox wagons carrying overseas goods on October 1, 1895, the Cape protested that Kruger had violated British suzerainty. As the Drifts Crisis deepened, Rhodes secretly adapted the Loch Plan, which High Commissioner Sir Henry Brougham Loch had conceived in mid-1893. Loch had envisioned direct imperial intervention, sparked by civil unrest in Johannesburg, to force the Transvaal into a union of South Africa under the British flag. During 1895 Rhodes and his agents conspired with and armed supporters in Johannesburg to help him overthrow the Boer government. On October 18, just two days after a private British ultimatum demanded that Kruger open the drifts, Rhodes's Chartered Company acquired a six-mile wide strip of land in Bechuanaland Protectorate along the Transvaal's western frontier. Pitsani, an isolated settlement in the strip proximate to Johannesburg, was selected as a base camp at the height of the Drifts Crisis by the administrator of Rhodesia and trusted friend of Rhodes, Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, should force be necessary to carry out the ultimatum. Unfortunately for Rhodes, Kruger reopened the drifts and ended the crisis.

The Cape remained threatened with bankruptcy. As long as Kruger controlled the golden hub of Johannesburg, he could play the Cape off against Natal and both off against his eastern, British-free line. Thus, an important economic and political cause of the South African War can be found in the opposing policies of

railway imperialists and railway republicans, exacerbated and left unresolved by the Drifts Crisis.

On December 29, 1895, just seven weeks after the Drifts Crisis, Jameson invaded the Transvaal from Pitsani. A smaller force forayed from Mafeking, some 30 miles south in British Bechuanaland, and joined Jameson at Malmani. Together about 500 men from Chartered Company police rode toward Johannesburg.

By December 30, the Boers knew Jameson had invaded. Jameson's allies in Johannesburg refused to help. Scouts betrayed him. Imperial authorities in London and South Africa ordered him to retire. He refused.

On New Year's Day the Boers ambushed Jameson's raiders in a valley three miles from Krugersdorp. Encircled, Jameson surrendered at Doornkop, about twenty miles west of Johannesburg. His forces had suffered 17 killed and 55 wounded; the Boers lost one dead. The Boers also recovered Jameson's correspondence and code books that revealed both the depth and the supporters of the conspiracy. After three weeks in Pretoria's jail and after Rhodes had paid a handsome ransom, Kruger turned Jameson over to British authorities. Tried, convicted, and sentenced to 15 months in prison, the doctor was released early due to ill health. He survived Rhodes and became a Cape premier.

The Drifts Crisis and the Jameson Raid poisoned imperial-republican relations in South Africa, diminished Boer opposition to Kruger, and estranged the Cape's railway ally, the Orange Free State, which purchased its section of the Cape's trunk line to Johannesburg and signed a military treaty with the Transvaal. Distrust, jingoism, and inflexibility combined to ignite war on October 11, 1899, publicly over Uitlander (immigrant) political rights in the Transvaal. When the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed on May 31, 1902, England had spent about £230 million pounds. Of the approximately 450,000 imperial and colonial soldiers who served in the war, over 22,000 lay dead. At least 7,000 Boer soldiers were killed out of the 87,000 who fought. An estimated 28,000 of 136,000 Boer men, women, and children met their deaths in 50 British concentration camps; 22,000 were children under 16 years of age. Approximately 15,000 Africans died assisting both sides.

The historiography of the causes of the raid and war is rich and unsettled. Grand theories and case studies have focused on economic, political, diplomatic, strategic, and cultural causes, as well as the motivations of individual actors. Joseph Schumpeter (1951) suggested that the atavistic (feudal) nature of British culture and society was responsible. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (1961) argued that only by balancing policies, events, and actors at the metropole (London) with those on the periphery (southern Africa and elsewhere) could primary causes be identified.

Capitalism and gold have been examined from a number of perspectives. In 1900 John Hobson argued that the conflict was a capitalist war fought to protect British investors and South African millionaires. More recently, Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (1992) have argued from the perspective of political economy that access to Transvaal gold, so crucial to the health of the international economy, was critical as well to London's position as the world's financial capital. Jean Jacques Van-Helten (1982) has investigated the impact of the gold policies of the Bank of England on the outbreak of the war.

In contrast to economic arguments, in 1900 Leo Amery believed that the war was caused by political differences between governments. Andrew Porter (1980, 1990) has found the causes of the war in the politics of the metropole and the consequences of those policies on South Africa. Iain Smith (1990) has argued similarly, stressing the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa and the security of the sea route to India.

Mordechai Tamarkin (1997) has pointed to Alfred Milner, the inflexible high commissioner of South Africa, while Ethel Drus (1953) has criticized Joseph Chamberlain, the secretary of state for the colonies in the Salisbury cabinet, for collaborating with Rhodes during the Drifts Crisis and in the preparations for the raid fiasco; both officials, these historians have maintained, bear heavy responsibilities for the war, whether due to political or economic motivations. Boer historiography, exemplified by J. H. Breytenbach (1969–77), has usually seen the war as a conflict between an aggressive, capitalist, imperial power seeking to wrest the independence of a virtuous, agrarian republic for its own material ends.

The war continues to intrigue scholars. Ian Phimister (1993) has suggested that future work concentrate on regional issues in southern Africa, the nature of Kruger's government and economic policies, and the character of British paramountcy. On the centennial of the South African War, consensus among historians remains elusive.

KENNETH WILBURN

See also: **Johannesburg; Kruger, Paul; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Rhodes, Jameson, and Seizure of Rhodesia; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899; Zimbabwe: Incursions from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele.**

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Johannes IV: See Ethiopia: Johannes IV, Era of.

Johannesburg

The spectacular growth of Johannesburg, from a tented village of a few thousand prospectors to the second or third largest metropolitan region in Africa (after Cairo, and possibly Lagos), took little more than a century and was triggered by the discovery of gold in early 1886 at Langlaagte farm, on the bleak Witwatersrand ridge in the southern Transvaal. The town was proclaimed in September 1886 and within six months three main streets had been laid out. By early 1888 the population was around 6,000, and with a massive influx of black and white labor to work in the rapidly expanding mining industry, as well as associated services and manufacturing, the population grew to about 100,000 by 1896 and reached 237,000 by 1911, when the city was the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Defining Johannesburg's boundaries has always presented problems. A fairly continuous ribbon of settlement developed for 65 kilometers along the line of the Witwatersrand (or Rand) gold reefs, from Krugersdorp

in the west to Springs in the east; and at the center of this belt, the city itself was increasingly fringed by black African townships like Alexandra and Soweto during the twentieth-century peak of apartheid. The latter were excluded from earlier census counts, but the postapartheid constitution of 1994 extended municipal boundaries and by 1997–99 estimates of greater Johannesburg's population ranged from four to six million.

With the Rand's share of world gold output rising from 7 to 40 per cent between 1890 and 1913, long lines of mine dumps and headgears dominated an increasingly diverse but sharply segmented city. At this time, half Johannesburg's inhabitants were migrant black laborers, crowded into unsanitary compounds on the mines, while a highly disparate white community was dominated by *uitlanders*—mostly Europeans and Americans—who uneasily shared the city with landless Boers, often drawn there as transport drivers, and numerous Asians. Even among whites, sharply demarcated suburbs developed: the elite escaped into the leafy northern ridges of Parktown, the lower middle and working classes into areas like Braamfontein and Jeppestown, while poor whites lived in developments nearer the mines like Burgersdorp and Vrededorp.

Johannesburg's character before the 1920s was in many respects typical of mining boom-towns around the world: a heavy preponderance of males, flourishing saloons (licensed establishments on the Rand growing from 147 in 1888 to 552 in 1892) and brothels, as well as an infamously high cost of living, although railway links to the distant coastline, opened 1892–1895, helped reduce transport rates. The local economy also experienced frequent fluctuations, especially during the South African War, when gold production virtually ceased and an *uitlander* exodus left only about 40,000 in the city between October 1899 and June 1900. The economy was also shaken during the Rand Revolt of 1922, when racially motivated labor disputes left over 200 dead.

The seeds of longer-term tensions were sown with a progressive tightening of racial segregation, particularly from the 1920s onward. Major outbreaks of bubonic plague in 1905 and influenza in 1919 provided excuses to burn down black slum housing within Johannesburg and forcibly relocate their residents to fringe townships, the first such large-scale development being Alexandra, established outside the northeastern city limits in 1905. Successive legislation reinforced this process, especially the 1923 Urban Areas Act, which prohibited black Africans from buying land, and the 1950 Group Areas Act, which designated single ethnic groups for specific suburbs. Before the 1923 act, blacks were able to buy land and build houses in a number of Johannesburg suburbs: by the 1940s and early 1950s the only such area to have retained a large

black African community was Sophiatown. This was a highly overcrowded, unsanitary township with an estimated population of 24,000 in 1934, when up to 40 inhabitants typically shared one or two toilets and a single water tap. Unsurprisingly, such conditions in this and other black communities in Johannesburg were reflected in an enormous racially determined health gap: in 1939–1944, for example, white infant mortality rates in the city were 52 per 1,000 while black rates were 580 per 1,000, the differential actually having widened since the early 1920s.

Government policies aimed at relocating black Johannesburg residents intensified after the 1923 act, and in 1932 a new township was established at Orlando, the first stage in the mushroom development of Soweto (southwestern townships). Between 1955 and 1963, Sophiatown was demolished, and its residents were forcibly relocated to the new township of Meadowlands, in Soweto; the official rationale highlighted rising crime and unrest within the old black suburb. By 1955 the official population estimate for Orlando and four adjacent townships was 200,000, but with a continuing influx of migrants from both within and outside South Africa, by the 1970s and 1980s unofficial estimates put Soweto's population at a million or more. Under the strict regime of apartheid, at least a quarter of a million Sowetans daily commuted by overcrowded trains and buses into the adjacent city, which relied on their labor but denied them residence. Tensions within the townships frequently escalated into widespread violence, especially during the Soweto student protests of 1976, when a state of emergency was declared, and in the ANC-Inkatha conflicts preceding the first free South African elections in April 1994.

Postapartheid Johannesburg remains a city of intense contrasts: between the ostentatious affluence of shopping mall crowds in chic northern suburbs like Sandton, and the abject poverty of recent migrants inhabiting the most squalid sections of Soweto. The city and its hinterland have diversified widely into manufacturing and services since the 1930s, but general economic problems have been exacerbated by recession in the still-important gold industry. Unemployment and crime are endemic, especially in such deprived neighborhoods as Eldorado Park, where gangs like the *Majimbo*s dominate the streets, and black infant mortality rates remain considerably above the national average. The ubiquitous middle-class obsession with violent crime and the increasing squalor of the city center, especially the central business district, has prompted a mass exodus of businesses and affluent residents into distant suburbs, most notably Sandton, where villas sit behind reassuring security-patrolled fences. Racial distinctions may no longer be enforced by statute and there are numerous mixed suburbs, such

as Hillbrow, but widespread segregation persists, largely deriving from inherited employment differentials. The present century presents great challenges for a city that some estimates suggest is now one of the fastest-growing in the world, with a seemingly unstoppable influx of migrants from Mozambique and other parts of southern Africa, crowding into ever-expanding fringe shanty settlements. Nevertheless, Johannesburg remains a vibrant cultural focus for the new South Africa, a tradition inherited from communities like Sophiatown, and this allows a degree of optimism for the city's future.

CHRISTOPHER SCHMITZ

See also: **South Africa.**

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Johnston, Harry H. (1858–1927)

British Explorer, Artist, Naturalist, Linguist, and Colonial Administrator

Harry H. Johnston was perhaps the leading Africanist of his generation. His travels took him to every region of the continent and enabled him, better than any of his contemporaries, to see Africa whole. Son of a London company secretary, his education was directed to developing his obvious talents in painting, natural history, and modern languages. In 1879–1880 he spent eight months in Tunis painting and studying Arabic, but also observing French preparations to take over the country as a protectorate. In 1882–1883 he accompanied a geographical and sporting expedition to southern Angola and afterward made his own way northward to the Congo estuary, where H. M. Stanley was preparing the ground for King Leopold's future colony by building a railway round the river's cataracts so as to open up the 4,000 miles of navigable waterways that lay beyond. It was a highly secret operation, but Stanley enabled him to visit the stations being built on

the upper river and to return home with the materials for an attractively written and illustrated travel book, which would establish him as an African explorer.

Soon Johnston was off again, this time to East Africa, where the Royal Society had invited him to investigate the flora and fauna of Kilimanjaro. With the help of 120 Swahili porters, he set up a collecting base in the foothills of the mountain near Moshi, where plants, insects, stuffed birds, and animal skins were identified and specimens sent home to Kew and the British Museum. He was already deeply involved in the recording and comparison of Bantu languages, which was to dominate the rest of his intellectual life. But his concern for the political future of Africa had also deepened to the point that he sent to the Foreign Office a madcap proposal for the establishment of a self-supporting colony of British farmers on the uninhabited upper slopes of the mountain, which would quickly mature into an “East African Ceylon.” Incredibly, but for the diplomatic pandemonium caused by the German annexations of 1883–1884, his scheme was approved by the Colonial Committee of the Cabinet and scotched only by the personal intervention of the prime minister, William E. Gladstone.

Nevertheless, “Kilimanjaro Johnston” was soon rewarded with a vice consulship in the recently declared Oil Rivers Protectorate in eastern Nigeria, which was combined with the representation of British interests in the adjoining German protectorate of Cameroon. From a base on the offshore island of Mondole, he made frequent visits to the Cross River, studying the northwestern Bantu languages and their relationship to the adjacent languages of eastern West Africa and preparing grandiose proposals for the projection inland of the colonial enclaves thus far created around the coasts of Africa. His views somehow reached the eyes of the new British prime minister and foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, who, on his return to England in 1888–1889, used him as a confidential adviser in his reshaping of British aims in the partition of the African interior, which were to be implemented in the crucial agreements with Germany, France, and Portugal of 1890–1891. Johnston returned to Africa in 1889–1890, ostensibly as consul in Mozambique but in reality to obtain the treaties with African rulers that would enable Salisbury to claim as British the territory which would later become Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

Between 1891 and 1896 Johnston presided as commissioner over the beginnings of colonial administration in what was at first known as British Central Africa. His initial funding was provided by Cecil Rhodes, in the expectation that most of the region would soon be transferred to his newly Chartered British South Africa Company. It enabled Johnston to

employ just ten European officials, seventy Punjabi soldiers, and eighty-five Zanzibari mercenaries, and to occupy effectively a few hundred square miles at the center of his vast domain. Such were the realities of early colonial government, which left him plenty of time to pursue his scientific and linguistic interests, and to produce an encyclopedic account of Britain’s latest acquisition. Only in 1894 was Nyasaland separated from Northern Rhodesia, and only then did he gain an imperial grant-in-aid sufficient to enable him to occupy Nyasaland as a protectorate. His proconsulship ended tragically in 1896 with a third attack of the dreaded blackwater fever, which should have precluded his further residence in the tropics.

In 1898–1899 Johnston served in the undemanding post of consul general in Tunis, which gave him the opportunity to complete much scholarly work, including a *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races*, which remained without a rival until the 1950s. In 1899 came the tempting offer to go for two years as special commissioner to Uganda, to establish civilian administration after seven years of disastrous and very expensive military rule. He succeeded by concluding a formal alliance with the ruling chiefs of Buganda, which turned them into the privileged allies of the British, thereby enabling him to halve the military expenditure incurred by his predecessors, before two more attacks of blackwater fever drove him permanently from the African scene.

There followed 27 years of retirement, devoted first and foremost to the *Comparative Study of the Bantu and Semi-Bantu Languages*, completed in 1922, which set out the equivalents of some 250 words in 300 languages, for many of which he had himself collected the primary data. Although now outdated, its classificatory analysis and historical interpretation of the evidence were remarkable. He understood the relationship between Bantu and the languages now called Niger-Congo that are spread across southern West Africa. He understood that the oldest of the Bantu languages were those spoken in the northwestern corner of the present Bantu sphere. And he saw that the eastern Bantu languages descended from ancestors that had crossed the continent to the north of the equatorial forest. It is remarkable that, although starting as a social Darwinist, his political outlook moved faster than that of most of his contemporaries. In *The Negro in the New World*, which followed a journey to the United States and the Caribbean in 1908–1909, he stressed the importance of treating individuals as equals, regardless of race.

ROLAND OLIVER

See also: Rhodes, Cecil J.; Stanley, Leopold II, Scramble.

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Jolof Empire: See Wolof and Jolof Empire.

Jonathan, Chief Joseph Leabua (1914–1987)

Prime Minister of Lesotho

With no prospects for further education, the future Chief Leabua joined hundreds of thousands of other Basotho young men and left to go and work in a South African gold mine. He remained there until 1937. He first held public office in 1937, when Chief Mathealira appointed him to an administrative post in the Tsikoane ward. Over time he performed more significant functions in the ward and ended up as a member of a panel that presided over customary court cases. Experience and knowledge gained in this role soon earned him a position as an assessor to the roving Judicial Commissioner in 1951. In 1956 Leabua was appointed to two significant political roles. He became a member of the Basutoland National Council (BNC), a body set up in 1903 and dominated by the chiefs, their nominees, and appointees of colonial authorities. He was also appointed to a panel of advisers to Chieftainess 'Mantsebo Seeiso, who ruled Lesotho between 1940 and 1960 as regent for Prince Bereng Seeiso (later King Moshoeshoe II). It was during this time that he left the Protestant Lesotho Evangelical Church to join the Roman Catholic Church.

Besides being a member of a 1957 deputation sent by the BNC to England to protest against the Colonial Office's appointment of South African-born A. G. Chaplin as a resident commissioner in Lesotho, Leabua joined a number of missions that went to England in connection with Lesotho's move to independence. In 1958 he was a member of another delegation that the BNC sent to England to present the Report of the Constitutional Reform Committee (to which he had been nominated in 1956).

In 1959, on the advice of Patrick Duncan, Chief Leabua formed a political party with a view to contest the 1960 District Council and the 1965 parliamentary elections on a more conservative, religious, anticommunist, and prochieftainship ticket, to counter the radical and antichieftainship Basutoland Congress Party

(BCP, formed in 1952). At that time, the Roman Catholic Church was assisting in the formation of a political party (the Christian Democratic Party) with a similar program to that of Leabua. The church agreed to abandon her plan, and gave her support to Leabua. His Basutoland National Party (BNP) was launched on April 4, 1959, in Maseru.

In the 1960 District Council elections where he competed against the much more established BCP, Leabua and his young party won 22 of the 162 district councils, although this translated into only 1 out of 40 seats in the Legislative Council. In the 1965 elections, his party won 31 of the 60 seats. This advancement was ascribed to Leabua's tireless campaigning, church assistance, aid from the South African government, and Mokhehle's complacency (due to the BCP's resounding victory in the 1960 elections). However, Leabua himself failed to win his constituency and when Parliament met it was his deputy, Chief Sekhonyana 'Maseribane, who was elected the first prime minister of Lesotho. The party made arrangements for John Mothepu, a BNP member of Parliament from the safe constituency of Mpharane, to resign his parliamentary seat so that a by-election could be held in the constituency, which Leabua easily won in July 1965. He then took over the premiership from Chief 'Maseribane.

Chief Leabua remained in power for 21 years. He developed into a shrewd politician. In the 1970 elections, Mokhehle and his BCP were victorious, but Leabua refused to hand over power, declared a state of emergency, and suspended the constitution. He sent Mokhehle to prison and later tricked him into signing a document by which Mokhehle accepted that the 1970 elections had not been free, that they should be annulled and new elections should be held. The king refused to cooperate with Leabua's government; the chief reacted by exiling him. Mokhehle was forced to flee Lesotho in 1974.

Chief Leabua tried to appease the international community, which was threatening to withdraw aid, by establishing an Interim Parliament in 1973, and setting up a government of national unity and reconciliation in 1975. But these concessions fell far short of the demands of the opposition and the international community. In the mid-1970s the chief took advantage of Cold War politics and, while maintaining and intensifying repression in the country, adopted a progressive foreign policy. Elements of this policy included a vociferous anti-apartheid stance and the acceptance of refugees fleeing South Africa. By the late 1970s the military wing of the BCP, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) was engaged in attempts to unseat Chief Leabua. These attacks began at the same time that the chief's government became a target of South Africa's destabilization policy because of its foreign policy,

primarily by military incursions into Lesotho. Soon a faction of Mokhehle's LLA was working with the South Africa security establishment against Lesotho. Leabua established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the USSR, and other East European countries.

These initiatives bore a bounty of political fruits. The opposition was split over some members joining Leabua's interim parliament and accepting his offer of cabinet posts. Mokhehle became discredited as an apartheid collaborator. The chief's government received various forms of aid from socialist countries as well as from Western governments eager to keep Lesotho free of Communist influence. The UN and nations opposed to apartheid dispensed aid freely, and Leabua and his regime gained some legitimacy and acceptability locally and internationally.

One of the most important causes of Chief Leabua's downfall in 1986 was the development of a personality cult around him. Individuals controlling the party's Youth League turned it into a vigilante group that determined civil service appointments, promotions, and dismissals, took over some of the functions of the army and the police, and unleashed a reign of terror in public institutions and civil society. All this was done to achieve absolute acquiescence and loyalty to the chief throughout the country. However, the activities of the Youth League alienated the more moderate elements within both the army and the chief's cabinet. It is individuals from this group who engineered the chief's downfall, with the help of South Africa, in January 1986. Chief Leabua died in Pretoria the following year of cancer.

MOTLATSI THABANE

See also: **Lesotho; Mokhehle, Ntsu.**

Biography

Born in 1914, Leabua was the fourth of Chief Jonathan Molapo's seven children with one of his junior wives, 'Makatiso. His grandfather, Chief Molapo, was the second son of Moshoeshe I and his first wife, 'Mamohato. He completed his primary education at a Protestant Paris Evangelical Missionary primary school, Maoana Masoana, in 1933. He married a distant cousin, Paleo Molapo and the couple had seven children. Leabua launched the Basutoland National Party (BNP) on April 4, 1959. Leabua himself failed to win his constituency and when Parliament met it was his deputy, Chief Sekhonyana 'Maseribane, who was elected the first prime minister of Lesotho. The party made arrangements for John Mothepu, a BNP Member of Parliament from the safe constituency of Mpharane, to resign his parliamentary seat so that a by-election

could be held in the constituency, which Leabua easily won in July 1965. He then took over the premiership from Chief 'Maseribane. Leabua remained in power for 21 years. The more moderate elements within both the army and the chief's cabinet engineered Leabua's downfall, with the help of South Africa, in January 1986. He died in Pretoria in 1987 of cancer.

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Journalism, African: Colonial Era

Newspapers, having become a feature of life in Europe in the eighteenth century, were started in colonies of settlement in Africa in the following century, beginning with South Africa. White settlers later established their newspapers in newly occupied parts of Africa in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, for example. At the same time, Africans began publishing newspapers in the nineteenth century in those West African areas where colonial rule or European influence, missionary teaching, and Western education spread at an early stage: the Gold Coast (Ghana), Lagos (later part of Nigeria), and especially Sierra Leone under British rule, and Senegal (i.e., the coastal "Four Communes" of Senegal) under French rule.

The first newspaper in Sierra Leone, apart from the government *Gazette*, was the *Sierra Leone Watchman* (1841–1851). Others followed, and in 1884 the most famous newspaper, the *Sierra Leone Weekly News*, was founded by the famous educationist and writer Edward Wilmot Blyden and the Rev. Claudius May; May's brother Cornelius was the first editor. The *Weekly News*, celebrated all over West Africa, continued publication until 1951.

In Gold Coast, the pioneer newspaper was the *Accra Herald*, founded in 1857 by Charles Bannermann and renamed in 1859 the *West African Herald*. James Hutton Brew founded the *Gold Coast Times* (1874–1885) and then the *Western Echo* (1885–1887). Such short lives for newspapers were quite common.

The founders and editors of these early West African newspapers were men of the educated elite: teachers, clergymen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and

others. They operated all along the West Coast and had roots and links in all the British territories and independent Liberia, which also had its early African-owned newspapers. The newspapers expressed the general outlook of the Sierra Leone Creoles and others of the elite: generally loyal to Britain, indeed often favorable to further British expansion but still critical of the British, who generally disliked their attitude, which became more critical after the great expansion of colonial rule in the “Scramble for Africa.”

There was commonly a close link between journalism and politics, as when the nationalist leader J. B. Danquah published the *West African Times*, renamed the *Times of West Africa*, in 1931–1934, as a daily—something rare in the first decades of the African press, although the *Gold Coast Spectator* had preceded it as a daily in 1927. Most editors and journalists were still amateurs then, but they often produced newspapers of high standard. There were some experienced journalists, such as R. B. Wuta-Ofei, for long editor of the *Spectator*. A new and daring approach was brought in when the U.S.-trained Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904–96) edited the daily *African Morning Post* in 1935–1936, and ran into trouble with the usually tolerant British authorities.

In Nigeria the African-owned press, centered in Lagos at first, developed as in other parts of West Africa; 51 newspapers appeared between 1880 and 1937, including 11 dailies. For much of that period the *Lagos Weekly Record* was a leading newspaper; others included the *Lagos Standard*, the *Nigerian Times*, and the *Nigerian Pioneer*. The regular political links were illustrated by the *Lagos Daily News*, which supported the Nigerian National Democratic Party in the 1920s. European businessmen, hardly involved in the press in West Africa until then, started the *Daily Times* in 1926 to compete with the *Lagos Daily News*. It was made an independent paper, and more like a typical modern newspaper, by its first editor, Ernest Ikoli (1893–1960), whose *African Messenger* had been taken over by the new newspaper; he later (1938–1944) edited the *Daily Service*, organ of the nationalist the Nigerian Youth Movement, with S. L. Akintola who became a major political leader in later years. But the leading journalist-politician was Azikiwe who, after his editorship in Accra, founded a group of newspapers based on the daily *West African Pilot* in Nigeria in 1937. These hard-hitting nationalist organs backed him in his campaign against British rule as leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) from 1944.

Azikiwe spread newspaper publishing to other parts of Nigeria, where, independently, a pioneering Hausa-language newspaper, *Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo* (Truth Is Worth More Than a Penny), was founded in the north in 1939. In the era of mass politics developing in

Nigeria and elsewhere from the 1940s, the press played a major role. It underwent expansion and modernization, with some involvement of European capital. Britain’s *Daily Mirror* group, the International Publishing Corporation (IPC), bought the *Daily Times* in 1947. It was developed rapidly and vigorously, with sister publications added, under the dynamic direction of Alhaji Babatunde Jose, the most prominent of many journalists who emerged in Nigeria; eventually the *Daily Times* sold 200,000 and *Sunday Times* 350,000 at their peak. Professional journalists were now common, in contrast to the earlier period. Many also worked in radio, also rapidly developed in Africa from the 1940s.

The IPC developed the *Daily Graphic* in the Gold Coast from 1950 on Western tabloid lines, with great success, to make it the leading daily when the country became independent in 1957. Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP) published from 1948 their own daily, the *Evening News*, to rival the *Graphic* and the *Ashanti Pioneer*, which was against the CPP. Many older newspapers ceased publication in those years in Ghana and Sierra Leone. In the latter country the *Daily Mail* was founded in 1933 as successor to *The Colony and Provincial Reporter* (1912), renamed *The Colonial and Provincial Reporter*, and in 1920 *The African Mail and Trade Gazette*. Taken over by the IPC in 1952, the *Daily Mail* was developed into the country’s only significant daily newspaper.

In eastern and southern Africa there was no parallel to the early West African development of African-run newspapers, with the significant exception of South Africa, where there were several such newspapers in the nineteenth century. There, too, the role of Christian missions in starting various publications, not always narrowly religious in outlook, was important. But in the twentieth century, the press in South Africa, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and East Africa was very largely in white hands.

The *East African Standard*, the settler newspaper of Kenya, was originally founded by an Asian, J. M. Jeevanjee, as the *African Standard* in Mombasa in 1902. It was renamed and moved to Nairobi, and became a daily, under two English owners in 1910. It launched the *Tanganyika Standard* in 1930. This was the only significant newspaper in Tanganyika until independence. In Kenya, however, there were well before then some Asian-owned publications: the *Kenya Daily Mail* of Mombasa, the *National Guardian* of Nairobi, and the *Daily Chronicle* of Nairobi. And there were some early African publications in the era of the nationalist upsurge, such as the *Coast African Express*, the *Nyanza Times*, and the leading Kikuyu paper around Nairobi, the weekly *Mumenyereri*. A liberal European, Charles Hayes, founded *Taifa Kenya*, which

was taken over, not long before independence, by the Aga Khan and replaced by *Taifa Leo* in Swahili, while the new owners then launched, in 1960, the famous *Daily Nation* and *Sunday Nation*.

Uganda in the colonial era had the *Uganda Argus*, part of the Standard group, but also some African newspapers, missionary education having spread early in that country. *Ebifa mu Uganda* was founded in 1907, *Gambuze* and *Dobozi Iya Buganda* in the 1930s. The first significant African newspaper, however, was *Uganda Eyogera*, founded in 1953; it was the voice of a nationalist party, the Uganda National Congress.

In Nyasaland (now Malawi) there was effectively one newspaper in the colonial period, founded as the *Central African Planter* in 1895, renamed the *Central Africa Times* soon after 1900, and then given its best-known name of the *Nyasaland Times*. In Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) the settler newspaper *Livingstone Mail* was founded in 1906, and in the 1940s the young Roy Welensky (later prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) started the twice-weekly *Northern News* at Ndola, as his mouthpiece; it was taken over by the Johannesburg-based Argus empire in 1951 and turned into a daily in 1953. Alexander Scott founded the weekly *Central African Post* at Lusaka in 1948, and the short-lived *African Times*, in 1958; then he joined with David Astor to start the weekly *African Mail*, edited first by the late Richard Hall (one of many journalists from Europe who helped to build up African newspapers), and independent of both the settlers and the African nationalists.

Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) had two pre-eminent settler newspapers for decades: the *Rhodesia Herald*, founded in 1892 by the Argus Company, and the *Bulawayo Chronicle* launched by the same South African company in 1894. They had their companion Sunday papers and the Argus group also published the *Umtali Post*. Among other newspapers the *Salisbury Daily News* was taken over by the Thomson newspaper empire in 1962 and sought to cater for Africans, supporting legitimate African aims. It was banned in August 1964 and its African editor, Willie Musarurwa, was imprisoned without charge for 11 years. This was one episode in the long struggle of the press against the settler regime that unilaterally declared independence from 1965 to 1980. The Catholic-owned Mambo Press, publishing in the 1960s the monthly *Moto*, which was popular with Africans, also fought a long battle against the Smith regime.

In French Africa, censorship was more strict than in most British colonies, and early development of the press was largely confined to Senegal. Several newspapers were founded in the 1880s and 1890s, but of them only *L'Afrique Occidentale*, founded by the Creole Louis Huchard in 1896 and the first modern Senegalese

newspaper, had more than a short life. Later newspapers were started both by European entrepreneurs and by local politicians. Jean Daramy, a globe-trotting adventurer, briefly made *Le Petit Sénégalais* a major scandal sheet in 1912; dismissed from there, he stayed in Senegal with the new name of D'Oxoby and founded in 1913 *La Démocratie du Senegal*, one of the first independent, satirical newspapers in French Africa.

A Frenchman, Charles de Breteuil, founded *Paris-Dakar* in 1933, initially as a weekly; it became a daily two years later and was subsequently renamed *Dakar-Matin*. De Breteuil founded a French-African newspaper empire later run by his son Michel. It included *France-Afrique* founded in 1938 in Côte d'Ivoire, later renamed *Abidjan-Matin* in 1954; this was one of the first newspapers founded in French West Africa outside Senegal and Dahomey (today the Republic of Benin), where, exceptionally, African-owned newspapers flourished in the 1920s. Later, after World War II, de Breteuil founded *La Presse du Cameroun*, taking over a European newspaper, *L'Eveil du Cameroun*, almost the only newspaper that country had had. In some French-speaking African countries, mission-founded newspapers played a major role, especially *La Semaine* in Congo-Brazzaville and, notably, *L'Afrique Nouvelle*, founded by the White Fathers, a Roman Catholic religious order, in 1947 and for decades a leading independent journal based in Senegal.

In Portuguese Africa the press was under strict control under the fascist dictatorship (1926–1974), but it did retain some degree of independence. Toward the end of Portuguese rule Angola had an evening paper, the *Diario de Luanda*, and a morning paper, *A Provincia de Angola*, founded in 1923. In Mozambique *Noticias* was founded in 1926; it was virtually an official government newspaper. Mozambique also had the *Lourenço Marques Guardian*, founded by the local British community in 1905; it was bought by the Catholic archbishop of Lourenço Marques in 1956 and renamed the *Diario*. Church influence, important in the development of the press in much of Africa, was particularly important in Mozambique; the Catholic bishop of Beira, more sympathetic to the Africans than the archbishop, provided assistance for the weekly *A Voz Africana* founded in 1932, with an African editor, and also founded the relatively liberal *Diario de Moçambique* in 1950. But censorship after 1933 largely emasculated the weekly *O Brado Africano*, a weekly founded by the Associação Africana (an organization for people of mixed race). *Voz Africana* was bought out in the late 1960s by the financial interests behind the right-wing European *Noticias de Beira*. Two relatively liberal newspapers, *Tribuna* and *A Voz de Moçambique*, were tolerated for a time in the 1960s.

The Portuguese territories were unusual in that press freedom was very limited or nonexistent in the last decades of colonialism. The rest of colonial Africa saw a large degree of press freedom, which imparted training and journalistic experience to African journalists. After the end of the colonial era, African journalists and newspapers in most countries faced independent governments that quickly sought to control and restrict the press.

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See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Media as Propaganda; Press.**

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Jugnauth: *See Mauritius: 1982 to the Present.*

Juhayna: *See Nubia: Banu Kanz, Juhayna, and the Arabization of the Nilotic Sudan.*

Jukun: *See Benue Valley Peoples: Jukun and Kwarafa.*

Juula/Dyula

“Juula” (or “Dyula”), a Mande (Mandingo) word meaning simply “merchant,” is used to refer to the trading caste that spread throughout the former area of Mande culture and influence, from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia to the Niger, and from the southern edge of the Sahara to the fringes of the forests further south. These Mande merchants made their appearance under the empire of Mali and, as specialists in trade, built up a mercantile economy in parallel with the construction of that empire and its successors.

Even earlier, merchants in the empire of Ghana, who were known as “Wangara” among the Sarakolle and the Soninke, had kept up the links between the trading cities of the Sahel and the savanna and forest

regions to the south. The Mande first embarked upon trade in the shadow of the Sarakolle and then, when hegemony over the region passed to them following the foundation of the Malian empire, the Juula took up the baton from the Wangara. The Wangara did not disappear, however; together with the Juula, they maintained a presence in all the cities of the Malian empire.

The Juula then spread out toward the West, where they introduced Islam into the city of Kano, in the land of the Hausa, as well as toward the forests of the south, where they went in search of cola nuts, which they obtained in exchange for millet and salt. The Juula organization was based on a vast commercial web spun across the savanna and the Sahel and then extended into the forest, as the Juula deployed their skills in buying and selling in order to regulate prices. There were fully fledged Juula trading companies built around family structures: the members of a given family, dispersed from the savanna to the forest, saw to the circulation of merchandise and information, placed orders, and controlled the mechanisms of supply and demand. The Juula were converted to Islam at an early stage, through contact with the Soninke and with Arab and Berber merchants, and they became active in diffusing the religion across the savanna. As the form of Islam that they tended to practice was relatively tolerant, and capable of accommodating traditional cults, they often served as priests, soothsayers, and counsellors at the courts of animist rulers.

In addition, the Juula spearheaded the penetration by the Mande of the forested areas in the south by taking their caravans of donkeys there and collecting the cola nuts that were much sought after throughout the savanna and the Sahel. As Moslems, the Juula were able to link up with the trans-Saharan trade conducted by the Arabs and the Berbers, whom they met in such cities of the Sahel as Djenn, Timbuktu, Takroun, and Walata. They sold slaves, gold, millet, and other commodities to the Arabs, in exchange for fabrics, incense, weapons, and books. They controlled the savannah as far as the lands of the Hausa, where their merchandise was passed on to Hausa merchants who were as expert in the trade as the Mande themselves.

Many of the staging posts that the Juula established en route to the cola-producing areas developed into market villages, or even cities, such as Kong in what is now northern Côte d’Ivoire. Kong traced its origins back to the fourteenth century and the Malian empire, under which it was established by a number of merchants from Djenn. Although it began as just another stopover for the Juulas’ donkey caravans heading toward the lands of the cola nut, it rapidly became a commercial center, far removed from the heartlands of the Mande people, handling large-scale trade between the dry savanna and the humid savanna. It was a center as

much for religion as for commerce and was home to a large number of Moslem scholars pursuing Quranic studies, with palaces and mosques built in the traditional Sudanese style. However, it faced competition from Bobo Julasso, in what is now Burkina Faso, another city founded by Juula from Kong itself within the same geographical area. As was the custom among the Juula, one of a set of brothers established himself at this intersection of trading routes, a location well-suited to the founding of a market. Thus, Bobo Julasso too began as a staging post and gradually grew as more and more merchants set up business there.

The city of Kong enjoyed its golden age from the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries onward. At its peak, in the early nineteenth century, it was the meeting place for Juula from Djenn, on the Middle Niger, and from Kankan (now in Guinea), on the Upper Niger, a city that had been founded by Juula from Diafunu and that controlled the savanna as well as the sources of the Niger as far as the mountains of the Guinea range, which borders on the forests of what is now Côte d'Ivoire. Both groups went to Kong to exchange rock salt, millet, and cotton fabrics from the savanna for gold, slaves, and cola nuts. The Juula of Kong also maintained links with the European trading posts set up on the Atlantic coast, around the Gulf of Guinea, from which they could easily obtain highly prized European goods, notably rifles, gunpowder, and textiles. The acquisition of rifles allowed the city to create its own militia in order to protect the caravans passing along the established routes through the territories of the various minor rulers. However, Kong was badly affected by the slave trade, since the hunt for slaves gradually led to the depopulation of the open country of the savanna. At the end of the nineteenth century, on the eve of the colonial conquest, Kong was still a beautiful city of fifteen thousand people, but now that there is no trade in its hinterland it is practically in ruins.

The Mande conquerors of the nineteenth century frequently made use of the routes established by the Juula. Indeed, it was his exploitation of their commercial network that allowed Samori Touré (1830–1900) to rise to a dominant position in the regions of the Upper Niger. He himself was a member of a Juula family from Sanankoro in Guinea and had started his adult life as a Juula pedlar, traveling from village to village with his merchandise on his head. Through a

series of unforeseen events, this merchant became first a warrior, then the head of a warrior band, and went on to use the merchant network to extend his rule, not only over the Upper Niger region of Guinea, but over the whole of the savanna. Having created an empire, he adopted the religious title of “Almamy” and recreated the Malian realm. The Juula had never enjoyed as much prosperity as they did under the Almamy, for he was one of their own, and took care to protect their routes, thus promoting the free circulation of people and goods. He put up the strongest resistance to the colonial penetration of West Africa, fighting both the French and the British for 17 years up to his final defeat in 1898.

The Juula had long been accustomed to surrounding their cities with fortifications and taking up arms when it seemed necessary in order to defend themselves and maintain the flow of caravans. As a result, they became closely associated with the warrior class. At the same time, given the Mande tradition of combining trade and warfare with farming, they were not averse to taking up the hoe and working the ground whenever the rains came.

The infiltration of the Juula into the forests of modern Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire proceeded slowly and, more often than not, peacefully. They established numerous markets and caravansarais that ended up as permanent settlements and thus created new population centers. Their descendants are among the inhabitants of part of the northern savanna in Côte d'Ivoire; and, while they are Mande, and not a separate ethnic group, they are known to their neighbors as Juula even today.

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See also: Mali Empire; Religion: Islam, Growth of: Western Africa.

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K

Kaarta: *See Massassi and the Kaarta State.*

Kabarega and Bunyoro

Nineteenth-century Europeans depicted Kabarega (1869–1899; d.1923) as an oppressive ruler, a brutal savage, and a proponent of the slave trade. However, his reputation was rehabilitated by Nyoro historians during the colonial period who saw his reign as Bunyoro's last moment of glory. After independence, Ugandan politicians and academics depicted Kabarega as a great protonationalist leader whose revolutionary reforms had transformed his kingdom. Bunyoro today sees Kabarega as one of its greatest kings, a modernizer who united and expanded the kingdom, although his reign is also remembered as a time of violence and exploitation.

Kabarega ascended to the throne in 1870, while still a young man. He was his father Kamurasi's chosen heir and was popular among the military and peasantry, but his elder brother, Kabigumire, was supported by most of the elite. A bloody succession war was prolonged by the intervention of neighboring kingdoms and Sudanese slavers. The rest of Kabarega's reign was dominated by the struggle to limit the power of Bunyoro's great families and to preserve his kingdom's independence.

Kabarega's internal reforms were concerned with the centralization of power and the extension of the political structures of the core of the kingdom to the semi-autonomous periphery. A series of foreign campaigns were embarked upon to heighten the prestige and the coercive power of the state, to bring in booty to reward followers, and to provide new tax resources and offices to be redistributed. Royal absolutism increased as competition for royal favor became institutionalized, and centers of opposition were removed, primarily

through the execution or destitution of most hereditary chiefs. Delegated authority was given precedence over inherited status, as commoner chiefs were entrusted with disciplining the destructive ambitions of royal kin.

What was most striking about Kabarega's reign was the violent transformation of administrative personnel. Aristocratic pastoralists and princes who were only distantly related to the current ruler viewed themselves as feudal lords and increasingly challenged royal authority. Kabarega's new men displaced these provincial lords, drawing on both traditional and modern sources of authority. One military chief's elevation derived from his reputation as a famous medium as well as his success as a general. Kabarega, moreover, replaced many holders of hereditary chiefships with closely related kinsmen or members of his mother's pastoralist clan. Nonetheless, Kabarega's most powerful chiefs were commoners who had displayed unusual ability in war and trade.

Kabarega made innovations in the structure as well as the personnel of the state. *Barusura* regiments were garrisoned in the various districts to counter any tendency toward fission while the development of the new office of prime minister was an indication of growing centralization of power. Kabarega's creation of the *Barusura* underlay the revival of Bunyoro's power. The *Barusura* should be viewed as a response to unprecedented threats to the Kinyoro state, from Europeans and traders as well as Buganda's growing aggression. Elsewhere in East Africa, nineteenth-century leaders relied increasingly on the use of force to maintain themselves in power, in the face of expanding trade, new epidemics, and the appearance of firearms. In few cases were the destruction of internal dissension and the expansion of territory so successful as in Bunyoro. Within Bunyoro, the *Barusura* enabled the royal government to achieve closer control over the population. The new warbands overawed powerful

chiefs, and *Barusura* leaders were given chiefships over areas with a history of rebelliousness. *Barusura* were used to punish criminals and to discipline rebellious peoples, but their reputation for lawlessness, brutality, and plundering made them universally feared.

Bunyoro built on existing regional trading links to maximize profit from the expanding coastal trade. Kabarega passed on imported copper, brass, and beads to the Langi, as well as traditional iron products, in exchange for ivory. Ivory was also brought in from Alur, Bulega, and Acoli, the latter area receiving guns in exchange. Bunyoro's access to immense resources of ivory became its strongest advantage over Buganda, whose supplies were fast declining. Kabarega wanted guns above all from long-distance traders. A musket worth one dollar in Zanzibar was exchanged in Bunyoro for ivory worth fifty pounds. Nonetheless, the same firearm could be sold on north of Bunyoro for much more. Firearms enriched Bunyoro, greatly increased its military power, and served to cement political alliances.

Bunyoro's wealth, unity, and military strength enabled her to overcome the unprecedented challenges that faced Kabarega when he came to power. Sudanese slave traders fostered local conflicts for material gain and sought to make Kabarega militarily dependent on their mercenaries. The Egyptian empire attempted to annex Bunyoro and replace Kabarega with one of his rebellious cousins, while immense Ganda armies began attacking Kabarega's capital instead of merely raiding Bunyoro's borderlands. While Kabarega's stubborn resistance and diplomatic skills contributed to the downfall of the slavers and the Egyptian Empire, his greatest military achievement was in bringing about some kind of parity with Buganda. For generations the Baganda had been free to raid almost at will across Bunyoro's borders.

Kabarega's military reforms brought Bunyoro victory in the Battle of Rwengabi in 1886, which transformed the balance of power in the interlacustrine region. By 1888 the Egyptian Empire had collapsed, all internal rebels had been defeated, and Buganda's armies had turned in on themselves. Nyoro armies had conquered thousands of square miles of territory and captured numerous livestock and slaves. Kabarega's very success, however, led to catastrophe.

In 1893 British forces invaded Bunyoro in order to secure the Nile. No serious attempt at negotiation was attempted because Kabarega was perceived as an uncompromising opponent of European intervention in the region. Kabarega's military skills meant that conquest in Bunyoro would be more destructive than anywhere else in East Africa. It took six years of sustained fighting before Kabarega was finally captured. Nyoro armies became proficient at guerilla warfare, constructed stockades and trenches, and allied with the

king of Buganda and mutinying imperial forces. Imperial forces in Bunyoro were larger than those employed anywhere else in the conquest of East Africa while nowhere else were scorched earth policies followed for so long. Defeat only came when the kingdom was utterly devastated and almost entirely depopulated. Kabarega was exiled to the Seychelles and one of his sons put on the throne. He was allowed to return to Uganda in 1923 but died before reaching his kingdom.

SHANE DOYLE

See also: **Uganda: Colonization, Resistance, Uganda Agreement, 1890–1900.**

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Kagwa, Apolo Kafibala Gulemye (c.1865–1927)

Chief Minister of Buganda, 1889–1926

Kagwa was born about 1865 at Kasozi in Busiro county. His father was the son of an important chief, but held no significant office himself. Nevertheless, he

was able to place the child Kagwa with an influential relative, who recommended the boy to the keeper of Kabaka Mutesa's mosque, which was inside the royal compound. There Kagwa served as a water bearer, learning the ways of the palace. In 1884 Kagwa managed to secure a transfer to the royal storehouse, where he had a number of friends studying Christianity and Christian texts with the Church Missionary Society (CMS) missionary Alexander Mackay. Kagwa was attracted to the mission by the offer of free food, and soon began to learn to read there. At the palace Kagwa was given responsibility for carrying medicine to the ailing Kabaka (king). When the *kabaka* died in October 1884, he was succeeded by Kabaka Mwanga, a young man who favored the youths of his generation.

Kagwa, soon baptized as Apolo, was tall and heavily built; he became popular as a champion wrestler, a sport much admired in Buganda. In the 1886 persecution of Christian converts, Apolo escaped execution but was struck with a spear by the angry Kabaka Mwanga. Perhaps his athletic fame saved his life; at any rate a year later Mwanga promoted Kagwa to be in charge of the royal storehouse. Thus Kagwa came to command a sizeable group of young Christian converts who had access to firearms. When civil war broke out in 1888, Kagwa became second in command of the Christian army fighting the Muslims for control of Buganda after Kabaka Mwanga had been deposed.

The war sealed Kagwa's military reputation. He became known for his fearless assaults on the enemy in an era when inaccurate muzzle loaders meant most engagements were fought at very close quarters. In one battle, Kagwa was wounded in the shoulder and almost died, but he recovered to fight again. A song was composed that praised Kagwa's courage but pointed out he was prone to rush headlong into ambush. On the death of the respected Christian commander, a Roman Catholic, Kagwa assumed leadership, but he lacked the tact of his predecessor. Christian victory in 1889 brought Kagwa the position of chief minister of Buganda; he was now more powerful than any previous holder of that office because the restored Kabaka Mwanga was a mere figurehead. Though a battle-hardened leader, Apolo Kagwa was only twenty-four years old.

The "Scramble for Africa" reached Buganda in the form of rival imperialist expeditions. Carl Peters promoted German aspirations while Fredrick Jackson, and later Captain Lugard, represented British interests. Kagwa and the Protestants, advised by the CMS missionaries, favored the British, while Catholic converts and Kabaka Mwanga sought any alternative. Kagwa announced that if the British were rejected the entire body of Protestant converts would depart the country. Ultimately the Battle of Mengo in January 1892 decided Buganda's fate in favor of British overrule,

with a dominant position enjoyed henceforth by Protestant Ganda allies under Kagwa. The rebellion of Kabaka Mwanga in 1897 tested that alliance but Kagwa and the Protestants, along with many Roman Catholics, were prepared to defend the new order on the battlefield. A grateful British government awarded Kagwa a knighthood in 1903.

Meanwhile, Kagwa was enthusiastically "modernizing." He built a two-story house (which was burnt by arsonists) and then another, stronger building called Basima House (meaning "they are pleased"). Many of his countrymen were not pleased with the power that Kagwa had acquired through his British alliance. They particularly resented Kagwa's overbearing role as chief regent ruling in the name of the child Kabaka Daudi Chwa, who was only four years old in 1900. They noted that after negotiations of that year resulted in the Uganda Agreement with the British, Kagwa and his friends emerged with vast holdings of private land. A new song called *buto dene* ("big belly") was anonymously composed. It proclaimed: "The man with the big belly has gone to Entebbe (British headquarters) to sell his children." An attempt was made to revoke Kagwa's clan membership by claiming that he was not a true Ganda citizen but had been captured as a child slave on a raid in neighboring Busoga. Kagwa fought back, marshalling his allies, and attacking his accusers mercilessly.

Despite his considerable unpopularity, Kagwa energetically promoted school construction, awarded prizes to top students, and hired those skilled in English to serve as translators for, and spy on, British colonial officers. Kagwa's trip to Great Britain for the coronation of Edward VII in 1902 brought him prestige and a small but efficient printing press. He churned out in rapid succession his five books in the Luganda language on Ganda history (*Basekabaka be Buganda*), customs (*Empisa za Baganda*), clans (*Ebika bya Buganda*), his own grasshopper clan (*Ekika kye Nsenene*), and folklore (*Engero za Baganda*). Several of these appeared in multiple editions and reprints and are still in demand today. His promotion of Buganda's oral-historical heritage was a sign that he wanted to preserve national identity while engaged in Westernization.

When the young Kabaka Daudi Chwa reached adulthood in 1914, many thought Kagwa would step down, but they were wrong. He was too entrenched and the kabaka, who also had progressive plans for his country, remained on the sidelines. Kagwa survived attacks by both traditionalists who objected to the loss of clan burial sites on privately owned estates, and a young generation of school leavers who could speak to the colonial officials in their own language. It was those British officials, augmented by an influx of World War I officers, who began in the 1920s to press for Kagwa's retirement. Their watchword was

“efficiency” and their test was financial accounting, which no chief of Kagwa’s generation could hope to pass. In vain Kagwa pointed out his decades of support for the British Empire, including mobilizing Buganda wholeheartedly for the war effort in 1914–1918. In 1926 at the age of sixty-one, Sir Apolo was forced to resign on “medical” grounds; depressed and feeling betrayed, he died within a year.

Although a collaborator with colonial rule, Apolo Kagwa was a Ganda patriot determined to see his country (as well as himself) benefit from the opportunities made available by an alliance with the British. That alliance doubled Buganda’s territory at the expense of neighboring rival Bunyoro.

Sharp bargaining in the 1900 agreement also ensured all the arable land went to Ganda owners while the British were left with swampland and bush. The primary goal was to preserve Buganda’s identity and autonomy, which was achieved but with serious implications for the future unification of Uganda.

JOHN ROWE

See also: Uganda: Colonization, Resistance, Uganda Agreement, 1890–1900.

Biography

Born about 1865 at Kasozi in Busiro county. Baptized Apolo. Placed in charge of the royal storehouse in 1887. Named second in command of the Christian army when civil war broke out in 1888. Appointed Chief minister of Buganda in 1889. Knighted by the British in 1903. Attended the coronation of Edward VII in Britain in 1902. Awarded a small printing press, on which he published his five books in rapid succession. Forced to resign on “medical” grounds in 1926. Died in 1927.

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Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda

Kakungulu (1868–1928) was born in Koki, a small state that had just broken away from the kingdom of Bunyoro. In 1884 Kakungulu went to Buganda to take

up service at the court of Mutesa I. This was a crucial period in the history of Buganda, as the European partition of Africa was gaining momentum. By 1890, when the Anglo-German Agreement placing Buganda in the British sphere of influence was signed, Kakungulu had become one of the most important generals of Buganda. His failure to establish a power base in Buganda, coupled with his military prowess and great ambition, made him a potentially useful tool for the new colonial administration in pacifying the protectorate.

The officials of the British East African Company, then in charge of Buganda, were faced with a number of problems. Buganda was polarized into Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim factions. The Muslims, who had been pushed out of Buganda in 1888, were in Bunyoro and threatening Buganda. In 1893 the Muslims again rebelled and the colonial officials used a large Baganda Protestant force, led by Kakungulu, to defeat them. After their defeat, he was put in charge of operations to prevent the Muslims still at large from linking up with the Sudanese soldiers stationed to the west of the country. The colonial officials also used Kakungulu in an expedition against Busoga, aimed mainly at safeguarding the route to the coast. He was also the commander of an army sent against the Buvuma islanders.

By this time, relations between Kakungulu and Apolo Kagwa, the chief minister of Buganda, were deteriorating; it soon became clear that Buganda could not accommodate both men. Simultaneously, the colonial officials were growing increasingly concerned about the situation in Bunyoro. Kabalega, the king of Bunyoro, was involved in conflicts with his neighbors, especially Toro. He was also joining with the Muslims who had fled to the area to threaten Buganda and the colonial officials. In 1893 the officials came to the conclusion that a full-scale invasion of Bunyoro and the subjugation of Kabalega was the only option open to them if order was to be restored in the area. Kakungulu commanded the Baganda troops, variously estimated to be between twenty and forty-three thousand strong. As a result of the role he played in the campaigns against Bunyoro, the British authorities rewarded him with a part of the Bunyoro territory, Bugerere. Kakungulu moved to Bugerere, where he established order and set up an efficient administrative system.

In 1897 Mwanga rebelled against British rule. After his defeat, he joined Kabalega in Lango, where the latter was taking refuge. The colonial administration decided to apprehend the two men, and Kakungulu was one of the principal commanders of the forces that captured both Kabalega and Mwanga. On his way back to Kampala, Kakungulu asked the British authorities for permission to expand his authority to Bukedi, and they agreed.

Bukedi refers to the area covering Pallisa, Bugwere, Budaka, and parts of Bugisu, Teso, and Tororo. It had

become a place of refuge for those opposed to British control in Buganda. The British government was not willing to allot funds for the pacification of other areas of the protectorate; therefore, the protectorate government welcomed Kakungulu's offer. On his part, Kakungulu was looking for a kingdom where he would be kabaka, or king. In June 1899, he left for Bukedi accompanied by a small force. Kakungulu pacified the area and brought Budaka, Pallisa, parts of Bugisu, Teso, and Kumam within the protectorate. He set up his headquarters at Budaka, built roads, and established efficient administration using the Baganda chiefs. When Sir Harry Johnston came to negotiate the Uganda Agreement in 1900, he was so impressed by Kakungulu's achievement in Bukedi that he recommended he be considered for post of native assistant in charge of Bukedi and be paid a salary just like the chiefs in Buganda. However, in 1902 the protectorate officials took over Budaka from Kakungulu, on the pretext that he was mistreating the local people. He was sent to Mbale and given some land on which to settle.

In Mbale, too, Kakungulu worked hard to establish law and order even beyond the area he was officially allotted. He set up an administration using the Baganda chiefs. He and his followers established banana farms and constructed roads. Indian traders went to Mbale and started a brisk trade. In 1903 the new commissioner, James Sadler, met Kakungulu and was impressed by the way he handled the Africans and the respect they gave him, and he reinstated him as chief. In 1904 the headquarters of Bukedi was moved from Budaka to Mbale.

By 1906 the conflict between Kakungulu and the assistant collector at Mbale had made it difficult for the two to work together, so Kakungulu was removed. The protectorate administration feared to retire him at this point, due to his immense influence. He was therefore sent to Busoga in 1906, as the president of the Busoga Council. The post reduced him to a mere bureaucrat. Nonetheless, he succeeded in transforming the council into an effective organ. He also supervised the labor force that built the Kakindu Namasagali railway. In 1913 the colonial administration felt it was safe to discard Kakungulu, as his influence had diminished and he was no longer a threat. He was sent back to Mbale as a county chief.

Kakungulu assisted the colonial administration in Uganda in establishing rule in both Buganda and what became the Eastern Province of Uganda. Having built the foundations of an orderly administration, he was pushed aside by the colonizers, who used his work to their own advantage.

FILDA OJOK

See also: **Uganda: Colonization, Resistance, Uganda Agreement, 1890–1900.**

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Kalonga Masula: See Maravi: Kalonga Masula: Empire, Trade.

Kampala

Kampala has a population of over one million residents of whom at least 99 per cent are Africans. The current Kampala population projections for the next census in 2004 stand at 1.5 million.

Prior to the establishment of British rule in Uganda, Mmengo, the capital of the kingdom of Buganda, was the seat of political power in the Great Lakes region and the location of the palace of the king (*kabaka*) of Buganda. When, on December 18, 1890 Captain Frederick Lugard, acting on behalf of the British Imperial East African Company, established company rule over Uganda, he inevitably raised the company flag in the vicinity of Mmengo Palace.

The raising of the company flag and the Union Jack by Lugard on Kampala hill (now Old Kampala), marks the founding of Kampala City. In 1900 Sir Harry Johnston was appointed British special commissioner to Buganda and formally established British rule over Uganda, with his headquarters located at Lugards Fort at Old Kampala hill.

After formal establishment of British, the settlement grew rapidly both in size and activity, and in 1906 it was declared a township with a population of 30,000. Several Asian families, many of whom had initially worked as indentured laborers on the Kenya-Uganda railway, set up shops and homes. Kampala was quite crowded, which forced the colonial administration to move its offices to Entebbe, along the shores of Lake Victoria, where the governor's official residence was located. Entebbe then became the colonial administrative capital of Uganda Protectorate. The few remaining government offices were subsequently moved to Nakasero, an adjacent hill to the east of Kampala, but taking with them the name Kampala, effectively turning the original (Ka) Mpala hill into Old Kampala.

Business seems to have followed the government's move to Nakasero, as Asian traders set up their

businesses there. Subsequently Nakasero was to become (and remain) the central commercial zone of Kampala. The Asian traders almost single-handedly controlled all commercial activity in the town, as they did in the rest of the country, until their expulsion by Amin in 1972.

Several shops of Indian Bazaar architectural style were set up and a few still remain as reflection of the city's early architectural history. Many of these historical buildings have sadly been pulled down to make space for new concrete high-rise skyscrapers. There are however several other landmarks of this early period of Kampala that still stand today. These include the Church Missionary Society hospital at Mmengo set up in 1897, the Roman Catholic cathedral at Rubaga, and the Anglican (Church of Uganda) cathedral on Namirembe hill. The British colonial administration set up Mulago hospital, which later became the Makerere College (University of London) teaching hospital in the early 1920s. Makerere College itself was founded in 1922 on land donated by the Buganda government.

The first Kampala town planning committee was set up as early as 1913 to plan and regulate the city's growth and development. By 1937 Kampala already had piped water and electricity from generators. Some major roads in the town had been paved and a drainage and central sewerage system was being developed. The residential neighborhoods experienced the prevalent colonial racially segregated residential pattern, as the European community moved to the top of Nakasero and the adjacent Kololo hills. The Asians occupied most of the lower western slopes of Nakasero, linking up with their old settlement on Old Kampala hill across the Nakivubo Channel. The Africans lived in the surrounding villages and rode into town on bicycles every morning. A few worked for Europeans or government while others delivered their home produce to the market for sale. It was not until 1950, when government started developing African quarters at Ntinda, Naguru, and Nakawa on the eastern fringes of Kampala, that the city got its first African residents. The only exception to this was the African suburb of Katwe, which became the hive of all African urban activity, both commercial and political, as well as labor organization and mobilization.

In 1946 the Uganda Broadcasting Service went on the air from Kampala as the country's first wireless broadcasting service. In 1949 Kampala attained municipal status with a population of 58,000, having increased from 35,000 in 1914. In 1959 Kampala got its first Ugandan African mayor, Serwano Kulubya. At independence in 1962, when Kampala was declared a city and officially became the capital of Uganda, its population had increased to 200,000.

These figures, however, should be read alongside the fact that the great majority of Africans on the city streets by day were, and still are, mainly nonresidents. In 1968, when Kampala incorporated the neighboring African villages of Kawempe (north); Nakulabye, Mmengo, and Natete (west); Makindye (south); and Nakawa, Luzira, Ntinda, and Kyambogo (east), the population of the resultant Greater Kampala swelled to 330,000. The 1994 comprehensive master plan of Kampala put its population at over one million, almost all African. This dramatic increase in Kampala's African population in the post-Amin years was partly due to the massive rural-urban migration to Kampala during the 1980–1985 civil war, during which Kampala was one of the few safe havens in the country. War refugees, especially from the Luwero triangle war zone, all flocked to Kampala for safety.

Kampala has had a number of firsts. The city hosted the first-ever papal visit to Africa, when Pope Paul VI visited in 1969. In 1975 Kampala was host to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit when Idi Amin was elected OAU chairman. In 1998 the city hosted U.S. President Bill Clinton when he visited the Great Lakes region and held a summit with nine African presidents from the region.

As the capital city of Uganda, and therefore the center of political power and seat of government, the city has suffered the brunt of most of the political turmoil and violence which the country has undergone since independence. The Battle of Mmengo, which ousted Sir Edward Mutesa and led to the abolition of Ugandan kingdoms, ushered in a culture of political violence, of which inhabitants of Kampala have been the main victims. The Amin regime subjected the country, and Kampala in particular, to violence and genocide. The overthrow of Amin in 1979 saw Kampala under siege; the city found itself engulfed in a war that nearly razed it to the ground. This was followed by five years of urban terrorism and cold-blooded massacre, the main proponents of which were based in Kampala. By 1986 when the National Resistance Movement stormed Kampala, it was almost a ghost town.

Since 1986 there has been a significant amount of rehabilitation of the city's basic infrastructure and services. The World Bank, the European Community, and other donors have given aid to rehabilitate the city. Today the post of mayor of Kampala is one of the most coveted elective offices in the country, perhaps only next to that of president of the Republic of Uganda. The Uganda Chamber of Commerce and the Uganda Manufacturers Association are both based in Kampala. The main railway head, as well as the only inland port, Port Bell, on the shores of Lake Victoria, are in Kampala.

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See also: **Uganda.**

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Kanem: Origins and Growth (Sixth–Tenth Centuries)

The Kanem Empire occupied a large area that includes parts of the republics of Niger, Chad, Camerouns, and Nigeria. The limits of the empire correspond approximately with the boundaries of the Chad Basin, an area of more than 300,000 square miles. The present lake is a shrunken version of a much larger area, which scholars now refer to as Mega-Chad. The drying-up of the Sahara after 8,000BCE resulted in the gradual diminution of the area known as Mega-Chad.

To be sure, the origins of Kanem can be traced to the settlement of the fertile areas of the lakes of Mega-Chad. The historical evidence suggests that in the first century BCE, there were probably two lakes. The two lakes were connected with each other through an area that is now known as the Jurab Depression. The configuration of the two lakes lasted until about 250 years ago when the Bahr al-Ghazal opening of Lake Chad became congested with residue, and water stopped


running. The fertile soil of the lake must have provided copious amounts of food to hunters and gatherers who had created a culture that was changing from Middle Stone Age to New Stone Age.

Between 2,000 and 1,000BCE, groups of Stone Age people moved into the area southwest of Lake Chad. Initially, they came to the area periodically, but later they began to settle the low hills that were adjacent to the flood plain. They made improvements on their dwellings over time as they further elevated their islands above the flood plains by amassing clay on the initial plane. They domesticated cattle and also hunted. The pottery of this people suggests that before 1,000BCE a food-producing culture had emerged in this area. In fact, the cultivation of *masakwa*, a sorghum, is believed to have been fairly widespread in these lands. The historical evidence would suggest that the inhabitants of this region were Chadic speakers.

The early history of the settlements in this region provides a background for understanding the beginning of the process of state formation in the Lake Chad region. One early interpretation explains the emergence of states in terms of the Hamitic hypothesis. The Hamitic hypothesis contends that the Lake Chad area was peopled by undeveloped Negroid peoples who were conquered and organized into politically centralized states by Semitic peoples from the north. Another interpretation, however, suggests that the rise of states in the Lake Chad region was not a result of conquest by a culturally superior external agency but through a process of interaction and reworking of the culture of the northern dwellers with that of the original inhabitants of the region.

The Lake Chad region is bounded in the north by the Fezzan, which in ancient times was dominated by the Garamantes. The Garamantes had succeeded in establishing a centralized state in the Fezzan by the fifth century. This state presided over trade relations with the towns of Mediterranean. The scope of their association with the interior is unclear, but the evidence suggests that they organized occasional raids to the south. To the south of the Fezzan were the Zaghawa. The Zaghawa appear in the documents of Muslim scholars in the ninth century. Al-Yaqubi was the first to mention that they lived in a land called Kanem. Also in this area could be found the Hawdin, Mallel, and al-Qaqu. It would seem that certain aspects of the political system of Kanem were a mixture of Mallel and Zaghawa political traditions. For example, the kings of Kanem became known as *mais*, which was the title held by the rulers of Mallel. By the tenth century the ruler of Kanem had extended his authority over the economically important Kawar oases.

By that time, a loosely organized centralized state had emerged in the region east of Lake Chad. It had



Kanem, eleventh–fourteenth centuries.

arisen from a coalescing of a number of small rival states probably under the aegis of the Zaghawa. The development of trade and the ancillary needs of security and transport had facilitated the growth of these states. Also, by the tenth century the emergent state had taken control of the strategically placed Kawar oases, which further enhanced long distance commerce. The oral traditions of the people suggest that after a period of intense rivalry among the ruling families of the Zaghawa, the Saifawa dynasty imposed its overlordship over the others and ruled Kanem for a thousand years. The traditions suggest that Sayf b. Dhi Yazan was the founder of this dynasty.

After bringing together the disparate groups in the area, the Saifawa dynasty created a state east of Lake Chad with a capital at Njimi and began a process of imperial expansion. Although the Saifawa dynasty lasted for such a long time, it was by no means a dictatorship. The *mais* ruled through a royal council. Further, the empire was divided into provinces, with important administrative and commercial centers. The *mais* mother, elder sister, and first wife enjoyed great privileges, and for the most part, the royal family remained in control of the political process and ensured the longevity of the dynasty. In the eleventh century, the ruling class in Kanem embraced Islam.

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See also: **Religion: Islam, Growth of: Western Africa.**

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Kanem: Slavery and Trans-Saharan Trade

The medieval empire of Kanem, to the east of Lake Chad, owed much of its economic fortune to its role as the southern terminus of the great trans-Saharan trade route from the Mediterranean sea coast of Tripolitania. That road via Fezzan and Kawar was possibly the oldest and certainly the most enduring and easiest Saharan crossing. It offered the shortest link between, on the one side, the entrepots of North Africa (with their direct access to southern Europe, Egypt, and the Levant)

and on the other the Sub-Saharan markets for the raw produce drawn from deeper into tropical Africa. It brought economic and associated benefits to traders, rulers, and senior state officials on both sides of the desert, as well as to intermediate nomadic and oasis trading communities, while its role as a channel for north-south Islamic religious, cultural, intellectual, and technical influences had far-reaching implications for the development of Kanemi political, economic, and social institutions.

The road's earliest use at least four thousand years ago suggests that some sort of organized trading societies had long existed at its southern and northern end. The route exploited the natural amenities of the south-north Kawar oasis chain, about one-third of the way from Lake Chad to the Mediterranean, and the oases of Fezzan, about two-thirds of the way across. That the sea-borne Phoenicians recognized the road's potential about 500BCE suggests the existence of worthwhile trading opportunities with inner Africa, probably through the agency of the Garamantes people of Fezzan. But it is not really clear what was then traded across the Sahara, and in particular which produce of inner Africa was able to withstand the hazards, high costs, and mistreatment of desert transport to find ready markets as luxury goods in the Mediterranean world. Gold dust, animal skins, ivory, gemstones, perfumes, and some black slaves—the attested staples of the medieval export trade of inner Africa—are assumed also to have been carried across the desert in earlier times. But the regular trans-Saharan trade in black slaves supplied through markets in the Lake Chad region to end users in North Africa and the Middle East seems to have been established only after the rise of the Islamic caliph empire in the seventh century. This was largely a replacement trade, since slaves in Islamic societies normally failed to maintain their own numbers by reproduction.

For the Islamic world, the largest and seemingly inexhaustible reservoirs of slaves were the inner regions of Sub-Saharan black Africa. Slavery was endemic there, and surplus or unwanted slaves were readily available for export. There is little doubt that Sudanese slavery, slave making, and trading all expanded under the stimulus of external Islamic demand. But the medieval empire of Kanem, as the prime supplier of slaves for the northbound trade to Fezzan and Tripoli, was itself an entrepot for peoples taken from the lands south of Lake Chad, and particularly from the Sara communities settled along the lower reaches of the Shari and Logone rivers. Kanemi raiders also exploited the country south of Baghirmi for slaves as the scale and scope of raiding expanded to keep pace with persistent North African demand. With the Islamization of Kanem occurring around the year 1100, jihad into

pagan lands became an additional incentive and justification for slave raiding. The Islamic-pagan slaving frontier tended to shift deeper into tropical Africa in response to these pressures, although on the Shari-Logone flood plains it stabilized, leaving the same peoples and tribes vulnerable to Muslim Kanemi slave raiders for centuries.

About two-thirds of the black slaves exported northward from Kanem were women and young girls destined to meet the domestic and sexual demands of North African and Middle Eastern Islamic households. The trade seems to have developed a regular yearly pattern of one or two large slave caravans after the Ibadī Berber penetration of the central Sahara and the lands beyond it in the eighth century; the oasis of Zawila in eastern Fezzan became the trade's main Saharan entrepot. Numbers of slaves exported are hard to estimate, but on the basis of some reliable eighteenth- and nineteenth-century figures, an average traffic between Kanem and the Fezzan of around 2,500 slaves per year seems reasonable, with perhaps a quarter of those dying on the way, or being sold to final owners in the desert. Although some of Kanem's medieval rulers were famed for their wealth in gold, its export northward seems always to have had secondary importance to the slave trade (presumably the main source of state revenues), as also had the traffic in other raw products of inner Africa.

Northern imports into Kanem included textiles, arms, and other transportable manufactures of Europe, North Africa, Egypt, and the Levant. The main medium of exchange for exportable slaves seems, at least in the later Middle Ages, to have been the larger and heavier imported horses derived from the Barb breed of North Africa, with one horse buying fifteen to twenty slaves. Also from the north came the arms, stirrups, and other cavalry equipment that ensured the empire's military ascendancy, and particularly its large yearly booty in raided slaves for local use and export. Although Kanem also traded with Egypt and with Tunis, the central Saharan road was always so important to the empire's economic and political well-being that successive Kanemi rulers protected and controlled it at least as far north as the Kawar oases; similar concerns also no doubt prompted the brief annexation of Fezzan and the establishment of a new commercial capital at Traghen oasis in the thirteenth century. Under Kanem's successor state, Bornu, the central Saharan road to Tripoli continued as a channel for commercial and intellectual exchange until its ruin by European abolitionist and other pressures in the late nineteenth century.

JOHN WRIGHT

See also: **Slavery: Trans-Saharan Trade.**

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Kanem: Decline and Merge with Borno (c.1400)

An African state founded by the Kanuri, a mixture of people from south of the Sahara and the Berber from the north, Kanem lasted a thousand years from the ninth to the nineteenth century.

The Kanuri lived northeast of Lake Chad in Kanem (Kanuri for *anem*, south of the Sahara). During the first few hundred years of Kanem's existence, the Kanuri had been dominated by the Zaghawa nomads from the north until the eleventh century when a new dynasty, the Saifawa, named after the legendary hero from the Yemen, Saif ibn Dhi Yazan, was founded by Humai (c.1075–86) whose descendants continued to wield power in the Chad Basin until the nineteenth century. Perhaps of Berber origins, Humai established his capital at Djimi (Njimi) as the *mai* (king) and founder of the Saifawa dynasty. Kanem prospered from agriculture and livestock, but the power of the *mai* and his court was derived mainly from the trans-Saharan caravan trade. Merchants coming across the desert brought goods that enhanced the prestige and authority of the *mai*, Islam, and the literacy of Arabic.

By the eleventh century, Islam was the religion of the court, but the *mai* and his officials continued to recognize the rituals and festivals of the traditional beliefs throughout the long history of the state. The consolidation of the court enabled it to embark upon conquests and during the next two centuries Kanem expanded by military might and alliances with the Zaghawa nomads of the desert and Sahel as far west as the Niger river, east to Wadai, and north to the Fezzan. The expansion of Kanem reached its zenith in the thirteenth century during the reign of *mai* Dunama Dabalemi ibn Salma (c.1210–1248) after which the power of the state began to decline, torn by a century of dynastic strife from within and the Bulala from without.

The introduction of collateral succession (one brother following another) rather than direct descent by primogeniture produced factions within the dynasty from the offspring of wives and concubines, short reigns, and instability that the Bulala exploited. The Bulala were nomads of the Nilo-Sahara language family living southeast of Lake Chad who invaded Kanem in the fourteenth century. They ravaged the eastern regions of Kanem, sacked Djimi, and between 1377 and 1389 killed seven successive *mais*, driving the Saifawa dynasty from the capital and their subjects west of Lake Chad into Bornu by the end of the century. The fraternal factionalism of the Saifawa dynasty continued throughout the fifteenth century until *mai* Ali Gaji ibn Dunama (c. 1476–1503) asserted his authority over his rivals, consolidated his rule in Bornu, and defeated the Bulala who remained, however, a constant threat on his eastern frontier. He constructed a new, walled capital at Birni Gazargamu and, according to legend, was able to mobilize 40,000 cavalry in his army.

Throughout the sixteenth century Bornu expanded under a succession of able *mai*, the greatest of whom was Idris Alawma (c. 1571–1603). He consolidated the internal administration of the state, expanded its empire and commerce, stabilized the Bulala frontier, and supported the propagation of Islam. Although a confirmed Muslim who supported the construction of mosques in Bornu, he did not make the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca and his subjects remained stubbornly committed to their traditional religions, which he respected. His successors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued these fundamental policies to defend the heartland of Bornu from incursions by the Kwararafe from the south, the Tuareg from the north, the growing power of the Hausa states to the west, and the resistance of the indigenous Mandara in Bornu.

These external threats were accompanied by the vicissitudes of climate that have historically determined life in the arid Sahel and parched savanna of the central Sudan. Drought was accompanied by famines, over which the *mai* had no control; all he could do was appeal to the spirits and Allah. The depression of the trans-Saharan trade during these centuries resulted in the loss of a constant supply of firearms, which was dramatically changing the balance of power in the *Bilad al-Sudan*.

More disturbing was the immigration of the Fulbe (Fulani) from Hausaland in the west. These pastoral nomads from western Africa eroded the state. They were disliked and discriminated against in Bornu and demanded redress for their grievances against the *mai*, his government, and his people. Supported by Uthman Dan Fodio of Sokoto, the Bornu Fulani rebelled in 1805 and would have prevailed if the *mai* had not

called upon Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, a Kanembu cleric, for assistance.

Al-Kanemi was reared in the Quaranic tradition, traveled widely, and made the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. In the 1790s he returned to Bornu as a *malam* (teacher). Responding to the *mai*, he carried on a famous correspondence with Uthman Dan Fodio over the religious reasons for his Fulbe jihad against fellow believers, the Muslims of Bornu. He rallied the forces of Bornu to defeat the Fulbe, and by 1820 he had become the virtual ruler of Bornu with a new capital at Kukawa built in 1814. Known as the *Shehu* he consolidated the sultanate of Bornu before his death in 1837.

Thereafter his successors, the *Shehus* of Kukawa, ruled Bornu killing the last *mai* to end the ancient Saifawa dynasty in 1846. The short-lived *Shehu* dynasty was soon overthrown by the freebooter, Rabih Zubayr. Born in Khartoum in 1845, Rabih Zubayr was a successful slaver in the Upper Nile and later in the 1880s a warlord in the Ubangi-Chari River valleys. He defeated a French expedition in 1891, occupied the kingdom of Baguirmi, and conquered Bornu in 1894. Supported by his *bazinqir* (slave troops), he dominated the Chad and Bornu until defeated and killed at Lakhta on April 22, 1900, by a French force under Emile Gentile. The kingdom of Kanem-Bornu was now a province of the French West African Empire.

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See also: **Borno, Sultanate of.**

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Kanem-Borno: See Chad: Nineteenth Century: Kanem-Borno (Bornu) and Wadai.

Kano

Kano has a population of about 600,000. It has a major role in Nigeria as both a commercial and a leather-working center. Kano also has a thriving industrial sector, producing peanut flour and oil, cotton textiles,

steel furniture, processed meat, concrete blocks, shoes, and soap. Its tanned goatskin hides, for centuries traded north across the Sahara, were once known as Moroccan leather.

Kano is one of the original seven Hausa states, with a written history going back to the year 999. At that time Kano was already a few hundred years old. For centuries Kano had been a center of culture and a leader in handicraft goods as well as a commercial center. These attributes led to extensive contacts in North and West Africa. These contacts increased its ethnic heterogeneity. At first Arabs and Kanuri came to Kano and many remained there. Soon other traders converged on the city. These traders came from Katsina, Nupe, and elsewhere.

At about this same time, during the latter part of the fifteenth century, Gao gained its independence from the declining Mandingo Empire. Gao was the Songhai center on the Niger River. Songhai capitalized on the decline of the Mandingo Empire and became the leading power on the Niger. Askia el Hajj led the Songhai Empire to its highest point and made Timbuktu the leading intellectual center of the area.

During this period the Hausa states received notice when the noted traveler and historian Leo Africanus visited the Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina, and Kano. Songhai had conquered these states, further reinforcing Islamic influence there. Many Islamic scholars settled in Kano bringing the latest developments in Islamic scholarship to the area.

During the rule of Mohammad Rumfa (1494–1520), a contemporary of Ibrahim Maji at Katsina, Kano was transformed politically. The chieftainship changed into a centralizing force with a great concentration of power. The reign of Rumfa is remembered in oral tradition at Kano as a time of Islamic revival throughout the Hausa states.

The Hausa states became commercial centers because trade moved east as changes such as the Moroccan conquest of the Niger area led to chaos in the Niger region. Subsequently, the Hausa states came into close commercial and political contact with North Africa, marking a turning point in the history of the Sudan. Arab traders began to develop the direct trans-Saharan route from Kano through Agades, Ghat, and Murzuk to Tripoli.

After the fall of the Songhai Empire, this route brought influences from all over Africa, including Ghadames, Tripoli, Murzuk, and Cairo. Merchants from these areas migrated to Kano. This trade resulted in a steady flow of Egyptian goods. Kano imported from Egypt such things as perfumes, incense, the more expensive inks, mirrors, and Maria Theresa dollars. These silver dollars were used in the famous Kano silver work.

Because of these influences, Kano's prominence in commercial activity, and the political stability it brought, Islam became the religion of the elite in the 1500s, reaching the zenith of its influence and power in the next two centuries.

In 1809 the Fulani under Usman dan Fodio conquered Kano during the Fulani jihad. However, Kano was able to reclaim its commercial leadership under their rule. Kano became the greatest commercial center of the Fulani Empire. Perhaps, its greatest fame came from the superb work of its weavers and dyers. The raw cloth came from Tripoli. After being dyed it went back to Tripoli for sale in its markets.

In 1824, Captain Hugh Clapperton, the British explorer, overcame his initial disappointment in Kano when he visited its market. The market regulations and variety especially impressed him. Similarly, the market impressed Henry Barth, another explorer. Barth said that Kano had around 30,000 foreigners living in the city, making it "the emporium of central Africa." A simple list of its imports in the mid-nineteenth century gives an idea of its commercial activity. Kano imported silk from Tripoli, cotton from Manchester, sword blades from Solingen, and paper, mirrors, and needles from Nuremberg. While importing these modern luxuries, it continued to be a center for the salt trade, importing scarce salt from the salt caravans of the Sahara. Kano was an exporter as well as an importer. It exported its famous dyed and woven cloth, of course. But it also sold grain from Hausa farms, kola nuts, natron from Lake Chad, and slaves. Kano remained a slave center until the British ended the slave trade and, eventually, slavery itself in the twentieth century.

In 1903 the British consolidated their rule of northern Nigeria through capturing Kano, further increasing its ethnic heterogeneity. During the colonial period, which ended in October 1960, the British brought British law and created the country of Nigeria, uniting areas that had never before been united. The southern part of Nigeria modernized more rapidly and thoroughly than the north. Kano has made attempts to keep up with the more developed south with its university, museums, and educated elite.

However, despite massive building projects and its many educated men and women, there is a sense of little real change in Kano. The market still retains its ancient qualities as if Clapperton could return and not be surprised by it. Modern items are found but there are still stalls in which millet, guinea corn, rice, and peanuts are for sale in mounds through which buyers can finger the product. Desert nomads still purchase saddles and bridles from men sitting cross-legged in huts. Dye pits with the royal indigo dye still exist.

Beneath the veneer of modern Kano with its thriving twenty-first century economy, there is still traditional

Kano, with its Islamic emir, shari'a law, cycle of prayers, white-robed *al-hajiya*. The future of Kano lies in its amalgamation of these past and present characteristics and its ability to attune them to the demands of Nigeria in the twenty-first century.

FRANK A. SALAMONE

See also: **Rumfa Muhammad.**

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Karagwe: *See* **Great Lakes Region: Karagwe, Nkore, and Buhaya.**

Karanga States: *See* **Mutapa State, 1450–1884.**

Karimojong: *See* **Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Eastern Nilotes: Ateker (Karimojong).**

Kasai and Kuba: Chiefdoms and Kingdom

The peoples living in what is now the Kasai region of the Congo vary from loosely organized chiefdoms to highly centralized states. In the north, Mongo influence is evident, while in the west, south, and east, the respective impacts of Kongo, Mbundu, Lunda, and Luba cultures are more pronounced. Among the most important Kasai ethnic groups are the stateless Pende, Lele, and Salampasu in the west; the highly structured Kuba in the northwest; the loosely organized Tetela (Mongo-related) and Songye (Luba-related) in the northeast; the Kasai Luba living in separate chiefdoms in the center and east; and the stateless Kete and more centralized Kanyok in the south. Over many centuries, trade, migration, warfare, and cultural borrowing among these groups have all contributed to a social, economic, political, and genetic melange. Although under Belgian rule the Kasai region was organized into territories, chiefdoms, and sectors, such political and ethnic tidiness had not existed before the colonial era.

Flowing north and west, the rivers in the Kasai region are tributaries of the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers that in turn join together before emptying into the much larger Congo River. Although the land close to the waterways is relatively productive, the savannas between the rivers (especially in southern Kasai) are less suitable for farming. As a result, people living in southern Kasai tended to cluster in the river valleys and claim hunting rights over surrounding grasslands. In the northern part of Kasai nearer to the great equatorial forest, people have access to a more varied environment that includes rivers, woodlands, and open clearings. Although all the Kasai peoples developed distinct ethnic identities marked by common language and culture, very few of the people had centralized political institutions and even those who did formed them during or after the 1700s.

Over the years, all peoples of Kasai have been affected by a number of profound changes. Probably as long as humans have settled in the southern part of Kasai, periodic droughts have led to famines that forced people to migrate in search of food and safety. Even those who had managed to save or grow sufficient food were endangered by roving bandits whose own lack of resources led them to plunder others. After about 1600, the influences of the Atlantic trade complex brought other transformations. Cassava and maize replaced bananas in the north and pushed out millet and sorghum in the south. Because the New World crops were more resistant to drought, less demanding in terms of harvest scheduling, and more likely to produce higher yields, these crops enabled people to build up food surpluses that supported increased trade and specialization. These crops also tended to shift more of the labor to women. Later, especially in the late 1700s and early 1800s, trade in ivory and slaves brought new wealth and power in the form of cloth, metal ware, liquor, and guns. In addition to this east-west trade, commerce between the forest regions to the north (a source of raffia, fish, slaves) and the savannas to the south (suppliers of copper, salt, and meat) preceded the opening of overland and riverine travel to the coast. Although much of the north-south and east-west trade was indirect, by the 1800s long-distance merchants able to mobilize impressive quantities of capital and scores of porters had become permanent fixtures in Kasai.

By the mid-1800s, the Cokwe from Angola were among the most successful because their long experience as hunters and gatherers of bee's wax gave them a comparative advantage in trade. Renowned for their ability and willingness to carry out business over vast expanses of territory, their social organization allowed them to easily incorporate newcomers and expand their politico-economic network.

Already in the 1600s and 1700s, strong political leaders began to emerge in Kasai. Taking advantage both of the dangers and opportunities that presented themselves, men emerged to serve as protectors, leaders of raiding groups, arbiters of disputes, and champions of commerce. Some became powerful and wealthy, attracting numerous youthful followers, obtaining slaves and clients, acquiring many wives, and fathering several children. All across Kasai, society became marked by clear hierarchies and tensions. At the bottom of the social order, slaves and clients (many former refugees) were marginalized as people without kin support. Such people were dependent upon their more powerful owners or patrons. Paradoxically, while the majority of the population regarded themselves as the “original inhabitants” of the land, they retained a mythological memory of autochthonous pygmylike people linked to the elemental spiritual forces controlling productivity and fertility. Also paradoxically, most “original inhabitants” could not expect to hold the highest political offices. Such positions were reserved for the families of the chiefly class. The ruling men and women of that class, people whose ancestors most likely were no different from those of the “original inhabitants,” claimed to be outsiders with heroic and exotic roots that set them apart from their less powerful neighbors and subjects.

Because of the somewhat unsettled nature of society and because of the evident rivalries and rifts, witchcraft was a constant reality. Jealously, the desire for power, suspicion, the need for revenge, and guilt all contributed to a climate in which both the disadvantaged and the advantaged used witchcraft and suspected others of resorting to such antisocial supernatural powers.

While many of Kasai’s leaders never established permanent polities, the Kuba (a name given to them by the Luba) in the northwest and the Kanyok in the southeast built formidable states. The Kuba kingdom was a multiethnic confederation under a Bushoong aristocracy. Related to the Lele, the Bushoong were one of several Mongo-speaking groups who migrated south from the forest region. By about 1700 they had gained ascendancy over their kin and neighbors (notably the Lunda-related Kete) to develop the basis for a strongly centralized and highly stratified kingdom. Shyaam aMbul aNgoong (c.1625–40), a long-distance trader and the reputed founder of the kingdom, was regarded as a key player in this process. Supposedly he founded the capital, conquered all the neighboring chiefs, and wielded awesome magical power. Paralleling the loss of political power by regional chiefs, regional gods and spirits also suffered diminished authority and prestige. By the mid-1700s, King Kot aNce was able to

claim the authority to exile or execute subordinate chiefs. Although able to act in an arbitrary manner since he was thought to be endowed with an innate sense of justice, a Kuba king’s proposals were subject to veto by a set of titled councilors. As a result of royal coercion and the introduction of crops from America, the kings were able to double agricultural surplus in their region. The surplus wealth was used for trade and to support a class of bureaucrats, warriors, artisans, and artists who worked to promote the power and glory of the king.

In southeastern Kasai, the Kanyok, who claimed Luba origins, were culturally, economically, and politically oriented toward the east and south. By 1700 they had developed a series of powerful regional chiefdoms which in turn were consolidated into a single polity by about 1800. This was achieved by leaders such as Chibang a Ciband (c.1775–1795), who strengthened the institution of the Mwen a Kanyok (supreme chief), and Ilung a Chibang (c.1820–1820), who cut ties with the Luba Kingdom. Like their Bushoong counterparts, the Kanyok leaders claimed distant and exotic origins that separated them from their more humble subjects. Like the Bushoong, the Kanyok benefited from the marked intensification of the slave and ivory trade in the late 1700s and early 1800s. By the mid-1800s, the Kanyok had become feared slave raiders who multiplied state wealth at the expense of their less centralized neighbors.

South of the Bushoong and west of the Kanyok, Lele and Kete peoples resisted the tendencies leading to political, social, and religious centralization. Village authorities and elders retained more power, parochial religious shrines remained more significant, and local lineages mattered more. On the other hand, both the Lele and Kete regions prospered less because they had a less pronounced division of labor and a less productive agricultural system. Both groups found it difficult to withstand the incursions of their more aggressive and prosperous neighbors. The same was true of the Luba Kasai people, living in the east central regions of Kasai.

BUNDJOKO BANYATA AND JOHN C. YODER

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Kaunda, Kenneth (1924–)

President of Zambia

President of Zambia from 1964 to 1991, Kenneth David Kaunda stood out as one of the most humane and idealistic leaders in the postindependence age. He played a notable role as a leader of the Frontline States in the long confrontation between independent black Africa and the white-dominated south, which only came to an end in 1994 with the election of Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa. A consummate politician, he spent much of his time shuffling top party figures to balance ethnic groups and their claims to power sharing. He was a poor economist and his critics claimed that had he devoted as much attention to Zambia's problems as he did to those of "confrontation" with the south, his country would not have descended to the level of poverty it had reached by the end of the 1980s.

At independence, copper was booming and provided Zambians with a relatively high standard of living, but when the boom came to an end in 1973, Kaunda showed little capacity for dealing with the new economic problems the country faced. Zambia sunk into debt. Throughout the 1980s, steadily deteriorating economic conditions substantially reduced Zambian living conditions. Kaunda was simply too busy on the international stage to deal adequately with domestic problems.

Kaunda began his political career as secretary of the Young Men's Farming Association, which was a stepping stone to the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC). In 1948 he founded and became secretary general of the Lubwa ANC branch; in 1950 he was appointed organizing secretary of the ANC for all of Northern Rhodesia. He rose to become secretary general of the ANC and deputy to its leader, Harry Nkumbula. He was firmly opposed to the Central African Federation (CAF), which came into being in 1953.

In October 1958, with a number of other young radicals, Kaunda quit the ANC to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) with himself as president. He opposed the new 1958 constitution and ordered the ZANC to boycott it. On March 12, 1959, he was arrested for holding an illegal meeting (by then he was seen as the main opponent of the CAF in the colony) and was sentenced to nine months in prison. While in prison he suffered a second serious bout of tuberculosis; he was released on January 9, 1960.

Kaunda promptly formed a new party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP); his aim was to take Northern Rhodesia out of the CAF and achieve

immediate independence. He launched a massive campaign of civil disobedience. Under the 1962 constitution, which he had initially opposed, Kaunda and UNIP contested the October elections; the result was inconclusive and UNIP joined Nkumbula's ANC in a coalition to form the colony's first government with an African majority, in which Kaunda became minister of local government and social welfare. The CAF came to an end at midnight on December 31, 1963, and a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia provided for self-government. In January 1964 Kaunda led UNIP to obtain a landslide victory and on January 22, he became prime minister of Northern Rhodesia, the youngest in the Commonwealth.

On October 24, 1964, Northern Rhodesia became independent as Zambia, with Kaunda as its first president. He was then at the height of his popularity and prestige.

Events to the south of Zambia, meanwhile, were already building up to a crisis. Nationalist wars against the Portuguese had begun in both Angola and Mozambique, while in Southern Rhodesia the end of the CAF was merely the prelude to a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) that was to come on in 1965. In South Africa, Hendrik Verwoerd was implementing the system of apartheid throughout his country; South Africa also controlled Zambia's southern neighbor Namibia. These developments were to have a profound impact upon the fortunes of Zambia over the next quarter century and upon the career of its president. Following UDI in Rhodesia, Kaunda declared a state of emergency in Zambia. He was to make many pleas to Britain to intervene in Rhodesia but they fell on deaf ears. At home, meanwhile, Kaunda became involved in a permanent balancing act between the different ethnic power groups that made up Zambia. He was reelected president in 1968.

In 1973 Kaunda won a third presidential term as the sole candidate. A turning point in the fortunes of both Zambia and Kaunda came with the fall of copper prices in 1973; it was the beginning of what turned into a permanent economic crisis. The country now became deeply indebted until; on a per capita basis, Zambians were among the most indebted people in the world. An attempted coup of 1980 emphasized Kaunda's growing unpopularity and isolation from those he governed. The decade that followed witnessed a steadily deteriorating economy, an ever widening circle of critics, and constantly falling living standards for ordinary Zambians.

Kaunda's reputation outside Zambia stood much higher than at home. His efforts to find solutions in Southern Africa were rewarded in 1979 when Lusaka was made the venue for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) of that year. Lusaka became the headquarters of the ANC and SWAPO, and in 1985 Kaunda succeeded Julius Nyerere of Tanzania as chairman of the Frontline States. Yet, despite his

external activities, by 1990 Kaunda's reputation had sunk to an all-time low at home, where demands for a multiparty system now came from both the National Assembly and UNIP, with the newly formed Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) holding nationwide rallies to demand change. After months of stalling as pressures mounted, Kaunda agreed to a new constitution in June 1991. Elections for the Assembly were held in October 1991 and resulted in a huge defeat for UNIP, which only held 25 seats to 125 for the MMD. In the separate presidential elections of November the trade unionist Frederick Chiluba obtained 972,753 votes to Kaunda's 310,761.

Kaunda was the first African president to be defeated at the polls and retire gracefully; to Chiluba he said, "My brother you have won convincingly and I accept the people's decision." Despite his shortcomings, Kaunda stands out as one of the finest African presidents of his generation.

GUY ARNOLD

See also: Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga; Zambia: First Republic, 1964–1972: Development and Politics; Zambia: Nationalism, Independence; Zambia: Second Republic, 1973–1991.

Biography

Kenneth Kaunda was born in 1924. He was secretary of the Chinsali Young Men's Farming Association in 1947, and secretary general, Northern Rhodesia's African National Congress in 1953. He formed the Zambia African National Congress in 1958. He was minister of local government and social welfare for Northern Rhodesia from 1962 to 1964. Kaunda was named first president of Zambia in 1964. In 1991 his term ended when he lost the presidential election to Frederick Chiluba. He has continued activity in the political realm, acting as president of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (The Kaunda Foundation) from 1991 until the present.

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Kazembe's Eastern Lunda

The Eastern Lunda are the faction of the Lunda state system most accessible in western libraries through the writings of British anthropologist Ian Cunnison, who

was interested in political institutions and their historical justification. This group, under the *mwata kazembe*, lives in the rich fishing areas of the Luapula river in northeastern Zambia; it is the remnant of what was a much larger hegemony before the mid-nineteenth century. By the time Cecil Rhodes staked his claim to this area as part of northeastern Rhodesia, the *mwata kazembe's* western lands had already been usurped by M'siri, a trader from modern Tanzania who had settled in Katanga to exploit its resources in slaves and copper. The British recognized the claims of the *citimukulu* as a paramount Bemba chief, although the Bemba had been a decentralized linguistic-cultural entity that included the largest portion of the subjects of *mwata kazembe* (whatever the proportion of the far-flung Bemba who owed political allegiance to *mwata kazembe* and his vassals). The Eastern Lunda clearly represented a conquest state, with an aristocracy tracing political titles through descent lines different from those used in civil matters and with praise poems in an obsolete language rather than the vernacular Bemba. During the colonial and postcolonial periods, the Eastern Lunda have been confined to the Luapula valley and adjoining eastern shores of Lake Mweru, for authorities in Congo discouraged cross-border relationships with a chief on the eastern side of the border.

The direct origins of the Eastern Lunda polity lay in southern Katanga among people who spoke neither Ruund nor Bemba. A transitory Lunda political entity was centered on the Mukulweji River west of modern Kolwezi in the late seventeenth century. According to oral tradition, a kinsman of the Ruund *mwant yav* (a lordship title) by the name of *kazemb* Mutand Chiyemb'yemb had been sent to subdue Ndembu-speaking and so-called Kosa peoples in the area. The title *kazemb* has a military connotation, and Mutand conquered as far as the salt marshes of the Kechila plain along the Lualaba north of Kolwezi. According to tradition, he sought to hide the new economic resource from his sovereign but was betrayed by Nfwembe Chinyanta, who naturally rose in the eyes of the *mwant yav* and was named captain of the area in place of Mutand. At the end of a conflict marked by assassination and intrigue, Mutand received partial reinstatement but withdrew to the Lukoji River well to the west among the northern Ndembu-speakers. Nfwembe's son Nfwidima Nganga Bilonda began moving his base of operations eastward but retained the Mukulweji as his ritual capital and was buried there. His brother Kanyembo conquered the Luapula valley and made it his permanent base.

The Mukulweji polity represents a zone of primary "Lundaization." Whether Mutand was biological kin of the reigning *mwant yav* or only a political dependent so described by the rules of Lunda perpetual kinship, the titles used came from the Ruund political homeland

at the Nkalany, as did some of the proper names. Today the Mukulweji is a no-man's land, near the borders of groups speaking Ndembu, kiLuba (but with matrilineal social systems and without the Luba political culture better known from farther northeast), and Sanga (another Luba dialect), with pockets of Ruund. The *kazembe wa lukoji* and the *mwata kazembe* of the Luapula were not alone; other southern Lunda titles tracing their origins to the Mukulweji include another *kazembe* in the Kechila salt marshes, *kanongesha*, *musokantanda*, and *ishindi*.

The most ancient praise songs among the Luapula Lunda are composed in kiLuba; the title *musokantanda* literally means "he who burns the land" in the same language. On the other hand, Mutand, the original captain sent by the Lunda court to carve out provinces in the south, and his successors have praise name elements suggesting Kete origins from outside the area, consistent with the *mwant yav* harnessing an ambitious young leader on the northern marches of his domain by sending him to the far south with royal blessing. The Eastern Lunda dynasty does not claim royal blood as descendants of a *mwant yav* but from a nephew of Ruwej, consonant both with their former great power and wealth and with only a tenuous biological connection with the Nkalany. It speaks of Nfwembe's clan, non-existent among the Ruund, and of a clan name that exists among the southern Luba of the Congo copperbelt. While there was likely Ruund participation in the Mukulweji conquest, it is clear that Lundahood is here a political rather than ethnic reality.

The Lunda who then settled in the Luapula valley conquered the Shila ("indigenous fishermen") living there previously. Calling themselves baLunda or bakaLunda, the conquerors were themselves divided into three subgroups: "true Lunda" (including the royal family above), the Bena Lualaba (absorbed during residence at Kechila), and the Bena Nkumwimba who came later. Intermarrying with the indigenous peoples, the Eastern Lunda dynasty claimed authority over groups living from the Lualaba to the approaches to Lake Nyasa. Lunda titles were generally held by people inheriting eligibility through a male line, yet the same individuals could participate in matrilineal clan politics at one stage of life and "patrilineal" royalty at another. The kiLuba praise songs anchoring the dynasty to the west are not the only sign of their origins on the Lualaba; the chief who installs a new *mwata kazembe* represents a group from there rather than the indigenous Shila of the Luapula, as could be expected. Nonetheless, many major officials bore titles known from the Ruund, and royal insignia were derived from the Nkalany.

The Eastern Lunda state was flourishing in the early nineteenth century when visited by the Portuguese expedition of Gamitto, following Bisa trading routes.

The capital was a substantial urban entity, court protocol was refined, and the chief's authority was widely recognized in principle. Certainly its authority over the Sanga peoples (matrilineal Luba) of the Congolese copperbelt was sufficient to produce a marked Lunda influence on their political institutions. The Eastern Lunda successor state retained the Lunda constitutional model that had been established at the Mukulweji, and its continued similarity shows their faithfulness to it once adopted. The Eastern Lunda state developed into a much more complex society than that which had existed at the Mukulweji and therefore shows greater innovation in court titles than the smaller *kazembe* courts at Kechila and the Lukoji, but the Eastern Lunda may have obtained some titles and insignia through later borrowing from the Ruund, for the two major courts kept up regular commercial and political contact. When the *pombeiros* (agents responsible for obtaining slaves) crossed the continent from Angola to Mozambique at the start of the nineteenth century, their route led them from the Nkalany through the Luapula.

JEFF HOOVER

See also: **Lunda.**


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**Keita, Modibo: See Mali, Republic of:
Keita, Modibo, Life and Era of.**

Kenya: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the East African interior was still a very secluded region in comparison with other areas of Africa. With its focus on the Eastern trade, neither the Swahili Arabs nor the Portuguese ventured beyond the small stretch of land along the Indian Ocean. The latter had ruled from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century but by the early eighteenth century Arabs from Oman had taken over the coastal zone near the equator. They started slowly



Kenya.

to penetrate the interior, moving toward the Buganda kingdom near Lake Victoria, albeit by a southern route. They mostly shunned the northern stretch of land that in the twentieth century would become known as Kenya.

During the nineteenth century, Kenya underwent tremendous changes and yet also retained a degree of continuity. While the period witnessed the end of the relative isolation of African societies in the interior, it marked the reduction of the relative significance of the cosmopolitan Islamic coast. Both areas experienced a process of evolution, expansion, and differentiation that facilitated the emergence of practices and institutions which would be interrupted by colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century. However, neither the interior nor the coast showed any reduced dependence on agriculture and trade as a means of survival and stimuli for change.

Several ethnic groups varying in size, internal organization, and language, such as the Bantus, Cushites, and Nilotes, constituted nineteenth century Kenya. Patterns of life among these groups demonstrated a strong relationship between the environment and internal evolution and extra-ethnic relations. Broadly, crop production and pastoralism shaped ethnic distribution, power, and influence. They determined not only group survival and expansion but also whether a community was sedentary or nomadic. Thus, land was to crop producers what pasture and water were to pastoralists, significant aspects of group life and class differentiation on the one hand, and sources of internal and external disputes on the other.

The Bantu-speaking groups monopolized crop production since they inhabited some of the richest agricultural lands in central and southwestern Kenya. With adequate rainfall and its loam fertile soils central Kenya nurtured one of the largest Bantu groups, the Kikuyu, who with their Mount Kenya neighbors, the Embu and Meru, were fairly self-sufficient in food production. All three groups grew beans, peas, sweet potatoes, sorghum, arrowroot, and millet besides taming goats, sheep, and cattle, albeit not on a similar scale to their pastoral neighbors, the Maasai.

Agriculture fundamentally influenced the internal evolution and external relations of the Mount Kenya Bantu throughout the nineteenth century. Internally, agriculture enhanced population increase and strengthened sedentary life, the two distinct features of farming communities as compared to pastoral ones in precolonial Kenya. Also, social organization, political leadership, religious rites, and technological innovation revolved around agriculture and land. Among the Kikuyu, for example, the “office” of the *Muthamaki* (the head of the extended family) evolved mainly to oversee land allocation, distribution, and arbitration over land disputes.

Externally, agriculture nurtured constant trade links between the Mount Kenya Bantu and their southern neighbors, the Bantu-speaking Akamba, and the Maasai due to the semiarid conditions and the overdependency on the cattle economy. The Akamba constantly imported food from the Mount Kenya areas. This led to the creation of strong regional networks of interdependency sustained mainly by the Akamba *Kuthuuu* (food) traders. They exchanged beer, animal skins, honey, and beeswax for the Mount Kenya staples of beans, arrowroot, and yams. Indeed, for most of the nineteenth century the Akamba played a prominent role not only as regional traders but also as long-distance (especially ivory) traders. They were intermediaries between the coastal Mijikenda and the Kenyan hinterland. From the second half of the nineteenth century their position weakened when the Zanzibar traders became involved in direct commerce in the Lake Victoria region and northern regions such as Embu, as elephants had become depleted in the more central areas. They exchanged cloth and metal rings for ivory and occasionally for slaves.

In western Kenya the Nilotic Luo and Bantu-speaking Luyhia practiced mixed farming, rearing animals, and cultivating crops. The Luo were originally pastoralists but gradually changed to mixed farming as a result of their migration to the Lake Victoria region and its attendant effects on their predominantly cattle economy. During a significant part of the nineteenth century their social, economic, and political institutions, like those of the Mount Kenya people, revolved around the importance attached to land. Increased pressure on land and subsequent disputes orchestrated the

evolution of *Pinje*, quasipolitical territorial units, among the Luo. The *Pinje* enhanced corporate identity besides protecting corporate land rights. External aggression toward their neighbors, particularly the Nilotic Nandi, Luyhia, and Gusii, added further impetus to the Luo identity in the nineteenth century. Kalenjin inhabitants (Sebei groups) of the Mount Elgon area were similarly involved in intensive intertribal warfare throughout the nineteenth century with neighboring groups, mostly Karamojong, Nandi, and Pokot pastoral groups. The Luyhia, like their Luo and Kalenjin counterparts in western Kenya, were also characterized by internal rivalry and external confrontation with neighbors over land and pasture. Among the major causes of the fighting were periodic droughts and famine; the latter occurring at least once every decade.

Some sections of the Luyhia, such as the Bukusu, kept animals while others such as the Kisa, Maragoli, Banyore, and Marama practiced farming. The less numerous and isolated Bantu-speaking Gusii further up the highlands of southwestern Kenya underwent similar economic changes to those of the Luo and Luyhia. Once avowed pastoralists when living on the Kano Plains of the Lake basin, they gradually lost their affinity with cattle with their migration to the present-day Gusii Highlands. They turned to crop production and reduced the numbers of animals they kept. Regional trade that involved the exchange of goods produced by different groups provided interethnic linkages and coexistence that mitigated against land-based conflicts among the various ethnic groups of western Kenya in the nineteenth century.

Providing an economic contrast to the Bantu-dominated agriculture were the Nilotic-speaking ethnic groups such as the Turkana, Nandi, and Maasai, who practiced pastoralism. They controlled large chunks of territories in nineteenth century Kenya partly because of the requirements of the nomadic pastoralism they practiced and their inherent militarism. Of all the pastoral groups in Kenya the Maasai were a power to be reckoned with. Their force had risen since the eighteenth century and culminated in a complex southward movement by Maa-speakers from the area to the west and south of Lake Turkana south to present-day Tanzania. By doing so they conquered, assimilated, and pushed aside other groups in the Rift valley.

However, unlike the Kikuyu who enjoyed increased prosperity and demographic increase, Maasai power declined tremendously during the nineteenth century in the face of climatic disasters that annihilated their predominantly cattle economy, internal strife that led to the partition of the Maasai into contending groups, and human and animal epidemics that reduced their population and cattle stocks. The Maasai were weakened by the succession disputes of the last years of the

nineteenth century. At the dawn of colonialism they had been replaced by the Nandi who emerged as the dominant power in western Kenya and resisted European penetration. In the northeast a similar change of power occurred. Since the sixteenth century Galla pastoralists had aggressively expanded southward from southern Ethiopia and Somalia. They finally reached Mombasa and occupied the lowland areas behind the coastal strip. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Galla, weakened by disease, had suffered several defeats at the hands of the Somali and gradually withdrew. Drought and rinderpest epidemics that swept through their cattle in the last decades of the century weakened them still further. This allowed the Mijikenda, although they suffered periodically from cattle raids by Maasai groups, to move slowly outward from the coastal zone in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The Kenyan coast, unlike the interior, had experienced historical links with the outside world long before the nineteenth century. The Arabs dominated the area from the tenth century onward with an interlude of Portuguese rule and economic monopoly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With the ousting of the Portuguese, the nineteenth century saw the reestablishment of the Oman Arabs' rule that for economic and political reasons was consummated by the transfer of their headquarters from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1840.

The politically semiautonomous settlements and trading posts such as Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu, Pate, Faza, and Siu remained as much an enduring feature of the Kenya coast in the nineteenth century as it had been in the previous century. The towns had strong ties between themselves based on religious, linguistic, and economic homogeneity. Islam was the dominant religion in the same way that Swahili was the prevalent lingua franca. Agriculture and trade remained the backbone of the coastal economy. Mainly practiced by the rich Arab families, agriculture's economic significance continued apace with demands for agrarian produce in the Indian Ocean trade. Local trade between the hinterland and the coast was in the hands of interior middlemen and the coastal Bantu-speaking Mijikenda.

Despite the above developments, the resurgence of Zanzibar as the heart of commercial traffic and activity stimulated the gradual decline of the economic and political significance of Kenyan coastal towns. The dawn of colonialism in the 1890s added further impetus in that direction. The establishment of various colonial administrative posts in the interior, the building of the Uganda Railway (1896–1901) and the shifting of the colonial headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi diverted attention from the coastal towns in the opening years of the twentieth century.

One of the most important discoveries that made the interior of Kenya known to the Northern hemisphere had

been the confirmation of the existence of snow-capped Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya. A German missionary Johann Rebmann saw Mount Kilimanjaro in 1848. He had arrived in Kenya to assist Johann Krapf in Rabai Mpia, a small village to the northwest of Mombasa. Both worked for the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of London, a Protestant mission founded in 1799. The work of the CMS and other Christian missionaries was the main European activity in East Africa before partition.

Although Christian missionaries pioneered European entry into Kenya, they were not responsible for the establishment of European political control that came about mainly as a result of happenings outside East Africa. French-British rivalry, both in Europe where Napoleon's defeat transferred the Seychelles and Mauritius among others to Britain, and in Africa especially due to interests in Egypt, should be mentioned. This triggered a scramble for the East African interior, in particular to control the source of the river Nile. The rising power of Germany in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, resulting in claims for the Dar es Salaam region, forced Britain to act. British and German chartered companies divided mainland territories that formerly belonged to the sultan of Zanzibar. Soon Britain took over from the Imperial British East Africa Company and a boundary stretching from the coast to Lake Victoria was drawn between British and German East Africa in 1895. Thus, it took until the end of the nineteenth century for Kenya to be explored, evangelized, and finally conquered by Britain.

The arrival of European colonizers put an end to the dynamic spheres of influence and changing fortunes of the African groups. Settlers were encouraged to come to East Africa to recoup some of the costs incurred in the construction of the Uganda railway. Soon Kenya was to be transformed from a footpath a thousand kilometers long into a colonial administration that would redefine internal power.

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See also: Kenya: East African Protectorate and the Uganda Railway; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Rinderpest, and Smallpox: East and Southern Africa.

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Kenya: East African Protectorate and the Uganda Railway

The early history of the East African Protectorate (after 1920 the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya) was intimately linked with the construction of the Uganda railway. The completion of the railway had an immense impact on the protectorate.

The decision of the British government to formally annex Uganda as a British protectorate in 1894 necessitated the building of a railway to connect the area around Lake Victoria with the Indian Ocean coast. Nevertheless, it was not until July 1, 1895, that British authority was formally proclaimed over the territory stretching from the eastern boundary of Uganda, then approximately fifty miles west of present day Nairobi. It was called the East African Protectorate (EAP).

Having formally claimed this part of East Africa, the imperial government undertook to build the railway through the EAP for strategic and economic reasons. It was believed that a railway would help foster British trade in the interior as well as provide the means for maintaining British control over the source of the Nile. Politicians in Britain also justified the construction of the railway by arguing that it would help to wipe out the slave trade in the region. Construction of what became known as the Uganda railway began on Mombasa Island with the laying of the ceremonial first rail in May 1896. The British parliament approved a sum of £3 million for construction in August, though not without opposition from critics who claimed that the railway "started from nowhere" and "went nowhere."

Construction began on the mainland in August, and the railhead reached Nairobi, which became the railway headquarters, in 1899. The line reached Uganda in the following year and was completed to Port Florence (later Kisumu) on Lake Victoria in December 1901. From Mombasa to Kisumu, the railway was 582 miles in length. At £5,502,592, actual expenditure far exceeded the initial provision of funds by Parliament. The cost of the line was borne by the British taxpayer. The bulk of the labor used for construction, on the other hand, was provided by "coolies" recruited in British India. Slightly more than 20 per cent of these remained in Kenya following completion of the line; they

formed a portion of the Asian (or Indian) population that took up residence in the EAP.

During the period of construction, railway building preoccupied colonial officials. Conquest of the peoples occupying the EAP was not as high a priority as the completion of the rail line. The colonial conquest was thus gradual and accomplished in piecemeal fashion, beginning in earnest only after the railway's completion. The Uganda railway facilitated military operations and was indeed the "iron back bone" of British conquest. By the end of 1908, most of the southern half of what is now Kenya had come under colonial control.

When completed, the Uganda railway passed through both the EAP and Uganda Protectorate. Imperial authorities quickly recognized potential difficulties in this situation. In order to place the railway under a single colonial jurisdiction, the Foreign Office, which was responsible for the EAP until 1905, transferred the then Eastern Province of Uganda to the EAP in April 1902. This brought the Rift valley highlands and the lake basin, what later became Nyanza, Rift valley, and Western provinces, into the EAP, doubling its size and population.

A substantial portion of Rift valley highlands was soon afterward opened to European settlement. Here also the construction of the Uganda railway played a significant part. The heavy cost of construction was compounded so far as the EAP and imperial governments were concerned by the fact that the railway initially operated at a loss and the EAP generated insufficient revenue to meet the cost of colonial administration. Thus the British government was forced to provide annual grants to balance the EAP's budget. In seeking to find the means to enhance the EAP's exports and revenues, its second commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, turned to the encouragement of European settlement. From 1902 he drew European farmers to the protectorate by generous grants of land around Nairobi and along the railway line to the west with little thought to African land rights or needs. London authorities acquiesced in Eliot's advocacy of European settlement, which eventually led to the creation of what became known as the "White Highlands," where only Europeans could legally farm. It meant that land and issues relating to African labor played a huge part in colonial Kenya as European settlers played a significant role in its economic and political history.

Ironically, the advent of white settlers did little immediately to solve the EAP's budget deficits. Only in the 1912–13 financial year was the annual imperial grant-in-aid terminated. The EAP's improved revenues were mostly the result of increased African production for export via the Uganda railway. European settler-generated exports accounted for the bulk of those of the protectorate only after World War I.

It cannot be denied, however, that the Uganda railway played a huge part in the early history of the EAP, from paving the way for conquest of the southern portion of the protectorate to helping to determine its physical shape and the character of its population, in the form of its Asian and European minorities in particular.

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See also: Asians: East Africa.

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Kenya: Mekatilele and Giriama Resistance, 1900–1920

The Giriama (also spelled Giryama) were one of the most successful colonizing societies of nineteenth century East Africa. From a relatively small area around the ritual center called the *kaya*, inland from Mombasa, Giriama settlement spread during the nineteenth century to cover a great swath of the hinterland of Mombasa and Malindi, crossing the Sabaki River in the 1890s. It was a process of expansion driven by a conjuncture of circumstances. Long-standing tensions over resource control within Giriama society were accentuated by the new opportunities for accumulation created by the rapidly expanding coastal economy and the growing availability of servile labor, female, and male. The northward expansion took the form of a constant establishment of new homesteads by men who sought to accumulate new dependents of their own, and to assert a control over these dependents that could not be challenged by others—either their own kin, or the "gerontocracy" of other elders who claimed power through association with the *kaya*. The ambitions and the northward expansion of these pioneers were encouraged through engagement with coastal society. This was similarly undergoing a period of northward expansion, driven by the growth of a trade with the hinterland in ivory, aromatics, and other products, and by a growing regional demand for foodstuffs that

encouraged the opening up of new areas of slave-based grain cultivation.

In the early years of British rule this expansion continued, and early administrators struck an accommodation with the most successful accumulators of the Giriama society that served the very limited needs of the early colonial state. But by the second decade of the twentieth century the demands of British rule had begun to conflict with the pattern of expansion and individual accumulation on which the nineteenth-century expansion had relied. The supply of slaves and runaway slaves from the coast had dried up after the abolition of slavery. British officials at the coast were increasingly concerned over the state of the coastal economy and sought to foster new plantation ventures, as well as supplying labor for the growing needs of Mombasa. Evidence taken for the Native Labor Commission in 1912–13 identified the Giriama as an important potential source of waged labor. In October 1912 a new administrator, Arthur Champion, was appointed to improve the supply of labor from among the Giriama, partly through the exercise of extralegal coercion and bullying, which was commonly used in early colonial states to “encourage” labor recruitment, and partly through the collection of taxes, which would force young men to seek waged work. Champion tried to work through elder Giriama men but demands for tax and for young men to go out to work struck directly at the pattern of accumulation on which these men relied: they sought to acquire dependents, not to send them away to work for others. British restrictions on the ivory trade were equally unwelcome. Champion found himself and his camp effectively boycotted.

The boycott was encouraged by the activities of a woman called Mekatilele (also spelled Mekatilili) who drew on an established tradition of female prophecy to speak out against the British and who encouraged many Giriama men and women to swear oaths against cooperation with the administration. This was a complex phenomenon, for it drew on an established accommodation between women’s prophecy and the power of *kaya* elders, and exploited tensions between old and young and between *kaya* elders and the accumulators who pioneered the expansion to the north, as well as on resistance to colonial rule. Mekatilele was soon arrested and sent up-country; she escaped and returned to the coast but was rearrested and removed again. Meanwhile, in reprisal for the oaths and for some rather mild displays of hostility, the colonial administration first “closed” the *kaya* in December 1913 and then burned and dynamited it in August 1914. British officials were quick to understand Giriama resistance as inspired by oaths, prophecy, and the power of the *kaya*, but this probably reveals less about Giriama motivations than it does about colonial perceptions of male household authority as essentially

good and stable, and magical or prophetic power as fundamentally subversive. In truth, Giriama resistance to British demands resulted from the disastrous impact of British policies and demands upon the authority of ambitious household heads.

The destruction of the *kaya* coincided with the outbreak of World War I, which immediately led to renewed efforts to conscript Giriama men, this time as porters for the armed forces. Giriama resentment was further inflamed by a British plan to evict Giriama who had settled north of the Sabaki, as a punishment for non-cooperation and to deprive them of land and so force them into waged labor. In an act of routine colonial brutality, one of Champion’s police, searching for young men, raped a woman and was himself killed in retaliation. Thrown into panic by the fear of a Giriama “rising,” and finding themselves in possession of an unusually powerful coercive force, British officials launched a punitive assault on the Giriama, using two full companies of the King’s African Rifles. As a result, 150 Giriama were killed, and hundreds of houses burned; officials found it difficult to bring the campaign to an end since there were no leaders with whom to deal and British policy had largely eroded the power of elder men. The campaign was finally called off in January 1915. There were no military fatalities. A continued armed police presence and the threat of further military reprisals ensured the clearance of the trans-Sabaki Giriama, the collection of a punitive fine, and the recruitment of a contingent of Giriama porters for the war.

Mekatilele returned to the area in 1919, and she and a group of elder men took up residence in the *kaya*. This continued to be a much-contested source of ritual power, but the idealized gerontocracy of early nineteenth century society was never reconstructed, and ritual and political power among the Giriama has remained diffuse. The trans-Sabaki was settled again in the 1920s, but Giriama society never regained the relative prosperity of the late nineteenth century.

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See also: Kenya: World War I, Carrier Corps.

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Kenya: World War I, Carrier Corps

Despite its strategic and commercial importance to the British Empire, the East Africa Protectorate (EAP, now Kenya) was unprepared for the outbreak of World War I. The King's African Rifles (KAR) were ill-prepared to sustain conventional military operations, as until that point it had been used largely as a military police force in semipacified areas. Moreover, the KAR possessed minimal field intelligence capabilities and knew very little about the strengths and weaknesses of the German forces in neighboring German East Africa (GEA, now Tanzania). Most importantly, the KAR lacked an adequate African carrier corps, upon which the movement of its units depended.

Hostilities began on August 8, 1914, when the Royal Navy shelled a German wireless station near Dar es Salaam. General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the *Schütztruppe*, which numbered only 218 Germans and 2,542 *askaris* organized into 14 companies, opposed the German governor, Heinrich Schnee, who hoped to remain neutral. Instead, Lettow-Vorbeck wanted to launch a guerrilla campaign against the British, which would pin down a large number of troops and force the British to divert soldiers destined for the western front and other theaters to East Africa.

On August 15, 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck defied Schnee and captured Taveta, a small settlement just inside the EAP border. Lettow-Vorbeck then launched a series of attacks against a 100-mile section of the Uganda Railway, the main transport link in EAP that ran almost parallel to the GEA border and about three days march from the German bases near Kilimanjaro. Relying largely on raids, hit and run tactics, and the skillful use of intelligence and internal lines of communication, Lettow-Vorbeck wreaked havoc upon the British by destroying bridges, blowing up trains, ambushing relief convoys, and capturing military equipment and other supplies. By using such tactics, Lettow-Vorbeck largely eluded British and allied forces for the first two years of the campaign.

Meanwhile, the British sought to resolve problems that plagued their operations in the early days of the war. A military buildup eventually resulted in the establishment of a force that numbered about 70,000 soldiers and included contingents from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, (now Zimbabwe), and India. There also were Belgian and Portuguese units arrayed against the Germans. Captain Richard Meinertzhagen, who became chief of allied intelligence in December 1914, created an intelligence apparatus that quickly

earned the reputation of being the best in the East African theater of operations.

In December 1915, the port of Mombasa received a great influx of military personnel and equipment such as artillery, armored vehicles, motor lorries, and transport animals. Many of the troops deployed to Voi, a staging area on the Uganda railway some sixty miles from the German border. General Jan Smuts, who became allied commander in February 1916, sought to launch an offensive from Voi against Kilimanjaro to "surround and annihilate" Lettow-Vorbeck's forces. Rather than commit himself to a major battle, which would involve substantial casualties, Lettow-Vorbeck resorted to hit and run attacks while slowly retreating southward. During the 1916–1917 period, Smuts fought the *Schütztruppe* to a stalemate. In late 1917, General J. L. van Deventer assumed command of British forces in East Africa and eventually forced the Germans to retreat into Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique). On September 28, 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck crossed back into GEA, but before he could launch a new offensive, the war ended.

Formed a few days after the outbreak of hostilities, the Carrier Corps, East African Transport Corps played a significant role throughout the East African campaign by supporting combat units in the EAP, GEA, and Portuguese East Africa. Its history began on September 11, 1914, when the Carrier Corps commander, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Ferris Watkins, announced that he had recruited some 5,000 Africans organized into five 1,000-man units, which were subdivided into 100-man companies under the command of native headmen. Initially, enlistment in the Carrier Corps was voluntary. On June 21, 1915, however, growing manpower requirements forced the colonial authorities to pass legislation that authorized the forcible recruitment of men for the Carrier Corps.

In February 1916, the colonial government created the Military Labor Bureau to replace the Carrier Corps, East African Transport Corps. By late March 1916, this unit reported that more than 69,000 men had been recruited for service as porters. When the East African campaign moved to southern GEA at the end of that year, the demand for military porters again increased. On March 18, 1917 the colonial government appointed John Ainsworth, who had a reputation for fair dealing among the Africans, as military commissioner for labor to encourage greater enlistment. During the last two years of the war, his efforts helped the Military Labor Bureau recruit more than 112,000 men.

Apart from service in the EAP, the Carrier Corps accompanied British and allied forces into GEA and Portuguese East Africa, where they served in extremely trying circumstances. Chronic food shortages, inadequate medical care, pay problems, and harsh field

conditions plagued all who participated in the East African campaign but Africans frequently suffered more than non-Africans. Agricultural production also declined because of labor shortages on European and African-owned farms.

Nearly 200,000 Africans served in the Carrier Corps; about 40,000 of them never returned. Thousands received medals or other awards for the courage with which they performed their duties. On a wider level, the Carrier Corps' contribution to the war effort was crucial to the allied victory in East Africa; indeed, without that unit's participation, the campaign never could have been fought. In the long run, many Carrier Corps veterans became important members of society. Some used the skills learned during wartime to become successful businessmen or community leaders. Others became politically active: Jonathan Okwirri, for example, served as a headman at the Military Labor Bureau's Mombasa Depot for eighteen months, then as president of the Young Kavirondo Association and as a senior chief. Thus, the Carrier Corps not only played a vital role in the East African campaign but also facilitated the emergence of a small but influential number of economically and politically active Africans.

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See also: **World War I: Survey.**

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Kenya: Colonial Period: Economy, 1920s–1930s

Land, labor, and production were strongly contested arenas for the political economy of Kenya, firmly based in agriculture, during the 1920s and 1930s. The contestation revolved around the basic nature of

Kenya's outward-looking economy: were its exports and revenue to be generated by European settlers or African peasants? The most important contestants were Kenya's European, Asian, and African populations, the colonial state in Kenya, and the Colonial Office in London.

Land was a bitterly contested issue in interwar Kenya as a result of the colonial state's decision to encourage European settlement in the highlands through the appropriation of large amounts of land. By the start of the 1920s, the colonial state and the metropolitan government had accepted the principle that the region known as the white highlands was reserved exclusively for European occupation. This segregated principle of landholding was challenged by Kenya Asians and Africans during the two decades. Kenya Africans not only protested against the reservation of the highlands for whites, they objected to the loss of African occupied land taken for settler use. They also complained about the land shortage in many of the African "reserves" created by the colonial state and expressed fears regarding the security of land in those reserves. Despite protests throughout the two decades, neither the colonial state nor the Colonial Office managed to appease African land grievances. The 1932 appointment of the Kenya Land Commission represented a major attempt to do so, but it failed. Its 1934 report endorsed the segregated system of land holding in Kenya, and this was enshrined in legislation by the end of the decade. It did little to reduce African land grievances. In fact, the contestation of the 1920s and 1930s made certain that land continued to be a volatile element in Kenya politics.

Labor was likewise an area of conflict as a result of the European settler demands for assistance from the colonial state in obtaining cheap African labor for their farms and estates. The state was all too willing to subsidize settler agriculture in this way, as through the provision of land. This reached a peak at the start of the 1920s, with the implementation of a decree in which the governor ordered state employees to direct Africans to work for settlers and the initiation of the *kipande* (labor certificate) system as a means of labor control. Protest, particularly in Britain, forced the alteration of this policy, called the Labor Circular, but the colonial state continued throughout the 1920s to encourage African men to work for settlers. This mainly took the form of short-term migrant labor or residence on European farms as squatters. However, the impact of the Great Depression altered Kenya's migrant labor system. With settler farmers hard hit by the impact of the depression, the demand for African labor was reduced and state pressure no longer required at past levels. Squatters, in particular, faced increasing settler pressure by the end of the 1930s

aimed at removing them and their livestock from the white highlands.

Pressure from settlers formed a part of the broader struggle over production that marked the two decades. The end of World War I found European settler produce (especially coffee and sisal) holding pride of place among Kenya's exports. This caused the colonial state to direct substantial support to European settler production in the immediate postwar years in the form of tariff protection, subsidized railway rates, and provision of infrastructure and extension services in addition to land and labor for the settlers. The postwar depression exposed the folly of ignoring peasant production, as the Kenya economy could not prosper on the strength of settler production alone. Pressed by the Colonial Office, the colonial state turned to what was termed the Dual Policy, which aimed to provide state support and assistance to both settler and peasant production after 1922. Nevertheless, the Dual Policy was never implemented as settler production held pride of place for the remainder of the decade, particularly after the return of a favorable market for settler produce from 1924.

The Great Depression brought an end to the strength of settler production as most settlers and the colonial state itself faced bankruptcy by 1930. The colonial state sought to save settler agriculture by a variety of measures ranging from crop subsidies and a reduction in railway charges to the setting up of a Land Bank to provide loans to European farmers. At the same time, the colonial state sought to stimulate African production for domestic and external markets during the 1930s as a means of saving the colonial economy and the settlers, a course that enjoyed strong support from London. Thus the decade witnessed a greatly expanded role of the state in African agriculture from a determination of crops to be planted to attempts to control the market for African produce. The decade was characterized by the consolidation of the commercialization of peasant production in central and western Kenya in particular while settler farmers continued to pressure the state for protection of their privileged position (e.g., removal of squatter stock from their farms and directing the sale of African grown maize through the settler-controlled marketing cooperative). The state introduced coffee, previously a crop grown exclusively by whites, to African farmers, though on an admittedly minute scale. By 1939 the state's role in African production had expanded dramatically, but the contradiction between peasant and settler production had not been resolved. This and the contestation it provoked continued to characterize Kenya's political economy over the succeeding two decades, just as was the case with land and labor.

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Kenya: Colonial Period: Administration, Christianity, Education, and Protest to 1940

As in many other parts of Africa, the establishment of colonial administration formed the prelude for the spread of Christianity in Kenya. Christian missionaries, such as the Church Missionary Society (CMS), had enjoyed little success prior to the establishment of formal colonial control in 1895. It was only after the conquest and the establishment of a colonial administrative structure that Roman Catholic and Protestant missionary societies gained a foothold. Just as the process of establishing an administrative structure for the protectorate was gradual and incremental, so also was the introduction of Christianity. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, colonial control had been established over much of the southern half of Kenya, and missions had gained converts as well in the region under British rule. In those areas in particular, missionaries were pioneers in introducing Western-style education in Kenya. Christians who had experienced Western education became part of a new elite that gained salaried employment with the missions as teachers and pastors, or with the colonial state, as chiefs and clerks, and took the lead in economic innovation.

Moreover, Christians with Western educations played a significant part in the protest movements that emerged to challenge the policies and practices of the colonial state in Kenya prior to 1940 and to demand improved status for themselves within colonial society. Such protest movements, which did not seek an end to colonial rule, but rather reform within the system, came to the fore following the end of World War I and were most active in the areas where the missions had established the largest numbers of schools, namely

central Kenya and the Lake Victoria basin. The war and its aftermath produced a number of hardships for Kenya's Africans, including higher taxes and greatly increased demands for labor from the colonial state and the colonial European settlers and for enhanced control over African workers, reduced market opportunities for African produce, and, in central Kenya in particular, heightened insecurity with regard to land. Many Kikuyu in that region had lost access to land as a result of European settlement, and in addition to a demand for the return of those lands, mission-educated men sought to pressure the colonial state so as to ensure their access to, and control over, land in the area reserved for Kikuyu occupation.

Protest emerged first in central Kenya with regard to the land issue. It was articulated by the Kikuyu Association (KA), formed in 1919 by Kikuyu colonial chiefs, and by the Young Kikuyu Association, quickly renamed the East African Association (EAA), formed in 1921 by Harry Thuku and other young Western-educated Kikuyu working in Nairobi, to protest against high taxes, measures initiated by the colonial state to force Africans into wage labor, reduction in wages for those employed, as well as land grievances. The EAA challenged the position of the KA and colonial chiefs as defenders of African interests. The organization had gained sufficient support by March 1922 for the colonial authorities to order Thuku's arrest. The latter produced serious disturbances in Nairobi and led to the banning of the EAA and the detention of Thuku for the remainder of the decade.

Nevertheless, another protest organization soon emerged in central Kenya to champion the interests of educated Christians and challenge the KA. This was the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), formed in 1924. It was concerned with the land issue (e.g., shortage and insecurity of tenure), but the KCA also took the lead during the interwar decades in demanding a greater voice for its members in local affairs and demanding enhanced access to the means of modernization, including more schools and planting high value cash crops. In western Kenya also, the postwar period witnessed the emergence, during 1921, of a protest organization led by educated Christians in the form of the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA). It also articulated grievances such as increased taxation, low wages, and the oppressive labor policies of the colonial state. As with the KCA, leaders also advocated more schools and greater economic opportunities directly challenging the colonial chiefs as political and economic leaders in their home areas.

In addition to the forceful suppression of the EAA, the colonial administration responded to activities of these protest organizations by some concessions, such as the lowering of taxing and ending officially

sanctioned forced labor for European settlers, by the introduction of Local Native Councils in 1924 where educated Africans might play a part, by making sure that such protests were confined to a single ethnic community, and by putting pressure on the missionaries to keep the political activities of their converts under control. In western Kenya, this led to recasting the YKA as the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association (KTWA) under the leadership of the CMS missionary William Owen, and the KTWA's focusing on welfare activities rather than political protest. The colonial state also co-opted some of the protest leaders; as a result some protest leaders of the 1920s became colonial chiefs by the 1930s.

Nevertheless, Western-educated men continued to take the lead in protest to 1940. As a result, some gained influence within the state structure as well as economic advantages, such as in trade licenses and crop innovation. Overall, however, these protest movements provided no real challenge to the colonial system itself. Such political and economic gains as resulted were limited. Despite consistent advocacy by the KCA, for example, little had been done by 1940 to address the increasingly serious Kikuyu land problem. Thus it is not surprising that after that date, many educated Africans turned to different forms of protest in an attempt to address African grievances and improve living conditions.

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See also: **Thuku, Harry.**

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Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt

The Mau Mau peasant revolt in colonial Kenya remains one of the most complex revolutions in Africa. It was one of the first nationalist revolutions against modern European colonialism in Africa. Unlike other

subsequent nationalist revolutions in Africa, the Mau Mau revolt was led almost entirely by peasants. The majority of its supporters were illiterate peasants who fought against the British military with courage and determination. Although the revolt was eventually defeated militarily by a combination of British and Loyalist (Home Guard) forces, its impact on the course of African history was significant. It signaled the beginning of the end of European power in Africa and accelerated the pace of the decolonization process.

The roots of the revolt lay in the colonial political economy. The colonization of Kenya by Britain led to the alienation of fertile land for white settlers from peasant farmers in Central Kenya, the home of the Kikuyu. This loss of land and the subsequent proclamation of "native reserves" sealed off possible areas of Kikuyu expansion. There arose a serious land shortage in Central Province that led to the migration of landless Kikuyu peasants to live and work on European settlers' farms as squatters in the Rift valley.

In the Kikuyu reserve, there were social tensions over land as corrupt chiefs and other landed gentry proceeded to acquire land at the expense of varieties of landless peasants. Some of these displaced peasants migrated to the expanding urban areas: Nairobi, Nakuru, and other townships in Central and Rift Valley provinces.

After World War II, there was widespread African unemployment in urban areas, especially in Nairobi. There was inflation and no adequate housing. A combination of these factors led to desperate economic circumstances for Africans who now longed for freedom, self-determination, land, and prosperity. The level of frustration and desperation was increased by the colonial government's refusal to grant political reforms or acknowledge the legitimacy of African nationalism. Even the moderate Kenya Africa Union (KAU) under Jomo Kenyatta failed to win any reforms from the colonial government.

From October 1952 until 1956, the Mau Mau guerillas, based in the forests of Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares and equipped with minimal modern weapons, fought the combined forces of the British military and the Home Guard. Relying on traditional symbols for politicization and recruitment, the Mau Mau guerillas increasingly came to rely on oaths to promote cohesion within their ranks and also to bind them to the noncombatant "passive wing" in the Kikuyu reserve. Throughout the war, the Mau Mau guerillas sought to neutralize "the effects of the betrayers." The guerillas relied heavily on the "passive wing" and hence could not tolerate real or potential resisters to their cause. In order to control the spread of Mau Mau influence, the British military and political

authorities instituted an elaborate "villagization policy." Kikuyu peasants in the reserve were put into villages, under the control of the Home Guards. The aim was to deny the guerillas access to information, food, and support. The "villagization policy" led to corruption and brutality toward the ordinary civilian population by the Home Guard, whose actions were rarely challenged by the colonial government so long as they "hunted down Mau Mau." At the end of the war, the colonial government stated that 11,503 Mau Mau and 63 Europeans had been killed. These official figures are "silent on the question of thousands of civilians who were 'shot while attempting to escape' or those who perished at the hands of the Home Guards and other branches of the security forces." It had been a brutal bruising war that was destined to have long-term repercussions in Kenyan society.

The British government's response to the Mau Mau revolt aimed to strategically reinforce the power of the conservative Kikuyu landed gentry while, at the same time, proceeding to dismantle the political power of the resident white settlers. This was achieved through a combination of the rehabilitation process and a gradual accommodation of African political activities and initiatives. The overriding aim of the rehabilitation of former Mau Mau guerillas and sympathizers was to "remake Kenya" by defeating radicalism. Radical individuals detained during the period of the emergency had to renounce the Mau Mau and its aims. This was achieved through a complex and elaborate process of religious indoctrination and psychological manipulation of the detainees.

The Mau Mau revolt forced the British government to institute political and economic reforms in Kenya that allowed for the formation of African political parties after 1955. Most of the former guerillas were not in a position to influence the nature of these reforms nor to draw any substantial benefits from them. The conservative landed gentry who had formed the Home Guard had a significant influence on the post-emergency society. Since the start of counterinsurgency operations, these conservatives and their relatives had been recruited by the police, army, and the civil service. They were best placed to "inherit the state" from the British while the former guerillas and their sympathizers desperately struggled to adjust to the new social, economic, and political forces.

In postcolonial Kenya, the Mau Mau revolt has remained a controversial subject of study and discussion. The failure of the Mau Mau to achieve a military and political triumph has complicated discussions about its legacy. Former guerillas, without power and influence in the postcolonial society, have been unable to "steer the country in any direction that could come close to celebrating the 'glory of the revolt.'" There is controversy

over the role that the Mau Mau played in the attainment of Kenya's political freedom. The ruling elite in Kenya have been careful to avoid portraying the revolt as a pivotal event in the struggle for independence. This has been done while continually making vague references to Mau Mau and the blood that was shed in the struggle for independence. Related to this is the emotive issue of the appropriate treatment (and even possible rewards) for former guerrillas.

The rising social and economic tensions in Kenya after 1963 have politicized the legacy of the Mau Mau revolt. Former guerrillas have been drawn into the postcolonial struggles for power and preeminence by the ruling elite. The result has been a tendency by many of the former guerrillas to adapt their positions to the current political situation. Both the governing conservative elite and the radical leftist opposition have invoked the memory of the revolt to bolster their positions.

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Kenya: Nationalism, Independence

In June 1955 the internal security situation in Kenya had improved sufficiently to enable the government to lift its ban on African political organizations. But colonywide parties remained illegal, and the Kikuyu of Central Province were excluded, except for a nominated Advisory Council of "loyalists." The government hoped that by fostering political participation among

Kenya's other African ethnic groups progress would be made by nonviolent means, and some counterbalance to Kikuyu dominance of African politics would be achieved. Equally important, the possibility of "radical" African politics and violent protest being organized at a countrywide level was minimized.

By the end of 1956, as the withdrawal of the last British soldiers on counterinsurgency duty began, so too did registration of African voters for the first African elections to Kenya's Legislative Council (LegCo). Based on the Coutts Report of January 1956, the complicated qualified franchise, and the intricacies of electoral procedure meant that African elections did not take place until March 1957, six months after those for Europeans. The European candidates had been divided into two groups, six seats being won by those who approved of African political participation, against eight won by those who did not, led by settler politicians Michael Blundell and Group Captain Llewellyn Briggs, respectively. But they soon united to consolidate their numerical advantage over the eight newly arriving African Elected Members (AEMs).

Having unseated six of the government-appointed African members and thus assured of their mandate, the AEMs, led by Mboya, had different ideas. They rejected the Lyttelton Constitution as an irrelevancy imposed under emergency conditions, demanded fifteen more African seats, and refused to take ministerial office. The European members recognized that without African participation in government there would be little chance of future stability and agreed that they would accept an increase in African representation. Accordingly, in October, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the secretary of state for colonial affairs, accepted the resignations of the Asian and European ministers. This enabled him to present a new constitution: the AEMs would gain an extra ministry and six more elected seats, giving them parity with the Europeans.

The Africans, including those elected in March 1958, rejected what they saw as the disproportionate influence that the provisions for the elections to special seats left in European hands. Following the largely unsuccessful prosecution of Mboya's group for denouncing as "traitors" the eight Africans who did stand for election to the special seats, in June 1958 Odinga sought to shift the political focus by referring to Kenyatta and others as "leaders respected by the African people" in debate in LegCo. Not to be outdone in associating themselves with this important nationalist talisman, the other African politicians soon followed suit. Thus began the "cult of Kenyatta."

Keen to emulate political advances in recently independent Ghana, the African leaders pressed for a constitutional conference to implement their demands for an African majority in LegCo. Lennox-Boyd

refused to increase communal representation, insisting that the Council of Ministers needed more time to prove itself. In January 1959, as the colonial secretary and the East African governors met in England to formulate a “gradualist” timetable for independence (Kenya’s date being “penciled in” as 1975) the AEMs announced a boycott of LegCo. With the prospect that the two Asian members of the government would join the AEMs, undermining the veneer of multiracialism, Governor Baring demanded a statement of Britain’s ultimate intentions for Kenya. Lennox-Boyd responded in April, announcing that there should be a conference before the next Kenya general election in 1960.

But in order for the conference to take place (scheduled for January 1960) with African participation, the state of emergency had to be lifted. By the time this occurred, on January 12, 1960, the Kenya government had enacted a preservation of public security bill that, beside enabling the continued detention and restriction of the Mau Mau “residue,” and measures to preempt subversion, deal with public meetings, and seditious publications, also empowered the governor to exercise controls over colonywide political associations in accordance with his “judgement of the needs of law and order.” This was not simply a political expedient. The defeat of Mau Mau led the Kenya government’s Internal Security Working Committee to conclude in February 1958 that future challenges to stability would take the form of “strikes, civil disobedience, sabotage, and the dislocation of transport and supplies rather than armed insurrection.” An Economic Priorities Committee “to study supply problems in such an eventuality” had been set up in April 1957; that same year saw some 4,000-plus strikes of varying intensity, and Mboya made frequent threats that if African demands for increased representation were not met, “the results would be far worse than anything Mau Mau produced.”

Kiama Kia Muingi (KKM), or “Council/Society of the People,” which emerged from the Mau Mau “passive wing” in March 1955, became so widespread, and too closely resembled Mau Mau, that it was proscribed in January 1958. Only political solutions to Africans’ grievances were to be allowed. But, by December 1958, Special Branch had discovered contacts between KKM and Mboya’s Nairobi Peoples’ Convention Party. Only by the end of 1959, following a concerted campaign of repression, did the “KKM crisis” appear to be resolved. As a precaution, however, Britain took the unprecedented step of resuming War Office control of the East African Land Forces, thereby removing the military from “local political interference.” The measure was announced at the constitutional conference and presented as a means of freeing up local revenue for development projects.

At the January 1960 Lancaster House Conference, the African delegates presented a united front, the result of collaboration since November. Again, the Africans pressed, unsuccessfully, for Kenyatta’s release. The outcome of the conference and subsequent negotiations was the concession by Iain Macleod of an effective African majority in LegCo, plus an increase in the number of Africans with ministerial responsibility. But the fissures in the African front resurfaced over the issue of whether to accept office, Mboya rejecting the constitution as “already out of date.” By June 1960 the two major pre-independence political parties had been formed: the Kenya African National Union (KANU), principally Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru, Kamba, and Kisii orientated, which boycotted the government, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), representing an alliance of the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Coast peoples.

In the February 1961 general election KANU won 67 per cent of the vote but refused to take its place in the government without Kenyatta’s release, leaving KADU to form a coalition with Blundell’s New Kenya Party and the Kenya Indian Congress. But the expansion of yet another Kikuyu subversive movement, the Kenya Land Freedom Army (KLFA)—many members of which also carried KANU membership cards—led the governor, Sir Patrick Renison, to press Macleod to reverse his decision on Kenyatta. It would be better, Special Branch advised, to release Kenyatta and gauge the impact of his return to Kenyan politics on the security situation while Britain was still “in control.”

Although the African politicians had used “land hunger” and the presence (since 1958) of a British military base as political sticks with which to beat the colonial authorities over the issue of “sovereignty,” a further constitutional conference in September 1961 broke down over access to the “White Highlands” because KADU rejected KANU’s proposals for a strong central government, favoring instead a *majimbo* (regional) constitution. The “framework constitution,” settled in London in February 1962, provided in principle for regional assemblies, and appeared to ameliorate tensions. But the coalition government, formed in April 1962, served as a thin veil over KADU-KANU ethnic tensions. The KLFA had spread: its oaths became increasingly violent; “military drills” were reported; over 200 precision weapons and homemade guns had been seized; and civil war seemed imminent.

It was no mere coincidence that, within weeks of KANU’s June 1, 1963, electoral victory, and Kenyatta becoming prime minister and appointing an ethnically mixed government, the British Cabinet agreed to December 12, 1963, as the date for Kenya’s independence. The apparent desire of the three East African

governments to form a federation meant that to maintain its goodwill, and for procedural reasons, Britain could no longer prohibit Kenya's independence.

But the prospects for a federation soon collapsed and civil war seemed likely. At the final constitutional conference in September, Sandys therefore backed KANU's proposed amendments to the constitution, making it easier to reverse regionalism at a later date, as the best means to prevent chaos.

Nevertheless, on October 18, 1963, Britain began to make preparations to introduce troops into Kenya for internal security operations and the evacuation of Europeans. The victory of the "moderates" in the KADU parliamentary group and the defection of four KADU members to KANU a week later seem, on the face of it, to have been enough to ensure a peaceful transition to independence.

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See also: **Kenya: Kenyatta, Jomo: Life and Government of.**

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Kenya: Kenyatta, Jomo: Life and Government of

Jomo Kenyatta (c.1894–1978) was born in Gatundu, Kiambu district, probably in 1894. His childhood was quite difficult due to the death of his parents. Early on, he moved to Muthiga where his grandfather lived.

Muthiga was close to the Church of Scotland's Thogoto mission. Missionaries preached in the village and when Kamau (Kenyatta's original name) became sick, he was treated in the mission hospital. Mesmerized by people who could read, he enrolled in the mission school. He accepted Christianity and was baptized Johnstone.

Leaving Thogoto in 1922, he was employed by the Municipal Council of Nairobi as a stores clerk and meter reader. The job gave him ample opportunity to travel extensively within the municipality. The allowed

him to interact with his African peers, as well as Indians and Europeans. With his motorcycle, a novelty at the time, and wearing a beaded belt (*kinyata*) and big hats, he became a familiar figure in the municipality. Moreover, he established a grocery shop at Dagoretti, which became a meeting place for the young African elite.

Becoming acutely aware of the plight of Africans, he decided to throw his lot with the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). He became its secretary general at the beginning of 1928 and editor of its newspaper, *Muigithania* (The Reconciler). The future of Kenya was also being hotly debated in the 1920s, with Indians being pitted against the settler community. European settlers demanded responsible government, restriction of Indian immigration into Kenya, upholding of racial discrimination, and the creation of a federation of the East and Central African British colonies. Under these circumstances, the African voice needed to be heard. KCA decided to send an emissary to England for this purpose. Kamau became their choice due to his charisma, eloquence, and education. By then, he had assumed the name Jomo Kenyatta.

Kenyatta went to England in 1929–1930 and made presentations to the Colonial Office and other interested parties. The British government appointed the Carter Land Commission to investigate the land problem that had become the bane of Kenya's political life. Again KCA dispatched Kenyatta to London in 1931, where he remained until 1946.

Life in London provided Kenyatta with many opportunities for self-improvement. He enrolled at the London School of Economics to study anthropology. He traveled widely across Europe. He met with the African diaspora in Britain, gave public lectures, and wrote to newspapers about the inequities of the colonial system. He also found the time to write his major work on the Kikuyu, *Facing Mount Kenya* (published 1938).

The peak event of his time in Britain was probably his participation in the Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945. The participants committed themselves to fighting for the independence of their respective countries.

Upon returning to Kenya in 1946, he immediately became president of the Kenya African Union (KAU), which had been formed in the same year. His return initiated a new era in Kenyan politics. Here was a man who had lived in Britain for fifteen years and married a white woman, Edna Clarke. To many Kenyans, Kenyatta knew the white man's secrets and would use this knowledge to liberate them from the colonial yoke. His tour of the rural areas to popularize KAU attracted huge crowds.

As the clamor for *uhuru* (independence) gained momentum, two camps emerged within KAU. Kenyatta

was a constitutionalist, while a faction of younger, more radically minded members, advocated for armed struggle. They began to prepare for a war of liberation by recruiting others into their movement, called the Land and Freedom Army, although it soon acquired the name Mau Mau. Initially, recruitment was through persuasion but increasingly it was carried out by force. Hence, violence escalated, and the colonial government declared a state of emergency on October 20, 1952, after the murder of Chief Waruhiu Kungu in broad daylight. Kenyatta, together with ninety-seven KAU leaders, were arrested. KAU leadership was accused of managing Mau Mau, a terrorist organization. Kenyatta was convicted, in what turned out to be a rigged trial, and jailed for seven years. He was interned in Lodwar and Lokitaung, in the remotest corners of Kenya. His release came only in 1961, after a swell of national and international outcry against his detention.

By 1956 the British and local military forces, supported by Kikuyu Guards, had contained Mau Mau. Nevertheless, Britain was forced to assess its role in Kenya and begin to meet some of the African demands. A series of constitutional changes were mounted and African representation in the Legislative Council gradually increased. Furthermore, the ban on political parties was lifted from 1955, albeit at the district level. These amalgamated in 1960 into the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The former was predominantly supported by the Kikuyu and Luo, while the latter attracted the smaller tribes, such as the Kalenjin and the coastal peoples.

Upon his release, Kenyatta unsuccessfully tried to reconcile the leaders of the two parties. He eventually joined KANU, becoming its president. KANU and KADU engaged in protracted constitutional negotiations centered on whether Kenya should be a federal or centralized state. Eventually KADU, which espoused federalism, was victorious. A semifederal system, *majimbo*, was accepted. In 1963 general elections were held which KANU won, ushering Kenya into independence on December 12, 1963, under Kenyatta's leadership (he was named president in 1964).

Kenyatta's government faced enormous problems. The formation of KANU and KADU was a glaring manifestation of tribalism, which threatened to tear Kenya apart as had happened to Congo. The economy was under the control of expatriates. It was also in shambles due to the flight of capital. There was rampant unemployment aggravated by landlessness. There were few well-trained and experienced indigenous Kenyans to man the civil service.

From the outset, Kenyatta preached the gospel of reconciliation and urged all Kenyans, irrespective of tribe, race, or color, to join together to work for the

collective good. Thus he coined the national motto, *Harambee* (pull together). In this regard, he encouraged KADU to disband, which it did in 1964, its supporters joining KANU. This reduced tribal tensions but produced an unexpected development. There emerged ideological divisions within KANU: a pro-Western wing that believed in capitalism, and a pro-Eastern cohort that sought to align Kenya with socialist countries. The former was led by Kenyatta and T. J. Mboya while the latter was led by Oginga Odinga, the vice president. This culminated in the ousting of Odinga as vice president in 1966. He then formed his own party, the Kenya Peoples Union, which was predominantly supported by the Luo.

To consolidate his position, Kenyatta embarked on a series of constitutional changes. He scrapped the *majimbo* constitution and increased the power of the presidency, including the power to commit individuals to detention without trial. He also increasingly relied on the provincial administration for managing government affairs and this led to the decline of KANU and parliament. So long as his authority and power were not challenged, he tolerated some measure of criticism and debate.

He eschewed the socialist policies that were in vogue in much of Africa. He vigorously wooed investors and courted the Western world. His policies paid dividends in that the economy grew by more than 6 per cent during his time in office. In late 1970s, this rate of growth contracted due to the vagaries of the world economy, such as the oil crisis of 1973–1974. Equally, he made efforts to indigenize the economy by establishing bodies that offered assistance to Kenyans. These include the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, Kenya National Trading Corporation, and Kenya Industrial Estates, among others. This assistance has produced a class of local entrepreneurs that is playing a significant role in the Kenyan economy.

Critical to the survival of Kenya was the problem of squatters and ex-Mau Mau. In order to gain their support, the government settled them and the squatters in former settler-owned farms. In the first ten years, 259,000 hectares of land were bought and distributed to 150,000 landless people, who were also provided with development loans and infrastructure.

Kenyatta's government abolished racial discrimination in schools, introduced curricula and exams in secondary schools to prepare children for university entrance, and made efforts to increase the number of Kenyans in universities, both local and overseas. For example, between early 1960s and late 1970s university and secondary students increased from 1,900 to 8,000 and 30,000 to 490,000 respectively. And adult literacy jumped from 20 per cent to 50 per cent in the same period.

Kenyatta died on August 22, 1978. By then, he had provided Kenya with peace and stability for fifteen years. In a continent ravaged by war and coups, this was no small achievement. But one should not ignore the fact that corruption started to show its ugly face during his term. He relied heavily on his kinsmen, a factor that fuelled tribalism. He had fought very hard for freedom and yet became an autocrat, albeit a benign one. Few can deny that he laid a firm foundation for Kenya. He is thus referred to as *mzee* (respected elder) or Father of the Nation. In short, he was an exceptionally formidable and complex man.

GODFREY MURIUKI

Biography

Born Gatundu, Kiambu district, about 1894. Named secretary general of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), and editor of its newspaper, *Muigithania* (The Reconciler), 1928. Goes to England, 1929–30. Returns the following year. Publishes *Facing Mount Kenya*, 1938. Participates in the Pan-African Congress in Manchester, 1945. Returns to Kenya, named president of the Kenya African Union, 1946. Convicted for the murder of Chief Waruhiu Kungu, 1952. Released due to national and international pressures, 1961. Named first president of Kenya, 1964. Died on August 22, 1978.

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Kenya: Independence to the Present

At the attainment of independence in 1963, Kenya inherited an economy that was symptomatic of most African colonial economies: a predominantly agricultural economy, a manufacturing sector whose cornerstone was import-substitution financed by foreign capital, and a transport infrastructure that was insensitive to the internal economic needs of the majority of the population. In the social arena, literacy levels were fairly low and disease patrolled the majority of households.

The government of Kenya under the first head of state, Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978), cogently identified and declared war on the three major enemies of

economic development in postindependence Kenya: illiteracy, disease, and poverty. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, titled "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya," was promulgated as the government's blueprint for eradicating poverty, raising literacy levels, and providing health care services to the citizenry. But Sessional Paper No. 10 was more than just an economic document. It had the political taint of the Cold War era, when socialism and capitalism were struggling for economic and political space in the countries that were emerging from the womb of colonialism. Thus, besides its economic agenda, the document was also meant to appease both the radical and moderate wings of the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), by emphasizing private and government investment, the provision of free primary education as well as health care services.

Between 1963 and 1973 Kenya witnessed the smooth expansion of African-owned businesses as well as the growth of smallholder peasant agriculture, particularly in foreign exchange earning crops such as coffee and tea. Since 1967 smallholder production has invariably made up more than 50 per cent of Kenya's coffee output. While in 1964–1965 there were 22,343 growers of coffee with a total 5,133 hectares (12,684 acres); by 1987–1988 the number of growers had increased to 151,860 with the number of hectares having jumped to 57,688 (142,550 acres). This marked growth of smallholder peasant agriculture was evident in other crops such as sugar, cotton, and tobacco as well. Out of these developments in the agricultural sector, the cooperative movement became a significant instrument in handling the processing and marketing of cash crops. In sum, the GDP growth rate in the 1964–1974 period stood at an average of 6.60 per cent. But this economic growth was also a function of the political and economic developments in the region of eastern Africa.

Kenya benefited from flawed economic policies of the neighboring countries: Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania mass nationalization of private companies and banks scared away foreign investors. The policy of "villagization" in the rural areas also adversely affected the development of agriculture in Tanzania. Uganda, particularly under Idi Amin Dada, instituted the policy of indigenization that led to confiscation of Asian property. Amin's rule resulted in the breakdown of law and order in Uganda. These regional economic and political developments left Kenya as the only premier nation in the eastern African region with a sound economic policy as well as political stability to attract foreign investment.

However, the Kenya of the 1990s was quite a different political and economic terrain from that of the 1963 to 1974 period. After the economic prosperity of the first decade, Kenya faced a number of political and

economic challenges, both from within and outside, that resulted in widespread poverty in a country that at the time of independence had the most developed economic infrastructure in the eastern African region and one of the most often cited as a showcase of economic success. With a population of about 30 million, the 1997–2001 Kenya National Development Plan put the level of absolute poverty in rural areas at 46.4 per cent, while the rate in the urban areas was estimated at 29.3 per cent. These official figures show that 75 per cent of the Kenyan population live in poverty. The GDP growth rate has been on the decline since 1974. While in the subsequent two decades, the GDP was at an average of 5.20 and 4.10 per cent, respectively, between 1994 and 1999 the country has witnessed an average growth rate of 2.50 per cent.

The causes of this decline are many, varied, and complex. The quadrupling of oil price in 1973; inflation in the developed countries and the accompanying high interest; the heavy borrowing of the 1970s; the unfavorable terms of trade; widespread corruption; internal political instability, particularly the ethnic conflicts that coincided with political multipartyism in the early 1990s which adversely affected the tourist industry; and the World Bank and IMF policies, particularly the structural adjustment programs, have in one way or another contributed to the current state of economic decline. The economic challenges of the 1990s are closely tied to the developmental as well as political policies that have been pursued since independence.

In industry and manufacturing, for example, the government used high tariffs and import licensing to encourage investment in the import-substitution industries. While this strategy yielded some success, it denied export promotion a viable economic space and stifled competition through protectionist policies. By the mid-1970s, all was not well in sections of the tariff-protected import substitution industries because they used more foreign exchange than they generated. As the pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund intensified in the 1980s with the Kenyan leadership being advised to warm up to a competitiveness in the manufacturing sector and exit the industrial protectionist strategy, the industries began to feel the pinch brought on by the more open import liberalization regime. Company closures, retrenchment, and the state's forced retreat from subsidizing social programs such as education, and health care services have coalesced to force many people into the poverty trap.

The repayment of the national debt against the economic backdrop of the structural adjustment programs has been a painful experience. Due to widespread corruption, which started during the Kenyatta presidency

and reached its apogee in the Moi era, international loans were spent on programs that did not benefit the poor. The loans were directed to private projects benefiting government officials and a small elite. By the late 1980s, the repayment of the debt was a burden borne by poor people, who did not have a voice in contracting the debt, but who bore the consequences of repaying it. The problem is not so much the size of the debt as the huge share of a country's income it takes to service it. In this regard, Kenya's case mirrors that of many other countries in Africa grappling with the challenges of economic growth, indebtedness, and the search for economic and political stability in the wake of structural adjustment programs and the resurgence of political pluralism. Of the forty heavily indebted poor countries identified by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996, thirty-two are located in Sub-Saharan Africa.

But the problem of economic development is also a function of politics and governance. Although Kenya's economy under the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta was quite healthy, it was deeply enmeshed in the cobweb of ethnicity, nepotism, and regional preferences. Nowhere is this manifested as in the case of land settlement schemes in the immediate postindependence era. Land has been a critical factor in Kenya's politics as well as economic development dating back to the onset of colonial governance. It was at the very heart of the Mau Mau revolt. In the post-independence period, it has been one of the major divisive issues whose repercussion has on occasions been expressed in bitter ethnic conflicts leading to death of thousands and displacement of many more over the last decade.

With funds provided by Great Britain at independence, the government of Kenya bought out European planters and then subdivided the land into relatively smaller portions, which were then sold to an emergent African elite who were provided with loans at low rates of interest, or turned to settlement schemes for the landless. On the positive side, the government's handling of land ensured smooth transition from the era of large-scale planters to the epoch of a majority small peasant holdings. It is this smooth transition that partly explains the expansion and economic vibrancy of the small-scale peasant holdings in Kenya. Through settlement schemes, hundreds of thousands of landless people were settled in various parts of the country, particularly in the Rift Valley, Central, Coast, and to some extent parts of Nyanza and Western provinces.

While the Jomo Kenyatta regime sought to distribute land, it became quite evident that the distribution of land to the landless Africans was not based on need alone. In fact, ethnicity was a major determinant. The "Africanization" of the former European settled areas was, by and large, reduced to the "Kikuyunization" of

those lands with the members of the Kikuyu ethnic group being given large chunks of land in the Rift valley, with the tacit approval of the then vice president Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, and much to the chagrin of the local communities. Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, also appointed members of his ethnic group to key positions in the government, as well as parastatals. These policies that accorded ethnicity and patronage a pride of place in the allocation of resources resulted in the marginalization of most ethnic groups, regions and those who questioned the economic and political iniquities of the Kenyatta regime.

Kenyatta, while allowing regular presidential and National Assembly elections, was quite reluctant to allow competitive multiparty politics. In his last few years in office, he nurtured authoritarian tendencies that saw critics of his regime detained without trial. Under Kenyatta, Kenya became a *de facto* one-party state after the banning of the Kenya People's Union in 1969. Moi's first few years in office after his accession to power in 1978 was quite promising. He released all political detainees and prisoners, focused on an all-inclusive government, and exhibited populist policies that endeared him to the majority of the population, at least in the short run.

But behind these official exhibitions of compassion, openness, politics of inclusion, and populism, Moi, like his predecessor, Kenyatta, silently embarked on empowering his Kalenjin ethnic group. Internal dissent intensified leading to the 1982 abortive coup attempt by a section of the armed forces. Within a decade of his accession to power, Moi had presided over the making of Kenya a *de jure* one-party state, compromising of the independence of the judiciary and the legislature, unprecedented corruption, and decline of the economy. As the decade ending 1989 wore on, Moi was under intense political and economic pressure, both from within and outside, to allow multipartyism and embrace economic reforms on the pain of losing economic aid. Moi reluctantly succumbed to the pressure and presided over the repeal of the *de jure* one-party clause in the constitution and allowed multipartyism much to the chagrin of his close political and economic cohorts.

On the eve of the multiparty elections of 1992, ethnic clashes erupted in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Coast provinces aimed at the so-called non-indigenous people who would tilt the election in favor of a candidate from one of the major ethnic groups. Moi had presented himself as the only viable candidate who would protect the interests of the minority ethnic groups. In fact, the strategies of divide and rule and scare tactics have been the most portent and indispensable weapons of Moi's presidency and political survival. A parliamentary commission of inquiry into the clashes implicated the government. In the two

multiparty elections conducted in 1992 and 1997, Moi emerged the victor because of a divided opposition. Although Moi was reelected in 1997 to serve his last term as the president of Kenya, he had to contend with two major challenges: economic stagnation and agitation for constitutional reform. Most international creditors remained reluctant to release aid because of the massive corruption in the country. The government's poverty eradication schemes failed to yield meaningful results. As a result, the unemployment rate spiraled and poverty continued to afflict the majority of the population.

In the midst of the foregoing economic problems, agitation for constitutional reform intensified with the civil society calling for drastic changes aimed at strengthening institutions as well as devolving powers from the office of the president. Moi reluctantly acceded to the demands, and after lengthy negotiations, a constitutional review commission was established under the leadership of Y. P. Ghai. Meanwhile, Moi proceeded to reorganize the ruling party, both with a view to identifying a potential successor as well as ensuring that the KANU emerged victorious in the 2002 general election. To further these two objectives Moi's KANU merged with National Development Party (NDP) led by a leading opposition politician, Raila Amolo Odinga in early 2002. KANU was transformed into a formidable political party destined to win the general election. But that was not to be. Moi's open and active support for Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president of Kenya, to be the KANU's nominee as the party's presidential candidate split the party.

Raila Odinga and other leading party officials, including Joseph Kamotho, Kalonzo Musyoka, and George Saitoti led those who disagreed with Moi, over the undemocratic way he settled on Uhuru Kenyatta as the preferred party's candidate, to decamp from KANU. They joined the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which Raila Odinga transformed into a major political party within a relatively short period of time. On the eve of the 2002 general election, LDP forged an alliance with the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) led by Mwai Kibaki, Michael Kijana Wamalwa, and Charity Ngilu. The two parties formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which they agreed on a power-sharing formula as well as common election platform, which included completing the constitutional review within the first one hundred days in office, providing free primary education, eradicating corruption, stimulating economic growth, creating jobs, and enhancing national unity. To show unity of purpose, NARC leadership nominated Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate. NARC emerged victorious in the 2002 election, with LDP faction bringing in more votes and members of parliament than NAK, thereby

ending nearly four decades of KANU rule. Moi handed over power peacefully to Mwai Kibaki.

NARC's victory under the leadership of Kibaki ushered in an era of optimism and expectation. International creditors expressed willingness to provide aid. The implementation of free primary education by the new NARC government convinced the people that the government was committed to its pre-election pledges. However, the hope, expectation, and goodwill that NARC victory brought began to wane barely after six months of Kibaki's presidency. The unwillingness on the part of the leadership to implement some of the election promises such as completing the constitutional review exercise within the promised time period, slow pace at which anticorruption campaign was being waged, use of ethnicity as a basis of appointing people to key positions in the civil service and reluctance to honor the MOU combined to dim the hope and expectation of Kenyans. Internal squabbles gained momentum with the LDP wing of NARC led by Raila Odinga demanding radical changes in governmental structure, immediate completion of the constitutional review and creation of the office of prime minister, full implementation of the MOU, and an aggressive anticorruption campaign. In contrast, the NAK faction insisted on effecting minimal reforms and suspending the radical reorganization of governmental structure until after the next general election scheduled for 2007. The postelection intracoalition conflict bedeviling NARC is instructive of the dilemma African leaders face in forging viable and working political coalitions based on clear and defined ideology of governance, the absence of which encourages nepotism, ethnicity, and regionalism.

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See also: **Mboya, Tom J.**

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Kenya: Islam

The story of Islam in Kenya is venerable one. The islands of the Lamu archipelago appear to have harbored some of the earliest discovered Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, Islamic scholarship, both in Arabic and Swahili, reached notably high levels at Pate and Lamu, and it was from there that a new, more literate, brand of coastal Islam radiated southward during the seventeenth–nineteenth centuries. Immigrant Arab ulama (Muslim scholars) from southern Arabia largely were transmitters of this new scholarship.

Coastal Kenya met with fresh external influences in the nineteenth century. Scholars from Barawa introduced new methods at Siyu in the 1840s and trained a new generation of local Swahili shaykhs able to compete successfully with dynasties of Arab ulama who had monopolized scholarship until then. In addition, Somali shaykhs helped popularize Islamic teaching through the Qadiriyya brotherhood. Due to opposition from the influential Mazrui shaykhs, however, the Qadiriyya largely skipped Pate, Lamu, and Mombasa and experienced more success in Zanzibar and along the Tanzanian and Mozambique coasts.

The nineteenth century also witnessed significant penetration of Islam inland for the first time, though this success was notably less decided in Kenya than farther south due to the relative failure of the brotherhoods there. Rather, other developments accounted for this in the case of Kenya. By the 1840s and 1850s, coastal Muslims were brought into more frequent and intense contact with non-Muslims of the immediate coastal hinterland. The general cause was the expanding economy of East Africa, but the immediate reasons included growing agricultural production and expanded trade. New farming areas, including some slave plantations, were opened around the Shimoni Peninsula, Gasi, Mombasa, Takaungu, Malindi, and the Pokomo Valley. Muslim trading posts appeared among the Mijikenda by mid-century and later. The result of these expanded contacts by the third quarter of the century has been termed "rural Islamization." As Muslims

advanced inland among traditionally non-Muslim peoples, conversions occurred individually and for a wide variety of reasons. However, much of this had to do with the growing presence of Muslim teachers who proselytized and taught useful new literary skills.

By the 1860s and 1870s, caravan trade for ivory became a more crucial factor linking coastal Muslims and peoples of the farther interior. Two major routes developed in Kenya. One was up the Pokomo Valley. The second went inland from Mombasa to Mt. Kilimanjaro or Kamba country; from thence it traversed the Rift Valley to the region east and north of Lake Victoria. Slowly, settlements of Muslims appeared along these routes. The most important was at Mumia's in north-western Kenya, but others appeared at locations like Machakos, Kitui, Baringo, and Eldama Ravine.

The absence of an official policy toward Islam during the colonial era initially fostered its continued success upcountry. In the early days of colonial rule, Muslims were favored for posts as government agents. Early administrators like Arthur Hardinge thought coastal "Arabs" to be more "civilized" than other Kenyans, so many (especially Sudanese) were employed as soldiers in the "pacification" of inland areas. Afterward, others were employed at administrative centers as policemen, clerks, translators, surveyors, tax collectors, and headmen. The prestige attached to these positions in the eyes of local peoples provided fertile soil for proselytization by the individuals who filled them.

By the twentieth century, however, Islamization in Kenya lost its earlier momentum. The causes of this were the greater prestige attached to Christianity as the religion of the colonial masters and the specific role played by missionary Christianity. As most Kenyans quickly realized, the key to advancement in the new order was education, and the Christian missions largely were the providers of that key. In many cases, a pre-requisite to admission to schools was conversion, but even where it was not, Muslims, fearing conversion of their children, refused to send them to these schools. Inevitably, Muslims were left behind and were replaced in most positions by mission-trained Africans.

Such marginalization has continued in the postindependence era. The wealthiest and most influential members of Kenya's elite are those who have benefited most from Western-style educations. Generally, this has meant those who are Christians. At times, ethnicity and regionalism have been factors weighing against Muslim advancement, particularly coastal Muslims. The Kenyatta regime favored Kikuyus, most of whom were Christian and educated. President Moi has downplayed ethnicity, but until 1992 all members of his cabinet were Christians with Western-style educations.

Over the years, Kenyan Muslims themselves have been splintered in responding to these challenges. Some, like Shaykhs al-Amin Ali Mazrui, Abdallah Saleh Farsy, and, more recently, Nasoro Khamisi, have tried to reconcile Islamic teaching with the requirements of modern life. Their efforts against saint veneration, costly burial rites, and other innovations have aroused opposition from the Jamal al-Layl shaykhs of Lamu's Riyadh Institute. The coastal ulama also have experienced increased challenges of leadership from upcountry, non-Swahili shaykhs in the past two decades. This appears to have been due partly to efforts by the government to divide the Muslims of Kenya.

Since the late twentieth century, there has been a growing radicalization of Muslims all over East Africa. Some local shaykhs have received training in Saudi universities and have returned exhibiting a greater awareness of international Islam and its dilemmas. Some have expressed open sympathy with the Iranian revolution. Preaching by such individuals has helped galvanize Kenyan Muslims into greater political awareness, especially over issues of concern to the entire community (such as the reaction that followed passage of the Law of Succession). Widespread opposition to KANU and the return to multiparty politics in 1992 allowed the creation of the Islamic Party of Kenya to give a voice to community concerns in national politics for the first time. The government countered, however, by refusing to recognize the IPK and to support a rival party, the United Muslims of Africa. Relations between Kenyan Muslims and the government have continued deteriorating in the aftermath of the bombing of the United States Embassy by Islamic terrorists in August 1998.

RANDALL L. POWELS

See also: **Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Islam.**

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Kérékou, Mathieu: *See Benin, Republic of (Dahomey): Kérékou, Mathieu.*

Kerma and Egyptian Nubia

The roots of the Kerma culture extend back into the late Predynastic period in Upper Nubia at least north of the Debba Bend, contemporaneous with the later (Classic and Terminal) phases of A-Group culture in Lower Nubia. Little evidence for its continuity has yet been found, but what there is indicates a social and political development of fewer but larger “statelets” and small “kingdoms.” Egyptian control over Lower Nubia during the Old Kingdom (which effectively erased all traces of the A-Group) allowed it to trade directly with the “Pre-Kerma” peoples who controlled the Upper Nubian Nile corridor. At the type site and probable capital of Kerma itself, just south of the Third Cataract, a major and densely populated “Pre-Kerma” settlement with circular houses up to 5 meters in diameter was revealed directly beneath the Middle Kerma period cemetery.

In the absence of written Kerma texts and with only a few Egyptian records, four developmental phases of the Kerma culture are recognized archaeologically through ceramic typology. The Early, Middle, Classic, and Late (or Post-) Kerma periods correspond roughly in Egypt to the late Old Kingdom and First Intermediate period, the Middle Kingdom, the Second Intermediate period, and finally the brief final phase in early Dynasty XVIII. The history of Kerma still must be viewed in relation to Egyptian history: power and control alternated between the two and was dominated by their need to control the river traffic in trade goods, and the gold mines of the Wadi Allaqi in the eastern desert were exploited first by Egypt in the Old Kingdom. The Nile was still, at this time, much farther east than today.

By the end of the Old Kingdom, a recognizable “Early Kerma” culture is visible archaeologically from



Tall pottery vessel. Predynastic. Egyptian Museum, Cairo. © Wener Forman/Art Resource, New York.

the Batn el-Hajar at least as far south as the Debba Bend. It is distinct from other contemporaneous cultures nearby, the “C-Group,” which appears to be the successor of the A-Group in Lower Nubia and the nomadic pastoralist “Pan-Grave” peoples, mostly in Nubia’s Eastern desert. Even further south, and possibly in some form of trading relationship with Early Kerma although not (directly) with Egypt, are the nomadic herders of the Western Butana (identified at the site of Shaqadud) and, even farther, the “Gash Group” (“Middle Kassala”) of the Southern Atbai. Other areas are insufficiently understood for comment, although cattle-keepers occupied the Wadi el-Howar.

“Kerma” is an entirely modern identification for this civilization, taken from the major city and its adjacent cemetery excavated in 1913–1916 by G. A. Reisner and until the 1950s virtually the only Kerma site known. The ancient Egyptian name for the Kerma territory appears to have changed over time. It probably was (at least in part) “Yam” in the late Old Kingdom, and perhaps later “Irem.” The designation “Kush,” usually cited in pejorative terms, begins to appear in the Egyptian records in Dynasty XII, and most likely this is the Egyptian name corresponding to the powerful and centralized Upper Nubian “Kerma” state by that time. Two Middle Kerma kings, Awa’a and Utatreses, are named on these texts, and those of other Kushite rulers also are attested.

During the Old Kingdom, Egypt controlled access along the Lower Nubian Nile as far as the Second Cataract but, at its end, was forced to retreat down to Aswan. Late Old Kingdom traders such as Harkhuf had traveled beyond the Second Cataract to conduct their business with the emerging Kerma state, but such expeditions are not evident later. The power vacuum thus created was filled by Kerma cultural and political expansion northward almost to Aswan throughout the Early Kerma/First Intermediate period in Egypt. The pastoralist C-Group peoples also became culturally distinct in Lower Nubia, but their relationship to the Kerma intruders is as yet not entirely clear. The increased power and importance of Kerma (both city and state) by the early Middle Kingdom may have been the reason why its Dynasty XI founder, Nebhepetre Montuhotep II, initiated a military campaign to regain control of Lower Nubia.

Eventually, the powerful Dynasty XII kings constructed a series of massive mud-brick military fortresses at strategic points along the Lower Nubian Nile, which controlled all access north of the Second Cataract by the time of Senwosret I. The other known major Kerma settlement and cemetery guarded this main Upper Nubian/Kerma frontier at Sai Island just south of the Batn el-Hajar, which Egypt did not breach until Dynasty XVIII. The Egyptian army recruited

entire contingents of Nubian mercenaries, most famously archers, who seem to have been mainly Pan-Grave and known as the “Medjay.” Its success, bypassing the C-Group population, is indicated in part by the much increased quantity of Egyptian goods from Early to Middle Kerma graves. Other features (including hieroglyphic writing and much iconographical adoption) suggest some overlying Egyptian acculturation, with Egyptian traders, craftsmen, and advisers resident at Kerma itself. Nonetheless, the unique character of the Kerma culture was retained.

The decline of the Middle Kingdom in Egypt followed the pattern at the end of the Old Kingdom, with Egypt withdrawing to Aswan and Kerma again wresting control of all Lower Nubia at the beginning of the Second Intermediate Period/Classic Kerma phase. The Egyptian fortresses continued to be manned by both Egyptian and Nubian soldiers, but they now served the king of Kush, not of Egypt. This is the apogée of Kerma civilization, during which the largest of the royal burial tumuli were constructed, the capital expanded considerably and massive quantities of exotic imported Egyptian goods (mostly originating in Upper Egypt and often heirloom pieces) are found throughout Kerma. The kingdom also expanded southward beyond the Debba Bend at least to the Fourth Cataract at Napata. It was as powerful at this time as Egypt had been in the Middle Kingdom. In Egypt, Kamose (the last king of Dynasty XVII) at Thebes complained he sat “between an Asiatic (the Hyksos king at Avaris) and a Nubian (the Kushite king)” who were politically allied against him. He and his Dynasty XVIII successors successfully campaigned in both directions for the next century, expelling both the Hyksos and the Kushites and regaining territorial control. This time they followed an entirely different policy, penetrating into the Near East as far as the Euphrates River and, in the relatively brief late or post-Kerma phase, into Upper Nubia itself.

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See also: Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia; Kush; Meroe: Meroitic Culture and Economy; Napata and Meroe.

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Khama III (c.1835–1923)

Botswana King

Boikanyo Khama, otherwise popularly known as Khama III, Khama “the Good,” or Khama “the Great,” was born in 1835 at Mosu near the Makgadikgadi Salt Pans, not very far from the Boteti River in the Central District of Botswana. He was the son of Kgosi Sekgoma I, credited for having reorganized the Bangwato Batswana, one of the major ethnic groups of the Central District of Botswana, into a formidable kingdom.

Khama III grew up in Shoshong. Like most Batswana youths, he looked after goats and calves before he graduated to herd cattle as an adolescent. He was exposed to Christian teachings by a Botswana evangelist known as Kgobati. In 1860 Khama III and his brother Khamane were baptized by Heinrich Schulenburg of the German Hermannsburg Missionary Society, who had been among the Bangwato at Shoshong since 1859. Two years later, Khama married Elizabeta, a convert and daughter of Tshukudu, a prominent member of the Ngwato royalty. Khama III became a staunch, almost fanatical, Christian. Adhering to Christian ideals, he refused to marry other wives as demanded by local tradition. As a result, Khama III and his brother fell out with their father, who saw his sons as shunning the traditions of their own people.

The London Missionary Society (LMS), which replaced the Hermannsburg in 1862, supported the actions of the two heirs against their father. Successive LMS agents (the Reverends John Mackenzie, Roger Price, and James Hepburn) saw Sekgoma as a villain bent on halting Christian progress. The Bangwato town of Shoshong became divided into two factions, Christian and pagan. The two factions entered a civil war in 1866 that culminated in the defeat, albeit temporarily, of the Christians.

Meanwhile, an uncle, Macheng, supposedly the legitimate heir apparent, became the Kgosi (chief) twice before he was ousted by Khama III in favor of his father, Sekgoma I. In 1875 Khama III, with the backing of the Christian community, ousted his father and became the Kgosi of the Bangwato until his death in 1923.

Khama became Kgosi at a time when white traders, travelers, and missionaries from the south were entering his country. Shoshong, his capital, became an important link to the interior where ivory and ostrich feathers, important commodities of the time, could be obtained and exchanged for money and manufactured goods.

Khama III reformed his kingdom along Christian ideals. From 1876 he banned initiation ceremonies, all

Bangwato were to observe Sunday as the Sabbath and no wagons were allowed to pass through Shoshong on that day. Christianity became the official religion of Bangwato. Polygamy was prohibited, and payment of *bogadi* (bride price) was ended. He allowed daughters to be entitled to inheritance, a practice hitherto unheard of in the Bangwato society. He abolished payment of tribute by conquered peoples and allowed them to use their cattle and land the way they saw fit. He opened *kgotla* (traditional assembly) meetings with prayer and above all banned both European liquor and traditional beer. Some of these reforms caused dissension as some members of the Bangwato were banished for criticizing the Kgosi for banning traditional brew, and being too stern in implementing these reforms. Raditladi, Mphoeng, the Kgosi's own son Sekgoma II, and their respective followers were exiled for opposing the Kgosi and his reforms.

From 1876 Khama III was plagued by white encroachment into his country. The Boers of the Transvaal in South Africa, notorious for their practice of land domination, were threatening to take Khama III's land. With the advice of missionaries who became his secretaries and advisers in foreign matters, he appealed for British protection against the Boers.

The British protectorate over Botswana, which was welcomed by Khama III, came in 1885 through a British soldier known as Charles Warren and Rev. Mackenzie, former missionary in his country. The British were intent on securing "the road to the north" to prevent Batswana country from being taken over by the Boers and Germans in South West Africa (Namibia). This arrangement suited Batswana, and Khama III pledged to be always a British ally.

In 1893–1894, Khama ensured his loyalty to the British by supporting Cecil John Rhodes's British South Africa Company's (BSA) invasion of Matebeleland. A year later Khama was shocked to learn that the British government was to hand over Batswana country to be annexed to Rhodes's newly founded colony of Rhodesia.

With the help of the LMS missionary W. C. Willoughby and two other chiefs, Sebele of Bakwena and Bathoeng of Bangwaketse, the three leaders journeyed to England in 1895 to protest against being handed over to company rule. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain was at first unwilling to listen to their pleas but changed his mind when they had mustered enough support from religious movements in Britain to sway British opinion in their favor. The protectorate would not be handed over to the BSA Company, and the chiefs would continue to rule their people as before.

From 1900 until his death, Khama III continually clashed with the protectorate administration and the

missionaries. The latter wanted to buy land, while the former invented laws for the protectorate without consultation. He suspected the protectorate administration of trying to hand over the Batswana country to the Union of South Africa, which was formed in 1910. Khama III died of pneumonia in 1923 and was succeeded by his son, Sekgoma II, father of the first president of Botswana.

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See also: **Botswana.**

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Khartoum

Located at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, Khartoum was originally a small fishing village. When the Turco-Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt, invaded the Sudan in 1821, it became a small outpost of the army. In 1824 the military governor, Uthman Bey, a Circassian, realized the strategic importance of Khartoum. He constructed a fort garrisoned by a full regiment, but the headquarters for the Turco-Egyptian administration in the Sudan remained at Sennar until 1825 when Mahu Bey, a Kurd, was appointed in command of the province of Sennar.



Camel racing in Khartoum, Sudan, 1960s. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

He resided, however, at Khartoum rather than Sennar and stationed his troops across the Blue Nile at Qubbat Khujali.

In 1826 Ali Khurshid Agha was appointed “governor of Sennar” but moved the administrative capital to Khartoum, which he devoted much energy to developing. Settlers were given land grants. The original mosque built in 1829 was demolished in 1837 and one that could accommodate the faithful was built in its place. Barracks, a military storehouse, and a dockyard were constructed by the Nile. Townspeople were encouraged to replace their tents with houses of brick and mortar. The market (*suq*) prospered, the trade routes were protected, and the population increased.

After the opening of the White Nile through the Sudd to the verdant and populous lands of the upper Nile a small but influential community of European traders settled in Khartoum. Led by the Savoyard, Antoine Brun-Rollet, they traded in ivory and supported the Roman Catholic mission to Central Africa that established its headquarters in the capital. In 1854 the new viceroy, Muhammad Sa’id (1854–1863) under pressure from European governments and bankers, closed the profitable public slave market in Khartoum and appointed the first Christian governor of the Sudan, Arakil Bey. His tenure (1856–1858) was cut short by his death in 1858.

During the reign of the khedive Isma’il (1863–1879), Khartoum expanded to accommodate his imperial ambitions in the Upper Nile and northeast Africa. Muslim merchant princes now organized large expeditions in Khartoum to proceed up the White Nile, through the Sudd, to the fertile grasslands and forests of the Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria. Isma’il employed the services of Sir Samuel Baker in 1869 to expand his khedivial empire from Khartoum to the great lakes of equatorial Africa. The administrative offices, military barracks, and the dockyard were expanded to accommodate the need for troops and steamers.

In 1881 Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi revolted against the Turco-Egyptian government in the Sudan, rallying the Sudanese in a jihad that swept all before them to besiege Khartoum and the new governor general, Major General Charles George Gordon sent by the British government to resolve the Sudan question and the revolt of the Mahdi. Gordon had previously served in the Sudan as governor of Equatoria under the khedive Isma’il. He arrived in Khartoum on February 18, 1884, realizing that there could be no accommodation with Muhammad al-Mahdi whose Ansar besieged the capital in September. The Mahdi arrived before Khartoum in October, and Gordon, a military engineer, organized the long siege of the city behind its walls. By the new year 1885 the garrison

and public, despite Gordon’s efforts, could no longer sustain themselves.

Upon the approach of a British relief expedition, the Mahdi ordered the assault on January 26, 1885, during the month of low Nile. The exhausted garrison was overwhelmed, Gordon was killed, the populace massacred or enslaved, and the city reduced to ruin and deserted. The capital of the Mahdists state was removed across the confluence of the White and Blue Niles to Omdruman.

Upon the reconquest of the Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian forces under the command of General Horatio Herbert Kitchener in 1898, Khartoum became the capital of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Like Gordon, Kitchener was a military engineer who took personal command in its reconstruction, laying out its grid, according to legend, in the form of the British flag but with broad boulevards presumably that could be easily enfiladed by the machine guns of the conquerors.

During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Khartoum gradually evolved into a modern city dominated by the government buildings and the Gordon Memorial College, which became the University of Khartoum in 1956. There was light manufacturing, printing, food processing, technical schools, and the Sudan National Museum and the Ethnographical Museum. Upon independence its population was 476,218.

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See also: Sudan.

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Khayr al-Din: *See Tunisia: Khayr al-Din and Constitutional and Administrative Reform, 1855–1878.*

Khoi-Dutch Wars: *See Cape Colony: Khoi-Dutch Wars.*

Khoisan Resistance: *See Cape Colony: Khoi-Dutch Wars.*

Kibiro: *See Great Lakes Region: Ntusi, Kibiro, and Bigo.*

Kilimanjaro: *See Upare, Usambara, and Kilimanjaro.*

Kimbangu, Simon, and Kimbanguism

Simon Kimbangu was born on September 24, 1889, at Nkamba, near Thysville (now Mbanza-Ngugu), in the Lower Congo. Kimbangu, which literally means in the Kikongo language “the one who reveals what is hidden,” was the member of a group, the Bakongo, that had long experienced Christianity and Christian revivalist movements. Due to the Christian heritage of the Lower Congo, colonial missions, including the British Missionary Society (BMS), established their first centers there. Kimbangu was brought up within the religious realm of the BMS. He became a Christian as a young man. In July 1915, after being thoroughly instructed by the missionaries, he was baptized along with his wife, Marie Mwilu. For a short period he was a teacher at the mission school in Mgombe Lutete where he further familiarized himself with the Bible of which he gained a strong command. He also ministered as an evangelist at Nkamba and enjoyed a particularly favorable reputation among the white missionaries who described the young Kimbangu as a good and thoughtful man who read his Bible and performed his tasks conscientiously.

Kimbangu received his first call to “tend Christ’s flock” one night in 1918. After declining the call he finally sought refuge in Kinshasa where he worked at various menial jobs without ever finding peace of mind, for even in Kinshasa the voice that called him to minister for the Gospel reached him. He returned to Nkamba and, on the morning of April 6, 1921, performed his first healing by laying his hands in the name of Jesus Christ on a critically ill woman. The second miracle was the raising to life of a dead child, and many more followed from healings of sick people to prophecies. At first, people thought Kimbangu was using charms but he eventually managed to convince people by insisting, “It is Christ who has performed these miracles through me. I have no power to do these myself.” From then on, pilgrims started flocking to Nkamba to seek healing and instruction.

Kimbangu’s message summoned people to renounce their non-Christian ways. It combated polygamy, profane dances, and fetishes. Kimbangu and the movement he initiated represented a Christian African reaction against colonization and colonial evangelization, although, it is worth noting, Kimbangu never opposed

the authorities but championed obedience to the powers to be, which in the case of the Lower Congo also meant for the people to yield to forced labor and continue to pay a burdensome poll tax.

Faced with a staggering desertion of workers and servants who flocked to Nkamba, the colonial administration branded Kimbangu an *illuminé* (visionary) who was seeking popularity that later might coalesce into an organized rebellion in a region particularly prone to such outbursts. A state of emergency in the districts of Mbanza-Ngugu and Luozi was declared and Kimbangu, after hiding for a few months, gave himself up and was arrested in September 1921, after only less than six months in the ministry. A military court charged him with sedition and civil disobedience, and he was sentenced to death in what seemed to be a legal travesty, but the sentence was soon commuted by King Albert to life imprisonment. Kimbangu was transferred to Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) where he spent thirty years in solitary confinement.

In the absence of the leader and in the face of a relentless colonial repression that took the form of destruction of places of worship (Nkamba was totally destroyed by the Belgians) and massive deportations, the movement went underground and, not surprisingly, branched out into various independent splinter groups, such as Nguzism, Mpadism, and Kakism. It later and quickly spread into French Congo and Gabon.

In 1959, after several decades of concealed activities, Kimbanguism was finally recognized by the Belgian colonial administration and placed on the same footing as the Catholic and Protestant churches. Under the leadership of Joseph Diangienda, Kimbangu’s second son who claimed his father’s mantle, the movement organized itself into an official church known as the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (*Église de Jésus-Christ sur Terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu*, EJCSK). EJCSK represents an attempt at forging a typically African Christian church against the backdrop of the “colonial mission” and the postcolonial dictatorship.

During the long reign of the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, the Kimbanguist movement became one of the regime’s clients and its most fervent defender. The church went from an explicit policy of no interference with politics to safeguarding Mobutu’s regime and promoting *Mobutisme*. In return, when in December 1971 Mobutu decided to ban all the “sects” in the country, EJCSK was not only granted a privileged status but also benefited from the repression of dissident religious groups that were forced either to disband or join EJCSK. Mobutu’s regime guaranteed the church’s financial prosperity and political protection as well.

Today, EJCSK enjoys a status as the third largest organized religious denomination in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC). It has become a powerful financial institution with hundreds of Kimbanguist schools and temples across the country, an imposing *Institut pédagogique et théologique* (Institute of Education and Theology) in Kinshasa, and a mausoleum in Nkamba, called the New Jerusalem (where Kimbangu's remains had been transferred), which attracts tens of thousands of pilgrims every year. In addition, EJCSK has extensive social services in agriculture, youth work (including several boy scouts troops), and cooperatives.

Since the promotion of EJCSK under Mobutu, one important feature in the social life of the church has been the leading role played by Kimbangu's three sons, especially Joseph Diangienda. Until his death, which occurred in 1992, he was considered a *zimvwala*, a title that confers prophetic and royal authority within the church. He was also called *tata mfumu'a nlongo* (sacred head). Diangienda's veneration by Kimbanguists reached such heights that after his burial a few devoted followers spread the word that he would resurrect within three days as Christ did. To the disappointment of many followers, Diangienda never rose from the dead and his confirmed death, mirroring that of Mobutu a few years later, intensified doctrinal as well as political divisions within the Kimbanguist church that threaten the church's destiny.

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See also: Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Mobutu, Zaire, and Mobutuism.

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Kimberley, Diamond Fields and

The year 1870 is widely regarded as a turning point in South African history, for it marks the beginning of the mineral revolution upon which South Africa's industrial transformation was to be based. On the eve of this mineral revolution, the territory that constitutes the modern state of South Africa consisted of a mixture of British colonies, Boer (Afrikaner) republics, and independent African states. Economically, the region was largely based upon pastoralism, hunting, and subsistence agriculture. The rapid expansion of white settlement, characteristic of earlier decades, had slowed as Africans became better armed with guns and better organized so as to resist further encroachment. The political balance of power between black and white in South Africa, however, was about to be

transformed by the impact of mineral discoveries at Kimberley.

The first diamond was picked up north of the Cape Colony near the confluence of the Vaal and Orange Rivers in 1867 and sold to a trader from the Cape. Over the next two years, increasing numbers of diamonds were found and traded by local Batlhaping (Tswana), Griqua, and Kora along the lower reaches of the Vaal. Large numbers of black and white speculators, adventurers, and traders converged upon the spot, eager to find the source, and during 1870 diamond "mines" were found both at "river diggings" on the Vaal and at "dry diggings" further south. Politically, the territory was disputed between Waterboer's Griqua, Batlhaping, Orange Free State, and South African Republic (Transvaal). The British government at the Cape put the matter to arbitration at Bloemhof and, despite evidence to the contrary, decided territorial claims in favor of Waterboer, who by then had been persuaded to seek British "protection." Thus, by the end of 1871, the British, who had started the year with no claims to the region at all, had annexed the whole of the diamond fields as the Crown Colony of Griqualand West. By then the "dry diggings" had been shown to contain the largest and richest mine of all, "New Rush," which was renamed Kimberley after the British secretary of state for the colonies. Griqualand West remained a separate Crown Colony until 1880 when it was appended to the Cape Colony.

In the early days of the diamond fields, black and white alike had staked claims and dug and traded for diamonds alongside and in direct competition with each other, both employing black laborers to do the actual digging. But when the flood of diamonds onto the world market led to falling prices, white claim-holders organized themselves into "mutual protection" associations and enforced racist exclusivity over the right to hold diamond claims. Claim-holders were the only ones legally allowed to sell diamonds to the merchants who had set up shop at Kimberley. Part of the white claim-holders' paranoia was due to the belief that black laborers were the most likely people to conceal diamonds found at the bottom of the shafts and they were most likely to sell those stolen gems through black claim-holders. In practice, all claim-holders were equally likely to trade in stolen gems, but competition was fierce and, in the politics of a colonial society, the white claim-holders pressured the British authorities to impose tighter restrictions on the movement and activities of Africans on the diamond fields. Thus emerged the notorious "pass" system in early South African industrial society—a remnant of Cape slavery from the early nineteenth century.

As the diamond mines were dug more deeply, industrial machinery was required for haulage and

for pumping out floodwater, and the individual claim-holdings gave way to capitalized companies. Competition between companies, however, still stimulated overproduction and unstable prices. The logic was amalgamation and, eventually, monopoly, an objective achieved by Cecil Rhodes's De Beers Consolidated Mining Company in 1888–1889. Then production and labor was cut, the market was stabilized, and capital investment and long-term profitability was secured. By then the African role in diamond mining had become restricted to that of unskilled migrant laborer, mostly on short-term contract, during which they were confined, controlled, and searched in fenced company compounds.

Beyond the confines of the Kimberley mines, the impact of the mineral revolution was profound. In a hitherto lightly populated dry part of the southern African interior, there grew up, almost overnight, a city of some 30,000 people. Besides the loss of political control by the various claimants to the diamond fields, the initial impact was mostly one of opportunity. Kimberley needed food and fuel, and local farmers, African and Afrikaner, responded with enthusiasm to the openings of production for market rather than for subsistence. Local Batlhaping cattle-owners sold surplus milk and cattle and bought ploughs and wagons with the proceeds, while Afrikaners from the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and Basotho from Basutoland (Lesotho), found a market for greater grain production. The most profitable marketable item through the 1870s and early 1880s was firewood to fuel the mines' steam-driven pumps, crushers, and haulage gear. "Wood riding" only declined as a profitable activity after 1885 when the extension of the railway from the Cape enabled the importation of cheap Welsh coal to the diamond fields.

The widest-felt impact of the diamond mines, however, was as a market for migrant labor. Africans came from as far away as Mozambique and the northern Transvaal to work on short-term contracts at the diamond fields. Competition between claim-holders meant that initially wages were relatively attractive: pay for one month's work could purchase a muzzle-loading gun, or several suits of second-hand clothing and domestic pots and pans. Although migrant labor later became a means of survival for the dispossessed, initially it was an opportunity to purchase firearms for hunting and defense of land.

The collective impact of all these factors was greater competition for access to land and labor, and its potential resources. Combined with a greater proliferation of firearms, this resulted in heightened potential for armed conflict. It is no coincidence that the late 1870s and early 1880s was a period when southern Africa experienced greatly increased level of warfare—wars of rebellion, resistance, and conquest.

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See also: **Labor, Migrant; Rhodes, Cecil J.; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881**

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Kinshasa

In 1881 the American explorer Henry Morton Stanley, acting on behalf of King Leopold of Belgium, founded what was to become the city of Leopoldville on the banks of the Congo River. Geography determined the location. Leopoldville was established at the downstream end of an extensive network of river transportation in the Congo Basin, dominated by the thousand-mile stretch of the Congo River navigable up to what is now Kisangani, and just before an extensive series of rapids (the Cataractes) renders the river nonnavigable as it heads to its mouth at the Atlantic Ocean.

A remote outpost for most of its first twenty years, Leopoldville was connected to the Atlantic and



Leopoldville (Kinshasa), 1955; the capital of the Belgian Congo with 400,000 inhabitants. © Lode van Gent/Das Fotoarchiv.

ultimately to the rest of the world in 1898, when the railway linking it to the inland seaport of Matadi was completed. Establishment of the railway allowed Leopoldville to develop as a commercial center, in particular as a transit point for rubber and other products from the interior of the Congo bound for Europe, and for goods imported from Europe and headed for the interior. Thus, for example, between 1910 and 1930 the volume of goods passing through the river port of Leopoldville each year grew from 19,000 tons to nearly 275,000 tons, representing almost a doubling every five years.

In 1923 Leopoldville became the capital of the Belgian Congo, and by the end of the 1920s the city had become an important administrative center. The growth of the city was rapid. Like many other emerging cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, Leopoldville was not located where human resources were plentiful, and hence it was necessary to import workers to meet the growing demand for labor. Recruitment of workers in rural areas served to attract Congolese men to employment in the emerging modern economic sector. The Great Depression of the 1930s slowed the city's growth briefly: 6,000 men were sent back to their rural areas of origin in 1930 and 7,000 more were sent back in 1932 in response to the corresponding sharp decline in demand for labor. This incident reflected the considerable control over labor and unemployment exercised by the colonial authorities, and it also emphasized the sensitivity to external events of this new urban center in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The importance of external events was further highlighted with the onset of World War II. Supplies to Leopoldville were cut off, and as a consequence the city was obliged to develop rapidly its industrial base so as to become more self-sufficient. Labor recruitment, as before, was focused on finding men to work in the city's growing modern economy, and the colonial government strictly controlled migration to Leopoldville. Hence, the city was characterized by relatively small proportions of women and children. The addition of considerable industrial activity to the city's existing commercial, transportation, administrative, and industrial activities resulted not only in substantial diversification of the city's economy but also in a doubling of the population between 1940 and 1945 and a doubling again between 1945 and 1950.

By 1960 Leopoldville had a population of roughly 400,000. When the Belgian Congo became independent in mid-1960, the controls on migration were effectively eliminated, and, fueled by the internal political strife of the early 1960s, the city began another period of rapid growth. This growth was accompanied by a variety of economic and social changes, including rapid expansion of the informal or unstructured sector

of the economy, and continuation of the substantial extension of schooling to women that had just begun near the end of the colonial period.

From 1965, when General Joseph Désiré Mobutu seized power in a coup d'état, until the mid-1970s the city (now named Kinshasa, after one of the villages that existed near the site where Stanley first established Leopoldville) and the country experienced a period of political stability and economic growth. In the early 1970s, on the heels of this political and economic success, President Mobutu announced a policy to promote "Authenticity." To further "Authenticity," the President required citizens to abandon their European names in favor of African ones, he changed the names of many other cities throughout the country from their colonial designations to African names, and he changed the name of the country from Congo to Zaire. However, following the implementation in 1973 and 1974 of ill-conceived policies of "Zairianization" and radicalization (which essentially expropriated most businesses owned by foreigners and typically turned them over to unqualified Zairians, with very harmful and long-lasting adverse consequences), and the sharp decline in world copper prices that took place at roughly the same time (copper was the main source of export earnings and government revenue), the economy entered a period of protracted crisis from which it has not yet emerged.

The chronic crisis that began in the mid-1970s was accompanied by stagnation in the modern sector of employment and continued growth of the informal sector. Despite these problems, the population of the city continued to grow rapidly throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Economic growth and development were further hindered by a notoriously corrupt and poorly functioning public sector (some political scientists described the governance system as one of "kleptocracy"). During the 1980s, the country's government attempted, with assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to implement a series of structural adjustment programs aimed at improving efficiency of operation of the public sector and encouraging the growth and development of the private sector. A number of economic reforms were adopted, but political support for structural adjustment was unsteady and had an "on-again, off-again" character.

Beginning in the latter half of 1990, the chronic economic crisis became acute. After a number of years during which inflation had averaged 40 to 50 per cent per year and real incomes declined substantially, suddenly very rapid inflation of 2,000 to 3,000 per cent per year emerged, as the monetary authorities effectively abandoned any efforts to adhere to the structural adjustment program. The ensuing economic crisis, occurring in the midst of a political crisis characterized by increasingly vocal calls for democracy and the ouster of President

Mobutu, came to a head in late September 1991. Initiated by soldiers who had seen the real value of their salaries shrink to almost nothing, rioting, looting, and generalized civil disorder broke out in Kinshasa and then spread to other urban centers throughout the country. This resulted in the withdrawal of foreign donors and in a considerable shrinkage of the Congo's and Kinshasa's fragile modern sector. A second round of looting and pillaging, this time solely by the military, took place at the end of January 1993.

Inflation continued at an accelerated pace after late 1991, reaching as high as 500 per cent in one month in Kinshasa at the end of 1993 and averaging 10,000 per cent and more on an annual basis for much of 1993 and 1994. In 1995 and during the first half of 1996, inflation slowed to less than 20 per cent per month, corresponding to well under 1,000 per cent per year.

By 1997 Kinshasa's economy was in shambles. Manufacturing activity nationally, which is heavily concentrated in Kinshasa, was cut in half from 1990 to 1993–1994. There was slight improvement in 1995 and early 1996, but by mid-1996 industrial production was at only 50 to 60 per cent of its 1990 levels. Transportation from the countryside to the cities became increasingly difficult, food prices skyrocketed, and malnutrition became increasingly prevalent.

In brief, the chronic crisis that characterized the Congo's and Kinshasa's economy since "Zairianization" in the mid-1970s became an acute crisis in the early 1990s. The political situation remained deadlocked until May 1997, when a rebellion begun in late 1996 with assistance from neighboring countries and led by Laurent Désiré Kabila succeeded in taking power from President Mobutu.

Not long after declaring himself president, Mr. Kabila changed the name of the country back to Democratic Republic of Congo. While his government showed early success in slowing inflation, changing the economy so as to replicate the relative prosperity of the early 1970s will be a far more difficult task. President Kabila now presides over a country rich in mineral wealth and with substantial agricultural potential but one also with a badly deteriorated transportation and production infrastructure, ruined by years of neglect, governmental corruption, and more recently, extreme economic instability and civil war.

Exacerbating the difficulties confronting the Kabila government is the fact that a rebellion broke out in eastern Congo in early August 1998. For a brief period, there was fighting in Kinshasa and elsewhere in the western part of the country. With considerable assistance from several other Sub-Saharan nations, the Kabila government was able to defeat the rebels in Kinshasa and western Congo, but the rebels have succeeded in capturing a significant share of eastern Congo. At present, Kinshasa is the second-largest city

in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population estimated at six million in 2003. However, in view of the country's ongoing political difficulties, its capital city faces an uncertain future.

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See also: **Congo, Democratic Republic of/Zaire.**

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Kitara: See Great Lakes Region: Kitara and the Chwezi Dynasty.

Kongo, Teke (Tio), and Loango: History to 1483

Archaeological evidence of material culture and linguistics combine to suggest that west-central Africa was settled by farming populations after about 1,000BCE. At present, the archaeological work is scattered and sketchy, and new work, especially in areas like Angola where very little systematic work has been done, is likely to modify any conclusions. The early settlers probably spoke languages of the western Bantu family and formed a part of the Bantu migration that originated a millennium earlier in Cameroon. Within five hundred years, knowledge of ironworking had also spread to the region, so that by 200BCE the region was making iron and steel tools.

At present the earliest evidence of complex society comes from Kayes and Madingo-Kayes, located in modern Congo-Brazzaville, where two large settlements located only approximately two miles apart seem to form the center of an interacting group of sites covering a larger area. Such a complex corresponds quite well with the polity that was called a *wene* in seventeenth-century Kongo, whose rulers bore the title

mwene, derived from a personal form of the noun, though the archaeological evidence could not confirm such a pattern of authority.

A finely made and uniform pottery over a larger area suggest the presence of a trading network, and perhaps some consolidation of political authority, which flourished in the period 100–350. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of what activity took place in the following period, and most of these early sites were abandoned after 400.

The kingdoms that covered the region north of the Kwanza and east of the Kwango, and extending northward along the Zaire River and the coast up to Gabon when the first Portuguese arrived in the area in 1483, can be correlated with an archaeological culture known as the Mbafu group, whose earliest manifestation seems to be around 1400. Unfortunately, the absence of systematic investigation of the main settlements of this culture and any preceding culture makes it unlikely that archaeology can add much more to our understanding of the region at the present time.

Oral traditions, written down in the sixteenth century, help fill in the gaps between the archaeology and the earliest eyewitness written documents. Kongo traditions of the origin of the country, which have been periodically written down since the late sixteenth century, were constitutional documents intended to establish the basis for government by anchoring political customs of the time of writing in allegedly ancient precedent. The stories of origin have changed over the years as the constitution of the country changed, so that the foundation tale of the seventeenth century reflects the specifics of Kongo in that period, while the traditions of the nineteenth century and today relate to yet another constitutional arrangement. For this reason, it is best to focus specifically on the earliest traditions for understanding the earliest periods, while recognizing that even these might distort events of earlier periods for purposes of constitutional precedent.

The earliest traditions describe the origins of the kingdom of Kongo as a federation of several earlier and smaller polities such as Nsundi, Mpangu, and Mbata in the valley of the Inkisi River, or Soyo along the coast south of the Zaire River. Genealogies written in the seventeenth century point to a foundation around 1390 and credit one Nimi a Lukeni with it. Kongo probably was one of several federations of smaller polities at the time, such as the “Seven Kingdoms of Kongo dia Nlaza,” a rival confederacy situated between the Inkisi and Kwango Rivers south of the Tio Kingdom that fell under Kongo’s control in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.

In sixteenth-century versions of Kongo tradition, the original state seems to have allowed for an elected

monarchy within a royal family by the hereditary rulers of the relatively independent provinces of the federation, especially Mbata, which had a special relationship with the king. However, Kongo’s constitution was changing by the time the first Europeans arrived, and in particular, early sixteenth century Kongo had a number of royal provinces (Mbamba to the south, for example, or Nsundi to the northeast) in which independent rulers had been defeated and were replaced by appointees of the king.

In addition to allowing for the appointment for limited terms of rulers of some provinces by the king, the provinces of both the federation and its subordinate sections were expanding, particularly Mbamba in the southwest, Nsundi in the northeast, Soyo on the north coast, and Mbata on the east, and incorporated other smaller entities into them. The kings of Kongo further strengthened their own position by concentrating population in or around their royal city of Mbanza Kongo, which was described by the earliest visitors as already being as large as the Portuguese city of Évora (10,000–15,000 inhabitants). The concentration of demographic and economic resources around his capital allowed the king of Kongo to overshadow the provinces and increase his authority. This had thus led to the consolidation of a kingdom of considerable centralization, and had already laid the groundwork for further centralization of authority by the early sixteenth-century kings.

The Tio Kingdom probably was just as old as Kongo, although we have no traditions before the nineteenth century that can trace its origin and hence no details concerning its early government. It is mentioned in early sixteenth century documents around the Maleba Pool region. North of Kongo the emerging kingdom of Loango is not mentioned at all by the earliest visitors to the coast, and only appears in the later sixteenth century. Traditions set down in the seventeenth century relate its origin to Kongo, although these probably only reflect the southern kingdom’s prestige and not a real relationship of origin and authority. Loango was not mentioned, for example, in royal titles of the sixteenth-century kings of Kongo, though some states north of the Zaire, like Vungu (mentioned only in the seventeenth century, but then as the origin of Kongo itself) probably predated Kongo.

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Kongo Kingdom: Afonso I, Christianity, and Kingship

The arrival of the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão at the mouth of the Zaire in 1483 took the Kongoleses by surprise. Although it was a large, growing, and powerful kingdom, Kongo had no contacts with the world beyond its immediate neighbors and the extent of its regional trade routes before the Portuguese arrived. Nevertheless, Kongo rapidly accepted the newcomers and quickly moved to integrate itself into the Atlantic and European world. Kongo's earliest relationship with Portugal is studied with the intention of understanding a pristine encounter between African and European, akin to the meeting of the Tainos with Columbus less than a decade later.

The initial contact involved an exchange of hostages, and then the decision by Kongo's ruler, Nzinga a Nkuwu, to enter into formal relations with Portugal and to accept baptism. In 1491 King João II of Portugal sent a small fleet to Kongo to accomplish this purpose. The atmosphere was charged as the Portuguese and Kongoleses jointly celebrated the baptism first of the *mwene* (ruler) of Soyo, the coastal authority of Kongo, and then the king himself, who was baptized on May 3, 1491, with the name João I in honor of the king of Portugal.

This first expedition of Portuguese to Kongo, and several others that followed in the next twenty years, were conceived as an exercise in cultural change. In addition to the spiritual help in guiding the new Christians, Portuguese colonists, including farmers and crafts people, also came to Kongo to teach new ways of doing things and living.

Only a few days after the baptism of João I, Portuguese armed forces left with the royal army to assist in the suppression of the rebellion of a small province located near the Zaire River. The campaign was a success, and the combined forces returned to Kongo's capital of Mbanza Kongo in triumph before the Portuguese leaders left for Portugal.

There are almost no historical records of the next fifteen years, during which time João I died and was succeeded by his son, Afonso Mvemba a Nzinga, sometime between 1506 and 1509. A very large portion of the next period of Kongo history, up until the middle of the sixteenth century, is known to historians almost entirely through the letters of Afonso to the kings of Portugal, Manuel I and João III. Thus, this critical period in Kongo history is illustrated primarily by sources of African authorship, which elucidate the relationship with Portugal and Portuguese resident

in Kongo, and also political structures in the early Kongoleses state.

Afonso's correspondence, and some collaborating evidence, reveal him to be literate, fervently Christian, and anxious to learn as much as possible about Portugal and Europe. Afonso claimed that he took power in a succession struggle with a pagan half-brother, Mpanzu a Kitima, in a cataclysmic battle that Afonso won with the help of an apparition of Saint James. He established the Roman Catholic Church in Kongo, provided for its funding, and moreover, studied the religion carefully himself and along with his own advisers and those from Portugal. He sent numerous children to Portugal and Europe to study, including his son Henrique Kinu a Mvemba, who was made a bishop in 1518 and returned to Kongo in 1521. Afonso also created an educational system that made the upper classes literate in Portuguese.

The end result was the development of a uniquely Kongoleses form of syncretic Christianity, revealed in the vocabulary of early catechisms, and the observations of priests, such as the Jesuits who came to Kongo shortly after Afonso's death. It combined Kongo's older religious norms, with their emphasis on territorial spirits and ancestors, with the cult of the saints in such a way that Kongoleses religion was enhanced rather than replaced. This work was so effective that it remained the Kongoleses faith until the twentieth century.

Afonso was also anxious to acquire Portuguese skills, and encouraged Portuguese carpenters, stonemasons, and other craftsmen to live in Kongo. He constructed a palace, a city wall, and numerous churches of stone and developed a corps of Kongoleses craftsmen who had mastered this craft. Other Portuguese techniques, like agriculture and making of bread were less successful in Kongo.

Afonso's relations with Portugal and the resident Portuguese have often been studied through his correspondence, especially letters of complaint issued in 1514 and 1526, and occasionally at other times. In these Afonso complained that the Portuguese in his service were immoral, lazy, and sometimes incompetent, at other times that some Portuguese conspired with his subjects to destabilize the kingdom or promote the slave trade. He was particularly concerned that Portuguese, especially those resident in the island of São Tomé (in the Gulf of Guinea), traded with his neighbors without his permission or control. These neighbors included Mpanzulumbu, located near the mouth of the Zaire, Kiangala on the coast north of Luanda, and probably also the kingdom of Ndongo to his south. In all these areas, Kongo had limited control in precontact times, and the growing Portuguese trade represented both assertions of independence on the part of the African partners and tax evasion on the part

of the Portuguese. At one point, in 1526, Afonso proposed stopping all trade with Portugal because he claimed that his own subjects, including members of the nobility had been seized.

Whatever the specific events he alluded to, there is little evidence that Kongo's sovereignty was substantially undermined, or that Afonso's reign was a noble failure to transform the country, as some scholars have contended. When Afonso died in 1542, he passed on a country that was stable, expanding its influence and authority, and committed to continuing the Christian faith. It would be over a century before the debilitating civil war that actually did destroy the country would begin.

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
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Kongo Kingdom, 1542–1568

When King Afonso I (1509–1542) died at an age of over eighty, he left a multigenerational set of successors behind him to struggle over the throne. His son Pedro I Nkanga a Mvemba ruled briefly, before being forced to take refuge in a church by Afonso's half brother, Francisco I Nkumbi a Mpudi, whose equally brief reign ended in 1545 when Afonso's grandson Diogo I Mpudi a Nzinga overthrew him. In 1550 Diogo put Pedro on trial for plotting treason against him; the legal process of this trial is an important source for understanding how succession was undertaken in Kongo in the mid-sixteenth century.

The nature of this struggle reveals how far the country had moved toward centralization of authority since the early sixteenth century. When Afonso came to the throne, the kingship was effectively elective, probably through an original constitution of Kongo that called for the selection of the ruler by the powerful independent nobility of Kongo's original loose federation. Afonso owed his own power, he wrote in 1514, to the good offices of the Mwene (ruler of) Mbata, the most powerful member of the federation. Later, shortly before 1529, Afonso had written to Portugal explaining that he could not name a successor without the consent of the Mwene Mbata. Yet if Mbata, or Soyo, probably



Kongo kingdom, c. 1500.

another early member of the federation played a role in selecting kings earlier, they played no apparent role in the mid-sixteenth century.

Instead, Diogo relied largely on his ability to appoint officials to those provinces of the kingdom that were in his power: Vunda, Mpemba, Nsundi, Mpangu, and other smaller ones. Yet it was not always easy to make the appointments that were technically in his gift, for he moved very slowly to replace his predecessors' appointed officials and even five years after ascending the throne had not completely filled these positions with his supporters. Pedro's plot, in fact, revolved around getting one or another of these appointed officials to rebel against Diogo in his favor. In the end, however, Diogo managed to force all to swear that they would never support anyone of Pedro's *geração*, a Portuguese term that probably translated the Kikongo word *kanda*, which in turn referred to a large and complex faction united by kinship, clientage, and other bonds for political means.

By the mid-1550s, however, Diogo was firmly in control of Kongo and its establishment. He had steered the church out of the hands of Jesuits, whose mission between 1548 and 1555 had sought to place both the church and the Portuguese resident community under their (and the Portuguese crown's) control. In 1553 he won the right to appoint a captain of the Portuguese against rights of the Portuguese throne. He was troubled, as was Afonso, with growing Portuguese trade with Ndongo, but he expanded the country. Southward he consolidated control over Kiangala along the coast, and under his guidance Kongo gained control all along

the south border of the country and into the east as well.

When Diogo died in 1561 there was a brief succession dispute between two of his sons. One son, named Afonso II, ruled before being overthrown by his brother Bernardo I (1561–1567). During Bernardo's reign, members of rival *kandas*, perhaps connected to Afonso II, plotted against him, and he faced one open rebellion led by a discontented nobleman who started out in Mpangu and also seized Nsundi. Some of the Portuguese community also joined in this rebellion but were slaughtered and their property seized. Not all the Portuguese joined in, and those who remained loyal were still secure.

Bernardo took an interest in expansion to the east, for early seventeenth-century tradition maintained that he died fighting the "Jagas," who seem to have resided in the region of the Kwango. The fact that his successor, his uncle and Diogo's son, Henrique I, also died in the east (fighting against the Tio kingdom) the very next year, 1568, clearly suggests a strong movement towards the Kwango, and equally strong opposition.

Henrique's death appears to have set off a succession dispute of great significance. Henrique left the capital and civil government of Kongo in the hands of Alvaro Nimi a Lukeni lua Mvemba, the son of his wife by a previous husband when he went to the east. After Henrique's death, Álvaro managed to be proclaimed king Álvaro I, on the basis that Henrique left no issue of his own. At this point, the "Jagas" invaded Kongo.

The origin and nature of the Jagas is a disputed point in Kongo historiography. The most detailed account places their origin along the Kwango, though historians have posited other locations. They were described as rootless cannibals who stormed the country through Mbata, sacking Mbanza Kongo and driving Alvaro to an island in the Zaire River. Some historians have taken this story literally and maintain that they were from the Kwango region, displaced by fighting there. Others see a local revolt behind the Jaga movement, perhaps in support of the Mwene Mbata, who had a claim to Kongo's throne should the royal dynasty ever die out. Since contemporary documents suggest that Álvaro's succession to the throne represented the end of one dynasty and the start of another, a rebellion from Mbata is not out of the question.

Whatever the cause, Álvaro's desperate plight inspired him to seek Portuguese help to restore him to the throne, help that came from São Tomé under the guidance of Francisco de Gouveia Sottomaior in 1571. He and his force of six hundred men did eventually place Álvaro back on the throne, but at a price. The price was, among other things, permitting Portugal control of the mines of precious metal (none was found), to colonize Luanda island, and probably to

collect tribute from the shell money (*nzimbu*) mines there, and the submission of the Portuguese residents in Kongo to an official appointed by the king of Portugal. Álvaro apparently also swore a symbolic vassalage to the Portuguese crown, though this carried very little significance.

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See also: **Kongo, Teke (Tio), and Loango: History to 1483; Kongo Kingdom: Jaga Invasion to 1665; Kongo Kingdom: Afonso I, Christianity, and Kingship; Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century.**

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Kongo Kingdom: Jaga Invasion to 1665

Kongo's King Álvaro I Nimi a Lukeni lua Mvemba (1568–1587) took power under irregular circumstances upon the unexpected death of his predecessor. He was not descended directly from Henrique, being the son of his wife by a previous husband. Later, apologetic genealogists made him a descendant of Afonso I's (1509–1542) second daughter, Isabel Lukeni lua Mvemba, when the issue of the first daughter, Nzinga a Mvemba, had finished, an approach that oversimplifies the real descent of the kings after Afonso. Challenges to his claim may have lay behind the Jaga invasion, which temporarily drove him from the throne and forced him to ask Portugal for assistance.

What Alvaro's success really illustrates, however, is the degree to which the electoral system had been bypassed by kings who could more or less choose their successors from either children or clients. Kongo's administrative centralization had increased, especially now that the appointment and dismissal of the governors of the major provinces was primarily in the hands of the kings and drawn from his clients and family (together making up his *kanda*). Once the Jaga threat was removed, and the Portuguese expedition of Francisco Gouveia de Sottomaior had been withdrawn in 1576, Álvaro consolidated his control over the country.

When Paulo Dias de Novais arrived to colonize Angola for Portugal in 1575, Álvaro had had to accept this as the price of Portuguese support, and in fact sent some forces to assist the Portuguese governor. When Dias de Novais's small force was nearly destroyed in

Ndongo in 1579, Álvaro dispatched an army to help. While unsuccessful, the attempt effectively removed claims that Portugal might have had over Kongo.

Álvaro extended Kongo eastward, and in the 1580s began a campaign to have his capital, which he renamed São Salvador after its principal church, designated as an episcopal see. He died before he saw these projects to their conclusion, but his son, Álvaro II Mpanzu a Nimi (1587–1614) continued them.

Álvaro II's succession was contested by his brother and by members of the *kanda* his father had displaced, and it was at least five years before he was secure against revolts. Once secure, however, he began moving, through strategic marriages and appointments, to bring the hereditary ruling elites of Soyo and Mbata, the traditional electors of Kongo, more fully under his control. The process he initiated would be a long one, successfully completed in Mbata but strongly resisted in Soyo, which thanks to its participation in international trade boasted a large urban capital, Mbanza Soyo, and ready access to the wealth of the Atlantic.

Álvaro II continued making conquests in the east, bringing Kongo to its fullest extent by around 1610. In 1596 he won the right from Rome to have his own bishop, but Portugal claimed the right to name the bishop. The Portuguese bishops favored Angolan interests over Kongolese ones and sought to extend church control beyond what Álvaro considered acceptable bonds.

The process of centralizing the powers of the king that had taken place during the reigns of Álvaro I and II, while it had changed Kongo's constitution, created new problems. The powerful provincial nobility could support rival claimants to the throne and might rebel when the victor sought to remove them. Álvaro III Nimi a Mpanzu (1614–1622), who won the crown over a rival shortly after Álvaro II's death, faced constant rebellion from his predecessors' appointees, who refused to yield their places to his own appointees. When he died in 1622, they forced the election of a compromise king, Pedro II Nkanga a Mvika, from a client lineage (said to be descended from Afonso's third daughter, Ana Zumba a Mvemba).

The compromise only complicated matters, for Pedro's son Garcia I Mvemba a Nkanga (1624–1626) tried unsuccessfully to force his own appointees into these offices, and was overthrown by one of them, Manuel Jordão, duke of Nsundi in favor of Ambrósio Nimi a Nkanga (1626–1631), one of Álvaro II's descendants.

After short reigns by several kings unable to consolidate their control, various provinces were held by members of two *kandas*, one, the Kinkanga a Mvika established by Pedro II, and the other, the Kimpanzu from the descendants of Álvaro II. Soyo was also in-

involved, for its rulers not only resisted integration into Kongo, but thanks to interlocking marriages with both *kandas*, provided a refuge for losing *kandas*.

The Kimpanzu king Álvaro IV Nzinga a Nkuwu took over from Ambrósio in 1631. In 1633 when he sought to remove Daniel da Silva, related to Soyo's ruling house, as duke of Mbamba, he was strongly resisted, eventually calling on two brothers from a client family (later called the Kinlaza) Álvaro Nimi a Lukeni and Garcia Nkanga a Lukeni. When Álvaro IV died in 1636, and his Kimpanzu successor Álvaro V sought to remove them, they rebelled and took over the kingship, first as Álvaro VI (1636–1641) and then as Garcia II (1641–1661).

Garcia's reign was marked, first by the suppression of all Kimpanzu officeholders, and then by the elimination of those from the Kinkanga a Mvika, completed by 1657. He was less successful in several sustained military efforts against Soyo, the last holdout against consolidation of royal control. Not only did Soyo resist and defeat Garcia's armies, but the Kimpanzu managed to take refuge there to continue to nourish their hopes of returning to power. Despite this failure, though, Garcia was in other ways Kongo's strongest king, presiding over a powerfully centralized kingdom at the height of its territorial extent.

When Garcia died in 1661, his son António Vita a Nkanga easily succeeded him to the throne and quickly eliminated potential rivals. António, however, was drawn into a border dispute with Portuguese Angola over control of the small state of Mbwila. In the Battle of Mbwila (or Ulanga as it was known in Kongo) in 1665, Kongo's army was defeated, leaving António dead on the battlefield and no clear-cut successor. The stage was set for a disastrous civil war.

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Kongo Kingdom: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

When King António I Vita a Nkanga died at the Battle of Mbwila-Ulanga (1665) a succession struggle ensued, with both Kinlaza and Kimpanzu *kanda*'s candidates. Fighting was as much Kongo against Soyo as

between rival branches, Soyo supporting Kimpanzu kings and nobles of Kongo supporting Kinlaza ones. The Kinlaza Álvaro VII Mpanzu a Mpandu (1665–1666) was ousted by the Kimpanzu Álvaro VIII Mvemba a Mpanzu (1666–1668), who in turn was overthrown by the Kinlaza, Pedro III Nkanga a Mpanzu (1668–1670). Pedro, in turn, was driven out by Kimpanzu Álvaro IX Mpanzu a Ndbwila (1669–1670), and fled with his followers to the mountainous region of Mbula, south of the Zaire, to build a rival capital at Lemba, where he remained until his death in 1683.

Meanwhile, another Kinlaza contender, Rafael I Nzinga a Nkanga, sought the aid of Portuguese Angola, not only to place himself on the throne but to conquer Soyo. Rafael's gambit threatened Kongo's sovereignty, but the Portuguese army sent to assist him was decisively defeated by Soyo's forces at the Battle of Kitombo (October 18, 1670). Rafael reoccupied São Salvador, and the Kimpanzu, rebuffed, set up a dynasty in exile at Luvota, in southern Soyo, where a line of short-lived kings, including Afonso II and III, ruled under the tutelage of the elderly Dona Suzanna da Nóbrega, effective head of the Kimpanzu *kanda*. Daniel I retook São Salvador for the Kimpanzu in 1674 but was driven out by the Kinlaza forces of Pedro III in 1678. Pedro III did not reoccupy the city, but sacked and abandoned it, leaving the once proud capital depopulated, too vulnerable to be defended or reoccupied.

A series of regional powers had now emerged, each headed by someone with a claim to the throne established through a *kanda*. The Kimpanzu continued in Luvota with Soyo's support, while Kinlaza contenders were found in Lemba, headed by Pedro III, and his son João II (1683–after 1716) after his death. Another Kinlaza branch ruled in the southwest at Nkondo headed by Dona Ana Afonso de Leão and her nephews. Yet another *kanda*, composed of people of mixed Kimpanzu-Kinlaza descent occupied the mountain of Kibangu in the east with would-be kings André I (1689), Manuel I (1690), Álvaro X Agua Rosada (1690–1695), and his brother Pedro IV Agua Rosada (1695–1718) as their claimants. The province of Nsundi to the north, meanwhile, fell under the control of Kimpanzus appointed in the 1660s and remained under their hereditary control, maintaining a nominal loyalty to Kongo, but no longer a participant in its politics.

The politics of the late seventeenth century revolved around attempts to reoccupy São Salvador, the spiritual capital of the country, first by Manuel in 1690, and then briefly by both João II and Pedro IV in 1696. No one could hope to restore the country without occupying the capital, and yet no one was prepared to risk the occupation without forces more sizable than could be mustered by any of the pretenders. At the same time,

missionaries of the Capuchin order, who had worked in Kongo since 1645 and were much respected, attempted to broker a negotiated restoration.

Pedro IV achieved this restoration by persuading his rivals that he could be king while respecting their rights to hereditary control in their respective areas. After winning nominal recognition from Ana Afonso de Leão's faction, Pedro moved to reoccupy the capital in 1701.

The reoccupation and repopulation of the capital was slowed by two factors. First, the head of the colonizing expedition, Pedro Constantinho da Silva, who had interests in Soyo as well as at Kibangu, rebelled. Second, a popular antiwar movement, headed by Beatriz Kimpa Vita, temporarily disturbed the process. Beatriz, who claimed to be possessed by Saint Anthony, spoke to the desire of the common people for an end to the wars and a restoration of the capital. When political leaders rebuffed her, she founded a mass movement and became the first to reoccupy the capital. Constantinho da Silva joined the movement to occupy the capital in his own name and allied with the Kimpanzu of Luvota, whose candidate Manuel joined him and supported the Antonians.

Pedro IV and Ana Afonso de Leão countered by managing to capture, try, and burn Beatriz as a heretic. In 1709 Pedro stormed São Salvador, later beating off an attack from João II. Pedro's restoration rested on allowing the regional rulers to retain hereditary control in their own realms in exchange for promises that their lines rotate as king.

When Pedro IV died in 1718, he was succeeded by Manuel II, from the Kimpanzu of Luvota. As unpublished documents in Rio de Janeiro reveal, Manuel's long reign helped to stabilize Pedro's peace. He faced challenges from Kinlaza of Nkondo, with fighting in 1733–1734. When Manuel died in 1743, he passed the crown on to Garcia IV (1743–1752) of the Kinlaza of Mbula (now in Matari) in accordance with Pedro's compromise.

Garcia met with opposition from those who did not wish to honor the compromise. Manuel's widowed queen, who returned to Luvota, fostered the ambitions of that faction while fearing Garcia. Garcia was succeeded by Nicolau I (1752–post 1758), probably from the Kimpanzu faction of Luvota, and he was succeeded by Sebastião I from the Kinlaza of Matari. In 1763 or 1764, Pedro V, of the Luvota faction became king but was forced to withdraw to Luvota by Álvaro XI (1764–1779), a Kinlaza from Matari.

When Álvaro died a new struggle developed, between his heirs, Pedro V's from Luvota, and the Kinlaza of Nkondo, who had not had a chance to rule since Pedro IV's compromise. José I, from Nkondo, emerged the victor in 1781 and passed power on to his brother Afonso V when he died in 1785, putting Pedro

IV's settlement in full disarray. The Agua Rosadas of Kibangu, Pedro IV's descendants, established a regency to determine the succession. Although several kings (Álvaro XII, Aleixo I, Joaquim I) were elected, the regency became a new constitution involving participation of both Kinlaza factions and the Agua Rosadas. Henrique I (1794–1803) emerged from the regency, but when he sought to end it, he was overthrown by Garcia V Agua Rosada, whose long rule (1803–1830) established a new system.

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Kouyate, Tiémoko Garan (1902–1940?)

Teacher, Journalist, Political Activist

A nearly forgotten pioneer of African nationalism, Tiémoko Garan Kouyate was prominent in the small left-wing anticolonial movements in France in the 1920s and 1930s. These movements had for a time a close but troubled relationship with the Communist International and the French Communist Party, the only powerful force totally opposed to Western colonialism in that period (1920–1935), and Kouyate was one of the first African communists. He came from the first generation of Western-educated Africans in French Soudan (now Mali), where he was born on April 27, 1902, at Segou. He went to the Ecole Normale William Ponty, a celebrated teacher training college founded by the French at Goree in Senegal, and worked as a teacher in Côte d'Ivoire from 1921 to 1923.

He was awarded a scholarship for further studies in France (something very rare then) and went to the Ecole Normale at Aix en Provence. He soon ceased his advanced teacher training there, possibly being expelled, and went to join in the radical political movements started by a few people from the French colonies living in France: Algerians, West Indians, Vietnamese, and some Africans. Some organizations and newspapers were founded by those "colonials" in the 1920s with help from the French Communist Party (PCF), but with both radical and more "reformist" individuals

sometimes working together, as in the Ligue Universelle de la Défense de la Race Noire (LUDRN) and the companion journal *Les Continents* in 1924. Later a more radical Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN) was set up on July 4, 1926. The dominant figure in this was Lamine Senghor from Senegal (1889–1927), a communist who sought to keep his organization an independent one for black people. Senghor (no relation of Léopold Senghor, Senegal's first president) attended the Brussels Congress of 1927, which led to foundation of the League Against Imperialism (LAI) by communist and other anti-colonial campaigners. Soon afterwards the CDRN spilt up, and in May 1927 the more militant Black anti-imperialists formed the new and radical Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN), again headed by Senghor until his early death a few months later. Kouyate became the leading figure in this anticolonial group, whose ideas were spread particularly through its newspaper *La Race Nègre*.

Kouyate told the famous African American leader W. E. B. Du Bois (on April 29, 1929) that the LDRN's aim was "the political, economic, moral, and intellectual emancipation of the whole of the Negro race. It is a matter of winning back, by all honorable means, the national independence of the Negro peoples in the colonial territories of France, England, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal . . . and of setting up in Black Africa a great Negro state." The French colonial authorities regarded the LDRN as a dangerous subversive organization and banned *La Race Nègre* in the colonies. Meetings were reported by police spies and the alleged proceedings were described in regular circulars on "revolutionary activity" sent to colonial governors.

The communist connection added to the colonial rulers' concern. It was always there, but for a time Kouyate rejected communist subsidies and control, maintaining contact with noncommunist black personalities. However, after 1928 the Comintern and PCF exerted closer control, all the more easily as the LDRN had no other source of funds than the communists. After Kouyate spent four months in Moscow in 1930 he called for fuller submission to Comintern direction. The Africans and West Indians in the LDRN had resented communist control and now a split occurred in 1930–1931. Emile Faure, a half-Senegalese activist, took control of the LDRN under that name, and asserted independence of the communists. Kouyate and his followers stuck with the communist paymasters and created a new organization in 1932, the Union des Travailleurs Nègres (UTN), a name reflecting Kouyate's energetic work to organize black workers, especially seamen, in France; in 1932 he attended the Altona (Hamburg) conference of the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers, organized by George Padmore,

secretary of the communist-sponsored International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW). Kouyate and the Trinidadian activist Padmore were prominent in radical black organizations linked to the Comintern and Moscow for some years.

The Kouyate group's newspaper in Paris was renamed *Le Cri des Nègres* and was subsidized by communist funds. But Kouyate still resisted complete communist control, and he was expelled from the PCF in October 1933 and from the UTN the following month.

Remaining in Paris, Kouyate helped organize protests among black people and others against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. In December 1935 he started a monthly magazine, *Africa*, initially with help from the LDRN, still active, and the North Africans' party in France, the Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA). Apart from fierce attacks on Italy, the magazine's tone was far from Kouyate's earlier militancy; like many other anticolonial campaigners, and like the PCF after 1935, Kouyate now concentrated on calling for reforms for Africans' benefit. After the Popular Front government came to power in France in 1936, Kouyate tried to start a "federation of African youth" based in Dakar and in 1937 wrote to the governor general of French West Africa proposing a federal-style association of France and its colonies. But the tamed radical had no further influence with the colonial authorities who had once feared him as a firebrand. For a time in the late 1930s he received money from the French ministry of the colonies.

Tiémoko Garan Kouyate met a mysterious death during the Nazi occupation of France. According to one story he was entrusted by the Germans with money for propaganda and was executed for pocketing the money; but this has not been confirmed. It is likely that Kouyate had always been ready to take money from any source available, while simultaneously trying to maintain his independence from external influences. He was clearly wrong if he thought he could try this with the Gestapo; but earlier he had, despite compromises, been able to maintain campaigning activity on behalf of Africa for years, as one of the few active campaigners against imperialism in Africa in the interwar period.

JONATHAN DERRICK

See also: **Mali (Republic of): Nationalism, Federation, Independence; World War II: French West Africa, Equatorial Africa.**

Biography

Born in French Soudan (now Mali) on April 27, 1902, at Segou. Attended the Ecole Normale William Ponty in Senegal, and worked as a teacher in Côte d'Ivoire

from 1921 to 1923. Awarded a scholarship for further studies at the Ecole Normale at Aix en Provence. Became involved in radical politics. In 1927 became head of the radical Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre (LDRN). Spent four months in Moscow in 1930, thereafter encouraged further loyalty to the Communist Party abroad. In 1932 formed a new organization, the Union des Travailleurs Nègres (UTN). Organized protests against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Started a magazine, *Africa*, in December 1935. Died under uncertain circumstances during the Nazi occupation of France.

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Kruger, Paul (1825–1904)

South African Statesman

Stephanus Johannes Paulus ("Paul") Kruger was born at Bulhoek, Eastern Cape, on October 10, 1825, the descendant of a German soldier employed by the Dutch East India Company. At the age of ten, he and his family took part in the Potgieter trek to the Transvaal. Like many of his peers he married early, in 1842, and again, on the death of his first wife, to her cousin Gezina du Plessis, by whom he had sixteen children. His bush skills, physical prowess, and leadership qualities were early recognized: in 1852, he was appointed deputy commandant for the expedition against Sechele, and after a period in which he successfully negotiated his way around and through the internecine squabbles that characterized the infant Transvaal republic, he was elected commandant general (in effect, the second highest office of state) in May 1864.

The final step on the political ladder beckoned in 1871, when Marthinus Pretorius resigned, following the Keate Award against the Transvaal. However, maintaining that he lacked the education required, he declined to stand, and the Cape Afrikaner Thomas Burgers took office instead. Relations between the two men soon deteriorated, the extreme Calvinist Kruger suspecting Burgers of religious unorthodoxy.

In May 1873 Kruger stood down and his post was immediately abolished. After a short period of withdrawal, he returned to active political life but pointedly turned down Burgers' offer to head the punitive expedition against Sekhukhune in 1876, declaring that it lacked God's blessing. Meanwhile, the Transvaal was rapidly drifting toward political and financial

bankruptcy. Burgers attempted to mend fences by appointing Kruger vice president in March 1877, but within weeks, Theophilus Shepstone had annexed the republic on behalf of Britain, claiming that he had the support of the majority of Transvaal Boers. Kruger immediately challenged this assumption, thereby staking his claim to future leadership. He headed a deputation to London later that year requesting a plebiscite; when this was refused, he organized an independent referendum that came out strongly in favor of independence, which was again refused when he returned to London in 1878. Mass protest meetings were then held, culminating in the Paardekraal (later, Krugersdorp) gathering in December 1880, at which independence was proclaimed on December 16. A short conflict then ensued (the First Boer War) marked by a British military reverse at Majuba Hill (February 1881). Fearing a wider confrontation with the Boers, comprising a majority of whites in South Africa as a whole, William Gladstone conceded a limited independence, which included an assertion of British suzerainty over the new state (Pretoria Convention, August 1881).

Kruger was inaugurated president in 1883, after an easy electoral victory over his main rival Piet Joubert. His first term of office saw success with Britain's removal of some of the restrictions of the Pretoria Convention, including the deletion of the suzerainty claim in the revised London Convention (February 1884). But the principal event of his first presidency was the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1886, which in a decade transformed the republic and increased its revenue twenty-fold, making it the primary economic power in South Africa.

During Kruger's second term of office (to 1892), a large, mainly British immigrant population (the "Uitlanders") established itself on the goldfields. Kruger sought to protect the Boers' and his political position by imposing a fourteen-year residence period for the franchise, building a railway to Delagoa Bay (completed in 1894) to lessen his dependence on Great Britain, and boosting his state revenues by granting monopolies over such vital commodities as dynamite, actions that imposed further burdens on the mining industry. Kruger's growing obduracy on this issue (and the narrowness of his victory over Joubert in the 1892 presidential election) was instrumental in inspiring the notion of a coup against his administration, supported by military assistance from outside. This was set in motion by Cecil Rhodes, who used the pretext of Kruger's oppression of the Uitlander community to organize the disastrous Jameson Raid in December 1895. The raid represented the high point of Kruger's career, winning him widespread international sympathy, enhanced by his shrewd decision to return Jameson and his men to the British authorities for punishment.

Thereafter, Kruger's status within the republic was unassailable: he was returned with a large majority over Joubert's "Progressive" platform in 1898, a victory that considerably strengthened his hand in his dealings with Alfred Milner, the South African high commissioner. The Uitlander franchise was again the main point at issue between the two sides, with the British claim to suzerainty being revived by Milner when Kruger was persuaded by his advisers to compromise on the franchise issue. Kruger's eventual decision to initiate war in October 1899 was based on the expectation that a quick Boer military victory would induce Britain to negotiate a settlement, as in 1881.

The South African War instead became a prolonged conflict in which Britain sought to regain its prestige as the leading imperial power, and the Boers reverted to traditional commando methods of fighting after the loss of Pretoria in mid-1900. Kruger himself left for Europe in September 1900 to rally support for the Boer cause. However, widespread public sympathy failed to translate into anything material. Disappointed, Kruger sought sanctuary in Holland, and died in the Swiss town of Mentone on July 14, 1904.

Kruger's reputation has suffered at the hands of both hagiographers and vilifiers. To older Afrikaner historians he was the God-fearing, incorruptible, and legendary folk hero; to many British observers, he was an ignorant, corrupt, obstinate, bigoted, and essentially hypocritical figure. Both of these views are essentially propagandist. Kruger seems to have encouraged the spread of probably mythical stories about his hunting adventures, and like many elderly statesmen who have enjoyed long periods of office, behaved in an increasingly autocratic and idiosyncratic fashion. On the other hand, despite his firmly Calvinist beliefs, he had good personal relations with non-Calvinists, and indeed, people with no religious faith. His "illiteracy" (certainly exaggerated) was moderated by a phenomenal memory that gave him obvious advantages in negotiation. And in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, he embarked upon the modernization and reform of his administration, appointing among others the future South African leader, Jan Smuts, as state attorney in 1898. His personal attitude to the black majority was at least marked by an honesty often lacking in the practice of individuals such as his main rival, Cecil Rhodes.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism, Nineteenth Century; Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Rhodes, Cecil J.; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899; South African War, 1899–1902.**

Biography

Born Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger at Bulhoek, Eastern Cape, on October 10, 1825. Took part, with his family, in the Potgieter trek to the Transvaal in 1835. Married in 1842. Later remarried upon death of his first wife; had sixteen children with his second wife. Appointed deputy commandant for the expedition against Sechele in 1852. Elected commandant general in 1864. Stood down in 1873. Appointed vice president in 1877. Inaugurated as president in 1883. Died in Mentone, Holland, on July 14, 1904.

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Kuba: See Kasai and Kuba: Chiefdoms and Kingdom.

Kumasi

Kumasi is the capital of Asante in the Republic of Ghana in West Africa. Today, Kumasi is the second most important city in Ghana and covers a total area of fifty-seven square miles with a population of about one million. Kumasi has tremendous importance as a political, cultural, and commercial center. Much has been written about this historic city based on both oral and literary sources. The origin of this city is traced to the activities of the descendants of Ankyewa Nyame, the great ancestress of the royal *Oyoko* clan that has ruled Kumasi and presided over Asante since approximately the seventeenth century. Through a series of migrations, Ankyewa Nyame and her descendants settled first at Asantemanso then moved to Kokofu, all in the southwestern part of the present day Ashanti Region. One of her descendants, Oti Akenten, allegedly moved and settled at Asaman in the Kwaman forest. According to oral traditions, the newcomers from Kokofu purchased the land from the original settlers in the Asaman area. This position is contrary to popular notions about traditional land acquisition and ownership among the Asante. It was this site that evolved into the modern day Kumasi.

Significantly too, before the *Oyoko* migrants from Kokofu moved into the present area of Kumasi, there were several independent settlements each with its own head. Among them were Amakom, Kaase, Suntreso, and Tafo. At this stage, the main significance of the Kwaman area of which Kumasi became a part was based on its commercial role. From the end of the seventeenth century, it assumed increasing political significance when Osei Tutu succeeded Obiri Yeboa as ruler of Kwaman. Through a series of shrewd moves involving dynastic marriages and political alliances, Osei Tutu, with the advice of his close friend and spiritual guide, *Okomfo* Anokye, was able to forge a strong political-cum-military union involving independent neighboring states like Mampon, Nsuta, and Bekwai. Osei Tutu headed this union that became known as Asante. With it the Asante in 1701 defeated Denkyira, their traditional enemy and overlord. Afterward, Osei Tutu ceased to be merely ruler of Kumasi (*Kumasihene*) but became that of Asante (*Asantehene*). Consequently, Kumasi began its meteoric rise to cultural and political eminence. Under Kumasi leadership, Asante had virtually conquered the entire region that came to constitute the British Colony of the Gold Coast (later renamed Ghana) by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

As the traditional political capital, Kumasi was the residence of the *Asantehene*. All important Kumasi officeholders and functionaries who performed services associated with the Kumasi court and their families were also resident there. The court had the responsibility of maintaining political order and expanding Asante territory. The national assembly met in Kumasi. Thus, all important officeholders throughout Asante also had temporary residence there, or at least visited occasionally to attend to official business. From the time of the *Asantehene*, Osei Tutu, Kumasi became the cultural capital. In this capacity, it was the venue for such important national festivals like the annual *Odwira*, which was an occasion for affirmation and renewal of personal allegiance to the *Asantehene* by officeholders.

In the precolonial period, the core of Kumasi population was made up of the *Oyoko* royals, their spouses, officeholders, and functionaries. There was also a small, carefully controlled settler community of "strangers," mainly coastal Fante and Muslim clerics from the northern Savanna region. They were usually involved in the commercial life of the city. Kumasi was at the center of trade routes radiating to the north, south, east, and west that linked the Gold Coast to the outside world via the Western Sudan and the Atlantic coast. Kumasi residents themselves often did not engage in direct agricultural production. Rather they depended on producers from the outlying villages for their food supplies. The main economic activity in

Kumasi involved the production and distribution of goods like imported commodities, gold ornaments, and services in the court that ensured the maintenance of the sociopolitical order.

Asante desire to participate in and control the maritime trade in the Gold Coast frequently led to confrontations with her southern neighbors and indirectly with the British, who by the nineteenth century had emerged as the most important European power there. It was as part of this saga that British forces invaded Asante in 1873–1874, burned the city, and unilaterally imposed the debilitating Treaty of Fomena on Asante. Between 1874 and 1883 there was relative peace and attempts were made to rebuild Kumasi. In 1883 there was a disputed succession that degenerated into a civil war (1883–1888). In 1888 Kwaku Dua III, later Agyeman Prempe I, was installed *Asantehene*. He renewed efforts to regenerate Kumasi. By 1896 the British had developed more fully their imperial strategy known as “the forward policy.” Under it the British attempted to undermine the integrity of Asante by abducting Agyeman Prempe I and sending him, together with his principal advisers and close relatives, into exile in the Seychelles, and imposing British hegemony on Asante.

From this period, the modernization of Kumasi began. The British continued to use it as their administrative headquarters for their new political creation of “Ashanti.” In this new capacity, modern buildings were constructed to house government offices. A Western judicial system was introduced along with Western concepts of local government. In 1925, the Kumasi Public Health Board was established as the basis of a modern local government. By 1989, it had evolved into the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.

The communication system was also modernized with the construction of motor roads, railway, postal, and telegraphic systems. Christian organizations, like the Basel and the Wesleyan Methodist Missions, moved in to proselytize. At the same time they began to establish schools and to construct church buildings and dwelling houses for themselves that were emulated by their converts. European firms also established branches there. The genesis of the modern banking system was also in this era. Competitive house building in Kumasi was a characteristic of this period, as house ownership was a means of asserting wealth and status in modern Kumasi society.

Despite attempts at innovation, the hallmark of Kumasi continues to be the coexistence of modernity and tradition that is likely to persist well into the twenty-first century.

WILHELMINA JOSELINE DONKOH

See also: Asante Kingdom: Osei Tutu and Founding of; Ghana, Republic of.

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Kumbi Saleh: See Ghana, Empire of: History of.

Kush

The term “Kush” was used by ancient Egyptians to designate one of the states to the south of their frontier at the First Cataract. Modern scholars have equated the Kingdom of Kush with the culture based at the town of Kerma in northern Sudan. This Kingdom of Kush coexisted with the Egyptian Old Kingdom, and during the Second Intermediate Period rivaled it in power. The beginning of the New Kingdom saw a resurgence of Egyptian power allied with an aggressive foreign policy which led, around 1500BCE, to the conquest of the Kingdom of Kush and the occupation of its territory. Egyptian control of this area waned during the eleventh century BCE, and into the resulting power vacuum arose another polity, also called the Kingdom of Kush, but frequently referred to today as the kingdoms of Napata and Meroe.

There is much debate as to the origins of this second Kingdom of Kush centered on the question of whether there was continuity from the New Kingdom into the early Kushite period, or whether there was a complete break of several centuries. Most of the evidence hinges on the necropolis at el-Kurru, located slightly downstream of the Fourth Cataract. The el-Kurru cemetery was excavated by George A. Reisner in 1918 and 1919. He was able to document a developmental sequence in

the burials, from simple pit graves covered by small tumuli, to rock-cut tombs decorated with painted wall plaster, entered by descending a stepped dromos and covered by pyramids. He believed that the earliest of these burials was of the first ruler of Kush; the nature of the grave and the date assigned to it, in the ninth century BCE, indicate that there was discontinuity between the Egyptian New Kingdom and the rise of the Kushites. Excavations at the nearby site of Hillat el Arab, where contemporary, but richer, graves to the early graves at el-Kurru have been found, open a whole new debate that has yet to be developed.

By the mid-eighth century BCE, the Kushites were already a major power. Their kings had adopted Amun as their state god, and they were in a position to interfere in Egyptian affairs as champions of that god. Kashta was the first Kushite king to enter Egypt, but it was his successor Piye who conquered the whole country and ruled over an empire stretching from central Sudan as far north as the Mediterranean. Although Kushite control of Egypt lapsed as a result of conflicts with the Assyrians in the mid-seventh century BCE, the Kingdom of Kush survived for another thousand years.

The main religious center of the Kushites was at Jebel Barkal, which they called the "Pure Mountain" and believed to be the dwelling place of Amun. Barkal was one of a number of important sites at Napata that included a large complex of temples and palaces at the foot of the mountain, a temple, palace, massive store-rooms, and cemetery at Sanam Abu Dom across the river, and the royal burial grounds at el-Kurru slightly downstream and Nuri slightly upstream. The political capital was probably moved regularly, the king progressing annually from his palace at Meroe far to the south to the major temples of Amun at Napata, Krtn, Gematon (Kawa), and Pnubs (Tabo or Kerma).

At the end of the fourth century BCE, the royal cemetery at Nuri was abandoned and, after a brief return to the ancestral cemetery at el-Kurru, thereafter almost all royal burials were at Meroe. In funerary culture, as in many other aspects of Kushite civilization, the influence of pharaonic Egypt was considerable, although the Kushites did not slavishly borrow from their northern neighbor. Rather, the Kushites selectively adopted religious ideology and artistic and architectural styles, and modified them to suit their own needs. In the architectural field, the pyramid is one of the most distinctive borrowings from Egypt (although the Kushite pyramid is derived from the nonroyal pyramids of the New Kingdom, which were a feature of Egyptian sites south of Aswan, rather than from the royal pyramids of the Old and Middle Kingdoms). Temples of the state god, Amun, were also of Egyptian type, although temples of local gods were distinctively Kushite.

The early Kushites used Egyptian as their written language but probably spoke an entirely unrelated language known as Meroitic. There is evidence that, early in the second century BCE, this language was committed to writing using two alphabetic scripts, one with characters borrowed from Egyptian hieroglyphs, the other a "cursive" script with some characters derived from Egyptian demotic. Almost all later inscriptions are written in one or another form of Meroitic, a language that remains untranslated at this time.

The withdrawal from Egypt does not seem to have had any serious repercussions for the Kingdom of Kush although the retention by the kings of the title "King of Upper and Lower Egypt" brought them into conflict with their northern neighbor on more than one occasion. In 593 BCE, Psammetik II invaded Kush and may have sacked Napata. Relations thereafter, with the latest Egyptian pharaohs and the Ptolemies, were largely peaceful or confined to small-scale military activities in the frontier zone. The arrival of the Romans in Egypt brought a renewed bout of fighting which may have culminated once again in the sack of Napata, although the frontier was drawn far to the north at Maharraqa.

There was much mutual benefit for Kush and Egypt from peaceful coexistence. Kush stood athwart one of the main trade routes from central Africa to the Mediterranean world and profited handsomely from its position as a middleman in that trade. The trade was probably entirely in the hands of the monarchy, and the wealth generated from it was of fundamental importance for the coherence of the state, it being used as patronage by the ruler to guarantee the support of the regional elites. The loss of the monopoly over this trade, which shifted eastward to the Red Sea, coupled with the increasing impoverishment of the later Roman Empire, may have been one of the causes of the dissolution and collapse of the Kushite state in the fourth century.

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See also: **Kerma and Egyptian Nubia; Napata and Meroe.**

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Kwarafa: See Benue Valley Peoples: Jukun and Kwarafa.

L

Labor: Cooperative Work

Cooperative labor, in the form of work parties or other forms of voluntary collaboration, is historically widespread in Africa, and continues to play an important role in many areas. Two basic types of work group have been identified, though the distinction between them is blurred and many work groups had (and have) elements of both. The first is exchange labor or the “reciprocal work group,” a small group of households that worked for each other regularly and in rotation, usually performing agricultural tasks. These were often relatively permanent groups, with fixed leaders and membership, though changes in the composition of the group could occur. Typically, the organizer provided everyday food and drink for the workers but the occasion was not associated with any kind of festivity. The second and larger type is referred to as the “festive” work group; food and drink were prepared and people came along on an appointed day to work, on the basis of either a public or private invitation. The work was concluded by the festive consumption of beer or other alcoholic drink. Reciprocity was not as strictly defined as in the former type, since these were ad hoc groups, disbanding after the task has been completed.

The basis of recruitment into work parties varied widely and could use ties of kinship, political unit, or locality, though in practice it was usually neighbors or people from the same territorial unit who collaborated. The morality involved was almost universally based on notions of reciprocity and mutual helpfulness, and the pool of potential workers was large. Those who contributed labor did so on the basis of close relationship, mutual interest, friendship, reciprocal obligation, or some other kind of preexisting link. In some areas, such as parts of Malawi and Zambia, extradomestic forms of labor cooperation were historically rare. In

other cases cooperative labor was an aspect of formal, villagewide associations. Among the Wolof, for example, these associations were organized partly on an age and gender basis and were called *kompin*, after the French *compagnie*. They had established leaders, cut across kinship and class lines, and had a variety of functions aside from cooperative agricultural work, much like an age-set organization.

Although the homestead was the basic unit of production in most African societies, relying primarily on its own members, larger labor combinations were necessary for certain heavy or time-consuming tasks. Work parties were in demand at crucial points in the agricultural cycle that affected everybody (ploughing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting) but fields were not all ready for a particular task at precisely the same time, allowing collective labor inputs to be staggered. There were considerable benefits accruing from this if it enabled land to be planted, hoed, or harvested at the optimum time. Apart from breaking labor bottlenecks, cooperative work groups had another advantage in that they were not specialized. They could be called upon to perform a wide variety of tasks and reciprocity was usually reckoned in terms of labor time spent rather than the task performed.

Some writers maintain that it would have been economically more efficient for people to do the work themselves rather than expending energy and other resources on brewing beer for a work group. Others estimate the amount of labor devoted to beer brewing as being about half of the labor gain from a work party. Economic surveys in East and West Africa showed that there was little reliance on indigenous forms of cooperative work among “progressive” farmers, and it seems that work parties were in fact not suited to the constraints of more modern, cooperative production instigated by an external agency, whether of a capitalist nature or in terms of an ideology such as *ujamaa*.

Many commentators feel that festive labor was undertaken by poorer people, to the benefit of wealthier households or political leaders, and that exchange labor was found mainly among households of relatively equal economic status. However, the evidence on this is not conclusive, due to the many different forms of cooperative labor, the uncertain nature of the distinctions between them, and the variable conditions under which work parties operated in different parts of the continent. Many work groups operated under a general assumption of reciprocity and mutual helpfulness, in that people helped each other without expectation of immediate return, but in the knowledge that the receiver could be asked to provide labor, grain, or something else, in the future. The sanction for nonparticipation confirmed the principle of reciprocity, with those not working as expected being refused assistance when they themselves needed help. It has also been claimed that cooperative work was a means of redistributing wealth from richer to poorer households and that without it the latter would not have been able to manage certain vital tasks.

A number of writers have pointed out that cooperative work groups cannot be seen simply as indigenous or traditional responses to the need for collaborative effort, as something persisting from an unchanging past, and different from more modern forms of work. Instead, work parties are often responses to particular historical situations where labor was scarce, where poverty created a shortage of resources such as draught animals or agricultural implements, and where cash or hired labor were in short supply. Cooperative labor often survived, facilitated, or developed in reaction to, radical economic and cultural change. For example, in some cases cooperative work of the large, festive type may have arisen where labor shortages resulting from slavery coincided with the introduction of commercial export crops. Cooperative work may therefore be quite recent in some places, and one cannot make assumptions about its lineal development from, or into, other forms of work, including wage labor. In some of the documented cases work parties arose or intensified as a result of the introduction of cash cropping; in other cases similar circumstances led to the development of wage labor and a decline of cooperative forms.

Where homesteads became smaller due to factors such as population decline, a lower incidence of polygyny, missionary influence, growing individualism, and the independence of younger people, labor combinations sometimes became more widespread as a means of ensuring production. Urbanization and the absence of migrant workers exacerbated rural labor shortages in many places and work parties were a way of overcoming this problem. Changes in the nature of rural production, and the introduction of new technologies

such as the plough, were also important, because they created new labor demands. Where production became more intensive due to the adoption of new crops or the introduction of cash crops, or where production was expanded due to new technology, cooperative work was sometimes one of the innovative responses that facilitated this.

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Labor: Decline in Traditional Forms of Exploitation

While some assert that colonialism was accompanied by systematic abuse of African labor, European colonial rule in Africa ultimately produced major changes in the traditional labor regime as it launched an attack on slavery and pawning and, consequently, on chiefs' rights in these areas.

Slavery in Africa, as elsewhere, was essentially an economic system although it was also justified on religious and social grounds. The nineteenth century witnessed a tremendous increase in slavery in Africa. Attempts to build new states or reform existing ones formed the basis for the increase in slavery. Abolition of external slave trade and the attempt to develop a "legitimate trade" in African raw materials stimulated slavery's growth across the continent, particularly in coastal societies and their hinterland. Zanzibar's emergence as an entrepôt and major clove producer stimulated slavery's growth in East Africa. In the savanna regions victorious Islamic jihad movements promoted increased production and trade that were both heavily dependent on slave labor. Thus, the Sokoto caliphate in northern Nigeria emerged as Africa's largest slave society by the end of the nineteenth century. Traditional forms of exploitation fell heavily on women.

Women dominated the slave and pawn populations in Africa as they were highly regarded for their productive and reproductive functions.

Closely interwoven with pawning and slavery was the issue of chiefs' rights. Chiefs could, and did, call on labor assistance for community projects (such as clearing paths and streams) and for work on royal properties, but as chiefs also became active slave masters, this brought the question of forced labor to the attention of European colonizers. European interest in nineteenth-century Africa was heavily influenced by economic and humanitarian concerns. Europeans professed an antislavery ideology for much of the nineteenth century, and their conquest of Africa was justified on this ground. Merchants and Christian missionaries called for the abolition of slavery (although for different reasons) that had increased as a concomitant of the state-building revolution which swept across Africa. Yet European colonial administrators found that immediate abolition of slavery was against their own interests. They needed the support of the chiefs, who were major slave-owners, to install the colonial system, and this made them less inclined to abolish slavery. Initially, therefore, it was something of a paradox that the erection of colonial rule witnessed the continuation of pawning and slavery, and the strengthening of the power of chiefs.

Opposition to slavery was dictated by colonial economic considerations. Surpluses from slave labor would not accrue to European capitalists, and this was contrary to the expectations of colonialism. Slaves were not consumers, and the prevailing doctrine held that slave labor was unproductive; consequently, both would adversely affect European industry. Simultaneously, colonialism made huge demands on labor and aimed to develop a wage-labor market in Africa. These could only be accomplished by an attack on slavery. Further, slavery was a moral wrong that would be righted by abolition. Generally, Europeans thought that slavery had to be abolished as part of the process of establishing European political control. Initially, however, European administrators (Belgian, British, French, German, and Portuguese) were reluctant to abolish slavery immediately for fear of undermining the chiefs and inducing economic dislocation. Yet the establishment of European rule and the economics of colonialism did produce an assault on the traditional labor regime and on the rights of chiefs therein.

Slavery was abolished by a combination of economic, administrative, and legal measures effected by Europeans as well as by a flight from the estates on the part of the slaves themselves. African slaves abolished slavery and broke the power of the chiefs when they deserted their masters in large numbers, often in the wake of the European military conquest. The conquest and subsequent *pax Europæana* ended the numerous

wars that had stimulated the supply of slaves in places like Yorubaland where warfare had been endemic throughout the nineteenth century. Conquest undermined the basis of political power of some chiefs by reducing their ability to acquire slaves and utilize them as followers or dependents. Europeans, however, emphasized the prevention of new slavery. This was a consequence of the 1890 Brussels Conference, which concluded that cessation of the slave raid and slave trade were priorities in the antislavery campaign. If there was no new slavery, ran the argument, slavery would die a natural death.

European officials introduced various moderate antislavery devices. The French freed the slaves of their enemies but allowed their allies to retain their slave population; while the British tended to abolish the legal status of slavery in British courts but not in the Native Courts that were based on Islamic law or "native law and custom" and dominated by the slave owners. Colonial administrations passed laws abolishing slavery. In French West Africa a judicial code introduced in 1903 gave no sanction to slavery, and two years later new enslavement and slave trade were outlawed there while the Portuguese outlawed slavery in 1910. Germany and Britain passed laws to abolish slavery in their colonies by the turn of the twentieth century and began to enforce these laws a decade later. However, slavery continued to operate in Ethiopia and elsewhere where abolition was circumscribed by various devices. Thus, for example, all slaves in southern Nigeria were freed on March 31, 1901, but in northern Nigeria only those persons born or brought there after this date were free. Reform of the traditional labor regime was a slow process. Administrative reluctance apart, the demand for slaves did not disappear overnight and slave markets continued to operate. In addition, pawning remained prevalent during the adverse economic conditions of the 1930s.

The decline in traditional forms of exploitation stemmed partly from international pressure, particularly from League of Nation agencies. The League focused on slavery across Africa including Ethiopia and Liberia, which were independent states and members of the League. It set up a Temporary Slavery Commission that produced a Slavery Convention (September 25, 1926) which outlawed pawning, slavery, and slave raiding but which also recognized the existence of "voluntary slavery." In the 1930s the League appointed an Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery, which examined the extent to which pawning and slavery were declining and strongly opposed continued "voluntary slavery." It is best remembered for pushing Britain into finally abolishing slavery in northern Nigeria (1936).

However, the League's general examination of global labor conditions also helped to undermine

African traditional labor practices. Investigations by the International Labor Organization (ILO), particularly in the realm of forced labor, intertwined with the antislavery campaign. ILO observations frequently questioned, even challenged, the rights of African chiefs to utilize labor and called for reforms to limit their powers. Indeed, the 1926 Slavery Convention banned the use of forced labor except for paid labor on public works, and in 1930 the ILO Convention on Forced Labor prohibited the use of forced labor “except for limited public purposes.” Across Africa forced labor ordinances or similar measures were implemented to define and regulate the duties and rights of chiefs under colonial rule.

Pawning, slave trade, and slavery continue to exist in Africa. It represents the last vestiges of a complex system of labor exploitation that developed significantly in the nineteenth century but was undermined by European colonial control in the twentieth century.

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Labor, Migrant

The expansion of European capitalism and the process of colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries resulted in a complex interaction between preexisting social formations and the emergent colonial order. The colonial system was characterized by a new administration that revolved around the colonial state. The system also brought new economic changes, which included monetization of the economy, taxation, and the development of wage labor. Migrant labor in colonial Africa was a distinct system of wage labor that entailed the migration of the worker to and from the workplace, often for a defined period of time, which was usually outside the rural area from where the worker was recruited and to which he returned after the expiry of the contract.

Migrant labor emerged as an integral part of the colonial economy. It was brought on by the interaction

between the preexisting African social formations and the newly instituted colonial economic system. In order to construct roads to facilitate colonial administration, work in the mines or settler plantations, and other colonial establishments the state required the supply of cheap labor. The demand for labor became intense during the formative years of colonial governance in Africa because many people were unwilling to leave their homes to go and work hundreds of miles away in colonial establishments. The demand became even more acute in the settler colonies, such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, where Europeans established huge plantations. Because of the labor-intensive nature of colonial plantation agriculture, demand often exceeded supply. As a result the colonial governments often resorted to a variety of methods ranging from outright force to legislation in order to procure labor for colonial establishments as well as private European plantation owners.

During the initial stages of colonial rule, the mobilization of labor was done through government-appointed chiefs, who were accountable to the local European administrator. Usually the chiefs were given wide-ranging powers including punishing those who evaded work in colonial establishments. The delegated authority was often used arbitrarily.

Demand for work among Africans was also created by the introduction of the poll tax, which had to be paid in cash. This made some Africans work for the purpose of getting money for the poll tax. As a result, once they had got enough money to meet their tax needs these workers would return home. In a sense they kept on moving to and from the workplace depending on their basic needs as well as tax obligation. However, some peasants could avoid going out to work so long as they could grow cash crops and raise money for their taxes. This was acceptable in the nonsettler colonies such as Uganda and Ghana where a vibrant African peasant sector was crucial in sustaining the colonial economy. However, in the settler colonies peasants were discouraged from growing cash crops on the grounds that it would lead to competition for labor between Africans and European planters. Thus as the colonial period wore on, the poll tax as a method of producing workers was found to be not entirely effective in producing the workers.

Besides the poll tax, therefore, the colonial governments often resorted to legislation. Able-bodied men were compelled by law to work for a certain number of months in one year. They were free to return home after discharging their responsibility as required by law. However, the migrant worker had to carry a work pass as a testimony of having fulfilled the required obligation.

The colonial state cherished the notion of migrant labor because it was fairly cheap to maintain. The workers did not have strong attachment to the workplace.

They were there for brief periods of time. Also, in most cases their families did not accompany them to the workplace. Hence housing projects for African migrant laborers were developed to cater for only the worker and not his entire family. Migrant laborers had few, if any, medical and retirement benefits. Low wages, economic security, and harsh working conditions made workplace as well as colonial labor establishments unfriendly environments. Workers tried to create a conducive environment where they had temporarily migrated, especially in the cities, to provide for their economic and social comfort. They formed social welfare associations, usually along ethnic and regional lines, which helped members of the group during times of need.

In some cases migrant labor had to contend with reprimands, flogging, and beating. Indeed, brutality was sometimes carried to the extreme in some countries, particularly in Belgian Congo where worker rights violation were not uncommon. Sadistic punishment, including dismemberment and murder, was widespread much to the chagrin of the citizenry and civilized world.

However, the workers often fought back in a variety of ways. Go-slows, defections, demonstrations, and violent confrontations were employed to force the colonial state as well as private employers to accede to worker's demands. While many colonial governments established a number of commissions of inquiry into the question of labor and attendant benefits as well as workplace safety, there was hardly any major improvement in the condition of the workers until after World War II. It is against this backdrop that for the migrant laborer, the workplace was not considered "home." The comforts of home were rare in the workplace. Home was where they were recruited from and to which they returned after the expiry of their contracts. It was at home where they lived in dignity and enjoyed the support of the immediate as well as extended family.

The inability of the colonial state to provide for the welfare of labor made the worker's allegiance to rural residential home an obvious necessity. This loyalty to the rural home delayed the development of the urban working class. The worker split his active working life between the city and other colonial establishments on the one hand, and rural home on the other. Sometimes proceeds saved from the workplace were invested in rural areas by establishing retail businesses or purchasing and accumulating livestock. Migrant laborers also fostered social change. In the way they dressed, few items they bought in towns and cities, and general topical conversations about the colonizer, the migrant laborers were instrumental in the movement of ideas from urban to rural areas and vice versa. They constituted a major link between the two geographical locations and, in some cases, countries. In the context of

southern Africa, the Mozambican workers traveled to and from South Africa to work in the mines. Migrant labor was therefore mobile and expansive in geographical setting.

The departure of the migrant laborers (who were invariably men) from rural areas to the colonial workplace impacted rural household division of labor as well as production patterns. African women farmers took over responsibilities that were hitherto held by the migrant male laborers. The result was increased roles for women in the management of the household economy and the rise of female-headed households. As a result, the intensification of women's labor led to the generation of wealth through small-scale agriculture and local trade in rural households where men had left for work in the colonial establishments. Since the colonial state hardly encouraged women's participation in the economy as migrant laborers, those women who made their way into the towns were not readily absorbed into the mainstream economy. Instead, they engaged in petty trade, selling agricultural produce such as vegetables, corn, and potatoes to the workers and other urban dwellers. Furthermore, the emergence of sex commercial workers during the colonial period has been partly attributed to the colonial state's encouragement of male migrant labor and the inability to provide work for the females who migrated to the colonial townships.

While the history of labor unrest in Africa predates the 1930s, strikes and violent protests increased in number and intensity after that period. Indeed, it was not until the 1930s and 1940s that migrant labor began to stabilize with increased numbers beginning to identify with the townships and the workplace. The number of workers increased substantially outstripping demand. Coercion and legislation were no longer enforced vigorously. This shift can be explained by a number of factors. First, the monetization of the economy had stabilized and cash had become an important aspect of daily transactions. Hence the need to get money had become a necessity that could not be easily wished away. Also, the development of Western education particularly at the pre-high school levels was producing enough literate workers for colonial establishments. Third, the Depression of the early 1930s and near collapse of the colonial economy left many people jobless. Also, after World War II the urban population increased in numbers. Although the colonial powers made a major shift in their investment policy by establishing import-substitution industries, the demand for jobs far outstripped the available opportunities.

The post-World War II period constitutes a major divide in the history of labor activism. Although there was massive investment of capital and social reform in Africa undertaken by the colonial powers, there was a

gap between expectation and achievement. Throughout the continent the strikes not only became more widespread, but they increased in intensity as well. Besides strikes by workers in private companies, there were strikes by public employees such as railway workers, dockers, telegraphists, and postal workers. Contemporaneous with the unrest was the decolonization wave that began to gain momentum in the 1940s and peaked in the 1950s. The long record of colonial state's reluctance to effectively address labor issues was quickly turned into a commentary on the undesirability of colonial governance. Nationalism and labor activism coalesced and led to the demand for independence.

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Labotsibeni (c.1858–1925)

Queen Mother of Swaziland, 1890–1899; Queen Regent of Swaziland, 1899–1921

Queen Labotsibeni was born about 1858 at Luhlekwini homestead in the Hhohho region in northern Swaziland. She was born when her father, Matsanjana Mdluli, was part of a Swazi regiment fighting a Pedi chief named Tsibeni near the present day town of Barberton in South Africa. Despite the circumstances of her birth, she lived a life dedicated to avoiding war.

Gwamile, her popular name, was a name of honor meaning the “indomitable one.” This accolade was given to her by her Swazi subjects; it was also recognized by the British colonial administration. The name was bestowed in recognition of Gwamile's ability to contain colonial encroachment and to protect Swazi sovereignty and culture. Labotsibeni restored most of the country's political and economic power between 1902 and 1921. Subsequent Swazi generations have acknowledged Labotsibeni's greatness. Economic, social, and political stability in Swaziland during the

precolonial era were an enduring legacy of Queen Mother Labotsibeni's moral stature, radical anticolonialism, and political shrewdness. A measure of her popularity among the Swazi is that she is acknowledged as one of the greatest rulers and queen mothers or queen regents in Swazi history. She transcended the status generally assigned to women in Swazi society.

Labotsibeni came from a distinguished family and clan. The Mdluli are divided into two branches and both have played an important role in the evolution of modern Swaziland since the eighteenth century. She came from the northern Mdluli clan, which was distinguished by its expertise in skills for military intelligence. The southern branch of the Mdluli's were trusted with the responsibility of producing an *insila*, a fictional blood brother to Swazi rulers. The Mdluli's are regarded as right-hand office bearers in Swazi society. Her lineage may have destined her to political fame, but it was more her personality—brave and assertive—that made her a distinguished Swazi ruler.

She was courted by Prince Mbandzeni, whom she initially rejected. A few years later, when he became king in 1875, Labotsibeni became his wife. She bore three sons, Bhunu, Malunge, and Lomvazi, and a daughter, Tongotongo.

Swazi succession law states that a king should not be succeeded by blood siblings. Therefore, none of Labotsibeni's children could be king. Yet another Swazi tradition provides that a king is king by the blood of his father through his mother. This conflict in traditions and principles of succession could have caused unusual turmoil. Labotsibeni had the knowledge and experience, based on her background, to justify and account for her manipulation of these traditions.

Following the death of King Mbandzeni on October 7, 1889, Labotsibeni was designated *Indlovukati* (Queen Mother) on September 3, 1890, when Bhunu was selected as the future king. Bhunu's reign was the shortest in Swazi history. When Bhunu died in December 1899, he left behind six widows, each with a single child, and one widow was pregnant. Three of the children were easily disqualified from competing for the kingship because they were female, and Swazi tradition only allows male succession to that rank. Although guided by succession principles, the elders failed to find an heir acceptable to all royal factions. One interpretation of this event was that this was an expression of deference to Labotsibeni; they sought her involvement by creating the impression that they had failed to reach a decision because the problem was so difficult that it could only be resolved by someone of Labotsibeni's stature. Her choice was Nkhotfotjeni, son of Lomawa Ndwandwe. The boy was only about three months old, yet the decision was welcomed with great acclaim. Labotsibeni became queen regent

until Nkhotfotjeni's coronation as Sobhuza II on December 22, 1921.

Many of her contemporaries acknowledge that she was a shrewd and clever politician. T. R. Coryndon as resident commissioner, with a wide colonial experience in southern Africa remarked in 1907 that as "woman of extraordinary diplomatic ability and strength of character, an experienced and capable opposition which it (the colonial administration) was for some time incapable of dealing with" (Jones, p.402).

Chris Youé (1985) explained how the local colonial administration, led by Coryndon from 1905 to 1917, plotted but failed to dethrone Labotsibeni. She challenged Coryndon's approach to the land question in Swaziland. Her husband had parceled away virtually the whole country through a complicated system of assigning land, grazing pasture, and mining rights. The whole arrangement had the potential that the Swazi king would control resource rights and adjudicate in any subsequent conflicts. Through the Concession Proclamation of 1909, Coryndon granted freehold title in land and gave Swazis on settler land five years in which to move to land set aside exclusively for them. Labotsibeni accepted this capitalist dispensation but challenged it by mobilizing her people donating cattle in order to buy back the land the Swazis had lost. This approach was modified to in-value the colonial administration in 1913 and has remained the operational policy in postcolonial Swaziland when addressing landlessness.

In the context of the Swazi power structure, Labotsibeni faced major challenges. First, she had to contain power struggles and to unite the Swazi nation during the rule of the young crown prince, Nkhotfotjeni. In terms of Swazi tradition, the youngest son who has no blood brothers or sisters is the one usually chosen to succeed his father. There was a feeling that Nkhotfotjeni's appointment as crown prince was rushed, because LaMavimbela was pregnant at the time of Bhunu's death. Selection should have waited for her to give birth. As it transpired, LaMavimbela delivered a son, Makhosikhosi, whose candidature was as good as, and probably better than, that of Nkhotfotjeni. However, the clan status of LaMavimbela attracted more questions than could explain the clan's contribution to the long history of the Swazi monarchy. On consultation, Labotsibeni recommended Nkhotfotjeni, because of his mother's background. The anti-Mona factions considered Labotsibeni's decision as calculated to prolong her reign or as designed to install her favorite son, Malunge.

At the turn of the century, the Swazi population increased its hostility toward Labotsibeni because of frequent droughts between 1902 and 1907. Tradition assigned the queen mother the power to make rain and

the Swazis were angry at the frequency of droughts. The droughts at the turn of the century led the Swazi to believe that it was wrong for Labotsibeni to be queen mother when her grandson was designated as the future king. People felt that her capability to make rain was undermined because she defied and defiled tradition. Meetings of the Liqoqo, the inner council or cabinet, became irregular, and in 1904 Labotsibeni had to fine her subjects to compel them to attend national ceremonies.

The local British officials also helped LaMdluli's cause. The Swazi rallied behind Labotsibeni because the British had systematically alienated most of the land to white settlers. This was finally consolidated in the Land Partition Proclamation of 1909 that left the Swazis in control of only about one-third of their country.

Labotsibeni acknowledged that she could not get back the land militarily and that land had become a commodity to bought or sold in an open market. She subsequently set up a Lifa Fund to which her people contributed money for buying back the land from the colonial government and white settlers. Although discontinued in 1915, Sobhuza revived it in the late 1940s resulting in Swaziland repossessing about 60 per cent of the country at the end of the 1960s. Labotsibeni had ensured support from her people. In the presence of 2,000 Swazis armed with traditional weapons, Labotsibeni condemned the British land policy.

Labotsibeni's distinguished political and economic achievements acquire further significance when related to Labotsibeni's contribution in the field of education. Labotsibeni insisted that her grandson, crown prince Nkhotfotjeni, should receive a modern education. There was strong opposition from the Swazi chiefs and royalty. Labotsibeni strongly believed that the power of white people lay in "books and money" (Matsebula, 1987), and the Swazi could appropriate some of that power for themselves by appropriating the tools of white people, and using those tools to empower themselves. Labotsibeni recognized the importance of literacy for a twentieth-century head of state. Over the opposition of the elders and aristocracy, she arranged that a school be established at Zombodze, where Sobhuza completed early education. He later moved to Lovedale in South Africa for more education. Thus, due to Gwamile's insight, Swaziland had a monarch in 1921 who had received more formal education than several African heads of state at the end of the colonial era in the 1960s.

Labotsibeni played a critical role in the making of the Swazi nation. Clearly, the role of individuals in the making of a nation is a complex one; but there is no doubt that Labotsibeni provided much needed leadership to the Swazi nation and that the British colonial officials

met their fair match in her. She died December 5, 1925, at Embekelweni, then the Swazi national capital.

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See also: **Swaziland.**

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Lagos

For most of the twentieth century, Lagos was the capital of Nigeria, and it remains the major hub of economic activities, as well as the home of the country's principal harbor, roads and rail terminal, the international airport, a large population, and a high number of schools and colleges. A new educated elite emerged here during the nineteenth century, which dominated politics until 1960, when Nigeria obtained independence. Demands for major reforms and anticolonial resistance occurred in Lagos, thus making the city a center of administration, politics, and media. The tradition of protest continues, either in violent street demonstrations or in a peaceful manner, daily reported in the newspapers and magazines that are concentrated here.

With an annual population growth rate close to 15 per cent, Lagos grows at a pace faster than most African cities and is always receiving a large number of permanent settlers and floating migrants. From the 1870s to 1963, the administrative territory of Lagos expanded from 4 square kilometers to 65 square kilometers, while the population increased from 28,500 to almost a million.

Lagos retains all the attractions and dynamism of a modern city, including the presence of leading hotels, nightclubs, and criminal syndicates. A crowded population of over three million people lives in the Lagos Island, a small area, with the mainland connected to it by three bridges.

Lagos is part of the Nigerian coastal belt that separates the mainland from the Atlantic Ocean. Due to the maze of swamps, lagoons, river estuaries and creeks, settlement patterns are fragmented. Heavy rainfall, low topography, and bad drainage conditions limit farming activities and impose constraints on city planning.

Although it has a small land area, it is one of the most densely populated cities in Africa.

The city's historical origins lie in a very distant past. Originally settled by the Aware, the people interacted with their neighbors and became connected with the economic network of the Yoruba, Bini, and Egun regions in what are now the southern parts of modern Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. As could be expected, the sea, river, and lagoons served as waterways, while an economy based on fishing and salt making also developed. The ecology was peculiar, and Lagos was able to manipulate this to its advantage in trade relations with its neighbors, although the need to control the waterways generated warfare and intense competition for power. When Euro-African relations began developing in the fifteenth century, places located along the sea, such as Lagos, became centers of commerce and European gateways to Africa. Lagos became a major slave port: its kings, chiefs, and merchants profited by playing the role of middlemen, obtaining goods from Europeans in exchange for slaves from the Yoruba hinterland.

Following the abolition of the slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century, many liberated slaves, known as Saro and Amoro, migrated to Lagos from such places as Liberia and Sierra Leone and the West Indies. A new cosmopolitan culture emerged, reflecting ideas from Brazil, the United States and England. As Lagos became more important to British trade and strategic interests, it was occupied in 1851 and governed as a consulate for ten years. It is from Lagos that the British encroached on the hinterland to establish a Protectorate later incorporated into the modern country of Nigeria. Lagos remained a dominant seat of British rule throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.

In 1967 the status of Lagos was further enhanced by the creation of Lagos State, with its headquarters in the mainland area of Ikeja. In the 1970s Nigeria witnessed an oil boom, which brought a phenomenal increase in the number of private cars (far more than the available roads could carry), a massive expansion in personal and business buildings, and rapid economic development. In 1976 Lagos lost its federal capital status to Abuja, although it took another 15 years for actual relocation to begin. However, the establishment of a new federal capital has not diminished the status of Lagos. Many federal businesses and diplomatic offices are still located there. A coastal location continues to ensure a dominant role in the manufacturing sector. As the commercial capital with an international airport, it is still the center of finance, industry, and commerce.

Suburban development continues to the north and west of Lagos Island at a pace faster than the supply of water, telephone, electricity, and the expansion of the road network. Due to traffic congestion and

overpopulation, Lagos continues to experience enormous planning and social problems. The majority of those who depend on the social services of Lagos or for their jobs live far away in the mainland. Daily journeys to work are long and unpleasant, as commuters rely on small buses and the city has no mass transport system. As vehicles compete for space on the congested roads, a journey of five miles can take two hours.

The social structure reflects a gross imbalance between rich and poor, especially in housing conditions and living standards. Housing is often substandard: many people crowd into small places, while others are forced to sleep in open spaces without toilet facilities. Excessive population growth means that public expenditures on housing and social services have very limited impact. As transportation and housing costs soar on a regular basis, many continue to live far below the poverty level, while the city remains the largest slum in the country.

Urban planning started too late and has remained haphazard, with a great deal of damage already done to virtually all sectors of city life. Due to a flat and low-lying terrain, the city is flooded after heavy rains and areas close to the sea are under threat of being submerged. There is also the problem of gross mismanagement by city officials. To compound both is the lack of solutions for slum clearance and traffic congestion as well as inadequate housing, and social facilities. In spite of all these problems, the people are friendly and optimistic, and as Fela Anikulapo-Kuti said in a famous song, they are noted for “suffering and smiling.”

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See also: Lagos Colony and Oil Rivers Protectorate; Nigeria.

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Lagos Colony and Oil Rivers Protectorate

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Lagos was a trading post actively involved in the illegal slave trade, following the British Abolition Act of 1807, and

the subsequent British naval patrolling along the West African coast. Although Britain’s formal, colonial presence started only in 1861 in the town, the immediate events leading to the formation of the Lagos colony date back to 1851, when British marines led by Consul John Beecroft attacked Lagos to disrupt the slave trade carried out by local African kings, working closely with Dahomean and Portuguese slave traders. In 1852 a consul was appointed at the town that represented Britain’s first consular authority on the coast in the region. This form of diplomatic presence was the emblematic representation of Britain’s informal empire in Africa, and in many other parts of the world around this time.

In West Africa in the bights of Biafra and Benin, consular authority reached back to 1849 when Beecroft was appointed as the British consul at the island of Fernando Po. Earlier the British navy had used this island as a naval base against slaving ships between 1827 and 1834, when Britain considered purchasing it but the amount Spain required was estimated to be too high. Changes in technology also furthered British presence, namely the introduction of steamships. Although regular mail service between West Africa and the home country was started in 1852, the flow of communication up the introduction of telegraph was still slow. This resulted in a high level of autonomy of individual consular actions. The political activities of Consul Campbell between 1853 and 1859, and Consul Foote’s military expedition in Porto Novo in 1860 all point toward the *fait accompli*, which was so characteristic of the period’s British policy toward the region. It was often the case that the London government faced a situation where significant actions had already been taken, making it more difficult to retreat than to follow the initial lines of events. Also, with the consular presence at Lagos, Britain engulfed itself in local affairs, especially in the troubled relations between different Yoruba states, supported by or opposed to the strong neighboring Dahomey. The continuous diplomatic turmoil with local African chiefs, especially with Kosoko, the former ruler of Lagos finally led to the decision in London to annex Lagos and create yet another coastal colonial urban enclave in West Africa.

After Lagos was created as a colony in 1862, the amount of problems only increased. The affairs of the small colony necessarily became linked to the events of Abeokuta, Dahomey, and Egbaland that extended behind the colony. The town under British administration was becoming an increasingly important trading post on the coast, an enclave that could not be avoided by any trading party. Governor Glover implemented an active policy, based on signing treaties, but London was not interested in furthering its actual sphere of interest. A series of wars raged after 1864 where the

British never took part actively, although traders supplied weapons, thus giving support to some warring parties.

Another element of colonial Lagos was the extremely high European mortality that gave rise to the name of “White Man’s Grave” at least since 1822, applied to the entire region of West Africa. It had some elements of truth that Lagos was a place that required three governors, one in a coffin on his way home, one dying in the town and one on its way to replace him. An estimated 30 per cent annual mortality was relatively frequent up to the 1860s. With regular use of quinine, this mortality began to decline but the region retained its former image as the “deadliest spot of the Empire” at least up to the early 1900s. This notion of imperial periphery could be recognized in the almost total disregard for material development of the town. Apart from the construction works carried out at the harbor, the most important buildings that were erected were those built by the Creole community. The state of public health and hygiene, a very characteristic element of British policy in parts of urban India for example, was neglected almost totally. The town’s total population was around 20,000 in the 1860s, to double by 1900. Of these, there were very few Europeans, their number hardly exceeding 20 to 30 people, including colonial officials and traders.

The most important economic factor of Lagos, and of the Niger Delta, was the increasing demand in Britain for palm oil, which was used for soap making but especially as a lubricant for fine machinery. Britain’s most important palm-oil exporting region was the Niger Delta and the immediate surroundings of Lagos. The introduction of steam ships secured a more profitable trade since while the number of actual voyages decreased, the total tonnage increased by four times between 1850 and 1890. At the same time however, from the late 1850s onward the price of the palm oil fell, complicating the trade further especially for the participating African merchants. The Niger Delta was probably one of the most important economic positions Britain held in the region since over half of its palm oil import, worth over \$1 million originated from there.

Britain’s presence in the Niger Delta region was based on a combination of the consular authority (from 1849) and the works of the Courts of Equity, up to the mid-1880s. These institutions, in short were created to regulate trade and to provide some legal forms, based on written treaties between African and European merchants. Although initially these courts had no legal power over British subjects, this changed from the 1860s. Over the decades from 1849 to the late 1870s these institutions were responsible for introducing Western concepts of property, contract or punishment

to the Delta. In 1872 consular authority was defined within legal frameworks, providing the opportunity for authorized interference into commercial and, indirectly political affairs.

The events in the decade of the 1870s gained an additional element in the form of European economic and, eventually, political rivalry. In 1877 Gorge Goldie Taubman arrived to the Niger to find a pressing commercial competition between French and British companies. He soon realized that Britain’s only option was to exclude other European rivals, an aim that he achieved shortly after the foundation of the amalgamated merchant organization, the United Africa Company in 1879. This already pointed toward the problems of the 1890s since the French companies were already receiving state subsidies while the British were not. The strengthened British traders in the Oil Rivers now only had to deal with local African merchants, of whom Jaja of Opobo was probably the most famous who, stepping out of his middlemen status, started to organize palm-oil shipments to Britain on his own. The European merchants, together with the British consul could not allow this, and in 1887, Jaja was trapped in a meeting and deported to Teneriffe. The next event was the formation of the Royal Niger Company, Britain’s chartered company that played an increasingly important role in the region that in the 1890s was inserted between French and German spheres of interest in Dahomey and in the Cameroons.

LÁSZLÓ MÁTHÉ-SHIRE

See also: Delta States, Nineteenth Century; Igboland, Nineteenth Century; Nigeria: British Colonization to 1914; Royal Niger Company, 1886–1898.

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Lalibela and Ethiopian Christianity

King Lalibela (ruled c.1200–1250) was the most famous king of the short-lived Zagwe dynasty (dynasty of the Agaw) that came after the demise of the Aksum kingdom. The Zagwe period runs from about 1137 to 1270, and the Agaw are one of the oldest indigenous people of Ethiopia. They originally occupied a large part of northern Ethiopia, extending from Bogos in Eritrea to Agawmeder Gojjam. The Balaw people in Eritrea are descendants of the Agaw. The Agaw also lived in Lasta, the center of their Zagwe kingdom. Nowadays most Agaw people live in the Agawmeder region of northwestern Gojjam. The Agaw language is classified as Cushitic. The Agaw had converted to Christianity during the Aksumite kingdom.

Of all the tremendous cultural achievements of the Zagwe dynasty, the rock-hewn churches that bear Lalibela's name stand out the most. The eleven churches carved out of rock made Lalibela's name immortal. So famous is he in the history of Ethiopian Christianity that Lalibela was canonized by the Ethiopian Church.

Remarkable as the achievements of Lalibela were, there is hardly any historical record detailing his life or reign. Partly due to the notion that the Zagwe were usurpers of power from the legitimate "Solomonid dynasty," this period of Ethiopian history is a neglected field of inquiry. The life and times of King Lalibela are shrouded in mystery, while the churches he built are given miraculous explanations, such as the assertion that the rock-hewn churches at Lalibela were built by angels. Whatever the hagiographical tradition says, Lalibela built in all eleven rock-hewn churches of which ten were built in a group of two, one consisting of six, and another of four churches. The eleventh one was built separately, for unknown reasons. This church attempts to duplicate Jerusalem; the small stream that runs through the churches is called Yordanos, after the River Jordan in Jerusalem.

King Lalibela strengthened the foundations of Ethiopian Christianity. The Zagwe kings before and after him maintained strong relations with the outside Christian world, including the age-old relations with the Egyptian Church. Interestingly, the famous twelfth-century Egyptian ruler Salah al-Din, who expelled Europeans from Jerusalem, gave Ethiopians a number of churches in the Holy Land, which in turn increased the number of Ethiopian pilgrims to Jerusalem. The Zagwe kings expanded the frontiers of the Christian kingdom.

By the time of King Lalibela, Christianity in Ethiopia had taken firm roots. Eight centuries earlier, King Ezana of Aksum had converted to Christianity. From that time onward, biblical and other ecclesiastical works were translated into Ge'ez, the Aksumite script. The fundamental tenets of Ethiopian Christianity derive mainly from Coptic Egypt. Among the uniquely Ethiopian traits of Christianity is the particularly strong presence of Old Testament–based ritual, which helps give Ethiopian Christianity its syncretic character.

Judaic elements in Ethiopian Christianity include the observance of the Sabbath on Saturday as well as Sunday. Christian Ethiopians follow the dietary laws laid down in Leviticus, in the Old Testament, by avoiding pork and other "unclean" foods. Following Judaic law, male babies are circumcised eight days after birth, while they are baptized forty days after birth. The structure of churches is similar to Jewish temples, while the dance of the *dabtara* with their drums and sistrum resembles the dance of Levites in front of the Ark.

Of all the Judaic elements, the most profound in distinguishing Ethiopian Christianity is reverence for the Ark of the Covenant, the *tabot*. Christian Ethiopia believes that the original Ark of the Covenant is in Ethiopia, kept in the safety of Aksum Tseyon (Zion) Church. As custodians of the Ark, Ethiopians believe that they have replaced Jews as God's chosen people. Some historians argue that this belief was introduced and popularized during Lalibela's reign.

The allegation that the Zagwe were usurpers from the "legitimate" Solomonid dynasty led to many rebellions by those intent upon returning power to the Solomonid rulers. The Zagwe kings patronized Dabra Libanos monastery in Eritrea, while neglecting traditional church centers like Aksum and Dabra Damo. This created resentment against the Zagwe. Amhara was one of the regions under Zagwe rule, and it was the Amhara chieftain Yekuno-Amlak who overthrew the Zagwe kingdom and brought about the so-called Solomonid restoration in 1270. Throughout the Aksumite, Zagwe, and Solomonid periods, Christian Ethiopia's fundamental social structure, religious life, and patterns of external relations remained essentially unchanged.

TESHALE TIBEBU

See also: **Ethiopia: Aksumite Inheritance, c.850–1150; Ethiopia: Solomonid Dynasty, 1270–1550.**

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Land and “Reserves,” Colonial

The idea of a “reserve” for the exclusive occupation of Africans was first mooted by the Dutch East India Company in 1774 to prevent frontier conflict between Cape settlers and the San in South Africa. The idea, however, was never translated into practice. It was not until much later in the colonial period, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that reserves became a commonplace in regions of white settlement. Reserves were inextricably linked to the great debate among Europeans on the solution to the so-called native problem. Were Africans to live separately from whites, under traditional forms of land tenure, or were they to be assimilated into an integrated European-dominated society? Were reserves to be the repositories of tribalism, so that Africans could, in the parlance of the 1920s and afterward, “develop along their own lines,” or were they temporary places of refuge that would, with the spread of capitalist farming, disappear with the passage of time? These debates, however, only became significant after reserves had been established. Much of the legislation of the twentieth century, including the South African Natives Land Act of 1913 (often seen as the true beginning of a systematic reserves policy) was constrained by existing patterns of land settlement. In other words, the advance of white settlement, by treaty with, or conquest over, African societies, determined where Africans should live. Reserves emerged in an ad hoc fashion in accordance with the political and economic circumstances of white-black conflict.

The earliest laws setting up reserves (then called locations) can be traced to mid-nineteenth century South Africa. In the South African Republic (Transvaal), the government endeavored to control Africans by pass laws, disarmament decrees and setting up small reserves, under the charge of military personnel, which were meant to provide labor for the white farmers who had expropriated the best land. While the reserves were predominantly labor reservoirs, they were also, following the Natal model, a way of preserving peace and security by “divide and rule.” Historians have

pointed out that the weakness of the republican state meant that African locations were not surveyed or demarcated. Yet, similar circumstances prevailed later in other white settler territories. In Kenya, for instance, while many reserves were established by the “pacification” campaigns that preceded World War I, these reserves were administrative constructs. It was not until 1926 that most of these reserves were formalized (or “gazetted”), and even by 1929 less than half of them had had their boundaries demarcated by trenches or cairns of stones. In southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) the position was just as unclear. More than 100 reserves were established between 1897 and 1902, but the Native Department officials who created them did so in an haphazard fashion, with no procedural directives, no maps, little or no knowledge of the terrain, and without establishing any criterion for land suitability or potential. As Angela Cheater (1990) notes: “the early origins of the reserves [in Zimbabwe] are obscured by conflicting dates and apparently non-existent statutes.” A key problem facing those charged with land apportionment during and after World War I, when the debate on reserves policy was in full flourish, was finding out where the reserves actually were.

Reserves, then, often constituted “remaindered” land, land not taken up by European farmers and concession companies. Reserve boundaries often became dependent on the boundaries of European farms, and as many of the latter were “unoccupied,” or rather occupied by African tenants or squatters, and themselves were not clearly fenced off, the distinction between “black” and “white” land was blurred. As John Overton tells us, in the case of Kenya, the black-white frontier “was at first a concept, an economic interface, not a physical border.” Nor did the appropriation of prime land and its privatization mean that all Africans were shunted off to the reserves. The 1903–1905 Lagden Commission in South Africa estimated that 1,398,787 Africans lived on white farms, more than half the number (2,458,281) that inhabited the reserves. These figures even exaggerate the reserve population given the fluid movement of migrant labor to the towns and private land. While most Africans who lived outside the reserves lived as sharecroppers (“Kaffir farmers”) and labor tenants, a few were landlords in their own right. It was this phenomenon—black occupation of white land—that triggered the drive to segregation in the twentieth century. Indeed, the main thrust of the 1913 Natives Land Act and the Land Apportionment Act (1930) in Rhodesia was to deny Africans the right to purchase land in the white area.

The appropriation of black land was, from the beginning, linked to the desire to control African labor. The “Native Question” in Africa, as many have pointed out, is hard to divorce from the labor question

(throughout the entire colonial period). The attempts to "civilize" Africans were tied up with the drive to proletarianize them. Some settlers, like the witnesses before the Transvaal Labour Commission (1904) and the members of the 1919 Economic Commission in Kenya, wanted to abolish reserves altogether. The 1915 Land Commission in Rhodesia, appointed by the British government to ensure sufficient reserve land for the Ndebele and Shona, actually recommended an overall reduction in reserve acreage. This would, according to the chairman, Robert Coryndon, help end "tribalism" and ensure a more sufficient labor supply. The bases for these recommendations were that Europeans were best able to develop agricultural land, and that the prime task of Africans was to supply labor to white farms. This was not segregation, though; Coryndon regarded segregation as a "dangerous tendency" (Youé, 1986); and while his commission may have tampered with the reserves, they were not abolished. In fact, Rhodesian reserves were rendered untouchable in the 1923 constitution of self-governing colony.

The myriad attempts to finalize or formalize the white-black division of land between the two world wars meant that reserves continued while reserve policy changed. There are many reasons for this. The failure of European regimes to civilize, or proletarianize, Africans, was in part due to the enterprise of African farmers, in both the reserves and on private land. Reserve land was not universally poor land (although most of it was); Beinart points out that much of the reserve land in South Africa "was largely within the higher rainfall zone. Some of it may have become very poor, but initially it was not the worst land" (1994). Indeed, a government development plan promulgated in independent Kenya (1966) reckoned that 80 per cent of the country's fertile land was located in African areas. Proponents of segregation, as well as radical scholars, have pointed to this as a deliberate objective of reserve policy: to ensure the social reproduction of a work force and social security for the unemployed, the old, and infirm. However, the tremendous variation in reserve conditions (the Ndebele referred to their first two reserves as "cemeteries not homes") should warn against such generalizations. The initial allocation of land had much more to do with the expedients of conquest than the theories of the conquerors (or their historians). Also, the reserves were centers of political power; chiefs were essential allies in colonial collaboration. White supremacist states were restricted in their action by ground-level power relations; tampering with reserves was almost as dangerous as meddling with white property rights.

It is not surprising that, despite all the legislative acts and commissions of enquiry, land settlement patterns in southern and eastern Africa remained a

seemingly anarchic tapestry of white farms, forest areas, unassigned land, and reserves. The latter were rarely contiguous wholes, or host to a homogeneous ethnic or "tribal" group, something that makes a mockery of the apartheid state's attempt to set up independent homelands or Bantustans in South Africa from the 1950s.

One of the key factors in the drive to segregation was the success of African farmers living on white land. Land legislation in the twentieth century was primarily devoted to abolishing Africans rights to acquire title in the European farm areas. Concern with depreciating land values, lack of labor, economic competition (often portrayed as "racial friction"), and the possibility of Africans assuming political rights motivated settler regimes not so much to consolidate reserves but to extinguish African rights in European areas. Nonetheless, this was not followed up immediately with forced removals, although many Africans were caught in the squeeze. White farmers were still dependent on squatter labor, and the political economy of the reserves prevented a wholesale repatriation. Almost 25 years after the critical Natives Land Act, the South African Native Affairs Commission (1936) lamented its nonimplementation. By this time it had become a commonplace in settler societies to add land to reserves (variously called release areas, native purchase areas, or native leasehold areas) to accommodate "progressive" African farmers and relieve the pressure on reserve land. These extended reserves were part and parcel of the segregationist project; reserves increasingly became tribal homelands where Africans could develop on their own lines, politically and economically.

From their beginnings as leftover land in the era of conquest, reserves eventually became the cornerstone of segregation policies throughout southern and eastern Africa. Initially, reserves were primarily the outcome of the military and economic pressures of colonial contact; later they became potential homelands, embraced, if somewhat reluctantly, by Africans and liberal whites as the only hope for black survival and development. Attempts to develop a reserve policy was as much predicated on African intrusions into designated white territory as it was on the actual developments in the reserves. The outcome was not an easily-identifiable colonial grid pattern (what John Harris of the Anti-Slavery Society once referred to erroneously as "black and white squares"), nor one in which the legislation provides a reliable guide. The making of African reserves in white settler territories actually preceded segregation, reserve policy, and notions of trusteeship. Controlling Africans on the land proved to be a lengthy and politically charged process.

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
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Language Classification

There are approximately 2,000 African languages, an estimated one-third of the world's total, spoken by some 750 million speakers (Grimes, 1996; Heine and Nurse, 2000). (See Table 1 for numbers of speakers and locations of selected major languages.) The history of African language classification has at times been highly contentious, and a valid and comprehensive genetic classification was not worked out until the second half of the twentieth century. Following Greenberg's (1963) seminal and now widely accepted classification, African languages group into four distinct phyla- or superfamilies: Afroasiatic, Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan, and Khoisan.

The Afroasiatic phylum contains almost 400 languages spoken across the northern third of Africa in addition to southwest Asia. There are six primary branches: Ancient Egyptian (extinct), Semitic, Berber, Chadic, Cushitic, and Omotic. All Afroasiatic languages except Semitic are spoken on the African continent. Prominent languages include Amharic, Arabic, Hausa, Hebrew, Oromo, Somali, Tamazight, Tigrinya, and Wolaytta.

The vast Niger-Congo phylum contains close to 1,500 languages (more than any other phylum in the



Languages of Africa.

world) and the Bantu subfamily alone covers much of the southern two-thirds of the continent. Niger-Congo includes Kordofanian, a family of languages spoken in the Nuba hills of the Kordofan area in the Republic of Sudan, in addition to most of the languages of western, central, and southern Africa, belonging to families such as West Atlantic, Mande, Gur (Voltaic), Kru, Kwa, Benue-Congo, and Adamawa-Ubangi. Revisions of Greenberg's (1963) subgrouping reassigned Kwa and Benue-Congo to the same south central group of Niger-Congo, and the position of the Mande languages within Niger-Congo is in dispute. Some of the larger Niger-Congo languages include Akan, Fulani-Fulfulde, Igbo, Kikongo, Kikuyu, Kinyarwanda, Lingala, Manding-Mandinka (including Bambara), Sango, Shona, Swahili, Wolof, Xhosa, Yoruba, and Zulu.

The nearly 200 languages in the heterogeneous Nilo-Saharan phylum are spoken mainly in central and east-central Africa, and they display such considerable diversity that their genetic unity is contested by some linguists. Proposed coordinate branches include: Saharan, Maban, Fur, Songhai, East Sudanic, and Central Sudanic (the latter two are essentially a regrouping of Greenberg's "Chari-Nile" branch). Songhai, together with Fur, is an isolate and its phylogenetic affiliation is controversial, with some linguists placing it in the Mande group of Niger-Congo. Other major Nilo-Saharan languages are Dinka, Kanuri, Luo, Maasai, and Nubian.

Khoisan languages are found mainly in the southern and southwestern region of Africa, especially Botswana and Namibia, as well as in Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, and include the languages of the San ("Bushmen") and Khoekhoe ("Hottentot"). As a result of the expansion of Bantu-speaking peoples from the northwest and the European occupation of the region, many Khoisan languages are extinct or on the brink of extinction, and only about thirty to thirty-five remain with a mere 200,000 or so speakers (120,000 of whom speak Khoekhoe). The phylum divides into two primary groupings: (1) South African Khoisan, including Khoekhoe (Nama); and (2) two East African ("click language") isolates spoken in northern Tanzania, Sandawe, and Hadza. The genetic unity of the Khoisan family remains controversial, however, due in part to the paucity of language data.

Malagasy, a language belonging to the Western group of the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) family, is spoken on the island of Madagascar. Although it has some loanwords from South African languages as Arabic and Swahili, Malagasy falls outside the African language phyla.

Serious descriptive work on African languages did not begin until the seventeenth century, when several

major grammars were published, for example, Kongo (1659) and Amharic (1698), in addition to some dictionaries, for example, Coptic (1636) and Nubian (1638), often written by European missionary scholars. After a period of relative stagnation, the late eighteenth and nineteenth century saw the publication of some important word lists, for example, Koelle (1854). A number of major works on linguistic classification also appeared, with the result that by the middle of the nineteenth century three African language families were generally recognized: Bantu, Nama-Bushman, and Hamito-Semitic—although there were still many disparate languages that did not fall into these families.

From the second half of the eighteenth century, African linguistics was dominated by German-speaking scholars. Two significant classifications were proposed by Lepsius and Müller, with initial versions published in the 1860s (Sebeok, 1971; Ruhlen, 1987). Both recognized Hamitic, Semitic, Bantu, Negro/Mid-African, and Bushman, with Bantu and Semitic reasonably unified and well defined. However, there were differences as to how the groupings related to each other, and how languages such as Fulani (Niger-Congo phylum), Hausa (Afroasiatic), Maasai (Nilo-Saharan), and Hottentot (Nama [Khoisan]) fit into the overall picture.

In the early part of the twentieth century, Meinhof (1912, 1915) emerged as the most influential African linguist of his generation. He classified the languages of the continent into five independent phyla: Sudanic, Bantu, Hamitic, Semitic, and Bushman. Some of Meinhof's classifications (supported in part by another prominent linguist, Westermann) were, however, erroneously based on nongenetic typological and racial criteria. West African Sudanic languages, for example, were defined as those lacking the diagnostic Bantu "noun class systems." In addition, Meinhof followed Lepsius in lumping together Hausa and Hottentot (Nama) into his proposed Hamitic family (adding Fulani and Maasai), the assumption being that the Hamitic languages were related primarily because they had grammatical gender. In classifying Hamitic, Meinhof also resorted to irrelevant cultural and racial (as well as racist) factors. Speakers of Hamitic languages became largely coterminous with cattle-herding peoples with essentially Caucasian origins, intrinsically different from, and superior to, the "Negroes of Africa," and the putative Hamitic family ended up encompassing languages from every phylum on the continent.

Meinhof's retrograde views held sway until Greenberg's intervention. Greenberg's comprehensive reclassification of African languages (developed in the 1950s and expanded and definitively revised in 1963)

LANGUAGE CLASSIFICATION

was a breakthrough of seismic proportions. Although it met with some hostility initially, not to say outraged rejection from some Bantuists, his overall classification has stood the test of time and has come to represent the standard, universal frame of reference (Newman 1995). Greenberg combined West Sudanic and Bantu into a

phylum he called “Niger-Congo” (including Fulani) and relegated Bantu to a relatively low-level node on the family tree as a minor subgroup of a subgroup of the Benue-Congo branch of Niger-Congo. (Westermann [1927] and others had already noted common features between West Sudanic and Bantu languages, implicitly

Table 1. Selected Languages by Phylum

Language	Estimated numbers of speakers (millions)	Countries/regions where mainly spoken
Afroasiatic		
Amharic	20m	Ethiopia
Arabic	160m	Middle East, north/northeast Africa, Sudan, western Sahara
Hausa	35m	Northern Nigeria, southern Niger
Hebrew	4/5m	Israel
Oromo	14m	Ethiopia, Kenya
Somali	8m	Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya
Tamazight	3m	Morocco, Algeria
Tigrinya	6m	Ethiopia, Eritrea
Wolaytta	2m	Ethiopia
Niger-Congo		
Akan	7m	Ghana
Bambara	3m	Mali
Fulani	8m	West Africa, Sudan
Ganda	3m	Uganda
Igbo	17m	Nigeria
Kikuyu	5m	Kenya
Kinyarwanda	9m	Rwanda
Kongo	3m	Congo, Angola, DR Congo (Zaire)
Lingala	8m	Congo, DR Congo (Zaire)
Luba-Kasai	6m	DR Congo (Zaire)
Sango	5m	Central African Republic
Shona	7m	Zimbabwe
Swahili	5m (but used by more than 30m as a <i>lingua franca</i>)	Tanzania, Kenya and east Africa
Wolof	2m	Senegambia
Xhosa	6m	South Africa
Yoruba	20m	Nigeria, Benin
Zulu	9m	South Africa
Nilo-Saharan		
Dinka	1/2m	Sudan
Kanuri	4m	Nigeria
Luo	3/4m	Kenya
Maasai	1m	Kenya, Tanzania
Nubian	1m	Sudan
Songhai	3m	Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso
Khoisan		
Khoekhoe	120,000	Namibia, Botswana
Sandawe	10,000	Tanzania

Figures based on Grimes (1996) and Heine and Nurse (2000).

pointing to a valid historical-phylogenetic relationship.) Greenberg also reassigned the Kordofanian languages to Niger-Congo to form the Niger-Kordofanian superfamily and combined a number of smaller groups and languages (including Maasai) into a new “Nilo-Saharan” phylum. Nama was placed within the Khoisan phylum; previous classifications of Khoisan languages had also been partially based on extralinguistic cultural and typological features. He also dismantled the fallacious Hamitic family and long-established Hamito-Semitic dichotomy, replacing them with five main branches—Ancient Egyptian, Berber, Chadic (including Hausa), Cushitic, and Semitic—and renamed the phylum “Afroasiatic.” (Omotic was subsequently taken out of Cushitic and set up as an independent sixth branch within Afroasiatic.)

Greenberg’s heuristic approach was based on the method of “mass comparison” or “multilateral comparison.” This discovery procedure involved closely comparing sound-meaning resemblances—in basic vocabulary as well as grammatical morphemes—across a large number of languages at the same time. Another crucial principle underpinning Greenberg’s historical-genetic classification was that it was based exclusively on linguistic evidence, not on the specious presence or absence of vague typological or areal features, or extraneous ethno-anthropological traits.

Since 1963 there have been differences of opinion concerning the internal composition of each of Greenberg’s four African phyla in addition to the boundaries between them, all of which have undergone subsequent elaboration and refinement. The essence of his continent-wide classification, however, has stood up to detailed examination and analysis.

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See also: **Johnston, Harry H.**

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Language, Colonial State and

During the colonial period in Africa, the various European powers pursued policies designed to most effectively ensure peak efficiency and productivity within their colonies. Colonial authorities rarely implemented such policies with the interests of indigenous peoples in mind. Rather, they generally viewed the African population as a labor pool that could provide maximum output at minimum cost. Colonial policies, especially as they affected Africans, encompassed every imaginable function in the colonial apparatus, including taxation, policing, agricultural and mining production, administration, and transportation.

In addition to these areas, colonial powers sought to create language policies, usually under the rubric of educational policies, that would both complement their colonial ideologies and enhance the mechanisms by which they ruled over large and diverse African populations. Although their approaches to the question of language were quite different, they nevertheless all had one thing in common: their policies served colonial interests but rarely included consideration of their African subjects’ needs and desires.

European aims in devising colonial language policy can generally be distilled into two major goals. The first was to create an elite group of educated Africans who could either speak the language of the European colonial power or a suitable *lingua franca*. These privileged people would then serve as administrators in the colonial government, thus reducing the need to relocate, at great expense, European administrators. The second goal was to promote a single language for the conduct of everyday functions within the colony.

Although each power was quite successful in the first endeavor, they were less successful in the second. While it was fairly simple to identify which few black students would receive further education, and thus, further language instruction, it was much more difficult to ensure that the entire population of the colony would also receive even minimal exposure to language instruction, given the colonies’ financial shortfalls. In order to achieve the second goal, European colonial rulers also had to somehow overcome Africa’s tremendous linguistic diversity, a task of immense proportions, and one that colonial structures could not very well accommodate.

Thus in most colonial states in Africa, a small Western-educated African elite emerged to fill mid-level roles essential to the colonial enterprise, primarily as civil servants and teachers. A rare few even allowed to attend European universities. Ironically, these elites

also became the leaders of African independence movements in the 1950s. But the vast majority of Africans living under colonial rule continued speaking their local languages and perhaps took on the language of administration, education, and power as necessary for the conduct of daily business.

The French were the most successful in making their language and culture an integral part of the indigenous peoples' lives. Under the idealistic French doctrine of "assimilation," and in conjunction with the governing principle of direct rule, colonial subjects were to become participants in French culture, if not full citizens. To make this process more than rhetorical, however, the French needed to devote more extensive resources to the colonial educational structure and to make opportunities available for every African to assimilate into French culture. They took neither of these measures.

In order to become a "French citizen of African origin," Africans had to fill several requirements, including passing a test in French language proficiency. Despite the fact that much lip service was paid to the "civilizing mission" and the goal of assimilation, by 1936 less than 1 per cent of the entire population of French West Africa could claim the status of "French citizen of African origin." Although French was the language of instruction in colonial schools, only a tiny percentage of Africans actually attended school. While men like Senegalese president Leopold Senghor ultimately gained prominence in postcolonial politics through their successful assimilation into French culture, his example was more the exception than the rule. For the vast majority of peoples living under French colonial rule, the ideal of assimilation was out of reach, simply because the French did not provide the tools necessary to bring it within the reach of ordinary Africans.

Similarly, Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Portugal pursued the goal of European language instruction halfheartedly at best. Each successfully built a functional colonial administration based on the presence of a relative few Western-educated Africans who spoke the language of administration. Each followed its own particular model of colonial rule, with the British system of indirect rule usually considered more liberal and far less paternalistic than the Belgian and Portuguese direct rule patterns. Opportunities available to Africans for advancement within the colonial governments were, as in the French colonies, limited at best. Correspondingly, only a few Africans received full instruction in European languages.

In some cases, Europeans chose to advocate certain African languages as their language of administration. For example, Kiswahili became the most widely spoken indigenous language on the African continent in

part because of German efforts to increase the language's efficacy as a *lingua franca*, so as to spare the expense of extensive education in the German language. The British similarly encouraged Hausa as a *lingua franca* in West Africa. Both of these had long histories as languages of trade, and each thus served in a very practical manner as a *lingua franca* connecting many different peoples in trade, colonial administration, and military forces. As for other, more localized African languages, most Europeans considered them suitable only for primary school instruction, and certainly not worthy of further development for use within the colonial structure.

Since the end of the colonial period, much debate has occurred in literary circles concerning the continued influence of European languages on African educational systems and literature produced by African writers. As Kikuyu writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o argues in his landmark 1986 treatise *Decolonising the Mind*, "in the twentieth century Europe is stealing the treasures of the mind to enrich their languages and cultures. Africa needs back its economy, its politics, its culture, its languages, and all its patriotic writers."

Yet most African writers continue to write for publication in European languages, and this trend appears to be well entrenched. According to the *UNESCO General History of Africa*, there has been no sustained effort on the part of African governments to develop comprehensive language policies to promote the growth of African languages or integrate these languages into the increasingly global economic and political structure.

This is a challenge that Africa will continue to face throughout the twenty-first century. European colonial rulers inserted European languages into the African landscape and encouraged small numbers of Africans to aspire to full literacy in those languages, thus producing the elite group of Western-educated Africans who later led their nations to independence. It remains to be seen how contemporary Africans will resolve the tension between wanting to break with their colonial past by promoting their own languages yet wanting also to participate fully in the global economic and political structure, an undertaking that presently requires command of European languages.

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See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.**

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Law, Islamic: Postcolonial Africa

The role of Islamic law (shari'a) in postcolonial Africa has varied from country to country as a result of the relative size of Muslim communities, the institutional traditions of legal systems, and historical contexts. In North African states with overwhelming Muslim majorities, Islamic law during the colonial period had come to be limited to personal matters: marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Muslim courts had been integrated to centralized judicial systems. Colonial authorities often maintained recognition of different legal traditions within Sunni Islam (Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi'i), and, in the Maghrib, the legal tradition of Ibadi Islam.

With the establishment of independent national states, starting in the 1950s, there were numerous efforts to codify law, necessarily eliminating recognition of variant traditions that had been rationalized in religious terms but were incompatible with the unitary emphasis of nationalist ideology. Codification also brought to the fore debates over women's legal rights. Through the 1970s the trend was, in varying degrees, toward greater protection of women's rights, notably in Tunisia. One of the best known of such reforms was that passed in Egypt in 1979, which restricted a husband's right to take an additional wife without his first wife's permission. This was dubbed "Jehan's law" in reference to the wife of then-President Anwar Sadat.

However, in some cases, notably Egypt and Algeria, there has been a trend toward more conservative interpretations of Islamic law since the 1970s, aptly symbolized by the repeal of "Jehan's law" in Egypt in 1980. This trend can be attributed to authoritarian regimes seeking to placate increasingly strong Islamic political movements through concessions on social issues, and to the popular perception that legal reforms were associated with a small, privileged, westernized elite.

In eastern and southern Africa, Islam had long been primarily a coastal phenomenon, and Islamic law only achieved official recognition from colonial authorities in Zanzibar and the coastal cities of Kenya. Where Muslim communities existed in the interior, Islamic

law was applied only on an informal basis, without governmentally appointed judges.

Postcolonial Tanzania had the largest proportion of Muslims in its population, but its government had a strong commitment to separate national politics from religion. In the elaboration of a national code of family law in the 1970s, the government consulted religious leaders and added flexible provisions to assuage the sensibilities of different communities.

In Kenya, where separate Islamic courts had survived in coastal cities, there have been repeated conflicts stemming from the national government's efforts to impose common legal norms in matters such as inheritance. The Muslim courts have been marginalized and are increasingly identified as "women's courts." The frequency with which women risk of making family disputes public by resorting to these courts is a product of deteriorating economic conditions and the weakening of kinship networks.

National governments throughout Sub-Saharan Africa have often set up national Islamic councils composed of prominent religious authorities. Their purpose is to mediate between Muslim communities and the national government, and to establish a consensus as to the solution of religious questions, especially in matters of ritual, such as the correct manner of prayer or appropriate behavior at funerals. Such disputes were connected with the growing influence of the puritanical Wahhabi movement, especially among members of younger generations who have had some formal Islamic education.

Most states of West Africa and the Sudan belt conform to the observations made for eastern and southern Africa, but there are two crucial exceptions, Nigeria and the Sudan. It is in these two countries that Islamic law poses the most difficult issues on the African continent.

During the colonial period in Northern Nigeria, the British had given formal recognition to Islamic law, administered both in the *alkali's* (Muslim judge's) courts, and in the courts of the region's traditional rulers. It was applied not only in matters of personal law but, with some modifications, in homicide, injury, and theft cases as well. But in southern Nigeria the British recognized only local ethnic legal traditions.

As Nigeria headed toward independence in the 1950s, the harmonization of legal systems became a matter of fundamental importance. A system of regional courts provided some insulation for Islamic law in the north when independence arrived in 1960. But with the end of the regional system in 1966, the emir's courts lost formal recognition and the *alkali's* courts were more strictly subordinated to the national system. Since then there have been periodic campaigns to establish a separate Islamic court of appeal at the

national level. The most important of these was that of 1978–79 during the framing of the Second Republic's constitution. In the end, conservative but pragmatic northern politicians such as Shehu Shagari preferred compromise on this issue to imperiling national unity.

The Sudan inherited from the colonial period a centralized Islamic judicial system and a corps of well-trained judges with a forward looking reputation. Indeed the British promoted the Sudan as a model for modernization of Islamic law in northern Nigeria. However, the most striking and original legal ideas came not from a jurist, but from the engineer Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, founder of the Republican Brothers. He formulated a theoretical basis for the reform of Islamic law in *The Second Message of Islam*, first published in 1967.

But with the growing influence of the Islamic revival in the early 1980s there was a push toward adapting Islamic law as the basis of national law for all Sudanese, regardless of religion. President Jafar Nimeiry, his popularity in decline, exploited this issue by announcing in May 1983 that Islamic law should be the basis of the Sudan's national law in all domains. In 1985 he sanctioned the execution for apostasy of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, whose ideas sharply challenged such a conservative and intolerant interpretation of Islam.

After the National Islamic Front came to power in Sudan in 1989, its leader, Dr. Hasan Turabi, followed two directions in Islamic legal policy. One was to give greater prominence to the application of Islamic legal principles in the socioeconomic domain, for instance by promoting interest-free Islamic banking. The other was to search for a means to balance respect for the rights and identities of non-Muslims with insistence on maintaining the Islamic character of the state. Nevertheless, a power struggle developed between Turabi and President Umar al-Bashir, culminating in Turabi's arrest in 2001, on the charge of undermining the state.

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

See also: Islam in Eastern Africa; Religion, Post-colonial Africa: Islam; Sudan: Turabi's Revolution, Islam, Power.

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Law and the Legal System: Postcolonial Africa

Postcolonial African nation-states are grappling with the problem of integrating the "consequential reception of laws derived from colonial imposition" and their own indigenous common law and Islamic legal heritage. How these plural legal traditions address the legalities of modern politics, commercial development, criminal law, and family law is the great issue of postcolonial law.

In South Africa the struggle against apartheid contoured the constitutional considerations during the liberation negotiations. The *Freedom Charter* adopted by the African National Congress became the driving force behind the 1991 Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). At CODESA, sixteen of the nineteen attending political parties signed a constitutional declaration that supported a "multiparty democracy, universal adult suffrage, and an independent judiciary." The ANC also pushed for the constitutional inclusion that "the land shall be shared amongst those who work it." For the ANC, land redistribution, as well as other bill of rights guarantees, is the basis for social justice.

However, in Kenya, land law changes in the post-colonial period continued the colonial practice of using British common law, which emphasizes individual freehold tenure because it appeared to be more adaptable to modern commercial development. In contrast, Ghana maintained and balanced the spirit of African communal land holding with its British legal heritage. At independence, both countries advocated their own particular views of "African Socialism" as the basis of national integration, while simultaneously confronting the legalities of tribal land tenure that fragmented and inhibited the formation of a national consciousness.

Criminal law within the postcolonial period has to contend with African traditional justice, behavior, and thinking. In the rural areas where homogeneous ethnic groups exist, traditional justice, faced with adversarial controversy, has sought to restore harmony with all litigious parties by an equitable restoration of the original rights and obligations of these individuals vis-à-vis the community. However, in urban areas, with their multiple ethnicities, the legacy of an Anglophone- or Francophone-style criminal proceeding dominates depending on circumstance. Individuals will seek out either the indigenous or European legal system depending on the controversy and how they perceive the prospects of

a particular system rendering a judgment in favor of their interests.

The dynamic and oscillating political terrain in the postcolonial period prompted dramatic legal changes. Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, used the legal device "The Presidential Command" to veto legislative threats. Nkrumah's legal vision for Ghana was disrupted with his overthrow in 1966. The new National Liberation Council suspended the 1960 Republican Constitution. With the rise in coups d'état and military authority in the early postcolonial period, the law's legitimacy was in constant flux.

Islamic law heritage was influenced by similar political winds of change. In the Sudan, the influence of colonially imposed law and thinking contoured "Mohammadan Sacred Law." The colonial system permitted the authority of sheikhs' courts only in the areas of personal or domestic law. By 1968 the postcolonial, revolutionary Sudan state defined itself as a "democratic, socialist Republic based on the guidance of Islam." With the Nimeiri coup in 1969, a new civil code was adopted which, because of antagonistic political dynamics, was modified in 1976 and later modified once again according to "Islamic Law, justice, equity and good conscience." One political dynamic that created legal issues was that the majority of Muslims in the Sudan belonged to the Maliki legal tradition while the secular politics and the legal training of their jurists led the Sudanese state to adopt the Egyptian legal ideas of the Hanafia school. In the Sudan most legalists were trained in Cairo and took advanced degrees in England. They favor legal eclecticism but usually lean toward English common law tradition. What the supreme law of Islam, shari'a, will eventually become in postcolonial Africa, as witnessed in the Sudan, will be determined by the ebb and flow of modernity.

Western-trained African jurists influenced the re-statement of indigenous law in many postcolonial legal codes. Various African nations called together representatives of traditional district councils who with the aid of these Western-trained African jurists, sat down to integrate and unify the varied legal systems. One can imagine the legal problems to overcome in this process, when many African nations have multiple Islamic legal traditions, as well as both patrilineal and matrilineal legal relationships. The influence, in the juridical system or in the legislature, of Western-trained legalists ensured that Western legal ethics and structure would prevail in the procedural codification and the resolution of legal conflict in this period. Western common law principles of "individualism, equity, liberty, and justice" would make any customary law repugnant that transgressed the Western interpretation of these legal ideas.

Family law or personal law has also contoured by Western legal tradition. Supreme courts of Namibia,

Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have ruled on domestic issues in keeping with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which sought to equalize the status of girls with boys. The 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child further sought to address the rights of children. An example of this protection was the Zimbabwe case of Mdutshana Dube. In this case, an administrative court found a forty-year-old man guilty of rape via a forced marriage with a sixteen-year-old girl. This was a "Western" adjustment to customary law that considers a girl past puberty to be ready for marriage and sexual relations and, therefore, an adult.

The influence of the Western legal tradition has caused difficulty in developing a unified code of family law. Parties in disputes reveal the problematic between particular customary law and, for example, English common law. The S. M. Otieno case in Kenya, involving a mixed marriage between a deceased Luo man and his Kikuyu widow who sought to have him buried on the family farm, is a classic example. Her reasoning was that they were married under the colonial Marriage Act of 1902, which, according to legal experts, gave her Christian authority over the final resting place of her husband. However, elders of the Luo clan insisted that Mr. Otieno be buried on ancestral Luo land as required by customary law. Both Kenya's High Court and the Appeals Court ruled in favor of the Luo clan leaders, leading to the accusations that such a decision was antimodern, anti-individual rights, and, according to the National Council of Women of Kenya, antiwomen.

The future of law in postcolonial Africa will continue to involve the complexities, difficulties, and the procedural modulations of integrating Western legal heritage with the indigenous and Islamic traditions. Postcolonial laws will also be redefined by the exigencies of politics, economics, and social trajectories.

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See also: Colonialism, Inheritance of: Postcolonial Africa; Kenya: Independence to the Present; Law, Islamic: Postcolonial Africa; Nkrumah, Kwame; Socialism in Postcolonial Africa; South Africa: 1994 to the Present.

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League of Nations: See Mandates: League of Nations and United Nations; Namibia (Southwest Africa): League of Nations, United Nations Mandate.

“Legitimate Commerce” and the Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century

Europeans did not initially arrive in Africa looking for slaves. They were more interested in gold, spices, and routes to the Indies, only to quickly realize that slaves offered the quickest profits. By the eighteenth century, Europe's trade with Africa was primarily in slaves. Nevertheless, trade in gold, ivory, dyewoods, and gum arabic remained important. By the late eighteenth century, shipping had grown more efficient, which meant that bulk commodities could be profitably traded. In addition, the industrial revolution was creating markets in Europe for different African goods. Machines needed lubrication, which was provided by vegetable oils. The nineteenth century saw increasing attention to personal cleanliness, especially in Britain, which created a demand for soap, also produced from vegetable oils. In addition, ivory was used for billiard balls and piano keys and gum for cloth dyeing and medicines.

When Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807 and pressured the rest of Europe to follow its example, these new items came to be called “legitimate commerce.” The slave trade was, however, only illegitimate in Europe and North America. African slave-trading states had an interest in continuing the slave trade and often resented the sudden change in European policy. For some, like Asante, the sudden end of the trade left them with the problem of how to use the many slaves flowing into market centers. The new trade differed from the old in that it was in commodities rather than persons. Where African states were able to continue the slave trade, they did so. In areas easily controlled by European ships, slave exports declined quickly. In others, like northeast Africa or Mozambique, exports increased. The Egyptian conquest of the Sudan opened up a new slaving frontier. African merchants in both East and West Africa combined trade in persons and

commodities, using income from one to purchase the other. Slave exports, which reached a peak of about 80,000 a year in the 1780s, were still above 40,000 a year up to 1850. Furthermore, the internal slave trade actually increased as slaves poured into areas where their labor could be used to produce commodities.

Palm oil exports to Britain rose to 1,000 tons in 1810 and then rose to over 40,000 tons in 1855. The French consumer was not willing to buy the cheap yellow soap the British were using, but French industrialists learned to produce an attractive soap from processed peanut oil. As a result, British interests developed most dramatically in palm oil-growing areas and the French in peanut-growing areas. The innovators in West Africa were the cultivators and the merchants. In East Africa the state played a key role. From 1818 Sayyid Said, the sultan of Oman and Zanzibar encouraged his Arab countrymen to plant cloves. By 1840 Zanzibar was the world's largest clove producer. Said also encouraged Indian financiers to settle in the East African ports and provide capital for traders who were going into the interior to buy ivory and the slaves. Slave exports from East Africa were a by-product of efforts to provide slaves for the clove plantations. In South Africa, white Africans, who migrated into the interior to escape British control, began exporting wool.

In the period from 1820 to 1850, the demand for African exports was fueled by increasingly favorable terms of trade. The demand for African products and the prices Europe was willing to pay were increasing, while European industrialization was reducing the cost of exports, particularly of cotton textiles. This pattern changed in the second half of the century, though exports continued to grow. New uses were found for vegetable oils even as petroleum replaced them as an industrial lubricant. Cotton was exported from Egypt and West Africa and coffee from Angola. First Sao Thomé and Fernando Po exported cocoa, then the Gold Coast and Cameroon. By 1910 the Gold Coast was the world's largest cocoa producer. East Coast plantations produced sesame, copra, and grain. The tapping of wild rubber trees developed from the 1870s and expanded dramatically to satisfy the market for tires and rubber raingear. The rubber boom lasted until after plantation rubber came on stream in 1908 and underwrote the creation of colonial infrastructure in colonies as diverse as Guinea, Gabon, and the two Congos. In South Africa, significant quantities of diamonds were discovered in 1870 and gold in 1886.

This growth in trade was taking place when prices for African products were declining and the terms of trade growing worse. Wherever production was expanding, there was a demand that could rarely be met by free labor. For African rulers and state builders, slaving remained the most profitable business available and

the only way to acquire the new breech-loading rifles necessary for political survival. The last quarter of the century was probably the bloodiest period in African history. For European economic interests, the insecurity engendered by these conflicts was increasingly seen as a barrier to economic growth. Until the 1870s these economic interests in Africa were primarily commercial. They invested neither in production nor in transport. They provided credit for African merchants who brought goods to coastal ports.

The economic side of the “Scramble for Africa” was the increasing importance of investment. The most important investments were in railroads. The largest system was in South Africa, where diamonds and then gold provided the basis for a network, which transformed South Africa into a modern industrial society. By 1910 the network extended north across Rhodesia to the copper-rich southern Congo and to ports in Angola and Mozambique. In the 1870s the French began work on a system draining the Senegalese peanut basin and connecting it to the Niger. In the 1890s railroads also began to be extended into the interior in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo, Dahomey, and Kenya. For areas dependent on human labor for transport, the cost of this transport dropped to a minute fraction of what it had been. Money was also invested in modern ports, in steamboats, and in roads. All of these investments required protection.

MARTIN A. KLEIN

See also: **Slavery, Colonial Rule and.**

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Lenshina, Alice (c.1920–1978)

Religious Leader and Prophet, Founder of the Lumpa Church

Alice Lenshina Mulenga Mubisha was born in the early 1920s in Chinsali District. She married Petros Chitankwa Mulenga, a carpenter at the Lubwa mission

of the United Free Church of Scotland (UFCS). She was a baptismal candidate at the church. The couple and their children lived in Kasomo village, a few miles from Lubwa.

In 1953 she had a traumatic religious experience that changed her life forever. After falling seriously ill, Lenshina died four times. Each time she revived after her relatives had already gone into mourning. Jesus, she claimed, had called her to a river where he told his people to send her back, as her time had not yet come. He taught her hymns and showed her the Book of Life, which he had laid on her head kerchief, where it left a yellow mark. Jesus also instructed her to visit “the people of whiteness/the pure ones” (*Abena kubuta*), who would have a message for her.

On September 18, 1953, a still very sick Lenshina told Reverend Fergus McPherson at Lubwa Mission her story. McPherson instructed her to thank God for her recovery and dedicate herself to serving him. In November she was baptized and named Alice by the Bemba minister at Lubwa, Reverend Paul Mushindo.

Despite being only a congregant of the UFCS, Alice Lenshina attracted a following among the Bemba villagers, who listened to her preach and sing her the hymns given to her by Jesus. The songs that Jesus taught her were a powerful means of getting her message across to the people because Alice Lenshina sang in the local Bemba musical tradition, unlike the missionaries.

The crowds that flocked to Kasomo village to hear her included both Protestants from Lubwa and Catholics from the White Fathers’ Ilondola Mission. Alice Lenshina’s congregation at Kasomo continued to grow, and as her power increased, the church at Lubwa tried to rein her in. Charging that monies collected at Kasomo had not been surrendered to the church but kept by Alice Lenshina and her husband, the couple was suspended. In addition, both the White Fathers and the Scottish mission declared Alice Lenshina a heretic.

Lenshina set up her own church and appointed her own ministers. Attempts by the Lubwa missionaries to reclaim her followers were not successful; only 400 out of the 3,000 who left to follow her returned to the fold. Lenshina’s church came to be known as Lumpa, Bemba for “the foremost church.”

Like any independent African church, Lenshina’s Lumpa sought to indigenize Christianity. Whereas most male-led churches promoted polygamy, Lenshina outlawed polygyny and widow inheritance, a decree Zambian feminists are still battling against today. She also preached against alcohol and witchcraft, using the medium of song more than the spoken sermon. The ethnomusicologist Mwesa Mapoma has noted that music and song are the means by which the Bemba communicate with God, as regular speech is considered profane.

By 1957 the Lumpa Church had spread to neighboring districts and was known throughout the Central African Federation. The church structure was more formalized and its rules codified. During this time, the nationalist struggle for independence was gaining momentum. The Lumpa Church was heading for a confrontation with the nationalist politicians, because Lenshina's followers were forbidden from participating in political activities.

In order to escape harassment by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) youth brigade members who were out to recruit more members to the nationalist cause, Lumpa followers set up their own independent villages. They saw themselves as Zionists leaving Babylon so as not to mix with infidels, whereas the UNIP members regarded Lenshina's followers as a stumbling block to independence.

Lenshina's power was spiritual first and political second. As a healer, she clearly had both political and religious authority. As a lawmaker, she did not merely repeat the Christian commandments of the missionaries but made them relevant to the lives of villagers. As a Bemba woman from a polygynous household in a matrilineal society, her Christianity could not but be feminist. Lumpa rules subverted many powerful interests in colonial society, and she was not without enemies, but the transitional UNIP government of Kenneth Kaunda was especially unhappy with Lenshina. It has been said that members of Kaunda's family in Chinsali were close to the Lumpa Church, but Kaunda himself was convinced that Lumpa members had become antisociety, and thus a threat to his government. Kaunda argued that "no clean-living and thinking man can accept the Lenshina passports to Heaven as anything more than worthless pieces of paper—a usurping by an imposter of the majesty of God Almighty. Such teaching cannot be allowed to corrupt our people and cannot and would not be tolerated by any responsible government" (van Binsbergen, 1981).

There were several fights between Lumpa and UNIP supporters in Chinsali villages. As the confrontations grew, they came to involve the police and army units. Many of Lenshina's followers were killed in riots and battles.

Alice Lenshina did not lead the uprising against UNIP. Her followers' disastrous confrontation with the Territorial Army on the eve of Zambian independence was blamed on her, but the men in her inner circle, including her husband, prevented her from giving herself in until the governor had guaranteed their safety. When she was detained and her followers sent to rehabilitation centers to begin the process of reintegration into a society that regarded them as savages, the defeat of the Lumpa Church was complete.

When Alice Lenshina died in December 1978 she had rejoined the UFCS, which had by then been incorporated

into the United Church of Zambia. Lumpa, however, did not merge with the Scottish church or die with Lenshina. Some of Lenshina's followers are still active in the New Jerusalem Church, and others have openly called for the ban on Lumpa to be lifted. Their continued faith in the Lumpa message proves that Lenshina succeeded in establishing a new church, albeit one that has yet to win official recognition and acceptance.

OWEN SICHONE

See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Colonial Africa: Prophetic Movements; Zambia: Religious Movements.**

Biography

Born in the early 1920s in Chinsali District. Married Petros Chitankwa Mulenga. Undergoes her religious, near-death experiences in 1953. Baptized into the United Free Church of Scotland that same year. Charged with extortion and declared a heretic by church leaders in 1955. Sets up the Lumpa Church, which spreads to neighboring villages by 1957. Attacked by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Kenneth Kaunda. In several confrontations, many of her followers were killed. Died December 1978.

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
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Leopard's Kopje: See Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Leopard's Kopje, Bambandyanalo, and Mapungubwe.

Leopold II: See Stanley, Leopold II, "Scramble."

Lesotho: Treaties and Conflict on the Highveld, 1843–1868


The modern nation of Lesotho was almost single-handedly created by Moshoeshoe I in the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, the territorial boundaries of



Lesotho.

the state were gradually fixed in a long process of diplomacy and conflict.

The arrival of Voortrekker immigrants in the Caledon Valley after 1836 complicated an already complex configuration of political authority. Sekonyela's Tlokwa and Moshoeshoe's BaSotho were the strongest military forces, perpetually at odds with each other. Since 1834 a community of several thousand Rolong under the Tswana chief Moroka had been growing up at Thaba Nchu. Other newcomers included groups of Kora, Griqua, and so-called Bastards, all of them in possession of horses and guns. The Boer settlers opportunistically played these forces off against each other. In the absence of any agreed authority to regulate land titles, overlapping claims to sovereignty abounded, constantly threatening to provoke open warfare. The parties to these disputes were able to defend their claims in writing because a large number of Protestant missionaries had settled in the Caledon Valley. Agents of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society had decided that Moshoeshoe offered them the best chances of future success and therefore stood ready to back up his claims. Agents of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society had led the Rolong trek to Thaba Nchu and established stations with a number of other groups whose land claims they were prepared to defend when called upon. The Boers, of course, had their own literate spokesmen who maintained continuous correspondence with relatives and well-wishers in the Cape Colony. These parties vigorously lobbied British authorities in the hope of securing support for their various causes.



Lesotho, 1824–1868.

From the commencement of the Great Trek, the Cape government had maintained that the Voortrekkers continued to be British subjects, potentially accountable for any crimes they might commit beyond the borders of the colony. On the other hand, they did nothing to enforce their claimed authority until 1842, when they sent an expeditionary force to Natal. In 1843 they announced the annexation of that territory. This gave them a more direct interest in the Caledon Valley, which lay along the overland routes of trade and communication linking Natal to the Cape. A tentative move toward regularizing political authority in the Caledon was made by Governor Napier, who concluded a treaty with Moshoeshoe in 1843 that recognized the Orange River as the southern boundary of the kingdom and the Drakensberg escarpment as the northeastern border with Natal. In addition, a sizeable territory on the northern side of the Caledon River extending nearly to the Rolong stronghold of Thaba Nchu and as far up river almost to the mission station of Mpharane in Sekonyela's territory was acknowledged as belonging to Moshoeshoe.

Unfortunately, this did nothing to curb disputes over land. As a further aid to pacification, the Cape appointed a British resident with headquarters at Bloemfontein. Henry Warden, resident from 1846, bungled from crisis to crisis until in 1848, the political landscape was transformed by the appearance of a new British governor, Sir Harry Smith. Within months of taking office, Smith attempted to untie the Gordian knot of highveld problems by annexing the entire area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers as the Orange River Sovereignty. A Voortrekker force that attempted to challenge the new dispensation was defeated at Boomplaats in 1848. However, in the wake of this victory, Smith and Warden, who remained resident, pursued policies favoring white settlers and Moshoeshoe's rivals, Sekonyela and Moroko. Warden laid down new boundaries that

deprived the BaSotho of nearly all their lands north of the Caledon River. He followed this up with a rash attempt to crush the allied forces of Moshoeshoe and his ally Moletsane. Warden's ragtag army of British, Griqua, Boer, Kora, and Rolong forces was defeated at the battle of Viervoet mountain, in June 1851.

Disillusioned by the never-ending conflicts, the British colonial secretary, Earl Grey, initiated a policy of withdrawal, beginning with the Sand River Convention of 1852, which dropped all claims to territory north of the Vaal River, and agreed to release Boers in those regions from their status as British subjects. Next, Sir George Cathcart, who succeeded the discredited Harry Smith in 1852, agreed that the Orange River Sovereignty should be abandoned. However, he determined to make one final show of force on the highveld. Backed by a force of 2,000 men, he delivered an ultimatum to Moshoeshoe, demanding 10,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as reparations for alleged thefts perpetrated by the BaSotho and the Taung. When these were not delivered, he attacked in December 1852. To his astonishment, the BaSotho cavalry put up an impressive defense and the British suffered heavy losses. Moshoeshoe, realizing that he could not prevail in the long run, now agreed to Cathcart's terms. A few months later he decisively defeated his old rival Sekonyela. Hopes that this might finally settle border problems were dashed by the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854, which transferred sovereignty to a Boer government without specifying a boundary between the new Orange River Free State and the BaSotho kingdom.

An agreement of 1855 fixed the boundary at the old "Warden Line" but failed to end conflict. President Boshof of the Free State declared war on the BaSotho in March 1858 but was defeated in a short campaign, which led to the transfer of some land back to the Sotho in an agreement of September 1858. Despite this victory, time was against Moshoeshoe. With each passing year the Free State became more populous and prosperous. In a second war lasting intermittently from 1865 to 1868, the BaSotho forces were outnumbered, outgunned, and plagued by internal divisions. At length the British high commissioner, Sir Philip Wodehouse, decided to intervene. Believing that victory for Free State would weaken Britain's strategic position at the Cape, and moved by the suffering of the BaSotho, he first cut off ammunition supplies to the Free State and then, on March 12, 1868, annexed Moshoeshoe's kingdom as the Crown Colony of Basutoland.

NORMAN A. ETHERINGTON

See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Difaqane on the Highveld; Moshoeshoe I and the Founding of the Basotho Kingdom.

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Lesotho (Basutoland): Colonization and Cape Rule, 1868–1884

At the height of the 1865–1867 war between Basotho and the Free State Boers, Sir Philip Wodehouse (British high commissioner to South Africa and governor of the Cape Colony, 1862–1870) persuaded the British government to allow him to declare Moshoeshoe I's territory British territory. By this time Moshoeshoe's pleas for a relationship with the British government, which dated back to the early 1840s, had become earnest; whereas earlier he had sought to influence the character of that relationship, he now wanted a relationship on any terms that the British might wish. On March 12, 1868, Wodehouse declared Moshoeshoe's kingdom British territory, and Basotho British subjects.

But this marked only the beginning of Moshoeshoe and Wodehouse's troubled partnership as they attempted to secure British protection for Basotho. The period between March 1868 and February 1869 was a time of much correspondence and political intrigues. Wodehouse's March 12 declaration had not been unequivocally authorized by the Colonial Office. In part, the British government's failure to give Wodehouse clear signals was due to its program of reducing personnel costs and other expenditure related to colonization; the assumption of responsibility over Basotho was not in keeping with this plan. The Cape parliament was dominated by interests sympathetic to the Free State Boers and hostile to the establishment of good relations between Moshoeshoe and the Cape or the British government. Wodehouse not only found himself dealing with intrigues engineered by those who did not agree with his actions in Natal and elsewhere, he also found that in many instances, these groups and individuals were encouraged by the very man whom he was assisting to secure British protection: namely, Moshoeshoe. The procrastination of the British government in authorizing Wodehouse to extend British rule over Basotho forced Moshoeshoe to pursue, behind Wodehouse's back, the alternative of his territory's

annexation to Natal. The Natal colony welcomed his overtures and made very strong moves to have Lesotho annexed to that colony. On February 12, 1869, Wodehouse managed to sign, with the Free State's delegation, the Aliwal North Treaty establishing the boundaries between Basotho's and the Free State Boers' territory. While the treaty was being considered for ratification by the British government, in 1869 Moshoeshoe encouraged and funded a mission to England to secure its repudiation.

On the basis of Moshoeshoe's overtures to Natal and the keenness of that colony to annex Lesotho, the Colonial Office supported a union between Lesotho and Natal. However, Wodehouse was opposed to it, fearing Basotho would soon rebel against Natal's colonial policies (which he considered unsuited to Basotho) leading to more instability. Instead, he favored Lesotho's annexation to the Cape Colony, an option opposed by the Cape parliament. In the end, Wodehouse successfully persuaded the Colonial Office to let him assume personal responsibility over Lesotho while he prepared the political ground in Lesotho and the Cape parliament for an eventual annexation of Lesotho to the Cape. This finally came about in 1871 after three years of uncertainty and confusion about who actually exercised power in Lesotho, and whether the administration of the country was based on colonial or customary law.

To prepare Basotho for annexation to the Cape Colony, Wodehouse had contemplated a gradual process of introducing colonial law and institutions to avoid the abrupt removal and replacement of indigenous law and political structures. However, his successors did not share his patience and tact. The men who succeeded Wodehouse and the officials they sent to Lesotho adopted a program of rapidly introducing colonial law into the country; and they had very little regard for the sensitivities of the groups who felt that such rapid change threatened their interests. The most critical of these were the chiefs who felt that their power over the people was being deliberately eroded, and the men who were opposed to the partnership that colonial law formed with the church to fight polygamy and advocate a more liberal status for women. Thus, although political stability returned after Lesotho's colonization, making economic recovery and prosperity possible from the early 1870s, there was simmering discontent among key political figures.

From the mid-1870s southern Africa as a whole became a battleground, as African chiefdoms took up arms against colonial rule and its destruction of their political systems and ways of life. The Basotho were no exception. In 1879 chief Moorosi protested the attempts by a young colonial magistrate to encroach on his power by assuming the responsibility to allocate

land in the chief's territory, and taking the side of a widow who showed preference for colonial law over customary conventions in the way she wanted to conduct herself. The uncompromising attitude of both sides (the chief believed colonial policies were stripping him of all his power, while the Cape Colony government sought to end opposition to their policies and used Moorosi as an example to other chiefs) led to a full-scale war between Chief Moorosi and the colonial forces supported by Moshoeshoe I's successor, Chief Letsie.

Soon after the war ended with Moorosi's defeat early in 1880, Lesotho as a whole was at war with the Cape Colony. This time the issue was guns, and the conflict has come to be referred to as the "Gun War." Faced with several uprisings in its colonies in the region, the British government decided to disarm African chiefdoms. For Lesotho the policy was implemented by its immediate overseer, the Cape Colony government. Basotho refused to hand over their guns arguing that they posed no threat to colonial rule. Once again the two sides were not prepared to compromise and war broke out in September 1880. It soon became clear that the war was at a stalemate—Cape forces had the advantage of better arms, but Basotho knew the terrain better and could count on the cooperation of the villagers. Furthermore, the war put an economic strain on the Cape Colony, which spent approximately \$5 million on the conflict. In view of these factors, a ceasefire was agreed and the war was brought to a close in April 1881. Over the course of the next three years, the Cape Colony government attempted to reassert its authority over Lesotho, but Cape rule had become so unpopular that the government's various schemes (including a proposition that the chiefs take over all internal affairs and leave external affairs to the Cape) were rejected by Basotho. Consequently, in 1883 the Cape government negotiated with the Colonial Office for Lesotho to be handed over to Britain. In March 1884 Britain passed a law un-annexing Lesotho from the Cape Colony; from that date to 1966 Lesotho was ruled directly by Britain.

MOTLATSI THABANE

See also: Cape Colony: Origins, Settlement, Trade; Moshoeshoe I and the Founding of the Basotho Kingdom.

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Lesotho (Basutoland): Peasantry, Rise of

The Kingdom of Lesotho was forged out of the destructive wars of the 1820s, when the Koena clan, under the celebrated leadership of Moshoeshoe, was able to bring together a disparate group of displaced people under its protection. Using the promise of protection, land, and cattle (often raided from neighboring peoples), Moshoeshoe was able to gradually draw together a large number of followers, who became known as the Basotho, and consequently extend his power to become the dominant leader in the southern high veld.

While cattle formed the basis of the kingdom's early wealth and power, by the middle decades of the nineteenth century Lesotho became the region's major producer of grains. By the 1870s Basotho peasant farmers were producing bumper harvests of grain, in particular maize, from the soils of the Calendon valley and exported their crops to as far away as the Eastern Cape and especially to the newly opened diamond fields around Kimberley. Peasant production in Lesotho remained high throughout the final three decades of the nineteenth century, but during the early twentieth century it gradually declined, in the face of competition from cheap imported grain, the development of capitalist agriculture elsewhere in South Africa, restrictive colonial policies (in order to secure labor for the mines) and, arguably, environmental decline.

The rise of peasant production in Lesotho was intimately linked to the expansion of the colonial frontier and the spread of new goods and techniques beyond the frontier. The arrival of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) missionaries in 1833 was welcomed by Moshoeshoe, who wished to learn more about the Europeans and their new technologies, which had been made known to the Basotho by migrants returning from the eastern Cape. The PEMS missionaries brought with them European goods including, crucially, the iron plough. This new technology allowed Basotho farmers to plough and plant large areas under maize. Another technology that the Basotho were particularly keen to acquire was that of firearms.

While Moshoeshoe had managed to defeat or enter into alliances with many of his neighboring clans, he still had a number of powerful rivals, including the Griqua, a group of outcasts and miscellaneous adventurers from the Cape Colony who had formed a new polity beyond the colonial frontier. From the 1840s on,

a new threat arrived within the Basotho's realm, as Voortrekkers from the Cape began to settle the southern high veld. Frequent cattle raiding and pillaging led to periodic disruptions of the developing farming system. On the other hand the new settlers were not self-sufficient grain farmers, concentrating their activities on livestock production, hunting, and cattle raiding, and were therefore reliant upon Basotho farmers to meet their day-to-day food requirements.

During this early period it was often the ruling lineages that led the way in increased production. Using tribute labor, the chiefs were able to plough large areas, and they benefited greatly from increased maize exports. However, the arrival of the Voortrekkers (Afrikaans-speaking settlers from the Cape Colony) meant that over the next few decades the Basotho chiefs increasingly lost control of some of their best arable lands to the north and west of the Calendon River. In a series of battles the Basotho gradually lost control of these areas and eventually sought the protection of the British colonial authorities to prevent further territorial losses to the Voortrekkers. This support was eventually gained in 1868, but at the cost of the majority of their best farming lands.

This did not mean, however, that Basotho ceased to farm the "conquered territories" (as the area came to be known in Lesotho). In fact, many Basotho entered into various forms of rental agreements, including sharecropping, with the Voortrekkers, and they continued to expand their agricultural production. With the onset of relative peace following the declaration of British protection, peasant production boomed in Lesotho during the 1870s. While chiefs and commoners closely associated with the missions had dominated the maize export market in earlier decades, it was now the turn of the ordinary Basotho to transform themselves into independent peasant producers.

Using cattle-drawn ploughs Basotho peasant farmers planted more land under maize and reaped impressive harvests. Previously food production had been primarily the responsibility of women, while men had concentrated on livestock rearing, but the use of cattle-drawn ploughs meant that men began to play a greater role in agriculture.

The growth of the colonial economy also led to increased opportunities for Basotho to access European goods through wage labor. During the late nineteenth century, Basotho migrants often took short-term contracts to work on the new mines in Kimberley and later on the Rand or on the farms of the eastern Cape or the Orange Free State. Wages earned from these short-term contracts tended to be reinvested in peasant agricultural production, by the purchase of ploughs, livestock, or horses. As in earlier decades, guns remained a desirable investment as the Basotho saw these as

being crucial to their ability to protect their land from further encroachment. When the Cape colonial authorities, whom the British had put in charge of the territory's administration, tried to disarm the Basotho in 1880, it led to the onset of the Gun War, which resulted in the British resuming direct administration of Lesotho.

Despite the disruptions of the Gun War, Basotho peasant farmers continued to increase their output. This growing peasant sector presented both a threat and an opportunity to the chiefs. Independent agricultural production meant that commoners were no longer as reliant upon the chiefs, and the gradual growth of a wealthy farming class, often strongly associated with one of the churches, provided a clear political threat. Nevertheless the chiefs were able to benefit politically from their control over the allocation of land, and they benefited materially from the institution of tribute labor and from demanding a proportion of returning migrants' earnings.

While South Africa's mineral revolution provided the impetus for the rise of the Basotho peasantry in the late nineteenth century, the development of mines also contained the seeds for its subsequent decline. The arrival of railways from the Cape meant that Basotho peasant farmers had to now compete with cheap imports from North America, while the capital produced by the mines was available for investment, often at subsidies rates, into white agriculture. Furthermore, the British colonial authorities responded to the demands of mine owners and actively discouraged peasant production in order to ensure the increased outflow of migrant labor. During the early twentieth century, Lesotho gradually slipped from being the breadbasket of the region to reliance upon remittances from migrant workers and on imported maize. Some Basotho peasant farmers, both inside Lesotho and in the conquered territories, continued to be successful into the middle of the twentieth century, but for most the transition from granary to labor reserve was completed by the 1930s.

THACKWRAY DRIVER

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Lesotho (Basutoland): Colonial Period

British colonial rule of Lesotho (or Basutoland, as it was known to the colonial authorities) has often been portrayed as a rule characterized by neglect. With the exception of a brief initial period when the territory was administered by the Cape Colony (1871–1884), the colonial administration's primary objective was to maintain the status quo. The major political issue for the colonial authorities was the persistent South African demand that the territory be transferred to South African control. Facing opposition to this transfer from groups such as the Anti-Slavery Society and the Fabian Colonial Bureau in the United Kingdom and from African opinion in Lesotho, the colonial authorities resisted these calls for transfer and were happiest when they could simply avoid discussing the issue. The colonial administration allowed the chiefs to exercise a large degree of control, so long as they did not challenge British political or economic objectives, primarily the continued outflow of migrant labor to the South African mines.

The peasant agricultural sector in Lesotho was vibrant in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, but during the early twentieth century it entered a period of terminal decline. Given the fact that a major aim of British colonial policy was to encourage the outflow of labor to the mines, the British were not, at first, concerned by this decrease in domestic production and, arguably, even introduced policies that hastened the demise of the peasant sector.

By the 1920s, however, the colonial authorities had become increasingly concerned about the state of Lesotho's agricultural sector; therefore, from the late 1920s they began to introduce agricultural development policies and projects. Of particular importance to the territory were policies aimed at the control of soil erosion, one of the major causes of the decline in the eyes of colonial officials, though this view has been challenged by some recent scholarship. These new interventions had very little impact and the 1930s were a particularly difficult decade. The global recession meant that there was a declining market for Lesotho's remaining agricultural exports, such as mohair and wool, while wage-earning opportunities for migrant laborers also decreased. Furthermore, the early 1930s saw a series of devastating droughts, resulting in poor harvests and a massive decrease in livestock populations. Despite repeated efforts at agricultural development projects in the post-World War II era, the economy of Lesotho continued to suffer throughout the colonial

period. A few wealthier farmers, often chiefs, did manage to make significant income from agriculture, especially in the mohair industry, which recovered and flourished in the mountain areas from the late 1940s onward. The vast majority of households, however, were unable to meet even their subsistence needs from agriculture. The lack of other exploitable natural resources mean that colonial Lesotho was forced to rely on the export of its labor resources simply to survive.

Migrant labor existed in Lesotho even before the advent of colonial rule but increased with the development of the diamond and then gold mines in South Africa. During the early colonial period migrant labor was characterized by short contracts that were undertaken to earn funds to buy specific European goods, such as guns, ploughs, and blankets. From the early twentieth century, however, the destruction of independent peasant production in Lesotho meant that most households came to rely upon remittances from migrant labor for the majority of their subsistence needs. Labor recruiters worked with the colonial authorities, and often with the chiefs, to ensure that a constant stream of cheap labor was available from Lesotho to service the needs of South Africa's mines. Young men tended to leave Lesotho on repeated labor contracts over a number of years, returning to Lesotho only for short breaks between contracts. Other Basotho left to find opportunities in the informal sector that arose to service the needs of the new urban labor forces. While men continued to dominate the migrant labor system, increasing numbers of women also migrated, both temporarily and permanently, to Johannesburg and other large cities especially during the 1930s and 1940s. The last decades of colonial rule saw a decrease in the number of Basotho leaving Lesotho for informal sector jobs, as South African influx controls increased under the apartheid regime. Large numbers of men continued to leave Lesotho on mining contracts, but these were formalized and strictly controlled.

In general the colonial authorities were keen to support the power of chiefs, though they also intervened to make sure that apparently loyal chiefs gained the most powerful positions. During the early colonial period the territory was officially ruled through two parallel administrative structures, one headed by the colonial resident commissioner, with a number of supporting departments (such as agriculture and education) and a series of district commissioners. The other administrative structure, known as the Native Authority, was headed by a paramount chief, who was advised by a national council of senior chiefs representing individual wards (the Basutoland National Council). Ward chiefs, in turn, had a number of lesser chiefs and headmen under their control. Chiefs could either directly inherit chieftainships or they could be "placed" in charge of

an area by a superior chief. The system of "placing" was used by senior chiefs to ensure that subordinate chiefs were under the control of a loyal follower. This system led to frequent disputes among chiefs and the proliferation of chieftainships.

In an effort to rationalize the Native Authority, the colonial government introduced a series of "reforms" designed to bring the system increasingly under the colonial authority's control and to administer the country through a system of indirect rule similar to that adopted in other British colonial territories. These reforms were opposed by many of the chiefs but were eventually accepted by the Basutoland National Council in 1938. The colonial authorities took an increasingly interventionist role in the chiefly affairs and, crucially, became the arbitrators in a dispute about the succession to the position of paramount chief. This effort by the colonial authorities to rationalize the system of Native Authority did not result in the hoped for decrease in conflict between chiefs. The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a whole series of so-called medicine murders, closely associated with power rivalries between senior chiefs, in particular between the British colonial authorities chosen candidate for paramount chief, the regent Mantsebo, and her brother-in-law and rival, Chief Bereng.

The spate of "medicine murders" fueled calls from a small but vocal African educated class, who lobbied the colonial authorities to be included in the running of the territories affairs. The colonial authorities were also under attack from a more radical grass roots movement, called Lekhotla la Bafo, who combined calls for a return to rule by "traditional Chiefly administration" with strong ties to the growing African nationalist movement in South Africa. With the development of an apartheid ideology, South African pressure for the transfer of Lesotho to its control decreased, as the policy was now to organize the African population into autonomous ethnically based states, and the British gradually moved toward granting Lesotho Independence. The Basutoland National Council was first expanded to include commoners representing certain interest groups (such as traders) and subsequently to include directly elected representatives. Lesotho was eventually granted full independence in 1966.

THACKWRAY DRIVER

See also: Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Lesotho: Independence to the Present

Lesotho gained its independence from Britain on October 4, 1966. Throughout the colonial period, the government did very little to develop the country's economy. Although Basotho were said to depend on agriculture for their livelihood, they mainly practiced subsistence agriculture; most families depended on earnings of relatives working in the South African mines and other sectors of that country's economy. Due to a lack of industrialization, very little urbanization had taken place during the colonial era, and today Lesotho's rural population still constitutes more than 80 per cent of the total population, which is currently estimated at 1.8 million, growing at the rate of 1.5 per cent annually.

Until January 1986, when Chief Leabua's government was overthrown by the army, the central policy of the government's economic strategy was the establishment of parastatal agencies to assist private sector investment. Between 1967 and 1975, the government established three such agencies, the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC, 1967), the Lesotho National Development Savings Bank (Lesotho Bank, 1971), and the Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO, 1975). The LNDC was meant to attract foreign entrepreneurs to invest in Lesotho's industrial development. Lesotho Bank was a means by which the government sought to mobilize small deposits from the nation, turn them into capital, and avail them to investors. BEDCO's mission was to assist small- to medium-scale local entrepreneurs with business skills and finance. Although of colonial origins, Co-op Lesotho was also supported as a facility to assist farmers and other cooperative associations with seeds and related requirements. However, this strategy made very little impact on Lesotho's employment opportunities and economic development. LNDC's concessions to foreign investors included a five-year tax holiday and allowing them to repatriate their profits. Investors took advantage of these conditions and shut their operations at the end of the five-year tax holiday. Clients of Lesotho Bank and BEDCO were mainly middle-class elements from the civil service. The loans they secured

from these institutions ended up in investments such as housing and very few went toward investment in successful commercial activities.

Foreign companies continuing to do business in Lesotho are mainly Taiwanese textile manufacturers. They employ a sizeable but extremely poorly paid, largely female labor force. For their part, government-sponsored credit institutions have found it difficult to force ministers and high-ranking government officials to repay their loans. The consequent high default rate has led to the collapse of institutions such as Co-op Lesotho and, more recently, Lesotho Bank and serious financial problems for others like BEDCO.

Lesotho's agricultural productivity began to deteriorate in the late 1920s and never recovered after the 1930s depression. At the heart of this deterioration was a combination of factors including decline in soil fertility, lack of resources to develop and change farming practices, soil erosion caused by overcrowding, overstocking, and Lesotho's topography. The failure of agriculture increased Basotho's dependence for jobs and earnings on the mines and other sectors of the South African economy. However, the numbers of Basotho able to find jobs in South Africa mines began to fall in the late 1980s. This trend continues and unemployment in Lesotho stands at more than 40 per cent, while the labor force increases at a rate of 25 per cent annually.

Lesotho's 1966 constitution provided for a constitutional monarchy in which executive power was exercised by a cabinet made up of a prime minister and his ministers and answerable to the parliament; the king acted on the advice of the prime minister and could delay but not veto, government and parliament action. From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, when politicians negotiated Lesotho's independence constitution with Britain, King Moshoeshoe II and his supporters attempted, but failed, to secure a political dispensation that would give him power. This issue became a source of political instability in Lesotho in the immediate postindependence period, as the king and his supporters joined groups that were attempting to unseat the postindependence government, which had gained only a slender majority in parliament in the preindependence elections of 1965.

The first postindependence elections were held in January 1970. Chief Leabua of the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP) lost but refused to hand over power to Ntsu Mokhehle's Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and suspended the constitution. Leabua proceeded to reign in all those who opposed him. By the end of that year he had successfully subdued the king.

In an attempt to force Leabua to reinstate constitutional rule, the donor community on whom the government depended greatly for financing development projects suspended or threatened to suspend aid.

Leabua reacted by establishing an interim parliament in 1973 and forming a government of national unity and reconciliation in 1975, after forcing Mokhehle into exile in 1974. Although significant opposition leaders boycotted these moves, some members from opposition parties participated in them. The resulting fragmentation of parties and the flight of Mokhehle weakened opposition to Leabua's dictatorial rule.

The international community continued to pressure the government to reinstate constitutional rule. In response, and taking advantage of developments in South Africa, the government adopted a progressive foreign policy while tightening its grip on power and intensifying repression inside the country. From the mid-1970s Leabua joined the international anti-apartheid and pro-liberation movement chorus. By the time he was overthrown by the army in 1986, he had established diplomatic relations with Cuba, the USSR, the People's Republic of Korea (PRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC) and a number of socialist governments in Eastern Europe.

The military regime that assumed leadership in 1986 made an alliance with the palace in an attempt to secure legitimacy. According to the arrangement, King Moshoeshe II was the head of state; below him was a Military Council made up of five colonels and headed by Major General Metsing Lekhanya, who was also head of government. The next tier was made up of a civilian, mainly technocratic, Council of Ministers. This government established more cordial relations with South Africa, forced ANC and other refugees to find alternative asylum, expelled PRC and PRK emissaries, and reestablished ties with Taiwan.

Although the first order passed by the junta declared that executive power was vested in the king, in practice it was exercised by Lekhanya and the Military Council. This caused tensions between the major general and the king who found support within the Military Council of two cousins who were members of that body. Taking advantage of Lekhanya's fatal shooting of a student in 1988, the king and his cousins attempted but failed to oust Lekhanya. The state, no doubt at Lekhanya's prodding, began legal proceedings against one of the king's cousins who had been implicated in the murder of two former ministers in 1986. The king declined Lekhanya's request to suspend his cousins from the Military Council. The tension that had existed between the two men became a public falling-out, and Lekhanya forced the king into exile and installed Crown Prince Mohato as King Letsie III in 1990. In 1991 Lekhanya was overthrown by junior officers who installed one of the members of the Military Council, Colonel Phisoane Ramaema, as head of government.

Under increasing pressure from the post-Cold War international community and local civil society, elections

were held in 1993 and won by the BCP, the leaders of which had returned from exile in 1988. King Letsie III put pressure on the democratically elected government to reinstate his father as king, but the government responded by pointing out that his father was not deposed by them. Under further pressure, the government appointed a commission to investigate the circumstances under which Moshoeshe II had been dethroned. Persons appointed to this commission were either members of the ruling party, whose reluctance to reinstate the king's father was evident, or individuals whose antimonarchical inclinations were well known. Regarding this as a farce intended to keep his father out of power, the king gained the support of the army which was still suspicious of Mokhehle and staged a coup d'état on August 17, 1994. Local, regional, and international pressure was exerted on the king, and Mokhehle's government was reinstated in September 1994, under an agreement that forced the government to reinstate Moshoeshe II in January 1995. A year later, he died in a car accident and was succeeded by Letsie III.

In 1998 Lesotho's third parliament was elected and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 of the 80 seats. This result sparked off protests by supporters of opposition parties from May until September 1998, which paralyzed the already weak government that had assumed power after the elections. The king, security forces, and other public institutions were sympathetic to opposition parties and abetted or turned a blind eye to antigovernment protests. On September 22 the government secured the assistance of Botswana and South African security forces to restore order. An investigation by a regional task team discovered that there had been irregularities in the administration of the elections but contended that these could not have affected the outcome. The government and opposition parties accepted the recommendation of the investigation team that the elections be annulled, and the Interim Political Authority (IPA), consisting of members of all parties that participated in the 1998 elections, was set up to review Lesotho's electoral system. Elections were held in 2002 under the new system, with the approval of foreign election observers, in which the LCD won a majority and Prime Minister Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili was elected to another five-year term.

MOTLATSI THABANE

See also: **Jonathan, Chief Joseph Leabua; Mokhehle, Ntsu.**

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Lesotho: Nationalism and Independence

The emergence of nationalist movements in Lesotho dates back to the formation of the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) and Lekgotla la Bafo (LLB), the Commoners' League, in 1907 and 1919, respectively. The BPA was a moderate organization that drew its membership from Lesotho's educated elite, who advocated modernization. They resented the partnership that the colonial regime had established with the chiefs and saw themselves as the natural allies of the colonial regime in its program of modernizing Basotho. They regarded chieftainship as an anachronistic institution and wished to abolish chiefly privileges. They did not demand independence but sought a political dispensation that accorded them a more prominent role at the expense of the chiefs. For some time, the organization's pleas for a more meaningful representation in the chief-dominated Basutoland National Council (BNC) failed, and the colonial regime successfully used the petitions of the BPA as a way to keep the chiefs compliant.

Lekgotla la Bafo was a radical conservative grassroots organization that campaigned against what it regarded as Britain's failure to adhere to the terms of its colonization of Lesotho and the undermining of precolonial institutions, particularly chieftainship. According to the organization, Lesotho was a protectorate and not a colony; this status required that Britain only protect Lesotho while leaving Basotho to govern themselves with their institutions without any colonial interference. The LLB established relations with left-wing organizations such as the Communist Party of South Africa and sometimes took positions that were at odds with its conservative nature. Like the BPA, LLB put pressure on the colonial authorities for representation of the commoners in the BNC. However, this pressure benefited not the LLB but the moderate BPA. Unable to ignore the persistence of the BNC, but fearing the inclusion of militant members of that organization in the council, colonial authorities began appointing members of the BPA to the BNC. LLB's petitions for representation in the council were met with the response that the commoners were adequately represented by members of the BPA.

The two organizations proved unable to keep up with the content and nature of the political consciousness that came with the end of World War II. The BPA was too civil and polite and its strategy of petitioning the colonial regime had proved largely ineffective. Contrary to the LLB's political stance, the majority of people in Lesotho wanted to be ruled and represented in government institutions by individuals or groups they elected and not by precolonial institutions and the chiefs, as the organization demanded. By the 1950s the appeal of both organizations waned and their place was taken by political parties that emerged at the time; the membership of the BPA scattered throughout the ranks of various political parties, mainly the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), formed in 1952, and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), an alliance formed in 1962 made up of Basutoland Freedom Party, BFP, which broke away from the BCP in 1961, and the royalist Marema-Tlou Party formed in 1958. The majority of the members of the LLB joined the BCP. The Basutoland National Party (BNP) formed in 1959 benefited mainly from a conservative membership that had been instilled with respect for authority, and which had therefore never joined the BPA or LLB.

As the first party to be formed and a successor to the LLB, which had had a troubled relationship with the colonial authorities, the BCP drew more distrust from the colonial regime than the other two parties. Because it had started agitating for independence at a time Britain's decolonization agenda was in its infancy, the BCP had seemed the most militant, adopting the strategy of petitioning the United Nations and mobilizing the sympathy of other international bodies against colonial rule in Lesotho.

From the mid-1950s, the BNC and these parties pressed for constitutional reforms. In 1958 a delegation of the BNC convinced the British government to transform that body into a legislative council with powers to make laws on internal affairs. This changed status of the council enabled its members to participate in the various steps toward Lesotho's decolonization, including the drafting and negotiation of the country's postindependence constitution. In 1960 District Council elections were held with a view, among others, to elect individuals to the Legislative Council. The BCP won thirty of the 40 seats but could not really exercise any power, which remained firmly in the hands of the colonial officials and a body, the Executive Council, established to run various ministries. However, being elected members of the Legislative Council gave BCP members a platform from which to call for Lesotho's independence. By 1962 the Legislative Council established a commission to make proposals for self-rule. In 1963 the commission toured the country soliciting views on the role of the monarchy in Lesotho politics;

the result of this consultation was that the king should be a constitutional monarch, a view which was strongly canvassed by the BCP.

The proposals resulting from the work of the commission in 1962 and 1963 formed the basis of constitutional negotiations between the British government and the delegation of the Legislative Council that were completed in 1964. During these talks, the king and some of the members of the delegation tried to secure an executive role for him but failed. In April 1965 the preindependence general elections were held to determine the first postindependence government. Of the 60 seats that were contested, the BNP won 31, the BCP 25, and the MFP 4. Because Chief Lebuja, the leader of the BNP, had lost the contest in his constituency, it was his deputy, Chief Sekhonyana 'Maseribane, who became Lesotho's first prime minister. However by July 1965, Chief Lebuja had won a by-election and assumed leadership of the party and the government.

The fact that Britain had accepted the need to free its colonies and had embarked on implementing its decolonization plan meant that the struggle for Lesotho's independence was a peaceful one characterized by negotiations rather than force. Because they dominated the Legislative Council and formed the majority in the delegations which that body entrusted with the negotiations for Lesotho's independence, members of political parties were able to secure a constitution that took power away from the traditional elite and gave it to elected representatives.

MOTLATSI THABANE

See also: **Jonathan, Chief Joseph Lebuja.**

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Lewanika I, the Lozi, and the BSA Company

In its quest for empire "on the cheap" in the late nineteenth century, the British government was not averse to using commercial companies to exact concessions from African leaders. This is what happened during the 1890s, when Cecil Rhodes's newly chartered British

South Africa Company (BSAC) made agreements with Lewanika, the powerful monarch of the central African kingdom of Buluzi. The king, or *litunga* ("owner of the earth"), anxious to preempt the threat of invasion from the Ndebele, eager to secure British protection as a modernizing force, and mindful of rival factions within his own regime, took the initiative in pressing for BSAC intervention.

At first, though, company interest in the region, primarily floodplain on the upper Zambesi, was fleeting and fitful. Rhodes was concerned with forestalling the Belgian advance on mineral-rich Katanga, and the Lozi kingdom was en route. By the time the BSAC's brash agent had reached the Lozi capital of Lealui, Katanga had been lost. Frank Lochner, however, stayed to negotiate, in mid-1890, one of the many concessions that Lewanika signed with the BSAC over the next twenty years.

The Lochner concession gave the company the perpetual right to mine, trade, and build railways in the Lozi Empire (but not within the central kingdom) in return for British protection, the appointment of a British resident, and an annual salary for Lewanika. The concession was allowed to lapse, in part because the BSAC became embroiled in conflict with the Ndebele, but it illuminates two significant themes in Lozi-Company relations. First, the BSAC acknowledged Lewanika's authority, whether real or fictitious, over a wide swathe of what later became northwestern Rhodesia (the Lozi Empire, termed Barotseland by the imperialists, was incorporated into northern Rhodesia in 1911 and is nowadays the western province of Zambia), something which would reinforce company claims to possible mineral-bearing areas. Second, the company took a laissez-faire approach to the Lozi kingdom (Buluzi) itself, because the exchange economy of the floodplain offered little prospect for profit and because it was considered imprudent to disturb the internal power structure.

The Lochner concession was followed by seven years of company neglect, despite the repeated protestations of Lewanika's French missionary ally at Lealui, Francois Coillard, and despite the concerns of the Foreign Office of a Portuguese threat. It was not until late 1897 that Rhodes sent one of his younger associates, Robert Coryndon, to take up the position of resident. Coryndon and four others, representing mighty Albion, were met by hundreds of Lozi, many in ceremonial dress, at Lealui on October 20, 1897. For the subsequent ten years, it is perhaps more appropriate to talk of Coryndon-Lewanika relations, as the BSAC was concerned only with establishing a nominal presence in Barotseland. A minimal white presence in a militarily powerful central African state offers little guide to power relations, however; most historians see Lewanika's

participation in the Scramble as a fateful ploy that reduced his empire, undermined Lozi sovereignty, and eventually decimated the floodplain economy.

The concessions signed in 1898 (the Lawley concession) and 1900 (Lewanika concession) are a matter of some contention. Lewanika and his senior *indunas* (as well as Coillard and a high-ranking member of the Barotse police) charged the company with deceit and intimidation. Even so, Lewanika managed to maintain control of his inner kingdom (company headquarters were far from Lealui) and garner support for his rule (Coryndon despatched a patrol to the royal capital in 1905 to forestall a coup). The company's actions were also circumscribed by Colonial Office overrule, at least in a legalistic sense, once the 1899 Order in Council incorporated Barotseland into northwestern Rhodesia. The concessions (another followed in 1906) were also significant in sorting out the technical arrangements of rule between the BSAC and the British government.

Mainga (1973) argues that it was not so much the early administrative concessions that tore the kingdom apart but the end of slavery and tribute labor. The advent of a cash economy has always placed severe strains on indigenous societies; the company certainly saw the formal abolition of slavery (accomplished by decree in 1906) and the imposition of a hut tax as a means of mobilizing labor for the white economy, something which would erode the foundation of the Lozi power. Lewanika was, however, well aware of the meaning of British rule from his missionary contacts and friendship with Khama of the Ngwato. In the phase of company neglect (1890–1897), he had engaged on a number of slave raids, for the first time among the Luvale in the west, and into Ila and Toka country, to gather slaves surplus to his requirements and, perhaps more importantly, to claim political authority where it was only tenuous before. Lewanika was an African imperialist whose *modus operandi* was little different from the BSAC itself. When tribute was superseded by the hut tax in 1902–06, Lewanika not only secured 10 per cent of the receipts but the installation of *indunas* in outlying districts. For Lewanika such symbolic acts legitimized his authority and were no doubt linked to a well-thought out scheme to entrench the power of the Lozi ruling elites.

Lewanika was also alert to the potentially damaging effects of colonial capitalism, but this he could not control. During his lifetime (he died in 1916), labor migration from Barotseland (especially to the South African mines) was just a steady trickle, but when an outbreak of bovine pleuro-pneumonia and subsequent embargo on cattle sales (1915) ended an era of prosperity, labor migration increased substantially. By the interwar years, Barotseland was one of the poorest regions of northern Rhodesia.

Lewanika often complained that the BSAC did not live up to its agreements to modernize his kingdom, to build schools, promote infrastructural development, and ensure the financial security of the Lozi aristocracy. British “protection” did not live up to its early, or even written, promises. The BSAC, as an imperialist and capitalist corporation, made severe inroads on Lozi independence. This should not obscure the fact that Lewanika secured the best terms of collaboration than any central African leader, as well as the continuation of a separate Lozi identity in colonial and independent Zambia.

CHRIS YOUÉ

See also: **Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): British Occupation, Resistance: 1890s.**


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Liberia, Nineteenth Century: Origins and Foundations

Liberia emerged out of a context of conflicting dreams, expectations, and plans. For several hundred years before 1800, the Grain Coast of West Africa had been a source of slaves, palm oil, and malgretta peppers for ships coming from Europe and America. The trade was controlled by coastal chiefs—mainly Dei, Bassa, Vai, and Kru—while the interior peoples such as the Gola, Grebo, Kpelle, and Loma provided many of the products. For their part, the Mandingos were important merchants linking regions of the interior with the large Mande-speaking world to the north. Although several large multiethnic confederations emerged along the main trade routes to the coast, most people lived in relatively small-scale communities led not only by political chiefs but by the religious and cultural heads of the so-called secret societies that included all adult males and females. It was here that the Liberian nation was established.

LIBERIA, NINETEENTH CENTURY: ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS



Liberia.

Liberia began as a project of the American Colonization Society (ACS), an alliance of southern slave holders, northern abolitionists, and religious optimists. In the south, as cotton gained importance and the value of slaves increased around 1800, the fear of slave revolts intensified. The catalyst for such uprising, it was feared, would be the growing population of free blacks living in the urban areas. In the north, especially, the sentiments unleashed by progressive religious and social movements called the institution of slavery itself into question. Because few Americans—even the more liberal—entertained the notion of a multiethnic society, many thought the best solution was to rid the United States of blacks by transporting them to Africa. Thus, was born the American Colonization Society. Leading Americans such as Robert Finley, Elias Caldwell, Bushrod Washington, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Andrew Jackson attended the founding meeting in 1816. Their goal was to solicit financial and political backing of the U.S. government. Very early on, the ACS lost the support of northern blacks and the leaders in the abolitionist movement. For example, Paul Cuffee, a wealthy black sea captain who had gone to West Africa as early as 1811 to search for land to resettle black people, distanced himself from the ACS because he feared its goal was deporting blacks from America rather than civilizing, Christianizing, and developing Africa. William Lloyd Garrison turned against the ACS when he realized it was not supported by northern black religious leaders who saw the organization as a tool of southern slave owners. Congress did appropriate \$100,000 for the ACS but refused to approve the resettlement of

blacks from America. Instead, the money was authorized for a settlement of recaptive Africans taken from illegal slave operations. Thus, when the ship the *Elizabeth* sailed from New York on January 31, 1820, the 86 settlers were officially regarded as carpenters, seamstresses, nurses, and cooks sent to prepare for the captives who would be taken from interdicted slave ships.

In April and December 1821, while the settlers remained in Sierra Leone, several white ACS agents contacted the local Dei chiefs in the area of modern-day Monrovia and persuaded them to “cede” land for a settlement. In March 1822, the first settlers, wards of the ACS, arrived to begin a new life in Africa.

From the beginning the small settlement struggled. By November 1822, the settlers experienced their first armed clash with their local African hosts. Hostilities continued for several more decades. During these years the settlers were greatly outnumbered by the indigenous peoples. In the first 12 years of its existence, fewer than 3,000 people emigrated from the United States. Not only did these first emigrants experience high mortality rates, a significant number returned to America or Sierra Leone. And, although some like Rev. Daniel Coker, Rev. Lott Carey, and J. J. Roberts were educated free blacks, most were manumitted slaves. Although the ACS envisioned the emigrants would take up agriculture and become self-sufficient farmers, many of them turned to commerce.

The first few years of settlement were marked by autocratic ACS control. Soon, the settlers chafed at the insufficient rations and the rigid rule of the ACS. In 1823 the conflict actually escalated into an armed attack against an ACS warehouse. In response, the white clergyman Ralph Gurley was sent to investigate the complaints and a new “Plan of Government” was adopted in 1825. The plan retained power in the hands of the ACS, but a settler was now designated as vice agent.

In addition to internal discontent, the colony was plagued by the intrusions and threats of European imperial powers. Claiming that neither the settlers nor the ACS had the right to regulate commerce along the coast, British, French, and Spanish captains engaged in trade the settlers considered smuggling. Furthermore, both Britain and France laid claim to large amounts of territory considered part of the ACS domain. Since the United States refused to recognize the colony and because European powers claimed only governments, not societies, could assert sovereignty over land, Liberia’s future was bleak.

In response to these serious threats, the ACS and the settlers began to contemplate independence as the best way to preserve Liberia. In 1839 the ACS established a commonwealth, an organization designed to join Liberia (the Monrovia area) with ACS-linked settlements

(Bassa and Sinoe) down the coast. When Governor Buchanan died in 1841, he was succeeded by Joseph Jenkins Roberts, the first settler to serve as Liberia's chief executive. An April 1845 incident proved to be the catalyst that led to actual independence. When the commonwealth government seized the *Little Ben*, an English schooner attempting to evade Liberian tariffs, the British responded by seizing a Liberian vessel and imposing a substantial fine on its owner Stephen Benson. Shortly after this incident, the ACS passed a resolution offering self government to the Commonwealth. In July 1847 delegates from Montserrado (Monrovia region), Bassa, and Sinoe (then called Mississippi) met in Monrovia to declare independence and prepare a constitution. Because of the paternalistic outlook of the participants, because of concerns about defending themselves against hostile indigenous peoples, and because of their overwhelming fear of European nations, the framers of the constitution vested great power in the hands of the president. After adopting the constitution, the settler community elected J. J. Roberts as the first president of Liberia. In 1857, Maryland in Africa, another settler state located in the extreme southeast, joined the new Republic of Liberia.

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Liberia, Nineteenth Century: Politics, Society, and Economics

On the surface, Liberian society in the nineteenth century exhibited a high degree of division and discord. The most obvious fault line pitted African Americans against the indigenous peoples. The settlers who first came in 1822 regarded themselves as emissaries of a

superior Western civilization marked by distinctive dress, diet, religion, governance system, and moral values. Even within the settler community there were clear distinctions between the lighter-skinned mulattos, who often had arrived in Liberia with more education and possessions, and the lower-status, darker-skinned immigrants, who often had been newly emancipated as part of a bargain leading to their expatriation.

In addition to the emigrants from America, from 1846 to 1867, the American government deposited approximately 5,700 people taken from slave ships captured on the high seas. These "recaptives" represented a diverse mixture of people drawn from the Congo-Angola region or from Nigeria (Ibo and Yoruba especially). The indigenous African communities were also divided into more than a dozen distinct language groups and hundreds of political entities of various sizes and government systems.

In spite of their obvious differences, peoples living in Liberia displayed numerous similarities, reflecting their common status as Africans. The settlers and the indigenous peoples believed political, social, and religious leadership rightly belonged to an elite minority. For the settlers this role fell to the Monrovia merchant class, which dominated government, church, fraternal orders, business, and the military. Indigenous society, for its part, was controlled by elders who regulated the community's affairs from the seemingly impenetrable inner circles of secret societies.

The recaptives, who came in large groups (756 people in 1846 and 4,701 in 1860) and were incorporated into settler society, served as a powerful social bridge between settler and indigenous culture. Although settler propaganda claimed the recaptives were completely integrated, more candid assessments indicated that even at the century's end many recaptives, known as Congoes, retained obvious elements of their ancestral culture that would have influenced their settler patrons. By the later decades of the nineteenth century, churches and schools served as vehicles of cultural exchange among the settlers, indigenous peoples, and recaptives. By then, Liberia College (opened in 1862) and Cuttington Collegiate and Theological School (founded in 1869) enrolled students from both settler and indigenous backgrounds. In addition, the educator Edward Blyden (1832–1912) advocated the integration of all Liberians.

Although people in all segments of society relied on subsistence farming (rice in northwest, tubers in the southeast) and fishing, trade was the preferred occupation for ambitious individuals. Mandingos (Mand-speakers claiming descent from prestigious northern war leaders), powerful coastal chiefs, and the settler merchant elite competed to control this source of wealth. Although slavery ended in the 1850s, domestic servitude continued. For example, the highly stratified

Vai society used slave labor for farms. And, to some extent, the slave trade was replaced by the export of contract labor. Local chiefs, settler politicians, and British, French, and Spanish labor recruiters all participated in these arrangements. Thus, Liberian workers (all of indigenous extraction) labored on coffee, cocoa, tea, and cotton plantations in places such as Gabon, Cameroon, or Fernando Po.

However, by the 1880s the economy had decayed. The great merchants, unable to compete with steam ships, became mere agents of the more efficient and more highly capitalized European firms. Thus, by the end of the 1800s, the great German banking and trading houses such as A. Woermann dominated Liberian trade and finances. Furthermore, lower prices, synthetic dyes, agricultural competition from French and British colonies, and New World substitutes for African products hurt Liberian exports. The government, having exhausted its resources in pacification campaigns against indigenous peoples, resorted to ruinous borrowing from the foreign firms and banks. By the end of the 1800s, about half of Liberia's budget was devoted to debt service while the other half went to paying salaries and rent for official buildings the government leased but did not own.

Politics was dominated by concerns about relations with indigenous peoples, tensions between the Monrovia elite and the upriver settlers, fiscal solvency, and protecting Liberia's borders against the encroachments of the British and French. Although most interior people eventually submitted to Monrovia by the end of the century, in the 1850s, 60s, and 70s conflicts with the Kru and Grebo strained the government's resources. Long accustomed to dealing with the outside world directly, the Kru and Grebo resisted Monrovia's efforts to collect tariffs, control trade, and appropriate land. A particularly fierce battle in 1875 (the Grebo mobilized between 5,000 and 7,000 men) was resolved only with the assistance of the U.S. Navy. Although "victorious," the Liberian government recognized that it would need to negotiate and accommodate rather than impose its will. Increasingly, Monrovia developed alliances with supportive or compliant indigenous leaders. Even so, by 1870, government control rarely extended more than 40 miles inland from the sea.

Internally, tensions between the mulatto merchant elite based in Monrovia and their darker-skinned competitors from the upriver settlements resulted in the formation of a new political party to challenge the Monrovia-centered Republican Party. The True Whig Party, founded in Clay Ashland, elected Edward J. Roye as president in 1869. However, the mulattos, led by former President J. J. Roberts, bitterly attacked Roye for the unfavorable terms of a foreign loan he negotiated. Consequently, Roye was arrested in October of

1871 and in February 1872 he was sentenced to be hanged for treason. The upriver settlements contemplated secession but the crisis ended when Roye drowned while attempting to escape from prison. Hillary R. W. Johnson, a Monrovia Republican turned True Whig, emerged as the dominant figure in Liberian politics. President from 1884 to 1892, Johnson was the major player behind the scenes for the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Although unable to resolve the fundamental economic, ethnic, and social problems, Liberia's leaders did manage to preserve the nation's precarious independence.

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Liberia: Firestone

For most of the twentieth century, Liberia was an impoverished country controlled by an Americo-Liberian elite who regarded the indigenous population as little more than a resource to be exploited. Until World War II, Liberia's major export was labor. Americo-Liberian politicians used the Liberian Frontier Force to coerce government-appointed chiefs into supplying men for the trade, mainly to the cocoa plantation on Spanish Fernando Po and the Congo.

The government was chronically short of revenue, with expenditure regularly exceeding income. Facing mounting debts, the Liberian government borrowed \$500,000 from Sir Harry Johnston's Liberian Development Corporation in 1906. While \$150,000 went to foreign creditors, most of the money disappeared with the Liberian Development Corporation. When the Liberian government sought to renegotiate the loan in 1908, the British government insisted on taking control of the customs department and Frontier Force. Liberia turned to the United States. In 1912 the United States organized a new loan of \$1.7 million at 5 per cent interest and took over the customs department, loan repayments having first call on customs revenue.

In 1910, in an attempt to raise noncustoms revenue, the government granted land to the British Mount Barclay Company to develop plantation rubber. The venture failed to generate anticipated revenue and collapsed. World War I further eroded the national economy with the collapse of exports to Germany. Falling producer income sparked uprisings by the Kru, crushed by the Frontier Force with American military aid.

In desperation, President Charles King (1920–1930) sought financial support from Marcus Garvey's "Back to Africa" movement. The scheme soon collapsed under the political threat of an African-American influx, disillusion with promised investments, and pressure from neighboring colonial governments. Unexpected assistance, however, materialized in the person of American tire magnate Harvey Firestone.

In 1922 Britain instituted the "Stevenson Plan" to force up rubber prices through a 75 per cent restriction on production, thereby securing a means to repay its wartime indebtedness through sales to the United States, the world's largest rubber consumer. Harvey Firestone countered by offering a \$5,000,000 loan to Liberia in return for a 99-year lease on a million acres, as well as Liberian government support in labor recruitment. The Liberian government initially rejected the Firestone proposal, hoping for direct American financial support. Firestone lobbied the U.S. State Department, campaigning for a source of rubber under "American control." Under pressure from the American government, Liberia signed an agreement with Firestone in 1925. In return for a \$5,000,000 loan at 7 per cent interest, financed through Firestone's Finance Corporation of America, Firestone was granted a 99-year lease on the Mount Barclay rubber plantation and options on the 99-year lease of an additional million acres. Firestone promised to construct and maintain a harbor at Monrovia, subsequently scuttled on the grounds of expense.

The Liberian Labour Bureau was to supply 50,000 workers annually for the new venture. However, the anticipated rubber-export revenue failed to materialize. Dutch Indonesian rubber production undermined the Stevenson Plan and world rubber prices collapsed. The Liberian politicians and the Liberian Frontier Force intensified the trade in contract labor Spanish Fernando Po.

In 1928 Harvard Professor Raymond Buell published *The Native Problem in Africa*, criticizing American economic imperialism in Liberia and the labor trade. The U.S. government sought to distance itself from the scandal by lodging a diplomatic protest with Liberia, sparking in turn a League of Nations' commission of inquiry. The appalling labor conditions on Fernando Po were glossed over, but the Liberian government was accused of trafficking in Kru and Grebo tribesmen. The inquiry recommended an end to the export of

labor, reform of Liberian native administration, encouragement of African American immigration and an "Open Door" policy to foreign investment. As a result, President King and Vice President Yancy were forced to resign in 1930.

The United States wanted to maintain its political and economic hegemony but resisted pressure for direct intervention in Liberia. President Edwin Barclay (1930–1944) proved adept at avoiding fundamental reforms, while effectively neutralizing various European schemes for an external takeover of Liberia by diplomatic procrastination.

As the impact of the depression was felt by the Liberian economy, the national debt mushroomed. In 1932 the Liberian government suspended repayments of the Firestone loan and the following year abrogated American control of customs revenue. Firestone unsuccessfully lobbied for American military intervention. In 1936, under pressures of British and Dutch rubber restrictions and rising prices, Firestone agreed to renegotiate the loan, with reduced interest and other concessions, in return for renewed payments and mining rights within his leasehold.

Dramatic economic recovery in Liberia only came with World War II. When Japan conquered the British and Dutch East Indian rubber colonies in 1942, Liberian rubber took on international economic and strategic significance. In the rush to expand rubber production at lowest costs, Firestone exploitation of Liberian labor was ignored.

President William Tubman (1944–1971) instituted an "open door" policy to private foreign investment and enjoyed unqualified American government support. While increasing his own political domination, Tubman forged alliances with indigenous leaders, drawing them into the ruling True Wing Party and American–Liberian establishment, as partners in the exploitation of the peasantry. Increased investment and diversification into mining and infrastructure after the war lessened dependence on rubber and fuelled economic growth, if not more equitable distribution. The Cold War and African decolonization resulted in continuing American strategic investments in Liberia, but low wages and lax labor regulation remained the major attraction for private foreign investors.

Increasing revenue facilitated improved education and health facilities, but corruption, nepotism and widening socioeconomic disparities persisted under Tubman and President William Tolbert (1971–1980). The Korean War led to heightened demand for rubber and, in 1959, Firestone agreed to new increased taxes based on profits. But the fall in world rubber prices with the development of synthetic rubber in the 1960s exerted further pressure for real reduction in labor costs. Adverse terms of trade through the 1970s eroded

living standards. The bloody coup led by Sgt. Samuel Doe in 1980, ending American-Liberian rule, did little to alter the exploitation of ordinary Liberians and set the stage for decades of political instability and civil war.

DAVID DORWARD

See also: Liberia: Tubman, William V. S., Life and Era of.

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Liberia: Tubman, William V. S., Life and Era of President of Liberia

William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman (1895–1971) was Liberia’s seventeenth president. Tubman enacted many reforms, including property and voting rights for women, and the creation of a national public school system. He was the first Americo-Liberian president of Liberia to sponsor development for the indigenous Africans of Liberia. Tubman called this his “national unification policy.” He supported indigenous African laws that were “humane and reasonable” and encouraged immigration of blacks from the United States, the Caribbean, British West Africa, and Latin America. Throughout the Cold War, Tubman headed the conservative, pro-American, “Monrovia Group,” which opposed Kwame Nkrumah’s radical “Casablanca Group.” Despite this, he was anticolonial and an advocate of African independence, like his nemesis Nkrumah of Ghana. The Tubman era lasted a quarter of a century. Liberia enjoyed social peace and economic development while he ruled the land.

In 1914 William was ordained as a Methodist minister and he taught at the seminary, while studying law. In 1917 he passed his bar exam and became

county attorney. He gave free legal advice to anyone who needed it, regardless of ability to pay. This made him popular with the masses and boosted his political career. Elected to the Liberian Senate in 1923, he represented the ruling True Whig Party. At age twenty-eight, he became the youngest senator in Liberian history. Voters elected him for a second term in 1929. Tubman won his first presidential election in 1944. He served seven consecutive terms as president of Liberia, the longest of any Liberian president.

His first act as president was to declare war on Germany and Japan. He offered Allied Forces supplies, ports, airports, and staging areas for the war effort. President Franklin D. Roosevelt invited him to the White House, and he became the first black guest to spend the night there.

Tubman launched his “Open Door Policy,” which invited foreign investment and trade as well as the exploitation of Liberia’s natural resources. The result was rapid economic growth. The Firestone company developed extended rubber plantations it owned since 1890. Liberia’s iron ore industry expanded. Tax revenues from rubber and iron paid for new roads, schools, bridges, markets, and hospitals. The capital, Monrovia, grew from 12,000 people in 1939 to 134,000 in 1970. Critics use this era to illustrate the limitations of “growth without development.” The core dominated the periphery and leading government officials became the leading business people. Skewed distribution of benefits caused unrest.

The political base supporting Tubman included lower echelon Americo-Liberians and indigenous Africans. He also had supporters in the elite inner circle of the True Whig Party and the Masonic Order, of which he was an officer. Generous patronage secured the loyalty of his followers. His greatest problem was that many members of the elite whom he depended upon to implement his policies feared that including indigenous Africans in the opportunity structure would deny them their “birthright” and undermine their standard of living. To get around this problem Tubman appointed many members of his family to important positions. He also depended heavily upon foreign advisers and technicians, not involved in party machinations, to modernize Liberia.

The assimilation policy was supposed to be a one-way street. Indigenous Africans would assume Christian names, join the cash economy, and become part of the Americo-Liberian community. In reality, many assimilated Africans restored their African names and made it acceptable to wear African clothing in public. Tubman became formal head of the Poro secret society. African culture, once viewed as “barbaric” and “uncivilized,” was embraced. By 1963 the True Whig Party included a platform plank urging, “a national cultural awakening to develop the essential African and Liberian

culture.” African nationalism was awakening pride in the African heritage. The term “Americo-Liberian” fell into official disfavor. Tubman had released the genie from the bottle and no one could return it.

The unification program was useless without the “Open Door Policy,” which preserved the high Americo-Liberian standard of living using foreign investment to supply indigenous Africans with higher living standards and social services, such as health care and education, without imposing either austerity measures or higher taxes on wealthy Americo-Liberians. It worked, and Liberia attracted twenty-five large firms who invested in Liberia, where formerly only one—Firestone—had invested there. Republic Steel Corporation of the United States and the Liberian-Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) developed Liberia’s iron ore. Foreign investments created thousands of jobs for Liberians bringing many into the cash economy for the first time. Low levels of education condemned most Liberians to low paying nontechnical jobs while expatriates secured most of the high-income jobs. This created dissatisfaction and criticism of Tubman. Lebanese merchants took advantage of the “Open Door Policy” to dominate the wholesale and retail sectors of the economy. By 1960 Lebanese merchants controlled half of all middle level economic activities in Liberia. Liberians resented this. The richer they grew, the more political discontent increased in both the indigenous and Americo-Liberian communities.

Tubman firmly suppressed opposition. Protection of direct foreign investment involved quashing worker unrest in foreign concessions. Suppression of antigovernment protest at the University of Liberia became commonplace. Discontent within Liberia’s Armed Forces (LAF) led to rumors of coup plots. Suspected of plotting to assassinate Tubman and overthrow the government, indigenous military officers belonging to the Aborigine Liberation Movement were spied upon. Opposition was poorly organized and uncoordinated. Henry Bioma Fahnbulleh, a distinguished Liberian diplomat, was arrested after serving as ambassador to Nairobi. Accused of plotting to overthrow the government, Liberia sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. Discontent was growing.

Tubman’s legacy is mixed. He was tenacious, shrewd, and artful as a politician. He created economic prosperity amid growing political unrest. He gave the vote to both men and women, rural and urban populations, and he promoted national unity. Social services, school, hospital, and road construction grew under his leadership. Despite this, Tubman was paternalistic and intolerant of opposition. He believed in Americo-Liberian rule and kept power in their hands, even while trying to lessen the gap between rulers and subjects. Tubman created greater opportunities for indigenous Liberians.

Transforming government from an Americo-Liberian monolith into a mosaic, which included indigenous Liberians, he expanded the institutions of government and made them more inclusive. He strengthened the office of the president at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches; nevertheless, Tubman brought Liberia into the modern age and maintained stability amid turmoil. However, a growing debt problem, falling commodity prices, reduced government spending, unpaid public salaries, few incentives for new foreign investors, and a small domestic market spelled trouble for Liberia’s future. Absent peaceful means to change, Liberians turned toward violent solutions. Tubman survived several assassination attempts and died peacefully in his sleep in 1971.

DALLAS L. BROWNE

Biography

Born on November 29, 1895, at Harper, Liberia. His parents were from Georgia in the United States, but they raised him among the Grebo. Entered the Harper elementary school in 1903. Attended Cape Palmas Seminary and Cuttington College and Divinity School. Served in the Liberian military, rising to the rank of colonel. Elected to the Liberian Senate in 1923. Elected for a second term in 1929. Won his first presidential election in 1944. Served seven consecutive terms as president, the longest of any Liberian president. Died in 1971.

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Liberia: Tolbert, William Richard, Life and Era of President of Liberia

William Richard Tolbert (1913–1980) became the eighteenth president of Liberia in January 1972, the last of the old succession of Americo-Liberian presidents.

On April 12, 1980, a military coup d'état, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, overthrew Tolbert, executing him and several members of his cabinet, on Monrovia Beach in front of television cameras.

Devoted to Christianity, Tolbert was an ordained minister in the Baptist Church. Between 1965 and 1970 he served as president of the Baptist World Alliance. Tolbert later became chief adviser for the All-African Missionaries Evangelistic Union in 1973.

Government attracted Tolbert and he took a position as a typist for the national treasury in 1934. Tolbert was promoted to disbursement officer for the government in 1936. In 1943 he won election to the National House of Representatives on the True Whig Party ticket. Tolbert became the youngest man to be elected vice president (serving under President William V. S. Tubman) in Liberian history in May 1951.

When Tubman died in 1971, Tolbert assumed power. He no longer wanted other Africans to view Liberia as a vassal or "colony" of the United States. Tolbert openly negotiated with South Africa, at a time when it embraced apartheid or legal racism, which made it repugnant and a pariah among nations. He aggressively established diplomatic relations with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Tolbert also cultivated improved relations with radical Guinea. These actions improved relations with neighboring states and culminated in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States. In 1979 Liberia hosted the Organization of African Unity, which elected Tolbert president.

Reform-minded, Tolbert fired corrupt cabinet ministers, revamped Liberia's national security system, freed political prisoners, encouraged greater freedom of the press, and lowered the voting age to eighteen. The presidential yacht cost \$250,000 a year to maintain, so he sold it. Liberia's presidents drove state-owned Cadillacs; he sold his and bought a Volkswagen. Making surprise raids in early morning hours, he tried to ensure that civil servants actually earned their pay. Appalled that civil servants had to give the True Whig Party one-month's salary every year to support the party, Tolbert abolished this custom, winning him new supporters among the civil servants. Lowering and subsidizing the price of rice improved his popularity among the urban poor.

Liberia became the world's leading maritime power, despite owning only two merchant ships, by allowing foreign ship owners to register their vessels under Liberia's "flag of convenience." The Firestone Rubber Company continued to flourish as its 90,000-acre rubber plantation thrived under Tolbert's "open door policy." By 1973 Liberia ranked as the world's third-largest iron ore producer. Pressuring foreign companies to hire more Africans, Tolbert also raised taxes levied on company profits. Tolbert insisted on a greater role

for Liberians in foreign-owned companies. Liberia, however, did not have enough trained local manpower to absorb the new opportunities thus created. Consequently, foreign managers and technicians continued to benefit from the creation of high paying skilled work.

As more and more Liberians were drawn into the cash economy, a new problem emerged: "back street boys." These were urban drifters unable to find employment who engaged in urban crime waves. They lived in squalid neighborhoods of Monrovia and were a potential source of unrest. Poor sanitation and inadequate housing made them susceptible to demagogues. In an economic climate of falling export prices and dwindling opportunities, even for university graduates, Liberia was a source of potentially explosive unrest throughout the 1970s.

Africanization of an economy long controlled by foreign interest became one of Tolbert's goals and his means of dealing with frustration that was boiling over into anger. Calling for greater self-sufficiency, Tolbert tried to promote a new subsidy on rice. The opposition opposed this since his family was among Liberia's largest rice growers. Gabriel Baccus Matthews, an admirer of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and leader of the Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL), organized a peaceful demonstration in Monrovia. An estimated 10,000 "back street boys" joined PAL's 2,000 activists. The back street boys soon rioted, looting retail stores and rice warehouses.

Tolbert ordered the militia to restore order. They had orders to "shoot to kill" and they fired on demonstrators, killing 74. He proceeded to jail political opponents on charges of sedition. In January 1980, the PAL officially registered as an opposition party under the name People's Progressive Party (PPP). In March the PPP, with backing from elements within the Liberian Armed Forces, launched a general strike, and called for Tolbert's removal. It was in this highly charged environment that on April 12, 1980, Sergeant Doe murdered Tolbert and seized control of Liberia.

DALLAS L. BROWNE

Biography

William Tolbert was born on May 13, 1913, in Bensonville, Liberia. Attended Bensonville Elementary School. Studied at Crummell Hall Episcopalian High School. Graduated *summa cum laude* in 1934 from the University of Liberia. Married Charlotte A. Hoff. Elected vice president under President William V. S. Tubman in May 1951. Assumed presidency upon Tubman's death in 1971. On April 12, 1980, a military coup d'état, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, overthrew Tolbert, executing him and several members of his cabinet, on Monrovia Beach.

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Liberia: Doe, Samuel K., Life and Era of President of Liberia

Samuel Doe (1951–1990) ruled Liberia in the 1980s. The corruption and brutality of his rule made the civil war of the 1990s all but inevitable. Doe seized power by means of a bloody coup, and during his ten years in power he steadily created enemies for himself while providing the justifications for an eventual uprising against him.

Doe, who was a member of the Krahn, was born on May 6, 1951, and in 1969, aged 18, he enlisted as a soldier in the Liberian army. He was enrolled in the Radio Communications School of the Ministry of Defense in Monrovia, where he completed his training by 1971. In 1979 Doe was chosen for further training at a camp run by U.S. Special Forces and was then promoted to master sergeant.

On April 12, 1980, accompanied by 17 soldiers, Doe carried out the coup that brought him to power. They broke into the executive mansion (the head of state's residence) in Monrovia where Doe and his men killed the president, William R. Tolbert, as well as about 30 officials and guards. Doe promoted himself to commander in chief of the armed forces and also made himself chairman of the People's Redemption Council. He promised he would return the country to civilian rule, although no date was set for this development. Notoriously, he had 13 of Tolbert's senior ministers and associates publicly executed on Monrovia Beach; pictures of this brutal spectacle provided a lasting image of his methods and set the tone for his ten-year tenure of office.

In an attempt to legitimize his rule, Doe advanced himself as a candidate in elections for the presidency that were held in 1985, and although these elections were widely seen to have been rigged, Doe only won by a narrow margin. What popularity he had declined steadily thereafter and Doe was obliged to maintain his position by increasing levels of oppression.

By the end of the 1980s, Liberia was ready to erupt against Doe's depredations, and a civil war to oust him was launched by two separate dissident groups at the end of 1989. The original uprising, which was an unplanned explosion of anger against the Doe regime, began in Nimba county near the border with Côte d'Ivoire over the Christmas period of 1989. After ten days of fighting, an estimated 10,000 people had fled across the border into Côte d'Ivoire to escape the violence. At this point the majority of the rebels were Gio people, the principal tribe of Nimba county, who directed their anger and attacks upon the Krahn.

There were two rebel leaders: Charles Taylor, leader of the main rebel group the National Patriotic Front, who later became president of Liberia; and Prince Yormie Johnson. Both men found no difficulty in gathering dissident soldiers to launch a series of attacks upon government targets. In the event they proved every bit as brutal and indiscriminate as Doe and the regime they wanted to oust from power; they were responsible for massacres of women and children and their forces ravaged the country, reducing Liberia to a state of chaos and fear. During the early stages of the war, few soldiers on either side were killed; most of the casualties were among the civilian population. At the same time, an ethnic pattern of killing emerged, with the Gio supporters of Taylor attacking Krahn civilians, and the Krahn retaliating against the Gio.

By the end of January 1990 an estimated 50,000 people were hiding in the bush of Nimba county in an effort to evade retaliation by government forces, and for a time it appeared that Doe's supporters might regain control. In April 1990, Doe claimed "there is no inch of this nation not under the control of the government." However, by the end of that month, the United States was advising its 5,000 citizens then in Liberia to leave, while British Airways was offering special flights to airlift out Commonwealth citizens. Taylor's army was then reported to be 3,000 strong as against 7,000 troops supposed to be loyal to Doe. Meanwhile, the numbers of refugees fleeing the increasingly savage fighting had risen to 300,000. By June the two rebel groups had seized control of the greater part of Monrovia, while Doe had fortified the executive mansion as his headquarters.

Taylor had fled Liberia in 1984 facing corruption charges and had taken \$900,000 with him to the United States. As he advanced so his forces increased and by

the end of May when he captured Buchanan, the country's second port, he had an estimated 10,000 followers. Then he captured Roberstfield, Monrovia's international airport.

The month of June spelled the end of Doe's rule, although he held on until September. The government forces began to disintegrate, turning upon each other on inter-ethnic lines, and by the end of the month some 750,000 people (half the population of Monrovia) had fled the capital as the rebel forces closed in. By that time, U.S. and British warships lay off Monrovia, ready to evacuate their citizens. Doe announced that he would welcome an international peacekeeping force if this could be arranged at the conference on the future of Liberia then being held in Sierra Leone. By this time discipline among government troops was nonexistent. Summary executions had become common, while army morale had collapsed. Demonstrators in Monrovia called on Doe to resign. By July no more than 1,000 of his troops remained in Monrovia, which had become a ghost city; they were routed whenever they confronted the rebels.

Liberia's neighbors, led by Nigeria, worked through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to create a peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) that was ready to intervene at the beginning of September when it established its headquarters in Monrovia. It was commanded by Ghana's Lieutenant General Arnold Qainoo and included troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

On September 9, 1990, Doe, accompanied by a bodyguard of sixty Krahn soldiers, left the executive mansion to visit the ECOMOG headquarters in order to negotiate his escape from Monrovia. However, he was intercepted en route by Yormie Johnson's soldiers. He was tortured, mutilated, and then killed on September 10.

Doe's inglorious end was the prelude to a long, drawn-out power struggle for the presidency between Charles Taylor, Prince Yormie Johnson, David Nimbley (Doe's former minister of defense), and Amos Sawyer, a former politician backed by ECOWAS. Only after years of strife and political maneuvering were elections finally held in May 1997, which brought Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party to power with 49 out of 64 seats in the House of Representatives and 21 out of 26 seats in the Senate.

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Liberia: Civil War, ECOMOG, and the Return to Civilian Rule

On Christmas Eve 1989, an armed group under the leadership of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) infiltrated Liberia's Nimba County from Côte d'Ivoire. Its stated aim was to overthrow the regime of Samuel Doe, which had been in power since April 1980. In the aftermath of the incursion, the Liberian government responded with counterinsurgency forces under the direction of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which repulsed the threat posed to the regime's authority. Corruption and ineffectiveness eventually undermined the AFL's capacity to provide credible resistance to the NPFL. As a result, within four months of launching the rebellion, the NPFL laid claim to over 90 per cent of Liberian territory. It maintained *de facto* control over these territories, with the exception of the capital Monrovia and its immediate environs.

Two important incidents occurred in May 1990 to interfere with what could have been a swift NPFL victory. First, the inception of diverse faction groups that became a characteristic feature of the civil war began when a breakaway faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was formed to challenge the monolithic NPFL. Eventually, by the time the civil war ended in July 1997, seven other factions had been formed. Second, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the subregional organization that represented the interests of member-states, discussed the Liberian civil war at its ordinary summit of heads of state and government in Banjul, Gambia.

ECOWAS's discussion of the civil war coincided with the initiation of several conflict resolution processes. These contained two critical central components. One was political and the other military. The most decisive political decision was the establishment of a standing mediation committee (SMC) comprising of Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo. Its mandate was to resolve conflicts among ECOWAS member states in a harmonious manner. Between May and early August 1990, several diplomatic and negotiation processes were initiated by the SMC to resolve the civil war. These involved meetings with the incumbent

president, the leadership of the NPFL, and several other identifiable Liberian groups. None of these efforts, however, resolved the conflict. Eventually, the impact of the war in terms of refugee outflows, the deteriorating human rights circumstances in Liberia, and the condition of entrapped foreign nationals worsened and began to influence not only the contiguous states but other ECOWAS states much further afield. Second, as an ancillary to controlling the engulfing crisis, the SMC established an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to intervene and resolve the crisis. ECOMOG was also mandated to demilitarize and demobilize combatants as enshrined under different peace accords. ECOMOG's establishment was made feasible by the earlier promulgation of three separate security-related protocols. These were the 1976 Protocol on Non Recourse to Violence, the 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol, and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense, which became operational in 1986.

The political decision to deploy ECOMOG in Liberia was made on August 6 and 7, and the troops were eventually deployed on August 24, 1990. This made ECOMOG, which comprised forces from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, the most rapidly deployed peacekeeping force in history. Its mandate was to secure Monrovia and reinstate democracy. As the war escalated and new alliances and cross-alliances were formed, ECOMOG's mandates were constantly changed and expanded from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peace support operations. Simultaneously, its troop capacity was increased by including non-West African troops from Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Due to the nature of Liberia's civil war and ECOMOG's inexperience in dealing with such crises, the United Nations established the United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 1993. Its mandate was to monitor and verify the demilitarization and demobilization components of diverse peace accords which ECOMOG was to enforce. UNOMIL thus became the first peacekeeping mission undertaken by the UN in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organization. Operationally, ECOMOG's collaboration with UNOMIL sought to arrange a rational division of labor and authority between the two organizations, while concurrently mounting a humanitarian and security mission in a country without any definitive form of authoritative government. Through this collaborative venture, ECOMOG and UNOMIL managed to demilitarize and demobilize almost a third of the estimated 33,000 armed combatants.

While ECOMOG formed the military component of ECOWAS' two-pronged strategy to resolve the civil war, different political endeavors were also initiated to end the war. These resulted in thirteen major peace accords that were signed during the three different

phases of the political search for a resolution. The first was the SMC period from May 1990 to June 1991. This was followed by the Committee of Five period, which was an adjunct to the SMC phase from June 1991 to June 1992. It comprised Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo. Finally, the Committee of Nine (C9), which was inaugurated on November 7, 1992, included Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, and Senegal. The most important accords were the Banjul Accord of 1990; Lomé Accord, 1991; Yamoussoukro I-IV Process, 1991-993; the Cotonou Accord, 1993; Accra and Akosombo Accords, 1994-1995; Abuja I Accord, 1995; and Abuja II Accord, 1996.

After several years of often tortuous attempts at peace, the Abuja II Accord introduced several concurrent processes that paved the way for a transitional government, disarmament, demobilization, and the 1997 special elections. The most innovative contribution of Abuja II to the peace process was the introduction of a stringent sanctions regime. This targeted faction groups in cases of noncompliance with diverse components of the accord. The processes for the return to civilian rule was closely tied to the military components of peace accords. As a result, the original schedule was for electoral processes to commence after demilitarization and demobilization was completed. Under Abuja II, these two processes were to be completed by January 31, 1997, whereupon elections would be held on May 30, 1997. Consequently, an Independent Election Committee (IECOM) was established to conduct the elections. Several difficulties arose in organizing the elections. Some were related to the registration and demobilization of combatants. Not only that, most of the factions that had fought in the war and had converted their military groups into political parties argued that the logistics for the elections had not been properly worked out. Closely related to these problems were IECOM's financial problems and lack of qualified manpower and institutional incapacity to organize the elections. ECOWAS considered these complaints and as a result, the elections were postponed until July 19, 1997. Paradoxically, but not surprisingly, Charles Taylor won the elections by gaining 75 per cent of the vote, which was declared free and fair by an international observation corps. Liberia's twenty-first president was inducted into office on August 2, 1997, thus ending seven years of brutal civil war.

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See also: Taylor, Charles

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Libreville

Libreville (Freetown), the capital of Gabon, is named after a village of freed slaves built in the Comptoir du Gabon in 1849. This *comptoir* (cartel), created by the French in 1843, was established in the Gabon estuary by the French Navy to combat the slave trade in the west coast of Africa. This French establishment had its origin when Bouet-Willaumez obtained a piece of land in the left bank of the estuary from "King" Denis Rapontchombo in 1839. In 1842 the post was moved to the right bank of the estuary with the agreement of the rulers of the villages of Dowe, Glass, Quaben, and Louis. It is from this position that France extended its influence over the Gabon region by signing alliance treaties with local chiefs between 1843 and 1846. In 1849 fifty "receptive" slaves from the ship *Elizia* or *Ilizia* were brought to the Gabon estuary after a three-year sojourn in Senegal. They were resettled in the village "Libreville."

The name was given to this village by Bouet-Willaumez in remembrance of Freetown in Sierra Leone, where liberated blacks were also being settled by the British. The fifty recaptive slaves were given a house and a piece of land, and in 1850 a decision was made by French naval officers to transfer the Fort d'Aumale from its previous position near the seashore to a new site on top of the Okolo plateau near Libreville. Catholic missionaries occupied the old buildings of the French post. The village Glass, which was the main trading center at the time of the French installation, was experiencing competition from French factories, which established themselves near the post between 1850 and 1854. These economic dynamics were accompanied by constructions that were to constitute the future city of Libreville. In 1865 houses in concrete built on the plateau announced the French *comptoir* with the administrative building, the hospital, a military

housing compound, and the Church of the Immaculate Conception. In addition to these constructions, there were the old Mpongwe villages of Glass, Louis, Quaben, Denis, and the American missionaries at Baraka.

At the time of these urban transformations, the French establishment was already the starting point for the exploration of interior regions. These explorations, carried out throughout the second half of the nineteenth century by explorers, made the Gabon *comptoir* a strategic location. When the French Congo was created in 1888, the name "Libreville" was given to the whole French establishment, including the Mpongwe villages, and Libreville became the capital of this new political entity. De Brazza, the French commissioner, resided in Libreville in 1882 and 1883. The lieutenant governor, who replaced the high commissioner after the creation of the Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF) in 1910, also resided in Libreville. These political changes were accompanied by the development of new administrative services, a colonial military, and the growing European population.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Libreville was still the only city in the Congo basin. But Brazzaville, created in 1881, was named capital of the AEF in 1910. Despite the loss of that position, Libreville found compensation in its role as capital of the Gabon colony. The real colonization of Gabon began in the twentieth century with the effective occupation of the country. New infrastructures were established which dynamized administrative functions of Libreville. At the beginning of the twentieth century, traditional factories and concessionary companies existed side by side and aggressively exploited local populations. This concessionary regime did not meet the expectations of the French colonial authorities, and the concession system was reorganized in 1910. It is only with the rise of industry centered on *Okoumé* trees that the Gabonese economy experienced a real boom before World War I, leading to a massive increase of the budget of the Gabonese colony. This economic boom went along with the emergence of a consumer market. The economy of Gabon passed therefore from a subsistence economy to an exchange economy, a direct consequence of the *Okoumé* industry.

This sudden development of a local consumer market at the beginning of the twentieth century gave Libreville a territorial radiation, which was lacking in the previous century. Libreville benefited from this, because factories and concession companies had their headquarters in Libreville. These headquarters established themselves near administrative services. The city also experienced an increase in office buildings and a steady flow of employees. Libreville received new equipment and developments, such as ports, and public sanitation. In 1940 modern engines were used

to build two roads linking Libreville to Owendo and Libreville to Kango and Lambaréné. In 1946 factories for the transformation of timber were also built in Libreville.

After World War II, Libreville was not only the capital of the Gabonese colony but also *chef lieu de region*, and *chef lieu de district*, further enhancing Libreville's stature. Libreville was also the "spiritual center" of the colony. Missionaries opened schools and libraries and other reading rooms. Around that time, between 2,500 and 3,000 individuals, victims of the economic crisis that affected the timber industry in the 1930s, found refuge in Libreville. This floating population came to live side by side or intermingle with other people from central and west Africa and the old Mpongwe stock.

Rural exodus was also another factor explaining the presence of rural populations. Migrants hoped to find abundant and well-paying jobs, and inexpensive merchandise, in Libreville. They usually settled in such quarters as Nombakele, Derrière la prison, or Derrière l'hôpital. The Fang mainly established themselves in Lalala. These new quarters were different from the old Mpongwe villages of Louis, Glass, and others, as their characteristics were established before this demographic overflow. After independence, the rural exodus intensified with the oil boom of the 1970s, and new quarters and neighborhoods, mainly slums, emerged. In preparation for the 1977 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit, new roads and buildings were constructed, giving Libreville a more modern appearance.

FRANÇOIS NGOLET


See also: **Gabon; Resettlement of Recaptives: Free-town, Libreville, Liberia, Freretown, Zanzibar.**

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Libya: Yusuf Pasha Karamanli and the Ottoman Reoccupation, 1795–1835

Yusuf Pasha Karamanli (1795–1832) was the last great ruler of the semi-independent Karamanli dynasty that ruled the nominally Ottoman regency of Tripoli



Libya.

(approximately modern Libya) from 1711 to 1835. Under Yusuf's predecessor, Ali Pasha (1754–1795), the regency had suffered political, economic, and social decline, worsened by tribal revolt, drought, and epidemics. By the early 1790s the country was in disarray and the aged pasha was unable to restrain the rivalries of his three sons. The youngest, Yusuf, eventually usurped the throne, first by murdering his elder brother, Hassan, and then, after Ali Pasha's fall from power and a period of political chaos, by forcing his second brother, Ahmed, into exile and poverty. Yusuf Pasha was a cruel, ruthless, calculating, and unprincipled tyrant, a man of great personal charm, whose main failure was to come to terms with the changing conditions of the age, and whose soaring ambitions for his little country were unfulfilled.

It took him almost ten years (1795–1805) to consolidate his rule at the center of power in Tripoli, restore some financial and economic confidence, build up the military force needed to extend his undisputed, centralizing power inland, and build up the naval strength intended to revive Tripoli's role as a corsairing state. These Saharan and Mediterranean ambitions were driven by the pasha's urgent need for more revenues than the primitive local farming and herding economies could provide, or the nomadic and seminomadic tribes of the interior could be persuaded to pay. State revenues were levied on the parasitic activities of the Tripoli corsairs in the Mediterranean and the trans-Saharan traders in black slaves; both sources were irregular and unpredictable but both, Yusuf Pasha believed, could be made to yield more.

The Napoleonic Wars and the Anglo-French struggle for domination of the Mediterranean enabled the pasha to regain a certain local supremacy for his corsair fleet, initially expressed in a pro-French policy. His ability to levy safe-passage tribute from maritime powers was, however, challenged by the newest such power, the United States. In 1801 Tripolitanian corsairs seized several American ships, but American freedom of the seas was asserted in the subsequent war. In the meantime, Britain's growing Mediterranean ascendancy, and in particular the implications of the Battle of the Nile (1798), which stranded Napoleon's punitive expedition in Egypt, the capture and occupation of nearby Malta (1800), and the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) were not lost on the pasha.

The British bombardment of the leading corsair base, Algiers, in 1816 finally persuaded Yusuf Pasha that the Mediterranean was no longer a safe or reliable source of corsair revenue. He promoted his Saharan policies accordingly, seeking to impose his recognized and centralizing policy over the few towns, trading oases, and scattered tribes of his regency. He thus pacified much of what is now modern Libya, bringing its eastern province, Cyrenaica (Barqa) under tighter rule and almost eliminating the large and rebellious Awlad Slaiman tribe of the Sirtica that had disrupted trans-Saharan trade for many years. In 1810 he sent troops to Ghadames oasis to secure the nearest stages of the southwest trade route to the Niger Bend and the Hausa states. In 1813 he overthrew the Awlad Mohammad dynasty that had ruled the southern province of Fezzan for the past 300 years. He thus achieved his objectives of closer control over and further stimulation of Fezzan's trans-Saharan traffic in black slaves and gold that had always underpinned the province's rule as a semi-independent but tribute-paying fief of Tripoli.

To speed the flow of black slaves into Fezzan and Tripoli, he mounted slaving raids deep into the southern Sahara and beyond. By 1817 he was ready to project the regency's power, influence, and lust for slaves into Sub-Saharan Africa. This imperial ambition coincided with British plans to explore inner Africa by the shortest Saharan routes from Tripoli. Such projects were prompted and nurtured by the remarkable British consul general, Colonel Hanmer Warrington, who held the post from 1814 to 1846 and who up to the mid-1820s wielded extraordinary power and influence over the pasha. While Britain took advantage of the close relationship with Yusuf Pasha and his claims to protect travelers right across the Sahara to send three important exploratory missions into the interior from Tripoli (1819–1925), the pasha's own trans-Saharan ventures were not a success. By the mid-1820s his relations with Consul Warrington had been undermined by the issue of the missing papers of the murdered British

explorer, Major Alexander Gordon Laing; Tripoli's mounting debts to Britain; and a clear revival of local French interests.

The pasha's serious international debt crisis, with resultant diplomatic and naval pressure from Britain and France, combined with tribal revolt in the interior, disruption of Saharan trade, and an outbreak of dynastic and civil strife, forced his abdication in August 1832 in favor of his son, Ali. But the succession was disputed (with the British and French consuls supporting opposing claimants) and was still unsettled when the Ottoman fleet intervened in May 1835. Ali Pasha was arrested, Karamanli rule was ended and, after 120 years of effective independence, the regency of Tripoli again came under the direct rule of Constantinople, which lasted until the Italian invasion of 1911. Constantinople had intervened to secure at least one North African possession following Egypt's effective independence under Mohammad Ali, the French conquest of Algiers, and the growing and dangerous local rivalry of Britain and France.

Yusuf Pasha had managed to sustain Tripoli's independence for nearly forty years against all the pretensions of outside powers. But in the long run he was unable to come to terms with the more complex and pressing political and economic realities of the post-Napoleonic world. As the Ottoman Turks after him were to find, the country's economic base was unable to provide realistic alternatives to such unacceptable activities as Mediterranean corsairing and the trans-Saharan slave trade.

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See also: **Tripoli.**

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Libya: Muhammad Al-Sanusī (c.1787–1859) and the Sanusiyya

Religious Leader; Founder of a Sufi Brotherhood

Born at al-Wasita near Mustaghanim in western Algeria in 1787, Muhammad al-Sanusī was the founder of a Sufi brotherhood, which provided the framework for

later state development in Libya, although it was also influential in what is currently Chad. Although the Sanusiyya is often portrayed as a politico-military organization, al-Sanusī originally established his brotherhood as a strictly religious order, characterized by teachings and devotional practices aimed at strengthening the faith of the Sufi initiate and inculcating within him a spirit of moral purity. Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when French, Italian, and British colonialism in Saharan Africa was at its peak, did the Sanusiyya adopt a position inclined toward military struggle.

As a young man, Muhammad al-Sanusī left his home in Algeria to pursue his studies at the thriving Moroccan cultural center of Fez, where he studied law and tradition and was initiated into several Sufi orders, including the Nasiriyya branch of the Shadhiliyya. His natural restlessness and desire for learning prompted him eventually to leave Fez for the scholarly centers of the Islamic East. In 1823 he arrived in Cairo, at that time under the rule of Muhammad Ali, and took up studies at the great mosque-university of the Azhar. In 1826 he made the Hajj to Mecca, where he came into contact with the influential Moroccan Sufi master Ahmad ibn Idris (1749?–1837) and joined his circle of disciples. Following Ibn Idris's departure from Mecca in 1828, al-Sanusī, as the most senior and accomplished of his disciples, was placed in charge of the former's students. When Ibn Idris died in 1837, many of these students recognized al-Sanusī as a Sufi master in his own right. Opposed by Mecca's conservative religious establishment, al-Sanusī led his band of followers from the Hijaz to the more hospitable environment of North Africa and, after a period of fruitless wandering, eventually settled in the relatively remote region of Cyrenaica, in northeastern Libya. The establishment in Cyrenaica of the group's first *zawiya*, or Sufi lodge, at al-Bayda in 1842 marks the beginnings of a distinct Sanusiyya brotherhood, as opposed to what had been up to that point a loose community of scholars inspired by the teachings of Ahmad ibn Idris.

Driven by a strong missionary impulse, Muhammad al-Sanusī made it his mission to reform what he considered to be the heavily corrupted religious beliefs and practices of Cyrenaica's mostly Bedouin population. To this end, he was instrumental in establishing throughout Cyrenaica and the Fezzan a hierarchically directed network of *zawiyyas* that functioned not only as centers of religious instruction but also as social and economic centers designed to introduce the local populations to the sedentary values associated with normative, scripturalist Islam. In terms of administration, al-Sanusī appointed for each *zawiyya* a shaykh, who held spiritual authority and was responsible for teaching

and the distribution of *zakat*, and a *wakil*, or deputy, who was in charge of the lodge's economic upkeep. The establishment of *zawiyyas* at the territorial junctures of two or more competing tribes enabled the shaykhs to function as "holy outsiders" who, through their alleged possession of *baraka* (divine favor), were equipped to arbitrate tribal disputes and thus encourage an environment of regional peace and mutual cooperation. The creation of disciplined communities organized around an ethic of pious endeavor was an important factor in the development of a lucrative trans-Saharan trade route that, under Sanusi auspices, came to link the Mediterranean littoral with Waddai in the south.

Muhammad al-Sanusī's message, the substance of which he inherited from Ahmad ibn Idris, was common to the moderate reformist trend which characterized much of the Sufism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He rejected the ecstatic and extravagant aspects of the Sufi tradition and advocated instead a path which looked to the pious example of the prophet Muhammad. The brotherhood's *dhikr*, or ritual remembrance of God, consisted of the phrase *Allah al-Azim* ("God is the Most Great"). Muhammad al-Sanusī left behind a written corpus of some 44 titles, which included works dealing with Maliki law, *ijtihād* (independent legal reasoning based upon the Quran and the example of the Prophet), and the *dhikr* requirements of forty other Sufi orders. These latter, he claimed, were all now superseded by the "Muhammadan Way" of the Sanusiyya.

Upon his death in 1859, Muhammad al-Sanusī was capably succeeded by his son, Muhammad al-Mahdi (1844–1902), who transferred the headquarters of the brotherhood from Jaghub to Kufra, a cluster of oases some 1,000 kilometers from the Mediterranean. The brotherhood's move south has been explained as an attempt by its leadership to escape the political authority of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, but more likely it was done in order to be closer to the vibrant trading economy of Wadai. Whatever the reason, the Sanusiyya's southward orientation brought it into conflict with the French, who at that very moment were penetrating the region of Lake Chad. Hostilities between the French and the Sanusiyya broke out in 1901 at Bir Alali and continued sporadically until the fall of the *zawiyya* at Ayn Galakka, south of Gouro, in 1913.

A second conflict arose with Italy, which invaded Libya in 1911 during the leadership of the third Master of the brotherhood, Ahmad al-Sharif (1872–1933), who had succeeded his uncle Muhammad al-Mahdi in 1902. As a defensive measure, Ahmad al-Sharif enhanced his relations with the Ottomans and, in order to mobilize his followers, proclaimed the jihad. When World War I broke out, the Sanusiyya allied itself with

the Central Powers and in 1915 unsuccessfully attacked Italy's British ally in Egypt. Defeated on all fronts, al-Sharif handed the affairs of the brotherhood to his cousin, Muhammad Idris and in 1918 fled to Istanbul on a German submarine. Idris signed agreements with the Italians, who provided the Sanusiyya with a semblance of autonomy, but with the rise of fascism in Italy in the 1920s hostilities recommenced. In this final and conclusive struggle, noted for the fierce resistance mounted by Umar al-Mukhtar, one of the brotherhood's leaders, the Italians managed by 1932 to destroy the Sanusiyya's organization of *zawiyyas* and thus its influence in the countryside. The war is widely recognized as having been one of the most brutal colonial wars of the twentieth century.

The leadership of the brotherhood, however, survived the war with Italy, and when Libya was granted its independence on December 24, 1951, Muhammad Idris, who had spent the war years in exile in Egypt, was proclaimed king. Under his rule, the Sanusiyya displayed signs of revival but was unable to recover anything approaching its former prestige. In 1969 the Free Unionist officers under the leadership of Colonel Qadhafi removed King Idris from power and proclaimed a republic. Qadhafi's regime has not tolerated the Sanusiyya and has done its best to excise its role in Libya from the historical record.

JOHN CALVERT

Biography

Muhammad al-Sanusi was born at al-Wasita near Mustaghanim in western Algeria in 1787. He left Algeria to pursue law studies in Fez. He was initiated into several Sufi orders. In 1823 he went to Cairo to study at the mosque-university of the Azhar. In 1826 he made the Hajj to Mecca, met Ahmad ibn Idris, and joined his circle of disciples. When Ibn Idris died in 1837, al-Sanusi was recognized as a Sufi master and the logical heir to Idris's leadership role. Al-Sanusi and his followers moved frequently, eventually settling in Cyrenaica, in northeastern Libya. In 1842 the groups' first *zawiya*, or Sufi lodge, was established at Cyrenaica. Al-Sanusi died in 1859.

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Libya: Italian Invasion and Resistance, 1911–1931

By 1900 Turkish Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (approximately, modern Libya) were among the last African territories not under European claim. Italy, a latecomer to the European "scramble" for African possessions, had gained Eritrea and Somalia but failed disastrously in 1896 to annex Ethiopia. It thus looked to Tripoli for compensation for imperial designs frustrated elsewhere. A persuasive nationalist lobby argued that possession of Tripoli would confirm Italy's great power status, while ensuring domination of the central Mediterranean. Tripoli, it was claimed, was the gateway to the supposed wealth and rich trade of Sub-Saharan Africa. It was also promoted as an agricultural settler colony for surplus and landless Italians, half a million of whom were then emigrating every year. From 1907 a policy of "peaceful penetration" of Turkish North Africa had little success, but local hostility to Italian ambitions offered the necessary cause for war. In late September 1911 an ultimatum to Constantinople, declaring Rome's intention to occupy Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, was followed by a massive sea-borne invasion in early October, and the ports of Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, Homs, and Tobruk were occupied. Yet, despite overwhelming Italian superiority in men, arms, and modern equipment (including aircraft, motor transport, and wireless), conquest was not the expected "military parade." For the Libyans, rather than hail the invaders as liberators from oppression, as had been expected, reinforced the small Turkish regular forces with thousands of their own volunteer fighters in a display of popular Islamic solidarity.

While the Italians could not be driven from coastal bridgeheads covered by their heavy naval guns, they made little progress inland. In November 1911 a royal decree placed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the Italian Crown. But by early 1912 the war had reached stalemate. Secret diplomatic contacts led in October to the Treaty of Ouchy: while leaving Italy in nominal control of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, it also recognized the local spiritual authority of the *ultan-caliph*, thus encouraging continuing Libyan resistance (particularly the resistance of the Sanusi confraternity in Cyrenaica) to a perceived infidel invasion.

Between 1912 and 1914 Italy conquered an arc of territory in northern Cyrenaica, but the Sanusi still controlled most of the country. Tripolitania was more easily overrun because local leadership was divided and demoralized and the terrain less easily defended. The southern Saharan province of Fezzan was invaded

in 1913 (partly to inhibit further French advance northward through neighboring Chad), but Italian control was insecure. By the end of 1914 a Libyan counterattack had forced the invaders back to Tripolitania. Except for small heavily defended enclaves at Tripoli and three other ports, Tripolitania was abandoned even before Italy's entry into the European war in May 1915. Local leaders then took advantage of the resultant power vacuum to declare an independent republic at Misurata supported by Italy's wartime enemies, Turkey, Germany, and Austria. Also with Turco-German encouragement, the Sanusi in Cyrenaica attacked British positions in Egypt in 1915–1916; but peace was brokered in 1917. Despite their apparently common interests, Tripolitanians and Cyrenaicans failed to work together at this opportune time, revealing a fatal weakness in Libyan resistance to long-term Italian ambitions.

Lacking the political and military will to start a war of colonial reconquest after World War I, Italy instead sought compromises with the Sanusi in Cyrenaica and the Tripolitanian Republic. Each province was given a parliament and governing and local councils through which Rome hoped to exercise light-handed control: in Cyrenaica, the Sanusi leader, Sayyid Idris, was recognized as hereditary emir. But little came of these good intentions: the Tripolitanian Republic collapsed in tribal anarchy, and in Cyrenaica Italo-Sanusi cooperation broke down in late 1921. The perceived dangers to Italian interests in Tripolitanian leaders' belated acceptance of Sayyid Idris as emir of all Libya in November 1922 had already been contained by the new governor of Tripolitania, Count Giuseppe Volpi, who had earlier that year started the military reconquest of the province, declaring martial law and rejecting all constitutional arrangements with the Libyans. As Benito Mussolini came to power in October 1922, northern Tripolitania was being reoccupied, Volpi having in effect anticipated by some months the fascist colonial policy of military reconquest soon to be applied to all Libya. Fascist Italy's new colonial war lasted nine years, with small numbers involved in petty engagements over vast areas. Like other European forces elsewhere in contemporary North Africa, the Italian military found no easy way of defeating local nomads' pugnacious guerrilla tactics.

By mid-1924, the Italians controlled the most useful and populous parts of northern Tripolitania. Over the following four years the wilder country to the south was slowly penetrated and the tribes "pacified" and disarmed: in 1928 the Sirtica desert was occupied. By early 1930 Colonel (later General) Rodolfo Graziani had completed the conquest of southern Tripolitania and Fezzan. In Cyrenaica, by contrast, the terrain was harder and Sanusi-inspired resistance more effective. Guerrillas

led by the aged Sanusi Shaikh Umar al-Mukhtar were particularly active in the wooded highlands of the Gebel Akhdar. The Sanusi center at Giarabub oasis was occupied in 1926 and that at the remote Kufra oases in 1931, but tribal resistance was only overcome with draconian measures, including the detention of most of the nomadic population in large concentration camps in order to deny the guerrillas supplies and recruits. Only the capture and execution of Shaikh Umar al-Mukhtar in late 1931 effectively ended Cyrenaican resistance. Rather than accept Italian rule, up to 100,000 Libyans sought exile in neighboring French African territories or in Egypt.

Costing many thousands of Libyan lives, the twenty years of wars of conquest provided an invaluable and undeniable basis for Libyan claims to an internationally brokered independence after World War II and were to be depicted by both royalist and republican postindependence regimes as a popular nationalist resistance.

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Libya: World War II and the Kingdom of Libya, 1942–1969

Following the British victory at El Alamein (October 1942), Italian Cyrenaica was occupied by the Eighth Army for the third and final time. In January 1943, Tripoli—the elusive objective of two and a half years of fighting in North Africa—fell to the British. Free French forces advancing across the Sahara from Chad occupied the southern province, Fezzan. British military administrations were set up in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with a similar French administration in Fezzan. Under the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention, they governed Libya as occupied enemy territory on a "care and maintenance" basis.

The question of Libya's future was postponed until after the war. But in return for support for the British war effort by the Cyrenaican Sanusi leader, Sayyid Muhammad Idris, and his followers, Britain had in January 1942 given a public pledge that Cyrenaica would never again fall under Italian rule. The postwar debate about Libya's future lasted many years, reflecting the emerging rifts of the Cold War and the strategic interests of the occupying powers. While Britain believed Cyrenaica could become an alternative military base to the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, France saw Fezzan as a strategic buffer, protecting French African possessions from outside infiltration. The strategic importance of the U.S. Wheelus air base near Tripoli grew as the Cold War developed. In Libya itself, interests were divided between Cyrenaica, apparently centered around the prestigious Sanusi leadership and ready to become a semi-independent emirate under British protection, and Tripolitania, economically and socially more "advanced" but torn by republican infighting and the interests of a large and vocal Italian settler community. Although the country was considered too poor and quite unprepared for independence (Italy having renounced all claims) the impasse was broken by the decision of September 1948 to refer its future to the United Nations. The General Assembly voted in November 1949 for Libya's full independence by the end of 1951, federating Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan in a united kingdom under a Sanusi monarch, Sayyid Idris.

The Kingdom of Libya, an apparently fragile product of bargains and compromises between domestic and foreign interests, lasted nearly eighteen years (1951–1969). In its early years, King Idris (age 61 on accession and a wily constitutional monarch) acted as the centralizing link between the centrifugal powers of the three provinces (each with governments of their own) and the relatively weaker central administration. There were no political parties or any organized sources of opposition, and the democratic parliamentary system that the UN had provided before independence was dominated by tribal and oligarchic family interests. This led to frequent government changes as ministers jockeyed for the "rewards" of office.

The kingdom's greatest early drawbacks were extreme poverty (per capita income in 1951 was an estimated \$35 per year) and lack of economic opportunities and trained personnel. Libya was obliged to "live on its geography," its main source of income coming from military base-leasing agreements with the United States and Britain. Necessary gestures to Arab solidarity such as joining the Arab League in 1953 did little to alleviate growing hostility from the Arab World (and especially from Nasserite Egypt) to inevitably close ties to the West, including reliance on Western defense and foreign aid.

A secure economic lifeline came with the start of lavish spending by foreign companies on oil exploration in the mid-1950s and then with the start of oil exports in 1961. No country exploited its oil reserves so quickly: revenues rose from a mere \$3 million in 1961 to \$1,175 million in the kingdom's last year, 1969. The fact that most oil was found in one province, Cyrenaica, prompted the abolition of the potentially separatist federal system and the proclamation of the unitary kingdom of Libya in 1963.

By then, a country of under two million people was exposed to all the pressures and excesses of a typical Third World oil boom. While there were few financial constraints on state spending on economic and social development, it took time for the benefits of oil wealth to filter down to people with newly aroused expectations. If many of the royalist regime's development projects only began to show results after the 1969 revolution (which inevitably took the credit), it did fail to curb the conspicuous corruption, wealth-getting, and consumption of many of its leading political figures and entrepreneurs. Nasser-led Egypt, which had large economic and social influence, also caused trouble by criticizing the Kingdom for hosting foreign military bases when there was no financial necessity to continue doing so.

As the elderly king Idris had no convincing heir, the succession remained uncertain. There was no obvious single source of opposition to a regime able to buy the acquiescence of disgruntled individuals or cliques. But there were strong demonstrations of undefined and largely uncoordinated public hostility in 1964 over the foreign bases issue and in 1967 over the Arab-Israeli war. Public corruption and the king's over-reliance on the Shalhi family for advice were further sources of discontent, checked by well-armed provincial police forces. By 1969 several disparate groups were apparently preparing coups that would end the uncertainty over the succession and the future of the valuable prize that Libya had become, among them the small group of junior Force officers led by Captain Moammar Gaddafi.

The Kingdom of Libya was at best a fragile creation, always vulnerable during its 18 years of existence to internal divisions and external pressures. Western notions of monarchy were alien to the Arabs, and kingdoms in the turbulent 1950s and 1960s were prime targets for Arab nationalists. King Idris, although generally respected as a scholar, was both an inadequate custodian of Libya's new-found wealth and a cause of likely turmoil on his death or abdication. Yet the kingdom survived during two of the Arab world's most troubled modern decades. It showed a certain dogged resilience in the face of its many crises and it began the exploitation of the oil wealth that was in the 1970s to give Libyans the highest standards of living and social

welfare in Africa. These were no slight achievements for this benign and unassuming despotism.

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See also: World War II: North Africa.

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Libya: Gaddafi (Qadhdhafi) and Jamahiriyya (Libyan Revolution)

Libya's revolutionary republican regime came to power on September 1, 1969, with the overthrow of the pro-Western Sanusi monarchy, which had ruled the country since independence in December 1951. The new Libyan Arab Republic was led by a revolution command council of twelve junior army officers; Captain Muammar Gaddafi promoted himself to colonel on seizing power. Although clearly radical, pan-Arab, and Nasserist in outlook and intent, these new leaders for some time lacked the practical experience to implement their more revolutionary ideals. Nevertheless, their first year in power was marked by some striking achievements, including the evacuation of remaining British and American military bases, expulsion of the small but influential Italian and Jewish communities, the suppression of all political parties, the start of the far-reaching price and ownership confrontation with the international oil companies, and the promise of the full commitment of Libyan oil wealth to the cause of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine.

For over 18 months after seizing power, the new regime promoted Colonel Gaddafi's emerging socialist ideology through ad hoc popular rallies. But the decision of April 1971 to unite with Egypt and Syria obliged the leadership to provide a working political structure, with the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union taken as a model for the republic's sole political organization. The first Arab Socialist Union (ASU) national

congress in March and April 1972 seemed to encourage open public debate and a popular decision-making process based on traditional tribal gatherings seeking consensus rather than majority decisions.

Since coming to power, Gaddafi had always sought legitimacy in his claim to represent the popular will. He had no difficulty in basing his ideology on Islam, for he saw no contradiction between religious consciousness and political decision-making. Gaddafi believed that Islam would again bring the Libyans in particular, but also Arabs and Muslims everywhere, to spiritual and political regeneration. This belief inspired the so-called third international theory that emerged in late 1972. It proposed a middle way between the failed ideologies of atheistic communism and materialistic capitalism by harnessing the two main forces of human history: religion and nationalism.

Socialist in character and purportedly to be universal in its appeal, the theory became the official philosophy of the 1973 "cultural revolution." By early that year, it was clear that the ASU and other means of mass mobilization had failed to rouse the politically apathetic Libyan people to "tumultuous popular revolution." Thus Gaddafi himself became a political agitator, launching the "cultural revolution" in April 1973 with a five-point program, including suspension of all existing laws, purging the "politically sick" (including Marxists, communists, atheists, and Muslim Brothers), arming the people to protect the revolution, an administrative revolution to destroy bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, and a "cultural revolution" to "refute and destroy" everything contrary to the Holy Quran. The people were urged to "run the government and assume the responsibilities of power" through "popular committees" intended to involve them directly in political processes and to control the revolution from below. The resultant "Quranic socialism," as practiced in Libya up to the late 1970s, was a moderate type of redistributive socialism on the Swedish model, underpinned by the massive oil revenues that financed a model welfare state. Economic conditions became more difficult in the 1980s under the impact of Gaddafi's even more egalitarian notions and a fall in oil revenues.

In response to growing domestic and external opposition, Gaddafi began a new phase of political evolution in 1975. Based on his ideas of popular democracy, policies were to be debated and approved in Basic People's Congresses and other popular committees and gatherings before being passed to a General People's Congress, whose 1,000 members were to coordinate them for implementation. Gaddafi set out his new ideas in three brief and artless political, economic, and social essays, which appeared as *The Green Book* in 1975–1976. Then, in March 1977, "the establishment

of people's power" and the "end of any form of conventional institution of government" were proclaimed. At the same time, the country's name was changed to Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, Gaddafi's neologism "Jamahiriyya" being generally translated as "state of the masses."

In theory, direct people's power was not unsuited to Libyans' social traditions and temperament and to a small and politically docile population unused to dissent, which was protected from the excesses and failures of such experiments by its oil wealth. But in practice the exercise of popular democracy, at least in the more complex areas of government, was constrained by the need for guidance and informed decision-making from a leadership that remained effectively in power, even if titles and functions had changed. The policies and actions of the Libyan revolution continued to bear the stamp of Gaddafi's unique thought and personality long after he had officially ceased to lead it.

Revolutionary foreign policy similarly reflected Gaddafi's own ideas and prejudices, often put into effect by the lavish deployment of oil revenues. Through its "sacred duty to all revolutions," especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the regime for many years gave largely unquestioning and ill-informed financial aid to so-called liberation movements and organized malcontents the world over struggling against "oppressive regimes." It is not at all clear that accounts of such spending have ever been kept, either as a financial record or as a political one. Gaddafi's personal obsession with Arab unity as a means to Arab revival and the liberation of Palestine led Libya into many abortive attempts to unite with neighboring states (Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia) and more distant ones, with failure leading to Gaddafi's increasing hostility towards Arab regimes and leaders. Unsuccessful Arab policies prompted his deeper involvements in the later 1970s in the seemingly less daunting affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa in the name of "revolutionary and Islamic solidarity." Intervention in the complex civil war in neighboring Chad led to prolonged Libyan military occupation of the northern third of that country, only ended by ignominious defeat by Chadian forces in 1987.

Militarism was one of the most striking features of the Libyan Jamahiriyya by the early 1980s, characterized by the purchase of a formidable arsenal, a near tripling of armed manpower since the 1970s, and general military training through conscription and "popular militias." First France and then the Soviet Union were the main suppliers of aircraft, tanks, and other equipment, bought for cash, and in far greater quantities than the Libyans could themselves use. If neighboring states looked askance at this military

buildup, the United States in particular became increasingly concerned about Tripoli's foreign policies, and especially the elimination of exiled Libyan dissidents, and the regime's perceived support for "international terrorism." Following the Libyan-inspired oil price and ownership revolutions of the early 1970s, most U.S. companies left the country. Relations with Washington worsened, particularly during the Reagan administration, with U.S. aircraft bombing Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. Strong suspicions about the Gaddafi regime's involvement in the sabotage of an American airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, and the later sabotage of a French airliner over the Sahara, led to Libya's further international isolation and years of United Nations sanctions, lifted only when the two Libyan Lockerbie sabotage suspects were handed over for trial in the West in 1999.

The extraordinary phenomenon of revolutionary Libya very largely reflected the ideas, prejudices, and ambitions of its leader, Colonel Gaddafi. By the end of the twentieth century, when he had been in power for 30 years, most Libyans in a young society knew no other leader or system. Gaddafi, as their country's first truly Libyan leader, still had a special relationship with fellow Libyans, even if in the 1990s there was evidence of growing and violent domestic opposition to his regime and to the prospect of succession by one or both of his sons. His ability to act as he did at home and abroad were always fueled by the oil revenues that for years allowed lavish and apparently unaccounted spending on domestic projects and foreign ventures. These were often of questionable use or value to a nation whose finite oil reserves represented the greatest single source of wealth it was ever likely to own.

JOHN WRIGHT

See also: Chad: Libya, Aozou Strip, Civil War; Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi; Libya: Oil, Politics, and OPEC; Oil.

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Libya: Oil, Politics, and OPEC

No country has developed and exploited new-found oil reserves faster than did the Libyan kingdom in the 1960s. On the eve of the 1969 revolution, only eight years after the start of commercial production, it overtook Kuwait as the world's fifth oil exporter and was challenging Iran's position. But in the early 1970s, revolutionary Libya curbed output and briefly became the engine of far-reaching oil pricing and ownership changes.

Foreign oil companies, both the seven "majors" and the so-called independents, were first drawn to Libya by the promising terms of the first (1955) petroleum law. The kingdom offered potential diversity for Middle Eastern oil, apparent political stability, reliance on Western patronage and military protection, plus unrestricted sea-borne access to expanding Southern and Western European oil markets. High-quality commercial crude oil was first found in 1959; exports started in 1961 and by 1969 nearly a dozen foreign companies or consortia of companies were exporting crude from five Mediterranean terminals. Output peaked at 3.7 million barrels per day (b/d) in April 1970.

From the start of oil production, the Libyan kingdom made various and partly successful attempts to increase its share of the new wealth. In 1962 it joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) set up by five exporters in 1960 to counter falling world oil prices. Between 1961 and 1969 the state's share of receipts per barrel exported rose from 50 U.S. cents to \$1.05—by then well above the OPEC average. But the new revolutionary regime was not satisfied with such revenues, which would have been higher but for the large tax-deductible discounts allowed to "independent" companies as "marketing expenses." Taking advantage of oil supply blockage in the Middle East (including the continued post-1967 war closure of the Suez Canal) and ordering companies to cut output, it put irresistible pressure on the "independents" without alternative means of supply to agree to modest price rises that other companies, "majors" included, were then obliged to accept. Libya's strength was its new-found role as West Europe's largest single oil source: neither companies nor governments wanted confrontation over demands reflecting an acknowledged political agenda as well as an economic one.

The 1970 settlement was the first big rise in crude oil prices depressed since the late 1950s and a tacit acceptance of Libyan oil's special values. Fellow members of OPEC then quickly followed the Libyan

lead, taking advantage of continuing supply difficulties to achieve the Tehran Agreement of February 1971. This saw companies settling for tax and price rises that gave six Gulf producers roughly equal terms with Libya. But as Libya was at a renewed disadvantage, companies were again pressured into accepting further tax and price rises (the so-called Tripoli Agreement of April 1971), which confirmed the continuing underlying strength of Tripoli's bargaining position and the value of Libyan oil.

Libya earned higher annual oil revenues from lower exports: \$1 billion from 945 million barrels exported in 1968, compared with \$22 billion from 622 million barrels in 1980. The Tehran and Tripoli Agreements were the direct outcome of revolutionary Libya's brief, politically and economically motivated confrontation with the oil companies. For a time, they transferred control of oil prices to OPEC; the resultant spiral in world oil prices was given further twists by the 1973 Middle East war and, after renewed price weakness in the mid-1970s, by the Iranian crisis of 1979–1980. But market forces reasserted themselves later in the 1980s as industrial countries cut reliance on OPEC oil. Libya's actual revenues from stagnant prices and output were much lower than expected: exports fell from over two million b/d in 1979 to barely one million in 1982.

In the meantime, revolutionary Libya had started the progressive nationalization of foreign company interests. Some such moves were avowedly political (such as the outright seizure of British Petroleum's [BP's] substantial interests in October 1971 as a direct result of British action in the Gulf); but some companies kept part-interests in producing fields in cooperation with the state National Oil Corporation. Others entered production-sharing agreements with the state. Again, other OPEC members followed the Libyan lead, bringing about radical changes in company-government relations that were to be more enduring than the ephemeral price and tax agreements of the early 1970s.

Within a few years of the 1969 revolution, foreign companies had almost stopped new oil exploration and development in Libya and later did the least needed to safeguard their remaining positions. Exploration has been relatively sluggish since 1970, compared with the 1950s and 1960s, although some important new oilfields were found and developed in the west and south and offshore in the Mediterranean. In the 1970s the country began to put greater emphasis on enhancing the value of its oil by increasing participation in such "downstream" operations as refining, petrochemicals, and marketing.

All these activities were greatly hampered by deteriorating relations with the United States during the Carter and Reagan administrations over Tripoli's perceived support for "international terrorism." Libya not

only lost the United States as its leading crude oil customer but found itself increasingly cut off from superlative American oil industry technology and expertise, an isolation made even deeper in the 1990s by United Nations embargoes over the Lockerbie airplane bombing controversy.

Oil (and considerable volumes of commercially under-exploited natural gas) represent the greatest source of wealth Libya has known. Its high quality and closeness to large European consumers made it eminently marketable. In the early 1970s the new radical regime led the way in temporarily remedying years of crude oil under pricing and revised the traditional relationship between oil companies and producer governments. But its extremist politics and reputation undoubtedly inhibited the development of Libya's full potential as an oil state in the 1980s and 1990s.

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See also: **Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi; Oil.**

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Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi

Over the course of more than 30 years as president of Libya, Muammar al-Qaddafi (there are several variant spellings) has earned a reputation for a penchant for encouraging and exporting revolutionary and terrorist movements.

Almost as soon as he came to power in 1969, Qaddafi tackled the oil companies, determined to bring them under control either by nationalization or by taking a majority shareholding in them. His successful takeover of the oil companies lent new strength to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), allowing it to become a formidable cartel able to challenge Western economic power in the Middle East. Qaddafi came to power when Libya's oil output was peaking, which gave him two advantages: he could implement reforms in Libya without imposing taxes, and he could use the surplus derived from oil wealth to finance a highly independent foreign policy.

Qaddafi's first concern was Arab unity, for which he insistently called during his early years in power. In a

controversial speech delivered in July 1972, Qaddafi said, "The sacred mission of all true (Muslim) believers today is to fight Great Britain and the United States. And if these countries think of fighting us in the Middle East, we will fight them on their own territories."

Qaddafi was also a firm opponent of Israel. In 1973 the year of the Yom Kippur War and OPEC's increased power, Qaddafi played a leading role in creating poor relations between Israel and Africa; he claimed, with some justification, that he had persuaded Chad, Congo, Niger, and Mali to end relations with Israel. In April 1973 he adopted an anti-Israel stance in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), demanding that Ethiopia (which housed the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa) sever relations with Israel, or that the OAU be moved elsewhere. Eventually, in October of that year, Ethiopia did break off relations with Israel. Qaddafi was persistent in his demand that black Africa should demonstrate solidarity with the Arab states against Israel. He made many efforts to drum up greater support for the Palestinians.

Qaddafi cast his net wide in Africa. Libyan interventions in the civil war in neighboring Chad were less a matter of exporting revolution than deciding which side to back in an unstable situation where Libya could reap advantages in terms of *realpoliti*; in 1976 Libya claimed 52,000 square miles of Chad (the Aozou Strip) which had rich uranium deposits. Here, however, Qaddafi found himself opposed to both France, which intervened a number of times in support of the Chad government, and the United States, which supported France in order to block Qaddafi's ambitions.

Elsewhere in Africa, Qaddafi's interventions were more quixotic. He supported the Eritrean rebels against the government of Haile Selassie, then switched his support to the government once Haile Mariam Mengistu had seized power. He supported the Polisario rebels of Western Sahara against Morocco until, for a brief period, there seemed to be a chance of a union between Morocco and Libya. He supported the "Christian" SPLA in southern Sudan against the Muslim north, despite his wish to spread Islam, because he was quarrelling with President Nimeiri. By the early 1970s Qaddafi was supplying arms and money and providing training for liberation movements in Eritrea, Rhodesia, Guinea Bissau, Norocco, and Chad, and aid for Togo and Uganda. Following the closure of the Zambia-Rhodesia border in January 1973 he provided financial aid for Zambia, as well as support for the ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas. His support for Idi Amin in Uganda in 1972 when the latter was expelling Asian foreigners to Britain did not endear him to London; he also sent four hundred troops to Kampala that year in support of Amin when pro-Obote forces first invaded Uganda from Tanzania.

At the very least, Qaddafi showed poor judgment in his support for such brutal figures as Amin and Bokassa. African leaders were becoming increasingly disturbed by his foreign interventions.

The West might have been less antagonistic toward Qaddafi had he confined his interventions to the Arab world and Africa, but he insisted upon his right to intervene in areas the Western powers regarded as their own back yards, so to speak. In 1972 he supported the Black Muslim mosque in the United States. He sided with the prime minister of Malta, Dom Mintoff, in his quarrel with Britain over finances for British base facilities. He warned President Marcos of the Philippines that he would support the Muslim revolt in that country and, generally, was always ready to support small and often obscure nationalist movements. In 1976 Qaddafi proclaimed his support for the Movement for Self-Determination and the Independence of the Canaries Archipelago, as well as the Sardinian, Corsican, and Basque nationalists. He made overtures to the Welsh, Scottish, and Irish nationalists, and later provided arms for the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

His support for the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines was sufficiently aggravating to that country to persuade Imelda Marcos to attend talks in Tripoli, where she agreed to some form of Moro autonomy; although this agreement came to nothing, the fact that the talks were held at all is testimony to Qaddafi's influence at the time. In the mid-1970s Qaddafi behaved as though he was on a par with the United States and Europe in terms of world power and influence. In 1977 he entertained Fidel Castro on an official visit, which infuriated Washington.

Despite deep-seated Arab and African suspicions of Qaddafi, he retained a measure of popularity because of his willingness to stand up to the United States and Europe. As soon as he came to power in 1969, he insisted that Britain and the United States remove their military bases from Libya.

He made an enemy of the United States early on, due to his antagonism to Israel, his success in nationalizing oil, and, at least according to Washington, in his support of terrorist groups. In 1981 Washington accused Qaddafi of orchestrating an assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan. In 1983 the U.S. State Department produced a report on "The Libya Problem" in which it accused Qaddafi of supporting leftists in Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Honduras, while also offering paramilitary training in Libya to left-wing groups from South and Central America. The United States increased its pressures upon Libya, which culminated in the air raid of April 14–15, 1986, which resulted in 130 casualties, including Qaddafi's adopted daughter. The core of the U.S. case against

Qaddafi was that he supported terrorism and terrorist movements around the world.

In the case of Britain, the two outstanding events that soured relations were the killing of Police Constable Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984 and the Lockerbie airplane bombing of 1988. In 1999, after 16 years, Britain resumed diplomatic relations with Libya when it accepted responsibility for the death of Fletcher and agreed that the two Libyans suspected of the Lockerbie attack should be tried under Scottish law (although the trial would be held in Holland).

Any assessment of Qaddafi while still living and president of Libya must be provisional. He has provoked angry reactions in the West, which in real terms in this case means in Britain and the United States. While several of his policies and actions have been questionable or reprehensible, it seems likely that special condemnation has been reserved for him simply because of he has dared to stand up to the great Western powers.

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Literacy and Indigenous Scripts: Precolonial Western Africa

The extent of literacy in precolonial Africa has been greatly underestimated and little studied. While some communities of precolonial West Africa may have made no use of writing, in others, a significant minority or even a majority of persons could read one or more languages. Some West African societies produced a significant body of writing in Arabic and/or in African languages rendered in modified Arabic script, while many more developed conventional systems of graphic signs, conveying a wide range of meanings and information.

The oldest Arabic documents from West Africa consist in eleventh century stone inscriptions from southern Mauritania (then associated with the Soninke people) and eastern Mali (still associated with the Songhay people). Several thousand Arabic manuscripts have

been cataloged so far, including well over a thousand original titles. These comprise chronicles, devotional and mystical poetry, legal and theological treatises (including commentaries on standard, medieval Middle Eastern and North African works), and biographical dictionaries. Knowledge of the sixteenth- to nineteenth-century history of the savanna areas depends largely on the chronicles composed there. Several legal works composed by West African authors have been widely studied in the Muslim world. West African calligraphic styles are derived from North African ones. A very small number of manuscripts were illustrated, mainly in the Soninke- and Moorish-speaking areas of southern Mauritania.

The oldest extant Kanuri, Hausa, and Fulfulde manuscripts, written in modified Arabic script, date from the eighteenth century; diacritics were added, and a few letters altered, in order to represent sounds not found in Arabic. Hausa and Fulfulde works include religious and legal ones designed for a lay audience, and a wide range of poetry, including elegies of political and religious leaders. The Arabic meters were employed in both Fulfulde and Hausa, since all three languages share an opposition between long and short vowels and many opportunities for rhyme. In the Futa Jalon in present-day Guinea, where a majority of persons may have been able to read their native Fulfulde in Arabic script, folktales and humorous stories were also committed to writing. Manding- and Soninke-speaking scholars have always preferred to write in Arabic, but Manding transcribed in Arabic characters was used for correspondence, especially in the Gambia.

Major centers of learning in which Arabic was the exclusive or primary vehicle of written expression include the cities of Jenne and Timbuktu in present-day Mali, and those of the nomadic Moors (who speak an Arabic dialect as their native language) in present-day Mauritania and northern Mali. The Futa Jalon was a major center of Fulfulde composition, while both Fulfulde and Hausa were widely employed in the Sokoto caliphate (founded in the opening years of the nineteenth century in what is now northern Nigeria). Knowledge of both Arabic and Arabic-derived scripts was acquired in the Quranic schools, as these have been misleadingly called. While the first phase of the curriculum was largely restricted to reading, reciting, and copying the Quran, the second phase, which emphasized comprehension, consisted in in-depth study of Arabic works, representative of several branches of Islamic learning, through oral translation and explanation in the pupils' native languages, thus providing a significant example of the complex interrelationships among oral and written media in West Africa.

Use of *tifnagh* for transcribing Tamachek, the language of the Tuareg (themselves a branch of the

Berber-speaking peoples, primarily localized in North Africa) goes back even further. This alphabet is derived from the Libyan ones attested since Carthaginian times and is known primarily from rock inscriptions but was also used for record-keeping and correspondence. It has not, however, been traditionally used for extended compositions, Arabic being preferred for this role. As with many of the alphabets of antiquity, its clearly separated letters could be written in any direction (vertically, from right to left or vice versa), without any spaces between words. There is some regional and dialectal variation as to the number, form, and phonetic values of the letters.

A considerable number of West African peoples have conventional systems of graphic signs. Very elaborate ones are found among the Manding, Dogon, and Bozo peoples of present-day Mali, and it has been hypothesized that these developed in part in emulation of Arabic writing. However, such systems are also found in areas where Muslim influence has been less strong, or is unlikely. Thus, among the Ashanti and other Akan-speaking peoples of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, where gold was of great political, economic, and symbolic significance, many goldweights bore signs that indicated their precise ponderal value; other signs corresponded to proverbs, while yet others represented concepts (for example, certain aspects of the Supreme Being). The *nsibidi* system of the Ekoi, Igbo, and Ibibio peoples of the Cross River area of present-day Nigeria used over a thousand signs to represent a considerable number of concepts as well as some sounds. *Nsibidi* was used to record court cases and convey complex messages, including warnings in wartime, and for summarizing folktales and personal narratives; its pictograms thus constituted a true writing system. As with the Malian systems of graphic signs, knowledge of *nsibidi* was often acquired within the initiation societies; but unlike the Malian ones, the *nsibidi* signs were often tattooed on the body or dramatically enacted through gesture. Rulers and leading personalities among the Yoruba of what is now southwestern Nigeria sent symbolic objects, consisting primarily of carefully arranged cowries, seeds, and other plant substances, to convey important messages. Although certain shell and plant configurations had conventional meanings, the symbolic objects were usually presented by one or more persons who also delivered an oral message.

The period immediately preceding the establishment of effective Western rule was characterized by the invention of at least one syllabary (system in which each symbol corresponds to a syllable rather than to a vowel or consonant), as well as at least one quasi-alphabetic form of writing. About 1833 a young man of the Vai people of present-day Liberia and Sierra Leone

developed a syllabary for this Northern Mande language, after a celestial book was revealed to him in a dream. He may also have been inspired by the graphic signs in use among the Vai, as well as the syllabary—invented about a decade earlier—of the Cherokee Indians of North America, knowledge of which could have been conveyed to him by Christian missionaries. About 1896 King Njoya of the Bamum people of present-day Cameroon invented a pictographic system, following a dream, and elaborated it further with the help of his people. He revised this system several times, developing a number of calligraphic styles and progressively moving toward a syllabic and, ultimately, a nearly alphabetic system. Both Momolu Duwalu Bukele of the Vai and King Njoya of the Bamum were aware of Arabic and European writing, and both attempted to teach their inventions to children and adults in schools established for this purpose. The Vai syllabary was used primarily for correspondence. The Bamum system was used to compose a history of the kingdom, a law code, and a religious treatise, and in correspondence through the 1930s.

There is some measure of continuity between the precolonial writing systems and the ones used in West Africa today. New attempts to adapt the Arabic alphabet to African languages continue to be made in Muslim areas, sometimes with the backing of foreign-based or international organizations. *Tifinagh* has been computerized and has become a vehicle of literary revival in Berber-speaking areas of the Maghreb as well as among the Tuareg of the Saharan and Sudanic areas. The modified Latin scripts introduced by the British administration in order to transcribe Fulfulde and Hausa in northern Nigeria were based upon the adapted Arabic ones, still used concurrently with the now-dominant Latin-derived scripts. The Vai syllabary remained in extensive use at least through the 1970s and inspired or foreshadowed the invention of several syllabaries and alphabets by speakers of other West African languages in the 1920s to 1960s. Not only are many traditional symbolic systems still in use in rural areas, but they have inspired contemporary artists, catering to popular, elite, and international audiences, as well as industrial—especially textile—design.

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See also: **Futa Jalon; Songhay Empire.**

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Literacy: Vehicle for Cultural Change

Literacy was not new to Africa in the twentieth century. Several North African peoples, such as the peoples of ancient Egypt along the Nile River valley, the Nubians of the Eastern Sudan, and the Axumites of the Ethiopian highlands had their own forms of writing. In the case of Egypt, hieroglyphics were in use by 3300BCE. In Nubia and Ethiopia, the Meroitic and Ge'ez script were employed by the beginning of the Christian era.

The next major literary influence on the African continent was the Arabic language introduced with Islam in North Africa in the seventh century. Islam and the Arabic language spread to West Africa from the eleventh century, but Arabic only became a major influence on the East African coast after the eighteenth century. European languages next spread on the African continent. From the fifteenth century, as coastal-dwelling Africans came into more frequent contact with European traders, a few learned to read and write in such languages as French, Portuguese, and English. Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano, for example, were slaves from West Africa who learned to read and write as slaves. They both gained their freedom in the late eighteenth century and wrote books condemning the Atlantic slave trade.

Many of the changes and possibilities literacy brought to Africa in these earlier times were echoed in the twentieth century as well: the creation of a literary elite, increased efficiency of state systems and tax collection, a universalistic legal system, and creation and adoption of state or regional religions. In most societies where literacy existed before the twentieth century, it was a skill possessed by relatively few. In Muslim Africa, for example, only a small number of boys attended Quranic school and advanced religious classes. It was not until the twentieth century that the majority of Africans lived in societies where literacy provided the foundation of their governments, religions, and long distance communication.

The agents who brought literacy to Africa in the precolonial and colonial century were missionaries,

greatly aided by their African auxiliaries: teachers and catechists. The majority of Africans educated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were youth and young adults, mostly male. From their first days in Africa, missionaries began schools in order to teach Africans to read the Bible or the catechism. Frequently, they taught in the local language (except in French and Portuguese colonies) in order to facilitate pupils' learning to read and write. The products of these schools first became teachers, catechists, and low-level government employees. They earned a small salary paid in cash by the government or the mission that enabled them to acquire items costly in traditional African economies, such as cloth, salt, and sugar.

One of the factors that distinguished literacy education of the twentieth century from that of previous centuries was that, rather than pursuing religious education, many sought to learn to read and write for other reasons. Literacy began to be important for economic survival. Africans who wanted to read and have access to some of the power and knowledge possessed by their European masters needed to be literate. Africans often pushed missionaries to offer more education than they were currently providing and in some cases, like in Kikuyuland in Kenya in the 1930s, they established their own schools to meet the growing African demand for education.

Literacy brought several important changes to African societies. Educated Africans were in a position to negotiate and succeed in the emerging colonial order with its numerous regulations and new communication and transportation systems. Africans skilled in reading and writing became part of an emerging educated elite. The same education also brought conflict to African families. Because youth were educated far more often than their elders were, they were better equipped for the new economy. This heralded an alteration of power relations within gerontocratic African cultures. Finally, a school-going child's time and energy were now divided between school and family. Families had to cope with fewer young laborers and children were taught to expect a different adult life than that of their parents.

One of the consequences of writing and literacy was that written materials introduced foreign and irrelevant elements. In an oral society, what is spoken of, remembered, and transmitted is that which is relevant to the particular society. As Goody writes, "Oral cultures are highly localized" (1998: 168). But the training in reading and writing African students received paid little attention to the pupils' social context. Both the implicit and explicit curriculum of these schools introduced Africans to a new lifestyle that involved time schedules, strict discipline, uniforms, and an emphasis on individual achievement. In addition, the subject matter that

was taught emphasized Western ideals such as Christianity and monogamous marriage. The stories that Africans read about in the Bible and in books on church and saints' history introduced them to worlds beyond their own. Little effort was made to teach aspects of indigenous cultures, so educated people were at once wise in the ways of the West and often ignorant of many of their own cultural traditions. The missionary and colonial emphasis on educating boys, often supported by African parents, created a significant gap between African men and women and the opportunities available to them in the colonial order. Men could be employed, women were expected to be farmers and to raise families. This education gap is still a problem for many African women.

With written expression comes the ability to look back on documents of the past and to observe changes through time, as well as the ability to critique records of the past. In colonial Africa, the very education offered by missionaries, and later colonial governments, became a tool in the hands of educated African men and women. Some, able to read the Bible for themselves, found discrepancies between the Holy Book and the actions and words of the missionaries, or found Christian mission spirituality lacking and founded their own churches. The Aladura church among the Yoruba of Nigeria and the Kimbanguist church of the Belgian Congo are two examples of African churches initiated by mission-educated men. In addition, educated African men organized trade unions and political organizations aimed at reforming the colonial system. Later in the colonial period, Africans used their knowledge of Western history and philosophy to fight for their own rights and freedoms. The French revolution, Marxist philosophy, and other historical traditions influenced African intellectuals. Freedom fighters in apartheid South Africa such as Nelson Mandela were influenced by events in Russia and communist ideas. John Africanus Horton, an educated West African, argued that just as the great kingdom of Rome was the result of a long historical process, the same achievements were possible in Africa. Introduction of literacy by Europeans thus enabled Africans to use European intellectual traditions to fight for religious and political equality.

Despite the many changes brought about by literacy, it is important to realize that literacy was but one of many forces introduced during the colonial period that instigated social change. Furthermore, literacy is still not universal and orality remains an important part of most African cultures. Oral historical traditions are still maintained, though now often influenced by written histories. Education, whether Koranic or state, also relies heavily on oral instruction. Literacy changed African families, religions, and governments, but it

also continues to be mediated by long-standing cultural traditions of oral discourse.

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See also: Education; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.

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Literature, Western: Africa in

Parataxis as a Narrative of Otherness

In European thought, Africa has remained the strange other, the resource, and, now, the market and experimental laboratory of European technology. Africa has been a textual, narrative, representational subject or "object-being" in European writing since antiquity. For Greco-Roman writers such as Herodotus, Diodorus, Philostratus, Pliny, and Aeschylus, Africa was both an expression, a symbol of physical, natural apartness, and the sign of difference itself. Herodotus was probably the first classical writer of substance to configure Africa within the rhetoric of parataxis, that is, within the tradition of placing things side by side. For Herodotus, the Africans of the Sahara were different from the Greeks because, unlike the Greeks, they had "wooly hair" and "their eyes in their breasts," and thus were "wild men and . . . wild women" (*The History*, Book II, chap. 191).

The same framing device was deployed by Diodorus Siculus in whose works the Africans—the blacks, who lived in the hidden interior—were a savage folk, who had, Diodorus wrote, "flat noses and woolly hair . . . [were] extremely savage and display[ed] the nature of wild beast . . . [were] far removed as possible from human kindness . . . they present[ed] a striking contrast when considered in the light of our [Greek] customs" (*Works*, Book III, chap. 8).

These and other examples demonstrate the fact that it was in writing that Herodotus and Diodorus exercised a noncorporeal power over Africa, and it was writing that endowed European thought with the power to name Africa, along with its material, spiritual, and cultural contents. Thus, Herodotus and Diodorus became speaking or writing subjects who transformed Africa into an object of writing, a construct of thought. The works in reference contain a considerable degree of desperation, inspired perhaps by the impatience of Herodotus and Diodorus with the distance of Africa, the farness of those Africans hidden in the interior, concealed from the observing, inspecting, probing, and inscribing gaze of the writers. The signification of Africa as the other enabled Herodotus and Diodorus to idealize Greek culture, to in fact elevate it over African culture. Invariably, writing allowed or enabled the two Greek writers to demarcate identity and difference, to impose a binary opposition between Greek and African essences, a dichotomy in which the Greeks were civilized, were as Diodorus puts it, "the light of our [Greek] customs" and the Africans were savages, "entirely savage and display the nature of a wild beast."

The Medieval Context: Framing the Heathen

The classical conception of Africa as "alien" and "wild" continued well into the medieval period. European cultural identity was discursively and ideologically sustained and dominated by theology, by Christian and Islamic thought specifically. Hence, much medieval writing about Africa took the form of what Mudimbe (1985) calls "missionary discourse." In this postulation, Africans were encoded as depraved pagans and infidels.

Missionary discourse required a stable convention of representation. Consequently, it made its object, the African, exist outside civil society and established normative values. It made him something other than man in the theological sense. In this way, "conversion" is coterminous with "representation"; mission is equated with technique. Inevitably, all Christian missionaries to Africa had first to write the "pagan" before "converting" his or her mind and space. This conception formed the nucleus of the ideology of civilizing or converting the native, and the root of slavery, imperialism, and colonization.

The Renaissance: Inscribing the Terra Nulla

The European Renaissance developed new observations and consolidated existing ones about Africa through the combined activities of travel writers, missionaries, and poets. From Vasco da Gama's 1415 voyage around the western coast of Africa, a new generation of writers (represented primarily by Antoine

Malfante and Alvise da Cadamosto) began to frame Africa as an exotic land, and its inhabitants and cultures as savage, alien, and malformed. Africa was also depicted as a source of great wealth that its natives had neglected to use for their own benefit.

The development of these conceptions coincided with a search for new sources of wealth and trade by the emerging European powers. It also coincided with the rise of a literate, urban-based reading public all over Western Europe. This reading public demanded to be entertained with sensational stories of strange and remote lands.

It was in the Renaissance literature of travel, as typified by the writings of Eannes de Azurara, Father Jerome Merolla de Sorrento, John Ogilby, and William Smith, that a distinctively modern European discourse of cultural identity and difference was born. With those writers, Africa was wild and unhistorical, and the dark skin of the “native” epitomized a universal antiaesthetic. Azurara, for example, wrote that it was legitimate to imprison and enslave Africans because they were not Christians, and had, unlike Europeans, no knowledge of bread and wine (84–85).

Yet such accounts of Africa in the early phase of modernity coexisted, rather contradictorily, with a romantic narrative of Africa’s fabulous wealth, immense commercial and industrial potential, and, not infrequently, with fantastic details about African kings and nobility, who were inscribed as possessing great wealth, vast harems, powerful armies, and prestigious courts.

The Enlightenment: Encoding the Other

By the late eighteenth century, the height of the Enlightenment, Africa had become the sign of inherent, biologically given, racial inferiority. The experiences of colonial-plantation slavery, the slave trade, and formal colonialism were sustained and justified ideologically by pseudoscientific racism. Long, Linnaeus, Buffon, Hume, Locke, Cuvier, Blumenbach, Kant, and Hegel justified the degradation of black people on essentially racial grounds. These thinkers and writers also argued that blacks were fit only for manual (slave) labor. Racist ideology was the paradigmatic basis of the ideology of Europe’s civilizing mission to the rest of the world.

The Enlightenment bequeathed to European writers on Africa a contradictory and contradicting discourse of reason, rational mastery of nature, a Promethean ideal of self-affirmation, “scientific” racism, racialist comparative anatomy, racial aesthetics, imperialist ideology, the rhetoric of progress and of the civilizing mission. This would be modified and mediated by Romantic ideology to produce what has variously been called “colonial discourse,” “rhetoric of empire,” and “imperialist ideology.”

The Postenlightenment Heritage

The entrenchment of Enlightenment and Romantic discourses in, for example, Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1899) and Andre Gide’s *Travels in the Congo* (1929), meant the “fabrication” of a style of symbolizing Africa in which the enormous complexities of the continent are reduced to simple conventions or rhetorics of representation, such as “oddity,” “savagery,” or “darkness. Within this textual practice of representing Africa, the continent as a whole is rendered as a story, a narrative, a writable spatial and metaphysical configuration. But such writing was not only a mapping of territory preliminary to colonial mastery of it, but also the production of what Pratt calls “Europe’s differentiated conceptions of itself in relation to something it became possible to call ‘the rest of the world’” (1992, p.5).

Thus, “Africa” has been, since the fifteenth century at least, the “Other” against which “Europe” had had to define itself. As Conrad’s Marlow shows, the European or Western writer could only think of Africans authoritatively or positively by silencing and negating the other identity; that is, could only think within the binary of civilized/savage, white/black, or Europe/Africa.

This, then, is the secret of Western representations of Africa: to dispel its own cultural anxieties (the threatening other), and to rationalize its own deep desire for order, Europe or the West needs a savage and exotic Africa to affirm its own identity; hence the Western writer’s construction or framing of Africa as chaos, disorder, excess, and wildness. To this extent, the African represented in Western writing is only a code or a metaphor—in short a myth, a mere representational object, more the effect of poetic ordering than reality.

Postcolonial Trends

The rhetorics and discourses of “African” representation have survived African decolonization. In this context, it is useful to discuss briefly four European and American texts written within the tradition of Western literary representation of Africa, even after independence.

In his *Africa: A Biography of the Continent* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), J. Reader encodes Africa as a mirror that reflects humankind’s troubled “rites of passage.” According to Reader, Africa is not only the ancestral home of humankind but also the center of today’s tensions, civil wars, dislocations, and genocides. Reader’s central texts are Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* and V. S. Naipaul’s *A Bend in the River* (1980).

For Dervla Murphy, whose *South from the Limpopo: Travels through South Africa* (London: John Murray, 1998), was written after her 6,000-mile bicycle journey south of the Limpopo River, modern South Africa

defies the binaries of white-black that had formed apartheid's metaphysics. Murphy herself shows great anxiety over the new South Africa. She even devotes a large space, for example, to demonstrating the capacity of the blacks for forgiveness in spite of the wrongs of apartheid.

In Western writing, the debasement of the other affirms the Western writer's mastery of form. A recent travel text by W. Langwiesche (*Sahara Unveiled: A Journey Across the Desert*, Pantheon Books, 1996) is written within this rhetorical frame. The book is an account of Timbuktu, an ancient city in the present day Republic of Mali. The author, an American, records his journey to Timbuktu, which he calls, with rhetorical verve, a city "long famous for being far away." For Langwiesche, the real, and perhaps the fictional Timbuktu is a "sleepy, sandy inglorious place, with only the faint traces of history to recommend it." Also, Timbuktu is, despite its function as an aesthetic metaphor of the exotic, a locale of roguish and unfaithful thieving natives, not worth the visit. Langwiesche is clearly retracing the footsteps of Mungo Park (1795–1797), Gordon Laing (who perished in the city in 1822), and Rene Caillie, who survived the journey and wrote a sensational account of it in 1830.

Langwiesche's narrative is a modernist version of Park's and Caillie's narrative of Timbuktu. In Langwiesche's text, the desert locale is harsh, forlorn, and politically hopeless. He restores order to it, as the literary critic might say, however, by fashioning, for the Western reader, an entertaining and edifying tale about the city itself. This is called superscription: the blanketing of the real object of writing all over it. The reader is told that Timbuktu was, or is, nothing but sooty-dark natives and crumbling walls. Much of the text registers its author's disappointment at not finding the fabled Timbuktu of the sixteenth century, where, says Langwiesche, "the ruling classes ate on plates of gold."

In 1988 Alex Shoumatoff, an American journalist, published *African Madness* (New York: Knopf), a collection of his journalism. One of the stories revolves around the author's search for the source of the HIV virus that causes AIDS. Shoumatoff journeys to the Ituri rain forest in the Congo, the setting for Stanley's *In Darkest Africa* (1890), Speke's *Journal of the Discovery of the Nile* (1863), Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1899), and Naipaul's *A Bend in the River* (1980). For Shoumatoff, Africa is the *locus classicus* of the apocalypse: hunger, disease, war, and death while for Stanley, Speke, Conrad and Naipaul, the African landscape is exotic, primal, and vegetative. As Shoumatoff nears the so-called AIDS epicenter, he finds whole villages devastated by AIDS; he sees poverty, hopelessness, and fear on the face of the country.

While Speke and Stanley walked in the African jungle, Shoumatoff mainly reports the cities, for he hears only "shrieks of madness and alienation" and nothing else in scores of Central African cities. Indeed Shoumatoff's is an updated version of Conrad's account of the Congo (1899).

Resistance

Although there is, as Achebe has argued, a "dominant image of Africa" in Western writing, dominant ideas or ideologies always bear an uncertainty: they are never monolithic, but crisis-ridden, marked by contradiction, ambiguity, and anxiety.

This only goes to show that there could be no integrated or unified vision of an alien culture or reality; that writing is multivalent and contradictory, for not only is signification itself racked by difference but also traversed by conflict, doubt, fissures, and indecision. Thus colonial discourse, imperialist ideology, or hegemonic representation is, as authority, incomplete.

However, "resistance" should not be seen as the automatic function of shifting signifiers: Western representations of Africa mask the silent inscription of the native informant or native presence. Representation is, and can only be, transitive. It is about something ontologically distinct, in spite of appearances to the contrary. In Western discourse, "knowledge" or "representation" could only be produced through interaction or negotiation with native informants or guides. Even in the so-called fictional texts, such as Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* or H. Rider Haggard's *King Solomon's Mines* (1885), "representation" amounts to no more than appropriating or configuring native ideas and presences as, and into, a story, a narrative/narrativized object.

However, the emergence of a postcolonial African literature written by Africans signifies the coming into being of an African perspective. Despite this ontological fact however, there are more question than answers: What form should African writing take? Should the African writer aspire to be the writing subject? Should African writing be a metaphor for Africa? Resistance is equally structured around ambiguities and as an ontological essence, Africa is yet to provide its own processes of self-regeneration distinguishable from Europe.

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See also: Achebe, Chinua; Colonialism Inheritance of: Postcolonial Africa; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies.

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Livingstone, David (1813–1873)
Scottish Missionary, Explorer, and
Antislavery Propagandist

David Livingstone combined a deep Christian faith with a passionate interest in science. This passion, together with his faith, lasted all his life; his notebook kept in his last dying days contains passages of deep devotion together with careful drawings and notes of local plants and fish, as well as of the local language ciBemba.

In 1839 he was accepted by the London Missionary Society (LMS) and was given by them some basic theological training. In 1840 he was ordained as a minister and sailed to South Africa. He was stationed initially at Kuruman, the home of Robert Moffat, translator of the Bible into seTswana. He married Moffat's daughter Mary in 1845. While there, Livingstone deliberately spent months in the bush without European companions so as to learn seTswana thoroughly. In those early months, he became convinced that only Africans themselves could effectively propagate Christianity in Africa, an opinion not held by Moffat. Two other things became

clear to him as he settled into mundane mission station work at Mabotsa, Chonuane, and then Kolobeng. The first was that he was not cut out for such work. The second was that he was called to open the way into the interior for Christianity and commerce, the twin influences that he believed would bring Africa into "the corporate body of Nations" (*Missionary Travels*, p.28). The route from the Cape was too difficult for regular communications, so a new route had to be found. Having been bitterly criticized for taking his family with him on his earlier treks to the north, which had earned him some fame as a cartographer, he felt that it would be best for them now to go back to Scotland.

In 1851 while in Cape Town to see the family off, he wrote several attacks on British policy in the Cape, defending the Xhosa and the so-called Hottentot rebels in their war with the Cape Colony, an episode ignored or passed over by his many biographers. Meanwhile his African friend Sechele and his bKwena at Kolobeng had been attacked by the Transvaalers, and Livingstone's house and property had been destroyed. Undaunted he set off for the north and reached Linyanti, the maKololo capital in modern Barotseland, in October 1853, where he was well received. It was with subsidies of men and supplies from the maKololo that he set off on his *Viagem contra Costa* (march from coast to coast). He and his maKololo arrived at Loanda on May 31, 1854. Portuguese slaving rendered this route unacceptable, so they marched back to Linyanti and on down to Quelimane on the East Coast, arriving on May 20, 1856. He was the first European to see *Mosi oa Tunya*, the immense falls on the Zambesi that he named after Queen Victoria. Livingstone was convinced the Zambesi was to



David Livingstone. © Das Fotoarchiv.

be the Mississippi of central Africa. He left his companions, with Portuguese consent, at Quelimane, promising to return and go back with them to Linyanti; he then sailed for the England where he was received as a hero.

In Britain he published his *Missionary Travels and Researches*, which sold seventy-thousand copies, thus ensuring financial security for him and his family. His many lectures produced a new public interest in Africa but only one practical outcome, the creation of the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA).

In 1858 he accepted an appointment from the British government to head an expedition to the Zambesi valley to map the area and open it up to international trade. He discovered the Cabora Bassa rapids, which he had unwittingly bypassed on his first journey. He turned to the Shire valley, and what is now Malawi, as the area of potential for Christianity and commerce. The massive increase in both Swahili and Portuguese slaving in the area made his plans seemingly impossible, however, and caused the UMCA to withdraw and the government to close the expedition. Poor relations between Livingstone and most of the European staff, and the deaths of Bishop Mackenzie, the UMCA leader, and Mary Livingstone added to the disaster.

From 1864 through 1865 he was in Britain, campaigning tirelessly to provoke international action to end the East African slave trade. Some influential people still trusted his judgment enough to support his return to Africa to seek the headwaters of the Congo and the Nile and to report on the slave trade, his obsessive concern until his death. From January 1866 Livingstone was back in Africa, where he wandered over northern Mozambique, Malawi, eastern Zambia, western Tanzania, and the eastern Congo. At times he had paid African porters and, as with the European staff of the Zambesi expedition, his relations with them broke down. During these years he became the focus of intense interest in America and Europe, particularly when H. M. Stanley's well-publicized expedition "found" him in 1871. A small group of African friends were loyal to him to the end. When he died, they buried his heart on May 1, 1873, and carried his eviscerated body to the coast.

After his state funeral in Westminster Abbey, a great number of books and pamphlets published over the course of the next forty years transformed Livingstone into the patron saint of the European conquest of Africa, a position far removed from his original stance as one who hoped to bring Africa into "the corporate body of Nations."

ANDREW C. ROSS

See also: **Europe: Explorers, Adventurers, Traders; Missionary Enterprise: Precolonial.**

Biography

David Livingstone was born on March 19, 1813, in Blantyre, Lanarkshire, into a Gaelic-speaking family that had moved to the Lowlands only one generation before. While working in the local mill he completed his school education to university entrance, which allowed him to enter what is now Strathclyde University in 1836 to study both science and medicine, continuing to work in the mill for four months of the year. He and his family were members of an Independent chapel. In 1839 he was accepted by the London Missionary Society. He continued his medical training in London, returning to Scotland to qualify as a physician through the Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow in 1840. In 1840 he was ordained as a minister and sailed to South Africa. He married Mary Moffat in 1845. In 1871 he was "found" by Stanley's expedition. He died in 1873.

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Loango: Slave Trade

The coast and immediate inland areas north of the Zaire River were occupied by fishers and then by farming people during the first millennium BCE. Iron working made its appearance in the region by 400BCE and quickly replaced the use of stone tools at many sites. The archaeological complex of Kayes and Madingo-Kayes, dating from around 100CE to 400CE, can be seen as an early complex society, with settlements of varying size and complexity, regional exchanges, and uniform material culture.

However, it is not until the twelfth or thirteenth century that the pottery styles typical of historic periods appeared, and there is a significant gap in our limited knowledge of the development of the population.

The people of the northern region probably spoke dialects of the Kikongo language, which was also spoken further south in the large and powerful kingdom of Kongo. The northern people had possibly spoken them

for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century.

The earliest travelers to the region made no mention of the kingdom of Loango, although its two southern neighbors, Kakongo and Ngoyo, are mentioned in Kongo documents of 1535. It was not until the 1570s that Portuguese documents from Angola mention a kingdom of Loango, after which date a regular trade emerged between the newly established Portuguese colony and the northern kingdom, initially mostly in copper and ivory, though in the 1620s occasionally there were also slaves among the exports of Loango. Although the earliest account says that the king of Loango was once a vassal of Kongo, by 1580 he was simply a “friend,” Kongo documents do not claim lordship over the country at any point in the sixteenth century.

Modern traditions trace large population movements into the region without offering chronological specificity, and some historians have seen in these an origin in the fourteenth century, about the same time as Kongo, with Loango being an initially subordinate part of a large Kongo federation. But the documentary records suggest that the kingdom was of later date. A seventeenth-century description and account of history does not suggest great antiquity and describes the many wars and battles required to bring the various provinces, many of which were formerly independent, into a single rule.

The earliest descriptions of the kingdom in the early seventeenth century divide it into several central districts, ruled by members of the royal family, and outlying conquests that were ruled by older, well-established local dynasties. Loango also seems to have dominated the old coastal states of Ngoyo and Kakongo, although never quite reducing their sovereignty. There was, in addition, a royally appointed set of officials in all areas performing bureaucratic and administrative functions. In the 1610s and 1620s the royal provinces were ruled by close kinsmen—brothers and sisters’ children—who were to succeed the king and rotate their provinces. The king who died in 1624 was in fact succeeded by the ruler of the district of Kaye, in accordance with these arrangements. If the kingdom was founded primarily by conquest originating, according to a seventeenth century account, from the small state of Nzari on the river Zaire, and if the king of 1624 had really ruled sixty years, as an account written of his death indicate, it is quite possible he was the founder of Loango. Even allowing for a longer development, the rotation system might have been this king’s own expedient.

In any case, the king ruling in 1663 decided to become a Christian (baptized as Afonso) and had to head off a rebellion from a “cousin” because of it. He was killed in rebellion, although the throne passed, perhaps irregularly to another ruler of the royal family, though not without a lengthy civil war. The king who died

about 1700 was not immediately succeeded by anyone, but instead a long regency ensued, led by his “queen mother”—not a biological mother, but a woman chosen by the king during his reign to be a coregent with special powers to govern succession. Earlier sources mention the queen mother as an honored member of the administration.

These alterations of central government may have allowed some of the officials to gain both hereditary control of their offices and to accumulate personal wealth. Loango became a much bigger exporter of slaves during the late seventeenth century, and it is likely that some of the wealth of this trade was taken in by wealthy officials, especially if royal power was slackened by succession struggles and interregna. Shipping records and fragmentary accounts suggest the emergence of a powerful class of people who owed their status more to commercial wealth and less to the state.

Some of these people were heads of merchant organizations involved in long distance trade. Loango merchants developed the custom of traveling long distances to reach markets first pioneered in the copper trade. The main mines were in the Niari valley and surrounding areas, located across the mountains of Mayombe in area not under Loango sovereignty. The practices and organization of the copper trade made Loango well conditioned to participate in the long distance slave trade. Much of Loango’s slave trade came not from within its territory or even its neighbors but from more distant inland kingdoms such as the Mpumbo region and especially Kongo and the Angola region. Merchants from Loango, known outside their country as “Mubilis,” traveled in caravans and established bases in these distant places, and delivered slaves from those areas to Dutch, English, and then French merchants established at Loango, and its two southern neighbors, Ngoyo and Kakongo. These two latter states seem to have gained considerable independence as Loango became weaker.

By the end of the eighteenth century the central power of Loango was much compromised by the emergence of wealthy brokers and officials who purchased their offices and enjoyed considerable independence, though the powers of the king were still quite strong. Kings seem to have still retained power over their administration, in spite of their greater independence.

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See also: **Kongo, Teke (Tio), and Loango: History to 1483; Kongo Kingdom.**

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Lomé

Lomé is not the oldest town in Togo, but today it is the most important urban center, as much for its political, administrative, and economic functions as for its cultural functions. It is one of the sea gates of Africa, with a deepwater port that has made it a transit point for Togo's landlocked neighbors in the Sahel. According to the most recent estimates, as of the year 2000 Lomé and its periphery together had around 1 million inhabitants.

Lomé's singularity stems from the fact that, unlike the majority of the capital cities of African countries, it is neither a city of strictly colonial origin nor an ancient, precolonial city. It is one of the few capital cities in the world that are located on a border with a neighboring country, in this case Ghana; and it has been marked by three successive waves of colonization: German, British, and then French.

In effect, it has been founded twice. To begin with, there were two traditional villages, Bè and Amoutivé, which had their origins in the seventeenth century, with the dispersal of the Ewe from their original city, Notsé, around 100 kilometers from the coast. Today, the Ewe are spread across three countries: Togo, Ghana, and Benin. The Bè and the Amoutivé, the traditional landowners of Lomé, contented themselves with their small village on the littoral of a lagoon (part of a Quaternary formation extending along a large part of the coast of West Africa, from Côte d'Ivoire to Nigeria, with some zones of interruption and some very large areas that effectively constitute lakes). The inhabitants of Lomé turned their backs on the sea, making their living from fishing in the lagoon and from cultivating the soil of the sandbar, known as Tokoin, that lies to the north of the lagoon.

The second and more decisive foundation of Lomé was due to the arrival of more migrants. Some belonged to the Anlo, another branch of the Ewe that had previously been settled farther to the west; some were Guin from Aného; and others were of diverse origins, notably a group from Sierra Leone descended from Afro-Brazilians who had returned to the African coast at the start of the nineteenth century. The special feature of this second wave of occupants of the site of Lomé was that it essentially comprised African merchants who participated in both the Atlantic trade and the trade among Africans themselves. They were thus intermediaries between the coast and the lands of the interior, to which they sent products unloaded from seagoing vessels. At a later stage, around the beginning

of the 1880s, these merchants came from the west to the site of "Bey beach" (as the Bè littoral is called on old maps). Their migration followed the decisive victory of the British over the Ashanti kingdom in 1874 and the gradual extension of British colonization to the east. One of the consequences of these events was that the British became determined to control the coastal trade by levying taxes on the Anlo, and other merchants, in Kéta and their other dependencies. Thus it was that the merchants came to be established, first at Denu and Aflawu, and then at Lomé.

However, the name "Lomé" derives from the tradition of the first inhabitants, who settled at a site where the presence of shrubs known as *alo* gave rise to the name *alo-mé* ("among the *alo*"), and this became Lomé. Despite the later development of the city, the inhabitants of the old Bè villages retained their traditions. For them, the most important place was still the sacred forest of Bè, the sanctuary of the god Nyigblin, a factor in the religious unity of most of the Ewe on this section of the coast (see Etou, 2001).

It is undeniable that the development and the attractiveness of Lomé arose from its function as a cosmopolitan city, where tradition and modernity cohabited in harmony. The development of trade after 1881 compelled the German colonial authorities to make the city into the capital of their colony of Togo in 1897. Since then, the construction of an administrative district covering 150 hectares, alongside the old merchant districts, the epicenter of the city, where several commercial firms of diverse national origins became established. The gradual extension of the urban periphery, above all in the aftermath of World War II, led to the birth of the megalopolis of Lomé, which now covers around 15 square kilometers.

Its function as a capital city has made Lomé the most important economic center in the country, as well as the site of numerous challenges to the political order. It was in Lomé that, in January 1933, a riot by women set the pattern for the opposition to the French colonial order, in particular over the issue of taxation. This tradition of opposition was also maintained throughout the course of the long struggle for the independence of Togo, which was proclaimed on April 27, 1960. On October 5, 1990, Lomé was also the locale for violent demonstrations against the government, which was accused of violating human rights.

Lomé's principal advantages remain its infrastructure of hotels; its port; its rich and colorful culture; and its very diverse architectural heritage, ranging from the traditional to the modern and taking in a mixed historical legacy that includes Gothic (the Catholic cathedral, built during the era of German rule), "tropicalized" Classical, and Afro-Brazilian. The warmth of Lomé's welcome begins with the permanent smile

of the Togolese, and the charm of the women selling goods in the great markets of Lomé, which today have been left by the famous “Nana-Benz” to the “Nanettes.” Private houses, usually surrounded by walls that are made of painted cinder blocks in varied colors, and are often relatively low, can be seen everywhere in the city, except in the old commercial districts, which are being reconstructed. Given the mode of individual ownership of land, allied with both traditional and modern practices, there is practically no spatial discrimination within each district.

Despite political problems, and the partial degradation of infrastructure, since the 1990s, the city of Lomé has not lost its charm, and its people still recall the city’s history, symbolized by the many vestiges of the past in its everyday life. Lomé, a city at a crossroads, has lent its name to the series of four “Lomé conventions,” the agreements between the European Union and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, which were all signed there.

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Lomé Conventions, The

The Treaty of Rome (March 25, 1957) contained in its fourth part specific clauses for the “association” of the newly created European Community with overseas territories, which at that time were mainly French colonies. These clauses aimed at endorsing their trade capabilities and promoting their development. They envisaged trade agreements (privileged access to the European market for overseas products) and financial help (through the European Development Fund). Specific points were defined in a convention that was attached to the treaty and was supposed to last for five years (1958–1963). During that period, most of the countries concerned became independent. However, they agreed to renew the convention on a contractual basis.

This convention was signed in Yaoundé in July 1963 between the six states of the European Community and eighteen states from Africa and Madagascar, for a duration of five years (and was renewed for an other five years in July 1969: Yaoundé II). Former clauses were preserved, but joint institutions were set up to allow the newly independent countries to take part in the administration of the association.

With the enlargement of the European Community in 1972, and especially with Great Britain joining, new countries (former British colonies) came to be part of

the association. A new convention was signed in Lomé in February 1975 between nine European states and forty-six African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The number of countries affiliated with the convention has increased since then; seventy-two Third World countries are now associated. The convention has been renewed in 1979 (Lomé II), 1984 (Lomé III), 1989 (Lomé IV), and 1995 (Lomé IV). During that time new organizations and sources of assistance have been devised, and old ones have been improved.

The European Development Fund has become one of the most important of these sources and has maintained its specificity compared to other international sources of funding. It gives donations rather than loans. Projects have to be prepared and proposed by the associated countries themselves and then adopted by the fund, which finances and controls their implementation. The fields it covers have been extended. The first fund, which was set up in 1959, was mainly concerned with investments in social and economic infrastructures (especially communication routes). The priorities of the second fund (1963) were extended to include rural development. Technical assistance was also added to help the ACP states prepare and implement their projects. Since 1975 more emphasis has been put on industrial development.

The Lomé conventions (I and II) attempted to strike a balance between financial aid and the needs of the ACP states given their varied degree of development. This was made possible through a diversification in the kinds of financial aid granted. More attention was focused on the less developed countries. At the same time, these conventions asked the ACP states to assume greater responsibility in the implementation of projects, which led to an increased decentralization in the administration of the Fund. In 1975 new schemes and tools were set up, such as compensatory financing schemes including the Stabex, a system meant to stabilise the export incomes of the ACP states. It protects states against possible loss in their export incomes due to natural disaster or price collapse. Lomé II introduced another system, the Sysmin, which focused specifically on mined products. Through a similar scheme of financial aid, it allows the ACP states to keep their mines working when the incomes from these mines are and threatening production.

All such plans have made the European development scheme quite unique. However, its efficiency has remained inconsistent, and opinions vary on the matter. The last Lomé conventions (Lomé III and IV) envisaged new mechanisms for control in order to increase efficiency. They proposed improved coordination between European actions and the policies followed by each ACP state, more consideration for local cultures when devising or considering proposals,

and for the preservation of the global environment. They encouraged the ACP states to set up a more secure institutional environment for attracting private investments.

Since Lomé IV, democratization has been considered as a condition for further aid. Previously, the conventions worked under the premise of giving aid regardless of the political regime and status of the ACP state in question. Lomé II only referred to the respect due to “human dignity.” Lomé III mentioned “human rights” but without providing further precision. Lomé IV clearly meant human rights as defined by the United Nations (including political rights). It placed the matter in the chapter titled “Aims and Principles of Cooperation.” This emphasizes a new focus on the connections between aid, political development, and economic efficiency.

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Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo

The origins of the Luyi or Aluyana, as the Lozi people were originally called, are carefully concealed in myths designed to maintain the prestige and selectiveness of the ruling dynasty. “Luyi” or “Aluyana” means “people of the river.” According to myth, the Lozi came from Nyambe (the Lozi name for God). This myth of origin implies that they were indigenous, not immigrants, to the western province of Zambia. The Lozi myth is believed to have expressed an important truth because in the Lozi society, where the dynasty originated from mattered less than the nature of the land they colonized. However, historical evidence suggests that the Lozi came from the Lunda Empire. Consequently, the Lozi kingdom developed an imperial structure similar to other kingdoms that had a similar background. The kingdom was favored by a relatively prosperous valley environment that facilitated dense settlement of the people.

Once the kingdom had been founded, it had a special economic base that consisted of fertile plains of about hundred miles long which were flooded by the

Zambezi River every year. The kingdom, also generally known as Barotseland, accommodated peoples of clear distinct origin and history as opposed to the true Lozi who occupied the flood plain. These peoples lived in the surrounding woodland.

The Lozi kingdom was founded in seventh century by people believed to have come from the Lunda Empire to the north. It is also believed that the newcomers introduced intensive cultivation of the flood plain. By 1800 various peoples to the west were brought under Lozi rule while to those to the east and west paid tribute in form of labor. The flood plain was mainly administered by relatives of the king in the early days of the dynasty. Later some kind of royal bureaucracy—an unusual development anywhere in Africa—replaced the earlier system. This was possible because of the plain, which made demand for control a matter of political control as well. As guardian of the land, the king built up a following of loyal officials who he allocated states on the plain. The system enabled Lozi kings to make political appointments on the basis of personal merit instead of birth. As such any such appointees could lose both office and land allotted to them if they fell out of favor. Trade also developed between the various peoples in the region.

Trade in fish, grain, and basket work for the iron work, woodwork, and barkcloth made Barotseland fairly self-sufficient. The Lozi also raided the Tonga and the Ila for cattle and slaves. However, the Lozi did not participate in the slave trade because they needed to retain slaves themselves to perform manual labor in the kingdom. The control of trade made the Litunga more powerful in his kingdom. Through his *Indunas*, the Litunga was able to have almost total control of the economy of the Lozi kingdom.

Following the Mfecane (a series of migrants set in motion by Shaka Zulu’s empire in South Africa), the Kololo were forced to move north to the Zambezi River. In 1845 the Kololo leader Sebitwane found the Lozi kingdom split by succession dispute following the death of the tenth Litunga Mulambwa in 1830. The succession dispute resulted into a civil that split the Lozi kingdom into three groups. Sebitwanes warriors quickly overrun the Lozi kingdom. The Kololo imposed their language on the Lozi, although their conquest was hardly disruptive. As a small group of nomad warriors who had turned into herders and not cultivators, they found the Lozi to have been well established. Their language became a unifying influence in the kingdom. Soon Kololo kingship became far more popular in style than that offered by the Lozi. Unlike his predecessor, the Kololo king was more of a war-captain and was freely accessible to his fellow warriors. This was unlike the Lozi Litunga who was surrounded by rituals and taboos, and hence kept

secluded. Because of this, Kololo kings were liked and easily accepted by most Lozi subjects. Sebitwane won the loyalty of his subject people by giving them cattle, taking wives from various groups and even giving leaders conquered people important positions of responsibility. He treated both the Kololo and Lozi generously.

However, despite this apparent popularity, the Kololo kings failed to come to terms with the special circumstances of Barotseland. They therefore made their capitals to the south of the central plain, among marshes that they considered secure from their traditional adversaries, the Ndebele, to their south.

The kololo did not disrupt the economic system of the Lozi, which was based on mounds and canals of the flood plain. However, the political system of the Kololo was very different from that of the Lozi. In the Kololo political system, men who were of the same age as the king were made territorial governors. Initially, this ensured that the flow of tribute to the king's court. The system did not, however, guarantee the continued operating system of the flood plain.

The Lozi kingdom was prone to malaria and had eventually developed an immunity to the disease. The Kololo, however, were not immune, and were often afflicted with the disease. This greatly undermined the Kololo ability to resist the Lozi when the latter rose against their conquerors. The various Lozi princes who had escaped and fled from Kololo invasion had taken refuge to the north. Among them was Sepopa.

Following the death of Sebitwane in 1851, he was succeeded by weak rulers. His son Sekeletu was not as able a ruler as his father. He died in 1863 after which Kololo rule declined completely. The Lozi and the Toka-Leya, who had also been under Kololo rule, rose against the Kololo and declared themselves independent. The Kololo did not put up any serious resistance because they were terribly divided.

In 1864 Sepopa raised a Lozi army that took advantage of malaria-afflicted Kololo and successfully defeated it. Sepopa revived the Lozi institutions, but the problem of royal succession resurfaced, and it remained a source of weakness for the revived Lozi kingdom. Consequently, Sepopa was overthrown in 1878. For two years instability reigned until 1878 when Lewanika became king of the Lozi as Litunga. He too continued to have difficulties retaining his position as king. He was constantly under threat of attack from the Ndebele in the south. This relationship with the Ndebele forced Lewanika to take a friendly attitude toward European visitors to his kingdom.

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See also: Difaqane on the Highveld; Lewanika I, the Lozi and the BSA Company; Tonga, Ila, and Cattle.

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Luanda

The capital city of Angola is situated in the northwest of the country on the coast, where a natural deepwater port is its primary economic *raison d'être*. The harbor has approximately four square miles suitable for ships to berth.

The Portuguese explorer Paulo Dias de Novais (grandson of the famous navigator Bartholmeu Dias) founded the city in 1575, becoming its first governor. Local Mbundu peoples inhabited the area before the arrival of the Portuguese settlers who established a permanent presence on the coast. The Ndongo kingdom was located inland from Luanda island, which protected the bay. Its king was called Ngola, from which the name Angola was derived. The area was originally under the influence of the Kingdom of Kongo. Tax was paid to the king in cowrie shells and the city's name originates from the local word for "tax," which was *loanda*. It later became known as Sao Paulo de Luanda. The Ngola withdrew his influence from the Kingdom of the Kongo, forming a temporary alliance with the Portuguese. Portugal's presence was reinforced when the imposing Sao Miguel fortress was built on a hill next to Luanda island, which is now an isthmus following twentieth century construction work. The fortress remains a dominant feature of the city and was turned into a museum of the revolution soon after independence, while still retaining a security function. After the Portuguese military base was established, a century of warfare followed before the Ndongo kingdom was subjugated.

Luanda acted as a refueling and restocking station for Portuguese and other merchant fleets, but the main economic impetus for its growth came from the slave trade, which lasted for almost four centuries. As early as 1627, the settlement became the center of the Portuguese colonial administration and a base from which missionary expansion could take place. The Portuguese colony of Brazil provided a heavy demand for Angolan slaves. The Portuguese Crown received a

tax for every slave exported and successive governors had an effective license to enrich themselves as long as they delivered the tax to Lisbon.

Tensions frequently existed between colonists and the governor and would occasionally erupt over the relative distribution of the rewards of the slave trade. Hence, in 1666 the new governor arrived from Brazil, only to depart again soon thereafter on the same ship, when the colonists revolted. Given the prevailing slave trade links, Angola was more a colony of Brazil than of Portugal. Indeed, immediately following the 1822 revolt of the Brazilian colonists against the Portuguese crown, there was a mutiny of troops in Luanda. Strong cultural links to Brazil remain to the present, with Luanda's elite more influenced by Europe and the Americas rather than by Southern African neighbors.

The Portuguese settlers in Luanda were essentially traders and soldiers. Many were convicted criminals deported to the colonies, and they were commonly known as *degradados*. By the mid-nineteenth century, 1,466 whites out of an overall white presence in the colony of 1,832 were located in Luanda. There were only 156 white women and a growing group of "mixtos," or mixed race people, numbering 5,759. The remainder of the population of the colony was black slaves (86,000) and free blacks (300,000).

Luanda was to develop a profound Creole culture, which remains apparent to the present day. Essentially this was a blend of Mbundu, Portuguese, and Brazilian influences. This Creole culture of the elite tended to create a sense of superiority toward the predominantly "Bantu" interior. It has fuelled discontent in the provinces, a factor heightened by the civil war that took place in the final quarter of the twentieth century between the MPLA government based in Luanda and the UNITA opposition. Luanda is seen as being privileged, while the provinces feel a sense of neglect.

The massive growth of Luanda only occurred in the twentieth century, especially in the final decades. It became the jewel in the Portuguese colonial African crown by the middle of that century. The enormous natural resource wealth of Angola was primarily channeled for export from the port of Luanda with some of the trading wealth accruing to the city. The Luanda railway, the oldest in the country, first became operational in 1901 and expanded thereafter, along with road transportation routes to the interior. In the colonial era these developments facilitated coffee, cotton, diamond, and salt production, which became the principal exports replacing the slave trade. What was to transform Luanda profoundly was the discovery of petroleum in 1955. A major oil refinery was built in the northern part of the bay of Luanda. A massive cement factory was also constructed. Other industries developed, primarily to meet the needs of the white settler population,

which greatly expanded in the third quarter of the twentieth century. After a slow start, by the mid-1970s oil replaced coffee as the principal export revenue generator.

After independence the Luandan government became overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues as domestic agricultural and industrial production collapsed. From the country being a food exporter prior to independence, Luanda now became heavily dependent upon food imports. This increased the relative isolation of Luanda from the rest of the country, as it became financially dependent not on its trade links to the interior, but on off-shore oil revenues.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Luanda was a vast sprawling city, home to approximately one-third or more of the country's population. The city has grown literally out of control in terms of residential development. A key feature of the city is the principal informal market place, arguably the largest in Africa, north of the city and named after a popular Brazilian soap opera watched avidly in the early years of Angolan television. The downtown port area retains some magnificent colonial architecture, notably the Central Bank along with a ribbon of modern high-rise offices, including the university, as well as residential apartments. Immediately inland and climbing up the hillside are commercial, administrative, and relatively affluent housing and then there spreads out an enormous mass of makeshift housing, built from cement blocks, with zinc roofs, in various states of disrepair which the poor inhabit.

The overriding impression of Luanda is of urban services entirely swamped by uncontrolled population expansion. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, because of the war, flooded into the relative safety of the capital, swelling the already high natural urban population increase. The massive exodus of whites at independence represented a huge drain of management and technical expertise. Black education had been sorely neglected and service provision began to deteriorate, although new opportunities opened up for access to health and education services previously denied to the black population. Water, sanitation, and refuse collection is vastly overloaded. Markets are unsanitary, health and education facilities are stretched to breaking point other than those provided for the small, wealthy political and business elite which is interconnected. The greatest problems facing the city are providing clean water and effective sanitation and waste disposal services. All of the city's problems come together in the Bay of Luanda, which is dangerously polluted. Much of the city's waste is eventually deposited there, ships in the port discharge oil and other pollutants. Since the island of Luanda became connected to the mainland, this interrupted the tidal

flow that helped in the past to flush out the pollution from the bay, albeit not entirely effectively.

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See also: **Angola.**

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Luba: Origins and Growth

Speaking of the Luba state is not a simple matter, for earlier studies have contributed to the idea of a centralized sociopolitical complex and have exaggerated the prestige of the imperial house of Kalala Ilunga as the central theme of Luba history. This focus has produced a skewed view, requiring newer efforts to give a more balanced view that is closer to the historical realities.

The origins of the state are controversial, in terms of localizing where political organization emerged. The earliest particularly Luba political forms are generally traced to the Kalundwe region of Chief Mutombo Mukulu; the territory between the Lomami and Lovidjo Rivers, and the northwestern region called Mongage. All these regions share a common founding hero, Kongolo Mwana or Kongolo Mwamba, although his origin is unclear. He would have settled among the “Bakolanga,” an indigenous population who would adopt the name Baluba, and organized them politically around the *bumfumu*, the power of a chief called *mfumu*, a proto-Bantu term.

From this eventful period, tradition recalls the construction of a capital at Mwibela near Lake Boya, regrouping various previously scattered populations. A foreign hunter known as Ilunga Mbidi Kiluwe arrived here from the northeast; he married the two sisters of Kongolo Mwamba (Mwana), Bulanda, and Mabele.

Discord developed between Kongolo and Mbidi Kiluwe, who left his brother-in-law for an unknown destination. Bulanda bore a son named Kalala Ilunga from the marriage, and he soon began to overshadow his uncle, making the latent conflict between them an open one. As the situation turned increasingly in his favor, *kalala* (a title meaning “commander,” “general,” “guide”) Ilunga sized power from his uncle and cut off his head.

This first period is characterized by a sociopolitical organization based on the family, and in which the *mfumu* was the head of a village dominated by a single extended family. The mode of production was based equally on sharing and solidarity. The *mfumu* acted as leader and oversaw all the problems of the community, assisted by a council of elders who were, in effect, the senior family members. The *mfumu* was chosen by an electoral council or *kitango*, convoked once a vacancy was observed, generally by death, with the oldest members of the family initiating the succession. Often the brother of the deceased *mfumu* was elected; otherwise, a son or a nephew was chosen. The insignia of the *mfumu* include a *lukano* or *lwelo* (bracelet), *ngwele* (iron wire bracelets for both the wrists and ankles), the skin of the *nzuzi* (civet), and the *nsala* (tuft of parrot feathers).

The second period centers around Kalala Ilunga, whose reign initiated an expansionary period for the Luba. He introduced into the area a new kind of political power, *bulopwe*. Luba society became patrilineal, and the political structure becomes more complex. *Bumfumu* was related to the self-sufficient economy, with power often held by women in the group; *bumfumu* as a type of political power is often described as the “wife” of *bulopwe*. The *bulopwe*, a sacred dignity or political power by initiation, eventually diffused throughout central Africa and contributed to the expansion of Luba culture. It also created centrifugal forces to the extent that the area of Luba culture is a mosaic of autonomous states. In its essence, *balopwe* is an autonomous power and thus someone who holds it cannot, in theory, be subordinated to another. The only relationship that can exist between two *balopwe* is one of senior and junior within the same family. There was thus a swarming of *balopwe* through the area, creating stable and independent sociopolitical, economic, and cultural communities, even if acknowledging a common source of their power.

Tradition tells us little of the end of the reign of Kalala Ilunga, for that was of little interest to contemporary historians compared with the accomplishments of his reign. We know that there was a series of *balopwe* but with an uncertain line of succession. However, there is relative agreement on the most powerful line of *balopwe* from Nday Mwine N'kombe to the separation of the brothers Kasongo Nyembo and

Kabongo Nkumwimba, that is, from the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century.

Historical developments after the reign of Kalala Ilunga were limited, for the attempts of several *balopwe* of the Lomami-Luvidjo area to bring other *balopwe* under their control seem to have failed in the long term. Cultural expansion was not synonymous with the expansion of political control.

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
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Luba: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Although the Luba kingdom was one of the most celebrated states of Central Africa's eastern savanna, historians are reduced to conjecture regarding its genesis. The earliest explicit reference to the kingdom was written in 1832 and no archeological research yet has been conducted in the region of the ancient capitals. Therefore, the only available sources for early Luba history are linguistic data and oral traditions. Linguistic records demonstrate that, for centuries, the Luba and Lunda shared political terminology. Oral traditions, transmitted in Luba royal and provincial courts as well as in the *mbudyé* secret society, an institution closely associated with kingship, also shed light on the Luba past.



The Luba and Lunda empires, seventeenth–eighteenth centuries.

Relying on his own field research and on written sources, Thomas Q. Reefe wrote *The Rainbow and the Kings* (1981), the first critical monograph on Luba history. Rejecting earlier literalistic approaches, Reefe interpreted accounts about the kingdom's foundation as mythical tales or as political charters. Thus, the historical existence of the first kings (Ilunga Mbidi Kiluwe, Nkongolo Mwamba, Kalala Ilunga, Ilunga Mwila, and Kasongo Mwine Kibanza) was called into question. And, after these founding heroes, oral tradition consisted only of lists of kings. Not only did these lists lack details about the leaders, the lists' order differed depending on the source. This inconsistent genealogical segment included Kasongo Bonswe, Kasongo Kabundulu, Ngoye Sanza, and Kumwimbe Mputu.

It should be noted, however, that an oral tradition devoid of mythical elements is associated with one or more of the following ancient kings: Ilunga Mwila, Kasongo Mwine Kibanza, or Kasongo Bonswe. That tradition recalls a war against chief Madya who lived near the source of the Luguvu River. This clearly ancient tale suggests that the early Luba kingdom emerged very near that region.

Beginning with Ndaye Mwine Nkombe, there is a general consensus regarding the Luba royal genealogy. Furthermore, the reigns are associated with precise and plausible events. Estimating each generation at about thirty years in length and working backward from known events in the nineteenth century, Reefe proposed the following chronology, noting that the earlier dates are increasingly approximate:

Ilunga Kabale: c. 1840–c. 1870

Kumwimba Ngombe: c. 1810–c. 1840

Ilunga Nsungu: c. 1780–c. 1810

Kumwimba Kaumbu and Miketo (Ilunga Nsungu's cousins who ruled c. 1780)

Kekenya: c. 1750–c. 1780

Kadilo: c. 1720–c. 1750

Ndaye Mwine Nkombe: c. 1690–c. 1720

The location of the ancient capitals provides important information about the Luba state. When a king died, his successor had to relocate. The old capital then became an autonomous domain directed by a court of dignitaries associated with a female medium in whom the previous sovereign was incarnated. This institution, which preserved the ancient political centers as memorials, makes it possible to map the displacement of the political center of gravity over the course of several centuries. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the capitals were located in the basins of the Luguvu, the upper Luvidyo, and the upper Lusanza Rivers. This assured the Luba kings an important commercial position. There were rich deposits of iron in the upper

Luvuyo basin. And in the nineteenth century, between the Mwenze and Mwibay rivers to the southwest, great salt deposits attracted hundreds of workers and merchants during the dry season. West of the Lomami, very near the center of the kingdom, lived the Ilande. Deeply involved in long-distance trade, it is likely that already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Ilande played a critical role on the great north-south economic axis. This route linked the Maniema forest, eastern Kasai, western Katanga, and the Copperbelt. The Luba heartland, with its iron, salt, and other products flowing to the royal court in the form of tribute to the king, became an important stage in this trading network.

The Luba kings certainly would have profited from their enviable economic situation. But they also proved to be good diplomats, employing a political strategy based on marriage alliances, and they were excellent cultural entrepreneurs. Attachment to the Luba court was—and still is—synonymous with legitimacy in many political entities, sometimes even those far from the Luba heartland. The Luba court was a ritual center without equal in a very large region. Provincial chiefs came here to obtain their emblems of power (sculpted objects, royal fire, white chalk, etc). The Luba installation rituals that made the Luba prince a true sacred king capable of mediating with the world of the spirits were paradigmatic models serving as a touchstone for most dignitaries and kings in the eastern savanna.

The process by which the Luba kingdom expanded is known only through sketchy evidence. For example, nothing tells us when the region directly south of the historical heartland (the Lovoy River basin) came into the kingdom's orbit. We do know that Kadilo (c.1720–c.1750) undertook campaigns into Songye country far to the northwest of the kingdom. His successor Kekenya (c.1750–c.1780) seems to have directed his military efforts toward the banks of the Lualaba River. Kumwimba Kaumbu (c.1780) died soon after fighting the Songye. The next ruler, Ilunga Nsungu (c.1780–c.1810) moved his capital south, nearer the Mashyo salt pans that were a major source of commercial and tribute wealth. Ilunga Nsungu's two successors also established their courts in the Mashyo area. That region is actually called Buluba (Luba country), perhaps because this was the location for the capitals of the conquering leaders who transformed the kingdom into a true empire.

During the reign of Ilunga Nsungu, the Luba experienced setbacks on their western frontiers. They failed to subdue the kingdom of Mutombo Mukulu. And the Kanyok, whose small chiefdoms had remained within the Luba political and ideological orbit throughout the eighteenth century, were united into a strong state that proved capable of rejecting the designs of their powerful

neighbor. In contrast, the Luba successfully penetrated far beyond the eastern banks of the Lualaba River. They pursued a policy of conquest in the entire Luvua-Lukuga corridor (as far as Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika). So long as the local chiefs agreed to become loyal clients, they could remain in office (for example the celebrated Kyombo Mkubwa). Elsewhere, the conquerors set up Luba dynasties. The *mbudyé* secret society seems to have played an important role in propagating Luba ideology and mythology throughout the region. Ilunga Nsungu's successors continued this aggressive policy for another half century after his death in about 1810. This political and military effort was halted only by the arrival of slave and ivory traders whose superior arms brutally ended Luba expansion.

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Lubumbashi

Capital of Katanga Province and second city of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it owes its name to a small river.

When the railroad from Cape Town through Rhodesia approached the Belgian Congo, the colonial government wished to avoid an influx of British colonists from the south. Thus in 1908 the seat of the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK) was transferred from Lukonzolwa on Lake Moeru toward the southern border. Cdts Tanneau and Émile Wangermée set up camp on the Kafubu

River. In 1910 a permanent government post was established on its tributary, the Lubumbashi.

In contrast, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, which had begun exploratory drilling at Kambove, was thrilled to find the railhead reaching Ndola near the Rhodesian-Congolese border in 1908. It therefore decided to begin work with the Congo Star mine near the Kafubu, as it would be first to have rail links, facilitating ore and metal transport.

Circumstances thus favored the creation of Elisabethville, now Lubumbashi. Wangermée, representative of the CSK, was named vice governor-general for Katanga on July 29, 1910. He refused to move to Kambove, chosen by the government of the Belgian Congo as capital of Katanga. By then construction of the city had already begun, as the copper refinery required a water supply; the railroad, at the Sakania border in 1909, reached Elisabethville September 27 and the Congo Star mine on October 1. On September 1, the government had named Elisabethville Katanga's capital in place of Kambove, and on November 9 Wangermée signed documents giving it the status of "urban district." The name honored Queen Elisabeth of Belgium, who had accompanied Albert I to the Belgian Congo before his accession to the throne, visiting the Congo Star mine.

Elisabethville served as capital of Katanga province from 1910, as headquarters of the district of the Upper Luapula (later Upper Katanga) from 1912 to 1929 and from 1932 to 1961, as headquarters of the territory of the same name from 1912 to 1956, and an urban district from 1929 to 1932 and 1956 to 1957. It received the status of city in 1941, modified by law in 1957. The city seal, bearing the words *Ex imis ad culmina* (from the depths to the heights) was registered in 1954.

Lubumbashi had been laid out by South African advisers on a site chosen by Wangermée, aided by the Swiss engineer Itten on the peneplain east of the Lubumbashi River. Thus there were two separate cities, one white (today's commune of Lubumbashi plus Bel-Air) and the other the native quarter. The region between the two cities was reserved for public buildings, churches, hospital, schools, and a prison operated by whites for Africans. The white quarter was reserved for Belgians and those assimilated to them, with darker-skinned foreigners (Arabs, Indians, Sephardic Jews, Greeks, Italians) living in peripheral areas such as Bakoa and Ndjandja. During the colonial period, racial segregation extended to two adjoining cemeteries.

Reserved for blacks and created by ordinance in 1912, the native city was moved away from the white section during the depression and transformed into an incorporated *centre extra-coutumier* in 1932. It eventually grew into four townships: Albert I (now Kamalondo, begun 1921), Kenya (1941), Katuba (1950), and Ruashi

(1954), plus the rural satellite town of Karavia. In 1957 the city was divided into five communes, one for Europeans and the four for Africans. The inhabitants of each elected a council that chose the mayor; no Katangese was selected among the four African townships, with most of the mayors Kasaians.

The Katangese reacted by creating CONAKAT (Confederation of Katangese Tribal Associations) under the presidency of Godefoid Munongo of the Yeke royal family. In the 1960 elections most of those who were to become leaders of the secessionist Katanga government were initially elected as CONAKAT provincial deputies from Elisabethville districts including Tshombe, Munongo, and Kibwe.

In 1970 the Mobutu government renamed the capitals of Congo and its provinces during Mobutu's "Authenticity" campaign, and Elisabethville retook the name of the original government post by the stream.

As in other African cities, most of the city's growth has come during the last forty years, after Congo's independence. In 1970 the commune of Kampemba was separated from that of Lubumbashi (ex-Elisabeth), and in 1977 the outlying Commune Annexe was created. Particularly during the Second Republic, numerous shanty towns appeared around the city, including: Cinq-Ans/Kasungami, Zaire, Kigoma, Madame Jeanne/Masangoshi/Quartier Six, Kawama, Zambia, Naviundu, Bongonga, Kinkalabwamba, Tabacongo, Kalebuka, CampAssistants, Kimbwambwa, Kalubwe, Foire, Katuba Mbujimayi, Katuba Gbadolite, and Katuba Kisanga.

From its inception, the city of Lubumbashi has played a variety of roles. It was both an industrial town, based on the copper smelter using ores from mines outside the city, and a political nexus as the administrative center of the wealthiest province in the country. The rail and road border crossings from Rhodesia remained rural outposts, ensuring that Lubumbashi was the customs and distribution pole for the southeastern third of Congo, with which it had rail links. Since 1956, with the opening of the Université Officielle du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi (now the Université de Lubumbashi), it has been an academic center, with several other institutions of higher education also present. It has an international airport, opened in 1958, the site originally having been an overnight stop on flights between Europe and South Africa in the days of propeller planes and visual navigation.

The city had a population of 754 Europeans in December 1910; 1,200 in 1912; 2,483 in 1925; and 20,000 in 1960. The African population stood at 8,000 in 1912; 13,990 in 1923; 32,637 in 1929; and 161,000 in 1960. The population in 2000 was approximately two million.

The best-known symbols of the city are the tall refinery chimney and the pyramid of slag towering over

LUBUMBASHI

the city. Major architectural landmarks include Governor's Residence and Imara and Twendelee schools (1910s), Saints Peter and Paul Cathedral, Makutano Club, Jerusalem United Methodist Church, and the Jewish synagogue (1920s), the courthouse and Mazembe stadium (1930s), the post office, former CSK headquarters, the theater, St. Mary's Basilica, and the railway headquarters (1950s), Gécamines tower and the two hospitals (1960s), and Hotel Karavia and Mobutu Stadium (1970s).

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Lugard: *See Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, and "Indirect Rule."*

Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

First and Only Elected Prime Minister of Congo

A recognized African leader on the international stage for little more than two years before he was murdered, Lumumba nonetheless became an icon for newly independent Africa, all the more so because of the belief that the West had played a role in his death.

Lumumba founded the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) in October 1958; it was Congo's first nationwide political party. In December 1958 Lumumba attended the first All-Africa People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, and subsequently returned to the Congo a far more militant nationalist. Following the violent suppression of two days of rioting in Léopoldville in January 1959, the Belgian government announced a program to lead the Congo to independence over five years. More radical nationalists denounced this as too slow and called for the boycott of the proposed municipal and rural elections. Belgian repression followed and on October 30, 1959, the forcible dispersal of an MNC rally in Stanleyville led to thirty deaths. Lumumba was imprisoned on a charge of incitement to riot. The MNC subsequently changed its tactics and entered the elections to win 90 per cent of the votes in Stanleyville.

Belgium then felt obliged to hasten the process of independence and convened a conference of all political parties to meet in Brussels in January 1960. The MNC refused to take part without Lumumba, who was released from prison so that he could attend the conference.



Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (second from left) of the Republic of the Congo, photographed with an aide, Capt. Mawoso (second from right), as he arrived in New York to establish direct contact with the United Nations secretary general in order to find a speedy solution to the problems facing his country. July 24, 1960. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

Patrice Lumumba's political party, the MNC, won a majority of seats in the May 1960 elections one month before the Congo became independent on June 30, 1960. The country was, by any standard, ill-prepared for independence. Moreover, prior to the handover of government authority, the Belgians had produced a new constitution that assigned to six provincial governments the same competencies as those of the central government, an arrangement that was an invitation for an immediate power struggle between the provinces and the center. Such a power struggle duly erupted within days of the country's independence. Lumumba, who favored a strong, centralized, truly national government, had been made prime minister while his political rival, Joseph Kasavubu, who preferred a loose federal structure and the creation of a BaKongo state, became president. The first signs of breakdown came with riots followed by a mutiny of the Force Publique for better pay and conditions. These disturbances led to an exodus of Europeans.

The great mineral wealth of the Congo meant that a number of Western nations (the excolonial power Belgium, Britain, and France as well as the United States, with a principal motive of Cold War strategy) were not prepared to see these resources lost to the West. A political struggle developed between Lumumba,

who was accused of “selling” the country to the Soviet Union, and the charismatic political leader of the mineral rich Katanga province, Moïse Tshombé, whose sympathies were pro-Western, while he also enjoyed close ties with Western business interests.

On Independence Day, attended by the King of the Belgians, the new prime minister considered himself and the Congolese people slighted when he was not scheduled to speak at the formal ceremony handing over power on June 29, 1960. Following a paternalistic speech by King Baudouin, which praised Belgium’s great “civilizing mission” in the Congo, Lumumba defied protocol and made a radical speech in reply, in which he castigated the brutality and injustice of Belgian rule in the Congo. In doing so, the prime minister merely confirmed the suspicions of the Belgian government: that Lumumba was an implacable enemy of Belgian interests in the region.

On July 11, 1960, Tshombé announced that Katanga was to secede from the Congo. On the following day Lumumba appealed to the United Nations to help restore order and maintain the integrity of the Congo by preventing Katanga’s secession. The United Nations faced a formidable task, and although Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld acted swiftly, the United Nations was unable to prevent the immediate secession of Katanga. Government forces did manage to take control of Kasai Province and prevent a second secession there. Belgium, which had significant economic stakes in the mineral wealth of Katanga, assisted Tshombé with mercenaries and other political support in his attempted breakaway, with the result that the province was not to be brought back under central control for three years.

After Lumumba’s dismissal by Kasavubu in September (the West by then saw him as “too independent”) the UN recognized the new Kasavubu government set up in October; this split African opinion, dividing continental opinion between radicals who supported Lumumba and moderates who supported Kasavubu. Lumumba had been given UN protection while he was in Leopoldville, but when he attempted to travel to Stanleyville, which was the center of his support he was captured by Kasavubu forces on December second. On January 17, 1961, he was handed over to Tshombé in Katanga, where he was first tortured and then killed.

Following his death Lumumba became a national and African hero. While the failure of the United Nations to protect him did the world organization great harm, his death also damaged Tshombé’s reputation. Lumumba’s importance lay more in his symbolism than any actual political achievements, although he was the first Congolese politician to create a national rather than a regional party. He was seen as the victim

of Western manipulation of a fragile new state whose potential wealth ensured that it would not be left to its own devices.

The release of documents in Belgium in 1999 provided evidence of primary Belgian complicity in Lumumba’s death, and on December 9, 1999, the Belgian parliament decided to set up a commission of inquiry into Lumumba’s death and Belgium’s responsibility for it.

GUY ARNOLD

Biography

Born July 2, 1925, at Onalua in Kasai. Granted full Belgian citizenship. Obtained a job as a postal clerk in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) and later in Stanleyville (Kisangani). In 1955 became president of a Congolese trade union of government employees and also an active member of the Belgian Liberal Party in the Congo. Wrote *Congo My Country*, published posthumously in 1963. In 1956 went on a tour to Belgium; on his return to the Congo, arrested and imprisoned for one year on a charge of embezzling post office funds. Named prime minister in 1960. Murdered in 1961.

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Lunda: Mwaant Yaav (Mwata Yamvo) and Origins

The Ruund (nuclear Lunda) inhabit northwestern Katanga Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo and adjoining areas in Kasai Province and Angola. At least, such is the modern ethnic group with its specific language (uRuund), political system (acknowledging

the *mwant yav*), ethnic consciousness, and bilateral kinship system relatively rare in Africa. By such a definition, the aRuund are a half to one million at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In more restrictive earlier use, the name referred only to the inhabitants of the Nkalany valley (the upper Mbujji-Mayi). In its largest sense, peoples from northeastern Zambia to southwestern Congo, including a broad swath of Congo, northwestern Zambia, and eastern Angola, are identified and/or identify themselves by the generic term “Lunda.”

Lunda/Ruund/Ruwund; Mwant Yav/Mwaant Yaav/Mwata Yamvo/Mwatiamvwa: spellings vary because of the many languages sharing this political legacy and due to their filtering into print through various European languages over 150 years. Spellings used here approximate Ruund usage, without final vowels and with certain sounds in neighboring Bantu languages replaced by others; the orthography distinguishes between long vowels (*mwant yav*) and double vowels (Ruund).

The far-flung Lunda political tradition associated with the *mwant yav* kingship developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was perhaps the largest precolonial state in Central Africa, although in disorder by the time Leopold II sent agents to claim the area for his Congo Independent State.

According to the “Lunda Love Story” of oral tradition, it began as a simple village community along the Nkalany. Nkond, the presiding elder, left his emblems (particularly an iron bracelet wound with human flesh, the *rukan*) to his daughter Ruwej rather than to disrespectful sons. As chief, Ruwej was brought a handsome intruder from the east captured by her villagers: Chibind (“hunter”) Yirung. Smitten, she made him her consort. The variants of the tradition, given by the Ruund and their neighbors, suggest little reaction; as a man, a woman chief has the right to choose her partner(s); he is, however, a “consort” and not a “husband.” The crisis came later. As menstrual blood causes ritual impurity, women must “go to the edge,” leaving the village temporarily. Ruwej began entrusting the insignia to Yirung, and not all the community could accept an outsider holding the emblems of sacred power. Some departed.

Versions of the story collected since the nineteenth century name among them the famous founder-heroes of Angolan states and ethnic groups, but linguistic analysis shows the names to be foreign loanwords from Angola. For the aRuund with their use of perpetual kinship, adding these names to the core tradition is like musical improvisation on an older theme, adapting it to the political and economic realities of the 19th century savannah. Traditions vary as to whether Yirung was killed, driven out, or tolerated by those who remained with Ruwej.

Traditions agree that the dynasty began not with Chibind Yirung but with his son, Yav a Yirung. The

childless Ruwej was the sociological mother; a maid-servant the birth mother. In the Lunda central court, Ruwej is perpetuated by the *nswan murund* (“heir of the friendship”) and the birth mother by the *rukonkish*. Both positions have played major political roles in recent centuries, with the *rukonkish* usually a close biological relative of the *mwant yav*. The *nswan murund* derives her authority through her own line and exercises a veto during the election process for a new *mwant yav*. Yav a Yirung thus embodied not only the earth rights of the first occupants but also the high chiefly culture of a more sophisticated state than the original Nkalany community, a political legitimacy symbolized by the direction of the rising sun.

Little evidence suggests that the Luba state center of northern Katanga was in close contact with the Lunda court until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Colonial authors often link Chibind Yirung with the historic Luba state of the *mulopwe* centered northwest of the Upemba depression, but nineteenth century transcriptions of the tradition give his origins in small states closer to the Nkalany though always to the east.

There is nonetheless abundant linguistic evidence of cultural cross-fertilization along that border. The aRuund are on the northeastern edge of one group of savannah Bantu languages, the Luba languages and dialects being their neighbors to the east and north. Further north, evidence suggests that patrilineal Luba-Kasai immigrants absorbed Ruund-like communities having simple pre-*mwant yav* political organization.

The Lunda political model that developed at the Nkalany includes a sovereign chosen from among a hereditary group, but among the bilateral aRuund, any descendant by male or female line is eligible; and with chiefly polygamy this ensures a wide field of candidates. Among peripheral Lunda, this often shows up in ethnology as a distinct inheritance system for chiefs: for example, “patrilineal” among the matrilineal Bemba-speakers of the Mwata Kazembe subsidiary state. Typically, there are political titles reserved for women and the optional election of women to other titles; this, of course, was not absent among other matrilineal peoples to their south. Chiefs are typically nominated by groups of specified political stakeholders, often pass a veto of a woman titleholder, and are installed by land chiefs representing the original occupants. The royal court was intricately organized, with spatial residence corresponding to political functions and state geography. Titles were also linked by the metaphor of perpetual kinship, with each titleholder succeeding to the identity as well as the position of the chiefly founder.

Lunda political insignia included the *rukan* (reserved for those claiming sovereignty), wound copper bracelets on wrists and ankles (with relative numbers on right and left sides indicating paternal or maternal ties to the

title), and animal skins. Since at least the nineteenth century the most visible are elaborate beaded crowns and full cloth skirts with contrasting borders.

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Lunda: Kingdoms, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The Lunda Empire was perhaps the largest precolonial state in central Africa, with major outlying centers along the Kwango in the west and in northeastern Zambia along the Luapula to the east, each a thousand kilometers from the heartland along the Nkalanj (upper MbujiMayi) valley. Cultural influence of the Lunda political model reached even further.

The caveat is that African states before the colonial period were very different from modern concepts of state. They typically were more interested in annexing people than land, thus in a sparsely populated subcontinent with agricultural systems based on shifting cultivation of leached tropical soils they had only vague borders. Concepts of sovereignty and authority could be very different from such in Europe, for example, where the medieval feudal state was also very different from modern bureaucratic governments.

The social system of the Ruund, at the heartland of the Lunda Empire is interrelated with political development. The Ruund lie along the northern edge of the "matrilineal belt" across Africa in the savanna lands south of the forests among agricultural peoples not heavily involved in cattle-raising. Far from molding human relationships by fixed vagaries of birth, Ruund kinship is lived out as political choice. Ethnic groups to the north and east tend to be strongly patrilineal; groups to the south are matrilineal. Ruund has a

Hawaiian kinship vocabulary, calling aunts and uncles on both maternal and paternal sides "mother" and "father," and cousins "siblings." (Separate gender neutral terms exist for older and younger sibling of same sex but only one for a sibling of opposite sex.) A special term exists for the maternal uncle, also called "mother without breasts"; the paternal aunt is called either "mother" or "female father." Marriage exchanges were limited to mutual hospitality and material tokens, and either spouse could initiate divorce. The web of kin soon extends throughout the community, with any two individuals likely tracing common kinship in a variety of ways. Which ties are operative at a given time depends much on circumstances and interests.

As with other societies having bilateral kinship, there is no defined lineage or clan able to practice social solidarity. The basic family unit is the *djikw* "hearthfire," composed of more than one *divumw* ("belly"). A larger unit is the *divar*, "family party," which is neither exclusive (one can exploit membership in several) nor ascriptive (it can be ignored since not exclusive). The extended family is thus incapable of resolving routine social conflicts to the degree normal in most Central African societies, and recourse to state institutions becomes more attractive. Likewise, where conflict between obligations to kin and state ideals of impartiality typically weaken African states, weakened ascriptive kinship among the Ruund favors stronger state structures.

In a reciprocal to the weak political role of Ruund kinship, Lunda political networks are couched in a kinship metaphor. Relationships among chiefs are identified as to whether a titleholder is a "child of Ruwej," a "child of the *mwant yav*," and so forth. The relationship may be generic: one title is considered a child of another. In other cases, the oral traditions would appear to give much more biographical data: a specific titleholder was the son of a specific *mwant yav* (a lordship title).

Taking such traditions at face value is naive, for they may speak only of political relationships. Traditions recorded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries generally name three brothers of Ruwej, the heroic mother of the Lunda State; Kinguri and Chinyama are universally cited by name and as the founders of the Imbangala slave-trading state on the upper Kwango and of the Luvale/Lwena people who expanded into southwestern Katanga and western Zambia in the nineteenth century. Early traditions may have spoken of Ruwej's disrespectful brothers, but the names now cited are modern grafts; none reflects the sound shifts that have taken place within the Ruund language after the period of Ruwej.

The Ruund political model offered a flexible and evocative structure for a far-flung political and economic

network from 1700 to 1860. Long-distance trade was carried out in the guise of gift exchange, making it difficult to interpret the reports of nineteenth century Portuguese travelers such as Graça, for each recipient could interpret the gift received as recognition of authority by the donor. It is difficult to evaluate which gift was of superior value (and thus who might be seen as truly tributary) in a situation where one donor was often far more involved in the world economy than the other. In other cases, gifts were symbolic rather than economic (lion or leopard skins, reeds filled with salt, scarlet parrot feathers, etc.). Recognition of a chief as a “child of Ruwej” acknowledged ancient status and a right to some autonomy within the Lunda State. Recognizing Chokwe elephant-hunters and raiders as followers of Ndongj, one of the purported disrespectful brothers of Ruwej, established a fictive bond favoring cooperation but also explained the conflicted relationships that led the Chokwe to depose more than one *mwant yav*, even occupying the Ruund heartland and imposing a decade-long interregnum in the late nineteenth century.

The widespread system of Lunda states was created both by spawning governors who operated with the blessing of the *mwant yav*'s court and by assimilating consenting local authorities. An example of the latter are local land chiefs who often remain the ritual investors (*atubung*) of Lunda territorial lords. The franchising of ambitious titleholders is exemplified by the Yaka *kiamfu* on the Kwango River far to the west and the *mwata kazembe* on the Luapula to the east. Both were kiLuba-speakers who set up Lunda states outside their home areas. Similarly, ambitious Kete from Kasai province were sent to the matrilineal Lunda-Ndembu to impose Lunda rule. Such chiefs as the *kanongesha* in northwestern Zambia or the *mwata kazembe* in northeastern Zambia continued to recognize the *mwant yav*'s sovereignty, yet little economic revenue could have been derived by the *mwant yav* from such distant subordinates. Restive governors could be nudged back to order by sending an *iyikej* overseer as resident ambassador. Particularly within economically important areas (slave sources either closer to the trading centers of Angola or more densely populated as in southern Kasai), armed bands of “catchers,” *atukwat*, acted as enforcers. Nonetheless, much of the longevity of Lunda states derived from the ingenious flexibility of the political system rather than simply from brute military force. Subchiefs obtained ideological justification and prestige from belonging to the larger network; the central court obtained more imported luxury goods (beads, cloth, etc.). The kinship metaphor allowed the system to stretch and bend with changing political and economic realities until the rising scale of trade in the nineteenth

century required a more rational economic model than gift exchange.

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Lunda: Titles

The Lunda Empire extended in a swath from west of the Kwango to east of the Luapula, not because of some demographic flowering in what is a relatively sparsely populated area, but because of the political utility of the state model developed along the Nkalanji (upper Mbuji-Mayi) River by the Ruund in the seventeenth century and due to larger economic factors impinging on central Africa.

Population pressure is often posited in the rise of the Luba kingdom of the *mulopwe* to the east, due to abundant protein from the fish of the Upemba depression coupled with agriculture on the plateau and varied mineral resources. However, Kapanga territory is today the least populated area in western Katanga, and the most densely populated nearby areas (Luiza territory in Kasai) represent ethnic groups who fought tenaciously to escape Lunda incorporation. While the *musumb* (capital) of the *mwant yav* appeared an impressively large agglomeration for nineteenth-century central Africa to Portuguese visitors, the gravitational pull of the Lunda headquarters is responsible, for travelers crossed large empty areas to reach it. The empty lands reflect in part a century of slave trade but also poor Kalahari sand soils and limited or inconveniently located permanent water sources.

Elements of the Lunda title system likely developed during the seventeenth century, and by the late seventeenth century the current title of *mwant yav* (“Lord Yav”) had emerged with Yav a Yirung and his successors. Oral traditions recall considerable conflict during the preceding generation, with dissidents going into exile. Yav’s father Yirung was a wandering hunter who had happened upon the community with Ruwej as its chieftainess, and she made him consort. Yav’s mother was a maidservant, for Ruwej was sterile. This tradition has been interpreted by Western academics as a euphemism for Luba conquest (although no kiLuba loanwords witness to a forced occupation), or a cosmological myth. If the interpretation based on a conquest by the historical Luba *mulopwe* state is unlikely, the “love story” clearly does represent a syncretic cultural process.

At the Nkalany and to the immediate east, Ruund- and kiLuba-speaking populations intermingled along their linguistic border. Certain titles are based on kiLuba rather than Ruund linguistic roots yet are clearly not borrowed from the Luba political tradition. The widespread title *nswan mulapw*, “vice chief,” is composed of Ruund *nswan*, “heir,” and Luba *mulopwe* “lord.” The Luba loanword is not used in other Lunda contexts, whether for God or for political authorities, so its spread is a marker of the Lunda political model. Luba-speaking groups such as the Sanga and the Luapula Bemba to the southeast, who belonged to the Lunda political system rather than that of the *mulopwe*, have distinct verbs: *-swana*, “to inherit a chiefly title,” and *-piana*, “to inherit from a parent.” Other Lunda titles are not widespread among the large Luba states, but exist in Kanyok or Kalundwe bordering the Aruund, with possible etymologies in their Luban speech forms, and thus seem to have been borrowed by the Ruund from their immediate kiLuba-speaking neighbors.

Other titles belong to an older heritage among the most closely related Bantu languages. *Mwant yav* is based on the generic term for “chief” or “lord,” replacing the proto-Bantu *mfumu* in these languages, plus the name of the dynasty’s founder. Many titles found across the Lunda world seem to have been coined among the aRuund during the development of the Lunda state model. They were then borrowed and imposed as parts of the overall architecture of a Lunda chieftainship.

Lunda expansion took place along an east-west axis, and to a lesser degree toward the south. In part, this reflects the easier communications across the savanna than in the rain forest to the north. This deep cultural sharing across the grasslands is also reflected in the older shift in Bantu languages from seven to five vowels as various groups pushed south into the savanna. The slave trade on the Atlantic coast (and perhaps, to a much lesser degree, the Indian Ocean trade in copper, slaves, and cloth) was a magnet directing expansion laterally toward the coast.

The Ruund did not expand significantly toward the more densely populated north among the Kete and Kanyok. The loosely-organized Kete appear to have been the closest linguistic and cultural kin of the Nkalany Ruund, but they resisted assimilation energetically enough to have been placed in Kasai province when the Belgians drew and redrew lines during the 1900s and 1930s, putting the Lunda who acknowledged the *mwant yav* in Kapanga territory and thus eventually in Katanga. Relationships were largely of slave raiding by the *mwant yav* and of resistance by the Kete. The Kanyok had a state tradition of their own, sharing a few titles and concepts with the Ruund but much more with their kiLuba-speaking kin to the

southeast and tshiLuba-speakers to their northwest. Kanyok and Ruund remember military campaigns between them as well as alliances against others, showing both conflict and cooperation among these neighboring states.

Before the 1750s Lunda captains were operating in both the Kwango valley of the modern Yaka and in north central Angola among those who became the Shinje Lunda and had already established themselves. Likewise, the *mwata kazembe* governorship on the Luapula River in northeastern Zambia (see further) began about 1740. Western expansion was documented by the Portuguese. By 1807 the *mwant yav* was sending embassies directly to the Portuguese in Luanda.

The Kanyok language of the Luba group shares the lack of final vowels with Ruund, a phonological fashion that appears to have begun far to the northwest, extended east along the lower Kasai River, and peters out with them. This and what appears to be pioneering Lunda adoption of manioc cultivation in the far center of Africa suggests a possible earlier western trading network toward the Congo River that predated the eighteenth century Imbangala slave-cloth trade and its nineteenth century Chokwe-Ovimbundu replacement.

Political expansion was largely by “franchising.” The founder of the *kiamfu* state among the Yaka was kiLuba-speaking, as were the *mwata kazembe* and other Lunda captains spun out by an ephemeral expansion polity on the Mukulweji river in southern Katanga. The Luapula Lunda speak of a cowskin belt given as a token of naturalization as a Lunda chief. The ideology of perpetual kinship and a chiefly system somewhat separated from kinship groups was a flexible political cement, holding heterogeneous groups together under the umbrella of the *want yav*, “the power of Yav,” and of an often fictive *kwol kwetw*, “our home village.”

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Luo: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Luo.

Lusaka

Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, was not initially founded as the administrative center of the country. The origin of the city, which was founded in 1905, was related to the extension of the railway line from South Africa through southern Rhodesia to the Broken Hill (Kabwe) mine. During the construction of the railway line, it was decided that sidings would be established at twenty-mile intervals. This process determined the location of Lusaka.

Initially Lusaka was located in the Chilanga subdistrict of the Luangwa district, the headquarters since 1905. The headquarters remained at Chilanga until 1931, when it moved to Lusaka.

In 1913 a village management board for Lusaka was established. During World War I, the area under the jurisdiction of the Village Management Board was extended northward to include areas where considerable suburban development had taken place. The increase in European settlement in the Lusaka area necessitated the enactment of the Lusaka Township Regulations in 1922. Further extension of the administrative area was done in 1928 to the east, where another considerable white settlement had developed.

Europeans were attracted to the area because of cheap land sold by the Northern Copper Company, which did not find any minerals in the area. The township began with a farm settlement by G. B. Marrapodi, an Italian contractor who was granted extensive farm land to the north and northeast of the siding. The Dutch Reformed Church was established on one of Marrapodi's farms. In 1912 a hotel, which became the Lusaka Hotel, was opened. The growing European and African population necessitated the establishment of an administrative body for Lusaka. By 1931 there were 1,961 Africans and 433 Europeans in Lusaka.

The economy of Lusaka was originally agriculturally based. Lusaka developed into a commercial center for the farming population of the area. Lusaka was

emerging as a commercial center, as opposed to an administrative center, for the country.

The status of the region changed in July 1931 when the colonial government decided to build a new capital city in Lusaka, which was chosen for its centrality in the country following the amalgamation of northeastern and northwestern Rhodesia in 1911. Lusaka was subsequently transformed into the country's capital. The governor and other government departments and officials relocated to Lusaka from Livingstone in 1935.

Because of the outbreak of World War II in 1939, very little was done to implement plans for the new capital in line with Professor S. D. Adshead's report, which had been submitted in April 1931. However, after the war, Lusaka experienced an influx of European settlers. Lusaka also experienced a growing demand for industrial plots of land. These developments changed the character of Lusaka from a retail commercial center into an industrial town. The Village Management Board was replaced by the Lusaka Management Board, which undertook the expansion of Lusaka in response to the increasing European and African population.

By 1963 it was evident that Lusaka was not a settler city like cities in the south. During the federal period (1953–1963), the African population of Lusaka grew rapidly, forcing the administration to address this increase in development. Lusaka had emerged as a major employment center because of the shift of the seat of the colonial government. After the war, Lusaka had developed heavy industries and bulk storage sites.

When the federation was dissolved in 1963 and Zambia gained its independence in October 1964, Lusaka assumed a new and more powerful status, becoming the capital of Zambia. In anticipation of the coming independence in 1964, Lusaka's infrastructure was further developed through the construction of the University of Zambia (the first phase was completed in 1965), Lusaka International Airport (completed in 1967), a new national assembly, and the Mulungushi House complex on Independence Avenue to house government departments and ministries. In addition new hotels were built to provide accommodation for the many visitors to the country whose entry port was Lusaka, especially those arriving by air. The University Teaching Hospital, the main referral hospital in the country, is located in Lusaka.

Lusaka was planned as a garden city, to facilitate agricultural activities within the city limits and in the residential areas. However, this concept was increasingly ignored or disregarded by development projects. Areas that were previously left for greenery were built up as pressure for real estate grew in the city, especially during the Second Republic. By the 1990s, Lusaka had lost much of its earlier beauty because of unplanned developments in the city.

Lusaka has hosted several important regional and world conferences. In April 1969 Lusaka hosted the East and Central Africa Summit Conference, which led to the signing of the Lusaka Manifesto on relations with Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. In 1970 Lusaka hosted the Non-Aligned Conference of heads of state and government. The hosting of that conference necessitated the building of the Mulungushi International Conference Center near the National Assembly. In 1995 Lusaka hosted the peace talks between the Angolan government and UNITA, generally referred to as the Lusaka Protocol. In July 1999 Lusaka hosted peace talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and rebel forces, which culminated in the signing of a ceasefire agreement. These significant events have earned Lusaka the moniker of Africa's "City of Peace." In September 1999 Lusaka hosted the eleventh ICASA world conference of AIDS.

Lusaka has grown to a vibrant city of 2 million people. The infrastructure of Lusaka continues to grow and a new shopping complex, the Manda Hill Shopping Mall, was built in 1998–1999. Because of the increase in commercial activities in the city, the business district has expanded, with some companies operating from previously exclusively residential areas.

The growth of Lusaka led to the development of Kafue Township some thirty miles to the south, which operates as Lusaka's heavy industrial area. Kafue is home to the Kafue Nitrogen Chemicals Company and the Kafue Textiles Company.

BIZECK J. PHIRI

See also: **Zambia.**

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Luthuli, Albert John Mavumbi (1898–1967)

Antipartheid Politician

Winner of a Nobel Peace Prize in 1960, Albert Luthuli was a politician and a leading figure in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa from the apartheid system.

Luthuli was a product of Christian Mission Schools at both the primary and secondary levels. He served, at various times within South Africa, as chairman of the Congregational Churches of the American Board; president of the Natal Mission Conference; and the executive director of the Christian Council of South Africa. In addition, he attended religious conferences in Madras, India, in 1938, and in the United States of America in 1948. Luthuli's belief in the teaching of Christianity was to be reflected in his political outlook, in which passive, nonviolent resistance to injustice was regarded not only as the correct opposition tactic but also a spiritual force in itself.

In 1935 Albert Luthuli was made the chief of the Abasemakloweni Zulu and this warranted his relocation to his home town, Groutville, to administer justice. After a few years of service on various race–relations committees in South Africa, Luthuli joined the African National Congress (ANC) in 1945, rising rapidly through the ranks to the presidency of the Natal province branch in 1951. As a traditional ruler, Luthuli threw his influence behind the struggle against the apartheid government in South Africa. In 1952, for instance, when, in protest against the government's discriminatory policy, a defiance campaign in which race laws were deliberately violated was jointly launched by the ANC and South African Indian Congress, Luthuli openly supported the campaign and encouraged his people to participate in it. This open involvement in nationalist politics was opposed by the government. Consequently, in October 1952 the government ordered him to choose between his membership of the ANC and his chieftainship; but he refused to do either. The government reacted by deposing him of his chieftaincy in November, restricting him to his village. Barely a month after, Luthuli was elected president general of the ANC while the restriction order was still in force. He remained the ANC president until his death.

Meanwhile, following the lifting of the restriction order in 1954, Luthuli flew to Johannesburg to protest a scheme in which Africans were deprived of their remaining land rights in Johannesburg and were ordered to leave the suburb of Sophiatown and resettle in the new location of Meadowlands. He was not only prevented from speaking but served a further two-year ban by the government. He was arrested in December 1956 along with 145 other leaders of ANC and charged for high treason but released a year later with 66 others.

In May 1959, after addressing mass meetings of nonwhites and whites in western Cape Province, Luthuli was again placed under house arrest in his village and banned from all gatherings under the Suppression of Communism Act, a broad statute employed indiscriminately against all opponents of apartheid. In March 1960

the restriction order was relaxed to enable him to attend his trial for treason. On his way to Johannesburg on March 26 to give evidence at the trial, Luthuli publicly burned the pass that he, like all Africans, was required to carry, as a protest against the massacre of hundreds of Africans on March 21 that year during a peaceful demonstration at Sharpeville. He also called for a national day of mourning on March 28 in honor of those killed by the police during the Sharpeville incident.

With Luthuli at the head of the ANC of various levels from 1945 to 1967, the organization completed its transformation from an assembly of notables into a popular nationalist movement. Admittedly, Luthuli was unable to play an assertive part in ANC campaign, due to his frequent imprisonment or the government's constant banning orders that confined him, most of the time to Groutville. Nonetheless, his resilience in spite of all the rigid restrictions, coupled with his strong advocacy for moderation and nonviolence in his struggle for full political, economic, and social rights for the oppressed Africans made him a national hero and earned him international respect and support. Not surprisingly, therefore, in 1960 Luthuli won the Nobel Peace Prize, which was awarded to him the following year in Norway. While accepting the award, he remarked unequivocally that the prize was a tribute not only to himself but to all democrats of all races, particularly the Africans, who had endured and suffered for so long in seeking a peaceful resolution to the problem of race relations in South Africa.

Luthuli's 1962 book, *Let My People Go*, which was partly his autobiography and partly a history of the ANC, further enhanced his reputation for its contents and scholarly presentation. The ban on the ANC was still in force when Albert Luthuli died in Durban on July 21, 1967, in what appears to many as a premeditated murder.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: 1952–1960.

Biography

Born in 1899 in Salisbury (now Harare) in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Luthuli grew up in Groutville in the Natal Province of South Africa. Son of a Congregationalist Mission interpreter and preacher, young Luthuli attended Mission Primary School, Adams College, a Mission secondary school in Natal, where his academic brilliance shone forth and was rewarded with a scholarship to Fort Hare University. However, he turned down the offer in order to work and earn money to support his family. Luthuli became an instructor of Zulu history and literature at Adams College from 1921 to 1936 when he was made a chief

by his people, the Abasemakloleni Zulu. Consequently, Luthuli relocated to Groutville. Luthuli entered politics in 1945 as a member of the ANC. In 1952 he was deposed from his chieftancy and elected ANC president, a position in which he served until his death in 1967. He was awarded the Nobel Peace for 1960. In 1962 Luthuli was elected rector of the University of Glasgow but was not allowed to travel to Britain for his installation. Luthuli died in Durban, South Africa on July 21, 1967.

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Luwum, Janani (1922–1977)

Archbishop of Uganda

Janani Luwum was born in 1922 in Mucwini, a village in northern Uganda. He belonged to the Acholi ethnic group. His father, Eliya Okello, was one of the early converts to Christianity in the area and a teacher. Janani Luwum did not start primary school until age ten, but he performed very well and joined Gulu High School, some eighty miles away. After high school, Janani joined Boroboro Teacher Training College in Lira, run by the Church Missionary Society. By this time, Janani was a nominal Christian. He completed his teacher training in 1942 and was posted to teach in Puranga Primary School in his home district.

The turning point in Janani's life came on January 6, 1948, when, during a Christian convention, he became a "born again" Christian, and a member of the *balokole* group. The *balokole*, a Luganda word meaning "saved ones," was an East African revival movement that started in the 1930s. At his conversion, Janani declared that he had become a leader in Christ's army and was prepared to die for Jesus Christ, should that be God's will. Janani became a fiery and demanding evangelist. He decried smoking and drinking and urged others to repent and turn to Christ. He decided to leave teaching in order to go into full-time ministry with the church of Uganda.

In January 1949, Janani joined Buwalasi Theological College. At the end of his course, he was posted to St. Philip's Church in Gulu as a lay reader. The bishop was so happy with his work that he sent him back to Buwalasi in 1953 for an ordination course, and he was ordained a deacon in December 1955. Keith Russell, the new bishop of northern Uganda, wanted to prepare

a new generation of church leader who would take over from the missionaries. It was through his influence that Janani obtained sponsorship for a course at St. Augustine's College in Canterbury, England.

Upon his return in 1959, the bishop posted him to what he considered the toughest parish in his diocese, Lira Palwo. The parish had twenty-four churches, communication was poor, church offerings were few, and there was little devotion to the church in the region. As this was the eve of political independence, political parties and political activity diverted people's attention from the church. Luwum worked hard but met with little success. In 1962 he was appointed vice principal of Buwalasi Theological College, but soon afterward he returned to England to study at the London College of Divinity. He returned in 1965 and was made the principal of Buwalasi Theological College.

In 1966 Luwum became the provincial secretary of the church of Uganda and he moved to Kampala. This was a difficult time in the country as well as in the church. In 1966 Uganda experienced its first political crisis, which forced the Kabaka (king) into exile. Archbishop Leslie Brown was succeeded by Sabiti, a non-Baganda. These developments angered the Baganda, and Luwum, as provincial secretary, had to deal with the ensuing difficulties. In 1968 he was appointed bishop of the newly created diocese of northern Uganda. He was consecrated in January 1969 in a colorful ceremony attended by high-ranking politicians, and security officers including Idi Amin, who was then chief of the Uganda Army.

Luwum took on the weakest diocese in the province. The church congregation had dwindled, the buildings were in a state of disrepair, some clergy had resigned, and donations to the church were extremely low. Janani worked hard to improve the situation but met with little success. The situation worsened after the coup d' état led by Idi Amin on January 25, 1971. Thousands of soldiers originating from Acholi were killed. There was intense suffering, bitterness, and fear, and Luwum worked hard to bring God's comfort to the people.

In 1974 Luwum became the archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire. All Asians had been expelled from the country in 1972, the economy was collapsing, prices were rocketing, and people were dying. Relations between the church and state continued to deteriorate as the church leaders condemned the government's brutality and unjust treatment of the people. Meanwhile, opposition to the government was growing, and President Amin began to see the church as an enemy of the government. On January 30, 1977, Amin met with his advisers to discuss the situation and they drew up a plan to eliminate all opposition, with Luwum high on their list of suspected dissidents.

On February 5, 1977, armed men raided the archbishop's house, searching for weapons. The following week, the Protestant bishops met to discuss, among other things, the raid on Luwum's house. They drafted a strong and frank memorandum to the president expressing their disapproval of the government. The president refused to meet with the bishops. On February 14, he summoned Luwum and accused him of plotting to overthrow the government. Amin called a meeting of all government officials, members of the armed forces, ambassadors, and religious leaders. The vice president chaired the meeting and publicly accused the archbishop of plotting with the former president Milton Obote to overthrow the government. Luwum was arrested, together with two cabinet ministers. The next morning, newspaper headlines informed the country that they died in a car accident while trying to escape, although it was widely accepted that they had, in fact, been murdered by Amin's regime. Janani Luwum was proclaimed the first martyr of the church of Uganda's second century, in a memorial service.

FILDA OJOK

See also: **Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979.**

Biography

Born in 1922 in Mucwini, a village in northern Uganda. Attended Gulu High School and Boroboro Teacher Training College. Completed his teacher training in 1942 and was posted to teach in Puranga Primary School. Became a "born again" Christian, January 6, 1948. Named archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire in 1974. Died February 17, 1977.

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M

Ma' al-'Aynayn (1830–1910)

Shaykh, Religious Scholar, and Political Leader

Ma' al-'Aynayn is the more familiar nickname of the Sufi shaykh, religious scholar, and political leader Sidi al-Mustafa Wuld Muhammad Fadil. Ma' al-'Aynayn's father was Muhammad Fadil Wuld Mamin (d.–1868) whose Sufi teachings he helped to disseminate throughout the western Sahara and Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century.

A member of the pastoral nomadic Ahl Jih al-Mukhtar, Ma' al-'Aynayn was a prodigious student said to shun all distractions in order to pursue his studies. He completed his early education with various members of the Ahl Jih al-Mukhtar before passing under his father's tutelage. Roughly a decade later, Muhammad Fadil acknowledged Ma' al-'Aynayn's mastery of the esoteric and exoteric religious sciences by bestowing on him the ceremonial turban of a shaykh that authorized him to transmit his teachings to others.

Ma' al-'Aynayn left the Hodh in 1857 en route to the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina in order to complete the *hajj*. In Marrakech he gained an audience with the Moroccan sultan's heir apparent Sidi Muhammad and followed this meeting by a visit with Sultan 'Abd al-Rahman in Meknes. Impressed by his guest and perhaps aware of Muhammad Fadil's reputation, 'Abd al-Rahman arranged for Ma' al-'Aynayn to accompany members of the Sultan's family who were departing for Arabia by steamer. This auspicious introduction began a lifelong association between the shaykh and the Moroccan ruling family.

Upon returning from the *hajj*, Ma' al-'Aynayn settled briefly in the town of Tinduf on the desert's northern edge where he married among the Tajakant, whose organization of caravans between Moroccan and Algerian cities in the north, and southern Saharan towns such as Timbuktu and Arawan, revived Tinduf in

the latter half of the nineteenth century. Ma' al-'Aynayn next embarked on a several year period during which he traveled widely in the western Saharan regions of Saqiyat al-Hamra', Tiris, and the Adrar, in many cases contracting marriages among the people with whom he came into contact, and in the process gaining a following drawn to him by his growing reputation as a mystic, mediator, and miracle worker. The social bonds symbolized in these marriage contracts endured beyond the actual marriages, most of which quickly ended in divorce, and reputedly, the shaykh married 116 times without exceeding the Quranic proscription of four concurrent wives. By the time Ma' al-'Aynayn returned to his father's camp in the Hodh in 1862, he remained just long enough to receive his shaykh's blessing to return permanently to that region of the northwestern Sahara, where he had already established himself as an important religious and political figure.

Ma' al-'Aynayn's standing with the 'Alawi rulers of Morocco continued to grow throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, aided by highly placed followers in the royal court. Moroccan Sultan Hassan's head of the imperial guard Idris b. Ya'ish and more importantly, his royal chamberlain Ahmad b. Musa, better known as Ba Ahmad were both Ma' al-'Aynayn's disciples. The Sultan in turn sought to use the shaykh's influence in the Saqiyat al-Hamra' as a means of extending Moroccan hegemony there and shoring up his southern defenses against increasing European incursions. From the mid-1880s, Hassan recognized Ma' al-'Aynayn as his *khalifa* or official representative over the lands between Tarfaya and Dakhla on the Atlantic coast.

Ma' al-'Aynayn had continued to live a predominantly nomadic existence until the late 1890s. Then, with financial and logistical support from the new sultan, the adolescent 'Abd al-Aziz, whose grand vizier and now de facto ruler was the disciple Ba Ahmad, Ma' al-'Aynayn undertook the construction of a large walled compound

at a site known as Smara in the Saqiyat al-Hamra'. A visitor to Smara at the turn of the century testified to the tremendous attraction this structure in the desert had on the region's nomadic inhabitants. Ahmad al-Shinqiti states that no less than 10,000 people were living in tents around Smara, all cared for by the caravans that arrived daily bringing supplies. Smara's importance as a trade entrepot had increased greatly at that time due to a protracted struggle between the Tajakant and their rivals the Tekna that decimated Tinduf and diverted most of the trade westward to Smara. News of a more aggressive French colonial expansion emanating from their post at Saint Louis on the Senegal River also arrived with the caravans. Ba Ahmad and Ma'al-'Aynayn attempted to counter French expansion along the desert's southern edge by sending emissaries along the caravan routes offering the Sultan's backing in resisting the French.

The murder in 1905 of Mauritania's first colonial commissioner General Xavier Coppolani hastened the military conquest northward toward Smara. French colonial sources implicated Ma'al-'Aynayn in Coppolani's death, although there is no conclusive evidence that he played a direct role in the attack carried out in the central Mauritanian town of Tijikja. However, Ma'al-'Aynayn was actively engaged in resistance efforts, calling for a jihad against the French and using his influence with the Sultan to secure arms and ammunition, while several of his sons directly engaged French forces in battle. By 1909 the French had advanced as far as the Adrar, forcing Ma'al-'Aynayn, his family, and followers to evacuate Smara for Tiznit in Morocco's Sus region. From Tiznit, Ma'al-'Aynayn set out for Fez where, some historians assert, he intended to seize power from Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz, whose overthrow of 'Abd al-Aziz the shaykh had initially supported after 'Abd al-Aziz signed the Act of Algenciras in 1906. Forced to turn back before reaching Fez by a large French military presence, Ma'al-'Aynayn returned to Tiznit where he died on October 28, 1910.

Ma'al-'Aynayn left a substantial written legacy dominated by works on Sufism and Islamic jurisprudence that also covered a wide and eclectic range of topics. Popularly ascribed authorship of over 400 works, less than 100 can be identified with verifiable titles. Forty-three of his writings, or approximately one-fourth of all book titles published in Morocco between 1891 and 1900, were lithographed in Fez largely with Ba Ahmad's financial backing.

GLEN W. MCLAUGHLIN

See also: Western Sahara: Nineteenth Century to the Present.

Biography

Born in approximately 1831 in the Hodh region of southeastern Mauritania. After being educated by the

Ahl Jih al-Mukhtar and his father, Ma'al-'Aynayn left the Hodh in 1857 for Mecca and Medina in order to complete the *hajj*. Settled briefly in Tinduf. Traveled for several years in the western Saharan regions of Saqiyat al-Hamra', Tiris, and the Adrar. Returned to the Hodh in 1862. Nomadic up until the late 1890s, when he undertook construction of the compound at Smara. Engaged in anticolonial resistance efforts. Called for a jihad against the French. Evacuated Smara for Tiznit in Morocco. Died in Tiznit on October 28, 1910.

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Maasai: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Eastern Nilotes: Maasai.

Macaulay, Herbert (1864–1946)

Nigerian Politician and Nationalist Leader

From 1898 until his death in 1946, Herbert Macaulay, more than any other individual, dominated the politics of Lagos. Having grown up in a rigidly Victorian household, as assimilated and Europeanized as any African elite of his time, Macaulay was not opposed to British imperialism as such. He was neither a revolutionary nor a demagogue as the colonial officials and his enemies portrayed him. Liberalism was his creed. With an acute sense of history, he espoused a doctrine of democratic self-government for the colonies based on justice and equality, within the British commonwealth, all of which ran counter to the ideology of colonial government and white supremacy prevalent in his time. With characteristic passion and great vigor, he threw himself into every political controversy in Lagos, never for once looking back, conceding defeat, or compromising. A great pamphleteer and propagandist, a man of unusual intellectual and social talents, he directed his bitter, but biting and effective invectives against all policies and practices of the colonial administration that he considered objectionable and against the interests of the Nigerian peoples, as he perceived them.

In case after case, and with the aid of his newspaper, *The Lagos Daily News*, Macaulay became a tireless and outspoken critic of British imperialism. As early as 1905, he published a scathing attack on the British deportation and imprisonment of two leading chiefs of Ilesa and took special exception to the jaundiced reporting of the case in the British Press, which described the victims as “nigger chiefs.” His wars against what he repeatedly described as the British arbitrary use of power, ruthless disregard of common courtesy, and arrogant indifference to pledges and assurances, would bring him into many confrontations with the government, while making him a popular hero among the masses.

In 1908 Macaulay launched a campaign against a proposed water rate or tax and against the Hausa Land Ordinance, which gave the colonial government wide power to acquire any land in the country. In another pamphlet he exposed a scandal in the Nigerian Railway, which the colonial administration was trying to cover up. He was one of the leading figures in the White Colonial Church question, which demanded leadership positions for Africans in the church. Between 1912 and 1913, he was the spokesman of the Lagos Auxiliary of the Aborigines Protection Society and was appointed to lead a delegation of the society to London to testify against land acquisition before a British parliamentary committee. But on the eve of his departure, he was arrested, charged with perjury, and sentenced to five years imprisonment, even though the five assessors of the court had each returned a verdict of not guilty.

The crisis over land came to a head in the celebrated Chief Oluwa’s Apapa Land case. Chief Oluwa, with the active support and advice of Macaulay, sued the Lagos government and demanded full compensation for the government acquisition of his family land at Apapa. When he lost the case in Nigeria, Chief Oluwa, accompanied by Macaulay, took the case to the Privy Council in London. The Privy Council upheld Chief Oluwa’s appeal for full compensation. Thus instead of the 500 pounds offered by the government, Chief Oluwa in the end collected a check of 22,500 pounds. Apart from bringing Macaulay into the limelight, the Oluwa case was a landmark in Nigerian history. To the chagrin of the colonial administration, the case established the principle of compensation for the chiefs as absolute owners of the land. Hardly had the dust of this case settled, when Macaulay again became embroiled in another case involving the *Eleko* or ruler of Lagos, Esugbayi. The trouble began with certain press interviews that Macaulay granted in London speaking about the plight of the *Eleko* and sharply criticizing the colonial administration. The Lagos government demanded that the *Eleko* publicly denounce Macaulay. When the *Eleko* refused, he was suspended, then

deposed, and later deported. Macaulay launched a tenacious campaign in Nigeria as well as in England to have the *Eleko* reinstated. Eleven years later in 1931, and with the ascension of a new governor, the *Eleko* was restored back to his throne.

Macaulay’s popularity transcended the confines of Lagos. Leaders of the Itsekiri and Urhobo invited him to represent them in their struggle against British oppression. The chiefs of Benin wrote him to express their appreciation of his kindness to Benin people resident in Lagos. In 1937 the Igbo people of Ogidi in eastern Nigeria, got him to write a petition to the government requiring a council for them. His involvement in organized politics led him to found the first political party in Nigeria, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Though he could not contest election, because of his earlier convictions, he remained the principal force behind the party that dominated and won every election held in Nigeria between 1923 and 1938, when the more radical Nigerian Youth Movement seized the initiatives. In 1944, two years before his death at the age of eighty-two, he became the first president of the first modern political party in Nigeria, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroun, a party largely organized by Nnamdi Azikwe, who became its first general secretary.

Macaulay was admired by many in his lifetime and memorialized, decades after his death, on the Nigerian currency as the “Father of Nigerian Nationalism” and thus of modern Nigeria. However, he also had many enemies, by whom he was criticized as self-centered, egocentric, vindictive, and of suspicious motives. While whatever might be said of Macaulay’s motives and flamboyant styles, no one would deny his personal charm, his dignified bearing, his generosity to the less fortunate, and his genuine sympathy for indigenous cultures and institutions. Equally impressive was his ability to identify with, connect to, and inspire the populace. In the defense of their interests he deployed his power of erudition, his indefatigable skill as a journalist and bibliophile.

FUNSO AFOLAYAN

See also: **Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence.**

Biography

Born in Lagos in November 1864. Started elementary school in 1869 and attended CMS Grammar School, Lagos, 1877–1880. Joined the Lagos Civil Service as a clerk in 1881. Left for England in July 1890. Studied surveying and civil engineering at Plymouth and music and piano tuning in London. Returned to Lagos in September 1893 and was appointed Surveyor of Crown’s Land, a position he occupied till 1898, when he resigned and obtained a license for private practice.

That same year, he married Caroline Pratt, who died a year later. From 1908 onward, he became involved in several cases and issues that repeatedly brought him into conflicts with the colonial administration. Notable among these were his pamphlet on the Railways (1908), his involvement in the Apapa Land Case (1920–1921), the Gunpowder Plot Rumor Case (1928), and the deposition and reinstatement of Eleko Esugbayi (1920–1931). Was imprisoned twice by the colonial administration. Founded the NNDP in 1923 and became the president of the NCNC in 1944. Became sick in the course of a national NCNC political tour and was brought back home to Lagos, where he died on May 7, 1946.

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
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Madagascar: Prehistory and Developments to c.1500

Madagascar, the fourth largest island in the world (area 587,000 square km), lies in the southwest Indian Ocean, separated from Mozambique on mainland Africa by some 230 kilometres. It, like India, separated from the vast continent of Gondwanaland some 200 million years ago, before the evolution of the larger mammals, and remained isolated from human contact until a relatively modern era.

The origins of the Malagasy are one of the great remaining historical mysteries. The issue is significant both in terms of the history of Madagascar and because of what it reveals about pre-Islamic, trans-Indian Ocean trade networks. Since at least the sixteenth century, visitors to the island observed two main physiognomic types, “Negroid” and “Malay-Indonesian.” The majority view until the 1970s was based on Grandidier, who held



Madagascar.

that Austronesians were the first to settle Madagascar. Impelled by a sense of adventure, they left their Indonesia-Pacific homelands and sailed directly across the Indian Ocean in successive fleets of outrigger canoes. Kon-Tiki-style expeditions have since confirmed that such voyages are possible. Since the 1970s, most scholars have followed Ferrand, a contemporary of Grandidier, in proposing an Indonesian migratory route that followed the old maritime network along the northern rim of the Indian Ocean, from Indonesia to Sri Lanka and India, and from there to East Africa via the Persian Gulf and Arabia.

There exist some traditions of autonomous African migrations to Madagascar, but, in the absence of African oceanic sailing technology, it is more likely that Africans either intermarried with Austronesians prior to their settlement of Madagascar, or accompanied the latter, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Slavery was introduced into Madagascar by outsiders as a consequence of prior involvement in a long-distance maritime slave trade. Genetic studies support the view that the forefathers of most present-day Malagasy originated from Bantu-speaking East Africa and from the Austronesian world.

The issue of timing is also contentious. Grandidier speculated that migrations to the island started during the last millennia BCE and continued through to the early centuries CE. Dahl, on the basis of the scarcity of Sanskrit terms in the Malagasy language, argued for a departure from Indonesia in the first centuries CE. Evidence of Indonesian cultural influence in East Africa,

but a lack of tangible evidence of Indonesian settlement there has led most historians to argue that the island was settled prior to the expansion of Islam, at the latest by the middle of the first millennium. However, archaeologists have to date found no firm evidence of human settlement in Madagascar prior to the eighth century. Thus, the evidence to date supports the view that the human species, which arguably first developed in Africa, probably did not colonize the largest African island until the eighth or ninth century, and that although some groups were African, others were wholly or predominantly Austronesian, thus constituting the most western outreach of this family of peoples.

From the seventh century, Muslims dominated the main trading routes of the Indian Ocean, and in the east African region an Islamic-Swahili economy flourished from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. Coastal entrepôts of importance were established not only along the east African coast but also on the northwest and northeast coasts of Madagascar, controlled by "Arab" groups (the *Antalaotra*) from the Swahili coast, Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and Indians (the *Karany*). However, in 1223 a Malagasy force temporarily seized Aden, a key entrepôt in east-west maritime trade, while direct commercial contact between Indonesia and Madagascar continued, at least intermittently, until the thirteenth century and possibly until the start of the sixteenth century, when tradition has it that the Merina, the most "Austronesian" looking, and from about 1800, the economically and politically dominant people of the island, first reached Madagascar.

The settlement pattern was largely dictated by geographic and climatic factors. The island possesses a high central plateau that, running on a north-south axis almost the entire length of the island, divides the narrow eastern littoral from the western plains. The east coast has a tropical climate and was covered with thick forests; the inland region is mountainous, infertile, and largely temperate. The western plains, covered variously with forests, bushes, and grass, has a varied climate; the north being semitropical and the south largely desert. The ease of coastal navigation and the physical barriers to travel into the interior meant that settlement extended from the northwest southward down the western littoral and along the northern and eastern coasts. Significant colonization of the high plateau interior occurred probably only in the second millennium. The size, topography, climate, relative isolation, and "virgin" nature of Madagascar ensured that such colonization was a slow process, resulting in small dispersed and largely self-sufficient settlements whose affairs were governed by chiefs guided by a group of elders.

The mixture of Indonesian, African, and Arabic was reflected in the material culture of the Malagasy. The

original settlers brought aspects of Indonesian material culture, notably riziculture, banana cultivation, rectangular house construction, and outrigger canoes. By origin a maritime people, they also took readily to fishing. African influence was also strong. Large groups of Bantu speakers existed on the west coast of Madagascar as late as the start of the seventeenth century and the raising of zebu, cattle originally imported from East Africa, became one of the principle economic activities in western and southern Madagascar. However, only communities on the northwest and northeast coasts remained in constant contact with the Muslim-dominated commercial network of the Indian Ocean, which exported natural products like tortoiseshell, beeswax, and honey. In return, it absorbed some of the commodities shipped from the east African hinterland, and commodities shipped from other regions of the long distance maritime trade network, including Indian glass beads, silk, and Chinese porcelain. Such commerce was facilitated by the regularization of direct voyages (using the monsoon) between western India and East Africa, and including Madagascar, and the gradual expansion of human settlement into the interior of the island.

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Madagascar: Malagasy Kingdoms, Evolution of

The evolution of kingdoms in Madagascar was closely linked to economic developments and to Muslim ideology. Madagascar was first settled sometime during the first millennium by a proto-Malagasy people of mixed Austronesian-African genetic heritage. Originally seafaring traders, they first colonized the coasts of Madagascar. Settlements were initially small and scattered, relatively concentrated populations developing only in ports on the northwest and northeast coasts linked to the Indian Ocean maritime network and in fertile valleys, notably in the northwest and in the southeast where rice was cultivated. Not until the mid-second millennium did communities of any size develop in the sterile plateau.

By the close of the first millennium, the main ports were dominated by the Silamo, Islamized trading groups of Arabic (*Antalaotra*) and Indian (*Karany*) origin. They imported an ideology of royalty that, of limited

scope in the scattered coastal trading communities, proved extremely valuable in controlling the inputs of land and labor vital to agricultural production in the hinterland. The ideology of kingship became particularly pronounced in the comparatively densely populated valleys of southeast Madagascar from the fourteenth century with the establishment of Antalaoatra dynasties claiming to have come from Mecca. The east coast of Madagascar was until the seventeenth century marginal to the maritime trading network and denied constant contact with their Antalaoatra colleagues on the northwest coast, the ruling elites in the southeast of the island adopted the Malagasy language and most Malagasy customs. They nevertheless retained the ideology of kingship, buttressed by the possession of the sorabe, sacred writings in Arabic characters, knowledge of which was closely guarded by a small group with sacerdotal influence called the ombiasy.

Under Antalaoatra influence a number of petty kingdoms developed in the southeast; they may have influenced the principalities that emerged in the southern part of the central plateau (Betsileo). However, there is debate over the origins of the first large and relatively centralized Malagasy kingdoms that emerged among the Sakalava of west Madagascar during the seventeenth century and the Merina of the high central plateau from the close of the eighteenth century. Some scholars hold that ombiasy carried the ideology of kingship across southern Madagascar to Menabe, thus stimulating the rise of the first large Sakalava kingdom, and that that ideology spread progressively northward up the west coast, promoting the creating of the Ambongo and Iboina kingdoms. Kent rather holds that the kingdom of Menabe was the creation of migrants of mixed Austronesian-African origin from Great Zimbabwe. Whatever the case, the magical and divinatory powers of the ombiasy were certainly much appreciated by ruling elites and were officially employed by the first sovereigns of the united Merina kingdom at the end of the eighteenth century and start of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the basis upon which both the Sakalava and Merina kingdoms were built was economic rather than ideological.

Madagascar long lay on the periphery of the Indian Ocean trading system which linked the regions bordering the northern part of the Indian Ocean. Critical to this commercial network were the monsoons, a particularly stable system of winds and currents that facilitated maritime sail. Only the north and northwest of Madagascar were connected to this system, most of the island lying beyond its reach, isolated from sizeable markets. This changed from the sixteenth century with the arrival in the Indian Ocean of rival European nations, for Madagascar lay on their route to the East, which passed the Cape of Good Hope. In consequence,

both southwest and east Madagascar became incorporated into Indian Ocean trade. Various attempts to found European colonies in the island failed, largely due to a hostile disease environment, but trading posts were maintained and Madagascar became a significant provisioning base and supplier of slaves to service European trading entrepôts, notably at the Cape and Batavia.

The impact of this was first felt most strongly in western Madagascar, which, unlike most of the east coast, possessed many protected anchorages, large tracts of agriculturally productive land (rice, maize, and cattle) and large rivers (e.g., the Mangoky, Tsiribihina, and Betsiboka) navigable far into the interior. It also possessed in the Silamo, a well-organized body of middlemen fully integrated into the Muslim dominated trade network of the northern Indian Ocean. Silamo leaders became the commercial advisers of Sakalava kings who were often sufficiently influenced to adopt Islam and marry their daughters to prominent Antalaoatra. Benefiting from burgeoning foreign trade, the Sakalava reduced most of northern and central Madagascar to tutelage.

In the late seventeenth century, European pirates hounded by the British and French navies from the West Indies maritime trade in the Indian Ocean, were also attracted to Madagascar where they established bases along the west and northern coasts of Madagascar. In the northeast, where they married into the families of the local Malagasy elite, their offspring formed the basis of the Betsimisaraka dynasty that came to rule over most of the eastern littoral. However, the rise of the Betsimisaraka dynasty owed little to traditional maritime trade. Rather, it was based upon the stimulus to the regional economy given by the rise of a plantation economy on the Mascarene Islands of Réunion and Mauritius from the mid-eighteenth century that swung the balance of commercial power from the west to the east coast of Madagascar. The Mascarenes specialized in labor-intensive cash crops for export, becoming heavily dependent upon imports of food and servile labor. Although some provisions and slaves were shipped from the coasts of East Africa and west Madagascar, east Madagascar constituted the closest and cheapest source of supply for the Mascarenes. In its turn, Mascarene demand stimulated the production of agricultural produce and export of slaves from eastern Madagascar. In part the latter was met by the coastal population, but the main source of slaves by the late eighteenth century was the plateau interior, where the adoption of drainage schemes and highly successful hydraulic rice cultivation had facilitated rapid growth in, and concentration of, population. The struggle to control the slave export trade, and the return trade in armaments, was similarly a decisive factor in the

emergence of the Merina kingdom in the late eighteenth century.

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Madagascar: Merina Kingdom, Nineteenth Century

In the mid-eighteenth century, Imerina, a small landlocked region in the largely sterile high central plateau of Madagascar, was plagued by famine and wracked by civil wars. By the 1890s it was politically united, economically self-sufficient and had become the trade center of the entire island. There were two main reasons for the political ascendance of the Merina. First, the Merina crown expanded agricultural production to the extent that it supported a sharp rise in population and the emergence of a significant specialist artisan sector. Second, from the mid-eighteenth century a plantation economy developed on the Mascarene islands of Réunion and Mauritius whose planters looked chiefly to Madagascar for provisions and slaves. The Merina crown, profiting from its ability to meet the demand for slaves, by the early nineteenth century emerged as the most powerful state in the island. It subsequently launched a program of imperial expansion, in an attempt to subject the entire island to Merina rule, which was halted by French colonial conquest in 1895.

The traditional historical interpretation is that the Merina unified all peoples of the island under a humane and modernizing monarchy, forging for the first time a Malagasy nationality. As a result of the 1820 British alliance, the Merina banned the slave export trade, received missionaries who founded a Western education system, artisans who helped construct the basis for one of the earliest attempted industrial revolutions in the world, and soldiers to create a well-equipped standing army. From the mid-nineteenth century, they introduced a constitutional monarchy, adopted Christianity as the official religion, and were among the first countries in the world to make schooling compulsory. Despite this, the French conquered Madagascar in 1895 under the banner of their “civilizing

mission.” The reaction was immediate and from 1895 to 1897 the island was wracked by the Menalamba uprising, one of the earliest nationalist revolts in African history.

The reality was different. In the mid-1820s, the Merina rejected the British alliance and adopted self-sufficient policies, central to which was the conquest of the entire island and the exploitation of its human and natural resources to promote the imperial Merina economy. *Fanompoana* (nonremunerated forced labor for the state) became the organizing principle of the imperial economy. As the state enjoyed monopoly control of everything of value, this labor tax for the free population included everything from military service and public works to industrial and agricultural labor.

The history of industrial *fanompoana* in the munitions factories from 1830 to 1857 is unique in precolonial Africa. At its height, the central Mantasoa complex comprised five factories with water-driven machines that produced a wide range of products but which specialized in the manufacture of muskets and cannon. It was constructed with a *fanompoana* force of 20,000, equivalent to about 5 per cent of adult males registered for *fanompoana* in Imerina, and was maintained with a permanent workforce of 5,000. *Fanompoana* was supplemented by slave labor: captives from imperial campaigns and imported African slaves.

From the mid-nineteenth century, the imperialist momentum slowed, but a general stagnation of trade from the late 1870s and the intensification of military conflict with the French precipitated the imperial Merina regime into bankruptcy. In consequence, it dramatically enlarged the scope and intensity of *fanompoana*, created largely through the state church (founded in 1869), which further supplied the ideology of empire; Christianity in subjugated regions became totally identified with Merina imperialism. Military conscription was applied to the Betsileo, and industrial forced labor was extended to include women and children. By the 1890s *fanompoana* reaching crisis proportions. In Imerina and Betsileo, which practiced finely balanced hydraulic cultivation of rice, even a few weeks absence during critical agricultural periods could bring economic ruin to a rural household.

Moreover, far from forging a common national identity, Merina imperial oppression and exploitation exacerbated ethnic tension and created an antipathy amongst non-Merina peoples toward the Merina that hindered the emergence of a “Malagasy” identity. Indeed, it could be argued that common antipathy toward the Merina forged a “national” consciousness amongst the Sakalava who, in the eighteenth century, had possessed a formidable empire to which the Merina had paid tribute, and who considered that the latter were a race apart; not of the original Malagasy stock, they

possessed lighter complexions than other peoples of the island, spoke a different dialect, and willingly cooperated with foreigners. Indeed, in some quarters an ideology of resistance developed that identified the Merina as a foreign imperial power.

From the 1880s *fanompoana* extended via the schools to children alienated Merina subjects who deserted both industrial projects and the land, resulting in the collapse of the industrial experiment and in an increasing incidence of harvest failure, famine, and disease. At the same time, incessant ethnic conflict frustrated the Merina vision of empire and limited their effective rule to, at maximum, one-third of the land surface of the island, comprising in the main the central plateau and most of the east coast. Moreover, as Merina military power started to wane from the 1850s, the Sakalava and Bara launched ever-increasing raids against the plateau heart of the Merina empire. Persecuted by the state and by the Sakalava and Bara warriors, ordinary subjects fled, often to form brigand groups whose depredations accentuated the plight of those who remained. By the late 1880s entire tracts of the plateau were deserted and famine and disease—malaria, smallpox, typhoid—increased, the latter often reaching epidemic proportions. When the French troops took the Merina capital in 1895, they were largely unopposed.

The majority view is that the *Menalamba* revolt of 1895–1897 was fueled by a patriotic desire to oppose unjustified French colonial pretensions and restore a united Malagasy kingdom. The revisionist view is that the French decision to impose a protectorate and rule through the existing Merina administrative structure ignited the anger of those—both Merina and non-Merina—who wished to see the swift demise of a corrupt and oppressive Merina regime. It is significant that the chief targets of the rebels were not the French, but rather the institutions and personnel, both indigenous and foreign, of the state church and schools—the primary means of recruitment of forced labor.

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See also: **Madagascar: Colonial Period: French Rule; Madagascar: Malagasy Kingdoms, Evolution of.**

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
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Madagascar: French Conquest, Colonization

For most of the eighteenth century, the British and French competed bitterly for ascendancy in the Indian Ocean, but victory in the Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815) gave predominance in the region to Britain. In the western Indian Ocean, Britain deprived France of its trading posts in Madagascar and of Mauritius and Réunion, returning only the latter to France in the postwar settlement. Stung by the loss of Mauritius, France continued to fight for influence over Madagascar, where it possessed considerable historical claims, based upon former settlements at Fort Dauphin (Taolanaro) (1642–1674), and subsequent trading posts, notably at Fort Dauphin and Antongil Bay. An 1818–1819 French expedition seized Nosy Boraha, an island off the east coast of Madagascar, and Tintingue and Fort Dauphin (Taolanaro) on the mainland. However, malaria decimated colonists, and the fall of Portal from government in Paris in 1821 resulted in the abandonment of a systematic colonial policy and the curtailment of imperial expansion on financial grounds.

Moreover, the British-trained Merina army seized the reoccupied French trading posts in Madagascar. Autarkic policies adopted from the mid-1820s led the Merina to reject both British and French influence in the island and to ban foreign access to Malagasy labor. This was anathema to Réunionnais planters who



Madagascar, eighteenth–nineteenth centuries.

depended on imports of cheap labor and provisions, of which Madagascar was the closest supplier. Their pleas for colonizing Madagascar were supported by the French Navy (and ultra-Royalists), which presented the island as the potential equivalent to France of Australia to Britain. In 1829 the government of Charles X briefly revived the imperial momentum: French forces backed a Betsimisaraka revolt on the east coast, where they attacked the main ports of Toamasina and Mahavelona. However, following the July 1830 Revolution, Louis Philippe (ruled 1830–1848) sought to appease British sentiment and in July 1831 French troops were withdrawn from mainland Madagascar, leaving as their sole Malagasy “dependency” the malarial island of Nosy Boraha. For the next half-century, French governments proved unwilling to engage in colonial ventures that might either offend Britain, the dominant global power, or burden the French treasury. Hence, while in 1841 ratifying treaties negotiated by the French Navy establishing protectorates over the neighboring islands of Mayotta and Nosy Be, the French government failed to heed calls for intervention in mainland Madagascar. This was the case even following the 1845 Merina ban on European trade and the 1848 emancipation measure that plunged Réunion into a prolonged economic crisis for which planters presented the colonization of Madagascar as a panacea. Indeed, from 1845 a *modus vivendi* was reached whereby France tacitly recognized British predominance in East Africa.

Thus, when in the early 1850s a group led by Rakoto Radama, heir apparent to the Merina throne, called for the French to intervene and establish a protectorate, Napoleon III refused. The latter desired imperial glory but was influenced less by the Saint-Simon school that stressed indirect rule and Catholic missionary activity more than direct rule. Indeed, in line with British policy, France in 1861, abolished colonial monopolies and adopted free trade—a policy even endorsed by the French Navy. Within this framework France in 1862 signed a treaty of “eternal friendship” with Radama II of Madagascar. The 1868 Franco-Merina treaty, while permitting freedom of access, movement, settlement, and trade to foreigners, as well as religious liberty, thus satisfying the bulk of the “open door” demands of Western powers, nevertheless recognized the Merina ban on both the freehold sale of land and the emigration of Malagasy labor.

From the late 1870s France’s attitude changed in favor of colonial expansion although not until the 1882 Egyptian affair was there a convergence of metropolitan and regional interests in favor of a forward movement in Madagascar: In 1883, de Mahy, the Réunion deputy and leader of a stop gap administration in France, started a conflict with the Merina that in

December 1885 ended in the cession to France of the port of Antsiranana (Diego-Suarez), an indemnity of 10 million francs and an ill-defined protectorate over the island. In 1886 France also declared a protectorate over all the neighboring Comoro islands.

The main pretext for intervention in Madagascar centered on the factors of French historic rights and its “civilizing mission.” The real motivation was the desire to preserve international status following military defeat by Germany in 1870–1871. The French feared that if they failed to react to what they perceived as British attempts to claim a monopoly in Africa from the mid-1870s, their national status would be further eroded. In Africa, Britain concentrated upon those regions deemed essential to its wider imperial interests; notably Egypt, South Africa, and Zanzibar. Thus Protestant missionary calls to support the Merina were ignored by the British government, which in 1890 signed a treaty recognizing French hegemony in Madagascar in return for French acceptance of British paramountcy in Zanzibar.

The French colonial cause was boosted by hopes of economic gain. The 1880s depression created a domestic audience receptive to arguments that colonies were a necessity for the employment of surplus domestic capital and industrial manufactures. These ideas converged with those of planters and traders on Réunion, suffering from depressed sugar prices following the conversion of France to sugar beet production, who viewed Madagascar as a potential field of settlement for its surplus and impoverished population. Madagascar not only possessed valuable tropical resources (forest products and plantations of coffee, cocoa, and spices), it also possessed gold the exploitation of which induced gold rushes to the island in 1891 and 1895.

However, forces within Madagascar that precipitated a crisis of the indigenous Merina aristocracy also played a major role in the French takeover of the island. Policies centered on self-reliance not only failed to stimulate an industrial revolution, but excessive exploitation of *fanompoana* (nonremunerated forced labor) undermined the traditional economy. The emphasis on *fanompoana* resulted in the flight of ordinary farmers from the land and created an increasingly vicious circle of social protest, famine, and disease. French pressure aggravated the situation, notably the imposition by France in 1885 of a \$2 million war indemnity. The Merina court reacted by increasing domestic taxation and *fanompoana*. By the early 1890s the cumulative effects of this had so critically undermined the economy that it precipitated a crisis. Merina subjects fled civil *fanompoana* and soldiers deserted the imperial army *en masse*, so that when Senegalese troops finally relieved the malaria-stricken French

expeditionary force of 1894, their passage to the Merina capital was virtually unopposed.

A widespread insurrection followed the French protectorate imposed in 1895. Traditionally interpreted as a nationalist revolt against the French, the uprising was primarily directed against the maintenance under the French protectorate of a Merina administration universally detested for its corruption and highly exploitative forced labor regime. Hence, the chief victims of the rebels were not the French, but the property and agents of the Merina state church, the institution through which *fanompoana* and other taxes were levied. The reaction of the French was, in the central provinces to replace Merina with French colonial administration, and in certain other regions, notably in Sakalava land, where there existed a strong tradition of independence, to grant a certain degree of indirect rule.

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Madagascar: Colonial Period: French Rule

It has traditionally been considered that colonization had a greater, mostly negative, impact upon colonized peoples than any other factor in history, except possibly the slave export trade. Subject to the dictates of the colonial administration, the Malagasy alongside other colonized peoples were exploited, and their economy distorted, for the benefit of the colonizing power.

In reality, French colonial aspirations in Madagascar were severely restrained by external and domestic forces, the major one of which was the fluctuations in the international economy. Thus the establishment of colonial rule in Madagascar was facilitated by the recovery in the international economy in the decade prior World War I and by high European demand for tropical produce during and immediately after the conflict. Prices remained relatively buoyant until the depression, when the colonial administration introduced



The port of Toamasina (Tamatave), eastern Madagascar, about 1930. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

protectionist measures designed to assist European settlers and companies.

A second external constraint was the climate. A cyclone strong enough to destroy 50 per cent to 80 per cent of plantation trees and cause considerable damage to the transport and ports infrastructure hits the east coast of Madagascar on average once every ten years. From 1939 to 1959, the region was visited by forty-nine cyclones, of which twenty-nine were of medium to severe velocity at over 100 miles an hour. Such natural factors, that accentuated the difficulties and thus cost of transport in an island of rugged terrain, isolated from most sizeable foreign markets, caused considerable year to year variations in the total value of trade.

The lack of labor constituted the major domestic hindrance to the French. Governor General Gallieni (1896–1905) envisaged the formation of a "Franco-Malagasy" race, but metropolitan French settlers were deterred by malaria and the generally infertile soils of Madagascar; the island attracted a mere handful of large French companies that survived only by diversifying: from commerce to plantation production and vice versa; and within agriculture by adopting a variety of cash crops. Thus the major "European" presence in Madagascar was impoverished Mascarene créole planters who depended on access to cheap Malagasy labor. Slavery was abolished in 1896, but many of the 500,000 liberated slaves remained in their former master's homes as servants. Moreover, the population and population density was low, while the quality of labor was poor due to malnutrition, disease, and alcoholism. Only from the late 1930s did colonial health policies succeeded in accelerating the birth rate and lowering the death rate, with the result that the population expanded.

Moreover, the Malagasy were notoriously averse to contract labor. After initial attempts to recruit Indian and Chinese immigrant labor failed (the last immigrant workers were repatriated in 1907), the French administration,

like the precolonial Merina regime, imposed forced labor, but their demand for labor for public works conflicted with the labor demands of private European concerns. Pressure from the latter resulted in private European access to SMOTIG, a public works scheme founded in 1926 using Malagasy military conscripts. Because of abuses, forced labor measures were periodically suppressed—including SMOTIG, which was banned in 1936. They also caused immense economic hardship for the Malagasy who did all in their power to evade them. As a result, they failed to relieve labor shortages, and European planters increasingly recruited Antandroy, Antaisaka, and Antaimoro contract labor from the more densely populated valleys of southeast Madagascar.

The traditional approach also underestimates the dynamic role under colonial rule of ordinary Malagasy. There was initially little difference between the immediate precolonial and colonial era for most Malagasy, some 90 per cent of whom continued to be employed in subsistence agriculture. However, in the 1920s the rise in the world price of tropical commodities led growing numbers of small farmers to grow successfully, alongside subsistence crops, export crops such as coffee, cocoa, vanilla, and sisal, the profits from which could be used to pay the taxes that released the producer from forced labor. Moreover, lower overheads and use of family labor enabled Malagasy producers to survive climatic and other vicissitudes better than poor créole producers.

During the 1930s depression, the colonial administration decided to favor coffee over other cash crops and introduced incentives to that effect. These measures had the inadvertent effect of persuading large numbers of small Malagasy producers to grow coffee. From 1932 both indigenous and European producers had access to agricultural credit at a maximum of 3 per cent interest, and by 1935 there existed 21 European and 292 Malagasy Agricultural Credit associations comprising over 8,000 members. At the same time, the cooperative movement took off, cooperatives playing an essential role in World War II, stockpiling products, notably coffee, which could no longer be shipped to France, and furnishing credit to producers. By 1945 there existed twenty-four Malagasy cooperatives (with 13,373 members) and by 1952, forty. Indigenous producers also appear to have gained substantially more than créole planters from technical assistance offered by the agricultural section of the administration.

By the time of the post–World War II boom in tropical products, the Malagasy farmer dominated the production of coffee, which was responsible for roughly one-third of exports by value. This applied both to high quality *Arabica* coffee, produced in comparatively small quantities mainly in the central highlands, and to lower

quality varieties (*Kouliou* on the east coast and *Robusta* in the northwest), produced in far greater quantity in the lowlands. It is in this context that the 1947 revolt may be viewed. In 1946–1947 the administration, responding to European planter pressure, ignored the decision to ban forced labor in the French Union, and imposed it in the coffee producing regions of the east coast. The local Malagasy interpreted the measure as an attempt to stifle their own, more efficient production of coffee and rose in revolt. The rebels gained virtually no support from nationalist groups in Imerina and were brutally suppressed with the loss of probably between 90,000 and 100,000 Malagasy lives, one of the single bloodiest episodes in colonial history.

The damage inflicted by the revolt and its suppression effectively squeezed the créole planter out of production of coffee (which by 1952 accounted for 44 per cent of total exports) which, even on larger European plantations, was mostly in Malagasy hands. The créoles mostly entered the retail trade in urban areas but failed to displace the established position there of Indian or Chinese middlemen. The 1947 revolt also helped boost the nationalist cause, which had advanced rapidly in the aftermath of World War II when French prestige had suffered due to defeat by Germany, followed in 1942 by a British and South African invasion force that toppled the Vichy French administration in Madagascar. Rising nationalism, combined with the anticolonial stance of the United States, which through the Marshall Plan was largely responsible for resuscitating the war-devastated French economy, led to a change of colonial policy, and in 1960 France granted Madagascar political independence.

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Madagascar: Great Rebellion, 1947–1948

The Malagasy rebellion of 1947–1948 is designated by several terms: “troubles,” “war,” “insurrection,” and “flight.” Each name conveys different aspects of what is certainly one of the most important, complex events in Madagascar’s history. The rebellion started the night

of March 29, 1947, when an extensive network of groups affiliated with the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Reform (MDRM), a Malagasy political party whose leaders were in the process of legally negotiating independence within the confines of the French political system, launched an insurrection. The revolt erupted simultaneously at a number of different points on the east coast, as rebel bands armed with spears and the occasional gun attacked military garrisons, administrative centers, and Malagasy sympathizers with the colonial regime, burning buildings and killing a number of French administrators and settlers. The French administration responded with force, leading a terrifying campaign of military repression that was matched by the brutality of rebel soldiers, who often forced civilians to join their cause. By the time the rebellion was declared officially over in December of 1948, 550 French were dead, and 100,000 Malagasy had been executed, tortured, starved, or driven into the forest. Over 11,000 appear to have been killed as a direct result of French military action.

The rebellion of 1947 was both an independence war and a popular revolt against state structures that came into being during and just after World War II. In 1940 the colonial administration aligned itself with Vichy France, which in turn sparked off a British invasion of Madagascar. The British handed the island over to a non-Vichy-aligned French government, which proceeded to use Madagascar as a reservoir of men and raw materials. The administration increased forced labor to intolerable proportions and seized peasant landholdings for the war effort. In 1943–1944 a famine broke out in the south of the island. In order to prevent starvation, the administration set up a “Rice Office” to control requisitions. The office was extremely unpopular because it created a huge black market in rice. Throughout Madagascar, villagers bore the brunt of the requisitions and were left without rice for their own consumption. At the same time, educated Malagasy were aware of independence struggles in other French colonial territories like Indochina, as well as the French humiliation at the hands of the Germans during World War II. This wider political context, in tandem with the growth of an organized independence movement whose claims were augmented by rumors that spread throughout the countryside, appears to have created an ambiance favorable to revolt.

A number of different theories have been advanced to try and explain the exact timing and organization of the rebellion. When the rebellion broke out French colonial officials blamed the leaders of the MDRM, which had enjoyed a substantial electoral victory in the provincial elections held in February 1947, and whose leaders were in the process of negotiating a peaceful independence. Circumstantial evidence was readily

available. Rebels that had attacked the military garrison at Moramanga wore MDRM insignia and military expeditions aimed at destroying rebel camps found numerous documents bearing military orders in the name of the MDRM. The French further argued that because the MDRM was comprised largely of Merina (eight-tenths of MDRM organizers were Merina), the most powerful ethnic group in Madagascar, that the Merina had provoked the rebellion. French insistence on blaming the leaders of the MDRM and the Merina allowed the colonial government to destroy indigenous political development in the country, thereby reinforcing the French presence.

However, the colonial thesis of an MDRM and Merina led rebellion oversimplifies the case. When the rebellion broke out, the MDRM leaders were in the process of trying to obtain autonomy for Madagascar within the framework of existing political processes. While certain sections of the MDRM undoubtedly participated in the rebellion, the party leaders sought to distance themselves from the events, condemning the rebels and their actions. Characterizing the rebellion as a Merina plot is equally problematic. When French control over the island was relatively loose early in World War II and a seizure of power possible, the Merina remained friendly to the French. Moreover, those Merina who did advocate change did so within the limits imposed by the colonial system. Further, most of the fighting took place on the east coast, outside of the area traditionally occupied by the Merina. Merina were clearly key in organizing the growth of the MDRM, but members of the Betsimisaraka, Bezanozano, and Tanala ethnic groups from the east coast occupied many of the key military positions in the rebel army.

A more plausible explanation of the rebellion lies in the nature of the MDRM and its political affiliations. The MDRM was not a hierarchical structure, but rather a loose coalition of different organizations and personal networks, including two secret societies, the National Malagasy Party (PANAMA) formed in 1941, and the National Malagasy Youth (JINY) founded in 1943, whose members were ready to obtain independence by violent means. Initially supportive of the deputies’ efforts, the secret societies eventually grew impatient with the slow legal process and demanded violent, and immediate, action. Propagandists, some of whom were members of the MDRM, circulated through the countryside, declaring that, “the authority of the deputies has replaced that of France” and advised people, under threat of force, to stop working on colonial concessions. They also announced that Madagascar belonged to the Malagasy and that all Europeans would soon die. Some members of the MDRM advocated independence by legal means, but

others were involved with the secret societies and eventually decided to follow a more radical policy by setting off the rebellion.

The crushing defeat suffered by the Malagasy, and the atrocities that were committed both by the French against Malagasy and among Malagasy, has made the place of the rebellion in Malagasy historical memory highly problematic. During the First Republic (1960–1972), the violence of the rebellion was largely ignored in favor of President Tsiranana's policy of reconciliation. During the Second Republic (1975–1992) President Ratsiraka tried to resuscitate the memory of the rebellion as part of a long series of nationalist struggles culminating in his rule. However, many rural participants who perceived the rebellion as the result of their foolish engagement in state politics do not accept the nationalist interpretation of the rebellion; their experience has left them deeply mistrustful of the post-colonial state.

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Madagascar: Reconciliation, Reform, and Independence, 1948–1960

The period immediately after the Great Rebellion was marked by general repression: specifically, restrictions upon the press, and an increasing French influence in the economic and cultural domains. The autochthonous people remained without many rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens. In accordance with the idea of having the economy of the metropolis and its overseas territories working complementarily, France remained attached to protectionism and thus encouraged exportation, although it invested little into industries. The trade companies (Marseillaise, Lyonnaise, and the Industrial and Commercial Company of Emyrne) were the biggest beneficiaries of this policy. Some agroindustrial companies also profited, such as the Sugar Company of Mahavavy in the northwest. Big settlers also made profits, while small settlements continued to collapse, and only a minority of the Malagasy population did well under these new economic circumstances.

Between 1947 and 1952, during the implementation of the economic and social development plan, priority

was given to infrastructure, specifically, roads. Subsequent four-year plans accentuated the modernization of agriculture through development schemes. During the 1950s there was an increase in agricultural production, but any related gains affected less than 10 per cent of the peasant population. This period was also marked by a strong demographic growth, thanks to a better health care system (specifically, mobile hygiene groups). Finally, the decade that began with educational reforms in 1951 witnessed a remarkable increase in schooling and the opening of European-style secondary schools for Malagasy students. The implementation of quotas that reserved a certain number of spots in rural schools and the Myre of Vilers (the school for civil servants in Antananarivo) for indigenous residents enabled the development of a non-Merina elite.

A series of different questions—amnesty of political prisoners, municipal reform, the stakes in elections at different levels, the road to emancipation—fostered debates in the press between moderate and intransigent nationalists. Even though newspapers reached only a minority of citizens effectively, the press had efficiently served the committees that mobilized in favor of those who had been imprisoned. The church, too, played a key role in these committees. Catholic ecclesiastics, particularly Father Jean de Puybaudet, contributed to the establishment of trade unions, to counterbalance the communist influence. In a letter of 1953, the Catholic hierarchy affirmed the legitimacy of the aspiration for independence. The combined action of the different pressure groups resulted in the granting of a partial amnesty for prisoners in 1954–1955.

After 1956 the political atmosphere became increasingly charged. The year began with legislative elections. For this occasion, the nationalists, who presented themselves as heirs of the Mouvement Démocratique de la Renovation Malgache (MDRM), set up an electoral committee, which was eventually transformed into a party, the Union of the Malagasy People. However, its principal opponent, the Parti des déshérités de Madagascar (PADESM), won the election for the third consecutive time since 1951—a rather mixed victory due to internal divisions. With the announcement of the *loi cadre* (enabling law) in June 1956, and the elections for the provincial assemblies—the first stage of the installment of the new institutions (Representative Assembly, then Council of Government)—the country fell into a state of turmoil.

Political divisions occurred at a rapid rate. France continued to play a role in the political situation. Its attitude during the restructuring of the PADESM at the end of 1946 was very significant and influential. France favored Deputy Philibert Tsiranana over Senator Norbert Zafimahova, who had formed the Union of Social Democrats of Madagascar with the conservative

wing of the PADESM, which was predominantly strong in the East and South. With the encouragement of the socialist high commissioner André Soucadaux, the Tsimihety teacher Philibert Tsiranana, elected Deputy in January 1956, founded the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Tsiranana, who since 1954 had spoken in favor of a progressive independence, skillfully established a dialogue with the moderate nationalists. With the support of the administration, he was propelled to the head of the Council of Government.

Before the ascent of the PSD, a dozen hostile organizations of the *loi cadre*, along with proponents of independence, defined a combined strategy during an assembly held in Tamatave in May 1958. After the referendum of September 1958, before which the PSD had campaigned in favor of the maintenance of a Malagasy state within the French, several of these organizations established the *Antokon'ny Kongresin'ny Fahaleovantenan'I Madagasikara* (Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar, AKFM) under the direction of the young pastor Richard Andriamanjato, successor of Ravelojaona, one of the primary nationalist figures in the capital. Throughout this time, the process of decolonization was occurring gradually. On October 14, 1958, the Congress of Provincial Assemblies officially proclaimed the Republic of Madagascar. The new state presented itself with a flag, a national anthem, and finally a constitution (April 29, 1959). Tsiranana was elected as the new nation's first president. On June 26, 1960, Madagascar officially obtained its independence.

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Madagascar: Independence to 1972

Once euphoria after the advent of independence had died away—happening under the sign of reconciliation with a general amnesty of political prisoners and the return of exiled MDRM representatives—the opposition renewed its criticism with regard to the regime that it qualified as neocolonial. But none of its principal adversaries was in the position of acting as counterweight to the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD): neither the Parti du Congrès pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (AKFM), party of managers mostly established in the capital, nor the MONIMA (National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar) of the old nationalist militant, Monja Jaona, a predominantly peasant party with a stronghold in the south. In fact, at the prompting of the secretary general, the minister of the interior, André Resampa, the PSD—a solidly structured mass party with a section per subprefecture, women's associations, and youth movements—rapidly became a dominant party.

In 1960 the PSD took 61 per cent of the votes cast for the legislative elections and 75 per cent for the general councils of the provinces. Five years later, these proportions changed to 88 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively. It is true that the PSD benefited from the weakness of the opposition, but its triumph in mobilizing the rank and file was also due to the capacity of its leaders, shaped by sister parties: the French SFIO, the German SPD, and the Israeli Mapai. In addition, the PSD had control over the administration, which suggested a PSD state that had taken over the place of the French by opening up the National School of Administration. If in 1960 the great majority of senior officers who started their career in the French army were Merina, now the "Malagasyization" of the officer corps started, from 1966 onward, at the Military Academy of Antsirabe, with some worries regarding

the equilibrium between regions. But, in accordance with the cooperation agreements, France maintained a strong presence in the military realm (technical assistance and military bases) and retained its status as privileged partner of a state turned resolutely toward the East. However, due to events, the government acted pragmatically in its foreign relations as it was forced to find a socialist Malagasy way: a difficult quest between the rejection of communism, foreign pressure, state interventionism, and a concern with preserving its perceived position as authentically Malagasy.

Madagascar needed help, and international organizations, particularly in Europe, were very generous in giving it, but this increased the small nation's dependence on outside sources. Madagascar had its own money (the Franc FMG); even though it might have been advantageous to belong to the Franc Zone, it is true that belonging to that Zone would limit Madagascar's maneuvering space on the other hand. If France—which in 1960 drained two-thirds of all exports—was a client for only one-fourth of exports in 1970, it nevertheless supplied two-thirds of Madagascar's importations, mainly in facilities and raw materials for substitution industries almost entirely in foreign hands, mostly French companies and some Indo-Pakistanis (*Karana*). In addition, the *Karana* in the west and the Chinese in the east still dominated commerce and served as intermediaries for the old trading companies or the new French companies that represented finance capitalism. In short, foreign planters supplied three-fourths of the value of fixed exports almost exclusively by revenue cultures encouraged in detriment of food crops. In this way, even though foreigners were a minority (1.5 per cent of 7,000,000 inhabitants according to the 1970 census), they were preponderant to a degree that the national bourgeoisie, which had inherited fortunes founded on commerce or had benefited from state interventionism, could not compete.

In a country where 85 per cent of the population lives in the countryside, the state intervened essentially in the rural sector, in view of what it called "politics of the stomach," especially after the rice-growing crisis of 1965. This became obvious in the creation of public establishments like the state farm *Ny Omby* (The Oxen), under the responsibility of managing directors or societies of mixed economies in charge of "rural valuing." Next to these capitalist ventures, other experiences appeared to be of a more socializing and participative nature, but state interventionism did not favor their success. This was the case with the development project that was based upon *fokonolona* (communal collectivities). In the end, state interventionism, which expressed itself also through the Civic Service and the Commissariat of Rural Animation, did not prevent the

pauperization of the countryside, disadvantaged with regards to the cities due to the maintenance of agricultural prices at extremely low levels. One can therefore understand that the divide between the powerful and the peasantry increased. The revolt of the south, the germ of the movement that eventually brought down the regime, was one of the most obvious proofs.

In a region struck by famine and a severe livestock disease in 1970, the zeal of the tax collectors in gathering the head and oxen taxed exasperated the population. Following the call of the MONIMA, in the night of April 12, 1971, villagers equipped with arms besieged the prison, the police station, and the administrative offices in several small towns. A severe repression followed an uprising that, far from being a simple peasant revolt, should have become a generalized insurrection, which was seen as premature by the intellectuals of the MONIMA in the capital. In Antananarivo, however, while the dissent at the core of the PSD ended toward the end of May 1971 in the dismissal of Resampa, the strongman of the regime (who was favorable to the revision of the cooperation agreement and was the presumed heir of a physically diminished president), latent discontent breaks out among the young. The young, threatened by unemployment, mobilized against an undemocratic instruction. Acculturation was particularly strong at the universities. The situation of the young, who underwent social and cultural dispossession, made for a potentially revolutionary group. The announcement of educational reforms did not stop the strike started in January 1972 by medical students and supported by the Federation of Student Associations of Madagascar.

While the movement was growing stronger, Tsirana—the only presidential candidate and presented by his supporters as chosen by God and the ancestors to lead the country—was reelected for the third time. He retained the status quo, despite his promises to the contrary, and dissatisfaction permeated the capital. The population responded to the decision of the government to resort to violence—arrests and deportations of 400 students in May and firing into the population assembled before City Hall by the paramilitary police of the Republican Security Forces on May 13—with the announcement of a general strike. On May 18, 1972, Tsiranana handed over full powers to Gabriel Ramanantsoa, chief general of the armed forces, nominated prime minister.

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Madagascar: Reform and Revolution, 1972–1989

After the fall of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) regime, speech became freer, and newspapers and leaflets flourished. For months, the seminars coordinated by the strike committee offered discussion spaces, with their eyes on the National Congress of September 1972. The insurrection favored the emergence of a proletarian party, the MFM (*Mitolona ho an’ny Fanjakan’ny Madinika* [They who struggle for the power of the small]), under the leadership of the academic Manandafy Rakotonirina, former member of the MONIMA, which ostensibly located its support among the peasantry and the working class, but whose clientele, then strictly urban, was essentially made up of young scholars and ZOAM (*Zatovo Orz Asa Malagasy* [Young Malagasy without work]). By guaranteeing a legitimacy to General Ramanantsoa, the plebiscite of October 8, 1972 permitted him to have his way vis-à-vis the radical wing of the movement, leading to the marginalization of the strike committee and the eviction of Tsiranana.

The constitutional law of November 7 installed a transitional regime charged with renewing Malagasy

society in five years. Ramanantsoa formed a government of a national union of civil and military technicians, supported by the AKFM and popular with the rural masses after the suppression of the head and oxen tax. The revision of the cooperation agreements (April 1973), followed by the withdrawal from the Franc Zone, reinforced the reputation of frigate captain Didier Ratsiraka, minister of foreign affairs. The state augmented its participation in the banks and created societies of national interest for import-export, and the collection and distribution of agricultural products. The popular development master’s program, which rested on the rehabilitation of *fokonolona* village communities, transformed into base cells of a pyramidal state structure until they reach the national level, contributed to the popularity of Colonel Ratsimandrava, minister of the interior. In the “Malagasyization” of education, the government showed great prudence before the reluctance, or even the hostility, of provincial peripheries due to historical reasons. In fact, this apolitical way did not stop the activism of the parties, like the Malagasy Socialist Party, which emerged from the rapprochement between the PSD and the Malagasy Socialist Union of André Resampa. What is more, governmental factions were facing fundamental choices, for example between communitarian and state capitalism. Finally, in 1974, when financial scandals compromised the regime, the country went through a severe economic crisis (a consequence of the paralysis of the activities in 1972, the retreat from the Franc Zone, and the world economic crisis), and the tensions in the army exploded into an open conflict. Even though averted, the coup d’état led by Colonel Brécharid Rajaonarison, originally from the southeast, led Ramanantsoa to hand over the power to the minister of the interior. One week later—the day after Ratsimandrava, who by crisscrossing the country had established a real dialogue with the peasants, was assassinated under circumstances that have not yet been elucidated—a military directorate took power with Andriamahazo, military governor of Antananarivo in May 1972, as its leader.

Ratsiraka distinguished himself from among the leadership of this institution through a program that he described as inspired by the movement of 1972, and he managed to gain a majority. Knowing that he could count on the provinces, he enlarged his political base to include students and the ZOAM of the capital, thus preparing his ascension, to which he acceded as president of the Supreme Council of the Revolution (CSR) when the directorate was dissolved in June 1975.

During the second part of 1975, Madagascar entered a period of disruptions, which, following the program traced by Ratsiraka in the *Charter of the Socialist Revolution* (the Red Book of the regime), was supposed to result in the establishment of a new state based on

the model of popular democracies. Through the referendum of December 21, which called for one answer to three questions—approve the Charter or not, of a constitutional project, and of the choice of Ratsiraka as president—Ratsiraka obtained a plebiscitary legitimization (95 per cent of the vote). The promulgation of the constitution on December 31 officially founded the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, whose policy, defined by the CSR, was implemented by the government. The regime favored relations with the countries of the East, particularly North Korea. Political expression passed exclusively through the channel of progressive organizations, members of the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution (FNDR). Different parties stuck to it, but the AREMA (Avant-garde of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution), the party of the president, acquired in less than a year an ultradominant, if not crushing, position. The revolution implied the nationalization of vital sectors of the economy, and the army took part in this process. Contrary to Ratsimandrava's project, the socialist *fokonolona* received orders from above as decentralized collectivities, in accordance with democratic centralism. Decentralization manifested itself in the cultural realm through the opening of regional universities that never operated well or smoothly.

The accelerated "Malagasyization" of primary education—without adequate support material or a coordination with other educational levels, and with a lack of experienced teachers—provoked strong criticism. Public schools lost some of their prestige in relation to the private establishments loyal to the French, which, starting in 1983, progressively regained importance as relations with France improved. In addition, while demographic growth remained strong, the country looked on as the state-controlled economy collapsed. Low agricultural prices did not encourage productivity. In the industrial domain, the excessive investment policy launched in 1979 revealed itself to be a setback. The chronic shortage of current consumption products accompanied the disorganization of markets in a country where the communication infrastructure was deteriorating. Financial bankruptcy compelled the state, put under pressure by the IMF and World Bank, to institute liberalization policies. As a result, there was a drop of 25 per cent of the average revenue per capita between 1980 and 1987, and the gap between rich and poor widened.

Even though some notables benefited from liberalization and privatization, the state was in a state of full socioeconomic decomposition and was threatened by great political instability. The universities were centers of permanent protest. Insecurity raged across the country. Oxen were stolen again with renewed zeal; in the capital, gangs of young unemployed people provoked

clashes. The religious forces represented by the FFKM (Fikambanan'ny Fiangonana Kristiana Malagasy), the council of Christian Churches formed in 1980, which in 1982 had already denounced the regime for some of its practices (electoral fraud, repression, resort to the political police), reiterated its warnings in 1985. Within the FNDR, the preponderance of AREMA was questioned. The rupture finally occurred the day after the presidential elections of 1989, which see the reelection of Ratsiraka for a third mandate but only with a majority of 60 per cent—a result that announced another revolution.

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Madagascar: Democracy and Development, 1990s to the Present

Since President Didier Ratsiraka rejected all challenges of the 1989 elections, the small improvement in daily life toward the end of the 1980s opened up the opportunity for the opposition to react. As the only participants in the two national consultations of 1990 that committed Madagascar to the transition to democracy, they boasted the title of civil and political society's

Lively Forces. The initiative for organizing these meetings, suggested by the national Committee for election observations, returned to the Fikambanan'ny Fiangonana Kristiana Malagasy (FFKM), the council of Christian churches formed in 1980, which enjoyed moral authority, due to the relative importance of the Christian community (45 per cent of Malagasy), the action of confessional organizations in the realm of health and education, and the role of the churches in the history of nationalism.

The leaders of the FFKM mobilized the participants of the consultations by picking up the biblical parallel of God freeing the Israelites from the pharaoh. They invite their compatriots to work for the liberation of the country, by following the example of Moses, who received the order from God to "make his people walk up" to the Promised Land. This exhortation became the slogan of Lively Forces, whose leader was the surgeon Albert Zafy, who had served in the Ramanantsoa government; its message of hope motivated the opposition. Starting in May 1991, when the social demands at Antananarivo turned into a vast political protest, the mass of students, mothers, civil servants, and managers—different from that of May 1972—listened religiously to the message.

The FFKM's failure at mediation led the Lively Forces to organize a counterweight and to better structure the movement that also reached provincial capitals. Playing upon ethnoregional rivalries, Ratsiraka tried to substantiate the idea of a protest that was exclusive to Antananarivo, and therefore to the Merina. The late nomination of the mayor of Antananarivo, Guy Razanamasy, as prime minister did not stop the opposition, which demanded the departure of Ratsiraka by organizing a peaceful march on the Presidential Palace on August 10, 1991. The impressive demonstration became highly dramatic and controversial. Officially, several dozen protesters fell, shot by the presidential guard. The generalization of the strike, the coexistence of two governments, and the proclamation of federal states by provincial notables, who counted on traditional authorities to defend the socialist regime, created great confusion until the political parties, including the FFKM, reached an accord on the establishment of a transitional regime on October 31, 1991. The functioning of the government was maintained, but a high state authority was led by Albert Zafy who supervised governmental activities. The difficulties of coordinating the institutions and respect toward the consensus between the different political tendencies limited efficacy. The essential event during this transitory period was the adoption by referendum, on August 19, 1992, of a constitution created as part of a national forum.

The constitution of the Third Republic affirmed in its preamble the superiority of the state of law and

instituted a parliamentary system that submitted the investiture of the prime minister, designated by the resident, to the National Assembly. The voting system, based on proportional representation, was favorable to small parties, and excluded any possibility for the chief of the government to have a parliamentary majority available. Also, after Zafy's victory over Ratsiraka, who was not eliminated from the presidential race for the sake of democracy, and after the relative success of Zafy's sphere of influence during general elections, the conflicts within the executive branch, as well as pressures brought by those opposing the Assembly, threw the country into chronic instability and led to a detrimental immobility in the nation.

In fact, the successive devaluations of the Franc FMG, inflation, excessive debt, and a deficit all contributed to the deterioration of the economy. In 1996, close to three-fourths of the population lived below the poverty line. The political class hoped for a revival of the economy after the finalization of an accord with the Bretton Woods institutions. The question of negotiations with the IMF and World Bank took center stage in political debates. Zafy adopted a revision of the constitution via a referendum on September 17, 1995, which was supposed to encourage economic recovery by guaranteeing political stability. The high rate of abstention illustrated the population's cynical disinterest. But despite the reinforcement of the president's powers, the parliamentary group of the opposition neutralized Zafy and his followers in a few weeks through successive schemes: a motion of censure against the government, a boycott, and finally the motion of impeachment against the president.

The anticipated presidential elections (which mobilized only 50 per cent of voters) of January 1997 resulted in ratifying Ratsiraka's return "by default." The president, who had been toppled by a popular movement, benefited partly from the disenchantment of his compatriots and partly from the errors and slowness of the leaders of the increasingly divided Lively Forces.

In 1999 Marc Ravalomanana, the mayor of Antananarivo, gained notice on the national political scene after building up a large and devoted following in the city. He ran against Ratsiraka in the bitterly contested 2001 presidential election, which was followed by a six-month-long power struggle. The United States and France recognized Ravalomanana as the victor and legitimate president, and Ratsiraka decamped to France. Although Ravalomanana has vowed to fight poverty and unemployment, he faced a daunting task, given the weak economy and political violence that has marked Madagascar.

FARANIRINA RAJAONAH

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Madikizela-Mandela, Winnie (1934–)

Antiapartheid Activist

Winifred Zanyiwe Nomzamo Madikizela was twenty-three when she met Nelson Mandela, who was then nearly forty, a father of three, and had been separated from his first wife for a year. The highly charismatic couple married in June 1958, when Mandela was on trial for treason. She admired his intellect and self-discipline; he introduced her to a wider world, which included active political involvement. The banned activist Helen Joseph became her mentor. One of those arrested for protesting against the pass laws in October 1958, she was as a result dismissed from her job at Baragwanath hospital.

From 1960 with the African National Congress (ANC) a proscribed organization, her husband began to work underground, and she saw even less of him. He was then arrested and sentenced, first to five years and then to life imprisonment. She was allowed only occasional visits to Robben Island, and was constantly harassed by the police. In May 1969 she was detained and treated in appalling fashion in jail before being charged with taking part in the activities of the banned ANC. The charges were dropped, but she was re-detained and recharged, under the Terrorism Act. Her lawyer Sydney Kentridge was, however, able to show that the new charges were no different from the previous ones, so she was released in October 1970. Her spell in jail hardened her; some claim she never recovered from the way she was treated.

She continued to be hounded by the police and had great difficulty finding work. Her banning order lapsed in September 1975 and was not reimposed, perhaps because of the sympathies she showed at this time with the Black Consciousness movement. With the Soweto uprising, however, she was detained in August 1976 and spent five months in the Fort Prison, before in May 1977 being banished to Brandfort in the Orange Free State (present-day Free State). There she had to live in a three-room shack in the black township, under highly restrictive conditions. When her second daughter, Zinzi, who had accompanied her, had to be sent back to Johannesburg, she was even more isolated. But she remained active, studying for a University of South Africa social work degree, and opening a day care center for children and a library in the township. As the Release Mandela campaign gained support worldwide in the early 1980s, her fame grew as the symbol of anti-apartheid resistance. Her autobiography, *Part of My Soul*, published in 1984, sold well, and she became a heroic figure, especially in the African American community. She was often called "Mother of the Nation."

In 1985 when her Brandfort house was bombed, and on one of her visits to Johannesburg, she refused to return to Brandfort and remained in Soweto, in her Orlando West house, although she soon began building a much larger house in what was known as Beverley Hills. In November 1985 flying to Cape Town to see her husband, who had been taken to a hospital, she met the minister of justice, Kobie Coetsee. Her banning order was then relaxed, and she addressed some public meetings.

She formed her own personal vigilante gang, the Mandela United Football Club, in 1986. Stories spread of her involvement with Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, and of acts of brutality and terror committed by members of the Football Club. It was at this time that she became known as "The Lady," for

people in Soweto were afraid to say her name. Both the United Democratic Front and her husband counseled her to disband the club, but she refused. In late December 1988 the fourteen-year old Stompie Seipei was taken to her house, interrogated, and later found brutally murdered. Soon afterward, her close friend and medical doctor, Abubaker Asvat, was shot and killed.

On February 11, 1990, Winnie Mandela walked beside her husband as he left Victor Verster prison. For a time she could glory in her new role, but her husband was busy and remote, and his dreams of a return to a romantic relationship began to fade. She was more bitter than he, and remained wedded to revolutionary ideas. In February 1991 she was brought to trial for kidnapping and being an accessory to assault, found guilty, and sentenced to an effective five years in jail. In the trial, she claimed that she had been in Brandfort at the time of Seipei's death. On appeal, the sentence was reduced to two years, which was suspended, and a fine. When she openly went abroad with a new lover, Dali Mpfu, her husband moved out, then announced that he and his wife were separating. In March 1996 they were divorced, and she announced that she wished to be known as Madikizela-Mandela. Further allegations against her surfaced, including misappropriation of funds in the welfare department of the ANC.

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela was a powerful speaker who expressed populist and Africanist views, and when she visited squatter camps she usually set aside her fancy clothes and put on camouflage fatigues. As a vote-getter and person of influence, the ANC decided that, despite being a convicted criminal, she should be placed high on its list for the election, and was duly elected to parliament in April 1994. She was made deputy minister for arts and culture but did not take her official duties seriously, and was dropped from office in 1996. Her antipathy to Cyril Ramaphosa, one of those who had been critical of her in the late 1980s, is thought to have helped lead to his marginalization. She was too important a person to be forced out of the movement, and was retained on the ANC list and reelected to parliament in 1999. She retained her position as head of the ANC Women's League, and was nominated deputy president of the ANC at the Mafeking conference in December 1997.

In November 1997, after she had refused to apply for amnesty, she was subpoenaed to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Those who gave evidence against her included Katiza Chebekhulu, a member of her Football Club who had gone into hiding for years and now claimed that he had seen Winnie murder Seipei. Others charged that she had been involved in other disappearances and in the murder of Asvat. The proposition of bringing new formal charges against her was entertained, but ultimately discarded.

It was widely recognized that this imperious woman had displayed exceptional courage in fighting apartheid and had played an important role in mobilizing anti-apartheid resistance while her husband had been in jail, but had herself become one of the tragic victims of apartheid.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

See also: Mandela, Nelson; South Africa: Anti-apartheid Struggle: Townships, the 1980s.

Biography

Born in the Bizana district of Transkei, the daughter of an Mpondo schoolteacher. Brought up a Methodist and educated at local schools, including Shawbury High School. Went to Johannesburg to train as a social worker at the Jan Hofmeyr School. Married Nelson Mandela, 1958. Divorced 1996.

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Al-Maghili (c.1425–1504)

Muslim Jurist and Reformer

Muhammad ibn abd al-Karim al-Maghili was born in Tlemcen, western Algeria. Al-Maghili fought against the privileged status of the Jewish community in Tuwat in the Sahara Desert. He also fought against the Jewish community's establishment of a synagogue. When the local African community opposed his position, he appealed to authorities in North Africa, who supported him.

al-Maghili embarked on a series of travels, which spread his influence throughout the western Sudan. He held particular influence over Mohammed Rumfa of Kano. For a time al-Maghili was the gray eminence behind the throne, directing Rumfa in his plan to make Kano an authentic Islamic state. al-Maghili corresponded with Rumfa throughout his life and wrote his influential *The Obligation of Princes* as a handbook for him.

After leaving Kano, al-Maghili went to Gao and instructed Askia Mohammed in Islamic law. So strong was his influence that Askia Mohammed asked him to answer a questionnaire for him on Islamic practice.

al-Maghili is also famous for founding one of the major Islamic brotherhoods, the Qadiriyya. Fellowship

spread throughout West Africa and became a major factor in its Islamization.

al-Maghili's fame continued to grow after his death. His book became a text for rulers wishing to apply the shari'a (Islamic law) in a situation of initial Islamic centralization. The Fulani under Usman dan Fodio, for example, used *The Obligation of Princes* as a guide to reforming the Hausa states they conquered and establishing their version of an authentic Muslim state.

FRANK A. SALAMONE

See also: **Hausa Politics.**

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Maghrib: Arab Conquest of, 650–715

The Maghrib, which from ancient times was the home of many different Berber tribes, existed under a series of foreign invaders. Of all the foreign rulers, the Arabs who conquered the region in the mid-seventh century made the most profound impact on the people. The Arab invasions swept away the last vestige of the Byzantines who had been in control in most parts of North Africa, including the Maghrib, from the beginning of the sixth century.

The Arab penetration of the Maghrib began in earnest following the completion of their conquest of Egypt with the fall of Alexandria in September 642. Initially undertaken as a means of gaining greater military prestige and wealth for the Arab soldiers on one hand, coupled with a religious zeal for extending Islam's influence on the other, by the mid-660s expansion into the Maghrib was viewed within the wider context of the religio-imperial confrontation of the Umayyad state with the Byzantine forces. However, the Arab advance into the Maghrib was by no means an easy task. Used to deploying forces rapidly across the desert or semidesert, they had to contend with the formidable naval fleets of the Byzantines along the coastal flank. Worse still for the Arabs, the Byzantine forces in North Africa received constant reinforcement through their naval base at Carthage. Until the development of their own naval power, therefore, it was difficult for the invading Arab forces to secure permanent control of the Maghrib area.

There were other major obstacles blocking Arab advancement into the Maghrib. The northern fringes of the Sahara from Tripoli westward was the home of a warlike group of Berbers, the Zenata, who were well

versed in the use of camels in mobile warfare and who posed a great threat to the Arabic incursion. Besides, beyond the Aures Mountains was Numidia, a complex of valleys and mountains in western Tunisia and eastern Algeria, where some Berber chieftains had erected considerable kingdoms that had for centuries been accustomed to resisting foreign conquests. Consequently, early Arab incursion took the form of raids rather than systematic conquest and even then, for over two decades between 643 and 667, the Arab forces that raided the Maghrib avoided the Byzantine positions. As a result of the precarious position in which they found themselves, the Arabs never succeeded in venturing very far nor in dominating the Maghrib until the second half of the seventh century.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of the second half of the seventh century, a veteran Arab army commander, Sidi Ugha ibn Nafi, began the long series of campaigns that culminated in the eventual Arab conquest of the Maghrib. He swept across the western desert through Libya into modern day Tunisia and Algeria. In 670, he established a new city in Tunisia called Qairawan, which became a strategic military base for further conquest as well as a center for spreading Islam among the Berber inhabitants of North Africa. Ugha ibn Nafi's first major military venture beyond Qairawan to Morocco ended in disaster in 683 when, on his return toward his base in Qairawan, his army was trapped and subdued by the forces of a Numidian coalition under their king, Kussaila. However, the division between the Numidian and their Zenata Berber kinsmen, and the inability to cooperate in a common cause against their Arab opponents eventually paved the way for the latter to recover, after which they defeated the Berber groups in quick succession. The Numidians were the first to be suppressed. Thereafter, with the advent of Arab naval power, the Byzantine control over Carthage was dismantled. And eventually, in 702, the Arab forces defeated the combined forces of Zenata tribes led by a queen, al-Kahina (the priestess). With al-Kahina's death the last serious Berber attempt to resist the Arabs during the era of conquest came to an end. The succession of victories paved way for the Arabs to March further westwards.

By 715 a belt of land, about 200 miles wide, had been brought under Arab control in the Maghrib, stretching from the borders of Egypt to the Atlantic coast and extending southward into the Fezzan and into the Sus region of southern Morocco. At the same time, a band of Berbers, who had welcomed the Arabs as their deliverers from Byzantine oppression, teamed up with their new overlords to form a mixed Arab-Berber army that embarked on further conquests across the Strait of Gibraltar.

Following these successful conquests, most parts of the Maghrib were officially placed under Arab governors resident at Qairawan. Repeated attempts were made to bring the whole area under unified political control together with Muslim Spain, and repeatedly they broke down, giving rise to kingdoms roughly corresponding to the present division into Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. In the early years of Arab rule, the city life of the Roman era continued to flourish and the Maghrib enjoyed a high level of cultural development. Similarly, trade increased considerably in the Maghrib, as in other parts of North Africa. From Morocco horses, camels, and olives were exported to the Near East. Most important was that the Arabs gained access to the gold of the western Sudan. Slaves were also brought across the desert.

The Arab regime, however, brought with it a major revolution through the introduction of Islam, which steadily replaced Christianity that had hitherto been the dominant religion in most of the Maghrib, since the incorporation of North Africa into the Roman Empire in about 146BCE. A mixed Arab-Berber Muslim society, similar to that in neighboring Egypt, developed. Under Islam, the Maghrib went through a long series of changes influencing every aspect of the people's existence. The administrative and legal systems, family life, education, philosophy, and the general worldview of the people were all profoundly influenced by Islam. In due course the urban and agricultural Berbers became assimilated into this civilization. This, together with the fact that Arabic became the everyday language of most of the people (except in mountainous areas such as the Atlas range in Morocco and the Kabylie mountains of Algeria, where the Berbers maintained their old language and culture together with a fierce spirit of independence), and the considerable admixture of Arab blood through intermarriage, accounts for the fact that Islam is still a considerable force in the region and that Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia to this day regard themselves as Arab states, with ties to the Middle East as much as to Africa.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: **Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers; Maghrib: Muslim Brotherhoods.**

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Maghrib: Marinids, Ziyanids, and Hafids, 1235–1359

The unification of the Maghrib by the Almohads was followed by a period of political fragmentation under the Marinids, Ziyanids, and Hafids. The successors of the Almohads in Morocco and Algeria, the Marinids and Ziyanids, were Zanata Berbers. However, while the Marinids were distinguished by their independence, the Ziyanids had become vassals of the Almohads, who rewarded them with a fiefdom in Tlemcen. After the Almohad Empire was weakened by a defeat at the hands of a combined force of Castilians and Arogonese at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the Marinids invaded northern Morocco from the Sahara. Likewise, in 1235, the Ziyanid leader Yaghmorasan conquered local Zanata lineage groups and established Ziyanid independence in western Algeria. On a campaign to restore Almohad authority, the Almohad caliph al-Sa'id was killed in battle by Yaghmorasan in 1248. The defeated Almohad army was annihilated in the same year by Marinid forces, led by Abu Yahya, who established the Marinid capital in the northern Moroccan city of Fez. From there, the Marinids advanced on the Almohad capital of Marrakech, which fell in 1269. At the same time, the Ziyanids set up an independent sultanate at Tlemcen.

The caliphal title to spiritual and political authority across the empire was, however, inherited neither by the Marinids or Ziyanids, but by the Hafids. By the time the last Almohad caliph fell to the Zanata usurpers, the Hafids had established themselves as the guardians of the doctrines of the Almohad religious movement and thus legitimate heirs to their spiritual and political authority. The Hafid ruler, Abu Zakariya, assumed the caliphal title of commander of the faithful (*amir al-muminin*) after 1235 and extended his sway over Tripoli and Algeria. Hafid forces took Tlemcen in 1242. In exchange for the recognition of Hafid supremacy, the Ziyanids were allowed to regain their territory in Algeria. During the reign of Abu Zakariyya's successor, al-Mustanir (1249–1277), the Marinids recognized Hafid suzerainty, while the crusade of Louis IX of France was repulsed by the Hafids in 1270. Ibn Khaldun recorded that al-Mustanir's reign was a period of economic prosperity and cultural florescence. Afterward, however, the Hafid state split between rival contenders to the throne, which enabled a Hafid minister, the Vizier Ibn al-Lihyani, to usurp the throne in 1311. The Hafid restoration under Abu Bakr in 1318 did not resolve conflicts among the nobles in

the cities and the increasing autonomy of the Arab lineages in the countryside, before Hafsid supremacy was challenged from the west.

In 1323 the Ziyamid sultan, Abu Tashfin, invaded Hafsid domains in eastern Algeria, but he was defeated by an alliance of Hafsids and Marinids. The Marinid sultan, Abu al-Hasan then sought to claim the mantle of the Almohad caliphs by reuniting North Africa into a single political community. First, the Marinids attacked the Castilians at Gibraltar and then occupied western Algeria. Abu Tashfin died defending Tlemcen against the Marinids in 1337. While the expulsion of the Marinids from Spain in 1344 indicated that the glory of the Almohad Empire would not be revived, Abu al-Hasan's conquest of Tunis in 1347 did briefly reunite North Africa as a single political community. Marinid rule in Tunis was cut short, after the Hafsids reestablished their influence over the unruly Arab lineages that had, alongside the Hafsid viziers (high Muslim officials), instigated the Marinid occupation. Nevertheless, the Marinid sultan Abu al-'Inan resumed the Marinid bid for supremacy, when he assumed the title of commander of the faithful and conquered Tunis in 1357. As the last Marinid to unite North Africa under one rule, he was also the last Marinid not controlled by his viziers. In 1357 he withdrew to Fez, and although his army campaigned in Tlemcen in 1358, Abu 'Inan was assassinated by one of his viziers before his imperial ambitions could be renewed. Ziyamid independence was thus restored in 1359.

Political fragmentation marks the era of the Marinids, Ziyanids, and Hafsids. Yet, these dynasties established kingdoms centered on the strategic commercial cities of Fez, Tlemcen, and Tunis, which had prospered under Almohad patronage. The cities continued to supply West African gold, ivory, and slaves, to the Middle East and to Europe, as well as being the center of regional commercial networks. Nevertheless, North Africa's "golden age" had passed. To account for this decline, many have seen the influx of Arab pastoral tribes from the eleventh century as a determining factor in political fragmentation and agrarian degradation, which had an impact on economic development. However, the contraction of the cultivated area had begun much earlier, with the collapse of the Roman Empire. Therefore, the devastation of agrarian society memorialized in the great historical works of Ibn Khaldun cannot be attributed to the Arab lineage groups solely. Perhaps the picture of political, cultural, and economic decline depicted by Ibn Khaldun is overdrawn, given that his era coincided with the ravages of the plague in the middle of the fourteenth century, which devastated the population.

Ibn Khaldun's theory of the cyclical rise and decline of kingdoms was undoubtedly influenced by the battle

for supremacy waged by the Marinids, Ziyanids, and Hafsids. While the dynasties claimed political legitimacy by reference to the Islamic, political language and symbols established by the Almoravids and Almohads, their authority rested upon dynastic, military power. To compensate for the loss of the Islamic political leadership, North African, Islamic society turned to the leaders of the Sufi religious brotherhoods, the marabout. In the thirteenth century, the Sufi movement flowered under the disciples of the twelfth century mystic, Abu Madyan (Boumedienne). To share in religious legitimacy, the dynasties patronized the Sufis, as well as the Malikite law school, which resulted in the foundation of religious universities (*madrasas*) and mosques, as well as state patronage for religious festivals. Although many have interpreted this as medieval religious decadence, it enabled the process of Islamization of North African society to continue.

The struggle for supremacy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries resulted in stalemate, but the contest consolidated the frontiers of an indelible state system. And while the dynasties continued to rely on the Almohad practice of recruiting Berber and Arab lineages for military service, the states were more than tribal confederacies. Rather than rely solely on the tribe, the ruling dynasties remade society by building an urban and rural nobility. Arab and Berber lineage groups with tax-collecting privileges dominated the rural hinterland, while in the cities the ruling dynasties engendered the formation of a ruling nobility of viziers, as well as a secretarial class composed of Islamic scholars (*'ulama*) and those who claimed descent from the Prophet (*shurafa*). Ibn Khaldun was one of those scholars trained in Islamic law and philosophy who attained high political rank in the royal courts, as well as living amongst the Berber tribes, where he was sent to raise military recruits. His itinerant career indicates the interrelationship between court, city, and countryside. It also illustrates that, while neither the Marinids, Ziyanids, or Hafsids could reestablish the Islamic Empire of their predecessors, the imperial legacy afforded them a common political culture.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: 'Abd al-Mu'min: Almohad Empire, 1140–1269; Berbers: Ancient North Africa; Ibn Tumart, Almohad Community and.

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Maghrib: European Expansion into, 1250–1550

Two points should be kept in mind when considering European expansion into the Maghrib from the mid-thirteenth century onward. First, contact with Europe generally involved one of the emerging naval powers at that time, that is, Portugal and Spain. Second, this expansion took place concomitant with a reversal of fortune for Islam in the same area, precipitated by the collapse of the Almohads. For the three hundred years that followed, the European presence in North Africa began to make itself felt, slowly and not always surely, but felt nonetheless. And while Islam may have been banished from Spain and Portugal at this time, this was not the case in North Africa. In fact, during this period there was little significant political change in the region, in spite of Islam's wider regional decline. Of greater importance was the "return of the Christians" to North Africa after an absence that began with the Islamic conquests of the seventh century.

Significant European expansion in the Maghrib was not possible while Europe itself was under the control of forces from North Africa. It was Dom Afonso who provided significant victories to this end for the Portuguese. He took Faro from the Moors in 1249 and Silves the next year, so that by 1250 Portugal could claim to be territorially complete and free of Moorish forces. Afonso followed these successes with several North African expeditions, earning him the sobriquet "the African." The Spanish too, by 1252, had reduced Islamic dominance to Granada. It was not until 1492 that the forces of Isabella of Aragon and Ferdinand of Castile took Granada from the Moors, ending nearly 800 years of Moorish influence in Iberia. Although they did not wait until then to begin their foreign adventures, the fall of Granada did embolden them sufficiently to give an extra push to a war in Africa. (One result of the victory in Granada was that, as an act of thanks, Queen Isabella gave funds to Columbus so that he could look for a sea route to the Indies.) An agreement signed between England and Portugal in 1303 allowed the latter's ships into English ports, as well as guaranteeing they would not be harried at sea. This led

to the growth of the Portuguese fleet and, after winning the Battle of Aljubarrota (1385), they were also free from the threat of Spanish interference. Guarantees of this were bolstered in 1411 when the peace between Castile, Aragon, and Portugal was formally settled, allowing their foreign adventures to begin in earnest. Just how quickly was seen by the action of the Portuguese at Ceuta (1415) when a force of 200 ships and 20,000 troops took the port with little resistance. For the next century, Ceuta was central to all of Portugal's exploits in the Maghrib, in spite of the fact that they never held the hinterland, forcing them into the costly position of having to supply the town entirely by sea.

The Portuguese, under Henry the Navigator, tried to take Tangier in 1437, with disastrous results. The Muslim forces only allowed them to return to their ships and leave if Ceuta was surrendered. The Portuguese force agreed, leaving the king's youngest brother as a hostage, while the Portuguese *Cortes*, or parliament, refused, thus leaving Prince Fernando to die in captivity. In spite of this, the North African expansion continued with the conquests of Al Qasr Kabir (1458), Arzila and Tangiers in a subsequent attempt in 1471, Safim (1508), Azamor (1513), and Mazagao (1514). Although the Portuguese did raid as far as Marrakech, this was uncharacteristic and they were largely confined to their coastal possessions. This last marked the extent of the Portuguese expansion in the region.

The successful Portuguese attack against Tangier was followed by the sack of the city and the massacre and enslavement of its inhabitants. In addition, it was carried out despite a declaration by the pope that war against a nonaggressive nation was not justified. To avoid upsetting Rome, the Portuguese employed the services of privateers to do the job. Privateers worked from privately owned and operated armed vessels that were commissioned by governments to act on their behalf, thereby allowing a government to avoid declaring any attack a national action. They were not pirates, whatever their brutal methods might suggest, as they acted within an accepted legal framework, and they eventually became indispensable to states on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Spanish efforts to carve out a Maghrib empire began in earnest in 1509 when Spanish forces captured Oran. By 1535 they were sufficiently emboldened to undertake an expedition against Tunis and in 1541 a failed attempt against Algiers when their fleet was destroyed by a storm. On the whole the Spanish experience was disappointing to them, when compared to the maritime dominance displayed by their Portuguese neighbors. Portugal led the way in this European movement in part because of its position on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It was also united earlier than its neighbors and compact, led by a military

aristocracy with nowhere else to go but abroad. Also important was the religious element, and the desire not only to rid Europe of Muslims, but to take Christianity to the Islamic world and beyond.

The Europeans presence in North Africa during this period was always going to prove difficult, especially when, as with Ceuta, entire garrisons had to be supplied exclusively from home and by sea. A series of defeats, coupled with the mounting drain on domestic budgets, persuaded the Portuguese to gradually withdraw from a number of their Maghrib possessions. The weakness of the ruling Watassi in Morocco was another cause for concern for the Portuguese as it led directly to the Saadi, who were originally from Saudi Arabia, to attack and capture Agadir in 1541. At this time the Saadi had declared jihad against the infidel invaders and they swiftly took control of the majority of the country, defeating both Moroccan and Portuguese forces. By 1550 the dream of empire in the Maghrib was essentially finished as Portugal fell back from all of its bases except Ceuta, Tangier, and Mazagan.

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See also: 'Abd al-Mu'min: Almohad Empire, 1140–1269; Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century.

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Maghrib: Ottoman Conquest of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis

The conquest of Istanbul in 1453 established the Ottoman Empire as the preeminent Islamic state, as well as placing it at the center of a maritime, commercial empire. Eastern Mediterranean trade was largely in the hands of Venetians and Genoese, who were rivaled only by the Muslim corsairs (*ra'is*), while in the western Mediterranean the Iberian states of Portugal and Spain had established frontier posts on the North African coast from the early fifteenth century. At the same time, the Marinid kingdom of Morocco collapsed

in 1465 and Hafsid power in Tunis disintegrated after the death of 'Uthman in 1488, which left North African ports prey to the Spanish and Portuguese. The crisis created by the Christian threat in the west was doubled after the fall of Granada to the Castilians in 1492, after which thousands of Andalusians, or Moriscos (Muslim exiles from the Iberian peninsula), poured into the North African ports. The Ottoman response was motivated by a combination of religious zeal and commercial interest, which launched the Ottomans into the western Mediterranean to block Iberian expansion.

The Iberian states, Castile and Aragon, having waged the *reconquista* for centuries, were the historical enemies of the Muslim states of North Africa. When the Ottomans took up the Muslim cause in the west, corsairs recruited by the Ottomans in the Aegean set out to the western frontier, and from North African ports staged raids on the Spanish coast. In response, Spain seized the port of Mars al-Kabir and Oran in 1505, Bougie in 1509, and Tripoli in 1510. A Muslim corsair in the service of the Hafsids of Tunisia, 'Urudj Babarossa, responded to Algerian appeals against Spanish aggression in 1516. He established himself as the ruler of Algiers, which was already a base for the holy war, having a large population of Andalusians, who supported the war against Spain. Algiers was relatively isolated, on the periphery of the Marinid, Ziyamid, and Hafsid realms therefore it provided a secure base for expansion into the North African interior. After conquering the hinterland of Algiers, 'Urudj defeated the Ziyanids at Tlemcen but died in combat after he was besieged by their Spanish allies in 1518. In 1520, 'Urudj's brother, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa sought the assistance of the Ottoman sultan Selim, who sent him 2,000 janissaries and artillery. Although Algiers was lost after Hafsid and Marinid assaults between 1520 and 1525, in 1529 Khayr al-Din retook Algiers and the Ottoman sultan, Sulayman, appointed him *beylerbey* (*bey of beys*) of North Africa.

In 1533 Khayr al-Din was appointed *kapudan-pasha* (admiral) and rebuilt the Ottoman fleet in Istanbul and then, alongside Sinan Rais, engaged Spanish forces across the western Mediterranean, briefly occupying Tunis in 1534. However, the Spanish restored the Hafsid caliph in that year and thus made Tunisia the forward bastion of the Spanish Empire in the Mediterranean. The Ottoman counterattack was swift, with Khayr al-Din's occupation of Minorca. After his death in 1546, Darghut Rais led the offensive, taking Tripoli in 1551 and defeating a Spanish fleet off the Tunisian island of Djerba in 1560. In Algiers, Khayr al-Din's son and successor, Hasan Barbarossa, took Tlemcen from the Spanish in 1553 and established Ottoman control over eastern Algeria while his successor,

‘Ulj ‘Ali, launched an unsuccessful invasion of Tunisia from Algiers in 1569.

The struggle for mastery of the Mediterranean was decided at Lepanto two years later, when the Ottoman navy was defeated by a league of papal, Spanish, and Venetian forces. This, together with the capture of Tunis by ‘Ulj ‘Ali and Sinan Rais in 1574, established a Mediterranean frontier that divided Christian Europe from Muslim North Africa. While the truce of 1580 between Philip II of Spain and the Ottoman sultan Murad III indicated the withdrawal of the great powers, this did not bring a general peace to the region. Instead, North African and European states became part of a complicated intercontinental system that vacillated between war and peace, evident in the intrigues of Algiers and France to undermine the accord between the Spanish and the Ottomans after 1580.

A reorganization of the Ottoman territories in North Africa was undertaken after the death of ‘Ulj ‘Ali in 1587. Murad III incorporated Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis into the imperial administration as provinces or regencies, ruled by governors (*wali*) with the rank of *pasha*. Effective occupation meant control over the surrounding Arab and Berber lineages, which was enabled by Ottoman gunpowder weapons in the hands of the janissary troops, led by Ottoman officers, the *deys* and *bey*s. In Tripoli, local notables were brought together in a council (*diwan*), presided over by the *deys* and the Ottoman *pasha*. Appointed triennially, the *pashas* of Tripoli established Tripoli as a commercial center for seafaring and trans-Saharan trade. To ensure the African trade, the Fezzan was invaded in 1576–1577 and the local sultan was forced to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, which extended Ottoman influence to the frontiers of the West African kingdom of Bornu.

Algiers, like Tripoli, was an Ottoman bastion in a landscape defined by tribal politics, divided between lowland Arab tribes and highland Berbers. But Ottoman political ideology was uniquely suited to conquer and rule under such conditions, because it clearly distinguished between the state and society, the *khassa* and the *ra’iya*, with the latter ideally viewed as a mosaic of religious and national communities. While the *pasha* was the appointed representative of the sultan, real power was held by the corsairs, organized in a corporation (*ta’ifa*), and the military (*ojaq*), led by *deys*. The corsairs made Algiers the leading North African port, meanwhile, the military advanced into the interior, conquering the neighboring lineage groups, who were then made allies of the Ottomans in still further expeditions. The Berber allies of the Ottomans were known as *zouaves*, while the Arab allies were referred to as the *makhzen* tribes, signaling their alliance with the Ottoman state. The new political landscape was thus divided between an Ottoman oligarchy in Algiers, the

makhzen tribes, and the subjects. Inter-marriage, however, blurred the distinction between the Ottoman state and North African society, by creating a class referred to as the *kulughlis*, an indigenous political class whose Ottoman culture did not prevent them from identifying with the territorial state they had helped to carve out in Algeria.

In Tunisia, as in Algeria, a class of indigenous origins emerged alongside the Ottomans; however, the integration of the Ottoman officials and indigenous society went further. Initially government was divided between a *pasha*, appointed by the Ottoman sultan, and the *bey*, who was responsible for local administration, such as tax collection, which led him to control provincial politics. In 1590 the janissaries, led by their officers, the *deys*, wrested control of Tunis from the *pasha* and his council, and placed it in the hands of the leading *dey*. ‘Uthman Dey (1590–1610) was primarily concerned with internal order, suppressing revolts amongst the Arab lineages of Tunisia. So, while the conquest of North Africa by the Ottomans was driven by a Christian threat to the Muslim community, it resulted in the emergence of new political units in North Africa.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Barbary Corsairs and the Ottoman Provinces: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in the Seventeenth Century; Maghrib: Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli under the Deys, Husaynids, and Karamanlis in the Eighteenth Century.

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Maghrib: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli under the Deys, Husaynids, and Qaramanlis in the Eighteenth Century

The prosperity of the cities of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli declined after the seventeenth century, particularly profits from seafaring, yet, at the same time the ruling elites of these cities consolidated their autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. In Tunisia and

Tripolitania, hereditary dynasties were founded early in the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, in Algiers, the ruler, or *dey*, was chosen from amongst the Ottoman militias, or *ojak*, which had become a semi-indigenous oligarchic class. While the cases of Tunis and Tripolitania were comparable, the case of Algiers was distinct in so far as the ruling oligarchy continued to identify with the imperial system, rather than the local society, which had an impact upon the structure of Algiers society.

In Tripoli, the *kulughlis*, those of mixed Ottoman and Libyan origin, represented an indigenous class who rivaled the power of the Ottoman *pasha* and janissaries. One of them, Ahmad Qaramanli, led a revolt against the Tripoli government in 1711, with the support of *kulughlis* and an Arab lineage group. As the *bey* of Tripolitania, Ahmad Qaramanli rebuilt the navy and army, concluding treaties with Holland and Genoa for the necessary European technological improvements and armaments. Subsequent attempts by the Ottomans to restore their authority were unsuccessful, as a result, Ahmad Qaramanli was recognized as the hereditary *pasha* of Tripolitania in 1722. Under 'Ali Qaramanli (1754–1793) Tripoli prospered by a contradictory policy of naval warfare against European shipping and good relations with Christian and Jewish merchants in the port of Tripoli. However, the outbreak of the plague in the 1780s, which cost Tripolitania half of its population, had a particularly severe impact upon the Christian and Jewish populations because of their concentration in urban quarters. Nevertheless, Tripoli in the eighteenth century was a typically cosmopolitan Mediterranean city. Its prosperity continued through the Napoleonic era, as a result of Yusuf Qaramanli's (1796–1832) policy of capitalizing on the rivalry of Britain and France in the Mediterranean.

In Tunis the Husaynid dynasty secured its hereditary title to the office of *bey* in 1710, with the support of the bourgeois class of Tunis. Wealth in Tunis was distributed between the ruling family and the bourgeoisie, which dominated the central area of the city. To this degree, Tunis corresponds to the typical Islamic city of the Middle East. The *madina* of Tunis was the political and religious heart of the city, consisting of the central market (*suq*), mosque, and the *qasba*, or citadel. The Zaytuna Mosque was one of the foremost in the Islamic world, founded in 745, it acted as a symbol of the Islamic identity of the city and of the country. In the eighteenth century, the Husaynid beys added to the complex, founding schools (*madrasas*), where the founders built their tombs as well as public fountains. The founder of the Husaynid dynasty, Husayn Ibn 'Ali (1705–1735), accentuated the Islamic character of his dynasty by constructing mosques and schools, as well as convening a *diwan*

(council) that included members of the local, Tunisian religious class. During the reign of Hammuda ibn 'Ali (1782–1814), rural landholders were also absorbed into the political system, alongside the religious and merchant classes of Tunis, beginning a process of administrative reform that would continue into the nineteenth century.

Whereas in Tunisia and Tripoli the ruling dynasties integrated important social groups into the political system, the *deys* of Algiers remained a distinct group. Inter-marriage between the military elite and local Algerians did occur, but the *kulughlis* were increasingly excluded from access to political positions. Likewise, the wealthy quarters of Algiers were almost exclusively of either Turkish or Algerian composition. The *deys* resided in the center of the city, in a vast complex of palaces. The complex included administrative and judicial offices, while the janissaries were housed nearby, alongside the port, as well as in the *qasba* on the western wall of the city. The residences of the Algerian commercial and religious elite, on the other hand, were mostly in the southern quarter of the city, segregated from the Turkish ruling elite. Likewise, ethnic divisions were apparent in the system of urban government of Algiers, which placed each ethnic group under a headman (*amin*) responsible for policing and answerable to the mayor (*shaykh al-balad*). The clearest line of social cleavage was that between the Turkish-speaking oligarchy and the remainder of society, Berber, Arab, Andalusian, and Jewish. Exclusivity was the consequence of a political system beset with factional struggles, which forced the ruling *deys* to isolate themselves from society. Their political history is thus obscure, with twenty-eight *deys* succeeding each other between 1671 and 1830, many of whom died by assassination. The alienation of the ruling oligarchy within the capital city was reflected in the relative isolation of the capital from provincial Algeria, which was predominately rural. Perhaps 10 per cent of Algeria's population was urban. The population of Algiers, at 50,000, was less than half that of Tunis at the end of the eighteenth century.

Tunisia had an advanced, industrial economy in the eighteenth century. The manufacture of the fez or *shashiya*, as well as fine clothing and textiles, was comparable to the most complex capitalist industries in Europe. The artisans of Tunis produced commodities for markets in all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers were also important outlets for Sub-Saharan products, trading local and European manufactured goods for African slaves, gold, ivory, gum, feathers, and spices. The vibrancy of the ports is reflected in their response to the stimuli of the Napoleonic wars, when Algiers' dominance

of corsair seafaring was rivaled by Tunis and Tripoli. Whereas in the seventeenth century Algiers had launched as much as 75 ships, the number had been reduced to twenty or less after the decline of the eighteenth century. However, there was a dramatic revival in the last decade of the century. Algiers constructed its first modern frigate in 1791, under the direction of a Spaniard, while Tunis relied upon its merchant capitalists to provision a fleet of fifteen to thirty ships, which equaled the number at the peak of corsair activity in the seventeenth century.

Other factors, however, contributed to the relative decline of North African commerce from the seventeenth century, such as political disorders in West Africa, which disrupted the trans-Saharan routes in the late eighteenth century, as well as the plague, which represented a demographic and economic catastrophe. Carried by Ottoman troops from Istanbul, the plague made its first appearance in Tripoli in 1701 and spread to Tunis in 1705. It reappeared in Tunis again in the 1730s and in Algiers by 1740. The greatest epidemic occurred in the 1780s, when Tunis lost 18,000 inhabitants between 1784 and 1785 and Algiers 16,000 between 1786 and 1787. The impact of the plague upon Tripoli was perhaps even more profound. Yet, the reorganization of the political and commercial system in Tunisia under Hammuda, like the revivification of seafaring under Yusuf Qaramanli, represented something of a revival. While the relative isolation of Algiers in relation to Algerian society, together with the long-lasting impact of the plague and the European policy of economic exclusion after 1814, weakened North African societies on the eve of European imperial expansion into Northern Africa.

JAMES WHIDDEN

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Maghrib: Muslim Brotherhoods

Earliest evidence for the presence of Sufism (Islamic mysticism) in the Maghrib dates to the early eleventh century, nearly a quarter millennium later than its appearance in the Islamic East. The first Sufi brotherhoods in the region grew up around rural mosques and instruction centers known as *ribats* built on the frontier between lands under Muslim rule and those outside of Muslim authority. The *ribats* served in some cases as defensive outposts against threatening non-Muslim neighbors, but primarily as bases from which to carry Islam, strongly influenced by the Maliki school of law, to the region's non-Muslim or nominally Muslim inhabitants. One such *ribat* was built on the Atlantic coast of Morocco at the site known as Tit-n-Fitr near a community of Sanhaja Berbers. Over time those associated with the *ribat* evolved into the *Ta'ifa al-Sanhajiyya* Sufi brotherhood. As its name implies, the *Ta'ifa al-Sanhajiyya* remained ethnically oriented toward Sanhaja Berbers even as it extended its influence more widely throughout the Maghrib. Similar ethnically or tribally based Sufi brotherhoods arose out of the establishment of *ribats* elsewhere in the region, such as the Masmuda based *Ribat Shakir*, originally built in the foothills of the Atlas Mountains to defend against attacks by the heterodox Barghawata Berber confederation.

The most influential figure in the transition of Maghribi Sufism from such parochial beginnings into more multiregional, multiethnic forms of Sufi brotherhood was the Andalusian Abu Madyan Shu'ayb (d.1198). Abu Madyan received his education in the esoteric sciences from a diverse group of Maghribi masters but most notably the Arab Ibn Hirzihim in Fez, and the illiterate Masmuda Berber ascetic Abu Yi'zza. Scholars disagree about the veracity of claims that Abu Madyan also completed the pilgrimage to Mecca and met the Iranian jurist and Sufi preacher 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d.1165). From his prayer center in the Algerian city Bijaya (Fr. Bougie), Abu Madyan attracted a considerable enough following to be perceived as a threat by the Almohad caliph Ya'qub al-Mansur. Forced to appear before the caliph, the aged shaykh died on his way to the capital Marrakech. Abu Madyan's teaching of a “middle path” balancing worldly and spiritual concerns influenced the development of Sufism throughout the Muslim world, while his prominence in the initiatic chain (*silsila*) of so many later Maghribi Sufis earned him the honorific title “Shaykh of Shaykhs.”

The two most prominent Sufi brotherhoods in the premodern Maghrib were the Shadhiliyya, named after its Moroccan founder Abu'l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d.1258) and the Qadiriyya, which takes its name from 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. Al-Shadhili came into contact with the Iraqi Rifa'iyya brotherhood first in Egypt through Abu'l Fath al-Wasiti (d.1245), and upon returning to Morocco, under the tutelage of 'Abd al-Salam b. Mashish (d.1228). The Rifa'iyya possessed a more developed institutional character and al-Shadhili incorporated a similar organizational structure into the Shadhiliyya. The Qadiriyya brotherhood first entered the Maghrib from Andalusia in the sixteenth century through the efforts of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani's descendants and spiritual successors living there. Although al-Jilani did not personally found the brotherhood that bears his name, his written legacy on rules governing the behavior of disciples indicates an institutional dimension akin to that associated with the Shadhiliyya. Despite the structural changes effected by the Qadiriyya and Shadhiliyya orders, affiliation to a particular brotherhood continued to signify foremost an association with a Sufi master's teachings while connoting no formal, much less exclusive allegiance to that master or his brotherhood.

The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a period of reform and renewal throughout the Muslim world, and the Sufi order became in many cases the center for much of the reformist activity. The increased ease by which Muslim pilgrims worldwide were able to travel to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina further internationalized Sufi brotherhoods and aided in the circulation of reformist ideas. The period also saw the creation of several new Sufi orders arising out of the traditional Sufi networks but possessing qualities that suggest a signal change from their predecessors. Although significant differences existed among these new reformist brotherhoods, generally they shared the following traits: a central, hierarchical organization; a greater missionary emphasis, particularly focused on Islam's peripheries; a pietistic emphasis on correct practice; the use of vernacular languages religious texts; and a predilection for communal rather than individual performance of invocations accomplished to achieve heightened spiritual states.

One of the most influential figures during this period was the Moroccan Ahmad ibn Idris (d.1837). Born near the port city of al-'Ara'ish, Ibn Idris moved to Fez where he studied at the famous Qarawiyyin mosque school and also studied with a number of Sufi shaykhs all of whom were associated with the Shadhiliyya. Later, Ibn Idris distanced himself from his Shadhili masters asserting that the legendary figure al-Khadir had taught him while in the Prophet Muhammad's presence the prayers and litanies that he in turn taught to his own disciples. Ibn Idris traveled to Mecca in

1799 and remained in the East the rest of his life, living at different times in Mecca, Egypt, and the Yemen. While he does not seem to have aspired to create a new brotherhood, Ibn Idris is indirectly responsible for the creation of the Sanusiyya in Cyrenaica, the Mirghaniyya and Majdhubiyya in the Sudan, and the Rashidiyya in Egypt, which were all founded by his closest followers.

Like Ibn Idris, the Algerian Ahmad al-Tijani (d.1815) journeyed to Mecca after several years in Fez where he was initiated into the Qadiriyya, Nasiriyya, and Tayyibiyya brotherhoods. En route to Mecca, al-Tijani was initiated into the Khalwatiyya while in Cairo. He too relinquished his ties with past masters after receiving instructions directly from the Prophet Muhammad to do so. Unlike Ibn Idris, al-Tijani consciously sought to create a new brotherhood under his authority and he eventually forbade his followers from having affiliations with other brotherhoods besides the Tijaniyya. The Tijaniyya found its greatest success in Saharan and Sub-Saharan West Africa beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.

GLEN W. McLAUGHLIN

See also: Abu Madian, al-Shadhili, and the Spread of Sufism in the Maghrib.

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Maghrib Unity, European Union and

Until the independence of Algeria in 1962, the concept of Maghrib unity was, for the most part, confined to a solidarity of action against a common colonial power

and a united struggle for the liberation of each country in the region. At independence, the attachment and commitment to this ideal of unity remained an irreversible aspiration, and was even embedded in the earliest constitutions of Tunisia (1959), Morocco (1962), and Algeria (1962). The continuing belief in the necessary unity of the Maghrib, by excluding any form of political union, was to be underlined on economic grounds as emphasized in the conclusions of the Maghrib foreign ministers' meeting in Rabat in February 1963. Regional unity or integration was perceived as a potentially effective medium not only for helping rapid economic development in the region but also for harmonizing policy toward other groupings, particularly the European Union (EU).

The first postcolonial attempt at regional integration goes back to the early 1960s. Factors that helped set this process into motion included, among others, the partial settlement of border disputes that emerged following independence, and the Organization of African Unity's suggestion regarding the common development of mineral resources in those disputed areas. Another driving force was the UN Economic Commission for Africa's assessment that, in a report tabled after a visit to the region in 1963, drew the attention of the Maghrib countries to coordinated projects that could benefit more than one country and urged consultation to avoid duplicating industrial investments. All these factors prompted the first Conference of Maghrib Economic Ministers in Tunis in 1964, which launched the Maghrib Permanent Consultative Committee to coordinate and harmonize economic policies among the partner countries.

Agreements signed in Tunis and Tangier in 1964 provided for the coordination and harmonization of development plans, including those for industries and services, as well as intraregional trade and relations with the EU (European Economic Community at that time). A Maghrib Center for Industrial Studies was established in 1968 in Tripoli, with financial and technical assistance from the United Nations Development Program, to promote joint projects. However, cooperation broke down because each country's industrial policy ignored those of its partners, resulting in the proliferation of rival industries, such as steel and fertilizer manufacture.

In relation to Europe, the EU, in its wish to conclude association agreements with the Maghrib countries, favored joint negotiations toward a single free-trade area for all these countries. They neither harmonized their attitudes nor coordinated their positions, and each country individually negotiated its own deal, leading to separate association accords in 1969 with Morocco and Tunisia, and cooperation agreements in 1976, with Algeria included this time.

The chief impediments to any tangible achievement were each country's embarking upon different economic policies, and their subordinating of the regional construct to individual political and economic choices. In addition, the frequency of inter-state frictions, particularly in the 1970s, was not conducive to dialogue and negotiation between partner countries. Tunisia's disengagement from the abortive declaration of union in 1974 with Libya worsened relations between the two countries for several years. More serious was the Algerian-Moroccan disagreement over the Western Sahara from 1975 onward, which decisively halted all progress on the regional front for more than a decade, during which period the Maghrib region was to witness the development of alliances (Tunis axis and Oujda axis) instigated by Algeria and Morocco, arguably more for political than economic considerations.

Improved interstate relations (resumption of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco in May 1988 and normalization of diplomatic ties between Tunisia and Libya later) paved the way for a renewed interest in regional integration. This culminated in the establishment of the Arab Maghrib Union (AMU) in February 1989, which became a matter of survival in light of the global trend toward the formation of regional trading blocs, and more important, the southern enlargement of the EU and the imminent completion of the European internal market.

Among the central objectives of the AMU was the strengthening of links between partner countries in order to ensure stability and enhance policy coordination, both regionally and with the outside world. A common development strategy was adopted in 1991, outlining four steps for integration with fixed deadlines for establishing a free trade area by the end of 1992, a customs union by the end of 1995, a common market by the end of 2000, and at a later stage with no specified date, an economic and monetary union. Up to April 1994, the AMU partner countries had signed several agreements related to diverse economic, environmental, and sociocultural areas. However, very few of these agreements had been translated into action.

The still-unresolved Western Sahara issue, the domestic problems in Algeria, and the repercussions of UN sanctions on Libya over the years raised serious obstacles to the necessary development of the group. After Libya's refusal to take over the AMU chairmanship from Algeria in January 1995, the activities of the organization were frozen and its fate became uncertain. The AMU's prospects for developing a relationship with the EU that would substitute for bilateral arrangements, and thus enable its founders to bargain collectively, also faded. Again, and within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership policy launched in 1995, each country negotiated on a bilateral basis, and

both Morocco and Tunisia already concluded new agreements.

The postindependence attempts at integration in the Maghrib, while favored by a propitious environment, at least in terms of geographical proximity and common historical and cultural backgrounds, have proven unsuccessful as they have been overridden by the national constraining realities of a political and economic nature. Evidently this lack of progress adversely affected the degree of coordination of their external relations, especially vis-à-vis their major trading partner, the EU. It remains to be seen whether recent developments in the region (the easing of sanctions on Libya, the relative improvement of the domestic situation in Algeria, and the new leadership in Morocco) can provide a spur to the regional process of integration.

AHMED AGHROUT

See also: Algeria: International Relations, 1962–Present; Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962; Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi; Polisario and the Western Sahara; Tunisia: Modern International Relations.

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Mahdist State: See Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898.

Mai Dunama Dibalami (1210–1248)

Mai Dunama Dibalami was arguably the most prominent ruler of the Kanem Empire. The Kanem Empire emerged in the central Sudan in the region that runs from the Sahel into the Sahara northeast of Lake Chad. Kanem began as a southern Saharan confederation of

nomadic groups, under the leadership of the Zaghawah. By the ninth century, the Zaghawah had settled in Kanem, whereupon they began a campaign of military expansion during the thirteenth century. Mai Dunama Dibalami was a central figure in the expansion of Kanem during this period.

Dibalami is credited with extending the territorial limits of the kingdom from the Niger to the Nile. He exerted control over the Fezzan and brought stability to long-distance trade between North Africa and Kanem. He also organized military expeditions to the west of Lake Chad, where in 1252 he campaigned against the Mabina, Kalkin, and Afuno. The expansion of Kanem under Dibalami facilitated control of two major routes of the trans-Saharan trade: the north-south trade from Tripoli to Kanem and the east-west routes from Egypt to Ghana-Mali-Songhai.

The major exports from Kanem were slaves, elephant tusks, ostrich feathers, and live animals. In exchange, Kanem imported horses, which were central to the creation of the Kanem cavalry. The evidence suggests that the cavalry of Dibalami was composed of 41,000 horses. In addition, Kanem also imported garments, fabrics, and iron weapons from the north. For example, the Islamic sources state that during the tenure of Dibalami garments were shipped from the Tunisian capital into Kanem. The prosperity of the trans-Saharan trade depended on the stability provided by the different powers that were situated in the different parts of the network of trade routes. In the north, the kingdom of Fezzan was the bulwark of the trade. The Berber chiefs of Kawar dominated the central region. In the south, Kanem provided security for the trade routes.

In the thirteenth century, however, under Dunama Dibalami, the historical evidence suggests that Kanem had supplanted the Berber chiefs of Kawar and the Berber dynasty of Banu Khattad as the dominant force in the trans-Saharan trade. Apart from dominating both ends of the north–south trade, it was also important for the Kanem kings to prevent the diversion of trade to alternate routes. To this end, the king of Kanem gained control over the western town of Takedda and also extended his control over Dadjo and Zaghawa to the east.

The Kanem under Dunama Dibalami was by no means a huge empire with a strong centralized organization. In fact, historical sources are imprecise as to the actual power the king of Kanem wielded over the Fezzan. Further, Kanem control of the eastern parts was tenuous. It is doubtful whether Dibalami extended his empire as far as Darfur. Although Dibalami fought a protracted war against the Tubu of Bahr-al-Ghazal, he did not succeed in imposing his rule over them. Nor did he succeed in subjugating the peoples living around the Lake Chad and on the islands. What this suggests is that the expansion of Kanem under Dibalami

was concentrated on the northern region. Kanem relations with the southern region were based on economic interest. The southern region was the main source of slaves for the trans-Saharan trade, as they were non-Muslim peoples. It was therefore not in Kanem's economic interest to extend the frontiers of Islam to this important source of slaves.

Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that Dibalami was a remarkable Muslim reformer, and during his reign Islam flourished. Dibalami used Islam to legitimize his rule. It also provided a justification for expansion through or holy war against unbelievers. He is credited with having founded a *madrasa* in Cairo for the states under the control of Kanem. Dunama also imposed Islam on the Berbers of the central Sudan.

It would appear that as Kanem expanded under Dunama Dibalami so did Islam spread. Islam brought a number of advantages to Kanem. It facilitated the spread of writing and scholarship. Further, the use of Muslim jurists aided the king of Kanem in consolidating its control by applying Islamic law to traditional customs. A contingent of judges was created in all the major towns with a high court in the capital. Further, because of the central location of Kanem, it became a center for the dissemination of Islamic thought and culture. It also became a nucleus for the cross-fertilization of ideas between the Mediterranean cities, the Middle East, and the central Sudan. There were also significant economic advantages to the spread of Islam into Kanem. Islam facilitated diplomatic relations with the states of North Africa and Arabia. The evidence suggests that as these diplomatic ties were strengthened, trade was also enhanced. The economic ties from Kanem did extend to Tunisia in the north and Egypt and Arabia in the east.

In spite of the great success of Dunama Dibalami, Kanem had begun to show signs of internal crumbling before his death. The eastern frontier was wracked by revolts, especially by the Bulala. This was compounded by internal squabbling among the ruling families. Nevertheless, there was up to a century of stability after the death of Dibalami, before Kanem entered a period of decline.

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See also: **Kanem.**

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Makeke, Charlotte Makhanye

Advocate for Women's Rights

Charlotte Manye Maxeke (1874–1939) was an important figure in African religious and political circles of the early twentieth century and was a prominent advocate of women's rights. She was born in 1874 near Fort Beaufort. Her father was a Sotho from the Transvaal who migrated to the eastern Cape for work. Instead of returning to his homeland, he married a Christian Mfengu woman, converted to Christianity, and became a preacher. Charlotte was the eldest of the six children. The parents were committed to providing education for their children, and Charlotte Manye studied at mission schools in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth.

By 1890 the Manye family moved to Kimberley, where Charlotte Manye worked as a teacher, one of the few professions open to educated African women. Charlotte and her sister Kate gained local renown for their singing. The vibrant African elite community of Kimberley was much influenced by the tour of the African American singing troupe, Orpheus McAdoo's Virginia Jubilee Singers, which toured South Africa from 1890 to 1898. This troupe provided the African elite with a model of black achievement. Inspired by the example of the Virginia Jubilee Singers, two British impresarios formed a sixteen-member choir to tour Great Britain. The choir was intended to raise money for an African college in South Africa. Charlotte and Kate Manye were part of this troupe, which toured from 1891 to 1892, and sang before Queen Victoria. Although the tour created a sensation, the group had financial and management problems and was almost stranded in Britain.

Charlotte Manye signed up for a second choir tour of North America in 1893. She hoped to use this tour as a way to gain access to higher education opportunities that were unavailable in South Africa. This tour also foundered and the choir was abandoned in Ohio. The group fortuitously met Reverend R. Ransom, a minister of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church. The AME Church was the oldest black denomination in the United States. With Ransom's help, six members of the choir, including Charlotte Manye, enrolled at AME Church's Wilberforce University in Ohio. A local branch of the AME's Woman's Parent Mite Missionary Society befriended Charlotte Manye and gave her financial and emotional support. While in Ohio, Charlotte Manye frequently lectured on South Africa.

Charlotte Manye wrote her sister Kate, who was then living in Johannesburg, about her experiences and the AME Church. Kate was acquainted with Ethiopianists, African Christians who broke away from mission churches and formed independent, black-led, churches. One prominent Ethiopianist, Reverend M. Mokone, acted on the basis of Charlotte's letter, and initiated contact with the AME Church. This contact eventually led to the establishment of the AME Church in South Africa.

Charlotte Manye earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Wilberforce University and returned to South Africa in 1901, intending to work as an AME missionary and teacher. She was the first black South African woman to earn a university degree. Due to the South African war, Manye was unable to proceed to her mission field in the Transvaal and worked in Cape Town. After it was safe to proceed, Charlotte Manye moved to Pietersburg and established a school and other mission work. A fellow South African graduate of Wilberforce University, Marshall Maxeke, soon joined Charlotte Manye and became head of the mission. Charlotte and Marshall married, had a son, and continued their mission work as a team. Among the many schools in the Transvaal that the Maxekes established was the Wilberforce Institute, near Johannesburg. At the invitation of a chief in the Transkei, they began work among the Thembu people. Around the end of World War I, Charlotte and her husband moved to the Johannesburg area, ending the most active phase of her mission work.

Charlotte Maxeke and her husband were involved in the African politics of the early twentieth century. Marshall Maxeke joined the South African Native National Congress, later the African National Congress, at its founding. Charlotte Maxeke was influenced by the massive passive resistance campaign of women in Bloemfontein, who in 1913 protested extending passes to women. Charlotte Maxeke helped found the Bantu Women's League, which was formed, in part, to represent women who were excluded from full membership of the South African Native National Congress. She served as its president in 1918 and was part of a group that met with Prime Minister Louis Botha to protest the passes for women.

Through the 1920s Charlotte Maxeke continued her public involvement. She was a popular speaker and broadened her concerns to include the urban issues affecting African women and children. She and her husband were involved in the Johannesburg Joint Council Movement, an interracial group of liberal whites and moderate Africans dedicated to discussing and improving interracial relations. Charlotte Maxeke testified before many government commissions in order to ensure that African perspectives were represented. She

continued her mission activity by visiting African women in prison. While Charlotte maintained her public life in politics and the church, she also provided for her extended family. Her husband was increasingly incapacitated by heart disease and died in 1928. Charlotte Maxeke worked variously as a probation officer, a "native welfare" officer, and briefly operated a domestic service bureau. In the late 1920s Charlotte returned to the United States for a meeting of the AME Church. Through the 1930s Charlotte Maxeke continued her political and religious work. She was one of the organizers of the National Council of African Women, a successor to the Bantu Women's League, and she served as its first president. Charlotte Manye Maxeke died in 1939.

MODUPE G. LABODE

Biography

Charlotte Manye Maxeke was born in 1874 near Fort Beaufort. She earned a bachelor of science degree from Wilberforce University in Ohio, United States, and returned to South Africa in 1901. She married Marshall Maxeke and had a son. She helped found the Bantu Women's League, serving as its president in 1918. She died in 1939.

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Makenye Kalembe (1835?–1899)

Collaborator and Resister in Kasai, 1880–1900

Makenye Kalembe was one of the African leaders of the last quarter of the nineteenth century who undertook reform of their society, managing to come to a degree of understanding with the Europeans but finally resorting to armed struggle to preserve independence.

Makenye Kalembo was born between 1830 and 1835 into a chiefly family in the clan of Bena Kashiya among the Luba people in the valley of the central Lulua River around the present-day city of Kananga in the western Kasai region. His father, Tunsele-Twa-Ilunga, chose him as his successor probably because of his leadership qualities. Makenye made a number of business trips to Angola, and his village, Kempe, developed into a prosperous commercial center that attracted Chokwe traders and became the point of departure of caravans of ivory, wax, and slaves to Angola. The triumph of his clan over its rivals resulted from the accumulation of wealth and firearms in the framework of long-distance trade and from the acquisition of ritual powers, the *Nkwembie* (spirit of force). By 1865 Makenye had the economic, social, and symbolic capital to contribute to the political integration in the valley of the central Lulua.

Makenye adopted various political strategies to extend his power, including gift-giving, feasting, the use of force, and the control of trade with the Chokwe. With the accumulated capital, Makenye was able to institutionalize his power by introducing new principles of legitimacy. His nickname, Kalembo, became a dynastic name. His son Tshisungu took the name of Kalembo Mwana (Kalembo Junior). Makenye Kalembo adopted the Chokwe title of “Mwanangana” (“landowner”) and instituted a rigorous hierarchy at his court. From that time on Makenye was invariably referred to as the “King of Bena Moyo” (king of people who greet each other by *moyo*, or life) mostly by his people, and “King of Bashilange” by the Chokwe.

Religious rituals contributed to fostering unity and social cohesion. However, the extent of political centralization—that is, the number of people over whom he exercised power and from whom he could collect taxes—was still limited to a few clans and clients. There were other clan leaders who did not share Makenye’s religious enthusiasm and political goals. Thus, his main challenge for the two decades after 1865 remained the integration of his rivals, as well as new groups, into the emerging state of Bena Moyo.

On October 30, 1881 Mwanangana Makenye Kalembo welcomed Dr. Paul Pogge and Lt. Herman Wissmann, German explorers sent to participate in what was later known as the “Scramble” for Africa, to Kempe. Their meeting provoked a great cultural misunderstanding. The Germans had a colonial project; they understood their mission to be a scientific expedition with a political agenda, namely, the exploration of the Kasai River basin, and the installation of a German post in the region. Lt. H. Wissmann even reported that Makenye Kalembo and his Luba “nation” constituted an appropriate target for evangelization. Kalembo and his subjects, however, believed the newcomers were

their ancestors (*bajangi*) coming back to life in the form of white men to recreate a paradisiacal world where there would be no sickness, aging, or death. Makenye seized control of this cultural capital to further the process of political centralization. With the help of Makenye Kalembo, Pogge and Wissmann explored the central Kasai basin between December 1881 and April 1882.

The arrival of the Germans created tension between Makenye Kalembo and Muamba Mputu, the latter accusing the first of appropriating his *bajangi*. But Makenye was preoccupied with deeper existential dilemmas: the behavior and the activities of his *bajangi* did not conform to prevailing cultural categories. He started the painful task of redefining them.

In 1884 King Leopold II of Belgium hired Wissmann to complete his geographic discoveries and to collect data on the natural and human resources in the Kasai basin. Makenye Kalembo gave Wissmann a piece of land on the banks of the Lulua River, where they built a German station called “Luluabourg,” that the Angolan porters named “Malandji” in memory of Malange, their native city in Angola. The king also helped Wissmann build canoes for the exploration of the Kasai river.

Makenye Kalembo expressed his hope of establishing a meaningful partnership with the Europeans. He made a blood pact (*ndondo*) with Wissmann, with the understanding that they would become “brothers” who would provide each other with assistance in all circumstances and refrain from acts of hostility. Thus, indirectly, Makenye became an ally of King Leopold II. One provision of this (verbal) pact stipulated that a breach of the agreement would result either in the death of the traitor and his family members, in the worse case scenario, or in the removal of his power. The war against Katende, one of Makenye’s rivals, that followed thereafter tested the solidity of the pact. The conquered chief spent four months in Luluabourg’s prison.

In 1885 Makenye Kalembo accompanied Wissmann in his exploration of the Kasai River. Their expedition clarified the relationship between the Kasai and Congo Rivers. The trip to Nshasa and Leopoldville was an important learning experience for Makenye and his subjects. It highlighted the difference between the Luba values and those represented by the Congo Free State (CFS) and its agents. He came back convinced that his recent religious experience was an illusion, for there were more *bajangi* beyond his territory than he had imagined. Furthermore, the *bajangi* were mortals and were unable to protect their “descendants” from violence and suffering.

With the return of Wissmann and other CFS agents (the Belgians de Macar and Le Marinel) to Luluabourg in April 1886, the center of trade in wax and ivory

shifted from Kempe to Luluabourg, now perceived as the “Paradise of Congo.” Through various hegemonic processes, the CFS administrators transformed Luluabourg into a center of political power and positioned themselves as arbiters between Makenye Kalemba and the other chiefs. But Makenye Kalemba did not see these attempts at centralization as an encroachment upon his sphere of influence. Actually, he mobilized the firepower of the Europeans to promote his own interests. The attack against Muamba Mputu that took place in 1887, with the help of de Macar and Le Marinel, is a good case in point. Muamba Mputu was defeated after two fierce battles and, according to tradition, he escaped from the battlefield only thanks to his magical powers.

In 1887 Makenye Kalemba was at the peak of his power in a prosperous land. Despite an increasing number of CFS agents, merchants, and missionaries in Luluabourg, the relationship with Kalemba was cordial. The region had abundant natural resources, and there was little competition for resources.

This political peace slowly broke down under the pressure of merchant capitalism and the CFS. The competition between the European trading companies and the local population for resources sharply increased and provoked tension between them. Makenye Kalemba now faced a serious challenge to his political and economic power from the CFS and its agents, who openly questioned his “independence” and the activities of Chokwe and Bihe traders in Kempe. The *entente cordiale* gave way to a “hostile attitude” on the part of Makenye and his subjects.

The tension erupted into open conflict when CFS agents ordered Makenye to transfer the collection of tributary taxes to the CFS. The conflict started in early 1891 and continued after the death of King Makenye from pneumonia in 1899. Resistance to colonial rule persisted until 1924, when the Belgian colonial administration recognized Kalemba Muana as chief of the Bena Kashiya clan, not the king of the Luba-Lulua.

KALALA NGALAMULUME

See also: Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Zaire: Nineteenth Century: Precolonial; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Zaire: Belgian Congo: Administration and Society, 1908–1960.

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
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Malaria: *See Epidemics: Malaria, AIDS, Other Disease: Postcolonial Africa.*

Malawi: Ngoni Incursions from the South, Nineteenth Century

The Ngoni incursions into the regions west and east of Lake Malawi are part of a broader historical phenomenon which is commonly known as *Mfecane*. It comprises a whole series of Bantu migrations, which proceeded northward from southern Africa as far as Lake Victoria. The Ngoni were a cattle-rearing Bantu people, ethnically and linguistically very closely related to the Swazi, Zulu, and Xhosa.

The reasons for the northbound migrations of the Ngoni from their original home in Natal have to do primarily with the long drought there at the end of the eighteenth century, which led to the decimation of cattle stocks and a famine that lasted several years.



Malawi.

In consequence, different chiefdoms made war on each other over scarce water and forage resources. In the course of these conflicts, age-sets were transformed into military reserves. Not only could a standing army thereby be maintained, it was also possible to more easily integrate defeated peoples into such a military unit, because within such a transformed age-set a strong feeling of solidarity arose from the experience of common military service.

According to the dominant oral traditions, it was Chief (*Inkosi*) Zwide who initially emerged victorious in these campaigns, after taking captive his last opponent Dingiswayo in 1818, who died a few days later. Thereupon Shaka, one of Dingiswayo's client chiefs, took up the fight against Zwide, and already in 1818 (some sources say 1821 or 1822) defeated Zwide and killed him. Zwide's surviving followers fled northward, beginning the Ngoni migrations.

According to other sources, however, the migrations had been triggered earlier, in 1817, by Zwide's assault on Matiwane's Ngwane at Mzinyathi River, some time before the Zulu under Shaka became independent. Regardless of which of these scenarios is correct, the losers of the conflicts fled northward in three main groups. One settled in southern Mozambique, while the two other sections under Zwangendaba and Shongonane invaded the region of present-day Zimbabwe. In 1823 Zwangendaba subjugated the Tonga and incorporated them into his military units. He then continued on to the valley of the Limpopo River, where Shongonane refused him obedience. Zwangendaba crossed the Limpopo, further integrating defeated tribes into his military units. Some traditions report, however, that this policy of assimilating peaceful tribes, who had not undergone the intensive military training like the Ngoni, actually reduced the military effectiveness of Zwangendaba's troops.

In 1835 Zwangendaba crossed the Zambezi. However, his rearguard under Mputa Maseko, with the main body of the cattle, failed to make the crossing. Zwangendaba, for unclear reasons, did not wait for them. Without his cattle and his rearguard, Zwangendaba settled for five years among the Nsenga, many of whom were integrated into the Ngoni forces. The losses of livestock were balanced by Zwangendaba through the systematic confiscation of cattle owned by neighboring peoples. In 1840 or 1841 he invaded the Chewa dominion of Mzimba on the Lundazi River and settled among the Tumbuka and their Chewa masters.

While the Tumbuka were forced to work in the fields for their new Ngoni overlords, several Chewa chiefdoms were conquered and devastated, such as Chulu and Gebisa. Zwangendaba then marched through the region of Kasungu, migrated further northwards in 1842 and 1843, and settled among the Sukuma, east of

the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika. He died in the village of Mapupu sometime between 1845 and 1848. Meanwhile Mputa Maseko's fraction of the Ngoni had settled in the Songea region, in the southeastern part of present-day Tanzania.

After Zwangendaba's death, violent disputes over the succession broke out, which had lasting and partially destructive effects on the areas concerned. Zwangendaba had designated his favorite son Mbelwa as his heir, but he had not yet reached puberty. Mbelwa's claim to the throne was soon challenged by two major factions. The first was led by Zwangendaba's brother Ntabeni Jele, who was striving for the throne on behalf of his oldest son Mtutu. The second faction, supported by most of the army, was commanded by Zwangendaba's cousin, Mgayi Jele. Ntabeni died shortly afterward, his armed forces retreating to the southwest in the face of the approaching Mgayi. Some of the fleeing units fell upon the Nyamwezi, who were settled on the southwestern side of Lake Tanganyika. Other Ngoni units fled to Lake Victoria, where Stanley heard in 1871 that they lived in permanent conflict with neighboring peoples. Mgayi died shortly after his campaign against Ntabeni and left no successor.

Several Ngoni groups invaded Ufipa; another group settled near Songea. This last branch under Zulu Jama, a royal adviser (*Induna*) acting in his own interest came to blows with Mputa Maseko, who was already settled there. Mputa was killed, and his successor Chikuse was forced to retreat southward with his people along their original northward route until they reached an area southwest of Lake Malawi, where they still live. Meanwhile Mtutu crossed the Luangwa to the east, avoiding armed Bemba units. Around 1865 he attacked the Chewa Chief Mbang'ombe, besieging him for years in his hill fortress until Mbang'ombe surrendered.

Mtutu then settled in the Nsenga country and adopted their language. In the meantime, Mtutu's brothers had reached Nkamanga in Malawi about 1855, where they installed Mbelwa as their chief.

The military power of the Ngoni in Malawi, already considerably eroded from decades of fighting and subsequent fragmentation, dwindled further with the installation of a British protectorate in Nyasaland in 1891.

The Ngoni incursions had, and continue to have, a lasting influence on the peoples involved. These campaigns claimed many lives in nearly all the regions surrounding Lake Malawi; along with this went the deliberate and systematic devastation of settlements and economic resources. Originally unwarlike peoples were integrated into the Ngoni military structures and, thus trained, attacked other ethnic groups. Even groups not integrated by the Ngoni, such as Bena, Hehe, or Sangu, adopted Ngoni military tactics. A partial

collapse of the economic infrastructure occurred: crops rotted on the stalks, the fields could no longer be tilled, and local and regional trade experienced severe disruption. Victims of the Ngoni campaigns invited Europeans, notably missionaries, to come to Malawi (Nyasaland) as their protectors, with far-reaching consequences.

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See also: **Difaqane on the Highveld; Mfecane; Mozambique: Nguni Ngoni Incursions from the South; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Ngoni Incursion from the South; Zambia: Ngoni Incursion from the South; Zimbabwe: Incursions from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele.**

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Malawi: Long-Distance Trade, Nineteenth Century

The long-distance trade in both ivory and slaves in the region of present-day Malawi was frequently the business of the same political and ethnic groups as in pre-colonial times; indeed, the same trade routes were used.

Elephant hunting and the trade in ivory have always been a major concern of the local Yao and Makua peoples of Malawi and Mozambique. Trade relations between coastal settlements and Yao ivory traders probably began to develop in the sixteenth century, and by the end of the seventeenth century represented a well-organized system. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the ivory routes ran from the areas north and south of the Zambezi to the Portuguese-controlled Mozambique island, with the ivory probably following the routes of the older gold trade. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the town of Kilwa became practically the sole export harbor for ivory because of the ruinous Portuguese taxation policy in Mozambique, which had made it prohibitively

expensive to trade ivory there. Kilwa had extended its economic hinterland as far as Lake Malawi during the slave trade with the French possessions in the Indian Ocean in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The ivory was brought by Yao and Makua from the areas between the Zambezi and the northern tip of Lake Malawi to Kilwa or Mozambique island; from there the goods were shipped by Arabs, Swahili, or Indians to coastal settlements like Zanzibar and Mombasa, which maintained trading relations with customers in India, China, Europe, and North America. The ivory trade experienced a boom around the 1840s, when more and more vessels from the United States and Europe began anchoring at Zanzibar; the Industrial Revolution in the United States and Western Europe had brought about a fashion revolution, and an interest in luxury goods. Ivory was needed for products such as billiard balls and decorative carvings.

In the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the trade routes from Zambezia and Malawi to the coast came increasingly to be exploited for slave trading. Until 1820 the Arabs and Swahili at the coast had been content with their role of providing markets for slave caravans from the interior, which were largely organized by Makua, Yao, or Nyamwezi. But soon the demand for slaves grew precipitously, first through the expanding plantation economy on the French island possessions and Madagascar in the second half of the eighteenth century, then through the development of a plantation economy at Zanzibar and Pemba in the first half of the nineteenth century. Madagascar remained an important customer for slaves throughout the nineteenth century; from about 1860 on, however, the French increasingly covered their need for workers through the importation of cheap labor from India. The profit margin in the slave trade to Zanzibar and Madagascar, however, became so considerable that Arabs and Swahili started to explore the long-distance trade routes themselves.

In Malawi and neighboring territories, primarily Yao, Bisa, Ngindo, and Nsenga, fell victim to the slave trade, as prisoners of war or as repayment for debts; children were exchanged by their families for food during famines. Portuguese from Zambezia, as well as Arabs, Makua, and particularly Yao, were involved in slave raiding, acquisition and transport. The Yao, originally hunters themselves, could survive only by committing themselves to the hunting and selling of slaves. The Yao controlled the ivory and slave trade at the Shire and Zambezi Rivers until the late 1880s. They withstood threats by Bisa and Ngoni, not least because they had been supplied with firearms by the Portuguese and the Arabs. In the 1880s most of the Yao chiefs in Malawi were involved in slave hunting, particularly

east of the M'lela River, in the territory of the Lomwe and later around Lake Malawi, mainly in Jumbe, Angoni, Magwangwara, Makanjile, and Mpenda.

Although the trading partners of the Yao were mostly Arabs and Swahili, the slave trade was financed initially by Europeans, subsequently by Arabian and Indian merchants at the coast. Relatively rarely, however, would Arabs or Indians enter the slave-hunting grounds themselves. Rather, they concentrated on a few trading posts, where their Yao, Makua, or Bemba representatives exchanged captured slaves for guns. The Arabs then brought the slaves to Lake Malawi, and across to Lindi, Kilwa, and Mikindani. A significant share of the slave trade can be ascribed to the Ngoni, who would sell prisoners of war when necessary.

During the 1880s the role of the British in these regions became increasingly pervasive. At Zanzibar the British antislavery campaigns produced considerable results, but in the south the more remote slaving routes through Malawi and Mozambique remained intact and supplied a whole chain of smaller slave-exporting harbors between Kilwa and Sofala. From there, the slaves were smuggled to more northern coastal trading centers. As late as 1875, some 2,000 to 4,000 slaves were presumably exported in this way. Pressure upon the slave hunters and traders grew through British trading companies and missionaries, who were settling in Malawi (Nyasaland) in increasing numbers; reservations for runaway slaves were set up in the course of the antislavery campaigns. Between 1887 and 1889 serious fighting erupted between agents of the British Line Company and Arab or Yao traders, which interrupted the slave trade. Threats by influential antislavery lobbyists in Britain to urge the annexation of the coastal hinterland of Mozambique persuaded the Portuguese authorities, starting in the middle of the 1880s, to take military action against the slave trade.

In 1892 the Portuguese opened Zambezia to international capital, which encouraged the penetration of the traditional slave-hunting grounds by Europeans. Concurrently the British were increasing their influence in Malawi, and the Germans pushed forward their frontiers in Tanganyika. Thus the slave trade was suppressed, although the resistance of Arab slave traders continued at least until 1899.

The slave raids resulted in a depopulation of the area west of Lake Malawi and in serious disturbances of economic activities like agriculture and trade. Reports of contemporary European eyewitnesses regarding the number of slaves involved were probably exaggerated and should be seen in the context of propaganda moves by missions and trading companies interested in an intensified European penetration of Malawi. For the years around 1850, for example, modern estimates reckon

that about 10,000 to 12,000 slaves were exported annually from Kilwa.

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Malawi: Missionaries and Christianity, Nineteenth Century

Although Jesuit missionaries operated in the Zambesi valley in the seventeenth century, they do not appear to have gone up the Shire into Malawi. The first missionary to enter Malawi was David Livingstone when, in his capacity as leader of the government sponsored Zambesi Expedition, he entered southern Malawi in January 1859. In April 1861 the first formal missionary party arrived in the Shire Highlands. They were missionaries of the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA), a mission created in response to Livingstone's famous appeal in his Cambridge lectures of 1857. Bishop C. F. Mackenzie was the leader of the expedition. Unfortunately the antislavery fervor of the mission led to conflict with local Yao chiefs involved in slave trading. After Mackenzie's death and that of other members of the mission from malaria, the new bishop, Tozer, withdrew the mission to Zanzibar in December 1863 despite bitter protests from Livingstone.

The return of Livingstone's body to Britain in 1874 and his funeral in Westminster Abbey triggered new interest in Malawi, particularly in Scotland. The Free Church of Scotland as well as the Church of Scotland decided to send missions to Malawi in honor of Livingstone. The Free Church Mission, which arrived in 1875, was called the Livingstonia Mission, the Church of Scotland Mission, which arrived in 1876, called its first station Blantyre, round which the modern city of Blantyre later grew up. The Livingstonia party soon to be headed by Robert Laws, who held the post

until 1927, included four Xhosa missionaries from Lovedale in the Cape, among whom the longest serving was William Koyi.

The Livingstonia Mission was established first at Cape Maclear at the south end of Lake Malawi, but in 1880 they moved to Bandawe in what is now the Northern Province and began their long association with the north where Robert Laws built in the 1890s at Khondowe mountain, a medical, educational, and evangelistic institution similar to Lovedale in South Africa. This rapidly became the center of a network of schools across the province and what is now north-eastern Zambia, where David Kaunda (the father of President Kenneth Kaunda) was one of the pioneer Livingstonia missionaries. The institution trained Africans in the skills required for the modern economy reserved in Rhodesia and South Africa for whites as well as teachers and ministers.

The initial party of missionaries at Blantyre made a disastrous beginning and a number of them were dismissed, leaving David Clement Scott, who arrived in 1880, to rebuild relations with the local chiefs. This he did very effectively aided by a number of African colleagues, notably Joseph Bismarck. He also rapidly built up a cadre of young African leaders for the church; among the most notable were Harry Kwambili Matecheta, Mungo Chisuse, Thomas Mpeni, and John Gray Kufa, who was hanged by the British in 1915 for his support of John Chilembwe.

Scott was so effective in his attempts to enter into African culture that he produced in 1890 his *Cyclopaedic Dictionary of the Chimang'anja Language*, a volume that still lies behind all subsequent attempts to produce a dictionary of the language variously called Nyanja or Chewa. His radically pro-African stance, for example he wrote articles criticizing Rhodes and the British South Africa Company's conquest of Zimbabwe, led to his being forced to retire from Malawi in 1898.

It was the lobbying of the British government by the Scottish missions and their supporters that led to British intervention in the area. The Scots' campaign started in 1889 when they feared that Malawi would soon be divided between the Portuguese and the Swahili traders from Zanzibar. However, when British support appeared as if it would take the form of rule by Rhodes's British South Africa Company the Scottish missions campaigned against this successfully and again in 1893 when it appeared that Rhodes might still get control of Malawi.

In 1901 the Livingstonia Mission became a mission of the United Free Church of Scotland but more significantly African church leaders from Blantyre and Livingstonia met and sought with missionary support the creation of one Presbyterian Church in Malawi. At another conference in 1904 this was agreed though

complicated negotiations in Malawi and Scotland and problems of geographical distance delayed the formal legal institution of the autonomous Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) until 1914.

Meanwhile, in 1886 the UMCA returned to the area establishing its headquarters on Likoma island. Then in 1888 the Cape Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) began work in the area between the Blantyre and Livingstonia areas. Despite very different attitudes to education from the Scottish missions, the church produced by this mission did join the CCAP in 1924.

A quite different group of missions entered Malawi after it became a British Protectorate in 1891. The first was Joseph Booth's Zambesi Industrial Mission founded close to Blantyre in 1892 soon to be followed by the Nyasa Industrial Mission. These and several other missions that sought to support themselves by commercial agriculture tended to settle in the Shire Highland where there was some commercial development and the beginnings of international trade. It is important to notice that the DRC, the UMCA, and these new missions all shared a very limited vision of the education appropriate to Africans in contrast with Blantyre and Livingstonia. Their attitude was that the creation of literacy in the vernacular was all that was necessary; in contrast the Scots placed great emphasis on advancing education in English to as high a level as they could afford to organize.

Sometime in 1900, the Reverend John Chilembwe, a Malawian converted under the influence of Joseph Booth and trained in the United States, began the Providence Industrial Mission in Chiradzulu. In 1901 his mission was reinforced by two African-American missionaries, the Reverend N. L. Cheek and Miss Emma Delaney. The American missionaries left in 1906 leaving Chilembwe alone.

Also in 1901 an African American missionary, Thomas Branch, and his family founded the Seventh Day Adventist Mission, though afterward the expatriate staff of this church were predominantly white. There were also a number of small but lively Christian independent churches begun in Malawi, notably by Elliot Kamwana, Charles Chinula, and Charles Domingo.

Roman Catholic missions entered Malawi only in 1901. The White Fathers had been in the Mangoche district briefly in 1890–1891 but only in 1901 did they begin effective work in what is now the central and northern Provinces. The southern province was assigned to the Montfort Marist Fathers and the sisters of the Society of the Daughters of Wisdom. By the late twentieth century, approximately half of the population of Malawi belonged to either the Roman Catholic Church or the CCAP.

One notable feature of Malawian Christianity was that, before 1914, it had produced an indigenous Malawi

hymnody. These hymns, set to traditional tunes, were created by a number of independent pastors and Livingstonia CCAP church leaders, principally Charles Chinula, Mawelero Tembo, Jonathan Chirwa, and Peter Thole (known as “the sweet singer of the Ngoni”). This is in stark contrast to mission Christianity elsewhere in Africa at that time, in which translations of European hymns set to European tunes were the rule.

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See also: **Livingstone, David; Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.**

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Malawi: Colonization and Wars of Resistance, 1889–1904

The hasty decision by Britain in 1889 to declare a British protectorate in Malawi was precipitated in a large part by a Portuguese expedition led by Lieutenant António Maria Cardoso to the area of Lake Malawi in 1888. The expedition sought to establish a mission and expand Portuguese influence in the area of central Africa claimed by Portugal between Angola and Mozambique. Cardoso’s expedition posed a direct threat to the interests of the chain of Scottish missions in the region and to British hopes of securing a land corridor between its colonies in eastern and southern Africa. In 1889 Britain therefore appointed Harry Hamilton Johnston as the new British consul to Mozambique and the interior.

Johnston’s first task was to negotiate a treaty with the Portuguese. It was proposed that the Portuguese should extend their territories into Malawi as far as the Bua River, in return for a strip of land west of the Luangwa River that would link British interests in southern and eastern Africa. In essence, the offer was to swap southern and central Malawi for southern, central, and northern Zambia. While these terms satisfied the wishes of the British government, they offered the Portuguese large tracts of land formerly under the control

of Scottish missionaries. The church was furious, and more than 11,000 Scottish church ministers and elders signed a memorandum protesting against the draft agreement. The British government was persuaded to reject the deal.

In May 1889 Johnston departed from London with two thousand pounds that Cecil John Rhodes had given him to pay for new treaties with the rulers of Malawi. Using a British gunboat, he forced his way through the Chinde entrance of the Zambezi to the Shire River. This was a direct challenge to the Portuguese and an assertion of British rights to free navigation along the Zambezi. At same time a second Portuguese expedition, led by Serpa Pinto, was marching up the Shire River signing treaties with chiefs. From the boat, Johnston authorized John Buchanan, a missionary coffee farmer and acting consul, to write to Pinto stating that the Kololo country and the Shire Highlands north of the Ruo River had been placed under British protection. The Kololo enjoyed special status, as they had been brought to the area some decades before by David Livingstone. South of Chiromo, Johnston met with Pinto and told him that proceeding north could result in war with Britain. Pinto returned to the coast to consult with his superiors. He left Lieutenant Coutinho in charge of the force. Coutinho defied Johnston and, continuing north, attacked a stockaded Kololo village.

A war of words erupted between the British and Portuguese governments. On September 21, 1889, Buchanan raised the British flag in front of his Zomba residence and wrote to Coutinho informing him that the British had declared a protectorate over the “Makololo, Yao, and Machinga Countries.” The protectorate was known as the Nyasaland Districts. From September to December 1889 Johnston traveled widely and concluded treaties with rulers on the lower Shire, the Shire Highlands, the western shores of Lake Malawi, and southern Tanzania before returning to London. On January 10, 1890, the British minister in Lisbon presented an ultimatum to Portuguese, demanding that the governor of Mozambique withdraw all Portuguese troops on the Shire, in Kololo country, or in Mashonaland. The Portuguese acquiesced, and all troops were moved south of the Ruo.

The years 1890 and 1891 saw a series of agreements that laid out the boundaries of present day Malawi. In July 1890 an Anglo-German convention defined the northern border of the Protectorate at the Songwe River and the northern lakeshore. The Germans ceded a large area in Malawi that they had previously claimed in return for Heligoland in the North Sea. In August it was agreed with the Portuguese that the eastern border of the protectorate would be as it is today. The southern border was defined as a line from Chiromo to a point on the Zambezi midway between Tete and

Kebrassa. This was adjusted in a final Anglo-Portuguese Convention on June 11, 1891. In this agreement the Portuguese ceded land south of the Zambezi in return for some areas north of the Zambezi that had previously part of the protectorate. The confluence of the Ruo and Shire Rivers was the new and final dividing line. The western border of the protectorate was fixed in the same month by an agreement between the Foreign Office, the British South Africa Company, and the African Lakes Company.

Johnston returned to Malawi in July 1891 to take up his new appointment as commissioner for the Nyasaland Districts and consul general to those territories under British influence north of the Zambezi. Alfred Sharpe was appointed vice consul and Captain Cecil Maguire was put in charge the Nyasaland armed forces. Maguire came from the Indian army and brought with him forty Sikh infantry and thirty Muslim cavalrymen. This force was increased by a further two hundred Indian recruits in 1893. The British Treasury paid the salaries of the British officials. The rest of the funds needed had to be raised, the bulk coming from Cecil Rhodes.

A priority of Johnston's administration was the eradication of the slave trade. This led to military conflict with the Yao. Two days after arriving in Malawi, Johnston sent a force of Sikhs against the slave-trading chief Chikumbu, who had attacked a mission and some coffee planters at Mulanje. Other similar strikes upon the Yao followed. Of particular strategic importance was an attack on Mponda of the Machinga Yao in October 1891. Mponda's village was at a strategic crossing point on the Shire River just south of the lake. This location had allowed his father to control the ivory and slave trade in the region and so gain great prominence and wealth. Although Mponda's position was somewhat unstable because of an armed struggle against his brother, Chingarungwaru, he was a key figure in the slave trade network of the southern lake region. On October 19, the British shelled Mponda's village and eight days later Mponda signed a treaty. Fort Johnston was built across the river from Mponda to maintain the peace.

Not all of the early attacks on the Yao were this successful. In 1891 a British assault on Zarafi was repulsed and an attack on Kawinga failed to dislodge him from his stronghold on Chikala Mountain near Zomba. Two campaigns were also waged against Makanjira during 1891 in an attempt to end slave trading on the eastern lake shore. In the second one Maguire was killed. It was not until a third campaign in 1893 that Makanjira was defeated and forced into Portuguese territory. Fort Maguire was established to watch over the site of Makanjira's old headquarters.

On February 22, 1893, the Nyasaland Districts were given the new title of "British Central Africa." By this

time, roughly one-fifth of the land belonged to planters, traders, and missionaries, one-fifth to Rhodes' British South Africa Company, one-fifth to the British Crown, and two-fifths to Africans. Johnston was concerned that some of non-African owned land had not been justly and honestly acquired from African rulers. He spent two years reviewing all claims, and reduced some in size and rejected others. All those accepted gained title deeds in which it was stated that existing villages and field could not be disturbed or removed without government permission. All existing villagers could live on their land freely without paying rent, but new villages could only be established if the landowner approved and tenants of them had to pay rent. This led to the hated and abused *Thangata* system, whereby people were forced to work on plantations for no pay in lieu of rent.

Johnston focused his attentions in 1894 on the Ngoni. In central Malawi two brothers of the Maseko Ngoni, Gomani and Kachindamoto, had been fighting for paramountcy since 1891. Two wars are remembered: the Mwala wa Nkhondo and the Mlomo wa Nkuku. These wars were ended in November 1894 when a force under Captain Edwards intervened and made the two chiefs declare peace. With the south and center pacified, Johnston turned his attention to northern Malawi. The areas around Nkhotakota had been one of the major African slave trading stations since the 1840s ruled by a series of Arab traders called Jumbe. After the signing of a treaty, relations between Jumbe III and Johnston had been amicable. But, when Jumbe IV was charged, and convicted of murder in December of 1894, the Jumbe's were banished to Zanzibar and Nkhotakota fell under direct British rule. With the Jumbe's gone the last slaving stronghold was that of an Arab trader named Mlozi who lived in the far north at Karonga. But, in February 1895, before an attack could be organized, the Yao chiefs Makanjira, Zarafi, Kawinga, and Matapwiri launched a four pronged attack to oust the British from the Shire Highlands. The attack lacked co-ordination and was repulsed. In September Johnston launched a massive counterattack in which Zarafi was ejected from his stronghold, Matapwiri was forced to surrender and Makanjira was forced permanently across the border. The Yao lands were finally cleared of both slave traders and guns.

The assault against Mlozi, and his allies Msalemu and Kopa Kopa, came in December 1895. Mlozi was captured by a Tonga soldier, Sergeant Major Bandawe, tried by Ngonde chiefs and hanged. His death marked the end the slave trade in Malawi. Soon after this attack Johnston was crippled by illness and was forced to leave Africa. He handed over power to Sharpe who concluded BCA military operations within six months

of taking office. The final campaigns were launched against the Yao chiefs Tambala and Mpemba as well as the Chewa chief Mwase Kasungu. The Ngoni chief Gomani was also arrested after harassing the mission at Dombole and was executed for “seditious behaviour.” By 1897 the only significant region not under direct colonial rule was northern Ngoniland. The rest of the country had been divided into twelve districts, each with a collector who collected customs duties and hut taxes and acted as a policeman and magistrate. Northern Ngoniland, the area between the South Rukuru River and Hora mountain, remained autonomous and paid no taxes until a serious outbreak of rinderpest disease in 1903. This killed the large herds of Ngoni cattle and ended the Ngoni ability to retain independence. On September 2, 1904, the northern Ngoni signed an agreement with the British and when, a month later, the British flag was hoisted over Hora Mountain by Hector MacDonald, the last section of Malawi submitted to colonial rule.

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See also: **Johnston, Harry H.; Livingstone, David; Rhodes, Cecil J.**

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Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period: Land, Labor, and Taxation

As was the case in most British colonies, the shapers of colonial land, labor, and taxation policies in the Nyasaland Protectorate (modern Malawi) faced the difficult task of balancing their obligation to African welfare with the necessity of developing the protectorate along capitalist lines. In the 1890s the British government allowed private companies and individuals to acquire vast tracts of land in the territory as a low-cost way to establish their claim to central Africa. Since Nyasaland lacked exploitable mineral reserves, these concerns relied on low cost African labor to produce cash crops for export. Although the Nyasaland government often doubted the wisdom of supporting the European planters, it believed commercial agriculture had to be the basis of the protectorate's economy and therefore sought ways to encourage Africans to

produce crops for the world market. Conversely, British missionaries, who had lobbied for the annexation of Nyasaland to put an end to slave trading, were committed to preserving the humanitarian ideals that provided the moral justification for British rule. While they believed in the “civilizing” power of work, they were not willing to tolerate exploitation of the African work force. Colonial authorities in Nyasaland therefore faced the difficult task of transforming local patterns of subsistence and generating labor for European estates without provoking humanitarian criticism or African unrest.

The Nyasaland government sought to accomplish these goals through taxation and land alienation. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, foreign economic concerns acquired title to roughly 15 per cent of the arable land in Nyasaland. In return for calico, copper wire, and other trinkets they pressured African rulers into signing away their people's claims to enormous tracts of land. John Buchanon, a former member of the Church of Scotland Mission, acquired one million acres in the southern half of the protectorate, while Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company claimed almost three million acres in the north. Sir Harry Johnston blocked further land alienation when the territory became a protectorate in 1891 but left most of the remaining estates intact. In the first decades of the colonial era, territory in Nyasaland was divided into three main categories: land held by European planters, land leased from the Crown, and Crown land. Technically, all African land fell into the last category until 1936, when the government reserved all unsold land exclusively for African use as Native Trust land. This land included the holdings of the British South Africa Company, which surrendered its claims in the north in exchange for exclusive mineral rights to the region.

The main European agricultural estates were concentrated in the Shire Highlands of Nyasaland's southern province. The planters hoped that the cool climate of the highlands would be ideal for producing coffee, cotton, and tobacco for export, but they had difficulty turning a profit due to poor weather, fluctuating prices on the world market, high transportation costs and, most importantly, difficulties in attracting and retaining African labor. The estate owners therefore used their political influence to lobby the government to stimulate the flow of wage labor through taxation. Faced with a hut tax ranging from three to six shillings, Africans had to either grow cash crops or work for the planters to earn the money to pay their taxes. The government forced defaulters to spend a month working for private employers and granted tax rebates to Africans who worked voluntarily for Europeans. Yet these measures failed to solve the labor shortage in the southern province because most local Africans worked just long enough to pay their taxes.

As a result, the planters turned to immigrants from Mozambique, known as the Lomwe, to supply the bulk of their labor needs. As immigrants, the Lomwe earned the right to settle on the estates in return for supplying the planters with labor. This arrangement became codified under an existing system of labor obligations known as *thangata*, under which Africans had provided tributary labor to their rulers in precolonial times. As the primary landholders in colonial Nyasaland, the planters turned this obligation into a form of rent, and required their tenants to work for up to six months per year in return for access to land. The original inhabitants of the estates were technically excused from *thangata*, but the distinction between native and immigrant gradually blurred as Lomwe immigration increased. Estate owners often extracted extra labor from their tenants through intentionally poor record keeping and abusive African overseers, and in 1915 John Chilembwe led a violent uprising against the system that forced the government to pay more attention to conditions on the estates. After World War I, African tenants received the right to pay their rent in currency, cash crops, or labor but still faced eviction if they left the estates to look for work.

Yet even *thangata* could not make the estates sufficiently profitable enough to be the sole basis of Nyasaland's economy. Although colonial officials had initially hoped the planters would become the economic backbone of the protectorate, they eventually realized that individual African growers could produce cash crops like cotton and tobacco more efficiently and profitably than the planters. To encourage African production, the British Cotton Growing Association established ginning factories and buying centers in the Shire valley in 1910. The protectorate tapped this production by stationing collectors at the markets to ensure the farmers paid their taxes. In 1923 the association acquired the sole right to purchase cotton from African growers by promising the colonial government half its profits. Many African farmers became quite prosperous and successfully outbid the planters for the available supplies of African labor. Moreover, the creation of sufficiently lucrative markets for tobacco and cotton allowed Africans to pay their taxes and escape the pressures that drove poorer workers to the European estates.

Commercial agriculture never took hold in Nyasaland's northern province during the colonial era. The necessity of using steamers on Lake Malawi to transport produce to the southern railhead made it too expensive to export the north's agricultural commodities for the world market. Although the region was blessed with a favorable climate and fertile soil, most African farmers in the province grew food for local consumption. Moreover, the British South Africa Company, the

main landowner in the region until 1936, worried that developing the north's agricultural capacity would reduce the number of Africans who worked in the Rhodesias as migrant laborers. While taxation in the south created inexpensive wage labor for the estates, northerners left for better paying jobs on farms and mines in South Africa and northern and southern Rhodesia. Nyasaland's numerous mission schools produced a large, well-educated class of Africans who worked as clerks and artisans in the south, and the northern province's Livingstonia Mission was the primary supplier of educated labor migrants. By 1937 the government estimated that 90,087 Nyasalanders were working abroad, which amounted to approximately 18 per cent of all able-bodied males in the protectorate.

The Nyasaland government originally tried to restrict this flow of African labor because the journey south was often dangerous and employers in Rhodesia and South Africa had a reputation for exploiting African migrants. Labor migration also reduced agricultural production, increased divorce rates, and contributed to the spread of venereal disease when the young men returned home. Yet during the depression the colonial government had no choice but to encourage labor migration to raise revenue and decrease unemployment. The money that migrants sent home to their families became an important source of revenue for the protectorate, and by the early 1950s Nyasaland's remittances from abroad totaled almost £700,000 (\$1,099,400).

Faced with these pressures, colonial officials allowed South Africa's Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and southern Rhodesian farmers to hire laborers directly in the north, but in the southern province the planters used their political influence to ban all foreign labor recruiters.

These patterns of southern agricultural production and northern labor migration held throughout most of the colonial era, but by the end of World War II the inequities of the colonial economy began to generate significant African opposition. In the south the estates became increasingly overcrowded, with population densities approaching four hundred people per square mile. The planters still resisted successfully government attempts to regulate relations with their tenants and the *thangata* system continued to generate considerable discontent. A widespread and dangerous famine in 1949 brought on by drought and the shift from food to cash crop production further increased tensions. The Nyasaland African Congress spoke for most farmers when it called for the redistribution of land. Its pressure for tenant rights, coupled with anger over Nyasaland's incorporation into the Central African Federation, led to a rural uprising in 1953 that forced the protectorate government to call out the army.

Colonial officials tried to address these grievances through an ambitious program of labor reforms, resettlement, and soil reconditioning. To reduce tensions over the *thangata*, they allowed tenants to pay their rent in cash if they chose to leave the estates to work. They sought to address growing African land hunger through ambitious hydrological projects intended to reclaim flood land and purchased failing estates from struggling planters. The most ambitious of these development schemes was the £8 million Shire Valley Project that was intended to relieve pressure on the most overcrowded southern districts. Yet many African farmers rejected the project because the protectorate government tried to enforce unpopular agricultural policies including a ban on planting on hillsides and riverbanks, replacing small-mound planting with contour ridging, and adherence to a mandatory planting schedule. Moreover, much of the new land was poorly watered and infested with dangerous wild animals. Faced with mounting African opposition and an inability to raise enough money to fund even a fraction of the projects, the Nyasaland government abandoned its most invasive and unpopular agricultural policies to avoid provoking political unrest in the years leading up to independence. Its attempts to balance the humanitarian responsibilities of colonial rule with the economic necessities of making the protectorate pay had proved impossible.

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See also: **Colonial Federations: British Central Africa.**

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Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period: Chilembwe Rising, 1915

The Chilembwe Rising of 1915 was a relatively small-scale outbreak, involving not more than 900 people, who were mostly immigrants from Portuguese territory, with a leadership of “Westernized” Malawians headed by the Yao preacher John Chilembwe (c. 1871–1915). Their first target was the Bruce Estates at Magomero, notorious for its brutal and exploitative labor conditions, where three white supervisors were killed on the evening of January 23, 1915. Early the next morning, another party failed to obtain more

than a handful of weapons in a bungled raid on a Blantyre store. Thereafter, the rising quickly lost its focus. Prior to an imminent attack by government troops, Chilembwe’s forces evacuated their stronghold at the preacher’s village, Mbombwe (near Chiradzulu), and their leader was killed a few days later near the Portuguese border.

Although the rising was, in military terms, little more than a series of skirmishes, it has become a landmark event in the history of Malawian, and indeed, African nationalism, as evidenced in the issue of stamps commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the rising, and the appearance of Chilembwe on the current K200 Malawi banknote. Also, it has become the subject of an intense historical debate, involving consideration of factors such as Chilembwe’s personality and apparent quest for martyrdom, the impact of the prewar colonial system (labor, taxation, race discrimination) on Chilembwe and his followers, the relative influence of the radical missionary Joseph Booth, and African American political thought (Chilembwe studied in the United States at the end of the 1890s), the millennial teachings of Watch Tower and other chiliastic groups, and the involvement of Malawians in white men’s wars, including World War I. There is the further complication (noted in Shepperson and Price’s classic account, 1987) that much of the direct evidence has disappeared: documents seized from the “rebels” in January 1915 were destroyed in the conflict at the central secretariat in February 1919.

The depiction of Chilembwe as political martyr, who died for his oppressed people, is based on George Simeon Mwase’s account of the rising (c. 1931–1932), which draws on the reminiscences of some of its survivors, and points to a parallel with John Brown’s anti-slavery stand at Harper’s Ferry, prior to the American Civil War, and familiar to the preacher from his time in the American South. Mwase’s editor, R. I. Rotberg, subsequently made a psychiatric study, focusing on Chilembwe’s asthma, failing eyesight, and indebtedness as sources of unbearable strain, turning the hitherto “model” Westernized African into an advocate of anticolonial violence. The failure of the rebels to capitalize on their “gesture” at the Bruce Estates is adduced as evidence that Chilembwe never expected victory; his aim was simply to expose the failure of the government to “help the underdog,” as he put it in his (unpublished) letter to the *Nyasaland Times* of November 26, 1914.

However, the martyr thesis has received some justified criticism. Why did Chilembwe wait until nearly the end of January to launch his revolt, some time after his letter was dispatched, and even longer after the Battle of Karonga (September 1914), referred to in his letter, in which black Malawians had sustained casualties?

Pachai has credibly suggested that Chilembwe's decision was actually taken at the last moment, following a tip-off that the authorities were going to arrest him for sedition. The nature of such a last-minute, preemptive action, would certainly account for what appears to have been a general lack of preparation, and also explain his hesitation after the failure of the Blantyre arms raid, which could have been founded on a feeling of uncertainty about what to do next.

Enquiries into the ideological character of the rising raise further material issues. Shepperson and Price have emphasized the Baptist, and generally nonmillennial, genesis and development of Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission, quite distinct from Elliott Kamwana's Watchtower (Kitawala) movement that flourished further north. However, Jane and Ian Linden have noted the strong millennial currents flowing through the various churches in the territory as a whole before 1914, the product of the social malaise affecting African society generally during the early colonial period, but given a focus by Watchtower's prediction of a "Second Coming" in October 1914. Against this background of fear and uncertainty, Chilembwe and his followers apparently saw the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 as the fulfillment of the grim predictions of war made in the Old Testament Book of Daniel. While there is scant direct evidence about Chilembwe's thoughts in his final days, this explanation may go some way toward explaining his apparently desperate behavior in January 1915.

Similar debate has occurred about the "nationalist" character of the rising. Noting that the *Nyasaland Times* letter was written "in [sic] behalf of his countrymen," Mwase (and Rotberg) see it as nationalist. At the other extreme, Leroy Vail regards it merely as a local revolt of exploited immigrants from Portuguese East Africa, coordinated by a handful of "educated" men like Chilembwe. Pachai terms it a half-way stage in the development of modern nationalism, while in a detailed analysis of its composition, Shepperson and Price point out that it failed to win wider support as the majority of Malawians were still "tribesmen," oriented toward their traditional political and social structures, and thus unresponsive to "marginal men" like Chilembwe who had tried, with little success, to be truly accepted in the white man's world. While noting his importance as a symbol and inspiration for later Malawian nationalists, this interpretation seems the most credible of those currently on offer.

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Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period: Federation

After World War I the administration of the Nyasaland Protectorate moved toward a policy of "indirect rule" somewhat modified because of the small but influential settler community. The traditional chiefs and headmen were given increasingly important roles and they responded by becoming the government's loyal servants. The only critical response from Africans to the administration came from a movement that was developed primarily by those men (in this period it was only men) educated before the war by the Livingstonia and Blantyre missions. The movement began when, in 1912, the North Nyasa Native Association and the West Nyasa Native Association were formed with the encouragement of Dr. Robert Laws.

After the war other associations were formed in the northern and southern provinces but none in the entral province where, except in Ntcheu District, neither the Blantyre nor Livingstonia Missions had any influence. In the 1930s Lilongwe produced a Native Association but it was founded by Blantyre and Livingstonia alumni who were resident there. (This lacuna has significance for the subsequent history of Malawi.) These groups were explicitly antitribal, they kept in touch with each other, and their closeness is seen in the way that they each adopted what were in effect the same set of rules. The movement, loosely organized though it was, became by the 1930s a national pressure group whose leaders had each received the informal but effective forms of post primary education that both Scottish missions had developed before the war. However, it should be noted that Livingstonia and Blantyre both began to change in the 1920s. They came into line with the other missions and the wishes of the government and settlers and concentrated on primary education.

Beginning in 1930, members of the administration tried to prevent the associations having direct access to the governor. The officials insisted that Native Association minutes, letters, and petitions should only reach the secretariat if approved by the district

councils dominated by chiefs and headmen. However, this move eventually failed, as it was decided that the communications of the associations could be sent directly to the secretariat.

The administration faced a number of massive problems between the wars for which it produced no solutions: First, there was the encouragement of cash crop production by African farmers versus the demands of the planters. Another problem was the attraction of high wages in South Africa and Rhodesia that was making the protectorate a labor reserve for the south, versus the planters' veto on any increase in local wages in the public or private sectors. Finally, the serious pressure on land in the southern province due to significant immigration from Mozambique was a concern.

The Native Associations pressed for higher wages in the protectorate, a more just tax collecting system, and the development of secondary and higher education. Twice their activities produced very hostile reactions from the settlers and the administration. The first instance was when, in 1930, they opposed the legislation that made it a criminal act for an African man to have sexual relations with a European woman. They attacked the measure specifically as discriminatory because it did nothing to protect African women. The second was in 1937 when they pressed for African membership of the Legislative Council with educated Africans electing half the council's membership.

However the greatest threat to the welfare of the people was the continuance of the pressure from the south for the absorption of Nyasaland into a settler-ruled Greater Rhodesia. This was a continuation of Rhodes's attempt to takeover Nyasaland frustrated by Scottish pressure groups that gained the ear of Lord Salisbury in 1892–1893.

In 1927 the Hilton Young Commission was set up by the British government to investigate the question of the closer union of the British East and central African possessions. Hilton Young himself recommended a form of amalgamation of the central African territories but the other members opposed him. They confessed to have been influenced by the evidence of the Native Associations representative Levi Mumba and of the missionaries of the Livingstonia and Blantyre Missions about the unanimity of African opposition to closer contacts with the south. The settlers in all three territories did not give up. The British government set up in 1938 a royal commission under Lord Bledisloe in response to their pressure. It reported in 1939 and all members were agreed on the intensity of African opposition to amalgamation in Nyasaland that had been expressed by the chiefs as well as by the associations and the missions. Indeed, at the request of Nyasa Christians the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland formally petitioned the government opposing amalgamation in May 1939.

The outbreak of World War II did not distract the politicians of southern Rhodesia from continuing to press their case. Meanwhile in Nyasaland the associations had come together in 1944 under the leadership of Levi Mumba and James D. Sangala to create the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC). The new movement continued the old policy of seeking more power for Africans within the British colonial system that they saw as tolerable and markedly different from what went on south of the Zambesi.

All was to change after the end of the war, in which thousands of Malawi soldiers served with distinction. First, the Labour government and then, in 1951, the new Tory leadership in Britain listened to the Rhodesian case and deliberately discounted the warnings of the same groups that had opposed amalgamation in 1939. The only concession to the opposition, which was particularly strong in Scotland, was for the government to stop short of amalgamation and set up a federation of the three territories, with the local administration of the northern territories remaining under the Colonial Service. This was an arrangement that pleased no one and which had massive inbuilt administrative problems.

The NAC mounted a massive campaign of civil disorder that was put down quickly and firmly and the federation came into being in September 1953. This marked a massive change in Malawi history for the people's trust in Britain was decisively damaged by what they saw as betrayal.

Some African leaders and white liberals like Andrew Doig felt they should try to make the best of a bad situation and help make the federation work as a genuine experiment in multiracialism. By 1957 they were convinced this was impossible and resigned their positions. Moreover they feared that the federal government was about to get the Dominion status it sought in order to entrench white supremacy. In this crisis a new group of very young leaders, most of them graduates, came to the fore in the congress. They sought withdrawal from the federation and also, as soon as possible, independence from Britain whose good intentions could no longer be trusted. H. M. Chipembere, M. W. K. Chiume, Orton Chirwa, the Chisiza brothers, and others gave the congress a new dynamism and growing popular support. They were aware of the uneasiness of traditional village people about their youth, and to meet this problem they made the fateful decision to invite back to Malawi the respected senior, almost legendary figure of H. Kamuzu Banda.

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See also: **Banda, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation, 1953–1963; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation.**

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Malawi: Nationalism, Independence

Although the story of Malawian nationalism has tended to start with the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in 1944, its development goes back to the interwar years when welfare, or native, associations were established in various parts of the colony. Among such organizations were the North Nyasa Native Association (1912), the Mombera Native Association (1920), the Chiradzulu Native Association (1929), and Zomba Native Association, also in the 1920s. Generally cautious, and happy to work within the colonial framework, the associations were concerned predominantly with issues that concerned their localities. Such matters included health, education, labor migration, and its effects on families, markets and marketing, communications, and the numerous licenses that were introduced by the government (an example being dog licenses, regarded by Africans as unnecessary and a major nuisance).

On the whole, the leadership of the associations was Western-educated, and consisted mostly of teachers, clergymen, and civil servants, all of whom viewed themselves as qualified to represent the majority in their areas. As early as the mid-1920s, umbrella associations had been created to discuss, and advocate on, matters concerning wider areas. For example, there was the Southern Province Native Association, formed in Zomba, and there was the Representative Committee of the Northern Province Native Associations, also established in Zomba.

By the early 1940s it became clear to leaders such as Lewis Mataka Bandawe, senior clerk in Blantyre, and James Sangala, also a government clerk in that town, and member of the Blantyre and Zomba Native Association and of the Southern Province Native Association, that matters of concern to Africans were territorial in nature. Only through a united representation would they achieve meaningful political and socio-economic gains. Many Western-educated Malawians in Blantyre and other centers thought likewise, including

James Ralph Chinyama, a Lilongwe-based businessman and activist, and Levi Mumba, a respected senior clerk, founder of the North Nyasa Native Association and president of the Representative Committee of the Northern Province Associations.

In 1943 the Nyasaland African Council was formed in Blantyre and, in the following year, changed its name to the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC). Mumba was its first president general, and Charles Matinga, the secretary general. This was the first nationalist political association in the colony, in the sense that its membership extended to all regions of Nyasaland, crossed ethnic boundaries and acted as the main mouthpiece of African opinion. It should also be noted that the leadership was basically the same as that of the pre-World War II native associations, elitist and moderate; nor was the agenda a radical departure from the interwar situation. Among NAC's main preoccupations were African representation on the legislative council, greater government involvement in African education, improvement of teachers salaries, removal of the color bar, more European respect for Africans, and continued African opposition to any form of federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The relationship between the leadership and the rural communities was minimal, primarily because those in the upper echelons of the NAC assumed that they knew and understood the needs of the masses. This attitude, the organization's poor financial situation, its initial resistance to employ a full-time organizer, and the government's tendency to disregard it, made the NAC a particularly ineffective organization throughout the 1940s.

The NAC, and African politics in general, went through a particularly difficult time in the period of 1949 to 1956. Charles Matinga, who had become president general of the party in 1946, had to resign in 1950 on grounds of financial mismanagement, favoritism, and weak leadership. His successor James Chinyama did not fare much better and was forced to resign in 1954. A major problem was the gulf between those at the top and those they were supposed to speak for; this was especially evident in the events of 1953.

In 1953, there were riots in the Shire Highlands, mainly in Thyolo, Mulanje, and Zomba, primarily connected with land problems that had plagued the area since European settler farms were established at the end of the nineteenth century. There were also major incidents in Ntcheu, leading to the arrest of the traditional ruler, Inkosi Philip Gomani. The events in the latter place and, to an extent, those in the Shire region, were a reaction to the imposition in October 1953 of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, a union that was unpopular among Africans. The establishment of the federation coincided with new agricultural and conservation measures that were disliked by

Africans. For most rural producers, these regulations and the federation were inseparable evils, directly associated with colonialism. The riots and other forms of resistance which occurred in other parts of the country did so largely independent of the national leadership of the NAC which had opposed violence, and was divided on the matter of the federation.

In 1955 changes in the constitution enabled the election, a year later, of five Africans to the Legislative Council. For the first time the NAC, which won all five seats, had a voice in the corridors of power. Of the new members, Henry Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume belonged to a new generation of nationalists who wanted immediate constitutional changes leading to majority rule; they also realized that new and effective leadership was required, and, on their recommendation, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda was recalled from Ghana to lead the NAC.

Banda, who all along had supported the NAC morally and financially and had acted as its main external spokesman, returned to Nyasaland in July 1958 and reorganized the NAC. For the first time, there was truly a common language between the central executive of the NAC and the people. He was now openly and strongly challenging the government on issues that concerned them most: agriculture and conservation, health, education, bicycle taxes, and, for those in the Shire Highlands, *thangata* (labor tenancy). By February 1959 the political atmosphere throughout the country was highly charged, and violent incidents began to occur in some districts. Convinced that the NAC was about to organize a general rebellion, the governor, Sir Robert Armitage, declared a state of emergency on March 3, resulting in the banning of the NAC and detention without trial of Banda and hundreds of NAC people.

A British Commission of Inquiry, led by Justice Patrick Devlin, determined that the governor had overreacted. Banda was released in April 1960 and appointed to lead the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which since September 1959 had effectively replaced the NAC. In July constitutional talks took place in London, leading to the first general elections in August 1961, which the MCP won overwhelmingly. Most of the positions on the Executive Council (EC) went to the party, with Banda becoming minister of natural resources and local government. Further constitutional talks in London in 1962 led to internal self government status in 1963; the EC was replaced by a cabinet, and Dr. Banda became prime minister. In September more constitutional discussions, presided over by R. A. Butler, minister for central African affairs, determined that Nyasaland would become independent on July 6, 1964, after general elections in April of that year. All MCP candidates went to parliament unopposed; in

July Banda became prime minister of independent Malawi, the name adapted from that of the ancient Maravi Empire.

OWEN J. M. KALINGA

See also: **Banda, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu; Malawi: Independence to the Present.**

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Malawi: Independence to the Present

At independence on July 6, 1964, Malawi's economic prospects were so poor that many in the international community did not have much hope for its survival as a viable nation state. It had no minerals of economic worth, and African agriculture was mainly subsistence. The principal exports, tea and tobacco, were dominated by European settler farmers. The transport infrastructure was inadequate, as was the educational system.

The supremacy of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the power of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda were consolidated following a major crisis parliament in August 1964, which resulted in the dismissal of the six ministers who had opposed the new prime minister on major policy issues. Malawi was deprived of able politicians and, from then onward, Banda's team consisted of diehard party loyalists who rarely challenged him. The policies of the MCP and the government became indistinguishable, and parliament lost its effectiveness. People suspected of disagreeing with Banda or the party were detained without trial, some for more than twenty years. In 1971, Banda, president since Malawi's attainment of republic status in 1966, was declared Life President; dictatorship and abuse of human rights were to continue throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Throughout the 1960s, Malawi sought to wean itself from British budgetary aid and to improve the

socioeconomic welfare of the citizenry. The strategy was to promote cash crop production as a foreign exchange earner while also encouraging food self-sufficiency but, realizing that the ability to move produce from rural areas to local and international markets was crucial for economic development, the government also embarked on a major expansion of this sector of the economy. By 1990 there were 8,000 miles of bituminized roads up from 242 miles at independence; there were also extensions to the railway system in the 1970s and 1980s. With road and railway extensions underway, government sought the assistance of the World Bank and other aid agencies to plan and execute rural development projects, especially those relating to smallholder agriculture. From 1965 to 1978 there were major projects in Lilongwe, Karonga, and the Lower Shire where, although food production was advocated, the stress was also on cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, and groundnuts. This approach was revised in 1978 because results fell short of expectations, giving way to the National Rural Development Project (NRDP), which covered wider areas and gave farmers more access to extension and credit facilities. By the 1980s it was clear that there was no real growth in smallholder production; certainly yield did not match the increase in population at the rate of 0.3 per cent per year. Only in the estate sector (mainly tea, tobacco, and sugar) did real growth take place.

Significant in this regard were the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), and Press Holdings, both with large agricultural interests. ADMARC also had a virtual monopoly on the marketing of smallholder produce, an arrangement that was much to the disadvantage of the producers. The two organizations also embarked on major joint ventures and, in this way, Banda controlled critical aspects of the country's economy.

By the mid-1980s Malawi's economy was not healthy, partly because of internal factors—including expensive projects such as the new Lilongwe airport and the Kamuzu Academy—and partly because of external factors such as the cost of fuel imports and commodity prices at international markets. As a result, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced structural adjustments that had to be accepted as a precondition for financial relief. Subsidies on items such as fuel and fertilizer were affected, raising their prices. Peasant production and self-sufficiency were negatively affected, as unemployment rose.

Malawi achieved a more noteworthy success in education for, while the development plans of the 1960s and 1970s emphasized agriculture and transport, they also recognized the role of education, including raising the level of literacy, in attaining the goals of the government. Primary school education expanded threefold:

in 1964, 350,000 pupils were enrolled, rising to 481,500 in 1973, increasing further to 1.3 million in 1990, and by a further 50 per cent five years later. The same applied to teacher and vocational training and secondary school education. Although this development did not meet the demand, it was a major improvement on the pre-independence situation. In the meantime, the University of Malawi opened in 1965 and, in the next two years, it incorporated the Polytechnic in Blantyre, the Soche Hill College in Limbe, and the Bunda College of Agriculture in Lilongwe. In 1974 Soche Hill College and the Institute of Public Administration at Mpemba became part of Chancellor College at its new campus in Zomba.

In late 1978 the Kamuzu College of Nursing was founded, followed, ten years later, by the new College of Medicine. The latter was expected to solve the problem of the shortage of doctors as many of those sent to study abroad did not return, mainly because of poor facilities and low pay. Since the 1960s many more nurses and clinical workers have been trained, but doctor shortages have remained critical. Health education and primary health care both suffered as a result. With AIDS becoming a major factor since the mid-1980s, the pressure on health facilities increased throughout the 1990s.

Dr. Banda's dictatorship had been ignored by Western powers because of his strong anticommunist views and his support for the West. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Banda's Western allies insisted on political reform, which they now linked with aid.

Malawian exiles had always called for change and, within the country, clandestine groups were organizing opposition. On March 8, 1992, a letter from the Roman Catholic bishops was read in all their churches detailing, among other things, the effects of human rights abuses and poverty on family life and social relationships. Soon afterward, Chakufwa Chihana, head of a regional trade union organization, openly challenged the government, which then arrested him. More internal and external pressure upon Banda led to a June 1993 referendum that displayed overwhelming support for multiparty democracy. In the general elections of May the following year, Banda lost to Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front, which won the majority of seats in parliament.

Besides fostering the young democratic culture, the new government had to contend with economic problems that had worsened during the withdrawal of aid in 1991–1992. Inflation went up by over 40 per cent and, between 1997 and 1999, the Malawi kwacha was devalued by over 60 per cent, leading to a dramatic rise in the cost of consumer goods, fuel, fertilizer, and maize; medical supplies in hospitals became scarce. At the

behest of the IMF and the World Bank, liberalization and privatization of the numerous parastatal organizations, including ADMARC, went into full force. Although free primary school education was introduced in 1994, the teacher: student ratio widened, and the need for classrooms also increased tremendously.

In June 1999 Muluzi was reelected. Charged with a tepid response to reports of corruption in his government, he reorganized his cabinet in 2000. In 2002 a proposed constitutional amendment, which would have allowed Muluzi to run for a third five-year turn, was rejected by parliament. In January 2003 demonstrations were held to protest Muluzi's further attempts to amend the constitution in his favor. In the face of this pressure, the proposed amendment was retracted.

OWEN J. M. KALINGA

See also: Banda, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu; Malawi: Nationalism, Independence; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Mali Empire, Sundiata and Origins of


The late Guinean historian Souleyman Kanté (1922–1987), writing in the Maninka script known as N'ko, which he invented, shared the belief of many that the Mali Empire dates from the first half of the thirteenth century, possibly about 1235–1236. Basing his dates on oral tradition and Arabic sources, Kanté estimated that Sundiata was born about 1205, ruled Mali for about twenty years, and died about 1255. More than a century after the time of Sundiata, he was known to the eminent Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who refers to him by one of several names that are still heard in recitations by the Maninka bards of northeastern Guinea: “Their greatest king, he

who overcame the Susu, conquered their country, and seized the power from their hands, was named Mari Jata.” Khaldun's sources claimed that Sundiata ruled for twenty-five years.

When official oral traditionists (*jeliw*) of the West African Mande peoples recount episodes of events that led to the founding of the Mali Empire, they name Sundiata as the early thirteenth-century charismatic leader responsible for unifying the formerly autonomous chiefdoms of the Mande territories into what was to become one of the great empires of the Middle Ages. Consistent with Mande belief that charismatic leaders receive their power from their mothers, Mande epic tradition emphasizes the roles of key women in addition to recalling the exploits of male heroes.

The oral tradition, which we must rely on in the absence of written documentation, focuses on kinship themes and spiritual power sources that are essential components of the Mande worldview. The story begins with Sundiata's future father, the *mansa* (chief, king) of Konfara (the town is often identified as Niani, although it was of a later era), whose courtiers include his chief bard (*jelikuntigi*) Nyankurnan Dugha Kouyaté and the influential Muslim adviser Tombonon Manjan Bè. The *mansa* consulted his diviner to determine which son would best serve as his successor and learned that he has not yet found the wife who will deliver the greatest of his offspring. Meanwhile, in the mysterious land of Do and Kri, the powerful sorceress Do Kamissa, the “Buffalo Woman,” assumed her animal form and embarked on a deadly rampage, because her brother the *mansa* of that land, refused to share the family legacy with her. The Buffalo Woman eventually surrendered the secret of her mortality to two adventurous young hunters from a distant land, the brothers Danmansa Wulanba and Danmansa Wulanni. Kamissa divulged the secret of how she could be killed, on the condition that when offered the reward of a young bride, the hunters refuse all others in favor of the ugly, physically deformed Sogolon Wulen Conffi, who is destined to give birth to Sundiata. After killing the rogue buffalo, selecting Sogolon, and being rejected by her as suitors, the brothers delivered her for marriage to the predestined father of the hero.

Sogolon's subsequent pregnancy was cursed by her jealous co-wives, especially Sansurna Bèretè, mother of the father's eldest son Dankaran Tuman. Sundiata was born crippled but eventually walked and achieved the reputation of a great hunter. After long suffering at the hands of her rivals, Sogolon retreated into exile with Sundiata and his siblings, eventually finding refuge with Faran Tunkara at his town of Kuntinya in Mema, on the desert frontier (Souleyman Kanté estimates that the period of exile commenced c.1226).



Mali, c. 1250–1450.

Back in Mande, Dankaran Tuman became *mansa* upon his father's death but was unable to defend his lands against Susu conquest and eventually fled south to the land of the Kissi in the forest region. Desperate for effective leadership after years of Susu domination, the Mande people sent a delegation to search for the exiled Sogolon and Sundiata. Once the exiles were found in Mema by the delegation, the aged Sogolon died there, and Sundiata returned to Mande where he accepted the kingship (*mansaya*) and prepared to lead his people against their Susu oppressors.

During the period leading up to the final battles with Susu, a potentially divisive conflict of interest had to be resolved by one of Sundiata's most powerful supporters, Fakoli Koroma. Fakoli was the son of Mansa Yèrèlènko of the powerful iron-producing territory of Nègèbòriya, which lay in northern Mande near the Susu frontier. A junior wife of Mansa Yèrèlènko was Kosiya Kanté, sister of Sustis ruler Sumanguru (or Sumaworo), and she was Fakoli's natural mother. Tradition indicates that Kosiya died young and that Fakoli was raised by Yèrèlènko's senior wife Ma Tènènba, the third of three famous Condé ancestral women of Do and Kri, along with Do Kamissa and Sundiata's mother Sogolon. Thus Fakoli owed allegiance to both Mande and Susu, and as the general leader of several powerful, weapons-producing blacksmith clans, his decision of which side to fight on could sway the outcome of the war. Fakoli initially sided with his uncle Surnangurti, but for reasons that are not entirely clear (political intrigue seems to have been a factor), Fakoli reversed his decision and marched into Mande in time to place his formidable troops at Sundiata's service in the war with Susu.

Among Sundiata's other powerful supporters were his brother Manden Bori, who had endured the years of exile with him, as well as the leaders of the Kamara

and Traoré (or Tarawèlè) lineages. The mountainous Kamara stronghold of Sibi and Tabon, like Nègèbòriya, commanded a northern zone near the frontier with Susu. Tradition indicates that Sibi under its mansa Tabon Wana Faran Kamara was the most influential of the pre-imperial autonomous states of Mande, and the most knowledgeable Maninka bards believe that Sundiata's sister Kolonkan married into the Kamara ruling lineage after returning from exile with her brothers. Tiramakan (or Turamaghan) Traoré is particularly recalled as distinguishing himself after the war with Susu by leading a successful expedition against the Jolof in what is now Senegal, thereby expanding Mali's western frontier.

The final great battle in which Mande defeated Susu is recalled as taking place in a region near the Niger River. The defeated Sumanguru is said to have been last seen downstream near the mountain of Kulikoro, in which his spirit is still believed to dwell. Modern demographic evidence supports oral traditional claims that in subsequent years a majority of the Susu population migrated out of their former territories southward toward the Atlantic Ocean, in what later came to be known as the Guinea coast.

Souleyman Kanté dates the actual founding of the Mali Empire from the time of a great council meeting after the defeat of Susu, at a place called Kurukanfuga (c. 1236). It was in that open space, near today's Kangaba, that Sundiata assembled his subjects and introduced the laws and political system of the great western Sudanic state that would reach its apogee a century later under Mansa Musa (1312–1337) and flourish until the early fifteenth century, when the Songhay Empire replaced Mali as the preeminent western Sudanic state.

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See also: **Songhay Empire.**

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Mali Empire: Economy

Mali was the cradle of one of the greatest empires in precolonial Africa. It was built on gold and flourished during the Middle Ages of Europe. This great state, which evolved in the savanna zone, originated from a Mande (Mandingo) cultural core, from where it extended its sway over a large number of states and societies. Mali arose as a successor state to the Old Ghana Empire, which had collapsed in 1235 after the onslaught of the ruthless Susu king, Sumanguru. His power was challenged by the Keita, a Mande group. This group, originally traders, had endeavored to develop political control over a number of kingdoms in the adjacent territories. After prolonged warfare, the Keita group produced a king, Sundiata (1230–1255), who overthrew Sumanguru and went on to capture the capital of Ghana. From the remnants of Ghana he laid the foundations for the new Mande empire, which from 1240 became the major political and commercial power for the whole of western Sudan.

Mali was the product of a southerly Mande group. They possessed fertile land, which afforded better conditions for agriculture and gave them more direct control over the alluvial gold fields. The group aimed to control the whole Sudan, as far as the Niger bend, where the new southern termini for the trans-Saharan trade, Timbuktu and Gao, were situated.

In this, Sundiata and his successors achieved remarkable feats. By the fourteenth century, they controlled an empire that reached some 1250 miles from the Atlantic in the west to the borders of northern Nigeria in the east, from the southern Saharan caravan centers of Audaghost, Walata, and Tadmakka in the north, to the borders of the Guinea forests in the southwest.

The expansion of the Mande from the thirteenth century, however, often had important political and economic consequences. The victory of Mali over the Susu opened the way for expansion northward, which enabled the empire to gain control over the end destinations of the trans-Saharan trails. Its controls extended over the Sahara desert, which included the valuable salt mines of Taghaza and the copper mines of Takedda. The movements of Mali westward over the upper valley of the Senegal and toward (present day) Gambia enabled it to hold sway over all the internal trade routes. The pattern of their movement to the east and southeast appears to have been determined to some extent by the existence of largely agricultural communities. This no doubt enhanced the vitality of Mali, as by the fifteenth century there was a considerable trade in

millet, rice, cotton, and livestock within the empire. Mali had created an empire whose main artery was the river Niger and the commercial cities of the Niger bend.

The gold deposits in Mali made the empire great. The extent of the wealth of the empire was brought into bold relief by the famous pilgrimage of Mansa Musa (1312–1337) the ruler of Mali to Mecca in 1324. His splendid passage through Cairo, according to Al-Omari (an Arab scholar), had an unsettling effect on exchange rates: “the people of Cairo earned incalculable sums from him whether by buying and selling or by gifts. So much gold was current in Cairo that it ruined the value of money. . . .” Such profligacy nearly ruined Mansa Musa, who experienced serious political troubles on his return to West Africa. Nevertheless, the visit succeeded in advertising the wealth of the empire, thus attracting more traders and Muslim scholars who contributed immensely to the economic and cultural development of the empire. Apart from his visit to Mecca, Mansa Musa also strengthened the links of his empire with the Muslim community in the outside world. He initiated diplomatic relations with the sultans of Morocco. Mansa Musa’s contact with North Africa brought important development in architecture. On his return from Mecca, he was accompanied by an Andalusian architect, Es-Saheli, who went on to build an impressive palace in Timbuktu and Gao. The materials and architectural style were new to Mali, since he adopted the flat roof of north Africa, the pyramidal minaret, and burnt bricks.

Mali at its peak was not only a center of civilization, scholarship, and custodian of an orderly system of law and government but a remarkable economic success. The whole atmosphere of the empire was one of peace and prosperity. Law and order was maintained so well that people laden with goods could travel the length and breadth of the empire without fear of harassment. The semidivine status of the king of Mali projected the aura of a ruler of a very wealthy state. For instance, Ibn Battuta, a Berber of Tangier who visited Mali in 1532, was immensely impressed by the majesty that surrounded the king. He marveled at his exalted status and the wealth at his disposal. Whenever the king gave a public address, he did so on a three-tiered dais covered with silks and cushions and with a ceiling supported by elephant tusks. Before the king advanced a throng of dancers, praise-singers, and slaves, and behind him were his three hundred bodyguards.

The glittering courts of Mali were, however, maintained at a considerable cost to human lives. Both by inheritance and conquest, the king acquired a number of slave villages. The peoples of these villages were forced to provide the king with annual fixed quantities of produce or service so that all the needs of his court were satisfied. Another set of slave villagers, the *arbi*,

acted as domestic servants, personal bodyguards, and royal messengers to the king.

The regeneration of the empire was ensured by a succession of dynamic rulers until the end of the fourteenth century, when it disintegrated due to dynastic struggles, several weak rulers, revolts, and secessions in the outlying provinces.

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Mali Empire: Decline, Fifteenth Century

The empire of Mali, founded by the Mande (or Mandingo) conqueror Sundiata Keita in the thirteenth century, stretched from the coast of what is now Gambia in the West to the city of Gao on the river Niger in the East, and from the Teghazza saltmarshes of the Sahara in the north to the edges of the forests of modern Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in the south. It was the largest and most powerful of the political formations in West Africa in the Middle Ages, reaching its peak under Mansa (Emperor) Musa, who reigned from 1307 to 1332. In the fifteenth century, however, it began to decline, and it disappeared from the political map of Africa around the beginning of the seventeenth century. The heart of the empire was composed of the commercial centers of Djenn, Timbuktu, and Gao, which lay along the middle loop of the Niger and maintained relations with the Arab countries to the north. After Mali lost this crucial region to the Songhay kingdom, the Mansas turned their attention to the west, where the Portuguese had just started their commercial ventures along the Atlantic coast of Senegambia. The appearance of these European mariners on the shores of Africa seemed to offer a lifeline to the Juula, the Mandingo merchant caste, who now directed their caravans westward.

From the beginning of the fifteenth century onward, Mali also became the target of military campaigns launched from the Sahel by two nomadic peoples, the Moors and the Tuaregs. It was at around the same time that the Songhay kings, who were vassals of the Mansas, threw off the Mande yoke. Both these developments were made possible by the increasing

weakness of the central government, which in turn owed much to the succession crisis within the ruling family at the end of the fourteenth century. The descendants of Sundiata, the senior branch of the dynasty, had rebelled in an attempt to retrieve the supreme power from the junior branch, descended from one of Sundiata's brothers, which had monopolized the throne ever since the accession of Mansa Musa, and the empire had been weakened by assassinations and palace intrigues. The Tuaregs, Saharan nomads who had earned the respect of the Malian forces from the thirteenth century onward, took advantage of the succession crisis to rise up and drive the Mande garrison out of Timbuktu in 1433. The Mansas also lost control of Walata, Nema, and the whole of the Sahel region that they had once ruled. As a result, they lost control of the trails across the Sahara that had linked their empire with the commercial centers of the Maghrib and Egypt.

However, the decisive blow was struck against the Malian empire with the rise to power of Sonni Ali, a prince of Gao who displayed unrivaled energy and ambition. It was Sonni Ali who drove the Tuaregs away and then made himself master of the whole of the loop of the Niger as far as Djenn, the most important of the commercial centers. Having lost the cities of the Sahel and the rich territories of the inland delta of the Niger, Mali was effectively pushed back into the West. Its Senegambian provinces, heavily populated by Mande, rapidly acquired greater economic importance following the arrival of the Portuguese mariners, whose desire to open trading relations with Mali stemmed from its reputation for being rich in gold, a reputation that had haunted the imaginations of Europeans since the days of Mansa Musa. The Juula willingly sent their caravans to the ports at which the Europeans' ships had just arrived, which are now in Gambia and Guinea but were then also ruled by the Mansas. The Wanga and Juula merchants bought black and blue cotton fabrics, Indian textiles, and embroidered clothing from the Portuguese, although it frequently happened that the Juula brought so much gold with them that the caravels (the Portuguese ships) could not carry enough merchandise to exchange for it.

The Portuguese duly recognized and valued the commercial skills of the Juula, and from the mid-fifteenth century began to ask them for slaves: trading relations between Africans and Europeans were about to be transformed, at a very rapid pace and to the advantage of the Europeans. The Malian trade along the coast continued up to the end of the sixteenth century, but the main effect of these contacts between the Portuguese and the local rulers, who were vassals of the Malian Empire, was that these rulers tended to become ever more independent of the authority of the Mansas.

Among the non-Mandingo subjects of the Mansas, the Fulani, a pastoral people of the Sahel, were among the first to break away from their rule. Ever since the thirteenth century, the Fulani had been moving far to the south in search of pasture and watering holes and had thus established a strong presence in Futa-Toro, on the banks of the river Senegal, in Macina, in the inland delta of the Niger, in Futa-Jallon, in the grassy valleys, and in the Bondu savanna. For a long time they submitted to the laws imposed on them by the farmers, but from the fifteenth century onward they rose up, throughout the region, and became the masters of the sedentary population in their turn, going on to create their own powerful states. The uprising of the Fulani was led by their tribal chief Tenguella, and it was in order to combat him that in 1490 the Mansa of Mali sought military aid, or at least a supply of firearms, from the Portuguese. They responded by sending an impressive delegation to Niani, but although these envoys came laden with gifts, they did not supply any weapons to the emperor.

Tenguella then gathered a powerful army and organized an effective cavalry, so that the Fulani were able to cause devastation wherever they went. Their campaign against both the Songhay and the Mande lasted from 1480 to 1512, under both Tenguella and his son, Koly Tenguella, who proved to be a strong leader of men like his father. Having built a major fortress in Futa Jalon, and having left his son in charge of it, Tenguella led a campaign to the East against the Songhay, who had been trying to move westward in the footsteps of the Mande, seeking control of the gold mines of Bambuk. The Fulani and the Songhay clashed at Diarra in 1512: Tenguella was defeated and killed by Amar Kondjago, a brother of the Askia (ruler) of Gao, Mohammed.

Tenguella carried on the war, recruiting a large army of Baga, Kokoli, Badiaranke, and Mande mountain warriors and leading it out from the fortress. He adopted the Mandingo title of “Silatigi” (“trail head” or “guide”), although the Portuguese came to know him simply as the Grand Fulani. He then drove the Malian forces back towards what is now Gambia, conquered the kingdoms of the Wolof and Futa Toro, and imposed his rule over the numerous local dynasties in the West, setting up his capital at Anyam-Godo in Futa Toro. The Mande, expelled from Futa Jalon and Futa Toro, were left with no more than a narrow corridor of land along the river Gambia, linking them to the Atlantic.

The Mansas still hoped to establish a stable relationship with the Portuguese, who did not hesitate, however, to sign commercial contracts directly with the local rulers who were vassals of Mali. Even so, on two occasions, in 1481 and 1495, King John II of Portugal sent envoys to Niani, where Mansa Mahmud II

received them with pomp, only to have his repeated requests for firearms rejected. In 1534 his grandson Mansa Mahmud III also received envoys from Portugal at Niani, this time led by the King’s representative at the fortress of El Mina. Yet while the Mansas committed themselves to favoring Portuguese trade on the River Gambia, the King of Portugal secretly gave aid to many of the provincial governors, rulers, and chiefs, helping them to free themselves from central control and thus undermining the authority of the Mansas. As a result, Saalum and other kingdoms and principalities, as well as the Mande provinces of Gabu and Gambia, became independent of the Mansas. Niani, being located more than 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) from the coast, could not cope with all these rebellions.

At the end of the sixteenth century Mansa Mahmud IV attempted to take advantage of the weakness of the pasha of Morocco, following the disruptions caused by the Moroccan conquest of the lands of the Songhai, by recruiting a large army and launching a campaign to reconquer Djenn. He relied on the complicity, or at least the neutrality, of a number of the local rulers, and his army made a deep impression on the Moroccans. However, the Moroccans used firearms to repel the Mansa, and neither he nor his successors ever again attempted to regain control of Djenn. In any case, after the death of Mahmud IV his five sons divided what was left of the empire between them, and in the seventeenth century the empire of Mali vanished from the political map of Africa.

DJIBRIL TAMSIR NIANE

See also: **Mali Empire, Sundiata and Origins of; Songhay Empire: Sonni Ali and Founding of an Empire.**

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Mali (Republic of): Economy and Society, Nineteenth Century

Most of the territory of the present-day Republic of Mali had not been occupied by colonial forces until late in the nineteenth century, when the French penetrated the area and occupied Kita, Bamako, and Segou. Subjugation of the thinly populated northern area,

where Tuareg nomads lived, took place only in the first decades of the twentieth century. The economy was mainly agricultural, and cattle herding Fulbe lived mainly in the Niger valley.


The most important infrastructural determinant for the economy was the river Niger. Caravan routes were also of great importance, in particular the routes that connected Mali with the north. Westward the most well-known trade route was the Mandesira, which connected the relatively green and fertile area south of Bamako (where gold was found), with the area dominated by the Senegal River. Southward, various smaller trade routes connected the area with the Guinean coast. The landscape of this area is quite flat, which facilitates transport; in the south of present-day Mali, however, during the rainy season river tributaries tend to overflow; they were serious impediments to any form of mobility (trade or warfare).

Political power along the Niger was not centralized, although the authority of certain rulers could cover immense areas. Such rulers levied taxes in semiautonomous polities and in adjoining polities that they dominated. At the periphery of their area of influence, which was contested by another ruler from a polity even farther away, income was produced from pillaging. These so-called warrior states, as Roberts (1987) has described, were led by a ruler who closely collaborated with an elite of warriors that lived from a surplus of production they took by taxing or violence. These warriors and rulers were not involved in products that stimulated and increased production, such as irrigation. The rulers of polities that paid taxes to “the center” in turn levied taxes from the agriculturists and passing traders, whose safety they guaranteed.

The relationships between warrior states were fickle; a former center of political power could quickly become the periphery of another polity. Some polities seem to have been able to avoid this fate, such as the great state of Segou, but still these polities suffered from rapid changes within the ruling elite as well as regarding the size of their area of influence.

Kinship relations were important, and relations in general were often expressed in terms of kinship; a ruling group or segment that was accepted and represented as the “younger brother” of adjoining “older brother” ruling families was actually the army leader in times of communal warfare or defense. After the war, the “younger brother” group had to distribute the pillaged gains. After the communal effort, collaboration stopped, and often internal conflict arose. On a more local level, relations were in terms of host versus guest/stranger. These relations were often clearer in task division and more stable in hierarchy and role than those in terms of kinship.

A majority of the population belonged to ethnic groups that are today classified as Mande cultures.



Mali.

They all had a patrilineal descent system, shared similar institutions (secret societies, mask associations), and spoke related languages. Mande groups were organized in three status categories: freemen, artisans, and slaves. Slaves often were former freemen who were captives from warfare or house slaves (who were descendants from captives). Within a few generations, house slaves were often able to marry into their “host” family, thus becoming a freeman with a “guest” status. The category of artisans, which made up 5 per cent of the population, was endogamous. In theory (but often not in practice), artisans were not directly involved in warfare; they were griots (bards), blacksmiths, leatherworkers, or weavers.

In the nineteenth century, jihads swept through this area, but these seem not to have changed fundamentally the organization of the polities and the attitude of the people: as Hanson (1996) described. The soldiers of Umar Tal left the Futanke region (present day Senegal) to conquer Karta, but soon lost their religious zeal after victory and preferred to settle as agriculturists instead of pursuing their jihad further eastward.

In the south, Samori Touré organized an empire in the period 1865–1898, the year he was captured by the French. Samori’s deeds are vividly remembered, often in a positive way, although Samori actually destroyed many towns and villages with his scorched-earth tactics. At the end of the nineteenth century, Tieba Traore established a powerful polity with Sikasso at its center. Clashes between Tieba and Samori weakened their armies, thus facilitating the French conquest of the Sudan after the Berlin Conference.

The nineteenth century was characterized by increased construction of so-called *tata*, or walled fortifications. Changes in warfare strategies and the jihads that raged in the area stimulated the construction of *tatas*. However, recent excavations in Dya, north of Djenne, demonstrate that walled towns already existed before the jihad era. *Tatas* varied greatly in size (height 2 to 5 meters) and material (dried mud, dried mud with pebbles). The main function of *tatas* was defense. If possible the local populations made use of geographical characteristics to organize defense; those who lived close to a river built a shed at the other side of the river, while those who lived close to cliffs or rocks, prepared a hiding place from which they could throw stones at invaders. In oral tradition, people state that agriculture was also dangerous in times of peace; unguarded workers were said to fall easily victim to slave-raiders.

The French took the small polities as the territorial bases for the canton and *cercle* structure they introduced at the end of the nineteenth century and reorganized during World War I. In present-day oral traditions, the canton structure of the end of the nineteenth century is often imagined as representing the “traditional kingdoms.” This has resulted in contrasting claims by villages that aimed to establish “communes” to meet the government’s request for decentralization: some focused on the canton structure, while others had the “traditional kingdom” in mind.

JAN JANSEN

See also: **Mali, Republic of: Traoré, Moussa, Life and Era of.**

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Mali (Republic of): Alliances and Wars

Numerous changes, driven mainly by Islamic jihads and the French invasions, occurred in the nineteenth century on the territory that constitutes present-day Mali. Social and economic development accelerated, sometimes fueling rebellions. Animist traditions and

Islamic rule had difficulties coexisting. Evolving trade patterns steadily undermined the caravan trade, which had been the mainstay of power and wealth in the region for centuries.

The earliest major event was Ahmadu Lobo’s creation of the Hamdallahi caliphate in Macina (1818). Successful though his undertaking had been during his lifetime, rivalries arose under the reign of his heirs and came to a head under his grandson Ahmadu III (1852–1862) when the Tukolor Empire, created by the jihad of al-Hajj Umar, threatened the neighboring Bamana kingdom of Segou. What happened then was symptomatic of the depth of the intra-African enmities that facilitated European conquest. Umar attempted to forge an alliance with fellow Muslim Ahmadu against the Animist Bambara, but Ahmadu refused, mistrusting Umar, member of a Muslim brotherhood different from his own. He saw the Tukolor invading his sphere of influence and believed they would attack him after having defeated the Bamana. Indeed, Umar conquered both the kingdom of Segou and Macina, and then he moved on to Timbuktu. His actions triggered another fratricidal war. An alliance of dispossessed northern Tuareg and Macina Fulani destroyed his armies and killed him (1864).

During his lifetime Umar had also faced crises due to the other major cause of upheavals at the time, European imperialism. He had early (1848) offered the French collaboration. He foresaw little conflict, believing that the French merely wanted trade, while he wanted to build an empire. The French ignored his proposal and instead moved inland in Senegal and hence into Mali, building a fort at Medina (1855). In 1860 it finally suited Louis Faidherbe, governor of Senegal, to agree to a treaty accepting the Senegal River as common boundary. Umar was free to continue his conquests, but his son Ahmadu inherited both the internal problems of a shaky empire and the external threat of French colonialism. He continued negotiations with the French and assumed a friendly attitude. He did not take advantage of their weakened position when their garrisons were depleted during the Franco-Prussian War (1870), yet the French tacitly continued to support his enemies.

During the last twenty years of the century the tempo of change accelerated. The French formulated their policy to reach the Niger so as to obtain uninterrupted communications between their holdings in the Sudan and their increasingly important territories in Côte d’Ivoire. After 1885 occupation became essential for them in view of the stipulation approved at the Berlin Conference, namely that claims on African colonies had to be based on actual occupation.

The French undertook railway construction from Senegal to the Niger to improve communication lines.

In 1881 Simon-Joseph Gallieni negotiated the Treaty of Nango with Ahmadu to forestall Tukolor opposition. Ahmadu doubted Gallieni's offer of friendship but was internally too weak to oppose him. The French soon broke the treaty, penetrated the Tukolor Empire, took Bamako and then Kita. Again, Ahmadu's reaction was temperate.

Meanwhile, near Bamako, the French encountered a formidable enemy about whom they knew little, Samori Touré. Samori, a Malinke, had started out as a trader and soldier. He was an outstanding tactician and administrator, who visualized building an empire in the area that had long been the base of Mande commercial expansion and settlement. Though born in an animist family, he had in 1868 proclaimed himself a religious Islamic leader. Intent on equipping a powerful army and building an empire, he in turn had given the French no thought until they occupied Bamako where he attacked them, but failed to dislodge them.

Actually, the French were more vulnerable than they appeared in 1885. Their lines of communication were overextended, and they were forced to combat a new enemy on the border between Guinea and Mali, Marabout Mahmadou Lamine. Yet, African leaders did not move. Ahmadu was unwilling to support Lamine, who proclaimed himself the spiritual heir of his father, Umar Samori sought to profit from the distraction by accepting a compromise agreement which left him free to tend to his empire. By 1888, Ahmadu and Samori had signed similar treaties with Gallieni, both nominally accepting French protection in exchange for recognition of their authority and the sale of modern weapons.

Treaties, however, meant little. The new French commander, Louis Archinard, captured Segu in 1890. Ahmadu was forced to fight. He made conquest difficult for the French, but they persisted. In 1891 he made one last stand in Macina. Archinard had to stop to restore order in Segu, but in 1892 he conquered Macina. The defeat of the Tukolor empire was complete.

Meanwhile, the French also routed Samori. In 1891 they invaded his capital, Bissandugu, but they found a desert; Samori had followed a scorched-earth policy. By 1894 he was in present-day Côte d'Ivoire, again in the way of communication between French possessions. In vain he sought an alliance with the British, who also saw him as a threat. Pursued and captured he died in exile.

The French proceeded to take Timbuktu. They now had control of all of modern-day Mali, and incorporated it, with Senegal, into what they called the French Sudan. In 1895 they united all their territories in West Africa into one administrative unit named French West Africa. (Mali would reacquire the name of its ancient empire when it gained independence in 1960.)

Besides the firearms gap, nothing had helped the French colonize Mali more than disunity between

Africans, who saw the Europeans as less dangerous than their African rivals. They were familiar with the goals of the Africans, while they could not quite evaluate what French rule might mean. Surrounded by traditional enemies, they concentrated on treaties by which they hoped to gain access to the French superior firepower. And so, in most of their campaigns in Mali, the French had African allies. Moreover, the so-called French forces, while commanded by French officers, were made up of African soldiers.

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See also: **Touré, Samori (c. 1830–1900) and His Empire.**

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Mali (Republic of): Colonial Soudan Français

Once the conquest of the Niger valley was complete, the French sought to integrate the regional economy into their own while placing as few demands as possible on metropolitan taxpayers. In order to convince private enterprise to participate, the government had to provide security for French lives and investments. In the short run, that required a convincing display of military force. In the long run, it meant convincing Africans to adopt French culture.

The French organized the society of French Soudan (colonial Mali) into a strict hierarchy with Europeans at the highest levels of authority, Africans at the lowest levels, and a few "evolved" Africans admitted to the middle rungs to serve as intermediaries. To train the first intermediaries, the French opened the "School for Hostages" (later "School for the Sons of Chiefs") in Kayes in 1886 to teach the French language. Although the French succeeded in establishing some useful relationships, like that with Abdul Lahi ben Ahmadou, the grandson of El Hadj Umar, many chiefs were hesitant and instead sent the sons of their subjects. As a result, the first group of evolved Africans included a mixture of men who were recognized as leaders by the local



Inauguration of the Sotuba Channel, Mali (Soudan), by the french minister of the colonies, M. Maginot, in the 1930s.
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population, and men who were viewed as pawns in a power struggle between local leaders and the French.

The French began to draft Africans for military service in 1912, and a disproportionate number came from the French Soudan, the Bambara population which was viewed by the French as strong, docile, and particularly immune to suffering. Following World War I, African veterans enjoyed special access to jobs in the expanding colonial bureaucracy, and many obtained positions of responsibility under the French to which they could never have aspired under traditional rulers. They were joined in the 1930s by the first graduates of colonial schools like the *École Primaire Supérieure et d'Apprentissage* in Bamako and the *École William Ponty* near Dakar. After World War II a mixture of union members, teachers, postal workers, and war veterans provided personal contacts between the French and Africans in the urban areas around Segou and along the railway west of Bamako. However, the concentration of French personnel along the major axis of transportation meant that most Soudanese had only sporadic contact with French culture.

To finance their plans, the French tried to develop the export economy. The possibilities were limited because the colony was landlocked, but the western portion was accessible to ocean-going ships in late August of each year via the Senegal River. In the first two decades of colonial rule, the French encouraged Africans to exchange gum arabic and rubber at forts along the Senegal River. Once the Colonial Marines began to build a railway from the Senegal to the Niger River in 1881, European merchants shifted their operations to Kayes at the railway's western terminus.

After the Kayes-Niger railway opened in 1904, European merchants moved their operations to Bamako

at the railway's eastern terminus. Bamako became the colonial capital and nearly doubled in size between 1902 and 1912, then doubled again to 15,000 inhabitants by 1920. As steamship transportation became more reliable, European merchants established new trading posts downstream to buy wool and animal skins, and by 1907, they traveled as far east as Gao, 1,300 kilometers from Bamako.

After World War I the French encouraged Soudanese farmers to produce peanuts, which already enjoyed considerable success in coastal Senegal. The government also promoted the production for export of traditional crops like cotton and rice, plus animal products from pastoralists who lived in the region. The largest project, the Office du Niger, joined several cotton and rice-growing projects in 1925 to form a semipublic corporation based in Segou. During the depression, the French encouraged men to migrate to Senegal to grow peanuts and to Côte d'Ivoire to work on the cocoa plantations.

Since the main colonial transportation route ran east-west to the coast, it received little business from local trade, which followed routes that ran north and south between the Saharan salt mines and the Ivorian forest. The cost of transportation to the coast made Soudanese exports relatively expensive in world markets, so except for periods of high world prices, the revenue from the export economy never matched French expectations. The French tried to augment their revenues by collecting a cash "head tax" beginning in 1905. The French institutionalized the use of forced labor with the 1912 military conscription law, and Soudanese draftees were assigned to work on roads in the colony or projects near the coast. After World War I thousands of Soudanese were forced to work on the railway to Senegal as well as on canal and dam projects of the Office du Niger.

Forced labor, taxation, and military conscription provoked resistance, and local institutions remained strong in the absence of a larger European administrative contingent. The French were forced to rely on good relations with influential local leaders to get cooperation from the Soudanese. The French rarely challenged local religious authorities and even went so far as to discourage Christian missionaries from entering the area. Although Roman Catholic missions were eventually founded as far north as Timbuktu, they won few converts outside of the capital at Bamako, the administrative town of Segou, and a few other locations along the railway and in the Niger valley.

The French actively cultivated the support of leaders from the two main Muslim brotherhoods, the Qadirriyya and the Tidjianiyya. Colonial officials in the 1920s saw Islam as an antidote to "communist influence" and viewed with suspicion the development of rival brotherhoods like that which followed

Mohammed al Tashiti Hamallah of Nioro du Sahel. Collaboration of the mainstream brotherhoods with the French was also an issue in the rise of the Wahabiya, who sought to reunite local Muslims with international Sunni Islam after World War II. However, neither of these movements ever became dominant, and in 1957, many Wahabi merchants became the targets of urban violence in Bamako.

Many more Soudanese resisted by deserting from forced labor camps and migrating to the English colonies to avoid taxes and conscription. By the 1930s they began to remind French authorities of their legal obligations to prevent the worst abuses, and following World War II, the Soudanese mounted sophisticated legal challenges to the French system. In particular, Soudanese railway workers proved especially militant during the strike that lasted from October 1947 to March 1948. European workers at the *Office du Niger* staged their own strike on February 1, 1950, and other African workers struck the steamship service in 1954 and the electric company in 1955, while African consumers staged a boycott to protest against a French tax on dried fish in 1956.

The elections to create the French Fourth Republic triggered the formation of political parties led by African civil servants and traditional leaders. Fily Dabo Sissoko, a teacher and descendant of traditional chiefs, won the 1946 election with French backing, but Mahmadou Konaté, another teacher, gained the support of a younger generation of teachers and civil servants. In October 1946 Konaté and other members of the Union Soudanaise (US) hosted delegates from all of the French African colonies at the Congress of Bamako where they united in the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA). Konaté died in May 1956, but his successor, another teacher named Modibo Keita, successfully rallied the party members, and in 1959, the US-RDA absorbed its main rival, Fily Dabo Sissoko's Parti Progressiste Soudanais. At the elections for the Mali Federation in 1960, Keita was unopposed and he became the first president of Mali.

During the 1950s the French attempted to neutralize local discontent by increasing their investment in economic development. The Office du Niger completed the Sansanding Dam on the Niger River in 1947 and added more canals and irrigated land throughout the 1950s. Bamako received sewage lines, drinking water, a maternity hospital, and other government buildings, as well as a bridge over the Niger River and regularly scheduled flights to Dakar and Paris. Towns like Kayes, Gao, Mopti, Segou, and Timbuktu all received airports and other improvements, while in 1954, a bus service started operations from Bamako to Mopti.

The investments in infrastructure were not matched by investments in social programs. In part because of

an acute shortage of teachers, only 836 Soudanese completed secondary or vocational school between 1905 and 1947. Although the French began building new schools and replacing mud-brick buildings with concrete block structures after the war, the teacher shortage persisted and by 1950, the colony served barely 23,000 students out of an estimated school-age population of over half a million. Additional medical facilities were constructed in Bamako, and the largest private companies were required to provide clinics for their workforces, but most Soudanese saw no change before independence.

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See also: **Mali, Republic of: Keita, Modibo, Life and Era of; Mali (Republic of): Nationalism, Federation, Independence.**

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Mali, Republic of: Nationalism, Federation, Independence

In Mali, which was known as Soudan français (French Sudan) during the colonial era, anticolonial demands began with the arrival of the French and continued to be expressed as long as they remained in the territory. Such demands took various forms, ranging from resistance to the census, taxation, and schooling, to open revolts. However, they did not take on a more nationalistic tone, in favor of independence, until World War II, when the recruitment of infantrymen, and the rising burdens of taxation and forced labor induced by the war effort, led to increasing discontent. The Brazzaville conference of February 8, 1944, which recommended better representation of the colonies in the future but refused to grant them self-government, did nothing to reduce this discontent.

After the war the new international context, notably the weakening of the French colonial system and the confrontation between the major blocs, reinforced desires for emancipation among the Sudanese. The *évolués* ("the developed" or "progressive"), as African intellectuals were then known, established numerous associations, such as the Foyer du Soudan (Sudan the

Homeland), led by Mamadou Konaté, or Art et travail (Art and Labor), led by Modibo Keita. The first political expression of the Sudanese people occurred on October 21, 1945, when just 3,500 of them were authorized to elect a single representative to the Assemblée nationale constituante française (French National Constituent Assembly). This exercise in consultation led to the victory of Fily Dabo Sissoko, who was also reelected on June 21, 1946, when the second Assemblée constituante (Constituent Assembly) was chosen, at the expense of Mamadou Konaté, the Secretary General of the Sudanese section of the Confédération générale du travail (CGT, General Confederation of Labour).

Meanwhile, the first political parties had begun to be recognized from the beginning of 1946: the Parti démocratique soudanais (PDS, Sudanese Democratic Party), which was close to the Parti communiste français (PCF) (French Communist Party); the Bloc soudanais (Sudanese Bloc), which was close to the Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière (SFIO, French Section of the Workers International, or Socialist Party); and, finally, the Parti soudanais progressiste (PSP, Sudanese Progressive Party), led by Fily Dabo Sissoko, which was favored by the French administration. Opposition crystallized around the issue of the Congress of Bamako, in October 1946, which saw the creation of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA, African Democratic Rally). The Union soudanaise (US, Sudanese Union), of which Modibo Keita was Secretary General, became the RDA's section for the French Sudan, through a merger between Mamadou Konaté's Bloc soudanais and Modibo Keita's PDS, but Fily Dabo Sissoko rejected the RDA's connections with the PCF and refused to join it.

In the elections held on November 10, 1946, for the three Sudanese seats in the National Assembly, the PSP and the US-RDA began a struggle that was to last until 1958. The PSP was victorious up to 1956. Thus, in 1946 it sent two deputies, Fily Dabo Sissoko and Jean Silvandre, to the Assemblée nationale, while the US-RDA was represented by Mamadou Konaté alone. The outcome was the same on June 17, 1951, when their mandates had to be renewed. Similarly, in the elections for the newly created territorial assemblies the PSP won twenty-seven seats, as against thirteen for the US-RDA.

Things started to change in January 1956, when the French Sudan was to elect four deputies. The US-RDA obtained a majority and won two seats, for Konaté and Keita. In the territorial elections, which were crucial because they were to put in place the institutions established under the Framework Law of June 23, 1956, there was a veritable electoral landslide in favor of the US-RDA, which won fifty-seven seats, as against six

for the PSP. As a result, it was the US-RDA that formed the first council of ministers for the French Sudan, on May 21, 1957. The executive was headed by Jean-Marie Koné because Modibo Keita had in the meantime become, first, a deputy speaker of the National Assembly, and then secretary of state for France d'outre-mer (the French Overseas Territories). Over the course of succeeding years, Fily Dabo Sissoko and other members of the PSP joined the US-RDA, which had no opposition by 1959.

Another rupture had begun, however; this time between those who opposed the existing federations and those who favored them. This rupture became obvious in September 1957 at the RDA congress. The majority of delegates there supported the retention of the federations, as advocated by the Senegalese leader Léopold Sedar Senghor, so that the redistribution of resources between the territories could continue. However, the president of the RDA, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, rejected the idea. This conflict became all-important after the referendum of September 28, 1958, in which a large majority voted "Yes" to the new constitution of the Fifth Republic.

The two camps proved to have taken up entrenched positions at the federal congress, held in Bamako in December 1958, at which the "federalist" delegations from Senegal, the French Sudan, Upper Volta, and Dahomey decided that their territories should unite as "Mali," in memory of the historic empire of that name. At Dakar on January 14, 1959, these delegations established a federal constituent assembly and elected Modibo Keita as its speaker. However, when the time came to ratify the constitution drafted by this assembly, only the French Sudan and Senegal adopted it, as of January 22, 1959. The Federation of Mali therefore brought only two territories together when it was officially launched on April 4, 1959, with Léopold S. Senghor leading the Federal Assembly and Modibo Keita as chief executive. Negotiations with France began in January 1960, and on June 20 France recognized the independence of the Federation of Mali.

The federation was to have a brief existence of precisely three months, as dissension grew rapidly between the Senegalese, who feared Sudanese domination, and the Sudanese, who preferred to reinforce the integration of the new state. Political confrontations, disagreements over federal structures, and the personal rivalry between Senghor and Keita led to crisis. The elections to various responsible posts, held in Dakar on August 20, 1960, became the pretext for the split. Sudanese politicians were arrested by Senegalese troops and sent back to Sudan by train under military arrest, while the National Assembly of Senegal unilaterally proclaimed their country independent. On September 11, France ratified this proclamation; it then sponsored Senegal's

application for membership in the United Nations. Having lost all hope of restoring the federation, the former French Sudan in turn proclaimed its independence on September 22, retaining the name Mali. Modibo Keita was to continue to preside over its destiny until he was overthrown in a coup d'état on November 19, 1968.

This ephemeral and isolated attempt to unite former colonies within a larger federation, which would have greater economic and financial viability, had misfired. The "Balkanization" of the former French West Africa became irreversible: the desire for the unity of Africa had given way to nationalisms.

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See also: Mali Empire, Sundiata and Origins of; Mali, Republic of: Keita, Modibo, Life and Era of.

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Mali, Republic of: Keita, Modibo, Life and Era of *President of Mali*

Modibo Keita (1915–1977) stood in the elections for the Assemblée constituante française (French Constituent Assembly) on October 21, 1945, but lost to Fily Dabo Sissoko. He then became involved in the Parti Démocratique soudanais (PDS, Sudanese Democratic Party), which was close to the Parti communiste français (PCF, French Communist Party). Next, he joined the Bloc soudanais (Sudanese Bloc), in opposition to Fily Dabo Sissoko's Parti soudanais progressiste (PSP, Sudanese Progressive Party), which was supported by the colonial administration. The PSP was victorious once again in the elections for the second Constituent Assembly, on June 2, 1946.

At the Congress of Bamako (October 18–21, 1946), Modibo Keita was a delegate from French Sudan and took part in the creation of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA, African Democratic Rally). Its section in French Sudan took the name of the Union soudanaise (US, Sudanese Union), and in January 1947 Keita became its general secretary. After

he had denounced the "slave-master regime" of the French administrator in a speech at Sikasso, he was arrested on February 21, 1947, and transported to the Santé prison in Paris, but he was freed two months later. This allowed him to play an active role in the major railway workers' strike at the end of 1947.

In 1948 Keita was elected to the Territorial Assembly of French Sudan, and then, in 1953, he became an adviser to the French Union. In the legislative elections of January 1956, he was elected as a deputy to the French National Assembly, and he became its deputy speaker in October that year. Finally, in November, he was elected mayor of Bamako. This high standing in the political world led to his appointment in 1957 as secretary of state for France d'outre-mer (the French Overseas Territories). During the constitutional referendum campaign of 1958, Modibo Keita adopted a decidedly federalist position and called for a "Yes" vote.

After the proclamation of the République soudanaise (Sudanese Republic) in November 1958, Keita became the presiding officer of its Great Council, but he did not give up his preference for unification. However, the opponents of unification, notably Félix Houphouët-Boigny, ensured that the Fédération du Mali (Federation of Mali), established in April 1959, brought together only Senegal and the former French Sudan. Modibo Keita was appointed head of the federal government, while Léopold Sedar Senghor became the speaker of its Assembly. The Federation became independent on June 20, 1960, but rivalries within the government and political divergences led to its collapse soon afterward. Modibo Keita and the other representatives of the former French Sudan were expelled and sent to Bamako in August 1960, and Senegal unilaterally declared independence. On September 22, 1960, Mali, reduced to the former French Sudan alone, declared independence in its turn, with Modibo Keita as its president.

Keita's activities as leader of Mali, which he sought to lead in the direction of socialism, had uneven effects. He undoubtedly had some success in external relations. He never ceased to agitate for African unity, starting out by joining the Casablanca Group, and then taking part in the conference that established the Organization of African Unity in May 1963. He also committed Mali to the movement of nonaligned countries, which selected him to represent them in talks with U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1961. Mali also undeniably derived significant international recognition from the relations that Keita maintained with the Eastern Bloc, and from his international travels, not only to the Soviet Union and China, but also to many other countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, he successfully oversaw the orderly ending of French colonization, bringing about the departure of the last French soldiers in September 1961 and, in 1962, signing

the first agreements with France on economic and cultural cooperation.

Keita's domestic policies were not as successful. Hoping to secure economic independence for Mali, he started a currency reform in July 1962: the country left the Franc Zone and the Malian franc was introduced instead. This initiative failed, however. The economic difficulties that arose from agricultural underproduction, low productivity, and the decline in the balance of trade were aggravated by the weakness of the Malian currency. In 1967 Mali was forced to rejoin the Franc Zone, and its currency was devalued by 50 per cent in the process.

The realization of the original currency reform had also revealed President Keita's authoritarian conception of government. When opposition by the merchants led to riots, the government put the former leaders of the independence movement, Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadou Dicko, on trial, and had them condemned to death. Their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, but both prisoners met their deaths in 1964, in circumstances that remain unclear but do not reflect well on Modibo Keita. In 1963 a rebellion broke out among the Tuaregs of the Saharan massif of Adrar des Ifoghas, in the north of the country, who opposed the Malian government and its "socialist" reforms. Modibo Keita, anxious about the unity of the country, once again chose to adopt a policy of repression, and hundreds were killed. The revolt was crushed in 1964, but the lasting distrust that resulted from these events was to undermine relations between the nomads and the settled population for some time to come.

Excessive tendencies toward socialism and bureaucracy in society and the economy produced other forms of discontent. In particular, peasants objected to the granting of monopolies over the commercial sale of produce to state companies and a network of cooperatives, as well as to the creation of "collective fields" in every village. In June 1968 an uprising at Ouolossébougou was met with harsh repression, which helped to deepen existing tensions. Keita tried to reassert his grip on politics by creating a "Comité national de défense de la Révolution" (National Committee for the Defence of the Revolution) and, on January 22, 1968, replacing the National Assembly, which he had dissolved, with a legislative body of twenty-eight people. On November 19, 1968, he was overthrown by a group of army officers and placed in detention, first at Kati, and then at the prison in Kidal, where he remained until his death in May 1977. Nevertheless, Keita retains a significant positive reputation in Mali, where a center dedicated to his memory was recently opened.

PIERRE BOILLEY

See also: **Mali, Republic of: Nationalism, Federation, Independence.**

Biography

Born in Bamako in 1915. Elementary school 1925–1931, higher elementary school 1931–1934, école normale William Ponty (William Ponty teacher-training school) 1934–1936. Elementary school teacher in Bamako and Sikasso. General secretary of the US-RDA from January 1947 onward. Arrested in February 1947 and released two months later. Elected to the Territorial Assembly of French Sudan. Adviser to the French Union in 1953. Elected as a deputy to the French National Assembly in January 1956; became its deputy speaker in October. Elected mayor of Bamako in November 1956. Twice appointed a secretary of state, 1957–1958 (in the governments of Bourguès-Maunoury and Gaillard). Elected president of the Great Council of the Fédération de l'Afrique Occidentale (AOF, West African Federation) in January 1959 and head of the government of the Federation of Mali in April. President of Mali from the declaration of independence onward. Received the Lenin Prize for Peace in May 1963. Arrested by a group of army officers on November 19, 1968 and interned in the prison at Kidal, in northern Mali, until his death. Funeral in Bamako on May 17, 1977.

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Mali, Republic of: Traoré, Moussa, Life and Era of

Head of State of the Republic of Mali, 1968–1991

Moussa Traoré (1936–) was a young lieutenant when he participated in the 1968 military coup that overthrew Modibo Keita, the first president of independent Mali. Senior officers, who engineered the coup, feared that African leaders, such as Sekou Touré (Guinea), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d'Ivoire), or Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal), might come to Keita's defense. Consequently they readily agreed to have Traoré head the Comité Militaire de Liberation Nationale (Military Committee of National Liberation, or CMLN) they formed, which was to govern Mali for ten years.

His preparation for the position was scant: officer training at the Military College of Fréjus (France) and

seven years in the Malian army, mostly as military instructor at Kati. At first his job was facilitated by support from the Malian population, tired of the economic deprivations caused by Keita's failed socialist experiment. The CMLN proclaimed a new order and promised reforms and a return to civilian government. In 1974 it held a referendum on a new constitution that was favorably received by Malians, and in 1979 it sponsored presidential elections. Moussa Traoré, by then a general, was elected to preside over a civilian government, but democratization was only a slogan. Traoré had already ruthlessly eliminated all opposition and potential rivals, and institutionalized a one-party system. Through his party, the Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien, he controlled all aspects of Malian life. He was reelected in 1985.

Within the parameters of his dictatorship, Traoré did endeavor to improve conditions in poverty-stricken Mali and to gain international respect and support for his country. He made progress in unifying a nation made up of numerous diverse ethnic groups speaking multiple languages. He attempted to increase the yield of subsistence farming and to introduce new agricultural techniques for the cultivation of the main cash crops, peanuts, and cotton. He gained international recognition as president of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and favorable press for his 1987 Bamako Initiative to enhance the availability of medicinal products in Africa, and for co-chairing the UN World Summit for Children, held in New York in September 1990.

Traoré was pragmatic. He did not abruptly reverse Keita's popular socialist policies; instead, he supported existing programs with resumed financial aid from France and other Western donors. However, severe droughts repeatedly exacerbated poverty in essentially agricultural Mali. In order to receive aid and attract foreign investments, Traoré had to comply with the austerity programs demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. He had to cut government spending, liberalize the economy, and privatize state-owned businesses. He found himself in a bind: the changes caused widespread unemployment and economic hardship, which triggered massive protests by government employees, workers, and students in 1987. To pacify them, Traoré implemented several reforms. He dismissed some corrupt public officials, gave civilians partial access to government through periodic local and National Assembly elections and appointment to the Council of Ministers, and made minor economic concessions. These, however, were insufficient to prevent the IMF from suspending aid. The government found itself unable to meet payrolls. Protests and strikes resumed.

Border disputes with neighboring countries and ethnic upheavals in northern Mali, moreover, required

destabilizing military expenditures. In 1985 Traoré fought brief wars with Burkina Faso over a narrow strip of desert in the Agacher region. Fortunately, the International Tribunal in The Hague was able to work out a compromise acceptable to all; however, no such solution was available regarding Touareg rebellions.

The national borders created by colonization and confirmed at independence had disrupted the nomadic Tuareg's patterns of transhumance and transformed about 300,000 Tuareg into Malian citizens. Deprived of their traditional livelihood, they started rebelling in 1962. Droughts in the 1970s and 1980s deepened their plight. Rebellion spread, and Traoré sent the army to restore order. The heavy-handed repression provoked further, more serious uprisings. A relative peace was achieved only after Traoré's presidency had ended in 1991. At the start of the twenty-first century, the Tuareg's survival is still not assured.

These problems, along with the ravages caused by droughts in the mid-1980s, and the fluctuations of world prices for the cash crops that were Mali's only export, undermined Traoré's hold on the country. In 1988, as democratic movements gained momentum in Mali as in other African countries, voices demanding liberalization and a multiparty political system grew louder. Civil disobedience became the order of the day in January 1991. The National Workers Union of Mali declared an open-ended general strike, and daily unruly demonstrations took place in the capital, Bamako. Traoré refused all concessions and ordered the army to shoot into crowds.

The widespread opposition had organized new political parties. In March 1991, Moussa Traoré's regime was overthrown in a palace revolution led by lieutenant colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, former commander of the presidential guard, who became the head of the Conseil National de Reconciliation (National Council of Reconciliation). The council removed all existing governmental institutions, sought civilian participation, and declared its intention to move rapidly toward democratization. Indeed, by April 1991 a transitional government made up of both military and civilians was in place. Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected president in free elections in 1992.

Moussa Traoré was tried as a murderous dictator in 1993 and sentenced to death. The sentence was never carried out, and in 1997 Konaré commuted it to life imprisonment. The former president was tried again in late 1998, this time for financial misdeeds. Again he was sentenced to die, although estimates of the seriousness of his economic crimes vary. In 1999 Konaré commuted this second sentence in a spirit of national reconciliation. In 2002, just before leaving office, Konaré announced an official pardon, which Traoré reportedly refused.

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See also: **Mali (Republic of).**

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Mali, Republic of: Politics, Economics: 1990s

During the 1990s there was a veritable transformation of Mali, which undoubtedly changed more in those ten years than in the three decades that preceded them. The first upheaval that Mali underwent was its transition to democracy. Ever since independence, the political life of the country had been shaped by single-party regimes: that of Modibo Keita's Union soudanaise-Rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA, Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally) from 1960 to 1968, then that of Moussa Traoré's Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM, Malian People's Democratic Union) until 1991. In addition, the circumstances were not exactly favorable, since there was a rebellion by the Tuaregs and the Moors in the north of the country, and the economy was in a disastrous state. Nevertheless, Mali has been able to handle these difficulties in a positive way.

In June 1990 the first offensives by the Tuareg Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad (MPA, Azawad People's Movement) and the Moorish Front islamique et arabe de l'Azawad (FIAA, Azawad Islamic and Arab Front) were harshly suppressed by the Malian army: the north of the country became a zone of slaughter, and large numbers of nomads fled from the region to take refuge in Algeria or Mauritania. However, in December 1990 the government and the rebels signed the Tamanrasset Accords.

In the south, meanwhile, democratic forces organized "associations"—since parties were banned—such as the Association des élèves et étudiants maliens (AEEM, Association of Malian Schoolchildren and Students), the Association pour la démocratie au Mali (ADEMA, Association for Democracy in Mali), and the Congrès national d'initiative démocratique (CNID, National Congress for the Democratic Initiative). These provided frameworks for the discontent that had been exacerbated by the dictatorial character of Moussa Traoré's government, its deplorable management of the economy, and its nepotism. Popular demonstrations, and strikes by schoolchildren and students, led to

riots in Bamako from March 22 to March 25, 1991, which resulted in death for scores of people and injuries for many others. The Malian army then took power, under the leadership of Amadou Toumani Touré, and on March 31, 1991, it established the Comité transitoire de salut public (CTSP, Transitional Committee of Public Safety).

The new regime accepted a multiparty system and organized a national conference over the following months. Moussa Traoré was imprisoned along with his wife, Mariam: he was twice condemned to death by the Bamako Criminal Court, in 1994 for his crimes of violence, and in 1998 for his economic crimes. While the rebels launched new offensives in the North, the CTSP entered into lengthy negotiations, accepted mediation by France, Algeria, and Mauritania, and, on April 11, 1992, succeeded in signing a national pact with the Mouvements et fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad (MFUA, Unified Azawad Movements and Fronts), providing for the integration of the rebel fighters and greater involvement of the northern regions in the political and economic life of Mali.

In 1992 there was a series of exercises in democracy: the referendum on the new constitution (January 12), and elections for municipal authorities (January 19), the legislature (March 8), and the presidency (April 12 and 26). The ADEMA won two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, and its founder, Alpha Omar Konaré, became the first democratically elected president of Mali. Amadou Toumani Touré gave up power, as he had promised he would, and returned to his military duties.

However, President Konaré, who was reelected on May 11, 1997, for a second and final five-year term, had to face some difficult challenges. On the political plane, he had to deal with the rise of a radical opposition, concentrated in the Collectif des partis politiques d'opposition (COPPO, Collective of Opposition Political Parties), which had decided on a total boycott of the referendum and the elections. The disturbances that arose from its intransigence did not end until 1999, when the COPPO finally disintegrated. In the North, there were delays in the implementation of the National Pact, confrontations between the army and the rebel movements, which had not been disarmed, and rivalries between the nomads and the Songhay fighters of the Mouvement patriotique Ganda Koy (MPGK, Ganda Koy Patriotic Movement), which gave rise to fears of new outbursts. However, the region gradually returned to a state of calm normality, symbolized by the ceremony of the "Flame of Peace," in Timbuktu on March 27, 1996, when thousands of weapons were burned and all the different rebel movements formally dissolved themselves.

The improvement in the situation in the north allowed the Tuareg refugees to return home in stages,

in a process that ended in May 1997 for those who had taken refuge in Mauritania, and in October for those returning from Burkina Faso. Finally, the special status envisaged in the National Pact exclusively for the northern regions was transformed into a measure of large-scale decentralization that was extended to all the regions of Mali. The lengthy process of preparing technical resources and personnel for this decentralization culminated in the communal consultations of May 2 and June 6, 1999, which completed the process of creating 682 new communes (communities) intended to bring government closer to local populations.

On the economic plane, the successive governments of democratic Mali succeeded in redressing the catastrophic conditions that prevailed at the beginning of the 1990s. On September 15, 1993, Abdoulaye Sékou Sow submitted proposals aimed at reducing the budget deficit, which was the main requirement of the IMF, and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who became prime minister since February 1994, succeeded in convincing both the IMF and the World Bank to grant Mali financial assistance amounting to 1.2 million French francs. Mali also received aid from its main partners, most notably France and the European Union. A little while earlier, Mali, along with the other countries in the Franc Zone, had felt the effects of the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc initiated by France and the IMF. This devaluation created significant problems for large sections of the population, but it also allowed Mali to stabilize its international trade by reviving its exports, notably of its main product, cotton, of which it is the second largest producer in Africa after Egypt, but also of agricultural produce and gold. Following the success of the Structural Adjustment Plan for 1992–1995, negotiations were reopened in February 1996, and in 1997 the plan was extended for a further three years.

Mali has succeeded in restructuring its public sector, while maintaining a high priority for education, and in improving its balance of trade. For several years it has enjoyed a series of bumper cereal harvests as well as exceptional cotton harvests. The inflation rate, which exceeded 30 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s, has been brought under control: by 1999 it had fallen to 4.2 per cent. The economy has been revived, with growth rates being held steady at between 4 and 6 per cent a year. Numerous problems remain, including a low endowment of energy sources, an underdeveloped industrial sector, and difficulties with tax receipts, in a country where most of the population live below the threshold of poverty. Nevertheless, there has been real political and economic progress during the 1990s.

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Mamluk Beylicate: See Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Mamluk Beylicate.

Mamluk Dynasty: See Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army and Iqta' System; Egypt.

Mamluk Dynasty: See Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Plague; Literature, Western: Africa in.

Mandates: League of Nations and United Nations

The movement for the protection of colonial subjects began to form in the sixteenth century when Spanish social reformers urged Emperor Charles V to end forced labor in Spain's American colonies, set up free and independent labor communities, and use cash incentives instead of slave labor to encourage agricultural production. The goal was to halt human exploitation and the decline of the native American population. In the eighteenth century, British political leaders asserted that at the core of the concept of trusteeship was the humane treatment of colonial subjects, and that colonies were "a sacred trust" of imperial powers. In India, for

example, Edmund Burke believed that British colonial authorities should not only promote British imperial interests but also protect Indian life, culture, and property against the depredations of over-zealous colonial officials. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of trusteeship had received widespread support from theologians, philosophers, moralists, social reformers, and politicians, all of whom advocated a policy of fairer treatment of the native populations in far-flung colonial territories.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 accelerated the quest for the creation of an international organization capable of mediating international disputes and promoting the welfare of colonial peoples. In an address to a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson laid out Fourteen Points upon which peace could be maintained in the postwar years. In the Fifth Point, Wilson envisaged an “absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims” based on the interests of the people. The realization of that goal proved problematic at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Through secret treaties Britain, France, and their war-time allies (with the exception of the United States, an associated power) resolved to maintain their respective colonial empires while agreeing not to relinquish control over enemy colonies they had captured during the war. The justification was that these colonies posed a threat to world peace and international commerce. In the end, the idea of an international trusteeship as a first step toward the protection of colonial populations and the eradication of colonial rule applied only to the German and Turkish colonies in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific Ocean.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations created the mandate system that encapsulated the principles enunciated by the various social and political reformers by the dawn of the twentieth century. The allied and associated powers divided the former German and Turkish colonies into three classes of mandates. In descending order, each class of mandates reflected a degree or two of readiness for independence. The class A mandates, administered by Britain and France, were colonies that formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire in the Middle East (Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq). The peace conferees considered these to have attained a level of political development such that they could be granted provisional recognition as independent states with their own self-governing institutions. The primary responsibility of the “advanced nation” to which they were entrusted was to provide administrative advice and assistance until they achieved full independence. The class B mandates, adjudged by the powers to be politically less advanced than those in the Middle East, were located in Africa. They included Tanganyika, Togoland, the Cameroons, and

Ruanda-Urundi; they were administered by Britain, France, and Belgium.

These mandatory powers undertook to nurture freedom of conscience and religion, suppress the slave trade and the traffic in arms and liquor, maintain the open door, and prevent the establishment of military fortifications and the training of the local populations for offensive military purposes. The remaining former German colonies in Africa and the Pacific Ocean were categorized as class C mandates. These included southwest Africa, New Guinea, Nauru, Western Samoa, and the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall Islands. Since the allied and associated powers considered these territories to be politically the least advanced of Germany’s former colonies, they were administered “as integral portions” of the mandatory powers and in accordance with their existing laws. In many other respects, the C mandates were similar to the B mandates in Africa to the extent that they lacked self-governing institutions or local autonomy. To ensure compliance with Article 22, each mandatory power was required to submit annual reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). Further, the terms of the individual mandates could not be altered without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

Thus, Article 22 of the covenant formalized the idea that the well-being and development of colonial subjects was “a sacred trust of civilization” to be monitored by the League of Nations. However, the division of former enemy colonies into three classes of mandates concluded a chapter in the secret territorial arrangements of the Great War. It represented a compromise between the principles of self-determination enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and the allies’ insistence upon the outright annexation of the former German and Turkish colonies as the prize of victory. In theory the mandate system placed these colonies under the “tutelage” of the “advanced nations” and admonished them to further their well-being and development toward independence. In practice the mandates were governed as colonies of the mandatory powers. In the A and B mandates, local leaders were excluded from the central administration of their respective territories. For example, in Tanganyika the first two Africans to serve on the Legislative Council were appointed in 1945; the number was increased to four by the end of the decade. The Executive Council remained a preserve of British colonial officials until the 1950s, when the first two Africans were appointed to it.

World War II not only hastened the decline of Europe’s colonial empires but also rendered obsolete the entire machinery of the League of Nations, which formally ceased to exist on April 18, 1946. The postwar era began with the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO) in 1945 and the adoption

of a wide-ranging resolution on mandates by the General Assembly. The resolution reiterated the purposes of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Apart from noting with satisfaction the manner in which the League of Nations had performed its supervisory functions over the mandates, the General Assembly also commended the PMC for its success in guiding Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan toward independence between 1932 and 1946. Palestine remained problematic, Jews and Arabs fought for control before and following the creation of Israel in 1948.

With the demise of the League of Nations, the UNO assumed responsibility for the administration of the mandates. Under Chapter XI, Article 73 of the United Nations Charter (adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945), the A and B mandates were renamed “non-self-governing” trust territories under the supervision of the same mandatory powers that had administered them since 1919. Chapters XII and XIII provided for the establishment of an international trusteeship system to replace the mandate system. The Trusteeship Council succeeded the PMC. Its functions included the examination of annual reports and petitions and the conduct of tours of inspection of the various trust territories.

While reaffirming the principles entailed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the new UN Charter took a positive step further by recognizing the growing demand for self-rule in the trust territories especially since the adoption of the Atlantic Charter by the United States of America and Britain in 1941. Among other things, the UN Charter urged the administering powers to respect the culture of the people, promote their economic, social, and educational advancement, treat them justly, and protect them against abuses of all kinds. In a welcome departure from past practices, the charter also called upon Britain, France and the other powers to take account of the political aspirations of the people as they develop free political institutions for eventual self-government. With the exception of Southwest Africa (Namibia), which became independent in 1990 after a protracted national liberation war against South Africa, the administering state, all of the African trust territories achieved independent statehood between 1960 and 1962. Apart from Palau (part of the Caroline Islands) and the Mariana Islands, which are still U.S. territories, the Pacific trust territories won their independence between 1962 and 1986.

World War II marked a significant turning point in the history of colonial rule and the trusteeship system. Contrasted with the previous mandate system of the League of Nations, the UN trusteeship system recognized the right of self-determination of colonial peoples as an essential element in the maintenance of peace in the post-war world. By recognizing that right, the UN Charter ended a quarter century of political uncertainty

for the world’s colonial peoples and territories. The keys to understanding the change of direction were the nationalist frustrations engendered by the failure of the 1919 Peace Conference to take a resolute stand in favor of self-determination, the inability of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, the Atlantic Charter’s enunciation of the right to national self-determination in the colonies, and the nationalist ferment of the wartime and postwar years. After centuries of political agitation by social reformers, politicians, theologians, and other concerned groups and individuals, the UN trusteeship system finally ushered in a new era of decolonization in Africa and the Pacific Ocean.

PETER A. DUMBUYA

See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; World War I: Survey; World War I: North and Saharan Africa; World War II: French West Africa, Equatorial Africa; World War II: North Africa; World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Impact.**

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Mandela, Nelson (1918–)

President of South Africa, Antiapartheid Activist

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born on July 18, 1918, in the small village of Mvezo in the Eastern Cape. Following the death of his father, Mandela was

“adopted” by the regent of the Tembus, Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo. With the intention of preparing the boy for a career as a councillor to the Tembu king, the regent sent him to be educated at the Clarkebury Institute, Healdtown College, and the University of Fort Hare.

In 1941 Mandela was expelled from Fort Hare and, faced with an arranged marriage, he fled to Johannesburg. His first job was as a night watchman with Crown Mines. Among his new friends was Walter Sisulu, who would become a lifelong political colleague. Sisulu introduced Mandela to a liberal law firm who employed him as an articled clerk. By 1944 Mandela was an active member of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League. In the same year he married a young nurse, Evelyn Mase.

As a member of the Youth League, Mandela adopted a position of African nationalism, strongly opposed to the influence of the Communist Party of South Africa. During 1951 Mandela began to accept the importance of a strategic alliance between the ANC and the Communists. In 1952 he played an important organizing role in the Defiance Campaign. In the same year Mandela established the first African law firm in South Africa in partnership with his political colleague, Oliver Tambo.

Throughout most of the 1950s, Mandela was either “banned” or on trial. At the same time he wrote a number of essays and speeches. In 1953, for example, he developed the M-plan, a secret cell-structure for the ANC. In 1956 he contributed an article to *Liberation* on his interpretation of the Freedom Charter. He noted that when the Freedom Charter was instituted “the non-European bourgeoisie will have the opportunity to own in their own name and right mills and factories, and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish as never before.” This sentence would attain great importance in the decades that followed as Mandela had to defend himself against the accusation that he was a secret member of the Communist Party. In the mid-1950s, Mandela’s first marriage broke down and he married Winnie Nomzamo Madikizela in 1958.

Mandela had been arrested in 1956 and charged with treason along with 155 other political leaders. Five years later, the treason trial ended and Mandela and his co-accused were found to be innocent of the charges leveled against them. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the ANC (1960), Mandela decided to go underground and rapidly entered South African popular mythology as the “Black Pimpernel.” In the same year he assumed the leadership of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the ANC. After extensive travels through Africa and a brief visit to London, Mandela was captured in Natal. In October 1962 he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Less than a year later, this

sentence was overtaken by fresh charges related to the capture of the MK high command at Rivonia in July 1963. Following the Rivonia trial, Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964.

Mandela’s years in prison steeled and hardened him for the negotiations that lay ahead. He rapidly emerged as the leader of the ANC group of political prisoners on Robben Island. Conditions were grim during the 1960s and visits by relatives were infrequent. However, by the mid-1970s, hard labor was phased out and prisoners were allowed to take part in organized sports and academic study. With the arrival of black consciousness activists following the Soweto uprising, Robben Island became something of a university of revolution. For Mandela, this was the ultimate test of his political skill. Faced with radical youngsters imbued with militant passion, he successfully argued the case for nonracialism and collective discipline. In 1978, to note his sixtieth birthday, the first Free Mandela campaign was launched by the ANC and the antiapartheid movement in London. The Mandela campaigns would grow in magnitude throughout the 1980s.

In 1982 Mandela and a handful of his senior colleagues were transferred from Robben Island to Pollsmoor Prison. Secret talks with representatives of the government began in the mid-1980s, although Mandela engaged in these talks without the authorization of the exiled ANC. In December 1988 he was moved to Victor Verster Prison. In February 1990 President F. W. de Klerk announced Mandela’s release and lifted the ban on various liberation organizations. Mandela had served twenty-seven years in prison.

The transition period in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 was tortuous. As the leader of the ANC, in practice, if not to begin with in name, Mandela tended to stand apart from the negotiations, only intervening in moments of crisis. He traveled throughout the world raising funds for the ANC and was greeted with almost universal acclaim, in the process finding himself acknowledged as one of the great iconic figures of the twentieth century. In 1993 Mandela shared the Nobel Peace Prize with F. W. de Klerk although their relationship was marked by resentment. In the same year, following the murder of Chris Hani, Mandela appeared on television to calm the anger of the people. It was apparent that fundamental power had already shifted in South Africa. This was confirmed by South Africa’s election in April 1994 during which the ANC won a resounding victory.

As president of South Africa from 1994 to 1999, Mandela devoted his time in office to reconciliation with his former enemies. Although the “Rainbow Nation” suffered economic crisis and burgeoning crime, he was not a hands-on politician; rather, as president Mandela was something of a monarchical figure. In 1998 he

married for the third time, to Graca Machel. Mandela retired in 1999, having guided South Africa through its first period of majority rule. Mandela's retirement set something of a precedent in Africa by demonstrating that a great leader can willingly hand over the reins of power.

JAMES SANDERS

See also: **Luthuli, Albert John Mavumbi; Madikizela-Mandela, Winnie; South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle, International; South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: 1952–1960; South Africa: 1994 to the Present; South Africa: Transition, 1990–1994.**

Biography

Born on July 18, 1918, in the small village of Mvezo in the Eastern Cape. Expelled from the University of Fort Hare and moves to Johannesburg to avoid an arranged marriage in 1941. Becomes active in the ANC Youth League. Marries Evelyn Mase in 1944. Established the first African law firm in South Africa with his political colleague Oliver Tambo in 1952. Divorces and marries, to Winnie Nomzamo Madikizela, in 1958. Arrested and charged with treason in 1956. The ANC banned, and Mandela goes "underground," in 1960. Captured in Natal, and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964. Released February 11, 1990. Shared the Nobel Peace Prize with F. W. de Klerk in 1993. Served as President of South Africa from 1994 to 1999. Married for the third time, to Graca Machel, in 1998. Retired in 1999.

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Mandinka States of Gambia

The Mandinka, a major ethnic group in Gambia, trace their origin to the earliest group of human beings that occupied the Sudanese Belt in the Stone and Iron Ages. These early human beings were hunters and made and used stone and iron weapons such as knives, axes, scrapers, hammers, and needles. Later they made weapons like spears, harpoons, clubs, shields, blowguns, bows, and arrows.

The black population that inhabited the Sudanese Belt occupied a small portion of the area prior to the

year 700. They continued to practice agriculture and were able to develop larger and more dense populations than those whose preoccupation was cattle rearing. They eventually colonized the forest areas of West Africa.

During the early Islamic contact period, from 700BCE onward, long distance trade played an increasingly important role in influencing the economic, social, and political patterns of western Sudan. The trade brought wealth to some parts of West Africa, which laid the foundation for social stratification and state formation. When the empire of Ghana emerged, the Mandinkas formed part of the Mande-speaking peoples of the Soninke Clan. The Mande people were also known as Manden, Malinke, Mndinka, or Mandingo.

After the fall of the empire of Ghana in 1076, all the former tributary states that made up the empire regained their independence. It was not until 1235 that a small Mandinka kingdom emerged. The kingdom was ruled by a Mandinka king, Sundiata Keita, who was credited with laying the foundation of the powerful Mali Empire. In fact, according to oral tradition, the Mandinka expansion into Gambia commenced during the rule of Sundiata in the thirteenth century.

Mandinka immigration was carried out through both peaceful means and military expansion. Some Mandinka moved to the Senegambia region prior to the establishment of the Mali Empire. The early migrants traveled south and west in search of better farmland, food, and shelter. Some traders and hunters moved with these people into the well-watered land area in the Senegambia. When they settled, they engaged in agriculture and intermarried with the indigenous ethnic groups of the region.

The military expeditions were carried out at the request of Sundiata. He sent one of his generals, Tiramang Traore, west to conquer Cassamance and Guinea Bissau in the thirteenth century. Consequently, Tiramang defeated the local population easily and laid the foundation of the Kaabu Empire, which eventually stretched as far as Gambia. Kaabu became the center of Mandinka culture. Its capital was located at Kansala. Tiramang also conducted expeditions against the neighboring Jollof Empire on behalf of Sundiata.

The immigration of the Mandinka's from Mali to Gambia resulted in the formation of many Mandinka families as a result of intermarriage. Tiramang was married into the Sanneh family. Mandinka families like Sanyang, Bojang, Conteh, and Jassey trace their ancestry to the inhabitants of the Mali Empire.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century, the Mandinka controlled a land area that stretched from Gambia to Futa Jallon. Several Mandinka states made

up the Mandinka Empire of Kaabu: Kantora, Tumaana, Jimara, Wurapina, Nyamina, Jarra, Kiang, Foni, and Kombo. Kombo, a former Jolla state, had been forcefully conquered by the Mandinka. The kingdoms of Baddibu and Barra were overcome by Amari Sonko, another general of Sundiata Keita. Amari established the Sonko dynasty in both kingdoms.

The Mandinka states had a centralized system of government under the *mansas*, or chiefs. The local government was staffed by village heads who were also known as *al-cadi*. They were members of the nobility whose chief function was to distribute land and enforce judicial measures. They presided over minor cases and collected taxes.

From the fourteenth century, trade settlements were established in the Mandinka states. The villages where trade was conducted were large and populous. The impact of the Atlantic trade was felt in Gambia; it played a decisive role in the economic, political, and social evolution of the states in particular and the people in general. From the fifteenth century, success in trade, military expertise, and strong government made it possible for the Kaabu Empire to reach its zenith in the sixteenth century.

The fifteenth century also witnessed the Portuguese exploration of West Africa. The Portuguese conducted a very profitable business with the Mandinka at the time. In 1491 Rodrigo Bebello, a Portuguese, and seven members of his group met with Mandimansa, the Mandinka ruler of Kantora state. They established friendly relations that subsequently led to the development of a regular trading system. The Mandinka traded in gold, slaves, ivory, and beeswax. The commodities were brought from the interior and exchanged with crystal beads, iron bars, brass pans, fire arms and ammunitions, liquors, tobacco, caps, and iron. All the items of trade were measured in bars of iron, which gave them equal quantities of all goods that were exchanged.

The trade in the Mandinka states also attracted the Berbers and the Moors who had settled in Gambia earlier in the eleventh century. The Berbers and Moors who were Muslims opened small Koranic schools where boys were taught to read and write in Arabic. The Mandinka kings enrolled their children in the schools and employed the Muslim teachers, or *marabouts*, to pray and make charms for them.

The *marabouts* also intermarried with local Mandinka women, thus creating Muslim families. Some of the Mandinka who practiced African traditional religions also converted to Islam.

The Mandinka merchants traveled in trade caravans that comprised 40, 50, or 100 people. They used the river valleys to buy and sell. Some local Mandinka traders joined the groups in the river valley. The

women and slaves carried the loads on their heads. Donkeys were also used to carry the loads. The women led the journey while the men followed in the rear. On arrival at a village, the women cooked the food for the party to eat. Items that were available for exchange were woven cloth, ivory, beeswax, hides, gold, civet cats, green parrots, perfumes, corn, shea butter, salt, fish, and iron. The traders paid taxes to the caravan leaders.

As the various peoples of the Senegambia established their settlements, the Mandinka also built settlements and villages and developed their own unique culture. The cultural development was accompanied by customs like naming ceremonies, initiation, marriages, and funeral rites.

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mandinka Empire of Kaabu was the most important empire of the Senegambia region. The success of the theocratic revolution in Futa Jallon at the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, affected the end of the expansion of the Kaabu Empire.

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Mane: Migrations, Sixteenth Century, History of

The era between 1545 and 1606 is considered to be significant in the social history of the West African region that became part of modern Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana, because it was during this period that the Africans whom the Portuguese called the Mane came into contact with African ethnic groups like the Bakwe, Grebo, Kru, Gola, Vai, Kpelle, Loma, Kissi, Mende, Kono, Temne, Bulom, Lokos Fula, Susu, and the Europeans who were arriving in the area about this time. The simultaneous arrival of the Mane and Europeans, together with the impact they and the Africans of the region had on each other, have added to the confusion regarding the origins and ethnic backgrounds of the Mane. Indeed, scholars have paid more attention to the

origins, migrations, and invasions of the Mane than the roles they played in the development of West African social, economic, and political orders, especially from 1545 to 1800.

Nearly all treatments of Sierra Leone in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by European observers portrayed the Mane as invaders who conquered the early inhabitants of the area and those of what became known as Liberia in 1822. There is little consensus, however, on the beginning of their migration or their specific date of arrival in Sierra Leone. Alvares de Almada, a Cape Verdean Afro-Portuguese, wrote in his 1594 book that the Mane had been waging wars on the early inhabitants of Sierra Leone for a hundred years and added that they were in fact Mende. De Almada based his latter assessment on the fact that the Mane spoke, dressed, and used the same weapons as the Mende. He noted that the Mane had arrived in Sierra Leone through what became Guinea. He later speculated that their empire expanded from the coastal area between the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Gambia. Captain R. Avelot, in his study of Sierra Leone, considered the Mane as Temne, and dated their arrival as about 1550. Anthropologist Northcote Thomas maintained in his 1919 publication that the Mane were not Temne, and added that the former arrived in Sierra Leone in the early 1500s. John Hawkins, an English enslaver on the West African coast in the 1560s, maintained that the Mane, whom he described as Sumbose, arrived in Sierra Leone in 1561. He failed, however, to address the origins of their migrations.

While the above-mentioned studies are characterized by contradictions, Walter Rodney's 1970 study of the Upper Guinea illustrates that not all their arguments are misleading. Basing his analysis on published and unpublished records together with Mende oral traditions, Rodney traced the origins of the Mane migrations to the southern end of ancient Mali; and noted that they were to move to the interior of Côte d'Ivoire, and then to the Gold Coast, where they had minor conflicts with Portuguese traders. He maintained that the Mane, under their female leader Macarico, were expelled from Mandimansa in 1505 for unknown reasons. This was followed by their migrations in two directions: one toward the east coast, and the other, which constituted the bulk of the migrants, toward the coastal area of what became Liberia. It was during their westward movement that the Mane are said to have come into contact with the Bakwe, Kru, Grebo, Vai, Kissi, Loma, Mende, Bulom, Temne, and others. Indeed, the impact of the Mane in the pre-Liberian area was illustrated by their establishment of the kingdom of Quoba in the vicinity of Cape Mount, several miles from the southeastern end of Sierra Leone. Macarico's son was reportedly killed in the Mane War against the

Bulom, whose influence was felt in Cape Mount. This event was followed by the death of Macarico in 1545.

The advent of Mane was reinforced in the coastal area of Upper Guinea through military means, and by collaborating with Europeans or pitting one African group against another. The Mane had worked with the Kru and Europeans against the Vai to promote their political, military, and material objectives in the Cape Mount region. The Mane also employed such strategy in the establishment of the kingdom of Boure in Sierra Leone.

Mane migrations had several effects in the area of Sierra Leone and what would become Liberia. Mende, Kissi, Bulom, Kru, Temne, Loma, and others who were recruited into the Mane army not only used Mane weapons; they were also indoctrinated to be loyal to the new Mane leadership. Reciprocally, the Mane new army used the Mende who had migrated from the north to the area earlier as informants. It has been demonstrated that the language the Mane and their recruits spoke took the form of the Mande language. The social attributes of the Bulom, Kissi, Loko, and Gbande reflected Mane characteristics. However, the Mane were socially and culturally absorbed over time by these other ethnic groups.

The Mane strengthened the transatlantic slave trade on the coastal area of Sierra Leone and the region that was to become Liberia. They collaborated with Europeans and other Africans to enslave a large number of Kono, Mende, Sape, Bulom, Gola, Vai, Loma, Gbande, and Kpelle for the Americas. More than 300,000 Africans were enslaved from the coastal area of the future Liberia alone. The Mane army was essentially a slave capturing-organization, especially in the early eighteenth century.

The Mane have been credited with introducing new military weapons and strategies, a large centralized political system, and techniques of weaving cotton, making iron and medicine in Sierra Leone and in the future Liberia. They helped spread the Mande language in West Africa.

AMOS J. BEYAN

See also: Sierra Leone: Temne, Mende, and the Colony; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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Mansa Musa, Mali Empire and

The Mali Empire occupied its greatest level of achievement during the period extending through Mansa Musa's reign (1312–1337) and that of his brother Sulayman (1341–1360). During this time of its greatest expansion, Mali's territory is believed to have extended from the headwaters of the river Niger and from where the Gambia and Senegal Rivers reach the Atlantic coast, to the southern fringes of the Sahara and the Niger Bend country beyond Timbuktu. The prosperity of Mali's rulers (*mansaw*) was based on its control of commercial centers and routes to the goldfields. Highly valued imports such as copper and salt were heavily taxed, and the *mansaw* accumulated vast quantities of gold by exacting tribute from the producers. Mali's citizens included many intermingled groups who spoke each others' languages. These included speakers of Mande dialects such as Maninka, Bamana, and Soninke, in addition to neighboring groups such as the Fula and Dogon. While trade was extremely important, the majority of the population were engaged in agriculture, cattle-raising, and fishing, with specialized artisan groups such as blacksmiths, leatherworkers, and potters.

Much of the information about Mansa Musa that was recorded during his own time comes from the Arabic writings of al-'Umari (1301–1349), who interviewed eyewitness informants in Cairo, Ibn Battuta (1304–1368) who visited Mali in 1352–1353, and the famous Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–406) who recorded oral historical traditions from Malian scholars. The combined descriptions of al-'Umari and Ibn Battuta evoke a royal court in which the *mansa* occupied a lofty pavilion and sat on a dais decorated with ivory and silk under a dome adorned with an image of a golden bird the size of a falcon. On ceremonial occasions the *mansa* was dressed in a gold turban and crimson gown. He carried a quiver and bow as part of the royal insignia and was escorted by hundreds of musicians and armed slaves. When Mansa Musa rode on horseback, the large flag that signaled his presence was yellow on a red background. In Mande society it was customary for the ruler to speak through an intermediary, or *jeli*, and the leading spokesperson of the Malian court that was visited by Ibn Battuta (in the time of Mansa Sulayman) was flitted with fine garments of silk brocade, a sword with a golden sheath, and boots with spurs. Ibn Battuta reported that any ordinary citizen called into the sovereign's presence had to go in ragged clothes to express his humility, and that when the visitor was addressed by the *mansa*, he must strip to the waist and sprinkle dust on his own head and back.

Mansa Musa was reputed to be a pious Muslim, and he became famous outside of the Mali Empire owing to circumstances of his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324. Before leaving Mali on a journey that would take at least a year, in keeping with local custom Mansa Musa consulted a diviner to learn the most auspicious date for his departure. He waited nine months for the appropriate date, during which time provisions for the journey were collected from all corners of the realm. When the *mansa* departed there were thousands of people in his retinue including members of the court, baggage carriers, and bodyguards. According to the *Ta'rikh al-Fattash*, which was written more than three centuries after the event (c.1665), Mansa Musa was also accompanied by his senior wife, Inari Kanuté with five hundred of her own servants.

The royal caravan from Mali reached Egypt after suffering months of hardship crossing the Sahara Desert, emerging near the pyramids at Cairo. Both al-'Umari and Ibn Khaldun heard from their informants that Mansa Musa left Mali with somewhere between 80 and 100 loads of gold, and his extravagant spending throughout the journey, and especially in Cairo, made his pilgrimage a sensational event. According to al-'Umari's informant, Mansa Musa's arrival gift to Sultan al-Nasir included 50,000 dinars, and he was similarly generous to many others. The Malian emperor flooded Cairo with such wealth that it depressed the value of gold for more than a decade following his visit.

Witnesses in Cairo were impressed with Mansa Musa's piety and with the dignified manners of his well-dressed companions. The emperor was repeatedly interviewed, and asked about his kingdom and the circumstances by which he became *mansa*. Sultan al-Nasir presented Mansa Musa and his courtiers with richly ornamented robes of honor, saddled and bridled horses, the use of a palace for the duration of their visit, and pack animals and provisions for their onward journey to Mecca. After about three months in Cairo, the Malian caravan continued to Mecca in the company of Egyptian pilgrims.

While in Mecca, Mansa Musa succeeded in recruiting four *shurafa* (descendants from the Prophet Muhammed's family) to accompany him back to Mali with their families. Ibn Khaldun reported that returning to Cairo from Mecca, the Malians narrowly averted disaster when they became separated from the larger Arab caravan and had to make their way to Suez where they survived on fish until they were rescued. By the time the pilgrims returned to Cairo, the gold Mansa Musa had brought with him had run out, and he found it necessary to borrow money from the city's merchants, which he later repaid at an exorbitant rate of interest. In addition to the *shurafa* from Mecca who returned to Mali with Mansa Musa, there was Abu- Ishiq al-Sahili,

a poet and architect from Andalusia. Al-Sahili created an elegant, domed palace in Mansa Musa's capital and later settled in Timbuktu where, it is believed, he built one of the mosques.

Mansa Musa is credited with establishing Mali's reputation of greatness far beyond his imperial territories by means other than his extravagant expenditures during the famous pilgrimage. He encouraged Islamic scholarship by sending students to study in Fez and initiated diplomatic relations between himself and the king of Morocco. For this purpose, high-ranking dignitaries from each kingdom were exchanged as ambassadors. The mutually beneficial relations continued with the successors of these monarchs, until late in the fourteenth century, when both Mali and Morocco fell prey to dynastic rivalries.

Before departing on his famous pilgrimage, Mansa Musa had appointed his son Magha to rule in his place. Upon Mansa Musa's death in 1337, Magha again assumed control. His succession deprived Musa's brother Sulayman of the power which customarily belonged to the eldest male in the family. However, Magha died within four years and Sulayman became mansa at that time. Though described by Ibn Khaldun as a wicked, tyrannical ruler, Mansa Sulayman successfully maintained the empire that had enjoyed its golden era under the benign and able rule of Mansa Musa.

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See also: **Ibn Khaldun; Mali Empire.**

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Manyika of Eastern Zimbabwe

The Manyika, whose country is known by the same name, are eastern Karanga who lived in the Eastern Highlands, in an area defined by the Odzi, Rebvuwe, Pungwe, and Gairezi Rivers. This is a cool, well-watered high plateau, 5,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. The Portuguese first referred to the Manyika in 1513, when Antonio Fernandes traveled from Sofala to the Mutapa State. Fernandes reported that they were well organized politically and traded gold with Sofala. From 1573 onward, written sources refer to Manyika rulers as Chikanga.

Traditions dating from the mid-sixteenth century locate Manyika origins in the Mutapa State. Karanga language gradually spread toward the Indian Ocean. Traditions relate that some Zimbabwe Culture stone buildings appeared there at the same time. Late sixteenth-century Portuguese accounts record that Teve, Manyika, and Danda were once ruled by Mutapa's sons, but nineteenth-century traditions suggest they broke away from the state as a result of poor relations with Changamire, king of the Rozvi.

The Chikanga dynasty ruled Manyika from the second half of the sixteenth century, taking over from an earlier dynasty, linked to Barwe. The new dynasty claimed origins from Mbire, in the Mutapa State. It seems that Mutapa, who ruled up to 1694, was expelled from the state and went into an alliance with Changamire Dombo, who conquered Manyika in 1693–1695. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Chikanga title was changed to Mutasa, excluding rival houses to the throne.

Like the rest of the Karanga, the smallest socioeconomic unit in Manyika was the household, which was part of a village, followed by a ward and then country (*nyika*). *Nyika* represented the largest administrative unit, encompassing several wards. Highly respected women functioning as royal magistrates headed some wards. This institution of women governors helped maintain centralized control of the state. Several *nyika* constituted the state, controlled by the king who in turn enjoyed absolute powers, but in practice ruled with the consent of his subjects. The king lived at *guta*, the royal court. The most important Manyika ceremony was the election and installation of the king. To avoid civil war the election of kings was conducted secretly, and only publicized at coronation. Contesting houses to the throne usually rejected this.

Rozvi kings recognized Manyika rulers through envoys sent to present the king-elect with emblems of kingship (crown, conus shell, and battle-axe) and other symbols of authority. For their tasks envoys were paid in cattle. The Rozvi practiced this only at the beginning of their reign as an exercise in political integration. This, however, did not prevent succession conflicts.

The Manyika had no standing army except about 200 men who defended the capital. When invaded by the Portuguese in the late sixteenth century, they recruited approximately 2,000 men to defend their territory. Lack of a standing army put the Manyika at a disadvantage, especially during civil wars.

The basis of Manyika economy was agriculture. Crops grown included millet, sorghum, groundnuts, cowpeas, bananas, and maize. Cultivation, harvesting, and processing of crops was done communally. Some harvested grain was stored in granaries for drought relief, or for special ceremonies. Cattle were an important

part of Manyika society. They were acquired through inheritance, court fines, tribute, bride-price, and trade. They were used as insurance following bad harvest, exchanged for grain, redistributed following the death of their owner, or presented as payment for a bride.

A variety of animals were hunted for food. The king organized communal hunting parties. Elephants were killed mainly for ivory, which was traded at Sofala, especially during the sixteenth century. Ivory trade flourished until the nineteenth century.

The Manyika were also involved in industrial activities and workshop trades. Pottery-making produced a variety of domestic utensils. Bark string was woven into cloth. Iron was smelted to produce hoes, an integral part of the agricultural system. These hoes could be exchanged for wives. Copper was used to produce bangles and bracelets.

Gold attracted Swahili and Portuguese traders from the Indian Ocean coast. It was gold that brought the Portuguese into Manyika in the late sixteenth century and resulted in the *feira* (market) of Masekesa. We do not know how much gold was exported but it was probably second to ivory as a source of Manyika wealth. Its production to meet the demands of external traders disrupted agriculture during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Although some Portuguese managed to visit Manyika gold mines in 1514–1515, direct contact intensified after 1569. Before this, coastal and hinterland rulers fought for the control of trade with the coast. This forced the Portuguese to abandon Sofala for the Zambezi, where they settled at Sena and Tete in 1531. They defeated the Swahili traders in order to monopolize trade. Between 1559 and 1575 the Portuguese had attempted to invade the Mutapa State, first through Francisco Barreto, who tried to penetrate the hinterland using the Zambezi but was halted by disease, and then Vasco Fernandes Homem, who in 1573 came through Sofala. This brought the Portuguese into Manyika, but the expedition failed to locate gold mines. The invasion resulted in the development of *feiras* in Manyika that included Masekesa, Matuca, and Vumba. They were part of a wider network of trading places, established in Manyika, Mukaranga, Teve, Madanda, and Barwe during the seventeenth century. Masekesa lasted until the nineteenth century.

The gold trade was disrupted by Portuguese aggressive tendencies during the seventeenth century, when they interfered in the politics of Manyika, Mutapa, and Torwa. Between 1632 and 1695 the Portuguese reigned chaos in southern Zambezia, virtually taking over control of trade, relegating local rulers into puppets. *Feira* activity increased. In 1675 the Manyika resisted Portuguese invasion. The Rozvi, who in 1684 took control of Masekesa, halted the Portuguese.

Rozvi domination of Manyika started with the 1693–1695 war, which resulted in the attack on *feiras* of Massapa, Dambarare, and Masekesa. Masekesa was reopened for trade in the 1720s. Before that trade seems to have shifted to Teve. Between 1720 and 1730 the Portuguese tried to make peace with the Rozvi. The Manyika paid tribute annually to the Rozvi in the form of cloth, cattle, and gold. This sustained Rozvi political domination on the Manyika, which, however, slowly waned as the eighteenth century progressed.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese tried to negotiate with the Rozvi for increased access to Manyika. This was, however, complicated by Manyika succession disputes, (c.1795–1833). The Rozvi only managed to intervene twice. This was unfavorable to the Portuguese, who suffered increased difficulties in their trade with the Manyika. By the end of the eighteenth century, Rozvi influence was on the decline. Apart from the succession disputes dominating Manyika politics from about 1795, Nguni invasions during the first half of the nineteenth century also weakened both the Rozvi and Manyika.

INNOCENT PIKIRAYI

See also: **Sena, Tete, Portuguese, and Prazos.**

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Mapungubwe: See Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Leopard's Kopje, Bambandyanalo, and Mapungubwe.

Maputo

Maputo provides the best natural harbor on the coast of East Africa, as the island of Inhaca helps partly to enclose and protect the bay. The inland area of the southern coast of Mozambique is dry and has poor soil with the exception of the river valleys, where intensive agricultural production is possible.

Portugal's earliest presence along the southeast African coast centered on the northern part of Mozambique, beginning in the fifteenth century. The main areas of activity and settlement were Mozambique Island down to Sofala and inland along the Zambezi River. Only very much later did Delagoa Bay in the extreme south become important and Lourenço Marques (after independence renamed Maputo) become the capital of this Portuguese colony.

Diamond and gold discoveries in the 1870s and 1880s in South Africa, along with the attendant massive development of Johannesburg and the Transvaal were to have enormous implications for Lourenço Marques, as this was the closest natural harbor to serve the import and export needs of the South African mines. In the early nineteenth century, the Nguni invasions from South Africa brought most of the area from the Limpopo River in the south to the Koniati under the control of the Gaza kingdom, restricting Portuguese influence. Portuguese rights to Delagoa Bay were recognized internationally in 1875, and with the economic development of the region fuelled by the burgeoning gold mines of the Rand, in 1888 Lourenço Marques was officially designated the capital of the territory and the conquest of the African peoples was finally consolidated. A railway line linking the Transvaal to the port of Lourenço Marques begun in the 1880s, was completed in 1894. Alongside of the railway, road links to South Africa were created and these became the arteries for the export of South Africa's mineral resources and trade imports. They were also the means by which tens of thousands of Mozambicans traveled every year to work on the South African mines. Total tonnage handled in the port increased rapidly from a quarter of a million tons at the turn of the twentieth century to one million tons by 1914 (half of which was coal).

Lourenço Marques was assured of a continuing and growing economic base under a series of conventions signed between the Portuguese colonial government and South Africa, which linked use of the port by South Africa with Mozambique's provision of migrant laborers to the mines of the Rand. This was extremely lucrative for the Portuguese colonial regime. The flow of migrants was regularized, with the colonial government receiving a fee for every miner hired. Under the terms of an agreement made in 1909, the port of Lourenço Marques was guaranteed 50 per cent of the Transvaal trade, with fees paid for the use of the railway in exchange for supplying mine labor. A new rail line linking southern Rhodesia to the port was also constructed, increasing the importance of transit trade earnings to the economy from neighboring interior states.

South Africa exerted a powerful influence over Lourenço Marques, such that in January 1929, it was

able to oblige the Portuguese government to nationalize the port and railway, in an effort to improve the functioning and efficiency of the system. Much of the stevedoring and freight handling, however, was undertaken by private South African companies. At this time, only 11 per cent of Mozambique's exports were going to Portugal, while 34 per cent were destined for South Africa. In the 1930s new refrigeration plants were built to cope with the increase in South African food exports.

From the 1930s, following Salazar's takeover in Portugal and his subsequent nationalistic dictatorship, increasing white settlement was encouraged in Mozambique. Lourenço Marques began to expand, developing a significant number of industries to meet the settler's needs. The city took on distinct characteristics. The so-called cement city was occupied by the whites predominantly, surrounded on two sides by the ocean. Outside of this area were the shanty towns, or "canico" areas, named after the local reed used to construct the huts. There was a stark contrast among the services, facilities, and standards of living available in the two areas.

The beginning of the independence struggles in Portugal's African colonies from the 1960s led the colonial power to reverse its earlier economic nationalist stance encouraging foreign investment, and the economy of the city boomed. Once again, South Africa was the major player and by the 1970s, Mozambique derived over 40 per cent of its gross national product and between 50 and 60 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings from that country. Lourenço Marques became a major tourist destination for South Africans. Apartheid policies preventing interracial sexual relations led to a huge growth in the prostitution industry, with an estimated 50,000 prostitutes in the city by independence.

With independence in 1875, the city underwent drastic changes. A large emigration of whites led to a massive influx of blacks from the "canico" shantytowns into the "cement" city. The city deteriorated initially; property was nationalized while maintenance and rehabilitation projects were suspended. A major social benefit was the increased availability of services and facilities (water, sanitation, health, and education) to the black population. South African destabilization and an expansion of the armed Renamo opposition movement's activities created a further massive population expansion, swamping service providers as people sought the safety of the capital city. Maputo became the prime focus of government activity, appropriating the majority of development aid, which accounted for 70 per cent of the GDP from the mid- to late-1980s until the early 1990s.

From the late 1980s the government increasingly opened up the economy to foreign investment (after an early postindependence experiment with socialism).

MAPUTO

The city became revitalized by the end of the twentieth century following an end to the civil war and the holding of democratic elections. There was substantial investment in an aluminum smelting plant and a major initiative to revitalize the port and transit facilities to the interior in cooperation with the South African government and the private sector. Privatization of the economy and of housing led to a renewal of the city, and tourism increased. Maputo became the main beneficiary of one of the highest economic growth rates in Africa at the end of the twentieth century. The government's strict adherence to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment program led to a major program of debt relief, clearing the way for continuing economic development.

BARRY MUNSLOW

See also: **Mozambique.**


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Maraboutic Crisis: See Morocco: Maraboutic Crisis, Founding of the 'Alawite Dynasty.

Maravi: Phiri Clan, Lundu and Undi Dynasties

The present-day Chewa are descendants of a number of local groups who had resided in the region between the southern tip of Lake Malawi and the lower Zambezi since early in the first millenium invading groups established a number of chiefdoms over the various Chewa groups sometime between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Soon after their arrival these invaders called themselves "Maravi," which means "fire flames." Among the most renowned Maravi chiefdoms were Undi, Lundu, and Kalonga. These names derive from those of their rulers and were also bestowed upon succeeding rulers as titles. The Maravi rulers were of the Phiri clan, whose remote origins may have been in the Luba territory. The immediate origins of Undi and Lundu lie in the early period of Kalonga in the



Maravi Kingdom, seventeenth century.

sixteenth century. Oral sources state that disputes over succession led members of the Phiri clan, among whom were Lundu and Undi, to leave Kalonga and to form their own Maravi chiefdoms.

These traditions recount that Undi, the brother of the deceased Kalonga, failed to gain the support of the councilors, who appointed the chiefs, although he had the support of most of the royal lineage. Undi soon departed, apparently taking with him all female members of the royal lineage and a large number of other supporters. For a long time thereafter successors to the Kalongaship had to be sought from Undi, who controlled the royal lineage. Undi's departure from Kalonga can be dated from Portuguese records to before the last half of the sixteenth century. Undi went farther west to establish his capital in the Mano area between the Kapoche and Liuye Rivers in Mozambique. In 1614 a Portuguese source mentions trade with a chief "Bundy" in the area north of the Zambezi-Liuye confluence. By about the same date, and certainly by 1640, Undi's Mano chiefdom had begun to expand to the north and northwest into the Nsenga territory, which lies in present-day Zambia. These areas were far from Portuguese trade centers and evidently did not benefit from long-distance trade until after they were accepted into Undi's chiefdom. In return for the tribute from the ivory-rich Nsenga areas Undi reciprocated by providing a redistribution of imported trade goods.

The degree of Undi's authority was limited as his chiefdom was decentralized. When there was a crisis needing military action Undi had to rely on the support of his subordinate authorities. The powers of chiefs,

tributary chiefs, and of Undi himself were based on the reciprocity of goods and services. The chiefs, as owners of the land, distributed land to headmen for peasants to use. To ensure the well-being of his people, the chief performed ritual duties, apart from those performed by rain-callers and keepers of spirit shrines, and settled legal disputes. For these services the chief received tribute of both goods, including ivory, and labor force.

Evidently due to the heightened Portuguese involvement in the ivory trade in Undi's chiefdom, increasingly more traders were employed by the Portuguese traveling to Undi's capital. One result of this development was that, by 1750, a number of gold mines were discovered and opened by the Portuguese. Portuguese individuals received Undi's permission to work the mines with slave labor. In return, Undi received revenues from the profits made. The Portuguese, however, had preferred to negotiate directly with Undi's subchiefs and not with Undi himself, and thus undermined Undi's authority. Moreover, the Portuguese in the Zambezi valley sent professional hunters, the so-called *Chikunda*, equipped with firearms for hunting elephants to Undi's territory. These hunters did not have permission to hunt from Undi and paid tax solely to the local subordinate chiefs, who were increasingly reluctant to send revenues to Undi. Undi, in turn, could not redistribute the wealth. The Portuguese, and later the Yao and Bisa, acting as agents to Arab merchants, encouraged this decentralization of trade that resulted in a decentralization of authority and finally in secession. When the chiefdom was largely fragmented, the Ngoni arrived and struck the final blow to the Undi chiefdom in approximately 1835.

Less is known about the Lundu chiefdom. Lundu had founded his chiefdom in the lower Shire valley probably in the second half of the sixteenth century. The power of Lundu was based on two factors. First, he controlled the river route into the Shire Highlands and had his stronghold opposite Sena and Tete. Second, the chiefdom had an extraordinary agricultural potential due to a combination of wet-land and dry-land cultivation that in times of drought gave it a decisive advantage over much of lower Zambezia. Thus the valley also became important to the Portuguese settlers along the Zambezi as a granary in times of drought and scarcity. The first mention of Lundu in a Portuguese document refers to the year 1614 that has led to the alternative hypothesis that Lundu did not develop until around this time.

Unlike Undi, Lundu had absolute supremacy in ritual matters, even in respect to the rain ceremonies which were normally performed by ritual specialists who were independent of the rulers. The hypothesis is that Lundu, with the help of the Zimba armed forces, initiated a repressive system to obtain total control not

only of ritual matters but also of production and trade in and around the lower Shire valley. The expansionist wars waged by Lundu in the closing decade of the sixteenth century probably coincided internally with a massive attempt at centralization of political power. With his Zimba allies Lundu could defeat the Portuguese in 1592 and 1593. Sometime after this he became a powerful ally of the Portuguese of Tete. In 1622, however, he was defeated by his rival, the Maravi chief Muzura, who at that time had made a deal with the Portuguese. Why Lundu had become an enemy of the Portuguese remains unclear.

Even so, the Lundu paramountcy survived until modern times and remained an important factor in the Mbona rain cult. By the 1860s the Lundu paramountcy had nearly collapsed due to the slave trade and was only saved by allying to the British. It was officially restored after Malawi independence and formed one focus of modern Chewa nationalism.

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Maravi: Zimba "Invasions"

Knowledge about the Zimba and their role in the history of Zambezia derives mainly from several contemporary Portuguese documents and from African oral tradition. The Zimba were apparently Bantu-speaking invaders, who dwelt in the lower Zambezi region and managed to expand their influence to a large part of Makualand by about 1590. The sources frequently refer to them as cannibals. There is no direct documentary evidence providing information on the origin of the Zimba and their motivation for invading northern Zambesia. A popular hypothesis in regard to their geographical origin describes the Zimba as refugees from the south bank of the Zambezi. Two arguments in favor of this hypothesis can be put forward. First, over the course of the twentieth century, the Shire valley witnessed immigration from the east and from the west, but only immigrants coming from the south, especially from the hinterland of Sena, have been associated with

the name "Zimba." Thus, there must have been some kind of preexisting tradition linking the name "Zimba" to these peoples. The second argument derives from evidence related to ritual practices. *Tundu* (or *Tondo*) was the name of a legendary Zimba leader of the 1590s. During the following centuries this figure was transformed by the peoples of the lower Shire valley into a male spirit responsible for all kinds of natural disasters and plagues. Traditions and rituals concerning *Tundu* consistently associate him with the south.

Several hypotheses exist as to the motivation of the Zimba invasions. The most influential one was developed primarily on the basis of oral tradition, and suggests that the Zimba operated as a mercenary force under Lundu, the ruler of the Maravi state of the same name. Lundu himself may have given his consent to the formation of the Zimba army, or he was able to use the already existing Zimba army for his own purposes. Lundu did not have an army worth mentioning at his disposal and was dependent on armed assistance from outside. This suggests that it was the Zimba who provided Lundu with the offensive fighting power he required to reach his goal. Thus, the Zimba were in alliance with the Lundu of that time and the latter used them to consolidate his power in the Shire valley and beyond. In this respect, the Zimba raids can probably be seen in connection with Lundu's striving for ritual supremacy, particularly in regard to rain-making cults. This supremacy was unknown to the other Maravi states, where rain ceremonies were performed only by ritual specialists, who were in principle independent of the secular rulers. The ritual supremacy of the secular ruler could apparently be achieved only by force. Circumstantial evidence indicates that Lundu exercised extreme repression to obtain total control not only of ritual power but also of production and trade in and around the lower Shire valley. In sum, it can be concluded that the expansionist wars waged by Lundu in the last decade of the sixteenth century coincided internally with a massive attempt to centralize political power by forcing a large segment of the population into total subjection and by fundamentally restructuring the system of economic production and distribution. This points to the fact that the Lundu state, together with the rival Maravi state of Muzura, was already well established in the second half of the sixteenth century, if not earlier.

According to Portuguese sources, prior to 1590 the Zimba's main stronghold lay opposite Sena, one of the most important Portuguese entrepôts within the Monomotapa kingdom in the lower Zambezi region. Apparently Muslim Swahili, Portuguese, and African groups traded luxury goods there. Chiefs with whom the Portuguese maintained good relations were frequently threatened by Zimba raids, probably initiated by Lundu. In 1592 the Portuguese captains of Sena and

Tete, de Santiago and de Chaves, put together an army to rid themselves of this threat. However, when they reached the fortified village of the Zimba near Sena they were ambushed by them, several hundred Portuguese including both captains as well as African allies were killed. Since the Zimba had become too overconfident in their power and increasingly bellicose, the captain of Mozambique, de Sousa, assembled an army in 1593, equipped it with artillery, and marched toward the fortified settlement of the Zimba. Despite their artillery and a massive assault, the Portuguese failed to conquer the fort and after two months they decided to return to Sena. However, the Zimba overpowered those Portuguese forces that were still in the camp, killed some of them, and seized a considerable amount of equipment and artillery. Soon afterward the Portuguese and the Zimba made peace and the traffic on the river was opened again. In 1597 there was renewed fighting, after which the Zimba leader Tundu offered peace to the Portuguese of Sena in approximately 1599. Nevertheless, the new captain of Mozambique, de Ataide, sought leave for a punitive campaign against the Zimba, who by that time were in control not only of the north bank of the Zambezi but also of much of the coastal area and the nearby regions.

A second hypothesis that attempts to explain the motive behind the Zimba raids maintains that the states of Lundu and Muzura did not exist as formal systems until the first quarter of the seventeenth century. In this view the overall situation just before and after 1600 was rather one in which powerful groups of invaders, including the Zimba, forming one of several groups of Maravi invaders, were in search of a suitable environment in which to set up a feudalistic state system. Defeated by the Portuguese and thus unable to settle south of the Zambezi, the Maravi chiefs changed direction and invaded the Mozambique lowlands. It may have been one of these incursions during the 1580s that gave rise to the legend of the marauding, cannibalistic Zimba. Portuguese sources recall an episode from 1589, when a Zimba war party reached the East African coast, attacked Kilwa, pillaged Mombasa, and proceeded to Malindi, where they were annihilated by armed forces of the local Segeju people. However, there are scholars who argue that the Zimba raids on the East African coast have been misinterpreted and should better be understood in terms of frictions in local political relations. Some even go so far as to suggest that the entire existence of the Zimba was a delusion of the Portuguese.

Contemporary Portuguese sources explain the Zimba raids on the East African coast with reference to an ambitious minor Zimba chief, who emigrated from his homeland with an armed force in order to conquer foreign territories and attain fame and notoriety.

During the following centuries certain groups of professional elephant and hippopotamus hunters were called “Zimba.” Today, groups exist in the Shire valley who call themselves Zimba, but who are probably descendants of nineteenth-century immigrants.

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Maravi: Kalonga Masula: Empire, Trade

The sources on early Maravi history—contemporary Portuguese written documents and African oral tradition—are scarce and often contradictory. Thus, modern historiography relying on these sources often bears the character of mere speculation.

Sometime between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, invaders established a number of chiefdoms over the various Chewa groups settled in the region between the southern tip of Lake Malawi and the lower Zambezi. These invading rulers were of the Phiri clan and are said to have originally come from the Luba region. According to oral tradition they called themselves “Maravi,” probably soon after their arrival. This term means “fire flames,” since the land shimmered like flames in the sunshine when it was first seen by the newcomers.

Among the most renowned Maravi chiefdoms were Undi, Lundu, and Kalonga. These names derive from their founding rulers and were also bestowed upon succeeding chiefs as title. Kalonga’s chiefdom probably expanded slowly and did not reach its peak of power until the early 1600s, partly as a result of the stimulation of trade in ivory and cloth with the Portuguese. Kalonga exploited the Zambezi trade and controlled movement along the Shire from his center of power which lay near the south-west corner of Lake Malawi. Oral traditions reveal that at some point, probably in the late 1500s, there was a dispute over succession which seems to have had disastrous effects on Kalonga’s central authority. Undi, the brother of the deceased Kalonga, was passed over as successor,

whereupon he left Kalonga, taking with him all the female members of Kalonga’s part of the royal Phiri lineage. This meant that Kalonga had no means of ensuring his own succession. Since he did not have a mother or sisters to produce brothers and nephews, he could not rely on the continuing support of close royal kin in his capital. Instead he was burdened with the restrictions of the councillors who were recruited from the Banda clan. For a long time thereafter successors to the Kalongaship had to be sought from Undi who controlled the royal lineage. An important element in the decline of Kalonga’s central authority could also have been the influence of external Muslim and Portuguese traders.

In the early seventeenth century, chief Muzura established a powerful state on the southern border of Kalonga, controlling most of northern Zambezia. This state is first mentioned in Portuguese records in 1608 and last mentioned in about 1635. Many writers have assumed that this Muzura was the paramount chief of the Maravi and holder of the title of Kalonga. There is, however, no documentary evidence at all to show that Muzura was a Kalonga and no tradition recorded by the Maravi remembers a Kalonga of that name. The very meager evidence suggests that the state founded by Muzura north of the Zambezi later became known as the “empire of the Maravi,” and that the paramountcy which he established later assumed the title of Kalonga.

In 1616 the term Maravi is used for the first time to describe Muzura’s capital. Muzura’s expansive ambitions were fostered by his military alliance with the Portuguese, who helped him to defeat Lundu in 1622. It is likely that these military activities were of some importance in the expansion of “Kalonga” Muzura’s chiefdom in the 1600s. This is remembered in the oral traditions of Undi, Mkanda, and others. After the defeat of Lundu, political dominance in the region was taken over by Muzura. This is the first time that the term Kalonga is mentioned in Portuguese documents. In 1631 Muzura shifted his allegiance in favour of an alliance against the Portuguese. This alliance had been forged by Kaparidze of the Karanga, who had been ousted by the Portuguese as a rival claimant to the throne of the Monomotapa, and by the Manyika. The uprising failed and the Portuguese maintained power in Karangaland and probably south of the Zambezi, while the north bank of the Zambezi continued to be controlled by Muzura and his successors. By 1667 the area north of the river is generally referred to by Portuguese sources as being the empire of Maravi, ruled by Kalonga. Most Maravi chiefs could maintain their authority until the nineteenth century, particularly their monopoly over trade, even in the face of the decentralizing tendencies within their chiefdoms. Occasionally Portuguese references before 1800 give

the impression that a trade monopoly was also being maintained by Kalonga. It is mentioned that he restricted trade, especially in ivory, to himself and two other rulers at the end of the seventeenth century.

However, in comparison to other Maravi states, decentralization took place in Kalonga at a relatively early stage. The weakness at the center was probably due to an ill-suited successor and the lack of relatives to support Kalonga about 1750. A weakness at the center could easily be taken advantage of by subordinates who either felt that they were receiving insufficient services or desired to control tribute and external trade to their own benefit. As the eastern and southern parts of Kalonga's chiefdom had probably seceded in the mid- or late seventeenth century, and as Undi had established himself independently, it would appear that Kalonga's economic position was greatly weakened. Since the chief was the ultimate owner of the land he had the right to collect tribute, but he also had certain responsibilities, both to the land and to the welfare of the people living on it.

The Maravi chiefs received ivory hunted in their country and other raw materials such as skins. The export of ivory and other tribute goods by the chiefs was important in terms of the maintenance of their central authority as the imported goods were redistributed to the chief's subordinates. This redistribution secured the economic dependence of these subordinates. The chief virtually had a monopoly over the collection of ivory tribute and its sale to external traders. The breaking of this monopoly and the decentralization of the chief's control over tribute and trade finally led to the general decline of the central powers not only of Kalonga, but sooner or later of all Maravi chiefs. The role of the Portuguese in this process is not yet clear. The Portuguese may have undermined Kalonga's central authority, since they tended to negotiate with local subordinate rulers.

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Margai, Sir Milton: See Sierra Leone: Margai, Sir Milton: Independence, Government of.

Marinids: See Maghrib: Marinids, Ziyanids, and Hafsids, 1235–1359.

Marrakech

Marrakech (sometimes written as Marrakesh) is the capital of southern Morocco, a city of 745,541 (1994), the fourth largest in Morocco after Casablanca, Rabat-Salé, and Fez. The spoken Arabic *Mer-r<sh* provides Western languages with the name of the country, Morocco, Maroc, Marueccos, and so forth. The word is undoubtedly of Berber origin, but its meaning is unknown.

Marrakech is today composed of three parts: the older city, the Medina; Guéliz, which is the former European town, planned as a separate modern city with its own central business district and suburbs; and numerous extensions of the city, some planned, some mere *bidonvilles* (shantytowns) that have grown up to the north and west of the Medina mostly since the 1960s. The Medina is effectively Marrakech as it was before the arrival of the French and the establishment of Guéliz, which was drafted as a whole plan in 1919 and represents one of the more successful French urban designs, intended as a method of retaining the architectural integrity of the old city as well as providing a segregated atmosphere for colonial life. The Medina is entirely walled, has numerous massive gates, and contains many distinctive neighborhoods and quarters. It is flanked on two sides by massive royal gardens (Agdal and Menara), themselves walled and part of the urban matrix. The city is focused on the Djemma al-Fna, a vast and chopped-up open square, devoted to cookshops at night and story tellers, acrobats, and other entertainment and services by day. Aside the square lies the dominating minaret of the Koutoubia ("booksellers") Mosque, which dates from the Almoravid era of Sultan Yaqub al-Mansour (r.1184–1199) and is the stylistic older twin to the Giralda of Seville. Vast markets (*souqs*) penetrate the Medina, purveying textiles, brass, and leather goods to the legions of tourists who make Marrakech Morocco's top tourist destination.

Marrakech, the "Red City"—so named for the color of the sun-dried earth (adobe) that composes the basic urban building material—is an Islamic city, founded by the Almoravid (al-Murbitun) movement as it swept out of the western Sahara and established itself in Morocco in the mid-1000s. While the date of the founding of Marrakech is debatable, most scholars have settled on its construction begun in 1070 on orders of Abu Bakr ibn 'Umar, which were carried out by Yussef Ibn Ben Tashfin, the Almoravid conqueror of Morocco and Spain.

Marrakech supplanted an earlier city, Aghmat, located some distance away at the mouth of the Ourika valley in the High Atlas. A Berber capital, Aghmat was probably founded about 704 as part of the Kharijite revolt that swept Morocco's early Islamic history but had become firmly welded to the political fabric of Morocco, largely dependent on power from Fez. The Almoravids first built a *qsar* (fort), which was excavated and revealed to be intact during the colonial era. As Marrakech grew, Aghmat withered, and so Fez and Sijilmasa, the greatest cities of Morocco to this time, had a new rival, strategically located to rule, as did 'Ali Ben Yusef, Yusef's heir (r. 1106–1143), from Algiers to the Atlantic and from the Sahara to the Ebro. It was in 'Ali's reign that Marrakech began to flourish as a kind of western Baghdad, and savants such as the philosopher Avenpace of Zaragoza and doctors Avenzor of Seville and Avenzoar congregated at the court. 'Ali was no cosmopolite, however, and the intellectuals of Marrakech found themselves in jail from time to time.

In the High Atlas south of Marrakech, Berbers, organized as a new religious movement, the Almohad (al-Muwahidin, "Unitarians"), saw the Almoravids, initially the bearers of a fundamentalist strain of Islam, as corrupt and venal. In 1147 Marrakech was attacked by the Almohad 'Abd al-Mu'min (r. until 1163), who conquered the city, sacked and destroyed many Almoravid structures, and resanctified others for his use. Almohads invaded Spain and succeeded in reformulating effectively the same imperial domain as their predecessors had. An example of the rise and fall of Islamic dynasties later outlined by Ibn Khaldun, the Almohads rose to greatness over their first three sovereigns, and in particular, the third, Yaqub al-Mansur, created many of the main lines of Marrakechi urbanity traceable to today. Long-distance trade soared as new souks, notably a cloth bazaar (*qaysariya*) for sale of Italian and eastern fabrics; the booksellers of the Koutoubia and the Koutoubia itself; and numerous *fondouqs* (caravanserais) were established. Intellectual life of the Almohad court exceeded that of the Almoravids: Averroes wrote his *Essay on the Substance of the Universe* in Marrakech; Avenzoar lived to return to the Almohad court.

In symmetry to their rise, the Almohads declined over several generations and fell into in-fighting in which Marrakech suffered great destruction in the 1220s and until 1232. In the breach, Merinids, Berber warriors from western Algeria, took control of Morocco. Marrakech, which had been reduced to a regional kingdom, was taken in 1269 and for most of the succeeding 230 years of the Merinid dynasty, Marrakech was ruled through a series of semiautonomous princes dependent on central authority in Fez. One prince, Yusuf ben Abi

Iyad, was inspired to rebellion in 1308; after being defeated by imperial troops along the banks of the Oued Oum er-Rbia north of Marrakech, he spirited back to the city, plundering along his way, and sought refuge with a *shaykh* in the Atlas, who turned him in. He was killed and the heads of 600 of his followers were rammed on stakes along the city ramparts. Princely Merinid rule continued through the 1300s, and at some unknown point in the 1400s, which is very poorly known in Moroccan history, local leaders, the Hintata, came to play a dominant role and were identified as the "kings" of Marrakech when the Portuguese conquered the coastal town of Safi in 1508.

Threat of the Portuguese conquest of all southern Morocco, including Marrakech, led to the emergence of the Saadians, powerful *sharifs* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) from the Draa valley, who leveraged their holiness and military acumen to defeat the Christians, itself a struggle that lasted most of the sixteenth century, and establish a new Moroccan dynasty at Marrakech. The Portuguese, at last defeated in what F. Braudel called the "last Crusade of Mediterranean Christendom" at the Battle of Three Kings or Oued al-Makhazine (1578) in northern Morocco, the victorious Saadians turned their attention to the embellishment of Marrakech under the reign of Moulay Ahmad al-Mansur, the "Golden" (r. 1578–1603). Most elaborate of all buildings built by Mansur was the Badi ("incomparable") Palace, decorated with Carrara marble paid for by cane sugar grown in the Sus valley (southwestern Morocco).

Under the Saadians, but especially Mansur, Morocco pursued a policy of Saharan conquest, and took Touat, Gourara, and then the empire of Songhay, focused on Timbuktu, in 1590–1591. This aggressive policy withered following Mansur's death, as did the Saadian state, but its impact on the Ottomans and European powers was great; harboring a prestige for Morocco that far outlasted Morocco's actual strengths.

With the rise of Morocco's present dynasty, the Alawites, in the seventeenth century, the seat of government left Marrakech for all time, moving to Fez, Meknès, and eventually Rabat. Moulay Ismail (r. 1672–1727) destroyed the Badi Palace and removed the marble to his newly remade capital at Meknès. From time to time (down to the present), an Alawite sultan sojourned in Marrakech and important building projects completed, but the center of power moved elsewhere. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the young sultan Moulay Abdel Aziz (r. 1894–1908) spent six years in Marrakech, the result of which was the Bahia ("splendid") Palace. Antiforeign sentiment grew in these years, and the murder of the French doctor Mauchamp in Marrakech in 1907 only heightened

xenophobia in Morocco and the crisis atmosphere that accompanied European, and especially French, policies toward Morocco. His brother and successor, Moulay Hafid, abdicated in June 1912, at a time of extreme popular unrest following the signing of the Treaty of Fez (March 14, 1912), which established the protectorate over Morocco.

In Marrakech a shaykh, Ahmad al-Hiba, emerged as the head of (self-declared) Islamic resistance against the French and proclaimed himself sultan in August 1912. Having taken the city, al-Hiba proceeded to arrest selected French residents of Marrakech, including the vice consul. General Lyautey then speeded up the French conquest of Marrakech, which was accomplished swiftly under the direction of General Mangin. In September 2,000 holy fighters died at Sidi Bou Othmane, just north of Marrakech. General Mangin occupied Marrakech the next day. He was accompanied by Thami al-Glaoui, leader of the Atlas "grands caïds" who threw in their lot with the French early after a generation of serving as rural tax collectors for the sultans. Al-Hiba escaped, his movement collapsed, and he died in obscurity in 1919. Thami Glaoui played a key role in the protectorate and became virtual lord of Marrakech and the Atlas in the 1930s and 1940s.

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See also: **Maghrib; Morocco.**

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Martial Races

Imperial states often recruited their military force from supposedly "martial" groups from the margins or outside the empire altogether. Sometimes armies of this kind, as for example the Mamluks in Egypt became self-perpetuating, and politically dominant. In colonial Africa, soldiers were recruited mainly from particular ethnic groups. Such forces sustained the colonial system, but in many cases the ethnically unbalanced composition of the armed forces constituted a problematic legacy for succeeding independent African states.

Where the process of conquest was particularly lengthy and brutal, as in Algeria and South Africa early in the nineteenth century, or later in Angola and in German South West Africa, units of the metropolitan army and locally recruited white settlers were used. In Egypt and the Sudan, Britain took over the Khedive's army, extended the practice of recruiting Africans from

the south and, for major expeditions, used metropolitan troops. Sudanese mercenaries trained in Egypt took part in the British conquest of Uganda and in German expansion in East Africa. German forces in Kamerun were recruited elsewhere in West Africa. The first soldiers of the Force Publique in the Congo Free State were recruited from Zanzibar and from West Africa.

Elsewhere, local Africans were crucial both to the process of conquest and to the maintenance of colonial control. In British Africa, particularly in East Africa, allies crucial to the conquest such as Ganda and Maasai played little part in the later colonial armies. In French Africa, continuity between the army of conquest and the army of colonial occupation was much greater. Everywhere the pattern of recruitment to the colonial armed forces was the product of a mixture of expediency and imperial theory, in particular the notion of "martial races." British thinking about "martial races" derived from experience in India. There it owed much to the belief that in the Great Rebellion of 1857 the Raj had been betrayed by high caste soldiers of the Bengal army and rescued by troops recruited in the Punjab. The theory of "martial races" was elaborated after 1880, when, faced with a threat from Russia, General Roberts restructured the Indian army.

Arguments from military need combined with a range of sometimes-contradictory notions derived from the current thinking about race, masculinity, and the impact of climate and geography. The ideal recruit, who would display courage, loyalty, and a ready obedience, was thought to be an illiterate peasant of Aryan descent, and possibly of Islamic religious adherence, from a remote northern mountainous region. Officials with Indian experience imported the notion of the "martial races" into British Africa as part of the mélange of ideas about race that underpinned colonial rule throughout Africa. In Africa as in India two possible objectives were differently emphasized in different contexts. On the one hand it was necessary to guard against the danger of rebellion. That objective was best secured, Lord Lugard argued in the *Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* (1922), by recruiting troops from the geographical and social margins of local society rather than from locally dominant groups. On the other hand Africa might serve, as India had done, as a source of military manpower that could be deployed elsewhere in the tropics or even in Europe, in which case recruitment might need to draw more generally from the whole population.

In British Africa military forces were comparatively small and recruited mainly from rural, inland, savanna regions. Thus in Gold Coast recruitment concentrated on the northern territories, and French territories beyond, rather than the Gold Coast Colony and Asante. Within the north some groups, in particular the Frafra,

increasingly predominated. In a sense Frafra ethnic identity was a product of their close involvement with the military; they became a “martial tribe” as a consequence of being recruited in such numbers. In Nigeria too recruitment concentrated on the north. Hausa remained the language of command, but the rank and file were increasingly recruited from the non-Hausa regions of the middle belt. In East Africa recruitment was highly differential. In Uganda, in addition to the original Sudanese, transmuted into Nubi, recruitment concentrated on northern groups, particularly Acholi. In Kenya, Kamba and Kalenjin predominated. British military thinkers were sceptical of using African troops outside Africa. But in both world wars British African forces were substantially expanded, with a necessary broadening of the range of recruitment, including the recruitment of educated southerners in West Africa. In the Burma campaign the West African Frontier Force’s light armament and use of carriers rather than mechanised transport was deployed to good effect.

In French Africa, particularly in North Africa, the metropolitan French army played an important role. In tropical Africa forces recruited locally from subjects rather than citizens increasingly replaced French troops. The first recruits to the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, founded in 1857, were largely slaves, and former slaves continued to contribute substantially well into the twentieth century, although high-status Africans, served in the French forces. Recruitment concentrated on the Sudan and Upper Volta, and Bambara became the *lingua franca* of the *Tirailleurs*. That preference was justified in part by the use of “martial race” arguments, in particular the notion that peoples from the forest zone were unsuited to military combat. In *La Force Noire* (1910), Charles Mangin, who had served under Archinard and who had strong right-wing sympathies, developed French thinking about “martial races” in a more expansive form. He believed that the human resources of French Africa were a vital part of France’s defense against potential German threat, in part on the grounds that for cultural and biological reasons Africans were particularly well suited to war. Mangin’s views were not universally accepted, but the necessities of the conquest of Morocco and even more dramatically of World War I entailed a large expansion of France’s African armies. Expansion on that scale could only be achieved by a form of conscription first introduced in 1912 and consolidated in 1919. In the Belgian Congo the size of the *Force Publique*, though employed mainly in internal security, necessitated the use of compulsion. Here too, however, certain areas contributed more recruits than others and the use of Lingala as a *lingua franca* contributed to the development of Bangala ethnic identity.

The idea of “martial races” was part of the highly racialized worldview of the colonial period that found expression in many ways, for example in the Kiplingesque notion of a possible affinity between brave men across racial divides. The idea of “martial races” did affect recruitment, particularly in British Africa, but even there it was secondary to the imperatives of “divide and rule” and the demands of major international conflict.

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See also: Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army, Iqta’ System; Nigeria: Lugard, Administration and “Indirect Rule.”

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Mascarene Islands Prior to the French

The Mascarene Islands, composed of the islands of Mauritius, Réunion and Rodrigues, were uninhabited prior to European settlement. The Portuguese are credited with having discovered the islands, although it has been contended that Arabs, Phoenicians, and Dravidians also visited the islands, although no documentary evidence exists to prove this claim. Wax tablets bearing “Arabic-looking” inscriptions were found on the shore of Mauritius by Jolinck, the first Dutch sailor to have toured the island and recorded his observations, but no research has been carried out on them.

The “Arab sounding” names of Cantino and al-Idrisi found on Portuguese maps (dating to 1502 and 1165, respectively) have led some historians to conclude that Arabs first visited the island. However, this view has been contested by several scholars, based on several observations. There are no existing maps of Mauritius

of non-European origin. Idrisi was a cartographer for King Roger I of Sicily. The names, rather than deriving from Arabic, may be Sanskrit words.

It is not clear who first set foot upon Rodrigues Island. Some believe that it was Diego Fernandez Pereira, who was a navigator in the expedition of Pedro Mascarenhas. Others suggest that it was Diego Rodriguez, a Portuguese captain, who discovered Rodrigues between 1534 and 1536. Pingré, writing in 1761, mentions yet another name, that of Vincent Rodrigue de Lagos, whose name appears on a map found in the Linschot papers of 1611.

Whatever the truth may be about the discovery, the island only became settled in 1691 by François Leguat and seven companions. Leguat was a French Protestant refugee from Holland and had been sent to the Mascarenes to found a colony on Rodrigues. He was forgotten there, and lived there with his companions until 1693, when they decided to leave the island. They built a boat and returned to Mauritius, which was still under Dutch occupation. He wrote extremely detailed diaries, and it would seem that the island did not receive a single visitor during his stay there, although he observed Portuguese names engraved on the trunks. After 1693 Rodrigues remained uninhabited until 1725, when it was occupied by the French.

The first navigator to arrive in Mauritius was believed to be Pedro Mascarenhas, sometime between 1500 and 1530. On Portuguese maps, Mauritius was known under several names: “Santa Apolonia,” “Mascarenhas,” “Diego Roiz,” and “Cirne.” The Portuguese did not settle there; rather, they seem to have used the island to obtain fresh water and fruit. However, they did introduce or set loose monkeys, pigs, goats, and rats upon the island, which wreaked havoc upon the ecological balance of the island.

The island was also visited by pirates, and both British and French ships, but no one established themselves there until 1598, when the Dutch took possession of the island and began a settlement in 1638. It is claimed that the Dutch used the island as a port of call on their way to and back from the East Indies. Fewer ships came to Mauritius after 1611, when the Dutch governor general of the East Indies suffered a shipwreck off the west coast. Nevertheless, the island was expected to produce some revenue, and governors were encouraged to exhort colonists to engage in agriculture, and search for ebony and ambergris, which were sold at high prices in Europe. The colonists however, were reluctant to sell everything they found to the Dutch East India Company, especially as there was a more lucrative trade being carried on privately with passing pirate ships. Supplies did not come regularly from Europe, and the colonists were often on the verge of starvation.

The establishment of a port of call at the Cape of Good Hope sealed the fate of Mauritius as a potential

Dutch settlement; interest in Mauritius dwindled. The settlers asked to be repatriated to the Cape, and the last batch of settlers left the island in 1710. The coastal forests had been decimated and it is during Dutch occupation that the Dodo bird was last seen. Numerous other species also disappeared during that time.

The failure of the Dutch settlement can be attributed to their unwillingness to import more labor. The Dutch East India Company did not want for the number of slaves to exceed the free population. Although a slave trade was started by Adrian Van der Stel and later by Hugo, very few of these slaves were brought to Mauritius. Those who were did not adapt to the conditions in Mauritius and suffered a high mortality rate.

VIJAYA TEELock

Massassi and the Kaarta State

In the seventeenth century, the Massassi dynasty of Bambara chiefs and kings (*faama*) was founded by Kaladian Kulibali (1652–1682) at Segou, on the south bank of the Niger River. In the eighteenth century, the kingdom was consolidated by Mamari Kulibali (c.1712–1755) who used the traditional age-set organization of the Bambara. He recruited slave soldiers, the *tonjon*, to expand the state while driving out rival Bambara clans including the Massassi. He assumed the title of *faama* (king) until his assassination by the *tonjon* in 1755. The Massassi fled across the Niger to establish their authority north of the Baoute River in the Sahel and savanna of Kaarta, which was a terminus of the trans-Saharan caravan trade and a center for the east-west trade routes between the Niger and Senegal Rivers.

The Massassi, known as the Kulibali, asserted their control over the Jawara Soninke, Mandinka, Bambara, and Fulbe by 1800 to establish the kingdom of Kaarta. It derived its wealth from the export of slaves and



The Tomb of Biton Koulibali. Segou, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

horses in return for Saharan salt from the north and gold and kola nuts from the south. Cloth was the principal currency. The Massassi relied on *tonjon* to establish their authority, for the Kulibali were divided into six lineages that produced internecine disputes and rival candidates for the throne. They made little attempt to include the indigenous chiefs in their courts, but the *faama* observed traditional Bambara rituals, led by a priesthood that maintained the court temple with altars and objects called *bori* to ensure the fertility of women and the land. Muslim clerics, most of whom were Soninke and involved in the caravan trade, were tolerated but not permitted to interfere in the enslavement of Muslims and their sale or other Bambara customs repugnant to Islam.

Massassi rule in Kaarta was unpopular but uncontested until the 1840s. The Kulibali kept firm control of the fertile Kolombine region and the caravan routes to the Upper Senegal and its rich gum and cloth trade that had hitherto been the monopoly of the state of Khasso. In the 1820s the Kulibali had expanded to the east at the expense of their former rulers in Segou, until checked in the 1840s by the Muslim regime in Masina. They never successfully subdued the Awlad Mbark Berbers to the north, whose mobile camels and cavalry eluded the more pedestrian forces of the Massassi and their *tonjon*. The Jawara Soninke of Kaarta never reconciled themselves to Massassi Kulibali rule and revolted in the 1840s. Although defeated, they continued their insurgency, which weakened the resources of the state.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the tenth *faama*, Mamadi Kanja (c. 1844–1855), moved the capital from Yelimane in the Kolombine to Koghe and then to Nioro in order to have greater control of the caravan routes from the north and to suppress the Jawara insurgency. His unreliable cousins remained in central Kaarta, in its scattered garrisons, to face the jihad of Al-Hajj Umar Ibn Said Tal and his Tucolor army from the upper Senegal. Tal was determined to impose Islam on the Bambara Massassi of Kaarta. The walled towns of the Kulibali, Yelimane and Koghe, fell to Al-Hajj Umar and his Jawara allies. He occupied the Massassi capital of Nioro on April 11, 1855. Mamdi Kanja submitted and converted to Islam. Bambara shrines were destroyed and mosques were built.

This was the formal end to the Massassi dynasty of the Kulibali, but in defeat the Massassi demonstrated a remarkable unity to regain their privileged position in Kaarta. Violent Bambara Massassi revolts against Al-Hajj Umar broke out in 1855 and 1856 that were ruthlessly suppressed, but at great cost to the invaders. Thereafter the successors of Al-Hajj Umar colonized Kaarta with Fulbe from the Senegambia, while maintaining commercial relations with the Berber traders for salt in return for gold, kola, and slaves. The Massassi

staged an abortive revolt in the 1870s but were defeated and driven into exile by the successor to Al-Hajj Umar, Amadu Sheku Tal in 1874.

Kaarta recovered from these years of violence. The Massassi returned in 1879 and there was a brief period of peace. Threatened by the loss of their slaves from the French policy of abolition, thousands of Fulbe in the Senegambia migrated to Kaarta, where they played a leading role in the resistance to French expansion. The Fulbe colonists found in Kaarta land, slaves, minimal government, mosques, and Quranic schools. They supported Amadu, who sought to create at Nioro in Kaarta the Islamic society of his father. In the autumn of 1890, Captain Louis Archinard led 200 French officers and men and 1,500 African *tirailleurs* to defeat Amadu and destroy the last vestiges of Tucolor authority in Kaarta. After a brief skirmish outside Nioro on January 1, 1891, Amadu abandoned the capital and fled eastward to Masina to make the last stand against the advancing French forces. The Massassi and the Bambara of Kaarta were to become reluctant subjects of the French empire in west Africa, where revolts against French authority were ruthlessly suppressed. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Kaarta was still a divided region. In the north and west the population was approximately 150,000; slaves made up one-third of that population. In southern Kaarta, the Bambara descendants of the Massassi remained to control the trade and the land as in the past.

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Massawa, Ethiopia, and the Ottoman Empire

Since the Aksumite period, the Red Sea and its ports were the main outlet for Ethiopia's contacts, for trade and other purposes, with the outside world. For this reason, Ethiopian rulers have always sought to exercise hegemony over the Red Sea ports or, at least, to have unrestricted access to the Red Sea coast. For similar commercial reasons control of the ports in particular, and the Red Sea basin in general, was a matter of crucial importance to all other powers with interest in the Red Sea trade. This was especially true of Egypt, the

Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, which conquered Egypt in 1517, and Portugal, which had by 1502 established a sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope and sought to protect it through control of the Red Sea ports. Given the circumstances, conflict between these various powers with interest in the Red Sea could hardly be avoided in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

From at least the tenth century, the port of Massawa, situated on an offshore island, and its twin port of Arkiko, situated on the mainland opposite the island, became the principal Red Sea ports for Ethiopia's external trade. The twin ports therefore became the main targets for control in the struggle over the Red Sea coast at this period.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Ethiopia exercised hegemony over the twin ports. They remained under Ethiopian control until 1557, when they were seized by the Ottoman Turks operating from Egypt.

With the revival of trade in the Red Sea, the Arabian peninsula, and the Persian Gulf from the late fifteenth century, the expanding Ottoman Empire turned its attention to these areas, conquering Egypt in 1517 and Aden in 1538. From about 1520 to about 1566 the Ottoman Turks struggled unsuccessfully with the Portuguese for control of the trade route to India and the Far East. Their failure against the Portuguese led the Ottomans to settle for dominating the Red Sea coast.

To this end, the Turks occupied the port of Massawa in 1557 and thereafter sought to establish their hegemony over Ethiopia's coastal province. Conflict between the Ottoman Turks and Christian Ethiopia over Massawa and its hinterland became a regular feature of the history of the area.

In their effort to create a hinterland for Massawa, Ottoman troops seized and fortified Arkiko on the mainland, advanced inland onto the plateau and occupied Debarwa, the capital of Ethiopia's coastal province (*Bahr midr*), fifty-seven miles from the coast. A wall was constructed around Debarwa and a mosque built there. An *eyalet* of Habesh, or Ottoman province of Ethiopia, was created with its headquarters at Massawa. Turkish-Ethiopian conflicts had thus began.

In 1559 Ethiopians expelled the Ottomans from Debarwa, but up to the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks not only made periodic incursions into Debarwa but also meddled in the internal politics of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's relations with the Ottoman authorities in Massawa were marked by uneasy coexistence. Several incidents reflect their tense relations. In 1561–1562, Uthman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Massawa, made peace with Bahr Nagash Yishaq and sent troops to support the latter in his revolt against emperor Minas (1559–1563). Like many other provincial governors, Yishaq resisted the centralizing policy of the emperor. During the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, a number of the emperors of Ethiopia attempted reforms to centralize political military and administrative power in the hands of the imperial authority at the expense of the provincial governors; the governors, on their part, wanted to be independent of the central imperial authority and therefore invariably opposed the reforms by rebelling against the reforming monarch.

Bahr Nagash Yishaq and his Ottoman allies defeated Emperor Minas in battle in 1562 but Minas's successor Sarsa Dengel won back the allegiance of the Bahr Nagash by restoring Tigrean autonomy. As a result, the alliance fell apart.

In 1572 the Ottoman Turks attacked and captured Debarwa, but once again they were evicted in 1574 by their erstwhile ally, Bahr Nagash Yishaq. Three years later an alliance was made between the Ottoman Turkish governor of Habesh, Ahmad Pasha, and Bahr Nagash Yishaq, in disgrace at the time but as ambitious as ever. This alliance led to another clash between Ethiopia and the Turks. In the encounters that followed, the Ethiopian emperor defeated the allied forces in two successive battles, leaving both allied leaders dead on the battlefield at Addi Quro on December 17, 1578. In 1588 the Ottomans again occupied Debarwa, but this time the occupation was short-lived; thereafter, they restricted their activities to Massawa, which they occupied until the late nineteenth century.

Over the course of the seventeenth century, Ottoman power and interest in the Red Sea declined; the garrison at Massawa was reduced while Arkiko was handed over to a Beja family, which subsequently governed the mainland port on behalf of the Ottoman Turks. The Beja governor was given the title of Na'ib.

Despite the weakened position and interest of the Ottomans on the coast, the ever-shifting relationship between the Turks and Ethiopia continued during the seventeenth century. In the first quarter of the century there were tensions from time to time between the two over Turkish raids for cattle in Ethiopia's coastal province or confiscation of goods destined for Ethiopia from overseas or over imposition of high tariffs on such goods. Each time such a situation developed, Ethiopia was able to secure restitution or compliance from the Turks by stopping caravans from going to the coast.

In 1648, however, Ethiopia and the Ottomans in Massawa temporarily settled their differences and made an agreement that required the Ottoman governor of Massawa to prevent Europeans in general and Catholic missionaries, in particular, from entering Ethiopia via Massawa. This agreement followed up on Emperor Fasiladas's (1632–1667) expulsion in 1632 of the Jesuit missionaries who, starting from 1557, had attempted to convert Ethiopia to the Roman Catholic faith. The Jesuit missionary activity brought divisions

not only within the church but also in the Ethiopian polity and resulted in a devastating civil war during the reign of Emperor Susenyos (1607–1632).

The uneasy coexistence between Ethiopia and the Ottoman Turks in Massawa continued for the rest of the seventeenth century and into the next century. Although Ethiopia was interested in controlling Massawa and was able to exercise influence there because the town depended on the mainland for water and other supplies, Ethiopia was not strong enough to militarily capture the port from Ottoman control. On the other hand, though dependent on the mainland for supplies, the Ottoman Turks were either not interested enough or too preoccupied in other areas to have wanted to conquer Ethiopia.

R. H. KOFI DARKWAH

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Matthews, Z. K. (1901–1968)

South African Educationalist and Political Leader.

Zachariah Keodirelang (Z. K.) Matthews was a prominent leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1940s and 1950s, and a pioneer African educationist at a time when there were very few black academics in South Africa.

Matthews was strongly influenced by Christian, Cape liberal traditions that emphasized the power of education to resolve social inequalities and belief in a nonracial society. He had ties with white liberals, serving on the executive of the South African Institute of Race Relations. Yet he also believed that Africans should run their own lives and that their history should be written from an African point of view. His own family and Tswana oral traditions stressed the theft of his people's land by colonizers.

Throughout his career Matthews sought to combine academic and public life. In 1930 he was elected president of the Natal Bantu Teachers' Association and in 1941–1942 held office as president of the Federation of African Teachers' Associations. He served on the 1936–1937 Royal Commission into Higher Education

in East Africa and the 1945 Union Advisory Board on Native Education, and also sat on the Ciskei Missionary Council.

Increasingly, opportunities for black advancement were blocked under segregationist and, after 1948, apartheid policies, driving members of the black elite such as Matthews into politics. He helped launch the All-African Convention in 1935 but then joined the ANC in 1940, being elected to its National Executive in 1943 and helping draw up *African Claims* (1943) and the *Program of Action* (1949), seminal statements of the ANC's transition to a more mass-based movement. Elected president of the Cape ANC in 1949, in the same year he declined nomination as national ANC president by Congress Youth League activists led by Nelson Mandela.

During the 1940s the ANC had an ambiguous policy toward state structures, which could at times be used to aid African interests. Hence Matthews, together with other ANC figures, was elected in 1942 to the Natives' Representative Council (NRC), a consultative body with no real power. In this forum he defended African rights and in 1946, on behalf of the NRC's African members, condemned the "wanton shooting" by police of striking African mineworkers. However, despite the urging of ANC radicals, it was not until 1950 that he resigned from the NRC in protest of apartheid policies.

Matthews remained active in politics in the 1950s. He was involved in preparations for the Defiance Campaign but did not take part in its actions, as from June 1952 to May 1953 he was a visiting professor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City where, despite pressure by Pretoria, he also lobbied the United Nations. At the 1953 ANC annual conference, in response to questions about alternatives to apartheid, he proposed a Congress of the People to draw up a charter to embody the aspirations of all South Africans. This landmark Congress was held in 1955 and its product, the Freedom Charter, became a core policy document of the ANC for the next four decades. Matthews also served as ANC deputy president general under Chief Albert Lutuli, delivering the 1955 presidential address on his behalf. However, state repression increased and in December 1956 he and his son Joe, together with many other prominent ANC leaders, were detained for the treason trial. Matthews was acquitted only in April 1959 and was again detained during the 1960 emergency. Nevertheless, he continued to contribute to various unity initiatives, including the 1960 Cottesloe Consultation of the World Council of Churches in Johannesburg and briefly resumed the post of Cape ANC president.

Facing persecution, Z. K. left South Africa in 1961. In exile he focused on ecumenical work, spending

five years as Africa director of the World Council of Churches in Geneva but also speaking out against apartheid. In 1966 he became Botswana's ambassador to the United States and permanent representative to the United Nations. He died in Washington, D.C. in 1968 and was buried in Botswana.

Matthews was a prolific writer and wrote numerous scholarly and press articles on South African politics and history, as well as works on Tswana history and culture, and a posthumously published autobiography.

Matthews was a moderate, and wary of radicals. Yet he also was influenced by African nationalist ideas prevailing in the post-1940 ANC, and his consistent advocacy of black rights and his elevated status as a pioneer African educator made him an important force for unity in the ANC. He came to see that the ANC had to become an effective mass movement, and his liberalism did not prevent him from acknowledging, in the early 1960s, that the ANC's turn to armed struggle took place only when all peaceful avenues had been closed. His legacy endures. In 1997 Thabo Mbeki told the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission that Z. K. Matthews was "an outstanding leader of our people."

PETER LIMB

See also: Mandela, Nelson; South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: (1952–1960).

Biography

Zachariah Keodirelang (Z. K.) Matthews was born in Barkly West, Cape Colony, in 1901. Graduating from Lovedale Missionary Institution and the South African Native College (later University of Fort Hare) he was appointed in 1925 as the first African principal of Adams College, Amanzimtoti, Natal. Received an LLB degree (the first African to receive this honor from the University of South Africa) in 1930 and was admitted to the Johannesburg bar. In 1934 he was awarded an master's degree from Yale University and then was a research fellow at the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures at the London School of Economics under anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. Appointed Lecturer in social anthropology and Bantu law and administration at Fort Hare in 1936. Promoted to professor of African studies in 1945. In 1954 and 1956 he was acting principal and remained at Fort Hare until 1959 when he resigned over the apartheid government's discriminatory policy of "Bantu Education." Helped launch the All-African Convention in 1935 but then joined the ANC in 1940, being elected to its national executive in 1943. From June 1952 to May 1953 he was a visiting professor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York. In

December 1956 he detained for the treason trial. Matthews was acquitted only in April 1959. Detained again during the 1960 emergency. Left South Africa in 1961. Named Botswana's ambassador to the United States and permanent representative to the United Nations in 1966. Died in Washington, D.C. in 1968.

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Mau Mau Revolt: *See Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt.*

Mauritania: Colonial Period: Nineteenth Century

Nineteenth-century Mauritania remained a stateless society dominated by nomadic and semisedentary Arabo-Berber pastoralists (Moors), with Black Wolof and Tukolor sedentary cultivator communities located primarily along the Senegal River. Enslaved blacks and descendants of freed slaves bound by clientage to their former masters existed throughout Mauritanian society.

A process of cultural and linguistic Arabization among the Muslim Moors that had begun in the sixteenth century with the first influxes of small groups of Arab immigrants culminated in the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, the Berber Znaga dialect had largely given way to the Arabic dialect known as Hassaniyya, and patrilineal Arab genealogies had largely supplanted older matrilineal Berber genealogies as the basis for constructing social identity.



Mauritania.

Important sources from that period suggest a rigid social stratification dominated by Arab warriors called the *Banu Hassan* and Berber clerics known as the *Zawaya*. In fact, social identity, both genealogically and occupationally, was considerably more fluid. Groups periodically merged, disbanded or emigrated, acquiring or shedding aspects of their identity in the process. Similarly, groups once engaged in nomadic pastoralism occasionally became sedentary in the transition into trade or scholarly activity, while others adapted to a new pastoralist culture after moving from regions that supported camel husbandry to regions that were better suited to cattle. Warriors who based their livelihood on raiding and the collection of protection tribute were sometimes forced into tributary status themselves by more powerful groups, and in some cases relinquished their arms altogether under threat of punishment or under the influence of religious leaders. At other times, groups whose leaders were revered spiritual figures had recourse to take up arms against one another, as occurred between the Kunta and the Tajakant on numerous occasions throughout the century.

The gum arabic trade, transacted at trading ports established on the Senegal River's right bank in the southwestern Mauritanian region known as the *Gibla*, spurred growing European interest in Mauritania throughout the nineteenth century. Europeans used gum arabic, a resin found in the variety of acacia tree prevalent across southern Mauritania, in the production of textiles and pharmaceuticals. *Banu Hassan* groups initially dominated trade at the ports and required toll

payments by Moorish and French traders (or their indigenous representatives) alike. A growing French military presence in Senegal gradually eroded *Hassani* authority, first by granting French protection to, then by establishing French authority over, agricultural communities formerly under *Banu Hassan* hegemony on both banks of the Senegal River. By mid-century, the governor of Senegal Louis Faidherbe was able to exact *Hassani* recognition of French sovereignty even over the right bank ports.

In 1899 the French colonial ministry successfully lobbied to expand French authority throughout West Africa, including Mauritania. Responding to a request by France's prime minister for a means of achieving this goal at minimal cost in men or materiel, an Algerian-born Corsican in the colonial administration named Xavier Coppolani proposed a method of "peaceful pacification" that was quickly embraced in the foreign office. Coppolani's plan entailed coopting Moorish religious leaders through promises of protection from the region's endemic raiding, thereby removing the major obstacle to their religious and commercial endeavors. Early on, Coppolani succeeded in gaining the cooperation of the most influential religious figures in the *Gibla*, Shaykhs Sidiyya Baba and Sa'd Bu.

Coppolani also attempted to play on rivalries among warrior groups in his efforts to gain a foothold in the region, although early success with this divide and conquer strategy proved ephemeral. Faced with stiffening resistance, Coppolani's initial strategy quickly gave way to overtly military means of conquest. Moors opposed to the growing French presence turned to Sa'd Bu's brother Ma' al-'Aynayn whose close relations with the Moroccan sultan and outspoken opposition to any foreign incursion drew the growing resistance movement to him. The French attributed Coppolani's assassination in 1905 to Ma' al-'Aynayn's machinations though largely on circumstantial evidence. From his compound at Smara, Ma' al-'Aynayn led the struggle to force the French out, until 1909 when he and his followers were driven from Smara in the face of an advancing French force and were forced to flee to Tiznit in southern Morocco.

The French government incorporated Mauritania into its wider colonial administration of Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). Organized to mirror other AOF civil territories, France divided Mauritania into administrative units known as *cercles* that remained largely intact even beyond independence. Mauritania was proclaimed a separate colony in 1920, although still under the auspices of the AOF's governor general. Notwithstanding these administrative changes, French "pacification" of the whole of Mauritania would not be complete until 1934. Even then, many of the colony's nomadic inhabitants remained either beyond the pale

of French rule or subject to only nominal government control. In 1944 a decision to add the eastern region known as the Hodh to Mauritania from the adjoining territory the Soudan (modern Mali), created the borders that exist today.

Following the end of World War II, France responded to growing criticism both at home and abroad of its continued role as colonizer by initiating steps to grant its colonial subjects greater autonomy. In accordance with the 1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic, Mauritania formally became part of the French Union as an overseas territory. The election of Mauritania's first representative to the French National Assembly in 1946 underscored considerable political divisions among Mauritians. The more progressive elements were predominantly socialist, avowedly nationalistic, and hostile to the region's traditional chieftaincies, while more conservative elements drawn primarily from the traditional power structure sought to maintain the status quo including retaining close ties with France. The progressives, with the backing of the French Socialist Party, carried the day, electing the young nationalist and political neophyte Horma Wuld Babana.

Wuld Babana ultimately alienated his core constituencies by remaining in Paris throughout his tenure as representative in order to pursue his own personal political ambitions, and when he launched a new political party in 1948, the Entente Mauritanienne, it failed to secure a solid base in Mauritania's developing political arena. A rival party formed that same year with the backing of the traditional chieftains, the *Union Progressiste Mauritanienne* (UPM), filled the political vacuum; its candidate, Sidi al-Mukhtar N'Diaye, succeeded in unseating Wuld Babana in his 1951 reelection bid. Wuld Babana remained a controversial figure on the Mauritanian political scene for several more years, but his support of Moroccan claims of a Greater Morocco that included Mauritania finally doomed his political future.

The following year the UPM won all but two of the twenty-four seats in the General Council, which France had established as a consultative body and a first stage in granting greater future legislative autonomy to the territory. Not long after its formation, leadership of the UPM passed to Mukhtar Wuld Daddah, a member of Sidiyya Baba's important Gbla tribe the Awlad Ibiri. Wuld Daddah attended school in Saint Louis, Senegal, before serving the colonial administration as an interpreter during World War II. After the war, he studied in France where he attained a law degree, becoming the first Mauritanian trained in French law. Despite the UPM's continued success under Wuld Daddah's guidance, the party failed to represent all segments of Mauritanian society's interests.

In the mid-1950s, a generational divide among party members resulted in the formation of the Association de

la Jeunesse Mauritanienne (AJM) whose members were impatient with the older UPM leadership. The AJM sought to push harder for Mauritania's independence and democratization, but its pan-Arab inclinations alienated many non-Moors. The Bloc Democratique du Gorgol (BDG) arose among Mauritania's Halpulaar population largely in response to fears of closer ties with the Arab north, and in particular, of calls for political unity with newly independent Morocco. On the other end of the political spectrum, the Nahda al-Wataniyya al-Muritaniyya Party represented Moors in the north of the territory who sought a rapprochement with Morocco while opposing federation with Mali and Senegal.

In April 1957 the French government moved a step closer to granting its West African colonies independence by reorganizing the AOF into distinct governing councils. Wuld Daddah was selected to form a Mauritanian government, and in an effort to achieve national unity, he drew from opposition and allies alike to form a cabinet. In May 1958 Wuld Daddah formed a new party the Parti du Regroupement Mauritanien (PRM) that fused the UPM, remnants of Entente Mauritanienne, and moderates in the AJM. Nahda remained as the only opposition party capable of challenging the PRM until a corruption scandal and internal dissent destroyed its viability as a mainstream political force. In response to Nahda's increasingly militant posture, Wuld Daddah's government banned the party and arrested its leaders. This left the PRM unchallenged on the eve of Mauritanian independence.

France granted Mauritania autonomy as a member of the French Community in October 1958, and on March 2, 1959, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania adopted its first constitution. Over the course of the next eighteen months France transferred power to Wuld Daddah's government culminating on November 28, 1960, with a proclamation of Mauritanian independence.

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Mauritania: Independence and Western Sahara, 1960–1979

Mauritania achieved independence from France on November 8, 1960, establishing itself as the world's first Islamic republic. The president of the pre-independence Conseil, General Mukhtar Wuld Daddah, succeeded in unifying existing tribal, ethnic, and ideological divisions to become Mauritania's first prime minister. Morocco's Sultan Muhammad V (d.1961), and then his successor Hassan II, claimed Mauritania as part of a historical "Greater Morocco" and not only refused to recognize an independent Mauritania but used his influence to sway other Arab leaders to deny the state's legitimacy. Faced with this diplomatic affront, Wuld Daddah looked to his Sub-Saharan African neighbors for support while maintaining strong ties to France, including a French military presence that remained in Mauritania until 1966.

Throughout the early 1960s, Wuld Daddah moved Mauritania gradually toward single-party rule. A revised constitution passed in May 1961 by a National Assembly dominated by Wuld Daddah's Parti de Regroupement Mauritanien (PRM) centralized authority in the office of the president, and on August 20, 1961, Wuld Daddah handily won the country's first presidential election. Soon after, the PRM and certain of the other smaller political parties convened to create a new unified political party the Parti du Peuple Mauritanien (PPM) under Wuld Daddah's leadership, and in 1965 a constitutional amendment granted the PPM sole legal status as a political party.

By the mid-1960s, most Arab League member states had reversed their earlier positions and entered into diplomatic and economic relations with Mauritania. Bolstered by growing Arab support, Wuld Daddah embarked on a domestic policy of Arabization in 1966 whose centerpiece was the replacement of French as the official language in education and government with Arabic. This decision alienated many black Mauritians for whom Arabic was not a principal language and ensuing protests led to repressive police actions that left several dead and dozens wounded, while numerous prominent black leaders were arrested.

Algerian President Boumédiène succeeded in initiating a dialogue between Wuld Daddah and Morocco's King Hassan II that led to a Moroccan renunciation of its claims to Mauritania in 1970 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. No longer dependent on France's protection from Morocco and facing growing nationalist

pressure within Mauritania, Wuld Daddah took steps to distance himself from France that increased further the country's dependence on his Arab allies. Mauritania issued a national currency, the ougiya, in 1973, replacing the French CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) used by other francophone West African countries. The following year Wuld Daddah nationalized MIFERMA, the French-owned iron ore consortium. By the mid-1970s, Wuld Daddah had achieved internal stability albeit at times through repressive measures, and stability vis-à-vis his regional neighbors through successfully balancing Mauritania's position in both African and Arab political spheres.

Events surrounding the decolonization of Spanish Sahara not only jeopardized this stability but ultimately brought Wuld Daddah's rule to an end. For as long as Spain retained its hold over the colony, Wuld Daddah was able to voice public support for its inhabitants' right to self-determination with the assurance that Spain's presence afforded as a buffer between Morocco and Mauritania's vast northern border. The rapprochement between Wuld Daddah and Hassan II altered Wuld Daddah's position, and in Madrid on November 14, 1975, he signed a secret tripartite agreement with Spain and Morocco that called for partitioning Spanish Sahara between the two countries following Spain's imminent departure.

Forced by Morocco's decision to carry out the Madrid agreement and annex its portion of the former colony in January 1976, Wuld Daddah dispatched troops to Rio de Oro, renaming the territory Tiris al-Gharbiya. The Polisario Front, the militant force of the movement for Western Saharan independence, immediately struck at Mauritania. The Polisario leaders rightly felt that Mauritania was far more vulnerable to attack than Morocco and less prepared to sustain an armed conflict over the annexed territory. Polisario waged a campaign that quickly crippled Mauritania's economy by significantly disrupting the transport of iron ore from the northern mining town of Zerouate to the port in Nouadhibou, as well as striking targets much deeper into Mauritania. The entire country suffered a severe psychological blow when, on two occasions, the Polisario forces reached the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott and attacked the presidential palace with mortar fire. Efforts to respond to this threat by more than quintupling the size of the Mauritanian army placed additional stress on the country's rapidly weakening economy, but did little to reverse its military fortunes.

In mid-1977 Wuld Daddah took the unprecedented step of signing a mutual defense pact with Morocco that, among other things, allowed Morocco to station nearly 9,000 soldiers on Mauritanian soil. In addition, the Mauritanian president turned to former colonizer

France for military aid and air support. These decisions were both unpopular and ultimately ineffectual in turning the tide of war. Finally, the cumulative effect of Wuld Daddah's efforts to sustain control of Tiris al-Gharbiya was more than his presidency could bear. A group of disaffected military officers under the leadership of Colonel Mustafa Wuld Salek staged a bloodless coup d'état on July 10, 1978, arresting Wuld Daddah and several of his closest aides.

Competing agendas within the newly formed government known as the Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN) impeded efforts toward a settlement despite the Polisario's unilateral cease-fire against Mauritania. In April 1979, a second bloodless coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Wuld Busayf under the banner of the Comité Militaire de Salut National (CMSN) removed Wuld Salek from power and promised a more aggressive effort to reach a peace agreement. However, Wuld Busayf died in a plane crash on May 27, 1979, and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Khuna Wuld Haidallah succeeded him as prime minister. The Polisario responded to Wuld Haidallah's early cautious diplomacy by resuming attacks on Mauritanian targets in an effort to force Wuld Haidallah's hand. On August 5, 1979, the CMSN signed an agreement in Algiers relinquishing Mauritania's claim to Tiris al-Gharbiya and agreeing to hand its administration over to the Polisario, but before this could occur, Moroccan forces occupied Tiris al-Gharbiya.

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Mauritania: Domestic and International Politics and Conflict, 1980s and 1990s

Mauritania's history in the last two decades of the twentieth century was infused with cataclysmic political upheavals at both the domestic and international levels. The ousting of the first elected government of President Moukhtar Ould Daddah, in a military coup in July 1978, and the establishment of the Military Committee for National Salvation (Comité Militaire de Salut National: CMSN) was to mark a critical turning point in the country's history. The first two years of military government, from 1978 to late 1979, witnessed a spate of changes: political parties were banned while

the National Assembly was disbanded; existing government bodies were dissolved and the country's constitution was suspended, while within the military authority itself there were incessant counter-coups and cabinet reshuffles.

In January 1980 the governing Military Committee announced the dismissal of the then head of state, Lt. Col. Mahmoud Ould Louly, who had been in office since May 1979. He was replaced by Lt. Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, who had been prime minister and minister of defense under Louly's government. In April of that year, a group of exiled Mauritanian army officers then in asylum in Morocco allegedly plotted a counter-coup, aimed at turning Mauritania toward a more active policy against the Polisario, the organization fighting for the independence of Western Sahara. Following this, several members of the military and former government ministers were arrested. A cabinet reshuffle took place thereafter, resulting in the dismissal of some top military officers, including the army chief of staff and the interior minister. In May, Haidalla accused the French of masterminding disturbances, resulting in the forced departure of all French troops. In June 1980 an opposition movement in Paris, known as the Mauritania Democratic Alliance, was formed in a bid to return ousted President Daddah (then exiled in Paris) to power. Prompted by the extent of Mauritania's socioeconomic crisis, the regime of Ould Haidalla began a process of initiating a few far-reaching changes. Slavery was made illegal on July 15, 1980, although it took some time before the full implementation of the abolition law was felt.

An experiment in civilian government was initiated on December 15, 1980, but ended abruptly less than five months thereafter, with the restoration of full military rule under Haidalla's control as supreme commander by the end of April 1981. However, Ould Haidalla began to restrict the fundamental rights of the people. The harsher provisions of the shari'a (Islamic legal code) were enforced, especially against perceived political dissenters. Similarly, he clamped down on his opponents through incessant harassment and/or imprisonment. However, Haidalla could not carry his military colleagues in the CMSN along in his policies and actions. He was accused of sanctioning a mode of government based on waste, corruption, and abuse of power. Specific allegations of economic impropriety were leveled against him in his dealings with fishing industry, the country's main foreign exchange earner, from which his family was accused of making huge profits to the detriment of the country.

In the realm of foreign relations, his colleagues in the military junta accused Haidalla of working too closely with the Polisario Front. Tension was further heightened by his unilateral decision to recognize

the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) government-in-exile in February 1984, a move that incurred the wrath of Morocco. On December 12, 1984, Colonel Haidalla was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Col. Moaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya.

The new government of Ould Taya began a process of rapid economic and political transformation. Political prisoners were promptly released, while amnesty was granted to exiles. He instituted anticorruption measures and imposed austerity programs to cut down government expenditure, although these were later revised in 1986 as a result of incessant protests by the country's civil servants. Politically the Ould Taya's government, like its predecessor, granted official recognition to the SADR but kept itself apart from the activities of the Polisario Front. He initiated a process of gradual transition from military to civil rule beginning with the ministerial elections conducted in December 1986.

However, internal stability was short-lived, as the mid-1980s onward witnessed increasing political unrest to which the military head of state reacted by descending heavily on his opponents, both real and imagined. The period was characterized by unprecedented retirement of workers, arrests, detention without trial, and politically motivated assassinations. This incurred the indignation of the Amnesty International and allied organizations that repeatedly accused Ould Taya's government of human rights abuses. Among the groups that rose to challenge the status quo in Mauritania was the Forces de Liberation des Africains en Mauritanie (FLAM), which was established in 1983, with its operational base in Dakar, Senegal. Collaborating with other groups in the country, FLAM sought to unite black Mauritians in a concerted struggle against the increasing Arabization of that country, while agitating for equal rights and privileges with the Moors, especially in matters of education and employment. The government accused the FLAM membership of undermining national unity and security especially through their distribution of an inflammatory "Manifesto of the Black African Mauritanian." Several activists were arrested and sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to five years. This development further heightened the existing racial tension in Mauritania.

The trend worsened when, in October 1987, Ould Taya's government claimed it had uncovered a coup plot, a development that led to mass arrests and detention of fifty-one Tukular senior military officers, three of whom were later executed while others were sentenced to various prison terms. Over five hundred other black Mauritians from the rank and file of the army were dismissed from the armed forces.

By the late 1980s racial tensions within Mauritania and the concomitant widespread discontentment in the

country had assumed an international dimension, spilling over into neighboring Senegal. The fear was aggravated by the news of the death of many black Mauritians, especially Tene Youssouf Gueye, a renowned black writer. Many Mauritians and Senegalese are of the same ethnic stock (i.e., Fulani, Soninke, or Tukolor), and there had been several years of close links between the two neighboring states and, as records indicate, citizens of the two states crossed their respective borders without hindrance to trade and work. By April 1989, however, media propaganda over the alleged prison deaths in Mauritania as well as the ill-treatment of black Mauritians created tension in Senegal and contributed to the demise of the two nations' peaceful coexistence.

The tension came to a head in April 1989, when disagreements between Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian herdsmen over grazing rights in the Senegal River valley led to clashes, shootings, and looting on both sides. Rioting broke out first in Dakar where Senegalese embarked on massive killing of Mauritians and the destruction of their property. A few days later, the Mauritians retaliated, attacking Senegalese in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. By August 1989, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed, leading them to the brink of war in 1989–1990.

While the conflict with Senegal was still raging, internal racial crises continued to engulf Mauritania. Apart from FLAM, whose members were unrelenting in their struggle for equality between the black Mauritians and their Arab counterparts, a new black militant opposition movement, Front Uni pour la Resistance Armee en Mauritanie (FURAM) emerged on May 1, 1990. FURAM engaged in armed struggle to reject the continued Arabization of Mauritania and the marginalization of blacks. Its constant attack on government military positions, especially at Saboualla, near Kaedi, brought the Ould Taya government to accuse it of masterminding a coup in collaboration with some Senegalese.

Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed two additional international crises for Mauritania. Civil disorder in neighboring Mali in 1990 had forced Tuaregs to seek refuge in Mauritania. The Malian government thereafter accused Mauritania of harboring Tuaregs who were using Mauritania as a military base for launching attacks on Mali. This created diplomatic tension between the two countries. The next international crisis emanated from the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in 1990 during which Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. Mauritania, believed to have had close relation with Iraq predating the Gulf War, declared open sympathy and support for that nation. This development aroused the indignation of Mauritania's numerous Arab allies who responded by imposing sanctions.

For much of the 1990s, the political waters of Mauritania remained murky. Tension was high and there

were continued allegations of coup plots between 1990 and 1991 leading to mass arrests and executions. In 1992 political activities gathered momentum all over the country. Earlier in 1991, Ould Taya had announced preparations for the conduct of multiparty elections the following year. In the presidential election that followed in January 1992, Ould Taya was declared winner, on the platform of the Parti Republicain Democratique et Social (PRDS). The result was declared unacceptable by the combined group of opposition parties led by the Union des Forces Democratiques (UFD).

Despite these protests, the civilian government led by Ould Taya took control, initiating measures to address the myriad of problems it inherited. Economic problems persisted, generating domestic protests in major towns and cities in 1995 over mounting inflation, especially the rising price of bread. In the area of international politics, a degree of normalcy was restored as diplomatic relations were reestablished with Senegal, Mali, Kuwait, and other members of the Arab league. On the whole, up to the close of the 1990s, Mauritania's domestic and international politics still remained plagued by hope and frustration.

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See also: Mali, Republic of: Politics, Economics: 1990s; Senegal: Independence to the Present.

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Mauritania: Ethnicity, Conflict, Development, 1980s and 1990s

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, composed of both the Arab Maghreb and Sahelian West Africa, is a multiethnic country consisting of an Arabic-speaking majority who refer to themselves as the Arabs, or Moors, and African minorities consisting of Tukolors, Wolof, Fulani, and Soninke. The country, with substantial deposits of iron ore, copper, and gypsum has a size of 400,000 square miles. It borders Morocco in the north, Algeria and Mali in the east, and Senegal in the south.

Mauritania had attained its independence from France in 1960. Ever since, the nation had been embroiled in mutual ethnic antagonism, suspicion, instability, and chaos. The government of Mauritania consciously contributed to the hostility that has become an enduring characteristic of this West African state.

The ruling Arab-Moors comprise approximately 80 per cent of the country's population. Immediately after independence, they attempted to "Arabize" the

former French colony, without regard for the wishes of the African minorities. The imposition of compulsory Arabic instruction in secondary schools in 1966 led to major riots and deaths, especially in the Senegal valley.

The Arab-Moors continued to dominate politically and their commitment to the gradual implementation of Arabic as a national language did not weaken. This heightened the conflict between the different groups.

The late 1980s and early 1990s further witnessed the inability of the country to come to terms with its multiethnicity. In April 1989 a serious crisis erupted that pitched the Arab-Moors against the blacks. The immediate cause of this was traced to a minor border clash caused by the movement of the nomadic Arab-Berber herdsmen southward, in search of pastures for their cattle. While still on the Mauritanian side of the river Senegal, the herds destroyed the farms of the minority Fulani, Wolof, Soninke, and Bambara ethnic groups. The protest by the black population led to fighting, in which two Senegalese farmers were killed. The angry Senegalese retaliated by attacking Mauritians in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. Anti-Senegalese clashes also erupted in Nouakchott, the Mauritanian capital. Hundreds of people were killed in the ethnic riots. The clash prompted an exodus of refugees in both directions.

But while the Senegalese government quelled the riots on its own side, the Mauritanian government, under the leadership of President Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya (who had seized power in a bloodless military coup in December 1984), seized the opportunity to visit terror on the ethnic populations in the south. Within three months, more than a thousand minorities had been killed.

Mauritania's military government, dominated by the Arab-Moors, began expelling ethnic minorities after accusing them of fraudulently acquiring Mauritanian citizenships. It claimed that Mauritania was exclusively owned by Arabs, and that the ethnic minorities had been placed in the south by the French colonial administration. An official policy to rid Mauritania of its minority population was thus effected. Scores of dark-skinned people were thereafter deported to Senegal irrespective of age, status, and nationality. Mauritanian students in the University of Dakar were withdrawn from their courses of study.

In response, black Mauritians launched a guerrilla movement from neighboring Senegal called the Mauritanian African Liberation Forces (FLAM). The mass expulsions and torture inflicted on Mauritanian blacks led to villagers in the south setting up so-called resistance committees along the 800-kilometer long border. A sizeable number of black soldiers in the Mauritanian army also deserted.

The violence in the country abated with the advent of multiparty democracy in 1991. A new multiparty

constitution was drafted by the ruling Military Committee for National Salvation. (This document replaced one that had been suspended after a military coup in 1978.) Mauritania had been governed under one-party systems virtually since independence. A referendum was held in July 1991 to approve the new constitution, which allowed for an unlimited number of political parties. FLAM suspended its guerilla warfare when Mauritians voted for a new multiparty constitution.

The military ruler, Sid' Ahmed Taya, ran on the platform of the Democratic and Social Republican Party (DSRP). He won the 1992 multiparty elections in the first round with over 62 per cent of the vote, defeating former political exile Ould Daddah, half-brother of the country's first president. The DSRP also won fifty-two of the seventy-nine seats in the parliamentary elections.

In the election, the Movement for Democracy and Unity (RDU) got one seat, while Independents took nine seats. Voting for the remaining seventeen seats proved inconclusive and went to a second round of voting on March 13, 1992. In the parliamentary elections, official results reported a national turnout of just under 39 per cent, compared with 48 per cent in the presidential elections of 1992. A boycott by six opposition parties, including the high-profile Union of Democratic Forces (UFD), reduced voter numbers in pro-opposition areas, particularly in the south, where black Mauritians claimed they were oppressed by the Arab-led government.

President Taya's election was protested by the opposition. Five people were killed in a subsequent demonstration that greeted the election result, as security forces opened fire on people outside the headquarters of President Taya's main rival, Ould Daddah. After this episode, the guerillas of FLAM renewed their armed resistance to the government. A similar confusion attended the second presidential election of the democratic era. In 1997 the opposition criticized the government for creating an electoral commission that was not independent and which was established mainly to serve the interests of just one clan. The incumbent president won the election as he had done in 1992.

In spite of the country's tribulations, appreciable progress had been recorded in the socioeconomic spheres. In July 1980 the Mauritanian government officially abolished slavery in the country. A decree to this effect was issued by the then ruling Committee of National Redemption. The law put an end to the plight of Mauritania's black population, which under the cover of the "Islamic Dogmata" was deprived of its civil rights. The abolishing of this obnoxious practice was revolutionary as it would no doubt help speed up the social and economic development of one of the less-developed countries of Africa.

In 1993 Mauritania also adopted far-reaching economic reforms that yielded some positive results.

According to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey, the country's average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was sustained at an estimated rate of nearly 5 per cent between 1993 and 1995. The rate of inflation was also reduced to 9.3 per cent in 1993 and to 6.5 per cent in 1995. In 1996 the IMF approved a second yearly loan of \$21 million for Mauritania under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, in support of the country's macroeconomic and structural adjustment program. In the same year, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) gave Mauritania a grant of \$100,000 to finance projects in drought-affected areas.

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
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Mauritius: Slavery and Slave Society to 1835

When slavery ended in Mauritius in 1838–1899, the blow to slave owners was both economic and psychological, as the white Creole ethos was that, by definition, the honorable man owned slaves. The British statutes against the slave trade were formally applied after the island capitulated in December 1810. So far as authority in London was concerned, Mauritius was supposed to survive, like the Caribbean colonies, on the natural increase of its existing slave population, in which women were heavily outnumbered and the mortality rate was high. If the slave trade from Madagascar and Mozambique continued into the early 1820s, as it did, this was due to the prevalence of established attitudes in colonial courts after the capitulation. Governor R. T.



Mauritius.

Farquhar and his circle of British and white Creole officials thoroughly believed in slavery, expected revolt from slave owners if what they regarded as their rights were infringed upon, and feared the martial law that antislave-trade soldiers in the British garrison would willingly have imposed in order to bring the white population under firm control.

The economy depended on a steadily replenished supply of slaves. Between 1773 and 1810, 64,413 new slaves, mainly men, arrived from Mozambique ports and Zanzibar, with about a 25 per cent rate of mortality at sea, while another 12,979 embarked from Madagascar, with a 12 per cent mortality rate. To set foot ashore at Port Louis was to be confronted by dockyard slaves with “their spines knotted like a pine tree, and their skins scaled and callous, with the flesh cracked into chasms, from which blood oozed out like gum” (Trelawney, p.187).

The records of slaves enfranchised for service showed how semiskilled urban roles that were once filled by whites had been taken over by slaves in the latter part of the eighteenth century; clearly they had often been hired out by their owners and allowed to keep part of their wages. Legal documents reveal slaves as owned by freed slaves, and the freed in their turn buying loved ones and relations out of slavery.

Just as this was never a self-supporting community of slaves (although there were approximately 14,000 Creole slave children under the age of twelve in 1826), so it was not a static one either. Some 43,789 slaves changed hands between 1823 and 1830, when Sir Robert Farquhar was able to get the sugar duties changed in the island’s favor. The high proportion of new slaves before, if not after, the capitulation hardly increased the security of the minority white, or even of the colored, population. Slaves were controlled directly by their masters, backed by white opinion and power, and only lightly mitigated in practice by theoretical protection offered to slaves by the Code Noire. By the 1740s slave-owners’ rights extended so far as directing slave marriages. Compensation was paid to owners for their loss of slave capital. Roads, bridges, public buildings, and fresh-water canals were built and maintained by convicted slaves delinquent in serving their owners or considered a menace to public safety.

Theft by slaves was common. Arson and poisoning seem to have been much feared by slave-owners, but the courts generally showed an awareness of owners’ paranoia about this, for an accusation of arson or poisoning against a slave did not always necessarily lead to conviction. There were special slave courts to deal with complaints and charges against slaves. The Port Louis bazaar saw slaves regularly flogged (“corrected,” according to the official police records) and occasionally even burnt alive. A common punishment

was condemnation to perpetual labor in chains, on public works.

British soldiers and seamen, in particular, found it intolerable that this system was regarded as so essential to the survival of colonial society by white slave-owners in Mauritius, that any relaxation of slave-owners’ authority, under existing law or successive Orders in Council promulgated in London, was opposed and considered likely to bring on large-scale slave revolt. The fact was that Rassitane’s “revolt” in 1822 was the only outbreak to rise above the marauding of small bands for mere survival, and whatever may have been in the mind of this exiled, imprisoned, and escaping Madagascar noble, he had only about thirty men with him before his recapture and execution. This may be taken to show how effective the system was. Actually, rebellion was primarily carried out by white Creoles. To show that they were still Frenchmen, they took up arms against the abolition movement, forming an underground local government in the early 1830s. It planned attacks on the garrison but never achieved its goal of an independent island to fruition. Its members were duly acquitted of treason when tried before sympathetic local judges. Britain regarded this affair as a mere show of bravado and refused to implement an elected legislature as demanded by the group.

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Mauritius: Indentured Labor and Society, 1835–1935

Of all nations, Mauritius hosted the largest number of Indian indentured immigrants in the nineteenth century. Some 453,000 indentured laborers were brought to Mauritius, mainly from India, from 1834 to the 1920s. The sugar trade had begun to expand in 1815; this expansion continued at a more rapid pace from 1825. At the same time, a shortage of labor had begun to affect sugar planters, due to several factors: the abolition of the slave trade, the consequent ageing of the existing slave population, increased manumission, a high mortality rate, and a low birth rate. The recruitment of indentured labor from 1834 onward was thus a

continuation of attempts to increase the labor supply. Most immigrants were embarked from the ports of Calcutta and Madras and to a lesser extent, Bombay. Mauritius became essentially one large sugar factory, with some 40,000 laborers arriving each year in the peak period.

One of the weaknesses of early indentured immigration had been the absence of women. The colonial government insisted that women form part of any ship carrying emigrants. Most women thus arrived as part of family or kin groups. Most of the women did not take up regular employment, but they did engage in household-based economic activities, such as cattle and poultry rearing and vegetable gardening. Some entered domestic service. A major difference with slavery was that families could be reconstituted. Planters themselves found wives for the laborers and hunted for wives who ran away. The dowry system as practiced in India became converted into a “bride price,” with men paying for wives. The planters, contrary to what they had done under slavery, did not object to the formation of families; rather, they encouraged this development, so that they would be able to keep their labor force near or on the estate.

By the 1870s a process of labor stabilization had begun. If in 1860 only 33 per cent of the immigrants reindentured with the same employer, by 1870s, this had increased to 63 per cent. After their term of indenture, the control of immigrants thus became a prime concern for the authorities and the planters, and labor needed to be maintained near or on estates.

In Ordinance 16 of 1862, the concept of the “Old Immigrant” was introduced. In 1867 Ordinance 31 was passed imposing restrictions on the immigrant population that had not existed since the period of apprenticeship. This was the “pass” system, designed to keep track of the movements of laborers. Laborers were photographed and details of their employment were registered on a pass. Failure to carry a pass and produce it on demand led to arrest, imprisonment, and fines. “Old Immigrants” working on estates numbered some 54,383 in 1870 and were exempt from carrying passes. Children of “Old Immigrants” born in Mauritius were also exempt, although it was difficult for the authorities to distinguish between Indian-born and Mauritian-born. The law also did not apply to “Creoles of the Colony, the ex-slaves, and their descendants, the natives of Madagascar, or the African coast” (Report to the governor by Selby Smythe, Major-General, and others, April 4, 1872, RCE Appendix H, p.309).

Just as there were never any major slave revolts in Mauritius, so there were no revolts by indentured servants. Most protests related to work and living conditions and were carried out by small groups. There were also individual acts of violence and frequent desertion or complaints to the protector or magistrate. One

significant event was the petition circulated by Adolphe de Plevitz and signed by over 900 laborers outlining their mistreatment in Mauritius. The petition led to the establishment of a Royal Commission of Enquiry. The report is one of the most comprehensive documents relating to the conditions of immigrants in Mauritius. The witnesses interviewed included magistrates, lawyers, accountants, and managers of estates, police, proprietors, and doctors (although no immigrants seem to have been formally interviewed).

After the expiration of their period of “industrial residence” on sugar estates, many indentured immigrants chose to live off the sugar estate. The mechanism by which this occurred and the ensuing transition from camp to village has yet to be analyzed by historians. The movement from camp to village also bore close resemblance to the ex-slaves’ desire to leave the sugar estates after 1839, when the apprenticeship system was abolished. The transition for indentured laborers was a much smoother process because they were still able to retain their employment in and around the sugar estate. Both groups, however, faced the restrictions and control of plantation society. Despite these restrictions, villages sprang up in the shadow of the plantation. The movement from camp to village was not only an important historical event but a crucial one for former indentured laborers who began the process of recreating and rebuilding their society, somewhat shattered by the voyage, and period of stay in the camp. The “Indian village” was never recreated but there occurred the emergence of a hybrid culture, which also merits the attention of historians.

There had always been protests against the establishment of the indenture system, many seeing in it another form of “unfree” labor. Protests had come from India and England and even in the receiving colonies themselves. The British government had always seemed uneasy at the criticisms leveled against it but had shown little willingness to change the system. By the end of the 1870s, however, the peak of indentured immigration had passed, and in 1880 very few immigrants arrived. When Gandhi went to South Africa and witnessed firsthand the conditions there, he began a public campaign to have immigration banned. He also visited Mauritius and noted the total separation of wealthy urban Indians from the laborers. Manilall Doctor, a young Indian lawyer was sent to Mauritius and he defended laborers in court and campaigned for equal rights for immigrants. In Mauritius, there began to be protests at the continuation of indenture. Indentured immigration slowly came to a halt in the 1920s when the Sanderson Committee recommended that emigration be stopped.

Acquisition of land and increased access to education at the end of the nineteenth century led to the

formation of a new social class among Indian immigrants and their descendants. The two processes brought social and economic mobility leading to a small but influential group made up of professionals and other educated Indo-Mauritians. They were to spearhead the anticolonial struggle and demand better conditions for workers and laborers on sugar estates. Their rise in economic and social status within “Mauritian” society was accompanied by a cultural renaissance leading to the commemoration of the centenary of the arrival of indentured laborers in Mauritius in 1935 and the founding of the Indian Cultural Review and the Indian Cultural Association.

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Mauritius: Nationalism, Communalism, and Independence, 1935–1968

A movement toward independence only began in the 1950s, partly as a consequence of demands for increased mass political representation in the Legislative and Executive Councils, which had begun in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1951, the British classified Mauritius as a “class III” territory that needed a complex central government because of the unique difficulties caused by its simultaneous small size and complex, multifaceted population. The Colonial Office recommended the creation of a new category of territory, in which a system of self-government would address all concerns except defense and foreign policy, which would continue to be overseen by the British.

In 1942 Governor Mackenzie-Kennedy had made proposals for a new constitution. His proposals gave rise to great debate and two “Consultative Committees.” Two camps emerged: the conservatives who did not want universal suffrage, and those who did. The Conservatives also asked for separate rolls for each “community.” The question of adequate representation of minorities in a system of democratic elections based on universal suffrage came to the forefront. The underlying assumption was that people voted on a purely ethnic or religious basis, so that an elected candidate would only represent his own ethnic or religious group.

Governor Mackenzie-Kennedy had a “distaste for Indian intellectuals” but was forced to implement British Labour policy giving “responsible government to local people.”

Elections were held on August 10, 1948. Further elections brought further success to the Mauritius Labour Party (MLP). It strove to make people see that it represented all sections of the population. Today, many political observers see the movement toward independence as having been a struggle between the MLP (considered by some as representing the Indo-Mauritians), and the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD) representing Afro-Mauritians and Franco-Mauritians.

The competition between different political parties and politicians to obtain the sympathy of the masses also changed the character of Mauritian politics. Politicians had now to appeal to the masses rather than to a select elite. Public speaking methods, the dimensions of meetings, and the nature and style of propaganda machine had to adapt. People like Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Renganaden Seenneevassen, and other Western-educated intellectuals came to the forefront. Cr. Curé was replaced by Anquetil as president of the Labour Party; he was succeeded by the charismatic G. Rozemont. Curé and Ramgoolam had very different opinions on the methods to be used to achieve independence. Ramgoolam’s training and familiarity with the British political system led him to adopt a parliamentary style of opposition. Curé, on the other hand, adopted a militant stand, confronting British authority directly. The other party to enter the political scene was that started by Sookdeo Bissoondoyal. His brother had started a campaign in 1939 among Hindu-Mauritians to encourage pride in Indian culture, and in 1958 Bissoondoyal founded the Independent Forward Bloc (IFB).

Proportional representation, as it came to be known, came to the forefront during 1955 when the Parti Mauricien began its campaign against what it called “Hindu hegemony.” One attempt by Lennox Boyd, the secretary of state, to introduce proportional representation failed. In the MLP, it was the more radical elements that denounced proportional representation, seeing Mauritius as being composed of classes rather than ethnic groups.

In 1959 the principle of universal suffrage was accepted. In the elections that followed, the MLP won twenty-three out of forty seats. There was evidence that the principle of party loyalty was beginning to make headway and that people did not vote blindly for their own ethnic or religious group. The Labour Party, which obtained 41.4 per cent of the vote, received 57 per cent of the seats; the Parti Mauricien won 15 per cent of the votes and received 7.5 per cent of the seats. Ramgoolam was able to press for full

independence, but the British wanted a counterweight to the Labour Party. They soon found one, in the form of the oligarchy, which became their perfect “opposition.”

On March 12, 1964, a system of self-government was introduced to Mauritius. In 1965, Anthony Greenwood, secretary of state for colonies, visited Mauritius. He believed that further constitutional developments and changes would be acceptable to the majority of the population. In 1965, after the Labour Day demonstration, fighting broke out between gangs of various political parties. Despite this, the Colonial Office continued to press for constitutional progress. Independence was agreed to and the Barnwell Commission was appointed to recommend an electoral system. In 1966 the parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, John Stonehouse, visited Mauritius to review the Barnwell proposals. He agreed to establish a system of “best losers.” In other words, seats were to be reserved for any ethnic group that was not represented. Although today this system is criticized for institutionalization of communalism, at that time, there was a concern to establish a system that would not exclude any group. Leaders of each political party accepted it, but whether this was believed to be a temporary solution or a permanent one is not known.

Elections were announced on August 7, 1967. There were 307,908 electors and once again the main election issue was over independence or continued association with Britain. The Labour Party, the Independent Forward Block (IFB), and the Comité d'Action Musulman (CAM) won 56 per cent of the vote (39 out of 62 seats).

The elections were clouded by the fact that riots broke out in January 1968. Twenty-five people were killed, a state of emergency was declared, and British troops were called in. Forty-four per cent of the island's electorate had voted against independence, a historic decision that indicated the divisions in the society.

At the first meeting of the Assembly, Dr. Ramgoolam once again presented a motion asking for full independence. This was approved, and on March 12, 1968, Mauritius became independent. The challenges facing the country were immense. Severe unemployment, high rates of illiteracy, poverty, and interethnic and religious tensions were some of the problems that the new government had to face.

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Mauritius: Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur, Government of

On March 12, 1968, Mauritius gained its independence as a state within the British Commonwealth. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (1900–1985), a British-educated Hindu doctor who for many years had enjoyed a broad base of popular support, became the country's

first prime minister, heading a Labour-led coalition that found itself governing a country with deep-rooted economic problems.

During the 1960s, and to the detriment of economic reform, Mauritius had been preoccupied with the immediate objective of obtaining independence without provoking ethnic conflict or installing a Hindu-dominated government. Despite the recommendations of two 1961 reports, which noted the urgency of reducing population growth rates and encouraging economic diversification, little had been done to these ends: unemployment was high and rising, and the economy remained singularly dependent on sugar. The workforce was poorly trained, and the well-educated white-collar sector was emigrating, fearful for its future in an independent state. In 1970 Ramgoolam drew up a plan that called for sustained economic growth and established the basis for this growth, the Export Processing Zone (EPZ).

The EPZ aimed at attracting foreign and domestic capital for an industrialization program. It provided an attractive package, offering tax relief, government subsidies, and credit facilities, with promises of good infrastructure and the placing of no restrictions on capital transfer. The government promised a competent, cheap, and reliable labor supply, which the Mauritian public education system was able to supply, and from 1971 to 1975 the economy boomed.

Although the EPZ, based principally on textiles, was clearly a success, it was dependent upon the health of the sugar sector. During several years in the early 1970s while world sugar prices were extremely buoyant, Mauritius produced several bumper crops, and the resultant profits fuelled EPZ growth. Sugar profits also funded investment in the tourism sector, and in services, they also provided increased government revenue, thus permitting improvements to social services and infrastructure development.

Mauritius' continued status as a developing country attracted substantial development aid, particularly in view of its stable government and its potential as a development success story. In 1972 its close relationship with France led to the country being invited to join OCAM, the association of former French colonies in Africa. Aware that imminent British membership of the EEC would remove the privileges Mauritius enjoyed in the British market, Mauritius accepted OCAM's invitation and became the first Commonwealth state to obtain preferential access for its exports to the European Community, several years before the Lomé Convention.

Despite economic success, the Labour Party faced opposition. Poor economic conditions, high unemployment, and low wages in the late 1960s had led to the formation of the left-wing Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) in 1969. Led by Paul Bérenger, a

young radical who had spent 1968 in Paris, the MMM rapidly established itself as a force to be contended with. Appealing to the youth to renounce communalism and take up the class struggle, the MMM won a by-election in the strongly Hindu constituency of Triolet in 1970 and went on to further victories in the 1971 local elections.

In late 1971 the MMM backed striking workers and began preparing for the 1972 general election, but Ramgoolam invoked emergency powers under the Public Order Act, claiming the country could not risk social unrest. Political meetings were banned, trades union activity severely restricted, the MMM newspaper shut down, and a number of MMM leaders, including Bérenger himself, were arrested. The 1972 election was postponed until 1976, and although its leaders were released from prison, throughout the period Ramgoolam maintained restrictions on the MMM.

If Ramgoolam could justify his actions by pointing to the economic boom, it proved to be unsustainable. Rapid growth had fuelled inflation and a demand for imports; in the mid-1970s sugar prices collapsed and the rise in oil prices led to a worldwide economic downturn that did not spare Mauritius. Exports slumped and although the GDP continued to grow, the rate of growth had slowed, unemployment was increasing, and external debt was on the rise.

By the 1976 election, Ramgoolam realized that the MMM could no longer be ignored and all restrictions were lifted. Both Labour and the more conservative Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD) attacked the MMM as Marxists, raising the specter of totalitarian rule, but the MMM had toned down its rhetoric and, in Aneerood Jugnauth, had found a candidate who would appeal to Hindus. The election was closely fought, and the Labour/PMSD coalition clung to a two seat majority, the remainder having been won by the MMM.

Throughout the late 1970s the economy continued to suffer and in 1979 the government was forced to appeal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. A structural adjustment program was put into place, including curbs on public sector spending and a devaluation of the rupee. It is to Ramgoolam's credit that the government maintained its commitment to social welfare policies, including free education and health care, during this period.

The IMF program eventually had the desired effect, but too late to save the government. The Labour Party was facing increasing criticism, particularly from within. A splinter group led by Harish Boodhoo launched accusations of corruption (two ministers were forced to resign in 1979), nepotism, and incompetence among the aging leadership, who were seen to be out of touch with the population. The MMM backed a general strike in mid-1979, while Boodhoo's insistent probing

led to his expulsion from the Labour Party. He established the Parti Socialiste Mauricien (PSM), which formed an alliance with the MMM to fight the 1982 general election, thus guaranteeing the MMM the Hindu vote.

Both the Labour Party and the PMSD realized they had little chance of winning in 1982. The economy had yet to feel the effects of the structural adjustment program and serious cyclones from 1979 to 1981 had exacerbated the effects of a 21 per cent unemployment rate, falling foreign investment, unstable sugar prices, high inflation, and a 5 billion rupee foreign debt. The MMM presented a more moderate image than it had done in 1976; the alliance with the PSM reassured Hindus, while Bérenger went out of his way to court the private sector, especially the sugar estates. The election was a landslide victory for the MMM-PSM alliance, which won 62 per cent of the popular vote and all sixty available seats.

The 1982 election effectively marked the end of Ramgoolam's political career, and he was appointed governor general shortly thereafter. Despite the poor performance of the later years of his government, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam is respected as the father of modern Mauritius. His role as a leader not only of Hindus but of all Mauritians, with his emphasis on dialogue and moderation and his perseverance in building a modern welfare state with a nonaligned foreign policy, won him friends and admirers both in Mauritius and abroad. It is without doubt due to his personal skills that Mauritius not only achieved not only independence but did so as a stable and harmonious democracy.

IAIN WALKER

See also: **Lomé Conventions, The; Mauritius: Nationalism, Communalism, and Independence, 1935–1968.**

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Mauritius: 1982 to the Present

Mauritius is one of the few African countries in which a multiparty system has been maintained since independence (1968), and where competitive elections have been held almost regularly. Over the last three decades, party politics have been influenced by interrelated ethnic and class conflicts, as well as by personal rivalries of party leaders, party breakaways, and tactical alliances. Over time, the latter have been indispensable to form parliamentary majorities.

While Mauritius is an intricately plural society, the country has managed to build a democratic consensus among rival politicians within a relatively stable political system. A key factor of Mauritius's politics is that successive governments have shown relative tolerance for opposition political rivals. As a result, while class and ethnic loyalties crisscross one another, the political system's relative consensus has helped prevent political competition from becoming a zero-sum game. In addition, over time political stability has also been underpinned by adoption of a "best loser" system. This has ensured the representation of ethnic minority interests on a partially proportional basis in Parliament. The



Sugarcane fields in front of the Nicoliere Mountains, Mauritius, October 1, 2002. © Jochen Tack/Das Fotoarchiv.

key point is that both opposition and government leaders have shared an agreement to work together to politically marginalize any political forces perceived as antidemocrats. Moreover, the rival political leaders have agreed to regulate political competition along recognizably democratic lines, a state of affairs facilitated by the fact that there has not been much of a proliferation of new parties nor excessive instances of splits in the old ones.

The politically consensual trend began in 1982 when Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the founding father of independence, lost elections gracefully to the opposition. The results of the elections of that year brought a fundamental political change, as they showed a major swing toward the hitherto opposition *Mouvement Militant Mauricien* (MMM) and its small alliance partner the *Parti Socialiste Mauricien* (PSM), a breakaway from the ruling *Mauritius Labour Party* (MLP). Other than the two seats of the island of Rodrigues, won by the Rodriguan People's Organisation (OPR), the MMM/PSM won all sixty directly elected legislative seats. Candidates of the traditionally powerful parties—the MLP, the Muslim Action Committee (MAC), and the *Parti Mauricien Social Democrate* (PMSD)—which had, prior to the 1982 elections, dominated the Mauritian political scene were all but wiped out in elections.

The new coalition government, under the leadership of MMM president Sir Anerood Jugnauth as prime minister, turned out to be less radical than expected. This was not least because of the conditions for much-needed foreign loans set by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which strongly affected the government's economic and political agendas. Perhaps because of the enforced moderation, within a year the coalition had broken up due to the MMM fracturing. Paul Bérenger led his fraction of the MMM into opposition while Jugnauth, continuing as prime minister, founded the *Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien* (MSM) around his loyal MMM wing plus and PSM supporters. However, unable to command a parliamentary majority, Jugnauth called for new elections in 1983 and managed to continue as prime minister on the basis of an alliance formed by MSM, PMSD, and the MLP.

Helped by the electoral system, Jugnauth's alliance won comfortable legislative majorities in 1983 and 1987. Later, in 1991, when the MLP appeared to be negotiating an electoral pact with the MMM, Jugnauth managed to arrive at a new alliance between MSM and MMM. This resulted in a resounding victory for both Jugnauth and the MSM/MMM alliance and after the elections, Jugnauth retained his position as prime minister. However, as part of the alliance agreement, Mauritius became a republic by constitutional change in March 1992. Henceforward, a ceremonial president would replace the post of governor-general. The impact upon national politics was, however, minimal.

In 1993 the MMM split again. A breakaway faction, led by Paul Bérenger, joined the opposition. The loyal wing of the MMM stayed in the MSM-led coalition government and formed a new party, the *Renouveau Militant Mauricien* (RMM). Elections in 1995 were won overwhelmingly by the opposition Mauritian Labour Party and Bérenger's MMM. This marked the second peaceful transfer of power to the opposition via elections since independence. In June 1997 Bérenger was dismissed from the cabinet and most of the other MMM ministers resigned their posts in protest. The prime minister, Dr. Navin Ramgoolam, son of the former prime minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, formed a new cabinet that included only MLP ministers except for one OPR member and one independent. Later, following further elections in September 2000, Anerood Jugnauth returned as prime minister with Paul Bérenger as deputy prime minister and finance minister. The 2000 elections were won on the back of an electoral pact between the MSM and the MMM, under which Jugnauth would take the premiership until 2003, when Bérenger, MMM leader, would take over the top job.

This transfer of power did not lead to a very different economic agenda. It is often noted that Mauritius' economic record under governments of different complexions has been more promising than in most other African countries. Since the early 1980s, Mauritius had had an average annual economic growth of more than 5 per cent, with unemployment in the region of 8 per cent. While in 2000 growth sank to 3.6 per cent, this was primarily due to a drought that affected the key sugar crop. Forecasts of improvements in 2001 and 2002 were eventually scaled down as a result of the depressed international economic situation. However, Jugnauth and Bérenger announced plans to build on encouraging aspects of the economy, notably the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). First introduced in 1970, EPZ manufacturing industries had increased rapidly during Jugnauth's first period in office in the 1980s and had steadily grown in importance since. Bérenger announced in 2001 that the aim for Mauritius was what he called a "quantum leap" to a "knowledge economy." This would involve the introduction of "cyber-cities" to further reduce the country's still heavy dependence on sugar and manufactured exports such as textiles.

JEFFREY HAYNES

See also: **Mauritius: Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur, Government of.**

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Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman: See Morocco:
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Mawlay Sulayman: See Morocco: Mawlay Sulayman, Life and Era of.

Mboya, Tom J. (c.1930–1969)

Kenyan Trade Unionist and Politician

Mboya was raised far away from his native Rusinga Island, in Lake Victoria in Luo Nyanza. Hence he developed a cosmopolitan personality from early childhood. He grew into a polyglot, speaking Dholuo, Kiswahili, English, Kikamba, and Kikuyu fairly fluently.

On joining the City Council, Mboya became the vice president of the Nairobi African Local Government Servants Association (NALGSA) and shortly transformed it into the Kenya Local Government Workers Union (KLGWU) where he became general secretary. He went on to become the general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL). Mboya argued that unions should concentrate on negotiating with the government to reap maximum benefits for the workers. He discouraged strikes as hampering economic growth. As minister for labor, Mboya presided over the establishment of the Industrial Relations Charter (IRC), forerunner of the Kenya Industrial Court (KIC).

Mboya became involved in the Pan-Africanist movement, to which he was introduced by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The All African People's Conference (AAPC) of 1958 in Accra brought together five hundred

leaders of parties and unions. Mboya was appointed the chairman of the conference.

Nkrumah and others such as Modibo Keita and Sekou Touré, espoused the idea of a political union for Africa from the start. Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Mboya, and others advocated piecemeal unity based on regional blocs. It was in this context that the question of international labor affiliation was posed: Should African labor affiliate to Euro-American organizations? Nkrumah opposed dependency on the West as a gimmick of neocolonialism. He viewed Mboya as being a lackey of the West. Mboya and the KFL had a long association with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). He reasoned that it was a partner in decolonization. In May 1961 Nkrumah's camp formed the All Africa Trade Union Federation (AATUF) in Casablanca. Mboya's camp walked out. In January 1962 they congregated in Monrovia, Liberia, to form the Africa Trade Union Confederation (ATUC).

Mboya's "American Connection" afforded him political mileage as well as resentment at home. Mboya played a crucial role in the decolonization process. He was first elected to the Legislative Council in 1957, and quickly set up the African Elected Members Organization (AEMO). He used the caucus to harmonize strategies for gaining independence. Mboya dominated the constitutional talks that resulted in the independence of Kenya. He was young, familiar with the Western press, ebullient, and a consummate schemer.

When the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed in 1960, Mboya became the general secretary and retained the position until his death. The party was formed and initially organized with the help of Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

Mboya was appointed minister for justice and constitutional affairs in 1963, a position that involved formulating a new constitution. In this he worked closely with the attorney general, Charles Njonjo. The outcome was a republican constitution that made the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), with its regionalist policies, difficult to operate. As a result of Mboya's persuasion and blackmail, KADU gradually diminished as its members joined KANU.

Mboya was appointed minister for economic planning and development in 1964. He held the position until his death in 1969. He thus became the architect of Kenya's development strategy, whereby he sought to create an African state and economy in harmony with African values. He recognized foreign aid and private investment as crucial components of economic growth. In 1967 in Lagos, Mboya called for a "Marshall Plan" for Africa while castigating the insensitivity of the West toward the continent. Mboya called for regional economic integration, which could result in a common

market and currency for the continent. This dream was fulfilled in the 1990s with the formation of the various subregional economic blocs across the continent.

Mboya and Oginga Odinga were both Luo by ethnicity. Yet they remained political rivals. Jomo Kenyatta exploited this to get Mboya to undermine and destroy Odinga. This was accomplished in 1966 when Odinga, out of frustration, resigned from government to start an opposition that was never allowed to take root. What Mboya realized too late was that his brilliance, popularity, and capacity to organize turned the Kikuyu caucus in the government against him.

Mboya confided to his friends that his life was in danger. His mail was being tampered with, and on one occasion, his house guard had sprayed bullets into his empty vehicle. On July 5, 1969 after leaving his Treasury Building office, Mboya stopped at a chemist to pick up medicine. He was followed and gunned down by Isaal Njenga Njoroge. He was rushed to Nairobi Hospital, where he died on arrival.

The death of Mboya shook the nation and led to ethnic animosity, especially between the Kikuyu and the Luo. Cases of sporadic violence were witnessed in Nairobi and in Luo Nyanza. The mistrust between the ethnic groups lingers still and has contributed in no small measure to the subsequent history of Kenyan politics.

Mboya was buried according to Luo custom on Rusinga Island. Njenga was convicted of murder but insisted he had been carrying out orders from others. To this day, the identities of those who masterminded Mboya's demise remain unknown.

EDWIN GIMODE

See also: **Kenya: Independence to the Present: Kenya: Kenyatta, Jomo: Life and Government of.**

Biography

Thomas Joseph Odiambo Mboya was born August 15, 1930, on a sisal plantation estate in central Kenya. Attended the Jeans School, Kabete, where he trained as a sanitary inspector. Joined the Nairobi City Council in 1951. Attended Ruskin College at Cambridge University in 1955 where he studied industrial relations. Married Pamela Arwa in 1962. They had two sons and two daughters, in addition to Mboya's daughter from an earlier marriage. Appointed chairman of the All African People's Conference of 1958. Elected to the Legislative Council in 1957. Set up the African Elected Members Organization (AEMO). Named secretary general of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 1960. Appointed minister for economic planning and development in 1964. Died July 5, 1969.

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Media as Propaganda

Colonial authorities held inflated and often racist views of the subversive impact of African “exposure” to mass media, including radio, film, and print journalism. Such views arose from the propaganda legacy of World War II and were strengthened by the virulent anti-communist strains of the early Cold War years. The rise of serious African nationalist challenges to colonial domination after World War II set the stage for extensive, heavy-handed and generally unsuccessful late colonial information management policies. In South Africa and Namibia, these lasted well into the 1980s.

Colonial Britain was generally more credulous than France, Portugal, or Belgium, drawing from extensive wartime propaganda experience, to develop, use, and tightly control radio, newspapers, and film to fashion postwar information policies for its African territories.

Radio was first seen as a means for European settlers and colonial civil servants to keep in touch with African cities and the world outside Africa. It also served the needs of the small educated African elite. Britain and France introduced state radio services in West Africa during the 1930s. Kenya had radio as early as 1927, Rhodesia 1932, and South Africa 1924.

World War II, and the need to recruit and inform Africans, led to the first broadcasts in African languages. Britain used radio in pre-independence Ghana and Nigeria to explain the Second World War to Africans and to justify and promote their participation in it. France used colonial radio as a rallying point for Free French forces in West and Central Africa to counter pro-Vichy broadcasts from Dakar, Senegal.

Powerful transmitters installed for wartime propaganda purposes proved useful in postwar development of colonial radio. By 1945 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was recommending that national radio networks in English-speaking African territories be developed along lines similar to the model of a semipublic corporation in Great Britain. The French model for its

African territories was more centralized and called for direct state control. African-language broadcasts did not begin in Francophone Africa until the late 1950s and early 1960s. As nationalist challenges mounted departments of information were set up in an effort to manage and regulate new official information sources, including territorial film units, radio services, and newspapers, while locking out contaminating foreign mass media.

Establishment of radio in many parts of colonial Africa coincided with a perceived need to set up government-run services as part of overall information management policies, while serving the news and entertainment needs of white settlers. The BBC was instrumental in bringing national services into operation in every Anglophone African territory by the end of World War II, providing financial and technical expertise and training.

Radio is the only true mass medium in Africa, reaching an estimated 85 per cent of Africans today, much more than any other medium. Although from its introduction in the 1920s radio was largely restricted to urban areas, the transistor revolution, coinciding with the rise of African nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, helped to spread it to even the most remote areas. Not only colonial government but liberation movements employed radio broadcasting to further political objectives, regime survival, or majority rule and independence.

Exiled political leaders were able to beam shortwave radio broadcasts into their home territories via Radio Cairo as early as 1953. As independence swept down the continent, from West to East, to southern Africa, additional foreign radio transmission facilities became available to liberation movements for transmitting programs in vernacular languages, much to the concern of colonial and white minority regimes.

In part to counteract this trend, South Africa started an external African service in 1958 and expanded its own domestic apartheid-style vernacular radio network, “Radio Bantu.” The role of radio in the propaganda war remained firmly entrenched through the decades of African independence, into the late 1980s. South Africa maintained authoritarian control of radio and employed disinformation in broadcasts to maintain its hold on Namibia until 1989.

Use of mass media as propaganda tools for shaping or managing public opinion reached new lows in the information policies of white minority regimes in post-1948 South Africa and Southern Rhodesia from 1962 to 1979. Racist regimes in both states also used propaganda in attempts to burnish sagging images abroad. Between 1972 and 1977, the South African Department of Information undertook a multimillion dollar covert propaganda offensive to build a more favorable image of South Africa internationally by purchasing influence with U.S. and European newspapers.

Ownership and control were inherited by the new states following independence and, with the exception of a few religious radio services, it was not until the 1990s that commercial radio and deregulated, public service parastatal radio services appeared in Africa. African leaders have viewed radio as a powerful tool for national integration, development, and maintaining themselves in power. Highly centralized state broadcast monopolies could thereby be justified indefinitely.

Colonial authorities feared the subversive influences of foreign radio broadcasts from communist services, particularly Radio Moscow, although there is little evidence that more than a handful of Africans possessed the shortwave equipment or interest to listen. Far more listened to the postwar African services of the BBC, Radio France International, Radio RSA (South Africa), and other European services.

Similarly, and beginning in the 1920s, the forms that colonial film policy took were intimately linked with British, French, or Belgian efforts to build loyalty, if not legitimacy, for colonial rule. Colonial Film Units were set up and given the task of putting the best face possible on territorial administration, both for natives and for home populations. During the war years (1939–1945) colonial film served as a wartime propaganda tool. Following the end of the war, emphasis shifted to mass education and community development films aimed at strengthening the position of colonial governments. Africans still tended to be portrayed as inferior and dependent while Europeans were wise, powerful, and benevolent.

It was believed that film could enable illiterate people to understand and eventually participate in Western civilization and the modern world. At times, particularly in the case of film in British territories, the Colonial Office seemed to identify film as a partial panacea to solve major problems of communication and development in far-flung, illiterate territories of its African empire. Colonial administrators were initially fearful of exposing Africans to corrupting images of western life, or causing subjects to question colonial rule itself.

A desire to avoid contaminating commercial films led to a policy of providing noncommercial, government-produced documentaries and newsreels and tightly restricting import and distribution of foreign commercial films from Europe, America, or South Africa. Colonial censorship boards worked with local missionaries to cut scenes which might endanger the prestige of whites. Colonial film makers never trained Africans to make films. Frequency of exposure to films was limited, especially in contrast to radio, which came on strong in the 1950s.

Given the linguistic and cultural pluralism of African audiences in most territories and the limited number of mobile film vans, it was difficult to draw

and keep large audiences. The ideology that underpinned many colonial films tended to sow more confusion than cultural guidance or education. The patronizing desire of colonial administrators to regulate cinema was intended to maintain a submissive, malleable population, capable of official guidance.

Perceived needs to “educate” Africans for citizenship and service and to create new consumers for European products also provided motivation for use of film. Films with religious themes made for African audiences in places like the Belgian Congo in the 1930s and 1940s used folktales and vernacular languages, as well as African actors, to advance missionary work of gaining and educating new converts. Cinema was a modern mass communication medium but easy to control by colonial authorities. Expansion of radio services led to the demise of Colonial Film Units by the mid-1950s.

JAMES J. ZAFFIRO

See also: Drama, Film: Postcolonial; Journalism, African: Colonial Era; Press.

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Medical Factor in Christian Conversion

The medical achievements of the second half of the nineteenth century coincided with the heyday of missionary enterprise in Africa. Thus, Protestant and Roman Catholic missions pioneered Western medicine in Africa. By all accounts, missionary medical work played a critical role in the conversion of Africans to Christianity. Reports drawn from various mission fields illuminate our understanding of the importance of missionary medical work in the conversion process. Among other things, it proved very effective in breaking down local prejudice and in winning the affection and confidence of the local people. The experiences of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries in various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa clearly illustrate the diplomatic importance of missionary medical work. In Nigeria, for instance, health care services rendered by missionaries of the British Church Missionary Society (CMS) fostered a dramatic change of relations, as in the Igbo town of Awka. According to the Rev. G. T. Basden, "During the disturbances at Awka, we were able to render assistance to some of the wounded," and, as a result, we won the confidence of our neighbors, and were thus able to establish ourselves in a place where, up to that date, our tenure had been . . . precarious . . . From being merely tolerated we were accepted as friends, and the relationship thus established has remained a cordial one ever since" (1966, p.204).

Similarly in Onitsha, Nigeria Roman Catholic medical work in 1890 had a dramatic effect. Not only did it provoke "a remarkable movement towards Roman Catholicism," it also led to the defection of CMS adherents to Roman Catholicism. Thus lamented the CMS station agent: "We are daily coming across cases of persons who used to belong to our church, but who now are Roman Catholics. In almost every case the means used to draw our people has been medicine" (Report of 1890). Sadly, plans to "fight the Romanists on their own grounds" failed, largely because of lack of medical supplies from headquarters.

In central and eastern Africa, as well, missionary medical work not only engendered "a speedy change in the attitude of the people" toward missionary propaganda, but missionary medicine proved to be "the bait to catch converts." Not surprisingly, the Rev. G. H. Wills of the Universities Mission to Central Africa triumphantly proclaimed missionary medical work as

"one solid asset of the missionary work here." Initially, most religious agencies tended to deemphasize the value of medical work, believing, instead, that "faith alone" was sufficient to induce conversion. African realities, however, tempered religious orthodoxy, and hence the enthusiastic adoption of medical work as a necessary tool of Christian evangelism.

This commitment to missionary medical work was clearly reflected in the establishment of hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, and related facilities. These establishments became not merely centers of healing but powerful agents of religious indoctrination as well. As an illustration, patients who came for treatment at the medical facilities were often first given doses of religious instruction, and medical care afterward. Conversions often followed, thus demonstrating the "evangelistic efficiency of hospitals" and other health care facilities. Yet some missionaries have emphasized the humanitarian dimensions of missionary medical work: "If we saw no spiritual results; if we saw no converts brought out by medical missions . . . it would still be the burden duty of Christian people to do what they can with . . . western science which God has given, to alleviate misery, wretchedness, pain, and disease wherever it may be found" (*The Church Missionary Review*, 1921: p.23).

Available evidence suggests a close relationship between disease, Western medicine, and Christian conversion. In Africa, epidemics had a significant impact on conversion, as missionary response(s) to the pandemic influenza of 1918–1919 illustrates. Known popularly in Sub-Saharan Africa as the "Spanish" influenza, the epidemic spread rapidly throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa, and wrought great havoc. Because of its novelty, there were no indigenous medical or magical remedies to deal with the disease. Thus, at the onset of the epidemic, missionaries provided medical care, and, in the process, expanded their missionary frontiers.

In Nigeria, the Roman Catholic missionaries were particularly active. In addition to providing medical relief to the suffering victims of disease, they reportedly baptized a large number, who were frightened into believing that, if they died without baptism, they would invariably suffer eternal damnation in hell. Christian eschatology thus contributed to conversions. Indeed, the growth of Roman Catholicism in parts of the present-day Imo state of Nigeria, at least as oral testimonies suggest, may be attributed partly to the Roman Catholic provision of health care during the pandemic influenza. In eastern, central, and southern Africa, too, studies show that missionary medical work, at this time of health crisis, resulted in conversions. African elders, for example, are said to have interpreted baptism as being synonymous with physical healing. Consequently, some patients opted for baptism, in the belief that it

would restore good health. But missionaries were at pains to disabuse the Africans of this association. "Baptism," warned a Protestant missionary, "is [not] a charm for curing ills [illness]" (Ranger, p.275).

Clearly, African culture and cosmological ideas played a role in Christian conversion. African elders, for example, accepted Christianity with the impression that the new religion meant the addition of another deity (Jesus Christ) to the existing pantheon of gods. Besides, traditional African religion tends to gravitate toward pragmatism, meaning that Africans could switch allegiance from one deity/spirit to another, especially when, in times of social crisis, he/she appeared no longer powerful. Nevertheless, acceptance of Christianity did not imply abandonment of traditional ways of life. On the contrary, traditional values continued to exist after conversion.

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See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.**

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
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Meroe: Meroitic Culture and Economy

"Meroitic" is a modern term used to designate the later phases of the kingdom of Kush, known to the Greco-Roman world as the kingdom of the Aethiopians. The kingdom of Kush developed in the earlier part of the first millennium BCE and came to dominate most of the Nile valley from the First Cataract into central Sudan. Initially centered on the region called Napata at the downstream end of the Fourth Cataract, by as early as the later eighth century BCE a major community had developed at Meroe between the Sixth Cataract and the Nile-Atbara confluence. Until the fourth century BCE, all burials of the Kushite rulers were at Napata. However, early in the third century BCE the royal burial ground was transferred to Meroe where most subsequent rulers were buried. This is the date traditionally given to the transition from the Napatan to the Meroitic periods.

This was also a time of major cultural change. The Kushite state from very early in its history was heavily influenced by the culture of its usually more powerful northern neighbor, Egypt. Although from the later eighth into the mid-seventh centuries BCE, the Kushites succeeded in conquering Egypt, but this only served to reinforce the cultural dominance of pharaonic Egypt. During the fourth century BCE pharaonic control in Egypt, already disrupted by periods of Persian occupation, was replaced by the Macedonian regime of



Meroe, 500BCE–350CE.

the Ptolemies after the conquests of Alexander. This ushered in a period of great cultural assimilation between the Greek and later the Greco-Roman worlds and pharaonic Egypt. The Kushites, in their turn, were heavily influenced by this new “Egyptian” culture. The distinction between the Napatan and Meroitic periods, therefore, is the result of a change in external stimuli, and the underlying continuity from one period to another must be stressed.

Meroitic culture was a dynamic mix of imported elements of Greco-Roman tradition grafted onto earlier imported elements of Pharaonic culture, all overlaid onto the culture of a basically African civilization. The Meroites did not slavishly adopt Egyptian cultural traits but, as in the Napatan period, were highly selective and modified where they considered necessary those traits so that Meroitic culture is a distinct entity in itself. The Meroites demonstrated their linguistic independence in retaining their own language, which was first committed to writing in the early second century BCE. Although the characters used were derived from Egyptian, the nature of the script was very different, being alphabetic rather than hieroglyphic. The structure of the language was also significantly different. Indeed, it is the unique nature of the Meroitic language, with no known close relations, which has frustrated all attempts to translate it.

Religion and funerary culture also demonstrate aspects of the unique Meroitic cultural identity. Although many of the state gods were of Egyptian origin, others were purely local deities. Chief among these was the lion god Apedemak, who was particularly popular in the region around Meroe. From the eighth century BCE the rulers adopted the pyramid as the funerary monument par excellence, to be appropriated by the elite. However, the indigenous tradition of burial under tumuli continued throughout the Napatan and Meroitic periods and on into the medieval period. Even in the royal burials, so Egyptianized in outward appearance, the discovery of human and animal sacrifices highlights the local cultural traits continuing from the Kerma period in the mid-second millennium BCE and extending into the post-Meroitic period in the fourth and fifth centuries.

One major cultural influence that was particularly strong in Egypt during the later phases of the Meroitic state was Christianity, but there is no evidence that this religion was accepted by the Meroites, who maintained their adherence to pharaonic religious practices long after they had been abandoned by most of the Egyptian population.

The subsistence economy of the Meroitic state was based on agriculture and animal husbandry. Manufacturing was on a large scale, particularly the production of pottery and perhaps of iron, but how these were

integrated into the economy is unclear at the time of this writing. The Meroitic economy was nonmonetary, but whether it was a market economy or a redistributive economy is not documented. Pottery should furnish evidence for internal trade networks, but the study of this material as an indicator of trade is not yet well developed.

International trade may have largely been in the hands of the monarchy. The Meroitic state sat athwart the age-old trade route from Central Africa to the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern worlds, and was thus able to profit as a middleman in that trade. Trade in luxury goods, animal products, gold, and slaves may have been of fundamental importance for the coherence of the kingdom. The wealth generated by this activity could then be used by the ruler in the form of patronage to the regional elites to ensure the preeminence of the monarchy and the territorial cohesion of the state. The large amount of high status Greco-Roman objects found in the tombs of the rich are probably a physical manifestation of this patronage and do not furnish evidence for the involvement of a wide section of the populace in international trade. Many of these goods may have been obtained through gift exchange from the rulers of Egypt, and hence may themselves not be indicative of market trading. As early as the New Kingdom, the Egyptians had traded down the Red Sea with the Horn of Africa; this trade network was greatly expanded during the Greco-Roman period, probably with catastrophic results for the Meroitic elite. Robbed of control, or at least a significant share, of the lucrative African trade, this most likely led to a serious decline in the wealth and, therefore, in the prestige of the monarchy, and may have been a major factor in the fragmentation of the state in the fourth century.

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See also: **Kush; Napata and Meroe.**

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Metalworking: Origins of Ironworking

As a historical marker, the term “Iron Age” is both useful and misleading. It implies a sudden break with what preceded, and a revolutionary impact on all that followed.

In fact, the use of metals spread very gradually in Africa and overlapped the continued use of stone tools. Ultimately, however, the effect was revolutionary, encouraging greater economic productivity but also more deadly efficiency in warfare. The cultural impact of iron and other metals has been equally profound, if more diverse and harder to evaluate historically.

The history of metallurgy is better understood in Sub-Saharan than in North Africa. In the Sahel and lands to the south, we can say for certain that metals have been worked for more than two thousand years. Those who produced these metals and the objects they fashioned have played dominant roles in the history of the subcontinent. In many cultures, myths of origin refer to the introduction of metalworking as a signal event, while objects of iron, copper, and gold have long figured in political, economic, social, and religious life. So abundant were its deposits of gold that Africa was for centuries synonymous with the glittering metal, first to the Arab and Indian Ocean worlds, then to Europeans. However, in Africa itself iron has been the primary metal in all spheres of life, from utilitarian to ritual, and in many societies copper was traditionally more highly esteemed than gold.

Resources and History

The red soil typical of much of the Africa south of the Sahara is actually exposed lateritic crust, that is, low-grade iron. Metallurgists exploited primarily the richer deposits of oxides such as hematite, magnetite, and limonite. Gold, in both alluvial and reef form, also occurs much more widely throughout the continent than is generally realized but not all sources were utilized. Copper deposits, in contrast, are relatively scarce in West Africa, with the exception of areas of the southern Sahara in Mauritania and Niger and small deposits in eastern Nigeria but become more plentiful in regions of central and southern Africa. Lead occurs occasionally, especially associated with copper; tin was also exploited in a few areas, especially in southern Africa and possibly on the Bauchi plateau of Nigeria. Despite tenacious Portuguese beliefs to the contrary, there is little silver to be found in Africa, and use of that metal is recent except in the Sahara and Sahel.

During the period from about 500BCE to 500CE, the working of iron and copper spread over the entire continent, apparently in tandem; there is no evidence of a sequence from copper to arsenical copper or bronze and finally to iron as in the Middle East and Europe. The question of origins is still unsettled, in part because the chronology of metalworking is very uncertain in the regions from which it was earlier thought to have entered Africa. The lack of clear routes of diffusion has led some scholars to propose that metallurgy may have

developed independently in Africa. Technically, this would have been difficult since iron smelting requires precise control of temperature and gases within the furnace, and it is hard to imagine how mastery of these factors would have been achieved without a long period of experimentation with metals that are easier to work such as copper and its alloys or without kiln firing of ceramics, which also demands high temperature pyrotechnology. Nevertheless, the possibility of independent invention has been newly strengthened by early dates associated with iron smelting in the Termit region of Niger. If these dates are substantiated, there is still a problem in explaining its irregular diffusion throughout West Africa.

The spread of metalworking throughout the Congo Basin, and into eastern and southern Africa was long held to be associated with the migration of Bantu agriculturists. More recent archeology and linguistic reconstructions have undermined this theory except in southern Africa. The technology seems to have spread in complex patterns, and at the same time stone-using hunter gatherers coexisted with iron-using farmers in many areas. Indeed, ironworkers themselves frequently continued to use stone tools for rough forging until very recently. Further, possession of iron technology is no longer considered the crucial element in Bantu expansion; conversely, non-Bantu speaking peoples are now believed to have been intimately involved in the evolution of iron technology even earlier than the Bantu.

Iron tools and weapons increased the efficiency of agriculture, hunting, fishing, and warfare, contributing to the evolution of complex societies characterized by production of surpluses, craft specialization, and social stratification. Iron, copper, and gold all entered circuits of trade. Raw iron and copper and forged objects were traded locally to peoples lacking resources or specialists. With the development of the trans-Saharan trade during the first and early second millennium CE, copper and brasswares became major imports into West Africa, often exchanged directly for gold. The opening up of maritime routes between Europe and West Africa in the second half of the fifteenth century led to an exponential increase in these imports and, for a brief period, in exports of gold. Eventually, too, iron bars also became a staple import from Europe. Africa's mineral wealth was a major catalyst for European conquest and colonialism.

Technology

As more and more sites are surveyed and excavated in Africa, the vast scale of precolonial iron smelting becomes apparent. While some industries produced only enough for local needs, others engaged in intensive

production, often over long periods of time. The Middle Senegal valley, the Bassar region of western Togo, Kano and its environs in northern Nigeria, and the Ndop Main of Cameroon are thus far the best known of these proto-industrial centers, but areas of Futa Jallon and Yatenga may also have been major producers. Modern geological surveys have shown that virtually all copper deposits in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of some of the deep ores in what became known as the Copperbelt (in Zambia), were identified and worked by indigenous metallurgists before the colonial period.

African smelters used an enormous variety of furnace types to produce bloomery iron or raw copper: open bowls, low shaft, high shaft, permanent, impermanent. So far it is impossible to tell whether furnace forms were dictated by the nature of local ores or even of the charcoals used almost universally for fuel. A peculiarly African innovation is the tall shaft furnace that relies on natural draft, drawing air into a number of holes around the base, rather than bellows; outside of Africa only a single example is known from Burma. While inefficient in its use of fuel, such a furnace avoids the intense labor inputs of bellows operators.

In some areas a single craftsman smelted and smithed iron and copper. In others there was a high degree of specialization among smelters and smiths and among those who forged tools and those who made ornaments of copper, brass, or gold. Further, these occupations were—and still are—often hereditary, especially in the western Sudan. Smiths and smelters were, however, invariably male, although women and children provided a great deal of the ancillary labor of mining, preparing ores, and making charcoal.

The art of lost-wax casting reached a remarkable level of perfection throughout West Africa as far south as the Cameroon Grassfields. This involves making a model of the object to be cast in wax, then enveloping it in clay. When the wax is melted, metal is run in to take its exact form. Finds from three small sites at Igbo Ukwu in southeastern Nigeria and dated to the eighth to tenth centuries CE include bronze pendants, staff heads, and vessels that illustrate the mastery of the technique as well as a virtuoso delight in replicating natural materials in metal. Although the method dates back to ancient Egypt, African brass casters have adapted their own refinements. Thus both Akan and Grassfields artists often attach crucible to mould to reduce the buildup of gases and enable the molten metal to flow more quickly and evenly. Although most lost-wax casting utilizes copper alloys such as bronze or brass because of their lower melting temperature and greater ductility without unwanted gases, some of the classic heads and figures from Ife were cast in pure copper, a technical feat of the first order.

Cultural Role of Metallurgists and Metals

While much of the literature emphasizes the “otherness” of the African smith, this is most characteristic of West African peoples such as the Mande, where smithing is limited to certain endogamous “castes,” and of pastoral societies such as the Masai, where smiths are looked down on in part, at least, because they perform manual labor. Where the craft is not hereditary, aspirants must often pay costly apprenticeship and initiation fees, which tend to restrict access. Smiths may also function as sculptors, diviners, amulet makers, circumcisers, and morticians, and their wives, are often potters and excisers.

The complex and often ambivalent attitudes expressed toward smiths derive in large measure from the acknowledgment of their power. The rest of society, from farmer and hunter to king and priest, is dependent on their ability to transform inert matter into hoes, spears, emblems of authority and status, and symbols of the spirit-objects that are believed themselves to be endowed with agency. Because they literally “play with fire,” metalworkers must acquire a great store of ritual knowledge. This is particularly true of smelting as the primary act of transformation: it usually takes place in isolation and involves invocations and offerings to the ancestors, strict observance of sexual and menstrual taboos, and ample use of medicines. Comparable rituals may attend the setting up of a new forge or manufacture of a new hammer or anvil.

Because of their evident access to supernatural power, smiths are often associated with kingship, especially in central Africa where they may play a major role in royal investiture and in manufacturing elements of regalia. Like chiefs, smiths are often feared as potential sorcerers or witches, since the power they wield can be beneficent or dangerous. Like chiefs too, smiths may have control over fertility, metaphorically—and even actually. Smelting rituals in particular frequently invoke the human model of gender and age to explain and insure transformative power.

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Mfecane

Mfecane is a term widely used by historians from the late 1960s to the late 1980s to refer to a series of wars and population movements that took place over much of southern Africa from the 1810s to the 1830s. Before the 1960s, these upheavals had been known unproblematically in the relevant literature as "Shaka's wars" or "the Zulu wars," the implication being that they had originated under the explosive expansion of the Zulu kingdom during Shaka's reign. From the late 1980s, a small but growing number of historians began to challenge this notion. It was, they argued, primarily a product of colonial historiography, and, in the light of more recent research, could be seen as outdated and misleading. Far from being the cause of the upheavals, the expansion of Shaka's Zulu kingdom was in fact a product of them. The causes needed to be sought elsewhere.

When they were first aired in public, these revisionist views caused considerable controversy. By the later 1990s, however, as revisionist arguments became more nuanced, as well as more familiar, numbers of previously resistant historians were coming to accept that the long-established Zulu-centric explanations of the upheavals of the early nineteenth century needed to be comprehensively rethought. From being an unquestioned "fact" of history, the notion of the *mfecane* came to be seen as a particular interpretation of history which had outlived its usefulness.

The roots of the notion of "the wars of Shaka" go back to the *izibongo*, or praises, which were composed about the Zulu king by his official praise-singers during his lifetime. Versions of his praises recorded in writing in later times portray him, in terms that we can now see as highly exaggerated, as having been a great warrior and conqueror of other chiefs. After his assassination in 1828, such ideas fed into the overblown images of Shaka that were developed in books produced for European readerships by writers like Nathaniel Isaacs (*Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa*, 2 vols., 1836). From the 1840s, fanciful descriptions of the might and despotism of Shaka spread widely in colonial travel writings and histories.

In the earlier literature with its strongly localized focus, Shaka's influence was not generally portrayed as having extended much beyond what is now the KwaZulu-Natal region. It was not until the 1880s that Shaka began to be cast more systematically as the originator of a chain reaction of violence and bloodshed that had spread through African societies across much of southern Africa. The main figure in the development of this idea, as in the development of so many other colonial stereotypes of South African history, was the well-known Cape historian George Theal.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the notion of "Shaka's wars" was further elaborated by influential historians like D. F. Ellenberger (*A History of the Basuto, Ancient and Modern*, 1912), and Alfred Bryant (*Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, 1929). From very different perspectives, black writers like Magema Fuze (*Abantu Abamnyama Lapa Bavela Ngakona [The Black People and Whence They Came]*, 1922) and Rolfes Dhlomo (*Ushaka*, 1936) were also instrumental in purveying the notion of Shaka as a great conqueror. In the 1950s and 1960s, E. A. Ritter (*Shaka Zulu*, 1953) and Donald Morris (*The Washing of the Spears*, 1965) took advantage of an expanding Western interest in African history to produce best sellers that popularized ideas about Shaka as the founder of a mighty warrior nation.

An important shift in the packaging of this notion, though not in its basic assumptions, took place in the academic histories of Africa that began appearing in the 1960s. This was the period of decolonization, when new African nations were being formed and new views of Africa's past were being developed. In keeping with these ideas, historians in Western Europe, North America, and the newly independent countries of Africa were recasting Shaka as a "nation-builder," and the rise of the Zulu kingdom as the factor that had set in motion a process of nation-building among the early nineteenth-century black societies of southern Africa. The most influential work in this genre was John Omer-Cooper's *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa* (1966), which was primarily responsible for introducing the term *mfecane* into the literature in place of "Shaka's wars." The word, which was derived from the Xhosa word *imfecane*, meaning something like "landless raiders," quickly became a widely accepted label for the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s. Its meaning was also extended to cover a series of supposedly causative events stretching back into the later eighteenth century. By the early 1970s, inside and outside South Africa, the notion of the *mfecane* (or *difaqane*, in its seSotho form) was firmly entrenched in academic and popular histories and was making its way into school textbooks.

The consensus about the historical reality of the *mfecane* as a series of upheavals caused by the expansion

of the Zulu kingdom was contested in 1988 by Rhodes University historian Julian Cobbing. In an article published in the *Journal of African History*, he forcefully argued that the upheavals of the early nineteenth century had been set in motion not by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom but by the expansion of the frontiers of European commerce and colonial settlement. The main destabilizing impact had come from slave-raiding and trading carried out by Dutch/Afrikaner and Griqua freebooters from the Cape frontier in the south and by Portuguese traders and their African allies from the Delagoa Bay region in the east. The convergence of waves of violence set in motion from these two epicenters had touched off chain reactions of conflicts among African societies on an unprecedented scale. The notion that it was Shaka and the Zulu who were to blame, Cobbing claimed, was an “alibi” made up by white colonial writers from the 1820s and 1830s onward to obscure the role played by white settlers and traders in establishing a traffic in slaves. The whole concept of the *mfecane* was too closely linked to simplistic Zulu-centric explanations to be salvageable: better, in his view, for historians to jettison not just the name but the very notion, and to reexamine the period afresh.

Cobbing’s provocative arguments brought an immediate reaction from numbers of other historians. Critics asserted that he had greatly exaggerated the extent of the slave trade in southern Africa, that he had seriously distorted the available evidence to make his points, and that his arguments about the historiography of “Shaka’s wars” were reductionist and simplistic. Sympathizers, on the other hand, found merit in Cobbing’s thesis that the causes of the upheavals needed to be looked for primarily in the effects of colonial expansionism, though few were prepared to uncritically accept his arguments that the main cause had been an increase in European slave-raiding and trading.

The debates sparked off by Cobbing’s intervention continue today. The main issue is not, as some commentators have thought, whether the upheavals of the early nineteenth century took place or not: it is about the nature of their causes, and the extent to which they can or cannot be seen as constituting a single historical event. Few, if any, historians would now defend the old idea that the upheavals were caused by the expansion of the Shaka’s Zulu kingdom. Many, however, still want to hold on to the term *mfecane* as a useful label for them, whatever their causes. Others argue that to attach a single and misleading label to a long series of complex and widespread historical processes is an obstacle to understanding their causes, and that not simply the term but the general concept of the *mfecane* should be abandoned altogether.

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See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Difaqane on the Highveld; Natal, Nineteenth Century; Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom, 1810–1840.

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Migration: See Gender and Migration: Southern Africa; Oromo: Migration and Expansion: Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.

Military: Colonialism, Conquest, Resistance

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the European “Scramble” and subsequent partition of Africa was accomplished largely by military means. By 1900 fifty colonial territories had replaced some 1,000 African polities or states. The process of conquering African peoples continued well into the twentieth century, as primary resistance was replaced by secondary resistance. In Europe, colonial warfare was often referred to as composed of “savage” wars, compared to the supposedly “civilized” wars that went on between modern industrial states.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the balance of weaponry and firepower of many African states was similar to that of European states. Both used single shot, muzzle-loading guns. However, Europe’s industrial growth and the increased manufacture of new and more powerful weapons, rapidly widened the technological gap between African and European states. After

1850, European armies became better organized, and navies were increasingly equipped with larger, faster, steam-driven steel warships equipped with larger guns. The extending telegraph system could be used to call reinforcements and supplies. Soldiers were armed with breech-loading and then repeating rifles, and by the 1890s the quick-firing machine gun had become standard equipment in the modern army. The volume, range, and disciplined firepower of European forces was overwhelmingly greater than that of any African army.

Europeans learned more about tropical disease and its prevention, but this did not have any significant effect until most of Africa had been conquered. For example, over 6,000 French troops died of disease in the Madagascar campaign of 1895, and the majority of British casualties in the South African War (1899–1902), were due to disease rather than military combat.

Certain peoples in Africa were never effectively “pacified” by European colonial rulers. Some resistance was lengthy and only involved small armies, for example the struggle by the Somalis against the British and Italians. Other resistance wars resulted in long campaigns and large forces, for example the Rif war against the Spanish and French in Morocco in 1921–1925, and the Italian attempts to defeat the Senusi in Libya from 1912–1931. In these and other twentieth-century military operations, the European colonial powers deployed bomber and fighter aircraft, armored cars, and tanks against relatively poorly armed Africans.

At the time of the “Scramble,” African states varied greatly in size. Some were large and relatively well-organized, such as Asante and Ethiopia, while others were small. Size and organization did not necessarily enable African states to resist foreign invasion; many large states collapsed following a major military defeat while small and seemingly less well-organized polities (the Nandi of Kenya for example) fought lengthy wars of resistance against the European invaders. Divisions within and rivalry between African states weakened their ability to resist foreign invasion and provided Europeans with African military allies. Some African states used diplomacy rather than war to secure better terms for themselves in the new colonial order (e.g., the Buganda Agreement, 1900). Ethiopia was the only African state to remain independent although eventually it was conquered by Italy in the brutal invasion of 1935–1936.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, some African states had access to firearms. These had to be imported, as Africa had no significant indigenous firearms industry. Local smiths could make and repair firearms, as did Samori Touré’s *forgerons* in Guinea, although locally produced iron and steel tended to be

of poor quality, as were the gunpowder and bullets produced within Africa. Muzzle-loading firearms, surplus to European requirements and superseded by new weaponry, continued to be imported into Africa where they were used for both hunting and warfare. By the Brussels Convention of 1890, the European colonial powers, determined to keep the balance of weaponry in their favor, placed an embargo on the import of modern precision weapons into Africa. A trickle of modern weapons continued to enter Africa, mainly in north and northeast Africa, to the benefit of Ethiopia. Thus, African soldiers went to war armed with a variety of weapons; some had guns but many carried spears, swords, clubs, or bows and arrows, all of which were inadequate to do battle with a well-equipped modern army.

Few African states had standing armies. Some South African societies, such as the Zulu, had well-trained armies organized by age groups, but in most states chiefs and vassals mobilized their men, who provided their own weapons, when hostilities threatened. During the 1880s the Asante state tried with little success to create a drilled and trained standing army. Women often accompanied African armies to provide food and comfort for the soldiers; in the army of Dahomey women also served as combatants. African soldiers mostly fought on foot. In some savanna and upland regions, for example Lesotho and the Sahel, horses were used in warfare. Mounted soldiers and horses, in cavalry states such as Sokoto, were protected by quilted armor.

In the early and mid-nineteenth century, mainly European (or West Indian) soldiers were used to fight African wars; this proved expensive of lives and money. European armies invariably required long and cumbersome supply lines which were vulnerable to attack and needed protection. In southern Africa, ox-wagons and horses moved supplies, but in tsetse fly-infected tropical areas, where draught animals could not be used, for even small campaigns thousands of human carriers had to be recruited, paid, fed, and forced to work.

From the 1870s onward small, locally recruited colonial armies were formed and increasingly became the mainstay of most military campaigns of conquest and “pacification.” Many colonial soldiers were mercenaries who came from ethnic groups living in peripheral areas of a colony, or from neighboring colonies. Certain peoples from which soldiers were drawn, for example the Hausa, Kamba, and Bambara, soon became identified by European recruiters as “martial races.” Most colonial armies numbered a few thousand infantry led by white officers. The Federal West African Frontier Force, created in 1898, consisted of fewer than 10,000 soldiers deployed in four colonies; the King’s African Rifles in East Africa numbered a mere 2,440 soldiers in 1913. A larger army was the

Force Publique, which grew to 20,000 men in the Congo Free States; under its Belgian masters it earned a reputation for brutal behavior. African troops were usually raised for employment within the continent but the French increasingly used Tirailleurs Sénégalais, recruited in West Africa, in overseas campaigns. By 1912 the French, in order to compensate for their demographic weakness compared to Germany, had begun to recruit a large black African army for use in the event of a European war.

Most colonial forces were little more than lightly armed gendarmerie. They had several advantages over European troops: they were cheaper to employ, less susceptible to tropical diseases, could live off the countryside while on campaigns, and, despite one or two mutinies, proved to be generally loyal. Of the mutinies, the most serious was that by Sudanese troops employed by the British in western Kenya and Uganda.

In colonial wars African forces rarely stood much chance against the well-disciplined and superior fire of European-led armies. Occasionally, European forces were defeated because of poor leadership and overconfidence, by being outnumbered or taken by surprise. African armies could also take advantage of the terrain, for example the Asante used forest stockades from which to fight the British. European major defeats were few but had serious political repercussions in the metropolises. In 1879, a 1,250-strong British force was surprised and destroyed by the Zulu army at Isandlwana, although at a cost of some 3,000 Zulu lives. However, later that day a small garrison of 130 British troops, well armed and behind hastily erected defenses, successfully held off a Zulu force of 2,000 to 4,000 at Rorke's Drift. Established Zulu tactics of soldiers armed with spears advancing at speed like the horns of a cow to engulf the enemy from each side, revolutionary when used against rival African armies, were ineffective in the face of rapid and accurate rifle fire. The Zulu possessed guns but these were not their main weapons nor properly used. In 1896, at Adwa, the Ethiopians utterly defeated an Italian invading army that had divided into three columns; the victory helped secure Ethiopia's independence. And in 1921 a 10,000 strong Spanish army was defeated by the Rif in Morocco.

In most open battles against European armies, Africans were defeated and suffered high casualties. For example, in Sudan, at the Battle of Karari (Omdurman) in 1898, over 11,000 Mahdist soldiers, mainly armed with spears and swords, were killed by artillery and machine gun fire while the invading British and Egyptians lost a mere handful of men. African leaders had to change their military strategy if they wished to continue successful resistance. Guinea's Samori Touré, defeated in open battle by the French, resorted to guerrilla tactics and a scorched earth policy. Guerrilla warfare was the

most successful form of African military resistance and made colonial "pacification" much more difficult, but also it often led to brutal action against civilians, as in the Nama-Herero rising in Namibia (1904–1907) and during the final stages of the South African War (1899–1902).

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See also: **Colonial Armies, Africans in; Martial Races.**

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Military Rule: *See* **Coup d'État and Military Rule: Postcolonial Africa.**

Mining

Africa's mineral resources have excited European imaginations for centuries. Prester John's fabled wealth inspired the Portuguese in their early imperial travels, and the search for King Solomon's mines continued to figure in European thinking even in the twentieth century.



Workers in a uranium mine in Roessing, Namibia, 1996. © Charlotte Thege/Das Fotoarchiv.

Minerals were a major component of the “treasure-house myth” that convinced many nineteenth-century Europeans that penetrating the African interior would be highly profitable. The myth held some measure of reality, in that Arabs and the Portuguese had long been trading in African gold and copper when national rivalries, commercial interests, and military considerations led to European penetration of the interior. Where minerals, particularly gold, were found (or in some instances even just thought to exist) finance capital soon followed.

Europeans acquired rights to minerals by conquest, the expansion of colonial occupation and control, or by “negotiation.” The Asante goldfields, for example, came under British control as part of the spoils of war, as did the copper mines of Katanga (Shaba) when King Leopold’s claim to the territory was confirmed by killing the local ruler, Msiri. In the Transvaal, by the time gold was discovered on the Rand, European settler control was sufficiently entrenched that no formal acquisition of rights from Africans was considered necessary. Earlier, the Griqua had lost their claim to the Kimberley diamond area on the Cape in a dispute also involving the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. The concession in Mashonaland by Lobengula, the basis of the British South Africa Company’s application for a charter to administer and exploit much of Central Africa, was obtained fraudulently; the two parties had very different ideas of what was granted. Similar concessions were negotiated elsewhere to justify mineral exploitation, ignoring the traditions that denied a chief the power to give away his people’s land.

Railways were essential for maintaining viable mining operations, although a high proportion of lines were originally built for military and political purposes. Power for the railways, as well as for mining and smelting operations, was primarily supplied by coal.

In the Transvaal, gold and coal mining were integrated, with further supplies from Natal. Wankie coal supplied the needs of southern Rhodesia and Katanga and later of the Copperbelt and Broken Hill (Kabwe). Nigerian coal was available for the Jos tin mines, and North African lines could rely on Algerian coal until steam engines were phased out in the 1950s.

In north and west Africa, labor demands were met by local populations or by migrant workers. Further south, the situation was different, due to the scale of operations and competition for labor from other economic activities (primarily agriculture) and because mineralized areas tended to be sparsely populated. Ethnically and geographically linked, and joined by the railway by 1911, Katanga’s copper mines were more closely linked to neighboring northern Rhodesia than to other parts of the Congo.

As mining developed on the Copperbelt, northern Rhodesians were needed closer to home and permission to recruit for Katanga ended. In response the Belgians extended their own recruiting activities and adopted a system of stabilized labor, whereby men signed contracts for longer periods than earlier migrant workers, with accommodation, health and educational facilities being provided for wives and children. Copperbelt companies also adopted stabilized labor, taking advantage of a pool of experienced mineworkers. The Belgians did not adopt as restrictive a color bar as prevailed further south, although this was perhaps more noticeable on the railways, where many engine drivers came from west Africa.

Exploitation of the northern Rhodesian (Zambian) copper mines only became feasible during the interwar period when technological advances (developed in the United States and Chile) made it possible to treat their deep sulphide ores. In contrast, Katanga’s oxide ores were closer to the surface, high grade, and relatively easily smelted. New technology also meant that the zinc and lead ores found at Broken Hill (Kabwe) that had previously proved financially disastrous for the British South Africa Company, could now be separated. Revenue from mining shifted the economic balance more toward northern Rhodesia, but southern Rhodesia, with its entrenched white settler population, continued to dominate the region politically.

Mines in southern Rhodesia, the Transvaal, and at Kimberley depended more heavily on migrant labor. Initially this was because African men and their communities were primarily interested in wage labor only as necessary to meet their needs or desires for cash and preferably at times when they were not required for agricultural work at home. At the same time, some people had developed almost a tradition of migrating into the Cape and elsewhere to find work. Mozambicans in particular formed a substantial part of the labor

force in Kimberley and elsewhere. The Kimberley mines were able to meet their African labor requirements from people who came forward voluntarily, even after they stopped paying wages in guns and ammunition. Rand gold and coal mines required virtually continuous recruitment.

Large numbers of African workers were needed for the gold mines, partly because of initial reluctance to risk massive capital but also because labor was the only factor of production over which the companies could exercise cost control and thereby affect their profitability. Machinery and other essential materials were imported at prices and transport costs outside their control. Before 1899 the Kruger government imposed a dynamite monopoly—a factor in the Jameson Raid and South African (Boer) War—which forced the mining companies to pay a protective tariff on imported explosives. The companies could, as long as they cooperated with one another, pay Africans low wages. To succeed, this required a steady, large movement of Africans to work on the mines. The number of volunteers was insufficient, and many workers were provided by “touts,” generally local traders who used debt to entrap Africans into agreeing to work on the mines for a wage considerably less than the “tout” received from the mining companies.

Many of these “touts” subsequently became licensed recruiting agents for the Chamber of Mines. The Chamber’s Native Labor Department wanted to ensure a regular flow of labor to the mines and avoid a rising spiral of competitive wages. Restricted recruiting rights in the Transvaal pushed the search into neighboring colonies. The Rand (later Witwatersrand) Native Labor Association, formed expressly for the purpose in 1897 had its greatest success in Mozambique where the Portuguese were happy to allow men from the southern districts of Gaza and Inhambane to be recruited for the Rand in exchange for a capitation fee, guaranteed traffic for the railway line to Lourenco Marques (Maputo), and preferential access to Transvaal markets. Mozambicans had long migrated to other parts of southern Africa, one of their most important motives being to escape the harsh Portuguese labor regime. They contracted for longer periods, some remaining on the Rand for several years at a time, and for several decades constituted half or more of the Transvaal mine labor force.

Apart from the more glamorous and capital consuming mining of gold and gem diamonds, southern, central, west, and north Africa have a range of mineral resources that have contributed in varying degrees to the economies of many countries. Nonferrous metals are found in abundance, although some, notably copper, have declined in value with increased use of plastics. Phosphates and manganese are found in North Africa along with coal

and iron. Uranium has also been significant, Katanga supplying the basis of early atomic experiments; and Namibia providing a substantial part of world supplies. A varied mineral resource base with substantial reserves of iron ore and limestone facilitated South Africa’s industrialization and unsmelted iron ore became a major export from Mauretania. Also significant have been the industrial quality diamonds from Angola, Namibia, the Kasai region of Congo, Sierra Leone, and most countries of West Africa. The profitability of mining gem quality diamonds can only be maintained by the restrictive selling practices controlled by De Beers Consolidated’s Central Selling Organization. Industrial diamonds, although not sold entirely without some regulation, have a more natural market in oil drilling and other industrial applications. Artificial diamonds threaten both.

It is not easy to determine the historic profitability of many mining companies. Apart from the lack of publicly available, accurate accounts, it is difficult to factor in to calculations the impact of direct and indirect transport subsidies, while the operations of international cartels also distort the picture. In South Africa gold mining was shown to be as profitable over the long-term as many other spheres of investment. Early fortunes tended to be made more from speculation in mining shares than from actual operations. Over time an increasing proportion of those profits were paid in South Africa rather than to foreign investors. Profits increased when the world’s economies went off the gold standard between the wars and subsequently when the price of gold was allowed to float. However profitable mining remained highly speculative.

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Mining, Multinationals, and Development

A major paradox of modern African development is that the continent is so richly endowed with mineral resources and yet remains the poorest in the world. This perception has fuelled considerable debate about both the colonial economic legacy and postcolonial impediments to effective linkages between the mining sector and broad-based economic progress. Discussion frequently focuses on negative aspects of investment by multinational corporations, but it remains necessary to recognize great spatial disparities in Africa's resource endowment and complexities in the historical pattern of mineral industry development.

A century of colonial exploration, prior to the 1960s, indicated widespread African mineralization, and this frequently led to the establishment of enclaves of capital-intensive mining, most notably on the Witwatersrand in South Africa. Insatiable demand for minerals during World War II and large-scale prospecting programs in the 1950s and 1960s confirmed Africa's vast but unevenly distributed mineral wealth. Southern Africa has been estimated to contain almost all the world's chromium reserves, Gabon and South Africa hold the world's largest manganese deposits, while Morocco and Tunisia have the largest phosphate resources. Massive deposits of gold, platinum, diamonds, copper, iron ore, bauxite, coal, and other minerals are also known. In general, the greatest concentration of mining is in southern Africa, with slightly lesser concentrations in the Maghrib, and a belt running through West Africa into the Congo basin.

Dependence on foreign mining companies, established in the colonial era, continued in many independent states, except where diminished by nationalization programs such as in Ghana (1961) and Zambia (1970), or in the unique case of South Africa, where large domestic mining corporations like Anglo-American and Gencor continued to dominate their own economy, as well as reaching out with mining investments in other parts of Africa. The increasingly capital-intensive and technologically-complex nature of mining projects frequently entailed a degree of reliance on foreign

investment and personnel that encouraged charges of neocolonialism. The British multinational RTZ was particularly vulnerable in this regard, with large investments not only in Zimbabwe and Zambia, but also in Namibia where its half-stake in the Rössing uranium mine was highly politically sensitive before independence in 1990.

Criticism of foreign multinationals normally focuses on the enclave nature of mining developments, which underutilize local supplies and managerial talent, while exporting minerals in a semiprocessed state, suppressing spin-off industrial developments within the host nation. Most African copper, for example, is shipped as ingots to Europe or Japan, where it undergoes the far more profitable process of fabrication into wire and other end-products. Foreign mining companies also stand accused of reinforcing export dependency in host nations, and so their susceptibility to global economic crises. An excessive part of the profit from mining and mineral processing is often supposed to be siphoned out of Africa, leaving little capital for local social investment. In addition, mining multinationals have often been seen as corruptly influencing host political regimes, for example American, German, and Swedish iron-ore interests in Liberia, especially before 1980. In this context, multinationals appear to have considerable leverage in pressuring host nations, within unequal bargaining situations, into granting overgenerous mineral concessions. And, taking a longer-term view, it can be argued that foreign mining firms often lack concern for the environment, or the sustainability of communities based on mining and smelting projects.

Anxiety about such issues led many postcolonial African states to nationalize all or part of their mineral industries. In 1961, four years after independence, Ghana established the State Mining Corporation (SMC) to take over various gold and diamond mining interests, while in Zambia the state took over 51 per cent of the copper industry in 1970 (until then controlled by South African, British, and American interests). By the mid-1980s, nationalization was widespread: ranging from 100 per cent control of Zaire's copper industry by the state-owned Gecamines, and 100 per cent control of Moroccan phosphate production by OCP, to the 37 per cent state-owned Lamco that dominated Liberian iron-ore mining. However, state involvement in the minerals sector did not always resolve the fundamental problems involved in dealing with foreign markets and companies: leverage by the latter could still result in iniquitous agreements. A classic case arose when Ghana was pressurized into funding the expensive Volta River hydro-electric scheme during the 1960s, to provide the cheap electricity that would persuade the U.S.-based Kaiser Aluminium Corporation to build a

large refinery in the country, which would then allow profitable mining of massive Ghanaian bauxite deposits, discovered before 1914. Once built, Kaiser controversially imported what it argued was cheaper Jamaican bauxite, despite protracted government pressure and anti-American demonstrations.

Nationalization also failed to protect mineral export-dependent nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Zambia from the world economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s. Like most primary products, copper prices slumped (by 50% in real terms between 1970 and 1976 alone) and remained low in historic terms through to the late 1990s. The economic effects on Zaire and Zambia were severe, since copper exports for both had accounted for about a third of GDP in the late 1960s. Africa in general suffered profoundly from the deteriorating real value of its mineral exports throughout the last quarter of the century, a problem made worse by the apparent inability of African states to influence global commodity prices. The short-lived copper exporters' association, CIPEC (modeled on OPEC), of which Zambia and Zaire were leading members, failed in the 1970s to make any impression on price-setting mechanisms firmly rooted in centers like London and New York. Nationalization was, moreover, charged with crippling many of Africa's mining enterprises. The state-run Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) was a prime example: political interference and poor management were reflected in badly deteriorating performance, with its share of world output slumping from 13.7 per cent in 1969 to 2.9 per cent in 1997.

South Africa's minerals sector requires some separate consideration, largely due to the country's distinctive historical development within the continent; generating an element of white capitalism—to a large degree independent of that in the European-American metropole—which has survived largely intact beyond the dismantling of apartheid. South Africa's mineral endowment is also one of the richest in the world: its mines since the late twentieth century have produced as much as two-thirds of the world's platinum, half its chromium and gold (although the latter declined to a fifth by 1997), and a fifth of its diamonds, as well as significant volumes of manganese, uranium, iron, coal, and copper. Political relations between government and the industry were close under apartheid, primarily through the medium of the Chamber of Mines (established 1889), dominated by the Johannesburg-based mining houses like Anglo-American and Gencor. Such corporations remain global operations of considerable stature: Anglo-American in particular is a huge multinational and by 1980 was estimated to control around 250 mining companies in twenty-two countries, as well as 73 manufacturing and

financial concerns. Notwithstanding the considerable benefits accruing to the South African economy from the minerals sector, this has recently experienced deep recession, particularly in gold mining. Falling gold prices (from \$613 an ounce in 1980 to \$250 in 1999) resulted in massive lay-offs and mine closures: 40,000 were made redundant in 1990 alone, and a continued slide in profitability during 1999 led to threats that 80,000 could lose their jobs. The impact extends beyond the borders of South Africa, since thousands of migrants from countries like Mozambique and Lesotho have long relied on work in the Witwatersrand mines.

Africa in the 1990s witnessed indications of a reversal of the depression in the minerals sector of the previous two decades, with accelerating exploration programs throughout the continent both by African and foreign companies. The South African firm JCI prospected in Ghana, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Swaziland, and in a reflection of shifting post-Cold War alignments, undertook a joint venture with the Mali government to reopen a gold mine last operated by the Russians in 1991. JCI has also been involved in the ongoing privatization of ZCCM, part of a wider program of denationalization by the Zambian government in the post-Kaunda era. More problematically, numerous multinationals have flocked to develop the mineral potential of Democratic Republic of Congo, during and after the civil war victory of Laurent Kabila. During the conflict, numerous firms scrambled for concessions from both sides: in 1997, for example, American Mineral Fields obtained a \$1 billion concession from Kabila to rehabilitate the Kolwezi copper and cobalt project, near Lubumbashi, although President Mobutu and Gecamines dismissed the contract as illegal. After Mobutu's fall, foreign companies were joined by Zimbabwean, Namibian, and South African groups in the search for concessions. In November 1998 a Zimbabwean entrepreneur was appointed head of the reconstituted state enterprise, Gecamines.

The potential for future African mineral exploitation appears considerable, although the capacity for converting this into broader-based economic development will undoubtedly prove more difficult. It is also clear that with a continuing trend toward more capital-intensive mining and processing, the minerals sector will continue to need foreign capital and enterprise, even if more of this can be found in African-based firms like Anglo-American and JCI. But a key role for mining is clear, if only because the biggest challenge is faced by those African states such as Niger and Burkina Faso that have few identifiable economic mineral deposits and consistently rank among the world's poorest nations.

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See also: **Multinationals and the State; South Africa: Mining.**

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Missionaries: See Angola: New Colonial Period: Christianity, Missionaries, Independent Churches; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.

Missionary Enterprise: Precolonial

Christianity flourished in Africa before it made its way to western and northern Europe. Preexisting beliefs in a single god existed in many parts of Africa and may have influenced the transition to monotheism in ancient Egypt. Much of Ethiopia, Nubia (the Sudan), and North Africa was Christianized by the fifth century. Nonetheless, from the fifteenth century onward, European Christian missionaries launched waves of evangelical agents into Africa.

Much of the fervor that fuelled Portugal's push down the Atlantic coast of Africa was a legacy of medieval Crusades to free the "Holy Lands" of the Middle East from Islamic domination. During the European Middle Ages, legends circulated about a mysterious Christian King, Prester John, who sought allies in the defense of his realm. Some speculated that that home was in Africa. When Portuguese navigators reached the Congo River in 1484, they encountered a powerful king who, if he was not Christian, was at least not Muslim. The missionary priests they dispatched in the



Livingstone's Zambesi expedition reaches Lake Malawi, September 1859. © Das Fotoarchiv.

hope of converting the Manicongo and his people to Christianity launched the first modern missions to Sub-Saharan Africa. As the Portuguese proceeded to seize strongholds in Angola and on the East African coast, Catholic missions followed. While the flame of Portuguese missionary enthusiasm subsequently waned, it never entirely died.

In the eighteenth century, Protestants turned their attention to Africa. Stimulated by movements in Central Europe which expected that Christ's second coming would be marked by the evangelization of the world, and sparked by the rise of Methodism in Britain which emphasized that salvation could be attained by individual effort, new missionary societies were formed to bring the Gospel to Africa. Moravian missionaries established a foothold in South Africa in the mid-eighteenth century. By the turn of the nineteenth century a host of British missionary societies had sprung up.

Some of the new enthusiasm for Africa derived from guilt about European participation in the Atlantic slave trade. First the Quakers, and then all the major Protestant denominations, denounced the trade as sinful. The British colony of Sierra Leone originated as settlement for freed slaves, led by Protestant evangelicals who hoped it might serve as a bridgehead for the conversion of Africa. The idea of substituting "legitimate trade" for the slave trade underpinned a number of early missions to West Africa, the most notable of which was the Church of England's push into Nigeria, led by an African bishop, Samuel Crowther.

The Cape of Good Hope with its less threatening climate and British government, proved to be a magnet

for missionaries in the early nineteenth century. It also set the scene for what was to be a series of confrontations between white settlers and Christian evangelists.

Neither Dutch nor British settlers at the Cape cared much for the missionaries. They despised agents such as Johannes van der Kemp and James Read, who adopted African lifestyles. They feared agents such as John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa from 1822 to 1849, who advocated equal rights for Africans and championed the independence of African rulers. In 1854 John William Colenso was appointed as bishop of Natal and soon made himself an unpopular defender of African rights. By the 1870s American Congregationalists, French Calvinists, Scottish Presbyterians, German Lutherans, Roman Catholics, and Swedish and Norwegian missions had spread themselves along the South African coast and into the interior. The progress of their religion lagged behind the extension of their operations. Almost everywhere Africans seemed indifferent to their message. They made little headway among chiefs and the leaders of society. Their small congregations were drawn mostly from the poor, the outcast, and the alienated. In the face of such obstinacy, many missionaries openly prayed that the extension of European colonial rule might pave the way for the advance of their religion. On the eve of the Zulu War of 1879, for example, most missionaries in the region lined up on the side of the British invaders.

The double-edged character of nineteenth-century missions was exemplified by David Livingstone of the London Missionary Society. Initially employed as an assistant to the venerable Robert Moffat of Kuruman, Livingstone was discouraged by the agonizingly slow progress of his religion among the Tswana. Much more exciting was the discovery of new lands for the propagation of the faith. He was appalled by the white Afrikaner "Voortrekkers" who used force to seize African territory and steal African children. As he ventured out into unknown regions, he began to realize that Afrikaner slave trading was only a small part of the problem in East Africa. Like the West African missionaries before him, Livingstone advocated "Commerce and Christianity" as remedies for the slave trade. His expeditions to the Zambezi and the great lakes of East Africa were motivated by a desire to "open up" Africa to trade and missions. At the same time that he was exposing the evils of the slavers, he was paving the way for European colonization. His plea to the undergraduate students of Oxford and Cambridge in the 1850s inspired the Universities' Mission to Central Africa. When Africa seemed to have swallowed him up in the late 1860s, an international effort was launched to "find Livingstone." The explorer Henry Morton Stanley, whose embarrassed greeting,

"Dr. Livingstone, I presume," confirmed his "rescue" of the lost missionary, went on to open the Congo River Basin to exploitation by the notorious regime of Leopold II's Congo River Free State. Commerce proved to be a dubious partner with Christianity.

Although European missionaries reaped the lion's share of publicity for the evangelical thrust into what they termed "the Dark Continent" (because, in their opinion, it had yet to be illuminated by "Christian truth") the basic work of conversion was done by Africans. Except in Uganda, mass conversions were rarely accomplished by European agency. Mission stations isolated themselves from the surrounding populations. African evangelists went out and met the people. A largely unsung army of African preachers made their continent the scene of Christianity's greatest modern triumphs.

Africa was also the scene of much religious innovation. Protestant missionaries, who stressed the importance of Scripture, worked hard at translating the Bible into African languages. This not only laid the basis for the today's grammars of those languages, it stimulated the workings of Africans' religious imaginations. The Old Testament spoke of ancient Hebrew people who allowed polygamy, people who aspired to live comfortably amid their flocks and fields, people who feared witches, who heard prophets, and who suffered under the yoke of foreign oppressors: in short, people who appeared to be like them. Wherever the Christian message was preached, it inspired Africans to craft their own interpretations of the Bible. It inspired some of them to prophetic utterance.

In the Congo, in the first decade of the eighteenth century, a young African woman announced that she had received direct messages from Saint Anthony and that she, Dona Beatrice Kimpa Vita, would shortly give birth to a child of divine fatherhood, who would correct the false interpretations of Scripture promulgated by the Catholic missionaries. As her Antonian Movement spread, authorities became alarmed and she was burned at the stake. In early nineteenth-century South Africa, a prophet, Ntsikana, arose among the Xhosa people with a message that combined African insights with the message lately promulgated in the region by missionaries. Luckier than Dona Beatrice, a hymn he composed is much loved and still sung in South African churches. Late in the nineteenth century, Protestant churches in southern Africa began to suffer defections from their congregations. One after another, a series of African Christians refused to conform any longer to the dictates of missionary authority and founded their own churches. By the end of the century there had been so many of these that not only missionaries but colonial authorities spoke of the "menace" of what was termed the "Ethiopian movement." In West Africa the growth of the new churches was termed the

Aladura movement. Some west and central African prophets acquired huge followings; among the most notable were the Prophet Harris of Côte d'Ivoire and Simon Kimbangu of the Congo.

Various scholarly interpretations of these movements have been put forward. Some hypothesize that they were reactions against the refusal of the European missionaries to treat their converts as equal and their hesitation to ordain them as ministers. Others, noting that the more authoritarian Roman Catholic missions suffered fewer defections, lean toward the opinion that Protestantism itself, with its emphasis on direct communication with the Holy Spirit and individual interpretation of the Scriptures, was responsible for fission in the churches. Still others see the prophetic Zionist and Ethiopian movements as veiled expressions of hostility to colonialism.

However, over the course of the twentieth century, many missionary organizations and mainstream churches made their peace with the secessionists. So did the state, for the realization grew that the Independent Churches (as they are generally called today) did not, for the most part, pose anything more than a symbolic threat to secular authorities. Today most of the Independent Churches are no longer condemned by missions as heretical but are accepted as a genuine and important aspect of the Christianization of Sub-Saharan Africa.

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See also: Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Independence and Churches, Mission-Linked and Independent; Religion, History of.

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Mobutisim: See Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of Zaire: Mobutu, Zaire, and Mobutuism.

Mogadishu

Mogadishu is Somalia's largest city and its capital since independence. European writers and historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries routinely described it as having been founded in the tenth or eleventh century by Arab immigrants. We may perhaps never know the source word or words for Mogadishu, which may have come from some Bantu or Cushitic dialect. However, most certainly, in its early days, Mogadishu was a small fishing village like the many villages along the East African coast populated by Africans of Bantu descent; later it became part of the ancient network of trading towns that existed between Africa, Arabia, and India, as has been described in the *Periplus Maris Erythraie*, a Greek manual for seafaring merchants in the first century CE. At that time, Mogadishu was a seaport that exported tortoise shells, ivory, rhinoceros horn, and nautilus shells.

After the arrival of Islam, the city would become part of what was then the Swahili civilization, a series of Muslim city-states strung along the Indian Ocean, with Mogadishu being its most northern point. In its Swahili period, Mogadishu often became the adopted home of Asiatic travelers and seafarers; these immigrants contributed to the diversity of the city's population.

Some time after the tenth century, Mogadishu started a period of its history that might be called the Benadir period, distinct from the purely Swahili period. This later period marks the beginning of Mogadishu as a city ruled by Somalis who had migrated from the



The people of Mombasa line the streets for a British royal visit, 1956. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

north. This period is so named because the coast came to be known as the Benadir coast. The word “benadir” (cities; singular, “bendar”), is Persian and entered the Somali language through the northern ports, by way of sea merchants from the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

In 1331 Ibn Battatu, the Muslim traveler from what is now Morocco, visited the major coastal Somali cities; he described both the residents of Zeilah in the far north and those of Mogadishu as being of the same kind of people, namely black Berbers who spoke the Berber language (“Berber” was the medieval Arab term for Somalis and peoples closely related to them). He also mentioned that its merchants were wealthy and exported locally made textiles to Egypt and other places. Almost two centuries later, a Portuguese, Duarte Barbosa, described it in these words:

It has a king over it, and is a place of great trade in merchandise. Ships come there from the kingdom of Cambay [India] and from Aden with stuffs of all kinds, and with spices. And they carry away from there much gold, ivory, beeswax, and other things upon which they make a profit. In this town there is plenty of meat, wheat, barley, and horses, and much fruit; it is a very rich place. (Hersi, p.196.)

Mogadishu’s fortunes would change for the worse with the arrival, in the Indian Ocean region, of the Portuguese, the precursors of European enterprise, and domination in the Indian Ocean and Far East trade. In 1499 Mogadishu was bombarded by the Portuguese captain Vasco da Gama and was again attacked in 1518. The Portuguese were not able to take or keep the town under their domination; however, their raiding and piracy disrupted trade and thrust the coastal cities, including Mogadishu, into a deep decline.

In the seventeenth century the Abgal Yaquub, a Somali clan (located today in the north of Mogadishu) overthrew the Muzaffar dynasty and started the Abgal Yaquub dynasty. The Abgal instituted a system of governance in which the ruler was called an *imam* (the previous rulers of Mogadishu were either called sultans or shaykhs). Because of the new trade patterns established by Europeans in the Indian Ocean and Far East, the new dynasty was unable to restore Mogadishu’s glory and prosperity. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries the city drew inward and focused on its ties with the hinterland, especially in the Shabelle valley, which provided the city with produce.

In 1842 a power struggle developed between the heirs of the recently deceased imam: Ahmed Mohamed, the deceased imam’s son, and a nephew, Ahmed Mohamud. As the succession conflict intensified, Mogadishu became a divided city, with a “no-man’s land” separating

its two halves of Shingani and Hamarweyne. With the conflict unresolved for a number of years and the city nearly ruined, elders from the Hamarweyne district sent a request to the Zanzibari ruler, who was of Omani origins, and had earlier manifested a desire to add Mogadishu to his new dominions in East Africa. In 1843, in response to that request, the Zanzibari ruler, Seyyid Said, appointed a Somali, one Ali Mohamed, as his governor. However, Zanzibari involvement remained nominal, and the Zanzibari ruler had to pay tribute to the powerful sultan of the Geledi, whose lands lay to the west of the city (Alpers).

Thus, Mogadishu’s affairs remained in local hands. By the middle of nineteenth century, Mogadishu grew more prosperous by serving as an outlet to the increasingly productive farming communities of the Shabelle valley, which were producing grain, sesame oil, and Orchella weed for export (Cassanelli).

As the nineteenth century came to a close, another chapter of Mogadishu’s history would start: the Italian period, which would last until 1960. In an age when major European powers were engaged in the “Scramble” for Africa, the Italians established their colony of Somalia, with its capital as Mogadishu. Today the Italian influence, whether in architecture or food, is still visible in the city, which had a large Italian population during the heyday of Italian colonialism in the region.

As the capital of the Somali Republic formed from British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, Mogadishu would see its importance increase phenomenally and would grow into the biggest Somali city. In the 1970s and 1980s, Muhammad Siad Barré’s government would invest substantial amounts in renovating Mogadishu in an Italian style, marked by large government buildings, towering statues, and gardens. However, after Siad Barré was overthrown in 1991 in a bloody revolt, factional fighting reduced much of Mogadishu’s public and commercial infrastructure into rubble. The city became divided into two zones, one held by Ali Mahdi, and the other by General Aidid. Later, more factional fighting created several smaller fiefdoms in Mogadishu, each governed by a warlord with his own militia. The city played a central role in the U.S.-led UN humanitarian international intervention dubbed “Operation Rescue Hope.” In the aftermath of that failed mission, Mogadishu remains a divided city with no unified administration.

MOHAMED DIRIYE ABDULLAHI

See also: Ibn Battuta, Mali Empire and; Somalia: Barré, Mohamed Siad, Life and Government of; Somalia: Nineteenth Century; Nomads to British and Italian Protectorates; Somalia: 1990 to the Present; Somalia: Pastoralism, Islam, Commerce, Expansion: To 1800.

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Mokhehle, Ntsu (1918–1998)

Prime Minister and Opposition Politician

The fifth of ten children, Ntsu Mokhehle grew up in his native village of Ha Mokhehle, in the Tejatejaneng district. After an irregular attendance of school punctuated by financial difficulties and illness, Ntsu finished his secondary education in the normal time of five years. In 1940 he went to Fort Hare on a government scholarship. His studies were marked by interruptions due to involvement in political activities.

While at Fort Hare, Ntsu met a group of individuals who would shape the political destinies of various countries in the region. His participation in activities aimed at addressing students' grievances and involvement in student politics in general at Fort Hare helped to widen and sharpen the political consciousness of a young man who had already shown his political awareness by joining Lekgotla la Bafo (LLB) in Lesotho in the mid-1930s. Ntsu also joined, led, or founded a number student organizations and teacher organizations. In their own way these organizations challenged colonialism and championed the nationalist cause, however narrowly.

Ntsu's involvement in wider, nationalist politics began with his membership in the LLB in Lesotho and the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League in South Africa.

After he returned to Lesotho in 1950, Ntsu suffered at the hands of the colonial regime, which blocked all his efforts to secure a job suitable for someone of his qualifications. This increased his determination to resist the colonial regime. In 1952 he formed the Basutoland African National Congress (BAC, the name was changed to Basutoland Congress Party, or BCP, in 1959). His membership in the LLB, combined with the blessing he received from the leadership of that ailing organization, gave him an almost ready-made following for his party.

Ntsu undertook a number of overseas trips in connection with Lesotho's advancement toward independence. He attended the All-African People's Convention in Ghana. In 1959 he visited Guinea Bissau and met President Sékou Touré. In 1962 he appeared before the United Nations' decolonization committee and petitioned that body to pressure Britain into granting Lesotho independence sooner. He was a member of the 1964 BNC delegation that finalized constitutional talks with Britain.

Although the BAC/BCP initially advocated a position similar to that espoused by the ANC, Ntsu himself had always subscribed to more militant Africanist and anticommunist views. Thus, when the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) broke away from the ANC in 1959, the BCP aligned with it. His ideological position notwithstanding, Ntsu was able to establish friendly relations with progressive organizations and individuals and, until the late 1970s, had cordial relations with a number of socialist countries.

His party won the 1970 general elections, but Chief Leabua refused to hand over power and incarcerated Ntsu and other opposition leaders. He was freed in 1970 after signing a document declaring that intimidation had marred the 1970 elections and that new elections would be arranged and held in due course. In 1974, frustrated by Chief Leabua's actions, Ntsu's supporters staged a poorly coordinated uprising which Leabua's forces easily crushed. Ntsu was forced to flee Lesotho and he lived in Botswana for a time before he was expelled and went to Zambia. Exiled and seeing no other means of overthrowing Leabua, Ntsu established a military wing of his party, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which began raiding Lesotho in 1979. At the same time, South Africa began its destabilization campaign against countries that it accused of harboring ANC and PAC: Lesotho was on that list. Soon South African operatives persuaded Ntsu that they had a common enemy and that they should work together. The LLA split and a faction led by Ntsu collaborated with South African agents.

Ntsu returned to Lesotho in 1988 and participated in processes leading to the restoration of constitutional rule in Lesotho. In 1993 his party won all sixty parliamentary seats, and he was named prime minister. However, his government was weak and suffered not only from lack of cooperation from state institutions filled with members of Leabua's party but also deep in-party divisions. It was because of these divisions that, in 1997, Ntsu was forced to leave the BCP and form another party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The majority of the parliament joined his party, and this new party formed a government. This caused a controversy that raged until the end of the term for Ntsu's government, in 1998. In the elections of that

year, his party (now led by Pakalitha Mosisili) won in seventy-nine out of the eighty constituencies.

As a politician, Ntsu was known among his opponents as a man of no fixed principles; he took any political position that served his current interests. He had a keen lifelong interest in the history of Lesotho in general and in Moshoeshe I in particular. Among his writings is a pamphlet in which he tried to synthesize Moshoeshe I's ideas, sayings, and deeds into a systematic ideology.

Ntsu died in December 1998, shortly after his eightieth birthday.

MOTLATSI THABANE

See also: **Jonathan, Chief Joseph Leabua; Lesotho.**

Biography

Born in Ha Mokhehle, in the Tejatejaneng district, in 1918. Ntsu completed his primary education at a local Anglican primary school in 1933. In 1940 he went to Fort Hare on a government scholarship. He was expelled in 1941, the University readmitted him in 1942. He completed his degree in 1943. He taught and then rejoined Fort Hare in 1946 on a study grant from the South African Institute for Scientific Research. He completed the degree with distinction in 1947. Thereafter, he enrolled for a University Education Diploma, which he passed with distinction. In 1948 and 1949 he taught at South African schools before returning to Lesotho. In 1952 he formed the Basutoland African National Congress (BAC, the name was changed to Basutoland Congress Party, or BCP, in 1959). His party won the 1970 general elections, but Chief Leabua refused to hand over power and incarcerated Ntsu and other opposition leaders. He was freed in 1970 after signing a document declaring that intimidation had marred the 1970 elections and that new elections would be arranged and held in due course. In 1974, frustrated by Chief Leabua's actions, Ntsu's supporters staged a poorly coordinated uprising, which Leabua's forces easily crushed. He was forced to flee Lesotho and he lived in Botswana for a time before he was expelled and went to Zambia. Ntsu returned to Lesotho in 1988 and participated in processes leading to the restoration of constitutional rule in Lesotho. In 1997, he formed the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). He died in December 1998.

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**Momoh, Joseph Saidu: See Sierra Leone:
Momoh, Joseph Saidu: Regime, 1986–1992.**

Mondlane, Eduardo (1920–1969) *Politician, Leader of FRELIMO*

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane won one of the very few places for black students at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, where he studied social sciences. Here, he encountered many new ideas, meeting with African students and discussing politics in the Diogenes Club, the Progressive Forum, and the Students Liberal Association. He mixed also in white circles and was exposed to many liberal ideas. Mondlane helped to establish the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (NESAM), predominantly involving Mozambican secondary school students in Lourenco Marques. It was organized by the few Mozambican students attending university in South Africa. A future president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano cut his political teeth through NESAM, later becoming its leader. As a result of these activities the Malan government in South Africa handed Mondlane over to the Portuguese authorities, where he was imprisoned and investigated by the PIDE state police.

He was later sent by the authorities to study in Portugal, as he was considered too dangerous if left in Mozambique. With the secret police continuing to keep him under surveillance, he decided to leave Portugal and continue his studies in the United States. After earning a doctorate, he became a university professor, then took up an appointment as a research officer in the United Nations Trusteeship department. This new post gave him some relative political immunity from persecution and he took leave to visit Mozambique for three months in 1961. As a guest of the Swiss Protestant Mission, he held numerous meetings with young people and built up support for the impending national independence struggle. Among those he met at that time was Samora Machel, the future president of Mozambique.

The dictatorship in Portugal forbade any African nationalist organizations inside the colonies. Mondlane kept some distance from the three proto-nationalist movements existing at that time, each of which had predominantly a regional base of support inside Mozambique but were obliged to have headquarters in neighboring countries. The National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) was based in

Southern Rhodesia, the National Union for Mozambican Independence (UNAMI) was based in Malawi and the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) was based in Tanganyika. In 1961 Mondlane met President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and it was agreed that Nyerere's country would provide a rear base. The following year, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was formed, joining together UDENAMO, UNAMI, and MANU under the presidency of Mondlane, with its external headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

Portugal, the colonizing power, was never likely to countenance African nationalist opposition in its colonies. FRELIMO, barred from legal and peaceful avenues of protest, launched an armed struggle in September 1964. Mondlane believed that to be effective, a guerrilla war would have to be waged in the countryside. He had absorbed the experiences of other successful armed struggles from around the world faced with a similar intransigent dictatorship and he applied the lessons of armed struggle creatively to Mozambique.

Mondlane had a rather turbulent time in the early years of FRELIMO, having to manage significant in-fighting, in addition to the main task of leading the anticolonial struggle. FRELIMO opened up war fronts in four provinces initially, but these were soon reduced to the two northernmost provinces of Mozambique, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado, bordering onto Tanzania. In 1968 a new front was opened up in Tete Province and support for FRELIMO grew. Unlike Angola, there were no substantial nationalist party rivals to FRELIMO, for which Mondlane can take much of the credit. He had a talent for identifying and coopting many able young men into the Central Committee of the party. He supported the young radicals in their battle with the old guard in the period surrounding FRELIMO's Second Congress held in 1968, notably Samora Machel, head of the army, Joaquim Chissano, and Armando Guebuza. In particular Mondlane stood firmly against those espousing racism, tribalism, and regionalism at that time. Mondlane inspired confidence in FRELIMO both internationally and among Mozambicans. As such, he was targeted by the Portuguese authorities and was assassinated in 1969, when he opened a parcel bomb.

Mondlane's avowed antiracism, inclusiveness, and opposition to tribalism and regionalism provided an important legacy for the FRELIMO party and for the politics of postindependence Mozambique. He is regarded as the father of Mozambican nationalism, even though he never lived to see the independence of his country.

BARRY MUNSLow

See also: **Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Mozambique: Machel and the Frelimo Revolution, 1975–1986.**

Biography

Born in the province of Gaza in southern Mozambique in 1920. Spent youth herding goats. Refused entry to secondary school inside Mozambique on the grounds of being too old, went to South Africa to continue his studies. Completed his secondary education in the 1940s at a school in northern Transvaal. Won a scholarship to the the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, where he studied social sciences. Sent to Portugal to study by the authorities, as he was considered too dangerous in Mozambique. Left Portugal to continue his studies in the United States, where he met his American wife, Janet Mondlane, with whom he had a son and two daughters. Studied sociology and anthropology, gaining a doctorate at Northwestern University. Became a professor, then took up an appointment as a research officer in the United Nations Trusteeship department. In 1962 FRELIMO was created and he assumed leadership. Assassinated 1969.

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Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640

The Christian church in Egypt (now known as the Coptic Orthodox Church) traces its beginnings to Saint Mark's evangelization in the year 41 and the Coptic Church calendar begins in 284. With the accession of Diocletian to the Roman throne, Mediterranean Africa was a vital player in Christianity during this period. In the first centuries of the Common Era, Egypt was the most significant see of the church, and the Catechical School of Alexandria was the center of Christian knowledge and philosophy.

In the late fourth- and fifth-century Roman world, Christianity was tied to political and economic power. After 392, when Emperor Theodosius consecrated Christianity as the state religion, the Christian church and its leadership became an integral part of the power

structure of the Roman Empire. When Constantinople became the political capital of the Roman Empire, Alexandria became the third most significant Christian center (instead of second place) after Constantinople in the eyes of Eastern Christians in general. Yet, Alexandria remained a significant Christian center and had popular support from the tens of thousands of Egyptian monks. Alexandria also had support from time to time from Rome, as fear of Constantinople's authority threatened Roman pre-eminence.

Monasticism was another contribution that Egyptians made to the history of Christianity. The monastic practice became very popular in Egypt and was in many ways the soul of the Coptic Church in the fifth and sixth centuries. Monophysite theology, emphasizing only the divinity (as opposed to the humanity) of Christ, was in keeping with monastic ascetic practice that sought to deny human needs in order to obtain a higher spiritual existence.

By the fifth century, the bishops of Rome and Constantinople found the Egyptian leaders' preeminence threatening. Egyptians had maintained their own language and culture during Greek rule and resented imposition of foreign power and ideas. Theological disagreements, which reflected political schisms and power struggles, marked the fifth century Christian Mediterranean world. The difference in thinking between the Antiochene and Alexandrian schools of theology accounts for much of the debate that arose over Christ's nature and led to the rise of monophysitism. Antiochene theologians tended to be more concerned about rational interpretations of religious doctrine than mystical ones. They also laid greater emphasis on the full humanity of Christ and the distinction between human and divine natures, while Alexandrian theologians were much more mystical and emphasized the unity of the divine and human in one person.

In many ways, monophysite theology was a reaction to contemporary Nestorianism. Named for Nestorius (whose views are deemed heretical by the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches), this variant emphasized Christ's nature as distinctly dual, both divine and human. In 427 Nestorius, originally from Antioch, became bishop of Constantinople. His emphasis on the humanity of Christ attracted the attention of Alexandrian theologians. Cyril, the bishop of Alexandria (412–444), was one of the chief opponents of this belief, preaching what later monophysite believers looked upon as the foundations of their theology, that Christ was truly and only divine. While Cyril recognized the two natures of Christ, he claimed they had been joined by the hypostatic union to form one nature of the Incarnate Word. If there was a founder of monophysitism, it was Cyril.

Cyril's concerns were not simply theological. Like his predecessor, Theophilus, he wanted to reestablish

the preeminence of the see of Alexandria. Emperor Theodosius II (r.408–450) called for a council at Ephesus (in western Asia Minor) in 431 to settle the dispute; Cyril presided as papal legate. Nestorius was condemned and deposed, and a new patriarch at Constantinople replaced him. Cyril's attack on Nestorius led Alexandria to new heights of power and influence in the Christian church.

Monophysite proponents were not only found in Egypt. Eutyches (378–457), archimandrite of a great monastery just outside the walls of Constantinople, took Cyril's orthodox statement in an extreme, heretical direction and proclaimed that Christ did not have the same nature as humans. (Monophysites today do not accept Eutyches' extreme interpretation of monophysite doctrine.) In Constantinople in 448, Bishop Flavian (patriarch of Constantinople) called a local synod during which Eutyches was deposed and excommunicated for his beliefs. Eutyches did not submit to his condemnation but instead sought support from the pope and Dioscor, the patriarch of Alexandria (444–451). Emperor Theodosius II was also sympathetic to Eutyches' position, as were many Egyptian theologians.

Dioscor, like Cyril, hoped to see the triumph of Alexandrian over Antiochene theology. A synod was held at Ephesus in 449 to resolve the dispute. Dioscor ensured his theological success with military assistance. The emperor also sent soldiers to protect Eutyches. The synod is remembered less for its dialogue than for its brutality. Soldiers rushed into the church on the first day, creating disorder and causing violence. Flavian was deposed and Eutyches was declared innocent. Those bishops reluctant to sign the sentences of deposition were compelled to do so by soldiers. This council was not regarded as a legitimate council in the West and was designated the Robber's Synod.

A new empress, Pulcheria, and her husband, Marcian (r.450–457), sympathetic to Flavian's antimonophysite position and more Western-oriented than Pulcheria's brother and predecessor (Theodosius II), called another synod at Chalcedon (across the Bosphorus from Constantinople) in 451. Delegates presented evidence as to the violent methods employed by Dioscor at Ephesus. This time Dioscor lacked not only the emperor's support, but that of many in Alexandria, who felt he had mistreated Cyril's relatives. Dioscor and other monophysite theologians, such as Eutyches, were condemned and deposed. The dual, yet unified, nature of Christ was accepted as orthodox Christian belief. Monophysites and their belief that Christ's humanity was not of the same nature as humankind, and that Christ's one divine nature was to be emphasized above his dual nature, was deemed heretical by the Roman Catholic Church.

In Alexandria, the verdict of Chalcedon was met with anger. While some Egyptian Christian leaders

accepted the new orthodoxy, most did not. Constantinople recognized the danger of Alexandria's volatility. The patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius (1471–489), with Emperor Zeno (r.474–491) addressed a letter of compromise (the *Henoticon*) to Peter Mongus. It accepted Cyril's theology, but rejected that of Nestorius and Eutyches. Mongus agreed with the compromise and thus led Alexandria from 477 to 490. This restored peaceful relations with Constantinople for a time and encouraged monophysite belief in the eastern portion of the empire. The Western church, however, rejected the *Henoticon* because it diminished the authority of the Council of Chalcedon.

By the sixth century, economic power in Egypt had passed to the monasteries and landowners. Egyptian monophysites were proselytizing in lands to the south, such as Nubia and Ethiopia. Most Nubians had converted to the monophysite variant of Christianity by the end of the sixth century. When Justin I acceded to power (r.518–527) in Rome, he challenged the Alexandria-Constantinople detente because he wanted to restore Constantinople-Rome relations. In 537 Emperor Justinian (r.527–565) chose Paul as the Christian patriarch in Alexandria. He was given military authority to enforce Chalcedon in Egypt. The Chalcedonian church that emerged was Greek-speaking and wealthy, although small in numbers. In contrast, the monks and peasants of the Nile valley, greater in numbers, remained monophysite, although their influence was limited.

Monophysite leaders began consecrating and ordaining themselves and developing a separate organization for their church in the mid-sixth century, while monophysite believers in Syria and Armenia established their own churches. The Muslim invasion of Egypt in 639CE led to the conversion of the majority of Christians to Islam over the course of the next several hundred years. The Coptic Church, although small, is the largest Christian church in modern-day Egypt, with 6 million members, out of a population of approximately 58 million.

KATHLEEN R. SMYTHE

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Monrovia

Monrovia, located along the coast of West Africa at Cape Mesurado, has remained the capital of Liberia since it was founded in 1822. Its establishment was due to the initiative of the American Colonization Society, which was aimed at solving the then prevalent American problem of finding the best solution to the problems associated with freed black slaves. The society acquired land from the Dei rulers in 1822 for the resettlement of freed blacks who were willing to move to Africa.

Although Monrovia began with a small nucleus of returnee slaves from America, it was from here that what eventually became known as Liberia emerged. The Monrovia settlement grew in size and population over time, as more and more freed blacks arrived from the United States. With time, new settlements emerged inland, and so began what became the core and capital city of Liberia. The name "Monrovia" was derived from the name of the U.S. president who provided support for the establishment of the original settlement, James Monroe.

In its early years, the Monrovia population was comprised of the returnee freed slaves referred to as Americo-Liberians and the indigenous Dei and Bassa people who settled in the territory. The Americo-Liberians were, however, dominant in population as well as in the affairs of the state. Over time, the city grew increasingly cosmopolitan, with the Bassa, Kru, and Garebo kinspeople of the Dei swelling the indigenous population, as well as people from other West African states.

A remarkable feature of Monrovia is its deep water harbor, which makes it a key port in West Africa. It is therefore not only the seat of administration but also the commercial center of Liberia. Monrovia's port is the main outlet of Liberia's exports such as rubber, palm kernel, gold, and iron ore, as well as the main site where imports are received. The commercial activities of its inhabitants date back to the foundation of the city, for they have always been engaged in trade.

Monrovia is also the seat of the University of Liberia, which was founded in 1963, and where the Roberts Field International airport is located. The first constitutional conference in modern Africa was held in Monrovia in 1839. It is also the base of the first West Africa newspaper, the *Liberia Herald*, established in 1930.

Even though partly ravaged by the civil strife in Liberia, Monrovia was the only city that was not

MONROVIA

completely captured by the rebel forces throughout the duration of the 1989–1996 Liberian civil war. This is partly explained by the fact that it formed the military base of the ECOMOG peace initiative.

In 1999 President Charles Taylor was suspected of supporting antigovernment rebels in Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leon. The governments of these nations, in turn, lent support to anti-Taylor forces.

Fighting continued into 2003. In March of that year, the anti-Taylor forces, known as the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) marched toward Monrovia. Citizens in the capital were caught in warfare between the warring factions. In August, West African peacekeepers, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), sent peacekeeping forces to Monrovia. Several hundred Monrovia citizens died in the crossfire. The starving populace was receiving food aid as of August and September 2003.

C. B. N. OGBOBO

See also: **Liberia.**


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Morocco: Sa'dians

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the opposite shores of the Mediterranean were characterized by contrasting political developments. Whereas Spain and Portugal had achieved some territorial integration and consolidation as dynastic states, the Maghrib was divided into competing "power states." According to Ibn Khaldun these were the Hafsids of Tunis (1229–1574), the Abd al-Wadids or Ziyanyids of Tlemcen (1236–1550), and the Marinids/Wattasids of Fez (1269–1420; 1420–1540). They were the political offshoots of the defunct Almohad regime (1147–1269) that had exercised previously exercised unified political rule. The political fragmentation of the Maghrib rendered it vulnerable to its northern neighbors. The reaction to Portuguese imperialism in Morocco produced the Sa'dians, just as the opposition to Spanish imperialism in the rest of the Maghrib inaugurated the rule of the Ottoman Turks.

At various times in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Portugal occupied a number of coastal towns on the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of Morocco:




Morocco.

Ceuta (1415), al-Qasr al-Saghir (1458), Arzila and Tangier (1471), Safi (1481), Azemmour (1456), Massa (1497), Agadir (1505), Mogador (1506), Agouz (1507), and Mazagan (1514). The coastal towns became the base from which the Portuguese exercised a de facto protectorate over the immediate hinterland. Communities within this informal empire came under Portuguese supervision, prompted by security concerns, amounting to regimentation; those outside the imperial orbit were victims of periodic *razzias* by armed Portuguese bands. *Entradas*, as these *razzias* were called, were lucrative, if hazardous, ventures, procuring the booty, both human and material, which furnished much of the wealth of the Portuguese establishment in Morocco. The Portuguese occupation also entailed their control of Morocco's maritime trade. They instituted a monopolistic commercial regime on the seaboard, stifling indigenous enterprise

The humiliation of Portuguese domination called for an organized opposition, which the leadership in Morocco could not provide. The Sa'dians came to power in Morocco in answer to this need for a leader to champion the jihad against the Christian invader. The head of the family, who was also the shaykh of the *zawiya* of Tagmadart in the Dar'a, Abu 'Abdallah al-Qa'im, was elected for this purpose by the Sous community of southern Morocco in 1511, with Agadir as the target of attack.

Agadir was, as it were, the Cinderella of the Portuguese possessions in Morocco. Its survival was always precarious. It never attracted sufficient financial and military support to guarantee its security in enemy territory, its



Morocco, sixteenth–seventeenth centuries.

garrison remained small and ill-provisioned, and its defenses were further weakened during the period of hostilities by the accidental explosion of a barrel of powder that opened a yawning breach in its walls, a disability the Muslims, occupying a hill that dominated Agadir, exploited to great advantage. In contrast to the adverse fortunes of Agadir, the Sa'dian movement enjoyed overwhelming superiority in numbers and benefited from the contraband traffic in arms and ammunition by European merchants, notably by the Genoese and the Castilians, but also by the French and the English. Agadir capitulated to the Muslim siege in 1541.

The fall of Agadir was crucial to the collapse of Portuguese power in Morocco. Agadir had served, if symbolically, as a front line against Sa'dian insurgency. Deprived of their advance protection, a number of Portuguese possessions north of Agadir fell to the onslaught of the Muslims: Safi and Azeemmour (1541), and al-Qasr al-Saghir and Arzila (1550). These victories popularized the Sa'dian movement, generating the ground swell that swept from power (1549) the Wattasid sultan, Bu Hassun. He was temporarily reinstated in Fez in 1553, thanks to the Turks of Algiers, only to be killed in combat in September 1554 by Muhammad al-Shaikh, the leader of the Sa'dians. This marked the definitive establishment of the Sa'dian dynasty in Morocco. The maraboutic movement, provoked by Portuguese imperialism, was fundamental to the rise of the Sa'dians, whose legitimacy derived from the jihad to liberate the Muslim community from infidel domination.

The Sa'dians ruled Morocco as a unified entity for about half a century (1549–1603); the reign of Ahmad



Sqala de la Kashbah, an old Portuguese fort, Morocco. © Peter Schickert/Das Fotoarchiv.

al-Mansur, the conqueror of the Songhai empire in the western Sudan (1591), marked the peak of their power. Al-Mansur's political structure, typical of the power state, was held together by his personal authoritarianism rather than resting on institutional foundations. It collapsed immediately after his death in 1603. Multiple centers of power emerged in Morocco, presided over notably by the *murabitun* or marabouts. The last of the Sa'dians, Mawlay al-'Abbas, exercised a shadowy power in Marrakech until 1659, when he was ousted by a neighboring Berber group, the Shabana, under their leader, Abd al-Karim.

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See also: **Morocco: Ahmad al-Mansur and the Invasion of Songhay.**

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Morocco: Ahmad al-Mansur and the Invasion of Songhay

Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1603) was the sixth ruler of the Sa'adian dynasty. Born in Fez in 1549, he was a son of the second Sa'adian sultan, Muhammad al-Shaykh al Mahdi.

The Sa'adians were the first dynasty of *sharifs* (descendants of the clan of the Prophet) to rule in Morocco, having supplanted the Berber dynasty of the Banu Wattas earlier in the sixteenth century. Although they claimed origins in Arabia (specifically, Yambu in the Hejaz), and also claimed to be descended from the Prophet, the base from which they launched their conquest had been the valley of Dra'a. In 1510 Muhammad al Kaim bin Amr Allah, the first important head of the dynasty, had attacked the Portuguese at Agadir, and in 1524 his son Ahmad al Aaredj had taken Marrakech from the Wattassids and become the head of the new Sa'adian state. After a long struggle, he had had to give way to his brother Muhammad al-Shaykh, who was installed as leader at Fez in 1549.

Over the course of the following decades, there were further struggles within the family over who should succeed whom. Mulai Muhammad al-Maslühk mounted the throne in 1574, but his uncle Abd al-Malik, who had taken refuge in Istanbul, succeeded in taking power away from him, with the aid of the Ottoman pasha of Algiers, in 1576. However, Mulai Muhammad then succeeded in coming to terms with both Philip II of Spain and, more importantly, Sebastian I, the young king of Portugal. Sebastian set sail for Morocco in 1578 and joined his forces with those of Mulai Muhammad. On August fourth that year, these two allies came up against Abd al-Malik in what is known as the "Battle of the Three Kings" at al Ksar al-Kabir. Mulai Muhammad and Sebastian were both killed, while Abd al-Malik, already sick, died the same day. Victory went to Abd al-Malik's army nonetheless. His younger brother Mulai Ahmad, who had not even taken part in the battle, drew all the benefit from it, and triumphantly took up the reins of the sultanate under the name Ahmad al-Mansur, "the Victorious." His reign, which was to last for a quarter of a century, was one of the longest and most important in the history of Morocco.

The new sultan reorganized the country and the government. Under his authority, his guards, his court, and his administration (*makhzen*) took on an appearance resembling that of their Ottoman counterparts,

notably through the appointment of beys and pashas. Al-Mansur was a great builder: he ordered the fortification of the cities of Taza, Fez, and Marrakech, and in the last-named city he had the palace of al-Kasr al Badi constructed. He also developed Morocco's diplomatic relations with the Ottoman empire, with Philip II's Spain, and, particularly after the destruction of the "invincible" Armada in 1588, with the England of Elizabeth I. English merchants obtained a monopoly on Morocco's commercial traffic through the privileges granted to their Barbary Company. Despite recurrent political disturbances, arising most notably from conspiracies by his nephews and his own son's claims to power, al-Mansur's reign was a relatively peaceful one. He died in Fez on August 25, 1603, in the midst of an epidemic, either of cholera or of the plague, that was then ravaging his country. His remains still lie in the mausoleum that he had had built for them in Marrakech.

Undoubtedly the single most important event in al-Mansur's reign was the conquest of western Sudan, which is described by all the historians of the Sa'adian dynasty and in the celebrated chronicles of Sudanese history, such as the *Tarikh al-Fattash* or the *Tarikh as-Sudan*. The motives for this Sa'adian expansionism included both a desire for greater power and a wish to enrich the country. The undertaking of the conquest can be best explained by reference to the desire for prestige, on the part of a ruler who regarded himself as a descendant of the caliphs of Islam, rivaling the Ottoman sultans; by the quest for black slaves for the sugarcane plantations of Sousse; but, above all, by the hope of controlling the important Saharan salt mines at Taghaza and Taodeni, and of gathering in the gold of Sudan.

There had been contact between Morocco and the Songhay people on the Middle Niger for several centuries—indeed since ancient times—but in launching his conquest, Ahmad al-Mansur took advantage of the decline of the empire of the Askias, which had been divided by internal struggles, been made the target of attacks by the Mansas of Mali, and fallen prey to famine. In 1578 the Askia ruler Daud acceded to Sultan Ahmad's demand that the exploitation of the salt mines be entrusted to Morocco, but this first extension of Moroccan influence over the Saharan salt industry proved to be insufficient. In 1581 the Moroccans occupied the oases of Tuat and Gorarin, the crossroads of the trade between the Mediterranean and the Sahel, and in 1584 they launched their first expedition in the direction of the Senegal River, although in the end this turned out to be no more than a raid, without any consequences.

In the autumn of 1590, however, an army of several thousand men (between 3,000 and 4,000 soldiers, accompanied by 8,000 dromedaries) set out from Marrakech under the command of Judar Pasha, a Spaniard who

had been captured in Granada as a child. After advancing through Warzazat, the valley of the Dra'a, and Taghaza, the army reached the Niger on March 1, 1591, at Karabara, near Bamba. On March 12 it confronted the army of the Askia ruler Ishak II at Tondibi, around thirty-five miles from the city of Gao. Judar's troops, who were better organized and armed with cannons, crushed the Songhay army and pursued it as far as Gao. Ishak II then made peace offers that left Timbuktu open for the taking. Some months later, Mahmud ibn Zarqun replaced Judar Pasha, while the Askia Ishak was deposed by his brother Muhammad Gao, who was then captured by the Moroccans and executed in 1591. When the Moroccans conquered Jenne in 1592, the realm of the Askias collapsed. The whole of the Middle Niger fell under Moroccan domination, which lasted, in various forms, up to the early nineteenth century, under the control of the Arma, the successors of the Moroccan pashas.

Far from seeking the reconquest of Spain, Ahmad al-Mansur had succeeded in reorienting his foreign policy toward the south. He derived considerable financial benefits from doing so. Every year, a convoy of slaves and gold taken from Sudan arrived in Marrakech, and Sultan Ahmad acquired another epithet: Al-Dhahabi, "the Golden." However, the main result of the conquest was that Morocco gained control of three complementary zones of trans-Saharan trade: the Maghrib, now opened up to Europe and its products; the Sahara, with its rich endowment of salt mines; and the Sahel, with its gold and its slaves.

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See also: Sahara: Salt: Production, Trade; Songhay Empire: Moroccan Invasion, 1591.

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Morocco: Maraboutic Crisis, Founding of the 'Alawite Dynasty

The so-called maraboutic crisis in seventeenth century Morocco was a crisis of the state, the Sa'dian state, rather than a crisis of maraboutism. In so far as there was a crisis in regard to the *murabitun* or marabouts, this must be understood in political terms as a reference to their prominence in the politics of Morocco during the interregnum following the collapse of the state after the death of Ahmad al-Mansur. Their prominence obscured or overshadowed their hallowed religious and spiritual *raison d'être*. It was a crisis, as it were, of institutional identity arising from the prevailing political climate of anomie, which impelled the marabouts to a political vocation: the re-institution of the state as the means to political stabilization in Morocco. It was the competitive aspiration to the achievement of this end by various actors on the political scene that produced the Alawite dynasty.

No sooner had al-Mansur died (1603) than his three sons Zidan, Abu Faris, and Muhammad al-Shaikh engaged in a bloody and ruinous power struggle. The ensuing civil war (1603–1609) ended with the victory of Zidan, whose writ hardly extended beyond the southern capital city of Marrakech. The aftermath of the war was the demise of the state, and the dismemberment of the fragile political structure.

This "feudalization" or fragmentation of authority in Morocco was epitomized by the expansion of the jurisdictions of the marabouts to fill the political vacuum occasioned by the eclipse of the Sa'dian state. The *zawiya*, the center of activity of the marabouts, has been likened to the monastery in medieval Europe. Each *zawiya* is founded on a particular mystic or sufi doctrine, namely a corpus of ideas and rites constituting a theosophic system, a way (*tariqa*), as it were, to spiritual communion with the deity. Most *zawiya-s* in Morocco, from the sixteenth century onward, were organized on the basis of the Jazuliyya *tariqa*.

The most powerful of the *zawiya-s* during the interregnum was the *zawiya* of Dila, located strategically at the center of Morocco. Founded by Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad in the sixteenth century, the *zawiya* enjoyed reputation as a center of Islamic scholarship and a haven of hospitality, attributes which endeared it to the *talib* as well as the downtrodden. The political crisis of the seventeenth century provided the occasion for a political dimension to the activities of the *zawiya*. Under its energetic leader, Muhammad al-Hajj, the *zawiya* became the leading power in Morocco in the middle years of the seventeenth century (1641–1660).

It held sway in northern and central Morocco, including the northern Atlantic seaboard, together with the pirate republic of the Moriscos—Muslim refugees from Spain—and exercised power in Fez, without its leader, however, assuming the sovereign title of sultan, contented with being represented there by a lieutenant.

Second in political importance was the *zawiya* of Iligh, in the Tazarwalt region of the Sous. The *zawiya* was the dominant power in southern Morocco and the Saharan region, thanks to its leader Bu Hassun, controlling Sijilmasa, the northern terminus of the trans-Saharan trade, and the Atlantic ports of Agadir and Massa, important outlets to the commerce of Europe.

The most politically ambitious of the marabouts was Abu Mahalli. From his base in a *zawiya* located in the Sharan region of Morocco, he proclaimed himself the *Mahdi* to mobilize support for this political pretension, the occasion for which was provided by the cession of Larache (November 20, 1610) to Spain by Muhammad al-Shaikh to secure Spanish military assistance in the power struggle with his brothers. Abu Mahalli seized power in Marrakesh, assuming the title of sovereignty (May 20, 1612). Zidan was able to recover his throne only by pitting the forces of a rival marabout, Yahya ibn Abdallah, based in the High Atlas, against Abu Mahalli, who died in the encounter (November 30, 1613). Yahya, himself, died in March 1626 after two unsuccessful attempts to occupy Marrakech, his political ambition having been kindled by his restoration of Zidan.

Morocco in the second half of the seventeenth century presented the following configuration of power. Al-Ayyashi, a *condottiere* based in Salé and renowned as a holy warrior (*mujahid*), but now with the status of a warlord, had died in 1641 in his confrontation with the *zawiya* of Dila, the most formidable power in Morocco, albeit now in decline, as demonstrated by its defeat in 1660 by al-Khadir Ghailan, another warlord on the Atlantic coast thrown up by the political crisis, and also in the tradition of the *condottiere*. Operating from al-Kabir and Arzila, Ghailan was now unchallenged militarily and politically on the northern Atlantic seaboard. A Berber group, the Shabana, ruled in Marrakech, having usurped power from the last of the Sa'dians, Mawlay al-'Abbas, in 1659. The *zawiya* of Iligh continued to be dominant in the politics of southern Morocco.

Ironically, however, it was from a quarter much less known in Moroccan politics, namely the sharifan house of Sijilmasa in the Tafilalet, that a new dynasty was to emerge in Morocco to resolve the political impasse. Al-Rashid, after a period of preparation in which he built up a military organization to support his sovereign ambition, captured power in Fez and had himself proclaimed sultan (June 6, 1668). He then proceeded

to eliminate the strongholds of power in Morocco: the *zawiya* of Dila (June 18, 1668); al-Khadir Ghailan (July 1668); the Shabana of Marrakech (August 1668) and the *zawiya* of Iligh (July 19, 1670). Thus was established the Alawite dynasty after the prolonged interregnum following the death of al-Mansur in 1603. But al-Rashid died accidentally barely two years later (April 29, 1672), and it was left to his brother, Mawlay Isma'il, to consolidate the foundations of the new dynasty. The mythology of redemption from the political stranglehold of a legendary Jewish king provided the ideology of legitimation of the Alawite dynasty, in the way that the jihad of the sixteenth century that liberated the Muslim community from Portuguese domination served to legitimize Sa'dian rule.

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Morocco: Mawlay Isma'il and Empire of

Mawlay Isma'il (1672–1727) was the second sultan of the 'Alawi dynasty of *shurafa'* (descendants of the Prophet) from southeastern Morocco. The dynasty fought its way to power in the vacuum created by the collapse of the previous Sa'di dynasty early in the seventeenth century. When Mawlay Isma'il succeeded his brother, Mawlay al-Rashid, in 1672, 'Alawi control over Morocco was still tenuous, challenged by both domestic rivals and the existence of Spanish, Portuguese, and British enclaves on the coast. It was therefore Mawlay Isma'il's task to consolidate 'Alawi power. To achieve this end he adapted and synthesized elements from Morocco, the Ottoman Empire, and Sub-Saharan Africa with which he had a strong affinity as the son of Mawlay 'Ali al-Sharif and a black concubine. During his long reign Mawlay Isma'il constructed a tributary state, supported by a slave army and legitimized by reference to Islam, which achieved greater control over Morocco's towns and tribes than most regimes. He also recaptured several European enclaves and constructed a corsair fleet to assert Moroccan power in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters.

On becoming sultan, Mawlay Isma'il's had to defeat his domestic rivals for power, the most important of whom were al-Khidr Ghaylan, a northern warlord who had distinguished himself in action against the European coastal enclaves, and his cousin, Ahmad B. al-Mahriz, the governor of Marrakech, who set himself up as counter-sultan on his uncle's accession. Mawlay Isma'il defeated Ghaylan in battle, thereby securing the north, but Ahmad b. Mahriz remained a problem for fourteen years, during which he provided a figurehead for regular revolts in the south and east of the sultanate. He could not, however, challenge Mawlay Isma'il's control over the heartlands of Morocco. The second challenge faced by the new sultan was the construction of a viable system of government.

First he needed a reliable armed force to gather taxes and combat the centrifugal inclinations of the Moroccan tribes. He therefore founded a black slave army, the 'Abid al-Bukhari, modeled in part on the Ottoman Janissary corps and in part on the tribal forces of earlier Moroccan dynasties. Like the Janissaries, the 'Abid were a geographically marginal group transformed into a loyal military elite by palace training. Unlike the Janissaries, however, the 'Abid became a self-perpetuating servile kin-group, described as a "tribe" (*qabila*) of the army. The tribal aspect was heightened by the corps' blood relations with the dynasty which resulted from sultanic use of 'Abid concubines. This gave it the character of a black sharifian super-tribe, a character shared by Mawlay Isma'il's other main corps, the Udaya, a cavalry corps recruited from southern Arab tribes and the central Saharan oasis of Tuat.

Mawlay Isma'il selected the small market town of Meknes as his capital and there constructed an enormous royal city, with architecture inspired by the Roman ruins at nearby Volubilis, the mud-brick complexes of Southern Morocco and West Africa, and the decorative styles of al-Andalus. This vast royal city functioned as the sultan's residence, the 'Abid training school and barracks, and a stage for 'Alawi court ceremonial. It was also the place where Mawlay Isma'il put the Europeans captured by his corsairs to work and received foreign delegations. From this imperial hub, he went on regular military progresses through his domains to extract taxes. During his constant peregrinations he employed the 'Abid to build and then occupy forts from the Rif mountains in the north to Tafilalet in the pre-Sahara. His fortifications gave provincial Morocco a more comprehensive governmental presence than ever before, and fortified its sensitive eastern frontier with Ottoman Algiers. Although the sultanate was a tributary state levying what it could from the country by deployment of its coercive powers, Mawlay Isma'il incorporated tribal notables into the governmental structure by appointing them governors (*qâ'id*,

quwwâd), who enjoyed the prestige of their position in return for assisting the state in gathering taxes and maintaining law and order.

Formation of the 'Abid al-Bukhari and construction of a rural governmental network consolidated 'Alawi power but did not legitimize it. Many viewed the dynasty as alien and the elite of Fes deeply resented Mawlay Isma'il's raising of his servile black 'Abid above free Muslims. To legitimize the institutions he had created, he looked to Islam. In a society where many believed that the descendants of the Prophet held a special right to rule, he used his sharifian ancestry as a platform to transform himself from warlord to commander of the faithful (*amîr al-mu'minîn*), the religious and political head of the community of believers, the *umma*. He signaled his new position by leading the communal Friday prayer in Meknes, patronizing the religious establishment and dedicating the 'Abid al-Bukhari to the Islamic aim of expelling the 'infidel' Europeans from their coastal enclaves. During the 1680s, 'Abid forces secured the British evacuation from Tanger (1684), and expelled the Spanish from Laraish (1689) and Asila (1691), successes hailed as jihad victories which proved the legitimate right of the 'Alawi *shurafâ*' to rule. Devotion of state resources to the jihad also possessed the advantage of legitimizing tax collection as vital for the maintenance of Muslim unity and the financing of Islamic aims. Corsairing confirmed Mawlay Isma'il's reputation as a holy warrior and brought him considerable revenue which he supplemented by the high duties he levied on foreign trade.

In the 1680s and 1690s, Mawlay Isma'il began to expand southwards into the Sahara to revive the western trans-Saharan trade routes which had faltered due to political insecurity, and eastwards into the province of Algiers to consolidate his control over the eastern marches and capture the city of Tlemsen on the trade route east from Fes to Egypt. Although logical in terms of the close cultural and commercial relations between Fes and Tlemsen, Mawlay Isma'il's campaigns provoked an Ottoman counter-offensive from Algiers. The Ottoman forces easily defeated the 'Abid and the sultan was forced to terms in 1701. After this defeat, domestic politics became increasingly unstable as several of Mawlay Isma'il's sons challenged his rule. When he finally died in 1727, tensions between his many sons, between north and south, between town and tribe, quickly escalated into a civil war which lasted on and off for thirty years. During that time, however, the right to rule of the 'Alawi *shurafâ*' was not seriously questioned, suggesting the fundamental genius of Mawlay Isma'il. During his long reign he had created a durable framework for government, transformed the dynasty from warlords into sharifian commanders of the faithful,

and secured the grudging recognition of the Ottoman Empire and several European states.

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See also: Religion, History of; Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Morocco: Sidi Muhammad and Foundations of Essawira

The founding of Essawira (as-Sawira in Arabic, Tassurt in Berber, and known as Mogador to Europeans) in 1764 by Sidi Muhammad bin Abdallah (1757–1790) was, according to the chroniclers of Moroccan dynastic history, among the most important achievements of the 'Alawid sultan's reign. Due west of the southern capital of Marrakech on the Atlantic coast, Essawira became a royal port, closely controlled by the sultan. The foundation of the new port was part of Sidi Muhammad's efforts, after three decades of political disorder and dynastic struggle following the death of Sultan Mawlay Isma'il in 1727, to consolidate control from the southern capital of Marrakech by gaining revenues from foreign trade. The central government frequently had difficulty controlling the trade along the southwestern coast, especially from the port of Agadir, where some of the commodities most sought after by Europeans were exported: olive oil, ostrich feathers, goat skins, and gum arabic. These goods were transported from the southern districts of Morocco or by the trans-Saharan caravans.

Sidi Muhammad hoped to concentrate all European trade and foreign merchants in one port where the central government administration (referred to as the Makhzan) could gain revenues from customs duties. The foundation of the port, however, was legitimized by the purpose of jihad. Ahmad al-Ghazzal, a courtier of Sidi Muhammad, states that the reason for the foundation of the port was that the estuary of Salé became blocked with sand for two months of the year, thus impeding the movement

of the corsairs. Essawira provided a natural harbor that was partially sheltered by an island about 1,500 meters offshore. In reality, the activities of Moroccan corsairs were rapidly diminishing, and the real importance of Essawira was in conducting foreign trade. A few decades after its foundation, Essawira became the only maritime port where foreign trade was allowed, though this proved impractical in the long run and other ports also were used for trading certain commodities.

In ancient times, the offshore island was used by the Phoenicians for the production of a purple dye, and further archaeological evidence attests to Roman and Byzantine settlement on the island. The Portuguese established a short-lived fortress on the mainland in 1506. But at the time of Essawira's foundation in 1764, the only settlement in the area was the small village of Diabet to the immediate south of the port. Essawira was located in a relatively isolated region on the border between the Haha and Shiadma peoples. Without a fertile hinterland, food always had to be transported over some distance. The design of the town is attributed to a French engineer named Théodore Cournut, but according to tradition, Cournut was dismissed and the work was completed by Genoese renegades. Europeans often observed that the architecture and layout of the city appeared more orderly than those of other Moroccan cities, but as the city grew, it took on the shape of other cities in Morocco with its main thoroughfares in the commercial districts and port, and a more intricate web of narrow, windy streets in the Muslim quarters of the *madina* and the Jewish quarter (the *mellah*, as the Jewish quarters were called in Morocco).

The town was first peopled by soldier-settlers from the ranks of the Black soldiers, known as the '*abid*, and by a large number of families from Agadir, many of who were compelled to relocate to Essawira when Agadir was closed to commerce. Another group called the Bani 'Antar, who according to local tradition originated on the western flanks of the High Atlas Mountains, were among the early settlers, forming military units in the new town. Essawira was also inhabited by the local population of the Haha and Shiadma districts. Jewish merchants settled in large numbers, and Jewish peddlers and craftsmen soon followed. The Jewish population grew to about 30 per cent of the town's population.

Moroccan Jews became the crucial element in the town's foreign trade. According to Jewish tradition, representatives of ten of the most important Jewish families of Morocco from a variety of cities (Marrakech, Tetuan, Agadir, Safi, and Rabat) were chosen in 1766 and granted special privileges to conduct trade in the new town. Sidi Muhammad wished to attract all the principal merchants, European or Moroccan, to the new port. European, Muslim, and Jewish merchants built houses in Essawira, with promises that customs

duties would be relaxed. Sidi Muhammad signed numerous commercial treaties with European states, encouraging foreign merchants to settle in Morocco. After a few decades, about thirty foreign merchant houses were located in Essawira: Italian, Spanish, French, English, Dutch, and Danish merchants settled there. The foreign merchants of Essawira formed a tribunal of commerce known as the *commercio*. The majority of the Moroccan merchants were Jews, with only a few prominent Muslim merchants. These merchants were known as *tujjar as-sultan* (or “merchants of the sultan”), and they were advanced sums of money by the Makhzan to conduct trade. The merchants were required to pay back their loans in monthly installments. Since taking interest was proscribed by Islamic law, the sultan expected to profit indirectly through customs duties. As official traders of the sultan, the merchants were granted houses in the casbah quarter, where government officials and the foreign merchants lived. Many of the Jewish merchants had representatives of their families in London, Amsterdam, and Livorno, cities with whom a major part of Essawira’s trade was conducted.

Following the death of Sidi Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah, and during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman, foreign trade dwindled, and few foreign merchants remained in Morocco. Most of the trade of Essawira remained in the hands of several prominent Moroccan Jewish merchant firms. Essawira’s foreign trade grew again beginning in the 1830s, with increasing numbers of European merchants established in the town. Essaouria remained Morocco’s most important seaport until the late nineteenth century.

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Morocco: Mawlay Sulayman, Life and Era of

Mawlay Sulayman (1792–1822) was one of the sons of the sultan, Sidi Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah (1757–1790). He expected to spend his life as a religious scholar but the sudden death of his brother, the sultan Mawlay al-Yazid, in 1792 triggered a succession crisis that impelled him into the political arena. The two main contenders for power were Mawlay Salama, a northern candidate who represented the *mujahidin* (holy warriors) devoted to maintaining a military offensive against the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and Mawlay Hisham in Marrakech, who represented the commercial interests of the south that had developed trade relations with European countries through southern Atlantic ports such as Essawira. The religious elite of Fes, or Fez, the most important city in the sultanate, however, doubted the viability of either candidate and called on Mawlay Sulayman to accept their oath of allegiance. Their choice almost certainly reflected their feeling that Mawlay Sulayman, as a religious scholar like themselves, would be sensitive to their wishes if he became sultan.

Mawlay Sulayman reluctantly accepted their oath of allegiance and quickly defeated Mawlay Salama to become sultan of the north. It took him seven years of war, however, to defeat Mawlay Hisham as a result of the competing commercial interests of Fes and Marrakech. The opening of the port of Essawira in 1764 had reoriented a significant proportion of the trans-Saharan trade from the eastern Tafilalt to Fes route, to routes from Tafilalt and the Wad Dar’a to Marrakech and Essawira. Thus while the south supported the development of Atlantic trade with Europe, the merchants of Fes denounced it as un-Islamic and sought to draw the trans-Saharan trade back to the eastern route. As long as the sultanate remained divided, both sultans competed to control Atlantic ports and their trade as essential sources of supplies and customs revenue, but Mawlay Sulayman’s attitude changed after 1799 when Mawlay Hisham’s death in a plague epidemic left him sole sultan of Morocco.

In the stable middle decades of his reign, Mawlay Sulayman responded to the wishes of the scholarly and mercantile elite of Fes and closed many coastal ports to European traders. He also shifted the tax burden from customs duties and market taxes (*mukus*), considered uncanonical by the ‘*ulama*’, to rural taxes sanctioned by the Shari’a (Islamic law). Other factors also influenced Mawlay Sulayman’s attitude to foreign trade. Although the European consular community interpreted his actions as xenophobic,

they in fact reflected pressures placed on the sultanate by the Napoleonic Wars. Since both the French and the British had threatened to bombard countries that supplied their opponent, trouble-free trade with Europe was virtually impossible. Mawlay Sulayman's decision to suspend trade enabled Morocco to maintain its neutrality. It also avoided domestic criticism of the sultan for allowing trade with the "infidel" at a time when popular fears of a Christian Europe offensive against the Islamic world were growing as a result of Napoleon's occupation of Egypt (1798–1801).

Internally, the most important effect of Mawlay Sulayman's commercial policy was his need to extend tax gathering among the mostly Berber-speaking tribes of the mountainous fringe of Morocco. In order to strengthen the military arm of the state, he sidelined several Berber communities that had served militarily during his father's reign and replaced them with Arabs from the south. He then dedicated his forces to campaigns into the Middle Atlas where several large Berber confederations challenged state power. His restructuring of the 'Alawi army and aggressive tax collecting coincided with the revival of rural religious brotherhoods. Religious revival dated to the reign of Sidi Muhammad who had tried to simplify the religious education offered by urban *madrasas* in order to educate a body of 'ulama' capable of spreading simple urban orthodoxy in the countryside. The 'ulama' largely rejected his initiative, but it struck a chord among Sufis, many of whom established new religious brotherhoods that promoted rural religious education through regional networks. The most important brotherhoods of this type were the Darqawa, which had supporters throughout the Rif and Middle Atlas into West Algeria, the Qadiriyya, which had adherents in West Algeria, the Rif and the eastern marches, and the Tijaniyya.

Mawlay Sulayman's relations with these brotherhoods, except the predominantly urban Tijaniyya, was tense. On the one hand, his tax-gathering policies created competition between the state and the brotherhoods for a share of tribal surpluses. On the other hand, they resented his critical attitude toward certain aspects of rural religiosity, including pilgrimage and offerings (*ziyara*) at the shrines of holy men and annual celebrations (*mawsim*, *mawlid*). The situation came to a head in 1819 when the sultan decided to march into the Middle Atlas to force the Berbers of the region to pay taxes. They resisted fiercely and lowland Berbers within the sultan's army promptly defected, creating a massive Berber coalition against the sultan, given integrity by the fact that the majority of the tribes involved were affiliated to the Darqawa brotherhood. Mawlay Sulayman's son and heir died on the field

of battle while the Berbers captured the sultan and escorted him back to Meknes.

Mawlay Sulayman's humiliation at the hands of the Berbers triggered a widespread political breakdown that escalated into a revolt of Fes and the north against him. This revolt indicated a major crisis of confidence in the sultan in several areas of government. First, in addition to criticising popular Sufism, he had declared himself sympathetic to the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, breaking his long-standing alliance with the Fasi 'ulama' who opposed Wahhabism. Second, he had reorganized government in the north and several Fasi families who had traditionally served the sultans felt sidelined. Third, his expensive and unsuccessful mountain campaigns brought his military credentials into question just as a European threat appeared to be developing. These grievances and doubts as to his abilities led to the revolt. Mawlay Sulayman spent the next years fighting his nephews Mawlay Ibrahim and Mawlay Sa'id for control of the north and then retreated to Marrakech to face further outbreaks of insurgency. He died in 1822 with the country still in a state of unrest and his ambitious plans to extend state control over the mountain fringe in tatters.

AMIRA K. BENNISON

See also: Egypt, Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt; Morocco: Economics and Social Change since Independence; Morocco: Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman, Life and Era of.

Biography

Mawlay Sulayman became sultan of the north in 1792, upon the death of his brother, the sultan Mawlay al-Yazid. In 1799 Mawlay Hisham's death in a plague epidemic left him sole sultan of Morocco. In 1819 he decided to march into the Middle Atlas to force the Berbers of the region to pay taxes. He was captured and escorted back to Meknes. Doubts concerning Mawlay Sulayman's leadership led to revolt. He spent the last few years before his death fighting his nephews Mawlay Ibrahim and Mawlay Sa'id for control of the north, eventually retreating to Marrakech. He died in 1822.

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**Morocco: Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman,
Life and Era of
Sultan of Morocco**

The reign of Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman (1822–1859) marked Morocco's transition from the early modern to the colonial era. During his years as sultan, the balance of power in the Mediterranean shifted decisively in favor of industrial Britain and France, affecting all the North African states. The most dramatic event was the French capture of Algiers in 1830, which triggered resistance not only in the territories of the Turks of Algiers but also in Morocco, where it dominated political discourse for nearly twenty years. French colonialism pushed Morocco's rulers to initiate the process of military modernization already taking place in Tunis, Egypt, and the central Ottoman empire, a process resisted by the population. Less striking, but equally damaging to the sultanate in the long term, was European commercial penetration of the Atlantic seaboard, which began seriously in the 1840s and steadily disrupted state-society relations. Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman faced the task of steering the sultanate through this difficult period.

Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman became sultan in November 1822 after the death of his uncle, Mawlay Sulayman, who nominated him as heir on his deathbed. Mawlay Sulayman's choice of Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman over his own sons was unusual, indicating his belief that his nephew possessed the personal qualities needed by a sultan: the ability to mediate, to conciliate, and the warrior skills to prove himself on the field of battle.

He spent the first three years of his reign fighting to restore central power and authority, a task complicated by his lack of resources, the endemic disorder in the countryside, and opposition to his rule from the sons of Mawlay Sulayman and northern groups involved in the revolt. This period of unrest indicated a renegotiation of state-society relations, a regular occurrence in pre-colonial Morocco where a tension existed between the sultans, who aspired to create a centralized state, and their subjects, who accepted the principle of sultanic rule, but expected each sultan to prove himself fit for the task by guaranteeing prosperity, distributing largesse, and defending the faith.

Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman tackled the problems he faced by judicious diplomacy and regular military progresses to meet his tribal subjects, prove his power to them, and receive tokens of allegiance. When a major famine in 1825–1826 ended this troubled period, he tried to increase his prestige by reconstructing the 'Alawi corsair fleet, which had fallen into disrepair

during Mawlay Sulayman's reign, and using it to harass European shipping, a policy described as maritime jihad (*al-jihad al-bahriyya*). During the late 1820s his agents purchased several secondhand ships in Gibraltar that were refitted in Moroccan ports and then sent to sea in 1828. In order to preserve Morocco's foreign trade, Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman assured the European consuls in Tanger that his corsairs would not attack the shipping of countries which had treaties with the sultanate. The corsairs, however, paid scant attention to this proviso and their activities provoked a hostile response, which Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman had not expected. The British threatened to bombard Tanger, an Austrian squadron attacked the harbors of Laraish and Tetuan in retaliation for Moroccan capture of one of their vessels, and a number of disputes arose with Spain.

In 1830 the French capture of Algiers and the demise of the Turks sidelined the international disputes caused by Moroccan corsairing and put popular pressure on the sultan to launch a jihad against the infidel. Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman initially viewed the situation as an opportunity to expand his power eastward and incorporate the West Algerian city of Tlemsen into the sultanate. The 'Alawi occupation of Tlemsen during the winter of 1830–1831 created tension between the inhabitants of the city and the 'Alawi army, put a huge strain on resources, and triggered strident French protests. To save his reputation, Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman withdrew his troops but gave material and moral support to the emerging leader of resistance in West Algeria, 'Abd al-Qadir. During the 1830s and early 1840s enormous quantities of arms and ammunition passed through Morocco to Algeria from Gibraltar, Tanger, Tetuan, and Fes, and volunteers from the Rif and eastern Morocco joined the Algerian resistance.

The intimate relationship between Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman and 'Abd al-Qadir, however, led to continuous French protests and threats that culminated in the short 1844 Franco-Moroccan War. The French easily defeated the sultan's army and bombarded the ports of Tanger and Essawira, forcing Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman and his son, Sidi Muhammad, to set in train the modernization of the Moroccan military, using the example of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt. Military modernization demanded an increase in state revenue, which the sultan hoped to gain through closer control of trade and the imposition of monopolies of the import and export of staple goods in the mid-1840s. The late 1840s also signaled the formation of *l'Algérie française*. In the last years of the Algerian resistance, 'Abd al-Qadir retreated to Morocco and endeavored to persuade Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman to go to war with France. When he refused, 'Abd al-Qadir publicly accused him of reneging

on his duties as an Islamic ruler creating a political crisis that was only resolved in 1847 when the sultan's armies finally forced 'Abd al-Qadir back into Algeria where he surrendered to the French.

Commercial issues dominated the last decade of Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman's reign. His imposition of monopolies conflicted with the wishes of the sultanate's European trading partners, especially Britain, which exerted constant pressure for restrictions to be lifted. They were unsuccessful until the 1850s, when they gained general European support, and drew up an Anglo-Moroccan trade treaty (1856) that opened the sultanate to European manufactures and enabled Europeans to buy property in Morocco. This marked the beginning of serious European commercial penetration of Morocco that disrupted indigenous industry and frequently provoked hostile responses from the inhabitants of the sultanate. In the Rif the search for minerals by European speculators and Spanish extension of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla led to conflicts with local tribesmen that escalated into the Tetuan War of 1859–1860 between Spain and Morocco. During the war Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman died, leaving his son Sidi Muhammad to continue the process of modernization and adaptation to Europe's growing stake in North Africa.

AMIRA K. BENNISON

See also: Morocco: Economics and Social Change since Independence; Morocco: Mawlay Sulayman, Life and Era of; Northern Africa.

Biography

Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman was governor of Essawira. He commanded the army during the 1819–1821 revolt of the north. He was then appointed governor of Fez. He became sultan in November 1822, upon the death of his uncle. He died in 1859, during the Tetuan War between Spain and Morocco.

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Morocco: Economy and Society, Nineteenth Century

Peopled predominantly by a Berber-speaking population, Morocco in the nineteenth century was still largely a tribal society, defined as a society organized on the basis of kinship, which presupposes a society without the political superstructure of a state. In effect, Morocco was constituted by an aggregation of tribes, subordinated to an urban complex, the bureaucratic mechanism of the state.

Although the tribal world was largely outside the effective political orbit (territorial jurisdiction) of the sultan, it was, nonetheless, subject to his sovereignty (jurisdictional authority), symbolized by the mention of his name in the Friday sermon, or *khutba*. Here, then, is a concept of sovereignty that is not so much territorial as anthropological, which compels a revision of French historiography of Morocco. French historiography depicts it in terms of antagonistic jurisdictional bifurcation, the *bled el-makhzan* and the *bled es-siba*, the land subject to the control of government, and the land outside its control, a misconception or misinterpretation stemming from the perception of a totally dissimilar social reality in Western cognitive categories. Dissidence may amount merely to a renunciation of the burden of taxation, the index of political subjugation, which is not necessarily inconsistent with the



Dyeing the textiles for the traditional cloth of the Moroccans. After the cloth is pulled through the dye, the color is kneaded into the textile using feet. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

recognition of the sovereignty of the sultan as the imam of the community of the faithful. The dualistic picture of French historiography of Morocco may also have a “rationalizing” or ideological function: to present precolonial Morocco as ramshackle and incoherent in structure, and a prey to disorder, until French colonialism forged a unified political framework and a centralized administration, bringing the benefits of “law and order.”

Morocco may be visualized, not in terms of a dichotomous but of a unified jurisdiction. Social anthropologists describe tribal societies in terms of the concept of “segmentarity,” which captures the diffusion or the atomization of authority in these societies, although in Morocco some form of informal, trans-tribal or overarching jurisdiction was exercised by a ruling group of holy men or marabouts (*igurramen*).

Corresponding to the sociopolitical hierarchy of tribes, peasants, and the state was an economy at varying stages of evolution: a merchant capitalism of the state, coexisting with a “moral economy” of the tribes (in E. P. Thompson’s economic anthropology), “instituted” or “embedded” in the routine of daily life, with “subsistence production and non-monetary circuits [predominating]” (Rodinson, 1978: pp.55–56).

The circumscribed ambience of the market economy and merchant capitalism was reflected in the foreign sector of the Moroccan economy, an “enclave economy,” largely irrelevant to the vast majority of the population. “There was minimum recourse of the part of the fellah to the city or to foreign sources for the satisfaction of his needs” (Stewart, 1967: pp.16–17). The bulk of the population thus lived virtually in a closed economy, in which exchanges were, in the main, internal and geared largely to use value or the reproduction of the household, with beasts of burden as the means of transportation. There were no railways before 1911, the eve of colonialism, which introduced modern highways and motor transport to the Moroccan landscape.

The foreign sector was the prime mover of the market economy and merchant capitalism. The trans-Saharan trade continued the medieval commercial tradition, complementing maritime trade, and stimulated by the burgeoning industrial capitalism of Europe. In this way Morocco, together with other regions of the Third World, was incorporated into the global economy, serving capitalist reproduction through “unequal exchange” (Emmanuel, 1972).

Britain and France dominated Morocco’s maritime trade, which recorded substantial expansion in the nineteenth century. Tangier and Casablanca were the leading ports, outstripping Essaouira in commercial importance. European merchandise, notably cotton goods (the principal item of British commerce), glassware, and hardware, as well as tea and sugar were exchanged, in

the main, for wool, grain, hides and skins, gold, ivory, and ostrich feathers, the last three originating from the trans-Saharan trade.

External trade, both inland and maritime, was the realm of merchant capitalism. Its practitioners, mainly Jews, belonged to an aristocracy rather than a bourgeoisie. They were either connected with the court, trading on behalf of the sultan (*tajir-s al Sultan*), or in partnership with him. The state was, in fact, the merchant par excellence, epitomizing Karl Polanyi’s concept of “administered trade,” an *etatisme* inimical to the capitalist doctrine of *laissez-faire*, prompting the pressure by the European mercantile community for a liberal commercial dispensation on the coast. The result was the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856, which inaugurated as “open door” policy congenial to capitalist penetration of Morocco. The treaty introduced trade liberalization, abolishing erstwhile state monopolies and controls, and rationalizing a once arbitrary and chaotic customs regime. These gains were consolidated by two other commercial treaties. The first was the Spanish-Moroccan treaty of 1861, which ended the Spanish-Moroccan War (1859–1860), in which Spain was victorious. Morocco had to pay a war indemnity, necessitating her resort to a loan from the British capital market on the security of her customs receipts; and the second was the Franco-Moroccan treaty or the Beclard Convention of 1863.

The Beclard Convention revived the practice of “protection” in Morocco. French commercial agents in Morocco came under the regime of “protection” and thus lived in a “state of extra-territoriality” outside the jurisdiction of the Moroccan authorities. Other European merchants also claimed “protection” for their employees under the most-favored-nation clause.

European commercial pressure was to culminate in a crippling financial crisis in Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century. The regime of “protection,” through its abuse, covered a widening circle of the taxable population, severely reducing the fiscal revenue of the state. The standardization of the customs duties also reduced the revenue from customs, a major part of which had been committed to offset the loan secured to pay the war indemnity. Payment was in foreign currency or gold, which, together with the severe balance of payments deficits—Moroccan gold and silver coins as well as foreign specie were smuggled to Europe, and imports far exceeded exports—exhausted Morocco’s reserves, with the concomitant of monetary devaluation. With devaluation, much less foreign exchange accrued to the treasury through foreign trade. The bankruptcy of the state, arising from its inability to generate revenue to meet its domestic and international commitments, impelled it to external loans, the prelude to colonialism.

The loans were secured principally from a consortium of French banks. By 1906 Moroccan debt stood at 206 million francs; the figure subsequently rose by 100 million francs, with Morocco's sources of public revenue pledged to its repayment. The stranglehold of French capital on Morocco had reduced it to a veritable French financial protectorate. Colonialism, signified by the protectorate treaty of March 30, 1912, was the political complement to the French financial protectorate.

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Morocco: Hay, Edward and John Drummond, British Diplomatic Protection, 1829–1903

Edward Drummond Hay, a fluent Arabic speaker, was sent to Morocco by the British government in 1829, the year before France invaded Algeria on the pretext of avenging the dishonor done to its consul when the dey of Algiers slapped him in the face with a fly whisk. While perhaps not immediately apparent, the posting and incident in Algiers were to become of great importance to Great Britain. The French entry into Algeria became the first step in the formation of its North African Empire; the appointment of Hay as British consul put in Morocco one of the country's strongest advocates for continued Moroccan independence.

Hay worked to strengthen Anglo-Moroccan relations, and his language skills gave him greater credibility with the sultan. His focus as consul, though, had much to do with events in neighboring Algeria. He was at his post when the Treaty of Tafna was signed (1837), dividing Algeria into two spheres, one of French control, and one under the control of the Amir Abd al-Qadir. In 1843 these events became more imminent for Morocco, as Abd al-Qadir fled to the adjacent state, seeking protection and assistance from the sultan, Mawlay Abd al-Rahman. The sultan granted him haven in Morocco and agreed to provide military supplies for his movement, which predictably brought Morocco into direct conflict with France. In 1844 French forces commanded by General Bugeaud roundly defeated the sultan's army at the Battle of Isly. The defeat

highlighted European military strength, and the resulting Treaty of Tangier forced Moroccan recognition of France's presence in Algeria and required the sultan to withdraw his backing of Abd al-Qadir and the anti-French movement in Algeria. The elder Hay helped negotiate the Treaty of Tangier but died suddenly in 1844. His son, John Drummond Hay, who had gone to Tangier as a temporary assistant for his father, stayed on, eventually replacing his father permanently as consul.

Like his father, the younger Hay was fluent in Arabic and had a vast knowledge of Morocco, unlike many other European diplomats in the country. Hay had joined the Foreign Office in 1840 and prior to his arrival in Tangier had served in Alexandria and Constantinople. In his post as British consul to Morocco, one of Hay's first tasks was to persuade the sultan to conclude an unfavorable boundary agreement with Spain at Ceuta. He also averted Swedish and Danish fleets from being sent to make war on Morocco by persuading the sultan to cease his demands for tribute from those two states.

In 1856 Hay's diplomatic skills achieved a substantial victory for Britain, when he began negotiations on a commercial treaty that would lower duties and abolish all monopolies. Hay presented it as a progressive treaty that would profit all parties and as something leaders around the world recognized as a beneficial means of exchange. Makhzen officials were not so easily convinced, though. They remained skeptical that changes in economic policy initiated by European countries would bring any real benefits to Morocco. In December 1856, a new treaty was signed; this treaty abolished monopolies, reduced import duties to 10 per cent, and fixed maximum amounts for export duties. In negotiating the treaty, Hay thus achieved some of Britain's primary economic goals in relation to Morocco. However, he also had to make some concessions to the Moroccan negotiators. Hay could not get the sultan to agree to allow foreigners to own land, and the sultan retained the right to reimpose export bans as he saw fit. Even so, the treaty was a substantial economic victory for Britain, essentially granting it most favored nation status in Morocco. While technically in force for a period of only five years, the agreement substantially reduced Moroccan control over its own trade policy.

The conclusion of the treaty did not stop Hay from demanding further concessions from the sultan. He continued to argue for more open markets and for land ownership rights for foreigners, and he was not hesitant to berate the makhzen for what he saw as violations of treaty arrangements; in 1864 he accused the sultan of selling a monopoly on fuller's earth to a makhzen official, thus violating the 1856 treaty. He was also a forceful advocate for the interests of individual Britons and for British companies. In 1864, when the Awlad Amran tribe refused to pay a British company located at Safi

for the weapons they had received from the company, Hay held the makhzen responsible and forced it to pay the tribe's debts to the company. That same year, when a British traveler was killed en route to a religious ceremony, Hay forced the sultan to fire his local officials on the grounds that they had not ensured the safety of their areas.

Hay pushed for the further development of infrastructure in Morocco. His main goal in doing so was to make getting goods to ports and hence to Europe easier and faster, but Hay was skilled at presenting his plans to the sultan in ways that would make them think Britain was helping the sultan achieve his own goals. For instance, he persuaded Sidi Muhammad to develop his road system and ports so that, he said, the sultan could more quickly move his military around the country, thus giving the makhzen an advantage in subduing rebellious tribes. Sidi Muhammad was convinced and began a construction program of roads, merchants' quarters, and new port works.

Hay also served as a mediator between the makhzen and other European powers in Morocco. While Britain was officially neutral in Spain's war with Morocco in 1859–1860 the country, in the person of Hay and some Gibraltar navy officers, had given substantial technical aid to Moroccan forces. All this was for naught, as Spain won the conflict. But Britain remained involved, refusing to allow Spain to take Tangier and negotiating a treaty between the two parties. Britain got Spain to agree to withdraw from areas too close to the Straits of Gibraltar for British comfort by forcing the sultan to accept a treaty that clearly vastly favored Spain. The treaty included sizeable indemnity payments, Spanish seizures of territory around Ceuta, Melilla, and Ifni, as well as the sultan's permission for missionaries to build a church in Tetuan; it also laid groundwork for Spain and Morocco to negotiate a treaty like Morocco's 1856 treaty with Britain. This economic treaty, the Treaty of Madrid, was signed in 1861, and was followed by Belgian and French versions of treaty. The combined effect of these events was to bankrupt the makhzen, make the government look weak to its people (particularly for being forced to accept foreign religious institutions on its lands), and make it clear that Morocco's only European friends were the British—and even their friendship was limited.

John Drummond Hay retired in 1885 but continued to live in Morocco where he had spent so much of his life and career. He died in Tangier in 1893. Hay had been the dominant force in international diplomacy in Morocco for more than forty years, outlasting ten French consuls. While his connections via family and friends arguably made his job easier, his language skills helped him make close relationships with Moroccans. Hay frequently spent his leisure time hunting wild

boars with prominent Moroccan officials. He also helped his Moroccan colleagues when he could, for instance by having British ships take children of the Moroccan elite to Mecca on pilgrimage and by getting medical treatment for the Moroccan elite from British military doctors in Gibraltar.

Despite his skill in diplomacy, his long tenure in Morocco, and his apparent enjoyment of his post and the country, Hay was not enthusiastic about the makhzen. In his memoirs, Hay called the Morocco's form of government "the worst in the world," noting that officials were not paid, extortion and bribery were commonplace, governors were greedy, as were ministers, and farmers suffered greatly. He wrote that Morocco had "no security for life, or property, no encouragement for industry, and it is only a matter of wonder that the whole country is not allowed to lie fallow."

While Britain remained France's main rival for influence in Morocco into the 1890s, with no other European country willing to take on Britain's role as the guarantor of independence yet not willing to see Britain withdraw from that role because of what that would mean for France and for the European balance of power, European power and influence in general in Morocco continued to grow into the early twentieth century. Land purchases by Europeans continued, the numbers of Moroccans under European consular protection expanded, and European press and diplomats vigorously publicized and protested what they viewed as the human rights abuses in the country. European hotels and beach resorts were built near Tangier, and tourism increased substantially. Leisure time activities began to be more closely regulated in order to organize them according to European tastes; the boar hunts Hay had so heartily enjoyed with his Moroccan colleagues were now illegal, as the Tangier Tent Club banned Moroccans from participating in the hunt, except as servants.

After Mawlay Hasan died in 1894, British-backed reforms picked up speed, backed by the new vizier and regent Ahmed Ibn Musa (Ba Ahmed). The reforms begun by Ba Ahmed and continued by the sultan Mawlay Abd al-Aziz after his formal ascension in 1900 were to strengthen Morocco against French pressures. But by 1903 significant rural protests against the reforms coupled with changes in European politics that demanded a reassessment of British and French policy combined to put France in the preeminent position in Morocco.

In 1901 the young sultan embarked upon a series of economic and administrative reforms to his provincial governments and asked Britain to support the moves. Given that the reforms would be costly and given that Britain was reluctant to alone bear their costs, the British advised the sultan to seek support from France as well, which meant solving thorny issues like the border question between Morocco and

French Algeria. While an agreement on this issue was reached, France was reluctant to endorse or fund the reform program.

Nevertheless, the sultan announced the new reform program at home, which included substantial spending on port works and the military, a new universal tax on agriculture and livestock to replace traditional *ushr* and *zakah* taxes, and elimination of old tax exemptions. The new projects drained the treasury.

At the same time that Morocco's economic problems were becoming quite dire, the country was losing the ardent support of Britain for its continued independence. By the early 1900s, British attention had been diverted further south, to South Africa and the ongoing war there. French economic interests in Morocco were substantial by this time. In addition, European events prodded Britain and France to agree to settle their disagreements over Egypt and Morocco, as well as Madagascar, Gambia, Siam, and Newfoundland. The secret Cambon-Lansdowne Agreement negotiated in 1903 and finalized the next year, gave France a free hand in Morocco in return for French renunciation of claims in Egypt. The British-French agreement was part of the formation of the British-French Entente, the first leg of the Triple Entente that preceded World War I. French involvement deepened in Morocco that year when a consortium of French banking, political, and business interests called the Comité du Maroc made a loan to the sultan in the staggering amount of 62.5 million francs—a loan to which substantial strings were attached. What was by that time all but a charade of independence continued until 1912 when France officially imposed its protectorate over Morocco.

AMY J. JOHNSON

See also: **Morocco: French and Spanish Protectorates, 1903–1914; Morocco: Mawlay Hasan and the Makhzen; Morocco: Spain in Morocco and the Sahara, 1900–1958.**

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Morocco: Mawlay Hasan and the Makhzen

The term “makhzen” (literally, “storehouse”) in North African usage originally denoted the location where taxes were stored; gradually, it came to have the more specific meaning of local, decentralized places of tax revenue storage, similar to government treasuries. By the sixteenth century, this had become the generally used term for the Moroccan government. The makhzen, or government, was a formalization of submission of the tribes to the sultan. Included in this was the willingness of the tribes to defend the sultan and his rights. Broadly speaking, the makhzen's primary job was extracting taxes and maintaining a military to enforce taxation.

At the head of the makhzen was the sultan. The sultan had religious power; he held the title of *Amir al-Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful), he was seen as representative of Muhammad, and he was a *sharif* (descendant of the prophet Muhammad). As such, the sultan had inherited from his ancestors *baraka* (blessing, or power to do good). In theory, therefore, the sultan would not make errors. Yet while the sultan's religious stature was generally agreed upon, his political authority was not.

Mawlay Hasan (r. 1873–1894), Sultan Hasan I, was the ninth ruler of the Alawi dynasty of Morocco that began with al-Rashid in 1664 and continues to govern the country today. While often considered one of Morocco's strongest rulers, even he had to create his own power base in accordance with this system. When his father died in 1873, Mawlay Hasan journeyed to several different places to receive the *bay'a* (oath of loyalty), fighting various factions along the way.

Despite his military skills, Mawlay Hasan was known primarily for the modernizing reforms that characterized his reign. As sultan, he tried to strengthen his state by adopting Western-style reforms. In his view, this policy of defensive modernization would gain for Morocco the reputation of a strong state whose sovereignty European nations should protect, and equally important, the reforms would allow the sultan to control the pace of social and economic change.

Mawlay Hasan's viewed the stabilization of currency and the creation of a more efficient tax collection system as the basis of his reforms, yet his program also included a number of significant military and administrative changes. Like other rulers in the nineteenth century, Mawlay Hasan recognized the superiority of European weapons and military training. The sultan began his reforms by continuing the expansion of the army begun by his father, Sidi Muhammad. He continued

to increase the number of Moroccan troops; by the end of his reign, the sultan's army had approximately 16,000 infantry and 12,000 to 15,000 cavalry. While this was a substantial increase, it did not meet the sultan's ambitious goals. Moreover, it was rare that all troops were on active duty at any given time. Low and irregular pay posed further problems for Mawlay Hasan's military.

Mawlay Hasan also began a significant weapons purchase program. While the sultan bought most of his cannon and other weapons from Britain and France, agents from other countries frequently peddled their wares to the sultan of Morocco. In order to keep foreign influence balanced, and in order not to unduly offend any potential suppliers, the sultan arranged for weapons purchases from a variety of other countries as well, including Belgium, the United States, Germany, and Austria.

At the same time that he recognized the need to buy the latest weapons from Europe, the sultan also wanted Morocco eventually to be able to supply itself with modern weapons, eliminating its dependence on Europe. In keeping with these ideas, Mawlay Hasan built a cartridge factory from his father's gunpowder factory in Marrakech and built a new rifle factory to replace imports. Unfortunately, production in the new factory was slow, and its products were prohibitively expensive. These Moroccan-made rifles cost more than 3,000 francs apiece to produce, compared with the 50-franc price tag for an imported Martini-Henry rifle (the model they were to replace).

In addition to increasing the size of his army, procuring for the troops the latest weapons, and attempting import-substitution of military supplies, the sultan also saw the importance of modern training for his military. This training was accomplished in part by sending students abroad (primarily to Gibraltar and Royal Military Academy at Woolwich) and in part by importing instructors.

Sir Harry Maclean, a Briton, came to Morocco to train the army in 1876 and remained chief instructor of the infantry for thirty-two years. Other European countries objected to British preferential treatment and wanted a role in military training as well. Jules Erckman became France's chief military instructor of Moroccan troops. The two took different approaches that were indicative of their nations' policy toward Morocco, with the Briton Maclean stressing the need for training for Moroccan independence and the Frenchman Erckman stressing Moroccan dependence on France for guidance and training. Germany wanted a role as well, and it took over responsibility for the coastal artillery, with less than impressive results. (60-ton guns were supplied by Krupps; it took ten years to install them, and they were fired only twice before their cement emplacements cracked, rendering them useless.) Italy and

Spain also wanted a role in the Moroccan military; the sultan agreed to allow the Italians to run the arms factory at Fez and to allow the Spanish to maintain one bridge. While undertaken in order to strengthen Morocco, these military reforms opened door to further European involvement, provided a stage for European rivalries to be played out, and resulted in huge expenses for the government. The makhzen's reforms were further weakened by tribal acquisitions of modern weapons after 1880. By this time, arms sales to the tribes in the interior had increased, often through smuggling. This served to make later sultans' attempts to form and solidify their tribal power base much more difficult.

Mawlay Hasan also recognized the need to alter the administrative apparatus. However, in doing so, his primary goal was not to fundamentally change the nature of Moroccan government. In this area, the sultan was primarily concerned about increasing his own power. In 1879 the sultan increased the power of the *wazir* (chief minister), making him responsible for overseeing the entire bureaucracy. To facilitate this, the Mawlay Hasan divided the country and its administration into three regions (from the Bou Regeg north to the Straits of Gibraltar; from the Bou Regeg south to the Sahara; and the Tafilalt) each with its own secretary and all under the jurisdiction of the *wazir*. He also appointed officials for daily palace operations. One official was in charge of order, military groups residing in the palace compound, and the presentation of people to the sultan. Subordinate to him were the master of the stables and the official in charge of the royal encampments. In the palace itself, one official was responsible for the domestic servants and there were several minor officials in charge of certain parts of domestic affairs.

One consequence of reform, however, was an increase in European influence in Morocco. This problem was evident to the sultan, as the conflict over the protégé system demonstrates. Protégés were Moroccans who provided services (such as translation and trading) for European governments and merchants. They were exempt from Moroccan law and were under the legal jurisdiction of a European consul. In practice, protégé status was hereditary and included not only the protégé but also all family members and retainers of the protégé. Europeans sometimes sold protégé status to the highest bidders. It was a system that lent itself to abuses and to the underreporting of actual protégés; in 1877, the European consuls general estimated there were 800 protégés, but there may have been three times that many.

In 1880 Mawlay Hasan requested British assistance in resolving the problems of the protégé system. The British government organized an international conference in Madrid to address the issue. The outcome of that conference was an agreement to limit protected

status. According to its terms, protégés could not be government officials or criminals, their numbers had to be decreased, protégé status could not be hereditary, and foreigners and protégés had to pay gate and agricultural taxes. In return for these restrictions, foreigners were given rights to own land, and their native employees, if arrested, could not be acted against by the makhzen until their employers and their consul were informed. While the conference also agreed to preserve Morocco's territorial integrity, its benefits are debatable. The limitations of protégés were not widely enforced, Europeans gained some expanded rights, Tangier was turned into an internationally administered area, and the conference made Moroccan affairs an international issue, thus at least symbolically decreasing Moroccan sovereignty.

As a consequence of the reforms and the resultant increase in European presence in and influence on Morocco, the Mawlay Hasan had to face numerous calls for jihads directed against Europeans. However, he did not endorse these calls. In fact, the makhzen launched its own propaganda campaign against those who called for jihad, arguing that the Europeans would inevitably win in any conflict because of their military strength and that therefore, jihad against them was not permissible because the end result would be loss of Muslim territory.

The sultan died at Tadla on June 7, 1894. Before he died, Mawlay Hasan called his ministers together and had them sign a paper recognizing his fourteen-year-old son, Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, as Morocco's next ruler.

Verdicts on Mawlay Hasan vary from hailing him as a great leader and Morocco's last strong sultan to condemning him as the man who set the stage for the failure of the makhzen and the imposition of the protectorate. Mawlay Hasan's reforms were not meant to fundamentally restructure or change the system of government in Morocco. They were meant to make himself more powerful and his control firmer. Judged by these criteria, the reforms were a success; his control over Morocco was tighter at the end of his reign than at the beginning, partly thanks to modernizing his army and buying more and better weapons from Europe. The makhzen continued to function relatively well throughout his reign, dealing with issues like currency devaluation and continual European commercial pressure with some success.

Yet the reforms came with a price. Other groups in Morocco could use these same tactics to strengthen themselves as the makhzen had; they could trade with Europeans and buy arms from European sources as well. All of this meant increased European involvement in Morocco and a relative decrease in the power of the makhzen.

AMY J. JOHNSON

See also: **Morocco: Hay, Edward and John Drummond, British Diplomatic Protection, 1829–1903.**

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Morocco: French and Spanish Protectorates, 1903–1914

The resignation of the renowned John Drummond Hay from his post as British consul and the failure and disgrace of Charles Euan Smith's reform proposals marked a gradual decline in British-Moroccan relations and a resultant weakening of both British power and British resolve to ensure Moroccan independence. Likewise, the 1894 death of the energetic reformist sultan Mawlay Hasan was a significant blow to the makhzen. The new sultan, Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, and his regent, Ba Ahmed (who governed the country until the sultan's official ascension in 1900) were determined to continue their predecessor's reforms. However, neither was able to do so as successfully as Mawlay Hasan had. Differences in the rulers' personalities and abilities coupled with a worsening economy, tribal revolts, and continually increasing European pressures on the country made early twentieth century Morocco a volatile place. Changes in European politics profoundly affected the country as well.

Unlike in earlier times, when Morocco successfully played off European interests against each other, the country now had few choices as to where to turn for aid. Britain was preoccupied with its South African war, and European political maneuvering had resulted in a secret 1903 agreement between Britain and France concerning Morocco. The so-called Cambon-Lansdowne Agreement, negotiated in 1903 and finalized the next year, resulted in Britain agreeing to not meddle in France's policies in Morocco in return for France renouncing its claims in Egypt. This agreement, part of a general settling of disputes over colonial territories by the European powers prior to World War I, meant that Morocco had lost the principal guarantor of its independence.

After the failure of the British-backed reform scheme, and given Morocco's need for financing, French foreign minister Theophile Delcassé saw France's

opportunity to get leverage over the makhzen. He signified his approval of a new loan package for the country by the French banking consortium led by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The loan agreement would include setting up a debt commission. The makhzen was not eager to assume a massive foreign debt. However, its attempts to avoid French loans were hampered in 1904 by the continuing rural tax crisis and by its need to spend significant amounts of funds on fighting Abu Himara, a pretender to the Moroccan throne who claimed he was Mawlay Muhammad (Sultan Mawlay Abd al-Aziz's brother) and his tribal allies.

Matters became complicated, however, when news of the impending deal spread to other officials and to tribal leaders in Morocco. In the spate of rumors that followed, the deal was said to be a manifestation of Britain's selling Morocco to France. The (accurate) idea that the loan package meant a massive increase in French control over Moroccan affairs appalled many in the makhzen and even forced the sultan to see the deal in a new light. A representative of the banking group arrived in Fez later that year to continue discussions. This aroused more opposition to the deal when it became evident that Morocco, in agreeing to the package, would be exchanging numerous small creditors with little enforcement power over loan repayment for one powerful creditor able to force repayment through its control of Moroccan customs. Makhzen officials began vocally protesting the loan.

In June the loan deal was finally negotiated and signed. Morocco received 62.5 million francs, with 60 per cent of its customs duties noted as collateral. To ensure security on its collateral, a debt commission (*Contrôle de la Dette*) was set up to oversee customs collection. The loan package also included public works programs, the foundations of a state bank for Morocco, and preferential treatment to the consortium banks in any future loans. The conclusion of the agreement meant France had achieved essentially unfettered control of the Moroccan government.

Border clashes with French Algeria continued as well, complicating French-Moroccan relations. In 1903 General Louis-Hubert-Gonzalves Lyautey had been sent to Morocco to secure the border areas. His refusal to remove his troops from the Ras el Ain oasis based on what he perceived as the need to protect French Algerians on the other side of the border caused a diplomatic stir and confirmed in the minds of many Moroccans that France did not have the interests of Morocco at heart.

In late 1904, Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, in an effort to resolve the differences among his officials and strengthen the antireform coalition, asked the ulama (religious scholars), the *ayan* (notables), and the *shurafa* (plural of *sharif*, a descendant of the prophet) to consult

and make a recommendation to the makhzen on the proposed reforms. Not surprisingly, the recommendation was against the proposals. An accompanying *fatwa* on European advisers was issued by the ulama in Fez shortly thereafter, blaming Morocco's problems on the presence of foreigners in the country. Accordingly, the sultan informed the French minister in Fez that all Europeans employed by the Moroccan government were henceforth dismissed from their posts.

In 1905 the situation in Morocco was significantly altered by the visit of German Emperor Wilhelm II to Tangier. The German government proclaimed its support of Moroccan independence and of international treaties on Morocco (e.g., the Madrid Convention on protégés); France took umbrage and accused the Germans of meddling in affairs that were none of their concern. For Germany, Morocco provided an arena to challenge France indirectly. By proclaiming itself in favor of the status quo (independence) and supporting the indigenous antireform movement, Germany could help prevent the imposition of the protectorate (and hence further impede French colonial gains) without risking an outright conflict with its neighbor.

The German wrench thrown into the French works in Morocco resulted in the sultan formally declining the French reform program. It also resulted in the convening of the 1906 Conference of Algeciras, at which the European powers confirmed Moroccan independence and confirmed the economic equality of all European powers in Morocco. It also set up an international commission to deal with Moroccan reforms. While on its face these might appear to have been gains for Morocco, the reality was a bit different. The international commission on reforms was heavily dominated by France, and its extensive powers (including broad rights to intervene in politics and economics throughout the country) meant further erosion of Moroccan sovereignty. A state bank was formed to be the makhzen's lone financial agent. It had the power to issue currency and do whatever was necessary to stabilize the economy. This bank, like the reform commission, was French-controlled, with most of its officials coming from the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The sultan, who did not agree with the provisions stemming from the conference, was bullied into signing the agreement.

In signing the agreement, Mawlay Abd al-Aziz made himself the target of antireformers, who claimed he was weak and had submitted unnecessarily to European pressures. The agreement also galvanized opposition to continued European presence in Morocco. In 1907 this opposition resulted in attacks on Europeans in the city of Casablanca that led to France occupying the area. Across the border, French forces in Algeria entered Morocco and occupied another city, Oujda, as a response to border attacks launched from that area.

The country's fortunes did not improve the following year. In 1908 a civil war in Morocco pitted the sultan, Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, against his brother, Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz. Opposition to Abd al-Aziz as sultan had grown so strong following the 1906 agreement that he had little support to continue in his position, and the ulama formally deposed the sultan in favor of his brother. The following year, Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz was formally recognized by the European powers as the legitimate sultan of the Moroccan state. Yet all did not go smoothly for the new government. The new sultan still faced the ongoing Abu Himara rebellion and a rebellion by Abd al-Hayy Kittani, the head of the Kittani brotherhood. Both revolts were successfully put down.

In 1911 Morocco appeared to benefit from European rivalries once more, when a German gunboat appeared in Agadir, supposedly to protect German interests in the country. The arrival of the Germans was brought about by the occupation of Fez by French forces, following attacks on French citizens in that city. The sultan vociferously protested the French action, and Germany endorsed the sultan's position. The apparent German interest in Morocco was short-lived, however. The so-called Agadir Incident simply resulted in another European colonial tit-for-tat, with Germany recognizing French rights in Morocco in return for some territorial gains in the Congo.

The year 1912 dealt the final blow to Moroccan independence, which, by that time, was largely a fiction in any case. That year, the French forced the sultan to sign the Treaty of Fez, which formally established a French protectorate over southern Morocco. This agreement gave France permission to direct Moroccan foreign affairs and to oversee its domestic affairs. The same year, France and Spain agreed upon the establishment of a Spanish protectorate in the remaining areas of Morocco. While both regions were technically under the authority of the sultan, Moroccan independence was an illusion. After agreeing to the imposition of the protectorates, Sultan Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz abdicated and his more compliant brother Mawlay Yusuf took the helm of the now French and Spanish occupied Moroccan ship.

Lyautey was appointed the first resident general of Morocco and given almost total control of both the civilian and military branches of the administration. The first step for Lyautey's government in Morocco was to pacify the country. The Treaty of Fez had not been warmly accepted by the tribes. In May 1912, tribal allies attacked the city of Fez and its foreign institutions, with the support of a large number of the Moroccan residents of the city. The revolt was put down, but it did not signal the end of resistance to the protectorate. The rebellion of El Hiba, who had

declared himself the leader of the *mujahidin* forces and dedicated himself and his supporters to expelling the French from the country, posed a more serious threat to the French occupation. He and his five thousand troops captured the city of Marrakech in 1912; the local ulama subsequently declared him the rightful sultan. While the government in Paris counseled restraint, Lyautey favored offensive action. An attack on Marrakech began and ended on September 5. The superior weaponry of the French forces turned the battle into a massacre, with more than two thousand Moroccans being killed versus four French dying in the battle.

In addition to pacifying the country, Lyautey also began an immediate reorganization of the apparatus of government. The central change was the division of the old makhzen into two sections, one whose officials would be Moroccan Muslims and another whose officials would be French. While the sultan remained the head of government, he was essentially a figurehead, and real power rested in the office of resident general.

Lyautey also initiated significant changes in property rights and land ownership. Land surveys were conducted, maps drawn, property rights commissions convened, and land registrations begun before French courts. Large amounts of land were expropriated by the new government in order to make land available for incoming French colonists and to make land available for the government to supply services (e.g., schools, security, medical facilities) for the new colonists.

The Spanish protectorate, centered in Tetouan, governed two sections of the country, one in the north and one in the far south. Here, the sultan theoretically governed through a chosen *khalifa*, who had subordinate officials, courts, and ministers. The *khalifa* was to be protected by the government of Spain, in the person of a high commissioner. The Spanish high commissioner was in charge of security, the maintenance of order, and the service ministries, such as health, commerce, industry, and communications. In other words, while the *khalifa* was supreme on paper, in reality, the high commissioner governed the Spanish zone in much the same way that the resident general was in charge of the French zone.

By 1914 the government of Morocco had been substantially changed. The new French protectorate had reorganized the government and taken control of most important government functions. Land seizures and increased immigration resulted in more Europeans entering the country than ever before and in the loss of much agricultural land by Moroccans. While the sultan continued to rule in name, he presided over a country that bore little resemblance to Morocco a mere twenty years earlier.

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Morocco: Resistance and Collaboration, Bu Hmara to Abdelkrim (Ibn 'Abd El-Krim)

Before colonial occupation in the early twentieth century, Morocco was divided into an area under the control of the sultan's government, or Makhzen, the Blad al-Makhzen, and an area where his authority was nominally acknowledged but in fact slight, the Blad al-Siba. The Berber tribes of the mountainous regions, such as the High Atlas and the Rif were commonly in the Blad al-Siba, ruling themselves through local assemblies (*djemaa*). Actual rebellions by them and others were common in Moroccan history. Sultan Hassan I, who reigned from 1873 to 1894, tried to strengthen and modernize the central government, partly to help protect Morocco against European powers encroaching on the country, but had limited success. Under his pleasure-loving and spendthrift son Abdel Aziz, government authority steadily broke down.

Morocco borrowed heavily from European sources and mortgaged customs revenue for debt service. This helped European powers encroach further on Morocco; while others advanced their business interests and insisted on reforms in the Moroccan government, France was from 1900 out to assert its influence. In this situation local rebels and warlords arose, sometimes declaring opposition to the increasing influence of Westerners.

Jilali ben Idris al-Zarhuni al-Yusufi, alias Bu Hmara or Abu Himara, was a rebel who at first claimed to be the Sultan's disgraced elder brother Muhammad. From his first base at Oujda he razed the entire eastern border area and the Middle Atlas, and defeated the sultan's forces in December 1902 but was defeated in turn a month later, and in 1904, driven from his Taza base to the eastern Rif, near Melilla. He held out there for several years, claiming the title of sultan and granting "concessions" to foreign companies.

European powers' interest in Morocco led to the crisis between France and Germany in 1905 and the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which established virtual Franco-Spanish control of Morocco's finances and a port police force as well as a state bank under French control. The agreement was largely ineffective, and French troops

occupied Oujda and landed at Casablanca in 1907. Then a powerful Berber chieftain in the High Atlas, Madani el Glaoui, induced Abdel Aziz' brother Abdel Hafiz to rise up against the sultan. After a few months they defeated Abdel Aziz (1907–1908) and Abdel Hafiz became Sultan. He ruled for four years and was able in September 1909 to defeat and capture Bu Hmara, who had tried unsuccessfully to extend the area under his control in the Rif; after capture he was brutally executed.

Some Moroccans hoped that Abdel Hafiz might be able to restore government authority and resist European encroachment, perhaps with outside help. He was influenced by pan-Islamist ideas developed in Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, and in 1909–1910 contacted Germany, Italy, and Turkey; a Turkish military mission was sent, financed by a Moroccan or Maghrebian organization in Cairo, al Ittihad al-Maghribi. At this time the Salafiyya school of Islamic thought was spreading in Morocco from the Middle East. It preached a return to the true original values of Islam and had the effect of encouraging Muslims to react against European colonialism. Its influence was to spread at the historic Qarawiyyin University in Fez; Abdel Hafiz recalled from exile a prominent Salafi scholar, Abu Shu'ayb al-Dukkali (1878–1937).

This activity presaged the awakening of Moroccan, Arab and Muslim sentiment, partly through Middle Eastern influence, which was to challenge French domination. But from 1909 to 1912, these anti-French feelings had no tangible effect. France sent a new expedition in 1911 at the request of the sultan himself, when Fez was surrounded by rebels, and on March 30, 1912, France established a protectorate over most of Morocco. In effect, Morocco became a colony, although the monarchy and other traditional institutions were preserved. Marshal Lyautey, the first resident general, installed two administrations, one continuing the traditional government for certain limited purposes with Caids, Pashas, and Cadis, the other being the overriding French administration. Meanwhile Spain occupied a smaller northern area from 1909.

In the High Atlas, the French used the three major "Great Caids" of the Berbers, and especially the Glaoua, as instruments of their rule. The Glaoua were headed by Madani el Glaoui (1866–1918), who had been Abdel Hafiz's Grand Vizir after installing him on the throne, and then by his brother Thami el Glaoui (1879–1956), pasha of Marrakech. They ruled as semi-independent potentates, and Thami el Glaoui was for decades the leading collaborator of the French, apart from the sultan. In fact the sultan, while still respected by his people, was wholly subject to French orders; the decrees (*dahir*) issued nominally by him

were in fact drawn up by the French resident general. After signing the protectorate treaty, Abdel Hafiz was deposed within a year and replaced by Sultan Youssef. The *khalifa* who represented the sultan in the Spanish Zone was equally subordinate to the colonial power.

Islam in Morocco was dominated by brotherhoods based on veneration of particular holy men; with the partial exception of the Tijaniyya of Tetuan, they backed colonial rule. But orthodox Muslims inspired by Salafiyya teaching opposed the brotherhoods both for that reason and on the grounds that their form of Islam was corrupt. This orthodox Islamic movement, based in Fez, led to the creation of “free schools,” or modernized Muslim schools, from 1921, and later helped lay the ground for modern nationalism.

To the south of the Atlas there were uprisings by the “Blue Men,” led by Ma el-Ainin who had recognized the sultan’s rule in Mauritania a few years before, and who proclaimed himself sultan in 1910 but was defeated and then died later that year. The leadership was then assumed by his son Ahmed el Hiba in 1912. El Hiba revolted against the French occupation and proclaimed jihad at Tiznit. He took Marrakech in August 1912 but was then defeated, and steadily driven back in 1912–1913.

In World War I, the Glaoua helped Marshal Lyautey hold on to territory already occupied by France. Many areas, however, were not subdued, and German agents encouraged dissidence, operating mainly in Spanish Morocco (Spain being neutral in the war). Albert Bartels, the main German agent, worked against the French with Abdelmalek bin Muhyi al Din, a grandson of the famous Algerian resistance leader Abd el Kader; ex-Sultan Hafiz also worked with the Germans for a time, in Spain. In 1914–1918, after limited Spanish occupation (Tetuan was occupied in 1913), the Rifi Berbers remained effectively independent, some being ruled by the chieftain Raisuli, active since the early 1900s. He had at least 2,000 well-armed men, but although he was called “Sultan of the Jihad” he came to terms with the Spanish; for years he ran his fief based at Tazirut in the western Rif.

“Primary resistance” by Berbers was a constant worry to the colonial rulers but not a major threat. However, a new development occurred in Spanish Morocco when Muhammad ibn Abdel Krim al Khattabi, better known simply as Abd el Krim (1868–1963), united many of the Rifis in a concerted and well-organized war effort against the Spanish occupiers. Educated at Fez, he had been chief judge (*qadi*) in the old Spanish colony at Melilla, but he joined his father in organizing resistance when Spain began to extend its effective occupation in 1919. He led a confederation of Rif tribes to a crushing victory over the Spanish forces at Anual in July 1921. For four years much of the interior of

Spanish Morocco was under Abd el Krim’s control. He established a government based at Ajdir, with many modern features, breaking away from traditional Berber custom. There was an administrative system with *qadis* and *qaids*, and a miniature state called *al-dawla al-jumhuriya al-rifiya* (the state of the Rifian Republic). The government raised a large sum from ransoms for prisoners in 1923 and sought to acquire modern military equipment, besides establishing a telephone system and planning a new currency (never issued). There was a regular army (numbering approximately 2,000 to 3,000) besides troops recruited or conscripted all over the area under Abd el Krim’s control; some European adventurers fought for him. He was celebrated in the Muslim world and appealed to Europeans’ imagination.

He never won total support in the Rif but defeated Abd el Malek and then, in 1925, Raisuli. In that year, however, Abd el Krim attacked the French, and after initial successes he was defeated by the alliance of two European colonial powers. He had maybe 12,000 men at the end, against combined French and Spanish forces of 123,000 men and 150 aircraft. Abd el Krim surrendered to the French on May 25, 1926, and was sent into exile in Réunion.

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See also: Morocco: French and Spanish Protectorates, 1903–1914; Morocco: Lyautey, General Hubert, and Evolution of the French Protectorate, 1912–1950; Morocco: Spain in Morocco and the Sahara, 1900–1958.

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Morocco: Lyautey, General Hubert, and Evolution of French Protectorate, 1912–1950

The name of General Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934), the first resident general of French Morocco, is synonymous with the concept of the protectorate. Lyautey was appointed in 1912 to oversee the creation of a new regime in Morocco and was charged with implementing the theory of protectorate. The sultan was to be maintained in position and respected, though authority

ultimately belonged to the resident general, who was answerable to the Foreign Ministry in Paris.

Lyautey's first priority in 1912 was to complete the "pacification" of Morocco and consolidate the gains already made by French troops. However, with local resistance and geographical considerations making complete military victory unlikely, Lyautey decided to concentrate on achieving control of what he termed "useful" and "necessary" Morocco; that is, the areas of the country with some economic worth from agriculture or mining. Lyautey was keen to avoid the creation of an exploitative colonial regime in Morocco. He attempted to restrict European immigration so that the settler-native divide seen in Algeria would not be reproduced in Morocco, and to work with the settlers to avoid the excesses of colonialism.

This aim came into conflict, however, with his other main goal: rapid economic development of the protectorate. Foreign investment, principally from France, was welcomed; twenty-nine thousand settlers arrived in 1912 and 1913. A large-scale program of public works was undertaken, to construct roads, railways, and harbors. In addition to the immigration that this work attracted, a shift of population to the cities took place within Morocco; Casablanca's population rose from 12,000 in 1912 to 110,000 by 1921. During the World War I, agricultural exports to Europe brought a much-needed improvement in economic conditions. After the war, however, the problems posed by development became greater. Moroccans' living conditions in the cities saw little improvement, partly because Lyautey's insistence on respecting the local population meant that modern European cities had been constructed alongside the old and crowded *medinas*. In the countryside, meanwhile, Lyautey failed to prevent French settlers from seizing and exploiting large areas of land.

The military situation in the protectorate's early years was not a complete success either. Resistance to French "pacification" continued in the more remote areas and by the mid-1920s had found a leader in 'Abd al-Karim. He conducted a successful campaign in the Rif Mountains and achieved victories against depleted French forces in 1925. This episode, which underlined the limits of French success in winning popularity through economic and social development, coincided with Lyautey's resignation. By the time 'Abd al-Karim was defeated in 1926 by a combined French and Spanish force, Lyautey's Morocco resembled other colonies, with problems of inequality and exploitation already giving rise to nationalism.

Lyautey's successors as resident general, Steeg (1925–1929) and Saint (1929–1933), were more favorable to French immigration and colonization. European settlement progressed rapidly, and the character of

immigrants changed; many were now Frenchmen of modest means, less receptive than earlier settlers to Lyautey's ideal of respect for indigenous society. During the depression of the 1930s, the settlers pressurized the French authorities to support them by relaxing labor laws, making it easier to employ poorly paid Moroccan casual labor while protecting the Europeans' investment in industry and agriculture. European living standards rose during the 1930s, while those of Moroccans dropped dramatically and unemployment became a serious problem in the still-expanding cities. Contact between the settlers and the Moroccans was minimal, and very few Moroccans were able to gain access to the modern economy or to posts in the protectorate administration.

The post-Lyautey era also saw little progress in the field of social and religious cohesion. French attempts to distinguish between Arabs and Berbers, the latter seen as easier to assimilate into the secular French state because of their supposedly weaker Muslim faith, had long been a feature of French rule in North Africa. In May 1930, the French authorities announced plans to regulate Berber law, with the intention of hastening the Berbers' assimilation and distancing them from Islam, which was considered to be the source of the Arabs' resistance to French rule. The Moroccan reaction was rapid, with protests against this separation of Arabs and Berbers, while the Sultan Sidi Mohammed, as spiritual leader, supported the protests in the name of Islam. Lyautey's aim of respecting Moroccan culture and belief appeared to have been forgotten by the authorities.

Social policy, too, revealed the failings of French rule. Despite a socialist government in France in 1936, Resident General Peyrouton (March–October 1936) refused to introduce progressive measures. Moroccan strikers were sacked or imprisoned while their European counterparts were able to negotiate with the authorities. Unrest among Moroccans increased in the face of growing inequalities, until General Noguès (October 1936–1943) was appointed as resident general to restore order. Noguès is generally seen as the only resident general to attempt to follow in Lyautey's footsteps. He attempted to prevent further growth of nationalism by raising the Moroccans' living standards, in particular by granting financial aid to the rural population and extending irrigation. The beginnings of Noguès' rule certainly encouraged nationalists and alarmed settlers, but the onset of World War II prevented the continuation of gradual reform.

Although Morocco fought in 1939–1940 as an ally of France, the subsequent defeat and division undermined France's prestige. The American influence during the war encouraged nationalists, and in 1944 the Atlantic Charter's guarantee of self-determination further

threatened French authority. De Gaulle appointed a conservative, Puaux, as resident general in 1943 and riots in favor of independence were repressed, but popular support now rallied round the sultan as a symbol of independence, rather than merely hoping for reform of the protectorate regime. In 1946 the metropolitan government appointed the liberal, Labonne, as resident general, but though he was willing to anger the settlers by urging greater effort to move toward equality, his plan for an assembly with representation for both settlers and Moroccans was rejected by both sides. Furthermore, Labonne found that most of his administrative staff were staunchly conservative supporters of the settlers, undermining his plans for reform. Security forces violently repressed Muslim demonstrations; the sultan publicly criticized the French and turned to the United States and the Arab League. Labonne was replaced in 1947 by the conservative General Juin. Juin welcomed new settlers, heavily invested in the modern settler-controlled economy, and sought to oppose nationalism by encouraging any opposition to the sultan. His policies created the climate of bitter division and anti-French feeling that characterized the last years of French Morocco and further distanced the protectorate from Lyautey's legacy.

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Morocco: Spain in Morocco and the Sahara, 1900–1958

At the turn of the twentieth century, Spanish holdings in Morocco comprised the Mediterranean coastal *presidios*, or garrisons, at Melilla, Ceuta, and Alhucemas, as well as the Atlantic coastal enclave of Ifni, held by treaty since the fifteenth century, but which the Spanish had never successfully occupied. In 1884 a powerful Spanish commercial lobby pressing the government to compete with France in Northwest Africa's colonization had also succeeded in establishing a trade settlement at Villa Cisneros in the Western Sahara. The Spanish government signed a series of accords with France in 1900, 1904, and 1912 that further demarcated Spain's sphere of influence in Morocco to an area roughly one-twentieth the area under French control. Spanish Morocco included a strip of land that ran along the northern coast then turned southward into the Rif Mountains and a southern region from Rio de Oro

in the Sahara to the Wadi Draa, as well as the area immediately surrounding Ifni.

Successive territorial agreements with the other European powers left the Moroccan Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz increasingly powerless to use international pressure to stem France and Spain's actions in Morocco. The 1906 Act of Algeciras to which 'Abd al-Aziz was a signatory gave the two countries virtual control over the country despite fictive recognition of the sultan's continued sovereignty. France first established a protectorate over Morocco in 1912 under the pretext of defending 'Abd al-Aziz's half-brother and usurper 'Abd al-Hafiz from a rebel force that was marching on Fez. Under the protectorate, both France and Spain began to expand control over their respective territories openly. For several years, the Spanish contended with a guerrilla war led by Ahmad al-Raisuli in the Jbala region around Tetuan and were even forced to recognize his de facto control over the area for a brief period. However, the far greater challenge to Spanish authority came from the Rifian leader Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karim whose ideologically based opposition movement united the Rifian people in a self-proclaimed republic under his leadership. During the period from 1921 to 1926, 'Abd al-Karim's followers inflicted a series of heavy defeats on the Spanish, and the ease with which his forces defeated the Spaniards prompted him to expand his efforts into French controlled territory as well. This led ultimately to a combined Franco-Spanish force of nearly half a million men routing 'Abd al-Karim's force of sixty thousand and forcing his surrender in May 1926.

Faced with the struggle to assert Spanish supremacy in the Rif, successive Spanish governments made little effort to establish a presence beyond the coastal town of Villa Cisneros in the south. The region's military governor from 1903 to 1925, Francisco Bens Argandona, succeeded in nurturing positive relations with the region's inhabitants largely because the Spanish presence at that time posed no threat to local autonomy. In the absence of a Spanish military presence in the interior, the Spanish Saharan zone provided a place of refuge for Western Saharans involved in efforts to expel the French from the region, and became an ongoing source of diplomatic tension with France. Only in the early 1930s as France was on the verge of completing the subjugation of its Saharan territories after over two decades of fighting did Spain act to take control of its interior Saharan holdings.

Concerns about rising Moroccan nationalism following the founding of the *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party in French Morocco prompted the Spanish government to separate its Saharan territories administratively from its protectorate in Morocco. In 1946 they formed Africa Occidental Espanola (Spanish West Africa), which consisted of Spanish Sahara and Ifni.

Slow to recover from the damage to its economy caused by the Spanish Civil War, the Franco government invested little in the infrastructure of its colonies. Particularly in the Sahara, the lives of its nomadic inhabitants changed little under Spanish rule as administrators lacked the resources to control much less tax their subjects.

Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco sought to counter his country's political isolation in the years following World War II by courting diplomatic ties to the Arab Middle East. Franco recognized that his Moroccan colony could be a useful bargaining tool with Arab Muslim leaders. Toward this end, the Spanish government disavowed France's deposition of the nationalist Sultan Muhammad V in August 1953, while orchestrating public demonstrations in Spanish Morocco supporting Muhammad V, and granting amnesty or sentence reductions to prisoners. In late 1954 Spain delivered on promises of greater Moroccan participation in the governing of Spanish Morocco while stopping short of full Moroccan autonomy. A new government was formed that placed prominent nationalists in high-level ministerial positions, including the leader of nationalist efforts in Spanish Morocco 'Abd al-Khaliq Torres, who became minister of social affairs.

Spanish Morocco now became the nationalist movement's base of operations in its efforts to oust the French from Morocco, as the movement of smuggled arms and the carrying out of military training took place unimpeded, and perhaps aided by Spanish authorities. On March 2, 1956, both France and Spain recognized Morocco's independence as Muhammad V returned from exile in Madagascar to rule as king rather than sultan. Faced with relinquishing its holdings in Morocco, Spain refused to turn over control of its southern zone around Ifni, asserting that the area was in a state of anarchy and posed a threat to Spain's Western Saharan settlement. Villa Cisneros was not regarded as part of newly independent Morocco, despite nationalist protestations of a historical Greater Morocco claim to the region.

The conflict escalated throughout 1956 and 1957, from anti-Spanish public demonstrations in Ifni to politically motivated assassinations and sporadic fighting between the Moroccan Liberation Army and Spanish forces. Beginning in November 1957, the Liberation Army amassed a large enough force to drive the Spaniards from Ifni's hinterland. Faced with expulsion from the region altogether, Spain and France cooperated in unleashing a large-scale air and ground assault on several fronts that defeated the Liberation Army contingents in the first months of 1958. Despite its costly victory, Spanish administrators remained restricted to Ifni itself until its complete abandonment in 1969.

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See also: **Morocco: French and Spanish Protectorates, 1903–1914; Morocco: Immigration and Colonization, 1900–1950; Morocco: Lyautey, General Hubert, and Evolution of French Protectorate, 1912–1950; Morocco: Nationalism, Muhammad V, Independence, 1930–1961.**

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Morocco: Immigration and Colonization, 1900–1950

The year 1900 marked the official ascension of Sultan Mawlay Abd al-Aziz, for whom the regent Ba Ahmed had been governing the country since the death of the previous sultan, Mawlay Hasan, in 1894. Like his father, the new sultan was keenly interested in pursuing a program of modernizing reforms for his country. Unfortunately, economic pressures and continued European encroachment meant his reform programs were not as successful as those of his father had been. One form of increased European pressure on the Sherifan Empire was immigration. The number of foreigners resident in Morocco rose during the first half of the twentieth century, picking up significantly after the imposition of the French and Spanish protectorates in 1912.

The governmental changes begun by France's first resident general, Louis-Hubert-Gonzalves Lyautey, were designed to impose security and order in the country; they also made Morocco more attractive to French settlers. Lyautey's pacification program successfully put down several rebellions. His troops also spread throughout the country, establishing pacified areas where local economic activities began to flourish. French takeover of much of the apparatus of government coupled with the introduction of French courts with wide-ranging authority served, among other things, to encourage immigration. Even more significantly, large amounts of land were expropriated by the new government in order to make land available for incoming French colonists and to make land available for the

provision of government services (e.g., schools, security apparatus, medical facilities) for the new colonists.

Yet Lyautey did not want settlement on the pattern of French settlement in Algeria. He had neither patience with nor respect for peasant settlers. Lyautey's view was that his government was to take care of the country and its native inhabitants—quite literally, to “protect” Morocco. Instead of encouraging small farmer immigration, Lyautey favored large-scale farming by major corporations, viewing this as a profitable and minimally disruptive type of agriculture. In his mind, land registrations and changes in property laws coupled with seizures of agricultural land and with expropriation of roads, rivers, beach areas, forests, land previously owned collectively by tribes would provide the basis for corporation agriculture in Morocco. Still, though, his reforms in the first year of the protectorate alone attracted some 29,000 new European (primarily French) settlers to Morocco. Most of these new immigrants settled in cities on the coast.

After World War I, the settler influx continued. Lyautey's successor, Theodore Steeg (resident general from 1925 to 1928), took a much different approach to the question of immigration and settlement. Unlike Lyautey, Steeg was a firm believer in the necessity of encouraging the immigration of small-scale, or peasant, farmers to Morocco. Lyautey had believed that so many small farmers could mismanage their lands and resources and become a burden to the state; he also realized that arable land in Morocco was limited and all settlement by French farmers would necessarily reduce the amount of arable land available to Moroccan farmers. The result would be that the untrained Moroccan farmers would move to the cities, where they would not be able to find jobs. Steeg however, believed the French small farmers would be a source of economic success. Time proved Lyautey correct, however, as many of the small farmers went under and required economic assistance from the protectorate—assistance that had come from taxes on native Moroccans. During the protectorate, 5,903 rural settlers farmed 1,017,000 hectares, 289,000 of which was expropriated by the government and then sold to the settlers, and the remaining 728,000 hectares of which had been acquired through private sale.

Urban immigrants who arrived in Morocco in the 1920s settled into a typically colonial lifestyle. They constructed and lived in European-style cities, much of whose architecture was explicitly modeled on that of Europe (in contrast to new buildings at the beginning of the protectorate, which were built with some concessions to local styles). They worked in European companies, socialized almost exclusively with other Europeans, rarely came into social contact with Moroccans, and took advantage of their access to the best goods and forms of

travel. In other words, the immigrants were essentially segregated, by choice and economic position, from the Moroccan population.

In 1931 there were some 115,000 French settlers in Morocco, which represented a 42 per cent increase in only five years; some sources estimate the total foreign population at 200,000 by the mid-1930s. Not only had these settlers built and rebuilt Moroccan cities, but they had reinvigorated trade, built new towns in the interior, and reorganized agriculture along European lines. They also proved a powerful lobbying group, pressuring the French administration in Morocco for policies favorable to their interests and for political institutions wherein they could formally mobilize and influence French policy in the country.

In 1919 French settlers had successfully pushed for the formation of the Conseil du Gouvernement, which served as a debating and discussion body for the French population of Morocco. The organization of the settlers into a lobbying body allowed them to substantially influence policy decisions and the fates of the resident generals. Henri Ponsot, the resident general from 1933 to 1936, pushed for reforms and concessions to Moroccan nationalists and opposed a revision of the Algeciras Act of 1906 that would have altered tariffs for the benefit of the settlers. In response, the colonists demanded that the Conseil du Gouvernement be changed from a consultative group to one that would formally deliberate (and hence have more influence) on government policy. The conflict resulted in Paris recalling Ponsot, marking a major increase in the power of the settler population.

Immigration to Morocco began to decline after 1931, yet opposition to the settlers continued. In 1937 the diversion of water supplies by French settlers occasioned a large-scale riot in Meknes. The continued French presence, policy, and power in Morocco coupled with the privileged and segregated lifestyles of the settlers occasioned widespread discontent among most Moroccans. This discontent eventually led to the formation of several organized protest movements and parties. The *istiqlal* (independence) movement began before 1930 but became explicitly opposed to the continuation of the protectorate in 1930, after the government promulgated the Berber Dahir, which recognized Berber rights and promoted Berber separatism. The group, under the leadership of Muhammad al-Wazzani and Allal al-Fassi, drew up a program of reforms. Despite the split of the movement into two sections in 1937 (the same year al-Fassi was deported to Gabon for his nationalist activities), resistance continued.

World War II resulted in only minor demographic changes in Morocco. The 1939 German invasion of France prompted Muhammad V to send 20,000 of his troops to France to defend the country. When France

was occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940, the resident general, Charles Noguès, sided with the new Vichy regime. Yet the sultan supported the Free French Movement, refusing to sign anti-Jewish decrees, and asserting that Moroccan Jews were his subjects like all the Moroccan people and he would defend their rights. This encouraged the resistance, as did American landings in Morocco in 1942 and the apparent support of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt for Moroccan independence. While the French North African colonies became important sites of Free French organization, massive immigration to Morocco did not occur.

In 1944 the *istiglal* group was formally made a party and appealed to the United States, USSR, France, and Britain to put an end to the protectorate. In 1947 the sultan, long in agreement with the group's aims, formally aligned himself with the party. By 1951 a new group called the National Front had been formed, incorporating several parties in both the French and Spanish zones. Despite mounting resistance and international pressure, France was not ready to abandon its position or its settlers in Morocco. In order to govern through a more tractable leader, France, in 1953, deported the independence-minded sultan to Madagascar and replaced him with an elderly uncle. Rather than solving the problem, this move galvanized the opposition, leading to two years of intensified attacks on French settlers, institutions, and property. In 1955 the Oued Zem massacre of ninety-five settlers prompted a French reconsideration of the issue. Shortly thereafter, negotiations to end the protectorate began. In 1955 both the French and the Spanish protectorates were ended, as was the international control of Tangier, and Morocco became once more an independent, sovereign state.

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See also: Morocco: Lyautey, General Hubert, and Evolution of French Protectorate, 1912–1950; Morocco: Mawlay Hasan and the Makhzen.

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Morocco: Nationalism, Muhammad V, Independence, 1930–1961

After the death of Sultan Moulay Hassan in 1894, Morocco experienced a period of political turmoil characterized by contested successions and popular revolts. This contributed to the weakening of the country and thus paved the way for colonial domination. The Treaty of Fez, signed by the Sultan Mawlay Abdelhafid, established a French protectorate in March 1912. The treaty divided Morocco into three administrative zones: French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, and the international zone of Tangier. However, the “pacification” of the entire country proved extremely slow and difficult. Resistance from various tribes to European occupation, with the Rif War (1921–1926) led by Abd el-Krim being a prime example, lasted until the conquest was completed in 1934.

Morocco enjoyed the status of an independent country for centuries and thus foreign domination was vigorously opposed. Indeed, the crushing of the armed struggle had not brought an end to the resistance, for the opposition to occupation had only taken a different form which became political in nature and urban based. The movement had already started in the mid-1920s with two small groups of young nationalists in Fez and Rabat. Both Allal al-Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej were respectively acting as spokesmen for these two groups.

The Sultan Muhammad V, chosen by the French to succeed his father Mawlay Youssef in 1927, was still young (seventeen years old), without experience, and representing no threat to the existing alliance that developed between the sultanate and the French colonial administration during his father's reign. During the early years of his rule, he remained loyal to France, and on occasions showed certain sympathy with the nationalist movement. In addition to the effective French control exercised over the dynasty, he also found himself deprived of his actual powers as a monarch. In other words, he was essentially little more than a figurehead.

In 1930 the sultan signed the Berber Decree (*dahir*), a French-inspired legal instrument aimed at replacing Islamic law (Shari'a) by the customary tribal law in

Berber-dominated areas. Viewed as a “divide and rule” measure, it was met with wider protests both in Morocco and in other parts of the Muslim world. Inside the country it was a turning point, particularly for the nationalist movement, which is believed to have come fully to life as a consequence. Indeed, this led the nationalists to organize themselves into a movement called the National Action Bloc and make the sultan more aware of and sensitive to their aspirations, initially through the celebration from 1933 of the anniversary of his accession to the throne.

A detailed program of reforms was drawn up by the nationalists and presented to the sultan, the French government, and the residency in 1934. Although not disputing the protectorate treaty, this program addressed the failures and abuses stemming from direct colonial administration. It called for the strict application of the treaty terms and measures of political, economic, and social nature to promote the well-being of the indigenous Moroccan population. To the chagrin of the nationalists, these somewhat moderate demands were not given any consideration by the French government either immediately or later, in the form of “urgent demands,” when the Front Popular assumed power in France in May 1936.

From 1937 the nationalists embarked on a campaign aimed at mobilizing the masses to support their cause. The demonstrations of solidarity by the population in many cities and parts of the country were met with brutal repression from the colonial administration. The nationalist leaders were arrested and some of them, such as Al-Fassi and Muhammad Ouazzani, were sent into exile afterward. As a result, the nationalist activity came to be severely restricted in the French zone. A situation that was quite different in the Spanish zone where the nationalist movement, represented by the Party of National Reforms and the Party of Moroccan Unity, was under less repressive conditions.

With the outbreak of World War II the sultan made a public statement in which he expressed Morocco’s support to France and its Allies. The nationalists were also supportive of the sultan’s declaration. In 1942 the Allied forces landed in Morocco and Algeria. And this was to herald a new era in the development of the nationalist movement and its relationship with the sultanate. In his meeting with the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt a year later, the sultan was assured of the American support for Moroccan independence. During the same year the nationalists reconstituted their party, which became the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. Having taken matters into their hands, they presented the French residency and the sultan with a manifesto calling for the country’s independence in 1944. The immediate reaction of the French was to

arrest some prominent nationalist leaders, accused of intelligence with the Germans. This attitude only contributed to persuade the sultan that Moroccan aspirations could not be achieved under the protectorate system.

The visit made to Tangier in 1947 and the emphasis on Morocco’s Arab ties marked a turning point in the sultan’s commitment to the cause of independence. In view of his growing disapproval of the protectorate, the French government made some concessions, allowing the participation of Moroccans in the council of government. But these concessions were attacked because they meant the maintenance of the colonial rule in the form of a shared sovereignty. The sultan’s refusal to sign decrees restricting his country’s sovereignty made him emerge as a symbol of Moroccan unity and the nation’s leader in the struggle for independence. His declaration demanding full sovereignty to Morocco in 1952, and subsequent maneuvers of French officials with the collaboration of certain Moroccan religious and Berber notables, led to his deposition and deportation to Madagascar. But his exile made him a living martyr and turned him into a national hero.

The pressure from the nationalist movement and the armed resistance that had just started to operate from the Spanish zone prompted the French government to reinstate him in 1955. A year later, agreements signed successively with France and Spain ended the colonial occupation and recognized the independence of Morocco. The sultan, adopting the title of king from 1957, skillfully managed not only to portray the monarchy as the exclusive embodiment of the country’s unity but also to impose it as the dominant political institution. After his death in 1961, his son, Mawlay Hasan II, succeeded him (1961–1999).

AHMED AGHROUT

See also: Morocco: Hassan II: Life and Government of; Morocco: Mawlay Hasan and the Makhzen.

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Morocco: Hassan II, Life and Government of King of Morocco

Hassan II (1924–1999) shared with all monarchs of his dynasty, the Alawites (French, Alaouite), the title “Commander of the Believers,” which signifies a claim to the office of caliph (*khalifa*), or successor of the Prophet Muhammad and head of Islam. As such, Hassan was also head (imam) of Islam in Morocco and presented himself as the pious preserver of Muslim values on most public occasions, both sacred holidays and monarchic events. The annual presentation of fealty by the Moroccan elite on Throne Day (March 3), including the Islamic notables of the country (*‘ulama*) in an act of allegiance (the *bay’a*), was the most notable of these public acts merging monarchy with Islamic authority. Hassan controlled religious authorities tightly; any hierarchy of Moroccan Islamic figures culminated in Hassan himself. In other roles in the sphere of Islam, Hassan commemorated himself through the construction (finished 1993) of the world’s second largest mosque (after Mecca’s), the Hassan II Mosque on the Atlantic coast in the heart of Casablanca. Hassan was also head of the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which struggled to protect the Islamic sites in Jerusalem in the 1980s and 1990s.

As king of Morocco, Hassan, like his father, Mohammed V (d. February 26, 1961), used the Arabic *malik* (king) rather than sultan (head authority) to describe his capacity, the use of which was an innovation following independence from France in 1956. As head of state of the kingdom of Morocco, Hassan was the head of the *makhzen* (treasury), what Moroccans traditionally have called their government. In this sense, Hassan, like all Alawite monarchs, was head administrator of state. Ultimately all customs, laws, activities, and policies of the Moroccan state were dependent upon Hassan’s will. He was a monarch in the complete sense of the word; his powers were effectively limited only by his interests. It was in his interest, he felt, and in the interests of his Alawite descendants whom he felt were forever destined to rule Morocco, to divest power in a limited and orderly fashion to the national parliament, the prime minister and his cabinet, the judiciary, and civil authorities. Hassan built a slowly emerging, occasionally revoked, but generally broadening constitutional monarchy in which he withheld the right to intervene at key points and retain ultimate power.

Hassan was sixteenth in the line of the Alawite dynasty that has ruled over the Atlantic, Saharan, Mediterranean, and Atlas mountain dominions that in some configuration have made up the Moroccan state

since the time of Alawite sultans Rashid (r.1664–1672) and Moulay Ismail (r.1672–1727). Hassan emphasized Alawite connections to the Prophet Muhammad, underlining his large family’s lineal descent from the founder of Islam, and identifying (as had Alawite leaders before) their special status as *sharifs* (descendants of the Prophet) as a way of continuing the legitimacy of Alawite rule in the modern world. Further, as *sharif*, Hassan was held by the Moroccan population, Muslim and Jewish alike, to have a quality of divine grace (*baraka*) far greater and more powerful than most humans.

Hassan represented deep traditional Islamic values in a modernizing state confronting the problems endemic to most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the wider developing world: rapid population growth, limited capital investment, and high unemployment coupled with rising economic and social aspirations. In Morocco, Hassan’s long reign saw a thoroughly colonial society gain a strong sense of Moroccan identity and nationhood. Relations with independent Algeria, socialist and antiroyalist, were generally poor, suffering an early low point in October 1963 in a still unresolved territorial dispute known as the “War of the Sands” over the southeastern Moroccan boundary and the ownership of Tindouf. A long stretch of disharmony with Algeria followed the audacious Moroccan acquisition of the Spanish Sahara after Hassan’s repudiation of the decision by the International Court of Justice in favor of self-determination for the Sahrawi people and the “Green March” of 350,000 Moroccan civilians directly into the disputed territory in November 1975. Algeria’s subsequent championship of the Polisario (Western Saharan liberation fighters) and the long-term civil unrest in Algeria led to bad and often bitter relations with Morocco’s eastern neighbor throughout most of Hassan’s reign.

Relations with France remained generally strong throughout Hassan’s reign. Exceptions reveal the tightly interwoven relationship between the ex-colonial power and Morocco: 1965–1969, in the aftermath of the Ben Barka affair; 1973, following the unexpected nationalization of remaining French farms and shops; the mid-1980s, when Danielle Mitterand (wife of French President Francois Mitterand) infuriated Hassan with her support of the Polisario; and the aftermath of the publication of Gilles Perrault’s *Notre ami le roi* (1990). The last was an anti-Hassan exposé, which reported Hassan’s heavy hand regarding domestic dissent; his role in the murder of the Moroccan opposition politician, Mehdi Ben Barka, in France in 1965 (probably with the collusion of the French administration); and the active role played by Hassan and the Alaouite family in the French economy (owner of a chain of supermarkets; part owner of Hachette publishing, etc.). Hassan held respect in France for his superb control of the French

language, as great as his mastery of Arabic. He was held to be one of the great orators of modern times. Hassan maintained friendly relations with powerful leaders worldwide; among the mighty whom Hassan sheltered when they fell from grace were Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran (1979); and Mobutu, president of Zaïre (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998).

Hassan's African strategies reflected his jealous safeguarding of Moroccan strategic policies. In 1984 Hassan signed a treaty of unity with Libya in a deal whereby Muammar Gaddafi withdrew his support for the Polisario for a Moroccan guarantee not to send troops to support the French in Chad. The treaty was repudiated by Gaddafi in July 1986, when Hassan became the second Arab leader (after Sadat) to talk with Israel in a meeting with Prime Minister Shimon Peres at the Moroccan vacation town of Ifrane. In 1976 and 1977, Hassan sent Moroccan troops to protect Mobutu's regime from rebels moving from Angola into Shaba region in operations known as Shaba I and Shaba II. Hassan's links with Mobutu can be traced to their efforts to maintain high prices for cobalt, of which the two nations were the major producers outside the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. As he gained confidence in his own leadership, Hassan maintained excellent relations with Washington, D.C. (although not during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who questioned American military support of Morocco's Saharan adventure), often playing a behind-the-scenes role in the Cold War.

Hassan's contributions lie first in his long survival as ruler and his skill in leading Moroccans through the thirty-eight years of his reign toward a generally improved quality of life; in his efforts to bring Israelis to talk with Palestinians, rooted in his sense of patriarchy as an Arab-Islamic ruler of the nearly half million Moroccan Jews, nearly all expatriated; and in the acquisition of the Western Sahara, nearly doubling the land size of Morocco and increasing its territorial sea by an even larger amount. By the end of his reign, Hassan had weathered economic riots (especially, 1965, 1981, 1984, and 1994) and contained political opposition, while maintaining a firm grip on the Western Sahara.

Hassan survived two coup attempts on his life. At Hassan's birthday party at the Royal Palace at Skhirat (on the coast just south of Rabat) in July 1971, army officers led by Generals Oufkir and Medbouh failed in their attempt to kill him and take the government. In 1972 Hassan survived an attempt by his own air force to shoot his jet down as he was returning from France. Upon his death, the adulation of the Moroccan people for him and his family was clear; whether this was seated in the fear of the unknown or not is a question that has in many ways been answered by the early strong public support accorded his son and successor, Mohammed VI.

JAMES A. MILLER

See also: **Morocco: International Relations since Independence; Polisario and the Western Sahara.**

Biography

Born in the Royal Palace in Rabat on July 9, 1929, son of Mohammed V (r. 1927–1961) and Lalla Abba. Schooled at the Royal Palace by French and Moroccan governesses and tutors. Imperial College founded 1942 for his secondary education and that of his siblings. Attended Casablanca Conference (Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Mohammed V), January 1943. Studied law at Bordeaux, receiving law degree in 1952. Accompanied father and family into exile in Corsica and Madagascar, 1953–1955. Named crown prince, July 1957. Chief of Staff of Royal Armed Forces, 1957. Named deputy premier by Mohammed V, May 1960. Married Lalla Latifa upon accession to the throne, March 3, 1961. Children: Meriem, 1962; Mohammed (b. September 6, 1963; now Mohammed VI); Asma, 1965; Hasna, 1967; Moulay Rachid, 1968. Died July 23, 1999.

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Morocco: Education since Independence

During the years preceding independence, the education system established in Morocco cultivated an educated Moroccan elite. Although it claimed to be open to the majority of the population, many were not able to take advantage of it. When independence was achieved in 1955–1956, it was estimated that only 18 per cent of school age children were actually attending school.

The first step taken after independence to further education was to create the Ministry of National Education (MOE). The MOE was responsible for providing facilities, designing curricula and formulating and implementing the country's education policies. The ministry

had divided the country into regional school districts headed by an administrator who reported to the central administration in the country's capital of Rabat. Almost immediately, the MOE attempted to add Moroccan and Arabic elements to the educational system. The primary goal was to replace expatriate French faculty with Moroccans.

Unfortunately, for the first twenty years after independence, this policy was unsuccessful. It was not until the mid-1970s that Moroccans filled positions as teachers. As of that point, the MOE intended to complete "Moroccanization" on the secondary level by 1990, although it has not yet been entirely accomplished.

The process of introducing Arabic into the school system was commenced at independence. Total Arabization was not scheduled to be completed until the mid-1990s. The process, however, has not been as successful as the newly formed government originally anticipated.

Since independence, pre-primary education has been introduced throughout Morocco. The majority of pre-primary education is given through mosque-controlled schools called *kouttabs*. It is estimated that during the school year 1984–1985, about 667,000 children took advantage of these schools, even though education is not compulsory until the primary level, at age seven. Of this number, approximately 188,000 were female students.

Compulsory education, starting on the primary level, is a five-year program based on the French model. The program stresses mathematics and language skills, both in Arabic and, starting in the third year, French. Enrollment has steadily increased on the primary level since Morocco achieved independence. In 1975–1976, there was a total enrollment of 1,475,000, with 35 percent of those students female. This number increased to approximately 2,408,000 in 1985–1986. The percentage of female enrollment has stayed about the same. It is estimated that only 37 per cent of the total number of children enrolled in primary schools in 1985–1986 were female, showing only a slight improvement in the male-female ratio.

The secondary system is almost identical to that setup by the French during the protectorate years. Enrollment in secondary schools is not as high as it is at the primary school level. This is due to the fact that many parents in rural regions do not feel it is necessary for women to be educated past the elementary level.

However, in spite of the obstacles presented by tradition, there has been a steady increase in enrollment in secondary schools by both male and female students. By 1975–1976, for example, there were about 141,000 females enrolled in high schools, which represented approximately 30 per cent of the total secondary school enrollment. By 1983–1984, this figure had increased to 40 per cent of the total enrollment. In addition to public and private bilingual schools, there are

also a limited number of schools that offer what is known as common education in preparation for entrance to higher education specializing in Islamic studies. In 1987–1988, there were more than 13,500 students enrolled in these types of schools.

Higher education has always been an integral part of Morocco, going back to the ninth century when the Karaouine Mosque was established. The mosque school, known today as Al Qayrawaniyan University, became part of the state university system in 1947. Up until 1989, it was part of six independent universities that made up Morocco's higher educational system. In 1989 university status was given to various other institutions that had previously been attached to the original six.

Besides the numerous universities, there is also another major area of higher education: technological and scientific institutions. These offer more vocational instruction in comparison to the academics that are found in the universities. All universities are technically supervised by the Ministry of National Education; however, they act independently, with each having its own administration and budget.

Enrollment has also increased at the university level. In 1963–1964 there were 7,310 Moroccans enrolled in higher educational programs. By 1987–1988, the number of students was estimated to be 157,484. This great expansion is due to the vast amounts of money that have been earmarked each year for the creation of advanced higher learning. All schools, except for those that are private, are funded entirely by the Moroccan government. According to one study, the MOE has received about 19 per cent of the state's national budget, which is about 6 per cent of the GDP.

One particular problem in the educational field that confronted Morocco was Berber education. The Berbers were the original and indigenous people of the Mahgreb region, and their influence was felt much more so in Morocco than in Tunisia. Sixty percent of the population spoke the Berber language in Morocco versus less than 1 per cent in Tunisia. Arabic, as well as French, was a foreign language to them, especially to those children in the rural regions. The policy under the French was to actually incorporate as many of the Berbers into their program of acculturation as possible. Education was to be extended to them; however, instruction would only be offered in French, as the new administration wanted to maintain a policy of separation between the Arabs and the Berbers.

In addition, the education of the Berbers was a sensitive political issue. The French regarded the Berbers as a group that needed "taming," which, they believed, could be accomplished initially through educating the children, who would in turn influence their parents. In 1930 the French issued the famous Berber Dahir, which was intended to isolate the Berber from the Moroccan

Arab. The idea behind this policy was to eventually create a group that would identify more with the French than with the Moroccan Arabs and Islam. Berber-only schools were opened, such as the Azrou. However, it was proved extremely difficult to deny entry to those that spoke Arabic. There were demands for Arab-speaking Berbers in many areas, especially the bureaucratic offices. The dream of a Franco-Berber education as envisioned by the French would never come to pass.

It was estimated that there were approximately 27,000 children in school out of a population of 900,000 school-aged children by 1940, approximately 3 per cent of the population. In 1946 a new resident general, Labonne, felt that these statistics were not satisfactory. He issued a mandate that, within two months, significant steps should be made toward opening more schools. The results were unprecedented: 383 schools were set up in the following two months, accommodating 19,000 children. An example of the push to create more schools and reach the indigenous population can be seen in the Benahmed region where there were only 160 children in 3 schools in 1940. Within a ten-year period, this figure rose to 1,575 children in 21 schools. This illustration was indicative of what happened throughout Morocco in the field of education.

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Morocco: Economics and Social Change since Independence

Unlike most countries in Africa, Morocco was not a colonial creation but rather a country with a long pre-colonial history and identity of its own to draw on. This was advantageous when it came to national and social unity, and the hoped for postindependence growth. Additionally, the effects of colonial rule on the country were less significant than on its neighbors due to the relative brevity of and limits to colonial rule: forty-five years as a French protectorate. On gaining independence in 1956, therefore, the country had to "rework" its social system, rather than having to create one. To the country's benefit, there was a solid economic infrastructure in place in 1956, including road and rail transport

and port facilities. Casablanca alone was responsible for handling more than 80 per cent of Morocco's trade at that time. When King Muhammad V returned from exile, he immediately called for the constitution of an elected and representative government. However, there was no real system of government in place when independence was gained (palace aside) and so the king, who was extremely popular, became the de facto ruler with more power than had been possible when he had been Sultan.

Many Moroccans imagined that the end of the protectorate would mean that they would become wealthy overnight. They were soon disabused of this idea as the country's debt initially soared, primarily due to the fact that the country was now responsible for many expenses that the French had previously paid, such as defense, diplomacy, education, and public services. When French aid to Morocco was cut, the shortfall was made up by the United States who was paying 40 per cent of Morocco's development budget by the early 1960s.

Morocco's lack of significant natural resources has proved to be a hindrance to large-scale, postindependence economic development. The country's hydrocarbon reserves for example are tiny: 2,000 figures show the country managing to produce an average of less than 1,000 barrels of oil per day, compared to Algeria's 1,253,000 and Libya's 1,400,000. On the other hand, Morocco is estimated to hold approximately 75 per cent of the world's phosphate reserves, production of which even in the early 1950s amounted to 4 million tons per annum. Before independence, however, the wealth produced was controlled by a small number of Europeans and an even smaller number of Moroccans.

Agriculturally Morocco has always been fairly strong, with none of the water problems that affect other North Africa countries, due in part to the snow capped Atlas Mountains. In 1956, 70 per cent of the population relied on agriculture. A succession of three- and five-year plans were tried but frequently abandoned as the economy wasn't strong enough to sustain them for their full term. In 1973, when Morocco was the world's largest exporter of phosphates, the international price of phosphates tripled. The government spent the windfall on food subsidies for the cities and on enormous irrigation schemes that led to significant increases in cultivatable land, although without managing to make the country self-sufficient in foodstuffs as the majority of produce were exotic goods for export. Since 1960 Morocco has been a net importer of cereals. In 1974 phosphate prices collapsed and the economy disintegrated as inflation rose steeply. With growing trade deficits an IMF loan was secured in exchange for the promise of bringing the economy back under control.

Many workers left the country for Europe and better salaries (in excess of 1.3 million), sending a proportion

of their earnings home. Those who did not make it as far as Europe swelled Morocco's urban centers, depleting the rural workforce so that agricultural production failed to keep up with increased demand due to population growth, or increases in the cost of living. This movement to the cities and a growing population led to health facilities falling behind growth on an annual basis, even though life expectancy has risen significantly since independence and is now at sixty-seven years of age. During the same period the rural population fell from 80 per cent to 45 per cent.

An Association Accord signed with the European Union in 1996 was aimed at promoting free trade, with Morocco gradually dismantling tariffs and customs duties on industrial imports from the EU over a twelve-year period, starting in 2000. The EU promised transitional aid to support economic modernization and agreed to maintain access for Morocco's traditional agricultural exports at their current levels. Morocco wanting full membership in the EU, first applied to join in 1987; in the meantime it is the largest recipient of EU financial aid.

The importance of education was realized immediately at independence, with the government espousing free and universal primary education. A program to make more places available in higher education was also put in place, especially for vocational training in everything from agriculture to the chemical industry in recognition of the country's two greatest economic possibilities. Great strides have been made but Morocco's literacy rate remains poor at under 50 per cent. Female illiteracy is still nearly double that of males and while urban school attendance figures were recently reported to be over 90 per cent, in rural areas they are as low as 63.

The role of women in Moroccan society is perhaps the most obvious change since independence. Women too fought for independence and the King encouraged a greater role for them in the new Morocco. The 1962 constitution states that men and women must have equal political rights and additionally that all citizens have equal rights to education and employment, although there is some resistance to the employment of women from Islamist conservatives and other traditionalists. However, there is no doubt that women have attained a prominence unimaginable forty years ago. Women have also been helped in this forward movement by the promotion of full literacy and the need across the country for more professionals.

One of the country's biggest challenges today is unemployment, which official figures put at more than 22 per cent and rising. The fear is that apart from the economic strain that this puts on the country there is always the chance that, if there is little hope for employment in the near future, those who feel disaffected and

disenfranchised, especially the young, may turn to the Islamists and their promise of a better world. The May 2003 bombings in Casablanca are just the sort of incidents that support the government calls for greater assistance from the international community in their fight against terrorism.

EAMONN GEARON

See also: **Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle; Morocco: Education since Independence; Morocco: Nationalism, Muhammad V, Independence, 1930–1961.**

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Morocco: International Relations since Independence

Independence did not mean that Morocco was economically independent of foreign (French) landowners, money, and assistance. Breaking diplomatic relations with France at the time of the Suez Crisis, for example, caused Morocco the loss of all financial aid from France—a not insubstantial sum. Franco-Moroccan relations were again strained during the Algerian war of independence, as the Algerian cause received broad support in Morocco. That said, Moroccan foreign policy since independence has tended to forge closer, though not trouble-free, relationships with other North African and European nations rather than with the Arab world or Africa.

In the last decade of the twentieth century links between Morocco and Europe grew steadily stronger, with the former being most voluble in its desire for ever-closer ties with the European Union. In 2002 more than 60 per cent of Morocco's exports went to Europe; the country was also the biggest recipient of EU development aid, and most cash remittances back into the country come from its nationals living and working across Europe. In 2002 Morocco began to implement an EU association accord that should establish

tariff-free trade between Morocco and the EU by 2012. Morocco's head of state, King Muhammad VI, has even gone so far as to say that he would like future agreements to lead to complete freedom of movement for both labor and goods. One important concession the Moroccans have gained so far is a decision by Italy to cancel Morocco's debt to them, which was worth more than \$100 million.

Relations between the United States and Morocco in the immediate postindependence period were somewhat strained due to the continued presence of a number of American airbases on Moroccan soil at a time when many in the country wished to forge closer links with the Middle East through the organization of the Arab League. Toward the end of 1959, frustrated by endless negotiations about their military presence, the United States announced that it would close all its bases (except the naval base at Kentira) within five years. Morocco lost financially as a result, but the nationalists claimed a victory against imperialism. During the Cold War, Morocco attempted to follow a path of nonalignment, straining relations at the national and international level in the process. When Morocco requested that U.S. supply aircraft with which to start a national air force, the Americans said no; the Moroccans swiftly found their order filled by the Soviet Union.

In 1991 Morocco sent 1,200 troops to Saudi Arabia in support of the war against Iraq, a decision that was not popular domestically and led to rioting in every major city. The strength of feeling surprised the regime but did not alter government policy. Since his accession in 1999, Muhammad VI has continued to place importance on closer relations with the United States, perhaps even more than his father did. A visit by the king to the United States in 2000, and strong condemnation of the September 11, 2001, attacks, helped bring the two countries closer together. The May 2003 bombings in Casablanca served to bring Morocco even closer to the United States and the undeclared war on Islamic fundamentalists.

Relations between Morocco and its neighbors have been most tense, and closer than ever, since independence. Most of this tension has come about as a result of Moroccan (and sometime Mauritanian) claims to what was Spanish (Western) Sahara. In 1973 the Polisario was formed in order (their manifesto stated) to establish an independent state there, a claim supported by the United Nations. Morocco took matters into its own hands in November 1975, when more than 500,000 civilians took part in the "Green March," and simply marched over the border and into the Saharan territory. The following year, the Polisario declared the independence of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and began a guerrilla war with Algerian support. Following a defeat by the Polisario, the Moroccan government

took a new approach to the Western Sahara and, with Saudi backing, built a wall around the desert areas they claimed were theirs.

A UN-monitored ceasefire has been in effect, with countless incursions, since 1991, but the status of the territory is far from settled. Contracts allowing foreign oil companies to explore offshore Western Sahara, which Morocco sanctioned, are also on hold. In 2001 Muhammad VI went on a tour of Western Sahara, adopting the strong nationalist line that has over the years provided the monarchy with some of its strongest support. It was also as a result of support for an independent Western Sahara on the part of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that Morocco resigned from the organization in 1982. Since coming to power, Muhammad VI has been following a path that retains all claims to the territory, while trying to move away from the referendum that was supposed to allow the local population to settle the issue once and for all.

Because of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Morocco has at different times been in and out of favor across the region and the Arab world at large. Keen to maintain ties with oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Morocco sent troops to fight in the Six Day War (they did not arrive in time) and to the Golan Heights and Sinai in 1973. When claims to the Western Sahara seemed more important to the country, Morocco changed tack, attempting to gain favor for its territorial claims by sending a delegation of Moroccan Jews to America and by staging meetings between Israeli and Arab leaders in advance of Sadat's Jerusalem visit in 1977. Such actions certainly helped improve Moroccan-American relations, though not those with other Arab nations, although the old king never recognized Israel and always supported Palestinian claims. The importance of Hassan's role as mediator, however, was obvious by the attendance of both the Israeli president and prime minister at his funeral and the significant Jewish minority in Morocco may hope that Muhammad continues his father's example.

Morocco's immediate future would logically seem to involve closer ties with Europe, before world trade passes the country by. At the same time, it remains equally important that the country's Maghrebi cousins are not alienated; the 2003 Casablanca bombings might perhaps serve as a reminder to Morocco that such links with those of a similar background can help to foster greater security and strength in the region.

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See also: **Polisario and the Western Sahara**

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Moshoeshoe I and the Founding of the Basotho Kingdom

Moshoeshoe (1786–1870) was the name taken by Lepoqo, son of Kholu and her husband Mokhachane, headman of the small village of Menkhoaneng in the valley of the Caledon River, which today forms the northern boundary between South Africa and Lesotho. While the year of his birth cannot be precisely fixed, 1786 is the date accepted by modern scholars. During his long life he laid the foundations of the Kingdom of Lesotho and died acknowledged as the father of his people, the man who defended their land against the encroachment of European settlers.

His family was not especially important, though a number of stories relate that he was marked out by the influential chief Mohlomi as a man destined for greatness. As a young man he acquired the nickname Moshoeshoe (pronounced “muh-shwee-shwee”), a word suggesting the sound made by the shaving of a sharp razor. This commemorated his skill as a cattle raider who could steal animals as swiftly and silently as a razor shaves hair. His opportunity to found a kingdom came when the Caledon River valley was convulsed in the 1820s by a series of wars which smashed existing political authorities—a period retrospectively named by historians the *lifaqane* or *difaqane*. From the west Kora and Griqua raiders with horses and guns penetrated the Caledon Valley, wreaking widespread havoc as they seized cattle and children. To the north of Moshoeshoe’s village, the Tlokwa people, led by Queen Regent ‘MaNtatisi and her son Sekonyela, became involved in wars with Hlubi and Ngwane chieftaincies from the neighboring KwaZulu-Natal region. These culminated in Hlubi and Ngwane invasions of the Caledon Valley in the early 1820s and a general reorientation of allegiances. Moshoeshoe emerged as an effective leader who gathered the remnants of many small groups together on the hilltop fortress of Botha-Bothe (sometimes Buthe-Buthe) in or about the year 1822. Here he successfully withstood a siege by Sekonyela’s forces. In 1824 he moved his people to a more secure position, on the hilltop of

Thaba Bosiu, which he defended against successive waves of attackers.

For the rest of the 1820s Moshoeshoe’s primary concern was to restock his herds. Some he acquired by raiding south of the mountains into the territory of the Thembu and the Xhosa. Some he acquired by lending cows to his followers, who were allowed to milk them, while pledging that any calves that might be born would belong to the chief’s herds. It was at this time that the name BaSotho (or Basuto) first began to be generally applied to Moshoeshoe’s people. As his power grew, he formed new alliances, many of them cemented by marriages (his wives numbered more than 140 by the time of his death). The great accomplishment of this period was his displacement of his rival, Makhetha, who had a much better claim to inherited chieftainship. Makhetha perhaps unwisely allied himself to the Ngwane chief Matiwane and undertook a series of raids into Xhosa territory, where they were routed by a combined force of Xhosa, Thembu, and British forces. By the early 1830s Moshoeshoe had all but eliminated his rival.

The next period of Moshoeshoe’s career is distinguished by the alliance he forged with Protestant missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society whose first agents arrived in 1833. Well aware of the defeats inflicted on the Xhosa and other peoples on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, Moshoeshoe was pleased to have men at his capital who could communicate in writing with Cape authorities. He encouraged them to found mission stations throughout the territory he controlled. The missionaries welcomed his protection and wrote glowing tributes to his statesmanship, though they never converted him to their religion. They took his side in his wars against Sekonyela and other military rivals. During these years Moshoeshoe became increasingly powerful, partly because Sotho people who had fled to the Cape Colony during the wars of the 1820s now returned with cattle, horses, and guns they had bought with money earned working on farms. Moshoeshoe adopted a partially European lifestyle and set out consciously to modernize his kingdom by modifying many customs and traditions. He built a formidable military force armed with guns, whose centerpiece was a well-drilled cavalry.

A new chapter opened with the arrival of the first Voortrekkers (Afrikaans-speaking settlers from the Cape Colony) in 1836. Moshoeshoe took at face value their statement that they sought nothing more than safe passage through his territories. Soon, however, they began to settle near important sources of water, often claiming to have bought land from rival chiefs. In 1843, in a bid for British protection against the invaders, Moshoeshoe concluded a treaty with Governor Napier of the Cape Colony that he hoped would lay

down firm boundaries. However, in 1848, a new Cape governor, Sir Harry Smith, annexed the entire region of “Transorangia.” British Resident Henry Warden fixed a new boundary line that removed most BaSotho land north of the Caledon. This led directly to a war in which Moshoeshoe’s forces decisively triumphed at the Battle of Viervoet Mountain in June 1851. Not long after, Britain decided to transfer the Orange River Sovereignty to an independent Boer government. General Sir George Cathcart determined to reassert British power by attacking Thaba Bosiu in December 1852, but it was Cathcart’s forces who learned firsthand what a determined resistance could be mounted by the disciplined BaSotho cavalry.

After the British withdrawal, Moshoeshoe was left to his own devices in dealing with the government of the Orange Free State. He triumphed in the first war of 1858, but was facing defeat in the long second war (1865–1868) when Britain intervened to save the kingdom by annexing it as the Crown Colony of Basutoland. Not long after the annexation, Moshoeshoe died, on March 11, 1870, revered by friend and foe alike as one of Africa’s greatest statesmen.

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See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Difaqane on the Highveld; Lesotho: Treaties and Conflict on the Highveld, 1843–1868.

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Mosque, Sub-Saharan: Art and Architecture of

The aesthetic features of the Sub-Saharan mosque owe their origins to three primary religious, cultural, and historical interpretations. First, the institution of the Friday congregational prayer, a legal Islamic requirement for all men. Second, the efficacy of vernacular building traditions, especially in relation to the Muslim Mande, Fulani, and Hausa. These three ethnolinguistic groups are among the dominant Muslim populations who inhabit Sub-Saharan West Africa; they were most influential and played an active role in the cultural web of interactions, trade, diaspora, and the early nineteenth-century jihad movements.

The third explanation is more closely related to the history of Sub-Saharan medieval dynasties, that is, the Ghana, Mali, Songhay dynasties, and the later nineteenth-century Sokoto and Tukolor Caliphates. Each dynasty played host to the formation of architectural traditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. During the reign of Mansa Musa, the fourteenth-century ruler of Mali best known for his pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Makkah, Arabia (1324–1325), religious and educational buildings were constructed at Gao and Timbuktu. Upon his return to Mali, Mansa Musa brought an entourage of scholars from the Muslim world, among whom was an Andalusian architect and poet, Ibn Ishaq as-Sahili (d. 1346 in Mali). As-Sahili is reputed to have introduced a “Sudanese” style of architecture in West Africa through the commissions granted to him by Mansa Musa. Scholars have since expressed doubt as to whether the architectural works of as-Sahili were single-handedly achieved.

A number of indigenous factors have contributed to the formation of the Sub-Saharan mosque in general and the aesthetic nuances that we find in the Mande, Fulani, and Hausa mosques in particular.

The Mande Mosque

The Mande, and in particular the Dyula, carried Islam southward from the northern savannah to the forest verges in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. They also carried the basic forms of the hypo-style mosque that can be found at Timbuktu, Djenne, Mopti, and San (Mali); Bobo Dialasso (Upper Volta); Kong and Kawara (Côte d’Ivoire); and Larabanga (northern Ghana). These religious edifices are a particular style of rectangular clay building, hypo-style in plan, and uniquely idiomatic in their exterior character. Formal modifications occur in the features of the mosque as it travels from north to south, from Timbuktu to the Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana; these modifications pertain to size scale, structure, construction details, and variations in the plan.

Compacted earth construction is used consistently with lateral timber members to reinforce the exterior walls. Protruding timber members also act as scaffolding. The exterior walls are also strengthened by butressing or with vertical ribs. The ribs also give the appearance of decorative crenellations, termite mounds, or ancestral pillars of varying size as they terminate at the parapet. Wider ribs on the exterior facade and in the center of the qibla-wall correspond to minarets. The flat roofs are reinforced with wooden joists; this is where the *muadhhdhin* stands to summon the faithful to prayer (*adhan*). The courtyard (*sahn*) is quite small or virtually nonexistent in Sub-Saharan mosques.

The Mande distinguish three functional types of mosques: (1) the *seritongo* used by individuals or small groups of Muslims for daily prayers, simply an

area of ground marked off by stones; (2) the *misijidi* (*masjid*), *missiri*, or *buru* serves several households for their daily prayers or for Friday prayers; (3) the *jamiu*, *juma*, or *missiri-jamiu* used for Friday prayers, which serves the large community.

The Fulani Mosque at Dingueraie

Amid the fervor of the nineteenth-century jihad movement in the Futa Jalon, Guinea, a unique idiom and expression of mosque architecture was born. The Fulani mosque at Dingueraie is linked to Al Hajj Umar's (Umar ibn Uthman al-Futi al-Turi al-Kidiwi, 1794–1864) stay at Dingueraie from 1849 to 1853 and served one of the principal functions of a *ribat*, a place from which the abode of Islam (*dar-al-Islam*) might expand.

The Fulani mosque at Dingueraie was the first instance in which the nomadic tent and the organization of nomadic space lent themselves with the greatest of ease to a new mode of spatial orientation. Two modes of spatial orientation are evident: The first is an ambulatory space that surrounds a cube building, the actual mosque. The outer layer of the spatial enclosure is very much like the Fulani sedentary hut enclosed by a palisade wall, which demarcates an edge. In the nomadic tradition this circular space is quite evident. According to local custom at Dingueraie this outer layer is changed every seven years, at which time an elaborate ceremony is held for the occasion.

The second layer of space is the cube itself, which has heavy earthen walls and an earthen ceiling supported by rows of columns. A central post supports the exterior roof structure from within the cube, like a great big tree it radiates to its outer roof. But the central post, the perimeter columns, and the thatched roof dome are structurally separate from the earthen cube within.

The mosque at Mamou and Dabola, Guinea, also has central posts that support the roof of the cube. Its inner cube has singular openings in the perimeter wall very much like the openings in Umar's sketch. The position of the central post at Dingueraie and Mamou also approximates to the central element in Umar's diagram. These spatial patterns, the elements they employ, and the image they convey can be described simply as cultural metaphors. They are also concrete renditions of Fulani spatial concepts.

The Hausa Mosque at Zaria

The mosque at Zaria was built at the end of a period of puritanical fever (jihad) and reform, and during a period of religious formation wherein the Sokoto caliphate united the Hausa states under the leadership of Uthman ibn Fodio. In the post-jihad period the ascetic scholars mainly favored the building of mosques.

None of the earlier works of Babban Gwani, a great master builder, match the architectural vitality and

structural vocabulary of the vault in the Zaria mosque. However, it is very unlikely that the Babban Gwani actually invented the Hausa vault, but there is no doubt that he made the greatest and boldest use of the vault. It is very likely that Katsina, being at the forefront of Hausa custom and civilization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had developed the vault principles in reinforced earth technology. However, there are hardly any extant pre-jihad structures to support this hypothesis.

Professor Labelle Prussin argues that the vault is actually a synthesis of the Fulani tent armature, which was developed using Hausa skills in earth construction. The Hausa vault and dome are based on a completely different structural principle from the North African, Roman-derived stone domes. On the other hand, the Hausa domes incorporate, in nascent form, the same structural principles that govern reinforced concrete design. The bent armature in tension takes the horizontal thrust normally resisted by buttresses and tension rods and interacts with the compressive quality of earth. It was the development of this technology that permitted the transplantation of the symbolic imagery of Islam and in turn created a unique Fulani-derived architecture.

The increase in earth arch construction was particularly innovative in the post-jihad mosque at Zaria and the palaces of the period. The earth-reinforced pillars and the reinforced Hausa vaults are no commonplace construction. Very few pre-jihad buildings exhibit the structural solutions to an architectural problem of earth construction over such large spans. A more obvious solution can be found in the hypo-style mosques of Bauchi, or the Shehu mosque, Sokoto. Instead, given the program to provide a liturgical space, Babban Gwani in his organizing principle of geometry and structure derived a much more sophisticated and less formal plan than the hypo-style hall.

In determining the ceiling-type for a given building, the importance of the building, followed by the status of the patron, is brought together with the skill of the master mason. In context, a radical departure seems to have occurred from the simple trabeated type of construction which we find in the Shehu's mosque, the Kazuare mosque, and the Bauchi mosque, all built roughly in the same period (1820s) and the much later Zaria mosque (1836). The post and beam structure used to support short spans is quite commonly used in the earlier mosques, that is, Bauchi, and Shehu. They share a tradition with the Mande mosques of Mali and northern Ghana.

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
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Moyen-Congo: See Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of: Colonial Period: Moyen-Congo.

Mozambique: Nineteenth Century, Early

Around 1800 most of the territory that was to be delimited as the Portuguese overseas province or colony of Mozambique later that century (mainly between 1869 and 1891) was the domain of independent African states. The Portuguese territory was a string of settlements with surrounding rural estates on the coast and on the Zambezi. Portugal maintained an administrative center on the island of Mozambique and garrisons at Ibo, Quelimane, Sofala, Inhambane, and Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) on the coast and Sena and Tete on the Zambezi. Intermittently the trade posts of Macequece (Manica) and Zumbo (now Feira, in present-day southeastern Zambia) also had garrisons until 1835, when they were withdrawn owing to threats of attacks and lack of funds to sustain them. Except around Lourenço Marques, which had only been occupied definitively in 1799 or 1800 and only counted military and civilian government servants until about 1815, the settlements were composed mainly of civil populations of local, Indian, and European origin. They were surrounded in 1800 by areas of estates where inhabitants of the Portuguese towns grew some of their food and maintained many of their slaves who seemed to have constituted up to two thirds of the permanent population of the settlements. Except for the fort of Lourenço Marques and the outposts of Macequece and Zumbo, the settlements had municipal status and the free citizens elected a municipal chamber, and a justice of peace, sometimes in conflict with the local

Mozambique.

military governor. Soldiers were mostly locally recruited and some literate youths held secretarial jobs and were trained as officers.

Regarding commerce and trade, imports of textiles and other trade goods were paid mainly from the sale of slaves and ivory. Ivory went mostly to western India, where most of the imported cotton textiles and some of the beads for trade were obtained. Slaves were exported mainly to Brazil and French possessions (Mascareignes and the Caribbean) and from about 1837 to Spanish colonies such as Cuba. Some food staples were imported from neighboring African mainland territories and the islands of Comoro and Madagascar.

Interruptions of the trade caused by Napoleonic Wars, a temporary Brazilian import ban on slavery (effective 1831 to c. 1836), the general trade depression of 1831–1833, and interference with Portuguese Indian merchant vessels as parts of the activity of the British antislavery campaign around 1840–1845 caused crises in the activity of local Portuguese and Banian (*Vanya*) traders. Loss of capital around 1845, its emigration around 1831–1845 paved the way to trade capital from Bombay to take a lead in Mozambique in the 1850s and for new elephant hunters and traders from the metropolis and Goa.

In the interior, African chiefs consolidated lineage states. Examples are Cee Nyambe Mataka I in Niassa, who may have started around 1825–1830 Mwaliya near Montepuez in the 1790s, Ossiwa in Alto Molocue somewhere in nineteenth century, the Khosa, Dzovo Mondlane, and the Makwakwas in modern Gaza around

1810, Yingwane and Bila-nkulu near Inhambane possibly from 1780 onward. Those in the south were overtaken by the impact of the *mfecane* and foundation of new states like Gaza after 1821. Near the Zambezi, descendants of traders and military officers like the Caetano Pereiras and Cruz (Bonga) who had settled in African communities the hinterland of the Portuguese estate in the later eighteenth century area emerged around 1840 as local power holders, often at the cost of local dynasties like Undi. The successors to earlier states like the Mutapa, Barue, and Uteve states maintained their internal cleavages although some candidates occasionally managed to obtain a more prominent position.

The relatively extensive coverage of local events by sources permits us to trace some major droughts and famines as result of events related to the phenomenon of el Niño around 1745–1760, 1790, 1818–1833, 1844–1845, 1855–1862, in addition to Red Locust invasions mainly during the el Niño periods, as well as smallpox and measles epidemics. This and the effects of warfare during the *mfecane* are supposed to have had such an effect on the population that Gaza King Soshangane was said to have ordered in 1845 to stop the export of slave from his domains.

The independence of Brazil from Portugal in 1822 inspired a revolt of soldiers on December 16, 1822, in the island capital but had few other consequences. From the point of view of Portuguese administration the most significant event ending the period of absolutist rule in the shape of the populist dictatorship of D. Miguel (c.1826–1834) was the successful liberal revolution in Portugal of 1833–1834. It happened to take place during one of the trade crises toward the end of a long period of famines, when local revenues were down and no budget support came from Portugal. Local liberals deposed and substituted governors and imprisoned some of the most able qualified representatives of the former government. The shortage of priests increased because the new regime also abolished religious orders, retaining the parish priests on the payroll of the crown. The effect of the trade crisis of 1831–1834 is highlighted by two events in the south. The governor of Lourenço Marques, Dionísio Ribeiro, had been executed at the orders of Zulu king Dingane in October 1833. He had been reluctant to meet the Zulu kings demands of tribute from his own stores and of a private trading company. There had been no trade and almost no government funds to sustain the garrison. A year later the governor Manuel da Costa of Inhambane was killed with most of the soldiers and able bodied men from Inhambane (apparently some 280 to 1,000 men) on a foray to recover impounded ivory at a distance of about 150 to 250 kilometers from Inhambane. The settlement itself was never approached by raiders, unlike Sofala, which was

attacked by Nguni chief Nqaba in 1836. As a result attempts were made to build or repair fortifications around the main Portuguese settlements except Quelimane. (The governor of Sofala eventually shifted his administrative capital to the island of Chiloane.)

For the next decade and a half after the liberal revolution of 1834 the authority of the state institutions was very low and the attempts by military governors to reestablish their power (and possible use it for smuggling slaves) was countered by about eight isolated local revolts of the creole garrisons and settlers in the years 1840–1855, some of them apparently inspired by contemporary revolts in Portugal. Free trade policies and more direct control by the metropolis stabilized the administration after 1855. In 1834 control of movements of traders inside the colony was reduced and the establishment of Hindu and Muslim traders in the district capitals was no longer prohibited. They therefore started to spread out after 1838–1840.

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Mozambique: Nguni/Ngoni Incursions from the South

Between the ninth and twelfth centuries, the moister summer rain areas that were adequate for millet-based agriculture in modern South Africa had been occupied by Bantu populations almost to carrying capacity and a number of processes took place to accommodate the population pressure that was building up in the areas less affected by malaria. Increase of social differentiation and of age of marriage, armed competition over farming areas and pastures, emigration and conquests, and formation of larger states seem to have been social responses to these pressures in South Africa and possibly also southern Mozambique. During this period important nuclei the ethnolinguistic or cultural formations as we now know them—Karanga (Shona), northern, eastern, and southern Sotho, Nguni, Tsonga, Tonga—seem to have been formed in southern eastern Africa. Larger states developed in the Karanga area, which extended to south of the Limpopo. Disputes over succession and land seem to have led to immigration

both of Kalanga and Nguni groups to Mozambique south of the Save River. As far as migrations and especially the Nguni group are concerned in mid-sixteenth century the Portuguese encountered already in place a number of chiefdoms in southern Mozambique who according to traditions collected in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries had immigrated from the Nguni (or *Twa*) areas. In pottery traditions, this identity may not always have been visible and the immigrants were assimilated also linguistically to the Tsonga Chopi and BiTonga groups in southern Mozambique.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw further groups moving north who claimed origin in the south (modern Ngwane or Swaziland and the Middelburg Ndebele areas). Most prominent were the Dzivi and Nkumbe (Cumbana) groups in Inhambane. They rapidly assimilated to the northern Tsonga (Tswa) and Bitonga and were accompanied by other groups from the Limpopo and Nkomati valleys or further south. They include the Bila or Bilankulu (Vilanculos) who had already been moving north around 1720–1730. Their spears and shields and penis sheaths distinguished them from the older Tsonga-Chopi populations north of the Limpopo using bows.

After a period of another sixty years, which registers only local dynastic quarrels and fights for hegemony, a series of campaigns and destructive wars known as *mfecane* in South Africa spilled over into southern Mozambique. Unlike earlier periods of invasions the *mfecane* one was dominated by a sociopolitical system equipped with institutions functioning to incorporate individuals and existing political structures at different places and in overlapping institutions in a new sociopolitical system. The development of this system based on an older age-class system seems to have been the result of political competition in southeastern Africa around 1810–1821 that ended with the formation of the Zulu state, which incorporated the parent Mthethwa and remnants of the Ndandwe state complexes and extended to Swazi and Ndebele. After a period of competition between the Ndandwe and Mtetwa states—which may have lasted for a decade—decisive clashes had come in 1819–1821. The Mtetwa led by the military commander Shaka Zulu invaded the Ndandwe kingdom after a military victory and forced important groups of the royal lineage and a number of vassal chiefs ruling parts of the kingdom to move away to the north, where at least five almost independent nuclei attempted to survive from mid-1821 onward. The groups of refugees were headed by the exiled king Zwide (who may have died c. 1822) and his sons, who chose to turn back until 1827, and autonomous leaders like Ngwana Maseko, Nqaba Msane, Sochangane Nqumayo, and Zwangendaba Jere, who chose to move on and become independent

heads of state. Zwangendaba may have had the position of head *induna* or administrator of the house of Zwide.

Zwangendaba seems to have spearheaded the advance close to the present capital of Mozambique in 1821, passing Matola and later moving to Manhiça, where from 1821 to about 1825, when he moved to the Limpopo valley. Soshangane initiated attacks in Tembe in 1821 and operated in association with Zwangendaba Jere until 1826 or 1829. Nqaba had apparently moved to the area north of the Limpopo by 1823 and in 1826 crossed into the area north of the Savé, where he founded a state that existed for about ten years. He and his warriors, many of them locally recruited, were known as “Mataos,” from which the present-day ethnic designation of Ndaus is derived.

The emigration or flight of Zwangendaba from the Limpopo valley to the Venda and Zimbabwean Plateau in around 1827 or 1829, the defeat of Nqaba Msane by Soshangane around 1835–1836, the crossing of the Zambezi by Zwangendaba in 1835 and the Maseko in 1839 left the area between the Nkomati and the Zambezi to Gaza.

Parallel to the establishment of the Gaza state south of the Zambezi came the extension of Zulu rule to southernmost Mozambique from around 1824 to 1835 up to the Limpopo valley engulfing temporarily the Portuguese settlement of Lourenço Marques, which was also the aim of Swazi attacks in 1863 and 1864. The Nguni state of Swaziland exerted pressure east of the Libombos in the period 1840–1865 and maintained some presence there after the partition in 1886. Zulu military influence south of the Bay ended around 1878.

North of the Zambezi, the Nqabas group was defeated and destroyed in the upper Zambezi valley around 1840, but part of Zwangendaba's followers and successors under his son Mpezeni and *induna* Zulu Gama managed to extend their power to Tete and Niassa provinces between 1870 and 1895. Remnants of a Maseko incursion to Niassa in around 1847/1860 stayed in present-day Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces while the main group settled on the watershed on the present border between Tete province and Malawi, where the colonial conquest reached them around 1898/1900, after which they could go to war only as auxiliaries in colonial wars.

The new incorporative military and age-grade system of the Nguni after 1820 permitted to establish a more permanent domination and class society with some chances of promotion for the subject population. In contacts with their superiors the subjects used the language of the victors until the defeat of the systems by the colonial conquest.

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See also: **Difaqane on the Highveld; Malawi: Ngoni Incursions from the South, Nineteenth Century; Mfecane; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Ngoni Incursions from the South; Zambia: Ngoni Incursion from the South; Zimbabwe: Incursions from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele.**

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Mozambique: Colonial Period: Labor, Migration, Administration

Although Portugal established a presence in southern Africa long before any of the other European powers, it never had sufficient financial power or people to create a viable administration or to promote economic development. Even the establishment of effective occupation by reason of conquering the indigenous Africans was only completed in 1919. Early attempts to provide a foundation for that occupation and to promote some economic activity followed the Iberian pattern in the American colonies. Areas of northern Mozambique were granted to individuals in the form of *prazos*, within which the *prazeiros* had complete control; the right to exploit natural resources and people for their own profit, and in return for the payment of some taxes. The *prazos* were later replaced by three chartered companies, but Portugal's hold over Mozambique remained precarious, vulnerable to threats of takeover by Cecil Rhodes and Jan Smuts and to division between Germany and Britain. European diplomatic rivalries ensured that Portugal remained the nominal imperial overlord of Mozambique, but in economic terms the colony was dominated by the neighboring Boer republics and British colonies, subsequently the Union of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Southern Rhodesia.

Partially to promote greater economic development, partly because of the ineffectiveness of the *prazo* system, the Portuguese created chartered companies which replaced it. The Companhia da Moçambique was given the right for fifty years to exploit and administer some 62,000 square miles north of the Savé River, including

the major port of Beira. The company's financial backers were Belgian, French, and British; many heavily involved in the Transvaal and other parts of southern Africa and including, somewhat ironically, the British South Africa Company.

The Niassa Company and the Zambesia Company were also chartered by the Portuguese. They did not have the same degree of administrative responsibility as the Mozambique Company, and their authority was such that full administrative control was exercised by the Portuguese government virtually exclusively in southern Mozambique, south of the Savé River. This included the port of Lourenço Marques-Maputo on Delagoa Bay, one of the finest natural harbors on Africa's East Coast. That port was the starting point of the development of the economic links with the Transvaal and South Africa which were ultimately to a subimperial relationship in which Mozambique was the subordinate partner, South Africa the dominant.

In 1869, much to Britain's dismay, the Portuguese reached agreement with the Transvaal for the construction of a road linking the republic to Delagoa Bay, finally making a reality of a nonratified treaty of 1858. The road itself was easily built and completed in 1871. The Transvaal saw Delagoa Bay not only as the nearest port of entry and exit for its trade but also, and more important, as a means of access to the coast and world trade that was outside British control. For the Portuguese, the Transvaal represented Lourenço Marques' only hinterland of any potential value. To further cement the links between them, the 1869 Treaty also provided for free trade between the two countries.

In the course of negotiating this treaty, the idea of building a railway as well as a road was raised. A concession for the short stretch of line within Mozambique was granted to Edward McMurdo in 1884. For a variety of reasons, including fraud and shortage of money, the line's connection to the Witwatersrand's gold fields was delayed until 1895, the same year in which two other lines linking the Rand to the Cape ports and Durban were completed.

By 1895 the MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process for separating gold from its surrounding rock had ensured the long-term viability of the Rand goldfield, although not even the most optimistic of predictions could have justified building three rail links to the mines. Politics and the understandable desire of the different ports to reap whatever benefit they could from mine-related traffic played a great role in the decision-making process.

Although the mining industry had more lines than needed, it was seriously short of workers, for whom competition had been driving up wages beyond the ability of less profitable mines to pay. In 1896 the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, formed in 1889 primarily

in an effort to control the wages spiral, and the Mozambique government agreed the terms on which Mozambicans would be recruited for work. The designated recruiting organization, was the Rand (later Witwatersrand) Native Labor Association (Wenela), set up that same year by the Chamber of Mines. Mozambicans had, from at least 1850, a history of migrating to various parts of southern Africa to seek work in agriculture, construction, and diamond mining. Attracted by higher wages than they could get in Mozambique, they also sought to escape social restrictions imposed on them and, more significant, the harshness of the Portuguese forced labor system. An approved, regularized system enabled the Portuguese not only to exert some control over population movements but also brought in revenue from the capitation fees levied on each recruit; all at virtually no cost to the Mozambique government.

Mozambicans rapidly became the most important single group of workers on the Rand. They also became especially experienced, as they frequently returned to the mines or simply renewed their contracts for extended periods. In 1901, even before the Anglo-Boer War ended, their value was recognized in a temporary agreement incorporating the continued right to recruit labor in exchange for a guarantee of traffic to the railway line to Lourenço Marques and the privileged right of entry of Mozambique goods and services to the Transvaal mining region. This right was reciprocal, and over the years the value of South Africa's exports to Mozambique greatly exceed that of its imports. Ultimately, Mozambique had only its male workers to use as a lever in negotiations with its more economically powerful neighbor. Despite pressure from Natal and elsewhere to end Mozambique's privileged position, that labor remained sufficiently important (some 50 per cent or more of the Transvaal mines labor force) for the arrangements to be incorporated into a formal convention in 1909.

Although the rail link from Lourenço Marques to the mines was shorter than any other, total shipping costs were not necessarily lower. It cost substantially more to ship goods between Lourenço Marques and Europe than was the case with the Cape ports and Durban; handling facilities at Lourenço Marques were not as good, and rates on South African lines were easily manipulated to attract traffic to them. Only the formal agreement ensured that the Mozambique line got any traffic at all, and what they did get attracted the lowest tariffs.

After World War I, efforts to renegotiate the convention failed. Cancellation had little practical effect and in 1928 it was renewed. To meet South African concerns about the working of the port at Lourenço Marques, the South African government secured a

measure of control over its administration. South Africa's desire to limit the number of Mozambican recruits was met by restriction on the number of times workers simply renew their contracts without returning home. The interwar period also saw the introduction of deferred pay. A portion of workers' wages was withheld and paid through local authorities at home, ensuring the payment of taxes and generally the interjection into the local Mozambican economy of money that otherwise tended to be spent on the mines. When the price of gold was allowed to float on world markets, accumulated deferred pay was transferred in gold to the government of Mozambique at an artificially high rate of exchange. The Portuguese could then sell the gold at a profit. This arrangement continued until shortly after Mozambique became independent.

Mozambique could not necessarily rely on continuing high levels of demand for mine workers. The Rand mines only had a finite life, and the new mines opening up in the Orange Free State were not as labor intensive. Other sources of labor opened up in the 1930s with the removal of restrictions on bringing workers from tropical areas. Restrictions had been imposed because of the high susceptibility men from those areas had to illness, notably pneumonia, when they arrived on the Rand, with its relatively hostile climate. Nonetheless, Mozambicans continued to constitute a substantial portion of the Transvaal labor force.

As South Africa felt increasingly vulnerable to pressure from the spread of independence throughout Africa, allowing recruitment to continue was one way of supporting Mozambique as part of the *cordon sanitaire* around the apartheid state. Mozambique's independence meant that South Africa could and did restrict labor migration, more to Mozambique's detriment than South Africa's. During the antiapartheid struggle, Mozambique could not oppose apartheid too vehemently because of its vulnerability to reprisal and its continued economic subservience to South Africa.

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See also: Rhodes, Cecil, J.; Smuts, Jan, C.; **South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899.**

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Mozambique: Colonial Period: Resistance and Rebellions

Mozambique was supposedly conquered by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. However, it was not until the nineteenth century, during the “Scramble for Africa” that the Portuguese effectively colonized Mozambique. Landing at the port of Sofala on the coast of the Indian Ocean, in 1505, the Portuguese intended to exploit mineral deposits in the interior. The interior belonged to the Mwenemutapa Kingdom, rumored to have an abundance of gold deposits.

Portuguese traders and merchants were not the first foreign forces in the Mwenemutapa Kingdom. They found that Muslim traders had been trading in the area but the Portuguese used their military might and drove them away and established commercial and administrative centers at Sena, Tete, and Quelimane.

Portuguese presence in Mwenemutapa Kingdom, and indeed in the rest of Mozambique, was never accepted by Africans. In a bid to access mineral deposits, the Portuguese sent a religious mission in 1560 whose aim was to pacify and convert the king and his subjects to the Catholic religion. The mission failed and its leader was killed, as he was suspected of having nefarious intentions. Further attempts by the Portuguese to control Mwenemutapa Kingdom were futile, as they were repulsed. Resistance to Portuguese presence had begun.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Portugal still had not effectively colonized Mozambique as the Portuguese officials entrusted with the colonizing venture were inefficient, being more interested in their own personal gain. To ensure some kind of loyalty and obligation, Portugal relied on individual settlers. These were given title deeds by the Portuguese king for lands they had coveted for themselves. From this system developed the *prazo*, or crown estate. The owner was known as *prazeiro*. These *prazeiros* acted as Portuguese imperial agents and were supposed to pacify the area and rule African kingdoms on behalf of Portugal. The *prazos* were notorious not only for land alienation but also for exploiting Africans as sources of labor and taxation.

In the seventeenth century, the Mwenemutapa was plagued by internal dissensions, which the Portuguese used to their advantage. They installed rulers of their own choice. It was this interference in the African political system, coupled with land alienation, and an oppressive and exploitative Portuguese system that sparked African resistances, rebellions, and oppositions. Even with Portuguese interference in the African political systems, Africans still resisted in order to assert

their independence. Often Africans made alliances with their neighbors in a bid to oust Portuguese rule. Nhamitanga of Mwenemutapa and Changamira of Rozwi made such an alliance in 1692, and subsequently the Portuguese were driven away. Sometimes Africans showed their resistance by attacking Portuguese commercial and administrative centers, including *prazos*.

The Portuguese tried to use the Catholic religion in a bid to control some of the African kingdoms. In the eighteenth century for instance, the Portuguese tried to control the Barue Kingdom in this manner. The Barue soldiers defended themselves by attacking *prazos* and Portuguese commercial centers. Other ethnic groups, notably Sena, Tonga, and Tawara, also resisted the Portuguese presence, protesting Portuguese interference in political and religious autonomy, and the notorious slave armies.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Afro-Portuguese *prazeiros* of the Zambezi valley were using their *Achikunda* slave armies to pursue their slave-trading activities, in defiance of Portuguese authority. By then British, French, and Boers of the Transvaal were showing increasing interest in the region of Mozambique, thus forcing the Portuguese to make strenuous efforts, during the 1860s, to bring the whole area more visibly under their control. They faced some of their strongest opposition from rebellious *prazeiros* who objected to this reassertion of Portuguese power. Nevertheless, a combination of military and diplomatic effort ensured that by 1875, the whole of the modern Mozambique coast was recognized by fellow Europeans as belonging to the Portuguese.

By the time of the “Scramble,” the African kingdoms were not as well organized as they had been previously. They were replete with dissensions. Taking advantage of the situation, the Portuguese regrouped and remobilized, and from 1885 began to gain control of the Mozambique interior. Portugal then proceeded to establish its oppressive colonial system based mainly on forced labor and taxation, which the Africans resisted in various forms. Africans deliberately worked slowly, sometimes feigning illness, destroying agricultural implements or burning seeds so they would not grow. Some, like Mapondera, fled to areas that were not easily reached, from where and with the support of local societies, they attacked and destroyed symbols of Portuguese oppression. These kinds of resistances laid the foundation for national liberation movements of the 1960s such as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). At other times, peasants simply revolted, destroying symbols of exploitation and Portuguese property and burning plantations. However, these revolts tended to be sporadic and uncoordinated, and therefore easily suppressed by the Portuguese.

One of the most common causes of resistance was taxation. Africans evaded paying tax, because they did not have the means to do so. They fled or hid before tax collectors arrived. Forced labor, or *chibalo*, also contributed to revolts. African peasants naturally preferred to expend their energies on their own lands, but the colonial system forced them to perform manual duties for the Portuguese. Often peasants staged small scale uncoordinated revolts, save for the 1893 rebellion in Tete, which temporarily united neighboring states in destroying symbols of oppression.

From about 1884 to the early twentieth century, Mozambique witnessed several rebellions aimed at driving out the Portuguese. The Massingire rebellion of 1884 was sparked by tax resistance. The 1897 Cambuenda-Sena-Tonga was the result of a 45 per cent increase in the hut tax. Makanga opposed the Portuguese demand of two thousand males for labor, Tawara wanted to assert the independence of the Mwenemutapa and the Shona in 1904 were against forced labor policies. The rebellions, significant as they were, were ultimately quelled because they were not united or well-organized.

Between 1900 and 1962, the Portuguese continued with their oppressive colonial system based on forced labor and taxation. Thousands of Africans were sent to South African mines and Southern Rhodesian plantations.

From the 1920s through the 1950s opposition to the Portuguese took various forms that included intellectual, rural, worker, church, and finally national opposition to Portuguese colonial system. Leading *assimilados* and mulattos of the 1920s started a newspaper, *O Africano* (The African), which spoke against the injustices of the Portuguese colonial system. In the 1950s writers and poets produced works condemning the atrocities of the Portuguese system. Workers also demanded better working conditions and wages and various independent churches expressed anticolonial sentiments. Meanwhile, the rural population continued with its sporadic and uncoordinated resistances.

It was not until the 1960s, when the ethnic and opposition groups united under FRELIMO, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, that there was national resistance. Adopting guerilla tactics with the support of the rural peasants, FRELIMO resisted and fought the Portuguese until Mozambique achieved liberation in 1975.

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Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975

By the 1960s it was clear that the Portuguese government would not follow the precedent offered by its British and French colonial counterparts in negotiating, relatively peacefully, the terms of decolonization with the rising forces of nationalism in its African colonies, including Mozambique. Too economically underdeveloped to feel confident of retaining the neocolonial reins after its colonies' independence, Portugal's authoritarian political system at home was also one legitimized ideologically by the myth of empire and by ingrained practices of paternalism. Nationalists in Mozambique (but also in Angola and Guinea Bissau) would have to fight for their freedom against such a recalcitrant colonial power.

In the early 1960s, Tanzania became the central base for nationalists from throughout the southern African region who had come to similar conclusions about the imperatives of their own situations vis-à-vis white minority rule. In Dar es Salaam, encouraged toward unity by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and certain continental leaders like Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah, a number of Mozambicans-in-exile came together, drawn from various of the quasi-nationalist movements then existent in territories neighboring Mozambique, from student and other organizations that had developed, up to a point, inside Mozambique itself, and from more distant exile (elsewhere in Africa, in Europe, and in North America). They moved to form, at a founding convention in September 1962, a more unified and effective organization to be named FRELIMO, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (soon referred to simply as "Frelimo"). Crucial to this development was Eduardo Mondlane who returned from a career of university teaching in the United States and employment with the United Nations to accept the position of first president of the new organization.

With the OAU Liberation Committee backing and by dint of a deft handling of relationships with other potential sponsors beyond Africa, both East and West, Frelimo soon outstripped rival claimants to nationalist primacy. Thus Frelimo was to prove far more skilled than other liberation movements in the region in drawing

military assistance from both the Soviet bloc and China; its diplomatic efforts would also garner it an impressive degree of international acceptance, as well as considerable practical assistance for its “humanitarian” programs, from some Western governments (notably from the Scandinavian countries and Holland), churches and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Frelimo’s primacy in the eyes of the OAU and others was further consolidated by the movement’s advances in military terms. After the training in Algeria of its first military cadres, including Samora Machel (soon to be head of the guerrilla army and later first president of independent Mozambique), the movement launched, in 1964, an armed struggle that would soon drive the Portuguese from large parts of both the Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, which bordered on Tanzania. Similar efforts were at first abortive in Tete, but from 1968 Frelimo reengaged more successfully in that province (via Zambia), pushing forward in the early 1970s to the Zambezi and ultimately, bypassing an inhospitable Malawi, into the middle of the country where it began to pose some threat to the Portuguese presence in Manica and Sofala provinces.

Such was the unifying logic exemplified by Frelimo, and the advantages reaped from the consolidation of its legitimacy within Africa and beyond, that only rather marginalized alternative voices were now heard within the broad camp of Mozambican nationalism. Much more apparent were tensions within Frelimo itself. The conventional political practices that had defined the brand of nationalism prevalent elsewhere in Africa seemed ill-suited to the requirements of the guerrilla warfare that was now deemed necessary. In consequence, one wing of the movement (influenced both by its own experience inside the country and by a sympathetic awareness, in those heady days of the 1960s, of the ideas of “people’s war” associated with the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions) began to advocate a more deeply grounded process of popular mobilization. The experience of these cadres also drew them towards an anti-imperialist critique of the nature of Portuguese colonialism and of the global capitalist system that framed it, another dimension of their radicalization.

Set against this increasingly leftist, even Marxist, tendency was a nationalist politics that instead emphasized a more exclusively racial reading of the imperatives of the anticolonial struggle and a more opportunist (elitist and entrepreneurial) practice of it. The contradictions within the movement that these differences produced may have helped trigger the 1968 assassination of Mondlane in Dar es Salaam, although the actual bomb that killed the Frelimo president was traceable to the Portuguese police.

Mondlane’s death was no doubt a considerable loss to the movement in the long term, albeit one difficult to

measure. Like the younger colleagues who would become his successors, Mondlane was certainly moving to the left, but his continuing presence at the heart of the movement might well have moderated the autocratic tendencies that Frelimo would eventually carry into government after 1975. More immediately, however, his death and the question of the succession merely brought into sharper focus an internal power struggle, one in which Samora Machel and the progressive group around him (with valuable support from Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania where Frelimo was then primarily domiciled) prevailed over the more conservative Uriah Simango for the leadership. This elevation of Machel, a considerable military leader and a charismatic force, to the presidency meant a positive consolidation of the practices of armed struggle as well as a confirmation of the movement’s leftward trajectory.

Some historians have questioned any such account of Frelimo’s forging of effective and progressive purpose during this period. They have emphasized, for example, the importance of regional and racial factors to the movement’s internal politics, viewing the group that emerged to power under Machel’s leadership as being marked principally by their identity as “southerners” or “mulattos.” Others have chosen to see them merely as constituting an arrogant elite-in-the-making in their own right, albeit one (some would add) self-righteously and uncritically wedded to a modernizing agenda. Such interpretations are almost certainly overstated, although, as regards the latter point, it is probably true that the very successes of the new leadership during this phase of their struggle helped blind them to certain complexities of the transformational project they would seek to realize for their country in the postliberation period.

Opinions also differ as to the extent to which Frelimo had actually rooted itself firmly in a popular base in its “liberated areas,” even in those parts of the country where it had a palpable guerrilla presence. Nonetheless, the beginnings of a project of social transformation and popular empowerment (in terms of education, health, gender roles, even production) that the leadership felt it was witnessing in these areas helped further to radicalize its views as to what a liberated Mozambique could look like under the movement’s leadership. It is also true that only a relatively small percentage of the population in the northern part of the country fell under the direct influence of Frelimo activity. Yet there can be little doubt that the movement had earned for itself a substantial credibility in the minds of a large proportion of the country’s overall population by the time of the Portuguese coup in April 1974.

The precise reasons for the fall of Portuguese fascism are much debated. Nonetheless, the guerrilla challenge

in Africa (and not least in Mozambique) to the regime's colonial project was an especially crucial factor in both draining the Portuguese army's morale and undermining the legitimacy of Marcelo Caetano's regime at home. Frelimo had been able to weather the combination of brutal intimidation (the massacre at Wiriyamu in 1972, for example), construction of strategic hamlets, and launching of "great [military] offensives" (such as the much trumpeted "Operation Gordian Knot") thrown at it in the early 70s. Then, even after the coup, Frelimo refused to be tempted by the neocolonial blandishments of General Spínola and instead kept the fighting alive until a more radical Portuguese government agreed both to transfer power to the movement and, as occurred in June 1975, to recognize the new nation's independence.

Fatefully, Frelimo had thus come to power with much popular support but without benefit of elections and indeed (so certain was it of its mission to further transform in socioeconomic terms the lives of its popular constituency) with a pronounced distaste for entertaining opposition to what it considered to be its noble purposes. The hierarchical tendencies implicit in its experience of the (necessary) militarization of its struggle but also imbibed from the authoritarian practices of even the most enlightened nationalist leaders elsewhere on the continent no doubt contributed to this predilection. But so too did the movement's heady pride in its victory, its self-confidence, and its unquestioning commitment to the progressive project, deemed to be at once socialist, modernizing, and developmental, that it had forged in the liberation struggle.

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See also: **Mondlane, Eduardo; Mozambique: Machel and the Frelimo, 1975–1986.**

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Mozambique: Machel and the Frelimo Revolution, 1975–1986

After the overthrow of the Portuguese colonial presence in Mozambique, FRELIMO (soon, as a political party, simply "Frelimo") came to power in 1975 with



Cabora Bassa Dam, Mozambique. © Friedrich Stark/Das Fotoarchiv.

an ambitious agenda highlighting nationalist, developmental and socialist goals. Although he surrounded himself with a deeply committed and unified team, the key figure in this process was undoubtedly Frelimo's president, Samora Moisés Machel. Born in southern Mozambique in 1933 and trained as a nurse, Machel left Mozambique in 1963 to join FRELIMO in Tanzania. After military training, he soon rose to be head of the army and, in the wake of Eduardo Mondlane's assassination and a subsequent struggle for primacy within the movement, to its presidency in 1969. In the liberation struggle he came to play an absolutely crucial role in sustaining and advancing FRELIMO's military challenge to Portuguese rule and consolidating the movement's leftward trajectory. He was a man of enormous charisma, if also one of rather overweening self-confidence, and something of an autodidact in matters of revolutionary theory. He was deeply concerned with transforming and modernizing his country and the condition of its peoples. There can be little doubt that Machel and key leaders of Frelimo, now in positions of governmental authority, thought that this transformation would occur along socialist lines: Machel's speeches were studded with statements regarding the evils of exploitation and the nature of the global imperialist system that allow of no other interpretation of the movement's intentions.

The realization of such intentions would prove to be more difficult. The departure at independence of most of the resident Portuguese (who also engaged in substantial sabotage on leaving) created chaotic conditions, while also underscoring just how vulnerable the inherited economy was, and just how few trained Mozambicans Portuguese colonialism had produced. In addition, Mozambique was to be struck by a range of natural disasters (droughts and floods) throughout Frelimo's early years in power. The new government was prepared to be quite pragmatic in certain respects (e.g., as regards its inherited linkages with South Africa), but the various crises of the transition probably encouraged Frelimo, which in any case was extremely ambitious, to embrace too many tasks at once. Moreover, there was limited room for maneuver for progressives in power in the then polarized world of the Cold War. In such a context, Frelimo's developmental agenda was also distorted by the impact of assistance from the Eastern bloc upon which it became overly, if almost inevitably, reliant.

In the event, the movement was drawn away from the peasant roots of its liberation struggle toward a model that, by fetishizing (with Eastern European encouragement) the twin themes of modern technology and "proletarianization," forced the pace and scale of change precipitously, both in terms of inappropriate industrial strategies and, in the rural areas, of highly mechanized state farms and (against the evidence of experience elsewhere in Africa) ambitious plans for the rapid "villagization" ("aldeias comunais") of rural dwellers. Debate continues as to how (and indeed whether) a more expansive economic development strategy that effectively linked a more apposite program of industrialization to the expansion of peasant-based production might actually have been realized under Mozambican circumstances. Nonetheless, the failure to do so was to be a key material factor in placing in jeopardy Frelimo's parallel hopes of mobilizing popular energies and transforming consciousness.

Similarly, in the political realm, the authoritarianism of prevailing "socialist" practice elsewhere reinforced the pull of the movement's own experience of military hierarchy and of the autocratic methods conventionally associated with African nationalism to encourage a "vanguard party" model of politics, this being officially embraced at Frelimo's Third Congress in 1978. The simultaneous adoption of a particularly inflexible official version of "Marxism-Leninism" had a further deadening effect on the kind of creativity (both vis-à-vis the peasantry during the liberation struggle and as further exemplified in the transition period by the encouragement of grassroots "dynamizing groups" in urban areas) that the movement had previously evidenced. Such developments substantially contradicted

any real drive toward popular empowerment, tending to turn the organizations of workers, women, and the like into mere transmission belts for the Frelimo Party. It is true that the kind of "left developmental dictatorship" now created by Frelimo witnessed successes in certain important spheres (health and education, for example) and advances in the principles (if not always the practice) of such projects as that of women's emancipation were impressive. Moreover, the regime took seriously the challenges to their emancipatory vision posed by the structures of institutionalized religion, by "tradition" and patriarchy, and by ethnic and regional sentiment. But the high-handed manner (at once moralizing and "modernizing") in which it approached such matters often betrayed an arrogance and a weakness in methods of political work that would render it more vulnerable to destructive oppositional activity than need otherwise have been the case.

The fact remains that the most important root of such "oppositional activity" lay in Frelimo's fateful decision to commit itself to the continuing struggle to liberate the rest of southern Africa, Rhodesia in the first instance but also South Africa, a point often downplayed by those observers who now choose to underestimate the high sense of moral purpose with which Frelimo assumed power in 1975. It was a choice for which the fledgling socialist state was to pay dearly, however. The cutting off of economic links with Rhodesia helped undermine the economy of Beira and its hinterland (especially when little of the promised international compensation for implementation of sanctions was forthcoming). And the support for ZANU guerrillas in advancing their own struggle prompted the Rhodesians to launch efforts to destabilize Mozambique, notably through the recruitment of renegade Mozambicans as mercenaries into a "Mozambique National Resistance" (the MNR, later Renamo). Then, after the fall of the Smith regime in 1979, the South African state itself chose to breathe fresh life into Renamo while intensifying the latter's cruel program of outright destabilization, characterized by its brutal targeting of Mozambican civilian populations, and its wilful destruction of social and economic infrastructures.

The conclusion carefully argued by Minter (1994: p.283) stands: that without such external orchestration, Mozambique's own internal contradictions would not have given rise to war. Once launched, however, the war did serve to magnify Frelimo's errors and to narrow its chances of learning from them. Indeed, such was the war's destructive impact on Mozambique's social fabric that what began as an external imposition slowly but surely took on some of the characteristics of a civil war. Given the nature of its own violent and authoritarian practices, Renamo could not easily pose as a champion of democracy (except in some ultraright

circles in the West). Nonetheless, it had some success, over time, in fastening onto various grievances that sprang from the weaknesses in Frelimo's own project, Renamo seeking to fan the resentments of disgruntled peasants, disaffected regionalists, ambitious "traditionalists" (e.g., displaced chiefs). Meanwhile, under pressure, the Frelimo state itself buckled, its original sense of high purpose and undoubted integrity beginning to be lost. Thus, by the time open elections did finally occur in the 1990s as part of the peace process, Renamo had gained sufficient popular resonance to present a real challenge to Frelimo, albeit on a terrain of political competition reduced to the lowest kind of opportunistic calculation of regional, ethnic, and sectional advantage.

In the period covered in this entry such outcomes were not yet visible. And yet, by the early 1980s, Frelimo had begun to adapt its domestic policies in a less aggressively revolutionary, more market-sensitive direction. True, this was done (at its Fourth Congress in 1983, for example) in ways that could still be interpreted as realistic adjustments calculated primarily to ensure the long-term viability of quasi-socialist goals. In retrospect, however, they can also be seen as first steps in an effort to placate various Western actors, in particular the Reagan White House, which was now so aggressive in the region and a tacit supporter of South African strategies. By the 1990s such trends would witness a full-scale surrender by Frelimo to the globalizing logic of neoliberalism.

Just how far, had he lived, Samora Machel would himself have been prepared to travel down that road must remain a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, Machel had already presided over the movement's most humiliating capitulation, that to South Africa, as crystallized in the signing of 1984's Nkomati Accord. This pact found Frelimo trading abandonment of its support to the ANC for South Africa's promise to wind down its orchestration of Renamo's destabilizing activities. In fact, South Africa did no such thing, and Machel now proposed a (long overdue) housecleaning of state structures, in particular of the military. He was to perish, however, in October 1986, when his airplane crashed while returning from a meeting in Zambia (a crash which, some continue to claim, may have been engineered by the South Africans). Whatever the disarray and uncertainty that by now characterized Frelimo's overall project, the renowned unity of the movement's leadership core held firm. Joaquim Chissano, himself a veteran activist from the liberation struggle period, was elevated to the presidency.

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Mozambique: Renamo, Destabilization

South Africa's apartheid regime responded to independence and majority rule in neighboring states with a policy of destabilization, in which it covertly fomented war and created economic problems in those states. This had three purposes: to weaken those states and prevent them from supporting the South African liberation movements, to disrupt transport links and keep the countries dependent on South Africa (and thus disrupt the newly founded Southern African Development Coordination Conference, or SADCC), and to demonstrate to its own people and the wider world that black governments were incompetent and unfit to rule. From 1981 this policy received tacit support from the U.S. administration of President Ronald Reagan, which saw which South Africa as an anticommunist bastion standing up to black "communist" governments.

Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo) was South Africa's agent in Mozambique, and during the 1981–1992 war, at least 1 million people died, 5 million were displaced or became refugees in neighboring countries, and damage exceeded \$20 billion. Renamo was initially set up by the Rhodesian security services in 1976 when Mozambique imposed mandatory United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Renamo's first members were Mozambicans who had been in particularly brutal Portuguese colonial units before independence, and who then fled to Rhodesia fearing punishment. Renamo made raids into central Mozambique, and built up recruits by raiding open prisons in rural areas. The main Renamo bases in Mozambique were captured in 1979 and 1980, and Renamo was largely defeated.

With independence in Zimbabwe in 1980, the remaining Renamo fighters were passed on to South African military intelligence, which set up special bases for them in northeast South Africa. Rhodesia had only used Renamo for harassment and intelligence, but South Africa built Renamo into a major fighting force with extensive training and supplies by boat and plane. South African commandos took an active part in key Renamo sabotage actions. Afonso Dhlakama was selected as the new commander. By mid-1981 Renamo was active in the two central provinces; by the end of

1983 it was disrupting travel and carrying out raids in six of the ten provinces; it required 3,000 Zimbabwean troops to protect the road, railway, and oil pipeline that linked the Mozambican port of Beira to Zimbabwe.

On March 16, 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord, under which South Africa agreed to stop supporting Renamo in exchange for Mozambique expelling African National Congress (ANC) members. Mozambique abided by the accord, but South Africa did not; support for Renamo was reduced but never stopped.

South Africa wanted to disrupt transport and commerce and destroy economic infrastructure in Mozambique, and it also wanted to destroy the image of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, popularly known as Frelimo. A central plank of its strategy was fear, and Renamo was molded into an effective terrorist force. Frelimo had gained its greatest popularity through its rapid expansion of health and education, so Renamo attacked schools and health posts and maimed, killed, or kidnapped nurses and patients, teachers, and pupils. The goal was to make people afraid to use health posts and send their children to school, and to make teachers and nurses afraid to work in rural areas, thus eliminating Frelimo's traditional sources of support. To disrupt commerce, shops were destroyed and there were brutal attacks on road and rail transport; wounded passengers were burned alive inside buses, but some were always left alive to tell what had happened, thus creating fear of travel. More than half of all rural primary schools, health posts, and shops were destroyed or forced to close.

In 1998 the United States deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Roy Stacey, accused Renamo of carrying out "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II." Renamo, he said, was "waging a systematic and brutal war of terror against innocent Mozambican civilians through forced labor, starvation, physical abuse, and wanton killing."

Renamo recruited largely by kidnapping large groups of young people. The Renamo members allowed the most determined of the kidnapped to escape. The rest were frightened into submission, forced to kill, and gradually molded into willing soldiers.

Travel and commerce became difficult in much of the country. By 1985, exports were only one-third of their 1981 levels, and GDP per capita was half of its 1981 level. By 1990, one-third of the population had fled to towns or neighboring countries, leaving rural areas depopulated. By 1992, the United Nations estimated that Renamo controlled 23 per cent of the territory of Mozambique, but only 6 per cent of the population.

Renamo had popular support in some areas, particularly in the center of the country. Peasants were critical

of Frelimo for its opposition to "traditional leaders" and, in its rush to modernize the economy, for Frelimo's failure to adequately support the peasantry. The war and deteriorating economy turned many against Frelimo.

In 1992, after two years of negotiation in Rome, the government of Mozambique and Renamo signed a peace accord. Both sides were tired of war, and the ceasefire was quickly implemented. The peace accord implicitly accepted that there would be no truth commission, and thus no punishments would be meted out for atrocities committed during the war. Frelimo demobilized 66,000 soldiers; Renamo demobilized 24,000 adult soldiers and 12,000 child soldiers, according to the United Nations. The peace accord called for a new integrated army of 30,000 men, half from each side, but only 12,000 of the demobilized chose to join the army.

Renamo was recognized as a political party and received extensive donor support in the two years before the 1994 elections to convert it from a guerrilla force into a political party. Many people joined Renamo in that period, seeing it as the only viable opposition party.

Multiparty election on October 27–29, 1994, and December 3–5, 1999, were quite similar. Approximately two-thirds of all adults of voting age voted in each election. Both elections were declared free and fair by foreign observers who also praised the organization of the electoral process. Frelimo and its president Joaquim Chissano won both elections, but Renamo took a significant portion of the votes. Renamo boycotted the opening session of parliament after both elections, claiming fraud, but offering no evidence to support its claim.

In February 2000 southern Mozambique suffered the worst floods since 1895; 700 people died, 40,000 were saved by the Mozambique navy and South African air force, and 500,000 were displaced and assisted by the international community. Although Mozambique's per capita GDP continued to increase, the floods slowed growth in 2000, and the impact continued into 2001.

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See also: **Mozambique: Chissano and, 1986 to the Present; Mozambique: FRELIMO and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Mozambique: Machel and the Frelimo Revolution, 1975–1986; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959.**

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Mozambique: Chissano and, 1986 to the Present

Following the death of Samora Machel in 1986 in an airplane crash, Joaquim Chissano assumed both the presidency of Mozambique and of the ruling Frelimo party in a peaceful and uncontested transition. Chissano successfully led the transitional government to independence in 1974–1975 and was minister of foreign affairs in the postindependence government. Chissano came from the same area and ethnolinguistic group in the south of the country as Machel and his predecessor as leader of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane. All were Shanganas (named thus, after a famous Nguni leader) from Gaza province, yet none of the three leaders had a narrow “tribalist” outlook.

South Africa-backed destabilization, supporting the internal Renamo armed opposition, combined with failed radical socialist policies and an extended period of crippling drought, brought the country to its knees. The United Nations launched a series of unprecedented emergency humanitarian appeals for six successive years, beginning in 1987. Mozambique had become the poorest country in the world with a GDP per capita of less than \$100. Under Chissano, the move toward the West and away from earlier Marxist-Leninist influence gathered pace. Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank and attracted increasing levels of aid. By the early 1990s, 70 per cent or more of GDP was accounted for by aid, reflecting the ongoing emergency facing the country. Chissano’s pragmatism was to help transform Mozambique into one of the few success stories in Africa, in terms of economic growth, in the final years of the twentieth century.

Chissano also presided over the complex transition from a single-party state to a multiparty electoral system. A new constitution in 1990 set up a multiparty state, along with the mechanisms for direct elections for the presidency and for members of parliament. Efforts were made throughout the 1990s to move away from the existing, extremely centralized, administrative model. Decentralization of state power only proceeded slowly, however, in a context of scarce resources and the prevailing political culture.

Transformation toward majority rule in South Africa reduced external support for Renamo. The war was recognized by both parties to the conflict as a

stalemate, and under growing internal and international pressure, peace negotiations began between Frelimo and Renamo in 1990 in Rome. In October 1992, a General Peace Agreement was signed after a long and tortuous period of negotiations and compromise.

The peace process was successfully concluded, 92,000 rival troops were demobilized, and a small unified national army was created. Landmines were removed, and bridges and roads were repaired. A further task involved in the peace process was reintegrating the 2.1 million internally displaced persons and 1.7 million refugees. This was mainly undertaken between 1992 and 1994. Democratic elections were held in 1994. Frelimo won a majority of seats in parliament (129 compared with 112 for Renamo), and Chissano won the presidential vote quite convincingly. Yet Renamo received a clear majority of votes in the center of the country in its historical heartland. Frelimo won a majority in the south and in the north of the country, where its fundamental support lay. Over the remainder of the decade all evidence pointed to an effective transition from war to peace. Yet the need remained for a more even spread of the benefits of peace and economic development across the country if regional tensions were to be effectively managed.

Economic recovery was encouraged by the peace process and privatization. A considerable expansion of private investment took place, mainly in massive projects involving aluminum smelting and iron and steel production, offshore gas, heavy metal sands mining, hydroelectricity, and tourism initiatives. The major impediment to sustainable economic development remained the massive debt burden. A significant breakthrough occurred when Mozambique was chosen for the implementation of the highly indebted poor countries debt relief initiative enabling almost \$3 billion of debt to be canceled. The government’s strict adherence to the structural adjustment program had won it considerable international support for such a move. Gross domestic product was growing at 10 per cent per annum in the final years of the century. All of the primary schools destroyed by the war had also been restored. Effectively two decades of development were lost by the conflict. Inflation was also brought under control and the dire poverty of much of the population began to be tackled.

Mozambique benefited from active economic cooperation with its neighboring states, particularly South Africa. A major stimulus for economic renewal in the south of the country was the corridor initiative linking the South African industrial heartland of Gauteng with the port of Maputo. Other similar initiatives were planned with neighboring countries to the north. A good deal of the renewed economic well-being felt by the population resulted not only from peace and the opening up of access to the agricultural land of the

interior, but also to the end of the decade of drought, which fortuitously coincided with the peace and the democratic elections. Access to land, security, and good rains kick-started the rural economy back to life. Subsistence food and commercialization circuits reopened and the free market policy framework promoted economic initiative.

BARRY MUNSLow

See also: **Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Mozambique: Machel and the Frelimo Revolution, 1975–1986; Mozambique: Renamo, Destabilization; Socialism in Postcolonial Africa.**

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Mphahlele, Ezekiel (1919–)

South African Writer, Critic, and Teacher

Ezekiel (later, Es'kia) Mphahlele played a central role in the development of African literature and criticism in general, and literary opposition to apartheid in particular. His widely read autobiography, *Down Second Avenue*, is considered a classic of South African literature.

Born in Marabastad Township, Pretoria in 1919, Mphahlele spent part of his childhood with his extended family in the impoverished rural village of Maupaneng, northern Transvaal, before returning to Pretoria. Urban and rural experiences reflect and shape the ever-present themes of township life and African culture in his writings. Educated at St. Peter's Secondary School in Johannesburg (where schoolmates included novelist Peter Abrahams and PAC leader Zeph Mothopheng) and Adams Teaching Training College, Natal, he matriculated by correspondence in 1942 and worked as a clerk, typist, and instructor at the Enzenzeleni Blind Institute before taking up a teaching post at Orlando High School, Soweto, in 1945.

Mphahlele's first publication, *Man Must Live and Other Stories* (1946), was the first published collection of short stories in English by a black South African. Critics decried his "unsophisticated" style, but the stories captured the indomitable struggle for survival of poor urban blacks in the face of racial domination. He continued to teach, also gaining a bachelor of arts degree by correspondence from the University of South Africa in 1949. The increasing repression of the apartheid regime pushed him into action. Elected secretary of the Transvaal African Teachers' Association in 1950 he mobilized African teachers against the Bantu education bill that imposed a highly discriminatory and inferior state education system for blacks. His vocal opposition to "Bantu Education" led in 1952 to his dismissal and banning from teaching and his blacklisting in surrounding countries. He nevertheless obtained work as a teacher for a short time in 1954 in Lesotho and at St. Peter's. In 1955 he joined the African National Congress (ANC) and was briefly active in the organization, but was critical of its inattention to cultural and educational matters.

In 1955, as literary editor and reporter for the influential *Drum* magazine, he helped raise the visibility of young African writers and reported key events such as forced removals and bus boycotts but, ill at ease in journalism, and objecting to editorial censoring on the white-owned journal, he chose teaching and writing as his life's work. In 1956 he completed a master of arts thesis on black characters in South African fiction at the University of South Africa. Banned from teaching and in search of greater intellectual stimulation, he went into self-imposed exile the following year.

From 1957 to 1961, Mphahlele lived in Nigeria. He taught English and creative writing in the University of Ibadan Extra-Mural Department and interacted with important Nigerian writers such as Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka. In the 1960s, he traveled widely and helped establish cultural and literary centres, such as the Mbari Writers and Artists Club in Ibadan (1961) and the Chem-Chemi Cultural Center in Nairobi (1963). As an editor of the seminal literary journal *Black Orpheus*, he was instrumental in forging international visibility for black South African writers. He was part of an influential emerging group of writers, including Soyinka and Ngugi wa Thion'go, who challenged established literary mores. In 1961 he moved to Paris as director of the African section of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an American-sponsored organization. He subsequently lived in Kenya, Zambia, and the United States. He taught and received a doctorate (1968) from the University of Denver and in 1974 became a professor at the University of Pennsylvania.

In exile Mphahlele published widely. *Down Second Avenue* (1959) met with great critical acclaim.

This autobiographical narrative vividly depicts his personal and community struggles against racism and captures the endemic poverty of black urban life and the oppression of white rule, but also the resilience of Africans. It also provides a glimpse of momentous events in South African history. In *The African Image* (1962), his first critical work and one of the earliest books of literary criticism by an African writer in English, he elaborated key themes in African literature, though critics pointed to his limited grasp of theory. In the sixties he also edited major anthologies of African literature (*African Writing Today* and *Modern African Stories*) as well as publishing his own short fiction (*The Living and Dead, and Other Stories* [1961] and *In Corner B* [1967]). Like his prose, his short stories convey the traumas of harsh urban life under apartheid and the little acts of resistance and desperation by ordinary Africans. His most successful stories include “He and the Cat,” and “Mrs. Plum” (about patronizing whites). In the 1970s and 1980s, his literary criticism included *Voices in the Whirlwind and Other Essays* (1972). He published two novels, *The Wanderers* (1971), an autobiographical novel dealing with themes of exile, and *Chirundu* (1979), focusing on political corruption set in a thinly disguised Zambia. He also wrote a juvenile novella, *Father Come Home* (1984), set against a major event of South African history, the 1913 Natives’ Land Act. However, his novels were not successful. *Afrika My Music* (1984), the sequel to his autobiography, described his exile and return to South Africa. A collection of his letters, *Bury Me at the Marketplace*, appeared in 1984.

After twenty years of exile he returned to South Africa in 1977 to teach at the University of the North in the Lebowa bantustan. His return soon after the bloodily repressed Soweto Revolt to a country still ruled by the apartheid system he had condemned proved controversial, and he was criticized by fellow exiles Dennis Brutus and Lewis Nkosi. This diminished his reputation as an unyielding antiapartheid writer but he stressed his need to seek literary inspiration in African culture and landscapes. The apartheid regime annulled his appointment and he was instead forced to work as a school inspector. He later secured a research position at the University of the Witwatersrand where in 1983 he was foundation professor of the Department of African Literature. After retiring in 1988 he continued to write but produced no major works.

Major themes of Mphahlele’s creative work and life are alienation and the isolation of exile caused by apartheid and cultural colonization, and the antidote to this malaise, African humanism (or *ubuntu*), drawn from African culture. Like Ngugi, he sought to “decolonize

the mind.” While seeing literature as distinct from politics he found ways to incorporate into his fiction important political themes such as corruption. He also portrayed the strength of African women.

Mphahlele’s work was crowned with literary achievements. He was nominated for the Nobel Prize and received numerous awards. But his major impact was on the development of a new approach to African writing. As a strong critic of the limitations of the *négritude* movement and ardent proponent of the self-assertion of African identity, he indirectly influenced the development of the Black Consciousness movement. An indication of his enduring influence is the continued presence of *Down Second Avenue* in South African school curricula.

PETER LIMB

Biography

Born in Marabastad Township, Pretoria in 1919. Matriculated at Adams Teaching Training College, Natal, by correspondence in 1942. Took up a teaching post at Orlando High School, Soweto, in 1945. Earned a B.A. degree by correspondence from the University of South Africa in 1949. Elected secretary of the Transvaal African Teachers’ Association in 1950. Dismissed, banned from teaching, and blacklisted in surrounding countries in 1952. Completed an M.A. degree at the University of South Africa in 1956. Taught English and creative writing in the University of Ibadan. Moved to Paris to work as director of the African section of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in 1961. Taught and received a Ph.D. (1968) from the University of Denver in 1968. Appointed professor at the University of Pennsylvania in 1974. Appointed professor in the Department of African Literature at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1983. Retired 1988.

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MPLA: See Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974.

Msiri: Yeke Kingdom

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Swahili Arab merchants from Zanzibar extended their trading network deep into East and Central Africa. Although previously active in the hinterland of the Indian Ocean coast, they now moved inland in order to control the rapidly growing trade of slaves, ivory, and other products. Permanent trade centers emerged along the various routes leading to the interior. The most important routes led toward Lake Tanganyika and Lake Mweru where Swahili Arabs were present as early as the 1830s. The main link to Lake Tanganyika crossed the lands of the Nyamwezi and Sumbwa peoples south of Lake Victoria. The Swahili counted these people among their principal commercial partners. In fact, the Nyamwezi and Sumbwa were more than economic auxiliaries; they organized their own expeditions to the heart of the continent. For example, Sumbwa groups reached southern Katanga (Congo-DRC) in their quest for copper, ivory, and slaves. Under the impetus of the talented leader M'siri, whose own father had established friendship pacts with small Katanga chiefs, certain Sumbwa were permanently established in the region around 1850. In Katanga they became known as Yeke, a Sumbwa term for an elephant hunters' guild.

The region where the Yeke settled was far from the Luba, Lunda, and Kazembe kingdoms that were the great political centers of the time. From the start, the Yeke, who numbered no more than several hundred, had the foresight to establish good relations with their far more powerful neighbors. Relying on their guns and the sense of strategy they had developed in Tanzania, the Yeke gained control of the petty local Sanga chiefs. Unlike other slave trading groups that made no long-term plans, but relied only on force, the Yeke demonstrated a great capacity for integrating themselves into the political, social, and religious fabric of the region. They were especially skilled at utilizing the process of fictive kinship in order to bind themselves to their new allies. Cleverly manipulating kinship as a political tool, M'siri soon had himself proclaimed *mwami* (king).

During the 1880s, M'siri's Yeke kingdom reached its apogee. At that time the Yeke controlled southern and eastern Katanga where they managed to subdue a number of territories previously attached to the three great neighboring empires. Now, the Yeke state resembled a series of concentric bands. The Yeke exerted direct control over the immediate area around their capital, Bunkeya. Beyond that was a band of territories

whose chiefs were obligated to pay tribute in exchange for regalia providing them with legitimacy. M'siri sometimes installed a Yeke resident ruler in these regions while at the same time bringing local princesses or chiefly heirs to be educated at the Yeke royal court. These policies led to the development of a pronounced Yeke presence within and influence upon the Katanga elite. Beyond this band was yet a third region that extended as far as Zambia. In this band, the Yeke sought not stable political centers, but merely commercial products such as slaves and ivory obtained through raids.

The Yeke were ideally situated on the line dividing the Indian Ocean commercial zone from that of the Atlantic zone. Thus, they could negotiate simultaneously with Luso-Angolan and Swahili-Arab merchants. Immense caravans containing hundreds, even thousands, of people regularly passed through the Yeke capital Bunkeya.

By the end of the 1880s, Leopold II, king of the Congo Free State, and Cecil Rhodes, whose operations were the vanguard of British colonialism, competed to gain control over M'siri. Both saw M'siri's capital as the gateway to a region reputed to contain great mineral wealth. Both Rhodes and Leopold organized expeditions, but Leopold was successful. In 1891 a fourth Belgian expedition reached Bunkeya. An argument broke out and M'siri died in the course of a shooting incident. M'siri's death coincided with the fall of the Yeke Kingdom. The state was undermined by rebellions led by local people who seized the occasion to emancipate themselves from Yeke control.

During the following years, the Yeke became the Congo Free State's principle allies in Katanga. This cooperation saved the Yeke from political obliteration and assured the establishment of a large colonial chiefdom ruled by the Yeke kings. Even today, Yeke influence far outweighs Yeke demographic importance (they number perhaps 20,000). M'siri's grandson, Godefroid Munongo, was the minister of interior in the secessionist Katanga government (1960–1963). Subsequently, Munongo occupied many ministerial posts in the government of Zaire. Munongo died in 1992 while participating in the National Conference in Kinshasa. The loss of such a powerful figure was damaging to the Yeke who since then have become the target of criticism. Other inhabitants of Katanga reproach them for not being original inhabitants of the region. The small groups of Yeke who were established outside of Bunkeya in the nineteenth century—mostly north of Lake Mweru and along the Luapula (including the Kitopi and Kashyobwe)—have been dispossessed of their rights to land they once held.

The Tanzania elements of Yeke culture such as their language (*kিয়েকে*, a Shisumbwa dialect now spoken only at the *mwami's* court) are now in decline. Nevertheless, the Yeke maintain their strong sense of identity. Recently,

groups of young singers, dancers, and comedians have been established at Bunkeya in order to save and promote their culture. Each December 20, Yeke travel from all over Katanga to assemble at Bunkeya in order to celebrate the death of M'siri. This ceremony takes place at locations linked with the memory of that tragic event.

PIERRE PETIT

See also: Rhodes, Cecil, J.; Stanley, Leopold II, "Scramble."

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Mswati III: *See Swaziland:* Mswati III, Reign of.

Mugabe, Robert Gabriel (c.1924–)

Zimbabwean Politician and Former Guerrilla Leader

Head of government since independence from white minority rule in 1980, president of Zimbabwe, and leader of the ruling party, ZANU (PF) Robert Mugabe is a member of the Zezuru subgroup of the Shona ethnic cluster, which makes up roughly 80 per cent of the population today. He was born at the Kutannya Catholic mission near Zvimba in Makonde district, in what was then Southern Rhodesia.

Interested in a career as a teacher, he attending Catholic mission schools and worked as a primary school teacher at Kutannya until 1943, followed by stints at Empandeni and Hope Fountain missions until 1950. In that year he won a university scholarship to Fort Hare University in South Africa. Both his tertiary education and involvement with African nationalism began at Fort Hare. He received a B.A. degree in 1951. His education continued at the University of London. Over the next twenty years, partly in and out of prison, Mugabe earned four more university-level degrees in education, economics, law, and administration.

Returning in 1952, Mugabe continued teaching at mission schools, and in northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in 1955. In 1958 he moved to Accra in Ghana following its independence from British colonial rule to teach and experience African freedom personally. It was during this time that he met and married his first wife, Sally Hayfron. In May 1960 they returned to southern Rhodesia, where Robert became increasingly

politically active in the executive body of the National Democratic Party (NDP), a newly formed nationalist movement. He served as secretary for publicity until the NDP was banned.

He served as deputy secretary general of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo in the early 1960s. During this time, Mugabe was arrested frequently. While out on bail, he managed to flee to Dar es Salaam, ZAPU's exile headquarters. It was during this time, early in 1963, that Mugabe broke with Nkomo and joined the newly formed Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, serving as secretary general. Shortly after returning to Rhodesia, in mid-1963, he was rearrested and found himself in jail in 1964, when ZANU was banned. For the next ten years, Mugabe was held in prison or detention camps, until his release in 1974 as part of Ian Smith's general amnesty. Late in 1974, Sithole, still in detention, was suspended from ZANU by a vote of the executive committee and replaced as leader by Mugabe.

Following the 1975 assassination of Herbert Chitepo under suspicious circumstances at ZANU's operational headquarters in Lusaka, Mugabe, and Edgar Tekere moved to Mozambique in the wake of the end of Portuguese military occupation. From Maputo they reorganized ZANU and reactivated ZANLA, the military wing of the party. By 1977 Mugabe had become generally recognized as the uncontested leader of ZANU-ZANLA and a leading candidate in the eyes of African leaders for leadership of the still-divided national liberation movement. He was personally involved in both party affairs and military strategy, while traveling widely as key spokesperson in an international diplomatic campaign against the Smith-Muzorewa regime. By 1979 ZANLA had about 20,000 fighters under arms. Mugabe proclaimed himself a Marxist and was generally viewed as the most radical of all nationalist leaders.

In 1976, shortly before the beginning of unsuccessful negotiations with the Smith regime in Geneva, Mugabe and Nkomo had formed the Patriotic Front (PF). In 1978 both leaders participated in another round of peace talks in Malta, where they expressed support for independent elections in Zimbabwe. Terms of an internal settlement agreement, however, were denounced as a sellout by ZANU, which boycotted it. In 1979 Mugabe led the ZANU (PF) contingent to all-party talks at Lancaster House in London, which resulted in an agreement to hold elections.

Mugabe returned to Zimbabwe in January 1980 to stand in the upcoming elections as ZANU (PF) leader, after announcing that ZANU would contest the elections independently of the PF. Nkomo and ZAPU thereafter became a de-facto opposition party, representing the Ndebele speaking ethnic group which comprises

roughly 20 per cent of the population. Mugabe stressed national reconciliation and support for all provisions of the Lancaster House agreement, including the twenty (out of 100) reserved parliamentary seats for whites. ZANU won fifty-seven seats, and Mugabe became prime minister, presiding over a coalition cabinet which included ZAPU and whites. Mugabe kept the defense portfolio for himself.

Mugabe proved pragmatic and cautious in honoring pledges for land redistribution so as not to alarm white commercial farmers, who were urged to stay. His policies angered some ZANU hard-liners, particularly former Mozambique comrade Edgar Tekere, who was dropped from the cabinet in 1981. Problems of internal security, fears of assassination, sabotage of military equipment, and South African espionage led to harsh military and police actions in Matabeleland province against alleged “dissidents.” Nkomo, leader of the opposition, sharply criticized these attacks and was demoted in 1981.

Calls for socialist transformation of the economy and party approval of all major government policies intensified in 1982, as did calls to merge ZANU and ZAPU. The resulting political crisis came to a head in February 1982, following discovery of alleged ZAPU (ZIPRA) arms caches on farms owned by Nkomo, who was subsequently dismissed from cabinet. Near civil war conditions persisted in some parts of the country into 1984 and Nkomo fled the country at one point.

In 1984, at ZANU’s second party congress, Mugabe increased his pressure for creation of a one-party state in advance of scheduled elections in 1985. ZANU won sixty-three seats, enabling it to amend the Lancaster Constitution. Pressures to merge ZANU and ZAPU continued into 1987 when a unity pact was signed and Nkomo became vice president. The ten-year provision of the Lancaster Constitution lapsed in 1990. White seats were abolished by amendment, an executive presidency was created, and Mugabe was inaugurated in December after he won reelection against weaker multiparty opposition, including Tekere’s ZUM. A significant sign of increasing divisions within the ruling party was a vote to reject creation of a formal one-party state that same year. De-facto one-party rule was a given.

Mugabe stood for yet another term as president in 1995 elections, which witnessed a further erosion of formidable opposition party challengers. Economic problems had forced Mugabe to embrace IMF-World Bank structural adjustment policies and drop the socialist economic rhetoric by the early 1990s. Mugabe also began to step to greater prominence in regional and continental relations, serving as chair of OAU. Upon winning reelection, Mugabe made it clear he was not yet ready to consider setting a retirement date, although his health and general well-being were adversely affected by the death of his wife in 1992.

Growing civil society pressures for democratization combined with intensifying economic problems continue to cause major unrest, particularly in urban areas. Major strikes and demonstrations occurred in Harare in 1998 and 1999, leading some to predict the rise of a more serious political challenge to Mugabe, possibly from within the ranks of his divided party. Although he won the 2002 elections, they were decried as deeply flawed by both opponents and impartial foreign observers.

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See also: **Nkomo, Joshua; Zimbabwe: Since 1990; Zimbabwe: Conflict and Reconstruction, 1980s; Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Smith Regime, 1964–1979; Zimbabwe: Second Chimurenga, 1966–1979; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Nationalist Politics, 1950 and 1960s; Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Lancaster House and Independence, 1978–1980.**

Biography

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born at the Kutanma Catholic mission near Zvimba in Makonde district, in what was then Southern Rhodesia. He attended Catholic mission schools and worked as a primary school teacher at Kutanma until 1943, followed by stints at Empandeni and Hope Fountain missions until 1950. In that year he won a university scholarship to Fort Hare University in South Africa. He received a B.A. degree in 1951. His education continued at UNISA and later the University of London. In 1958 he moved to Accra, Ghana. In May 1960, he returned to Southern Rhodesia, and joined the National Democratic Party (NDP). In 1963 he joined the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In 1974, named leader of the ZANU. First elected prime minister in 1980.

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**Muhammad Abdile Hassan: See Somalia:
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1805–1849: Imperial Expansion; Egypt:
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**Muhammad Al-Sanusi: See Libya:
Muhammad Al-Sanusi (c. 1787–1859) and the
Sanusiyya.**

**Muhammad Ture: See Songhay Empire: Ture,
Muhammad and the Askiya Dynasty.**

Muhammed bin Hamed: See Tippu Tip.

Multinationals and the State

Multinational corporations (MNCs), also called transnational corporations (TNCs), have increasingly engaged the attention of the international academic community for obvious reasons. Besides the fact that the MNCs were key agents in the shaping of the present world economic order, the continuing conflict between the MNCs and governments in the present age of economic globalization echoes the old debate over collective destiny, or common humanity, and national sovereignty. The crux of the matter has been how to achieve order and sustained good relations between the MNCs and the state. While the relationship between the home state and the MNCs forms part of the general matter under consideration, our primary concern here is the relationship between the host state and the MNCs.

As an international business enterprise with corporate headquarters in the home state and subsidiaries abroad, the MNCs were established with the motive of maximization of profits, that is, to serve the basic interests of the stockholders. As global business entities, they have the capacity to wield enormous financial muscle, advanced technology, and marketing skills to integrate production of goods and services on a worldwide scale.

Any discussion on the MNCs and the state in post-colonial Africa must necessarily commence with an acknowledgement of the continuity of the colonial practice of economic exploitation and domination of the host state in the immediate postindependence era. Since the relationship between the MNCs and the colonial state is outside the scope of this discussion, we can observe in passing that the MNCs and their cosmopolitan home governments were in an unholy alliance of economic domination of the African continent and thus got themselves enmeshed in the ocean created by the Machiavellis of this world. The continuity of the culture of domination in the postindependence period made the concept of neocolonialism gain currency in African discourse. As a new form of colonization, whereby the postcolonial states remained economically dominated by the former colonial masters and new external economic actors, the MNCs played roles which were more exploitative than anything else.

For the purpose of illustration, we shall take specific examples from North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The irksome economic domination of the state by the MNCs is evident in the example of Libya. There, King Idris, a conservative, allowed the operation of the MNCs on extremely generous terms, compared with those demanded elsewhere in the oil-producing world.

In Egypt the situation was no better. Before the ascendancy of Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Egyptian seat of authority, Egypt, for all intents and purposes, was a playground for European MNCs. In Liberia the MNC American Firestone stood like a colossus. At one point, Firestone set up its own security system, and technically became a state within a state.

The discoveries of gold, diamonds, and other minerals made South Africa a theater of multinational rivalry. The ascendancy of the American MNCs in South Africa was achieved through a complex interplay of the creation and manipulation of postwar multilateral donor institutions and trade agreements, adroit gold and dollar diplomacies, and the use of trade-related U.S. federal agencies like the Export-Import Bank. Indeed, by the 1950s, the U.S. MNCs had deeply enscinded themselves in nearly every sector of South Africa's economy.

With the rise of economic nationalism, African nation states rejected the status quo and did everything within

their powers to reign in the multinationals. In Egypt, President Nasser adopted radical leadership. His example appealed to many young African nationalists. In Libya a group of young officers led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi deposed King Idris in 1969 while the latter was undergoing treatment in a Turkish spa. During May and June of 1970, Libya forced the oil companies operating on its soil to cut back production thus tightening the squeeze on Europe. In the negotiations that followed, Occidental Petroleum and other companies were compelled to yield to the demands of the Libyan government. By April 1971, through the instrumentality of increase in the posted price and share of the profit, Libya was receiving about 80 per cent more revenue than in the previous twelve months.

As the owners and patrons of the MNCs felt the effects of regulation, partial nationalization of MNCs, and the stringent measures placed on the operation environment of the MNCs by their African hosts, they realized that they could no longer play the game by the old rules of gun-boat diplomacy. Thus, they placed the matter on the global agenda. In this regard, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, in a resolution adopted on July 28, 1972, requested that the secretary general appoint a commission to carry out a study of the role of MNCs and their impact on the process of development as well as their affect on international relations. The group was also to formulate conclusions to be used by governments in making their sovereign decisions regarding national policy and to submit recommendations for appropriate international action.

In 1973 the UN organized a conference on the problems and prospects of the multinational corporations. Trends such as nationalization and expropriation, restrictive measures aimed at MNCs, the reservation of a substantial sector of the economic realm for nationals only, attempts by host countries to gain participation and control of policy making, production, and pricing of goods and services were addressed. Since that time, MNCs have taken steps to correct mistakes of the past and to negotiate directly with their hosts for new arrangements. Consequently, the policies, guidelines, and priorities of the host countries have been largely implemented.

In the final analysis, it is pertinent to state that the relationship between the MNCs and their African hosts have ranged in character from hostility and resentment to willing or reluctant cooperation.

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Munhumutapa: See Mutapa State, 1450–1884.

Museums, History of: Postcolonial

Almost all African countries had a national museum at the time of independence. The majority of these museums were started by the various colonial administrations in these countries. This is not to say Africans had no interest in preserving their cultural heritage. There were indeed institutions, if only sometimes informal, that were responsible for this important task of propagating and preserving the cultural heritage. There were also individuals or groups of individuals who were responsible for the preservation of their societies' cultural heritage for posterity.

The national museums of the colonial era have continued to exist into the postcolonial period, but with very little or no development at all in some countries. There are exceptions, of course. Egypt has had museums from as early as 1863 and they have been multiplying ever since. South Africa has a number of regional museums. There are also several museums in every city and at least a museum in every sizable town in South Africa. There are also local history museums and in some areas, there are specialized museums like mine or military museums at various related locations. Countries like Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria also have made notable strides in their museum development. There are also countries like Botswana, which may not have multiplied the actual number of their museums but have nevertheless developed more programs at their existing museums. Botswana's mobile museum program, Pitse ya Naga, covers the entire country, visiting schools and local communities at given intervals.

Major museum development has, however, taken place in West Africa since independence. Many countries in West Africa have multiplied the number of their museums. Nigeria, for instance, now has at least forty-one museums. Ghana has twenty-one, Senegal fifteen, Côte

d'Ivoire and Benin have twelve each. Mali has eight, while Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, and Burkina Faso have five museums each. The majority of these museums are museums of ethnography, or a combination of ethnography with history, archaeology, and/or natural history, but there are also many specialized museums, including military museums. Normally working against all odds, many African museums have successfully integrated more fully with the community they serve, instead of operating as foreign tourist attractions.

Many of the expatriate curators who initially ran national museums were replaced by indigenous African curators soon after independence. Although African curators were appointed to these posts and other museum positions, no funding was made available for them to do what they were supposed to do as museum professionals, apart from covering their recurrent expenditure, especially by way of salaries.

African museum professionals began creating regional and sometimes continentwide organizations to spearhead their professional concerns. Just before independence there was an organization for museologists in Africa, The Museums Association of Tropical Africa (AMATA/MATA), which survived until just after independence. Its last formal meeting was held in 1972 in Livingstone, Zambia. When UNESCO set up its Monuments and Museum Division, it came to the rescue of many African museums. UNESCO subsequently funded the establishment and administration of the Regional Conservation Center in Jos, Nigeria, for the training of African museum technicians, a field that badly lacked skilled personnel in many African museums after independence. The Jos Centre has trained quite a number of Africa's museum conservation technicians over the years.

In 1986 the southern African countries (except for South Africa, then run by the apartheid regime) set up the Southern African Coordination Conference Association of Museums and Monuments (SADCCAMM), bringing together museum professionals from at least seven southern African countries.

Similarly, West African museum personnel who had been quite active in the AMATA/MATA before its demise setup a new organization, the West African Museum Program (WAMP). WAMP has since been very active in bringing about regional collaboration and exchange of information and ideas between museum professional in Africa. Together with ICOM, WAMP published a directory of museum professionals in Africa, a very useful and handy sourcebook. Information on WAMP and its publications, and on a number of participating museums in its activities can now be accessed on the Internet.

Several other programs and projects have taken place in museums in Africa since the early 1980s. The Swedish African Museum Program (SAMP) is a training

program between Swedish and African museums, which was launched in 1984. Its aim is to "develop a model for museums co-operation, by exchanging skills, information and sharing experience through solidarity across borders." The program has registered considerable success and many African and Swedish museums have benefited from this two-way training and exchange program.

The ICOM program, which used to conduct museum conservation courses in Italy, has since relocated these Prevention in the Museums of Africa (PREMA) courses to Africa and are now being hosted and conducted in different African countries annually. Several African museum professionals and museums are benefiting from these PREMA courses by training their personnel at technician level.

In 1991 the American Social Science Research Council also announced their competitive "African Archives and Museum Project: 1991-92" grants, for the preservation and documentation of archival and museum resources for scholarly use. This program attracted a total of ninety-five applications from African museums. Six museums from Zaire, Cape Verde, Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia were awarded grants through this program.

Several regional workshops and conferences have been held and resolutions adopted mainly to draw African governments' attention to both the important role African museums can play in national development programs, cultural and national identity, as well as in fostering national unity and education. These professional gatherings have also highlighted the financial plight of the majority of African museums. However, because the situation on the ground is often that of a single national museum in many countries, it has been very difficult to enforce these resolutions on individual African governments. Several African national museums are usually under Home Office ministries such as community welfare, tourism, education, or home affairs, so they are always competing for funds with service-provider departments like prisons, police, or immigration. Since museums have nothing quantitative to put back into the national treasury, they have always come last in government spending priorities.

Museum professionals in Africa have now realized that they have to look elsewhere for funding if they are to carry out their mission. Thus, they are now targeting both regional and international programs that provide funding and grants. Organizations such as the European Union, SIDA, NORAD, the Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation supply funds for cultural institutions. A number of African museums have been able to obtain funds for research, documentation, and preservation of artifacts in their custody from such bodies.

Currently, there are a number of museum programs offering some form of professional assistance to African museums. These include Africa 2009, a ten-year program run jointly by UNESCO, ICCROM, and CRATEREAG concerned with conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is also PREMA, ICOMOS, and AFRICOM. This last program grew out of a 1991 African museum professionals encounter in Lome, Togo, and later on in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. AFRICOM works on a continentwide level to connect African museums with worldwide funding organizations. The program supports initiatives in training and education, exhibitions, fighting against illicit traffic of African cultural property, and supporting networks and future prospects in the field of museum development in Africa. It has the full support of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and UNESCO.

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Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta (c.1944–)

Political Scientist, Former Guerrilla Leader, and President of Uganda

Considered by many as a leading figure of the “new generation” of African leaders, Yoweri Museveni was born into a family of Hima cattle herders, a clan of the Ankole people of southwestern Uganda in about 1944. He was named Museveni in honor of the Abaseveni, those Ugandans who served in the Seventh Battalion of the King’s African Rifles during World War II.

Early in Museveni’s childhood his parents converted to Christianity, and from the age of seven he was sent to school. At Kyamate Primary School he met Martin Mwesiga and Eriya Kategaya, who were to become two close colleagues in the adult political struggles that lay ahead. In 1962, while at Ntare Senior Secondary School in Mbarara, Museveni became a born-again Christian, but in 1966 he broke with established Christianity over the missionaries’ refusal to allow the Scripture Union to debate his motion condemning Ian Smith’s Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia. For some time he had been unhappy with some of their biblical interpretations, and in particular he believed that their stand of evading “worldly” issues and condemning all violence, even as a means of liberation, was immoral.

By this time Museveni had developed an interest in Ugandan politics. He and his student colleagues condemned the sectarian basis of much of Ugandan party politics: the DP (Democratic Party) and UPC (Uganda Peoples Congress), as they saw it, being primarily divided along a combination of religious and tribal sectarianism.

In 1967 Museveni went to the University of Dar es Salaam to study political science. He preferred Dar es Salaam to Uganda’s own Makerere because he perceived it to be politically more radical and he saw Tanzania under Nyerere as the one African country that provided clear support for the liberation movements of southern Africa. Finding most of the university’s staff not radical enough, Museveni founded the student discussion group, the University Students African Revolutionary Front. He made contact with the Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO, and met Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joachim Chissano. In 1968 Museveni led a small group of students to visit the liberated zone in northern Mozambique. Contacts made at this time were to prove invaluable in the future when Museveni and his colleagues needed military training in guerrilla warfare.

Upon graduating in 1970 Museveni got employment in the President’s Office in Kampala as a research assistant and he briefly joined UPC. Although professing to have distrusted Obote and the UPC since the mid-1960s, Museveni claims in his autobiography to have harbored a faint hope at this time of changing the UPC from within.

Within forty-eight hours of Idi Amin’s coup d’état in January 1971, Museveni and four colleagues crossed into Tanzania intent on mustering support for a protracted liberation struggle. They made their way to Dar es Salaam, but Museveni at this time failed to gain Nyerere’s support for any kind of struggle which did not entail the re-instatement of Obote as President of Uganda.

Through the 1970s Museveni was active in covertly recruiting sympathizers inside and outside Uganda, organizing military training, mostly in Mozambique, and infiltrating arms into the country. He took part in Obote’s abortive raid into Uganda in September 1972, and in this and other clashes with Amin’s men a number of his close friends were killed. When the Tanzanians finally invaded Uganda in 1979, Museveni accompanied them with a well-trained force of Ugandan exiles under his command.

Museveni served in the interim governments of Yusufu Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, but he was unhappy at the intrigues and lack of consensus then emerging. Ultimately, he supported the removal of both these interim presidents, but he was frustrated to find the old sectarian party politics of the 1960s revived. With Obote back in Uganda from May 1980, Museveni

hurriedly formed his own party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement, to oppose him. After the deeply flawed election of December 1980 brought Obote back to power, Museveni declared the election “rigged” and took to the bush to fight his long-threatened liberation struggle.

The war was launched on February 6, 1981, with an attack on Kabamba barracks, to the west of Kampala. The attack by twenty-seven armed men failed to take the armory and Museveni led his men in some captured trucks by a circuitous route to the Luwero Triangle to the north of Kampala. Over the ensuing years of conflict and hardship, lessons were learned and under Museveni’s leadership and training a well-disciplined National Resistance Army (NRA) was built from scratch. A National Resistance Movement (NRM) was formed under Museveni’s chairmanship and a ten-point program was drawn up as the guiding principles for government once victory was achieved.

When Kenya’s President Moi tried to broker a peace between the NRA and the Okello regime that had seized power from Obote in July 1985, Museveni used the Nairobi peace talks to stall for time while his men positioned themselves for the final assault on Kampala. The city fell to the NRA on January 27, 1986, and two days later Museveni was sworn in as president of Uganda.

On coming to power, Museveni placed a high priority on army discipline, national reconciliation, and economic reconstruction. The well-disciplined army soon gained wide respect among civilians, in marked contrast to the fear and contempt that greeted the sectarian and ill-disciplined armies of Amin, Obote, and Okello. Museveni instilled in the army a clear respect for human rights and for law as well as order.

On the economic front, financial discipline and economic liberalization were well established, and Museveni was instrumental in persuading parliament to approve the return to Ugandan Asians of assets seized by Amin in 1972. In his view, they were experienced businessmen with capital and a commitment to Uganda and thus an important part of his plans for the country’s economic growth. Museveni’s vision of the future entailed a large free trade area of eastern, central, and southern Africa as the only way to promote real African industrial and commercial development. To this end he was instrumental in the revival of the East African Community in Arusha, Tanzania, in January 2001.

National reconciliation and economic growth and reconstruction have proceeded well in the southern half of the country, but until the northern half, the home of Obote and Amin, is brought more fully into sharing the economic advantages of the south, Museveni’s claims of national inclusivity remain somewhat hollow.

Attacks in the north by dissident rebels who operate from bases in Sudan and eastern Congo have severely tested the Ugandan army which, ironically, Museveni himself had originally built out of small, mobile bands of guerrilla forces. Additional rebel attacks across the western border from the turbulent Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaïre), prompted Museveni in 1998 to authorize the Ugandan Defense Force to cross into the Congo and pursue the rebels and their supporters there. In doing so Museveni embroiled Uganda in an ongoing civil war, which likewise involved the army of Rwanda. Whatever the strategic interests of Uganda in its neighbor’s civil war, the Ugandan army’s involvement in the Congo (until its withdrawal in 2003) has raised serious doubts about Museveni’s much-vaunted judgment and integrity.

Politically, Museveni still holds out against multiparty politics as being likely to lead to sectarianism. The strategic and economic support that he continues to receive from Britain and America ensure that he is almost unique in Africa in not being pressured into accepting the multiparty prescription. His inclusive, nonparty “movement” system is, however, unlikely to survive his final five-year term, which began with his reelection as president in March 2001.

KEVIN SHILLINGTON

See also: **Obote, Milton; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979; Uganda: National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Winning of Political Power; Uganda: Obote: Second Regime, 1980–1985; Uganda: Reconstruction: Politics, Economics; Uganda: Tanzanian Invasion, 1979–1980.**

Biography

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was born into a clan of the Ankole people of southwestern Uganda in about 1944. Attended Kyamate Primary School from age seven. Attended Ntare Senior Secondary School in Mbarara. Became a born-again Christian in 1962. In 1966 broke with established Christianity. Began studies in political science at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1967. Graduated in 1970, took employment in the President’s Office in Kampala as a research assistant. Sworn in as president of Uganda on January 29, 1986. Elected to his final, five-year term as president in March 2001.

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Music: Postcolonial Africa

In Africa today traditional, popular, and international music forms are found as accompaniments to a variety of activities. Traditional music transcends age, gender, and social class. It serves a formal function in various social and religious rites and is pervasive as an entertainment form. Popular music blends local and global influences and is most fashionable among urban youth. Popular music forms have been influenced by African American music such as rock 'n' roll, soul, rhythm and blues, reggae, and hip-hop, and by Caribbean music forms like calypso, rumba, and meringuemaringa. They are also characterized by the increased use of Western instruments, including electric guitars, horns, saxophones, and keyboards. Musicians integrate foreign sounds with indigenous styles to create new Africanized forms such as Congo jazz and *soukous*, burgher highlife, *juju*, Afro-beat, *mbalax*, *mbaqanga*, Afro-reggae, and African hip-hop.

In Central Africa, musicians living in and around Leopoldville and Brazzaville incorporated Afro-Cuban rhythms into their music and created Congo jazz, a popular music form that influenced new music styles throughout the continent. By the early 1960s, Congolese musicians such as Docteur Nico, Tabu Ley, and Manu Dibango began applying new guitar-playing techniques to the electric guitar and singing in the vernacular. In addition to the guitar, Congo music relied on an interplay of horns and percussion to create a sound that reflected new influences from abroad, including the American soul of James Brown and Aretha Franklin.



Bards (*jeliw*) of the Diabaté family playing ngoni. Kéla, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

Congo music quickly made inroads into the world music scene under the name *soukous*, one of its earlier dance forms. Spurred by the exodus of African musicians from the former French colonies to Europe, the popularity of *soukous* grew rapidly in the 1980s. One of the most popular musicians was Kanda Bongo Man, who moved to Paris in 1979 to escape the deteriorating economic conditions in Kinshasa. He worked to develop his own brand of *soukous*, increasing the pace of the music and reducing the size of the band by eliminating the horn section.

In West Africa, highlife music was the most popular music at the time of independence, especially in the former British colonies. By the mid-1960s, however, soul and rhythm and blues became more attractive to urban youth and popular music began to move in a new direction. Ghanaians resident in London formed the band Osibisa in 1969. They mixed highlife with rock 'n' roll and became famous within Africa and abroad. Later in the 1970s, Ghanaians living in Germany created another offshoot of highlife by adding synthesizers and electronic percussion instruments to earlier forms. They dubbed the new music "burger highlife" because they lived in the city of Hamburg.

In Nigeria, *juju* music also underwent major changes in the postindependence era. By the 1970s, Ebenezer Obey and King Sunny Ade, the most popular *juju* artists who gained fame through international tours, combined elements of traditional Yoruba music, Afro-Cuban rhythms, and American forms. The lyrics added social and religious commentary and the bands sometimes featured up to six or seven electric guitars linked together in a complex rhythmic pattern. No music from West Africa, however, can rival the status achieved by Fela Anikulapo Kuti and his Afro-beat during the 1970s and 1980s. Fela's music drew elements from African forms, particularly Congolese music and highlife, as well as African American soul and rhythm and blues. His bands were huge, consisting of horns, guitars and basses, keyboards, and percussionists, as well as a dozen singers and dancers. His lyrics, like the music, merged aspects of African and western cultures. Fela often sang in Pidgin and never hesitated to use his music to provide social and political criticism.

In the former French colonies of West Africa, Congolese styles dominated the popular music scene during the 1960s. In the following decade, however, *mbalax*, emerged in Senegal. It incorporated influences from calypso and Cuban music, African American soul and funk, as well as the previously dominant Congo forms. *Mbalax* utilizes local languages and instruments, including the *kora* (harp), the *balafon* (xylophone), and various percussion instruments. One of the most popular *mbalax* artist is Youssou N'Dour. Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin also saw a rising number of popular musicians

in the late 1970s. The Malian, Salif Keita, blends elements of traditional *griot* music with West African, Cuban, and Spanish influences. He includes traditional instruments of Mali but also uses guitars, saxophones, and keyboards. Other popular artists achieved success as well. Combining local influences from Benin with rock 'n' roll, soul, and funk, Angélique Kidjo has become one of the most prominent female singers today. Her songs focus on important social issues and her African-inspired funk now attracts a large following.

South Africa, with the unique conditions imposed by the long history of apartheid, has produced unique music styles. Under apartheid, most blacks were forced to live in townships where new music forms emerged. These included *marabi*, a keyboard style originating in the 1920s. Another form, *mbaqanga*, has undergone many changes, but the various forms have all relied on a heavy bass and lead guitar to produce popular dance rhythms. During the 1970s, *mbaqanga* incorporated elements of rock music and was popularized by Juluka, a rare multiracial band that began with a Zulu guitarist, Sipho Mchunu, and an English-born musician, Johnny Clegg. Some of the most heralded musicians, realizing the impossibilities of working within apartheid-era South Africa, moved abroad. Miriam Makeba, known as the Empress of African song, left South Africa in 1959 and became one of the most famous female singers in the entire continent. She was a vocal critic of apartheid but, after its fall, was welcomed back to her home country. The trumpeter and vocalist, Hugh Masekela, also left South Africa and later toured with Fela and performed with Paul Simon on the *Graceland* tour.

The most popular forms of music in urban Africa at the turn of the millennium grew out of Jamaican reggae and western rap and hip-hop. During the early 1980s, reggae grew popular among urban youth, in part, because its lyrics proclaimed themes of mental and physical liberation for Africans everywhere. African musicians incorporated the ideologies of reggae but blended the rhythms with their own musical traditions to create a distinct musical idiom. Born in Côte d'Ivoire, Alpha Blondy has achieved success in African and international circles with his Afro-reggae. Others like Lucky Dube and Kojo Antwi blend reggae sounds with local influences to enhance the popularity of reggae among urban African youth.

In the 1990s African musicians began to fuse American rap and hip-hop with local rhythms and language to produce African variants that can be found in most every major city. One variant, South African *kwaito*, developed in the townships and mixes hip-hop, rhythm and blues, and house music with local beats to give it more of a South African sound. Another variant, hiplife, contains undertones of highlife and has become immensely

popular among Ghanaian youth. The vernacular lyrics of African rap and hip-hop express the identities of youth and relate to the conditions of everyday life in Africa. The influence of music from outside of Africa has had a profound influence on the development of African popular music forms. International styles, however, have not replaced traditional styles, but have rather fused with them to form new and unique popular styles that reflect the creativity of African musicians.

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Muslim Brotherhood: See Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood.

Mutapa State, 1450–1884

The Mutapa state was established in the fifteenth century following the decline of Great Zimbabwe in the south. Swahili and Portuguese traders were in contact with it from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, respectively. Located in the northern part of the Zimbabwe Plateau, south of the Zambezi, its territorial limits have been exaggerated by earlier cartographers and chroniclers, who misled historians into thinking that it was an empire stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Kalahari Desert. From the early sixteenth century, the state controlled the northern limits of the Zimbabwe Plateau and the adjacent Zambezi lowlands. Kingdoms such as Manyika, Barwe, Uteve, and Danda are thought to have severed from the state. By the nineteenth century it was confined to Chidima, in the Zambezi.

Written evidence for the Mutapa state comes from the Portuguese, who entered the Zimbabwe Plateau at the beginning of the sixteenth century and compiled eyewitness as well as second-hand accounts of the state. The documents are inherently biased, as they focus mainly on trade and court politics. Oral traditions impart diverse information about the people once controlled by the state. Since the 1980s, archaeological work has been conducted in the northern Plateau and Dande, north of the Zambezi Escarpment, to identify the settlements connected with the state.

Oral traditions on the origins of the Mutapa state speak of migrations from Guruuswa, identified with the southern grasslands. The migrating parties were searching for salt deposits in the Dande area of the Zambezi. Its founders, according to traditions, conquered and subdued the Tonga and Tavara of the lower Zambezi, and the Manyika and Barwe to the east. Historical evidence suggests they initially settled in Mukaranga, the Ruya-Mazowe basin, before the sixteenth century, and conquered and integrated preexisting chiefdoms. This was necessitated by the need to control agricultural land and strategic resources, mainly gold and ivory, firmly placing the new state within the Indian Ocean trade network. Archaeological evidence links the rise of the Mutapa state with the demise of Great Zimbabwe in the fifteenth century. Since then stone buildings of the architecture similar to that used at Great Zimbabwe appeared in northern Zimbabwe. They represented major centers expressing a culture that spread from the south. These have been identified as royal courts. This was prompted by the increasing importance of the Zambezi River in the Indian Ocean trade initially channeled through Ingombe Illede. After 1500 there was a concentration of people in some areas such as Mount Fura and the adjacent Mukaradzi River to take advantage of incoming traders. Portuguese documents identify this area as Mukaranga, and its inhabitants as Karanga. They were part of the Mutapa state when the Portuguese arrived at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Portuguese sources refer to Mutapa royal capitals as *zimbabwe*. These courts, although imprecisely located, are described as “big,” and “of stone and clay.” The Portuguese also observed numerous large towns and villages, some as big as three to five kilometers in circumference, with houses spaced within a stone throw of each other. The king lived in several houses separated by courtyards. These capitals had an approximate population of 4,000. Archaeological evidence locates most *zimbabwe* on the Plateau south of the Escarpment before the mid-seventeenth century.

Mutapa history from 1500 is dominated by Portuguese attempts to interfere with court politics, civil wars, conquests, and trade. The Tonga reacted to the Portuguese invasion of about 1570 with stiff resistance. This was followed by the Zimba invasions from Maravi, north of the Zambezi. From *about* 1600 to 1624, the Portuguese fought in civil wars involving Mutapa Gatsi Rusere, subduing the state, and from about 1629 to 1660s they turned its rulers into mere puppets.

Trading centers appeared since the late sixteenth century, where the Portuguese and Swahili middlemen exchanged with the locals Asian beads, glazed ceramics, and cloth with gold and ivory. Massapa, Luanze, and Dambarare seem to have been frequented most,

compared to others found in the entire plateau area dominated by the state. Archaeological evidence from Baranda, which coincides with the Portuguese trading site of Massapa located in the Mukaradzi valley, show indigenous material culture similar to Great Zimbabwe, confirming a link between the Mutapa state and the former. Here the Portuguese maintained a permanent resident, tasked with negotiating terms of trade and monitoring Portuguese movement in the state.

Decline of trading activity in the state was due to Portuguese political interference, attempting to conquer the state. During the early seventeenth century civil war by rebels opposed to the ruling Mutapa and fuelled by the Portuguese seriously challenged central authority. The 1630s report lawlessness by some Portuguese *prazo* holders who raised private armies to rob or enslave people. Private fortifications are also reported.

Unstable conditions continued to up through the 1660s, seriously undermining trade in the eastern and central parts of the plateau, forcing traders to move further westward to open new markets. These too were abandoned subsequently. There was also loss of agricultural production, depopulation of the gold producing areas, and unregulated external trade. This undermined the authority of the rulers as it also encouraged revolts by peripheral groups that included the Portuguese *prazo* holders in the Zambezi. Fortifications arose in most parts of the state, and this is confirmed by archaeology. In the Ruya-Mazowe basin, more than 100 poorly coursed stone enclosures with loopholes (small, square openings probably used for peeping or as firing out points) are located on hill and mountaintops. These are probably the hill refuges used by rebels against Mutapa-Portuguese attacks. There are also reports of earthworks or wooden stockades (*chuambos*) built by the Portuguese. Toward the 1680s, conditions worsened, with disease decimating the human population in the area. The Portuguese were forced to leave the state. By the late seventeenth century the state had lost control of areas south of the Zambezi Escarpment.

The Mutapa state shifted toward Dande, north of the Zambezi Escarpment, during the early eighteenth century. The new state was limited in extend. To the eastern frontier, between Tete and the lower Mazowe, were the Portuguese *prazos* that it constantly attacked or occupied until the 1850s. Politically it was unstable as seen by quick successions and the civil wars fought between houses contending for the throne. Smaller, semi-independent polities controlled by some subrulers emerged in Dande and Chidima. Despite these, it survived because of its military strength, and ability to adapt well to new political circumstances. The Chikara religious cult of the Tavara was highly influential in regulating civil wars. Capitals were constantly mobile due to security considerations, severe droughts, and heat.

As a result they accommodated few people, only court officials, royal wives, and a garrison of about 500 fighters, except during times of war. During difficult periods, especially from around 1770 to 1830, it still managed to suppress revolts, fight *prazo* holders, and gain land.

In the nineteenth century, the Mutapa state survived the potentially destructive Ngoni invasions, serious droughts, and increased Portuguese attempts to reoccupy the lower Zambezi. However, after 1860, Portuguese *prazo* holders and their Chikunda armies began to assault the Mutapa state, invading it and forcing it to pay tribute. By 1884 the demise of the state seems to have been completed.

INNOCENT PIKIRAYI

See also: **Great Zimbabwe: Origins and Rise; Ingombe Ilede; Manyika of Eastern Zimbabwe; Nyanga Hills; Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rovzi.**

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Mutesa (Kabaka) (1856–1884)

Buganda Monarch

Mutesa epitomizes the traditional Buganda monarchy. However, his reign and person also marked the passing of old monarchism and the coming and embracing of enlightenment in Buganda, as the kingdom faced a new world.

Mutesa succeeded Kabaka Suuna as king in 1856, after a marvelously staged maneuvering and jostling for the throne by the elitist oligarchy at court. Being an



Mutesa and his dignitaries. © Das Fotoarchiv.

insignificant prince, and therefore the least expected to contest the throne, the chiefs and promoters of other more eligible princes were caught unawares, only to finally accepted Mutesa as king.

By this time, there were already many Arab traders in Buganda. Mutesa wanted Buganda to be the terminus of all trade, rather than a thoroughfare. He coveted the monopoly to redistribute trade goods, especially firearms, to his neighbors.

Mutesa spoke both Kiswahili and Arabic and could read and write Arabic. At the time of his death he could converse with missionaries in English and translate to his courtiers in Luganda. He adopted Islam, outwardly observing all its rituals, but refused to undergo circumcision. In 1867 he decreed the Islamic calendar as official in Buganda and demanded the use of Islamic etiquette at court. The presence of Arab slave hunters from Khartoum in neighboring Bunyoro became a potential threat to Buganda and of great concern to Mutesa. He was persuaded to back a losing Bunyoro prince, but his forces were badly repulsed by Kabarega. By 1871 Mutesa had a minimum of a thousand armed troops.

Mutesa was suspicious of the activities and motives of Richard Gordon, who was openly working for the khedive of Egypt, intending to extend the Egyptian Empire into the Lake Region. Under these circumstances, therefore, political alliance with Sayyid Bargash, sultan of Zanzibar, made good political sense. In 1874 Cahille Long got Mutesa to sign a document, the contents of which he did not understand, but which amounted to ceding his kingdom to the khedive of Egypt. In April 1875 Mutesa tactfully jointly received both Gordon's agent, Ernest Linant, alias Abdul Aziz,

and H. M. Stanley with the hope of playing them off one against another. In his dealings and discussion with both Stanley and Gordon's agents, Mutesa constantly demanded that Bunyoro remain as a buffer zone between Buganda and Egyptian territory to the north.

The famous 1875 Daily Telegraph letter by Mutesa calling for missionaries to come to Uganda was a result of these politicoreligious discussions with Stanley. However, evidence clearly shows that Mutesa's major concern was to have a group of European allies in his kingdom who would assist him when faced with the Egyptian (Gordon's) expansionist threat. His accommodating attitude to, and encouragement of, subsequent missionary enterprise in Buganda was part of his defense policy.

In 1877 the Egyptian threat became real when Nuehr Aga arrived with troops in the Buganda capital at Rubaga to claim the kingdom for the khedive, on Gordon's orders. Aga met very stiff resistance from Mutesa, and ended up as his captive. As a show of strength, Mutesa rounded up some seventy Muslims, who were executed publicly for Nuehr Agas benefit. However, Mutesa avoided open confrontation with Gordon who eventually sent Edward Schmitzler, alias Emin Pasha, to Rubaga to negotiate Nuehr Aga and his troops release by Mutesa.

The arrival of both the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the Roman Catholic White Fathers missionaries in Buganda in 1879 provided a good opportunity for Mutesa to revive his long-term objective of getting both arms assistance and political alliance with a superior European power against threats of Egyptian encroachment from the north. Mutesa quickly noted the denominational and personal differences between the missionaries and exploited these to the fullest in achieving his personal aims. While he maintained relations with the Zanzibari Arabs, whose trade offered him the only sure supply of goods and arms, he also feigned conversion to Christianity to get maximum benefit from all foreigners in his country. Mutesa derived great satisfaction in staging impromptu theological and political discussions at his court between Muslims, Protestant missionaries, and Catholic missionaries.

Dr. Kirk, the British resident representative in Zanzibar, had promised Mutesa British intervention to ensure Buganda's independence in face of Egyptian aggression. Kirk's friendly gesture inspired Mutesa to try to enter direct negotiation with the British government; he decided to send an embassy to England. Three emissaries of Mutesa were escorted to England by CMS missionaries and were received by Queen Victoria in 1879. They returned to Buganda in 1881 with presents and messages of good will from Queen Victoria to Mutesa, but with no practical proposal of a political

alliance between the two kingdoms, which was a great disappointment to Mutesa.

When, after the rise of Mahdism in Sudan in 1880, Gordon finally withdrew the southern garrisons in the Somerset Nile region, the Egyptian threat, which Mutesa had persistently felt, dissipated, leading to a sudden and dramatic change in his attitude toward the Christian missionaries who had refused his constant appeals to engage in trade. Christian missionaries henceforth suffered great hardships, including physical attacks on their persons.

One can only but guess what Uganda would have been like today if Mutesa was not the kabaka of Buganda and the person that he was at the time of the arrival of missionaries and subsequent European contact and colonization of Uganda. Mutesa's determined resistance to Egyptian domination saved Buganda from a possibly ravaging struggle for independence. Alternatively, Buganda could have become embroiled in the Mahdist upheavals with unpredictable consequence, as happened in the Sudan. Mutesa's decisions to ally with Britain, as opposed to France, may have determined the relatively liberal and unrestrictive relationship Britain had with Buganda, and subsequently with colonial Uganda.

Mutesa passed his kingdom on intact to Kabaka Mwanga, his son. The Mutesa I Foundation was started to commemorate Mutesa's achievements. The organization recognizes Ugandans who have made significant contributions to the development of their country.

DAVID KIYAGA-MULINDWA

See also: **Uganda: Early Nineteenth Century; Uganda: Mwanga and Buganda, 1880s.**

Biography

Mutesa was born in 1856. He was one of the sons of Kabaka Suuna. Mutesa's mother was sold into slavery by Suuna. She entrusted her son to another king's wife, Muganzirwazza Nakkazi Muzimbo, who eventually became very dear to him. He was born as Mukabya, but later took on the names of Walugembe Mutesa. He took the throne in 1856. He died in 1884.

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MUTESA (KABAKA) (1856–1884)

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Mwaant Yaav: See Lunda: Mwaant Yaav (Mwata Yamvo) and Origins.

Mwanga: See Uganda: Mwanga and Buganda, 1880s.

Mwata Yamvo: See Lunda: Mwaant Yaav (Mwata Yamvo) and Origins.

Mwenemutapa: See Mutapa State.

N

Nama: *See* **Namibia: Nama and Herero Risings.**

Namibia: Nineteenth Century to 1880


Southwestern Africa between the Kunene and the Okavango rivers in the north, the Orange River in the south, and the Kalahari to the west saw large-scale social restructuring and the final integration of its communities into the world market during the nineteenth century. The onset of missionary activity combined with the repercussions of Portuguese colonialism to the north and the advancing Cape colonial frontier, prior to more active German colonization after 1884. Induced by the nature of the area, the dominant modes of subsistence were foraging and pastoralism, with its concomitant social organization. Only in the north, where available rainfall allowed for agriculture, were sedentary forms of social organization possible.

The area to the north of Etosha was, by the 1800s, populated by different groups of agro-pastoral, Bantu-speaking Ovambo kingdoms, with considerable variation among them in terms of language and social custom and ranging from highly centralized kingdoms to rather loosely structured polities. Oral history, which is borne out by linguistic evidence, suggests that these communities were related to several groups of pastoral Herero, living in segmentary societies of the partly mountainous area south of Etosha, between the Kalahari and Namib Deserts. This area was also known as Damaraland during the nineteenth century. Interspersed in economic and environmental niches were Khoisan-speaking Damara communities, whose mining and smithing skills provided them with a means of survival. Their history remains clouded, however. Khoisan communities, both larger pastro-foraging groups (Khoekhoe>Nama-speaking) as well as smaller

groups of hunter-gatherers (San), peopled the southern stretches and exploited the least favorable environment of the area.

Since around the 1790s, groups of Oorlam raiders had crossed the Orange River from the south. On account of their long history in the colonial context of the Cape, these disenfranchised groups, who usually had originated from illicit master-slave sexual relations, brought with them not only the experience of colonialism but also important political, social, and religious institutions, which in the end would facilitate their suzerainty in southwestern Africa. Along with mother tongue variations of Khoisan, they spoke Cape Dutch, adhered to Christianity, had horses, arms, and wagons. Through all this, they provided the first link to the expanding world economy through the Cape nexus. This facilitated social change and provided lasting political influence in the encountered communities across the Orange River. Missionary activity, mainly by the German-based Rhenish Mission Society, was greatly facilitated by this development.

By the 1840s the Oorlam had established themselves in the south and, with a hegemonial position at present-day Windhoek in the center of the area, were ruled by the Afrikaner Oodam clan under their most important leader Jonker Afrikaner. Their economic base rested on yearly cattle raiding expeditions, of which the neighboring Herero communities around Windhoek and to the north bore the brunt, but which were organized as far as the northern Ovambo communities. This in turn sparked long-term social change, class differentiation, and political centralization among the Herero. As this process unfolded, mining interests, arms, ivory, and cattle trading made the establishment of Walvis Bay as an entrepot to the territory feasible. The bearers of this trade together with the missionaries, who by the 1850s were firmly established among the Herero as well, provided the Herero with weapons



Namibia.

to such a degree that the Nama-Oorlam hegemony was effectively challenged and crumbled after 1860. Guns and the increasingly developing markets for cattle that could be provided from Hereroland in the wake of the mineral revolution in South Africa resulted in a distinct process of pastoralization of the Herero with the attendant development of separate, more centralized chiefdoms, one of which would over time be perceived to be paramount, the Maharero chiefs.

Ever-growing numbers of European traders and hunters operating in the area from the 1850s, particularly around Otjimbingwe and Omaruru, effected these developments as well. Sexual unions, but more often than not intermarriage and the establishment of families, left traces. The offspring of these families would very often be the most suitable agents of acculturation and negotiators of innovation and change in the economic, religious, and political spheres: translators, secretaries, and evangelists for the mission and the local rulers. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Cape Dutch was used widely as a *lingua franca* in diplomacy, church, and trade.

The void created by the downfall of the Oorlam hegemony around Windhoek enabled the Baster, the last of such disenfranchised groups from the Cape, to move to the north and to settle at Rehoboth south of Windhoek in the early 1870s. This development, and the arrival of Boer trekkers from the Transvaal in search of yet more land led the Herero to invite colonial annexation by the British Cape Colony in an attempt to curb developments that were clearly perceived to be detrimental. The declaration of a protectorate over Walvis Bay and its surroundings in 1876 was a result of this.

In the 1870s and 1880s southern Nama groups reemerged on the political scene, again in their own fight. When Hendrik Witbooi, in a move inspired by divine intervention, tried to lead his community to a more northerly area, he was challenged by the by-now well-armed, rather wealthy, and organized Herero. This in turn often sparked decades of guerrilla warfare waged by the Witbooi Nama. It was in this situation, which again threatened the mission's endeavor after decades of only tenuous successes in their work, and given the background of heightened colonial awareness in Europe, that German missionaries started to agitate for colonial annexation. The German merchant Adolf Luderitz finally succeeded in concluding a treaty with a local ruler at Angra Pequena, which was known to be fraudulent. However, as the "Scramble for Africa" raised European political desires and anxieties, it was taken by Chancellor Bismarck as a stepping-stone to declaring the region a German protectorate. To fulfill the requirements of the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884, Germany started to erect a colonial administration from 1885 and to conclude treaties with a series of local rulers.

On account of their relative geographical inaccessibility, the Ovambo communities in the north were affected by the developments in the south far less, and only after the Finnish Mission Society started to make tenuous inroads in the 1870s. Processes of social stratification and large-scale pauperization led to a certain degree of feudalization, both of which were fully under way by the time of German annexation.

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Namibia (Southwest Africa): German Colonization, 1893–1896

Germany's initially very limited colonial penetration of late nineteenth-century Namibia was made possible by Britain's lack of attention to it, and by the severe isolation of its various communities and the serious divisions and conflicts between them. German economic and political activities in Namibia began in the 1880s as the efforts of a Bremen tobacco merchant, Franz Adolf



The old German fort in the Etosha, about 1930. © Das Fotoarchiv.

Eduard Lüderitz, to acquire land and wealth through concessions from Nama leaders and the unexpected actions of the imperial chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, that led to the declaration of a formal German protectorate. German Protestant missionaries of the Rhenish Missionary Society entered Namibia much earlier, in the 1840s, and established stations and influence among the Herero and Nama, but not in the north.

Lüderitz sent his young business associate Heinrich Vogelsang to Cape Town and Angra Pequena (an inferior harbor, transferred by Britain to the Cape Colony in 1884), where he arrived on Lüderitz' trading brig *Tilly* in April 1883. During the next months, Vogelsang persuaded the local chief of the Bethanie Nama, Josef Fredericks, to sign agreements transferring the land on the bay and then an extensive hinterland in exchange for money, rifles, and toys. With his agent raising the German flag at the renamed Lüderitzbucht and referring to the region inland as Lüderitzland, Lüderitz renewed a request he had made earlier to Bismarck for official recognition and protection.

In 1883 and 1884, Bismarck approached the British government cautiously over the status of Angra Pequena, only to suddenly extend protection to Lüderitz' Namibian claims on April 24, 1884, an event that can be said to have inaugurated Germany's overseas colonial empire during the "Scramble for Africa." Bismarck soon extended this foothold into a larger Namibian colony. The crews of two naval vessels raised the German flag along the coast, at Angra Pequena, Swakopmund, Cape Cross, and Cape Frio in August, enabling Germany to claim the entire coastline, except for Walvis Bay, from the mouth of the Orange River north to the Cunene River. To include the hinterland in the colony, Bismarck ordered his consul general for West Africa, the noted explorer Gustav Nachtigal, to secure protectorate treaties from the African chiefs.

In 1885 Lüderitz formed the Deutsche Kolonial-Gesellschaft für Südwest-Afrika but quickly lost control of it. His funds dwindled, causing him to sell off his concessionary rights to the company. He died in a boating mishap near the mouth of the Orange River in 1886. The company that eclipsed and survived him also obtained a number of mining and land concessions from the German government. Despite its recruitment of a small police force to safeguard gold operations near the Swakop River, the company was unable to locate significant mineral deposits or compel the Herero and Nama leaders to accept its control. Official representatives at first fared little better. Nachtigal's successor so far as Namibia was concerned, the first imperial commissioner of German South West Africa, Dr. Heinrich Göring, initially obtained agreements with African rulers, including Chief Maherero of the Herero. Angered by the inability of the Germans to prevent attacks from his Nama enemy, Hendrik Witbooi, and influenced by his Cape merchant ally, Robert Lewis, Maherero in 1888 renounced his agreement with Göring and forced the imperial commissioner to relocate his headquarters to the safety of the Walvis Bay enclave.

By 1889 German colonialism in Namibia was at a virtual standstill. Seeking to establish a degree of control in the center of its nominal protectorate, Germany sent out a small military contingent under Captain Curt von François, with orders to establish outposts but avoid fights with Africans. Landing at Swakopmund in January 1889, von François built a fort inland at Tsoabis. The following year he received reinforcements and built a second fort, known later as the Alte Feste, further inland, at Windhoek. In 1891, von François replaced Göring as imperial commissioner and transferred the colonial headquarters to Windhoek, which remained the capital of South West Africa during the German and South African occupation periods.

Relations with Namibians remained the key to German penetration of the territory. Maherero, the Herero ruler, renewed his recognition of the German protectorate and died in 1890. With his succession hotly contested, the Germans were able to adapt a strategy of divide-and-rule in Damaraland. Hendrik Witbooi, however, refused to submit to German overrule, and von François determined to destroy him. Additional reinforcements in early 1893 allowed the Germans to undertake a military campaign against the Witboois. von François attacked Hendrik Witbooi's camp at Hoornkranz on April 12, killing a number of his followers, mainly old men, women, and children. The Nama chief and most of his armed men survived the Hoornkranz massacre and fled to the Naukluft Mountains. Facing criticism in the Reichstag over von François' actions, Chancellor Leo von Caprivi sent out Major Theodor Leutwein, a military college instructor, as his special commissioner to investigate and possibly take

control of the colony. Leutwein arrived at the start of 1894 and, with reinforcements, defeated Hendrik Witbooi. Witbooi signed a protectorate agreement with the Germans and served them as an ally for the next decade.

Leutwein took charge of the colony and turned his attention to the Herero, imposing a frontier for them that allowed German settlement in southern Damaraland. The succession to Maherero's chieftainship was contested between Nikodemus, his strongly independent nephew, and the younger and more pliable Samuel Maherero, his surviving son by a fourth wife. Unlike Nikodemus and many other Herero, Samuel accepted Leutwein's boundary, and the Germans supported the unpopular claim of Samuel to his father's chieftainship. Garrisoning Okahandja deep in Herero country, Leutwein during the brief "War of the Boundary" in May 1896 attacked and defeated Samuel's opponents, Nikodemus and his eastern Herero followers and the Mbanderu under Kahimeme. He then executed their leaders as rebels and confiscated their lands and herds as state property. An additional four hundred soldiers arrived in mid-1896 to ensure Germany's control of Namibia south of Ovamboland.

Alongside their divide-and-rule policy toward the Namibians, the colonial officials encouraged German and Afrikaner settlement in central and southern parts of the protectorate. In Berlin the Syndikat für Südwestafrikanische Siedlung recruited and sent the first twenty-five families to settle in the Windhoek region in 1892. A similar number arrived the following year. Military veterans began to receive tracts of land in return for their service. In 1896 the syndicate obtained an official grant of 20,000 square kilometers for German colonization in the districts of Windhoek, Gobabis, and Hoachanas. The severe rinderpest epidemic that arrived the following year further impoverished the pastoral peoples of the central and southern areas, facilitating land alienation and settler colonization in the years prior to the great uprisings of 1904–1905. By 1897, 2,628 Europeans, mainly German officials, soldiers, missionaries, and settlers, resided in Namibia.

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See also: Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Ideology of Empire: Supremacist, Paternalist; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Namibia: Nineteenth Century to 1880.

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Namibia (Southwest Africa): Nama and Herero Risings

The Nama and Herero risings against German colonial administration in German South West Africa turned out to be the most important historical event in the history of present-day Namibia. Though interrelated and of the same genocidal consequences for both Nama and Herero, they were two different wars of which only the Herero war has found its way into debates and publication. Both can only be understood in the context of the developing German colonial state in southwestern Africa, however.

Protocolonialist influence and European imperial influence had been at work in southwestern Africa for about one hundred years before formal, and later effective, German colonization. Germany, compelled by the dynamics of the "Scramble for Africa" declared southwestern Africa to be a German protectorate in 1884. Starting at Angra PequeMa and driven by the Bremen merchant Loderitz for the next decade, German officials, backed by a small military contingent and aided by missionaries and traders, set out to conclude nominal treaties of protection with local rulers and communities, which were either accepted, negotiated, or contested depending on local circumstance, political expediency, and historical experience. Both Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama and Samuel Maharero of the Herero exploited these developments and, assisted by the colonialist need for centralized political ruling structures, styled themselves paramount rulers. Windhoek, an existing settlement, was established as military and administrative headquarters in 1890.

In the 1890s the German-African treaties of protection were challenged in a number of insurrections, most notably so by Hendrik Witbooi with guerrilla warfare. Theodor Leutwein, who took over as the colony's first formal governor in 1893 ruthlessly established German colonial overlordship with military means and skillfully applied "divide and conquer" policies among the different communities. In 1894 Witbooi signed a peace treaty with Leutwein, starting a decade of German-Nama collaboration. Maharero's position as paramount chief of the Herero was consolidated. He effectively started the administration of the territory's central and southern areas with the installation of an executive and a judiciary. A closely-knit web of police stations for surveillance and control was

established. The northern reaches of the territory remained largely untouched for much of the decade due to geographical inaccessibility and health reasons. Legislation was still largely effected in Germany. Active and planned colonization was embarked upon with the assistance of commercial and mining companies. Large tracts of lands, taken in the military campaigns of the 1890s and, declared as crown land, were used for settling German colonists. Ex-military personnel from the campaigns often chose to remain in the colony, married into local communities and either acquired land and stock through this or set themselves up on farms provided from confiscated, so-called crown land. The reverberations of the South African War (1899–1902) resulted in another wave of white settlers that were displaced by that conflict and chose to settle themselves in the southern parts of the territory.

During the 1890s and into the first years of the twentieth century processes of dispossession and indebtedness of African communities accelerated through exponentially growing trade and fraudulent credit practices between Germans and Africans. This was compounded by the Rinderpest pandemic of 1897–1898, with its ensuing effects of famine and subsequent droughts, and a general situation of lawlessness. Especially the sale of land by chiefs, in an attempt to retain political power and spurred by the pressures exerted by conspicuous consumption, helped to create a class of landless and impoverished, who in turn were desired by the growing, predominantly agrarian colonial economy.

Tensions between Herero and settlers grew and while the governor led a military campaign to quell a minor insurrection by the Boncleizwarts in the southern part of the territory, the Herero, led by Samuel Maharero, took up arms in January 1904. Sparing women, children, missionaries, and non-Germans, the Germans were surprised by this attack, and most male settlers were killed. Within two months the German forces had regained the military initiative with massive logistic and material reinforcements from Germany. When Leutwein was superseded by General Lothar von Trotha, because the former was blamed by settlers and colonial circles in Germany for leniency and the outbreak of the war, the situation had already calmed down. In this situation politicians were clamouring for a peaceful solution of the conflict to ensure that a steady supply of labor for the colony's economy was not annihilated, and missionaries started to argue for mercy, offering assistance to the colonial state in the pacification effort. von Trotha, however, enforced the Battle of Hamakari near Waterberg in August 1904, where a majority of the Herero had gathered. An already demoralized and exhausted enemy was thus forced to flee through the waterless Omaheke into the

Kalahari Desert in an attempt to reach safer havens across the Bechuanaland border. Unknown but small numbers of refugees, including Samuel Maharero, reached Bechuanaland.

von Trotha's infamous Vernichtungsbefehl, or extermination order of October 1904, ordered the removal of the remaining survivors of the conflict from German territory. Every Herero found inside German borders, with or without arms and cattle, was to be killed, regardless of whether man, woman, or child. This order was in effect until December 1904 and repealed when it was realized how impractical and counterproductive it was, given the local circumstances and necessities. The remaining survivors in the colony were, with assistance of the missions, systematically collected and incarcerated in concentration camps, where another substantial number died due to unsanitary conditions and weakened health. An estimated 80 per cent of the Herero nation did not survive this conflict.

During the later stages of the Herero German war in October 1904, the Nama, under the leadership of Hendrik Witbooi, took up arms. The German forces could retaliate immediately in full force on account of the termination of the hostilities with the Herero and by early 1905 had succeeded in quelling this rising as well. The death of Hendrik Witbooi in military action left the Nama without their military and political leader. However, groups of Nama continued to keep German military forces at bay with guerrilla tactics until 1909, especially under the leadership of Jakob Morenga. Only an estimated 25 per cent of the Nama population survived this war. Scorched earth policies, concentration camps, and even the deportation of large numbers of Nama to other German colonies in Africa were responsible for this genocide.

A strict labor legislation was almost immediately enacted to permanently disenfranchise and dispossess the Herero and Nama and to counter the detrimental effect of the war on the labor market. Every individual above the age of eight had to wear a metal tag around her/his neck, which made rigid mobility controls thus possible. The Ovambo, among whom unknown numbers of Herero had found refuge during the war, were drawn into the colonial labor economy by more diplomatic means. On account of their military strength, due to their connectedness into the Portuguese economic networks, but by now also under attack in pacification campaigns waged by Lisbon, these were considered with respect by the German colonial administration. A series of treaties, concluded separately with different rulers regulated relations and the labor flow from Ovamboland to the colony.

A dependable labor flow became ever more important since the discovery of diamonds in 1908 in the south of the colony had started a phenomenal economic

boom in the colony. This made German South West Africa the only German colony ever to realize a financial surplus. This growth of course happened on the background of an already burgeoning economy started by substantial numbers of ex-servicemen on land confiscated after the wars with large herds of confiscated cattle and cheap, conscripted labor. Still, substantial numbers of workers for the construction of railways and the diamond mining industry had to be acquired from the Cape Colony.

German colonialism came to an end in German South West Africa, when the Union of South Africa decided to join the war effort in 1914 and assist Great Britain against Germany. The Union Defence Force enforced a ceasefire in July 1915 near Khorab in the north of the territory, after which the territory was governed under military law until 1920. With the campaign against and final defeat of King Mandume of Oukwanyama in Ovamboland in early 1917 this northernmost part the territory was finally subjugated and brought under colonial domination. Processes of social and economic reorganization and restructuring among the Herero, and Nama, already under way during the last years of German influence, continued and received stimulus when South Africa, during its first years in GSWA, tried to present itself as a more benevolent colonizing force than the Germans. This served to underscore South Africa's attempt at being declared the mandatory guardian once the war was over. German colonial power was finally ended when South Africa was made the mandatory power "on behalf of his Britannic Majesty" under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in early 1919.

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See also: Namibia (Southwest Africa): German Colonization, 1893–1896; World War I: Survey.

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Namibia (Southwest Africa): South African Rule

The Germans gave the name "South West Africa" to the protectorate they acquired in 1884. Their territory expanded until it included all of what is now Namibia, except for the port of Walvis Bay, which had been annexed by Britain in 1878 and brought under Cape, then

South African rule from 1910. In 1915, during the World War I, South African troops conquered the territory from the Germans. The South Africans took over the name South West Africa and applied to it the entire country, including Walvis Bay. From the late 1960s an alternative name, Namibia (from the Namib desert), was adopted by the United Nations, and in the 1980s the South Africans came to accept the new name, though they used "South West Africa" as well, even after the decision to withdraw from the territory was made in 1988.

After five years of South African military rule, the territory was granted as a C-class mandate to South Africa by the League of Nations in 1920. South Africa continued many German practices, extended the system of reserves, and introduced more white settlers from the Union. Resistance by the Bondelswartz and other indigenous people was put down harshly. Though in terms of the mandate, South Africa was supposed to govern the territory in the interests of the inhabitants, South African rule was highly oppressive, and there was no effective check on what South Africa did in the territory.

When the League of Nations dissolved during World War II, the South African government of Jan Smuts hoped to be able to annex the territory, and formally applied to the newly formed United Nations (UN) in 1946 to do that, but its request was refused, largely on the grounds that the indigenous people had not been adequately consulted. The UN instead asked South Africa to place the territory under its trusteeship system, which provided for eventual independence for trust territories. When South Africa refused, a long-drawn-out legal battle began, in which the International Court of Justice at The Hague handed down a series of judgments on the status of South West Africa. In 1966 the Court decided that it had no legal standing in a case which turned on whether South Africa was governing the territory in the spirit of the mandate. The UN General Assembly then unilaterally terminated the mandate, a decision that was, a few years later, ratified by the Security Council. In 1971 that ratification was supported by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which ruled that South Africa's rule of the territory was illegal, and it should withdraw. In the same year a general strike of Namibian workers represented a new and massive example of resistance to one of the main pillars of South African rule, the contract labor system.

In the face of these developments, the South African government decided to abandon its policy of seeking to incorporate the territory to a greater and greater extent into its own administration, as a de facto fifth province, along with the creation of Bantustans there on the South African model. It decided instead that the

territory should remain as one entity and be given a form of “independence” under South African auspices. An ethnically based advisory council was established, and in 1975 a conference of ethnic representatives was called together in the Turnhalle building in Windhoek. When it seemed that the Turnhalle might lead to the South African government granting “independence” to a local client group, a Western Contact Group was formed, consisting of the five Western countries then members of the UN–Security Council, to press for a form of independence that would mesh with the UN demand for a transfer of power to the people of the territory (UN–Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976). By April 1978 a formula had been worked out providing for joint UN–South African administration during a transition period in which the UN would provide a monitoring team and a force to keep the peace. The South African government accepted this plan in April 1978, probably without any serious intention of ever implementing it. Numerous reasons were advanced in the years following by South African government spokesmen to explain why the plan (embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435) could not be implemented: the alleged partiality of the UN, the composition of the UN force to enter the territory during the transitional phase, the monitoring and location of the military bases of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, the army of the South West African Peoples’ Organizaation (SWAPO), and, from 1981, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

Operating from northern Namibia, South African military forces, and from 1980 South West African forces under South African command, launched raids against SWAPO bases in southern Angola. Brutal repression was used in northern Namibia to try to destroy SWAPO, while at the same time the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and other political groupings were built up in an attempt to form an anti-SWAPO alliance. Finally, as the result of an agreement signed in December 1988 between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, providing for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola, the date for implementation was fixed for April 1989. From that month, the South African administrator general worked with the UN special representative in preparing the way for an election held in November, after which the remaining South African troops withdrew from the territory. The South African administration remained in place while a Constituent Assembly deliberated on a new constitution. With that agreed, Namibia became independent in March 1990 and the South African administration finally withdrew. The country’s most important port, Walvis Bay, became part of Namibia by agreement with the South African government on March 1, 1994.

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Namibia (Southwest Africa): League of Nations, United Nations Mandate

In December 1920, after five years of military administration, South Africa was granted the former German South West Africa as a C- class Mandate by the League of Nations, which meant that the territory was to be administered as if it were an integral part of the mandatory power. The new administration emphasized four policy aspects. First, it downscaled the administrative presence to about a quarter of what it was during the German heyday. At one stage the total civil service numbered just over two hundred. This lack of administrative capacity, while ostensibly cost-effective, meant that much of the draconian oppressive legislation it passed could not be implemented, suggesting that much of this legislation served to encourage interpersonal settler violence. Second, it changed the settler demographics. About half the German settler population were either deported or left voluntarily, at the same time “poor whites” from South Africa were encouraged to settle in the mandate.

After 1923 Germans were encouraged to become, in effect, “dual citizens” of both Germany and South Africa, and while the number of Germans rose, it did not do so as fast as the Afrikaner elements and this issue defined the tone of the settler-dominated “Legislative Assembly” inaugurated in 1925. The administration decision to encourage and to subsidize Angolan Afrikaners to resettle in Namibia not only threatened the German-speakers, but it also signaled the end of a balanced budget, since each new farmer was subsidized to the amount of approximately 2,500 pounds. Third, the administration pursued a policy of segregation based on the South African model. A “native reserve” was created in each magisterial district where idle and surplus blacks could be located and which would form a source of inexpensive labor. Fourth, transport and communications were expanded and incorporated into the South African system. Not only was the railway line expanded to Gobabis in the east of the territory, but more important, it was linked

to the South African system; the operation of the railways and harbors was taken over by the South Africa Railways and Harbors Board, which had the effect of reorienting the territory in terms of trade and cultural domination away from Europe and toward South Africa.

These deployments were framed by an atmosphere of settler insecurity. Rumors enhanced the situation. Indigenous resistance, epitomized by the Bondelswarts Rebellion in 1922, the Rehoboth Rebellion in 1924, and the Ipumbu Affair in 1932 were suppressed using military aircraft especially brought in from South Africa for this purpose. Generally, however, the global economic depression coupled to drought and floods served to minimize capitalist development during the interwar years. Mining, fishing, and farming formed the major sectors of economic activity and, to service these, increasing use was made of contract migrant labor.

Fears of a possible Nazi incursion in 1939 led to a 300-strong South African Police contingent being sent to the territory and the incorporation of the police into the South African Police. Shortly thereafter the banking currency in the territory was also switched to South African.

World War II had relatively little direct impact on this region. About a thousand German males were interned and a small number of Africans did military service mostly as guards in South Africa. After the war there was a massive expansion in settler farming and “native administration” was incorporated directly into the South African equivalent. South Africa did not recognize the United Nations as the legal successor to the League of Nations and proposed to directly incorporate the territory. As part of this process it tried to implement most of the apartheid-like recommendations of the Odendaal Commission (1964) which greatly expanded the public service by creating twelve second-tier “ethnic administrations.” Various rulings by the International Court of Justice were inconclusive until 1971, when it finally found that South Africa’s presence there was illegal. This political uncertainty, in addition to hindering investment also had important ecological consequences as many speculators bought land and then overgrazed it in an effort to benefit from the South African meat market.

Resistance to South Africa’s overrule became clear and increasingly well organized after World War II, spearheaded originally by Chief Hosea Kutako who, with the assistance of the Rev. Michael Scott, made petitioning the United Nations an effective tool. In the early 1960s political parties, like the South-West African Peoples’ Organization (SWANU), were formed explicitly to promote independence, their importance underlined by the killing of people protesting removal

from the Windhoek Old Location late in 1959. SWAPO commenced its armed struggle with a skirmish in 1966 and guerrilla and border war continued in increasing intensity up to independence.

In late 1971 Ovambo contract workers went on a massive and successful strike. This event created minor concessions but more important led directly to large numbers of refugees fleeing the country who provided many of the SWAPO cadres. In the face of increasing international pressure various internal political configurations were unsuccessfully offered by South Africa.

The international independence struggle was closely tied to the antiapartheid struggle, and as divestment and boycotts started affecting the economy of both South Africa and its major trading partners, the five Western permanent members of the UN Security Council (and major trading partners) served as mediators in trying to implement UN Resolution 435, which called for free elections in Namibia. Their efforts, abetted by a worsening economic crisis in South Africa and an unwinnable border war and coupled to the collapse of the “Second World” or Socialist Bloc eventually led to the arrival of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in April 1989. This transition is widely held up as one of the major successes of the UN system. The closely monitored elections were held in November 1989 and won by SWAPO, which took power when the country finally became independent at midnight on March 21, 1990.

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Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle

The struggle to free South West Africa (SWA) from South African rule was crucially framed by the internationalization of the question of the territory’s future. SWA was originally ceded to South Africa as a League of Nations mandate, but in the 1940s the UN refused the territory’s formal annexation by South Africa. Instead, after extensive negotiations, the General Assembly terminated the mandate (1966), declared South Africa’s occupation illegal (a reading later [1971] endorsed by the International Court of Justice),

and established a Council for Namibia to exercise formal trusteeship over the territory. In practice, South Africa would successfully defy the UN by continuing its occupation until 1990.

Under such circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that Namibians, as they developed initiatives (a remarkable range of them for so small a population) to liberate their country, focused first and foremost on this international terrain: the Herero Chiefs Council played an important role in early Namibian initiatives at the UN, for example. Meanwhile, additional foci of opposition began to emerge in the late 1950s. A group of left-wing intellectuals crafted the South West African National Union (SWANU) from previously existing student organizations. But it was the South-West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) that would now place itself at the very center of the nationalist movement.

The roots of SWAPO's precursor, the Ovamboland Peoples' Organization (OPO), lay in the community of Ovambo migrant laborers working in South Africa and within SWA itself, but from 1960 OPO adopted a more inclusive nationalist strategy signaled by its new name. Confirming OPO president Sam Nujoma as SWAPO president, it began to relocate the center of gravity of its operations into exile in Tanzania. There, with the failure of unity efforts, SWAPO moved skillfully to gain exclusive international status for itself as voice of the new Namibia-in-the-making. SWAPO's courting of the OAU and its Liberation Committee, combined with its promise to launch military activity within SWA itself, led, in 1964, to SWAPO gaining OAU recognition as the "sole and authentic" representative of Namibia. Then, as pressure against South Africa's occupation of SWA mounted at the UN, SWAPO was granted, in 1973, the status of "authentic representative of the Namibian people" by the General Assembly.

Efforts to consolidate international support for Namibia were crucial, of course. South Africa was to try various schemes to legitimate its hold on Namibia, including the Odendaal Plan of the late 1960s for the "bantustanization" of Namibia, and the 1975 launching of the Turnhalle process designed to give the appearance of some devolution of power to Namibians themselves. Moreover, even though these various "reforms" failed, they were complemented by savage repression that was far more successful. True, some space was allowed for oppositional political activity in the southern and central "Police Zone" of the country, although SWAPO activists were harassed even there. In the north, the violence committed by the South African Defense Force and attendant locally based special forces (especially the notorious Koevoet) was even more extreme. This was particularly true of densely populated Ovamboland, which also provided

the staging grounds for South Africa's many incursions into Angola against both the MPLA government and SWAPO (the massacre at SWAPO's Cassinga camp in 1978 producing as many as 900 casualties, for example). It is true that from the time of their first operation at Ongulumbashe in 1966, courageous guerrillas penetrated the country sufficiently often to earn the attention of the South Africans. Nonetheless, SWAPO was never able to mount a serious challenge to South Africa's military grip on Namibia.

From exile, the SWAPO leadership continued to strengthen its centrality within the emergent Namibian polity, its international status complementing its popular credibility internally. This helped sustain common cause against the apartheid state's presence in Namibia and its various schemes, albeit, some would argue, at the cost of permitting a damaging degree of control by the external SWAPO over strategic initiatives inside the territory. These costs were perhaps most visible in the late 1980s, when organizations of workers, students, women, and churchgoers who sought momentarily to broaden the terms of internal struggle and the autonomous empowerment of civil society along lines then being exemplified in South Africa were effectively discouraged from doing so by the exile leadership. Even more certain, however, were the costs of the leadership's ruthlessness in crushing tensions within its own ranks in exile. SWAPO members who questioned SWAPO's practices in exile were first imprisoned, with help from the Tanzanian authorities, in the 1960s, but the movement's internal crisis in Zambia (where SWAPO had shifted its base to in the 1970s) was much more serious.

Inside Namibia, the early 1970s had witnessed a vast popular upsurge (the dramatic strike of migrant workers in 1971–1972 and an impressive wave of youth-inspired resistance throughout the country). When this revolt was crushed by the South Africans, thousands of young Namibians went into exile to join the liberation movement. They soon discovered a SWAPO that many of them considered to be militarily ineffectual, undemocratic, and corrupt. In 1975 they called for a congress, as promised at SWAPO's previous 1969 Tanga congress, to discuss such matters. Nujoma instead persuaded the Zambian army to arrest some 2,000 of these new arrivals, while also having the putative leaders of this "coup" jailed in Tanzania with the connivance of his fellow presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere.

The SWAPO leadership largely whitewashed these events in a subsequent internal investigation while continuing with its pragmatic course of pursuing external backing. SWAPO had long since cornered Soviet support, for example, and was prepared to make various left-sounding pronouncements to seal this relationship,

even as it complemented these with more moderate assertions aimed at other potential constituencies overseas. More difficult to finesse was the further playing out of the movement's authoritarian tendencies, which erupted, once SWAPO had shifted its center of operations to Angola in the 1980s, in a wave of often arbitrary incarcerations, torture, and even murder at its Lubango base of hundreds of alleged "spies" from within the movement. Set in a context of military frustration and considerable paranoia, these developments evidenced a security apparatus now almost completely out of control, its reign of terror manifesting ethnic, intraethnic, and regional tensions as well as the targeting of the more educated among SWAPO's cadres. As this deadly machine began to close in on even the most senior of the SWAPO leadership in the late 1980s, the movement was very close to the point of self-destruction.

Meanwhile, Namibia's broader fate had become hostage in the 1980s to the Cold War machinations of the United States. After 1977 a Security Council-based "contact group" of five Western powers largely took over the Namibia issue at the UN, rejecting further sanctions against South Africa but promising to facilitate resolution of the issue with the apartheid regime. This group in turn soon yielded to pressure from the United States to "link" Namibia's fate to the ending of Cuban support for the Angolan government (itself under siege from South Africa, with American backing) and thus helped stall international progress on Namibia. It was therefore fortunate that by the end of the 1980s the apartheid government, now facing (after its failed siege of Cuito Cuanavale) a costly military stalemate in Angola, was also seeing a need to reconsider its intransigent strategies closer to home. It now became party to negotiations over Namibia that (in a context which also registered the Soviet Union's own waning interest in southern Africa) finally realized the implementation of Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, which called for UN supervision of free and fair elections in Namibia as a prelude to independence.

Significantly, SWAPO was largely excluded from these negotiations. Nonetheless, the movement had managed to so consolidate its political credentials within Namibia, and especially in the northern, more populous, Ovambo-speaking part of the country, as to be a near-certain winner once the complicated process of clearing the ground for elections was finally realized. In the event, SWAPO won forty-one of seventy-two seats in the UN-supervised elections of November 1989, permitting the new assembly to unanimously elect Sam Nujoma the first president of a liberated Namibia. Independence itself came on March 21, 1990.

Encouraged by new realities, both local and global, to abandon many of its more overtly authoritarian practices from exile as well as the socioeconomic

radicalism that some of its earlier rhetoric implied, SWAPO now came to preside over a liberal-democratic constitutional system and a full-blown market economy. The darkest side of the movement's past practices seemed likely to reemerge only if any lack of success of that economic strategy were to polarize social contradictions dangerously and/or if a political opposition were to emerge credible enough to jeopardize SWAPO's electoral grip on power—which, among other things, would threaten SWAPO's military, security, and political elites with a reopening of questions regarding the movement's abuses of power in exile.

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See also: Nujoma, Sam.

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Namibia: Struggle for Independence, 1970–1990

There is a view (expressed in the work of Lauren Dobell [1998], for example) that the struggle for independence in Namibia was largely fought outside the country, chiefly by the diplomacy of the externally based South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) leadership. Within the country, certainly, SWAPO faced massive organizational problems, not only because of the way the population was dispersed across the land but also because the group's attempts to organize were met with harsh repression and violent reactions. Nevertheless, at certain moments the internal struggle played an important role in the process which eventually led to independence.

One of these moments came in 1971. After the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa's rule of the territory was illegal, the two main Lutheran Church leaders wrote an open letter to the South African prime minister, John Vorster, which presented a stance of open support for independence; this was the first time that the churches had identified themselves with the movement for independence. Within months, from December 1971 to March 1972, a major strike

took place that involved up to 13,000 contract workers, the backbone of the Namibian labor force. The external SWAPO leadership was taken by surprise by the scale of the strike, but quickly tried to capitalize on it. The new political consciousness born of the strike helped motivate the SWAPO Youth League to campaign against the imposition of the Bantustan policy in the north. The increasing resistance within the country to South African rule, and the threat of further mass action, undoubtedly played a part in the Vorster government's decision to shift ground and accept the idea of independence for the de facto colony. But South Africa wanted to control that process, to bring into office an independent Namibia—a government that would support, and not challenge, South African interests.

SWAPO was never banned in Namibia because of the international status of the territory, but its internal leadership suffered constant harassment at the hands of the South African authorities, and on a number of occasions its key officials were jailed; some of them were tortured and in September 1989 a top official was assassinated. As the increasingly vicious war in the north intensified, so repression elsewhere grew harsher. But in the mid-1980s, thanks to the reform program of the South African government, new space opened up for protest politics. The South African government knew that without international recognition of Namibian independence, the conflict with SWAPO would not end. It was not prepared to implement the Western plan for a transition to independence, accepted by the United Nations in September 1978, because it would almost certainly bring into office a SWAPO government, and it sought to create in the territory an anti-SWAPO front that could form an alternative to SWAPO. It therefore influenced a group of internal parties to form the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) in 1983, a wider grouping than merely the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which had won the internal election of December 1978. The MPC then pressed for the establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), which came into office in June 1985. There was no new election, but to give the TGNU some legitimacy, more freedom of expression was allowed, and SWAPO began to organize as it had not been able to for over twenty years. It now again held mass rallies, and a new leadership, returned from imprisonment on Robben Island, organized the first effective trade unions. The Namibian Union of Mineworkers under Ben Ulenga formed the backbone of the National Union of Namibian Workers, and the SWAPO Youth League gained a new lease of life.

In the crucial year 1988, when South Africa at last began negotiating the implementation of the Western plan, there were widespread protests within the country, beginning in the north, where scholars at schools

next to army bases protested against their proximity to the bases and called a school boycott. The school boycott spread throughout Ovamboland and into other areas, and workers began to give their support to the students. This growing internal crisis was one factor, argues Brian Wood, for the South African decision to go ahead with the implementation of the Western plan and to withdraw from Namibia.

After a delay of over a decade, implementation began on April 1, 1989, and a large United Nations presence entered the country to supervise the election that took place in the first week of November that year. SWAPO emerged victoriously, but with only 57.4 per cent of the vote, and not the two-thirds majority that would have enabled it to write the constitution for the new country on its own. By February 1990 the new constitution had been accepted, and the country became independent on March 21, 1990. Any account of the road to that independence must allow some space for internal resistance and mass protest in extremely difficult circumstances.

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See also: Namibia (Southwest Africa): South African Rule; Namibia: Independence to the Present; Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle; South Africa: Homelands and Bantustans.

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Namibia: Independence to the Present

When Namibia became independent on March 21, 1990, numerous heads of state from around the world attended the celebrations held in the Windhoek stadium. But international attention soon dissipated, in part because nothing dramatic happened in Namibia. Some had feared that far-right-wing elements would try to destabilize the new government, but this did not occur. One of the main features of Namibia in its first decade since independence was its relative political stability.

The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the main liberation movement, that had

gained less than two-thirds of the vote in the pre-independence election of November 1989, won over two-thirds in the next general election in December 1994, and retained its dominance in the December 1999 general election. The main opposition party, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, remained crippled by its association with South Africa and with Namibia's apartheid past, and steadily lost support. Mishake Muyongo, former vice president of SWAPO, took over as leader of the DTA from Dirk Mudge, but then left to take up the leadership of the separatist Caprivi Liberation Front. With some thousands of other Caprivians, he fled from Namibia to Botswana in late 1998, and was subsequently granted asylum in Denmark. A group of his supporters staged an armed attack on Katimo Mulilo, the chief regional center in Caprivi, in August 1999. This was the greatest threat to Namibian sovereignty since independence, but the attackers were quickly defeated. Allegations of human rights abuses by the Namibian security force against Caprivians then hurt Namibia's image, and tourists canceled visits in large numbers, but by September it seemed the threat was over.

Botswana's relations with Namibia remained cordial, despite the long drawn-out dispute between the two countries over the island of Katsikili/Sidudu on the Chobe River. When the two countries could not agree on the matter, it was referred by their governments to the International Court of Justice in The Hague for adjudication. Judgment in Botswana's favor in late 1999 was accepted by the Namibian government.

Another major development in 1998 was the establishment of a new political party, the Congress of Democrats (COD), under the leadership of Ben Ulenga, former trade unionist and long-time SWAPO member. He had been appointed Namibia's high commissioner in London but was unhappy when SWAPO approved the idea of changing the constitution to allow Sam Nujoma (the president) to serve a third term as president and was critical of Nujoma's decision to send Namibian troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of Laurent Kabila, for no clear reason other than to add support to the intervention of Namibia's close partners in the Southern African Development Community, Angola, and Zimbabwe. The COD obtained the support of many intellectuals and members of the Windhoek elite.

Those disillusioned included some who pointed to creeping authoritarianism on Nujoma's part, and who disliked SWAPO's dominance of the political scene. Many former members of the SWAPO armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, had returned to Ovamboland and not been able to find work. While some were absorbed into the police and the army, others claimed that the government had forgotten about them.

The continuing Angolan civil war meant that throughout its first decade of independence Namibia could never take the stability on its northern border for granted, but despite this, much economic development took place there, as ties between northern Namibia and southern Angola grew ever closer. It was on that border that the government planned a major hydroelectric scheme at the Epupa Falls, which not only threatened the lands on which some of the seminomadic Himba people lived, but was also much criticized by environmentalists. After the opening of the trans-Caprivi highway, which opened up the northeastern part of the country, the Kuwaiti government promised to fund the extension of the railway north from Otavi to the Angolan border. Nujoma himself had hopes of another port being built close to Ovamboland, but nothing more than a feasibility study was undertaken.

One objection to the Epupa scheme was that a new energy source had been discovered off the southern coast: the Kudu gas field, which could come on stream sooner, and send gas to Cape Town in South Africa for processing. Namibia remained highly dependent on its natural resources, and for some years in the mid-1990s its fishing industry fell on bad times, as the fish stocks declined. Although by the end of the decade they had recovered considerably, the falling price of uranium meant that production at the giant Rossing mine had to be cut back, and in 1998 the Tsumeb copper mine was closed, with the loss of thousands of jobs. Only diamonds retained their sparkle throughout the decade, in the middle of which the South African-based De Beers had made an agreement with the Namibian government for a partnership, creating a new company, Namdeb, in which the government held a 50 per cent stake. As this suggested, any idea of nationalizing the mines had disappeared after independence, as the country adopted orthodox capitalist policies. One of its successes was in creating economic enterprise zones, where tax was low and labor flexible. By the end of the 1990s, a number of such zones were in existence, at Walvis Bay and other places, providing the country with a small manufacturing sector, mostly producing export goods.

Most of Namibia's exports continued to go to South Africa. Relations with that country remained good, after the negotiating forum in South Africa had in 1993 agreed that Walvis Bay, Namibia's leading port, which the South African government had always claimed as its own territory, could be incorporated in Namibia. After some months of joint administration, the handover of Walvis Bay took place. When President Nelson Mandela came to office, he offered to take over the apartheid debt, which the Namibian government had inherited at independence. After long negotiations, this was done and over R700 million wiped off. The two

countries worked together in the Southern African Development Community, and the two presidents paid a number of visits to each other's countries. One new threat they both had to face was the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS infections: by 1999 an estimated 15 per cent of all Namibians between the ages of fifteen and fifty were infected. By then, the total population was an estimated 1.6 million.

Although the investment conference held in New York City in June 1990, shortly after independence, did not attract as much foreign investment as hoped, the government continued with investor-friendly policies and orthodox economic policies. The first SWAPO congress held on Namibian territory, which met in December 1991, did not challenge the leadership on central issues. A land conference held the previous June had begun to raise the tricky issue of land redistribution but in the years that followed very little was done to give effect to its recommendations. As it came to power, the SWAPO government had proclaimed national reconciliation as its policy. As the years passed, critics said that the only reconciliation they could see was with the small minority, at the cost of the black majority, most members of which still lived in poverty.

Namibia would not agree to participate in the South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the publication of Siegfried Groth's *Namibia: The Wall of Silence*, which told of the atrocities carried out in SWAPO's camps in Angola, provoked much controversy. Nujoma lashed out at the Beyond the Wall of Silence (BWS) organization, which had been established to campaign for the truth about what had happened in SWAPO's camps in Angola during the war to come out. Whites in particular were accused of undermining the government. While the media remained free, there was little probing of news or investigative journalism, and the government mostly remained tight-lipped about its policies. As Namibia entered the new millennium, it was clear that much time and effort would be needed to create a democratic culture.

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See also: Mining, Multinationals, and Development; Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle; Nujoma, Sam.

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Napata and Meroe

Napata and Meroe were the most important centers within the Kushite Empire, which flourished from the eighth century BCE to the fourth century CE. The exact meaning of the term Napata is unclear, but it probably designated a locality rather than a single site. Although there is some evidence for occupation in the Kerma Period, the earliest structural remains are those of a small temple, begun by the Egyptian Pharaohs Horemheb (1323–1295BCE) or Seti I (1294–1279BCE) and completed by Ramesses II (1279–1213BCE). Epigraphic evidence, however, records that a fortress with a shrine of Amun within it was constructed by Thutmose III (1479–1425BCE). Amenhotep II (1427–1400BCE) records that he sacrificed seven captive prisoners on his return from a successful campaign in southwest Asia and had the body of one of the victims hung on the walls of Napata.

Napata became a place of great religious significance to the Egyptians. On the right bank of the Nile stands Jebel Barkal, an isolated and prominent mountain with a sheer cliff-face over 100 meters high and a detached pinnacle 80 meters high. The Egyptians identified this mountain as the southern home of their state god Amun, calling it the "Pure Mountain."

Upon their adoption of the state god of Egypt, the Kushites held Jebel Barkal in equal veneration and began a building program at the foot of the mountain in the eighth century BCE, which developed into the largest religious complex in their extensive domains. The earliest Kushite temple may have been constructed by Alara (c.785–760BCE) or Kashta (c.760–747BCE). Piye (c.747–716BCE) was responsible for refurbishing and extending the New Kingdom temple of Amun, which on its completion was the largest in the realm. One of the most interesting temples, the Temple of Mut, was constructed, or reconstructed, by Taharqo (69–664BCE). The sanctuary chamber was hollowed out of the rock of the cliff face and decorated with reliefs one of which shows Taharqo making offerings to Amun who is depicted seated on a throne within the "Pure Mountain" itself.

Across the river and a few kilometers downstream, Sanam Abu Dom was the site of another large temple of Amun, with an adjacent palace and massive stores complex. The earliest Kushite rulers were interred at el-Kurru twelve kilometers downstream. Taharqo chose to be buried at Nuri, slightly upstream of Barkal but on the opposite bank, and most rulers from then on into the late fourth century BCE were interred there.

The earliest evidence for occupation at Meroe, which is on the left bank of the Nile and was reached by a direct route across the desert from Napata, is a number of circular timber huts dating to the tenth century BCE. The importance of Meroe was first documented at the time of the Kushite's invasion of Egypt two centuries later. An extensive cemetery, situated on a projecting spur of the plateau four kilometers to the east of the settlement, contained graves, many of which are clearly of wealthy and important individuals. The funerary customs and the artifacts buried with the deceased indicate that these people were subjects of the kings of Kush. By this date Meroe, although displaying a few regional characteristics, was an important and wealthy center of Kushite culture. From the later seventh century BCE Kushite rulers are attested in the city although they continued to be buried at Napata for several centuries thereafter.

During the mid-third and second centuries BCE, an area enclosed by a thick stone wall with projecting towers was constructed in the heart of the city. It was dubbed the Royal City by its excavator. Within were temples, palaces, and the so-called Roman baths, which functioned as a water sanctuary probably connected with festivals performed by the king on the occasion of the beginning of the annual inundation. A new Temple of Amun was erected on the east side of the Royal City. This was the second largest of the Amun temples in the kingdom after that at Napata and presumably was designed to replace the earlier temple of the god at Meroe which had stood on the site of the Royal City. At this time Meroe may have been on an island but, if so, the eastern channel ceased to flow by the beginning of the Christian era and thereafter a processional way flanked by temples was constructed leading up to the Amun temple. Elsewhere in the city most of the dwellings were of mud brick, one building succeeding another over the centuries until they formed a mound up to approximately ten meters in height. On the eastern side of the city there is extensive evidence for ironworking with large heaps of slag being a prominent feature of the landscape.

From the late fourth century BCE onward, most Kushite rulers were buried at Meroe; the pre-eminence of Meroe as an urban center was established. The reason for this move of the royal burial ground from Napata is unknown. It certainly does not represent an abandonment of the cult of Amun at Napata, which continued to flourish. Evidence for building activities at Napata continue for centuries and these include a large palace built by King Natakamani (c.1–20CE) who was also active in the Meroe region. At Napata, immediately to the west of Jebel Barkal, are two small pyramid cemeteries, one group dating to the period around 315–270BCE, the other to the period around

90–50BCE. Some of these are of Kushite rulers who certainly controlled the whole of the kingdom.

Napata may have been sacked by the armies of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty Egyptian ruler Psammetik II in 593BCE, and again by a Roman army under Petronius in 24BCE. The final abandonment of the site presumably occurred upon the collapse of the Kushite state in the fourth century. Meroe may have been occupied by the Aksumites from Ethiopia for a short period at that time. Like Napata, Meroe does not appear to have survived the collapse of the Kushite state, although burials of a slightly later date abound in the area.

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See also: **Kerma and Egyptian Nubia; Kush; Meroe.**

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Napoleon: See Egypt, Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt.

Natal, Nineteenth Century

A British colony from 1842 until 1910, this region of southeast Africa was so named because a Portuguese navigator, Bartholomew Dias, sighted its coast on Christmas Day (i.e., Christ's natal day) in 1497. For most of the nineteenth century, Natal was defined as the territory lying between the Drakensberg mountains and the sea between the Umzimvubu and the Thukela Rivers.

In the opening decades of the century, the district was caught up in tumultuous wars fought by a number of chieftaincies aspiring to assert hegemony over the region. By 1827 the Zulu kingdom forged by Shaka had emerged as the decisive victor. Some of the chiefs and communities formerly prominent in Natal moved away, but most accepted Zulu rule. The consolidation of power in the hands of a single government attracted the attention of a motley assortment of traders and hunters who were granted permission by Shaka to settle in the districts around Port Natal (modern Durban). Shaka commandeered their services as riflemen in his later wars and rewarded them with presents of cattle. By the time of Shaka's assassination in September 1828, the

leading traders had married local women and acquired sizeable followings of servants and hangers-on.

Unscrupulously claiming to have been granted huge tracts of land, the traders attempted unsuccessfully to bring about a British annexation of Natal. Shaka was succeeded by his brother Dingane, who expelled most of the adventurers at Port Natal. During the early 1830s, however, he again allowed traders and hunters to move in.

The British colonial government of the Cape Colony now began to take a serious interest in the Zulu kingdom. Dr. Andrew Smith was sent as an emissary to Dingane in 1832, ostensibly to cement cordial relations. In his private communications, however, Smith argued that it would not be difficult to seize the king's domains. Some of Smith's party were farmers from the eastern districts of the Cape, who marveled at the open green pastures that stretched from the Port Natal up to the Drakensberg. Their reports asserted that the Zulu wars had cleared the land of people and that the territory was therefore ripe for settlement. These statements should not be taken at face value; twentieth century historians have comprehensively exposed them as self-interested propaganda. Nonetheless, the idea of lush cattle lands just waiting to be occupied made a powerful appeal to the imaginations of farmers whose expansion into the eastern districts of the Cape had been halted by the determined resistance of the Xhosa and Thembu people. When land hunger and dissatisfaction with British colonial administration provoked the mass emigration of farmers later known as the Great Trek, the intended destination of most of the so-called Voortrekkers was Natal. They were cheered on by colonial newspaper editors and property speculators who extolled their pioneering spirit and argued that the British government should extend its protection over them.

Dingane was understandably wary of an uninvited, audacious invasion of farmers in 1837. He told the Voortrekker leader, Piet Retief, that he had heard reliable reports that white men had been stealing Zulu cattle and other property. There could be no question of negotiating about grants of land until this property was returned. Retief claimed that the real culprit was the Tlokwa chief Sekonyela. In November 1837 he offered to lead an expedition to Sekonyela's headquarters in the Caledon River valley to reclaim the stolen goods. On his return he sent word to Dingane that Zulu property consisting of 700 head of cattle, 60 to 70 horses, and 30 guns had been retrieved and would shortly be returned to the king. When Retief and his party of seventy farmers and assorted servants arrived at Dingane's capital, they were received with apparent cordiality. The king, however, had determined to halt this invasion in its early stages and had prepared a calculated

trap in the guise of a display of Zulu dancing on the third of February 1838. After Retief and his men had been persuaded to leave their horses and guns outside, the king gave the signal that the *amathakathi* (wizards or criminals) should be killed. The same day, regiments were dispatched to attack all the Voortrekker parties in Natal. They seized huge numbers of cattle and very nearly succeeded in exterminating the would-be colonists. After suffering heavy losses, the surviving Voortrekkers regrouped and determined to defend their de facto seizure of Natal by launching a counter-attack on the Zulu king. They were assisted by the Port Natal traders who deserted Dingane and mobilized their small number of African servants and supporters for an assault in March 1838. Although these forces were resoundingly defeated, a better-armed expedition inflicted a catastrophic defeat on Dingane's forces at Blood River, where some 3,000 Zulu men died on December 16, 1838. A standoff ensued for several months. Despite their victory, the Voortrekkers had not succeeded in either of their principal aims, which had been to regain their lost cattle and to negotiate a cession of Natal.

Meanwhile, the British government at the Cape had become alarmed, fearing that the Voortrekkers had unleashed wars that would eventually threaten the stability of their own eastern frontier. A small force was sent to Port Natal in November 1838 for the purpose of arranging a settlement with the Zulu king. It was not their intervention, however, but the defection of Dingane's brother, Mpande, and 17,000 followers that proved decisive. Allying himself with the Voortrekkers, Mpande proclaimed himself king and defeated Dingane's forces in February 1840. The boundary between Zululand and Natal was now set at the Thukela River. A short-lived Voortrekker "Republic of Natalia" with its capital at Pietermaritzburg expired in 1842 when the British determined that for strategic reasons they must hold Port Natal; the Cape governor proclaimed the annexation on May 5, 1843.

The incoming government faced formidable problems. A population of a few thousand colonists was vastly outnumbered by an African population estimated to number 100,000. Under the secretary for native affairs, Theophilus Shepstone, lands known as Reserves were defined for exclusively African occupation and chiefs were made the principal instruments for the administration of justice and the collection of taxes in those areas. The success of this experiment in keeping the peace and defraying the cost of government caused it to be copied in other British colonies of southern, central, and eastern Africa. Shepstone's system also helped to lay the foundations of twentieth-century segregation and apartheid in South Africa by laying down separate legal systems for white and black citizens.

The colonial economy languished until the establishment of extensive sugar plantations in the coastal regions in the 1860s. A shortage of Africans willing to work on the extended contracts required by the sugar planters led to the importation of indentured laborers from South Asia who formed the nucleus of South Africa's Indian population. They were followed by free Indian settlers, including, in the 1890s, the young lawyer Mohandas K. Gandhi.

Africans responded positively to the opportunities presented by a market economy. They grew crops not only in the designated Reserves, but also on purchased or rented land. Others affiliated themselves to the many mission stations established in Natal. In the pre-eminent century of European evangelization, Natal's accessible location and large population made it a favorite destination for missionary organizations. Especially important were the missions established by English Methodists, American Congregationalists, Swedish, German and Norwegian Lutherans, and the Church of England. Under Anglican Bishop J. W. Colenso, Natal became the scene for influential innovations in missionary practice and theology. Although Colenso was convicted for heresy in 1864, he continued to be recognized by the British government as the official bishop of Natal, using his friendship with Theophilus Shepstone to advance his interests.

This alliance ended suddenly at the end of 1873, when Colenso objected to the harsh punishment Shepstone imposed on Hlubi Chief Langalibalele, who defied an order to account for unregistered rifles held by his people and attempted to flee over the Drakensberg into Lesotho.

The furor raised in Britain by Colenso's accounts of atrocities inflicted on the Hlubi led the Colonial Office in 1875 to suspend Natal's constitution of 1857 and to replace it with one less susceptible to the influence of white colonists. Three years later another crisis arose when the British attempted to federate the various colonies and republics of South Africa. The high commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, who had been sent out to achieve this project, decided that the independence of the Zulu kingdom was a military menace and an obstacle to the economic success of the proposed federation. War was declared in January 1879 and despite unexpected early Zulu victories, eventually ended with the capture of the king Cetshwayo (who had succeeded his father Mpande in 1873). An attempt to rule Zululand through thirteen separate chiefs plunged the region into a devastating civil war that ended in 1887 when the territory was officially annexed to Natal, thus extending the northern boundary to the border of Portuguese Mozambique.

In 1894 a concerted campaign by white settlers to achieve self-government was successful and the colony for the first time had an elected prime minister. African

interests suffered greatly from the change, as the separate legal system established under Shepstone deprived them of the right to vote, unless they had been specifically exempted from "Native Law." Only a handful won exemption, ensuring the dominance of white interests. New laws curbed African rights to buy and own land, thus inhibiting the growth of the middle class. As the population grew the Reserves became overcrowded and degraded. By the end of the century people in the Reserves were already becoming dependent on the earnings of migrant workers.

The century ended spectacularly with the outbreak of the second Anglo-Boer War. Invading forces besieged the town of Ladysmith. Following British victory and the Peace of Vereeniging (1902), Natal saw its system of segregated reserves and dual legal system adopted by the entire Union of South Africa.

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See also: Anglo-Zulu War, (1879–1887) Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Mfecane; Shaka and Zulu Kingdom, (1810–1840); South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881.

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Nationalism: See Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism.

Nationalism(s): Postcolonial Africa

The concept of nationalism has been defined as a sense of collective identity in which a people perceives itself as different from, and often superior to, other peoples.

Nationalism also implies the existence of a variety of shared characteristics, most notably a common language and culture, but also race and religion, as shown by the rise of Islamic revivalist movements in North Africa and other regions of the world with sizable Muslim populations.

The emergence of African nationalism and African demands for national self-determination (independence) from colonial rule followed a different pattern than its classic European counterparts of earlier centuries. The emergence of European “nations” (i.e., a cohesive group identity) generally preceded and contributed to the creation of European “states” (the structures of governance). The net result was the creation of viable nation-states that enjoyed the legitimacy of their peoples. This process was reversed in Africa. In most cases, the colonial state was created prior to the existence of any sense of nation. As a result, the creation and strengthening of a nationalist attachment to what in essence constituted artificially created African states became one of the supreme challenges of African leaders during the postcolonial era.

The emergence of African nationalism was also unique in terms of its inherently anticolonial character. African nationalist movements were sharply divided on political agendas, ideological orientation, and economic programs. Regardless of their differences, however, the leaders of these movements did agree on one point: the necessity and desirability of independence from foreign control. Anticolonial sentiment served as the rallying point of early African nationalist movements to such a degree that African nationalism was equivalent to African anticolonialism.

The emergence and strengthening of contemporary African nationalisms unfolded gradually in a series of waves beginning in the 1950s with groups of countries becoming independent during specific historical periods. The first wave emerged during the 1950s and was led by the heavily Arab-influenced North African countries of Libya (1951), Morocco (1956), Tunisia (1956), and the Sudan (1956). Two countries outside of North Africa also obtained independence during this period: the former British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1957, followed by the former French colony of Guinea in 1958. This latter case was especially noteworthy in that Guinea was the only French colony to cast a negative vote against a 1958 referendum concerning the creation of a revised “French community of states.” A “yes” vote would have confirmed continued French sovereignty while at the same time granting some degree of political autonomy to Guinea and the other French colonies. The response of the French government was to order the immediate withdrawal of all French aid and advisors from Guinea. Despite the acrimony involved in this latter case, the first

wave of African nationalism was marked by a relatively peaceful transfer of power to African nationalists.

The second and largest nationalist wave emerged during the 1960s, when more than thirty African countries achieved independence. The majority of these countries were former British and French colonies in East, Central, and West Africa. All three Belgian colonies (Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo-Kinshasa) also acquired independence during this period, and were joined by the Republic of Somalia which represented a federation of the former British and Italian Somaliland territories. Aside from some noteworthy exceptions, most notably France’s unsuccessful attempt to defeat a pro-independence guerrilla insurgency in Algeria and the emergence of the so-called Mau Mau guerrilla insurgency in Kenya, the nationalist movements of the 1960s were also largely peaceful in nature. The departing colonial powers had already accepted the inevitability of decolonization. Questions simply remained as to when and under what conditions.

A third wave of nationalism culminated in 1974. A military coup d’état in Portugal led by junior military officers resulted in a declaration that the Portuguese government intended to grant immediate independence to the colonies in Africa. Coup plotters sought to end what they perceived as a series of African military quagmires that pitted poorly trained and unmotivated Portuguese military forces against highly motivated and increasingly adept African guerrilla insurgencies: the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique, the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC, Independence African Party of Guinea and Cape Verde) in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde; and three guerrilla groups in Angola—the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA, National Front for the Liberation of Angola), the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). The violent path of nationalist movements in the former Portuguese colonies was further complicated in 1975 when Angolan guerrilla groups began an extended civil war over who would lead an independent Angola. The former French colonies of Comoros (1975), Seychelles (1976), and Djibouti (1977), however, achieved independence under largely peaceful terms.

A fourth wave of nationalism gathered strength during the 1980s and was directed against the minority white-ruled regimes in Southern Africa. Since 1948, South Africa was controlled by the descendants of white settlers known as Afrikaners. This minority elite established the apartheid (apartness) system in which blacks and other minorities (roughly 85 per cent of the population) were denied political rights. The apartheid system

was eventually exported to the former German colony of Namibia after it became a South African mandate territory in the aftermath of World War I. Similarly, white settlers in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) led by Ian Smith in 1965 instituted a regional variation of apartheid after they announced their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from British colonial rule.

The minority white-ruled regimes of southern Africa were confronted by nationalist guerrilla-led organizations that enjoyed regional and international support: the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) in South Africa; the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia; and the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in Zimbabwe. In all three cases, the military struggles were suspended after the white minority regimes agreed to negotiate transitions to black majority rule. Zimbabwe's transition in 1980 was followed by the creation of multiparty and multiracial democracies in Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994.

The fourth wave of African nationalism culminated in South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 and largely focused on the self-determination of individual colonial states. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, however, a series of nationalist movements have emerged that seek the self-determination of peoples within individual nation-states. The leaders of what potentially constitutes a fifth wave of nationalism often underscore the historic mistreatment of their peoples as part of their pursuit of two overriding objectives: the secession of their territories from existing African nation-states; and international recognition of their territories as independent nation-states within the international system.

The emergence of secessionist nationalist movements is neither unique to Africa nor simply a product of the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold War has indeed fostered the reemergence of ethnically based nationalism on a global scale. The most notable outcome of this trend was the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union into fifteen independent republics. As demonstrated by the efforts of Nigeria's Igbo people to create an independent Republic of Biafra at the end of the 1960s, however, secessionist movements have existed in Africa since the beginning of the decolonization process. The post-Cold War era is nonetheless unique in that the demands for the self-determination of individual peoples appear to have increased in both scope and intensity, and the African and international communities appear increasingly willing to entertain secessionist demands. Achieving independence in 1993, Eritrea nonetheless serves as the only successful case of a secessionist nationalist movement during the postcolonial independence era.

The strength and long-term viability of similar secessionist nationalist movements, such as the internationally unrecognized claim to independence of the Somaliland republic, depends on a variety of factors, most notably the responses of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the international community. The OAU historically has opposed any attempts at secession because one of the hallmarks of the OAU Charter is the inviolability of frontiers inherited from the colonial era. Due to the multiethnic nature of most African nation-states, African leaders themselves remain fearful that changing even one boundary will open a Pandora's box of ethnically based secessionist movements and lead to the further Balkanization of the African continent into smaller and economically unviable political units.

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See also: **Identity, Political.**

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Ndongo, Kingdom of

The Kingdom of Ndongo probably emerged as a consolidated realm in the highlands between the Kwanza and Lukala rivers in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Sparse archaeological evidence can only tell us that agricultural populations probably occupied the area after 500BCE, and ironworking was practiced before the Common Era. It is possible that complex societies were already emerging in the early Iron Age, as they did further north.

Traditions of the later sixteenth century placed Ndongo's origins in Kongo, and Kongo royal titles include a "Kingdom of Angola" as early as 1535, but it is unlikely that Kongo played any substantial role in its

origin or early development. Ngola Kiluanje, the king identified as the founder in tradition, was said to have expanded the kingdom westward, occupying much of the coastal lowlands on both banks of the Kwanza and coming near to the island of Luanda, which was under Kongo sovereignty in the early sixteenth century.

Shortly before 1520, the king sent an embassy to Portugal to establish relations similar to those of Kongo. The Portuguese sent an exploring party which established itself at Kabasa, Ndongo's capital, until they were forced out of the country for unknown reasons in 1526. Afonso I, king of Kongo arranged for their return to Kongo and then to Portugal.

Many Portuguese merchants, especially from the island of São Tomé, but also from Kongo, established themselves in Kabasa, illegally in the eyes of both the Portuguese crown and the kings of Kongo. By the mid-sixteenth century Ndongo had emerged as a major power in the area, and its armies were fighting against the king of Benguela in the central highlands of Angola, and the king of Songo to the east as its borders expanded. There were probably also border disputes and skirmishes with Kongo in the mountainous "Dembos" region between them, where sovereignty was hard for either monarch to establish.

In 1560 a new Portuguese mission came to Ndongo, led by Paulo Dias de Novais and including Jesuit missionaries. It was not successful either, and Jesuit priest Francisco de Gouveia was held prisoner when Dias de Novais left to return to Portugal in 1563.

In the mid-sixteenth century Ndongo was an extensively networked country. Local rulers, called *sobas* and descended from ancient families, controlled hundreds of small areas, grouped into several large provinces. The king controlled a large royal district directly next to the capital; several *sobas* in the area around Kabasa claimed descent directly from Ngola Kiluanji. Rulers also maintained villages populated by dependent peasants (*kijikos*) who supported the king, his family, military units of the royal army, and officials. There were also traditions of the king making grants of land and subjects to supporters and favorites.

Later traditions suggest that the office of king was hereditary in a single line founded by Ngola Kiluanje, but that succession might also have been by primogeniture, election by the *sobas* or election by the officials (*tendala* and *ngolambole* as well as others). The provinces were supervised by a group of roving officials. The *tendala* were in charge of administrative and judicial matters, while the *ngolambole* presided over military affairs.

In 1575 Paulo Dias de Novais returned to Ndongo with a royal grant from Portugal to create a colony on the coast, south of the Kwanza. He offered his services to Ndongo and fought for Ndongo in several

campaigns against rebels. In 1579, however, factions in Kabasa allied with Portuguese merchants, who feared Dias de Novais, and perhaps a Kongo interest persuaded the king to massacre the Portuguese and expel them.

Thanks to help from Kongo, Dias de Novais was able to maintain some fortified positions, and he managed to conquer areas around Luanda and the north bank of the Kwanza through naval power and persuading *sobas* to join him against Ndongo. By the mid-1580s the Portuguese were strong enough to carry the war into the highlands from their base at Massangano. But Ndongo was sufficiently strong that they defeated the Portuguese forces decisively at the Lukala in late 1589. Dias de Novais, abandoned by many of his allied *sobas*, was driven back from the highlands. An impasse developed, finalized by a peace agreement around 1599 that fixed the border between the Portuguese colony and Ndongo.

During this crucial period, Ndongo was ruled by Mbandi a Ngola Kiluanji, who also worked to centralize his authority while fighting the Portuguese. Fifty years later, tradition represented him as favoring his wife and her brothers against nobles, but this was most likely part of a larger complaint against a policy of including them in decision making and office holding. He was killed in a revolt by being tricked into entering a fight against a rebel, only to be abandoned by his supporters. In any case, this hardly slowed the path of centralization pursued with equal vigor by his son and successor Ngola Mbandi.

On occasion, Portugal aided Ngola Mbandi against rebellious subjects, and a certain amount of competition between the two powers continued until the impasse was broken in 1617 by the Portuguese governor Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos. That year the Portuguese governor brought bands of Imbangala mercenaries from south of the Kwanza and led them with his own army in a series of devastating campaigns against Ndongo. The Imbangala were military groups who lived by rapine, capturing adolescent boys to replenish and augment their numbers; they were very effective soldiers. Between 1617 and 1620, much of the heartland of Ndongo was emptied of its population. Many of its inhabitants were sold to plantations in Brazil and Spanish America. Ngola Mbandi fled to islands in the Kwanza River and had to negotiate an unfavorable peace treaty in 1622. Despondent, he committed suicide in 1624, leaving behind a seven-year-old son, and leaving the country ripe for a bitter civil war that would bring Portugal deeper into the country and radically change the geography and politics of Ndongo.

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See also: Angola; Kongo.

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Négritude

The activist philosophy of *négritude* was at the origin of cultural nationalism in French-speaking Africa. The African poet and president of Senegal Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906–2001) and his friend Aimé Césaire, an avant-garde French West Indian poet from the island of Martinique, both first used the term in poems written in 1936, while they were university students in Paris. The development of *négritude* was later described by Senghor as a powerful “leavening agent” in the birth of a national sentiment among the peoples of Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. Senghor stated that he was never so fraternal with Europeans in general, with Frenchmen in particular, as from the moment in which he discovered the value of *négritude*, which simultaneously had the effect of making him proud to be a black man.

Although Senghor has defined *négritude* as “Negro-African cultural values,” this definition does not take into account the richness of this complex philosophy, which changes according to the period considered or the political inclinations of the individual espousing it. There are many *négritudes*: suffering *négritude*, which laments the abject conditions imposed on black people since the beginning of the slave trade, aggressive *négritude*, which clamors for recognition and primacy of African values and encourages literary, artistic, and scientific production by black people, conciliatory *négritude*, which advocates cultural miscegenation or cross-breeding between the newly rehabilitated African civilization and the other civilizations of the world, and an inventive *négritude* tending toward a new global or universal humanism which will be inspired by the eternal wisdom of Africa.

The historical approach is perhaps the best way to capture the meaning of *négritude*. Cheikh Anta Diop, the late Senegalese historian, wrote that *négritude* has a whole history of its own. Did it begin when the French West Indian poet Aimé Césaire invented the term sometime between 1932 and 1934? And should we, along with Senghor, recognize this authorship and “render unto Césaire that which is Césaire’s?” Such an approach does not seem to be an entirely accurate way of describing the events leading to the development and popularity of *négritude*.

If it was Césaire who invented the term, it was Senghor who was most responsible for developing the underlying philosophy. They were, however, but two of the black men and women who launched the movement. It would indeed be difficult to understand *négritude* without mentioning the pioneering contributions of Paulette and Jane Nardal, university students in Paris from the French West Indian island of Martinique. In 1931 the Nardal sisters initiated the Parisian publication of *La Revue du Monde Noir* (Review of the Black World), a monthly magazine written in both French and English. Almost thirty years before independence movements swept through Africa, the *Revue* brought together such diverse young authors as the American leaders of the Harlem Renaissance Alain Locke; Claude McKay; Countee Cullen; Langston Hughes; Nnamdi Azikiwe, future first president of Nigeria; Felix Eboué, future first black governor general of French Equatorial Africa; as well as future literary and political leaders Césaire and Senghor. The *Revue* studied the conditions facing black women and men and expressed faith in the future of the race and the necessity of creating a sentiment of solidarity among black peoples around the world. In addition, its editors hoped “to promote within the white race a mutual, complete, affectionate, and unprejudiced appreciation of the intelligentsia of all colored races.” That appreciation was to be based on recognition of the scientific, literary, and artistic contributions of both past and present black leaders.

Soon after meeting with the editors of the *Revue*, Senghor tore up all the poems he had previously written on Western themes and started writing about the African experience he had suddenly been encouraged to value. Césaire, too, furiously railed against Western civilization’s misdeeds toward Africa. A new black literary movement was launched and developed through the remaining years of the 1930s.

World War II brought about the fall of France to Nazi forces, but the “Free French” movement of Charles de Gaulle slowly gained headway in French colonial Africa. Thanks for the African efforts toward the liberation of France caused the post war government to incorporate Africans into the French parliament. Both Césaire and Senghor became members of the French political elite.

In 1947, with the encouragement of a host of famous French intellectuals as well Senghor and Césaire, a new journal, *Présence Africaine*, began publication in Paris under the direction of the younger Senegalese intellectual, Alioune Diop. In 1948 Jean-Paul Sartre wrote the preface to Senghor’s *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Française* (Anthology of New Black and Malagasy Poetry in the French Language). Sartre’s analysis, titled *Black Orpheus*, made the term *négritude* one of the most discussed philosophical notions in French literary circles. Debates raged in the

literary cafes and intellectual centers of Paris. Senghor and Césaire became heroes of that segment of the French intelligentsia who were profoundly attracted by the “exotic” literary outburst of these and other black writers.

From that moment on, black nationalists criticized *négritude* in quite different ways. Black communists called it a diversion with respect to the “class struggle.” *Négritude*’s emphasis on race undercut concentration on the class struggle. Those African nationalists who wished for independence in the 1950s objected to Senghor’s attempts to incorporate Africans into a new French community, all the while insisting on Africans’ uniqueness. Cultural crossbreeding was also anathema to those trumpeting Pan-Africanism. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the new journal *Presence Africaine* continued the tradition begun by *Revue du Monde Noir*, providing a forum for the many intellectual currents developed by black intellectuals. It hosted two major international conferences bringing together black intellectuals from all over the world.

As the 1950s progressed, the literary and artistic *négritude* movement begun in the 1930s was rapidly incorporated as an aspect of the African rush to independence. What had begun as an effort by black intellectuals to instill race pride was overrun by the political changes in the colonial world demanded and achieved by those who followed the dictum of “Independence Now,” as emphasized by third-world delegates at their ground breaking international conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

Thereafter, international recognition of people of African descent would come about because of their political, rather than merely their intellectual and artistic clout. The “culture first” of Senghor and the supporters of *négritude* was superseded by the “politics first” of Kwame Nkrumah, who won independence from British rule for the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1957.

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See also: Senghor, Léopold Sédar.

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Neolithic North Africa

“Neolithic,” or New Stone Age, is a term originally devised in Europe for that cultural period when polished stone artifacts appeared. It has subsequently been used

in both Europe and the Near East to represent the time when domestication of plants and animals first began. Part of the “package” of the neolithic has come to include pottery, and although pre-pottery Neolithic is recognized in the Levant, when pottery appears, the domestication process is well under way. There is some question whether the term should be applied to Africa, as it would assume that using the name would mean the same processes have occurred in the two areas. In fact such assumptions have been made by French researchers (Camps, 1974), and also by Wendorf in the Western Desert of Egypt at Nabta Playa, where ceramics have been found dated to about 9300 years ago, and called Neolithic. Cattle bones associated with these ceramics are thus assumed to be domestic (Wendorf, 1994). This has been challenged, and opens up the possibility that ceramics may pre-date the earliest domesticated animals in North Africa.

Food production was well established and widespread throughout North Africa around 7,500 years ago. There are separate cultural areas that can be recognized archaeologically. The Nile valley, with its permanent water and predictable riparian forage, whose annually rejuvenated silts from the Nile flood, was later ideal for mixed farming of domestic grains and livestock, but in the early Holocene produced rich hunting and foraging (Wetterstrom, 1993). The central Sahara, with open grasslands, would have been subject to rainfall variation, including droughts, but permitted nomadic pastoralism. Cultural similarity exists over a wide area from the Nile valley in the Sudan to Mauretania (Smith, 1980), and suggests a similar spread of cultural contact that is exhibited by the nomadic Tuareg today, with a common language, but regional variation in dress, equipment, and other cultural signifiers. Another area is the Maghreb, divided into the southern Atlas Mountains and the open plains of the northern Sahara, known to Francophone archaeologists as the area of the “Neolithic of Caspian Tradition” (Camps, 1974); and the Mediterranean littoral, a winter rainfall area possibly in contact with the Near East, Iberian Peninsula, and the eastern Mediterranean Islands, where wheat and barley agriculture was practiced.

Contact between the Nile Valley and the eastern Sahara existed, with the Sahara perhaps being the main driving force behind domestication (Barich, 1998), and the Nile valley only catching up later as population increased, and pressure was brought to bear on the rich hunting that would have existed in the valley in the early Holocene.

By about 8,000 years ago, semipermanent villages were being created in the Western Desert, suggesting that wild resources were sufficient to keep people in one place for a period of the year. Shortly after this there are indications in the area of cattle burials that

indicate ritual activities. These may well be the precursors of more elaborate cattle cults that dominated the beliefs of the states of the Nile valley during dynastic times.

By 7,500 years ago, small stock entered Africa from the Levant, and some would argue, so did the first domestic cattle. At this time, a gentler climate dominated the Sahara, offering an open grassland niche for the expansion of nomadic pastoralism with cattle (which are depicted on the rock walls of the Tassil n'Ajjer of southern Algeria [Lajoux, 1963; Kuper, 1978]). This rock art of the "bovidien" period is not homogeneous. There are two quite distinct styles and subject matter, but with domestic animals as the central theme. This would appear to reflect two racial groups, with one representing black African people, possibly precursors of the Fulani of West Africa today, and the other being of Mediterranean stock, showing individuals with light skin and long hair (Smith, 1993).

Intentional burial of cattle as part of ceremonies occurred in the Sahara before 6,000 years ago (Paris, 2000; Wendorf and Schild, 2001). Such "cattle-cults" predate anything similar in the Nile valley, so may be the precursor to what later becomes common in the valley. In the Nile valley, predynastic civilizations were appearing in upper and lower Egypt by 6,500 years ago. Lower Egypt, comprising the Nile Delta, most probably had strong affinities with the Levant. Much of the early cultural record, however, is obscured by the annual siltation of the delta by the Nile floods. The site of Merimbe beni Salame on the eastern edge of the delta has given the best record of early predynastic settlement in the northern sector. These were primarily traders who lived in small settlements. They buried their dead in individual graves, with few earthly goods placed within them. This is in marked contrast to the huge cemeteries of upper Egypt at Naqada and Abydos, where virtually every grave is filled with goods to ease the journey into the afterlife and the land of the dead. Not only is this an indication of strong religious beliefs, but the variation in quality of grave goods suggests that a hierarchy was already in place (Hoffman, 1980). This is an indication of a central authority that made possible the military conquest of lower Egypt, and the unification of the two areas 4,500 years ago.

ANDREW B. SMITH

See also: Domestication, Plant and Animal, History of; Egypt, Ancient: Unification of Upper and Lower: Historical Outline; Stone Age (Later): Nile Valley; Stone Age (Later): Sahara and North Africa.

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Neolithic, Pastoral: Eastern Africa

It is now abundantly clear that many regions of East Africa as far to the south as central Tanzania were formerly inhabited by stone-tool-using peoples who had no knowledge of metallurgy, but who had access to domestic animals. The archaeological remains of these peoples are most available in the highlands on either side of the Rift Valley in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania, although they are also indicated in the north Kenya plains east of Lake Turkana, in the Lake Victoria basin and, less certainly, in the coastal lowlands. They generally date between the second millennium BCE and the first millennium CE, although they appear to have been earlier in the north. They are conventionally known as Pastoral Neolithic (PN). Although widely adopted, the term is, unfortunately, misleading.

The term "Neolithic" has various connotations. Worldwide, it was originally used to distinguish, on the one hand, those later stone-tool-using peoples who made tools by grinding and polishing as well as by flaking and, on the other, their predecessors who relied exclusively on flaking. It was noted that ground-stone artifacts were often associated with pottery. Much later it was recognized in Europe that these typologically defined "Neolithic" communities had also been farmers: cultivators, herders, or both. Gradually, the presence of "food-production" in a pre-Iron Age context came to be regarded as the defining characteristic of the "Neolithic," at least among Anglophone archaeologists; many of their francophone colleagues continued

to base their use of the term on purely typological considerations. Major problems arise when these Europe-based definitions are applied in African contexts.

In Africa some artifact types generally regarded as “Neolithic” are demonstrably earlier than either cultivation or herding. Pottery, for example, was made and used during the post–Pleistocene climatic optimum in what is now the southern Sahara at fishing settlements where there is no evidence for the practice of either cultivation or herding. Stone axes were ground and polished by stone-tool-using hunter/gatherers in the south-central African savanna as long as 18,000 years ago, long before such a technology was practiced in Europe.

Many archaeologists have concluded that it is inappropriate and confusing to use the term “Neolithic” in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, but this proposal has met with some opposition, especially in East Africa. The confusion has there been compounded by its link with the word “pastoral.” Pastoralism in anthropological usage denotes a society, often nomadic, that relies to a very large extent on domestic herds in ways that extend beyond subsistence. This is not demonstrable in the case of the PN. True pastoralists rarely cultivate, but it is only incomplete negative archaeological evidence which suggests that PN peoples did not also cultivate. Indeed, some archaeological indications are emerging which support the historical linguistic argument that cultivation was in fact practiced by some of these groups.

A further undesirable result of the use of the term “Pastoral Neolithic” is political. Modern nomadic pastoralists in East Africa face considerable pressure to abandon their traditional lifestyle, to settle, and to cultivate. The idea needs to be resisted that they are in some ways backward or even prehistoric peoples who are resisting progress. Pastoralism in the modern sense is probably not a particularly ancient lifestyle in East Africa, but one that has over the centuries become uniquely adapted to the environmental circumstances where it is practiced.

The defining features of PN are absence of metal and access to domestic animals. As noted above, such societies are attested archaeologically in many areas of East Africa. Their flaked stone artifacts were essentially of microlithic “Late Stone Age” type; their typology varies considerably along with the characteristics of the available raw materials which, in some areas most notably the Rift Valley highlands, included plentiful fine obsidian. The associated pottery likewise shows considerable variation, the significance of which is not properly understood. Faunal assemblages contain very variable proportions of domestic and wild species, both cattle and sheep/goat being included among the latter. Whilst it must be concluded that domestic animals were present in the region during this period, the manner in which they were exploited and by whom

remain matters of uncertainty. It is by no means certain that all the peoples conventionally designated PN were themselves herders; they may have obtained stock by hunting or raiding from other sources. Floral remains, such as might demonstrate whether the PN peoples were cultivators have only very rarely been recovered or, for that matter, sought.

Both settlement and burial sites are known. The latter, including both inhumations and cremations, were often accompanied by characteristic stone bowls or platters, the function and significance of which remain unknown although they were sometimes paired with pestles. In several areas these burials were surmounted by stone cairns.

Several aspects of PN material culture appear to be rooted in earlier local traditions. This is particularly true of the flaked stone industries. On the other hand, the domestic animals were of species with no local wild ancestors: they must therefore have been introduced from elsewhere, presumably from a general northerly direction where they are attested archaeologically in earlier times. This gradual penetration from the north is supported by chronological evidence within East Africa, domestic animals being present for example at Dongodien near the northern end of Lake Turkana in the mid-third millennium BC, approximately a thousand years before there is convincing evidence for a PN presence in the Rift Valley highlands.

The distribution of PN sites extends through the East African highlands as far to the south as what is now central Tanzania. No convincing trace of them has yet been located in the south of Tanzania or beyond. It is noteworthy that this limit appears broadly to coincide with that which historical linguistic studies indicate for the former presence of Cushitic and Nilotic languages. Indeed there seems a strong likelihood that the PN people were speakers of such languages, study of which supports the view that some form of cultivation was practised at this time.

It is interesting to consider why this limit was established. The contemporary peoples further to the south appear to have been stone-tool-using hunter/gatherers who had no knowledge either of pottery or of metallurgy. They may have lacked any economic or other stimulus to adopt herding and the change of lifestyle that would accompany such adoption.

DAVID W. PHILLIPSON

See also: Cushites: Northeastern Africa: Stone Age Origins to Iron Age.

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Neto, António Agostinho (1922–1979)

Poet and Activist

To the beautiful Angolan homeland
 our land, our mother
 we must return
 We must return
 to Angola liberated
 Angola independent

This fragment of Agostinho Neto's poetry, written in prison in 1960, combines his exaltation of Mother Africa with combative tone previously unseen in his work. In a climate where direct political action was forbidden, the young Neto had become active in cultural organizations in the 1940s. His parents, Methodist teachers, had moved from the village Kaxikane to Luanda, where he finished secondary school. In 1944 he started working in the Angolan health services, but after 1947 he moved to Portugal to study medicine. Here he soon became involved in several cultural and political movements. In 1951 he was arrested and detained for several months as he was collecting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal. After his release, he accepted the leadership of an Angolan student organization. In his speeches as well as in his poems, which appeared in several journals, he expressed the suffering of the Angolan people under Portuguese colonialism. His outspoken ideas were not appreciated by the Portuguese authorities and from February 1955 until June 1957 he was imprisoned again. Despite this, he was able to finish his medical studies in 1958 and in the same year married the Portuguese-born Maria Eugénia da Silva.

In 1959 he returned to Luanda, where he set up a medical practice and became one of the leaders of a movement called MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which had been founded in 1956. Yet, within a year after his return he was arrested again. This evoked protest and demonstrations in his home village, which were suppressed brutally: some thirty people were killed and the village was razed to the ground. Between June 1960 and August 1962 he spent time in Angolan, Cape Verdian, and Portuguese prisons. During this period, Neto's protest against

colonialism had become more radical: he openly called for the need of armed struggle.

After he and his family managed to escape to Congo-Léopoldville (Kinshasa), Neto was elected president of the MPLA. It proved no easy task. His arrival led to rivalry within the MPLA leadership and a serious crisis ensued. Furthermore the balance between political ideology and practical guerrilla warfare turned out difficult to strike, the MPLA was hindered by its host country and its militants were attacked by rival FNLA fighters. Neto found himself leading a fractured movement with little support. In November 1963 Neto and other MPLA leaders were expelled from Congo-Léopoldville and moved across the river to Congo-Brazzaville. Here the movement was allowed to grow and slowly managed to gather some external assistance. For the MPLA president and his family this meant traveling to various countries: the Soviet Union, Ghana, Egypt, and Sudan. As MPLA activities were well-nigh impossible in the northern region because of FNLA rivalry, the MPLA shifted its attention to eastern Angola. Neto moved to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and especially after Zambian independence in 1964 the MPLA set out to organize an "eastern front." The guerrilla war in east Angola brought new successes and new problems. Despite frequent visits to Angola, the MPLA leaders, based in Zambia and Tanzania, remained aloof of the daily life in guerrilla camps in the eastern Angolan bush. Mostly leftist intellectuals from Luanda, they devoted much time to ideological disputes and bureaucratic affairs—interests not shared by impatient military men on the ground. In 1973 matters came to a head: Neto, informed by the Russians, accused military commander Daniel Chipenda of assassination plans, Chipenda retorted with accusations of power abuse and absenteeism. Chipenda later seceded from MPLA.

Neto's leadership of MPLA, although subject to several internal crises and sometimes fiercely criticized, remained remarkably stable. In 1975 he became president of the independent republic of Angola. Again the task proved formidable. Even before independence, the long civil war in Angola had started. South African forces, in cooperation with UNITA and FNLA, were approaching Luanda and only by calling in Cuban support could the MPLA government prevent their advance. Apart from these external attacks, the government was plagued by internal difficulties as well. The war increased problems in the already fragile economy. Rhetoric of mass participation could not prevent the development of an elaborate and unfair state bureaucracy and many politicians remained out of touch with the people they were supposed to lead. Neto's character, modest and disciplined,

but also reserved and distant did not help much to bridge the gap between leaders and the populace. In 1977 an attempt to stage a coup d'état, including a plan to kidnap Neto, was suppressed by the government with Cuban support.

In 1979 Neto fell ill; he died shortly before his birthday in a Russian hospital. The day of Neto's death is a national holiday in Angola, a university was named after him, and statues have been erected in his honor in various countries; throughout Angola people tell legends about their former president. Yet, eighteen years after his death, Neto's widow complained that her late husband's remains, placed in an unfinished mausoleum, were treated with as much contempt as his ideals.

INGE BRINKMAN

See also: **Angola.**

Biography

Agostinho Neto was born September 17, 1922, in Kaxikane, Bengo province, Angola. He studied medicine in Portugal, where he became active in a range of cultural-political organisations. He was arrested after he returned to Angola in 1960 and detained for two years. After his escape in 1962, Neto became president of the MPLA. He and his family lived in various countries and traveled much to gather support for the MPLA movement. Upon independence in 1975, Neto became president of Angola. He died September 10, 1979, in a Russian hospital.

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New Kingdom: *See* Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1938–)

Author, Playwright, and Professor

As a postgraduate student in England, Ngugi wa Thiong'o published his first novel, *Weep Not, Child* (1964), in the Heinemann's African Writers Series.

The book was an immediate success, and is widely considered to be the first major novel in English by an East African writer.

Ngugi supported the ideas of the *négritude* movement and therefore emphasized African aesthetics and languages in his oeuvre. In addition, the ideas of Karl Marx and Frantz Fanon have played a key role in the development of Ngugi's thinking and writing. Fanon's work has sensitized Ngugi to the effect of colonial violence on the psyche of the colonized, and in particular to the consequences of cultural imperialism, such as a feeling of racial and cultural inferiority. Fanon's position on the use—even necessity—of violence as a legitimate means to overcome colonial rule reappears regularly in Ngugi's prose, a revolutionary element which also stems from his ideological proximity to Marx. He remains faithful to a Marxist critique of capitalism and the exploitation of the working classes (especially in the context of post-independence Kenya), as well as to the idea of a (pan-African) workers' revolution. While his early fiction addresses issues of decolonization in the context of British rule and the Mau Mau insurgency, his later fiction, for instance *Petals of Blood* (1977), criticizes the neocolonial exploitation of the Kenyan masses.

In 1981 Ngugi published *Detained*, both diary and memoir, as an account of and reaction to his first experience of politically motivated imprisonment, which resulted from the performance of the play *I Will Marry When I Want* (1982; co-written with Ngugi wa Mirii). The play offers a people's history of Kenya during and after the colonization and denounces the new rulers' exploitative dealings with workers. The government's drastic reaction can be explained in part by the fact that this particular text, being a play and originally written in Kikuyu, reached a different and much broader audience than did Ngugi's previous works.

Devil on the Cross (1982), written during Ngugi's first detention, blends novelistic forms with dramatic, cinematic, and oral story-telling elements. This work stands out as Ngugi's decisive turn towards a critical examination of a phenomenon that he described in great detail in *Decolonising the Mind* (1986), namely, the linguistic process of continued suppression of the colonized through the annihilation of indigenous language and thus culture. The celebration of these very languages and cultures has been at the center of Ngugi's work ever since. *Devil on the Cross*, accordingly, was written in Kikuyu (Ngugi's mother tongue and one of numerous Kenyan languages) and translated into English by Ngugi himself at a later date. Ngugi has continued to write plays, even after his forced exile in 1982. In order to reach a greater audience (one reason why Ngugi decided to write in his mother tongue), Ngugi started to get involved in film-making,

seeing in this medium a better means for disseminating his ideas. His dedication to refamiliarize Kenyans with their own history and tradition also has led to his writing a series of children's stories. Published in Kikuyu between 1982 and 1986, they tell of the adventures of the young character Njamba Nene.

In addition to his international reputation as a writer of fiction, Ngugi became famous as the most outspoken supporter for the use of African languages in both creative and scholarly writing, thereby fighting against the linguistic and, hence, also psychological aspect of (neo)colonization. Ngugi's contributions to writing in African languages are indeed manifold. In addition to his numerous plays and novels, Ngugi has edited the American-based scholarly journal *Mutiiri* in Kikuyu. Yet, in more recent publications Ngugi once again addresses his audience in English. *Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams* (1998), a series of lectures first presented at Oxford University, and before that a revised edition of *Writers in Politics* (1997), seem aimed at a Western, even academic readership, thus apparently contradicting Ngugi's support of both the African and proletarian cause. However, both books conceptually continue the themes of earlier works. These are predominantly the role of literature, particularly performance, and the arts in postcolonial societies; governmental suppression and fear of critical artistic expression; similarities between African and Caribbean writing; the need for political struggle in the face of neocolonial exploitation; and finally a predominantly skeptical (Marxist) position on the future role of capitalism in African societies. Increasingly, however, Ngugi concerns himself with questions of exile and censorship, both of which are of immediate relevance to his own life. Even though most of Ngugi's recent scholarly writing is in English (a decision in part surely due to his continued exile in the United States), he remains highly critical of what he calls Europhonism, the exclusive use of European languages in African literature.

GERD BAYER

See also: **Kenya: Colonial Period: Mau Mau Revolt; Négritude.**

Biography

Born James Thiong'o Ngugi on January 5, 1938, in Limuru, Kenya. Attended local schools and entered Alliance High School in 1955. Received a B.A. in English at Makerere University College in Kampala (Uganda) in 1963. Worked as a journalist for a short period of time. Married in 1961. Left to attend graduate school at Leeds University (UK) in 1964. Changed name to Ngugi wa Thiong'o in 1977. At the end of that year, imprisoned in Mamiti Maximum Security Prison

for a year, without trial, for involvement in a theatre. Left Kenya for London in 1982. In 1992, named professor of comparative literature and performance studies at New York University.

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Ngwane Kingdom: See Swaziland: Sobhuza I, Foundation of Ngwane Kingdom.

Niger Delta And Its Hinterland: History to Sixteenth Century

The combined evidence of linguistics, archaeology, and oral traditions provides material for the discussion of early Niger Delta history up to the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century, from when written sources begin to appear.


The oral traditions of origin suggest that the Niger Delta peoples subsisted on the exploitation of local resources until population increases forced further migrations to other parts of the region. The different ecological zones of the delta provided numerous opportunities and resources for development and exchange. Most of the western and central delta was

freshwater swampland where considerable farming along the seasonally flooded banks of rivers was possible. In the eastern delta mangrove, saltwater and swamp conditions dictated a subsistence economy based mainly on fishing.

The early populations of the Niger Delta carried out some iron and bronze work, and were prolific in the manufacture of household, industrial, and ritual pottery, as well as terra cotta figurines, masks, and smoking pipes. These activities already suggest contact with hinterland communities from whom at least the metal would have had to be imported. Fishing, hunting, and the manufacture of salt along the mangrove belt provided resources for subsistence and trade with the hinterland. However, plantains, bananas, water yams, and cocoa yams were farmed within the Niger Delta, supplementing products traded from the hinterland, especially yams and livestock. Cassava products, which became staple food sources in many parts of the Niger Delta, arrived much later, first in the western delta, from Brazil, in the wake of the Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth century. Tobacco also arrived in this period, but the evidence of smoking pipes in excavations in the eastern delta suggest the earlier use of other materials for smoking.

Internal trade across the Niger Delta and into the hinterland in large canoes is reported in the oral traditions and confirmed by the linguistic evidence of the antiquity of the word for “canoe” in local languages. But the trade itself resulted in part from other changes triggered by migrations from the freshwater delta into the mangrove swamp regions of the eastern delta. These communities changed from reliance on farming and fishing, to depend on fishing and salt manufacture, and later, to trading to other ecological regions and the hinterland for food and livestock. These small fishing communities gradually changed into trading communities developing institutions for long distance trade. They became larger and more complex societies with the arrival of Europeans and the slave trade, from the incorporation of new members. In addition, the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few leaders was decisive in the creation of the “city-states” of Nembe, Kalabari, Bonny, and Okrika in the eastern delta. The internal trade expanded by the effects of the sixteenth century slave trade created the conditions for the creation of the well-known war-canoe “houses” or trading corporations of these city-states.

The Portuguese are reported to have made formal contact with the Oba of Benin in 1486 (Ryder, 1969). This suggests that they had begun to conduct business in the western delta on the Benin, Escravos, and Forcados Rivers before about 1480. There is evidence of such early trade in the eastern delta at Bonny and possibly at Elem Kalabari on the Bonny and New Calabar rivers,



The Niger Delta and hinterland, sixteenth–eighteenth centuries.

the combined estuaries of which the Portuguese named Rio Real (Royal River). Indeed, the names of the rivers opening into the Atlantic provide obvious evidence of the early arrival of the Portuguese in the Niger Delta, where they even began missionaries activities at the western delta state of Ode Itshekiri. The oral traditions record their early impact identifying all subsequent white visitors by a name associated with the Portuguese.

The slave trade made the delta states the middlemen between the visitors on the coast and the hinterland communities. Accordingly, slaves representing virtually all ethnic communities of Nigeria passed through Niger Delta ports to the New World. The oral traditions record the impact of slaves incorporated into local communities, and some internal enslavement of even delta communities. But it has only recently come to light that some Niger delta peoples were also exported to the Americas. The evidence comes from the study of the Berbice Dutch Creole of Guyana, which incorporates words identifiable from many communities of the eastern Niger Delta, but predominantly from Kalabari, Ibani (Bonny) and Nembe (Smith, Robertson, and Williamson, 1987). This confirms the general reports in the oral traditions and in the accounts of visitors to the Niger Delta of piracy and other internal forms of violence, a great deal of which derived from domestic and overseas slave trading. These, indeed, were some of the conditions which promoted the formation of the trading and fighting corporations of the delta states, which themselves engaged in slavery, but also needed to enforce peace along their trade routes, the hinterland markets, and in their own communities. The food crops

exchanges between the region and the Americas, and a few internal enduring institutions, constitute the legacy of the slave trade in the Niger Delta.

E. J. ALAGOA

See also: Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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Niger Delta and Its Hinterland: Peoples and States to 1800

The Niger Delta covers, at its maximum extent, territory extending from its northern apex on the Niger River, south of latitude six degrees north, to near latitude four degrees north at the coast. Along the coastline, it extends from close to longitude four degrees east and longitude eight degrees east. This triangle with a wide base is populated by peoples in the modern Nigerian states of Ondo on the west, where the delta merges into the Lagos lagoon, Delta state, Bayelsa state where the delta pushes farthest into the Atlantic ocean, and Rivers state in the east, where the delta merges into coastal creeks extending through Akwa Ibom state in the Cross River valley. The Niger Delta has expanded and contracted in the past ten millennia through the transgression and regression of the Atlantic.

The Niger Delta is relatively diverse in its ethnic composition. It is settled by the related linguistic families of Ijoid, Yoruboid, Edoid, Igboid, and Delta Cross. The internally diverse Ijoid group covers all ecological zones of the Niger Delta from the coast from the eastern to the western periphery, and north to the apex. The Yoruboid group is located in the western delta adjoining the Lagos lagoon and the Yoruba mainland in southwestern Nigeria. The Edoid communities entered the Niger Delta from the northwest in the direction of Benin, the most common place of origin cited in the oral traditions of Niger Delta peoples. The Igboid communities occupy the regions east and west of the apex, and the Delta Cross group lies within the eastern delta periphery. Indeed, the Niger Delta became increasingly integrated in the course of the last millennium.

The Ijoid group is estimated to have separated from the Yoruboid, Edoid, and Igboid, and moved into the Niger Delta over seven thousand years ago, by apparently aquatic routes, down the Niger. The development of the group in relative isolation in the Niger Delta has resulted in its clear distinction from the others. It eventually subdivided into four major dialect clusters: Eastern Ijo (Kalabari, Ibani—comprising Bonny and Opobo—Okrika, and Nkoro), Nembe-Akassa, Izon (comprising scores of language communities in the western and central delta), and Inland Ijo (Biseni, Okordia, Oruma). The oral traditions of the more than forty ethnic/linguistic communities into which the Ijoid group has split over the past two millennia indicate movements outward from primary dispersal centers in the central Niger Delta. Thus, in the western delta, the Arogbo and Apoi Ijo communities live among Yoruboid communities in Ondo State, and the Olodiana, Furupagha, Egbema, and Ogbe Ijo live among Edoid and Yoruboid. Similarly, the Inland Ijo of the central Niger Delta live close to Delta Cross communities.

The Ilaje and Ikale of Ondo State and the Itsekiri of Delta State constitute the major representatives of the Yoruboid group in the Niger Delta. They entered the western delta from the west less than two thousand years ago. Itsekiri traditions relate a more recent migration of Benin princes within the last millennium, resulting in the establishment of a Benin-type political state. The language of the Itsekiri has remained Yoruboid, and the people have had close enough relationships with the neighboring Urhobo and Ijo to have assimilated some of their cultural traditions.

Edoid communities of the Niger Delta comprise those classified as Southwest Edoid (Urhobo, Isoko, Eruwa, Okpe, and Uvbie/Effurum of Delta State), and Delta Edoid (Degema and Engenni of Rivers State, and Epie-Atissa of Bayelsa State). Oral traditions among some of these communities claiming migration from Ife, Igboid, and Ijoid areas must refer to relatively recent times or the entry of small numbers of immigrants. The majority of these groups have remained in the northern peripheries of the Niger Delta, but a few have penetrated deeper into the delta or moved across it into the central and even the eastern Niger Delta.

Igboid communities of the Niger Delta (Ika and Ukwuani of Delta State, Ndoni, Egbema, Ogba, Ikwerre, and Ekpeye of Rivers State) represent movements southward from more northerly locations. Claims among the Ogba and other Igboid communities to migration from Benin must refer to secondary movements of population. Test archaeological excavations at Ali-Ogba and neighboring sites suggest that the settlements in the northern Niger Delta hinterland took place over a thousand years ago.

The Delta Cross is made up of Central Delta (Ogbia, Abua, Oduai, and others of Rivers State), the Ogoni (Khana, Gokana, Eleme, Ogoi, and Babbe of Rivers State), and Lower Cross (Obolo/Andoni of Rivers State, and the Ibeno, Ibibio, and Oron of Akwa Ibom State). These peoples of the Cross River valley moved into the eastern Niger Delta periphery in the last two thousand years. The Obolo tell of migration from as far east as the Cameroon republic.

Processes of integration among these diverse groups were assisted by environmental factors, since the goods and products of the Niger Delta complemented those of the hinterland. Thus, Niger Delta traders traveled as far north as the Niger-Benue confluence at Lokoja, exchanging dried fish and salt for the yams and other agricultural produce of the Igbo, Igala, Nupe, Hausa, and other groups. An external dimension was added to this dynamic situation with the arrival of European adventurers, traders, and missionaries from the end of the fifteenth through the nineteenth century. The Niger Delta peoples became middlemen in the transatlantic triangular trade between Africa, Europe, and the Americas, first in slaves, principally, and then in palm oil and kernels, from the late eighteenth century.

State formation in the Niger Delta was fueled by diffusion from such hinterland centers as Benin, Aboh, and possibly, the Igala polity of Idah, and from internal dynamics, assisted in the final stages by the impact of the overseas trade. The Itsekiri kingdom at Ode Itsekiri or Iwere served as the surrogate for the Benin Empire inside the western Niger Delta. The eastern Niger Delta city-states of Nembe (Brass), Elem Kalabari (New Calabar), Bonny, Okrika, and Opobo (from about 1870), provide examples of the development of state systems from internal Niger Delta factors.

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See also: Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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
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Niger: Nineteenth Century: Survey

Niger consists of two historically separate, though complementary, regions. The northern two-thirds, arid and hot, were inhabited by nomadic peoples, mostly Tuareg. The more fertile south was home to different peoples whose political center lay outside of Niger's borders. At the end of the nineteenth century, the French conquered the region in order to prevent the British from interfering with its trade with Côte d'Ivoire.

For most of the nineteenth century, the northern regions changed little. The Tuareg roamed freely, in harmony with the foraging needs of their herds, and benefiting from the preservation of their lucrative trans-Saharan trade routes, the easternmost of which ran northward from Lake Chad to Bilma (now in Niger) and through the Fezzan region to Tripoli. Their fiercely independent clans never formed a centralized government. The closest they came was creation of temporary loosely organized confederations, when they felt that their life style was endangered. Throughout the century the Tuareg continued expanding southward, probably driven by worsening droughts that destroyed oases between Lake Chad and Kavar. While they maintained Agadez as a key trade center, they also developed a commercial base in Niamey.

The southern and more fertile part of Niger traversed for a distance of about 350 miles by the Niger River in the west, and abutting on Lake Chad in the east, was populated by a variety of agriculturalist sedentary groups, either connected to states outside of Niger, or refugees from events which occurred beyond Niger's borders. The area was inhabited by Zerma in the west, mostly descendants of Songhai inhabitants of the Malian Empire, Kanuri in the east, which constituted an important province of the empire of Bornu in northeast Nigeria, and Hausa kingdoms in the center, either incorporating land on both sides of the border with Nigeria, or created by refugees from the south.



Niger.

Early in the nineteenth century, the Fulani jihad of Usuman dan Fodio, which developed in Hausa Sokoto in Nigeria, altered the status quo in all of southern Niger. Usuman's intransigent Islam was incompatible with the rule of the Hausa kings. By 1804 the situation was such that Usuman felt compelled to declare a jihad, with himself as an independent Muslim ruler.

The Hausa kings failed to organize a united front against the Islamic rebellion. Discontented Fulani and oppressed Hausa peasantry supported the jihadists. Within three years, almost all Hausa kings had been replaced by Fulani emirs, followers of Usuman. The core of the Sokoto caliphate consisted of the Hausa states of Katsina, Kano, and Zaria, together with the former smaller kingdom of Daura. Sokoto and Gwandu eventually emerged as the twin capitals of a new Fulani Empire.

Niger's population grew because of the influx of refugees. Hausa states were reborn in Niger. Thus, when after a bitter struggle Fulani led by Umaru Dallaji, overcame Hausa Katsina (1807) and Dallaji became emir, Hausa aristocrats fled northeast towards Damagaram (Zinder). Under the direction of Dan Kasawa, they settled near the boundary between Damagaram and Maradi.

This territory, then governed by Fulani Muslim officials as part of Katsina, had long been administered by Hausa under Hausa kings. A local Hausa administrator, Maradi Wagaza, had retained his post despite the Fulani conquest. Wagaza conspired with Kasawa to overthrow the Fulani. The Fulani were taken by surprise, the revolt spread rapidly and Kasawa moved to Maradi, where he proclaimed a renewed Hausa Katsina chiefdom.

Dallaji called for Bello's help against Kasawa who, supported by local Hausa and by Tuareg allies, counterattacked and freed a large section of northwest Fulani Katsina (1821). Maradi became a new Nigerian Hausa state, and with the support of adjacent states, continued to fight nearby Fulani dominions. For a long time neither side was strong enough to seize the other's capital and win a decisive victory, but they continued to raid each other's small towns. On the Nigerian side the British arrived at the turn of the century, just as the Hausa were about to overthrow the Fulani. The British instituted their policy of indirect rule, under which both Fulani and Hausa were supported equally. On the French side the colonizers concentrated on restoring order with their armed forces.

Meanwhile, at the eastern end of southern Niger, Sokoto forces had attacked the Kanuri empire of Bomu, the might of which was based on control of salt-producing sites and long-distance trade. The unforeseen consequence of the Fulani offensive was the creation of a new Hausa state in Niger. Peripheric Damagaram, initially a tributary of Bornu, was able to

gain independence. Based in the city of Zinder, it took control of much of the trans-Saharan trade from there.

Bornu itself fought on. By 1808 Fulani rebels and invaders had captured Birni Gazargamu, the capital, but the ancient royal family of Bornu founded a new Kanuri capital in Kukawa and restored Bornu's independence. Bornu had its own clerics. One of them, Muhammad al-Kanemi, challenged the Fulani's exclusivity on interpretation of Islamic law and inspired national resistance. By 1826 he was effectively master of a new Islamic state, though the traditional kings were maintained in office until 1846. When the king rebelled against al-Kanemi's son and successor, Umar, he was defeated and killed. Umar proclaimed himself the first sultan of Bornu. Gradually, on both sides of the border, Fulani and Hausa intermarried. Hausa, rather than Arabic, became the language of the region.

Two African conquerors brought their empire-building attempts to Nigerian soil in the late nineteenth century: Samori Touré and Rabih az-Zubayr. Both fought the invading French and lost. Neither left a durable imprint on Niger.

The French, who had first appeared on the scene in the late 1880s, concentrated their efforts on colonizing Niger. By 1903 they incorporated it into their Sudanic holdings and in 1922 declared it a separate colony.

NATALIE SANDOMIRSKY

See also: **Tuareg.**

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Niger: French Occupation and Resistance

At the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885) the territory of Niger was placed within the French sphere of influence. The actual borders of the colony were decided by diplomatic negotiations in Paris and London as much as by military advances in the contested territories. Protracted discussions, centered on a demarcation line between modern Nigeria and Niger, finally led to an agreement to draw a line from Say, on the Niger River southeast of Niamey, to Barruwa, east of Lake Chad, and assign control north of this line to France and south to Britain (August 1890). However, the agreement could not be implemented, as neither France nor Britain had accurate knowledge of the area in dispute.

The French considered the presence of Britain in the region a threat to French colonies on the Atlantic, for if Britain gained control of the hinterland, trade would be diverted to British possessions on the coast. Therefore, it was imperative to conquer the hinterland as quickly as possible. This was the policy of Eugène Etienne, under-secretary of state for African colonies in Paris. He formulated the Chad Plan, based on the reports of Captain L. G. Binger's expedition (1887–1889) which proved that the Kong mountains, supposed obstacle to penetration, did not exist, and hence access from the Niger Bend to the Atlantic coast was possible. The new plan postulated a joining of Algeria and Tunisia with the Congo, and of French West African possessions with those on Lake Chad. It directly involved Nigerian territory.

Etienne organized an exploratory expedition. He sent Lieutenant P. L. Monteil to evaluate the extent of British presence in Sokoto, lay claim to unoccupied lands by concluding treaties with indigenous rulers who were not tied to any European power by prior treaties, and make recommendations regarding the actual course of the conjectural Say-Barruwa Line. Monteil reached Segu in October 1890, and then made his way across the Niger Bend region. In Say he concluded a treaty with the local ruler (1891). Hence he moved on to Sokoto, concluded a treaty with the sultan, and continued to the banks of Lake Chad. He returned to France in 1893, via Tripoli.

Both France and Britain began maneuvering under the principle that occupation was the key to possession. The French established military posts in South Niger in the late 1890s, and while they continued negotiating, they also became engaged in military actions in the Niger region. The most formidable resistance they faced in southern Niger came from self-made leaders whose conquests had led them to the region: Samori Touré and Rahib az-Zubayr.

Samori had established his military and political control over territories in adjoining Mali. He was a talented tactician who understood contemporary warfare. He procured as many modern weapons as possible; trained his men to use them, repair guns, and manufacture bullets. He avoided head-on confrontations and being cornered in vulnerable walled cities and resorted to guerilla tactics. He had, however, focused on his African rivals and failed to see that the French were after possession of the territory, not merely commercial development. When he realized his mistake and attempted to make alliances with other African leaders, it was too late. The French had to fight a number of campaigns against him; it took them until 1898, but they captured and exiled him.

In 1899 the French intensified their military efforts. Their offensive in Niger provoked determined resistance

because of the comportment of the notorious expedition led by Captains Paul Voulet and Charles Chanoine, moving from Zinder to Lake Chad to join up with columns from north and equatorial Africa. Cruel and bloodthirsty, they seized food and supplies from drought-stricken populations, burned down everything in sight when met with resistance, and killed thousands. They conquered Damagaram and the city of Zinder, and plundered their way through Niger until they were finally killed by a mutiny of their own men. Under new leadership, the French column moved on to defeat Rabih.

Rahib az-Zubayr was a Muslim leader from the Nile Valley who had established a military empire in the districts immediately east of Lake Chad. By the early 1890s he had built a considerable force armed with light field artillery. He intended to move against the Fulani in Sokoto, but had to change his plans to stop a French column moving northward from the Congo. In 1900 his forces met the French on the Logone River, where his army was routed and he was killed.

This completed the French advance in West Africa. They had conquered a vast territory, and limited the expansion of Liberia and the British colonies. In 1900 Niger was made a military territory. It was then included in Senegambia and Niger (1903), which became Upper Senegal and Niger (1904), to be renamed the French Sudan in 1920.

While by the twentieth century the French controlled southern Niger, northern nomadic peoples, mostly Tuareg, resisted successfully for many more years. The Tuareg's unrestricted movements threatened French rule. The French sent a military mission into the Sahara to control and tax caravans. The Tuareg rebelled. French attempts to regulate them represented an attack on the existence they had led for centuries. They fought to maintain their right to roam freely in accordance with the needs of their herds, keep up their caravan trade, and safeguard their right to own slaves to cultivate their fields while they were engaged in their customary pursuits. Tuareg and French seized each other's animals, filled or poisoned wells, and destroyed crops. Due to the persistent Tuareg resistance, France did not occupy Agadez until 1904. There was one last serious Tuareg uprising in 1916–1917, a result of drought-caused famine, harsh taxes, and French recruitment of soldiers for World War I. The French had greater resources and help from Tuareg slaves. In the long run, the French were victorious. When defeated, many Tuareg fled to Nigeria. Civil authorities took over only in 1922, when Niger was made a separate colony within French West Africa.

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Niger: Colonial Period to Independence

It was for strategic reasons that France first established a presence in Niger, a country that borders on the Sahara, Lake Chad, and Nigeria. Foreign explorers had already penetrated the territory, the most famous being Heinrich Barth, and Niger had become a factor in the delineation of the French and British spheres of influence in the region. Their boundaries were first drawn along the Say-Baruwa line (August 5, 1890), but this was followed by a new delimitation (June 14, 1898) that favored the British. The signing of these two treaties was accompanied by marches into Chad by three major French expeditions, led respectively by Fourreau and Lamy, Voulet and Chanoine, and Gentil, and the first military posts were established from 1896. The occupation proceeded from west to east, then from south to north, and Niger came under military administration from 1901 to 1920. After numerous negotiations, France eventually obtained a more favorable rectification of the frontier under the convention of May 29, 1906, which was ratified in 1910.

The delineation of Niger's borders with the other French colonies went more smoothly. The border with Upper Volta dated from the creation of that colony, although in 1926 the districts outlined by Say were attached to Niger along with cantons in the Dori circuit. Thus, when the colony was dismembered (1932–1947), the districts of Dori and Fada N'Gourma remained attached to Niger until Upper Volta was reconstituted. By contrast, Niger's frontier with French Sudan remained imprecise, because of the problems surrounding pasturage and waterholes. The frontier with Chad had been fixed by the Franco-British convention of 1899, while the frontier with Algeria was fixed by the convention of Niamey (June 20, 1909), and that with Libya, first delineated in 1898, was modified in 1919.

Few Europeans settled in Niger, which was always inhospitable to them: there were only 513 there in 1926. This lack of personnel obliged the administration to secure a strong base among the traditional rulers. Despite the limited economic potential of the territory, the administration imposed taxes from 1906 and implemented a system of *prestations* (obligatory payments). Colonization induced profound disruption

in a society that was already fragile because of the vagaries of the climate. Famine struck in 1900 and again, on a larger scale, in 1913–1914, and on the latter occasion it stimulated significant migration southward.

When World War I broke out in 1914, the conquest was still not complete. Military recruitment in the zones that had been "pacified" affected 3,948 men (0.33% of the population), although between 31 and 75 per cent of them were found to be unfit for service. The territory also provided produce for the French war effort and was compelled to take part in fundraising. With the war, resistance to colonization, which had made its first appearance in 1899, became more widespread. There were two major uprisings: Firhun's and Kaocen's. Firhun declared a holy war and was supported by the Tuaregs: the repression that followed was brutal and intensive, reflecting the degree of disquiet that the uprising aroused. Firhun evaded the French but was killed in a clash between Tuareg groups on June 25, 1916. The uprising of the Kel Air took up where Firhun had left off but was also linked to the reoccupation of the Fezzan by the Ottoman Turks and to the activities of the Sanussiyya confraternity, which Kaocen, the rebel leader, had joined in 1909. A native of Damergou, he had gained the support of the sultan of Agadez. The major event in this second uprising was the siege of Agadez, which lasted for eighty-two days. Kaocen was taken prisoner by the Turks and hanged on January 5, 1919, while the sultan of Agadez, who was also taken prisoner, was strangled on the order of the Turks during the night of April 29–30, 1919. The Kel Air was devastated during these events.

On December 4, 1920, Niger was reorganized as a territory under civilian administration, and on July 1, 1922, it became a colony. The period from then until 1930 was marked by relative prosperity for an economy that continued to be centered on livestock, textiles, and foodstuffs. However, there was a major famine in the West in 1931, caused by the administration itself, which, according to official figures, led to the deaths of 28,867 people and the departure of 30,000 others. Meanwhile, education made very slow progress. There were only 1,892 children in schools in 1938. Medical services were also very limited. Niamey, which was not made the capital of the colony until 1931, acquired a hospital in 1926, and campaigns were launched against the main endemic and epidemic diseases, including smallpox, measles, meningitis, and trypanosomiasis. Niger once again passed into the hands of a military governor at the outbreak of World War II, because of its strategic location. In 1943 the levying of colonial taxes brought about another famine.

Significant transformations began in 1946 with investments by the Fonds d'Investissement pour

le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES; Investment Funds for Economic and Social Development), while political activity underwent a remarkable expansion. The Parti progressiste nigérien (PPN; Progressive Party of Niger) became a section of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA; African Democratic Rally), and during the 1950s three new parties appeared: the Union nigérienne des indépendants et sympathisants (UNIS; Niger Union of Independents and Sympathizers), le Bloc nigérien d'action (BNA; Niger Action Bloc), and the Union démocratique nigérienne (UDN; Niger Democratic Union). The UDN and the BNA then merged to form the Mouvement socialiste africain (MSA; African Socialist Movement), which joined in creating the Convention africaine [CAF; African Convention]. Djibo Bakary led the CAF to victory over the PPN-RDA in the territorial elections of March 1957. The creation of the Parti du regroupement africain (PRA; African Consolidation Party) then entailed a change of name for the MSA, which became a section of the PRA under the name Sawaba ("liberty").

At the Congress of the PRA in Cotonou, a minority led by Djibo Bakary, who became general secretary, announced that it favored independence. It held to this position at the time when the Communauté française (French Community) was being formed, and accordingly campaigned for a rejection of the proposal. The French government, working with the colonial administration, the PRA's opponents, who had funds from the RDA, and the traditional chiefs, resisted this trend and succeeded in changing several people's minds, so that only 22 per cent of those voting on the proposed Communauté voted "No."

The referendum was followed by a major crisis. Djibo Bakary and his government were forced to resign, leaving the way open to the PPN-RDA under Hamani Diori. Boubou Hama became president of the Assemblée nationale (National Assembly) and commissioned Hamani Diori to form a government, which then promulgated the constitution of March 12, 1959. Shortly before, during February, the budget submitted by Djibo Bakary had been rejected and the municipal council of Niamey had been dissolved. Faced with these new developments, Djibo Bakary chose to go into exile. Niger took part in the establishment of the Conseil de l'Entente (Council of the Entente) in May 1959, and it was within this framework that it called for the transfer of powers and attained independence on August 3, 1960.

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See also: **Tuareg: Twentieth Century.**

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Niger: Independence to Present

Niger gained independence in 1960 by letting its membership in the French Community lapse. Since then, the country has been the victim of military coups, transitional governments, revisions of its constitution, poverty, social unrest, and civil war.

The contemporary turbulent history of the Republic of Niger results partly from the French colonizers' strategically motivated decision to make a territory with insufficient resources into a separate colony, and then draw its borders without regard to ethnic distribution or traditions.

The peoples of Niger have historically adopted very dissimilar lifestyles because its lands lie in different climatic zones. The northern two-thirds of the country lie in or adjacent to the Sahara desert, and are populated by nomads. The southern third, particularly along the Niger River basin and near Lake Chad in the southeast, is fertile and inhabited by sedentary farmers. Essentially, all that Niger's main ethnic groups—Hausa, Songhay-Zerma, Fulani, Kanuri, and Tuareg—had in common when the French arrived was Islam. At that, their Islamic faith was often nominal and adapted by each group to its own ancient beliefs. Populations of the area shared neither cosmology nor societal structure but rather identified with people of their own ethnic groups in what are now neighboring countries.

In precolonial times, pastoralists and agriculturalists were often quite peacefully interdependent. However, frontiers, modernization, urbanization, and French administrations that divided the population into two distinct groups, nomadic and sedentary, favoring the latter, accentuated tensions. Some feuds, like those caused by political jealousies between two southern groups, the Hausa and the Songhay-Zerma, were only periodically important. Other disputes grew into major lasting confrontations which interfered with development of the nation of Niger. The greatest difficulties arose between the government and the Tuareg.

From independence on, the Songhay-Zerma, the first group to be exposed to French education, dominated the regime and the army, and attempted to centralize power and subordinate the Tuareg, to the point where they even outlawed public use of Tamasheq, the Tuareg language. The Tuareg were accustomed to being independent traders and roaming freely across the desert, in accordance with the foraging needs of their cattle. When the creation of national borders made transhumance illegal, and the development of new

trade patterns disrupted the activities of their desert caravans, they saw their way of life and their very identity in jeopardy. A proud and courageous people, hardened by survival under harsh conditions, they repeatedly took up arms against the government, disrupted life in Niger, and attracted international attention to their plight.

Independent Niger's first president was Hamani Diori, the Songhay-Zerma leader of the Nigerien Progressive Party (PPN), the local branch of the African Democratic Assembly (RDA), who consolidated his power and ran for president unopposed (1960). He favored traditional governmental structures and close ties with France. With help from a friendly French administration and favorable climatic conditions, he was able to rule over a period of relative political stability, notwithstanding a weak economy and ethnic conflicts. He was reelected in 1965 and 1970. In the early 1970s, however, severe droughts drastically affected crops, cattle died by the thousand, famine ensued, and dissatisfaction spread. The revelation that international emergency aid had been misappropriated by cabinet ministers accelerated the end of Diori's rule. The military overthrew and arrested him in 1974.

A Supreme Military Council (CMS) assumed power under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Senyi Kountché, who had engineered the coup. It suspended the constitution, replaced the legislature with a consultative National Development Council, and outlawed political parties. Kountché's first concern was to provide relief to the drought-stricken areas. He gave aid directly to collectivized farms he organized. The elite, which he had bypassed, undermined his programs, but then uranium mines were discovered in Niger. This unexpected windfall raised hopes for a better economic future; however only a few entrepreneurs made profits. Furthermore, soon global opposition to uranium mining depressed world markets. In the early 1980s, droughts returned and unrest resumed. Moreover the Tuareg, whom Kountché had alienated by ignoring their demands, had found a backer in Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. In 1985 the Tuareg, based in Libya, attacked Tchin-Tabarene. Kountché tried pacification and appointed a Tuareg secretary of state, but he fell ill in 1986 and died a year later, leaving problems unresolved.

Colonel Ali Saïbou, chief of staff of the armed forces, who had ruled during Kountché's illness, took over with promises of democracy and reform. He proclaimed a general amnesty for political prisoners, abolished the ban on political parties, and disbanded the CMS. However, he created a new ruling party and a new council to draft a constitution for the Second Republic. The constitution was approved by a popular referendum. Saïbou, the sole presidential candidate,

was elected. Democracy was far from being a reality; the military still ruled. Problems with the Tuareg came to a head. Saïbou promised financial aid and preservation of Tuareg culture, but nothing changed. Rebel attacks and general lawlessness continued. In 1990 the Tuareg launched an all-out assault.

More threatening than Tuareg rebellions were economic problems. In order to qualify for international loans, Niger had to accept structural economic reforms. The budget cuts these required provoked student unrest and union strikes. In 1990, under international pressure and the threat of bankruptcy, Saïbou tried liberalization; he announced that the constitution would be amended to allow political pluralism, promised less stringent austerity, and convened a conference, headed by noted Niger scholar André Salifou, to outline the country's political future. The turmoil persisted. The conference stripped Saïbou of his powers and elected Amadou Cheiffou, a civilian, caretaker of a transition government. Cheiffou obtained emergency loans from France and oversaw the drafting of a new constitution for the Third Republic, which established a multiparty system and direct presidential and legislative elections (1992).

Mohamane Ousmane became the first Hausa head of state by winning the presidency in free elections (1993). However, shortly thereafter, an opposition party won control of the legislature. This led to a prolonged stalemate and ultimately to Ousmane's downfall. Unrest resumed in the army and the unions. Social tensions were exacerbated by the devaluation of the CFA franc. In 1994–1995 Ousmane negotiated with Tuareg groups and reached a peace agreement that provided for autonomous regions for the Tuareg, their incorporation into security forces and civil service, an amnesty for all fighters, and a law to accelerate decentralization so as to ensure the development of all regions of Niger. This success did not suffice to bring about political stability.

In 1996 a military coup under the command of Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, chief of staff of the armed forces, put an end to the long stand-off between Ousmane and prime minister Hama Amadou, which had paralyzed the government. Again the constitution was suspended, the national assembly dissolved, and a state of emergency proclaimed. A forum was convened to revise the constitution and electoral laws so as to ensure that the upcoming Fourth Republic would avoid repetition of past problems. The forum rapidly drew up a timetable for elections to appease international donors with whom Maïnassara needed to resume negotiations. Elected president in 1996, Maïnassara sought to improve the economic situation by developing regional cooperation and trade between African states. The country was comparatively quiet for a couple of years.

However, the political atmosphere deteriorated as Mainassara solidified his hold on power. The legitimacy of governmental bodies was questioned. The army and civil servants held demonstrations demanding past pay due them; strikes proliferated. Further destabilization occurred when the president was assassinated by the palace guard and replaced by Major Daouda Maflam Wanke, the very man responsible for the assassination.

This unprincipled act alienated the international community, and in particular the French, who threatened to withdraw aid. As head of a fourteen-man National Reconciliation Commission, Wanke restored civilian rule. The draft constitution for the Fifth Republic envisaged a balance of power between president, government, and legislature. Peaceful elections took place in 1999. Mamadou Tandja, a retired army colonel originally from the southeastern region near Lake Chad, was elected. He promised to improve the conditions of workers and respect the principles of democracy. However, cabinet reshufflements and unstable relations with the Tuareg continued. Inhabitants still engaged mostly in subsistence farming. The few existing industries manufactured only consumer goods for local consumption. The transportation network remained inadequate, and the trade balance was in deficit.

But there are hopeful signs. Responsible administration has been able to secure debt reduction from foreign lenders. A 3 per cent inflation and a 4 per cent growth in Niger's GNP are foreseen for 2001. The government is improving sanitary conditions and attempting to raise the literacy rate, still around only 35 per cent. Tandja has joined leaders of neighboring nations to address problems regarding dramatic reductions of the Niger River's and Lake Chad's water level due to droughts and population growth, he has worked with the World Solar Commission hoping to harness solar energy to alleviate Niger's energy crisis. There are also signs of an awakening of national pride manifested by greater interest in preservation of the cultural and artistic heritage.

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See also: **Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi.**

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
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Niger Mission: See Crowther, Reverend Samuel Ajayi and the Niger Mission.

Nigeria: British Colonization to 1914

The palm oil trade, which slowly replaced the slave trade by the 1850s, flourished and attracted more British merchants, mostly from Liverpool and Manchester. Although official presence was questioned when, in 1865, a parliamentary committee of the House of Commons suggested the slow withdrawal from the region, the formation of the United Africa Company (UAC) by Taubman Goldie, a former army officer, strengthened the informal empire of Great Britain in the region of the Niger delta. Lagos became a flourishing trading post on the coast, nearly reaching self-sufficiency by the 1870s, as desired by the metropolitan colonial government. At the same time, the earlier neglect of the town's infrastructure development would eventually result in a series of crises and require enormous sums of investment to enable Lagos to become the new colony's capital.

International events paved the way for an expansion into the interior, and a subsequent rivalry with other European colonial powers. In a series of events between 1882 and 1897, British forces of the UAC and the Lagos government marched against African forces in Yorubaland and the Niger delta. In 1897 the Benin punitive expedition put down the last remaining major opposing force in the south, although total subjugation of small enclaves was not completed until World War I. The northern war of conquest was led by Frederick Lugard, who had been actively involved in local affairs first as a commissioned leader of a treaty expedition in 1894 to Nikki, then later as the main organizer of the West African Frontier Force, Britain's regional colonial army. The hostilities against the states of the Sokoto Caliphate between 1900 and 1903 clearly demonstrated the European technical superiority in warfare. It proved again the truth of Hilaire Belloc's satirical rhyme: "Whatever happens, we have got, the Maxim gun, and they have not." The first hostilities



Nigeria.

between Europeans and a state of the Sokoto Caliphate broke out when, following a series of diplomatic infiltration, Nupe was conquered by troops of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), the successor of the UAC. In 1898 a British resident was sent to Sokoto itself, indicating a possible move toward diplomacy. This changed altogether when Lugard took command of the British forces and completed the brutal war in three years. The Battle of Burmi in 1903 is often seen as an unnecessarily brutal ending of the campaign that resulted in the death of over 600 people, most from the Fulani aristocracy.

Although the UAC received a royal charter and became the RNC in 1886, its rule lasted only until 1900, when the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was formed. With the colony of Lagos and the Northern Nigerian Protectorate, the three Nigerias represented distinct administrations, problems, and approaches.

The oldest British settlement of Lagos, with a population of more than 40,000 people, presented a highly sensitive African intelligentsia with critical voices toward the administration. Additional problems of urban sanitation only caused further concerns that were not solved, despite the presence of governors like William MacGregor, who tried to

address African needs and solve urgent issues of disease control and public sanitation, for example. His efforts and initiatives were often turned down by the Colonial Office as exaggerated, useless, and expensive. His only significant triumph was the building of the Lagos Canal and the draining of marshes around the town, which made further urban development possible.

The southern protectorate remained largely a trading enterprise. Many members of the company rule were accepted as administrators. Subjugation of resisting regions and peoples (especially the Tiv) presented a major problem for the southern protectorate. The different attitudes and composition of the administrative service could be traced through, for example, the neglect of African health issues prior to the amalgamation of Lagos and the eastern territories in 1906. For example, free quinine distribution for Africans against malaria was initiated as early as 1901 in Lagos, but it was an issue that surfaced in the east only after 1906. The most important figure after the 1906 amalgamation was Walter Egerton, who was the governor of the region up to 1912. His activities can be described as “anti-native” policy, especially against the Lagos intelligentsia, as he

abandoned the earlier diplomacy and communication efforts, and took a more confrontational approach leading, for example to forced land expropriation in Lagos.

The north resembled a military occupation. Up to the eve of the amalgamation in 1914, the proportion of British officials remained the highest in comparison to traders or miners of the southern territories. The "empire's frontier" image attracted many young officials with upper-middle-class backgrounds who were among the first to enter the reformed colonial service, recruited on the initiatives of Ralph Furse from 1908. The region was a trial ground for the implementation of Lugard's policy of indirect rule (the practice of European colonial administration through retaining the members of the former ruling class of Fulani aristocracy). Although every effort was made by the administration to create a working system in the first years, the Satiru revolt in 1906 indicated that the British had to plan their rule more carefully. Following this event, the relationship between the local elite and the officials started to improve, and a balance of power was achieved.

Successful taxation on imports resulted in a large surplus of revenues in the south, a major reason for the amalgamation of the two southern regions in 1906 and later, with the return of Lugard in 1912, the north and south. By this time, the colony had developed into the most important tropical colony of Great Britain in Africa. Out of the 1,399 Europeans serving in the colonial service in Africa, 622 were employed by the government of Nigeria in 1914, a figure that was to rise in later years.

LÁSZLÓ MÁTHÉ-SHIRE

See also: Benin Kingdom: British Conquest, 1897; Delta States, Nineteenth Century; Igboland, Nineteenth Century; Lagos Colony and Oil Rivers Protectorate; Royal Niger Company, 1886–1898; Yoruba States: Trade and Conflict, Nineteenth Century.

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Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, and "Indirect Rule"

Although relations in the forms of treaties between the Sokoto Caliphate and the British National Africa Company reached back as far as 1885, the actual conquest of the Caliphate did not begin until 1897 when the troops of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) defeated southernmost parts of the caliphate, Nupe and Ilorin. While this was still not a formal conquest, as the RNC was a private commercial enterprise, in 1900 the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) marched against the caliphate. Hostilities lasted up to 1903 with the final battle of Burmi, where the troops of Sokoto were defeated.

The British troops, comprised mostly of recruited Hausa soldiers of the WAFF (with a handful of European officers) were led by Frederick Dealty Lugard. Born in India in 1858, he entered military service early, serving in the 1879 Afghan, the 1885 Sudan, and the 1886 Burma wars where he acquired some considerable military experience. He joined the service of chartered companies first in East Africa, then in 1894 in Nigeria. In 1897 Chamberlain commissioned him to organize the British imperial fighting force, the WAFF, in West Africa to withstand the growing challenge of other European powers and opposing African forces. By the time of the Sokoto war, Lugard had become known as the foremost figure of frontier wars and a successful organizer. He became the high commissioner for Northern Nigeria, where he remained until 1906. He returned there from his Hong Kong governorship in 1912 to amalgamate the south and the north, a task that was implemented by 1914. He retired in 1919 to serve various imperial positions in Britain, including the country's representative for the League of Nations' antislavery commission.

The form of rule initiated and implemented by Lugard in northern Nigeria is known as "indirect rule," a form of government recognized as the predominant political philosophy behind British colonial administration in the first half of the twentieth century. While in 1898 there were 156 British officials and only about 10 non-officials north of the Benue-Niger axis, in 1914, there were 543 officials present out of the total British population of 969 in the region. Following World War I, the number of officials in government service dropped to 399, while non-officials were well over 1,000 in 1920. This relatively low number of administrators oversaw a region populated by an average of 54,000 Africans.

The mode of administration was based on the resident system, where African emirs and chiefs met with

British officers who acted as political advisors. The African leaders, who partially oversaw tax redistribution as well as legal affairs, retained a large amount of autonomy. Native treasuries, with British financial control, were responsible for local government fiscal policies and budgets. Autonomy applied to the British officers as well, although in a different sense. The image of Northern Nigerian service in the first two decades of the twentieth century typically presents a lonely officer, on tour most of the time, and responsible for various challenging duties, such as the suppression of slavery, road construction, and tax collection. Touring the administrative region was one of the most important ways of exercising colonial authority. The district officer was required to visit the villages of his district as a means of acquiring information about the state of the settlement. Lugard's blueprint for indirect rule, a book he wrote in 1922 (*The Dual Mandate*) describes this complex task.

The role of slavery has received some detailed analysis, suggesting that the initial British administration had an ambiguous role in maintaining some forms of it well after the onset of colonial rule. Following the official abolition of slavery in the caliphate, a mass slave exodus occurred across most of the territory where the British appeared. Since the caliphate's plantation economy was based on slave labor, these events precipitated a huge economic and social crisis. The issue of slave women was especially contentious, as some of them decided to remain in the service of their former masters, not opting for personal freedom. It was only the League of Nations' intervention that finally focused attention, and consequently a firm policy on the issue of slavery.

Another aspect of social change that occurred almost immediately in northern Nigeria was urbanization and growth of new metropolitan centers. Although initial selection for these places was "somewhat arbitrary," as Governor Bell remarked on Zungeru in 1910, by the early 1920s most of these colonial centers, especially Kaduna, functioned as commercial and railway junctions. Colonial town-planning also had aspects of paternalistic indirect rule; the applied principle was sanitary segregation that had its roots in a misconceived imperial medical idea of malaria prevention.

Urban-based economic circles had high expectations regarding the prospects of northern Nigeria. Cotton growing increased the region's economic viability, following the opening of the railway in 1911, due to a sudden boom in groundnut export, largely from small-scale farms. Colonial financial policy adopted the principle of direct taxation that had been widely used by the ruling Fulanis. Although it was a relatively successful policy, the large financial requirements resulted in a continuous deficit. This was one of the main reasons

why Lugard initiated the amalgamation of southern and northern Nigeria upon returning to West Africa in 1912, a task that was completed by early 1914.

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Nigeria: World War I

As a colony of Britain, Nigeria was drawn into World War I, forced to experience the anticipation of fear that came with it as well as the adjustment to the withdrawal of German commercial houses, the slump associated with the shortage of shipping, and the demand for resources to meet war necessities. The war did not last long enough for Nigerians to mobilize against the British, but the period witnessed a number of protests and the rise of an anti-imperialist ideology.

The country was loyal to the colonial administration headed by Lord Lugard, the first governor general, but not without some protests in the south. Even in the newly conquered areas in the north, opposition was rather subdued, in spite of attempts by the Ottoman caliph to rally all Muslims. The exploitative nature of colonial rule was still unfolding or yet unfelt in many places and therefore did not warrant widespread protest. The chiefs and kings saw no need to protest a system that was allowing them to consolidate and preserve their powers. Even the educated elite supported the war and were not yet in a position to build behind themselves a mass following. As far as the majority of the population was concerned, they knew too little about the war to raise much concern, although they did respond to changing economic fortunes.

Nigeria fulfilled three major war aims. First, it supplied much-needed raw materials. Second, it supplied manpower about 30,000 men from British West Africa. By and large, recruitment was done on a voluntary basis and was not large enough to create any population loss or social dislocation. The soldiers fought in the Cameroons and East Africa, and they returned home to put down local rebellions in Abeokuta. Third, colonies were expected to adjust their expenditure to ensure that Britain had adequate funds to prosecute the war.

Contributions, however small, were expected for the Prince of Wales' National Defense Fund.

While no battle took place in Nigeria, the country was not far away from volatile events in the German colonies of Togo to the west and Cameroons to the east, where wars were fought on African soil. The British and French took Togo and German Cameroons. The German community in Nigeria was interned, and its members later taken to England. Initially, the withdrawal of German firms in the cash crop export business created some hardships, but a rapid recovery followed as Britain and France increased the demand for war-time needs. Where a decline in cash crop exports was recorded, it did not devastate the economy, still largely dependent on food production.

The war was not, however, without its impact on the people and the course of future history. Of immediate consequence was the economic dislocation and disruption of trade. The trade with Germany, a primary importer of cash crops, had to be terminated. Germany was the biggest importer of palm kernels, in addition to large quantities of other items. Local trading elites preferred the Germans to the British, because credit terms were more generous. Alternative markets had to be found for groundnuts, cocoa, and palm products. Also, German imports had gained credibility among the people for their durability and quality, so substitutes, too, had to be found. For some periods, prices of exports fell while that of imports rose, fueling complaints in a number of quarters. However, as groundnuts and palm oil were of great importance as wartime needs, their prices actually increased, although the combines formed by British trading firms exploited the situation to their advantage. Among other economic consequences were the rivalry between foreign companies and local ones, unemployment, a halt to development projects, and inflation.

The major political impact of the war included security threats posed by Germany in Cameroons, the fear of insurrection, the possibility that a jihad could follow any support for Turkey, and the revolts that greeted the introduction of the system of indirect rule.

New ideas spread among the Nigerian troops who served in the British army. They acquired a better knowledge of Europeans and other places, thus broadening their minds. For a number of the soldiers and elite, the war cry of the principle of self-determination, that is, the right of different peoples to determine their affairs, was both appealing and attractive. Many naturally asked why this principle was not applied to them. The British feared that the failure to rehabilitate the discharged soldiers might create problems, since many of them had become accustomed to better living conditions. Lugard feared that Africans exposed to the use of guns and bombs and other knowledge might choose to use them against the British at a future time.

The transfer of ex-German colonies of Togo and Cameroons to the League of Nations, which then gave them to Britain and France in a mandate system, created a so-called theory of imperial responsibility: the preparation of Africans for eventual self-government and the idea that Africa should supply its raw materials in exchange for "civilization."

There were rebellions, some a direct result of the war, some against the introduction of indirect rule to the south, and others in the form of anticolonial resistance. Other causes of protests included the depleted British administration that lacked the resources to maintain security as well as economic recession, unemployment, and a number of war-time high-handed policies. In the Niger delta, a religious leader, Prophet Elijah II, was able to rally hundreds of people against the British. A decline in palm-oil exports and the hardship that followed drew to Elijah followers who expected that a German victory in the Cameroons would bring independence and prosperity to them. As the palm-oil trade revived, so too did Elijah see a decline in his popularity and the eventual collapse of his rebellion. In the east, parts of which were yet to be effectively occupied, revolts expressed resistance against the imposition of British rule. Among the Yoruba in the west, the introduction of indirect rule, which gave more power to the chiefs, created complaints and protests. Having been implemented in the north, Lugard extended the principle of local administration through the chiefs all over the country, in spite of different political and cultural systems. In the north, princes who had been denied access to power, Islamic religious leaders who resented the British, and the poor who were displeased with heavy taxation created their own revolts.

A protest of a different nature emerged from the educated elite, who had expected their loyalty for the British to be compensated by reforms and greater participation in a postwar government. A main voice during the period, the National Congress of British West Africa, had fully identified with British war aims, expecting the reform of the system of indirect rule, which had marginalized the educated elite. The disappointment instigated an agitation-based politics that gained momentum in future years.

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See also: Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, "Indirect Rule"; World War I: Survey.

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Nigeria: Colonial Period: Railways, Mining, and Market Production

Although contact between the Nigerian area and Britain dates back to the sixteenth century, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that Britain finally decided formally to colonize Nigeria. Throughout the precolonial and colonial periods, trade was the most important determinant of Anglo-Nigerian relations. In promoting her economic interest, Britain used both force and diplomacy in gradually bringing the different parts of Nigeria under its rule between 1861 and 1903.

The colonial era undoubtedly marks an important epoch in the modern history of Nigeria. Perhaps nowhere was the transformation of the country so dramatic than in the introduction of up-to-date means of transportation. Though not approaching its spectacular role in the industrial take-off of other countries such as Britain, Germany, and the United States, the railway system played a very significant part in opening up Nigeria to modern commerce. The British realized that the huge untapped or under-utilized natural and human resources of the country could only be exploited maximally through the provision of a relatively cheap, fast, and reliable means of transportation, which they found in the railway system. Railways stimulated mining and export crop production along their routes. Indeed, export expansion became the most obvious result of railway construction and a common justification for it as the twentieth century advanced.

Unlike other African colonies blessed with huge mineral deposits, such as Angola, Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, and South Africa, mining played a small role in the overall colonial economy of Nigeria. Apart from tin, the role of the other minerals like coal, columbite, and gold in the export sector was marginal. Tin was the first mineral deposit to attract any commercial interest in Nigeria. However, given the poor state of transportation until the extension of the railway to the mining areas of Bauchi in 1911, the Nigerian tin mining industry had very little hope of survival. Thus, just as in the case of cash crop production, the railway acted as a catalyst for the expansion of tin mining, especially on the Bauchi plateau. The export figures for the following years indicate an impressive increase in volume and value. In 1907, 212 tons valued at £25,265 (\$41,428) were exported. The volume and value rose to 12,069 tons and £1,373,466 (\$2,252,132) in 1930, respectively. By 1945 the volume and value had risen

to 15,166 tons and £3,129,265 (\$5,131,194), respectively. Destined to be a leading producer of crude oil, the production of the commodity by Nigeria only started toward the end of the colonial period.

Railways proved effective in transporting bulky export products down to the coast and in supplying imported goods to the people of the interior. This development witnessed an unprecedented expansion of trade, in terms of both exports and imports. Given the improved state of transportation, Nigerian producers responded to the growing external demand for commodities such as palm products, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, rubber, and tin. Export earnings from these and other commodities enabled Nigerians to purchase a wide range of imported goods on an unprecedented scale. Increased earnings also enabled the colonized people to meet their tax obligations to the colonial state. Furthermore, the occurrence of two world wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945) placed increasing pressures on commodity producers in colonies like Nigeria, since Asian supplies were seriously disrupted by the Japanese action in that part of the world during World War II.

The first railway in Nigeria, from Iddo near Lagos to Otta, was started in 1896. This line reached the river Niger at Jebba in 1909. The building of the railway from Lagos to the Yoruba heartland in the southwestern part of the country greatly stimulated the cultivation of cocoa for the export market. For example, while 305 tons were exported during the period 1900–1904, the volume had jumped to 102,379 tons in 1940–1944. Nigeria remained one of the world's major cocoa producers.

Starting from the coast toward the end of the nineteenth century, the railway eventually reached the commercial city of Kano in the hinterland in 1911. With the extension of the railway into the interior, the export of groundnuts from northern Nigeria, which was initially hardly anticipated by the colonial government, blossomed. As rightly pointed out by McPhee (1971), "The export trade of ground nuts from Northern Nigeria was a creation pure and simple of the railway" (88). Originally, the colonial authorities in Nigeria had envisaged that with development of a railway line from the coast to the interior, cotton would be the dominant export product of northern Nigeria. However, various factors such as the low price offered for cotton, high transport cost, and high local demand militated against the development of cotton as the principal export at the initial stage of the railway's arrival in the north. Instead, groundnuts, being both a food and cash crop, became the producers' crop. While 475 tons were exported in the period 1900–1904, the volume had increased to 181,901 tons in the period 1940–1944. Nigeria remained the second leading producer of groundnuts after Senegal.

Palm products were among the oldest commodities exported from Nigeria to Europe. And with the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century, palm products became the most important export from the Nigerian area to Europe. The extension of the eastern railway line from Port Harcourt into the Igbo hinterland in 1913 facilitated the expansion of palm exports from Nigeria. During the period 1900–1904, 117,358 tons of palm oil were exported; between 1940 and 1944, the figure stood at 284,889 tons.

In the 1910s and 1920s, Nigerian cocoa and groundnut exports accounted for about a quarter of all exports from Nigeria, although palm produce still supplied half of the total. Besides cocoa, groundnuts, palm products, and cotton, the production of other important commodities such as rubber, gum arabic, hides, and skins was greatly stimulated by the development of the railway.

YAKUBU MUKHTAR

See also: **Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy; Nigeria: World War I; Nigeria: World War II.**

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Nigeria: Colonial Period: Christianity and Islam

Christianity and Islam antedated the establishment of British colonial rule in Nigeria. Islam filtered into northern Nigeria from across the Sahara through the Borno Empire in the eleventh century and was introduced to the Hausa states to the west by Wangarawa traders, from Mali further to the west, by the fourteenth

century. By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the Hausa states and the Kanem-Borno Empire were officially Islamic in character. But from the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the outbreak of the Sokoto jihad opened a new phase in the spread of Islam in northern Nigeria and parts of Yorubaland to the south. By the end of that century, most communities in northern Nigeria had been incorporated in either of the major Muslim polities, the Sokoto caliphate, or the sultanate of Borno. The rest, the so-called pagan communities, maintained relations of conflict or coexistence with these states.

Christianity had been introduced to Warri and Benin in southern Nigeria as early as the sixteenth century but had not gained a strong foothold and was soon eclipsed. It was only from the late eighteenth century, following evangelical revival in England and the campaign against the slave trade, that Christian missions renewed interest in the evangelization of Africa. By the 1890s the Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Roman Catholics had established missions all over Southern Nigeria, notably at Badagry, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Onitsha, and Calabar. The religion made gains in large parts of southern Nigeria but did not in largely Muslim northern Nigeria.

By 1900 Britain had declared its rule over Nigeria. Initially, the British were hostile to the vanquished Fulani emirs of the Sokoto caliphate, a number of whom had resisted conquest militarily. But this changed when the British realized that the structures of the Islamic polities were indispensable to the success of their rule. The British, therefore, developed a protectionist attitude toward Islam, especially vis-à-vis Christianity. They allied with the emirs against a common threat: Mahdism, a brand of Islamic millenarianism. British preferential policy toward Islam was, however, limited to Northern Nigeria. It was not extended to Yorubaland, where the like of the Sokoto caliphate did not exist.

Most Muslims embraced the British when it became clear that they did not seek the overthrow of Islam. Nevertheless, there were hostile reactions to the new order, notably, *hijra* (planned withdrawal from the territory of the heathen), military confrontation, and Mahdist propaganda. *Hijra* and military resistance were demonstrated at Burmi in 1903 while the Mahdist challenge manifested at Satiru in 1906. Though Muslim resistance was crushed, the threat of Mahdism remained potent for the rest of the colonial period and drove the British and the indigenous ruling classes into a warmer embrace for mutual self-preservation.

Islam consequently spread phenomenally in northern Nigeria. First, with the establishment of peace under colonial rule, Muslim traders and scholars moved into the non-Muslim areas of northern Nigeria, plying

their wares and spreading their faith. Their literacy in Arabic and Hausa, and their association with commercial prosperity, made a positive impression on the pre-literate non-Muslim societies. The latter soon converted to Islam partly in order to join a wider commercial network and to share in its prosperity. Second, British officials strictly forbade Christian missions from establishing churches and stations within the emirates. This fulfilled their pledge to respect the sanctity of Islam and allowed Muslims to freely propagate and practice their faith unhindered.

Much more important was the colonial policy of placing non-Muslim communities under the emirates and appointing Muslims as their district heads. In time, Muslim control of commerce and the Native Administration (NA) system exerted pressure on non-Muslim subjects of the emirs who converted to Islam. The religion thus spread by peaceful means into areas where it could not be imposed by force in the previous century. Colonial rule had inadvertently achieved for Islam what the jihad had failed to do. Thus, the percentage of Muslims in the total population rose in Bauchi province from 50 per cent in 1920 to 75 per cent in 1952; from 74.9 per cent to 83.5 per cent in Borno; and from 43.5 per cent to 62.6 per cent in Ilorin, respectively.

In southern Nigeria, Islam did not fare as well partly because there was no corresponding colonial protectionism and partly because of the freedom granted Christian missions to operate in the region. Nevertheless, the government was sympathetic to Muslim rejection of Western education, which was seen as a ruse by the missions to proselytize their children. Government accordingly supported efforts by Muslims to establish their own schools so that their children could receive Western education without having to convert to Christianity. It gave limited grants and encouraged Muslims to develop curricula which integrated Western and Islamic education. The Ahmadiyya Movement, the AnsarUd-Deen Society, and the Anwar ul-Islam championed the development of Western education among Yoruba Muslims. The success of this blend of Western and Islamic education enabled Islam to hold its ground against the advance of Christianity in western Nigeria. The establishment of Muslim printing presses, increasing participation in the *hajj* (which exposed Western Nigerian Muslims to the wider world of Islam) and the distribution of Mahdist, Tijani, and Wahhabi literature also fostered the religious and intellectual growth of the Muslim community.

Christianity had made great inroads into southern Nigeria by 1900. Colonial rule, by enforcing law and order, enabled the Christian missions to spread into hitherto hostile territories. The defeat of the Ijebu in 1892 paved the way for the evangelization of that kingdom. The ability of the missions to offer Western

education and modern health facilities enabled them to win converts in many communities under the protection of the British flag. They pioneered the establishment of secondary grammar school education between 1859 and 1881 and later expanded educational facilities wherever they had a foothold. The translation of the Bible into many indigenous languages also gave a great boost to the spread of Christianity during this period.

The emergence of "African Churches" especially among the Yoruba, was a major development during this period. Africans who had been discriminated against in the appointment to church offices or had deplored the denationalizing doctrines of the European missionaries (on marriage and membership of secret or title societies, for example) sought to establish Churches devoid of unnecessary Westernization. Most major denominations experienced schisms leading to the formation of various "African Churches" which differed from the mission churches in doctrine and liturgy. Of significance were the "Aladura" churches in Yorubaland, which indigenized Christianity by introducing African music and instruments in worship, African chieftaincy titles in church administration, and the wearing of uniform dresses.

The role of Christianity in the establishment of colonial rule has been controversial. It had been argued that the religion had been the handmaiden of colonialism and had thereby reaped benefits from of this association. Although the missions supported British colonization of Abeokuta and Ijebu, for example, their consent or prompting was not decisive to the "forward policy" of the British, which had its own dynamics. In any case, in northern Nigeria, where Islam could better serve the ends of the colonial state, Christianity was kept out of the Muslim communities. Hence, while the missions supported the colonial government in their own interest, they did not hesitate to castigate the excesses of colonial officialdom as occasion demanded.

Christianity and Islam spread in different parts of the country and for different reasons during this period. Both took advantage of the presence of the British while inadvertently serving the ends of the colonial state. By the end of the colonial period they had become the leading organized religious groups in Nigeria.

AYODEJI OLUKOJU

See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to the World Religions; Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule; Sokoto Caliphate, Nineteenth Century.**

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Nigeria: World War II

Nigeria was involuntarily sucked into World War II (1939–1945), given its status as a colony of Britain. Britain's economic, industrial, military, and air power were weakened by World War I, and thus Britain was less prepared for a world war in 1939 than it had been in 1914. This, coupled with a quick succession of reverses in Europe, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, meant that Britain needed all the support it could muster from its colonies to prosecute the war. Nigeria, one of Britain's biggest African colonies, did not disappoint.

Britain mobilized Nigerian public opinion in its favor through assiduous propaganda. Hitler was demonized as “the harbinger of darkness,” and the war itself was presented to the public as between bondage, represented by Hitler, and freedom for humanity, represented by Britain and the Allies. Hitler's racist theories, his foul massacres in Poland, and the millions of Jews who died in his concentration camps and gas chamber made the oppressive and exploitative British colonial rule in Nigeria seem benign. Not surprisingly, Nigerians unanimously affirmed their loyalty to Britain and the cause of the Allies. Influential Nigerian political leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe and Herbert Macaulay, hitherto critics of British colonial rule, reversed gear and appealed to all Nigerians to “rally round the Union Jack.” Revered “royal fathers” used the influence of their esteemed offices to urge all Nigerians to support Britain and the Allies. The response was infectious, and seemingly overnight, win-the-war organizations mushroomed all over the country, propagating the gospel of a holy war against the force of Satan.

Verbal affirmation went hand in hand with concrete support. Barely a fortnight after the commencement of the war, the Nigerian War Relief Fund (NWRF) was

launched due to the urging of Sir Bernard Bourdillon, governor of Nigeria. The fund was for the provision of relief to victims of the war in Britain and other Allied countries. A national committee to oversee and popularize the fund was formed, and was backed up by local committees across the country. Thanks to the efforts of the committees, donations soon began to flow into the fund from individual persons and corporate entities in all parts of the country. Entertainments of various sorts were staged to raise money for the fund. Some people donated voluntarily, while funds were also squeezed out of local communities, civil servants, and other people in the colonial establishment through compulsory levies. Among the war relief and charitable organizations that benefited from the fund were those in Britain, Malta, China, Yugoslavia, Holland, Burma, Russia, Greece, Poland, and Finland. In addition to the NWRF, there was also the Win the War Fund to which Nigerians contributed substantial amounts of money. Some provinces made additional donations to Britain's war effort for the purchase of weaponry. The Nigerian government on its own part made substantial interest-free loans to Britain.

Nigeria also contributed to the Allies' war effort in regard to the supply of agricultural and mineral resources needed by British industries. The closure of the Mediterranean sea-route to Britain was compounded in 1942 when Japan seized the Far East island colonies. Consequently there developed a frantic demand in Britain for almost everything west Africa could grow and mine. To ensure accelerated supplies to Britain's war industries by her West African colonies, Britain dispatched a resident minister of Cabinet rank, Sir Swinton, to West Africa. Nigeria was penciled as a major actor in the scheme with especial regard to palm oil, cocoa, groundnuts, and tin. Subtle as well as coercive administrative measures were adopted to get Nigerian farmers to increase their production of the export crops even at the expense of local food production. The rationing of essential imports such as bicycle and lorry tubes and tires was manipulated in favor of traders in export produce, and local trade in foodstuffs was restricted. London also reversed its laissez-faire policy and set up the West African Produce Control Board, which it made the monopoly purchaser of British West Africa's exports. The board fixed the prices it bought produce from farmers invariably far below open market prices. About 1,800 unwilling laborers were conscripted into the tin mines of Jos under appalling conditions and at low wages. Against the poor returns for his produce or wage labor, the Nigerian consumer was faced with escalating prices of imports arising from wartime scarcity. The government tried to mediate the situation by controlling the sale of essential commodities, but the measures merely aggravated the situation.

Falling living standards and harsh sacrifices thus inflicted on all Nigerians estranged relations between Britain and Nigerians, but not to the point of considering Hitler as an alternative.

When Mussolini and Hitler effectively closed the Mediterranean to the Allies, Nigeria suddenly became strategic in the Allies' military calculations. The country provided the Allies with take-off points for bombing missions in North Africa and the Mediterranean front. Young Nigerians were hurriedly mobilized and drafted into various military and paramilitary construction projects such as airports, harbors, barracks, and railways. The rough-and-ready methods used in prosecuting the projects meant that the laborers were stretched to their utmost. Apart from the Nigerians who fought the war at the home front, there were 100,000 others who took part in direct combat and acquitted themselves heroically, in Eritrea, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Sudan, India, and, especially, Burma.

Inevitably the war impacted Nigerian in various ways. Excessive imperial direction of the economy estranged relations between ruler and ruled, evident in a series of protests by farmers, traders, and wage earners. The General Strike of 1945 was the most publicized of the protests. When Prime Minister Churchill denied that the principle of self-determination for all subject peoples, espoused in the Atlantic Declaration, applied to Africa, relations between London and Nigerian political leaders were strained to the limits. Nigerians, however, returned from the war imbued with a new confidence in themselves and with the aura of their colonial overlords shredded. During the war they had mingled with working-class, poverty-stricken, and barely literate Europeans, and they had killed many Europeans in the name of freedom and democracy. They started to question their own subject status and demanded a change in the status quo. It became increasingly difficult for Britain to deny freedom and democracy to Nigerians. The emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's leading powers—both anticolonialists—and the diminution of Britain as a world power weakened the cause of colonialism in Africa. The upshot of this was the radicalization of the nationalist struggle, which resulted in Nigeria's independence in 1960.

ONWUKA N. NJOKU

See also: **Azikiwe, Nnamdi; Macaulay, Herbert; World War II: North Africa.**

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Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence

Nigerian resistance to British rule began with the imposition of that rule, but the forces of nationalism really grew with the growth of the partially "detrified" educated elite, one of whose remarkable members, Herbert Macaulay, is widely referred to as "the father of Nigerian nationalism." Many have seen him as a collaborator with the Europeans, yet despite his Bechstein grand piano and his "stand-up collars of an irreproachable whiteness," Macaulay left his "European post" as Surveyor of Crown Lands in 1898 and became the foremost critic of the colonial government, which could never live up to his high imperial ideals. His influence grew through his championing of the cause of Eleko Eshugbayi of Lagos. His deportation in 1925 united the traditional and educated elite as never before, and Macaulay's six-year legal wrangle, which resulted in the return of Eshugbayi in 1931, made him into a popular hero.

Macaulay's ascendancy in Lagos politics is also shown by the formation in 1923 of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). A new constitution, which gave Lagos three elective seats for the first time, stimulated political activity in the capital. Two new political parties and five newspapers quickly made an appearance, but it was Macaulay's NNDP and his *Lagos Daily News* that prospered. Between 1923 and 1937 the party won all the elections for the Legislative Council and for the Lagos Town Council. It gained the support of the local aristocracy, the market women, the Muslim Associations, and the educated elite, thus translating modern political activity into traditional political language. Yet its

policy, which endorsed that of the National Congress of British West Africa (set up in Accra in 1920), was undoubtedly reformist, calling for reform within the existing system, and it is best considered as a proto-nationalist body. Furthermore, it made no headway outside Lagos, partly because Macaulay wished to dominate its affairs personally; and after the early 1930s, when Eleko Eshugbayi's return removed its major grievance, it was clearly in decline.

The initiative passed to the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), formed as the Lagos Reform Movement in 1934 to protest that the new Yaba Higher College did not have university status. The college enrolled only eighteen students in its first year, and the highest annual total over the next decade was thirty-six. The NYM soon dominated the Lagos town council, and in 1938 its candidates won all three Lagos Legislative Council seats. By this time it had a membership of 10,000, with twenty provincial branches. It also called for the eventual ending of colonial rule. But its practical program was reformist, and it held regular meetings with Governor Bourdillon to bring about piecemeal changes.

During World War II, which saw the escalation of nationalism in many colonies, the NYM ceased to function effectively. It split in May 1941 over the choice of a candidate to contest a vacant legislative Council seat, and by 1943 it was moribund. The initiative passed to Nnamdi Azikiwe, the American-educated editor of the *West African Pilot*, who in 1944 formed the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons with the veteran Herbert Macaulay. Azikiwe's 1943 "Political Blueprint of Nigeria" called for a fifteen-year period of preparation for independence. Nationalist activity now heated up. Partly this was due to a new constitution, which allowed for northern participation in the Legislative Council for the first time. Partly it was due to the repressive stance of Sir Arthur Richards, governor from 1943 to 1947, who failed to grant a cost of living allowance before extensive strikes took place and who wanted to reduce the influence of the educated elite. It was also a reaction to Azikiwe's insistence that he spoke for the whole of Nigeria.

By 1948 the situation deteriorated. The Zikist movement clustered around Azikiwe became increasingly violent; the radical Nigerian National Federation of Labour was formed; and the National Church of Nigeria proclaimed Azikiwe as the new messiah. On November 18, 1949, twenty-one miners were shot dead during a strike at the Enugu colliery, leading the Zikists to seek Azikiwe's support for a violence campaign of revenge against the whites in Nigeria. After a day's reflection, however, Azikiwe decided to repudiate violence, and after an unsuccessful attempt to

assassinate the chief secretary, Hugh Foot, the Zikists were banned. By this time the British had already announced that the Richards constitution would be revised, Nigeria having to keep broadly in step with reform in the neighboring Gold Coast. Violence would thus have been counterproductive. The door to rapid decolonization had been opened. But first the educated elite in Nigeria—who for so long had seemed to the colonial rulers out of touch with the masses outside the cities—had to learn to mobilize mass support.

The largely Igbo NCNC, strongest in the eastern region, was joined in 1950 by the Action Group, founded by British-educated Obafemi Awolowo from a Yoruba cultural association, the *Egbe Omo Odudua*, which was to control the western region, and in 1951 by the Hausa Northern People's Congress, set up by the Sardauna of Sokoto to prevent the better-educated southerners from gaining supremacy in northern affairs. Regional politics—and ethnic nationalism—dominated the political agenda. Nigeria's first general election was fought in the dry season of 1951–1952 between these three parties. It confirmed the dominance of each of the major parties in the region of its origin. The struggle for independence was now not so much against the British colonial power as between competing groups of Nigerian nationalists. What was at issue was the timing of independence and the form which a new self-governing state would take. That the road would be difficult was dramatically revealed by riots in Kano in May 1953, when at least thirty-six people, mostly Igbo and Yoruba, were killed. Henceforth Nigeria took the federal route. In 1956 the British sent out their last governor to negotiate the final hurdles to independence, which was completed in 1960.

ROBERT PEARCE

See also: **Azikiwe, Nnamdi; Macaulay, Herbert; Nigeria: Colonial Period: Federation.**

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Nigeria: Colonial Period: Federation

“Nigeria is not a nation,” concluded Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a front-line Nigerian statesman and scholar of federalism and constitution, “it is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’; the word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not” (*Path to Nigerian Freedom*, 47–48). The politics of federation are primarily designed to respond to the ethnic divisions in the country. A large and multiplural society, the difficulty of a direct government from one center in Nigeria partly dictated the choice of a federal system of government. Canada, Australia, and South Africa had provided a federalist model for the British, a way of keeping together disparate people. It was also a convenient politics of divide and rule, to prevent all ethnic groups from uniting against the colonial invaders, or of manipulating one large group against the others in order to gain some advantages. As the Nigerian experience unfolded, it became clear that federalism was an admission of disunity, the failure of integration, and the recognition of uneven development. The country officially became a federation in 1954, after seven years of experimentation with features of federalism and a long history of separate development.

The British conquest of Nigeria occurred in stages, leading to three protectorates, two in the south and one in the north. In 1906 the protectorates became two provinces, one each in the south and north. Both were amalgamated into one country in 1914 partly because



A native Nigerian transports a member of the Chicago Field Museum's Africa Expedition across a river in the 1930s. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

there was no artificial boundary between them, and in order to use resources in the south to finance the north. Both regions were different in their levels of development and culture. The educated elite in the south was more assertive, anti-British, sought a role in government, and simply assumed that it would inherit the mantle of power.

In spite of the amalgamation, differences in education, administration, and progress continued to divide the regions, while many British administrators continued to promote a policy of separate development. By the late 1920s, a model of federalism was being discussed, with the possibility of Nigeria being divided into four regions—the East, West, North, and Middle Belt, each with its own legislature and budgetary independence.

In 1946, Governor Arthur Richards took the first decisive step in the federation of the country. Without any discussion with the Nigerian elite, Richards divided the country into three regions, North, West, and South, each with executive, legislative, and financial powers. For him, Nigerians had different languages, culture, and customs, and Nigeria was “still far from being one country or one nation socially or even economically.” The 1946 constitution also created a Nigerian Legislative Council, to include representation from the North, although the body was purely advisory.

Although the elite and nationalists wanted unity, they had also come to realize after 1945 that unity would not work. Thus, from 1946 to 1954, debates about the form of a federal constitution were intense, but the idea of regional power was now taken for granted, with each developing at its own pace. The political conflict took a South-North divide: whoever controlled the center would determine the share of revenues and appointments and promotion to the civil service, police, and army. The political parties that emerged were regionally based: the Action Group (AG) controlled the West, the National Council of Nigerian and the Cameroons the East, and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) the North. After 1948, leading British officers served as umpires to mediate conflicts among the warring elite. Between 1948 and 1953, the Nigerian elite took the center stage in writing and modifying a federal constitution for the country, based on the assumption that regions and cultures were different. Debates and suggestions about the future of Nigeria reflected the tension between “nationalists” and “sectionalists,” and revolved around the timing of independence, the distribution of political power and federal resources, and the form of government.

Hostility was deep and bitter, with politics revolving around regionalism. The NCNC lost its national appeal, nationalism was now fractionalized, and ethnic-cum-cultural organizations became the basis of

political parties. Each region threatened secession, and the form that the federation would take became a matter of intense negotiation. At the Ibadan Constitutional Conference in 1950, the emirs of Kano and Zaria called for parity with the South in the membership of the Central Legislature if they did not want the North to secede. When the South demanded in 1953 that the country should become independent three years later, the North refused, fearing domination by the southern elite. A so-called enlightenment party by the AG to educate northerners ended in the Kano riots of May 1953. In the same year, the West threatened to secede if it was not given control of Lagos, the federal capital. Separatist tendencies were manifested in political cartoons, songs, and outright abuse of one another, as well as in policies and memoranda on the regionalization of the police, civil service, and judiciary. Forces of unity remained strong throughout the 1950s, laying the foundation for the crisis and eventual civil war of the 1960s.

The structure of Nigerian federation was faulty: there were three big regions, with the North as large in size and population as the two regions in the south combined. This anomaly made the fear of northern domination not just an imagination of the southern elite, but a real political threat. The northern region used its size and population to dominate the House of Representatives and the federal government.

Regionalism was enthroned, to the extent that it displaced nationalism. The regions were more powerful than the center. The leading political actors—Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, and Nnamdi Azikiwe—chose to be the executive heads of their regions and sent their deputies to the center.

Another defect was the difficulty of protecting the rights of minorities within the big regions. Each region comprised a big ethnic group and many minority groups. In the 1950s, as independence drew nearer and the dominant ethnic group gained more power, the representatives of the minorities began to form movements to demand political reorganization that would give them autonomy. These minorities complained of marginalization and domination. It was clear that the creation of additional states would have eased the problem; but only the AG was willing to tolerate the creation of the new states while the other parties and regional leaders were greatly opposed to the idea, thinking that it would undermine their contest for federal power. A commission was set up in 1957 to look into a series of complaints, but it accepted the imperfection of the federal arrangement, forcefully arguing against the creation of new states on the basis that they might not be viable, and that new minorities would actually be created within them. Better political management and time, argued the commission, would heal all wounds and the minority problems would disappear. If

regional leaders insisted on new states, concluded the commission, the date of independence would have to change, a condition that the anxious leaders would not accept. The defects in the federal arrangement were to lead to the instability and civil war of the 1960s.

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See also: **Nigeria: Colonial Period: Intelligentsia, Nationalism, Independence.**

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Nigeria: Conferences, Commissions, Nigerian Constitution: 1956–1960

The 1950s marked a period of decolonization in Nigeria culminating in the attainment of political independence on October 1, 1960. This decade witnessed the convening of constitutional conferences in Nigeria and Britain before each constitutional reform was promulgated. These conferences were characterized by divisive tendencies based on ethnic and regional rivalries. The division of Nigeria into three main administrative regions—north, east and west—each of which was dominated by a majority ethnic group, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba respectively, as well as the colonial policy of divide and rule, helped to accentuate ethnic rivalries.

The dominance of each region by a majority ethnic group resulted in a situation where the constitutional conferences were dominated by parochial and divisive issues that would favor each region and its dominant ethnic group as opposed to issues of national interest. Thus the contentious issues at the 1950–1951, 1953–1954, and 1957–1958 constitutional conferences included the percentage of representation of each region in the central legislature, revenue allocation, the status of Lagos, agitation for state creation by ethnic minorities and the date for Nigeria’s political independence. The 1954 constitution firmly entrenched federalism and regionalism in Nigeria and instituted the fiscal base of the regions through the regionalization of the marketing boards. This constitution established the institutional framework on which the independence constitution was based.

The period between 1956 and 1960 marked the final phase in the movement toward independence. It witnessed a number of amendments to the 1954 constitution most of which unfortunately intensified the strains and divisions between the different ethnic groups and communities in Nigeria. The first concrete step toward the granting of political independence to Nigeria was taken in 1957 when the western and eastern regions became self-governing in matters of regional competence. The granting of self-government to these regions was a compromise between their request for political independence for Nigeria in 1956 and the opposition to this request by politicians from the northern region. On March 31, 1953, Anthony Enahoro and Action Group (AG) member of parliament from the western region moved a motion demanding for self-determination for Nigeria in 1956. This motion received the support of politicians from the eastern and western regions but was opposed by politicians from the northern region who moved a counter motion that Nigeria should attain self-determination “as soon as practicable” rather than the specific date of 1956. This disagreement over the independence motion precipitated a crisis that led to the northern region threatening to secede from Nigeria. At the London constitutional conference of July–August 1953, politicians from the respective regions stood their ground on the self-determination issue. The British colonial authority therefore refused to commit itself to a date for Nigeria’s independence but agreed that any region that so desired could become self-governing in 1956: the western and eastern regions became internally self-governing in 1957.

Agitation by ethnic minorities for the creation of more states was a significant issue that dominated the deliberations of the 1957 and 1958 constitutional conferences held in London. Since these conferences were to prepare the final framework for Nigeria’s independence, the ethnic minorities were determined that their concerns be addressed. Since 1953 the ethnic minorities had become more vociferous in their demand for the creation of more states that would comprise the ethnic minority areas. The issue of state creation was raised at the 1954 constitutional conference but was not addressed because it was not included in the conference’s agenda. The 1954 federal constitution, which granted greater powers to regional authorities dominated by the respective majority ethnic groups, accentuated the agitation of the ethnic minorities. At the 1957 constitutional conference, the agitation by the minority ethnic groups for the creation of more states could no longer be ignored.

The Willink Commission was set up to examine the allegations and demands of the minority ethnic groups. The commission was charged with ascertaining the facts about the fears of minorities in any part

of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying the fears as well as recommending safeguards against the mistreatment of minorities to be included in the constitution. The commission could only make detailed recommendations for the creation of new states if no other solution could be found. It is clear from the terms of reference that the colonial administration was reluctant to create any new states in Nigeria.

The report of the commission, which, expectedly, recommended against the creation of new states and merely recommended policies for protecting the interests of minority ethnic groups, was presented before the 1958 constitutional conference. The representatives of the minority ethnic groups were very critical of the report while the leaders of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) who all along had been firmly opposed to state creation were very pleased with the report. The leaders of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) who would have liked to have seen more states created, largely supported the report. However, the leaders of the AG who had been ardent advocates of states creation, and in fact, made it a campaign issue in the past, stridently criticized the report. But because the colonial administration threatened that the creation of new states would delay the granting of political independence, the AG dropped its opposition to the report.

With the attainment of consensus over the issue of state creation among the leaders of the main political parties, the conference directed its attention to other issues. The north agreed to become self-governing in 1959 while it was agreed that Nigeria would become politically independent in 1960. The constitutional conference decided that representation in the central legislature should be based on population in place of the previous practice of parity between the north and the south. On this basis, the north had 174 seats in the legislature while the east, west and Lagos combined, had 138 seats.

The issue of revenue allocation was contentious in the 1950s (and has remained so in postcolonial Nigeria). From 1946 the introduction of any new constitution was accompanied by a review of the revenue allocation formula. The first of such revenue allocation commission, was the Phillipson-Adebo Commission of 1946, which accompanied the Richards constitution. The main disagreements between Nigerian politicians centered on the factors should be given more weight in allocating revenue. The west, and to some extent the east, placed more emphasis on derivation while the north favored population and size as the most important factors.

The Hicks-Phillipson Commission of 1951 was the first to attempt to spell out the criteria on which revenue allocation should be based. The criteria included derivation, needs, national interest, population, and

even development. It gave some weight to derivation by providing that 100 per cent of mineral rents and royalties be retained in the regions from where the minerals were derived. The Chick Commission, which was set up with the introduction of the 1954 federal constitution and the Raisman Commission of 1958, essentially followed the formula laid down by the Hicks-Phillipson Commission. However, the percentage of mineral rents and royalties to be paid to their regions of origin was reduced to 50.

In essence, the period between 1956 and 1960 marked the final phase of Nigeria's movement toward political independence. This period witnessed the organization of the final stage of constitutional conferences and the setting up of commissions that were to amend aspects of the 1954 constitution that essentially formed the basis of the 1960 independence constitution. However, two significant issues which were not effectively addressed by the conferences, commissions, and the independence constitution—the ethnic minority problem and revenue allocation—were to become sore points and the basis of some form of instability in postcolonial Nigeria.

J. I. DIBUA

See also: Nigeria: Federalism, Corruption, Popular Discontent: 1960–1966.

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Nigeria: Federalism, Corruption, Popular Discontent: 1960–1966

Nigeria's First Republic reflected the strong regionalism enshrined in the colonial MacPherson Constitution of 1951. As a result, federal governance relied on alliances and coalitions between political parties with deep roots in the country's three regions. The three

largest parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the east, and the Action Group (AG) of the west each depended on its home region's ethnic majority for support, and exploited local patronage networks.

The regions, however, had minority populations who felt their interests largely overlooked by the strongly ethnic characters of the three major parties. The NCNC was the most nationally oriented of the three major parties, and the most successful in attracting support outside of its regional base. Nonetheless, its mostly Igbo leadership alienated many non-Igbos in the east, who reiterated longstanding demands for a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state. Similarly, the western region's Igbo minority joined with other non-Yoruba groups in demanding a midwestern state separate from the mostly Yoruba west. And in the northern region, religion played a part as the largely Christian and traditional Middle Belt felt alienated by the close relationship between the NPC and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of the far north. This led to the formation of the Tiv-led United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), which agitated for a Middle Belt state. In Muslim parts of the north, opposition to the NPC came from groups like the Kano-based Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Borno Youth Movement (BYM) that appealed to subregional sentiments. Alliances (like the NCNC-NEPU and AG-UMBC pairings) tied the regions' dominant parties to opposition parties in other regions.

Each region also inherited the colonial Native Authority (NA) system of local government, which the ruling parties used to varying degrees to further their political goals. The NCNC and the AG each abused its power; the NPC, however, was particularly brazen in its use of NA police and local courts to harass and intimidate its NEPU, BYM, and UMBC opponents. In 1960, following UMBC electoral victories, violence erupted between UMBC supporters in Tivland and local authorities loyal to the NPC government of Premier Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. The "Tiv riots" lasted for four months, during which, authorities estimate, 30,000 houses were burned.

Since no party held a majority of seats in the federal House of Representatives, national power rested on a sometimes uneasy coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, into which the NCNC entered despite its longstanding partnership with NEPU, a rival of the NPC in the north. In Lagos, NCNC leader Nnamdi Azikiwe occupied the largely ceremonial office of head of state, while the NPC's Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa headed the government as prime minister. In 1962, under pressure from the coalition government, the opposition AG split, facilitating a political crisis in the western regional assembly. The NPC-NCNC government

intervened, and further eroded the power of the AG, which remained popular with many westerners. Then, in 1963, the federal government imprisoned AG standard bearer and opposition leader Obafemi Awolowo on treason charges. The federal government also created a mid-western region out of non-Yoruba portions of the west. The NCNC captured both a regional parliamentary majority and the premiership of the mid-west in regional elections in February 1964. Ironically, its victories came over the Mid-West Democratic Front, a party backed by the NPC, the NCNC's national coalition partner. Even as the NPC and NCNC excised the midwest from the west, they ignored demands for statehood in minority areas in the northern and eastern regions—regions they controlled, respectively.

Later that year, a major realignment of parties happened preceding national elections in December. The NPC broke its alliance with the NCNC and took as its major southern ally the new Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Dissident AG members and former western members of the NCNC had formed the NNDP after the 1962–1963 crisis, and the party controlled the western regional assembly. The NPC-NNDP alliance was called the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The NCNC joined with the AG and northern opposition parties to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

The national elections of 1964 were awash in controversy. In the north, there was evidence that the NPC had used the Native Authority system to hinder the registration of UPGA candidates. Further complicating matters was controversy over the results of the national census of 1963. Parliamentary seats were allocated on the basis of population, and historically the north had a 50 per cent share. The new figures gave the north more than half, leading to accusations from the southern parties of manipulation. As a result, eastern Premier Michael Okpara of the NCNC called for a boycott of the December 1964 elections. Prime Minister Tafawa-Balewa of the NPC ordered elections to go ahead, but many UPGA strongholds, including the east, did boycott. Not surprisingly, the election results in the other regions were favorable to the NNA, and the UPGA called for the government to throw them out. The federal parliament had dissolved before the elections, and, faced with a major crisis, President Azikiwe of the NCNC had the option of appointing a caretaker government; instead, in January 1965 he called for new elections in the east only, and invited the prime minister to form a new government, thus ushering in another period of NPC-NCNC coalition.

The west, however, was to remain at the center of events. While the NNDP had taken control of the western government from the AG following the

1962–1963 crisis, it had limited mass support, and imprisoned AG leader Awolowo remained a popular figure in the region. The buildup to 1965 western regional elections was bloody, with open violence between the parties and their supporters in the streets of western cities and the federal capital Lagos. The NNDP declared itself victorious despite what many saw as clear victories for the NCNC-AG opposition in most districts. As 1965 ended, fighting continued, and the NNDP government of Premier Samuel Akintola teetered on the brink of collapse.

Public confidence in elected leaders was at a new low. Local and regional politicians across Nigeria, in addition to members of the federal government, had stood accused at various times of patronage and financial improprieties. The chaos in the west combined with these factors to set the stage for the introduction of the military into Nigerian politics in January 1966.

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See also: **Nigeria: Biafran Secession and Civil War, 1967–1970; Nigeria: Army.**

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Nigeria: Army

The history of the Nigerian army started in 1886 just after the Royal Niger Company was granted a charter. The charter authorized the company to raise the Royal Niger Constabulary. This quasi-military power was used to enforce the authority of this early British colonial administration. When the British colonial government expanded its influence into the hinterland and consequently came into conflict with the inhabitants, the government found it necessary to increase the size and improve the training of these forces. In 1892 the Niger Coast Protectorate Force numbered about forty ordinary ranks, but by 1900 this force had risen to a battalion with the strength of nearly one thousand men.

In 1901 the various regiments and dependencies of Great Britain along the West African coast (Nigeria, and Gold Coast—now Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) were merged to form the West African Frontier Forces (WAFF). In Nigeria the WAFF had two regiments, one in the north and the other in the south. On January 1, 1914, on the day that the north and south

were amalgamated to form Nigeria the two WAFF regiments were merged. WAFF was changed to Royal West African Frontier Forces (RWAFF) in 1928. RWAFF became the Royal Nigerian Army in 1960.

Before 1949 there were no officers of Nigerian origin in the army. By January 1949, however, some Nigerian soldiers were selected for training as officers. Duke Basse was the first Nigerian to be commissioned into the Officer Corp of the Nigerian Army in April 1949. David Jemibewon (1978) asserts that out of the 250 officers in the Nigerian army in 1956, only 15 were Nigerians. While the officer corps had few Nigerians, the other ranks were overwhelmingly staffed with Nigerians by 1958.

Between 1958 and 1960, 82 per cent of the officer's corps was still British. However, with the assumption of ministerial control by the prime minister of Nigeria in February 1960, efforts were made to ensure that ordinary ranks were recruited from all parts of Nigeria. The prevailing regional recruitment quotas of 50 per cent from the northern Nigeria and 25 per cent from the western and eastern Nigeria was agreed upon when Nigeria took over the control of the military in 1958.

Efforts were also made to recruit university graduates into the military in order to raise the quality of the Nigerian officer corps and the image of the military. This attempt to improve the image of the military and to secure its loyalty to the government in power led to large increases in army pay. Nigerian troops were sent for training to the United States, Canada, India, and Australia, thereby abandoning the practice during the colonial period of having such soldiers trained only in Britain.

The strength of the Royal Nigerian army in 1958 was only 7,600. The general officer commanding of the army announced the plan to increase the size in May 1964 by about 2,900. Of the 10,500 in April 1965, only a little over 500 belonged to the officer corps, 330 of whom were of combatant status. After 1963, all battalions were commanded by Nigerians. The composition of the military after that time reflected an agreed-upon regional quota system. Nigerian soldiers were recruited on the basis of 50 per cent from the northern region, and 25 per cent from the western and eastern regions, respectively. The same quota system prevailed in the recruitment of officers. On attainment of a republic in October 1963, the army changed its name to the Nigerian Army. Many Nigerians were trained and commissioned as officers to replace the outgoing British officers. The Nigerian administration seems to have followed the British pattern in locating military institutions after independence. The Military School was located in Zaria (1960); the Nigerian Defense Academy (1964) in Kaduna; the Command and Staff College at Jaji (1973), near Kaduna; the

Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (1976) at Bukuru, near Jos; and the Nigerian War College (1992) in Lagos. The Nigerian War College is the only military institution in the southern part of the country. The preferential location of facilities has led to the northern domination of the army's higher ranks for the last twenty-five years.

Postindependence military intervention in Nigeria's politics started when late Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu led the first military coup on January 15, 1966. In the course of the first military intervention, four out of five of the northern senior officers, two out of six Yoruba senior officers, and one out of ten of the eastern senior officers also were murdered. Among civilians, the deaths were equally one-sided. Major-General Ironsi escaped the coup in Lagos and later emerged as the new leader of Nigeria after the federal cabinet handed power to him in an effort to restore order.

As a result, the distrust, riots, and bloodshed that took place in various parts of the country led to a counter-coup organized by northern officers in July 1966. General Ironsi's regime was short-lived. He and the then-western region military governor, Colonel Francis Fajuyi, were kidnapped and killed by mutinous troops in late July 1966. After several days of anarchy, Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon, an officer from the middle belt of northern Nigeria, emerged as the new head of state. The reasons for intervention conform with the "internal characteristics model," which suggests that one can explain military intervention in politics mainly by reference to the internal organizational structure of the military (Janowitz, 1964, 27-29).

During riots in September and October 1966, 30,000 Igbos were killed in the north, in a slaughter far beyond the scale of previous riots in May of the same year. The mass killings forced easterners from all over the federation to migrate in search of refuge. Colonel Ojukwu the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria in 1966 announced that the constitutional arrangements of the national government of Nigeria no longer represented a guarantee to the military government of the eastern region. Igbo lives and property could not be protected. The Igbos had lost confidence in a federated Nigeria and had no illusions about the chances of welding Nigerians into a single nation. Therefore, the Igbos seceded, and the consequence was a bloody and costly civil war that lasted thirty months, from July 1967 to January 15, 1970, and resulted in the defeat of the Igbo secessionists. The war was called the Biafra civil war.

Between 1967 and 1970 General Gowon directed the attention of the federal military government toward winning the Biafra civil war. In this process the size of the Nigerian military increased from its prewar level of about 8,000 to more than 250,000 men by 1970. General Gowon critics felt that he moved too slowly to curb

corruption, inflation, and economic mismanagement. Much of the profit from Nigeria's oil boom of the early 1970s was squandered or stolen, and the return to civilian government was delayed.

The government of General Gowon was overthrown in July 1975 without bloodshed while he was attending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Kampala, Uganda. The new regime was headed by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, with Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo as chief of staff, supreme headquarters and Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma as army chief of staff.

Within two months of assuming office, General Murtala Mohammed dismissed 150 military officers and 10,000 civil servants who were found guilty of corruption and abuse of office. Mohammed increased the number of states from twelve to nineteen and decided to move the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja. As a result, a group of army officers who feared for their own position attempted a coup on February 13, 1976. The attempt was unsuccessful, but General Mohammed was killed. His chief of staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, assumed power. As head of state, Obasanjo continued in the spirit of his predecessor. In October 1979, the military regime of General Obasanjo stepped down and ushered in a new democratically elected civilian government, called the Second Republic. On December 31, 1983, still another coup was staged by senior army officers, which brought the Second Nigerian Republic to an end.

The cost to the nation of military control of the government between 1966 and 1999 has been enormous, both in terms of professional preparedness and political stability and in loss of economic growth. The large number of coups and plots, abortive and successful, and their aftermaths, have made internal discord within the armed forces widespread. During the Babangida, Abacha, and Abubakar regimes the Nigerian army experienced constant purges, reshuffles, trials, and executions. These drastic actions have shaken the officer corps. The most notorious episodes after the abortive Vasta coup of 1985, the failed revolt in 1990, and the alleged conspiracy of 1995, prompted the execution of more than ninety officers and jail terms for many others. The Nigeria army has dismissed or forced the retirement of more than 350 officers since 1995, including sixty-four air force officers sacked in mid-1997. The chiefs of army and naval staff were dismissed in 1995, and the following year military administrators in the thirty-six states were relieved of their positions. The practice, inherited from the British, of retiring expensively trained military officers at the relatively young age of between forty and forty-five years has led to a decay in the nation's military readiness as well as being an enormous loss of funds to the Nigeria economy. In 1999 after only a few weeks in

office, Obasanjo retired more than 100 senior military and police officers that had held political positions in previous regimes. The Nigerian army has now become an institution where officers raise money to seek political positions. The military management style has been such that they would use the nation's money to buy off members of the armed forces who were potential rivals as well as the civil elites who would otherwise be clamoring for early return to civil rule. Nusakhare Isekure (1998) nicely describes the Babangida and Abacha regimes as those that used the most brilliant scholars to write speech using philosophical prose which the head of state themselves did not understand. In fact the Babangida and Abacha regimes could both be classified as periods of intellectual fraud, with characteristics of intellectual criminality.

Delegates from President Obasanjo's administration recently signed a contract with the United States military to help harmonize the Nigeria military into a more professional force that would respect the ongoing democratic process in the nation. The United States Military Professional Resource Initiative (MPRI), a private consultancy organization manned by retired U.S. senior military officers, has been mandated by the U.S. government to reorientate and reorganize the Nigerian military following the return to democracy in 1999.

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See also: Nigeria: Military Rule, 1983–1999.

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Nigeria: Gowon Regime, 1966–1975

On January 15, 1966, a group of young army majors led by the charismatic Major Chukwumma Kaduna Nzeogwu overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Abubaka Tafawa Balewa. Their aim was to restore sociopolitical and economic stability and to eradicate corruption. Between 1962 and 1965, Nigeria had witnessed many crises, which ranged from the disputed census and the controversial federal elections to the inconclusive, violent western regional election of 1965, all of which collectively eroded Nigeria's stability and unity.

But the partial and selective manner in which the military operation was conducted left much to be desired. In Kaduna, Ibadan, and Lagos, the event was marked by much bloodshed and led to the assassination of both top military officers and leading politicians. The Igbo-controlled eastern and mid-western regions were left unscathed by the event. However, the forceful intervention of major general J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, General Officer Commanding, and other loyal officers like Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Commander, Second Battalion Nigerian Army, Ikeja and his men, aborted the assumption of office by those who masterminded the plot. At the end of the day, the loyal troops under Ironsi, assumed the reins of power. The overthrow of the civilian politicians was initially welcomed in the south and tolerated in the north. However, as events unfolded and the identity of the coup-makers and their victims became known, the event of January 15, 1966, began to be seen as an Igbo bid to dominate Nigeria. Consequently, every action of Ironsi, especially the enactment of the unification decree that abolished regionalism in place of unitary government and unified administration, became misrepresented as part of an Igbo grand design to rule the country. The nonprosecution of the plotters was another sore point the northern officers and men held against him. These views, whether founded or not, generated much disquiet in the north and culminated eventually in the violent May riots against the Igbo in various northern cities.

On July, 29, 1966, a countercoup took place, spearheaded by northern officers and soldiers who said they acted to forestall further Igbo attacks on them. Major-General Ironsi, Lt. Col. F. A. Fajuyi, (military governor of the western group of provinces), and many Igbo officers and men were killed in Lagos, Ibadan, and Abeokuta. For three uncertain days Nigerians had no head of state. The northern instigators of the countercoup chose the most senior northern officer, Lt. Col.

Yakubu Gowon, Army Chief of Staff under Ironsi, as their candidate for the office of head of state.

On August 1, 1966, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon became the head of state and supreme commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Prior to his elevation, he was largely unknown to most Nigerians, but was popular with the army, where he had held important posts as adjutant general and army chief of staff positions that had endeared him especially among the northern officers corps and the rank and file. Yakubu Gowon had attended the renowned government (now Barewa) College Zaria and on graduation, joined the army in 1954 as an officer cadet, and by 1963 had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Gowon inherited a Nigeria that was politically unstable and on the verge of disintegration. His assumption leadership displeased Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of eastern Nigeria, who refused to recognize. The armed forces, which had struggled with credibility issues since the January coup, faced total collapse. Furthermore, massacres of Igbo in northern cities, and the exodus that followed, made any prospects for "one Nigeria" highly unlikely, as far as the Igbo were concerned. Mutual trust was now replaced by ethnic suspicion and hatred. Though worried, Gowon did not allow these problems to overwhelm him. In an effort to win public acceptance for his regime, he abolished the unification decree and reverted to a federal structure. He won over the largely Yoruba population of the western region when he released political prisoners, including Obafemi Awolowo and his colleagues (who had been charged with treason in 1963).

The failure of Gowon and Ojukwu to reach amicable compromise necessitated the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) at Aburi Ghana on January 4–5, 1967. Gowon's political inexperience manifested itself when he agreed, with Ojukwu, to accept confederation. But, when the SMC met in Benin to ratify the draft decree of the Aburi agreement, Ojukwu refused to attend on security grounds and so disowned its provisions. With his mind already made up to secede from Nigeria, he hastily promulgated the Revenue Edict, which appropriated taxes from the east due to the federal government. Further attempts at peaceful resolution, by the National Reconciliation Committee under Awolowo, failed.

As a result, Gowon's attitude hardened and on May 27, 1967, he declared a state of emergency and split the country into twelve regional states. The creation of two states for the eastern minorities was intended to undermine support for Ojukwu and present an excuse for attacking the Igbo. On May 30 Ojukwu, as expected, declared the state of Biafra and the country was embroiled in civil war for 30 months.

On January 12, 1970, the Biafran forces formally surrendered to Nigeria. To allay the fears of Biafran returnees, Gowon declared his famous policy of “no victor no vanquished.” He embarked on the “3R” program of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. In principle it was a laudable scheme but in practice it left much to be desired in its implementation. Winning the war was the high point of Gowon’s administration, but he failed to win the peace. He lost what goodwill Nigerians had for him when he was unable to successfully implement his program.

Gowon reneged on his promise to return the country to civil rule in 1976, pronouncing the date unrealistic in 1974. Public confidence in his administration was further eroded when allegations of impropriety were leveled against his officials. The incidence of corruption reached a new height and he appeared both unwilling and unable to do anything about it.

On the international level, Gowon pursued the non-aligned policy by making Africa its main focus. He was a founder of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

He was overthrown on July 29, 1975, in a bloodless coup, while attending the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Kampala, Uganda. He went immediately to Britain and enrolled at the University of Warwick, where he graduated with a doctorate in political science. For a time, he was implicated in the 1976 Dimka abortive coup in which his successor, Murtala Muhammed, was assassinated. He was granted amnesty by President Shehu Shagari in 1980. Despite his shortcomings, history will not forget the role of General Yakubu Gowon in keeping Nigeria united.

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Nigeria: Biafran Secession and Civil War, 1967–1970

Within five years of independence, Nigeria was subjected to a series of harrowing events. The country afflicted with regional and ethnic chauvinism, political intolerance, victimization, lawlessness, government ineptitude and corruption, and nepotism, which culminated in the

military coup d’état of January 15, 1966. The coup, aimed at rescuing the country from disintegration, was interpreted as an Igbo subterfuge to dominate Nigeria. The ineptitude of General Ironsi, head of state, and an Igbo, seemed to confirm northern fears of planned Igbo domination. A countercoup, which toppled General Ironsi on July 29, 1966, brought Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon installed as head of state. This countercoup was followed by massacres of Igbo in the northern region, in September and October of 1966. At the end of this organized genocide over 10,000 Igbo people had been exterminated. Several thousand more were maimed, or dispossessed, while 1.5 million people were turned into refugees within their own country. The perpetrators of this heinous crime were not punished, nor was compensation made to the victims.

The government’s failure to stop the massacres convinced the Igbo that their security could only be guaranteed in the eastern region, which was overseen by Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu, an Igbo. It was against this background that the eastern region refused to recognize Gowon as the head of state of Nigeria.

A combination of bad faith, mutual distrust, duplicity, and the incompatible styles of Ojukwu and Gowon scuttled all mediation efforts both within and outside Nigeria. For instance, a good opportunity for the peaceful resolution of the situation came in January 1967, when General Ankrah, the military head of state of Ghana, interceded in the crisis. He convened a meeting of the Nigerian Supreme Military Council at Aburi, Ghana on January 4–5, 1967 to iron out the differences between Ojukwu and Gowon’s federal government. The Aburi conference passed the following resolutions: non-use of force in the settlement of the crisis; a confederal status for the regions without boundary adjustments; a veto power for all members of the supreme military council that would enjoin a unanimous concurrence of the regions before any major decision could be taken; the payment of salaries of all displaced persons until March 31, 1967; and finally, the head of the federal military government should assume the title of commander in chief of the armed forces.

However, the prospects for peace in Nigeria were short-lived. Federal civil servants, after thorough perusal of the Aburi accord, told Gowon that he had been outwitted by Ojukwu. Gowon started to demur on the agreement and on March 17, 1967, issued Decree No. 8, which rejected some of the resolutions of the Aburi agreement. Ojukwu, in turn, rejected Decree No. 8.

The stage was thus set for a conflict between the eastern region and the federal military government. At the end of March 1967, Ojukwu issued a number of edicts to safeguard the region’s economic interest. The federal government imposed economic sanctions against the region. The face-off continued until

May 26, 1967, when Ojukwu summoned the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders in Enugu. On May 27 the assembly issued a communiqué empowering Ojukwu to declare the eastern region an independent sovereign state to be known as the Republic of Biafra. The federal authority reacted swiftly on the same day by splitting Nigeria into twelve states. Gowon assumed sweeping powers under Decree No.14, which banned political activities and introduced press censorship.

The “cold war” reached its crescendo when on May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra. The federal government declared the action null and immediately made clear its determination to suppress the secession. It also embarked upon massive mobilization and procurement of military weaponry. In Enugu, the Biafran capital, Ojukwu embarked upon a propaganda campaign, declaring that no power in black Africa could overcome Biafra.

The federal government launched a two-pronged attack against Biafra on July 6, 1967. From the northern border at Nsukka, Biafra presented an initial stiff resistance against the federal onslaught, but faced a continuing problem of low supplies of ammunition. Within a fortnight, the federal forces had pushed the Biafra forces out of the university town of Nsukka. At the Garkem-Ogoja front, Biafrans offered feeble resistance to the artillery and firepower of the federal troops. Biafra continued to suffer because of insufficient weaponry. The federal government drew from its enormous human and material resources, while Biafra was handicapped by sea blockade, little international support, and internal division. Despite heroic displays by the Biafrans through technological innovation, and grim determination, the secession was doomed to failure. Starvation decimated much of the Biafra population. Early in the war, an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 people died daily in Biafra, and about 10,000 daily toward its close.

Biafra had lost most of its strategic and important towns by July 1968 to the federal government. However, Biafra won a consolatory victory when it recaptured Owerri in April 1969. Nevertheless, Biafra lacked the resources to follow up its victories. About this time Biafra had shrunk to one-third of its original size.

Biafra’s insurrection collapsed on January 11, 1970 when General Ojukwu fled to Côte d’Ivoire. On January 15 General Gowon accepted the unconditional surrender of Biafra by Maj. Gen. Philip Effiong, declaring that there was “no victor and no vanquished.” Gowon’s post-civil war reconstruction was half-hearted, inconsistent with his government’s declared aims, and mere window-dressing to calm the international community’s fear of reprisals against the Igbo. The Igbo people were discriminated again in Nigeria during Gowon’s regime and received harsh

peace terms from the victorious federal government. Their properties were declared abandoned in several parts of the country at the end of the civil war. They were refused reinstatement in their previous places of employment. The fate of the Igbo people still hangs in the balance in post-civil war Nigeria.

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See also: Nigeria: Gowon Regime, 1966–1975.

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Nigeria: Murtala Muhammed, Obasanjo and Return to Civilian Rule, 1975–1979

The coup that brought the Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo regime to power in 1975 occurred against the background of general disenchantment with the corrupt and inept regime of General Yakubu Gowon. It was clear that Gowon could not check the excesses of his subordinates. The only solace that the public had was the promise Gowon made in 1970 to hand over power to civilians in 1976. But when, in 1974, he renegeed on the promise, declaring that 1976 was no longer realistic, large sections of the public that had long suspected the sincerity of the military’s promise to hand over power to civilians felt vindicated. Within the military, there were divisions over this issue of withdrawing from politics. It was against this background that a section of the military that favored withdrawal from politics and led by General Murtala Muhammed overthrew the Gowon’s regime in a bloodless coup d’état in July 1975.

Given the factors that influenced the coup, the primary concern of the new administration, which described itself as a corrective regime, was the improvement of the image of the military, ridding the society of

corruption and perhaps more importantly setting in motion a democratization process. The first step the regime took was to carry out a massive retrenchment of corrupt and inefficient workers from various government departments, the judiciary, parastatals at both the federal and state levels, as well as the military. However, the primary program of the regime was the setting in motion of a transition to civil rule process. Hence on October 1, 1975, during the independence day broadcast, General Muhammed announced a five-stage program of transition to civil rule which was to last from 1975 to 1979. The program combined structural reforms with constitution making. The structural reforms involved the creation of new states and the reorganization of the local government system. The constitution making process included the setting up of a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), followed by a Constituent Assembly (CA) to deliberate on the draft constitution, lifting of the ban on politics, elections into state and federal legislatures, and the handing over of power to civilians on October 1, 1979. Muhammed stated that structural reforms had to be carried out along with the demilitarization process, in order to create a viable political system that will be stable and responsive to the needs and realities of the country. However, this transition to civil rule program had barely started when Muhammed was assassinated in an unsuccessful coup on February 13, 1976. Muhammed was succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo, his second in command, who committed himself to fully implementing the transition program.

Based on the report of the Irikefe Panel, on the creation of new states, seven more states were created in February 1976, bringing the total number of states in Nigeria to nineteen. It was believed that the creation of new states would bring government closer to the people, promote even development and allay the fears of minorities, thereby helping to enhance political stability in the country. The 1976 local government reforms introduced a uniform system of local governments and made local governments the third tier of government in the federation. Local governments were to promote development at the grassroots level, were entitled to revenue allocation and had areas of exclusive legislative jurisdiction. One effect of these structural reforms was to increase the financial dependence of the states and local governments on the federal government with the result that these two lower tiers of government became mere administrative agents and distribution outlets for federal resources.

The first step in the constitution-making process was the inauguration of the CDC in October 1975. The all-male fifty-member CDC, made up largely of professionals, academicians, and bureaucrats, was given the mandate of producing a draft constitution which would provide a sound basis for the continuing existence of a united Nigeria. The submission of a two-volume

report by the CDC in September 1976 and the wide circulation of these reports, led to a nationwide debate on the draft constitution. Following the submission of the report of the CDC, a Constituent Assembly (CA) with majority of its members elected through the electoral college system and a few members nominated to represent special interests, was inaugurated. The main task of the CA was to deliberate on the draft constitution and produce a final copy of the constitution to the federal military government for ratification. Since most of the members of the CA were politicians, its deliberation was more partisan and controversy-ridden than the highly technical CDC. The issues that generated the greatest controversies, in particular, the establishment of a separate federal Shari'a (Islamic law) court of appeal and the formula for the creation of more states, reflected the religious and sectional differences among the members of the CA. The CA equally provided an avenue for the formation of political associations that metamorphosed into political parties when the ban on politics was lifted. However, the CA completed its task in August 1978 and submitted a copy of the constitution to the government.

The Supreme Military Council (SMC) deliberated on the constitution and made seventeen amendments before promulgating it into law in September 1978. Right from the beginning of the constitution making process, the military set down the framework of the type of constitution it desired. The final deliberation and amendments by the SMC ensured that the military had the final say regarding the nature of the constitution that was made law. This, together with the fact that the CDC and the CA were dominated by members of the elite, ensured that the constitution did little in the way of providing rights and privileges for the non-elite majority. However, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) which had been set up in 1976 to oversee the electoral process, registered five out of the over fifty political associations that applied for registration as political parties. FEDECO conducted elections at the state and federal levels between July and August 1979. After a bitterly contested and disputed presidential election, Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria was sworn in as the country's executive president on October 1, 1979, thereby marking the final stage in the transition to a program of civil rule. It was clear, however, that the Second Republic began on an uncertain foundation and was destined to face a number of serious challenges.

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See also: **Obasanjo, Olusegun.**

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Nigeria: Second Republic, 1979–1983

Nigeria's Second Republic started on a very shaky foundation. Four of the five political parties that were registered to contest the elections had the bulk of their support from specific ethnic groups and regions of the country. In fact some were reincarnations of the ethnic and regional based parties of the First Republic. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by the frontline Nigerian politician, Obafemi Awolowo, was a reincarnation of the Action Group of the First Republic and had the bulk of its support among the Yoruba. The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) led by Nigeria's First Republic ceremonial president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was a reincarnation of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and drew the bulk of its support from the Igbo (though it was able to capture Plateau state in the Middle Belt). The Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) was a reincarnation of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and drew the bulk of its support from Kano State (though by default it was able to capture the Governorship of Kaduna State). The Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) drew the bulk of its support from Borno and Gongola states. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which was more national in character and had a relatively large support in parts of the middle belt and the southern minority states, was more fully entrenched in the conservative Hausa-Fulani northern states. Even then, the NPN was a reincarnation of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC).

In the 1979 elections, it was only the NPN that was able to achieve a national spread in terms of the plurality of votes, the parliamentary and governorship seats won, but it was not able to win majority of the seats in the national assembly. However, although Shehu Shagari, the presidential candidate of the NPN, was declared the winner of the presidential elections, this was bitterly contested in court by Obafemi Awolowo, the candidate of the UPN who came second. The basis of the challenge was that Shagari did not win one-quarter of the votes cast in at

least two-thirds of the states of the federation as provided in the constitution. Before this election, two-thirds of the nineteen states was generally interpreted as thirteen states. But in a highly controversial decision Shagari was declared the elected President on the basis of the fact that he won at least two-thirds of the votes in twelve states and two-thirds of 20 per cent of the votes in the thirteenth state. This greatly angered Awolowo and his supporters who accused the military of bending the rules in order to install their favored candidate hence some critics referred to Shagari as "President by mathematics." This decision engendered serious opposition from the UPN, as its five elected governors championed the formation of an alliance by the twelve non-NPN governors, the so-called Progressive Governors who were constantly antagonistic and critical towards the federal government. This situation adversely affected inter-governmental relations and proved detrimental for the effective functioning of the Second Republic.

In the face of the opposition by non-NPN legislators, the federal government through various forms of patronage formed working alliances with legislators of the opposition parties in order to get its bills passed by the National Assembly. Up to 1981, when the alliance between the NPN and NPP was still in force, it was relatively easy for the federal government to mobilize the NPP legislators in support of its bills. But the collapse of the alliance in July 1981 resulted in the increased use of patronage and other corrupt practices. One factor that greatly contributed to the intraparty crisis that bedeviled the Second Republic was the competition for access to federal patronage.

The politicians were mainly members of the petty bourgeoisie that thrived on commerce, contracts, and political access. As a result the issue of whether or not to cooperate with the NPN became the most important source of intraparty disputes among the so-called opposition parties. Significantly, the anti-accord groups were usually led by State Governors who had access to state power and therefore patronage, while the pro-accord groups were usually led by federal legislators, who wanted patronage from the NPN federal government. Indeed the accord reached by the NPP with the NPN in 1979 was predicated on the appointment of NPP members as federal ministers and to positions in federal corporations and parastatals. It is important to note that the breakdown of the accord in 1981 was as a result of what the NPP perceived as discrimination in the award of contracts, import licenses, and distribution of offices. Even then while the NPP governors championed the breakdown of the accord, some of its ministers and legislators disagreed with the move. Two of the ministers therefore resigned from the party and

continued to serve as ministers in the NPN federal government while Senator Anah formed a breakaway faction of the NPP. Similar disagreements over cooperation with the NPN resulted in splits in the GNPP led by Senator Mahmud Waziri and the PRP led by Senator Sarbo Bakin Zuwo.

Within the NPN itself, the issue of the extent to which members benefited from federal patronage became an important source of disagreement. In fact the primary concern with patronage and rent seeking led to the award highly inflated contracts many of which were never executed, or at best very poorly done, to members of the ruling party. The massive corruption of the Second Republic plunged the country into a serious economic crisis, with Nigeria, which had an external reserve of 5 billion Naira in 1979, incurring an external debt of 20 billion Naira by the end of 1983.

The serious political and economic crisis that the country faced had by 1983 greatly delegitimized the NPN federal government. In the face of widespread opposition, the regime resulted to the use of coercion and various forms of manipulation to remain in power. The 1983 elections were therefore conducted under a very charged atmosphere. The attempt of the opposition parties to form an alliance, the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) was not very successful. Though there was clear evidence of rigging of the elections by all the political parties, the NPN used its control of state power and institutions to manipulate the outcome of the elections that virtually turned the country into a one party state. Widespread frustration with this “electoral coup” resulted in massive violence in parts of the country, especially in Ondo and Oyo states. The increasing use of coercion by the NPN to keep itself in power created the conditions that led to the military coup of December 31, 1983, which brought the Second Republic to an end.

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See also: **Azikiwe, Nnamdi; Nigeria: Military Rule, 1983–1999.**

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Nigeria: Agriculture, Irrigation, Rural Development

Traditionally, agriculture has been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. At the expiration of colonial rule, it employed well over 80 per cent of the working population and accounted for 56 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Colonial agriculture had emphasized export produce, namely cocoa, palm oil and kernels, and groundnuts, neglecting domestic food production. In the first decade of independence, the colonial system was hardly changed as emphasis was still on the export crops while the marketing boards, a colonial heritage, continued as the monopoly purchasers of peasant exports. They consistently paid the farmers well below standard prices in the world markets.

In the 1970s, crude oil replaced agriculture as the country’s chief revenue earner. This notwithstanding, successive governments have continued to recognize, at least in principle, the central place of agriculture in the nation’s economy. Various national development plans have, accordingly, provided substantial portions of their budgets to the sector. With urbanization and escalating costs of foodstuffs, the policy thrust of government has shifted to the domestic front with two basic aims: (a) to effect self-sufficiency in food production and to meet the demands of a rapidly growing population, and (b) to provide raw materials for agro-based domestic industries. To this end, the authorities established some management instruments such as banks to give easy credit to farmers. The banks are encouraged to establish in the rural areas where the farmers live. In 1976 a wide range of schemes that came under the general rubric Agricultural Development Program was launched. In the same year, the Operation Feed the Nation was initiated by government with the aim of projecting to the national consciousness the need for all Nigerians, to contribute to increase food production by cultivating every piece of land within their reach. A directorate of food, roads, and rural infrastructure was also established and charged with providing essential infrastructure, especially all-season roads, for rural communities.

During the third NDP, government initiated the National Accelerated Food Production Program and used it as the principal tool with which to bridge the widening gap between food production and demand. The main thrust of the program was to make available to farmers fertilizers, pesticides, and credits through agricultural research extension services and timely distribution of high response seed varieties. The program

was, however, marked by a high level of corruption and incompetence.

Among the agricultural instruments that government put in place were a number of river basin development authorities (RBDAs), each of which was charged with the task of harnessing the agricultural potentials of the river basin(s) under its jurisdiction. This involved creating extensive areas for year-round cultivation of cereals and vegetables. The RBDAs were large-scale capital intensive projects involving massive land clearing and dam construction. Under the scheme, it was projected that irrigated areas in Nigeria would jump from 13,000 hectares (1968) to 274,000 in a decade. The projects were costed in 1977 at \$2.2 billion but by 1982 they had used up \$2.7 billion. Much of the money went into providing lavish housing estates for the foreign contractors handling the projects.

There were little tangible results to show for the huge expenditures. In the southern parts of the country, the RBDAs were an abysmal failure. High-ranking officials in collusion with contractors ripped open the RBDAs. In the northern parts, a couple of dams were actually constructed and some land brought under irrigation, but the total acreage involved fell far below projections. In any case, the ecological and human costs have been disastrous. Water supplies from the dams are unstable and unpredictable. Flooding of farmlands, resulting in considerable loss of farm crops, has been a common occurrence. The Goronyo and Bakalori dams have diverted the flow of several rivers and drastically reduced water supply in several other basins. Rural self-sufficiency has been badly jettisoned. In 1980 frustration and starvation drove dislocated and unresettled peasants to violent demonstrations, which the government ruthlessly crushed. Government efforts in the field of agriculture have been a total failure. The contribution of agriculture to the GDP has continued to decline in absolute and relative senses. Food imports went up from a 1.6 per cent average between 1960 and 1970 to a 21 per cent average between 1971 and 1979. The high cost of food has created miseries for urban dwellers, who spend virtually all of their incomes on food. Since the 1980s, increasing numbers of agro-based industries have folded up or are working far below installed capacity because of inadequate raw materials supply. Sixty per cent of hides produced in Nigeria is eaten by humans as a source of protein because fish farming and animal husbandry have been grossly neglected.

A combination of factors explains the nonperformance of the agricultural sector. Soil deterioration has meant diminished output. Flight of youths to the city greatly diminishes the vitality of the agricultural labor force. Far much less has consistently been spent on agriculture per se than budgeted. And much of what

remains to be spent is hijacked by government officials. Peasant farmers, the backbone of Nigerian agriculture, are denied the benefits of modern agriculture and continue to rely on traditional tools and techniques. Agricultural modernization has neglected the fund of empirical knowledge which rural farmers have accumulated over generations. Foreign "experts" often find that they have a lot to learn from rural farmers about their local milieu. Finally, successive governments have emphasized the centrality of agriculture in national life, but as long as farming remains financially unattractive and rural neglect continues without redress, official appeals in favor of farming will fall on deaf ears.

Agricultural decline has been accompanied by a degeneration of rural life. Although about 70 per cent of Nigerians are rural dwellers, less than 20 per cent of the national expenditure goes into rural development. Most rural dwellers live below absolute poverty line, and rural-urban income differential is staggering. The rural populations are denied access to basic social amenities like good roads, piped water, electricity, education, and health care.

ONWUKA N. NJOKU

See also: **Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy.**

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Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy

At independence in 1960 Nigeria lacked modern industries worthy of note. Successive independent governments were determined to right this colonial neglect. The first step was to provide a conducive setting, through appropriate legislation and incentives

to industrialists such as tax holidays to infant or pioneer industries, easy repatriation of profits by foreign investors, and industrial layouts, which would facilitate land acquisition to investors and also permit the advantages of industrial aggregation. Government also established industrial banks and other financial institutions, the leading one being the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, to provide financial services to the industrial sector. In 1960 Nigeria had its Central Bank charged with the responsibility of giving the lead and direction to the banking sector. By the time the Nigerian civil war erupted in 1967, the industrial landscape had started to wear a new look and the contribution of the sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had moved from 4.37 per cent in 1962 to 18 per cent.

The first decade following the civil war witnessed prosperity, thanks to the rapid emergence of crude oil as Nigeria's leading foreign exchange earner. Bumper prices for crude oil, which hit the roof in 1973, inundated the national treasury with billions of dollars. Mesmerized and tempted by the huge foreign exchange reserves at its disposal, the government assumed a key role in direct economic activity, and got involved in a wide range of industrial ventures including iron and steel, oil refining, cement, vehicle assembling, brewing, textiles, fertilizer, and even pulp and paper. The government also dabbled directly into the service industry such as insurance; land, marine, and air transportation; and even hotel. The boom period attracted massive investments in industry from the private sector, too. The net result of all these was that by the early 1980s manufacturing and construction firms had blazoned the landscape of the major cities and accounted for over 70 per cent of the GDP.

Since the 1970s, petroleum has the key to the manufacturing sector. It is the fastest growing sector of the national economy, accounting for 58 per cent of export value in 1970 and over 97 per cent per annum since 1984. Crude oil provides a raw material base for the local production of bitumen, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and fertilizers. The country's three refineries are owned by the Nigerian National Production Corporation, a government parastatal enjoying total monopoly in oil refining. But oil prospecting and drilling are monopolized by foreign trans-nationals such as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Mobile, Agip, and ELF. The industry is very capital-intensive, employs some of the country's best professionals, and pays the most attractive wages. But the colossal dominance of the entire industrial sector by the oil industry distorts the total economy and disguises its narrow and unstable base.

The era of economic boom in Nigeria was short-lived, for by the late 1970s, the early signs of hard times had started to appear. Oil prices began to decline, and then tumbled to their depths. The national treasury

dried up. By the mid-1980s more manufacturing firms were going under than emerging, and the surviving ones were producing far below installed capacity. By the 1990s economic stagnation had degenerated to retrogression. Even the NNPC was strapped of funds and unable to maintain its refineries, thus leading to acute gasoline shortages in a country ranked fifth among the world's oil producing countries. Between 50 and 70 per cent of the country's banks and insurance firms collapsed, taking with them down the drain several billions of naira.

These developments had negative spread affects on the rest of the economy and the society at large. Unchecked unemployment, which had gone over the roof in the 1980s, hit hardest those in the between eighteenth and twenty five years old. Their future blighted, these youths have been driven to prostitution, drug, and armed banditry. Spiraling inflation made nonsense of the income of wage earners and pushed the living standards of most Nigerians beneath the absolute poverty line. A significant number of urban dwellers lived in squalid over-crowded conditions and could not afford one good meal a day.

With its national treasury empty, Nigeria joined the league of the world's eleven poorest nations. The military government of General Babangida turned to the World Bank and the IMF for loans but was required by these bodies to introduce a structural adjustment program as a precondition for obtaining the loans. Amid national outcry, SAP was introduced. The net result has been predictable: Nigeria got mired in a vicious debt-trap estimated in 1990 variously at between \$35 and \$46 billion. Servicing, let alone repaying, the loan has become too tall an order for the country.

A combination of factors explains the economic predicament of Nigeria. Wholesale reliance on crude oil, a diminishing resource, along with the neglect of agriculture, put the economy in jeopardy. Food imports took a substantial portion of scarce national reserves. Nigeria has adopted the import-substitution method in her industrialization efforts, which entails that the final stages in the manufacture of imported goods are carried out in the country. The implication is that the moving force of industrialization resides in the countries which produce the industrial machines and factories. Import substitution is a recipe for perpetuating strategic dependence because it denies the local economy the opportunity to initiate research and technical innovation.

At the root of Nigeria's economic woes is the involvement of government in direct economic activity. The government squandered the oil money, undertaking ego-boosting white elephant projects that had no relevance to the basic needs of the overwhelming majority of Nigerians. Overnight, government bureaucrats became managers of key industries. Sheer executive

incompetence was compounded by overdeveloped kleptomania evident in the unrestrained pillage of the state by a handful of state officials. Contracts were routinely over-valued, the excess going into the pockets of the officials, mostly top military men, who had been in power for twenty-five out of Nigeria's twenty-nine years of independence. This strikingly rich minority live a life-style of unrestrained revelry, flaunting their ill-gotten wealth in the face of the pauperized majority. The several billion dollars in cash recovered from the private homes of Sani Abacha, former military head of state of Nigeria, and his government officials are believed to be only the tip of a monstrous iceberg.

ONWUKA N. NJOKU

See also: Banking and Finance; Nigeria: Gowon Regime, 1966–1975; Nigeria: Agriculture, Irrigation, Rural Development; Oil.

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Nigeria: Military Rule, 1983–1999

From 1960, when the nation gained independence, to 1998, Nigeria only experienced ten years of civilian, as opposed to military, rule. Following the collapse of the first republic in 1966, the civil war and subsequent military rule under Generals Gowon, Muhammed, and Obasanjo, Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1979. The second republic under Shehu Shagari lasted from the elections of 1979 until the end of 1983 when the army, which by then had clearly acquired a permanent taste for political power, again seized control.

Major General Muhammed Buhari was the new military ruler. He emphasized the corruption and immorality of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which he had ousted, and dissolved or banned all political institutions

and reinstated the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The coup met with widespread approval.

The economy was in faced serious problems, and in 1984 the military government broke off negotiations with the IMF and initiated its own austerity budget. Special tribunals dealt with former politicians and state governors, a number of whom were sentenced to prison for corruption.

Buhari became increasingly unpopular because of his inept handling of the economy, which reduced Nigeria to bartering its oil for imports, and because of his authoritarianism and the imposition of severe restrictions upon the media. In May 1985 Buhari expelled 700,000 "unauthorized foreigners" including 300,000 Ghanaians, positioning them as scapegoats for the declining state of the economy.

On August 27, 1985, the army declared Buhari deposed, the SMC was dissolved, and a new Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) was set up with Major General Ibrahim Babangida as head of state. As with Buhari, Babangida faced a declining economy, with a static demand for oil (the country's principal export and foreign exchange earner). He was thus obliged to impose further austerity measures upon the nation.

In January 1986 Babangida announced that the army would hand back power to civilians in 1990. Unrest in northern Nigeria, mainly Islamic discontent, persuaded Babangida to apply for Nigeria to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in February 1986. Continuing clashes between Muslims and Christians led the government to set up an Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA) in April 1987.

The next five years were taken up with a great deal of discussion about the form of a new constitution, and the government postponed the return to civilian rule to 1992. During these years the continuing decline of the economy and the way in which Nigeria could return to civilian rule dominated politics. In October 1989 Babangida rejected the credentials of all thirteen political parties that had emerged to take part in the elections. Instead, the government announced that it would create two parties which all politicians would be allowed to join. Antigovernment riots during 1989 focused upon desires for civilian rule and a strengthened economy.

In April 1990 middle-ranking officers mounted a coup attempt, attacked Dodan Barracks (headquarters of the ruling military), and took over Radio Nigeria. The coup, which collapsed after ten hours of fighting, highlighted north-south rivalries and Christian fears of Muslim domination. On July 27 Major Gideon Orkar, the coup leader, and forty-one other soldiers were executed.

The year 1991 saw further religious riots in the north but also moves toward a return to civilian rule. The number of states was increased to thirty and the two government-authorized parties, the Social Democratic

Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), held countrywide congresses in June to select delegates for primary elections. Early in 1992 dates were set for the elections: November 7 for the Senate and House of Representatives, and December 5 for the presidential elections. However, although the elections for the Senate and House of Representatives were advanced to July (the SDP won a majority of seats in both houses), the results of the first round of presidential primaries were thrown out in August due to allegations of corruption and other irregularities. Fresh elections were set for September but following further setbacks and cancellations, President Babangida postponed the return to civilian rule until August 1993.

Although 1993 began with preparations for elections, it would turn out to be one of the worst years for Nigeria since independence. In January, as an apparent move toward instituting a civilian government, a transitional council composed mainly of civilians was set up. Chief Ernest Adegunle Shonekan was named head of government, although the real power remained with President Babangida. At the end of March the two political parties selected their presidential candidates: the SDP chose Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (“M.K.O.”) Abiola, while the NRC chose Bashir Othma Tofu. The elections were scheduled for June 12, and despite a legal attempt to stop them, they were held. By June 14 it was clear that Abiola was winning by a wide margin and on June 18, the Campaign for Democracy claimed that he had won outright in nineteen of thirty states. However, in June the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), which had been set up the previous January ostensibly to oversee the elections, annulled the results “to protect our legal system and the judiciary from being ridiculed and politicized both nationally and internationally.”

The United States described the annulment as outrageous; Britain cut off aid in protest. In August General Babangida stood down, handing power over to an interim national government led by Chief Shonekan that would rule through March 1994. Shonekan’s defense minister was General Sani Abacha, who had played a key role in the 1983 coup and was generally considered as Babangida’s right hand man. Abiola, meanwhile, had fled to London. On November 17, Abacha forced Shonekan to resign and made himself head of state. He dissolved the existing organs of state and set up a provisional ruling council (PRC). By the end of the year Abacha was presiding over a country where living standards were plummeting, inflation was soaring, and corruption was rife, while the price of oil stood at a ten-year low.

Nigeria was in a state of political crisis throughout 1994. In mid-June Abiola was arrested and despite calls by the courts to do so, the government twice

refused to produce Abiola for trial. The awful state of the economy was emphasized in April when Nigeria was obliged to import 100,000 tons of petrol due to production problems at its refineries.

Throughout 1995 the political uncertainty continued with demands for a return to civilian rule. Abacha announced the extension of military rule until 1998. A low point in Nigeria’s international relations was reached on November tenth when, at the beginning of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in New Zealand, Abacha had nine Ogoni activists, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa (who had been protesting at the activities of the oil companies in the Delta region) executed. The Commonwealth suspended Nigeria’s membership.

At odds with the Commonwealth over the Saro-Wiwa affair and his record on human rights, and widely criticized by Nigerians both inside and outside the country throughout 1996, Abacha paid scant attention to such criticisms, although he did twice dismiss numbers of senior army officers, clearly pre-empting coup actions. New rules for eventual elections were announced by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) and five political associations were registered as political parties.

A rise in the price of oil enabled the Finance Minister, Anthony Ani, to increase budgets for rural development, education, and health in his January 1996 budget. In February General Abacha announced that he might stand in the 1998 presidential elections; he claimed that his program to return the country to civilian rule was on schedule. Registration of voters at over 100,000 centers took place in February, and local elections were held on March 15. The turnout was massive; these were the first elections to be held since the Abacha takeover in November 1993. The electoral timetable for a return to civilian rule was set as October 1, 1998. Abiola remained in prison and Nigeria remained at odds with the Commonwealth.

The death of General Sani Abacha on June 8, 1998, followed a month later by that of Chief Moshood M. K. O. Abiola, fundamentally altered the political outlook for Nigeria. The chief of the General Staff, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, succeeded Abacha as head of state; he promised to reinstate civilian rule. In August Abubakar announced a new electoral timetable for the elections, and in September he published the draft of a civilian constitution and invited public comments on it. Meanwhile twenty-five of thirty-two political parties had registered for the forthcoming elections and the former head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo, announced his candidacy as leader of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

On March 1, 1999, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared General Obasanjo of the PDP winner of the presidential elections; in his

victory speech General Obasanjo promised to continue Nigeria's transition back to democracy.

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See also: **Nigeria: Army.**

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Nigeria: Opposition, 1990s, to the Fourth Republic

The 1990s witnessed widespread opposition against the administrations of Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993), Ernest Shonekan (August–November, 1993), and Sanni Abacha (1993–1998). The level of opposition was a product of the high degree of activism in civil society: indeed, civil society can be said to have come of age in Nigeria in the 1990s. This decade saw the proliferation of various nongovernmental voluntary organizations and associational groups, particularly human rights and pro-democracy organizations. The main opposition groups comprised human rights and pro-democracy organizations; students, acting mainly through their umbrella body, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS); professional associations; labor organizations mostly acting through their umbrella body, the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC); primordial groups with predominantly ethnic and regional character; the press, particularly independent newspapers and magazines; and different categories of womens' organizations.

The dictatorial manner in which the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was introduced in 1986, and the manipulation of the transition to civil rule, which had become apparent in the late 1980s, provided the background for the emergence of an activist civil society in the 1990s. However, the authoritarianism of the respective military regimes was the catalyst for the widespread opposition of the 1990s. In particular, the authoritarian and uncompromising manner in which SAP and the transition program were implemented, made confrontation with the increasingly vocal civil society inevitable. The opposition of the civil society groups took the form of demonstrations, strikes, riots, revolts, sabotage activities, critical press reporting, and the operation of underground radio stations.

The introduction of SAP in June 1986, against popular opinion, as well as the debilitating consequences of SAP, generated a great deal of opposition from the civil society. The situation was not helped by the repressive manner in which the program was implemented and the failure to brook any form of opposition to SAP with the Babangida administration insisting that there were no alternatives to SAP. The suppression of alternative viewpoints, as well as the increasingly negative effects of SAP on the Nigerian economy and society, created a situation where segments of the society resorted to demonstrations, riots, and strikes, against the continued implementation of the program. The opposition to SAP was championed by students under the aegis of NANS, and in alliance with human rights groups and market women organizations, among others. In April 1988 students organized a nationwide demonstration against the SAP-induced removal of subsidies from petroleum products, and in May 1989 they organized a nationwide anti-SAP demonstration.

Students continued to champion the opposition against SAP in the 1990s. In April 1990 they organized mass demonstrations against the World Bank loan for the restructuring of the Nigerian educational sector mainly because the restructuring was to be based on policies associated with SAP. The most wide-ranging protest against SAP championed by students occurred in May 1992, when NANS decided to launch a nonviolent mass protest against the deteriorating material conditions of Nigerians occasioned by the continued implementation of SAP. The protest, which started in Lagos spread to other parts of Nigeria and attracted the participation of various human rights groups, workers, market women organizations, urban youths, and the unemployed people. The violent nature of the protest was such that many government properties were destroyed.

An area in which the opposition of the civil society was more effectively coordinated was the transition to civil rule programs of both the Babangida and the Abacha regimes. Babangida tried to win an initial legitimacy for his regime on coming to power in August 1985, by promising respect for human rights and the handing over of power to a civilian regime in 1990 (later extended to 1992 and subsequently to 1993). However, it soon became clear that Babangida's transition program was a ruse and that the "hidden agenda" of the program was to ensure that he succeeded himself in office. In an attempt to achieve this aim, the transition program was constantly manipulated. The manipulation of the program led to an intensified opposition by the civil society against Babangida's self-succession bid. Most of the civil society groups decided to coordinate their campaign against military rule by coming together to form an umbrella organization, the Campaign for Democracy

(CD) on November 11, 1991. The CD campaigned vigorously for the termination of military rule no later than October 1992 and persistently called for the convening of a sovereign national conference.

The CD played a vanguard role in the widespread opposition to the annulment of the universally acclaimed free and fair June 12, 1993, presidential election presumably won by M. K. O. Abiola. The annulment was seen as an attempt by Babangida to actualize his self-succession bid and was therefore greeted with widespread demonstrations in various parts of the country. The massive opposition forced Babangida to step down from office and hand over power to a hastily contrived Interim National Government (ING) under the leadership of Shonekan. The civil society regarded the ING as an illegal contraption and called for the declaration of the result of the June 12 presidential election. The ineffective ING was subsequently overthrown in a military coup led by Abacha in November 1993. It soon became apparent that Abacha was not prepared to restore the June 12 mandate; rather, he was interested in putting in place another transition program that would result in his perpetuating himself in office. The civil society reacted by organizing nationwide mass demonstrations and strikes that would hopefully cripple the regime and force it to declare the winner of the June 12 presidential election. The period from June to July 1994 can be said to have marked a high point of opposition to military dictatorship in Nigeria in the 1990s. The various groups of the civil society and sections of the political class were joined by the powerful oil workers unions, unions of bank workers, teachers, nurses and midwives, and academic staff, among others in organizing nationwide demonstrations, riots, and strikes that virtually brought the country to a standstill.

Abacha reacted to the highly effective 1994 mass actions by becoming more repressive. The executive committees of the various workers unions that participated in the strikes were dissolved and many of their leaders detained, various human rights and pro-democracy activists were detained, while some critical newspapers and magazines were proscribed with journalists detained. Abiola, the presumed winner of the June 12, 1993, election was subsequently arrested and jailed. The naked repression of the regime included the trial and jailing of some critical army officers and other members of the elite class over what most Nigerians regarded as a phantom coup attempt in 1995. Olusegun Obasanjo, a military head of state of Nigeria (1976–1979) and a vocal critic of the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha, was allegedly implicated in this phantom coup and sent to jail. There was also the outright assassination of individuals who were critical of the administration (including Kudirat Abiola, the activist wife of M. K. O. Abiola). In the face of this naked repression, most oppo-

nents of the regime went underground and resorted to clandestine opposition activities like the setting up of an opposition radio, Radio Kudirat, named after the assassinated wife of Abiola. Some members of opposition groups like the Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka, and some leaders of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) fled abroad where they tried to mobilize international opposition against the Abacha regime.

Another form of opposition in Nigeria in the 1990s was that by minority ethnic groups, mainly from the Niger Delta oil producing areas, more ably exemplified by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa. These movements were protesting the degradation of their environments and the marginalization of their communities in spite of the fact that the bulk of the oil wealth that sustained the country's economy comes from their land. The execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of MOSOP on November 10, 1995, attracted widespread international condemnation and the imposition of various sanctions on the Abacha regime.

With the sudden death of Abacha in 1998, Abdul-salami Abubakar, who succeeded him, set in motion a transition to civil rule program. In March 1999 he released from jail the people who had been imprisoned by Abacha over the phantom coups of 1995 and 1997. Obasanjo who benefited from this amnesty won the presidential election on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which equally won majority of the seats in the national assembly. The fourth republic has been characterized by a great amount of political instability, ethnic and religious conflicts, with, perhaps, the adoption of the Shari'a law by most of the Muslim-dominated northern states posing the greatest threat to the survival of the fourth republic. Agitations by the oil-producing minority Niger Delta communities have intensified and in some instances, as in the Odi massacre, the Obasanjo administration has adopted repressive measures.

The Obasanjo administration has not been able to come up with meaningful economic policies to resolve the debilitating economic situation it inherited, while the high level of corruption among Nigerian politicians and other members of the elite, in the face of massive poverty and misery, have created disaffection and resentment among the populace. Obasanjo's rather dictatorial style as in the periodic increase of the prices of petroleum products in the face of massive opposition has further helped to aggravate the level of disaffection. The threat of instability was equally heightened by the outcome of the 2003 presidential and general elections that returned Obasanjo to power for a second term while the PDP won massive victories in the national assembly, and the governorship and legislative elections at the state level. The opposition parties refused to accept the outcome of the elections claiming

that they were massively rigged, a charge corroborated by both local and international observer missions.

The 1990s can be characterized as a decade in which postcolonial Nigeria experienced an unprecedented amount of civil society activism against military repression. The period between 1993 and 1994 during which a sustained and coordinated opposition was mounted against the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election can be regarded as the pinnacle of opposition politics in postcolonial Nigeria. The opposition groups achieved some amount of success but could not really achieve much in the face of repression by the authoritarian military administrations. Ethnic, sectional, and religious divisions, as well as the failure of these largely elitist, urban-based opposition groups to form meaningful and creative alliances with the rural dwellers, negatively affected their effectiveness. Nevertheless, the eventual disengagement of the military from politics and the inauguration of the fourth republic after the death of Abacha can be attributed to the rather sustained opposition to military rule by the civil society. Unfortunately, the performance of the civilian administration under Obasanjo has not been encouraging. There is still rampant corruption in the midst of the worsening impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of the Nigerian populace while Obasanjo constantly exhibits dictatorial tendencies.

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See also: **Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy; Nigeria: Military Rule, 1983–1999.**

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Nile Valley: *See Stone Age (Later): Nile Valley.*

Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Origins, Pastoralism, Migration

The Nilotic peoples of eastern Africa are conventionally placed in three separate groups on the basis of linguistic classification. These are Southern (or Highland), Eastern

(Plains), and Western (Lake and Rivers) Nilotes, each of which is comprised of several individual languages and dialects. Linguists consider these three branches to be subdivisions of the language family known as Eastern Sudanic, which in turn is a subdivision of one of the primary branches of the Nilo-Saharan language phylum. Compared with the much larger Niger-Congo and Afroasiatic phyla, Nilo-Saharan is particularly diverse, which may indicate that it is the second oldest African language phylum after Khoisan. Based on the reconstructed distributions of earlier forms of Nilo-Saharan, this phylum probably first evolved in the area between the Ethiopian Highlands and the White Nile. Subsequent splintering and fusion of different groups as well as interaction with speakers of Afroasiatic and Niger-Congo languages led, over several millennia, to the different branches and subbranches found today.

In terms of modern ethnic groups, Southern Nilotes, with the exception of Tatog-speakers of the Loita-Mara/Serengeti area, are comprised mostly of the various Kalenjin communities of Kenya. The latter are divided into Southern Kalenjin (e.g., Kipsigis, Marakwet, Tugen, Nandi) and Northern Kalenjin, of whom the Pokot, who inhabit areas of the Central Rift to the west of Lake Baringo up to the modern Kenya-Uganda border, are the only representatives. The remaining Kalenjin speakers occupy much of the adjacent highlands to the west and south of the Pokot. Eastern Nilotes can be broadly divided into Bari and non-Bari speakers. The latter has a much more diverse composition, and includes the Maa, Teso, and Lutoko language clusters. With the exception of Lutoko speakers, who like the Bari are found in Equatoria Province, southern Sudan, most eastern Nilotes inhabit the central Rift Valley and parts of the adjacent highlands, between Lake Turkana in the north to the southern edge of the Masai Steppe in central Tanzania. They include the Jie, Teso, and Karimojong of western Uganda; the Turkana, Chamus, and Samburu of northern and central Kenya; and the Maasai, Arusha, and Parakuyo of southern Kenya/north-central Tanzania. Western Nilotes are believed to have originated between the Bahr el Ghazal and the White Nile. Today, they are concentrated in three main areas: southern Sudan, along the White Nile, the Bahr el Ghazal and adjacent wetlands (e.g., Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk); north-west Uganda and adjacent areas between Lake Albert, the Victoria Nile, and Lake Kyoga (e.g., Acholi, Padhola, Paluo); and on either side of the Winam Gulf, on the eastern side of Lake Victoria (Luo, Busoga).

Virtually all of these modern groups are associated with cattle and small-stock herding, either, as in the case of the Maasai, Dinka, Samburu, and Karimojong as specialist pastoralists, or, more widely, as mixed agropastoral groups. Since there is no evidence for

local, indigenous domestication of either cattle or ovicaprids (sheep and goats), these species must have been introduced to the region from further north. The expansion of herding economies across eastern Africa, therefore, was probably intimately related to the southward movement of Nilotic speakers. The combined archaeological, historical, and linguistic evidence suggests that this took place in a gradual, piecemeal fashion rather than in a single or limited number of major population movements. Ecological variables, including the natural distribution of vectors that transmit livestock diseases such as Trypanosomiasis, Bovine Malignant Catarrhal Fever, and East Coast Fever, as well as climatic changes and the distribution of grazing lands would have provided a number of constraints and opportunities to newly immigrant populations, in addition to those offered by the social and historical contexts in which these occurred.

Linguistic evidence indicates that the earliest Nilo-Saharan speakers were food collectors, and it is conceivable that speakers of these early forms were the same pottery and stone-tool-using, gatherer-hunter-fishers whose settlement and burial remains have been found at numerous points along the Middle Nile in central Sudan. This material is generally attributed by archaeologists to the “Khartoum Mesolithic,” and dates to between approximately 7,500 and 3,500BCE. The linguistic evidence also suggests that, within the Nilo-Saharan phylum, food production—in the form of cattle keeping and grain cultivation—first took place among proto-Northern Sudanic speakers, from whom all Nilotic languages were ultimately derived. In this regard, it is interesting that the presence of domesticated cattle and ovicaprids is attested at a number of sites in the Middle Nile area, including Kadero and Esh Shaheinab, by the fourth millennium BCE.

The earliest securely dated archaeological evidence for the presence of pastoralism further south comes from the site of Dongodien, east of Lake Turkana (Kenya), where a large assemblage of sheep/goat remains and some cattle bones have been recovered in association with Nderit pottery, in levels dated to about 2,000BCE. However, most archaeologists and linguistic historians consider that these initial pastoralists were Southern Cushitic rather than Nilotic speakers, originating from the Horn of Africa. At the site of Enkapunya Muto, in the south-central Rift Valley, near Lake Naivasha, a few domestic ovicaprids and cattle remains have been recovered from a level dated to about 1,990BCE, raising the possibility that domestic stock were also present this far south some four thousand years ago. The majority of Pastoral Neolithic (PN) sites in central, southern, and western Kenya and northern Tanzania, however, date to around 3,000 to 2,000 years ago and so are significantly younger. Although many

of these sites are broadly coeval, there is considerable variation between them in terms of the styles of pottery and stone tools in use, the relative proportions of wild to domesticated fauna being exploited, and preferred site location. All of this would imply the existence of a number of distinct communities possibly with different cultural and perhaps linguistic origins, and also different subsistence strategies.

Of the various PN traditions defined by archaeologists, the Elmenteitan is regarded by some scholars as attesting the initial presence of Southern Nilotic speakers in the area (always bearing in mind that linking archaeological entities to linguistic or ethnic groups is notoriously problematic). These sites are found in a broad band running south-westwards from the Naivasha/Nakuru area across the Mara plains, to the edges of Lake Victoria. Most sites date to between 2,300 and 1,300 years ago, with faunal remains indicative of intensive use of domestic stock, as at Ngamuriak, Sambo Ngige, and Maasai Gorge. Sites closer to Lake Victoria, however, such as Gogo Falls and Wadh Lang’o contain more mixed wild and domestic assemblages, including evidence for fishing. For dietary reasons, it is likely that plant foods were also exploited, although the archaeological evidence for the presence of domesticated cereals is extremely limited. By about 200CE, iron-using cultivators of Bantu-stock would have present within the general area from whom crops and iron may have been obtained in exchange for livestock, and possibly other products.

From about 500CE, there is increasing evidence for the adoption of iron by the various PN groups, which seems to have precipitated a marked qualitative decline in stone tool production, especially in the use of obsidian. Around the same time, there was a greater shift toward the type of specialized pastoralism that has often been held to characterize the economies Nilotic speakers in more recent times. This is best exemplified by the evidence from the site of Deloraine, on the edge of the Mau Escarpment (c. 700–1000CE). At Deloraine, the remains of finger millet have also been recovered, although whether cultivated or obtained through trade with neighboring farmers is uncertain. Around 1200CE, another Iron Age pastoral tradition, characterized by Lanet Ware, appears. This pottery tradition has a widespread distribution, encompassing most of the areas previously occupied by Elmenteitan and Savanna PN groups. It is also commonly associated with a type of earthwork, comprising a sunken cattle pen and attached houses, known as “Sirikwa holes” after the presumed occupants, identified from surviving oral traditions as an early Kalenjin people. Not all scholars agree with this interpretation, however, arguing that the appearance of Lanet Ware correlates far better with the expansion of Maa (Eastern Nilote) speakers, who,

to judge from their oral traditions probably reached the northern Rift valley during the ninth century CE, and the southern Rift by seventeenth, perhaps earlier. Another characteristic of these sites is the first attested presence of humped cattle (*Bos indicus* or *Bos indicus/taurus* crossbreed), as at Hyrax Hill and Lanet, both dated to the sixteenth century CE. These were probably obtained, initially, through a network of exchange partners stretching either north to the Horn of Africa where *Bos indicus* had been present since at least the second century CE, or perhaps east to the Swahili coast.

Finally, mention must be made of the expansion of the Western Nilotes that took place over 400 to 500 years, ending in the nineteenth century. The oral traditions suggest that these originated from series of population movements in plains around the White Nile and Bahr-al Ghazal Rivers, precipitated by an initial expansion of Nuer at the expense of their neighbors. Among the other Lwo speakers that were displaced some moved north, giving rise to the Shilluk kingdom by the sixteenth century. Other groups, such as the Pubungu, moved south along the Nile into the savanna around Lakes Albert and Kyoga. Here they encountered various Central Sudanic and Bantu speakers, and frequently managed to gain political power within these communities, with interesting results. For example, the absorption of a Western Nilotic elite by the Alur, resulted in a language shift from a Central Sudanic base to a Nilotic one. In contrast, the Lwo clan known as Bito established their hegemony within the emerging Banti Nyoro kingdom, which subsequently became the Bunyoro state. Other clans related to the Bito included the Hinda, who formed royal dynasties along the western side of Lake Victoria and the Hima who rose to political power in Rwanda and Burundi. In these contexts, however, despite gaining access to political power, the immigrant Nilotic speakers adopted the Bantu language of their host community. Not all Lwo-settled areas developed a royal tradition, however. The Padhola who settled the forests west of Mount Elgon, for example, had a lineage based system of social and political organization as did the Kenyan Luo. Despite these variations, in virtually all these societies cattle were held to be ritually and symbolically, as well as economically, important, and often had particular associations with leadership and the divinity.

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Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Eastern Nilotes: Ateker (Karimojong)

Karimojong, the name of one particular community, has been used by some writers as a general designation (as in "the Karimojong cluster") for a larger group of peoples speaking closely related Eastern Nilotic languages in northeastern Africa. The name "Karamoja," for the district in northeastern Uganda where many of this group live, is also derived from it. Most Africanists now use the term *Ateker* as the generic name for the group.

From all indications, the Ateker were the last of the Nilotes to move south from the Sudan, apparently in the early or middle centuries of the second millennium. Typical of African origin sagas, many Ateker traditions which recount migrations from a mythical homeland, often called "Longiro," are highly stylized renderings containing elements of political charter and cosmological affirmation. Nevertheless, one can deduce that ancestral Ateker probably did move out of the southeastern Sudan in two separate streams. One, traveling via the wetter borderlands of western Karamoja, had close interactions with Central Sudanic-, Kuliak-, other Nilotic, and especially Luo-speaking peoples. Many became bilingual and most, although often keeping cultural attachments to livestock, developed a strongly agricultural economy, earning them the nickname *Ngikatapa*, "Bread People." The second stream pushed south through the drier grasslands of eastern Karamoja into the Koten-Magos hill country. Their economic outlook was mainly pastoral, although they also practiced hunting/gathering and dry grain cultivation.

By the early eighteenth century, the Koten-Magos group had begun to fragment, many pushing westwards into central Karamoja, apparently because of population increases linked at least in part to the development of more efficient pastoral systems featuring improved strains of cattle. These systems could be highly productive, but they were also, in many respects, inherently unstable. Their mobility could produce dynamic expansions resulting in fluid frontiers and constant interethnic contacts that might undermine group solidarity. Their livestock was vulnerable to a host of sudden disasters, such as drought, epizootics,

and the raids of competitors. Therefore, broad and complex systems of livestock exchange between individual stockmen gave insurance against catastrophe and created bonds that gave some corporeal form to basically amorphous societies. Moreover, animals provided the essence of cultural outlooks, as well as political economies.

The western Ngikatapa groups, although less pastoral, were still open to natural calamities. Their more sedentary systems of cultivation, involving permanent concentrations of larger populations in areas of limited agricultural potential, could tax the resources of fragile ecosystems and bring on terrible famines. By the early eighteenth century, one such occurrence, a famine remembered by some as the Nyamdere, disrupted their communities and caused many to flee. In the course of these movements, Kote-Magos and Ngikatapa elements came into contact with each other in various parts of Karamoja, where some formed new communities, such as the Jie, Karimojong, and Dodos. Combining their agricultural and pastoral skills, they developed mixed farming economies better suited to the environment than either of the older systems had been. Some of the Ngikatapa, however, such as the Loser, Loposa, and Kapwor groups, abandoned Karamoja to migrate westwards to more fertile regions around Mount Otukei where they could maintain their primarily agricultural focus. The formation of the new societies in Karamoja entailed additional fissioning, as people who would become Toposa, Jiye, and Nyangatom moved back into the southern Sudan, and others, who formed Turkana and Iteyo elements, went east to the headwaters of the Tarash River below the Karamoja escarpment in Kenya.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, another famine, the *Laparanat*, devastated the Ngikatapa around Mount Otukei, and many moved off even further to the west and southwest, some as far as the Nile. Here they formed sections of developing Iteso, Kumam, and Langi. While all retained many aspects of Ateker culture, the three latter groups adopted the Luo speech of neighboring peoples.

Up to about this point, Ateker groups had tended to favor decentralized, egalitarian political forms. In the more mobile communities of the east, political activity was exercised largely by ruggedly individualistic extended families, which functioned—at least ideally—as self-sufficient economic units. For most Ateker, age-class systems with strong generational principles crosscut kinship and territorial groups, however, and, through participation in common rituals, imbued them with their broadest sense of corporate identity. A degree of gerontocratic control was exercised by venerable congregations of senior elders, although some authority might be invested in a few outstanding

individuals, too, especially among some of the western societies. Nevertheless, the age-systems could also foster fission, as bands of young age-mates often hived off from parent societies to pioneer new areas and establish new political identities.

During their initial expansions, Ateker communities sometimes had clashes with others, and livestock raiding among the more pastorally oriented was endemic. From the late eighteenth century such conflicts apparently were becoming more frequent. In far southern Karamoja, the Karimojong raided Southern Nilotic peoples and dispersed an earlier group of pastoralists, the Iworopom. Many defeated remnants were absorbed into developing Ateker communities, especially the Iteso, who were also making contacts with Bantu societies to the west and south. In central Karamoja, the Jie and Dodos destroyed a last remaining Ngikatapa group, the Poet, assimilating many. In the far west, the Langi fought a wide variety of peoples, including the Jopaluo, Alur, and Madi. By the latter part of the century they were pushing vigorously to the south and west against the Kumam, Iteso, and Acholi. By then they also had contacts with the powerful Bantu-speaking Nyoro kingdom, for whom many became mercenaries.

The most dramatic expansion of all was that of the Turkana in the east. From the upper Tarash, the Turkana decimated a multilingual confederation, the Siger, already stricken by a serious drought in the early nineteenth century. They then advanced relentlessly across the rugged, arid plains west and south of Lake Turkana against the previous occupants, the pastoral Kor, retreating elements of whom helped form Maa-speaking Sumburu and Cushitic-speaking Rendille. They also drove Southern Nilotes out of the plains and up into highland areas. In a remarkably short time, Turkana thus gained a vast territory and absorbed huge numbers of outsiders.

Competition for resources, especially in the more pastoral regions, became increasingly intense as the century progressed, and soon individual Ateker societies, especially in Karamoja and the Sudan, began battling each other. In the west, internal tensions developed within the Lango and Iteso, leading to further dispersions, and, in the case of the latter, hard fought civil wars by the end of the century.

All this escalating conflict was accompanied by political changes among many of the Ateker. Among some, such as the Jie, Toposa, and Dodos, hereditary firemakers provided a deeper corporate unity, although their authority remained largely religious. With the Iteso, powerful military leaders used territorial bases to forge large confederacies. Similarly, among the Lango, military leadership became greatly expanded and institutionalized. Among the Turkana, hereditary prophet/diviners became emergent centralizing figures

who directed their territorial expansion. In addition to these general tendencies to consolidate power in the hands of individual “big men,” some Ateker societies altered their age-class systems. Among the Lango and Iteso, gerontocratic functions apparently disappeared altogether. With the Turkana, principles of biological age became dominant over generational ones, facilitating the more effective mobilization of fighting men.

By the eve of the colonial conquest, Ateker peoples were thus having a tremendous impact on the whole course of East African history. They also were proving themselves extraordinarily adaptive, adjusting economic and political features to conform to local conditions, and thus providing a cultural and linguistic bridge between Bantu- and Luo-speaking riverine agricultural states in the west and Eastern and Southern Nilotic- and Cushitic-speaking pastoral nomads in the east.

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Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Maasai

Maasai pastoralist society is a relatively recent development in the savanna areas of Kenya and Tanzania. The Maa language, today spoken by Maasai, Samburu, Tiamus, Parakuyo, and Arusha communities, is part of the Eastern Nilotic language group, historically found in the border areas of Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. Linguists theorize that Maa-speaking peoples broke away at least three hundred years ago from an ancestral



Maasai family beside their huts, twine structures covered with clay. When the group moves on, the huts decay. In a new grazing area huts are built again. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

area near the western side of Lake Turkana, and migrated southward into the high grasslands of the Rift Valley. Maa-speaking society was rooted in cattle-keeping and a decentralized political system in which individuals were organized by age-class, with elders and age-set spokesmen sharing political influence.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Maa-speaking peoples occupied the Rift Valley savanna as far south as the Maasai Steppe in present-day Tanzania, perhaps through interaction and assimilation with indigenous groups such as the Sirikwa. Maa-speaking peoples formed several independent sections linked together by linguistic, cultural, and ecological affinities. The Purko and Kisongo sections occupied the center of Maa-speaking territory. To the north were the Laikipiak and Samburu, to the west the Uasin Gishu and Looskelai, and to the south the Loogolala and Parakuyo. Maa-speaking society developed in at least two distinct ways: first, through the actual migration of people themselves, and second, through the emergence of new identities from within existing communities.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a new Maasai identity radiated outwards from the central heartland, spurred perhaps by competition for limited resources of water, salt, and pasturage. This new identity quickly came into conflict with the other Maa-speaking communities. The resulting civil confrontations, known as the “Loikop Wars,” saw the disbanding of some peripheral Maa-speaking sections, and the reorganization of others. For example, the Purko and Kisongo sections defeated the Loogolala in the 1840s and then the Laikipiak in the 1870s, scattering the defeated communities and effectively ending their existence as distinct sections. The Parakuyo section,

on the other hand, was able to regroup and push further south, filtering into central and southern areas of Tanzania by establishing close relations with neighboring agricultural communities.

The new Maasai identity was grounded in a more specialized form of pastoralism, a more professionalized military use of the *murran* (warrior) age-class, and the increased authority of the *loibon*, the traditional prophet-diviner in Maa-speaking society. The Nkidongi family became the primary *loibon* lineage, producing in succession three of the most influential individuals in Maasai history: Supeet, Mbatiany, and Lenana. The *loibon* was able to gain influence by divining, healing, and overseeing the raids of the *murran*, and he attracted clientele by giving away cattle, acquiring wives for himself, or paying bridewealth for others. As the Loikop Wars dragged on throughout the nineteenth century, the *loibon* gained more effective political authority than ever before in Maa-speaking society.

Maasai themselves generally think of their history as beginning with the emergence of this new identity, or more specifically, with the birth of Supeet around 1778. Maasai remember historical events through reference to the chronological succession of age-sets, providing a source of shared cultural identity. For example, the first age-set widely recognized in Maasai oral history is Tiyioki, whose members were *murran* from 1791 until 1811, the time of the first Loikop Wars. Likewise, Supeet's death is remembered to have taken place during the time when the members of the first Nyankusi age-set were *murran* (1851–1871), and the last Loikop War, during which the Laikipia were defeated, is remembered to have taken place during the time of the Laimer age-set (1866–1886).

In the late nineteenth century, Maasai communities, which had barely begun to recover from the effects of the Loikop Wars, were hit by a series of devastating epidemics. These disasters, which Maasai refer to as *emutai* (“to finish off completely”), further destabilized the beleaguered pastoralists of the Rift Valley. The first two epidemics affected Maasai cattle: bovine pleuropneumonia, which swept through Maasailand between 1883 and 1887; and rinderpest, which arrived in 1891. The cattle diseases were followed quickly by an outbreak of smallpox in 1892, and then a severe famine. Some Maasai were forced to abandon pastoralism temporarily and take refuge with agricultural neighbors. Among the remaining Maasai pastoralists, intersectional cattle raiding became more desperate and violent as the intricate network of relationships built upon cattle loans fell apart. Another period of civil warfare began, but this time with a significant new element, since it coincided with the establishment of European colonial rule in East Africa.

The “War of Morijo” began in the early 1890s as a conflict between Loitai and Purko, two of the stronger Maasai sections which had managed to maintain their cohesion through the time of *emutai*. Added to this conflict was a succession dispute between Lenana and Senteu, the sons of the *loibon* Mbatiany, who had passed away in 1890. Lenana threw his services behind the Purko, while Senteu took sides with the opposing Loitai. But the decisive factor proved to be Lenana's alliance with the British, who were eager to name him a “paramount chief” as a means of consolidating their rule. To the south, Senteu could come to no such agreement with the Germans, who saw Maasai only as antagonists. In 1901 Senteu and the Loitai offered their unconditional surrender and were allowed to rejoin the victorious Maasai communities.

The Maasai-British alliance proved to be brief, as the two sides saw their mutual interests fade quickly after 1900. In 1904 and again in 1911, Maasai in Kenya were moved onto arid reserves, a crippling alienation of land which Maasai unsuccessfully tried to reverse in court. During the twentieth century, Maasai pastoralists on both sides of the Kenya-Tanzania border have seen their land base continue to shrink in the face of restricted wildlife areas and expanding agricultural land use.

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Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Southern Nilotes: Kalenjin, Dadog, Pokot

The Southern Nilotes were early arrivals in East Africa from a homeland in the Sudan. Indeed, some linguistic reconstructions place them in the area as far back as the fourth century BCE, although other scenarios have them arriving considerably later. Some suggest they were linked to the Elmenteitan cultural tradition that persisted in southwestern Kenya until the seventh century, and that they practiced a mixed economy of pastoralism and cultivation, augmented by hunting. Others argue that they were specialized pastoralists from an early date.

There is more general agreement that by the beginning of the second millennium, Iron Age Southern

Nilotes had established themselves well into East Africa, where they interacted with earlier Stone Age Southern Cushites, and from them adopted initiation rites involving circumcision, food taboos, and certain sociopolitical structures. Gradually, the Nilotes assimilated or displaced these earlier populations until only a few small pockets of Cushites remained. The Southern Nilotes also appear to have interacted with Kuliak-speakers in eastern Uganda, and, in various places, with Bantu agriculturalists who may have facilitated the emergence of a pastoral focus among Nilotes within broad systems of regional interaction.

By the early part of the millennium, if not before, Southern Nilotes had split into three distinct sub-groups. In the south were Dadog, a vanguard of southern penetration, who eventually pushed down into the grasslands of northern Tanzania. Behind them, in the uplands of western Kenya, emerged the Kalenjin, and, developing separately from them to the north, the Pokot. At this point, all seem to have had decentralized political structures based on similar cycling age-set systems.

By at least the middle of the second millennium, the early Kalenjin inhabited a region from Mt. Elgon and the Cherangany Hills in the north, down across the Uasin Gishu Plateau, to the Kericho-Lake Nakuru area in the south. Their origin traditions often picture a rather mysterious people, the “Sirikwa,” as the earlier inhabitants of this area, and link them with the remains of “Sirikwa Holes,” semisubterranean structures, found throughout much of it. Deep wells, dams, agricultural terraces, and irrigation systems are sometimes associated with the Sirikwa, as well, although traditions of Maa-speakers attribute them to another ancient people called Il Lumbwa.

Some observers identify the Sirikwa with the early Kalenjin themselves and argue that they were specialized pastoralists for whom milking was especially important. Certainly there are indications that some ancestral Kalenjin and Dadog (who also have Sirikwa traditions) had a strong pastoral focus. Other scholars believe the Sirikwa are better seen as multilingual confederacies of mixed farmers, the products of long interaction between Cushitic and Southern Nilotic elements, and, later, Maa-speaking Eastern Nilotes as well. As such, they may be perhaps better regarded as a cultural “phenomenon” than as an actual ethnic group. Certainly this seems to have been the case with Sirikwa-like groups such as the Oropom and Siger who inhabited the Karamoja-Turkana borderlands northeast of Mount Elgon.

In any case, it is clear that not all early Southern Nilotes were pastoralists. The Pokot branch, for instance, most probably had a decidedly agricultural economy, as apparently did some of irrigation-using Kalenjin of the Cherangany Hills. In addition, an important feature

of this “Sirikwa era” were hunter-gatherers from whom were descended Southern Nilotic-speaking Okiek populations.

Many scholars believe that from about the seventeenth century the Southern Nilotes underwent profound transformations. The agents of these changes were in many cases Maa-speakers who began a series of significant expansions into areas previously held by Southern Nilotes and/or “Sirikwa.” These advancing Maasai apparently practiced a “new,” more vigorously mobile form of pastoralism, which combined with sophisticated military practices and the leadership of powerful prophets (*laibons*), led to the rapid assimilation or dispersal of Southern Nilotes. Sirikwa holes, which had provided defense against earlier raiding, were easily overwhelmed. Some Southern Nilotic traditions dramatically depict the cataclysm as a mountain falling from the sky to scatter earlier population. From this welter of activity, new Southern Nilotic communities were born; “Sirikwa” came to denote old-fashioned ways of earlier times.

By the mid-eighteenth century, agricultural Nandi and Kipsigis societies had been formed from Kalenjin elements to the southwest of Uasin Gishu, though excluded from the plateau itself by Maasai neighbors. To the west, closer to the shores of Lake Victoria, other Kalenjin interacted with Luo- and Bantu-speakers, sometimes adopting their languages while imparting Southern Nilotic cultural forms. In the Mount Elgon area, Kalenjin were forced from the grasslands below to the slopes of the mountain itself where some became plantain-cultivating Sebei. In the Cherangany uplands, Kalenjin-speaking Marakwet, Tuken, Endo, and Keyo agriculturalists, together with neighboring Pokot, were kept from the surrounding grasslands by pastoral neighbors.

To the south, Maasai displaced Dadog (known to them as Il Tatura) and their Cushitic allies from Lolindo, the Serengeti, and the Crater Highlands. Disintegrating into separate fragments, Dadog in small groups of migrating coevals gradually retreated throughout the nineteenth century into less desirable areas deeper into Tanzania, where they adapted themselves to a broad range of new environments. In recognition of their stubborn resistance, the Maasai gave them the nickname Il Mangat, “Respected Enemies.” Meanwhile, in the Turkana-Karamoja borderlands to the north, the last of the old “Sirikwa” confederations were defeated and absorbed by other expanding Eastern Nilotes, the Ateker group, by the early nineteenth century.

From about that same time, however, the Maa-speakers began a series of devastating internecine quarrels. In the process, Maasai groups, especially those which contained “Sirikwa” elements such as the Segellai and Uasin Gishu, were crushed and eliminated as

competitors with Southern Nilotes. This allowed the dramatic expansion of some Southern Nilotes into grassland environments, where, often absorbing remnant populations, they turned (or perhaps returned) to specialized pastoralism. By the later nineteenth century, for instance, both Nandi and Pokot had evolved strong pastoral sections that were competing successfully with their neighbors for control of pastoral resources.

Attending this reinvigoration, the sociopolitical structures of some Southern Nilotic communities underwent substantial changes. Nandi and Kipsigis borrowed the notion of powerful prophets, whom they termed *orkoiyots*, from defeated Maasai. The Sebei and Pokot developed similar prophets, apparently borrowing the idea from the Sirikwa-like Siger. In all cases, these functionaries became emergent centralizing figures who provided a stronger sense of community integration, and often more effective military leadership, as well. Nandi and Kipsigis also refined their *pororiet* territorial systems, and the Pokot altered their age-class system to an Ateker-like model, in each case to promote military efficiency.

By the eve of the colonial era, therefore, Southern Nilotic societies were among some of the most vigorous in all of East Africa. Over many centuries, they had displayed a remarkable resilience and the capacity to adjust to changing circumstances. As a result, their role in shaping the course of East African history had been profound.

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Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Luo

The Luo occupy areas of eastern Lake Victoria, mostly on either side of the Winam Gulf, Nyanza Province, Kenya. Pockets of Luo settlement are also found in southeastern Uganda, northern Tanzania, and parts of

Western Province, Kenya. The Luo are speakers of a Western Nilotic language who, according to their oral traditions, first settled in the Nyanza area toward the end of the fifteenth century, where they encountered a number of Bantu language speakers, including the ancestors of modern Abagusii and Logoli. The original homeland of these early immigrants is said to have been in southern Sudan between the White Nile and the Bahr-el-Ghazal, possibly around Wau at the confluence of the Meridi and Sue Rivers. Linguistically, they are closely related to the Dinka (Jiaang) and Nuer (Naath) of southern Sudan, who are also Jii-speaking groups. They also share linguistic and cultural ties with various Jii-speakers in Uganda, including the Acholi, Paluo, Lango, Padhola, and Alur, all of which are said to have migrated from the upper Nile zone at much the same time.

From the available clan histories and genealogies, it appears that Luo settlement of the Nyanza region took place in a number of phases, of which four principal ones are well established. These gave rise to the following four main clusters of Luo found in the area today.

The Joka-Jok (also known as Joka-Ramogi) from Acholiland, who are believed to have been the first Luo group to settle in the Nyanza area, between 1490 and 1600. Joka-Jok settled initially around Got Ramogi, before expanding into other areas including Alego, Uyoma, and Asembo.

The Jok'Owiny, which split from the Alur in northwestern Uganda, arrived in the region between around 1560 and 1625. Their initial area of settlement was around Samia-Bugwe, from where they expanded into Alego.

The Jok'Omolo, which broke away from the Padhola, arrived in the Nyanza area at about the same time as the Jok'Owiny, via Busoga and Ibanda (Uganda), before occupying parts of Samia and Central Nyanza.

A fourth, rather more heterogeneous group, known as the Luo-Abasuba, made up of refugees from Buganda and other neighboring areas, found mostly in South Nyanza and on the islands of Mfango and Rusinga, and who began arriving in the late eighteenth century.

Subsequent disputes and divisions between different sections of these larger groupings, and also responses to environmental change, led to further movements and the formation of various clans and similar descent groups, each with its own particular understanding of history and claims to a particular territory.

The reasons behind the successful expansion of Western Nilotic speakers into the Nyanza region are not well known. One possible explanation is that periodic droughts and famines across the region during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (for which there is a growing body of proxy environmental evidence), encouraged groups to move southward from the Sudan in

search of new land. Being predominantly cattle-keepers, the early Luo settlers may have been able to colonize less productive areas more suited to livestock grazing than agriculture. Conversely, a period of higher rainfall in the late fifteenth century may have caused longer and higher seasonal flooding of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, thereby reducing the amount of pasture and land suitable for habitation (as happened in the more recent past). This too could have stimulated population movements southward. At present, there is insufficient evidence on which to assess either hypothesis, and it is quite possible that various social and economic factors also contributed to the establishment of Luo settlements in Nyanza.

The oral traditions suggest that, whereas the initial phases of settlement were relatively peaceful, by the time the Jok'Owiny and Jok'Omolo began to expand, relations with neighboring groups such as the Gusii, Logoli, and Kuria had worsened, giving rise to periodic cattle-raiding and warfare. The presence of numerous, potentially fortifiable, stonewalled and earthen ditch-and-bank enclosures across Nyanza may bear testimony to this. The former, known as *ohinga* (pl. *ohingni*) in Dholuo, occur mostly in South Nyanza. Their basic plan consists of an outer, dry stonewall, circular enclosure between two and four meters (approximately 6 and 13 feet) high and at least fifty meters (164 feet) in diameter. Inside this, traces of other structures, such as cattle enclosures and house floors, sometimes also survive. The largest and most impressive example is Thimlich Ohinga in the Macalder subregion. The main enclosure here is about 115 meters (377 feet) in diameter and contains the remains of at least five inner stock enclosures and numerous house platforms.

Over 520 *ohingni* are known in South Nyanza alone. Studies of their distribution indicate a preference for hill-top and upper slope locations, typically within three kilometers (approximately 2 miles) of a permanent water source. They also tend to occur in distinct clusters, with the highest density occurring around Thimlich. Their precise origin remains unclear. Many Luo oral traditions suggest that they were built by Bantu speakers before the Luo arrived. However, finds of pottery similar to that made by modern Luo, and the available radiocarbon dates from Thimlich (which place its occupation in the eighteenth century), indicate that they were also occupied by Luo if not actually originally built by them. Resolving this question requires further archaeological research.

Although a few stonewalled enclosures are known from the northern side of the Winam Gulf (especially in Asembo, Seme, and Alego locations), most of the enclosures in this area consist of a circular earthen bank with an outer ditch. A few more complex types, with outer and inner ditches and internal banks also

occur. These are known as *gunda* (pl. *gundni*) in Dholuo, and like the *ohingni*, are believed to have been occupied initially by non-Luo. Some, however, were definitely occupied by Luo, and still in use in the early part of the twentieth century.

By the nineteenth century, and probably earlier, the Luo economy was based on small scale agriculture, cattle-herding and fishing. Land was owned by segmentary, exogamous, patrilineal descent groups. Traditionally, there was no central political authority, and political power was mostly vested in the male elders who headed the different patrilineal descent groups. These often formed alliances with one another, of which there were at least twelve or thirteen such larger associations at the beginning of the colonial period. Known as *ogendini* (sing. *oganda*), these were composed of several of patrilineal clans or large lineages, and varied in size from 10,000 to 70,000 individuals and had its own leader, or *Ruoth*. Each *oganda* was also associated with a particular "territory." It seems likely, however, that the precise composition and spatial distribution of these changed several times over the centuries, and it maybe that the variable nature and distribution of the *ohingni* and *gundni* across Nyanza are a reflection of this.

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Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak

The Western Nilotes—the Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, and Anyuak—form part of the greater Nilotic-speaking peoples of eastern Africa. They reside in southern Sudan with the exception of the Anyuak, who also extend into Ethiopia. Numerically the Dinka have the greatest population, numbering between three to four million. They speak an Eastern Sudanic language of the Chari-Nile branch of Nilo-Saharan.

Although linguistically connected, the migration histories of these Nilotes differ considerably. Shilluk oral tradition remembers that they were led north by their first king and culture hero, Nyakang. Around 1500 they arrived at their present location at the junction of the Sobat and Nile Rivers from a previous southern homeland remembered as "Dimo." The Anyuak, closely related to the Shilluk, also trace their

origin to the “country of Dimo” southeast of their present homeland. They were led north by a powerful chief, Gila, a brother of the Shilluk king Nyakang. A quarrel led to a split between the Shilluk and Anyuak prior to Nyakang’s arrival at the present-day Shilluk homeland on the White Nile, during which the Anyuak migrated east. Gila’s grandchild Cuwai became their first king. The Dinka claim an ancient homeland in northern Sudan. This is supported by linguistic data which shows loanwords from the classical language of Nubia, *Nobiin*, suggesting a cultural and religious connection with the Nubian kingdom of Alwa (300–1300). The Dinka migrated into southern Sudan (c.1300–1600) along the eastern bank of the Nile as far as Bor, and then forged across the river three hundred miles northwest. At this juncture they had penetrated into the swamps of the southern Sudan and fully surrounded the Nuer. The Nuer claim they originated from a barren waterless country northwest of their present homeland in a region they identify as “Kwer-Kwong.” It is remembered that a leader, Gau, married Kwong giving birth to Gaa who became the most important Nuer leader, the Land Chief, acquiring the title of “Chief of the Leopard Skin.” Some scholars suggest that the Nuer were formerly part of the mosaic of Luo peoples present in Southern Sudan prior to the Dinka arrival.

The politics of the Nilotes vary greatly. The Shilluk have been historically united in a single polity headed by a series of divine kings (*reths*) chosen by primogeniture. The Dinka have been less politically centralized than the Shilluk because of the vast geographical area they occupy. Their language is diverse and each group is internally segmented into small political units with a high degree of autonomy. During times of war, however, they have historically valued intra-group unity and tended towards political and military centralization. In the nineteenth century the Dinka amassed armies of thousands to fight the colonizing Turco-Egyptians whom they expunged permanently from their homeland. Politically the Nuer form a cluster of autonomous communities within which there is little unity. The basic social group is the patrilineal clan and in each community the men are divided into six age sets. Among the eastern Ethiopian Anyuak there is more dry ground available giving rise to closely connected villages and a wider political organization than that afforded the autonomous villages of the western Anyuak in Sudan. The Ethiopian Anyuak historically have had a royal clan and a king while western villages have not.

Religiously Dinka priests (*beny biths*) and Shilluk kings (*reths*) were believed to be divine and their physical and ritual well being were held to ensure the prosperity of the whole land. The large royal Shilluk clan traced descent from their first king Nyakang. Revered Dinka authority figures who were also rainmakers

(Masters of the Fishing Spear) were derived from “aristocratic” clans who traced descent from a leader, Ayuel Longar. Dinka priests and Shilluk kings, as sacred leaders could never die a natural death; if severe illness was imminent they were ritually killed, most commonly by burial alive for Dinka *beny biths* and strangulation for Shilluk *reths*. Dinka priests tended to live much longer than Shilluk kings for there was no special stress laid on the maintenance of high standards of sexual activity which the Shilluk demanded of their royal leaders. Neither the Nuer or Anyuak have ritually killed their priests or kings.

Levels of social stratification differ widely among these Nilotes. Along with several classes of royalty the Shilluk are divided into commoners, royal retainers, and slaves. The Dinka possess “aristocratic” and “commoner” clans as do the Anyuak. The Nuer however, recognize only a limited aristocracy tending towards less social stratification than the Dinka, Shilluk, and Anyuak.

Culturally and economically all four groups are patrilineal and polygynous. Marriage among the Dinka and Nuer is marked by the giving of cattle by the bridegroom’s kin and both are transhumant taking their cattle to the rivers during the dry seasons. The Shilluk are sedentary agriculturalists with strong pastoral interests (cattle, sheep, and goats). Unlike the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk the Anyuak keep some cattle but rely heavily on fishing, hunting, and agriculture. Among the Shilluk and Anyuak spears and sheep, and to a lesser degree cattle, have come to represent bridewealth.

Around 1770, slave raiders from the Islamic kingdoms of Wadai and Darfur forged south, plundering Dinka and Nuer communities in southern Sudan. This era marked the beginning of centuries of slave raids and instability in the region encouraging the Nuer, located on the inner periphery of the Dinka to forge east in large numbers to the Nile. The era was accompanied by drought intensifying ethnic stress and as the Nuer migrated into primarily Dinka and Anyuak territories wars ensued. During this period the Nuer ethnically absorbed many and expelled others. By the twentieth century 70 per cent of the Nuer comprised former Dinka peoples giving rise to the belief that the two were originally one ethnic group; an argument that no longer prevails among historians of the Dinka and Nuer. By the dawn of the Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1821) the Dinka, Nuer, Anyuak, and Shilluk lacked sharp ethnic boundaries.

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Nilotic Sudan: See Nubia: Banu Kanz, Juhayna, and Arabization of the Nilotic Sudan.

Nimeiri: See Sudan: Nimeiri, Peace, the Economy.

Njinga Mbande (1582–1663)

Queen of Ndongo

Njinga Mbande became Ndongo's most famous queen and remains a national heroine in Angola today. She was the eldest daughter of King Mbande a Ngola, a ruler who spent much of his long reign both fighting the Portuguese colonization of Angola (begun in 1575) and seeking to centralize power in Ndongo.

Njinga witnessed Ndongo's most serious crisis during her early life. Born in 1582 shortly after the war between Ndongo and Portugal, she saw her brother Ngola Mbande come to power around 1617; she also watched as the kingdom of Ndongo was crushed by the joint forces of the Portuguese governor Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos' army and its Imbangala mercenaries in 1617–1620. The Imbangala, brought from south of the Kwanza by the Portuguese after 1615, were ruthless cannibals who replaced their losses by recruiting new soldiers from among adolescent boys. In 1622, after the disastrous campaigns of Mendes de Vasconcellos, Ngola Mbande sent her from his new capital in the islands of the Kwanza river on a mission to Luanda to

negotiate relations between the two countries. Later tradition maintained that when the governor did not offer her a seat (a sign of subjection) she sat on the back of her serving girl to stress the continued independence of her country. During this visit she was baptized as Ana de Sousa and promised to help Christianize her country.

When Ngola Mbande committed suicide in 1624, Ndongo faced a serious succession crisis. Ngola Mbande's son was too young to take up rule, and the primary goal of the previous two kings had been to centralize power and limit succession by primogeniture by eliminating some of the electoral elements in it, especially the role played by the nobility. Njinga, with the approval of the court and the royal officials, declared herself regent of the Ngola Mbande's young son, but soon, when the son was murdered (perhaps at her command) she assumed the royal dignity herself.

Portugal was interested not only in supporting a vassal candidate for the throne, but also in insuring that servile populations (both military and agricultural) once under Ndongo's authority did not flee to Njinga, but continued to provide their services to the new colony of Angola. In the following war both Njinga and Portugal relied heavily on bands of Imbangala mercenaries to fight. Njinga was initially defeated in 1625 and had to withdraw from Ndongo's capital in the Kwanza islands but soon returned to the islands, only to be driven out again in 1628–1629, when her Imbangala allies deserted her.

Njinga fled eastward with her army, and sought to join with Kasanje, the most powerful Imbangala band of the area. She was rebuffed, and underwent initiation as an Imbangala herself. Using Imbangala methods to augment her army, she conquered the kingdom of Matamba, which was to remain her base even when her forces recovered the islands of the Kwanza in the mid-1630s. By 1639 she had regularized relations with the Portuguese colony. In undertaking the Imbangala initiation, Njinga repudiated Christianity, but she never abandoned the idea that she was rightful ruler of Ndongo, and did not propose changes of her own government along those of the Imbangala bands.

During this whole period, Njinga was troubled by claims against her legitimacy, particularly the claim that women ought not to rule. She tried successively being regent to Ngola Mbande's child, and queen to a puppet male king whom she chose, but this was also without success, even though she married two such men in turn. She also played a male role, leading her troops in battle, dressing in men's clothing, and at one point ordering her servants to do similar dressing reversals, and even to sleep together without contact. She was, according to eyewitnesses, both an excellent commander and quite capable of handling weapons such as the battle-axe.

When Dutch forces occupied Luanda in 1641, Njinga sought an alliance with them against the Portuguese who remained grouped around Massangano. The Dutch provided only half-hearted support, but Njinga's army launched very successful campaigns, first into the "Dembo's" regions lying north of her domains, and then against Massangano itself, which she narrowly missed taking in 1648. When the Dutch were driven from Angola in 1648, Njinga abandoned her offensive, but quickly fought the reinforced Portuguese army to a standstill, causing them to sue for peace in 1654. The final peace treaty, concluded in 1657 recognized Njinga's claims to Matamba and the islands of the Kwanza, called for the liquidation of some Imbangala bands, required her to return to Christianity, and returned her sister, captured in 1646, to her.

The last years of Njinga's reign were spent seeking a suitable succession to her rule. She had no children and sought to head off claims by either dissident nobles or the Imbangala elements in her army to replace the royal family of Ndongo as rulers. She sought compromise by readmitting missionaries and becoming a practicing Catholic herself, arranging a marriage with her sister, whom she named as successor, with Njinga Mona, the Imbangala leader, and by promoting another noble family, of Ngola Kanini to favorable positions. She negotiated Portuguese support for her plans in the treaty of 1657.

Her death in 1663 was followed by a struggle between Imbangala and Christian-legitimist factions, with occasional Portuguese interventions. After her sister died in 1666, partisans of Ngola Kanini and Njinga Mona contested the kingship, and it was not until 1681 that the line of Ngola Kanini finally won out. The descendants of this family, also known as the Guterres, ruled Njinga's kingdom for the next century. Njinga's struggle to be recognized as legitimate female ruler had significant implications, as some of her most important successors, such as Veronica I (1681–1721) and Ana II (1742–1756) were women.

JOHN THORNTON

See also: **Angola; Kongo; Ndongo, Kingdom of.**

Biography

Born in 1582. Sent to Luanda negotiate relations between Portugal and Angola in 1622. Baptized as Ana de Sousa and promised to help Christianize her country. Defeated in battle against the Portuguese in 1625. Sought an alliance with the Dutch forces against Portugal in 1641. Continued resisting the Portuguese until they agreed to a peace treaty in 1654, which was finalized in 1657. Died 1663.

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Nkomo, Joshua Mqabuko Nyogolo (c.1917–1999)

Zimbabwean Politician and Nationalist Leader

Joshua Nkomo is generally considered the founding father of Zimbabwe nationalism, from the generation of Nelson Mandela rather than Robert Mugabe. He officially began his political career in 1952, when he was elected an officer of the All-African Convention. In that capacity he accompanied Godfrey Huggins to meetings in London as a representative of African opinions concerning the proposed Central African Federation. He stood for election to the Federation Assembly in 1953 but lost. He continued to be politically active and in 1954 was elected president of the Bulawayo chapter of the African National Congress (ANC). In 1957 he became national ANC president.

In September 1959, while Nkomo was out of the country, Federation Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead banned the ANC and arrested many of its top leaders. Rather than face arrest by returning home, Nkomo remained in London where he established an ANC exile office. He was elected president of the new National Democratic Party (NDP), short-lived successor to the banned ANC, in October 1960. He led the NDP delegation to the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in London in 1960–1961. Initially accepting a United Federal Party (UFP) proposal granting Africans fifteen of sixty-five parliamentary seats, his party's rejection of it caused him to disassociate himself from the plan.

In December 1961, the Southern Rhodesia government banned the NDP. Again, Nkomo was out of the country, this time in Dar es Salaam. With the support of nationalist leader the Rev. Ndabangi Sithole, Nkomo formed and assumed the presidency of a new organization, the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) in 1962. Traveling widely to call attention to the Rhodesia problem, Nkomo won United Nations recognition of the issue of African rights and independence in Southern Rhodesia in 1962.

Shortly after Nkomo's his return to Rhodesia, in September 1962, the Whitehead government banned ZAPU. Nkomo was arrested in October and restricted

for three months to Kezi, near Bulawayo. Throughout 1963, he was repeatedly rearrested and released. He and Sithole split over strategy during this time, with Nkomo taking the more hard-line stance in opposition to the rising power of the extremist, pro-white, Rhodesia Front (RF) Party. It was at this time that Sithole formed the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), with Robert Mugabe and James Chikerema. Ian Smith and the RF came to power in April 1964 and a new wave of arrests, including Nkomo's, quickly followed.

Restrictions on his movement and long periods in jail and rural detention camps filled most of the next ten years, with brief releases in order to meet with British emissaries engaged in talks over Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1966, 1968, and 1971. The Smith regime released him in December 1974, for a new round of constitutional talks in Lusaka.

Intense competition and bitter rivalries for leadership of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement erupted into the open during late 1974 and continued in 1975, as international pressures, including sanctions, on the Smith regime to agree to a settlement, mounted. Nkomo briefly joined other African leaders under the umbrella of a reconstituted African National Congress (ANC) for yet another round of inconclusive talks with the RF government at Victoria Falls. This arrangement soon collapsed, as ZAPU and ZANU factions fought among themselves. By late 1975, Nkomo's ZAPU was emerging as the moderate alternative, in contrast to ZANU under its new leader, Robert Mugabe.

From December 1975 to March 1976, Nkomo and Ian Smith held a series of inconclusive informal weekly talks, bringing Nkomo even sharper criticism from other nationalist leaders. Later that year, Nkomo and Mugabe formed the Patriotic Front (PF), in preparation for another round of negotiations with Smith at Geneva and the British and Americans at Malta. Their position was for an unconditional transfer of power to the African majority and the talks ended without an agreement and with an intensified armed struggle appearing likely. Nkomo set up ZAPU military headquarters in Zambia and used his authority to help arm and recruit Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) fighters, with Soviet support.

The Smith government's "Internal Settlement" agreement with Bishop Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chief Chirau preserved white minority power while granting token African political rights under a new "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" constitution. In March 1978, Nkomo and Mugabe denounced it and declared that the armed struggle would continue. They also agreed to meet with British and American officials to set terms for another attempt at a negotiated agreement granting legal independence and full majority rule.

In 1979, under pressure from front-line presidents and Commonwealth leaders meeting in Lusaka, all parties agreed to a new constitutional conference under British sponsorship at Lancaster House in London, to begin in September 1979. The PF alliance between Mugabe and Nkomo held through three difficult months of negotiations leading to reluctant agreement to a less than ideal constitutional settlement in December.

Nkomo returned home in January 1980 to begin organizing and campaigning for scheduled February elections. Robert Mugabe announced that ZANU (PF) would contest parliamentary elections as a separate party, thereby ending the PF alliance and making ZAPU (PF) the main, *de facto*, opposition party. Drawing nearly all of its support from the minority Ndebele-speaking population of the south, Nkomo's ZAPU predictably finished a distant second in the elections.

Mugabe became prime minister of the new Republic of Zimbabwe and in March he formed a coalition government which included only four ZAPU cabinet appointments. Nkomo was offered and accepted the Home Affairs portfolio. In January 1981, Nkomo was demoted to Minister without portfolio. Conflict and rivalry intensified as Nkomo fought off pressures from ZANU to merge the two parties. In 1982 Nkomo was sacked from Cabinet after caches of illegal arms were discovered on his properties and he was accused of plotting a coup.

Nkomo continued to criticize Mugabe's increasingly forceful calls for creation of a one-party state in Zimbabwe, while complaining that the ZANU (PF) regime was persecuting and killing ZAPU members and supporters in Matabeleland. Mugabe charged that ex-ZIPRA "dissidents" were waging a divisive, anti-government terrorist campaign in the province and deployed elite, North Korean-trained soldiers from the Fifth Brigade to restore order. Nkomo charged that Fifth Brigade units were engaged in a politically and ethnically motivated extermination campaign against ZAPU. In March 1983, fearing for his safety, he fled to Botswana and then to Britain. Threatened with losing his seat in parliament, he returned to Zimbabwe in August. By then, he was ready to discuss the possibility of a ZANU-ZAPU merger, as part of a peace agreement for Matabeleland and in the interest of national unity.

Negotiations were slow and painful. In October 1984, with elections coming in 1985, ZAPU held its first party congress in ten years. Nkomo again rejected the idea of a one-party state and was reelected ZAPU leader. Following ZANU electoral gains, and ZAPU losses in June 1985, Nkomo agreed to reopen unity talks with Mugabe, eventually producing an agreement in December 1987. In 1988, Nkomo was appointed co-vice president, third-highest post in government, and minister of local government. ZAPU was merged into a

unified ZANU-PF. Nkomo accepted this diminished status and used it to help supporters in Matabeleland during his remaining years in government and public life.

He had largely retired from public life by 1995. He died on July 2, 1999, leaving Zimbabweans debating the political future of the country in his wake.

JAMES J. ZAFFIRO

See also: **Mugabe, Robert Gabriel; Zimbabwe: Second Chimurenga, 1966–1979; Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the Smith Regime, 1964–1979; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Nationalist Politics, 1950s and 1960s; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Urbanization and Conflict, 1940s; Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Lancaster House and Independence, 1978–1980.**

Biography

Joshua Nkomo was born in Matobo District near Bulawayo. Attended local mission schools and worked as a truck driver before going to South Africa in 1941 for secondary education at Adams College, Natal and post-secondary at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Science, in Johannesburg, where he trained as a social worker. Returned to Rhodesia in 1947. Hired as the first African social worker by Rhodesia Railways. Obtained a B.A. in social sciences from the University of South Africa in 1951. Appointed general secretary of the African Employees Association of Rhodesia Railways in 1951. Active in Zimbabwean national politics throughout his life. Contracted prostate cancer, and died July 2, 1999.

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Nkore: *See* **Great Lakes Region: Karagwe, Nkore, and Buhaya.**

Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)

Kwame Nkrumah left for the United States in 1935. He studied there and in Britain. It was while he was in Britain that he received an invitation from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to return home to become its full-time secretary, which he accepted after some hesitation. He arrived in Ghana on December 16, 1947.

Five months before his arrival, the UGCC had been launched with the aim of ensuring that "by all legitimate and constitutional means, the control and direction of the Government shall within the shortest possible time pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs." Though led exclusively by the upper-elite of lawyers, business magnates, and intellectuals, the UGCC had nonetheless succeeded in arousing strong nationalist and anticolonial sentiment throughout the country and opened a number of branches.

Nkrumah became an instantaneous success and soon won over thousands to the fold of the UGCC. However, he broke away from the UGCC and formed his own party, the Convention People's Party (CPP), on June 12, 1949. By the end of 1950, the CPP had eclipsed the UGCC as the more dynamic party, and its leader had become the most popular nationalist leader the country had ever known. It is not surprising, therefore, that at the first general election held in February 1951 (when Nkrumah was serving a prison sentence for the "positive action" that he had declared on January 9, 1950), the CPP swept the polls, winning thirty-four out of the thirty-eight popularly elected seats. Nkrumah was released to head the government.

During his first administration, from 1951 to 1954, Nkrumah adopted a pragmatic and laissez-faire approach and succeeded in promoting social, economic, and political developments including infrastructure development (roads, railways, and communications), free and compulsory primary education for children between the ages of six and twelve, the opening of numerous primary and secondary schools, training colleges and the new University College of Science and Technology, and a new salary structure and daily wage for workers. Politically, Nkrumah introduced a new local government system which drastically reduced the powers of the traditional ruling elite and compelled the British government to introduce a new constitution in 1954 that granted internal self-government by the introduction of a parliament.

Independence would probably have been conceded in a matter of months after June 1954 but for the sudden

rise of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the Togoland question, that is, the question of how the British Mandated Territory of Togoland was to be administered on the attainment of independence by Ghana. This was finally resolved by a UN-sponsored vote in 1956, which resulted in a majority vote in favor of the union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast (the former name of Ghana). In August 1956, the new parliament passed the motion for independence and on March 6, 1957, the Gold Coast was declared “free for ever” by Nkrumah.

Nkrumah introduced a number of measures to weaken the opposition parties and strengthen the CPP. Among them was the Deportation Act, under which a number of strong opposition party members supposed to be aliens were deported. The most notorious of these measures was the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) passed in July 1958, which empowered the government to detain anybody threatening the security of the state without trial for five years. Under this Act, sixty-seven opposition members were detained between 1958 and 1960.

Nkrumah’s career from 1957 to 1960 was marked by a continuity of the pragmatic and laissez-faire approach of the previous period. He allowed foreign companies and firms to continue to dominate the import and export trade and the mining, insurance, and manufacturing sectors. No restrictions were placed on the transfer of profits abroad while more goods from the dollar areas and Japan were put on the open general license in 1959 and 1960. Thus, the economy of the country boomed, and many new industries were built that increased employment opportunities. But this economic growth was to the advantage of the expatriate firms and companies, while the open door policy resulted in more capital leaving the country than coming in, which in turn caused a steady depletion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.

It was in the field of foreign policy that Nkrumah is best remembered. His policies here were driven by three main objectives, namely, the total liberation of Africa from colonial rule, the union of all independent African states and the integration and cultural renaissance of all black peoples in Africa and the diaspora. He organized the Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958. He followed this up with the All African Peoples’ Conference at Accra in December 1958, the All-African Trade Union Federation Conference in Accra in November 1959, and the Conference on Positive Action and Security in Africa held in Accra in April 1960. In addition to these conferences, Nkrumah made the first concrete move toward the formation of African unity by forming a union with Guinea in November 1958, which he expanded into the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in April 1961. Finally, in

pursuit of his pan-Africanist objectives, Nkrumah went on an official tour of the United States in June 1958.

The period from 1960 to 1966 witnessed an anticlimax of decline, fall, and tragedy. In the political field at home, Nkrumah introduced a new constitution in July 1960 that concentrated power in his hands and turned him into a constitutional dictator who could rule by decree, dismiss any public servant, and override the decisions of parliament. The second constitutional move was made in 1964 when, in conformity with his socialist principles, Ghana was turned into a one-party state. In 1965, in lieu of the planned party elections, he went on national radio to announce the names of the new politicians whom he had selected to represent the 104 constituencies.

In the economic field, Nkrumah abandoned his laissez-faire approach in favor of the socialist approach to economic development, which necessitated active state control and participation in all sectors of the economy and the establishment of a large number of state corporations. By March 1965, there were forty-seven state corporations in operation. Nearly all these corporations were running at a loss by the end of the 1965 due to a lack of trained personnel, lack of proper planning and feasibility studies, inefficiency, corruption, and nepotism. The country was also experiencing an acute shortage of food, manufactured and imported goods, spare parts, raw materials, inflation and acute unemployment.

By the beginning of 1966, the country had gone bankrupt and was on the verge of economic collapse. On February 24, 1966, a coup d’état was staged through the combined efforts of the armed forces and the police, which led to Nkrumah’s replacement by the National Liberation Council.

Nkrumah sought refuge in Guinea. He suffered from skin cancer and was flown to Bucharest, where he died on April 27, 1972. His body was flown to Guinea where it was given a state burial. However, it was later exhumed and flown to Ghana, where it was buried first at his village of Nkorful, and later transferred and buried at the polo ground in Accra where he had proclaimed the victory of the battle for his country’s independence.

A. ADU BOAHEN

See also: **All-African People’s Conference, 1958; Ghana.**

Biography

Kwame Nkrumah was born in Nkorful in the Western Region of Ghana in 1909. He was educated at the Government Training College at Accra and Achimota, 1926–1930, and taught before leaving for the United

States in 1935. He attended Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, 1939–1943, graduating with bachelor's and master's degrees in economics, sociology, education, theology, and philosophy. In May 1945 he left the United States for Britain and registered as a Ph.D. student at the London School of Economics. On March 7, 1957, the Gold Coast won its independence under the name Ghana. From 1957 to 1966, Nkrumah devoted his energies to promoting the social and economic developments of Ghana; leading the struggle for the liberation of Africa from colonialism; and campaigning for the formation of African unity, an African high command, and an African common market, as well as for the cultural renaissance and unity of all black peoples both in the continent and in the diaspora. He was overthrown in a coup d'état in February 1966, died of skin cancer in Romania in April 1972, and was buried first in Guinea and then in Ghana.

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Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga (1916–1983)

Zambian Politician and Opposition Leader

In July 1951, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was elected president of the African National Congress (ANC), replacing the founder and president Godwin Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika. As leader of the ANC, Nkumbula participated in several constitutional talks regarding the decolonization of Zambia. His popularity would eventually decline due to his position on the federation issue. African nationalists saw Nkumbula as too accommodating to the views of the colonial government over the question of federation. Although he opposed federation and was instrumental in the formation of the Action Plan in 1952 to fight against the introduction of federation, the Action Council proved futile in the face of government hostility toward the ANC.

The imposition of federation in 1953 lowered the morale of African nationalists for several years. During this period Nkumbula made a fatal mistake of supporting Sir Stewart Gore-Browne's idea of partitioning Zambia, which Nkumbula saw as the only hope

for Africans to ever attain a measure of self-government. The idea was greatly opposed by African nationalist and further weakened Nkumbula's position in the ANC.

The coming of federation and Nkumbula's apparent lack of radicalism further cost him the position of number one political leader in Zambian nationalist politics. Kenneth David Kaunda, his secretary general, began to emerge as the next leader of the party. The two leaders began to drift apart during their trip to London in May 1957. While in London, Kaunda was not happy with Nkumbula, whom he accused of spending less time on the nationalist cause. Furthermore, Zambians in London also disapproved of Nkumbula's leadership. Kaunda was urged to take over the leadership of ANC when he returned home. Although Kaunda was not happy with Nkumbula's leadership, he was not willing to remove Nkumbula from the presidency of ANC.

However, events in the country decided Nkumbula's fate. Nkumbula's attempt to deal with dissent in the party led him to dismiss Munukayumbu Sipalo, his private secretary. The move backfired and the *African Times* publicized the unpopularity of Nkumbula and talked of Kaunda as the "man of the moment." Although Nkumbula managed to hold on to power, the rift between him and other leaders grew. Pressure on Kaunda to take over was also mounting. In May 1958 Kaunda went on an extended visit to Dar es Salaam for a World Assembly of Youth Conference. Nkumbula took advantage of Kaunda's absence and dismissed members of the provincial offices who he thought were disloyal to him. The move only served to worsen the impending split. During this period, Nkumbula grew close to Harry Franklin, a European representative for Africans in the Legislative Council in charge of education and social services. Nkumbula also joined the white, liberal-dominated club in Kabulonga and urged other African nationalists to do the same.

By August 1958, the foundations of a breakaway movement were firmly in place. In October Nkumbula was reelected as ANC president. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe led a breakaway movement, which became the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and Kaunda became its president. Nkumbula's political leadership of the nationalist struggle was weakened and he never recovered. ZANC was short-lived and was superseded by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which was formed after an amalgamation of a number of parties that had emerged following the ban of the ZANC. Kaunda led UNIP.

Meanwhile, in July 1961, Lawrence Katilungu took over ANC leadership when Nkumbula was imprisoned for a driving offence. Katilungu died in a car accident in the Congo in November 1961, and Nkumbula reclaimed his position in the ANC. By this time Nkumbula had lost

the leadership of the nationalist struggle that was firmly in the hands of Kaunda's UNIP. However, Nkumbula still had a role to play in the nationalist struggle and this became evident after the December 1962 elections. Neither UNIP nor the white-led United Federal Party (UFP) had enough seats to form a government. It was inevitable that a coalition government was the only answer, and Nkumbula's ANC had the power to decide with which of the two parties to enter into a coalition. Nkumbula's decision demonstrated that he was an African nationalist who considered the interests of Africans to be of paramount importance. While he could have easily and legally entered into a coalition with the UFP, he chose to form a coalition government with the UNIP. The coalition government lasted until January 1964, when the UNIP formed an all-African government following its overwhelming victory in that month's election. The UNIP won fifty-five of the sixty-five main seats while Nkumbula's ANC won the remaining ten seats. From this time until December 1972, when the one-party state was declared in Zambia, Nkumbula remained the leader of the opposition in parliament.

Yet on January 22, 1969, the speaker of the National Assembly, Robinson Nabulyato, refused to recognize the ANC as an official opposition in the National Assembly because of its small number of members. The speaker, who was a founder member of ANC, argued that the ANC could neither form a quorum to execute the business of the House nor a government. Nkumbula, as leader of the opposition, was therefore denied a salary of the leader of the opposition, an official residence, as well as office space in the National Assembly building. Nkumbula ceased to be an important personage in parliament because the UNIP was running a de facto one-party state political system.

Nonetheless, UNIP required Nkumbula's signature to make Zambia a one-party state. While President Kaunda signed the bill on December 13, 1972, to make Zambia a one-party state, it took the Choma Declaration signed between Nkumbula and Kaunda to formally dissolve the ANC and for Nkumbula and his followers to join the UNIP. In June 1973 Nkumbula announced that he was joining the UNIP. In 1978 Nkumbula attempted to stand for the republican presidency, but he was disqualified on account that he had not been a member of UNIP for at least five years in line with a September 1978 amendment of the UNIP constitution. Nkumbula's appeal against the disqualification was turned down by the High Court in November 1978. From that time, Nkumbula's political career was over. In ill health, Nkumbula led a quiet life until his death in 1983 at the age of sixty-seven.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Zambia: Nationalism, Independence.**

Biography

Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula was born in January 1916 at Mala Village in Namwala in the Southern Province of Zambia. He was educated at Methodist Mission schools and received teacher training at Kafue Methodist Training College, where he qualified as a school teacher in 1934. From 1934 to 1942 he taught at Namwala schools. In 1942 he moved to the Copperbelt where he joined United Missions as a teacher. He was offered a scholarship to study at Makerere College in Uganda. After completing his studies at Makerere he was given a government scholarship in 1946 to study at the University of London where he obtained a diploma in education. He later embarked on studies in political science at the London School of Economics. However, the scholarship was withdrawn because Nkumbula was actively involved in politics. He left London in 1950 and spent a year working as salesman in East Africa. He returned to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in July 1951 and settled in his birthplace at Mala as a rancher. In ill health, Nkumbula led a quiet life until his death in 1983 at the age of sixty-seven.

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Nobadia, Makurra and 'Alwa

In the mid-sixth century, a number of ecclesiastical historians wrote of the conversion of the inhabitants of the Nile valley south of Egypt's border at Aswan, thus informing us of the existence of three kingdoms in that region. Nobadia lay closest to Egypt, beyond the Third Cataract was Makurra, and to the south of the Fifth Cataract lay 'Alwa. Later sources, many of them Arab writers, called these peoples Nubians. As early as the third century BCE, the Hellenistic geographer Eratosthenes describes a people known as the Noba living on the west bank of the Nile. By the fourth century they appear to have infiltrated the Kushite empire and assumed dominance upon the collapse of the Kushite monarchy. The Noba who came to occupy Nobadia

found themselves in conflict both with the Romans to the north and with the Blemmyes, desert tribesmen from the Eastern Desert who conquered part of the river valley. The Nobadians under their king Silko ousted the Blemmyes in the mid-fifth century and, like the Blemmyes, were alternately allies and protagonists of Roman Egypt.

In the sixth century, as part of the Byzantine emperor Justinian's plans to regain control of the former territory of the Roman Empire and extend the writ of the empire over the peoples beyond its borders, proselytizing missions were dispatched to Nubia. The royal family of Nobadia was converted to Christianity in 543, that of Makurra around 570, and the Alwan king in 580. Hostilities between the kingdoms of Nubia are reported in the accounts of these missionary missions; it appears that while Nobadia and Alwa enjoyed cordial relations, they were both at loggerheads with Makurra.

Between 639 and 641, Egypt was invaded and conquered by the Muslim armies of Amru b. al-As, breaking once and for all direct contacts between Nubia and its imperial Christian patron. The Muslim armies pushed on into Nubia but withdrew after meeting fierce and perhaps unexpected resistance. In 652 another Muslim army advanced as far as Old Dongola, the capital of Makurra to which it laid siege. However, no permanent conquests were made, and after the signing of a treaty known as the Baqt (a reciprocal treaty slightly biased against the Nubians), Egypt and Nubia coexisted until the twelfth century on relatively peaceful terms. In the accounts of the invasion of 652 no mention is made of Nobadia, and the Baqt was a treaty binding "on all the Nubians from the borders of Egypt until the borders of Alwa." This implies that by that date, Nobadia and Makurra were already united into one kingdom and the cultural dominance of the latter, certainly in the fields of art and architecture, are clear by the turn of the eighth century. The region of the former northern kingdom retained a degree of autonomy. It was known as the province of Maris and was governed by a high-ranking official, the eparch, known to the Muslims as the "Lord of the Mountain" or the "Lord of the Horses," who seems to have been primarily responsible for Nubian-Muslim relations. He was originally based in the old Nobadian capital at Faras but later his seat was moved to the hilltop fortress of Qasr Ibrim.

'Alwa remained independent, although links between the two Nubian royal families may have been close and the matrilineal succession practiced in both kingdoms seems to have occasionally placed an Alwan on the throne of Makurra, and vice versa.

The whole of Nubia shared a common culture united both by the Christian faith and by the use of common languages. Although the Meroitic language may have survived into the later fourth century, it was thereafter

replaced by Greek as the official language, with Coptic used primarily in religious contexts. Eventually Old Nubian came into use, largely replacing the other languages by the late Christian period. Arabic was also employed, and became more common to facilitate interaction with Egypt and the Muslim traders in Nubia, and also as a result of an influx of Arabic speakers into the region.

The culture of the early pagan Nubians was firmly rooted in local traditions. In funerary culture and religion, one can readily recognize traits going back several thousands of years, to at least the Kerma culture. The arrival of Christianity, which gradually percolated down throughout the population, caused a fundamental change. The new ideology made obsolete the need to physically manifest one's worldly status through grandiose tomb monuments and grave goods. The earlier Nobadian kings, buried at Qustul and Ballana near Abu Simbel under massive tumuli, had been accompanied to the grave by sacrificed individuals, camels, dogs, horses, and abundant material possessions. In stark contrast, the insubstantial nature of later burials is highlighted by the fact that not one single royal burial has been identified and the one royal tombstone known—that of King David of Alwa—found at his capital Soba East near Khartoum, is on a small roughly hewn slab of marble.

Nubia's Christian culture drew heavily on the Middle East and Egypt for its inspiration, but eventually developed with a distinct character of its own. Among the clearest manifestations of Christianity are the abundant churches found throughout the Nile valley, from the First Cataract as far upstream as Sennar on the Blue Nile. Some of the earliest churches were inserted into preexisting temples that were modified to suit the needs of the new religious practices. The major Nubian centers showed great architectural vitality. At Faras a sequence of increasingly grandiose churches was built on the same site over a period of approximately 150 years, culminating in the Cathedral Church of Paulos dedicated in 707. At Old Dongola there is a similar situation, with several very large churches being constructed, demolished, and rebuilt within the first two centuries of Christianity. With the uniting of the two northern kingdoms, the architectural norms established at Old Dongola were applied to the north; the Paulus cathedral at Faras is a provincial copy of the Church of the Granite Columns at the metropolis. Similar churches were also constructed within the Alwan capital, although the relative importance of, and direction of influences between, the united northern kingdoms and its southern neighbor cannot at present be assessed, largely because of the very limited amount of archaeological work undertaken within 'Alwa.

A particular characteristic of Nubian churches was the profusion of paintings that adorned their walls, and after the introduction of vaulted roofs, their vaults.

Excavations of the Paulos cathedral at Faras in the early 1960s, a building that had been totally engulfed in sand in the late Christian period, revealed a treasure house of mural art, with over 140 individual compositions on up to four superimposed layers of plaster, spanning from the early eighth until the fifteenth centuries. The large number of paintings, together with the many inscriptions from the building, allowed a detailed chronology of artistic styles to be developed and, at least for the later period, the discovery of many more paintings in the Monastery of the Holy Trinity at Old Dongola is opening up new horizons of inquiry.

The Nubians excelled in the production of fine painted pottery. The earliest pottery in the north drew on late Roman stylistic traditions, while in 'Alwa the highly decorated polychromatic pottery, known as Soba Ware, copied designs from the repertoire of the wall painter. Pottery was produced in great quantities at a number of centers. Faras and Old Dongola may have dominated the scene, and their products seem to have been traded widely. The main economic base of the Nubians was agriculture, largely along the banks of the Nile, and with the aid of the newly introduced water wheel, the *saqia*, to allow large scale irrigation for much of the year. Trade in the staple products of central Africa—among which slaves figured prominently—was also important, particularly to the monarchy. The terms of the Baqt stated that the Makurran king was obliged to deliver 360 (or 400) slaves annually, along with produce, to the Muslims at the First Cataract.

Although the Baqt did much to stabilize relations between Makurra and Egypt, there was a number of outbreaks of hostilities between the two powers, the expedition of King Cyriacus in about 748 to Fustat (Cairo) showing that the Muslims did not always have the upper hand. However, with the rise to power of the Ayyubid dynasty, followed by the Mamluks in the thirteenth century, Muslim armies, aided and abetted by various claimants to the Makurran throne, operated extensively in northern Nubia. The first Muslim ruler occupied the Makurran throne in 1323, while the throne hall of the kings at Old Dongola was converted to a mosque in 1317. Old Dongola was abandoned as the capital in the later fourteenth century and the court was established at Derr. There, as the Kingdom of Dotawo, a Christian enclave survived at least as late as 1485 but had vanished by the time of the arrival of the Ottomans in the sixteenth century. The fate of Alwa is less easy to document. Many of its churches appear to have been in ruins by the thirteenth century, although a Kingdom of Soba was still in existence around 1500, when it was conquered by the Abdallab Arabs or the Funj.

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See also: **Nubia: Relations with Egypt.**

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Nobel Peace Prize: See Luthuli, Albert; Mandela, Nelson; Tutu, Desmond.

Nok Culture: Terracotta, Iron

Nok has been described as one of the early centers of sculptural tradition, second only to Egypt. Its sculptures are terracotta figurines and iron implements, with the terracotta works being more extensive: while all the areas excavated thus far have produced terracotta figurines, only a few sites have yielded iron implements. The terracotta figurines and iron implements are widely distributed across northern Nigeria, covering an area of 500 × 150 kilometers. Within this space are found, in addition to the village of Nok, centers including Kegara, Katsina Ala, Tare, Jemaa, old Kafanchan, Wamba, Kachia, Rafin Dinya, Makafo, and Shere. These centers have yielded important objects or figurines that bear a striking resemblance to those found in Nok, which explains why they are all generally referred to under the umbrella term of the Nok culture area.

Terracotta Sculpture

Most of the terracotta sculptures were recovered from alluvial or water lain deposits and originally came to light in the tin mines near the village of Nok. The radiocarbon date of the deposits beneath the sculptures is 925BCE (plus/minus 70 years). This, combined with the specific dates for some of the sculptures in different parts of the Nok culture area, has led scholars to conclude that the date for most Nok sculptures ranges between about 900BCE and 200CE.

It is important to note that while some of the terracotta figurines are naturalistic, others are creative and artistic interpretations. Each terracotta figure was produced through a process or act of adding a little clay at a time, until the whole figurine was formed. In terms of style, both human animal figures shared similar eye shapes; the major features noticeable in all the figurines are the triangular or semi-circular shapes of the eyes. The human figurines are either cylindrical or conical in shape, and are usually adorned with head-dresses. In all the large Nok figurines, the lips, ears,

nostrils, and pupils are pierced. The piercing of the eyes in Nok culture resembles that of modern Yoruba “gelede” marks, which are stylistic features rather than functional ones. It has been suggested that the people of Nok used the holes deliberately as technical devices for the escape of air during the firing process.

The people of Nok were masters in the use of clay. Unfired clay contains air bubbles and moisture. When clay is fired, it shrinks by about one-tenth. The Nok people understood that the clay must not contain air bubbles to avoid expansion of the holes during the process of firing, which would automatically lead to the cracking of the objects. This sort of sophisticated understanding of the medium’s innate qualities underscores the skill of Nok sculptors.

The details of dress and hair style found in Nok sculptures resemble those found today among some groups in the Plateau State of Nigeria and the Benue River Basin such as the Tiv, the Dakakari, the Ham, and the Jebba. Nok culture shares numerous similarities with Ife culture. Both cultures are the only ones in Africa that produced life-sized or nearly life-sized human figures. While Ife arts are characterized by an idealized naturalism in both human and animal representations, Nok art displays extreme stylization in human figurines and great naturalism for animal figures.

Iron Works

The earliest evidence of the use of iron in Nigeria is found at Taruga. Taruga is about thirty-five kilometers south of Abuja. It lies in a group of hills west of Gurara River, a tributary of the Niger River. Excavations carried out in the area indicate that smelting operations were carried out in the valley. The archaeological finds here include wrought iron, a quantity of iron slag, quantities of domestic pottery, a number of figurines, and a small concentration of charcoal.

The radiocarbon date of the excavated charcoal samples is 440BCE (plus/minus 140 years). The radiocarbon date of iron objects is 280BCE (plus/minus 120 years). A number of other iron smelting furnaces excavated from Taruga produced radiocarbon dates ranging from the fifth to the third centuries BCE. An occupation site in the village yielded ten furnaces. The charcoal sealed in the base of one of the furnaces yielded a radiocarbon date of 300BCE (plus/minus 100 years). The layer on which a terracotta figure was found in the same excavation yielded a radiocarbon date 440BCE (plus/minus 140 years), while the iron slab itself yielded a radio carbon date of 280BCE (plus/minus 120 years), thereby confirming the fifth through the third centuries BCE the iron age in the Nok culture area. Since no earlier evidence of iron technology has been found in Nigeria to date, there is reason to suspect that iron smelting spread to other parts of Nigeria from here.

The origin of iron smelting technology found in Nok has been a matter of enormous controversy. Some scholars have asserted that the knowledge of iron came from outside the culture area. One theory is that the iron technology in Nok originated from Meroe, in the present-day Republic of Sudan, the capital of the ancient empire of Kush, which was destroyed around 400. It had been argued that, following the destruction of the empire, some people migrated westward along the southern edge of the Sahara desert, carrying with them the knowledge of iron and iron smelting. From here, it has been postulated, the iron technology diffused into the Nok culture area. In view of the archaeological evidence, which convincingly demonstrates that Nok iron-smelting technology predates the fall of the Kush Empire, this theory seems untenable. Evidence may yet emerge of trans-Saharan diffusion from North Africa, but until conclusive evidence pointing to diffusion of iron into Nok from outside the culture area become available, it is reasonable to assume that the iron smelting technology may have evolved from within the region.

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See also: **Ife, Oyo, Yoruba, Ancient: Kingship and Art; Igbo-Ukwu.**

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Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing, 1857

Little is known about the life of Nongqawuse, yet she has become one of the most famous figures in the history of the Eastern Cape and the Xhosa people. She was probably born sometime in the early 1840s. In 1856 the adolescent Nongqawuse was living with her uncle, Mhlakaza, near the Gxarha River, which was just outside the border of colonial British Kaffraria. In April of that year she and a younger girl named Nombanda were sent to drive birds away from the maize fields when two strangers called to them from a nearby bush. The strangers told the girls that the entire Xhosa community would soon be reborn but that all cattle must be slaughtered, as they had been raised by people contaminated by witchcraft. Furthermore, people should prepare for this rebirth by the building new gain pits, cattle enclosures, and houses. However,

when the girls went home to report what they had been told, no one believed them.

The next day they returned to the same spot, and once again the strangers appeared and told Nongqawuse to go directly to her uncle and tell him that they wanted to see him after he had purified himself by slaughtering a cow. Mhlakaza followed the instructions and four days later accompanied Nongqawuse to the field where he heard voices which repeated the earlier prophecies. Mhlakaza then reported this to Sarhili, ruler of the Gcaleka state and nominal king of the Xhosa, who was eventually convinced to issue a formal command that all the people should follow the orders that the strangers had given to Nongqawuse.

The message then spread to other Xhosa rulers, including those living in colonial territory. Ravaged by years of colonial aggression and a recent outbreak of a lung sickness among their cattle, many Xhosa people partially obeyed the prophecies by slaughtering or selling some cattle. When the date for the expected rebirth (the full moon of June 1856) passed without incident, Xhosa society became more polarized, as those who believed the prophecies blamed those who did not, and had not followed its dictates, for its apparent failure.

In January 1857 Nonkosi, a young girl who lived in British Kaffraria, reported seeing strange people who repeated the prophecies to her. This gave the cattle-killing movement renewed momentum within the colonial territory. Violence between believers and non-believers disrupted the planting season, and more cattle were slaughtered. Some chiefs supported the movement; others opposed it. Opportunistic colonial officials took advantage of this chaos to seize thousands of Xhosa to work on settler farms and to imprison Xhosa rulers, such as Maqoma of the Rharhabe, who had fought against colonial conquest.

By June 1857 mass starvation caused the cattle-killing movement to fade away. The cattle-killing controversy left as many as 50,000 Xhosa dead and upward of 150,000 displaced. As many as 400,000 cattle had been slaughtered. Within British Kaffraria, 60,000 acres were taken from the Xhosa and given to white settlers. In 1858, the colonial police invaded Sarhili's weakened kingdom and drove him further east into Bomvanaland.

After the cattle-killing, Nongqawuse and Nonkosi were detained by the British, who forced them to dictate "statements" about their roles in this event. They were most likely released in 1859. For the rest of her life, Nongqawuse lived in obscurity; she died around 1898 near the Eastern Cape town of Alexandria.

There are many different opinions concerning the origins of this series of events. At the time, colonial officials justified their enslavement of the Xhosa and possession of their land by claiming that the chiefs,

particularly Sarhili, had orchestrated the prophecies in the hopes their starving people would invade British territory. Today, Xhosa people believe a similar conspiracy theory, which maintains that colonial agents, perhaps Governor George Grey himself, hid in the bush and pretended to be Xhosa ancestors telling Nongqawuse the prophecies. The cattle-killing, therefore, is thought to be part of a colonial plot to destroy Xhosa resistance to colonial conquest. In some versions of this story, Nongqawuse is even portrayed as a colonial agent. It has become a common saying to describe a lie as a "Nongqawuse tale."

There are many other interpretations of the cattle-killing. As early as the 1930s, Elizabeth Dowsley identified the relationship between lung sickness and cattle-killing. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was seen as either the result of missionaries teaching biblical miracle stories or as a "pagan reaction" to the increased colonization. Jeff Peires, an historian of the Xhosa people, explains it in terms of Christian influence specifically emanating from Mhlakaza, who had once been a convert at a mission station. However, Helen Bradford has demonstrated that there is absolutely no evidence for this claim. Her explanation is that the cattle-killing movement, in which women played a prominent role, arose because Xhosa men had engaged in mass child abuse and incest. However, there is no compelling evidence for this conclusion, either. Jack Lewis points out that too much emphasis has been placed on explaining the ideology of the prophecies, but not enough on the material reasons explaining why people heeded them. According to Lewis, some chiefs attempted to use the movement to centralize their authority in the face of increasing colonial power. Tim Stapleton argues that the movement was, at least in part, directed against the traditional aristocracy, whose power was based on cattle patronage, which had been discredited by continual defeat at the hands of the British and weakened by cattle disease. Powerless, many chiefs sanctioned cattle-killing because they had no other choice. Julian Cobbing has pointed out that it is possible that colonial officials, whose records provide the bulk of evidence for historians, exaggerated the millenarian nature of the movement to conceal their destruction of Xhosa society as an irrational national suicide.

TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON

See also: **Hundred Years' War, 1779–1878.**

Biography

Born sometime in the early 1840s. In the mid-1850s she lived within the Gcaleka Xhosa state of King Sarhili, which was located just over the eastern border of British Kaffraria. She lived with her uncle Mhlakaza who was an advisor to Sarhili. In 1856 she reported

being visited by long dead ancestors who promised a national rebirth of the Xhosa people if they slaughtered their cattle and refrained from planting their crops. After the cattle-killing she became an obscure figure and died around 1898 near the Eastern Cape town of Alexandria.

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North Africa, Ancient: Urbanization

It is ironic to note that the roots of urbanization can be traced to the development of rural activities such as the domestication of animals and crop cultivation. Such a crucial change in lifestyle, from the hunter-forager to settled, and further to the creation of urban centers, marked a fundamental, irreversible step in human history. Additional factors that led to urbanization are many but they can be summed up as an adaptation to the acquisition of a new skill, such as metallurgy, or change in critical circumstances, for instance, environmental.

The domestication of animals and agriculture led to a food surplus for the first time in human history, which also allowed a number in the community to be relieved of food production duties, allowing for the development of other skills. In ancient Egypt, the surplus was achieved as a result of the population gaining an understanding of the Nile's annual cycle, and therefore knowing when to sow and harvest for the maximum gain. As a result of such advances people also began to recognize the advantages of living with others with whom there were neither blood ties nor a compulsion to live together, rather making a choice for mutual benefit. Simply put, without a surplus of food there would be no urban development.

The idea of creating towns because it could be for the benefit of nonkinsmen was a radical departure from any society up to that point, and yet the concept appears to have gained acceptance fairly rapidly, as soon

as the material gain was obvious. Different forms of benefit existed, security perhaps being primary among them, after which location was the single most important question that had to be dealt with. The most prosaic of reasons would be taken into consideration first, such as the presence of a reliable source of clean, defensible water and a location that is free of disease. It is not by chance that Egyptian cities would be founded along the Nile, with the desert providing additional security from foreign attack.

Other factors that impacted on the setting included both the spiritual and the temporal. For instance, if a location was of some religious importance or the ruler had a residence there, that alone could persuade followers or subjects to live in the immediate vicinity. Along strictly economic lines, trade was another powerful deciding factor in a town's location, whether because it fell at a trading crossroads or a prominent terminus, such as a port, as was the case with Carthage.

Cities were built behind walls with a gate or gates to control access to the interior, with the wall itself becoming one way that a town could be defined, and any growth could be more easily regulated. Having people within also made the business of taxation an easier prospect, as did the charging of tolls to outsiders who wished to gain entry or to trade. The size of the walls themselves did not always exist solely for the purposes of security; often they were oversized to impress visitors, (potential) enemies, or for an aesthetic preference. Not to be underestimated too is the sense of belonging to a community that could be very powerful should the need to defend the town be required. With the security this guaranteed, trade also tended to flourish.

The growth in number of non-food-producing citizens was a matter that a king had to deal with carefully, so as not to offend the producers. Religion was often used to this end, giving the ruler an inherent power to demand that the citizens do as instructed. It also worked in the urban centers to persuade subjects to work on building projects that would benefit the town as a whole, such as the walls, roads, stores, temples, and palaces. Masons are, therefore, one of the earlier examples of a skilled worker removed from food production. They were soon followed by all those professions that became necessary to a functioning town or city: merchants, priests, craftsmen, public officials, and transport specialists.

Again it was the advent of surpluses that created a need for an organized transport system, whether to move the food to other parts of the kingdom or into storage. And linked to the storing of food was the growth of literacy and mathematics out of necessity to record details such as dates of floods, quantities harvested, exports, costs, and the like. Once the surpluses had been organized, and storage and transport were

both available, then the possibility of regular trade arose, and with it the need for additional skills and skilled occupations. Also at this point there came into being a mercantile class, who in North Africa were fortunate to maintain some very lengthy trading contacts with foreign powers.

Profits from trade would go to the trader and the ruler, who now had to be supported by a ruling class, either political or religious, in order to assist with the day to day ordering of the town. Taxation, a concept alien before urbanization, was also needed to pay the public officials' wages. The erection of public buildings such as temples and stadiums helped to set the city apart from the village, an attempt to impress the food producers, and showed the people where the surplus money had been spent. Increased wealth also allowed citizens to enjoy leisure time, so that the arts also found an environment in which to flourish, creating a class of painters, sculptors, and so forth.

Memphis, the onetime capital of Egypt, was founded around 3100BCE and managed to maintain its importance for nearly two thousand years, until Thebes became the new capital. It is said to have been the largest city in the world with a population of more than 30,000. The other major city of ancient Egypt was Heliopolis, which was founded in 2900BCE. However, it was another five hundred years before it reached its maximum importance when it became the center of sun worship, with Ra moving up to become the state deity (which illustrates how important the role of religion can be upon the atmosphere and cultural life of a city).

Although it was in Egypt that urbanization had the best pedigree it seems not to have had more than a passing influence on the rest of the coast, or indeed Africa south of the Sahara. West along the coast, however, the Phoenicians founded Carthage around 800BCE. The city grew into a powerful trading city that had influence over most of northern Africa and the western Mediterranean. It was this influence that eventually brought it into conflict with the Roman Empire and led to its being razed in 146BCE. It was the consequent Roman conquest of North Africa that did most to

promote the spread of urbanization in the region from one end of the North African coast to the other.

EAMONN GEARON


See also: Carthage; Domestication, Plant and Animal, History of; Egypt, Ancient: Literacy; Hunting, Foraging; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire.

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North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire

The coastal plains of North Africa, which ran across the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, had a favorable Mediterranean-like climate, which supported the production of forest fruits and attracted sedentary population traders and settlers from Greece, Phoenicia, and Rome. Behind the coastal plains were the Atlas Mountains, which provided a home for the pastoral Berbers, who were probably the descendants of survivors of the various phases of Sahara desert habitation periods and of the mysterious "C Group" invaders of Egypt of the Old Kingdom. The mountain communities were not easily accessible to foreign influence, thus they remained in their seclusion for centuries. Beyond the Atlas Mountains lay the seemingly limitless Sahara Desert, the domain of the indigenous



North Africa under Roman occupation.



Roman water conduit in Mohammedia, near Casablanca, Morocco. © Johann Scheibner/Das Fotoarchiv.

Berber tribes variously called Libyans, Nubians, and Moors.

The Berbers of the North Africa were patrilineal, with social organization based on family groups. Villages were conglomerations of families usually from the same ancestral descent. The several villages constituted themselves into a division capable of entering into ethnic confederation with others to ward off external aggression. The Berber confederacies were usually temporary arrangements, which broke up as soon as the common danger was removed. Berbers throughout history never formed a permanent union because each tribe jealously guarded its independence. In spite of their inability to form any formidable single front on a permanent basis, the Berbers were not easy prey to external forces. Invaders had the difficult task of defeating one Berber clan after another and so had to conquer be claimed.

The Phoenicians were one of the best-known foreign visitors to the North African coastal plains. As sailors and explorers, they established several notable colonies as trade stations on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The city of Carthage, which was known for its citadel, fine natural harbor, and an extensive hinterland, became the greatest and most prosperous city. Carthage was more than a trade port, it was a republic. Two *suffetes* in the tradition of Roman consuls, ruled Carthage. The *suffetes* were elected by the population to preside over the senate where they dispensed justice. By the end of the fourth century BCE, Carthage was a flourishing commercial center, with a population of over 700,000. The wealth of Carthage derived from trade, and tributes paid by vassal states and tithe payments. Carthage maintained a large and powerful army with an armada of seven hundred military ships.

In about 580BCE, a *suffete*, Malchus, led the Carthaginian army into Sicily and conquered almost the entire island. The continued interest of Carthage in Italy led to war with Rome. Rome dispatched an army into Sicily to oppose Carthage when it became obvious

that a further delay would play into the hands of the ambitious Carthaginians. The series of wars that were fought intermittently between 262 and 146BCE between Carthage and Rome were called the Punic Wars. After 202BCE Carthage had lost some of its power and influence, although its trading ports along the Mediterranean coast kept it prosperous.

In 149BCE Rome imposed a military blockade against Carthage, and for three years the Carthaginians defended their city. Resistance to continued harassment by Rome failed, and the Carthaginian army was defeated. About 50,000 people were sold into slavery, and the city was razed to the ground. The rebuilding of the city was forbidden by the Roman conquerors.

The destruction of Carthage was the result of the rivalry for military and territorial supremacy between the two world powers. Rome saw Carthage as a dangerous rival to its dominant position.

Several attempts were made by Rome to move settlers to the old site of Carthage. In 122BCE, the Roman Senate unsuccessfully attempted to develop a colony on the site. Julius Caesar, pursuing the last retreating remnants of Pompeii's army under Scipio II, encamped near the ruins of Carthage, where he claimed he dreamed of an army of men weeping bitterly and uncontrollably. This intimate experience made him appeal for land, resources, and men to rebuild Carthage.

It was, however, the adopted son and successor of Julius Caesar, Augustus, who rebuilt the city. Augustus was a military ruler who realized the strategic importance of Carthage on the Mediterranean shore, seeing it as a gateway to the manpower and material resources of black Africa. By the time of Sentius Sartinuis, Carthage was once again a leading city, the headquarters of Roman Africa and one of the greatest and wealthiest of Roman cities.

The citizens of Rome's new experiment in Carthage fell into one of two broad categories: the wealthy class and the peasantry. The wealthy class produced the magistrates, the merchants, and the educated elite. They lived as the nobles of Rome and enjoyed more rights than the commoners.

Through interracial marriages, Roman-African families emerged. At least two of the best-known Roman emperors were Africans. The first, Septimus Severus, was emperor for eighteen years, beginning from 193BCE. Severus was born at Letpis Magna, received a good education, and became a civil magistrate. He also enlisted in the army and rose to the position of commander. During his tenure as emperor, he paid particular attention to African affairs and encouraged the breeding of camels in Africa. He is remembered as a man of enormous energy who instituted the habit of touring the empire periodically to right wrongs done in the course of native administration by appointed consuls.

Roman rule in North Africa was based on a system of land appropriation. The government annexed large areas of land as state property and made grants of land to its citizens and ex-soldiers. The peasant cultivators under this system were taxed to defray government expenses on local administration, to the extent that many of them left Roman territory to farm in the less fertile mountainous country. Those who remained became wage laborers on lands that formerly belonged to their ancestors. The system concentrated the ownership of land in a few nobles who were absentee landlords.

In spite of this, Roman civilization, which was essentially urban, became noticeable in North African civic life. It was possible to see the characteristic Roman basilica, temple, and baths in all these areas. There was one culture, one official language, one law, one literature, and one architecture from the Atlantic to the Nile valley and from the Mediterranean to the Scottish border.

AKIN ALAO

See also: **Berbers: Ancient North Africa; Carthage; Egypt, Ancient: Old Kingdom and Its Contacts to the South: Historical Outline; Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest, Occupation: Historical Outline; Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers.**

Further Reading

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Northern Africa

The region of North Africa has been given many names throughout history. To the Greeks, it was all “Libya”; to the Romans, “Africa”; to the Arabs, “the island of the west” (*jezirat al-maghrib*), a term from which scholars derive “Maghrib” (meaning North Africa west of Egypt), and the term from which the Arabic name of Morocco comes (*al-Maghrib*). Geography serves to partially isolate North Africa—with the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Mediterranean Sea on the north, and the Sahara desert to the south and west—from other parts of the world. It also has served to isolate areas of North Africa from each other. Although at different times in history the region has exhibited degrees of cultural unity, political unity has been elusive; there is no obvious portion of North Africa at which to base a North African empire, and the area’s high mountains have resulted in difficult communication and transport across the region. Until relatively recently, North Africa’s main economic and cultural contacts

were to the north, with the Mediterranean world, rather than to the south, across the Sahara, and with the rest of the continent. This connection with the Mediterranean world and North Africa’s involvement with and ties to literate, urban civilizations from a comparatively early period resulted in this region developing differently from the Sub-Saharan Africa.

The earliest African civilization from which we have extensive written records is ancient Egypt. Though urban culture arose in Egypt as far back as 4000BCE, Egypt was not politically united until 3100BCE under the first pharaohs. Geography facilitated Egyptian unification under the legendary pharaoh Menes (whose exact historical identity is uncertain, though scholars believe the actual pharaoh was either Aha or Narmer); the Nile River facilitated transport and communication, and most settlements were along this body of water. Egypt’s isolation also aided the formation of a strong, centralized, and protected state: with deserts to the east and west of the Nile River basin and the Mediterranean to the north, potential invaders faced a daunting task in conquering the country. Ancient Egyptian civilization is typically divided by historians into several different periods, roughly corresponding to the following dates: the predynastic period (prior to unification in 3100BCE), the protodynastic period (from 3100–3000BCE), the early dynastic period (3000–2625BCE), the Old Kingdom (2625–2130BCE), the First Intermediate Period (2130–1980BCE), the Middle Kingdom (1980–1630BCE), the Second Intermediate Period (1630–1539BCE), the New Kingdom (1539–1075BCE), the Third Intermediate Period (1075–656BCE), the Late Period (664–332BCE), and the Greco-Roman (also Hellenistic or Ptolemaic) Period (332–30BCE).

Legend has it that Carthage was founded in 814BCE, though this is not confirmed by archaeology. Phoenician settlements in North Africa were initially dependent on their home cities. However, with the growing power of Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, Carthage gradually became an independent power; it was because of Carthaginian resistance to Greek expansion that Sicily and points west did not become Greek territories (though Greek settlements and Hellenistic culture were commonplace). By the middle of the sixth century BCE, the main city of Phoenicia, Tyre, was under Persian control; by the fifth century BCE Carthage was not only independent but was also founding its own North African empire. The Carthaginian Empire at its greatest extent covered North Africa from Morocco to the Egyptian border and extended across the Mediterranean into Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica.

Carthage was an empire based on sea-going trade, although it never attempted to extend its control into areas distant from the North African coast. Its focus

was on the Mediterranean world, and here it came into conflict with another great regional power of the era: Rome. In 508, 348, and 279BCE these conflicts were solved through treaty; by 264 the competition erupted into warfare. The first of the three Punic Wars began as a struggle for control over Sicily and Corsica. After more than twenty years of warfare, Carthage was defeated and forced to cede Sicily and the Lipari Islands to Rome and pay an indemnity (Carthage was later forced to increase its indemnity payments and cede Corsica and Sardinia to Rome as well). The Second Punic War (218–201BCE) further reduced the Carthaginian Empire's holdings. The attempts of the famous Carthaginian general Hannibal to defeat Rome in Italy proved fruitless; Roman troops arrived in North Africa in 204 and in 201 forced Carthage to pay yet another indemnity, surrender its entire navy, and cede Spain and its Mediterranean island possessions to Rome. Now limited to its North African territories, Carthage nevertheless continued its luckless struggle against Roman domination. Though the previous wars had deprived Carthage of its political and military power, it remained a prosperous trading state; it was (at least in part) Roman greed for the wealth of Carthage's trade that caused the Third Punic War. Again, Carthage was defeated, but by this time it had neither territories nor a military to cede to the victorious Romans. The Roman conquerors instead sold the 50,000 surviving inhabitants of the city (from a population of around a quarter million) into slavery, razed the city to the ground, and seized North Africa as a Roman province.

Egypt was incorporated into the Roman Empire in 30BCE, yet Egypt and the Maghrib experienced Roman authority differently. Egyptian social and economic organization remained much as it had been prior to Roman domination; the principal difference was that Egypt's wealth was now being channeled to a Roman, rather than a Greco-Egyptian, elite. Egypt became one of Rome's main suppliers of grain, Egyptian religion continued to exist (though now deities were often identified with their Roman counterparts, as they had been with their Greek counterparts previously), and Alexandria continued to be a center of educational, scientific, and cultural achievement, as it had been under the Greek Ptolemies. The rest of North Africa underwent significant social, economic, and cultural change.

After the conversion of the Roman emperor Constantine to Christianity in 313 and the subsequent favoring of Christianity in the empire from about 320, Egypt became the center of a number of doctrinal disputes. Alexandria, where Saint Mark had preached in the first century, had become a stronghold of Christianity in North Africa (and the location of Roman persecution of both Christians and Jews before Constantine), and as such attracted numerous religious scholars.

Disputes over the nature of the Trinity arose in Alexandria (the "Arian controversy," settled at the Council of Nicaea in 325 is one such instance). Occasionally religious differences resulted in violence, as happened in 391 when the Coptic patriarch and his monks in Alexandria attacked centers of "paganism" and destroyed a subsidiary library of the museum complex in 391 (the original complex, including the library, was destroyed by civil war under the Roman emperor Aurelian in 272); earlier in 415 Hypatia, a noted female neo-Platonist scholar, was murdered.

The Alexandrian church also found religious doctrine as way to assert its independence from Constantinople, from which it was governed following the division of the Roman Empire in 364. Declaring its belief in monophysitism (the idea that Jesus had a single divine nature despite taking on human form), the Alexandrian church held fast to this belief even after the Council of Chalcedon rejected the view in 451. This atmosphere of religious dissatisfaction with Byzantine rule contributed to the ease with which Arab armies took the city in 642.

Though the Byzantines added North Africa to their domains in 533, it took more than ten additional years to pacify the region, as the Byzantines faced resistance from Mauritanian tribes and revolts within their own army (due to lack of pay and insufficient troops). Justinian's rule witnessed a campaign to restore, decorate, and build new churches in North Africa. However, these churches did not always agree with the eastern Church; they supported the efforts of the western Church against the Byzantine emperors prior to Arab conquest.

After the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632, Islam began to spread out of the Arabian peninsula and into other areas of the world, including North Africa. Under the second caliph (successor to the prophet), 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, Muslim armies succeeded in conquering most of the Middle East, including Egypt. In 639 the Arab general Amr ibn al-As and his army began their invasion of Egypt, bringing with them Islam and an end to Byzantine rule by 642. The general also created a new capital for Egypt at an interior site known as al-Fustat, near modern Cairo. The location of the new city was significant. No longer was the capital on the north coast, connecting Egypt symbolically and physically to the Mediterranean and thence to Europe; now the capital was farther south, at a new location not identified with Greek and Roman rule, and symbolically linking Egypt with other Muslim territories to the east. More broadly, the invasion of the armies of Amr ibn al-As inaugurated a new period in Egyptian history characterized by a break from past traditions and the Arabization and Islamization of Egypt.

From Egypt, the Arab armies continued their campaigns in the Mediterranean, to Nubia, and westward

across North Africa. By 670 a new base for westward expansion had been established by Uqbah ibn Nafi at the conquered city of al-Qawrayan in modern Tunisia. The invasions and the incorporation of North Africa into the wider Islamic world resulted not only in an increased Arab presence in the region but also in the Islamization of North Africa and the almost complete elimination of North African Christianity (with the exception of Egypt). Islam, though, was not spread in the Maghrib through force or concentrated missionary activity; instead, it spread among the Berbers because it proved an attractive means (through doctrinal differences) by which these tribes could assert their independence from caliphal government.

From their base in Tunisia, Arab armies under Uqbah ibn Nafi and his successor, Abu al-Muhajir Dinar al-Ansari, launched campaigns against Berber tribes in Algeria and Morocco and brought North Africa under direct Arab rule. Yet the process was not smooth, and Arab authorities faced serious Berber revolts throughout the late seventh century, necessitating Egypt's sending of two significant military forces to put down the rebellions. In the meantime, Carthage had remained in the hands of the Byzantines. In 698 Hassan ibn al-Numan began building a new Arab town called Tunis near Carthage, and this, coupled with waning Byzantine and increasing Arab naval power in the Mediterranean led to a Byzantine evacuation of North Africa around the turn of the century. Not until 705 was the Maghrib administratively separated from Egypt, grouped together as *Ifriqiyyah*, made a province of the Umayyad caliphate, and governed from the caliphal capital of Damascus. Umayyad caliphal government did not sit well with the independent-minded Berber tribes, however, particularly given official policies that discriminated against the Berbers despite their conversion to Islam and the religious requirement of equal treatment for fellow Muslims.

At the same time as the Umayyads were facing North African revolts against their authority, they were also facing a revolt in the east that would eventually topple the dynasty and bring about the dawn of the Abbasid caliphate in 750. The Abbasid caliphs put an end to a brief period of local dynastic rule in the Maghrib (under the Fihrids and the Ibaïtes) when they reconquered eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania (Libya) in 761. However, after a revolt in 800 by factions of the predominantly Arab army of Algeria led by Ibrahim ibn al-Aghlab, the Abbasids ruled largely by relying the eponymous Aghlabid dynasty to actually govern North Africa in the name of the caliph. The remainder of the former Umayyad territory of *Ifriqiyyah* then fell to a number of smaller dynasties: the Rustamids in western Algeria, the Banu Midrar in southern Morocco, and the Idrisids, based in Fez.

By the late ninth century, the Abbasid caliphate had begun to lose its grasp on some of its provinces, and Egypt was no exception. In 868 Ahmed ibn Tulun began governing Egypt for his stepfather Babak, who had been given Egypt as an *'iqta* (administrative land grant) by the Abbasid caliph. Ibn Tulun saw his mission a bit differently; however, he quickly established himself as the real ruler of Egypt, assembled his own army (based on slave service), wrested Syria from Abbasid control, and began minting coins with both the caliph's and his own name imprinted upon them. His reign was not only one of expansion and assertion of his own power but also one of prosperity (he left a sizeable budget surplus and larger agricultural yields) and beauty (as evidenced by the immense, splendid, and still-existing mosque he had built near Fustat).

Isma'ili Shi'ites in northern Syria under Ubayd Allah Sa'id had been attempting to undermine the Abbasid caliph's authority, and one way they sought to do this was by sending emissaries to North Africa to convert the inhabitants to Shi'ism and raise a revolt against Abbasid authority. Abu Abdallah al-Shi'i, one of those sent for this purpose, was able to interest enough of the inhabitants of Algeria in his mission to succeed in taking Algeria away from the Aghlabids in 907 before taking their headquarters at al-Qayrawan two years later. The new state, based at the newly built capital of al-Mahdiyyah in northern Tunisia, was named *al-dawla al-fatimiyyah* after the prophet's daughter Fatima.

The Fatimids sought nothing less than the replacement of the Sunni Abbasid caliphate with a Shi'ite Fatimid one, but they did not march at once upon Baghdad. Instead, the Fatimid caliphs turned their attention west and succeeded in seizing the capitals of the Rustamids and the Banu Midrar in 909; in 921 the Idrisids fell to the Fatimids as well. Yet Fatimid rule did not cover all of North Africa. Though they attempted to conquer western Algeria and Morocco, their influence extended little further than the former capitals of those areas—the northern Moroccan coastal cities of Ceuta and Melilla remained in the hands of the Umayyad rulers who had fled to Spain and established their own Umayyad dynasty after the Damascus branch fell to the Abbasid revolt, and Egypt remained within the bounds of Abbasid caliphal rule until 969.

In 969 the Fatimid general al-Jawhar and his Berber army removed Egypt from the Abbasid domain and proceeded to build al-Mansuriyyah, a walled city near the old, ill-planned, and sprawling Fustat. This new city underwent further alteration in 973 when the Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz renamed it al-Qahirah (Cairo, or "the Victorious") and designated it as the new Fatimid capital. Though the conquest of Egypt brought prestige and wealth to the dynasty, it also

shifted the attention of the rulers to the east, and the result was the loss of real control over the rest of North Africa a few years later.

The Fatimids, eager to spread their brand of Islam, to establish themselves as focus of loyalty for the Shi'ites under Sunni Abbasid rule, to eventually eradicate the Abbasid caliphate, and to gain a reputation for (and legitimacy from) religious zeal, founded al-Azhar University in Cairo as a center of religious, linguistic, philosophical, and scientific advancement. The building of al-Azhar and the Fatimid desire to end Sunni Abbasid rule did not result in the repression of other religions in North Africa, however. Controlling most of the North African coast, the Fatimids were a dynasty known for their tolerance of non-Muslims, and Christians and Jews continued to serve in high government positions. Although Sunni Islam was officially outlawed under this Shi'ite dynasty, there was no significant persecution of Sunni Muslims either (with the exception of the arguably insane Fatimid caliph al-Hakim [996–1021], who vigorously persecuted all but Ismai'li Shi'ites and insisted all his subjects convert or leave his lands).

Yet even Fatimid economic prosperity could not maintain a firm grip on the Maghrib. With the decline in Fatimid authority in North Africa, the way was open for the establishment of alternative centers of power, and as usual, the Berbers were the primary opposition group. The Lamtuna (from the Sanhajah confederation of Mauritania) controlled the trans-Saharan trade routes, and in the mid-eleventh century, after enlisting the aid of an *'alim* from Morocco, began a drive to both return to the simplicity and purity of the early Muslim community and to conquer more territory in the western Sahara region. This group founded the Almoravid dynasty, one of two Berber dynasties in the Maghrib in this period that was able to (at least partially) unite the region.

By the late eleventh century, the Almoravid dynasty had expanded its authority into all of Morocco and parts of western Algeria and across the Mediterranean to Muslim Spain. The linking of Spain and Morocco was perhaps the most important long-term accomplishment of the Almoravids, as it meant that the relatively isolated Maghrib was now connected and open to European influences (evident in this period in architecture and art).

Despite their accomplishments, the Almoravids were a short-lived dynasty. In the early twelfth century, a new religious group (*al-muwahhidun*, the unitarians) was gaining strength in the Maghrib and would go on to found the Almohad dynasty that replaced the Almoravids. The original emphasis of the religious movement was on the oneness of God and the need to return to religious fundamentals; its founder, Abdullah ibn Tumert, also emphasized the idea of an infallible

redeemer (*mahdi*), and eventually claimed to be that redeemer. By the late twelfth century, the Almohads had annexed all Morocco, had taken Spain from the Almoravids, and had also extended their control over North Africa as far east as Tripoli and Tunis. Yet this too was a brief dynasty; internal strife and serious military losses to the Christians in Spain in the thirteenth century combined to put an end to Almohad rule, and by 1269, the capital at Marrakesh was taken by Berber nomads.

The Fatimid dynasty lasted longer but fared no better in Egypt, though here opposition came from a different source: its own slave warriors. Military uprisings in the mid-twelfth century led to the Fatimid caliph being de facto replaced by his own vizier and chamberlain, yet even these men could not hold onto the reins of power themselves and asked for assistance from Sunni Muslim leaders and from the Christian crusader states. In 1169 a Sunni army under the command of the Kurdish general Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (Saladin) from Syria staged an invited invasion of Egypt, and Salah al-Din became the Fatimid vizier. By 1171 he had formed his own dynasty (the Ayyubids), returned Egypt to the Sunni fold, and given nominal allegiance to the Fatimids' nemesis: the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad.

From 1171 until 1250, Salah al-Din and his successors ruled Egypt and proceeded to tie it once more to the Muslim world of the east (and hence away from the rest of North Africa). Under the Ayyubids, Egypt became a military force to be reckoned with, not only fighting against the crusaders in the eastern Mediterranean but also establishing once more an Egyptian empire that included parts of Syria and Mesopotamia as well as portions of Arabia (Yemen and the Hijaz), and Palestine (after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187).

From 1250 until 1517, the Mamluks led Egypt again to a position of social, religious, economic, and political prominence in North Africa and the Islamic world. Eight years after the Mamluk dynasty was founded, the last Abbasid caliph (to whom the Mamluks owed allegiance) was killed in Baghdad by the invading Mongol forces from east Asia. Three years later, in 1261, the Mamluks reestablished the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo. Though the caliph no longer had any real temporal or spiritual power, the action was important in that it indicated the Mamluks' desire to be the leader of the Arab Islamic world.

The Mamluks ruled Egypt through a rather peculiar system of semihereditary succession. Upon the death of a Mamluk sultan, one of his sons became sultan, but he did not long remain in that position. Rather, he was sultan only as long as it took for one of the amirs and his corps of mamluks to overthrow him; the system thus ensured the succession of the most qualified military man to the position of sultan. Thus, the Mamluk sultans rose through the ranks of the sultan's mamluks.

By the fourteenth century, the system that had worked so well in the beginning was starting to crumble, as advancement became based not on skill and strength but on family and connections. Egypt also suffered tremendously with the arrival of the bubonic plague in 1348, the Mongol conqueror Timur's gains in Syria in 1400, the growing naval strength of the Portuguese (who replaced Egypt as the dominant power in Indian Ocean trade in the fifteenth century), and the increasing strength of the Turks in southwest Asia. It was, in fact, the Ottoman Turks who brought an end to the Mamluk sultanate in 1517 and incorporated Egypt into the Ottoman Empire.

After the collapse of Almohad rule in the Maghrib in 1269, the region was again fractured into several smaller Muslim Berber dynasties: the Zayyanids (based in Tlemcen and ruling western Algeria), the Marinids (Morocco), and the Hafsids (in eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania). Conflict within and between these Muslim Maghribi states continued until the end of the fifteenth century.

The internal conflict of the Maghrib combined with continued assaults from Europe eventually brought an end to these dynasties. From 1471 to 1505, the Portuguese succeeded in taking a number of coastal ports in Morocco; in 1492, the last Muslim outpost (Grenada) in the Iberian peninsula was retaken by Spain; and from 1505 to 1510, the Spanish began establishing strongholds on the North African coast—most notably at Oran and Tripoli. The arrival of European Christian colonial control in parts of North Africa provoked a religious and political reaction that paved the way for the Sa'di *sharif* (claiming descent from the prophet) dynasty to seize power in Morocco. Expelling the Portuguese (1550) and conquering the state of Songhay (now Mali) in 1591 helped legitimate Sa'di rule, as did the rulers' claims of descent from Muhammad and the support they received from the now powerful Sufi movement. Yet Sa'di rule was soon replaced by the rule of another group claiming *sharif* status—the Alawite family—who established their own dynasty and who still rule Morocco today.

The rest of North Africa did not remain independent but was instead incorporated into the Ottoman Empire (at least nominally) after the fall of the Mamluks in Egypt to the invading Turks. The original Ottoman entry into the Maghrib came as a result of the privateer Khayr al-Din Barbarossa's confrontation with Spain; Barbarossa asked for Ottoman aid and swore allegiance to the sultan in 1518, thus bringing Algeria into the Ottoman realm. Algeria was governed by governors sent from Istanbul, but in 1689, Ottoman troops rebelled against their governor and forced the installation of an officer of their own choosing as governor, thus inaugurating a new period in Algerian history. The

deys (governors) of Algeria continued to recognize the religious authority of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, yet they governed Algeria independently of Ottoman authority. Though the *deys* came from the class of Ottoman troops (and not the local population), they were acknowledged and accepted by the people because taxes were light (the government gaining most of its revenue through piracy) and local leaders did much of the actual governing of Algeria. By the eighteenth century, income from piracy was down and taxes were consequently raised, resulting in much internal unrest that contributed to the relative ease with which the French invaded and occupied Algeria in 1830.

Ottoman rule came to Tunisia briefly in 1534 (the Hafsids sought and obtained Spanish protection of their regime in 1535) and finally in 1574. In 1591 Ottoman troops in Tunisia did what those in Algeria would later do: they revolted against the Ottoman governor. This led to a system where Tunisia was governed by a *dey* (governor) and a *bey* (an official who collected taxes and maintained order). Gaining its income through piracy and trade, Tunisia recognized the religious authority of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, but not its political sovereignty. By 1705 the *bey* (Husayn ibn Ali) took control of the government from the *dey* and established a hereditary *beylik*, or dynasty (the Husaynids), that continued to rule Tunisia until its monarchy was abolished in 1957.

Libya was also herded into the Ottoman fold in the sixteenth century, when Ottoman forces seized the city of Tripoli from the Knights of Saint John of Malta. From this conquest in 1551 until 1711, all of Libya was governed as an Ottoman province. In 1711 Ottoman forces in Libya, like those in Algeria and Tunisia also revolted against their governor; cavalry head Ahmed Karamanli established his own dynasty (the Karamanlis) that ruled until an 1835 tribal rebellion, supported by the British, brought back direct Ottoman rule.

Meanwhile, in 1798, the French, concluding that an invasion of Britain was not feasible, sent their military, under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, to invade Egypt—not so much because Egypt was valuable per se, but instead in order to disrupt British trade and access to India and to have a strong bargaining position in any future settlements with Britain. France occupied Egypt until 1805 (though Napoleon, evading a British blockade off Syria, returned to France in 1799 and took power there). Brief though it was, the French occupation of Egypt was significant and is often dated as the dawn of the modern period in Egypt. The incident began a trend of increasing European involvement and presence in Egypt, brought Egypt in particular and the Ottoman Empire in general into the power rivalry between Britain and France, resulted in the discovery of

the Rosetta Stone (which proved the key to Champolion's decipherment of hieroglyphics), resulted in the publication of a massive work (*Description de L'Egypte*) on the country's ancient monuments, and highlighted not only the weakness of the Ottoman-Mamluk government (though under Ottoman control, the Mamluk class continued to do most tasks of government after 1517), but its reliance on foreign power to expel France (done with British assistance in 1803).

One member of this joint Ottoman-British effort to expel the French was a Turco-Albanian adventurer named Mehmet (Muhammad) Ali. In 1805, after quietly gaining the support of the *'ulama* and the elite, Mehmet Ali was installed as viceroy of Egypt during revolts in Cairo against the current Ottoman official. Mehmet Ali's reign in Egypt was characterized by intense activity abroad and at home. At the behest of the Ottoman sultan, Egyptian forces spent eight years (beginning in 1811) pacifying Arabia and putting down the rebellious Wahhabi movement (which posed a threat to Ottoman control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), conquered much of the northern Sudan (Nubia) in 1821 in accordance with Mehmet Ali's desire to acquire large numbers of slaves for his army, suppressed a revolt in Crete in 1822, unsuccessfully (due to European intervention) attempted to suppress a revolt in Greece in 1825, and then made a move to wrest Syria from Ottoman control. (The move on Syria was motivated by a number of factors, not least of which was the sultan's failure to honor his promise of make Mehmet Ali the governor of Syria in return for Egyptian aid in Greece.) Militarily defeated by Egyptian forces in 1839 (Sultan Mahmud II died two weeks later) and forced to recognize Mehmet Ali as the governor of Syria, the Ottoman government was in trouble. It was, however, saved from Mehmet Ali by the intervention of Europe. Mehmet Ali did gain one significant concession, however: the hereditary right of rule for his family in Egypt. It was the descendants of Mehmet Ali who governed Egypt until the revolution of 1952.

Internally, Mehmet Ali's reforms earned him the nickname "Father of modern Egypt." He was concerned primarily with making Egypt a military power and hence desired to build the institutions and infrastructure that would facilitate this. By the time he died in 1848, he had seized most of Egypt's productive land for the state, begun the cultivation of long-staple cotton as a cash crop to finance his other reforms, reorganized the military, founded schools, engaged Europeans to train his army and teach in the schools, sent Egyptian students abroad, founded a national press, and began translation projects of European works on the military, education, science, and medicine—all without incurring any external debt.

In 1830 France invaded Algeria, inaugurating the colonial period in Africa (though most colonial conquest did not take place until some fifty years later), setting up a colonial regime there that would last more than one hundred years and occasion one of the most violent conflicts of decolonization in the twentieth century. Resistance to French control was immediate and significant; French control over most of Algeria was not complete until 1872. Nonetheless, European immigration to Algeria, primarily from France, began almost as soon as Algiers was taken in 1830; eventually the French government began offering incentives of land, seed, and favorable trade terms to settlers, gradually transforming Algeria into a settler colony where the European 13 per cent of the population owned most all the productive land and had a virtual monopoly not only on political influence but on access to educational and social services.

By the late 1800s, Mehmet Ali's successors in Egypt had managed to squander most of the country's wealth and had become severely indebted to European creditors as a result of their misguided attempts to continue their ancestor's modernization schemes and to make Egypt more like Europe. European social and cultural influence was also significant, and the European population of Egypt was growing. The completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 meant further European penetration, as the canal was built by a French firm, its shares held in part by Europeans, and the canal itself used primarily for European trade. In 1882 a nationalist rebellion led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi provided Britain the excuse it sought to invade Egypt. Claiming to be protecting the canal, its financial interests, and the rights of the legitimate ruler (Tawfiq), Britain took unofficial control of the Egyptian government in an arrangement often referred to as the "veiled protectorate." Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) served as Britain's top official until 1907, and he reorganized Egyptian governmental policy to meet the needs of Britain. The Egyptian economy was reordered to ensure it met its debt payments to Europe, meaning export agriculture and European-led industry were encouraged and "unnecessary" expenses such as social services, education, and health services were kept to a minimum.

Beginning in the 1830s, under pressure from the French in Algeria and the Ottomans in Libya, the *beys* of Tunisia sought to modernize their state and thus stave off foreign invasion and domination. Yet, as was the case in Egypt, the *beys* did this by borrowing heavily and at extremely high interest rates from Europe; in order to meet its interest payments, the government had to raise taxes, causing unrest among its population. At the same time, Tunisia's foreign population (French, Maltese, and Italian) was growing and thus

further disrupting Tunisian society and bringing more interference by foreign governments seeking to protect their subjects. Though the French were set to invade Tunisia in the 1860s to secure their financial interests, pressure from other European governments delayed this plan until the completion of the Berlin Conference, which set up procedures for the European countries to abide by in colonizing Africa, in 1881. The only significant difference between French control of Tunisia and British control of Egypt was that the French instituted a formal protectorate from the first, whereas the British protectorate over Egypt was not formally declared until the beginning of World War I.

Morocco took a different path. Instead of welcoming modernization and rushing headlong into the all too eager arms of Europe, the sultans decided to preserve Moroccan traditions despite the risks of not adopting modern military techniques. The balance of power in Europe helped Morocco for a time, as Britain protected the sultan versus the neighboring Spanish and French forces. Yet in the early twentieth century, the sultan began to move toward modernization, causing a revolt near Fez. This provided the European powers with an excuse to interfere in Morocco. France promised Britain it would not interfere in Egypt if Britain refrained from action in Morocco and promised Spain its own area of Morocco if it too would delay action. Meanwhile the French government loaned large amounts of capital to the sultan and offered its services in running Morocco's customs and postal departments. Internal resistance to the sultan's policies continued, which led to division of Morocco between France and Spain, though the sultan remained the official leader with European protection.

Libya also fell to Europe in the early twentieth century. Italy invaded Libya in 1911 with the goal of creating another Italian-based Mediterranean empire, similar to ancient Rome. Though the Ottomans signed a peace accord with Italy in 1912 recognizing Italian authority, this authority was mostly confined to coastal areas. Resistance to Italian colonialism and to earlier French pressures from French-governed Chad was led by the Sanuysiyyah Sufi order (founded in 1837 and preaching a return to the simple beliefs and lifestyle of early Islam). Yet the leaders of the order were willing to compromise to maintain some autonomy. In 1917 the Grand Senusi (leader of the order), Idris, secured an agreement with the Italians that recognized his own authority in Cyrenaica (the Peace of Arcoma) and two years later engineered another agreement that helped him set up a parliament and got Italian aid for his state. Thus, by the start of World War I, all of North Africa was thus under some form of European control.

During the Great War, most of the fighting in Africa was in the eastern portion of the continent (in

German-controlled areas), rather than in the north. The Ottoman Empire was dismembered after the war, but since its North African territories had been only nominally a part of the empire for some time and had been governed by local leaders under European control, the dissolution of the empire brought little real change to the region. Though World War I did not have the impact upon North Africa that World War II did, the period surrounding the conflict witnessed significant change in North Africa. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and in large part as a consequence of foreign (in this period, European Christian) domination, reformers in North Africa began confronting the issue of how to best change Muslim societies to cope with these new threats. Though the specifics of the ideas differed, one shared theme was that the Muslim world ought to unite against the common foreign enemy and that this sort of unification needed to be based upon a reformulated Islam. Cairo's al-Azhar University became a key center for the propagation of these pan-Islamist ideas, as Muslim students from a variety of African (and other) lands came to Egypt to study and returned to their countries ready to reform their own societies. These early religious reform movements were then transformed beginning in the 1930s into more modern, often secular, nationalist movements that organized political and military opposition to European colonialism.

The effects of World War II upon North Africa were significant. Unlike in World War I, North Africa became a hotly contested area and an important base of operations. Italian-controlled Libya became a target of the British after the fall of France to Nazi Germany in 1940, but the Germans were able to push British forces back into Egypt in 1942. France's colonies in North Africa were administered by the Vichy government after 1941, prompting an Anglo-American invasion of Morocco and Algeria in 1943 and another British drive westward from Egypt the same year. With the region firmly in Allied control by 1943, North Africa then became a base for Allied operations against Europe (Sicily, Italy, and Vichy France).

In Morocco in early 1944, the growing nationalist movement (newly coalesced as the Independence Party, *Hizb al-Istiqlal*) asked sultan Sidi Muhammad and the Allied forces for independence; this earned its leaders arrests on the charge of collaborating with Nazi Germany. Riots ensued, and the sultan gradually became a staunch advocate of nationalism, despite French attempts to keep him in the colonial camp. By 1953 the sultan was viewed as enough of a threat by France that the French authorities in Morocco deported him and his family and appointed a new puppet sultan (this despite the Sidi Muhammad's forced signing of a decree giving his legislative powers to a joint

Moroccan-French assembly). The deportation of the sultan made him a national hero, and Spanish public opposition to French actions in French Morocco made the Spanish zone of Morocco into a haven for Moroccan nationalists. Continued opposition to French power in Morocco and the outbreak of rebellion in Algeria prompted a change in French policy, culminating in the restoration of Sidi Muhammad as sultan and the proclamation of Moroccan independence in 1956. The Spanish, though surprised by the rather abrupt declaration, nonetheless shortly followed suit in Spanish Morocco, and the country was united under the authority of the sultan.

Tunisian independence was achieved with relatively little violence. The leaders of its nationalist movement, headed by the Neo-Destour Party under Habib Bourguiba, had been deported to France when World War II began in 1939; when the Nazis occupied France, the nationalists were first given to the Italian Fascist government (as Germany viewed Tunisia as Italian territory), before being released and allowed to return to Tunisia. When the Allied and Free French forces took Tunisia in 1943, Bourguiba fled to Egypt, whence he began mobilizing further support for independence. Though allowed to return to Tunisia in 1951, Bourguiba's attempts to establish a national parliament met with stiff French resistance, which in turn sparked rural and urban riots, almost paralyzing the economy. By 1954 France was forced to promise independence to Tunisia; the final agreements were signed two years later.

Algeria's struggle for independence was much different than its neighbors to the east and west, though all three had been under French control. As a settler colony with its own powerful lobby in Paris, a land officially made part of France (annexed as three *départements* in 1848), and a target of the French policy of total colonization, Algeria was one colony France could not let go easily; France's loss of Indochina (1954) and Morocco and Tunisia (1956) also affected its desire to retain Algeria. The Algerian war for independence began in 1954 under the leadership of the *Front de Libération Nationale*, or FLN (National Liberation Front), a group advocating social democracy within an Islamic framework. The struggle (including mobilization of international pressure on France, the French left's opposition to continued colonization, extreme violence on both sides, and several settler revolts against French authority in Algeria when the settlers feared France might give Algeria independence) lasted eight years. In 1962, after a national referendum, Algeria became an independent nation.

Egypt, struggling in the interwar years with formal independence but little formal autonomy, continued to have the same problems after World War II. The three-way struggle between the palace, the British, and the

Wafd (the nationalist party founded by Saad Zaghlul) offered the country little stability, and both the Wafd and the king had been severely damaged by the 1942 Abdin incident when British Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson ordered British tanks into position near Abdin Palace and then went armed into the palace to inform King Faruq that he could choose between appointing a prime minister sympathetic to the British and abdication; Faruq chose to appoint a Wafdist minister, thus saving his throne but highlighting to the Egyptian people that the country, though formally independent, was in reality anything but. The creation of Israel in 1948 also spawned discontent, as it appeared to many Egyptians (and others in North Africa) to be yet another attempt at foreign colonization in the region. The end result was revolution in 1952, led by a small group of army officers under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasir. The last vestiges of British authority in Egypt were removed in the 1950s with the final agreement on the evacuation of all British troops from the last remaining base at Suez (1954) and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956.

Libya, occupied by the British in 1942, became a constitutional monarchy in 1951 under the formerly exiled Grand Sanusi Idris (who then became King Idris I). Yet despite the spiritual leadership of the Sanusiyyah brotherhood and its key role in resisting Italian colonialism, its leader did not function well as king. Though a strong ruler with total control of the military and strong influence with parliament, Idris was viewed as too conservative by the younger and more radical segments of Libyan society (young army officers and the urban middle class), and his government was seen as alienated from these groups, as it was made up of wealthy urbanites and strong tribal leaders. Idris had also refused to become involved in the pan-Arabist movement spearheaded by Abd al-Nasir, and this too affected his popularity. The discovery of vast oil reserves in 1959 also brought vast changes to Libyan society as the country was transformed from an extremely poor nation into one with immense wealth. The result of these divisions in Libyan society was a military coup in 1969 led by captain Muammar Gaddafi (also, al-Qadafi) while Idris was out of the country.

Since achieving independence, North African governments have continued to struggle with their colonial legacies. The colonial period resulted in the drawing of false borders, under or uneven development, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of foreigners and indigenous elites, and political arrangements that facilitated authoritarian governments, and independent governments have variously taken advantage of these factors and struggled to overcome them. Internal problems and the failures of governments to effectively address them, coupled with a desire on the

part of some elements in society to redesign their nations in a more culturally and religiously authentic (and less foreign and colonial influenced) manner, have resulted in the formation of various Islamist opposition groups that have attempted to gain power through both legal and illegal means. As majority Muslim Arab states, North African countries since 1948 have also had to address (both rhetorically and practically) the issue of Palestine and Israel, and this issue has colored their foreign relations.

In Morocco, despite some constitutional changes, the monarchy has continued to govern more or less autocratically while facing attempted military coups in the 1970s and popular protests caused by poor economic conditions in the 1980s. Territorial disputes with Algeria and Mauritania have also caused conflict.

Tunisia, benefiting from the organizational abilities of the Neo-Destour Party, underwent a rapid series of reforms (including advances in education and women's rights and changes to the legal system) after achieving independence. Though a multiparty political system was begun with the 1981 elections, opposition parties have boycotted both national and local elections, and Islamist opposition to Tunisia's increasing secularization and reformist agenda has caused unrest.

Independence did not bring peace to Algeria. Many European settlers fled the country in 1962, including much of the educated class and most technical experts. Attempts to reclaim Algeria's national heritage after more than a century of French rule were complicated by the fact that most educated Algerians were educated in French schools and in the French language; Algeria thus had to import teachers from other Arab countries to teach its population their native language again. Though provincial elections were held in 1967, ten more years would elapse before national elections were held. The FLN-dominated government favored a centrally run, socialist economy; it also began a plan of land reform that included both the formation of state-run farms (from former French estates) and redistribution of lands to landless peasants. By the late 1980s, Islamist opposition to the government (led by the Islamic Salvation Front, *Front Islamique du Salut*, or FIS) had been significant. The FIS won local elections and the first round of national elections in 1991, prompting the government to cancel the second round of elections. The cancellation of elections resulted in waves of violence in Algeria, as the FIS targeted foreigners, governmental and military officials, and a variety of real and perceived opponents to their agenda and as the government responded in kind.

Since 1952, Egypt has changed as well. The socialist-oriented economic policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser were gradually replaced by Anwar Sadat's *infitah* (opening) policies in the 1970s, and the government of

president Hosni Mubarak has continued to encourage foreign investment. The continued economic and cultural involvement of western countries in Egypt as well as Egypt's internal problems (including governmental corruption, economic problems, lack of arable land, and rapid population growth) has resulted in a growing Islamist opposition movement in this nation as well that has targeted public officials (including Sadat, who was assassinated by a member of one such group), foreigners, and Egyptian Christians. Governmental response has been repressive and occasionally effective, but the persistence of economic and social problems in Egypt guarantees that not all Islamist opposition will wither.

Libya under Gaddafi has undergone a series of domestic reforms (including nationalization of the lucrative petroleum industry, and bans on gambling and alcohol) in accordance with Gaddafi's dual socialist and Islamic agenda. Internationally, Libya's reputation is tied to Gaddafi's sponsorship of a wide variety of international extremist and terrorist groups, his mercurial style of leadership, and his confrontations with western countries. Libya was also involved in a series of border conflicts with its southern neighbor, Chad, that resulted in war in the 1980s.

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See also: **Algeria; Arab and Islamic World, Africa in; Augustine, Catholic Church: North Africa; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Northern Africa; Education: North Africa (Colonial and Postcolonial); Egypt, Ancient; Egypt: Fatimids; Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty; Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798; Libya; Maghrib; Media as Propaganda; Morocco; North Africa, Ancient; Urbanization; Tunisia.**

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Northern Rhodesia: See Zambia: Nationalism, Independence; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): British Occupation, Resistance: 1890s; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Colonial Period: Administration, Economy; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Copperbelt; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation, 1953–1963.

Ntusi: See Great Lakes Region: Ntusi, Kibiro, and Bigo.

Nubia: Relations with Egypt (Seventh–Fourteenth Centuries)

During the seventh century, the Christian Church in the Nubian kingdoms (Nobatia, Makurra, and 'Alwah) became aligned predominantly with the Coptic Church, thus strengthening ecclesiastical relations with Egypt. Following the Arab conquest of Egypt in 641, two military expeditions were sent by successive emirs into Nubia, reaching as far as Dongola, capital of Makurra. Neither was successful and in 651–652 a form of peace treaty was arranged, termed the *baqt*, which allowed the continued independence of the Nubian states. The *baqt* appears to have comprised a truce and an exchange of slaves (from Nubia) and certain goods (from Egypt). Ninth- and tenth-century accounts list wheat, drink (wine), horses, and cloth or clothing among the main items given.

Relations with Islamic Egypt were generally peaceful up to the reign of Cyriacus of Makurra. According to tradition, he invaded Egypt in 747–748 to obtain the release of the patriarch of Alexandria, who had been imprisoned by the emir. This invasion may have been of some importance because of the political support given to the patriarchate. Later in Cyriacus's reign, in 758, relations were strained temporarily due to the Nubians' nonpayment of the *baqt*. The Nubians again ceased paying the *baqt* from around 820. The Caliph al-Mu'tasim ordered King Zacharias II of Makurra, in 834, to pay the *baqt* and its arrears for fourteen years. Zacharias's son, George, went to Baghdad in 835–836 and negotiated successfully with the Caliph; the

arrears of the *baqt* were canceled and a further pact of mutual nonaggression was made.

During the first half of the tenth century, Nubian-Egyptian relations continued to be peaceful. Burials and tombstones demonstrate Muslim settlement in Lower Nubia from this period onwards. However, during the second half of the century, the Nubians mounted two main offensives, in 956 and again in 962, after which they retained control over part of Upper Egypt into the eleventh century. The Fatimids conquered Egypt in 969. Their relations with the Nubian Kingdoms appears to have been quite close during most of the period they were in power, the Makurran rulers being able to intervene in some Egyptian affairs. One king, probably Solomon, aided the patriarch of Alexandria on one occasion and cooperated with the rulers of Egypt by handing over the Kanz ed-Dowla, leader of an Arab-Beja tribe, who had rebelled and fled to Nubia. During this period, both secondary sources and primary historical evidence indicate that Egypt carried on considerable trade with Makurra and some with 'Alwah, a Muslim quarter being established at Soba, capital of 'Alwah.

Salah al-Din overthrew the Fatimids in 1171. In this same year, the king of Makurra invaded Egypt, capturing Aswan and advancing north, either seeking plunder or in support of the Fatimids, but the Makourran army was forced to retire. Nubia was entered in the following year by Shams ed-Dowla, the brother of Salah ed-Din. Reasons for this seem to have been partly punitive but also to have been to gain control of the country for use as a base, should the latter be forced out of Egypt. Shams ed-Dowla ultimately became convinced that Nubia was unsuitable for this purpose, and neither Salah al-Din nor his Ayyubid successors attempted to conquer Makurra.

Makurra's peaceful relations with the later Ayyubid rulers of Egypt did not long survive the accession to power there of the Mamluks in 1250. 'Alwah, or perhaps its northernmost principality, el-Abwab, appears to have had better relations with the Mamluks, occasionally aiding them in conflicts with Makurra. However, the processes leading to the collapse of both the Christian kingdoms can be seen to have begun at this time. One aspect of these relates to the Mamluks' hostile policy toward the nomadic tribes in Egypt. Many either migrated or were forced to flee into Nubia. Furthermore, members of some tribes entered Nubia as auxiliaries in the successive armies dispatched during the late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. Within the next three centuries they seem to have intermarried extensively with the Nubians. According to Adams (1977, p.458), the interventions of the Mamluks eventually "tipped the balance of power in favor of the growing Islamic element in the population." This balance became significant when political and ecclesiastical institutions within the Christian states began to disintegrate.

King David took the throne of Makurra in 1268 by deposing his uncle, Abu'l Izz Murtashkar, who had converted to Islam. David attacked the port of Aydhab in 1272, thus adversely affecting Egypt's sea trade routes, then devastated Aswan. The Mamluk Sultan Baybars counterattacked in 1276, deposing David and installing Shakanda, another nephew of Abu'l Izz Murtashkar, on the throne. Shakanda had to take an oath that included swearing allegiance to Baybars in return for his support, and transferring the province of Maris (Nobatia) to him, but these conditions do not seem to have been enforced.

Several successive Mamluk nominees subsequently held the throne of Makurra. Their reigns usually were short, since they were either assassinated or deposed. Such fates befell Kings Amay (before 1304 to 1311), Kudanbes (1311–1316 and 1323), and Saif ed-Din Abdallah Barshambu (1316–1317 or 1319) in the following century. The last-named king was a Muslim; he turned the Throne Hall of the palace at Old Dongola into a mosque in 1317 but, otherwise, seems not to have undertaken extensive Islamization of the state.

Egypt again became embroiled in Nubian affairs in 1365, when an embassy arrived from the two rulers of a divided Makurra seeking assistance in resisting some nomad tribes. The sultan sent a force that, together with the Nubian army, successfully defeated them. The seat of the king of Makurra then moved to Daw in Lower Nubia. The latest attested contact between Nubia and the patriarch of Alexandria occurred in 1372 with the consecration of a bishop of Ibrim. Trade declined drastically. Although a king of "Nubia" sought asylum in Cairo as late as 1397, it appears that by this time the kingdoms of Makurra and 'Alwa had each broken up. Effectively, the political relations between Egypt and these Nubian states ended with the century.

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See also: Egypt and Africa (1000–1500); Nobadia, Makurra and 'Alwa.


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Nubia: Banu Kanz, Juhayna and the Arabization of the Nilotic Sudan (Fourteenth–Eighteenth Centuries)

The Arabization of northern Sudan was a gradual process that started immediately after the Arab conquest of Egypt between 639 and 641. Although Nubia successfully resisted any military attacks from the north and was never annexed, Arab traders and settlers came to the country at an early date, and there is evidence of a progressive Arabization and Islamization of Nubia between the ninth and twelfth centuries.

In the later Middle Ages the stability of the Christian kingdoms was slowly undermined by forces from both within and beyond their borders. The fourteenth to sixteenth centuries saw the massive Arabization of the people of the Nilotic Sudan in connection with migrations of Arab groups into and within the Sudan. Inter-marriage was one important vehicle of Arabization, especially in regard to the Nubian peoples along the Nile, whose matrilinear system led to the acquirement of rights of succession to leadership as well as share in land by sons of Arab fathers and Nubian mothers. The gradual conversion of the people to Islam was another important factor that resulted in the emergence of new Arab-Sudanese ethnic entities. Although at first sight the Arabic influence seems to be predominant—for example in the many language shifts from indigenous languages to Arabic that took place—an equally intensive Africanization of the immigrants can be reconstructed. In the post-Christian era, religious teachers invited into the country by the Funj Sultans became important to the emergence of the characteristic



Nubian Kingdoms to c. 1400.

Sudanese Islam that can be found until today. These teachers were mostly representatives of the mystical Sufi orders, and they spread a form of popular worship with local cults and belief in saints and miracles that has always been associated with Sufism, but which was also well known to the northern Sudanese peoples through their Christian faith since the early Middle Ages. Most of the non-Sufi teachers were Sudanese who had studied in Egypt or other Muslim religious centers. In the middle of the sixteenth century Mahmud al-'Araki as the first Sudanese Muslim scholar who had studied in Cairo and is said to have established seventeenth schools on the White Nile on his return. Ibrahim al Bulad ibn Jabir introduced the teaching of the Maliki textbooks in about 1570, which helped to establish the predominance of the Maliki rite in the northern Sudan.

An impressive early example of the process of intensive Africanization of an immigrant people that set off the simultaneous Arabization of the original population are the Banu Kanz, who originally formed part of the Rabi'a from the Arabian Peninsula. In the middle of the ninth century an extensive migration of Rabi'a to Upper Egypt took place, resulting in their settlement among the Beja of the Red Sea Hills. The new settlers intermarried extensively with the original inhabitants of the region and finally extended their influence and control over Aswan and adjacent parts of the Nile valley. In 1006 the chief of the Nile valley, Rabi'a, assisted the Fatimid caliph in the capture of a political rival and was rewarded with title Kanz ed-Dawla ("treasure of state"), which later became a hereditary title. The group as a whole became subsequently known as Banu Kanz, or descendants of the Kanz ed-Dawla. By the end of the thirteenth century the Banu Kanz were a powerful group in the northern part of Christian Nubia and their leader presumably held the important Nubian office of the eparch. They profited by the internal weakness that at that time was characteristic of the Christian Nubian kingdom, and in alliance with the Mamluk rulers of Egypt they were in the position to overthrow or appoint Nubian rulers as they wished. This political involvement in and around Dongola had the more peaceful effect of widespread intermarriage between the Banu Kanz and the local Nubian population. Although they retained and even spread their Islamic faith, the Banu Kanz became Nubianized in language and culture. A new ethnic entity emerged, which is known as Kenzi Nubian today. The ruler of the Kenzi and his family also became allied with the ruling house in Dongola by marriage and in 1323 the Kanz ed-Dawla resumed the throne as legitimate heir of his maternal uncle. The history of Kenzi reign over Dongola is short. Only forty years later they had to withdraw to their original area around Aswan, where they resettled permanently.

Most of the Arabic-speaking groups of the Sudan affiliate themselves with one of two comprehensive groups, Juhayna or Ja'aliyyin. The Ja'aliyyin are essentially Arabized Nubians whose homeland lies in the Middle Nile region south of the Fourth Cataract. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, parts of the Ja'aliyyin migrated west to Kordofan where they were absorbed by the local population, but preserved a memory of their original identity. The term Juhayna has both a wider and a more restricted meaning. One meaning includes all non-Ja'aliyyin nomadic groups, which are not necessarily connected historically with the Juhayna who originated from south Arabia. The Juhayna had migrated to Upper Egypt in the Fatimid period and later, presumably under Mamluk pressure, had moved to the Beja country and later south to the green plains of 'Alwa. Unlike the sedentary Ja'aliyyin they kept up a nomadic way of life, and they played an important part in the final blow against the decaying Christian kingdom. Sudanese traditions trace the final downfall of 'Alwa to a combined nomadic Arab and Funj attack. Actually, this process has to be attributed to Arab groups alone. During the second half of the fifteenth century, a confederacy of Arab groups under the leadership of 'Abdallah Jamma' (the Gatherer) succeeded in conquering the kingdom of 'Alwa. For a short time, 'Abdallah and his descendants, the 'Abdallabi, succeeded in establishing an independent state, but they were confronted and defeated by the Funj in 1504. They were reduced to the position of vassal of the Funj sultanate but continued to rule the northern part until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1820.

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Nuer: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anywa.

Nujoma, Sam (1929–)

First President of Namibia

A bitter hundred-year struggle against colonial rule came to a close on March 21, 1990, when Sam Nujoma was sworn in as the first president of independent Namibia. Cofounder and leader of the South West

Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Sam Nujoma spearheaded a thirty-year military and diplomatic campaign attacking South Africa's illegal presence in South West Africa. By cleverly navigating the broader global politics of the Cold War, Nujoma converted SWAPO from an obscure nationalist movement into an internationally recognized voice of Namibian independence. In the process, he emerged as the personification of the independence struggle, assuring his own political primacy after liberation.

Samuel Daniel Nujoma worked a succession of jobs before emerging in 1959 as the leader of a protest against the government's apartheid-based policy of forcible resettlement. Arrested for his role in organizing the resistance, Nujoma went into exile and commenced an energetic campaign to thrust the plight of the Namibian people into the international spotlight. He was elected in absentia as president of SWAPO in 1960, working successfully to transform what had been primarily an ethnic and regionally based organization into a truly national one. He also set out to establish SWAPO as "the sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people. Unwilling to share the spotlight with other Namibian nationalist movements, Nujoma lobbied and politicked to win for SWAPO exclusive backing from the Organization of African Unity and later from the United Nations General Assembly. Nujoma's success in garnering international legitimacy for SWAPO enabled him to consolidate positions of unassailable preeminence within the movement for himself and his closest associates.

Operating in an environment where numerous nationalist movements were preparing for armed struggle against white minority regimes across southern Africa, Sam Nujoma undertook a dual approach to achieving Namibian liberation. He orchestrated a campaign of international diplomacy directed at triggering United Nations entry into the Namibian political process. Aside from statements of sympathy and solidarity, early efforts at lobbying and petitioning produced few tangible results. As a result, Nujoma turned to armed struggle. The first clash between SWAPO and South African forces took place in August 1966, and although the inaugural battle proved a hopeless mismatch in favor of the South Africans, the skirmish proved a decisive propaganda victory for SWAPO. Thus began twenty-three years of low-intensity conflict that utilized military action as a form of propaganda to strengthen SWAPO's diplomatic and political bargaining position on the international stage.

With arms supplied by the Soviet Union and other Eastern-bloc countries, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) conducted localized and sporadic attacks against South African interests in Namibia. Faced with the logistical problems created by carrying

out military strikes in Namibia from political headquarters in far away Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Nujoma, and the SWAPO leadership moved their center of operations twice. From 1966 to 1974, PLAN's campaign of sabotage and assassination was conducted from Zambia, but with the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola in 1974, Nujoma negotiated the establishment of PLAN bases in southern Angola. Although Nujoma's earlier ties to Jonas Savimbi caused frictions with the Angolan government in Luanda, he worked hard in the late 1970s to repair relations with the victorious People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA). With a stable base of operations and thousands of young Namibians crossing the border into Angola to join the ranks of SWAPO in exile, Nujoma stepped up the pressure with a more intense military campaign within Namibia itself from 1978 through 1984. In turn, South Africa escalated the conflict toward a more conventional war, leading to a series of PLAN defeats and questions about the competence of the liberation movement's military commanders and their continued commitment to armed struggle.

With PLAN casualties far outnumbering those of South African forces, Nujoma and the SWAPO leadership faced mounting criticism. Historically, problems within the organization had been countered by the diplomatic successes of Sam Nujoma, whose tireless presence on the world stage won for SWAPO considerable international goodwill and a level of financial support unequalled by other southern African liberation movements. But Nujoma's ability to exploit external assets only camouflaged the shortcomings that had plagued SWAPO from its inception. Nujoma and the leadership in exile developed a political culture that discouraged spontaneity and debate, increasingly defined criticism as disloyalty, and eventually focused considerable energies on maintaining security. This restrictive political climate aimed to silence criticisms of the leadership and to derail calls for democratization, accountability, and reform.

Nujoma proved adept at silencing dissent within the movement. When SWAPO members demanded more democratic procedures at a consultative congress in 1969, Nujoma undermined attempts at reform by adopting the militant language of his critics and by warning that party unity could never be compromised. A clear tilt toward authoritarianism occurred in the mid-1970s, when idealistic radicals of the SWAPO Youth League revolted against the leadership in exile in Zambia. Nujoma crushed the challenge to his authority by invoking Zambian military assistance to arrest and detain the dissidents. Strict hierarchy and party discipline were established.

Nujoma embraced Soviet-style phraseology on issues of security and, on occasion, raised eyebrows in

the West when he touted his commitment to liberate Namibia through a mobilization of the broad masses. With military support flowing into SWAPO from the Eastern-bloc countries, and with Nujoma's visits to Cuba and the Soviet Union in 1976, fears arose that SWAPO had transitioned from a liberation movement to a Marxist revolutionary party. But those closest to Nujoma understood that the socialist rhetoric found in SWAPO's public utterances was designed for political effect. The movement's sweeping manifestos were kept sufficiently vague so that they could be tailored to audiences and circumstances. Labels of ideology during the liberation struggle were meaningless, for Nujoma's pragmatism made ideology expendable. SWAPO's revolutionary undertones would not be allowed to damage its diplomatic campaign.

The final settlement that led to Namibian independence, which came about through lengthy diplomatic and political wrangling, had less to do with SWAPO's struggle than with changes in international relations as a result of the end of the Cold War. With the Soviet Union scaling back its support for liberation movements around the globe, and with South Africa increasingly isolated, the Western Contact Group (the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, and West Germany) devised a peace plan calling for a ceasefire, a phased withdrawal of South African forces, and one-person-one-vote elections under the supervision of the United Nations. Although the Reagan administration complicated the negotiations by linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with independence for Namibia, a comprehensive agreement was finally reached in 1988.

Ending three decades in exile, Sam Nujoma returned to Namibia in September 1989 to enter the political struggle for the future of his country. During his long years in exile when he was dependent on Communist support, Nujoma often called for a socialist government for Namibia. Although he continued to insist that the new government undertake land reform and redistribute wealth to the black majority, during the election campaign he went out of his way to reassure whites that their rights would be protected and that he would not impose one-party rule. SWAPO won just over 57 per cent of the total vote, ensuring that Nujoma would be chosen by the constituent assembly to lead Namibia into independence.

The politics of transition were far from easy. During the decades of struggle for liberation, little thought or planning had been given to the development of an independent Namibia under a SWAPO government. Upon assuming the presidency of independent Namibia on March 21, 1990, Nujoma proclaimed national reconciliation and nation building as his priorities. Facing the realities of running a state and governing a nation,

Nujoma abandoned any hint of socialism by working to establish relations with Western financial institutions. Nujoma settled on a pragmatic, market-oriented strategy for national development. Over the years, he has established a bond with Namibian voters, and they have remained loyal to him. Despite high rates of unemployment, a troubled economy, and accusations of government corruption, Nujoma and his South West African People's Organization have dominated presidential and parliamentary elections, winning overwhelming victories in 1994 and again in 1999. While praised for skillfully guiding Namibia through its early years of independence, Nujoma has been accused of adopting an increasingly authoritarian style.

W. FRANK ROBINSON

See also: **Namibia: Independence to the Present; Namibia: Struggle for Independence, 1970–1990; Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle.**

Biography

Samuel Daniel Nujoma was born May 12, 1929, in the Ongandjera district of Ovamboland in northern South West Africa. The son of farmworkers, he studied with missionaries and worked a succession of jobs before emerging in 1959 as the leader of a protest against the government's apartheid-based policy of forcible resettlement. Elected in absentia as president of SWAPO in 1960. Ending three decades in exile, returned to Namibia in September 1989. Assumed presidency of Namibia March 21, 1990.

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Nyabingi Cult and Resistance

The anti-colonial Nyabingi resistance movement had its origins in a secret society organization and was led by a woman called Muhumuza in southwestern Uganda between 1910 and 1930. The Nyabingi cult, however, dates much further back, to about 1700. The Nyabingi cult was one of the many religions in Kigezi in precolonial times. Many oppressed minorities

sought and found sanctuary and refuge in the Nyabingi cult. Through the process of *Okutweija*, many priestesses (*bagirwa*, sing. *mugirwa*) or agents of Nyabingi (always women) dedicated their daughters to the cult, thus ensuring a pool of ready adherents. There were many such *bagirwa* in various parts of Mpororo and Rwanda proclaiming Nyabingi's edicts and wishes.

Oral tradition claims that Nyabingi, a sovereign queen, ruled the northwestern Tanzania kingdom of Karagwe (Omugole) about 1700. She was later married to Ruhinda, a chief of Mpororo in southwest Uganda, who remained in her kingdom as prince consort. Ruhinda subsequently overthrew his queen, had her killed, and took over the kingdom himself. Nyabingi's spirit brought untold woes to Ruhinda and his kingdom, including the annexation of the Ndorwa region by the Mwami of Rwanda. The spirit of Nyabingi then appeared in Kisiki, Rwanda. This new personification of Nyabingi in Rwanda was killed by Mwami Lwagera of Rwanda, seeking to negate any other famous or potentially powerful forces in his own kingdom.

Around 1860, another personification of Nyabingi appeared—again in Rwanda—during the reign of Mwami Lwabugiri Kigeri IV. This spirit possession was through Kahaya's daughter, one of Mwami's vassal chiefs. Kahaya's daughter, Kanzanira, was subsequently killed on her own father's orders, and her spirit ostensibly reincarnated in a destitute woman called Rutajira Kijuna (Rutajira Muhanda). Rutajira's personification of Nyabingi almost turned her into the ruler of Ndorwa. She toured the country, receiving salutations of "Kisinje" (a term of salutation only due to royalty), as she cured the sick by evoking the powers of Nyabingi. Again, another Mwami of Rwanda, Lubugiri, could not stand Rutajira's fame and on his orders, Rutajira was killed and was succeeded by her son Katondwe at Kyante Rutaji. For over two centuries, the Nyabingi cult had gained momentum and recognition, especially among the peasant Bakiga community, as a religion of the oppressed and disadvantaged. The cult remained anti-establishment and the main opposition was directed toward the ruling Tutsi class in Rwanda and its territories.

The Nyabingi cult took root particularly in Ndorwa, Mpororo kingdom, where most of the inhabitants were the subject Bahutu. Here the area was not very favorable for cattle and as such there were very few Batusi in Ndorwa. Mwami's authority here was almost nonexistent. The area was an outlaw territory of political dissidents and runaways fleeing the Mwami's authority.

This was the cultural and political environment in which Muhumuza, wife of Mwami Lwabugiri and mother to the heir apparent, found herself as an exile from civil wars in her native Rwanda. Mwami Lwabugiri had died in 1894 and left the throne to Muhumuza's

son Bulegeya, at the time only an infant. Bulegeya's claim to the throne was challenged by the Bega clan, who also had a contender from their clan. Muhumuza and her son were forced to flee to Mpororo with the remnants of the royal guard.

She established herself on Mount Lutobo, northeast of Ndorwa in Mpororo kingdom. But Muhumuza, an obvious MuTutsi woman, former wife of Mwami Lwabugiri and also mother of the heir to the throne in Rwanda, was not readily accepted by the people of Ndorwa. Her flight from Rwanda did not lessen her desire to see her son become the next Mwami at some future date. She wanted to remain in contact with sympathizers back home. She realized that she needed political power, or some other type of awe-inspiring authority. She could only achieve all this by associating herself with the cult of Nyabingi. She first became a *Mugirwa* (Nyabingi priestess), and through her intelligence, force of character, and resolve, she gradually achieved leadership among *Bagirwa*, before claiming herself the reincarnation of Nyabingi. She thus claimed both religious and political legitimacy, and drew thousands of dedicated followers.

In 1903 Muhumuza intercepted a group of White Fathers missionaries near Lutobo on their way to found the Rivaza Mission in southern Ndorwa. She became increasingly anti-European and particularly hostile to the Germans, who were propping up Masinga on the Rwandan throne, creating the basis of their administration there. In 1908 Muhumuza was arrested by the Germans near Kaamwezi and jailed for two years in Bukoba. Upon her release from prison, she attempted to capture Rwanda for her son but was repulsed by the Germans and their Rwandan collaborators. She returned to Ndorwa, where she attempted to carve out a kingdom by declaring herself the queen of Ndorwa, and both as queen and the reincarnation of Nyabingi, she raised a large following of Bakiga and Banyarwanda, declaring herself the liberator of Ndorwa.

In 1911 Muhumuza and her forces attacked members of the Anglo-Belgian-German Boundary Commission constructing boundary pillars from Kamwezi to Mount Muhavura, through Ndorwa. A reprisal attack by British forces on Ihanga Hill was an ambush in which about forty of Muhumuza's men were killed and Muhumuza herself was shot in the foot and captured. As a military and political threat to British administration, Muhumuza was deported to Mengo where she died in 1944, without ever returning to Kigezi.

Her followers, the *Bagirwa*, continued the anticolonial struggle. Nyabingi priests and priestesses continued harassing the agents of British administration until 1928. In 1915 a Nyabingi priest, Ndochibiri, attacked a strongly guarded Anglo-Belgian post at Chahaji in Bufumbira with a two thousand-strong force; the battle

lasted five hours. Between April and May 1917, Ndochibiri and his followers organized another secret rebellion against the British and Belgian agents and their works. This was supposed to be the final rebellion to oust Europeans from the entire district of Kigezi and Kabale. However, Ndochibiri and his followers were ambushed near Kabale, and the entire party was wiped out. Ndochibiri's head was cut off and sent to England; it is supposedly still held in the British Museum. His two-fingered hand was also cut off and for a time displayed in Kabale to prove that he had indeed been killed.

These military measures seem to have broken up the central organization of the Nyabingi cult. Although various Bagirwa claimed to be reincarnations of Nyabingi, they were not strong enough to cause concern for the authorities until 1928, when a rebellion led by a man called Ndungutsi attacked Kabale station and the Kabale mission. They later attacked and killed a Muluka chief and two Batongole chiefs before they were overtaken by government forces. Ndungutsi and about twenty of his followers were arrested and sent to jail. That was the last organized uprising under the aegis of the Nyabingi cult in southwest Uganda.

D. KIYAGA-MULINDWA

See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule.**

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Nyanga Hills

The landscape of the Nyanga highlands of northeastern Zimbabwe, and adjacent regions to the west, bears extensive remains of agricultural terraces and cultivation ridges, water furrows, stone-walled homesteads and defensive forts, over an area of approximately 7,000 square kilometers. This complex dates from about the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, and is unrelated to the contemporary and better-known ruins of the Great Zimbabwe tradition, or to the preceding Early Iron Age occupation of the first millennium.

The southern part of the Nyanga highlands forms a broad dissected plateau at around 1,800 to 2,000 meters, falling relatively gently to the west and rising to Mount Nyangani (2,592 m) to the east. Northward the plateau narrows to a high spine at around 2,000 meters, with steep escarpments on either side. To the

west, granite inselbergs form often substantial hills, rising from a base level which declines from about 1,200 meters in the south to 900 meters in the north. The underlying geology is various granites, overlain by dolerites and some sedimentary rocks which cap the highlands, while dolerite sills and dykes also form lesser features in the lowlands.

The tentative sequence of development starts with nucleated sites covering several hectares on peaks and ridgetops over 2,000 meters on the northern range, dated to the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. Ruined "pit structures" at a slightly lower altitude are dated to the seventeenth century; pottery artifacts indicate cultural continuity from the earlier sites. Here and subsequently the settlement pattern represents dispersed villages. Better-preserved pit structures are lower again and probably date from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The pit structures have a large stone-lined pit for dwarf cattle surrounded by houses on an artificial platform. They occur down to an altitude of 1,400 meters, the lower ones associated with terraces. Below this level homesteads are stone enclosures with some geographical variation in design, also associated with terracing, and dating probably from the late seventeenth to nineteenth century. Imported items consist only of rather sparse glass beads throughout and the communities appear to have been relatively isolated. The whole complex was largely abandoned by 1900, but was almost certainly the work of the ancestors of the present populations.

Stone-faced terraces cover large areas of the highland escarpments and the slopes of foothills and detached hills mainly to the west. Some slopes have ranges of up to 100 terraces. The altitudinal range is from about 900 meters in the northern lowlands to around 1,700 meters on the escarpments and in the highlands, with very little above this level, which is about the upper limit for the cultivation of traditional grain crops at the present time.

Distribution favors dolerite rocks and soils that are of greater fertility than the sandy granite soils. However, they are often thin and very stony. Terracing is necessary to clear the stones and concentrate the soil for cultivation; it also protects against erosion and impedes drainage to allow water percolation. Terraces are not precisely leveled on the contour, allowing for longitudinal drainage, so that they could not have been intended to flood them either artificially or by rainfall. Stone-lined drains carried excess run-off down slope, while in some cases upstanding walls were pierced by drain holes. The majority of terraces were not irrigated.

Networks of cultivation ridges are extensive on the lower, less stony slopes below the escarpments and extending some sixty kilometers to the west, the total area

probably equaling or exceeding that of the terracing. The features are parallel or subparallel linear banks, usually seven to ten meters wide between ditches up to a meter or so deep, and up to several hundred meters long, with a more or less shallow longitudinal gradient. These occur both in areas of impeded drainage (vleis) and on the valley sides or interfluves. One such system immediately below the western escarpment covers around 1,000 hectares. Ridge size, patterns, and orientation to slope vary even within a single localized drainage basin and must represent a flexible system of balancing drainage and water retention under varying conditions of soil, slope, rainfall, and seasonal water table.

Numerous old water furrows survive mainly in the highlands where they are better preserved by perennial grass cover. Many furrows serve groups of homesteads and would have been used for domestic purposes, livestock, and watering gardens. Some of these also traverse ranges of terraces. In the National Park area, furrows commonly run on substantial earthen banks and must have been used for irrigating unterraced fields.

There is no direct association between the earlier occupation sites and the agricultural works, and it is not yet known when these were initiated, although some rough granite terracing may be associated with the preceding Early Iron Age.

The agricultural systems integrated crops and livestock. Cattle were penned in the pits or small stone enclosures within the homestead, and small stock in the houses, many of which have low dividing walls. The central pens are larger in the highland pit structures, suggesting larger cattle holdings. There are no signs of dung heaps and little accumulation of domestic refuse, so these must have been used for fertilizing gardens and home fields. Seeds of traditional crops (millets, sorghum, cowpeas, ground beans) have been identified from lowland sites, and traditional root crops such as *Plectranthus esculentus* and *Colocasia* must also have been grown especially on the cultivation ridges. Some degree of intensification may be postulated in an inner zone around the homestead, but the cultivation of outlying terraced fields must have been less sustainable and a continuous process of terrace building is envisaged, with older terraces fallowed or abandoned as fertility declined. This process could account for the extent and density of the complex even with a relatively small overall population. Ultimately terraceable land may have run out and the fertility of homestead plots proved unsustainable, which, coupled with political events, may explain the abandonment of the complex.

ROBERT SOPER

See also: **Manyika of Eastern Zimbabwe.**

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
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Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999)

First President of Tanzania

The first president of Tanzania, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, was one of the most outstanding twentieth-century African statesmen. He worked first as a teacher and later was always called by the title Mwalimu, meaning "the Teacher" in Swahili. Born at Butiama in the Musoma District of Tanganyika, the son of a chief, he went to Muisenge Primary School and Tabora Government Secondary School in Tanganyika, and then to Makerere University College in Uganda, where he qualified as a teacher. Then he went to the University of Edinburgh where he obtained a Diploma in Education.

His political career began when, in 1953, he became president of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), which concentrated initially on cultural matters, only to eventually play a key role in the development of the nationalism movement. On July 7, 1954,



The former President of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere.
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Nyerere joined others in revising the constitution of TAA to turn it into a very different body, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), a nationalist party calling for an end to British rule. The party built up an effective organization and won widespread support. Nyerere promoted the use of Tanganyika's common language, Swahili, from an early date, for example in TANU's slogan *Uhuru na Kazi*, "freedom and work." While Nyerere always rejected racism and his close colleagues for many years included a European (Derek Bryceson) and an Asian (Amir Jamal), TANU campaigned first for an end to the privileged position of Europeans and Asians, and for African majority rule. He served as a nominated TAA member of the Legislative Council but resigned in late 1957 because of the slow progress toward majority rule.

In 1958, however, Nyerere agreed to British proposals for elections under a new system, even though the three racial groups would each have ten elected representatives. In fact, TANU swept the board in elections in 1958 and 1959. Governor Turnbull now cooperated with TANU and, following a constitutional conference in 1959, elections were held for a new Legislative Council with an African majority on August 8, 1960; TANU was returned unopposed in fifty-eight seats out of seventy-one. Nyerere became chief minister in October 1960. Then, on December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became independent, with Nyerere as prime minister. But on January 22, 1962, he resigned, ostensibly to concentrate on the affairs of the party, TANU; Rashidi Kawawa became prime minister.

After a decision to make the country a republic, Julius Nyerere was elected president on November 1, 1962, winning 97 per cent of the vote; he was sworn in as president of the Republic of Tanganyika on December 9, 1962. A little over a year later, a revolution in newly independent Zanzibar brought the Afro-Shirazi Party to power, and it negotiated a union with Tanganyika, which came into effect on April 26, 1964, with the creation of the United Republic, soon afterward named Tanzania. Nyerere became president of the United Republic, whose Constitution of 1965 made it legally a one-party state. It was not until 1977 that the two ruling parties, TANU and the ASP, were merged into a single party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the "Party of the Revolution."

Julius Nyerere was a thoroughly authoritarian ruler, who defended the one-party system in theory as the best for Africa, as well as enforcing it in practice. In mainland Tanzania (i.e., Tanganyika) there were contested elections in which leading TANU or CCM politicians could and did lose seats. But in Zanzibar, where the revolution had involved large-scale killing, ruthless repression of a sort not seen in mainland Tanzania went

on for years, as the island government was essentially semi-independent. Nyerere defended principles of respect for certain human rights. However, his ideology and that of his party was a form of socialism, and they believed that their principles must be enforced on the population for its own good. Nyerere summed up the official ideology in the term *ujamaa*, "togetherness." He always stressed the importance of the rural majority, and for them the idea of "*ujamaa* villages" on cooperative lines was launched. The Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967, set out the basic policies of "Socialism and Self-Reliance." This included, as an early feature, large-scale nationalization of foreign businesses and state control over the greater part of the economy, including the retail trade.

Nyerere was an articulate speaker and writer who took care to explain his theories clearly and won widespread attention for them, including much admiration abroad. But within Tanzania, application of his theories had limited success. Tanzania did avoid the glaring inequalities of wealth seen in other African countries. But state control led to widespread shortages of goods, the "people's shops" often lying empty. Nyerere, who lived a simple and austere life himself and imposed a "Leadership Code" to avoid self-enrichment by those in power, fiercely condemned corruption, but it went on. His subordinates often failed to respect his principles. The call to establish "*Ujamaa* villages" on a voluntary basis met very little response. And in 1973–1975 the government carried out a drastic program of "villageisation," forcibly moving rural people from isolated hamlets into villages. Intended to make it easier to provide amenities for rural areas, this authoritarian measure caused great hardship and disruption. Nevertheless, amenities were extended widely over rural areas, and there was great progress in literacy and education, with Swahili generally used in schools.

President Nyerere was noted in Africa for his strong support for all action, including armed resistance, against the white minority and colonial regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and other territories. Tanzania was the main rear base for the struggle against the Portuguese in Mozambique, and Dar es Salaam was an important center for other liberation movement activity also. The OAU Liberation Committee was based at Arusha in Tanzania.

Unusually for Africa at that time, Nyerere said that oppression must be condemned whether it was by Africans or white people. On that principle he recognized Biafra during the Nigerian civil war, and later opposed the dictatorship of Idi Amin. Eventually Tanzania, after being attacked by Uganda, invaded that country in turn and drove Amin out in 1979. However, Nyerere then secured the return of Milton Obote who started another period of violent misrule in Uganda; meanwhile

Nyerere did not condemn the violent dictatorship in Burundi, another neighbor, as he did that in Uganda, though Tanzania gave shelter to thousands of Burundian refugees. In foreign relations, Nyerere favored African unity but wanted it to be approached cautiously through regional groupings, like the East African Community (Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda), which he backed but which collapsed in 1977. After that Tanzania closed the border with Kenya for six years, to isolate its poorer socialist economy from the exploitative and richer economy of Kenya.

President Nyerere left office on November 5, 1985, having announced that he would not stand for reelection; he was succeeded as head of state by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, but remained chairman of the CCM until August 1990, continuing to defend the policies that he had followed but which now had to be gradually modified, as the economy was in a poor state and the majority had seen only limited improvement in their lives. In August 1990 he gave up the party leadership and retired altogether. The one-party system was abolished in 1992; after cautiously endorsing this change, Nyerere later said it had not improved matters. There were greater changes in the socialist economic system. Although the nation's political and economic systems were greatly modified from what they had been during his presidency, Julius Nyerere's personal standing remained high. He continued to travel and in 1995 became the official mediator in efforts to end the civil war in Burundi. In the midst of this peace effort

he fell sick and was taken to a hospital in London, where he died on October 14, 1999. Half a million people thronged the streets of Dar es Salaam to witness the return of his body for burial, in a display of national mourning.

JONATHAN DERRICK

See also: **Socialism in Postcolonial Africa; Tanzania (Tanganyika).**

Biography

Born at Butiama in the Musoma District of Tanganyika in April 1922. Named president of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), in 1953. His party, TANU, swept the elections of 1958–1959. Named Chief minister in October 1960. Named prime minister of newly independent Tanganyika on December 9, 1961. Resigned, January 22, 1962. Elected president on November 1, 1962. Stepped down from presidency on November 5, 1985. Gave up party leadership and retired from politics in 1990. Died October 14, 1999.

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O

OAU: See Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism.

Obasanjo, Olusegun (1937–)
President of Nigeria

Twice as the country's president and as a leading commander during the civil war (1967–1970), Olusegun Obasanjo has played a major role in the postcolonial history of Nigeria. Courageous, ambitious, and intellectual, his path to power owes to his skills, luck, and image as a nationalist, rather than as an ethnic leader. Unlike most other politicians and leaders, he has not fallen on his ethnic constituency as a source of support. A simple lifestyle and a commitment to his Baptist faith also separate him from the crowd of corrupt politicians and military generals.

In 1958 he enlisted in the Nigerian army, with military training in England and India. In 1959 he became a commissioned officer, rising to the rank of a general ten years later. Meanwhile, the army had begun its long and infamous incursion into politics, starting with the coup of January 1966. Obasanjo spent most of the 1970s in political roles, starting as a federal minister of works and housing in 1973, then a chief of staff (Supreme Headquarters) in 1975, and head of state from 1975 to 1979.

His period as head of state is now regarded as a redemptive moment in military rule, for providing a sense of direction, for an articulate and aggressive foreign policy, and for new domestic policies. His government failed, however, to lay the foundations for a strong economy and actually took a small external loan to which his successors added to substantially until a crisis point was reached. He pursued an honorable commitment to transition to a democratic government, becoming the first military leader to voluntarily relinquish power to a civilian.

After his retirement in 1979, his stature actually increased, to the extent that he became an international figure, a candidate for the office of the secretary general of the United Nations, and member and co-chair of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on South Africa. In Nigeria, he was a member of the Inter-Action Council of Former Heads of States and Government and a leading critic of the government policies on economic reforms and military disengagement. He established the Africa Leadership Forum and Foundation, which convened conferences and published policy papers on African affairs.

He also became an author, with a major account of the Nigerian civil war, *My Command* (1980), and of his activities in government, *Not My Will* (1990). Both books generated considerable media interest and public controversy relating to his own original contributions to war and politics, and his bold and often condemnatory opinions of others. To many Yoruba, Obasanjo prevented the emergence of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria, as the country's president in 1979, a reason why he is unpopular among members of his own ethnic group. There is no justification for this accusation, but Obasanjo's denial has been made without humility, thus creating further antagonism. In many writings, he has criticized the collapse of moral and political leadership, the degeneracy of the civil service, the failure of the university system, and the collapse of professionalism in the armed forces. He is never shy in saying his mind, irrespective of who will be offended. He articulates a new vision for society, although he can be superficial in his recommendations. He is a federalist, with a passion for the development of his country as well as a belief that it should be the leading nation in Africa.

If the previous military regime of General Babangida could tolerate his acerbic criticisms, that of General

Sani Abacha which followed in 1993 was different. Abacha, an unrefined strongman and head of state, pursued a policy of incarcerating his political opponents and critics. Obasanjo was arrested in March 1995 for concealing information on a coup, an allegation without any evidence; he was tried in secret and sentenced to life imprisonment, which was later commuted to fifteen years after domestic and international pressure.

When Abacha died in 1998, a new government headed by Abdulsalam Abubakar released Obasanjo from prison. As with Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Obasanjo moved from prison to the state house. Despite his original desire to avoid politics and elections, he changed his mind, joined the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and became its flag-bearer after a keenly contested primary. He later won the election in February 1999. Ballot irregularities were many and his opponent went to court, but domestic and international opinions were very much in support of a new government.

Obasanjo assumed leadership as a civilian president on May 29, 1999, after fifteen years of military rule that generated grave political instability and ruined the economy. Although he lacks the power of the authoritarian military that he enjoyed in the 1970s, he remains decisive in some of his early actions. He has promised to combat corruption, which has destroyed the social fabric of society; to restore confidence in government and the civil service; to run an open government; to restore the country's image in international politics; to improve the standard of living of the people; and to settle the antigovernment protest in the oil-producing regions.

The milieu is different. Corruption has become institutionalized, poverty has spread with the country listed as one of the poorest, revenues have declined, external and domestic debts are enormous, agriculture has been devastated, unemployment and inflation rates are in double digits, youth are restless, and civil society recognizes the crucial role of violence. Although he has promised a new order, the majority of the politicians are motivated by greed and money, and the test of Obasanjo's regime will be how to keep the military in the barracks and change the orientation of politics. The future of Obasanjo and Nigerian politics are dependent on the extent to which he can move the country out of this depression.

TOYIN FALOLA

See also: **Nigeria: Murtala Muhammed, Obasanjo, and Return to Civilian Rule, 1975–1979.**

Biography

Olusegun Obasanjo was born in Abeokuta, a Yoruba city, where he also attended the Baptist Boys' High School. In 1958 he enlisted in the Nigerian army, with military training in England and India. In 1959 he became a commissioned officer, rising to the rank of a

general ten years later. In the 1960s he participated in two wars, first in the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in the Nigerian civil war. He was the commander of the Third Marine Commando Division, and the Biafran forces surrendered to him marking the end of the war in 1970. Obasanjo spent most of the 1970s in political roles, starting as a federal minister of works and housing in 1973, then a chief of staff (Supreme Headquarters) in 1975, and head of state from 1975 to 1979. He retired in 1979. Obasanjo was arrested in March 1995 for concealing information on a coup, an allegation without any evidence, and was tried in secret and sentenced to life imprisonment, later commuted to fifteen years after domestic and international pressure. When Abacha died in 1998, a new government headed by Abdulsalam Abubakar released Obasanjo from prison. Obasanjo assumed leadership as a civilian president on May 29, 1999.

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Obote, Milton (1925–)

First Prime Minister and Former President of Uganda

As independent Uganda's first prime minister (1962–1966) and executive president (1966–1971; 1980–1985) who was twice deposed by military coups (January 1971 and July 1985) and forced into political exile, Apolo Milton Obote occupies a unique place in Uganda's modern history. The controversial circumstances of his overthrow in each case and the general elections that returned him to power in December 1980 have generated considerable debate by scholars and other commentators. His contribution to the nationalist anticolonial struggle and the important role he played in founding the modern Ugandan nation in the first period of his rule seems almost indisputable. However, his overall life history and political career in particular will continue to exercise the minds of many scholars, journalists, and politicians, including both his detractors and admirers.

Upon leaving college, Obote went to neighboring Kenya where he secured temporary employment. After

a brief period there, he returned to Uganda to work with the Mowlem construction company in their accounts department at Jinja. In 1952, Obote was back in Kenya again when the company transferred him to their Nairobi branch. He remained there till 1957 when he decided to return home for good.

In both Kenya and Uganda, the early 1950s was a period of nascent nationalism, when Africans began to organize modern political parties and demand self-government. The launching of the Uganda National Congress (UNC) by Ignatius Musazi and Abu Mayanja in 1952 had found Obote in Uganda. He joined the Jinja branch. However, the party's main area of concentration then was Buganda. In Kenya, Obote met Jomo Kenyatta briefly. Later he also met the lawyer C. Argwings-Khodesh, whose Nairobi District African Congress he joined, and the trade union leader Tom Mboya. This was also the period during which the Mau Mau movement was active. Though never directly a participant, Obote apparently made his contribution to this and other African political causes quietly. His close association with Argwings-Khodesh and Mboya, in particular, provided him with the opportunity for cutting his political teeth in the emergent nationalist struggle of the 1950s.

Obote returned to Uganda around the middle of 1957 and immediately became involved in the local politics of his home district of Lango. The burning political issue then was the question of land tenure. The colonial administration had recently passed the Land Apportionment Act through which it hoped to introduce African individual land ownership. This provoked considerable opposition from the Langi people. Obote's return coincided with widespread unrest in the district. When the British administration asked him to accompany the officials in their tours around Lango to explain the land reform legislation, he obliged. In the event, this turned out to be an opportunity for the young politician to become known among the Langi. He emerged as an articulate, eloquent, and very astute individual who seemed quite critical and completely unafraid of the British administration. When later in the year the incumbent Lango District representative in the Legislative Council (Legco) resigned, Obote decided to contest the election for his successor. The District Council duly elected him and in March 1958 he took up his seat in the Legco.

For Obote this marked the beginning of an active political life in the country's public affairs that was only interrupted by the two military coups of 1971 and 1985. His contribution to the debates in the Legco, in which he articulated issues concerning his constituency, the wider Northern Province, and Uganda as a whole, soon caught the attention of the colonial state. Although later in his career he was to clash with the

Buganda kingdom and thus earn the wrath of Uganda's largest and most powerful ethnic group, at this stage he seemed quite preoccupied with ensuring its survival in a future independent Uganda. His biographer, Professor Kenneth Ingham, notes that Obote was then very sympathetic toward Buganda. When Uganda—except Buganda, which declined to participate—held its first direct elections later in 1958, Obote won the Lango seat with an overwhelming majority. He had stood as a UNC candidate. As the country moved toward self-government, the administration appointed him to serve on the country's constitutional committee that was to collect evidence from the Ugandan populace about Uganda's future independence constitution.

Obote's career as party leader began in early 1959 when the UNC split into two wings. One wing was led by him and the other by the veteran politician J. W. "Jolly Joe" Kiwanuka. Meanwhile, the newly elected Legco members from outside Buganda had formed a new political party, the Uganda People's Union (UPU), led by the Busoga District representative, William Nadiope. In March 1960 this party and the Obote wing of the UNC, which was far larger than Kiwanuka's, merged to form the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Obote was elected president of the UPC and Nadiope became the vice president. It was this party, in alliance with the Buganda-based Kabaka Yekka (KY, or "King Only") political movement advocating Buganda's interests, that formed Uganda's first independence government in 1962. Despite losing power twice, Obote remained president of the party throughout his first exile in Tanzania (1971–1980) and has continued, even in his second exile in Zambia in 1999, to be the UPC leader.

Obote belongs to that group of African politicians often described as the "founding fathers" of their nations. They usually had to grapple with the formidable task of forging new African nations out of many nationalities within the boundaries of their newly independent countries. Having led his country to independence in 1962, he was a signatory to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) charter in 1963. Four years later in 1967, with Presidents Kenyatta and Nyerere, he participated in the formation of the East African Community.

Internally, Obote attempted to unify Uganda in the mid-1960s by abolishing kingships, discouraging any centrifugal and divisive tendencies, and declaring Uganda a republic with a unitary system of government. In doing this he angered various political forces within the country. In pursuing African indigenous control of the Ugandan economy through nationalization, he antagonized several multinational companies and other external interests. He put Uganda on a sound economic footing during his first regime. This period saw an expanded secondary school system, the construction of an extensive road and railway network,

and the introduction of a vastly improved rural health service throughout the country.

However, Obote faced enormous problems and made some serious errors of judgment in his internal political policies. His critics would probably point to the prolonged civil war of the early 1980s as a serious blot in his career, and might argue that his policies may have led to the militarization of politics in Uganda.

Obote also misjudged his chief of the army and air force, Idi Amin. Obote considered Amin one of his most loyal supporters and ignored rumors that he had tortured opponents. Idi Amin was able to build an extensive power base from his high position within Obote's government. In 1970 Obote finally recognized that Idi Amin had become too great a threat and demoted him. However, the following year, Idi Amin led a coup d'état and declared himself president.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979; Uganda: Buganda Agreement, Political Parties, Independence; Uganda: Obote's First Regime, 1962–1971; Uganda: Obote: Second Regime, 1980–1985; Uganda: Tanzanian Invasion, 1979–1980.

Biography

Obote was born at Akokoro, a small village just north of Lake Kyoga, in Lango District, Northern Uganda, on December 28, 1925. Attended primary school locally in Lira before going on to Gulu High School in neighboring Acholi District. Moved on to secondary school at Busoga College Mwiri, near Jinja, Uganda's second largest town. In March 1947 at the age of twenty-one, Obote joined Makerere College to study English, geography, and general studies for the intermediate certificate. Served as Uganda's first prime minister, 1962–1966. Deposed by military coups in January 1971 and July 1985.

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Odinga, A. Oginga (1911–1994)

Kenyan Nationalist

Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga was an African nationalist and a leading figure in Kenya's struggle for independence from Great Britain. He took center stage in the independence fight while Jomo Kenyatta was imprisoned. Shortly after independence, Odinga parted company with Kenyatta. His organizational skill and political brilliance were devoted to creating an opposition movement. He abhorred the single-party rule imposed on Kenya first by Jomo Kenyatta and later by Daniel Tiroch Arap Moi. Odinga promoted the ideal of democratic socialism, which he preferred to what he perceived as authoritarian rule. Many observers consider Odinga one of Kenya's most controversial leaders. Odinga accused post-independence Kenya of being a "neo-colonialist" state. He wrote: "The object of neo-colonialism is to ensure that power is handed to men who are moderate and easily controlled, political stooges. Everything is done to ensure that accredited heirs of colonial interest capture power. This explains the pre-independence preoccupation of the colonial power with the creation of an African Middle class and the frenzy to corrupt leaders at all levels with temptations of office and property and preferably both" (Odinga, 1967, p.256).

Odinga was especially concerned about mistreatment of "freedom fighters," including the official practice of denying them land. It angered Odinga that following independence Britain silenced militant Africans and promoted moderate Africans, who supported what he perceived as neocolonial arrangements.

Jomo Kenyatta recruited him to organize the Luo on behalf of a growing Kenya African Union (KAU) when it initiated the post-World War II independence struggle. Odinga and other liberal Africans attempted to unite disparate African political and social organizations into a broad national movement. They tried to make KAU's leadership reflect Kenya's ethnic diversity. Odinga's Nyanza branch of the KAU became one of the strongest in Kenya. Despite this, KAU's executive committee remained overwhelmingly Kikuyu.

Odinga went to India on a two-month study tour in 1953. After Kenya declared a national emergency due to the Mau Mau revolt, Odinga formed the Luo Union. This was one of many ethnic organizations encouraged by the British to keep Africans divided. Arrested and questioned for opposing British efforts to recruit Luo to fight during the Mau Mau revolt, this only added to his fame as a nationalist.

In 1958 Odinga shocked the British Colonial Office by openly referring to Kenyatta as the recognized

leader of Kenya's independence movement and calling for his immediate release from detention. Kenyatta became the symbol of nationalism and freedom. This signaled to the British that their effort to use divide-and-conquer tactics with various African to delay independence had failed. The Kenya Legislative Council recognized Kenyatta as a genuine political leader, despite previous efforts to discredit him.

The Kenya African National Union (KANU) led by James Gichuru, Tom Mboya, and Oginga Odinga met with British officials at Lancaster House, in England, to discuss independence. KANU favored immediate independence and opposed the continued colonial occupation of Kenya. Another group, led by Ronald Ngala, together with Daniel Arap Moi and Masinde Muliro, was known as the Kenya African Democratic Union, or KADU. This group feared domination by the Luo and Kikuyu; they favored cooperation with the colonial regime and a delay of independence.

With Odinga and Mboya's help, KANU won a majority of seats in Kenya's first nonracial election. Odinga helped speed Kenya's advance to self-government. KADU favored *majimbo* or regionalism, while KANU favored centralism and the creation of a national identity as Kenyans. In election campaigns, KADU emphasized ethnic identity, while KANU appealed to a form of anticolonialism then termed "African socialism" as well as nationalism.

Odinga was vice president of KANU; he served as minister for home affairs from 1963 to 1964, and then vice president of Kenya. In 1960 Odinga visited China and Russia. Odinga's socialist views increasingly conflicted with Kenyatta's procapitalist stance. Odinga formed the Lumumba Institute, with the aid of socialist countries, to provide ideological training for Kenyan politicians. Kenyatta officially opened the institute at the end of 1964. Kenya's Ministry of Defense discovered guns in the basement of the Ministry of Home Affairs, headed by Odinga. British newspapers alleged that Odinga was plotting a communist revolution for Kenya. Odinga denied these charges, claiming that the arms had been ordered when Britain still maintained control over the region and the police force because he and Kenyatta wanted to be able to arm the police themselves.

Odinga held onto power from 1964 to 1966. Subsequently, he formed a radical political opposition party known as the Kenya People's Union (KPU). In April 1966, Odinga resigned from office to lead the KPU, thus making him the leading figure of Kenyan opposition. In 1967 he published an autobiography titled *Not Yet Uhuru*, became influential, and encouraged open opposition to the government. Fearing the spread of violence, the government banned the KPU following the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969. The government arrested and detained Odinga in an effort to quell

ethnic violence. In 1971 he announced his reconciliation with Kenyatta, but never again did he enjoy Kenyatta's confidence. Upon release from detention, Odinga rejoined KANU, but did not play a prominent role, as he was prohibited from running for a parliamentary seat.

Odinga continued to be an outspoken critic of the government and corruption. The end of the Cold War created international pressure for President Daniel arap Moi (in power since 1978) to agree to multiparty elections in 1992. During the election, he exposed major corruption. He easily won a seat in parliament, but lost his bid for the presidency, coming in last with 12 per cent of the vote. Again, he became the official leader of Kenya's parliamentary opposition, and chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Odinga died in Kisumu, Kenya, in 1994.

DALLAS L. BROWNE

See also: **Kenya: Kenyatta, Jomo: Life and Government of; Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt.**

Biography

Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga was born at Nyamire in Sakwa location, in Central Nyanza province in 1911. Attended Maseno Secondary School and Kenya's Alliance High School. After graduating from high school, entered Makerere University in Uganda. Earned a diploma in education and began a career as a teacher of mathematics at the Church Missionary School in Maseno. Promotion to headmaster of the Veterinary School at Maseno in 1943. Odinga resigned the headmastership in 1946 to found the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation. Appointed in 1947 to the Central Nyanza African District Council. Vice president of Kenya, 1963–1969. Died in Kisumu, Kenya, in 1994.

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Oil

Oil constitutes a major source of energy for any category of countries, rich or poor, industrialized or developing. All countries need it for different tasks, such as industry, transportation, or heating. Petroleum by-products are also used for a variety of products that are of importance to Africa, such as fertilizer. Oil's utility makes it an important source of revenue for countries that produce it. For countries that do not produce it, yet must use it, it constitutes a major import item that can be a drain on valuable foreign exchange if prices are high.

Apart from the fact that only a few countries in Africa are endowed with oil resources of any significance, Africa's known share of global reserves is much too small to make it a highly influential voice in global oil politics. Known reserves in the region were estimated to be around 10 per cent of the global total during the 1970s. Comparatively, Saudi Arabia alone accounts for 25 per cent of the world's reserves. In the 1980s, Africa's ratio of global oil exports was only around 4 per cent.

Oil production in Africa is concentrated in a few countries, the most significant of which are Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Production in these countries dates back to the late 1950s but did not become a driving force of their economies until the 1970s. Other producers of some significance include Cameroon, Egypt, and Tunisia. Major discoveries have also been made in Chad that would make that country the next new member of Africa's exclusive oil producing club, once production begins.

Oil did not become an issue of major contention in Africa (or, indeed, the world in general) until 1973. It was propelled to the forefront of domestic and global economic politics following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when, in retaliation against the Western states that had supported Israel in the war, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded in organizing an oil cartel, cutting back on production while raising prices. The 1973 cartel lasted until 1976. In 1979–1980, a second wave of restriction was put into effect.

Apart from its effects on the industrial capacity and household needs of industrialized countries, the OPEC cartel had two contradictory effects on the economies

of Africa. African countries that do not produce oil were forced by the higher prices to divert important foreign exchange reserves to buy oil at the higher rate. The cartel affected the oil importing states in different ways. Those that waited to see if prices would return to the pre-cartel level ended up paying even more than they would have paid had they ordered their requirements when prices started rising. On the other hand, the countries that ordered their requirements as prices started rising ended up beating the price hikes that came with time. The cartel affected not just crude oil but also by-products of oil. Therefore, its effects were extensive.

The high oil prices increased the indebtedness of African states and contributed to the debt crisis that erupted in the region in the early 1980s. African governments were forced to contend with less oil at very high price. The terms of trade (the price of exports in relation to the price of imports) already worked against Africa, and many countries were compelled to borrow more to meet their energy needs and also have enough left to meet their need for imported manufactured products. The result was yet more debt, for which interest had to be paid as well.

For oil-producing African countries, OPEC's actions had quite the opposite effect. The high oil prices increased their revenue base and most raised production to take advantage of the higher prices and increased demand. The rise in oil revenue led oil-producing African states to deemphasize agriculture and encouraged the migration of people from rural areas to the cities to work in oil-related positions. The net result was that three of the major oil-producing African states—Libya, Congo, and Gabon—became dependent on oil exports for more than 80 per cent of their export revenues in 1984–1985. The ratio for Nigeria was over 90 per cent, Angola 76 per cent, and Egypt 50 per cent. Only Algeria and Tunisia, with 36 and 40 per cent, respectively, maintained a degree of diversification within their export earnings.

The increased demand for their oil of the 1970s was only a short-lived blessing for African countries. By the early 1980s, prices had fallen to an all-time low, and prices have generally remained low. In the summer of 1998, prices fell further, before beginning to recover a year later. The legacy of nearly two decades of low oil prices continue to cause economic difficulties for African countries that depend on it for the bulk of their foreign exchange earnings.

MOSES K. TESI

See also: **Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment; Libya: Oil, Politics, OPEC; Nigeria: Industry, Oil, Economy; Sudan: Cotton, Irrigation, and Oil, 1970s.**

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Oil Rivers Protectorate: See Lagos Colony and Oil Rivers Protectorate.

Old Kingdom: See Egypt, Ancient: Old Kingdom and Its Contacts to the South: Historical Outline.

Olduwan and Acheulian: Early Stone Age

Around 2.5 million years ago (hereafter *mya*), global cooling and drying from polar glaciation initiated a period of accelerated biological and behavioral readjustment and change across mixed habitats: in East Africa, major adaptive changes occur in protohuman diet and behavior. Earliest traces of the genus *Homo*, which is archaeologically defined by toolmaking, are left by its first species, *H. habilis* ("able man," the toolmaker), on the continent's rifted and uplifted eastern side, where a volcanic geology favors fossil preservation.

Both advanced gracile australopithecines and early habilines (*H. habilis* varieties) were omnivores occupying an expanding scavenging niche, so stone knapping began for hammers to extract bone marrow, and for a sharp edge for butchering and plant processing. The earliest intentionally flaked stone tools have been discovered at Gona, Ethiopia, dated 2.5 million years old (hereafter *myo*); they are multipurpose hand-sized choppers and flakes of simplest design, though not obviously more rudimentary than those 1.8 *myo* finds at Olduvai that named this entire earliest tool-making period "the Oldowan." It persists virtually unchanged for 1*my*, with chipping techniques gradually refined to bring in the first bifacial tools: the Developed Oldowan Industry 1.7 > 1.6 *mya*, now considered part of the early Acheulean complex, formerly thought to have appeared around 1.5 *mya*.

By classifying different Oldowan tool types, Mary Leakey implied that the makers could mentally image standard designs for specific tasks, but most researchers now believe this ability developed only later,

with a larger-brained species: Oldowan technology is the basic minimum required for effectiveness, involving little more than detaching flakes from cores (mostly large "cobble"). Though the choppers resulting from this core reduction are well known, the more abundant flake products were probably more important. All Oldowan artifacts were rudimentary enough to be mistaken for later traditions' byproducts, so their occurrences can only be dated by associated fauna, such as at Sterkfontein and Swartkrans (South Africa), where Oldowan toolmakers were living two *mya*.

It is probably the overall rarity of habiline fossil finds that accounts for tools having been found exclusively in association with early *Homo*'s robust contemporaries the paranthropines. Though *P. robustus*'s brain size never crosses the "cerebral rubicon" of 600 cm², the robust species are otherwise anatomically candidate tool users in having had the same precision grip as *Homo*. Isotopic analysis of the Swartkrans paranthropine remains showed a remarkable protein intake for a vegetarian species, and when the site's fossil bone tools (some of the world's oldest) were reexamined, the wear patterns on these 13 > 19 cm-long straight splinters were found to result not from uprooting tubers, as initially proposed, but from digging into termite mounds. Year-round *insectivory* may have been as important as carnivory in the diet of habilines too.

Otherwise, direct evidence of non-toolmaking life is absent almost everywhere due to organic materials' ephemeral nature. And only East African sites (notably Olduvai and East Turkana) have sufficient excavation to allow some reconstruction of the life and culture of the several tool-making hominid species. Notably, everywhere the evidence for deliberate hunting (i.e., woodworking: spears), being perishable, is disadvantaged against evidence for scavenging (i.e., stone for butchering: hand-axes). But a recent Tanzanian hand-axe assemblage (Peninj west of Lake Natron) from 1.5 *mya* includes worn blades with traces of acacia-wood, suggesting woodworking was underway one million years earlier than previously imagined (from the oldest known wooden implements, from northern Europe 400,000 years ago, hereafter *tya*). This evidence that the tool kit was not limited to hand-held stone until around 500 *tya*, as formerly thought, but included shaped wooden implements, may revise present estimation of the habilines' foraging capacities.

Many sites show that Oldowan and later tools occur in localized concentrations (at Sterkfontein, for instance, cores from gravels close to the site were brought to be worked in the shade of trees growing at cave entrances). Since these artifact clusters are typically found near resources (water, plant foods, shade trees, rock outcrops), early studies took them to indicate camps ("home bases") consisting of "living

floors” 20 > 60 feet across, where tool-manufacturing and other activities were centered. Being frequently located beneath or near groves of climbable trees, these accumulations of stone and bone refuse also possibly mark “tree-nest refuges,” to which forage and scavenged meat (mainly long marrow bones) could be carried. This hypothesis is plausible if Oldowan hominids were still quasi-arboreal, but if they were not, it means they were able—despite lacking control of fire—to defend their safe places cooperatively against competitors. This implies a degree of reciprocity that now seems improbable this early on, as does the argument for food sharing.

For future ground-dwellers leaving the shelter of trees, however, predation by large carnivores would have encouraged large-group living and increased sociality. Coping with life in large social groups would have resulted in selection for increased intelligence, which was then applied in stone and other toolmaking; “curation” (retaining tools for future use rather than just shaping suitable materials at hand); and organized food procurement.

Major change in the tool kit leading to the more advanced Acheulean industry is seen first at Konso-Gardula in the southern Main Ethiopian Rift 1.9 > 1.3 *mya*, contemporaneous with the around 1.8 *myo* emergence of *H. ergaster*, early/African *Homo erectus*, who appears 1.6 *mya* at Koobi Fora. A stream-side site here yielded both the post-Oldowan “Karari” tool kit featuring serrated cutting flakes, and an arc of red patches indicating fireplaces: evidence of much earlier manipulation of fire than the 1.1 *myo* evidence from Swartkrans.

But fire was likely first managed for protection and warmth; only circumstantial evidence exists for a cooked rather than raw diet for *H. ergaster*. Her reduced chewing musculature, smaller molars, and less protective enamel compared to the habilines are thus more probably due to increased reliance on tools for processing tough foods than to cooking of new savanna edibles such as tubers. Certainly at some point the domestication of fire resulted in a diversification of diet that spurred *ergaster's* spread beyond the woodland mosaic, but until conclusive evidence of this appears, this critical range expansion should be attributed primarily to both her more modern anatomy (significantly, an increased cranial breadth) and improved tools. These were manufactured in great quantities in dedicated “workshops,” with a preference for large (fist-sized) cobbles of hard-to-work quartzite, off which large flakes could be struck for the crafting of both scrapers and elaborate, standardized *bifaces* (almond-shaped *hand-axes* and *cleavers*).

The radical cognitive advance represented by this new technology (implying the toolmaker retaining a mental template) may have been due to a general

increase in intelligence arising out of growth in size of the social group. As tool-carrying savanna gatherers, women made an enhanced contribution to group subsistence that was probably fundamental to the evolution of a more intense sociality. Acheulean toolmaking evidences the introduction of rules into society, with the pace of cultural evolution quickening beyond the proto-human when stoneworking came to form a *tradition*, probably along with other sets of rule-governed behaviors, forms, and procedures. (Stable pair-bonding and cooperative defense of food stores, however, may have arisen somewhat earlier, contrary to some recent speculation.)

Although bifaces vary in finish, with imposed patterns suggesting incipient symbolization (beliefs, aesthetic sense), they nevertheless do not show strong style trends in either time or space: hand-axe distributions indicate that the basic design concept was shared and transmitted down 1 *my*, and spanned the continent. There was no premium on innovation for what was, in the narrow niche of riverine wetlands and valley bottoms preferred by Acheulean biface-makers, the best design for a large, sharp hand-held tool.

The apparent predilection for semi-aquatic habitats explains the narrow, linear Acheulean geographic distribution, and why even with low population densities, it is found from the Cape to Morocco. The “Nariokotome/Turkana boy” fossil indicates *H. ergaster's* locomotion may have been more efficient than that of modern humans skeletally adapted to birthing larger-brained offspring; he becomes a successful hunter by running his swift savanna quarry to ground but also by occupying and adapting quickly to new niches (riverine wetlands, beachcombing: Acheulean tools recently found embedded in Eritrean coral reef along with fossil shellfish and crustacea were obviously used to harvest marine food. Though little evidence can survive land-water interfaces, such data may justify renewed attention to the hypothesis that at least part of our history took place in wetland environments).

Over the Acheulean's million years of evolution in Africa, it spread into most habitats other than true desert and moist evergreen woodland (Kalambo Falls excepted): hand-axes have been found in Nigeria (Jos), upper Niger (Adrar Bous), at riverside sites in Volta and Senegal, in middle and lower Egypt and the oases of Dakhla and Kharga west of the Nile, at Casablanca and Rabat, and in surface scatters from Zambia to the Cape. Dates indicate these continental radiations from East Africa took place over 500 *ty*. At Kabwe and Elandsfontein, “Broken Hill man” (200 *tya*) and “Saldanha man” (400 > 300 *tya*) respectively are not *H. ergaster*, but rather a massively built (archaic) *H. sapiens* named *H. heidelbergensis*, who also occurs in central Tanzania (Eyasi) around 100 *tya*.

The Acheulean in Africa, as elsewhere, continued in use by archaic *H. sapiens* to 200 > 100 *tya*, when the bifaces disappeared and the flake-tool component evolved into lighter toolkits with stone hafted into wood—the regional variants of the Middle Stone Age (Africa)/Middle Palaeolithic (Eurasia).

ROBERT PAPINI

See also: **Humankind: Hominids, Early, Origins of.**

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Olympio, Sylvanus (1902–1963)

Nationalist Leader and First President of the Togolese Republic

Born in Lomé on September 6, 1902, to an influential coastal merchant family, Olympio was educated at the University of Vienna and the London School of Economics. From an early age he was groomed for a leadership role among the Ewe-speaking people and the wider Togolese community. His charismatic style and authoritarian leadership proved the greatest threat to both French colonial control and postindependence political stability.

Sylvanus’ father, Octavianus, was Lomé’s leading citizen during the German, British, and French occupation. Sylvanus benefited from his father’s favorable alliances in education and commerce. Upon returning

to Lomé in 1926, Olympio joined the largest commercial firm, the British-oriented United Africa Company (UAC), and served with it in Nigeria (1926–1928), Gold Coast (1928), and French Togoland (1928–1938), becoming its general manager for Togoland and a prosperous merchant himself. A founding member and vice president of the Cercle des Amitiés Françaises, a pro-French cultural alliance association for the Lomé elite that later evolved into the Comité de l’Unité Togolaise (CUT), Olympio was imprisoned in 1942 in neighboring Benin, and only permitted to return with the end of the Vichy administration. In 1946 he led his nascent party to victory in the first elections for the new Assemblée Representative and became the Assembly’s president (1946–1952).

His involvement in the pan-Ewe unification movement and links with the All-Ewe Conference in the neighboring Gold Coast Colony and British Togoland, coupled with his erudite petitions to the United Nations Trusteeship Commission, placed him at odds with the French administration. The French government saw the solution in his relocating to the UAC Paris branch, in an effort to curtail his political influence. When he refused to leave Lomé, he was arrested on trumped-up charges for currency trafficking and prohibited from running for office. The CUT was also subjected to political intimidation as part of a wider attempt by French authorities allegedly to promote political alternatives. The CUT, under Olympio’s leadership, responded to this by boycotting all elections. This decision in turn led to Olympio’s main rival Nicolas Grunitzky and his Parti Togolais du Progrès gaining control of the 1958 Togo (French Union) legislature.

The UN Trusteeship Council, however, disagreed with the French Union and its concomitant granting of autonomy to Togo. The UN supervised an election that effectively ended the union with Togo, and with it the administration of Grunitzky. Olympio was named prime minister (1958–1961). He was also elected mayor of Lomé (1959–1961). The frustratingly close 1956 UN-administered plebiscite in British Togoland that led to its amalgamation with the Gold Coast Colony, and the subsequent 1957 gaining of independence in Ghana, marked a shift in Olympio’s political interests away from Ewe-centered concerns toward the new Togolese nation-state. After the merger of the two British zones, Olympio pressed for the independence of French Togo and appeared before the United Nations Trusteeship Commission. Independence was declared on April 23, 1960. Olympio engineered significant constitutional changes, however, and with the passing of a referendum on a presidential system, he became president of the republic (1961–1963). The new constitution has been described as having all

the powers of a U.S. presidency and all the weaknesses of parliament in the Fifth French Republic (Prouzet, 1976, p.26).

After independence, Olympio's political trajectory and technique changed markedly. He adopted a style of leadership marked by authoritarianism and paternalism, and his personal political goals clashed with those of the Togolese nation and the population as a whole. The most obvious example of this was the widening gulf between Juvento, the youth wing of the CUT, and the CUT. Juvento had established itself as an independent party in 1959. After independence, however, Olympio criticized the Juvento leadership as subversive and disloyal and imprisoned many of its most prominent members. Olympio felt himself to be in the shadow of the great independence leader of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, and a clash over the integration of Togo within a greater Ghana led to the closing of the Ghana-Togo border. Further examples of this departure in style include the lack of attention given to northern leaders and northern concerns, the impact of the border closure on Lomé commerce, the pressures of taxation on cocoa producers, and a clash with the Catholic archbishop in Lomé.

This change in personal style in 1961 and 1962 was mirrored by an intensified drive against all organized political opposition. Leaders of other parties and internal threats were imprisoned for alleged plots, opposition parties disqualified from standing in elections, and excessively strict electoral laws provided the means for political leverage. This political despotism culminated in 1962, with the creation of a one-party state under which all parties were banned except the CUT.

The political terror of 1962 coincided with the first serious financial test of the former French colony's internal economy. Olympio unwisely pushed for a balanced budget, and in so doing awakened the hostility of the last few remaining sectors of the administrative hierarchy that had not already declared their opposition to him. Fiscal austerity led to conflict with the colonial military veterans' association, and this served as a means whereby serving officers enhanced their collegial credentials. The NCO and officer corps sought better pay and conditions for themselves and their veteran allies and led the assault on the president's private Lomé residence on January 13, 1963. Olympio was killed by a group of soldiers; it is widely acknowledged that the future president, Etienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma, fired the shot that killed Olympio as he attempted to scale the walls of the neighboring United States Embassy.

After Olympio's death, all imprisoned dissidents were released, and political activities resumed. Nicolas Grunitsky, recalled from exile to assume the presidency, convened a national assembly. The political situation

continued to remain unstable until Eyadéma himself seized power in another bloody coup d'état in 1967.

The memory of Olympio, although somewhat tarnished by his later activities, remains a common point for all opposition to the Eyadéma dictatorship. Two of Olympio's sons remain active in the exiled political community, and one, Gilchrist Olympio, is widely believed to have won the 1998 president election. The results, marred by irregularities, fraud, and political violence, are the subject of a 2001 UN/OAU report.

BENJAMIN NICHOLAS LAWRENCE

See also: **Togo.**

Biography

Born in Lomé on September 6, 1902. Educated at the University of Vienna and the London School of Economics. Led the CUT to victory in the first elections for the new Assemblée Representative. Became the assembly's president in 1946, served until 1952. Named prime minister in 1958, served until 1961. Elected mayor of Lomé in 1959, served until 1961. Served as president of the republic from 1961 to 1963. Killed in an assault on his private Lomé residence on January 13, 1963.

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Omdurman: *See* **Sudan: Omdurman and Reconquest.**

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Orange Free State: *See* **Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa.**

Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was an outgrowth of several years of pan-African sentiments dating from 1900, when the First Pan-African Congress

met in London. Its establishment in 1963 was the culmination of successive attempts at establishing an inter-African organization. The emotional impetus for OAU's birth was provided by the colonial situation.

The deep-rooted unity of African states manifested itself first in the development of Pan-Africanism as an expression of African cultural nationalism, and later in what was called the "African personality" in world affairs. Its genesis could be dated to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the term "pan-Africanism" first came into vogue. Between 1900 and 1927, five congresses met to promote black solidarity and protest organizations. Though the initiators and delegates were primarily West Indian and African American, they nevertheless made some progress in putting the African case to the world.

During the 1930s, the movement was almost nonexistent, but in 1944 several black organizations founded the Pan-African Federation, and by the time the sixth Pan-African Congress was organized in 1945, Pan-Africanism and African nationalism had found concrete expression. Africans were now in the majority and for the first time the necessity for well-organized, firmly-knit movements as a primary condition for the success of the national liberation struggle in Africa was emphasized.

The first conference of independent African states, initiated by the newly independent state of Ghana, was held in Accra in 1958, resulting in a great upsurge of interest in the cause of African freedom and unity. Conflicts of opinion, however, divided the governments of the newly independent African states, leading to the emergence, in the early 1960s, of two powerful blocs. The first was the Casablanca Group, which consisted of the more "radical" states. Created in January 1961 under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the group argued for rapid political unity. The second group, known as the Monrovia Group, consisted of the more conservative states. Founded in May 1961, it favored a program of gradual economic unity. There was yet a third group, the Brazzaville Group, consisting of representatives of former French colonies still under powerful French influence and indirect control. It was comparatively weak and was eventually absorbed by the Casablanca Group.

At any rate, despite the differences in interests and approach, the ideal of a continental organization remained, and African leaders continued to strive towards its realization. Primarily through the initiative of Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (prime minister of Nigeria), and President Sekou Toure of Guinea, moves were commenced to resolve the differences between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups. This culminated in a meeting of representatives from independent African states at

Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital in 1963. The organization which the contracting parties agreed to establish was christened the Organization of African Unity and its charter was signed on May 25, 1963, by the thirty-two leaders of the then independent African states. After the formation of the OAU, the two ideological groups disbanded. Membership of the Organization was open to all independent African States and Islands surrounding Africa.

The broad aims and objectives of the OAU, as set out in articles II and III of its charter, were to:

- (a) promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
- (b) coordinate and intensify efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
- (c) defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence;
- (d) eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
- (e) promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Toward the above ends, the member-states pledged themselves to coordinate and harmonize their general policies by cooperation, especially in the following fields: politics and diplomacy; economics, including transport and communications; education and culture; health, sanitation and nutrition; science and technology; and defense and security.

Other provisions of the OAU Charter affirmed the principles of equality of all member-states with each other; noninterference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the existing frontiers of member states; and peaceful settlement of disputes. The charter equally condemned all forms of political subversion and assassination and pledged the member states to work for the liberation of African peoples then still under colonial rule and in South Africa. It declared the loyalty of member states to the policy of nonalignment by which African independent nations were implored to remain outside the "big-power blocs" into which the rest of the world was then divided, to forestall African nations losing their newly won independence. The OAU Charter was indeed a reflection of a compromise between the various prevailing opinions, especially among the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups, envisaging a unity transcending ethnic and national differences. From 1963, therefore, the African continent possessed its own international forum which won the loyalty of all the states, including those that gained their independence thereafter.

To ensure the achievement of the OAU's aims and objectives, several institutions were created. This consisted of an assembly of heads of state and government, which

was the policy-making body of the organization; a council of ministers appointed by the assembly; a general secretariat, which was the permanent administrative body of the OAU, based in Addis Ababa; and a commission to settle disputes. Peace-keeping efforts were made through the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, and through ad-hoc committees. Technical research, mainly in agriculture, was conducted through a scientific and research commission. Revenue for the organization was derived from member states, each of which was requested to contribute on the same scale as its contribution to membership in the United Nations.

Once launched, the OAU gave Pan-Africanist ideas a supranational basis toward overcoming the rivalries of nationalism and the divisions which hitherto characterized interstate relations. Admittedly, the deep-seated misgivings were not completely overcome, yet on the heels of the Addis Ababa compromise, the perspectives of the Pan-Africanists were at least redefined.

The survival and relevance of the organization, however, had over the years been buffered by a myriad of crises, and shaken by numerous problems. Among several others, the organization had been threatened by severe internal political crises and civil wars within and among member states. In the opening years of the OAU, for example, the earlier division between “moderates” and “radicals” continued to exist. The difficulty consisted, really, in a strong neocolonial presence. The other main difficulty, especially during the formative years of the OAU, was that the Pan-African scope and nature of the organization came into conflict with regional organizations and groupings. There were multiple loyalties of member-states to different pro-imperialist international organizations. This explains why at inception the meetings of the OAU were at times reduced to little more than empty talk or even the echo of voices and interference from outside Africa. Ideological cleavages among its member states or, divergent leanings toward opposing ideological blocs in the international system, had to be acknowledged. The OAU was beset by crushing economic and financial problems. Moreover, the apprehensive weight of pressures placed on several OAU member states by external powers and forces had virtually relegated the continental body into functional irrelevance during its last years. The general orientation of the bulk of African states had been pro-imperialist while the institutional structure of the OAU itself remained largely superstructural and superficial. Thus the OAU was less effective in tackling the problem of neocolonialism.

The OAU settled several boundary disputes between various member nations. From its inception, the political liberation of Africa was its preeminent Pan-African concern and duty. Toward this end, the

organization established a special fund to aid independence movements against colonial rule in Africa. This eventually culminated in independence in several African countries such as Guinea-Bissau in 1974, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome in 1975; Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990. The struggle against apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa was for long a major preoccupation of the OAU. It was a great triumph, therefore, for the organization when the new democratic South Africa joined the league in 1994, bringing the membership of the OAU to fifty-three.

On the economic front, where the purpose of the OAU was to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, it did not achieve as much, as Africa remains ravaged by famine and hunger and characterized by poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of economic growth. Admittedly, the OAU, concerned with Africa’s economic problem, began to address itself frontally to the critical and important issue of economic cooperation and development, especially from the 1980s. A treaty establishing an African economic community by 2000 was signed in June 1991 at the Abuja OAU summit. However, it is still expected that in the twenty-first century, the liberation of the continent from economic domination should be the central Pan-African task.

That task has now fallen to the African Union. On September 9, 1999, the OAU issued a declaration now known as the Sirte Declaration, which officially called for the establishment of a new body, to be called the African Union (AU). At the Lomé summit in 2000, the Constitutive Act of the Union was adopted. In 2001 the Lusaka summit produced an outline of the implementation of the AU. Finally, in 2002 at the Durban summit, the African Union was officially launched, as the first assembly of the heads of states of the African Union was convened. The African Union focuses on the process of political and economic integration in Africa, while also addressing problems that have arisen as negative side effects of globalization. In its focus upon integration, the AU continues to uphold the ideals of Pan-Africanism. In its emphasis on economic matters, it addresses the most pressing problems facing African nations in the new millennium.

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See also: **Du Bois, W. E. B. and Pan-Africanism; Nkrumah, Kwame.**

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Oromo: Origins, Social and Economic Organization

The Oromo (or Galla as they were formerly known) constitute one of the largest and most important ethnic groups of Ethiopia. The question of their ethnic genesis and origin has been subject of scholarly debates for a considerable period, and up to the present no general agreement on that problem has been reached. It seems an established fact that parts of the Oromo-inhabited regions are today occupied by Somali groups. Archaeological findings in the northern part of Somali country such as burials and funeral grounds are attributed to the Oromo. Essentially, however, evidence points to a highland origin in what is today the province of Ba'li, and contrary to a widely held belief of the past, the Oromo are a genuinely Ethiopian people. Correspondingly, it is now well known that the great Oromo migrations were not due to pressure of other peoples. Another biased perception of Oromo history and society concerns their description as primitive cattle-raisers with no knowledge of farming techniques. This incorrect assumption must be revised, since it has become evident that they practiced differentiated agriculture wherever they settled.

The Oromo consisted of genealogically connected groups and presumably as a result of a steadily growing population parts of these groups broke away and formed new independent subgroups. Initially, two major divisions existed that were named Borana and Barentu after their two mythical ancestors and assumed founders. As early as the sixteenth century, these groups were powerful confederacies that had integrated many different ethnic groups. It is therefore important to state that there probably never was anything like a "pure" Oromo ethnic entity.

One important impetus for the massive expansion of the Oromo might have been the *gada* system as a central institution of social and political organization, which ruled every aspect of life for the Oromo. The

gada system included a classification by age groups that succeeded each other in assuming military, economic, political, and ritual responsibilities every eight years. Every male member of the Oromo society was classified into generation-sets and *gada*-grades. The full cycle of the *gada* consisting of ten grades was divided into two periods of forty years each. Regardless of his actual age, each Oromo had to enter the children's class forty years after his father had done so, which meant that father and son were five grades apart at all times. During his lifetime every Oromo man had ideally to pass ten classes of eight years each. All those who entered a class together formed a *gada* group and remained a military fraternity all their lives. With membership of a certain class specific duties and rights were associated. The fifth and sixth classes constituted the leadership and warrior class. The political power was actually held by the *gada* class and selected officials were only representatives of the ruling set. It was expected that at least once during the eight years of the ruling *gada* class a fighting and killing expedition was undertaken against either big game or enemies which none of the ancestors had raided.

Another important feature of some of the Oromo societies was the *Qallu* institution. The *Qallu* was the spiritual leader of Oromo traditional religion and the first leader was believed to have been of divine origin. According to Oromo traditions, the *Qallu* was "the prophet of the nation" and guarded the laws of the *Waaqa*, who was both the sky god and the sky itself. Adult men went on a pilgrimage to the *Qallu* to receive its holy blessing.

The Oromo were characterized by a mixed economy with extensive farming. The status of cattle was high; beyond economic considerations, the people had a strong emotional and ritual relationship with the cattle. In the older anthropological literature, the Oromo were therefore regarded as typical exponents of the so-called cattle-complex. Cattle formed the basis of Oromo livelihood, and the Oromo myth of origin tells us that the first cattle and the first human being were created together. The importance of cattle is emphasized in another tradition according to which God exclaimed when creating the Oromo people, "Come forth, you owners of cattle!" In reality, the role of cattle within the mixed economy was determined by the natural environment of the different Oromo groups. Only where the arid climate led to less than ideal agricultural conditions did cattle-breeding predominate.

Another institution contributed to the dynamic character of the Oromo societies and might have facilitated the process of the migration. This institution consisted of the adoption of an individual or a group of Oromo or non-Oromo origin into an Oromo *gossa* (which is traditionally translated as "clan") or subgroup. Adopted

individuals or groups collectively became the “sons” of the *gossa*. Mutual responsibility and obligation were promised, and the adopting *gossa* thereby increased their numbers. This institution of adoption was inspired by political, economic, and military considerations on both sides. In this way, the Oromo seem to have assimilated more than they were assimilated by other ethnic groups. It demonstrates that the Oromo ethnic entities were fluid groupings. Through the continual process of migration and conquest, as well as interaction and assimilation, old members were lost while new members were incorporated into the group.

MARIANNE BECHHAUS-GERST

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
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Oromo: Migration and Expansion: Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

The massive expansion of the Oromo (or Galla as they were formerly known) at the beginning of the sixteenth century presumably was the result of multiple factors. One important impetus for the massive expansion of the Oromo might have been the *gada* system as the central institution of social and political organization, which ruled every aspect of life of the Oromo. An increase in population and demographic pressure also caused the leaving of former homelands of many of the Oromo groups. Oral traditions furthermore speak of great droughts at the time of their migration.

Originally there were two confederations of Oromo, called Borana and Barentu. During the first phase of their migration after 1530 the Oromo profited by the aftermath of the fierce warfare between Muslims and Christians and were advancing into regions virtually depopulated. The first land acquisition seems to have taken place as early as 1530 when the Borana Oromo invaded Bali. Between 1530 and 1538, in the period of the Mudana *gada*, the Oromo crossed the Wabi.

A tradition relates that even at this time a three-stage process could be discerned that consisted of scouting, surprise attack, and settlement. In the period of the Kiolole *gada* (1538–1546), they devastated the predominantly Muslim-populated country of Dawa’ro north of the Wabi river and the lowlands of the Hawas further north. The Christian emperor Galawdewos fought against the Barentu and the Borana during the Bifole *Gada* (1546–1554) but could not prevent them from attacking Waj, Fatagar, and other provinces.



Oromo, expansion into Ethiopia, sixteenth–eighteenth centuries.

Particularly important in the history of the Oromo migrations was the period of the Michelle *gada* (1554–1562), because it brought about a decrease in the power of both the Christians and the Muslims, which ended two centuries of struggle between the two groups. At the same time, the power of the Oromo dramatically increased, and Christians and Muslims united in their struggle against the common enemy for the next 150 years.

During the period of the Harmufa *gada* (1562–1579) the Oromo began migrating to the southwestern region of present-day Ethiopia. They attacked the provinces Angot, Amhara, and Bagemder, which were beginning to recover from the devastation of the war against the Muslims. Here the armies of the new emperor, Minas, confronted them. At the same time, Barentu Oromo groups attacked Adal, where famine and plague weakened any potential resistance. Only a few small groups of Muslims were able to flee to the Awsa Oasis in the Afar desert or survived within the fortified city. The greater part of the Muslim population of Adal was assimilated by the Oromo.

When Emperor Minas died in 1563, a third of the Ethiopian Empire was already occupied by Oromo groups. Their military strength was considerably improved by the introduction of the horse. During the first half of the seventeenth century, invasions by different Oromo groups were a permanent menace to the Ethiopian Empire. About 1617 the Borana attacked Bagemder and Gojjam, which were central regions of the empire. Between 1620 and 1660 the Ethiopian

emperors had to constantly defend different parts of their territory but were unable to put a stop to the waves of advancing Oromo groups.

The main target of Oromo expansion was Gojjam, which was assaulted from the south by the Liban Oromo, and from the east by the Tulama. Simultaneously, the Tulama expanded from Shoa into Amhara and the Wallo and Azebo overran Angot, parts of Amhara and Waj, Bagemder, and Tigre. In 1642 the eastern Oromo nearly annihilated the Ethiopian army in Tigre.

Under the reign of emperors Fasiladas and Yohannes the Oromo seem to have been virtually unrestrained in their expansion. It was Iyasu I (1682–1706) who resumed the offensive against the Oromo while at the same time recruiting battalions of loyal Oromo groups whom he settled in conquered areas. Tulama and Liban Oromo were settled in northern Gojjam and Bagemder. They were encouraged to convert to Christianity. Some of their authorities were appointed to high offices in the army and in the administration of the provinces. In 1684–1685 Oromo groups fought against Emperor Iyasu I in Wollo and Gojjam. In 1694 the Gugru-Oromo attacked Gojjam and Bagemder.

Although the military expansion of the Oromo continued, many Oromo groups started to settle in Ethiopian territory and developed into a political power, which was utilized by the different secular and ecclesiastical groupings. By the end of the seventeenth century they were taking an active part in the political formation of the Ethiopian state. The process of mutual assimilation between the Oromo newcomers and other inhabitants of the empire was well under way.

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Oubangui-Chari: *See Central African Republic: Colonial Period: Oubangui-Chari.*

Ovimbundu States

The great central highlands of Angola are characterized by fertile soil and a temperate climate. Since ancient times, the region has been regarded as the demographic center of west Central Africa. The Umbundu language is closely related to others of the western

Bantu linguistic group, and was probably spoken throughout the central highlands in ancient times, as it is today. Even in the seventeenth century, outsiders recognized a common cultural identity among the Ovimbundu people of the highlands. This cultural and linguistic unity was not recognized at the political level, however, for the highlands were always divided into several polities of various sizes.

Its deeper past remains essentially unknown, with only a handful of archaeological sites having been excavated. Judging from these and comparisons with better known adjacent regions, the area was probably largely dependent upon agriculture as early as 500BCE, and was practicing ironworking by the start of the Common Era.

Complex societies had probably already been developed for a long time when the Portuguese first arrived in central Africa. In 1540, responding to information about copper production and exports, the Portuguese crown organized an expedition to seek relations with the "King of Benguela," a polity which probably dominated the northwestern part of the highlands, and the headwaters of the Longa River. This kingdom must have been fairly powerful and extensive, for the important kingdom of Ndongo was frequently at war with it in the mid-sixteenth century, and Portuguese reports suggest it was among the largest in the area. Ndongo reports suggested that the kings of Ndongo had forced Benguela to submit to it, although this submission was probably little more than formal recognition and perhaps payment of tribute.

More modern traditions often link founding houses of the Ovimbundu states to that of Ndongo, or to the Portuguese post of Pungo Andongo, which was built in and claimed authority over the heartland of Ndongo. But it is not clear whether these traditions reflected real sovereignty or simply a means of attaching origins to a prestigious ancient kingdom.

However, at some point toward the end of the sixteenth century, the area was overrun by bands of Imbangala warriors who destroyed the old kingdom of Benguela, and perhaps whatever other polities existed in the region. The Imbangala were a group of mercenary military bands, organized into companies with an intricate command structure, known for their fearsome pillaging habits. Rumors abounded of their cannibalism and their habit of killing all children born in their camps. They replaced their wartime losses and augmented their numbers by capturing and kidnapping adolescent boys and integrating them into their system, which was governed as a sort of religious cult. They were powerfully armed and feared throughout the area.

The origins of the Imbangala are uncertain. An account of the band commanded by Imbe Kalandula around 1600 said that this band descended from a

“page” of Elembe, possibly one of the lesser known Ovimbundu states, and thus raises the possibility that they originated as a renegade faction of an official army. Later traditions linked them also to the central highlands, though their modern descendants trace their origin to the Lunda region, and some historians have seen a more ancient link there.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the highlands were divided into a number of “provinces,” each of which was in turn composed of a mixture of local political rulers and Imbangala bands. Some of these leaders, such as the ruler of Wambu, or Ngola Njimbo, acted as regional lords commanding the lesser leaders, but these organizations appear to have been alliances and nominal subordinations rather than real states. In many cases an Imbangala band or a combination of an Imbangala band and a regional lord might exert control.

The political alignments of the highlands began to change in the middle of the eighteenth century, however, as more firmly constituted states replaced the provincial organizations. The newer states grew out of the provincial politics of earlier times. The new kingdom of Viye, for example, was headed by an Imbangala band that had become a political authority and subordinated a host of lesser nobles (*osomas*) to their government. A professional army, perhaps drawn from the original band, combined with local levies to make Viye powerful enough to expand and dominate its neighbors, but at the same time the overall ruler was subject to electoral control by a group of fairly independent nobles.

In Mbailundu, which grew to be the largest of the Ovimbundu states, on the other hand, it was not the Imbangala element that prevailed, but that of older noble roots, manifested in what was called the “Impunga Court,” some sort of collective decision-making body

of several noble groups. In time, however, the kings of the new state, like their counterparts in Viye, had engrossed the power of the court, developed dependent armies, and conquered outlying areas.

The rise of these states was also connected with the emergence of a more aggressive Portuguese policy in the area. Portuguese traders had assisted the rise of the new states, and bought the many people enslaved through the wars of expansion. Some had become advisors, but now the Portuguese government wished to place them under its authority through a system of controlled markets. A series of military campaigns between 1773 and 1776 had succeeded in creating an alliance between Portuguese governors and African monarchs who swore “vassalage” to the Portuguese in exchange for their military assistance, or in the wake of defeat. The ruling dynasties of both Viye and Mbailundu were established during this period, establishing a special relationship with Portugal that did not necessarily impede the sovereignty of the Ovimbundu states but did help to bring trade under the control of these states and Portugal. The following period witnessed the increasing centralization of these states and the decline of local nobilities and Imbangala elements.

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***See also:* Angola: Chokwe, Ovimbundu, Nineteenth Century; Kongo; Ndongo, Kingdom of.**

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PAICGC: *See* **Guinea-Bissau: Cabral, Amílcar, PAICG, Independence, 1961–1973.**

Pan-African Technical Organizations and Associations

There is a wide range of inter-African organizations that can be classified under a number of headings, including the all-embracing Organization of African Unity (OAU) with its many subsidiary agencies. The United Nations (UN) and its various agencies in Africa include a range of regional offices. Economic organizations such as the African Development Bank and regional groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States or the Southern African Development Community, and intercontinental organizations with their affiliates such as the Franc Zone, the Commonwealth, the Lomé Convention, or the Organization of Islamic Conference also exist. Such organizations provide technical and professional advice and assistance at a number of levels, often to the range of smaller, more specific-purpose African technical organizations and associations that are dealt with here.

There are more than 100 continental or regional African organizations working at various levels of technical cooperation. They cover the following fields: agriculture, forestry, and fisheries including such activities as locust control or crop research; aid, development, and economic cooperation ranging from mapping to drought control; river basin development organizations; arts and culture; education; finance and economic research; government and politics; labor; law; medicine and public health; the media; religion; science and technology; social sciences; trade and industry; and transport and tourism.

It is not easy to give appropriate weighting to the importance of these organizations; their performance must depend upon the quality of personnel, available cash resources, and the level of cooperation provided by member countries that, in turn, may be adversely affected by political or other problems in the region. The more successful such organizations are often those with a precise, relatively narrow objective such as locust control rather than more wide-ranging objectives such as regional economic cooperation.

A number of organizations deal with water control, whether river basins and their management or drought control. At the technical level the Inter-African Committee for Hydraulic Studies, founded in 1960 with headquarters at Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, works to bring about cooperation in water sciences such as hydrology, climatology, and urban sanitation. The Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel working in collaboration with the UN combats the chronic drought of the region and is assisted by the Club du Sahel, based in Paris, which is a forum for donor countries that was formed in 1976 following the great Sahel drought of 1973–1974. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, founded in 1986, coordinates measures in the Horn region to combat drought and desertification and its programs cover food security, desertification control, environmental protection, and water resources management. In 1996 its members decided to widen its scope so as to cover economic and regional integration and conflict resolution. Six states are members: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda.

Water and its control presents many problems on a continent where large areas are subject to drought or flooding and a number of river basins affect three or more countries. The Gambia River Basin Development Organization, formed in 1978 by Senegal and Gambia

and later joined by Guinea (1981) and Guinea-Bissau (1983), is principally concerned with the agricultural and power potential of the river. The Mano River Union, on the other hand, was conceived in terms of fostering greater economic integration between its members (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) although the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990s retarded its development. Two other river basin authorities are the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (members: Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal) and the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, whose member states are Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. There is also the Lake Chad Basin Commission, whose purpose is to regulate and control the waters of the lake for its riparian states—Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

A number of organizations deal with aspects of development training such as the Centre africain de formation et de recherche administrative pour le developpement based in Tangier, Morocco, or the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Africa at Arusha, Tanzania.

Several of these inter-African organizations date from the immediate preindependence era of the 1950s when closer cooperation and union were seen as important political weapons in the nationalist struggles for independence and some, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (formed in 1957), linked the peoples of the two continents in their search for genuine independence at that time. The Pan-African Youth Movement, with headquarters in Algiers (founded in 1962), was created to promote youth participation in socioeconomic and political development at a time when politically oriented youth movements were appearing in different parts of the continent and were closely associated with independence struggles. Other organizations, such as the Association of African Tax Administrators, the African Bar Association, and the Association for the Taxonomic Study of the Tropical African Flora have far more precise professional objectives.

Finance and economic research institutions cover monetary studies, insurance, and banking. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions–African Regional Organization, formed in 1957, has affiliates in 36 African countries, while the Pan-African Employers' Federation, founded in 1986 and based in Nairobi, exists to link African employers' organizations and represent their interests at the UN, the International Labor Organization, and the OAU.

The emphasis of many of these interregional organizations, understandably, is upon trade, industry, transportation, and common infrastructure as member countries attempt to reconcile limited resources, huge

size and distances, and small populations with their need for greater continental cooperation.

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See also: African Development Bank; Commonwealth, Africa and the; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Lomé Conventions, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism; Southern African Development Community; Trade Unions: Postcolonial.

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Peacekeeping: Postcolonial Africa

Peacekeeping in Africa began with the United Nations (UN) intervention in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 via the ONUC. This mission exemplified many of the problems that have bedeviled peacekeeping operations on the continent ever since. It was plagued by a frequently altered mandate, often driven by events on the ground; a lack of human, logistical, and financial resources; and the meddling of external actors. ONUC moved rapidly from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and finally to war fighting, and lost its impartiality in the eyes of all the Congolese factions. It was a traumatic episode for both the United Nations and Africa and for some twenty years colored their perceptions toward peacekeeping.

Released from the strictures of the Cold War, the United Nations became emboldened by the successes—of limited scope operations in Namibia (UNTAC) and the first mission to Angola (UNAVEM I). As a consequence it once again became involved in a large-scale peacekeeping operation on the African continent, this time in Somalia in 1992. Just as in the Congo thirty years earlier, Somalia embroiled the UN in the complexities of a collapsing state. This operation was afflicted by the persistent problems affecting all United Nations peacekeeping operations: lack of funding, the absence of readily available forces, and an

overdependence on the resources of the United States. Coupled with confused mandates and a breakdown in communication and confidence between the UN and the United States, this led to disaster and ultimately to an effective withdrawal of the United States from UN peacekeeping operations.

This change of U.S. policy as announced in Presidential Decision Directive 25 in May 1994, with its restrictions on the commitment of U.S. funds and resources to the UN, had immediate and disastrous consequences in Rwanda. Here the United Nations mission (UNAMIR) sent to monitor an unstable peace accord between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, ended up as spectators to possibly the worse case of genocide since 1945. The UN and the broader international community have been accused of deliberately downplaying the events in Rwanda to avoid involvement. Whatever the reasons, the impotence of the UN and its endorsement of the heavily criticized French Operation Tourquoise did much to undermine its credibility in Africa.

The debacle in Somalia and catastrophe in Rwanda (together with events in the former Yugoslavia) have led to a devolution of peacekeeping responsibilities from the global to the regional levels. This can be interpreted as a function of Africa's general international marginalization, and it has forced the states of Africa to look to their own resources and capabilities when it comes to peace support operations and conflict resolution. African states have had some experience of mounting such operations, and African troops have made important contributions to UN peacekeeping operations both on the continent and elsewhere. However, the results from those purely African operations have been mixed. In 1982, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent its Inter-African Force (IAF) into the conflict in Chad, ostensibly in support of the government of Goukoni Ouaddei. Its mandate was open to misinterpretation by all sides and it was short of all manner of resources. The OAU openly announced its determination to avoid another Congo, and those contributing countries that actually sent troops were operating to individual political agendas not always compatible with the avowed aims of the IAF. The result was that the IAF became a mere onlooker to the overthrow of the government by the forces of Hissene Habre. The OAU has not attempted anything on this scale since.

Perhaps the most "successful" African peacekeeping organ is ECOMOG, the military arm of ECOWAS. It was first constituted as a cease-fire monitoring force for deployment in the Liberian civil war in August 1990. However, a failure to obtain the consent of all the warring parties, and the perception by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia that the Nigerians, principle contributors to ECOMOG, were

in fact trying to prop up Samuel Doe's government, led to ECOMOG becoming embroiled in the conflict itself. On many occasions in the ensuing seven years ECOMOG appeared to act as just another faction in the civil war and its deployment exacerbated tensions between the Anglophone and Francophone members of ECOWAS. It was only when the latter were persuaded to use their influence on the faction leaders and contribute to ECOMOG that some sort of resolution was found to the Liberian crisis. In the meantime it had spawned a related conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone, where ECOMOG's efforts in support of the Kabbah government have met with limited success against the Revolutionary United Front rebels. In Guinea-Bissau an ECOMOG force was deployed in February 1999 to police a cease-fire between pro- and antigovernment factions and to replace Senegalese troops sent in to support the government. However, this failed to prevent a resurgence in the conflict in May 1999.

The United Nations now effectively limits itself to endorsing local peacekeeping operations such as ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords. This African initiative to resolve a conflict between the government and mutinous soldiers the Central African Republic led to the deployment of African forces with French logistical support. Its mandate was to supervise the disarming of the various factions and facilitate a political solution. It resembled the more traditional style of peacekeeping operation and has now evolved into the United Nations Mission to the Central African Republic.

The capacity of African states to mount peacekeeping operations is limited by the available resources. In terms of manpower and equipment, Africa lacks the tools for the task. Despite the efforts of organizations such as the OAU, ECOWAS, and the Southern African Development Community, the political structures necessary to support peacekeeping operations remain threadbare. Much is expected of postapartheid South Africa, but its forces are in transition and large question marks hang over their effectiveness. The future of ECOMOG is also in doubt due to domestic pressures leading to a possible reduction of Nigeria's commitments. Some external help has been forthcoming; the United States has a training program known as the African Crisis Response Initiative, and has agreed with Britain and France to coordinate their assistance to Africa. All have contributed significantly to recent African peacekeeping exercises such as Blue Hungwe (1997) in Zimbabwe and Blue Crane in South Africa (1999). Nevertheless it is safe to say that much more significant external help will be required for the foreseeable future if African peacekeeping efforts are to stand any chance of success.

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See also: **Liberia: Civil War, ECOMOG, and the Return to Civilian Rule; Rwanda: Genocide, 1994; Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution.**

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Peasant Production, Colonial: Cash Crops and Transport

During the colonial period in Africa, the most important economic activity was agriculture. Agricultural production was organized around cash crops, which were introduced by colonial regimes all over Africa not only to generate revenue to run the colonies but also to provide raw materials for industrial production in the metropolitan countries. Cash crops were produced by peasant farmers who owned small farms and who used traditional implements, such as hoes and cutlasses.

African farmers specialized in a wide variety of cash crops depending on the climatic conditions of the area. For example, cotton was important in the savanna regions of Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, the Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and northern Nigeria. Groundnuts, first planted in Senegal in about 1820 as a food crop, became its chief export during the colonial period. With the coming of the railway to Kano in 1911, groundnut production soared, and by 1920 it had become the major export of northern Nigeria.

The most important recurrent cash crops during the colonial period were palm oil, cocoa, coffee, tea, pyrethrum flowers, and rubber. Oil palm was prominent in Zaire and in the rain forest of West Africa, especially Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Cocoa was an important crop in Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya and Ethiopia, with Ghana and Nigeria being the world's top two producers during the colonial period. The coffee produced in West Africa was mostly of the robusta type, which is of lower drinking quality than other types and is primarily used for making instant coffee. Most of the coffee in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia is the arabica type and is arguably the highest quality coffee produced anywhere in the world. Kenya was also the center of a flourishing tea industry.

Smallholders in cash crop production in Africa have not only used household labor, but also migrants. In some instances, migrants have been instrumental to the expansion of particular cash crops, as evidenced by the contribution of Akwapim migrants of southern Ghana to the growth of the cocoa industry in Ghana. Migrant farmers were also responsible for the phenomenal expansion of the cocoa industry in southwestern Nigeria in the 1940s and 1950s.

Plantation agriculture has been relatively insignificant in tropical Africa. During the colonial period plantation production was limited to only rubber, sisal, and tea, and there was substantial peasant farmer production of these crops as well. In the late colonial period, smallholders were responsible for most of the expansion in tea production and a significant part of the growth of rubber production—especially in Nigeria, which emerged as the largest producer in the region in the 1960s. European farmers in Rhodesia, Kenya, Angola, and other areas of white settlement have also produced export crops such as tobacco, pyrethrum, and coffee. In some instances—notably, that of coffee—production did not differ greatly from that on plantations. From these crops, too, there was substantial expansion by African smallholders after World War II in areas such as Kenya, where previous restrictions were removed and positive encouragement provided. Production of palm oil presents a mixed picture. In the late colonial period, exports of palm oil from the former Belgian Congo, which came about equally from European plantations and outlying groves, had caught up with exports from Nigeria, where smallholder production was dominant.

Cash crop production in colonial Africa had some important characteristics. First, it was possible to expand crop production with only minimal capital investments and without any significant change in the already available technology. Second, in colonies that developed cash crops, there was a significant increase in the standard of living and in the capacity of the colonial government to generate revenue for the development of infrastructure, such as roads and railways. Third, the emphasis on cash crops led to a decline of food production and a rise of food prices. Furthermore, the production of cash crops was not costless; it had an opportunity cost in terms of other economic production or leisure time lost. Production of cash crops such as cocoa in Nigeria and Ghana involved considerable investments of time and energy.

The colonial administrations in Africa created a transport system as an integral part of the colonial economy. The establishment of a transport network is arguably one of the truly revolutionary consequences of the colonial period. The transport system served three purposes: (1) it was designed to facilitate the

movement of cash crops from the interior to the coastal ports; (2) it enhanced the capacity of the colonial governments to control the subject population; and (3) it expedited the flow of European manufactured goods into the interior at much lower prices.

The majority of the colonies strove to fund an inexpensive single-track railway from the coast to the interior. The British began railway construction in Lagos and Freetown in 1896 and Sekondi in 1898. The French began railway construction in Dakar in 1880 and in Conakry, Abidjan, and Cotonou in 1900. The majority of these railways, however, were not completed until after World War II. In French Africa, railway construction was given considerable impetus after World War II with the inauguration of the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development (FIDES). The French colonial administration had realized that some of its territories did not have the resources to finance a transport network. For example, in the case of railways, the substantial expenditure that was earmarked could not be met only out of railway budgetary allocations. In the French colonial territories, new ways of financing these projects were thus created in the FIDES.

Under the first FIDES plan, which covered the period 1947–1954, expenditure on infrastructure amounted to 55.5 per cent of the total in French West Africa and to 53.7 per cent in French Equatorial Africa. As was stated in the 1954 report of the Commission du Plan des Territoires, which introduced a revised transport policy, the economies of the various territories had benefited from improvements in the transport sector financed through the FIDES. This was especially true of port improvements (e.g., at Abidjan, Dakar, and Conakry), and of railway development, the outstanding example of which was the completion in 1954 of the single-track Mossi line between Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso.

The FIDES was principally maintained out of grants from the French government, as well as contributions from the various territories, although most of the latter were also indirectly provided by the French Treasury in the form of long-term loans at a nominal rate of interest. Nevertheless, some of the expenditure incurred under the transport development plans laid a rather heavy burden on the territories concerned, in particular the outlay on certain very costly large-scale road projects that proved to be overambitious and whose economic impact was certainly not commensurate with their cost.

In Middle Africa the colonial powers had deemed it imperative to renovate the existing transport system in order to facilitate the exploitation of the area. They opined that only by constructing railways could European goods be sold profitably in the interior of

Middle Africa. It was also necessary to transport the produce of the interior to the coast. To this end, the building of the line from Matadi to Kinshasa in Congo Free State was begun in 1889. This line linked the vast natural communication system of the Zaire River with the sea, and also incorporated the Kongo people effectively into the colonial economy. The construction of this line exerted a heavy toll on the Kongo people as the government compelled all those who could to work. In addition, large numbers of contract workers were brought in from Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

In East Africa, the British government's main concern was to have a better channel of communication with the Upper Nile. Pursuant to this the British began the Mombasa-Uganda railway in 1895. In contrast to the Congo railway, which passed through fairly thickly populated areas, the Mombasa-Uganda railway generally traversed relatively uninhabited land. Large numbers of Indian laborers were contracted to work on the railway; its completion in 1901 facilitated the development of a cotton-exporting industry in East Africa.

The Germans also embarked upon railway construction in East Africa. The first line, from Tanga to Usumbara, which began in 1893 and was completed in 1905, was only about 80 miles long. The next line, which was more elaborate, had more far-reaching consequences than the first. This second line, which began in 1905, started out in Dar es Salaam and had reached Morogoro by 1907 and Tabora by 1912, and by 1914 had reached its terminus on Lake Tanganyika. In order to get financing for these large railway projects, the colonial administration in German East Africa resorted to making people grow cash crops and pay high taxes.

Although the railways did open up the interior of Africa to European trade, they had some significant shortcomings. First, none of the railways of one colony were connected with those of any other (unless it was to link a land-locked country to a seaport) so there was no transcontinental African railway system. This inadequacy underscores the fact that European colonial powers were not interested in promoting interregional trade within Africa. Each railway was simply constructed to link the colony's port with its hinterland, and to incorporate each colony more completely into the colonial framework of the metropolitan country.

This same principle is also reflected in the attitude of the colonial governments to road construction. With the arrival of automobiles and trucks, colonial governments began to build feeder roads to connect with the railways, but not trunk roads to the seaports. New areas in the interior that did not have access to the railways

could now grow export crops that were taken by truck to the railways. For the most part, trucks were African owned, and because they were cheaper and faster, they threatened the monopoly of the railways. Consequently, the colonial governments charged high license fees.

One significant result of railway and road construction was the growth in the population of port cities such as Mombasa, Dakar, and Lagos. Large numbers of people moved to these port cities in search of education and better economic opportunities. The inability of the colonial governments to cater to the social and economic needs of the growing population of the port cities would generate social unrest and make these cities important centers of political agitation throughout the colonial period.

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See also: **Railways.**

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Peasant Production, Colonial: Food, Markets: West Africa

European colonialism in West Africa started after the abolition of the slave trade, which led to the transitory period of “legitimate” commerce as a precursor to conquest and imposition of colonial rule. The main impact of this period beside the creation of the colonies was the expansion of agricultural production and exports of vegetable oils, which were demanded in increasing quantities in Europe for processing into soap, lubricants and candles. By the 1880s Senegal was exporting an average of 29,000 tons of groundnuts a year, and Lagos in Nigeria (still a major slave port in the 1850s) an average of 37,000 tons of palm kernels.

Thus, the initial stage in the imposition of colonial rule was mainly coastal based, where most of the European (particularly British, French, German and Portuguese) trading ports were established in areas like Senegal, Gambia, Gold Coast, Lagos, and the Niger Delta. These centers became the operational basis of the different colonial frontiers and tariffs, transportation, and communication (i.e. rail, road, telegraphic, and postal) systems and set the bases for the establishment of colonial West Africa. These coastal colonial enclaves were at St. Louis, Freetown, Lagos, and Monrovia.

In West Africa the colonial governments took advantage of the long history of trading contacts with the coastal peoples in the imposition of colonial rule (and a colonial cash economy). In fact, by 1960, West Africa was practically partitioned as the colonies of France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal. What followed was the establishment of the various colonial state formations of the different European nations.

The production of cash crops, either on the farms of the small African producers or in the few plantations that existed in French West Africa, determined the role of the majority of West Africans involved in agricultural production under colonial rule. Cash crops such as palm products, groundnuts and cotton had been exported before the imposition of colonial rule, fetching very low prices. The peasants produced just enough to pay taxes and to satisfy their immediate needs for imported textiles, utensils, and foodstuffs (like sugar and flour). The only exception were the producers of cocoa and coffee, which fetched high enough prices to affect their existing socioeconomic activities.

Although the process of colonial imposition went on at different phases, it nonetheless led to the mobilization and harnessing of African producers of exportable commodities needed in Europe. Food crop production was a desultory result of neglect and increased demand, with little rise in production as a direct consequence of the growth of cash economies based on the production and export of agricultural produce. Thus, in Gambia, production of groundnuts was done at the expense of rice cultivation, so that the colony had to import rice. The same was true of Senegal (in 1911) and Guinea, when production of groundnut and rubber led to shortages of rice produced locally, resulting in the inflation of prices of domestically produced rice, which eroded the gains from the sale of the export commodities (groundnut and rubber). Similarly, in the Gold Coast in 1930, imported foodstuffs like fresh fish, rice, maize, beans, salted and fresh meat, edible oils, spices, and fresh vegetables, which could have been produced locally, cost the colony up to £200,000 (Crowder 1968, p.384). Even though Capet estimated that in French West Africa “the main foodstuffs grew by an average of about 50% between 1947 and 1954” (Hopkins 1982, p.245), this was the exception rather than the rule. Even then, the marginal growth in food production was generally insufficient to satisfy increases in demands as a result of expansion in export crop production, mining activities, and the growth of urban centers.

The emergence and growth of new administrative headquarters—which were also important commercial centers—in colonial West Africa had a great impact on the region. For example, in the case of northern

Nigeria, the various administrative centers, like native authority, provincial, regional, and national capitals or headquarters, were in most cases in railway stations (or on a railway line), motor vehicle stopping points (or linked to a nearby road), and seaports, which led the rise and growth in trade in foodstuffs to these centers of colonial urbanization.

The colonial cash economy created two types of markets in Africa. One was the market for export-import commodities under the control of the foreign firms or traders, with their local retailing agents as buying and selling representatives. The other market type was the locally grounded trading outlet, which adapted to the new opportunities and realities of colonial rule. The import-export markets were mainly for the purchase of export commodities and the sale of imported manufactured goods, controlled mainly by European firms. This trade was an addition to the age-old commodity trade for internal consumption, dominated by the selling and buying of foodstuffs (Crowder 1986, p.299).

The markets in foodstuffs, as adjuncts of the internal trade system, were organized on precolonial models that were adapted to fit the new colonial order. These involved local markets centered around large towns or settlements, as the center of a local district, division, and provincial administrative unit. There were also natural and regional market centers, which specialized in the supply of certain types of products. These were strategically located on major transportation lines (railway, roadway, and seaways), linking areas of diverse demand in the regional colonial economy of West Africa. This trade was wholly in the hands of the local traders, with the only exception being when it involved the importation of foodstuffs from overseas. A unique aspect of this local trade in foodstuffs is that it was also dominated by the commissioned agents (such as the African middlemen) of the foreign trading firms, who purchased export commodities on their behalf. In Nigeria, the old merchants among the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Kanuri, traders mainly of kolanuts, cattle, and palm oil, became also the main agents of the foreign firms in the purchase of groundnuts, gum arabic, hides, and—most likely—cocoa for export. This is in addition to a network of overland trade across the colonially imposed borders between British and French colonies.

The trade in staple foods produced and consumed locally by African producers referred to as “peasants” or “petty commodity producers” was marketed in an organized pattern predating colonial rule. The commodity for sale passed through middlemen to the local market, from where the rural population could obtain it. These local markets were also the source of supplies for various traders and agents who supplied the urban centers.

Wholesalers distributed commodities to different consumers. This marketing system was also organized as an interstate trade, particularly in commodities produced from different ecological zones. However, the general direction of the trade was along northern-southern lines. For example in Nigeria, the northern traders from the savanna took cattle, groundnut oil, and cereals to the south and from the south brought forest-belt commodities like kola nuts, fruits, and palm oil to the north.

The small-scale producers of raw materials in West Africa—indeed, most of Africa—were exploited through the imposed cash economy, in which they were paid just enough to pay their taxes, which sustained the colonial state. This was succinctly put forward by Governor Clifford’s report to the Nigerian council in 1923:

The vast majority of the indigenous population are still independent of the outside world for all their essential supplies. They can and do spin their own thread, weave their own garments, provide their own foodstuffs and even when the necessity arises, forge their own tools and make their own pottery. For them imports from Europe are still in the main, luxuries with which if needs must, they can wholly dispense; and the sole exception to this in prewar days was imported spirits, of European manufacture. (Crowder 1986, p.347)

Twenty years later, with regards to the whole of British West Africa, the Leverhulme Trust Commission reported that “all Africans are to a very large extent, and very many of them wholly outside the system of money economy which dominates the economic life of Europe and the rest of the world” (Crowder 1986, p.347). A reflection of this aspect of colonial rule was also reported in French West Africa. In Senegal, families who had been involved in the export of groundnuts to Europe for over seventy years reverted to the production of foodstuffs for their consumption in 1932. As a result millet, manioc, and taro were substituted for imported rice, home-grown tobacco replaced imported varieties, honey was gathered in place of sugar, and local soap and perfumes were produced again (Crowder 1986, p.347).

The extent of the involvement of African peasants as producers of raw materials, wage earners, and traders under colonial rule depended on factors such as the nature of colonial rule itself, the value of commodity production in quantity and quality, transportation, taxation, and the marketing system. All these variables determined the extent of their involvement and cash returns which accrued to them as the most important level of measuring social value and material relevance in the new, colonially imposed, cash economy.

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Peasant Production, Postcolonial: Markets and Subsistence

One of the most intriguing aspects of the African economic crisis in the new millennium is the apparent exit from the world market and return to localized subsistence farming in much of rural Africa. This has been the culmination of a long process of neglect, and even deliberate undermining of small-scale producers dating back to the colonial period, especially in the settler colonies. The collapse of national markets for both subsistence and export crops, however, was mainly exacerbated by the structural adjustment policies that African states implemented under pressure from multilateral agencies and foreign governments in the 1980s and 1990s. As a direct consequence of this policy of rolling back the state, ending the provision of supportive services in production and marketing, peasant commercial farming all over Africa was destroyed.

American development anthropologist James Ferguson (1999) has described the resulting state of "global disconnect and abjection" in the midst of accelerating integration among Zambian workers and peasants, but other Africans have suffered the same fate. Indeed, the process of globalization under capitalism has always been based on policies that favored capital intensive farming over more sustainable peasant production, but the reversal suffered by peasant farmers

and unskilled workers since the advent of a neoliberal agenda in world economic management since the late 1970s has been as dramatic as the increased integration and deterritorialization of economic and cultural life for the global elites, including those who mismanage Africa's economies.

Experiments with laissez-faire capitalism date back to the colonial period. Between the end of World War II and the first decade of African independence, the benevolent colonialism of a declining Europe and the developmental policies of the independent states both tried to promote peasant farming. This period of rural development, coinciding with a battle for the hearts and minds of the world's poor during the Cold War and the Green Revolution in Asia, as well as World Bank involvement in aid to peasant farmers, played a significant role in containing communism.

The 1960s was a United Nations Development Decade, and saw many African nations gain independence. The two processes were well coordinated by UN agencies, as former African colonies, marked as less developed countries, were integrated into the global market as national economies and not European dependencies. What followed was ambitious economic planning, massive infrastructure projects funded by foreign aid and rapid but short-lived growth in certain sectors of the economy, such as import substitution industries. Local funding for the industrialization and infrastructure construction came from peasant agriculture, except in mineral-rich countries like Gabon and Zambia. This exploitation of the peasantry through price controls and government buying agencies was not very popular with the farmers and was an example of the "urban bias" that some economists blamed for the African crisis.

After the 1970s oil crisis and the unmanageable debts accumulated during this period, African governments sought the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in their attempts to stabilize their declining economies. The economic liberalizations that were demanded as conditions for accessing IMF and World Bank support led to the collapse of peasant farming in most countries in the 1990s.

Peasant farmers in countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, or Kenya who still earned cash incomes from export crops (e.g., coffee or cocoa) were also affected by the collapse of commodity prices. The cash revenues from export crops are insufficient for peasant farmers to pay their children's school fees or even to buy adequate food for their families. As a result, famines have been common in those parts of rural Africa that were once prosperous from the production of tea, coffee, cotton, and other export crops. In East Africa for example, producers of the high quality

Kenyan coffee begun to uproot coffee trees and plant beans, bananas, and other food crops. The latter were for the local market and did not earn foreign exchange, but were not subject to the control of urban elites and corrupt marketing agencies.

As it was in the colonial days, the export crops such as flowers and vegetables for European supermarkets now occupy the best land owned by local and foreign companies or capitalist farmers. Supportive services previously under government departments have been privatized, and infrastructure, irrigation, extension services, and credit have been channeled in support of exports whose earnings enable such countries to service their foreign debts.

Food crops like millet, sorghum, or maize grown by peasant farmers have been steadily denied access to supportive services, with the result that peasant farmers are no longer able to produce substantial harvests for the market and merely grow enough for local consumption and trade. In part this collapse of peasant farming has been caused by unfair competition from the heavily subsidized farmers in the European Union and the United States. Transnational monopolies that produce genetically modified and patented food crop varieties have also been aggressive in taking a share of the market away from small-scale producers.

The collapse of the cashew farming industry in Tanzania and Mozambique is a striking example of World Bank intervention on the side of global business. The case of how World Bank advisors and local ruling elites destroyed the Mozambican cashew nut processing industry is a good example of what has befallen peasant farming in Africa. As a study by Joseph Hanlon has revealed, the World Bank and IMF forced Mozambique to allow the free export of unprocessed nuts if India was prepared to pay a higher price than local industry. As predicted, once the factories in Mozambique closed, the Indian price plummeted to less than half the earlier price. It might be true that there was underinvoicing on the part of corrupt traders who reported export prices well below the real price in order to put the difference in foreign bank accounts (and not paying local taxes on the difference). Nevertheless, nearly all of the cashew factories closed, and 8500 of 10,000 cashew processing workers became unemployed. Despite claims by the World Bank that this intervention would bring higher earnings, both peasants and workers have suffered. There was no world market for raw African nuts since virtually all unprocessed cashew nuts were bought by India, which has excess processing capacity. Mozambican cashew processing factories were closed, precisely because of the World Bank–imposed liberalization of the trade in cashews—a policy that, in essence, held that it was better to export the nuts to India than to process them

locally. The Mozambican and Tanzanian cashew nut producers unable to sell their nuts found themselves facing the threat of famine as a result of being pushed out of the market by unfair competition from the more politically powerful transnational elites and their lobbies.

Having become disconnected from the market, Africa's peasants, especially able-bodied young men and women, have increasingly resorted to migration as a way of escaping the grinding poverty that has gripped rural Africa. If current demographic trends continue, rural-to-urban migration and attempts to legally or illegally enter the fortress economies of Europe and America will increase because the African peasant farming sector is no longer able to provide for the basic reproduction needs of the population.

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See also: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.

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Peasantry: See South Africa: Peasantry, African.

Pedi Kingdom, and Transvaal, 1822–1879

The Pedi Kingdom emerged from the Maroteng paramountcy of Sotho-speaking peoples in the Leolu Mountains of the northeastern Transvaal in the early nineteenth century. Pedi oral tradition establishes their origins as an offshoot of earlier Kgatala ironworkers, who likely monopolized metal tools and weapons for hunting and agriculture. In the 1820s, during the upheavals of the *difaqane* (the violent period of Zulu state formation), the Maroteng survived a severe attack by the Ndwandwe, who had fled the fighting in the Zulu heartland. This event reconfigured the Maroteng

into the new Pedi polity. The Pedi founding statesman Sekwati (1824–1861) then consolidated the kingdom by amalgamating subordinated chiefdoms through careful diplomacy. Thereafter, despite suffering repeated assaults from neighboring African and white communities, the Pedi rose to great power until their conquest by British imperial forces in 1879.

The unique Pedi political economy consisted of a centralized state, agropastoralism and hunting (which later developed into raiding), and the region's earliest example of migrant labor. Sekwati forged political links with the outside colonial societies of Boer and British settlers. This facilitated the development of Pedi migrant wage labor to distant urban centers such as Port Elizabeth long before conquest or the imposition of taxation. Migrant workers' earnings were crucial for the acquisition of firearms and thus the long-term military power of the Pedi. Indeed, they enabled the Pedi to fend off an attack in 1838 from the competing Swazi kingdom to the west. Moreover, after they repelled an attack by King Mpande's Zulu in 1851, the Pedi established cordial relations with that kingdom through diplomatic overtures and a symbolic gift of skins and ostrich feathers. Pedi society, while highly stratified and dominated by the Maroteng royal house, was flexible and accommodated newcomers through marriage and conquest. The Pedi polity was not strictly a unitary kingdom, but rather a federation where cohesion was maintained through political marriages arranged between subordinate chiefs and wives from the royal family. There remained, however, tensions between the core of the Maroteng people and neighboring chiefdoms that paid allegiance to other states such as the Swazi. The social hierarchy consisted—in descending order—of the royal lineage (*bakgomana*), Pedi commoners (*balata*), incorporated foreigners (*bafaldai*), and captive slaves (*mathupya*). The paramount and royal family governed in conjunction with commoners through an advisory cabinet of leading chiefs, state councils and the *pitso*, an obligatory public meeting for all male citizens.

The arrival of Boer settlers in 1845 presented the Pedi with political and military challenges. Sekwati gave a cautious welcome to the Boer leader, A. H. Potgieter, and the three hundred families that accompanied him. The Pedi were apprehensive of these white settlers who, having left the British-dominated Cape, had recently vanquished Mzilikazi's powerful Ndebele, and commanded considerable firepower. Nevertheless, Sekwati and Potgieter concluded an ambiguous peace treaty. The Boers, on the one hand, claimed the treaty gave them full ownership and title to a large area of Pedi lands. The Pedi, on the other hand, believed the treaty only entitled the settlers to use the land as clients. The Boers then sought to enforce their claims

by demanding taxes and labor, most often in the form of *inboekselings* (captive or indentured child labor) from the Pedi. In 1847, the tenuous interdependence that Sekwati and Potgieter had achieved collapsed after a dispute over the division of spoils from a joint raiding party. Matters deteriorated further when Boers from Natal established the Volksraad Party as a rival to Potgieter. The Volksraad Boers then gained a spurious title to Pedi lands from their new allies (and Pedi foes), the Swazi. In 1852, the Boers, emboldened by their alliance, sent a commando against the Pedi settlement of Phiring. The Pedi suffered heavy losses, but survived the siege, and retreated to Thaba Mosega in the Leolu Mountains. An 1857 treaty then established the Steelpoort River as the boundary between the Pedi and Boers.

During the 1860s, despite internal upheavals, the Pedi withstood further encroachments and established themselves, for a time, as the most formidable force in the eastern Transvaal. Following Sekwati's death in 1861, his son and heir, Sekhukhune I (1862–1883), was embroiled in civil conflict over the throne with his rival brother, Mampuru. While Sekhukhune prevailed, Mampuru fled, found refuge with Pedi adversaries and harassed the kingdom. Nevertheless, in part because of their formidable arsenal of guns, the Pedi routed a powerful Swazi attack in 1869. This intimidated the Boers and facilitated peaceful relations with them. Pedi society was, moreover, influenced by the arrival of Christian missionaries of the Berlin Missionary Society (BMS). Sekwati had permitted them access to the kingdom in 1861, in the hopes of strengthening his diplomatic relations with colonial governments.

Pedi relations with white society in general, and local missionaries in particular, soured through the 1860s and 1870s. Sekhukhune was suspicious of white motives, and wary of Alexander Merensky, the local BMS missionary who pressed the paramount to change Pedi society. Merensky had, after all, converted the king's brother, Johannes Dinkwanyane, to Christianity, and encouraged many people to abandon Pedi customs and polygamy, thereby undermining Sekhukhune's authority. In 1864, Sekhukhune attacked the BMS converts, and distanced the Pedi from Merensky, who was by then perceived to be a supporter of the Boers.

The 1870s was the final decade of complete independence for the Pedi. Boer settler society, which had consolidated in the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) under President T. F. Burgers, increased pressure on the Pedi for land, taxes, and labor. A treaty recognizing Sekhukhune's authority did not specify territorial boundaries, thus leaving the Pedi open to Boer deprivations. Moreover, the ZAR perceived the Pedi as a threat because of the increased numbers of people and firearms within the kingdom. Contrary to common

arguments, however, the Pedi were not the aggressors in the ensuing war in 1876. Although the Pedi were not vanquished in this conflict, Sekhukhune sued for peace and submitted to a fine of cattle in reparations. Negotiations, however, were complicated by the British imperial factor. Under the British confederation scheme for South Africa, Sir Theophilus Shepstone was dispatched to annex the ZAR in 1877. Shepstone, fearing unfounded rumors of a Pedi alliance with the powerful Zulu kingdom, then demanded the cattle fine to be paid in full. As with the ultimatum presented to the Zulu a year later, Shepstone's demand was impossible for Sekhukhune to fulfill, and thus calculated to precipitate conflict. British imperial forces under Sir Garnet Wolseley's command invaded in October of 1878 and finally conquered the kingdom by September of 1879. The British then broke up the Pedi and relocated them to two distant reserves, thus ending the independent kingdom.

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See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War.

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Peul: See Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Cattle Pastoralism, Migration, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Fulbe/Fulani/Peul: Origins.

Permanent Settlement, Early

The archaeologist Gordon Childe suggested that humankind went through a series of evolutionary stages in its sociocultural development. A committed Marxist, Childe saw human social development in terms of revolutionary events; his “Neolithic Revolution,” he argued, saw the emergence of agricultural and settled societies, and the beginnings of class/wealth differentiation. It is now recognized that developed agriculture was not a prerequisite for permanent sedentism; ethnographically, historically, and archaeologically there are many examples of settled communities whose occupants maintained hunting-, gathering-, and fishing-based economies (Hayden 1990).

The benefits of sedentism rather than cyclic mobility are clear; living a settled life permitted the accumulation of personal goods and the large-scale storage of foodstuffs; but sedentism would have been possible only with access to a dependable and predictable resource base and, in arid climates, the availability of water. In settling down, one radically reduces one's economic options, and the potential risk of social stress is increased; when this happens, it becomes attractive to resume a mobile, economically specialized way of life. Transhumant pastoralism can be a response to such crises (Mace 1993); flexibility, and a sliding scale of socioeconomic options, would be the key to survival.

The Nile Valley plays an important role in the emergence of sedentism in African Holocene prehistory; there is no archaeological evidence of sedentism prior to the beginning of the Holocene in Africa (see, e.g., the late Pleistocene site of Wadi Kubbanayah, near Aswan). During periods of extreme aridity, as are witnessed throughout the Holocene, this zone, with its dependable water supply and fertile alluvial land, would have been an attractive refuge for desert-dwelling peoples. During the middle Holocene, the Nile valley became home to an extensive population concentration, and the earliest archaeological signs of permanent settlement in Africa are to be observed in and around the river margins.

The earliest occupation at the site of Merimde Beni Salama in the Nile Delta, dating from around

8000BCE, has yielded evidence of a small, semi-sedentary community of broad-spectrum hunting-gathering-fishing peoples who lived in oval huts that contained hearths and pottery water jars sunk into the ground. The uppermost strata at this site, dating from around 4300BCE, show an increase in settlement size; now huts were built from mud brick strengthened with straw and plastered, roofs were probably thatched with reeds or rushes, and the huts were arranged in rows. The presence of large grain storage bins indicates a new socioeconomic emphasis, and it is estimated that this village supported a population of some 1300–2000 people (Hassan 1988).

Southward, in the Fayyum Depression, we have evidence of a rather more ephemeral occupation centered around a shrinking lake from around the seventh millennium BCE. The earliest “Fayyum B” occupations were essentially seasonal hunter-gatherer camps, but by the time of the “Fayyum A” occupations, during the sixth to fifth millennia BCE, the economic emphasis shifted more toward the exploitation of plant resources. Large grain storage silos are present, but it is clear that the inhabitants of these sites still exploited a wide range of resources. There is no evidence for permanent structures associated with these sites, but it is possible that the dwellings were ephemeral—rather like tents—and were built from perishable materials (Wenke, Long, and Buck 1988). The largest Fayyum site, Kom, dating from around 4700BCE, yielded evidence of hearths, granary pits and (probably) ephemeral structures. It has been noted, however, that the full annual complement of economic resources is present at this site, and it is possible that it served as a permanent refuge for children and the elderly, while the remainder of the population switched between seasonal, smaller camps. It has been suggested that the Fayyum developments represent something of a “halfway house” between mobile and fully settled societies (Hassan 1988).

Moving southward along the Nile and into the Western Desert, the sites of Bir Kiseiba and Nabta Playa—dating from around 7000BCE—exhibit signs of incipient social complexity. These desert margin sites seem to have been continuously occupied, and have yielded evidence of small, planned dwellings, large storage pits arranged in arcs, and large stone wells that would have been needed for watering cattle. Debate rages about the status of the faunal remains here; it remains a contentious question as to whether domesticated elements are present. At the least, it may be possible that the storage facilities represent some form of social control, and it has been variously estimated that these sites were home to 14 “family units” (Wendorf, Schild, and Close 1984, pp.425).

The desert zones should not be thought of as a wasteland in terms of human settlement; during wetter

periods these areas furnished a range of economic resources. Outlying *Steinplätze* (stone place) encampments were probably satellite functionally specialist sites of the villages; the rock shelter of Ti-n-Torha, Libya, was probably home to a small population of herders at around 7000BCE, and the site of Dakhleh Oasis has yielded evidence of small, circular huts. It is certainly clear that during the eighth millennium BCE the desert zones were much wetter than today, were probably crossed by numbers of dependable watercourses, and were home to sedentary groups of hunting-gathering-fishing peoples. The most striking evidence for these communities is witnessed in the southern reaches of the Nile Valley around Khartoum, Sudan.

During the 1940s, archaeological research in Khartoum uncovered evidence of a culture with a highly distinctive ceramic technology. The peoples who inhabited this settlement clearly relied extensively on fishing (a large number of net weights and bone harpoons were recovered), but also hunted game and gathered wild grasses from around the fringes of the desert margin. With an eye toward the European intellectual archaeological tradition, the excavator Anthony Arkell (1949) proposed the term *Khartoum Mesolithic* for this culture. Here was a settled community with pottery and storage technology (from c.7000BCE), yet without evidence of agriculture. Further work has indicated that seasonal, semipermanent specialist settlements were also of great importance at this time; some were specialist hunting stations, while others were dedicated fishing stations. The wide distribution of the distinctive “wavy line” pottery form and bone harpoon points in contemporary settlements across the Sahara (even as far west as Niger) led John Sutton (1977) to propose a hypothetical “Aqualithic” culture sphere, a notion no longer accepted by archaeologists.

It is certainly true that hunter/gatherer/fisher settlements were a feature of northern Africa during the wet, warm early Holocene period. In northern Kenya, for instance, settlements with similar ceramics and bone harpoon points have been found around the shores of Lake Turkana (e.g., Lowasera, Lothagam), and it is clear that these settlements supported quite a number of inhabitants (Stewart 1989). It is clear that it was the economic wealth of the lake margin environments, with a variety of ecozones available for exploitation, which permitted a largely settled lifestyle without the need for a dependable (and work-intensive) agricultural base.

Further archaeological research by Arkell in the Khartoum area uncovered evidence of a later settlement, with a different ceramic tradition, but with a developed agricultural resource base. Again, following on from the European archaeological tradition, Arkell named

the culture the *Khartoum Neolithic* (Arkell 1953). Khartoum Neolithic sites, which span the period of 5000–3000BCE, were characterized by extensive reliance on stock keeping and the emergence of a degree of social complexity, although it is clear that many outlying settlements continued to serve discrete, specialist economic roles. In broadly contemporary contexts in eastern Sudan (the Atbara region), the site of El Damer has yielded evidence of houses and burials, and large quantities of pottery; again the economy was based primarily on aquatic resource exploitation, and the use of pottery allowed for storage of foodstuffs (Haaland 1997).

Away from the main Nile Valley axis and the Western Desert, evidence for early settlement is sparse. In eastern Africa, apart from the lake-margin communities discussed above, major permanent settlements are not a feature until at least the early Iron Age, for thousands of years mobile pastoralism remained the preeminent economic strategy. Toward the south of the continent, mobile hunter-gatherer economies predominated until at least the first millennium CE. Of late, however, new data has emerged from the Sahel and tropical rain forest zones of West Africa that bear comparison with the northeastern African picture.

Coastal shell midden sites from the Mauretania Atlantic coast, dating from the sixth millennium BCE, bear witness to an intensive scale of aquatic resource exploitation, and it is probable that some form of permanent settlement was associated with these sites. Inland, although the archaeological data is sparse, it is clear that essentially a transhumant pastoralist strategy emerged during the third millennium BCE in response to increasing aridity in the Sahara. The settlement sites of the Tichitt Lake Plain and the Agadez basin (Mauritania) were clearly sited with access to water in mind. Cattle pens and granaries were associated with these sites (dating from around 1500BCE), and some evidence of socioideological development, going hand in hand with the process of “settling down,” is witnessed by discrete tumuli cemetery groups and cattle burial (McIntosh and McIntosh 1988). Southward, into the tropical rain forests of Ghana, the Kintampo culture, dating from around 2000BCE, represents evidence of an early sedentary society. The Kintampo sites, which are recognizable by assemblages of clay “cigars,” ground-stone axes, and decorative items (evidence for an associated “luxury” economy), include Ntereso, with its rectangular houses and post holes; Boyasi, with its granite house foundations; and Mumute, with its large, developed water cisterns.

It is clear from the overview presented above that the earliest sedentary communities in Africa were centered along the Nile Valley axis, and to some extent in the marginal desert zones during wet periods in the

middle Holocene. Although these data may be indicative of patterns of archaeological fieldwork over the last 50 years, it is clear that the proximity of water was a clear prerequisite for permanent settlement, and a dependable economic resource base with storage systems (including pottery) was an absolute necessity. It is also important to note that the earliest settlements were not agricultural per se, but were homes to broad-spectrum hunter-gatherer-fisher peoples who maintained a degree of economic flexibility and continued to maximize their options by using the complete range of their ecozonal resources. This is why we see central, permanent settlements and outlying functionally specialized satellite seasonal sites. From a social aspect, the settling-down process saw the emergence of more structured social roles and enhanced ideological outlooks, probably linked to the development of rigidly defined gender roles (Haaland 1997). It is clear, at least in the Nile Valley, that the successful earliest village economies of the area formed, for all intents and purposes, the basis of the civilization that came later.

NIALL FINNERAN

See also: Iron Age and Neolithic: West Africa; Stone Age (Later); Urbanization and Site Hierarchy: West Africa: Savannah and Sahel.

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Phelps-Stokes Commissions

The Phelps-Stokes Fund was established in 1911 by a bequest of Miss Caroline Phelps Stokes, a New York

philanthropist. The fund was set up principally for the education of blacks in Africa and in the United States. Dr. Anson Phillips Stokes, one of the trustees of the fund, chaired its educational committee, while Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones served as the educational director of the fund. The latter had formerly served on the U.S. Bureau of Education in Washington, D.C., where he was involved in the production of two volumes on the education of blacks in 1917. He later served at the Hampton Institute, dubbed "the most successful institute for Negro education in the world," as director of its research institute.

Through the activities of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the education of American blacks came to be used as a blueprint for the education of blacks in Africa. In this regard, the educational experiments undertaken at the black institutions of Hampton and Tuskegee served as an example of an "appropriate" education for colonial Africans. The Southern industrial and agricultural institutions of Hampton and Tuskegee were originally set up as a compromise to the Southern labor problem following the emancipation of slaves. Industrial education became the cornerstone of the education system that was offered to the freed slaves, which aimed at prevention of racial conflict. The rural educational applications of the American black South were extended within America by such educational agencies as the General Education Board, the Jeanes and Slater Funds, and the United States Department of Agriculture. They were extended to the African soil primarily by the Phelps-Stokes Education Fund. Thus, the Phelps-Stokes education commissions were influenced by the education principles that Samuel Chapman Armstrong had developed at Hampton, and those of Booker T. Washington and Principal Mouton at Tuskegee.

The membership of the Phelps-Stokes Education Commissions attested to the cooperation of colonial governments and missionary societies in America and Europe. Members included Dr. Henry Stanley Hollenbeck, who had served as a missionary in Angola, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Wilkie of the Church of Scotland Mission in Calabar, Nigeria, and Leo Ray, an accountant and specialist in industrial education. Ray had also supervised the technical training of "Negro" soldiers during World War I, and now served as the first commission's secretary. Dr. C. T. Loram, chairman of the South African Native Affairs Commission, and former chief inspector of native education in Natal, was included in the second commission. Hanns Vischer, secretary and member of the newly formed Advisory Committee on Education in Tropical Africa at the colonial office in London, and Mrs. Vischer also served in the second commission.

Only two of the members of the first commission also served in the second. These were Dr. Thomas

Jesse Jones and Dr. James Emmanuel Kwegyr Aggrey, the latter of the famed Achimota College in Gold Coast (Ghana). Dr. Aggrey's inclusion had been suggested by Dr. Paul Monroe, a professor at Columbia University and member of the board of trustees of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. "The Great Aggrey," an individual of outstanding ability, had just completed a professional teaching qualification. He went on to exert significant influence on the activities of the Education Commissions, and left an indelible mark on subsequent developments in African education.

The first of the two Phelps-Stokes Education Commissions carried out its activities in western, southern and equatorial Africa from July 15, 1920 to September 10, 1921, and in particular visited Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Cameroon, Belgian Congo, Angola, South Africa, and the British territories. The second, instituted at the suggestion of colonial governments, concentrated its efforts in eastern, central, and southern Africa from January 5, 1924 to June 19, 1924, traveling to Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Rhodesia, South Africa, and the trust territories. The goal of the education commissions was to ascertain the necessary requirements for improvement of the education of blacks in Africa.

The commissions invoked the Jeanes idea, which was based on the view that Africans were a mainly rurally oriented and agriculturally based people; it was named after Anna T. Jeanes, who had donated money to pay for the teachers of rural schools. Jeanes education went beyond the basics of formal teaching, and sought to facilitate an overall change in the socioeconomic makeup of African communities. It sought to do this by encouraging the emphasis of the African environment in the teaching of skills and trades as well as by promotion of the African way of life; African institutions, customs, stories, and songs; and the use of drills and games as a teaching method.

The most far-reaching of the commissions' recommendations were centered on the teaching of industrial education and agriculture as the core basis of colonial African education. Hence, less emphasis was placed on the "literary" or "bookish" education of Africans, as it was considered to be irrelevant to their needs. It was also seen to be alienating Africans from their predominantly rural lifestyle. Instead, institutions that promoted manual work and taught "practical" subjects were upheld as a good illustration of appropriate African education. The education philosophy espoused by the commissions sought to promote African traditions and aimed to foster African appreciation of these. Appropriate education of women was considered to be paramount to the adoption of a holistic and rurally oriented education system. It was on the basis of this that domestic

science in its widest sense was envisaged as an appropriate education for women. Women's education was to include hygiene and sanitation, the care of infant life, simple remedies for common ailments, and the nursing of the sick. Concerns about health and the spread of disease, advances in medicine (and, notably, the discovery of new vaccines) influenced the inclusion of hygiene in the curriculum.

In both formal and informal ways, African education was to reflect more closely the needs of a mainly rural populace. In this regard, much emphasis was placed on the importance of the village school. Teacher training was to form an integral part of this holistic view of African education, and in this regard mobile schools were started using both the teachers and extension workers to bring the school closer to the community. In eastern and central Africa for example, model Jeanes settlements or model villages were set up that served as examples to the rest of the community; in Zimbabwe, home visits by social workers, nurses, and family welfare educators were a part of the plan.

The commissions made valuable observations regarding the status and future prospects of the Western education of Africans—in particular, mission education, the education of women and girls, and the role of agriculture and indigenous skills training. The activities of the commissions culminated in the publication of two reports. The first, published in 1922, was titled *Education in Africa: A Study of West, South and Equatorial Africa by the African Education Commission, under the Auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and Foreign Mission Societies of North America and Europe*. The second report, entitled *Education in East Africa*, was published in 1925.

LILY MAFELA

See also: **Education.**

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Phiri Clan: See **Maravi: Phiri Clan, Lundu and Undi Dynasties.**

Plaatje, Sol T. (1875–1932)

South African Nationalist

A dominant figure among modern African political and cultural leaders in South Africa, and a talented linguist and writer, Sol Plaatje was instrumental in the founding of the African National Congress, serving as its first general secretary. He did much to publicize the grievances of Africans in South Africa.

Sol Plaatje was born on the farm Doornfontein, located in the Boshof district of the Orange Free State, then an independent Boer Republic, on October 9, 1876. His parents, Johannes and Martha Plaatje, were both Barolong, connected to RoloNg royalty and to the Lutheran Berlin Missionary Society (BMS) station at Pniel. Following the breakup of his family, Plaatje was educated and confirmed at Pniel by Reverend and Mrs. Ernst Westphal of the BMS. As a young man, he studied and learned eight languages, both European and African, as well as music and English literature.

Plaatje moved to Kimberley in 1894, where he first worked for the postal service and associated with other educated Africans. He voted in the Cape election of 1898 and became a clerk-interpreter in the magistrate's court at Mafeking, the headquarters of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Plaatje lived in Mafeking during the town's 217-day siege in the Boer War in 1899 and 1900, and produced the only known diary of an African during the war, in which he criticized Colonel Baden Powell's treatment of Barolong and other Africans under his control.

Early in the new century, Plaatje became the founder and editor of a series of African-language newspapers in the northern Cape Colony: *Koranta es Becoana*, launched in Mafeking in 1901 as the first Setswana-English weekly; and later, in Kimberley, *Tsala ea Becoana* (1910) and *Tsala ea Batho* (1912). In these newspapers Plaatje defended Africans against the inequities of colonial rule, urged policies of unity and reform by governments in South Africa, and promoted cultural life and literature among his Setswana readers.

During the formation of the Union of South Africa by Dutch-Afrikaans and English-speaking whites in 1908–1909, and in its early years after 1910, Plaatje opposed discrimination against black Africans and encouraged their unity across ethnic lines. He played a crucial role in the 1912 formation of a new African political movement, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which became the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. Plaatje assumed a key leadership role within the SANNC, as its first general secretary. In this capacity he served on deputations formed to protest the Natives Land Bill of 1913 and its mandatory restrictions on African land ownership,

appearing before the authorities in Pretoria and London. Plaatje remained in Britain from 1914 to 1917, composing works that ranged from his *Native Life in South Africa* (1916)—a lengthy analysis of racial conditions in his homeland that appealed to the British public to eliminate South Africa's land segregation, which he blamed for the destruction of the African peasantry—to his *Sechuana Reader* (1916), a collection of Tswana proverbs.

Plaatje returned home at a time when social and economic unrest had spread to African workers. He and other SANNC leaders opposed the industrial strikes of 1918 as a form of political protest. During the worldwide influenza epidemic, Plaatje contracted a serious heart condition. Nonetheless, he led a new SANNC deputation to London seeking the extension of voting rights to educated Africans. Plaatje made public speeches and conferred with officials. During his interview with Lloyd George on November 21, 1919 Plaatje requested property and voting rights, reminding the prime minister of the loyalty shown by the union's Africans to the empire during World War I. Lloyd George promised only to meet with his fellow prime minister, Jan Smuts, who rejected Plaatje's proposals.

After a delay, Plaatje journeyed to North America, touring Canada and the United States from 1920 to 1922. There he received treatment for his heart condition and spoke to large audiences in New York City and Detroit. He befriended W. E. B. DuBois, and toured other cities and the South, where he met Booker T. Washington's successor at Tuskegee. He left America, having created bonds between his movement and those of African Americans, especially the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Back in South Africa, Plaatje grew disillusioned by numerous failed attempts to redress African grievances and by continued ethnic divisiveness among the union's African population. Fearing enactment of a more restrictive color bar by the pact alliance of the Labour and National Parties, Plaatje worked unsuccessfully for Smuts's reelection in 1924. The election of the government of J. B. M. Hertzog by white voters, and its subsequent Native Bills, did not encourage him. While protesting these new segregationist proposals, Plaatje urged his followers to adopt a program of moral regeneration.

During the final decade of his life, Plaatje increasingly withdrew from political concerns and devoted himself to cultural and literary activities. He gathered the proverbs and folklore of his fellow Batswana, developed a phonetic orthography for their language, translated four of William Shakespeare's plays into it, and worked on a new Setswana dictionary. In 1930, he published a historical novel, *Mhudi*. The first of its

kind by an African writer in southern Africa, it depicted the era of the *difaqane* and the Great Trek from the standpoint of the Sotho-Tswana population on the High Veld and included strong female characters.

Despite his weakening heart, Plaatje continued to work hard in his final months, touring as far north as the Belgian Congo in 1931, where he was warmly received. Plaatje was stricken with influenza in Johannesburg in May 1932 and died of it the following month. No violent revolutionary, Plaatje sought to expand the old Cape liberalism as a vehicle for African advancement. As a highly cultured and accomplished individual, Plaatje sought to lead by example, including his interethnic marriage and espousal of the British democratic principles and the rule of law. The ANC of his era was highly reflective of his philosophy.

LOUIS W. TRUSCHEL

Biography

Born in the Orange Free State in 1876 and educated by German missionaries. He worked as a postal employee in Kimberley and court interpreter in Mafeking, including its lengthy siege during the Boer War. As a journalist, Plaatje opposed racial and ethnic segregation in South Africa. Playing a major role in the formation and early leadership of the African National Congress, he appealed to the British to improve political conditions for Africans in South Africa in deputations to London in 1914, and again in 1919. He established contacts with black leaders in the United States in the early 1920s. His literary career involved his creation of a new orthography for Setswana and production of the first African historical novel in South Africa, *Mhudi* (1930). Disillusioned with his limited political successes, he died of influenza near Johannesburg in 1932.

See also: **Dube, John Langalibalele; Jabavu, John Tengo; South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910; South Africa: Segregation, Political Economy of.**

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Plague: See Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Plague.

Plantations and Labor, Colonial

Plantations created more than a century ago by Europeans continue to dominate the current affairs of those African territories in which they were established. The term *plantation* has been invoked to describe agricultural units of varying size; both small cocoa plots belonging to African peasants and large landed areas worked by slaves in nineteenth century Sokoto have been categorized as plantations. Plantations in Africa produced for the export market, and the combination between management and labor was heavily influenced by racial considerations.

Generally, plantations were created in areas with significant white settler populations, although plantations did flourish in colonies without a settler element. Kenya and Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) are examples of the former, while Cameroon epitomizes those territories with a vibrant plantation culture in the absence of a large European population. In places like Zimbabwe and Kenya, corporate plantations existed alongside large-scale farms owned by individual settlers, while the plantations in Cameroon were in 1947 formed into a quasi-government entity, the Cameroons Development Corporation.

Plantations were often created through a combination of administrative, tax, and land instruments that provided generous allowances and conditions for plantations, typified by the “White Highlands policy” in Kenya. Thus, for example, land commissions were set up in Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe with the aim of creating “native reserves,” but these worked largely to reserve the best lands for white-owned plantations. The work of these land commissions was accompanied by laws such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 in Zimbabwe, which formalized the allotment of the best lands to plantations. In the early 1900s the Unilever Corporation was given enormous concessions in the Congo with respect to leasehold and freehold rights over almost one million hectares, but the Firestone Rubber plantations in Liberia were probably the most (in)famous in Africa. At the beginning of the twentieth century, nine million acres had been taken over in Zimbabwe, and by the start of World War II plantations covered more than 800 square miles in southwest Cameroon. In between these dates, plantations were built up in German East Africa (particularly in Tanganyika) and Portuguese Mozambique, while Unilever also acquired plantations in Nigeria and Gabon. Creation of plantations raised the question of labor supply, especially as Europeans were unwilling to provide manual labor.

Plantations are associated with “modernizing” or “developing” the areas in which they were established, though political considerations also played a key role in the concept. Plantations were the most significant avenue for promoting European colonialism and Western capitalism in Africa. They were sources of raw materials for European industry; avenues through which European currencies could be introduced; practical schools for instructing Africans in European agricultural and technical methods; and instruments for forging a wage-labor market in colonial Africa. In many respects, the link between plantations and African labor was the most critical.

Plantations were created by expropriating African lands, and native Africans became workers on these plantations—sometimes on the same lands they formerly occupied and cultivated. Plantation agriculture in Africa was characterized by the extensive use of cheap, often unskilled, labor that was obtained by various methods, with some element of compulsion central to all. Initially, it was military force that compelled Africans to work on plantations, but colonial governments included recruitment of labor for European enterprises among the duties of African chiefs. The need to pay taxes in cash to colonial regimes and the desire to purchase European imports forced Africans to work on plantations.

Plantations required a cheap, regular, and docile workforce. Cheap labor took several forms and became inseparable from exploitation and the abuse of labor. Plantation enterprises were loath to pay decent wages; consequently, both money and real wages were low. Similarly, laborers put in very long hours in a day’s work. Further, feeding and housing laborers formed part of the contractual arrangements between laborer and plantation, but the quantity and quality of the food supplied were poor and the standard of housing was poor.

Colonial control facilitated labor’s exploitation and conditions resembled slavery. Plantation labor involved the migration of large numbers of male workers. The indigenous population of the plantation zones was unwilling or unable to meet the needs of the plantations for large amounts of labor due to the demographic and socioeconomic features of these precolonial African societies. Populations were small, and planter interests resorted to importing labor from within and without the plantation colonies. Generally, women had been responsible for agricultural production in precolonial societies, but their labor services were not heavily demanded by the plantations; nonetheless, women found employment doing light duties on tea estates.

The period 1890–1945 marked the zenith of exploitation of African labor, and conditions during the

economically depressed 1930s and World War II were particularly harsh. However, there were attempts at reform affecting the plantations. Labor departments were set up by colonial regimes and trade unions emerged in response to increased labor agitation between 1930 and 1945. The demands of Africans for economic and political change often targeted the plantations, yet there was no consistency in African politics in plantation areas. There emerged in Cameroon a conservative political movement based on the Cameroons Development Corporation Workers Union, while in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe more radical forms of nationalism developed in which land reform was central.

RICHARD A. GOODRIDGE

See also: **Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Colonial Period: Land, Tax, Administration.**

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Pokot: *See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Southern Nilotes: Kalenjin, Dadog, Pokot.*

Policing, Colonial

Before World War I, pioneer colonial administrators received paltry amounts of funds, which made policing the young colonial states difficult. This slowed colonial occupation, since expanding and maintaining colonial influence required substantial policing, which was not affordable. In Nyasaland, Harry H. Johnston was sent to found a colonial administration with his own salary and £10,000 a year. With this, he could just barely afford an armed force of 70 Indian soldiers under two British officers. When Captain Lugard set up a colony in Northern Nigeria, he had little over £100,000 for a territory of approximately ten million people. His police force consisted a regiment of a West African frontier force consisting of 2000 to 3000 African soldiers under about 120 European officers. Forces of this size always had to be used with the greatest caution. One serious defeat, or even a successful ambush, could have wiped out the entire police force of most early colonial governments.

When the colonial government adopted a policy to recover the costs of occupation through taxation, the necessity for efficient policing became evident. Open revolt from the natives necessitated reinforcements of the established small groups of forces. In nearly every territory of every colonial power, only a serious military crisis brought forth reinforcements and forced up grants-in-aid to a level that permitted some rough policing of the whole territory. By 1900 for instance, Nyasaland's £10,000 grant-in-aid had risen to £100,000 and Uganda's from £50,000 to £400,000. The policing situation in most colonial territories showed a comparable development five to ten years after the start of colonial rule.

By 1914, metropolitan grants-in-aid to colonial establishments were virtually extinguished. The result was that a great burden was placed on colonial officers, and policing the colonial state became an administrative nightmare. For instance, because he could not provide the capital outlay represented by the period of grants in aid in more conventional colonies, King Leopold employed an ill-controlled and barbarous native soldiery to levy arbitrary amounts of tribute for the benefit of the state and the concessionaire companies in which it held interests. This was a doomed undertaking and his personal rule in the Congo sank to such appalling depths of misadministration that he was forced to surrender his private empire to the Belgian government in 1908.

Throughout tropical Africa, the termination of grants-in-aid more or less coincided with the bringing of all but the most remote of the peripheral areas under civil administration. With the opening up of the hinterland to trade through expanded communications, the “pacification” through military patrols in the early colonial states was rolled back to the areas that had not been opened up for trade.

In the early stages of colonial history, every occupying power inevitably made both friends and enemies, depending on whether the local communities felt advantaged or humiliated by the colonial occupation. Consequently, before any occupying power could train a local police force, it needed native allies and was prepared to accord substantial privileges to those who would play this part. Policing thus became an important factor in gaining and executing the sense of gain and loss in the minds of the natives in relation to the fortunes of colonial expansion.

The first one-third of the colonial period throughout tropical Africa was a period when colonial powers were concerned first and foremost to making their own territories self supporting, with policing options being conditioned by shifting economic foci of the early colonial stations.

Policing options in the colonial states changed in the years preceding World War I. Colonies throughout

Sub-Saharan Africa began to assume the forms they would retain until the eve of independence. Since the period of emancipative nationalism had not began, and the period of resistance by traditional communities was over, police and military garrisons consisting almost entirely of African troops under European officers were adequate to deal with any small emergencies.

Between World War I and World War II the idea that the colonial powers had an obligation to go beyond policing, institute just governments, and carry the colonial peoples forward economically and politically had currency. This policy was more aggressively pursued after World War II, creating great changes in the social and political structures of the colonies—changes that ushered in the period of nationalism and lay the groundwork for the road to independence.

In North Africa, two currents of virtually no significance elsewhere in the continent determined the course of events. The first was the direct political and military conflicts between European states, and the second was the growth of Arab nationalism. The British protectorate in Egypt had become a nominally independent monarchy, though British troops remained in occupation to guard the Suez Canal, much to the displeasure of Egyptian nationalist party, the Wafd. The British troops were withdrawn under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 to a narrow zone on either side of the Suez Canal. Egypt was also to become a vital base for the British troops in their campaigns of 1940–1943. In 1943 Britain used its troops to impose and maintain a Wafd government. But internal disintegrations and corruption of the Wafd saw a group of young army officers inspired by colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser institute a military government. Nasser continued working with the British until 1957, when the British and French used the Israeli invasion of Egypt as a reason to send in troops to police the Suez area. International opinion briefly forced out the British and French, making Nasser a hero of the anticolonialist movement throughout Africa and Asia.

In Algeria, France's biggest interest in North Africa, a force of close to half a million troops was employed to counter Algerian resistance. By 1958 it was clear that the military occupation had failed to keep down the Algerian revolt; a cease-fire was negotiated in 1962, and the right to self-determination was granted.

MICHAEL WAINAINA

See also: *Algeria: War of Independence, 1954–1962; Egypt: Nasser: Foreign Policy: Suez Canal Crisis to Six Day War, 1952–1970; Johnston, Harry H.; Nigeria: Lugard, Administration and "Indirect Rule"; Stanley, Leopold II, "Scramble."*

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Polisario and the Western Sahara

In 1884, Spain occupied Rio de Oro and Vila Cisneros, proclaiming a Spanish protectorate over the Western Sahara coast. In 1900, a Franco-Spanish agreement settled the frontier between the Spanish Sahara and French-occupied Mauritania. In 1956, when it gained its independence from France, Morocco at once laid claim to all the Spanish possessions in northwest Africa, as well as Mauritania. The following year, "irregular" Moroccan forces raided the most heavily populated areas of the Spanish Sahara. Both France and Spain intervened militarily to put down these Moroccan incursions.

Mauritania became independent in 1960, and in 1964 and again in 1966 informed the United Nations Special Committee that it wanted to take part in direct talks with Spain over the future of Western Sahara. In 1965, however, the people of Rio de Oro (the southern part of the Spanish Sahara) pledged loyalty to King Hassan of Morocco, while at the United Nations Morocco expressed the hope that its claim to the Spanish Sahara would be settled peacefully. In December 1967 the UN called upon Spain to hold a referendum on the future of Spanish Sahara. A UN resolution of 1973 called on Spain to grant independence to the Spanish Sahara; the resolution also recognized that both Morocco and Mauritania had "claims" to the territory.

Spain established a tripartite administration for the territory with Morocco and Mauritania, and announced that it would cease to administer the Spanish Sahara on February 28, 1976. Several nationalist



The Western Sahara conflict. Training camp of Polisario near Rabouni, Algeria, 2001. © Sebastian Bolesch/Das Fotoarchiv.

groups had emerged by that point, each seeking an end to Spanish rule, leading Spain to declare a state of emergency in the territory in 1972. The most significant of these groups was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). Algeria decided to arm and support Polisario, mainly on the grounds that it did not wish to see the emergence of an enlarged and more powerful Morocco. In 1975 King Hassan of Morocco launched the peaceful Green March of 350,000 Moroccans across the border into the Spanish Sahara to emphasize his country's claim. The marchers, however, were halted by Spanish troops at El Aaiun.

On February 27 1976, the day before Spain was to withdraw, Polisario proclaimed the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and turned to Algeria for support. Spain now handed over "rights" in its former colony to Morocco and Mauritania and withdrew from the territory, leaving a situation ripe for conflict. The war that followed was to be popular in Morocco and came at a time when Hassan's popularity at home was on the wane. It would almost cripple Mauritania, which was far too poor to sustain a long military campaign. After suffering an initial defeat by Moroccan forces at Angala in January 1976 (before the Spanish had departed) Polisario turned to guerrilla tactics. It also made the tactical decision to concentrate its war efforts upon its weaker opponent, Mauritania, first. It was able to inflict such damage upon the Mauritanian military and economy that in July 1978 a coup was mounted against President Ould Daddah. After his fall, the Mauritanian government withdrew from the conflict and gave up its claims to the Spanish Sahara. Morocco at once moved its forces to occupy the whole territory, and the war became a struggle between the Moroccan army and the Polisario guerrillas.

By 1980 the Polisario had 10,000 troops, with half engaged in guerrilla warfare and half in camps in Algeria at any one time. Its primary tactic was to mount hit-and-run attacks upon centers of population. By 1982 Morocco controlled the main centers of population, as well as the huge phosphate mines at Bou Craa; it then embarked upon the construction of defensive sand walls, which were designed to deny Polisario access to the populated regions of Western Sahara. By 1984 these extended over 600 kilometers to the Mauritanian border.

The war continued throughout the 1980s, with both sides using increasingly sophisticated weapons. Various efforts by the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to find a formula for peace came to nothing. In 1988 Morocco and Polisario did accept a UN plan for a cease-fire and referendum, but this broke down in 1989 and the war was resumed. Other UN efforts were aborted, mainly because of Morocco's

insistence that the referendum should include Moroccans that had been settled in Western Sahara since 1976, as opposed to only those who had been living there at the time of independence. (In 1975 there had been a population of only 75,000, and by the mid-1980s about 10,000 of these had been killed).

During the 1990s the territory was in a state of uncertain peace marked by outbreaks of war. Morocco insisted upon its claim, while the United Nations and Polisario demanded that the referendum be held. In 1990 Algeria, which wanted to forge a good relationship with Morocco, began to withdraw support from Polisario. In 1993 Morocco included its "Saharan Provinces" in its general elections and the UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, postponed the referendum until 1994; it was then again pushed back to 1995. Further delays and fighting occurred throughout 1995; the referendum was again deferred and the secretary general of Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz, said that Polisario would continue the struggle, whatever the result of the referendum.

Morocco's principal strategy was to stall on the referendum while entrenching its power in Western Sahara; the longer it managed to do this, the more it reduced the effectiveness of Polisario. In 1996, the UN again extended the mandate of MINURSO (the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) while setting no new date for the referendum. Voter registration remained blocked. The UN secretary general declared that the differences between the two sides were irreconcilable. Meanwhile, MINURSO reduced its military and police components in the territory. Morocco continued its delaying tactics and persuaded ten states in the OAU to withdraw their earlier recognition of Polisario by offering them financial assistance.

The referendum was again set, this time for December 1998, after Morocco had agreed to accept lower figures for voters eligible to take part and for the number of troops it could place in the disputed territory. Yet at the same time the Moroccan prime minister, Abellatif Filali, claimed that the referendum would merely reaffirm Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which, he said, would always be an integral part of the Moroccan kingdom. At the end of the year the referendum was once more deferred, this time until mid-1999; from then until the present, the situation has remained essentially unchanged, with the UN unable to schedule a referendum on Western Sahara's status, as the two sides continue to disagree on who is eligible to take part in such a vote.

GUY ARNOLD

See also: **Morocco: International Relations since Independence.**

Political Elites and Patronage: Postcolonial Africa

Patron-client relations undoubtedly remain at the heart of all postcolonial African political systems, whatever the nature and the official ideology of the regimes concerned. In a former dictatorship like Zaire, where Mobutu's clique was acknowledged to have largely cut itself off from the rest of the population, empirical studies show that redistributive clientelistic networks reached relatively low down the social strata. In contemporary Zambia, or Benin—two countries generally considered as relative success stories of political transition—it is evident that a particularist relationship among high-ranking officials, myriads of middlemen, and the population matter much more politically than universalistic, institutionalized regulations. Under civilian as well as military regimes, it appears obvious that accumulation of wealth and patronage remain crucial for any ambitious politician.

Several aspects must be distinguished when one studies patron-client networks in postcolonial Africa. It is essential to understand that the ties between the privileged and their dependents are of a particularistic nature. They also involve exchanges (admittedly unequal) and not just pure domination or exploitation. Furthermore, they durably tend to strengthen vertical cleavages and solidarities, meanwhile preventing the emergence of class antagonisms and favoring factional struggles. Finally, they are decisively informal, constantly renegotiable, and therefore largely inimical to the development of genuinely institutionalized patterns of relationships.

Particularist Loyalties

In Sub-Saharan Africa, prestige and influence are intimately linked to the number of clients one claims to have. Pressure from modern political competition compels political leaders to continuously widen their support base. They endeavor to constitute themselves as "big men," controlling as many networks as they can. Patrons' legitimacy derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. Political elites try to establish principles of reciprocity, based on the model of kin and family relations, but these loyalties are much less solid and depend almost entirely on the extent to which the clientelistic networks are properly resourced. In the absence of an institutionally autonomous and relatively impartial state, affording protection to the country's "citizens" (whatever their origins and social position), it is imperative for ordinary people to maintain links with those who have power by playing on ties of clientelism. This long-lasting trend prevents the development of more neutral and impersonally organized relationships

associating individuals directly with the state, and where everyone would be treated according to the same standards. On the contrary it maintains deeply particularistic ties which are much more evanescent, uncertain and open to instrumentalization.

Asymmetrical Reciprocity

Although there are strong inequalities within clientelistic relations, patrons suffer considerable constraints. In fact, the maintenance of their status is entirely dependent on their capacity to meet the expectations of their dependents, who in turn must satisfy their own clients. The acuteness of apparent inequalities is reduced by the need to be seen as a redistributor on a scale appropriate to one's standing. When rooted in clientelistic ties, social relations are inevitably based on personalized bonds of mutually beneficial reciprocity. The demands of such networks may frequently force patrons to act against their own immediate economic self-interests in order to meet the obligations on which their social rank and political authority depend. That is why, despite the undeniably large gap between elites and the populace, leaders are never wholly dissociated from their supporters. They remain directly bound to their supporters through a myriad of clientelistic networks staffed by dependent brokers. A powerful figure will see his authority all the more reinforced as his reference group identifies with him and he incarnates all its hopes. One would be wrong to consider that this type of relationship amounts to a simple manipulation, for the evidence shows that it partakes much more profoundly of a sort of common heritage, within the framework of complex networks which are interwoven from the top to the bottom. The exercise of power rests firmly on commonly recognized terms. Even if patron-client relations remain unequally biased in their favor, patrons can easily suffer "the blackmail of the ruled"—that is, the obligation of personalized and vertical redistribution to which they must submit in order to anchor their position across the different social strata which provide support.

Vertical Cleavages

If relations between leaders and followers, rulers and ruled, are to be understood in terms of asymmetrical reciprocity, then solidarities, mobilization, political linkages tend to be more vertical than horizontal. This is not a denial that African sociopolitical systems are far from egalitarian but simply emphasizes that most political actors are simultaneously dominant and dominated, one of the links in the many chains of dependence. Often torn by internal disputes, faction leaders are forced to cultivate relationships with those below them in order to gain support in their power

struggle with one another. This argument thus casts serious doubts on the validity of those interpretations which conceive of African societies from an excessively dichotomized angle, emphasizing divisions between “high” and “low” politics, elites and masses, ruling classes and populace. Taking advantage of power is not necessarily inadmissible but it is still necessary to live up to the expectations of one’s supporters in a satisfactory way as regards redistribution. Political leaders enjoy relative legitimacy only in accordance with the credit granted by the populations. For those at the very bottom of the social system, the material prosperity of their betters is not itself reprehensible so long as they too can benefit materially from their association with a patron linking them to the elites. Even if it had achieved the economic means of its hegemonic ambitions, any elite that became a ruling “class,” thus cutting itself from the rest of society, would rapidly lose prestige, influence and, thereby, legitimacy. Within the existing African political culture, patrons generally have closer links with their clients than with rival leaders. At the opposite end of the social scale, ordinary people will always relate more directly with their local Big Man than with their economic peers elsewhere in the country.

Informal Transactions

South of the Sahara, the nature of the relations between the rulers and the ruled is determined by practices that have little to do with the formal structures of power. It is crucial to understand that the foundations of political accountability are both collective and extrainstitutional: they rest on the informal links between “big men” and their respective networks. This may be considered as nefarious to the macrodevelopment of African countries since it makes political and economic activities quite unpredictable. There are, however, good reasons as to why it is not likely to disappear. Indeed, a system of such profound uncertainty and opaqueness, which depends on subtle and constantly fluctuating ties of loyalty, provides ample opportunity for the instrumental use of properly cultivated social relations. African states would undoubtedly benefit from more regulated relations, but the main political and economic elites are able to use the absence of transparency as a most valuable resource. Such is the efficacy of the existing system that it has survived unscathed all generational and social change—adapting as it goes along to the demands of modernity.

Despite the current political “democratic transitions” on the continent, it is far from clear that this complexion of political transactions has been modified. For instance, voting is indelibly linked to the anticipation

of the direct particularist benefit that elections offer. Contrary to teleological presuppositions, political life in postcolonial Africa remains essentially a question of infranational identity representation. The debate is hardly tied to choices of society that would be presented through competing formations to enlightened “citizens.” Elites, intermediaries, and common inhabitants first of all perceive themselves according to ethnoregional reading grids, or factional ones in the event of needing to enter into coalitions. There is no reliable evidence that this type of particularistic leadership, based as it is on clientelistic transactions, is waning on the continent, although it might be markedly weakened by the scarcity of resources from which the elites are currently suffering. On the contrary, it could be argued that the present economic crisis in Africa reinforces, rather than undermines, the logic of vertical and personalized patronage.

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Political Identity

The colonization of Africa by the major European powers in the late nineteenth century was caused by many factors—political, economic, and nationalistic. Colonial hegemony brought on by colonization was partly constructed on the idea of race difference; the assumption was that blacks were inferior and needed new tools and ideas to uplift themselves. The advent of anthropology helped to provide many middle- and upper-class Victorians with scientific justification for believing that they had a divine duty to “civilize” Africans. The idea of race was made respectable by reports of missionaries and gentlemen explorers

and travelers of the nineteenth century. Once colonial rule was established, class and race became inseparable.

Race constituted a group identity that had certain predetermined advantages. Nowhere was this manifest more than in the settler colonies of South Africa, Algeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Wages, residential locations, as well as access to education and health care facilities were determined by one's race. While the foundation for a segregated South African society was laid in the decades before and immediately after the dawn of the twentieth century, it was the victory of the Nationalist Party in the 1948 election that led to the adoption of apartheid—racial segregation—as the official government policy. As a result, the South African apartheid regime classified all the people in South Africa into the following “racial” categories: Caucasian, Asian, Colored, and Black. Each race had its own place in the society. The significant point to note here is the way the apartheid regime defined and constructed the idea of race for the purpose of control of the majority by the minority. Furthermore, it is also instructive that the regime created a distinctively capitalist nation whose economy was based officially on racial oppression and exploitation. In Algeria the victorious French armies imposed French civic codes on the Muslim society. In British colonial Kenya, the Devonshire Declaration of 1923 upheld the view that Kenya was primarily an African country, but the British had the authority to hold and govern the country in trust for the Africans. This view was the cornerstone of the principle of British Trusteeship mandate by which it justified its governance of the country until Africans would be “guided” to independence. In all these cases Africans were dispossessed and considered in the new milieu to be inferior to Europeans. Colonialism was a system that buttressed race, thereby exerting pressure on all Europeans in the colonies to maintain a pretense of race preeminence and class snobbery so as not lose face in front of the Africans.

Besides race, ethnicity was another critical group identity in the colonial plan and scheme of governance. Ethnicity represents a sense of collective identity that rests on claims of common descent, shared attributes such as language and cultural traditions, territoriality, and political organization. In the context of most African societies ethnicity was not unchanging identity. Before the onset of colonialism ethnic groups in Africa were involved in fruitful mingling and migration. In the process ethnic identity went through constant redefinition, as some communities split and were either absorbed by the dominant groups or simply moved away into new terrain to assume new identity. What is important in the history of evolution and

development of most ethnic groups in Africa is not how they are, but how they came to be. Most communities operated on the notion that their continuity and long-term survival depended less on its purity or single origin than on its ability to accommodate and assimilate diverse elements. Ethnicity, then, may represent one of the most accessible and easiest levels of discourse on the complex issue of identity in both colonial and postcolonial Africa, but it is not the most accurate, nor is it explanatory.

With the onset of colonialism and the institutionalization of the colonial state, African societies were forced to exist within defined boundaries and borders of the artificial construct of nation-state. The construction of the borders of the African colonial state was so arbitrary that some communities, clans, and even lineages were torn apart and placed under different nation-states. In the same vein, many and varied societies, with little in common, were lumped together, given new names, and depicted as ethnic groups. Ethnicity in the colonial system became relational markers of differences between groups. It served the colonial state as its premier instrument of divide and rule. Ethnicity was used to emphasize differences in culture, economy, and politics among the various communities. Terms that were hitherto merely expressive of ethnic identity became transformed into stereotypical prisms of ethnic differences. Indeed, the colonial state nurtured and promoted ethnic schism by privileging myths in which some communities were adulated as superior and enlightened, while others were dismissed as indolent and inferior. This sowed the seeds of rivalry, hatred, and destruction that flowered in the postcolonial period. In essence, the colonial state nurtured ethnic and racial parochialism for the purpose of maintaining order by emphasizing difference. Individual identities were sacrificed at the altar of group identities, race and ethnicity.

African elites have confronted the variables of race and ethnicity in many different ways, both in the colonial and postcolonial periods. While colonial powers promoted Western education and developed health care facilities, these developments occurred against the backdrop of African political marginalization and cultural disinheritance. Some of the Africans who had acquired Western education attacked racist ideas and presented significant historical evidence on the consequences of African civilization and contributions to human progress. In the French colonies this critique of colonialism and race coalesced into the Negritude movement. Spearheaded by Leopold Senghor of Senegal, the movement emphasized pride in African culture, but not the dismantling of the colonial system.

However, in some cases, particularly after World War II, the critique of preferential treatment based on

race led to the formation of nationalist movements, which challenged and sought to change the status quo. The African elite found out that the colonial pecking order prevented them from assuming certain positions in the colonial public service, denied them access to state resources, and confined them to eternal subjugation. Since racism endowed the settler with class/race cohesion, the African elite mobilized the masses in their determination to dismantle colonialism. In essence, the African elite viewed colonial oppression and exploitation as situations reinforced by race difference. Africans were united by their common desire to attain independence. In the course of struggle for independence ethnicity was temporarily suppressed, and they rose above ethnic parochialism in the determination to present a united and formidable front against the colonial state. The attainment of independence and dismantling of colonial rule signaled the end of race as a dominant factor in the domestic politics of postcolonial African countries. The paradox, though, is that no sooner had the independence been won than ethnicity resurfaced as a destructive force in African politics. The end of colonial rule unleashed forces of cultural, ethnic, economic and national intolerance with untold suffering to the citizenry. The critical issue in postcolonial Africa has been the persistence of ethnicity as a potent force in national politics.

The African elite inherited the colonial state structures intact. The institutions of governance had been anything but democratic. Furthermore, few political parties were developed on the basis of interests that transcended ethnic interests. The African elite and leadership focused more on using the inherited state apparatus and structures to accumulate wealth and reward their cronies and less on democratizing the political institutions for better governance. As a result, the elite perpetuated the colonial state's authoritarianism, as well as an agenda of divide and rule by using ethnicity to rally members of their ethnic groups in support of self-centered narrow political and economic interests. Thus, ethnicity in the postcolonial period has been used within the wider political field as an instrument in the exercise of power and accumulation of wealth, as well as a mechanism for rallying members of an ethnic group to support their elite in their struggles on the national stage.

In the wake of weak economies and fragile institutions, the competition for access to state resources has intensified ethnic tensions leading to military coups, political instability, and incessant civil wars. Ethnicity has become the crushing burden that most postcolonial African states have to contend with. This is not to imply that ethnic conflicts were nonexistent in Africa before European colonization. Nothing could be further from the truth. The contention is that the intensity

of ethnic conflicts that have characterized most African countries in the postcolonial period have been destructive and severe in the extreme. Also, the unbridled competition for access to state resources within the boundaries of the nation-state is a unique phenomenon that can be partly attributed to colonialism, since the boundaries of the nation-state are fixed. Power struggle and competition for resources usually takes place within the defined boundaries of the nation-state. When rivalry gets out of control the stability of the state is compromised. And in cases where members of an ethnic group have been split and live in two or three adjacent nation-states, the turmoil spills over to those countries as well. Furthermore, when the state collapses or its institutions are mobilized by the elite and directed against members of a rival group the consequence is usually catastrophic in terms of human lives lost and the number of people who are displaced from their homes. Indeed, Africa has the largest number of refugees. The situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa best exemplifies the intricacies of the legacy of colonialism, ethnicity, power struggle, competition for resources, and international economic interests in postcolonial Africa.

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See also: **Ethnicity; Martial Races, Political Élites and Patronage: Postcolonial Africa.**

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Political Parties and One-Party States

One of the most important political acts undertaken by the first generation of postcolonial African leaders was the establishment of single-party political systems to

replace the hastily constructed, ill-suited, and largely untested multiparty political systems bequeathed by the departing colonial powers. These single-party systems ranged from Chama Cha Mapinduzi, a mass mobilizing party created by Julius Nyerere, the former socialist leader of Tanzania, to the Workers Party of Ethiopia, a vanguard party created by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the former Marxist leader of Ethiopia, and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the sole ruling party of capitalist-oriented Kenya that was created by former President Jomo Kenyatta, and strengthened by his successor, Daniel arap Moi. Regardless of their political ideology, nearly all African leaders exhibited authoritarian tendencies that inevitably resulted in the creation of single-party political systems.

African leaders offered numerous rationales to justify the establishment of political monopolies over their respective political systems. The first justification was that single-party systems were reflective of traditional African political systems as they existed prior to the imposition of direct colonial rule. According to this argument, explains J. Gus Liebenow, the single-party system was not to be perceived as a “temporary aberration” from a universal norm of multiparty democracy, but rather as a “modern adaptation of traditional African political behavior” (1986). Unlike the divisive nature of Western multiparty systems in which one party emerges dominant and the others are marginalized, the concept of single-party democracy was heralded as conducive to promoting the traditional African norm of seeking consensus in which every participant has the right to voice his or her opinion—though women were normally excluded from decision-making during the precolonial era—and decisions are made only when agreed upon by all present.

A second rationale for creating single-party systems was the imperative of responding to existing and potential crises. African leaders argued against “wasting” scarce resources on competitive politics when their countries were confronted with crises of development (How can we quickly develop our society?), crises of administration (How do we quickly educate the required leaders?), and, most important, crises of governance (How do we quickly satisfy rising popular demands for the fruits of independence?). Just as unity was crucial to the attainment of independence, as those who led the nationalist struggles during the 1950s argued, so too was unity important once that independence had been achieved. Equally important, African leaders feared that multiparty systems would foster the fragmentation of ethnically diverse African societies, and therefore perceived the single-party system as one of the most important tools for transforming colonially inspired, artificial states into true nations.

A third rationale, especially offered by African leaders from the Marxist tradition, underscored the vanguard role that single parties were expected to play. Drawing upon the Leninist concept that the “masses” of individual African societies needed to be led by an “enlightened elite,” the single party was envisioned as serving to protect and promote Marxist revolutions on the African continent. The single party was particularly oriented toward the future evolution of African societies, especially in terms of ensuring industrial development and the promotion of basic human needs such as guaranteed access to adequate food, shelter, and health care.

The nearly 30-year experiment with single-party rule achieved few positive results. Even in the most benevolent of examples, such as Nyerere’s *ujamaa* experiment in Tanzania, the country made significant strides in promoting mass literacy and the provision of basic human needs only at the expense of a failed overall economy that witnessed an annual average decline of 7 per cent in agricultural output. One of the primary reasons for this failure was that the initially voluntary villagization program, the centerpiece of the *ujamaa* ideology in which peasants were grouped together in new communal villages, ultimately became coercive in nature. Many peasants were forced to move from their traditional lands to village projects that were either poorly conceived or simply inappropriate for farming practices. If the state inevitably became coercive and therefore counterproductive to the goal of development in the most benevolent of single-party systems, one has only to imagine its impact on the development of the most authoritarian single-party systems such as the Marxist-inspired tyranny created in Mengistu’s Ethiopia.

The most notable problem associated with the single-party experiment was that it led to a stagnation of ideas. For example, although Kenyan legislative candidates were allowed to run against each other under the unified banner of KANU, they were not permitted to question either the capitalist domestic ideology or the foreign policy of the Kenyatta regime. Candidates could debate the instrumental aspects of carrying out party-approved policies, but were unable to offer alternatives to misguided policies. In this and other cases, African leaders who felt they “knew best” restricted the range of political debate to such a degree that the single party ultimately became a means for maintaining control rather than a dynamic tool for promoting change and development.

The downfall of single-party communist systems throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s sent shock waves throughout single-party political establishments of the African continent. The rejection of single-party rule in

its intellectual heartland ensured that African leaders could no longer justify the continuation of this model on the African continent. "If the owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system," proclaimed Frederick Chiluba, the leader of the Zambian prodemocracy movement and future president of Zambia, "who are the Africans to continue with it?" Equally important, authoritarian leaders could no longer use Cold War rhetoric as the means for ensuring superpower attention and therefore the financial and military support necessary to prevent opposition movements from taking power; the former Soviet Union had ceased to exist and a new Russian regime preoccupied with domestic economic restructuring had largely withdrawn from African politics, while the United States and its Western allies were increasingly prone to link African support for democratization and economic liberalization to future commitments of foreign assistance and preferential trade agreements.

The emergence of a Western consensus in favor of promoting democratic principles coincided with the rise of increasingly vocal and powerful African prodemocracy movements. Popular protests and demands for political reform often emerged due to the intensification of government-sponsored political repression and human rights abuses throughout the 1980s. This trend peaked in 1991 when a total of 86 popular protests were recorded in 30 African countries. Protestors were emboldened by the adoption of continent-wide human rights norms confirmed by the ratification of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights by the majority of African countries at the beginning of the 1990s. Protesters were also driven by the severe deterioration of African economies that made it increasingly difficult for individual families already perilously close to abject poverty to acquire basic foodstuffs and other necessities of day-to-day living.

The convergence of these domestic and international trends resulted in renewed scholarly interest in the emergence and consolidation of multiparty democracy in Africa. Reminiscent of the optimism expressed by modernization theorists during the 1950s and the 1960s, the liberal democratic tradition at the end of the 1980s was reinvigorated by the emergence of prodemocracy movements that fostered dozens of experiments in multiparty democracy throughout the African continent. An initial euphoria surrounded what some scholars optimistically referred to as the rebirth of political freedom throughout Africa, making transitions to multiparty democracy the most studied topic among Africanists within the field of political science during the 1990s.

The best example of this scholarly trend is Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle's *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective* (1997), which offers the first comprehensive analysis of all democratic transitions which took place

between 1989 and 1994. According to their study, truly competitive multiparty elections during the five-year period (1985–1989) preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall were held in only five African countries: Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. From 1990 to 1994, more than 38 countries held competitive multiparty elections. Most important, 29 of the multiparty contests of the 1990–1994 era constituted founding elections in which "the office of the head of government is openly contested following a period during which multiparty political competition was denied." South Africa's founding election of April 26–29, 1994, serves as one of the most heralded examples of African democratic transition. For the first time, voters of all races cast ballots in free and fair elections that ushered in South Africa's first multiracial, multiethnic, and multiparty democracy.

However, numerous scholars nonetheless remain wary of the long-term impact of multiparty politics and the literal explosion of opposition parties throughout the African continent. In the extreme, scholars are particularly critical of the role of foreign powers in promoting multiparty democracy as a form of neocolonialism that is contributing to the recolonization of the African continent. According to Claude Ake (1996), for example, the adoption of multiparty political systems in many cases has fostered what he refers to as the "democratization of disempowerment"—a process whereby multiparty elections allow for the rotation of self-interested elites of different parties while the vast majority of the population remains disempowered from the political system. As Ake argues, the critical aspect of true democracy is not multiparty elections but the assurance of "popular" (mass) participation within African political systems. It is precisely for this reason that the multiparty experiments of the 1990s and beyond will serve as the cornerstone of debates over the viability of democracy in Africa.

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See also: **Banda, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu; Nkrumah, Kwame; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), One-Party Politics; Zambia: Second Republic, 1973–1991.**

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Political Systems

Any attempt to study African political systems confronts three problems: historical scope, comparability, and generalization. Is it possible to study politics from the precolonial period to the contemporary? How does one compare systems across such wide expanses and such diverse historical periods? On what basis can one generalize from the incomplete knowledge we have of the various parts of the continent? One way forward is to approach the question from a clear conceptual perspective.

Africa has often been regarded as “traditional” or “timeless,” a world where nothing changes. Yet all political systems are dynamic, even when they appear to evolve very little; they need to respond to environmental and other historical challenges or crises (disease, invasion, migration, slave trading, etc.). It is thus quite pointless to seek here a description of a notional “single” African political system, one that would encompass the range of historical experience of the continent since the beginning of time.

Finally, how is it possible to generalize about such a huge continent, the north of which is often more commonly associated with the Middle East, the west with slave trading, the east with the Indian Ocean, and the south with white settlement? The short answer is that the only profitable way of discussing such diverse regions is to focus squarely on how arrangements of power contrast with those found elsewhere. Hence, this essay attempts to account for African political systems in firmly comparative terms. Politics in Africa is in no way unique—even if today it appears to be historically singular—and it can readily be related analytically to that of Europe or Asia.

This article is in two parts. The first gives a brief overview of some key moments in the history of the continent, among which migration, European expansion, slave trading, colonial conquest, and decolonization loom large. The second is an attempt to show how a properly grounded historical knowledge of African political systems helps us to understand what is happening today on the continent.

Overview

Underlying the evolution of the continent as a whole is the question of demography. Until the colonial

“revolution,” which significantly lowered the death rate, population growth in Africa had been very slow. Thus, for most of their history, the peoples of the continent have sought to adjust their ways of living in order to match a relatively limited population with the large availability of space. Socioeconomic and political developments were thus predicated on the politics of survival rather than growth. The simplest response to a crisis was to move elsewhere, to occupy land as yet not settled by others. It has been argued that Africa’s slender population density made possible a way of life in which technical and scientific innovation was largely superfluous. Although this argument can easily become a caricature of an unchanging or “timeless” Africa, there is no doubt that local conditions led to the widespread system of small and relatively self-contained political communities for the greater part of the continent’s history.

Up to the fifteenth century, when the Portuguese “discovered” the continent, Africa’s political evolution was primarily affected by the movement of people. Such migrations had two main effects: the first was that culture, technique, and tools were shared over time; the second was that migrants, even where they asserted political dominance, were eventually assimilated into those people they encountered. Africa was thus not a land of splintered and discrete entities, but one in which the migration of people constantly affected existing social and political cultures and where modes of cultivation or husbandry were influenced by such exchanges.

The most important of these movements was the systematic drive by Bantu people toward the west and south of Africa, colonizing land, creating new communities, and adapting to their environment wherever they settled. Despite the pronounced differences of languages and cultures to be found in Africa today, there is thus much shared “common” history. This has obviously had a bearing on the sociopolitical systems that developed before colonial rule.

A second significant factor in the continent’s history was the expansion of Islam from the Middle East and North Africa, also toward the west and south of the continent. The spread of this religion had distinct societal effects, of which literacy and changes in political structures figure prominently. Islam brought with it not just a belief system, but a way of life tied to commerce and a certain notion of social order. It was also able to accommodate existing sociocultural traditions, thus rooting itself quite effectively among the peoples who adopted the faith. There was thus a distinct Islamic sociopolitical environment to be found in large swathes of western, eastern, and central Africa.

Equally, it is useful to understand that Africa was, with the exception of a few groups like the Pygmies and Khoisan, a continent of continually shifting

regional and sometimes long-distance commerce. Until the Sahara became a desert, and even afterward, trade between North Africa and the Middle East with the rest of the continent was significant. Exchange with Asia, as far afield as China, had also been recorded long before the Europeans landed on the continent's shores. Africa was, in this respect, well connected to other parts of the world.

Contact with the Europeans, initiated by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, added a new dimension to Africa's evolution but did not result in a wholesale "revolution," as is sometimes alleged. Other than in the few areas (the islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé, a number of coastal towns, or the Zambezi colonies) where the Europeans (or, more likely, their mixed-blood offspring) settled, the main effect of their presence was to divert commerce and influence economic activity. Undoubtedly, the most serious changes were wrought by the (infamous) Atlantic slave trade. Although domestic slavery existed long before that period, the demands from the New World resulted in a pattern of trade from western and central Africa wholly or partly dominated by slaving during at least three centuries.

The impact of the slave trade on African political systems was complex, but three main points should be stressed. First, commerce in human beings became economically profitable for a large number of the continent's societies. Some raided their enemies to obtain slaves, others exchanged them for diverse products, and still others delivered them to the coast. Given the value embodied in slaves and the duration of the Atlantic (and the later Indian Ocean) trade, commerce in that single commodity made many rich. Those who controlled the trade, inevitably the chiefs or kings, had a ready supply of wealth with which they consolidated their power and extended their reach. Conversely, those who suffered slavery (either through raid, defeat or poverty) belonged to societies prone to economic weakness and disintegration.

Second, while it is impossible to minimize the horrors of such slave trade, it is important to stress that its effects on the continent were not as all-consuming as has sometimes been argued. Estimates suggest that around 10 to 13 million Africans were transported between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such numbers undoubtedly had a serious impact on those African societies that supplied most of the slaves. However, given a pattern of economic activity in which production was geared to assert power rather than promote growth, it is unclear how much long-term damage the trade inflicted. Furthermore, it is wrong to assume that the slave trade displaced all other commercial activity. Africans continued throughout the period to exchange goods (from salt to ivory or gold) with the

rest of the world. Thus, the abolition of the slave trade had a differentiated impact on the various societies involved in it. Some undoubtedly collapsed from the lack of revenue, but others adapted readily by expanding the trade of other goods.

Third, the scale of the slave trade undoubtedly led to an increase in the level of sociopolitical disruption endured by Africans on the continent. Not only was there an incentive to obtain slaves during several centuries, thus prompting raiding and warring, but there was strong competition to control their supply to the coast. The demands of the trade brought about violence and cruelty on a scale greater than had hitherto been known. Furthermore, when the trade declined and was finally abolished, there was inevitably an increase in the number of slaves available to African rulers. This resulted in an expansion of the use of slavery for domestic production, thus affecting the ways in which the economy of some societies would develop in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the colonial powers were committed to the abolition of slavery, the colonial "peace" turned out to be problematic for some political systems in place.

Partly because of the impact of the abolition of the slave trade, but also for a host of internal factors, the nineteenth century proved a particularly chaotic period for many African societies. The transition to what the Europeans called "legitimate" commerce had differentiated effects on the continent, although the search for profitably tradable goods such as ivory put a premium on force and violence. The greater use of firearms only compounded the problem. A large section of East Africa suffered from the aftereffects of the *mfecane* (the aggressive northward migration of Ngoni peoples from Southern Africa), based as it was on military might and oppressive force. As a consequence ancient kingdoms from southern Mozambique to the Great Lakes regions either suffered or engaged in aggressive military action.

As trade from the Indian Ocean increased steadily throughout the century, distinct communities reacted differently. The kingdom of Bunyoro, for example, was perhaps the chief example of a centralized political structure that maximized its opportunities from trade and conflict. Buganda, by contrast, was unable to resist the force of such commercial and military intrusion and disintegrated in the nineteenth century. Whatever the case, the movement of population and developing commerce provided challenges that some could meet and others could not. While the development of mining, for instance, would benefit a number of Africans in the long term, reliance on the trade of slaves or ivory ended abruptly as the "Scramble" for Africa gathered momentum.

In West Africa, the most important event probably was the wave of jihads that swept the northern part of

the region in the first part of the nineteenth century. Of these, the 1804 jihad led by Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817) was undoubtedly the most consequential, as it united Hausaland into the Sokoto Caliphate and provided a highly sophisticated and efficient political structure for the region which was congenial to economic development. The Western savannah also experienced other, less successful, jihads but the long-term consequence of these movements was to turn the greater part of West Africa (with the exception of the coastal areas) into comparatively modern, centralized states well able to negotiate on a level of equality with the European “explorers” who arrived in greater numbers as the century progressed.

In southern Africa the disruptive influence of the Boers’ trek northward and the Ngoni’s aggression on their neighbors provided opportunities for local modernizing chiefs to transform their fledgling political community into viable kingdoms. The Tswana, Swazi, and Sotho peoples came to be aggregated into greater political entities due in large measure to the political acumen of some of their leaders. Moshoeshoe, originally one of many minor Sotho chiefs, eventually brought together a large proportion of his nation and, through a combination of shrewd diplomacy and enlightened politics, created and defended the kingdom of Lesotho. His use of missionaries both as legitimating European influence and as intermediaries with the outside world eventually ensured that his realm came under British protection and thus escaped Boer conquest.

There were obviously wide variations in the manner in which nineteenth century African societies met the acute internal and external challenges that faced them. Broadly, however, it can be argued that political trends during that period were toward centralization and modernization. True, many areas of central and southern Africa suffered grievously either from the consequences of violence (in what is today the Congo and Angola region) or disease (particularly virulent in eastern Africa). But it would be wrong to portray the nineteenth century, as often it was done during the colonial period, as a time of universal savagery and dereliction. In every part of the continent there were successful and thriving societies that had successfully managed the transition from slave trading and adapted to the new demands of the increasingly present world economy.

It is customary to distinguish nineteenth-century Africa as being politically composed of state and stateless peoples—that is, to make a distinction between those societies in which patterns of authority were centralized and structured and those that were diffuse and informal. Although this contrast can easily become reductive, it does have explanatory merit as there was

indeed a clear difference between these two types of political communities. In Nigeria, for example, there could be no greater contrast than between the Sokoto Caliphate and the Igbo peoples of the coastal areas. The one was in every respect a highly developed state structure, complete with bureaucracy and armed forces, presiding over the destiny of a large population and controlling a vast economy. The others were small-scale village based communities, where politics remained tied to kinship and where the power of the local chief, *primus inter pares*, was sanctioned by a council of elders, reflecting as it did the primacy of older adults over the young.

Clear as this distinction is in terms of patterns of authority, it would be wrong to deduce from it that economic dynamism and innovation was the preserve of the former while the latter were stagnant, autarkic, and “traditional” political communities. The reality was indeed far from this cliché so favored by the Europeans, who loved the pomp and pageantry of the West African emirates. Indeed, in many instances it was the stateless peoples who proved most deft at adapting to the developing trade with European traders and most resilient in the face of the increasingly hostile imperial challenge. This should come as no surprise given their active involvement in procuring and trading slaves in the three previous centuries. Moreover, these communities had long been involved in regional, and even long distance, commerce much before their northern neighbors had consolidated into powerful Islamic states. Finally, it was precisely these societies that proved to be the most difficult to “pacify” after the onslaught of colonial conquest.

Thus, contrary to colonial myth, African societies in the nineteenth century were evolving quickly. It was the suddenness, arbitrariness, and violence of the “Scramble” that introduced into the political equation a number of new and unpredictable variables to which, ultimately, most of these communities could find no satisfactory answer. Indeed, the European will to conquer could scarcely have been anticipated by Africans based on their previous experience. Nor could it have been achieved without the introduction of modern weapons, of which the Maxim gun was the key.

The colonial conquest of the continent had three important consequences for the evolution of African political systems. First, it created boundaries around given territories regardless of existing historical and sociopolitical realities. At a stroke it cut across or reordered precolonial political structures. Second, it established a colonial state, the main attributes of which were that it was coercive, bureaucratic, and unaccountable to the people over whom it presumed to rule. Third, it facilitated the development of an imperial economy in which the colonies were simultaneously open to the world

capitalist system and beholden to the economic requirements of the metropolis.

***African Political Systems,
Historical and Contemporary***

Understanding politics in contemporary Africa demands that we identify the nature of the changes—but also, and crucially, the continuities—between the pre- and postcolonial periods. It has long been argued that the colonization of the continent resulted in the wholesale destruction of precolonial African political structures and the restructuring of power around the norms and practices of the bureaucratic colonial political order. What we now know of the history of postcolonial Africa suggests that such an interpretation was quite simply erroneous. It is not just that the political practices to be observed in contemporary Africa belie the simplistic view that independence made possible the Westernization of political systems; it is also that the assessment of the true impact of colonial rule was misjudged.

The colonial powers had neither the ambition nor the means to establish in Africa working models of their own political institutions. Nor, paradoxically, were they as zealous as they proclaimed to be in eradicating precolonial political structures. In simple terms, the imperial rulers administered their colonies as cheaply and effectively as they could. Although different colonial powers had distinct political traditions—from Britain's parliamentary conventions to Portugal's authoritarianism—they went about the business of managing the colonies in surprisingly similar fashion. Where it was possible to use African political systems, as in most of Muslim West Africa, they did so. Where it was necessary to impose some hierarchical structure on stateless societies, as in the coastal areas of that same region, they appointed colonial chiefs. In practice, therefore, the behavior of the local colonial administrator (British district officer, French *commandant de cercle* or Portuguese *chefe de posto*) had broadly similar consequences for the political development of the colonies.

Despite the admittedly massive differences between the political institutions inherited by the nationalists after decolonization, there has been a quite remarkable convergence in the political evolution of independent Africa. Although in the first long decade and a half (1960–1975) after independence it seemed that the colonial legacy had enabled the establishment of self-standing Western political institutions in Africa, the economic crisis unleashed in the 1970s by the sharp increase in oil prices revealed that this analysis of the patterns of authority and power on the continent had been superficial. Put very simply, what that crisis made

manifest is the extent to which nationalist euphoria had masked the continuities between the pre- and postcolonial eras. Contemporary politics on the continent had to be analyzed in greater historical depth.

What had in fact occurred is what is best described as the Africanization of politics—that is, the process by which the new African rulers redesigned the political structures inherited at independence, reshaped their architecture and redefined the parameters guiding political action. Although the modalities of such Africanization differed substantially according to the nature of the political system put in place after decolonization, what is significant for political analysis are the evident similarities. Indeed, the widespread notion that the colonial heritage, as well as the vagaries of decolonization, were decisive for the formation of the postcolonial political “order” turned out to have been vastly exaggerated. In retrospect, what is striking is that the Africanization of politics had similar systemic effects everywhere.

In essence, what took place amounted to the overlapping of two apparently discordant political logics. On the one hand, there was an ostensible strengthening of the political institutions as they emerged out of the decolonization process, whether peaceful or violent. On the other, there developed a new disposition of political priorities that was frequently at odds with the newly constructed formal structures. The supposed democratic and pluralist organs of political representation set up in most African countries at independence rapidly gave way to the one-party state: the development of a single, not plural, political logic.

In retrospect, what became clearer over time is that there was a more important political process at work than the narrowing of formal politics at the top. Indeed, the Africanization of politics entailed the emergence of neopatrimonialism, the central characteristic of which is the resort to personalized and vertical ties of solidarity as the backbone of the operative political system. The concept of neopatrimonialism is used here to refer to the juxtaposition of an apparently “traditional” patrimonial political logic and “modern” formal state institutions derived from the Western experience. The reasons why the one-party state became the norm in Africa is not, as has been widely argued, primarily because postcolonial governance required cohesion and unity—which it obviously did. It is fundamentally because politics at independence became patrimonial rather than institutionalized. What is meant is that, despite their Western appearance, African political systems operated differently. At the core of the formal political order there developed a logic of patronage which relied almost entirely on networks of personalized and vertical relations between rulers and ruled, elite and populace. The stuff of politics became more and more informal.

The Africanization of politics thus entailed the overriding dominance of a system that bore little relation to that defined by the tenets of the constitutional order. The one-party state was thus nothing more than the logical evolution of the reshaping of the political structure inherited at independence. In a neopatrimonial system, political accountability rested on the extent to which the patrons were able both to influence and meet the expectations of their followers according to well-established norms of reciprocity. The quest for political legitimacy thus required the fulfillment of particularistic obligations that had nothing to do with the emergence of a public sphere transcending infranational identities. Elections, the measure of accountability in Western polities, became in Africa one of the many instruments of factional mobilization.

While most political leaders at independence were new rather than “traditional” elites, the parameters of the neopatrimonial system that they put in place owed a great deal to what might be called “traditional” principles of legitimacy. Among those, the most significant had to do with a system of accountability in which the legitimacy of political leaders was perceived by all (from top to bottom) to rest on their ability to provide for their own personal constituents. Political representation, in other words, was seen to occur when patrons met their obligations in respect of their clients.

Although such a neopatrimonial system worked well in many countries after independence, it was inherently unstable. First, the situation of relative economic well being—useful colonial assets and stable export prices—was shattered by the world economic crisis in the 1970s. As revenues declined and debt increased, African patrons began to run out of means. In a situation where the search for resources became ever more difficult, political competition increased. Since in the African neopatrimonial system access to governmental assets is paramount, struggles for power intensified and violence rose.

Second, the neopatrimonial system as it developed in postcolonial Africa was essentially inimical to economic development as it took place in the West, or later in Asia. This is because it failed to foster, and in many ways totally undermined, economic growth—the prime basis for sustainable development. Political legitimacy was based on the maintenance of a situation in which patrons had simultaneously to uphold the image of substance that their station required and to feed the networks on which their position depended. Thus, they could scarcely defer consumption and expenditure for the longer-term purpose of “national” economic growth. For this reason, African states as well as entrepreneurs rarely invested in economically productive activities.

African political systems today exhibit three intriguing characteristics that deserve careful analysis, if

only because they go against prevailing expectations. They are increasingly informal, they appear to “retraditionalize,” and they have failed to spur sustained economic development.

The first trend—the apparent informalization of contemporary African politics—is best explained by reference to the notion of identity and the relation between the individual and his or her community. Western political systems rest on the assumption that citizens are discrete, autonomous, and self-referential individuals who cast their votes according to overtly political criteria. The reality in Africa is different: the individual cannot be conceived outside of the community from which he or she hails, however geographically distant he or she may be from it. The political system thus operates according to criteria that embody this core “communal” dimension. The individual is less the self-conscious citizen than someone whose behavior accords to the multiregistered (and sometimes contradictory) logics that guide his or her place within the community. These belong essentially to the realm of the informal, meaning here only that they are not encompassed within the legal and constitutional order that is the official political norm in all African countries.

The manner in which power is understood and exercised helps to explain why politics in contemporary Africa diverges from that of the West. Briefly, the state in Africa is not much more than a relatively vacuous shell, useful insofar as it permits the control of the resources it commands but politically feeble because it is neither institutionalized nor functionally differentiated from society. Similarly, there is no self-standing civil society because vertical ties remain infinitely more significant than horizontal (professional or functional) links. Finally, African political elites behave according to the norms of political legitimation and representation inherent in the neopatrimonial system. They use their (official) position to fulfill their (unofficial) obligations to their clients and to meet the demands on which their power and standing as rulers rest.

The second paradox is that much of what is happening in contemporary Africa seems to reinforce the notion that the continent is moving backward, or that it is in some ways retraditionalizing. What is meant here is that what we see in Africa confounds expectations of modernization. Both the ways in which Africans appear to define themselves and the manner in which they behave fail to conform to what social scientists expect of modernization. This notion of retraditionalization, as it were, emphasizes the extent to which Africans function simultaneously on several different registers, from the most visibly modern to the most ostensibly traditional, in their everyday lives. The failure to understand the apparently contradictory nature of

politics in Africa is itself very largely the result of a Western analytical convention that tends to assume a dichotomy between the realms of the modern and of the traditional. The African elites, however, operate in a world that combines both—a world congruent with the beliefs of the rest of the population. One example will illustrate the point. Based on empirical evidence, it is clear that what is apparently illegal (for example, smuggling or the embezzlement of state funds) is often seen as legitimate by those who benefit from it. In other words, neopatrimonial political accountability allows for actions that in the West would be seen as corrupt.

The third, and final, question about Africa's path to modernization is the absence of development. The evidence is disquieting. Although there were in the early 1960s a number of African countries (like Zambia) with a gross domestic product per capita equal to some of their Asian counterparts (like South Korea), the situation today is radically different. The erstwhile Asian Tigers have surged ahead while even the most prosperous African states (Gabon, Nigeria, or Côte d'Ivoire) have failed to achieve anything like sustainable economic growth. If the external constraints—falling world prices, debt, and structural adjustment—that have constrained Africa's economies are clear enough, they cannot in and of themselves account for such disparities in development.

It is becoming more obvious, therefore, that the very organization of African political systems must itself be considered to be (at least) partly responsible for this state of affairs. On reflection this is not surprising. Neopatrimonialism rests on notions of political legitimacy that favor the redistribution of resources from patrons to their clients. If the principal source of revenues is the export of primary or agricultural products, if insufficient attention is devoted by government to the development of such exports, and if the world prices for these commodities tend over time to decrease, then income falls. In the absence of coherent policies to generate growth from other economic assets, resources diminish overall. External borrowing obviates such shortfalls in the immediate future, but the burden of debt soon cripples the economy. This, with only a few notable exceptions like Botswana, is what has happened everywhere in Africa.

Indeed, neopatrimonialism may well have reached its limits or, rather, it may now have been changed into a political economy of disorder. Where the search for short-term economic gain is paramount, political leaders find that their legitimacy as "big men" is conditional upon their ability to obtain resources by any and all means necessary. The informal sector has always been of singular importance in Africa. There are now indications that it may well be the exploitation of the resources engendered by disorder (corruption, civil

strife, war, smuggling, dealing in illegal substances) that have become the more substantial marketable activities available. Thus, the primacy of communitarian and clientelistic political imperatives, which may make good sense at the microlevel of individuals and communities, leads assuredly to massive economic inefficiency and, possibly, to terminal damage at the national level. For this reason, we are likely to witness an increase in informal practices, both domestically and internationally. This will obviously impinge strongly on the future evolution of African political systems.

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See also: **Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Community in African Society; Democracy: Postcolonial; Identity, Political; Law and the Legal System: Postcolonial Africa; Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Pan-Africanism; Political Élites and Patronage: Postcolonial Africa Political Parties and One-Party States.**

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Population and Demography

The demography of Africa in precolonial times remains largely unknown. Since the pioneering study of

William Brass and colleagues (1968), the detail and scope of the demographic data available has improved markedly across the continent. Independence granted new states opportunities to more closely examine population issues in national development planning. Specialized demographic surveys were initiated in several countries in the 1970s, while others participated in the World Fertility Survey in the early 1980s. Large, centrally funded programs (such as those by the World Bank) continue to dominate data collection.

Currently, Africa's population and demography broadly can be characterized by uneven population distributions, rapid population growths, and high rates of population mobility. Africa's population reached over 803 million by 2000, and 1.5 billion by 2025. The population structure is youthful, with a "bottom-heavy" population pyramid. Approximately 45 per cent of the continent's population was under the age of 15, while only about 3 per cent was over 64 (Sadik 1990). This has wide implications for health care, education, and employment.

Africa's population is also characterized by high fertility and high mortality, especially among infants and mothers. The total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman will bear during her reproductive years, usually between the ages of 15 and 49. Women in Africa on average give birth to six children over this period of their lives. Explaining Africa's high fertility is difficult, but it reflects various influences including attitudes toward children, infant mortality patterns, marriage customs, and family planning. However, there is considerable variation by region, socioeconomic status, and rural or urban place of residence. For instance, Doenges and Newman (1989) identified a belt of markedly lower fertility rates in central Africa stretching from southwest Sudan through the Central Africa Republic into Zaire.

Other zones of low fertility, or what has been termed "impaired fertility," have high incidences of gynecological disorders and pelvic inflammatory diseases such as gonorrhea, syphilis, and schistosomiasis. African children also have the world's lowest life expectancy at birth, about 49 years for boys and 52 years for girls. With the AIDS epidemic in Africa still in its infancy, its implications for Africa's demographic future is debatable. Infection with HIV (the virus that causes AIDS) has brought about zero or even negative population growth rates in many African countries. AIDS is the number one cause of death in Africa, and in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, 20 per cent of the population or higher is infected with HIV (Stephenson 2000). To date, Africa is affected by two distinct strains of the HIV virus: HIV-1 and HIV-2. HIV-1 is particularly concentrated in central Africa (Uganda,

Rwanda, eastern Zaire, northwest Tanzania, and the Lower Conga River basin), while HIV-2 is found primarily in West Africa, especially in Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau. The two strains have different demographic effects. HIV-2 affects older age cohorts, while HIV-1 is most prevalent among those aged 15 to 49, with young women aged 15 to 20 having the very highest rates of infectivity, so more seriously impacts birthrates and infant survival.

Birth and death rates are higher in Africa than in any other region of the world. This places most African countries in the second stage of the demographic transition model, a "high expanding stage," which signifies declining death rates but consistently high birthrates. If Africa follows the European countries' four demographic stages associated with their level of economic development, then the continent will witness substantially falling birthrates. However, in some regions of Africa, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, death rates have been rising, primarily from AIDS (Brown and Halweil 1999).

A crude death rate in Africa of 13 per thousand in 1990 remained high, especially in eastern, western, and central Africa. Mortality levels in Africa have declined substantially over the years, converging toward the levels associated with more developed countries. This is attributed to improvements in health, sanitation, and nutrition standards, massive vaccination campaigns against measles, small pox, and other diseases, and increased efforts on the part of the World Health Organization and the International Red Cross. The rate of infant mortality (infant deaths between birth and age one) reached 96 deaths per thousand in 1990. This rate is relatively high compared to the average rate of 10 per 1,000 in more developed countries. Malnutrition, disease, and poverty are the most common causes of infant and child (between birth and the age of five) mortality.

Contemporary population distributions reflect disparate natural environments and historical processes of development. For example, the slave trade depleted regions such as parts of West Africa's Middle Belt, while other regions such as Nigeria's Jos Plateau served as defensive refuges from the slave trade and became more densely populated as a result (Stock 1995). While little is known of precolonial population distribution, the imposition of colonial rule, which visibly marked the landscape with new cities, administrative and trade centers, certainly reshaped Africa's population distribution.

Currently, Africa is characterized by uneven population distributions. The population of Africa is still predominantly rural. Overall, less than one-third of the population resides in urban centers, while in some countries, such as Rwanda, 94 per cent of the population of 7.9 million live in the rural areas. Population

densities also vary widely, ranging from 273 people per square kilometers in Rwanda to 29 people per square kilometer in Zimbabwe. Areas of high or low population density seldom, if ever, correspond to national units. For instance, one major zone of dense settlement is the West African coastal belt stretching from Dakar, Senegal to Libreville, Gabon, while the arid-semiarid region of southwestern Africa represents a sparsely populated region. These spatial distributions coincide with various environmental and developmental issues (urbanization levels, industrialization, and agricultural development), and sociopolitical characteristics (oppressive regimes, ethnic disputes, and resettlement schemes). For example, the West African coastal strip contains most of the region's urban, economic, and political centers. These uneven population distributions are also evident on small scales. For example, in Tanzania, the sparsely settled, environmentally hazardous central region is surrounded by dense population clusters. These clusters exist on the fertile slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in the north, on the shores of Lake Victoria in the northwest, on the shores of Lake Malawi in the southwest, and in the economic center of Dar-es-Salaam on the east coast. Government policy on resettling people into cooperative, nucleated settlements (Ujamaa villages) has also had its impact.

Population growth is a function of birth or fertility, mortality, and net migration. In Africa, migration data is often difficult to track, so birth, fertility, and mortality rates are used primarily to gauge net changes in population. With a growth rate of 3 per cent per year, population is growing faster in Africa than any other region in the world, and it almost doubles the world average of 1.6 per cent. A 3 per cent annual rate of growth can result in a country doubling its population in just over 23 years. Ethiopia and Nigeria are predicted to attain the (particularly high) population growth rates of 177 per cent and 124 per cent, respectively (United Nations 1998). Africa's rapid population growth rate is often linked with various problems, including damage to ecosystems or food shortages. However, it is debatable whether population growth is the primary cause of these problems.

Africa's rapid population growth stems from high fertility, with an average birthrate of 43 per thousand and relatively high but declining mortality over the past 30 years, about 13 per thousand in 1990 (Sadik 1990). Regional differences persist, with high rates of population growth in western and eastern Africa (3.3 and 3.2 per cent, respectively), and relatively low rates in central Africa (2 per cent in 1990). Intra-regional, intracountry, and rural-urban differences in growth rates are substantial. For instance, in northern African states, population growth rates ranged from 2.3 per cent in Libya to 3.1 per cent in Algeria in 1990

(Joffe 1992). Africa has one of the lowest proportions of its population living in urban areas (34 per cent in 1990) but the rate of growth of the urban population is by far the highest among the regions of the world (5 per cent in 1990). This rapid urban growth results from high natural increase combined with accelerated in-migration to towns. Africa's rural population has been increasingly steadily at about 2 per cent per year, making it the fastest growing of all the world regions except South Asia.

Oral history indicates that Africans have been highly mobile from early times. Major large-scale migrations have occurred over several centuries, including the Bantu colonization of the southern half of the continent over five millennia, and the exodus of Ndebele from South Africa to Zimbabwe in the mid-nineteenth century. Ancient local-scale circulations include pastoralists moving between seasonal pastures to access adequate water and fodder for their animals. Long-established migration streams can impact on modern population distributions. For example, since the fourteenth century reign of Emperor Mansa Musa of Mali, West African Muslims have been traveling to Mecca and other holy places of Islam. Many West Africans have settled permanently along the entire savanna corridor once followed by most pilgrims from Nigeria through Chad and Sudan to the Red Sea. The pilgrimage route has served as a cultural conduit along which innovations such as new crops, farming techniques, and architectural styles have spread, both eastward and westward. Pilgrims seldom completed the journey in less than three years, often worked along the way, and stayed in their own neighborhoods in the larger towns. This ancient overland pilgrimage exemplifies the complex relations among population movements, distributions, and growths.

Contemporary Africa continues to have high rates of mobility on various scales—regional, national, and international. While official statistics on migration are sketchy and sometimes deficient, Africa is estimated to contain about half of the world's total international migrants (Ricca 1989). Several theories aim to explain Africa's high rates of mobility, and the resultant differential effects on source areas and destination areas. Two prominent forms of migration include flow of labor migrants to colonial (then postcolonial) centers of economic development and flight of refugees from politically or ecologically distressed areas. In central Africa, oil in Gabon and the copper and diamond mines of Zaire are major attractions, while in southern Africa, Zambia's copper and the economic force of South Africa (particularly the Witwatersrand region) have been the major "pull" factors. Ecological changes occurring because of colonial policies also affected local population movements. Diseases as well as

people migrated along the transportation corridors, creating environments where disease vectors could proliferate.

Africa has the largest concentration of refugees in the world. The volume has continued to grow over the past four decades, and the vast majority of these refugees are women and children. The flow of refugees has been very uneven, both spatially and temporarily, but the current refugee crisis is especially problematic for countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. For instance, the estimated one million Mozambican refugees in Malawi in 1992 equaled one-fifteenth of Mozambique's population and one-eighth of Malawi's. Difficulties in measuring actual numbers of refugees are compounded by competing definitions of what a refugee is. Refugees can escape to safe havens within or outside of their country of origin for a wide range of reasons including religious, ethnic, or political persecution; economic deprivation and famine; external aggression or occupation, or foreign domination.

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Port Harcourt

A British colonial creation, Port Harcourt was established on the Niger delta in Nigeria in 1913 to serve European commercial, administrative, and industrial needs. Its origins are rooted in the 1909 discovery of coal in the Udi Hills, near Enugu. Although the name Port Harcourt was said to have been given after a British Marine Department navigator, Mr D. L. Harcourt, who

was allocated land in the area in 1911, many believed that the town was named after Lewis Harcourt (later Viscount Harcourt) who served as secretary of state for the colonies at the time.

The city was organized and administered according to European models, and by European personnel. It was the British Railway Department that built the port and the city, and laid the solid foundation that gives the town the distinction of being one of West Africa's few well-planned cities. The residential areas, which are separated from the industrial and commercial areas, are the government reserved area, accommodating the city's expatriates and the Nigerian upper class; the section for the middle-class population; and some squatter settlements. Accommodation has remained a serious problem in the city.

Port Harcourt was populated primarily by culturally diverse rural immigrants. Apart from the Ijo, Efik, and Ibibio, the initial immigrants that flooded the city were the Igbo. Other immigrants were the Hausa, Yoruba, and Edo of Nigeria. There were also Europeans, Americans, and Asians. The city witnessed a rapid increase in population because of its commercial and industrial potentials. Today the city's population is estimated at 288,900.

Port Harcourt's population was predominantly working-class, made up of traders of all categories—market women, vendors in market stalls, and the larger importers and contractors who competed fiercely with foreign firms. There were three major markets in the city, but the largest and most popular was the Port Harcourt Main Market, located at the center of the town.

Since it was established, Port Harcourt has played a significant economic role in Nigeria because of its connection to the railway, the harbor, the airport, and the oil industry. A major port expansion was completed in 1960, with eight berths and seven transit sheds. Inland water services were provided between the city and some major riverine communities. By 1965, Port Harcourt was the site of the second largest harbor in Nigeria, serving as the principal distribution point for eastern and parts of northern Nigeria's exports and imports.

The city is also the site of the great eastern terminus of the Nigerian Railway. The Eastern Railway line, which passed through Enugu in 1916 and the northern cities of Makurdi, Jos, and Kaduna in the 1920s, linked the two regions and helped in the transportation of coal from Enugu, palm produce from the Igbo hinterland, and groundnuts and other products from the north to the terminus and the port. In 1969, a link line to the NNPC Refinery at Alesa-Elеме was constructed to move petroleum products to other parts of the country.

PORT HARCOURT

Today the city has one of the three major international airports in the country, the Port Harcourt International Airport, Omagwa, commissioned in 1979. Since opening it has acted as a gateway for aircraft billed to central, eastern, and southern Africa in addition to several parts of Europe, including Rome, Amsterdam, and London. The airport is the second busiest airport in Nigeria.

A major factor in the economic importance of Port Harcourt was the discovery of oil at nearby Oloibiri in 1956 by Shell–British Petroleum. In 1958, the company transferred its African headquarters from Owerri to Port Harcourt, and by 1963, nine oil and natural gas fields had been established. The development of the industry led to advent of more oil marketing companies in Port Harcourt, such as Mobil, Texaco, African Petroleum, Total, Agip, National, Unipetrol, and Independent. Consequently, the city witnessed an industrial upsurge. The Trans-Amadi industrial estate, built after the 1957 Saville Report, provided industrial plots that the government leased out to expatriate and indigenous investors as an incentive. A tire plant, an aluminum sheet factory, a glass industry, a cement paints industry, and an enamelware factory were in operation by the early 1960s, in addition to already established concerns such as the Nigerian Tobacco Company and breweries. In 1984, the first gas recycling plant was established at nearby Obrikom/Omoku.

Port Harcourt has also played an important role in the field of trade and commerce. With the establishment of the city, European merchants and mercantile firms penetrated the hinterland and flooded the local markets with their merchandise. The railway, harbor, and airport facilitated movement of people and goods. The solid commercial foundation laid by the early immigrants into the city has made Port Harcourt the scene of intense commercial activity, a situation that continues today.

The colonial government that established Port Harcourt was so preoccupied with its own economic interests that it paid little or no attention to the provision of social facilities and services. The city did not have a secondary school until 1932, when Rev. L. R. Potts-Johnson established the Enitonna High school, a coeducational, nondenominational institution. Between 1942 and 1962, seven secondary schools and one industrial training school were established in Port Harcourt. In 1975 the University College of Port Harcourt, which was affiliated with the University of Lagos, was established. It was upgraded to a full university, the University of Port Harcourt, in 1977. In 1980, the first technical university in Nigeria, the Rivers State University of Science and Technology, was established at Port Harcourt by the state government.

Investments were made also in the field of health. The Port Harcourt General Hospital, established in 1916, has since been improved upon with modern

structures, equipment, and facilities to meet the health demand of the city's teeming population. The Port Harcourt School of Nursing was commissioned in November 1970, and the School of Midwifery was established in March 1972. In October 1974, the School of Health Technology–Port Harcourt came into existence. All these facilities have helped to improve the health condition of the city's population.

Port Harcourt's economic importance has placed the city at the center of both the intra- and interregional politics and conflicts that have characterized recent Nigerian history. The question of who controls Port Harcourt, given its oil economy and position as a major national and regional economic center, has been a crucial issue in colonial and postcolonial Nigerian politics. At the city's inception, political resources were monopolized by the European minority. The Igbo of Eastern Nigeria took over between the mid-1940s and the outbreak of the civil war. Their numerical and financial strength placed them at a vantage to monopolize seats in the municipal, regional, and federal governments, and therefore determined who would represent the interests of Port Harcourt residents. Port Harcourt has had a role of special significance in the political development of the Igbo. The city housed the administrative headquarters of the Igbo State Union, which was transferred from Lagos; it was their economic center, and the residence for a large number of Igboland's most prosperous and influential citizens. Port Harcourt adequately served the interests of the Igbo entrepreneurs because it gave them direct access to the sea for their waterborne international commerce.

Igbo hegemony over Port Harcourt was challenged by the Ijo separatists, who in 1958 presented a case before the Willink Commission for the creation of a Rivers State with Port Harcourt as its capital and with the exclusion of the Igbo. Their desire was met at the eve of the Nigerian civil war, when the federal military government, under the States Creation Decree of May 27, 1967, created twelve states that included Rivers State (capital: Port Harcourt) and East Central State (capital: Enugu; the only Igbo state). It is widely believed that the oil politics and petroleum diplomacy that centered around Port Harcourt were instrumental in the outbreak of the civil war.

The postwar reconciliation between the Rivers and East Central States, especially as regards the issue of "abandoned property," was embedded in Port Harcourt politics. The Igbo claimed they owned about 92 per cent of buildings in Port Harcourt. They were denied access to these properties until November 1971, when the Rivers State government released a mere 1,000 "abandoned" houses to their Igbo owners.

The political focus has shifted to an intrastate issue between the Ikwerre-dominated upland people and the

Okrika-dominated riverine population. Port Harcourt is not only the capital city of Rivers State but also the only city there. The Ikwerre called for a Port Harcourt state that would exclude the Okrika, which came to pass in 1997, when Bayelsa state was created out of Rivers State.

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See also: Nigeria: Biafran Secession and Civil War, 1967–1970; Nigeria: Lugard, Administration and “Indirect Rule.”

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Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century

When Portugal commenced its voyages of exploration down the African coast during the fifteenth century it had already freed itself from Muslim rule. At that time the economic reward from exploration and finding a direct sea route to the east were attractive. The area beyond Portugal offered richer fishing opportunities. The Portuguese had an appetite for gold, which had been reaching Mediterranean ports through trans-Saharan trade. Portugal employed technological innovations available at the time to make the voyages possible. Innovations in navigation and sailing, and improvements in navigational tools like the compass, astrolabe, and quadrant were significant. The caravel also allowed fast coastal and shallow water travel.

Portuguese expansion in Africa dates back to 1415 and the capture of the thriving Muslim city of Ceuta on the Moroccan coast. From the North African coast, the Portuguese acquired valuable information on trans-Saharan trade, and the prospect of outflanking the Muslim merchants and trading directly with the Africans on the coast proved attractive to Portuguese merchants. During their voyages down the African

coast, the Portuguese used the Atlantic islands as strategic and forward-looking positions. In 1420 the Portuguese settled at Madeira and also began colonizing the Azores, which they had reached in the 1340s. Sugar cane planted in the Madeira from the middle of the fifteenth century brought prosperity to the island. Sugar came to dominate the Canaries, and by 1460 the Cape Verde islands had been colonized.

The organized Portuguese exploration down the African coast under the patronage of Prince Henry the Navigator moved slowly. The Portuguese reached Madeira in 1418 and passed the reefs of Cape Bojador in 1434. Arguin was reached in 1443, and two years later the Portuguese built a fort there in the hope of diverting some of the inland African trade between Mali and Morocco, but this proved a failure. By 1444–1445, the Portuguese had passed beyond the desert and reached more fertile areas, where the population was predominantly black. Although Portugal failed to develop the inland trade, it started to capture Africans on the coast.

In 1441, Antam Goncalvez captured a few slaves and took them to Portugal. This violent capture of Africans later turned into regular trade between Africans and Europeans. By 1460, the Portuguese had reached the area of Sierra Leone. Between 1460 and 1469 the Portuguese colonized and developed Cape Verde into a base for holding slaves as well as a trading base for the adjacent mainland of the Upper Guinea Coast. A number of Portuguese settled on the upper Guinea coast to trade. They took African wives and entered into alliances with local rulers and traders. This led to the creation of a new society of private European and mixed-race traders living with Africans and known as Lacandos. Official and unofficial Portuguese policy toward the region was focused on reducing the power of African rulers and maintaining a system of order needed for the flourishing of peaceful trade.

In 1469, a merchant from Lisbon named Fernao Gomes was given a five-year monopoly of the trade beyond Cape Verde, on the condition that he explore a hundred leagues of coastline each year. In 1471 two of Gomes’s captains reached the gold-rich area of the Gold Coast. The availability of gold fulfilled in part the Portuguese aim for exploration, and when Gomes’s contract expired, King John I of Portugal took direct control of the work of exploration.

In December 1481, the Portuguese crown sent Don Diego d’Azambuja to build a castle in El Mina on the Gold Coast. Despite the opposition from the local chief, the castle was constructed. The castle was the first true European building on the coast designed to protect Portuguese trade against other Europeans and to store gold and other trade goods for transportation to Europe. The gold trade in El Mina developed steadily, and from 1487 to 1489 an average of 8,000 ounces a

year was shipped to Lisbon. From 1494 to 1496, the figure rose to 22,500 ounces.

The Portuguese had no commercial interest in the area between the Volta and Benin. They traded in slaves and pepper, but the pepper trade declined after the Portuguese reached India. The Portuguese sent many of the slaves to the Gold Coast, where they were used in mining activities. By 1475, the Portuguese had passed the equator and in 1483 Diego Cao reached the mouth of the Congo River. Here the Portuguese encountered a well-organized state where the ruler, Nzinga Nkuwu, shared rule with provincial and district chiefs. Nzinga Nkuwu sent an embassy to Portugal in 1490 that returned with technical help and missionaries. During this period there was a certain amount of cultural borrowing. In fact, Nzingu Nkuwu was baptized as João I.

In 1490, the island of São Tomé was colonized by Portuguese sugar planters who used a labor force composed of convicts and racial minorities. In 1487 Bartholomeo Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope and on May 20, 1498 the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama arrived in Calicut, India, after a voyage of 9,500 miles from Lisbon. Gama stopped at some of the city-states on the East African coast, such as Mombasa and Malindi, but most of the trade goods the Portuguese had to offer were unsuitable for tropical trade.

Gama's successful voyage to India achieved the primary Portuguese objective of finding a sea route to the east, and after the direct contact with Asia, Africa became a secondary concern for the Portuguese. Portuguese interest in Africa was to be challenged by the European powers of Holland, England, and France. These Europeans did not respect the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which had divided the world between Portugal and Spain.

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Predynastic Egypt: See Egypt, Ancient: Predynastic Egypt and Nubia: Historical Outline.

Press: Northern Africa

The first printing press was brought to Egypt in 1798 as part of the arsenal of Napoleon's expeditionary

force in Egypt. The French produced a newspaper, *Le courier de l'Égypte*, and a scientific journal, *La decade égyptienne*, for the instruction of the French troops. The press also printed proclamations addressed to the Egyptian nation for the purpose of political indoctrination. The brief French regime in Egypt, therefore, introduced some of the techniques characteristic of modern mass communication.

A printing press was resumed at Cairo in 1805, producing an official journal, *Jurnal al-Khidiwi*, in 1822. This journal was superseded by *al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya* in 1828, which printed material for military personnel. It was discontinued in the 1850s, but reappeared in 1865 when the Egyptian ruler, Isma'il Pasha, began his reforms of Egyptian cultural institutions. The press became an instrument of public education, particularly in journals such as *Wadi al-Nil*, which was published by an official from the Bureau of Schools, and *Rawdat al-Madaris*, edited by Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi. In the 1870s privately owned journals were printed, such as *al-Ahram*, founded by the Taqla family of Syria in 1876.

Journalists led the cultural renaissance of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt. The expansion of the press and educational institutions occurred simultaneously, in both cases influenced by European models. The result was the development of a more functional use of Arabic in place of the rhymed prose (*saj'*) of existing Arabic literature. The new literary form of the political essay was developed in Egypt by the leaders of the national parties that formed in opposition to British colonial rule. Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid edited the journals *al-Liwa'* and *al-Jarida*, representing the ideological positions of the *Watani* and *Umma* parties. The political essay was perfected by professional journalists in the interwar period, notably by Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, and Ibrahim al-Mazini. Beside the anti-colonial movement, journalists were involved in causes such as socialism and feminism, the latter beginning with the appearance of the journal *al-Fatah* in 1892. Journalists also played a part in democratic politics after 1922; for instance, the journals *al-Siyasa*, *Misr*, and *al-Balagh* represented the ideological positions of the Liberal-Constitutional, *Watani*, and *Wafd* Parties. In content, the cultural renaissance adapted Arabic to the expression of foreign concepts through the redefinition of words such as *watan* and *umma*, to represent the nation, as well as concepts such as justice, liberty, socialism, and feminism. Perhaps the most important impact of the press upon the Arabic-speaking societies of northern Africa was this redefinition of identity and the community.

The other states of northern Africa adopted the innovations of the Egyptian journalists. In Tunisia an

official journal, *al-Ra'id al-Tunisi*, appeared in 1861 and was published regularly after 1873 when the reformist prime minister, Khayr al-Din, encouraged the publication of articles on educational, social, and political reform. After 1881 the French protectorate supported journals such as *La Petite tunisien* and *La Tunisie-française*, which argued in favor of gradual constitutional reform. The first nationalist arguments were made in the Arabic-language journals *al-Hadira* (1888), *al-Zahra* (1890), and *Sabil al-Rashad*, the last of which appeared in 1895 and was edited by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Tha'alibi. In the prewar period these Tunisian journals were influenced by the Egyptian, Islamic reform journal, *al-Manar*. However, during the first massive demonstrations against colonial rule in 1911, Tha'alibi's Arab-language journal, *Tunisien*, showed the impact of Egyptian, nationalist journalism. After the First World War the Young Tunisians formed the Destour Party, led by Tha'alibi, who was succeeded by Habib Bourguiba. Like his predecessor, Bourguiba's career began with the publication of a journal, *L'Action tunisienne* in 1932, and then a party, the Neo-Destour, in 1934. Journalism and political associations were inseparable, at least in the formative period of northern, African nationalism.

The Algerian press was at first influenced by Tunisian and French metropolitan politics. The journals *Le Rachidi* and *L'Etendard algerien* provided the platforms for the formation of the Young Algerian movement in 1912, which was modeled on the example of the Young Tunisian movement. After World War I, the Young Algerian leader Emir Khalid published political essays in the journal *al-Iqdam*. The French colonial administration responded by suing the journal in the colonial courts. Another Young Algerian leader, Ferhat Abbas, argued for assimilation of Algerians into French Algeria in *Taqquadum*, *La Tribune*, and *Le Trait d'Union*. He also edited *La Republique algerienne*. At the same time a more radical nationalist program was popularized in journals published in France, *Iqdam nord-africain* and *El-Oumma*, which began the movement that took the name *Parti du Peuple Algerien* in 1937. An independent Arabic press appeared in 1924 with the publication of the journal *al-Shihab* by the Islamic reformer and educator 'Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis. This journal was influenced by the Islamic reformism of *al-Manar* and therefore was part of the larger cultural renaissance in northern Africa and the Middle East. The press of the *Front de Liberation National* followed this trend, publishing the journal *al-Mujahid* that popularized the idea of an Islamic and Arab, Algerian nation, alongside the guerrilla war against the French.

In Morocco the press was at first private, with the appearance of *al-Maghrib* in 1889. After the French

occupation in 1912, the radical nationalist journals of northern Africa were banned by the French authorities. The nationalist press appeared in 1933 with the publication in Fez of *L'Action du Peuple*, a moderate journal countenanced by the French authorities. An Arabic journal, *al-Hayat*, appeared first in Tetouan in the Spanish zone. The *Plan de Reformes* of the nationalist party was penned and published by the editors of the nationalist journals in 1934. Afterward, the national movement and journalism were centered in Rabat, with the publication of the French-language *L'Action populaire* and the Arabic *al-Atlas* and *al-Maghrib* in 1937. At this time a new element was introduced into the North African press when Spain's General Francisco Franco attempted to undermine French power in Morocco by broadcasting radio transmissions into the French zone.

The new medium of radio made the press available to a broader spectrum of society in the postwar years. Although it had emerged privately in the 1920s, radio only became popular in Egypt after it was adopted as an instrument of public education by the government after 1952. The revolutionary regime used radio to communicate the socialist and Arab nationalist message through the programs *With the People* and *Voice of the Arabs*. The results were successful, with the broadcasts reaching 85 per cent of the Egyptian population. Moreover, the unifying image of the Arab nation had an impact across the Arab-speaking population of northern Africa. This increased the legitimacy of the medium and the message. In Algeria the National Liberation Front (FLN) broadcast the revolutionary cause through *Radio-Algerie libre*, a crucial factor in mobilizing resistance as well as instilling a renewed nationalist ethos within the Algerian people.

The media expanded rapidly with the national movements against European colonialism. Therefore, the power of the media to educate or influence public opinion was something already appreciated by the political leaders in northern Africa at the time of independence. The printed press, however, was limited in its utility by social conditions. The relative impoverishment of northern Africa meant that there was only an elite market for newspapers. In the mid-twentieth century only 13 per cent of the Arabic dailies in Egypt were able to survive without subsidies, state or private, and among the small number of profitable papers it was necessary to put the courting of popular opinion (the small number of literate readers) before impartial news reportage. The other inhibiting factor was literacy, which was restricted to little more than 10 per cent of the population in northern Africa at the time of World War I and remained so in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya until the 1960s. Since then literacy has increased rapidly with the social and cultural reforms of the

independent states; for instance, by 1980 literacy rates in Algeria and Egypt were at 42 per cent, Libya's were higher at 56 per cent, while Morocco lagged at 29.5 per cent. Radio and television were mediums that did not rely on literacy, but the new mediums were developed in the postcolonial setting, in which governments attempted to monopolize or censor the message.

The newspaper *al-Ahram*, the oldest independent paper in Egypt with a reputation for news reportage, was transformed into Gamal Abdel Nasser's mouthpiece after the press was nationalized in 1960. The editor of *al-Ahram*, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, provided Nasser with a means to influence public opinion through his weekly editorials. After the defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war with Israel the editorials appeared to argue for a reevaluation of socialist policies and a return to a more "open society." Nasser exploited the "open society" to attack the military establishment through Haykal's editorials. The episode did not reestablish the autonomy of the press; it simply reasserted presidential power.

In the other states of northern Africa even the principle of press freedom was ignored as newspaper, radio, and television were employed by governments as media for educating the population in "correct" political attitudes. Libya's official press policy was to embody the revolutionary social, economic, and political objectives of Muammar Gaddafi. After Tunisian independence in 1956, Bourguiba's *L'Action* was transformed into the official journal, *al-Amil*, of the ruling Neo-Destour Party, while radio was placed under the control of the Ministry of Information in 1957. Journals representing opposing views or groups were suppressed. Upon Algerian independence in 1962 there were a multitude of French and Arabic papers and radio stations, all of which were placed under the supervision of special committees of the ruling FLN party. In 1962 *Al-Chaab* became the first national daily, printed in French and later in Arabic. In 1963 an edict nationalized the daily journals of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. In 1964, after the coup that brought Houari Boumediene to power, the government took complete control of the press by establishing a new French-language daily, *El-Moudjahid*, to communicate the official Arab, socialist ideology.

Morocco, uniquely, has had a liberal policy toward print, radio, and televised media. It was the first country to have a national news agency, l'Agence Maghreb Arabe Presse, which was begun as a private initiative but became a public establishment in 1977. In Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria the news agencies were state owned from the start and therefore monopolized subscriptions to foreign wire services. The result was state censorship of news reportage. In Egypt the private press has been relatively free, having access to foreign wire

services. Nevertheless, the national news agency reportage has served as an indicator of the government-endorsed point of view, which independents have tended to cautiously follow. *Jeune Afrique*, a Tunisian journal, was able to remain politically independent only by remaining in exile after 1956. It put itself beyond the reach of the state censors by publishing first in Rome, and later in Paris. Satellite television broadcast by Arab communities in Europe has had a similar impact in the late twentieth century, because northern African governments have little power to control the reception of satellite broadcasts. In the 1980s the press across northern Africa recovered some autonomy when Egyptian politics was democratized after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. The removal of Bourguiba in 1987 had a similar impact in Tunisia. In Algeria the government adopted a new press policy in 1982, encouraging the expression of free opinion. This had an impact on the demands for political reform that were voiced during the demonstrations of 1988, which led in turn to the experiment in democratic reform in the 1990s. At the same time, the government's criticism of the press and subsequent attacks upon journalists during the Algerian civil war reflect the fragile condition of the press in postcolonial northern Africa.

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See also: Egypt: Printing, Broadcasting; Journalism, African: Colonial Era; Media as Propaganda.

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Press: Southern Africa

The press in southern Africa dates to the beginning of European colonialism, with the earliest newspaper appearing at Capetown in South Africa in 1800. In 1824, the *South African Journal* was launched, defying British colonial restrictions on nonofficial newspapers. Media-government relations in the region have been contentious ever since.

Colonial states' efforts to gain and exploit economic and political domination, and Eurocentric cultural, religious and social influences, set the parameters for press development in the region well past independence. The colonial press in southern Africa almost exclusively represented the interests of governments, missionary societies, and settler communities. Many early papers began as official newsletters of the British colonial authorities. For example, the Bechuanaland Protectorate government produced a Tswana/English newsletter, *Naledi ya Batswana*.

By the early twentieth century, most commercial southern African newspapers catered to small, urban-based, white settler populations, publishing in Dutch and Afrikaans (South Africa), Portuguese (Angola and Mozambique), German (Namibia), and English (South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana). With the spread of British colonial rule and white settlers, new papers emerged that were designed to serve whites but also increasingly came to be read by literate Africans. A good example was the *Rhodesia Herald* (Salisbury). Throughout the twentieth century, English-language newspapers from South Africa—especially *The Star*, *Rand Daily Mail*, *Sunday Times*, and *Bantu World*—enjoyed a small but significant African readership throughout the region.

The earliest African-language (vernacular) newspapers appeared during the colonial era, generally produced by Christian missions, who viewed the printed word in many forms—not just in the Bible translated into vernacular languages—as a tool for education as well as the winning and holding of converts. In Botswana, for example, a Tswana-language press has existed in some form since 1856, when the monthly Wesleyan Mission *Molekude wa Bechuana* first appeared. Missionary newspapers helped set the stage for growth of a more news-oriented Tswana press in the twentieth century. In 1901, the first newspaper published and edited by Batswana, *Koranta ea Bechoana*, appeared.

Most African-language newspapers from Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho were absorbed into a larger South African “African Press,” and it was not until the 1950s, at the threshold of independence, that a more nationalist African press reemerged in these territories.

In West Africa during the 1930s and 1940s, anticolonial nationalist opposition grew increasingly articulate in strongly worded editorials in indigenous newspapers. Colonial states imposed a vast array of legal restrictions to slow or stifle development of independent African newspapers. Restrictive press laws and court rulings proliferated and spread to eastern and southern African territories in the 1950s. All newspapers had to be registered with colonial governments in order to lawfully publish.

The key factor in the rise of a second wave of African newspapers in the region was anticolonial nationalism and formation of political parties pressing for independence. Some parties and national liberation movements published their own newsletters, such as the African National Congress's *Sechaba* and SWAPO's *New Era* in Namibia.

Clandestine radio was more effective than the printed press as a vehicle for launching and expanding nationalist movements. Gripped by fears of rising Soviet and Chinese subversion and propaganda, and based on their interpretation of events leading up to the Congo crisis, colonial governments and white minority regimes were, by the 1960s, cracking down on the small African presses and setting up their own government newspapers.

South Africa (particularly after 1948 and the rise of formal apartheid) and Southern Rhodesia (after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence) imposed the most elaborate, complex, and stifling array of press restrictions. Penalties grew increasingly severe as white minority regimes were pressed during the 1970s and 1980s. The ultimate sanction was outright banning of a publication or jailing of editors. Many chose exile.

Government-run newspapers persisted in many African states long after the end of colonial rule. With independence, many pronationalist newspapers became mouthpieces of the new governments they had helped bring to power. Private papers were steadily brought within the range of government influence, if not outright control.

Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the *Herald* and *Chronicle*, the two largest national newspapers, which had been oriented to the white minority and had been under partial South African ownership, were placed under the guidance of an ostensibly autonomous Mass Media Trust (ZMMT). Government influence over management of the ZMMT and outright purchase of South African shares resulted in these newspapers' eventual transformation into what were virtually government publications. Independent-minded editors were forced out, Ministry of Information news directives were applied, and any semblance of press freedom had ebbed away by 1990.

In the name of national unity, development, and nationalism, new leaders were reluctant to abide any press criticism. Critics were treated as subversives who jeopardized development. Structures of colonial control over information and free expression were well-suited for authoritarian one-party regimes, and were thus retained and even extended. Indirect measures to control the independent press included withdrawal of government advertising and denial of foreign exchange allocations to “uncooperative papers” for purchase of newsprint, presses, and spare parts.

More of an explanation than lack of press freedom is needed to account for this pattern. In a number of cases, incoming postindependence governments inherited official newspapers and continued them, not only for political reasons but for economic ones as well. Some new states, such as Botswana, with a small, mostly illiterate population scattered across a wide territory, lacked a mass readership, commercial advertising base, or production and distribution facilities to make a viable private national newspaper possible. Only two decades after independence did the necessary elements of commercial press viability begin to reach critical mass. Independent private newspapers did not take root in Botswana until the mid-1980s, and then only as weeklies. All four major papers today are based in Gaborone, the capital, and primarily target English-literate, urban-based readers and the small commercial sector.

The press played pivotal roles in the so-called second wave of independence that rolled across many African states in the late 1980s and 1990s—notably Zambia and Malawi, where mass movements pressing entrenched authoritarian regimes for democratic changes were led or strongly aided by newly established private newspapers.

In the early 1990s, these pressures for democratic reforms were rewarded by unprecedented media freedom and an explosion of new independent newspapers. In Malawi, the most dramatic example, the number of private newspapers grew from 1 to 30 by 1994. In Zambia, under incoming President Frederick Chiluba, some of this heady press freedom lasted only as long as it took some of the new publications to criticize the new regime. In 1995, the offices of the *Post* were raided and its editor jailed.

Although political pressures on independent newspapers in southern Africa eased considerably during the 1990s, today most find themselves in constant struggles for viability, if not outright survival; economic constraints continue to directly affect production and distribution. Despite the end of apartheid and a more democratic political order, many alternative South African newspapers are facing severe economic problems. Many are folding, while mainstream newspapers are increasingly falling into the hands of global media conglomerates and experiencing a new kind of external control.

Economic stagnation and decline does not allow for the development of a viable commercial business sector interested and able to purchase advertising space, chief major revenue source of most private newspapers. Outside of South Africa, there are virtually no commercial daily newspapers in the region today.

External financial support, be it from global media conglomerates or nongovernmental organizations interested in the promotion of democracy via freedom of

expression and media pluralism, are responsible for keeping some of the major private weekly newspapers afloat in Namibia (the *Namibian*) South Africa (the *Weekly Mail*) and elsewhere across the region. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) based in Windhoek, Namibia, is investing foreign donor support to develop programs aimed at training and organizing southern African journalists, commercial media owners, and other African media professionals. MISA provides economic, managerial, and even political support.

Across the region, private newspapers still have to negotiate not only economic and educational barriers but also increasingly intolerant government censors. Even in states with relatively high degrees of press freedom (Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa), self-censorship, fears of court actions, threats, and violence are all too commonly a part of southern African journalists' daily work environments, stunting their professionalism, credibility, and independence.

A growing number of fledgling southern African newspapers are taking advantage of recent advances in information technology to become economically and politically sustainable. Some, such as the *Independent* in Zimbabwe and *Mmegi* in Botswana, are posting weekly editions in cyberspace, and networking with regional and international media pools, such as the Pan-African News Agency and press freedom groups (MISA, Reporters sans Frontières, Index on Censorship, Article XIX) to improve news flows, ease government pressures on their operations, and gain support for national media reforms.

Western research on the postindependence press in Africa focuses strongly on the issue of press freedom, usually conceptualized in Western terms or not defined at all. A counterconceptualization that gained much currency in Africa during the postindependence era, "developmental journalism," emphasizes the responsibility of the press to support government policies rather than adopting a fourth-estate critic-watchdog mission, especially in the reporting of news.

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See also: Journalism, African: Colonial Era; Media as Propaganda.

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Press: Tropical Africa

The birth of the press in tropical Africa dates to 1801, when black settlers in Sierra Leone began publishing a simple broadsheet called *The Royal Gazette and Sierra Leone Advertiser*. From this humble beginning the independent African press has gone on to play an important role in articulating a critique of racism and colonialism throughout much of Africa during the colonial era. In the initial decades after independence African rulers of one-party states tightly controlled the press in the name of nation-building. However, as many nations began moving toward democratization during the 1990s, the continent has witnessed a revival of an independent press.

The first newspapers in tropical Africa appeared in regions of heavy European influence. An English journalist in South Africa established the *Cape Town Gazette*, the continent’s first settler paper, in 1800. The following year repatriated Africans in the West African settlement of Sierra Leone published their first paper. However, publication of these early papers was sporadic, and the first periodical that could be compared to a modern newspaper was the *Liberia Herald*, first published by Charles L. Force in 1826. Force had emigrated to Liberia from Boston, where the Massachusetts Colonization Society had given him a printing press. Though Force died shortly after the publication of his first issue, his paper was renamed and relaunched in 1830 by another American émigré. The reconstituted paper continued publishing until 1862. During its three decades in operation the *Herald* was a vociferous opponent of the slave trade, and frequently published articles popularizing the accomplishments of famous Africans. Its last editor was the West Indian pan-Africanist Edward Blyden.

The early press in West Africa found its audience in the Westernized, literate, urban African peoples of the coastal communities. From its bases in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the West African press spread to other regions of English influence. In 1874 several newspapers were founded in Gold Coast, and in 1890 the first daily paper in West Africa appeared in Lagos, Nigeria. Though these papers often contained criticism of colonial policy, their staunch support of Western over indigenous African culture is reflected in the *Liberian Advocate’s* motto “Christian Liberia: the open door to heathen Africa.”

West Africa was also home to the first newspaper to be published in an African language. In 1859 Anglican missionaries in Abeokuta began producing a newspaper in Yoruba. Though the paper ceased publication after its equipment was destroyed in 1867, this was the first of many similar ventures in vernacular publishing that would be launched by Christian missionaries. By 1900, limited-circulation papers were being published from mission stations in many colonies, including Uganda, South Africa, and Cameroon. Their efforts helped to spread literacy, and eventually fostered a mass readership for newspapers.

While the press in Anglophone West Africa remained in African hands, the rapid expansion of colonial rule after 1880 inspired the creation of a number of new papers published by and for the growing white settler communities. In South Africa the press expanded in tandem with the rapid growth of the mining industry after 1867. In East Africa the first newspaper arrived with the construction of the Uganda railway at the end of the nineteenth century. British settlers in Kenya published the *East African Standard* after 1910, which was conspicuous for its racist prosettler views. The publishers of the *East African Standard* also introduced similar papers into neighboring Uganda and Tanzania.

Outside of Anglophone Africa there were few African newspapers before the 1930s. In the new French territories of West and Central Africa, low levels of literacy, and the high cost of importing publishing equipment, discouraged the spread of an indigenous press. The only papers of note in French West Africa appeared in the older colony of Senegal, where periodicals such as *Le Rêveil du Sènegalais* (founded in 1885) catered to a largely white, urban, merchant community. In the Belgian Congo, official opposition to local initiatives discouraged the development of an indigenous press until the eve of independence. In these regions missionaries produced the only newspapers, usually in local languages.

Before the 1930s, African newspapers tended to cater to an educated class that aligned itself with the colonial order. There were incidents of short-lived

papers publishing strident attacks on colonial administrations. But these were sporadic, and they enjoyed little circulation or influence. In West Africa the moderate tone of the press changed dramatically in 1935 when the Nigerian journalist Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe moved to the Gold Coast to take over publication of the *Africa Morning Post*. Azikiwe had spent nine years living and working in the United States, and his experiences there had radicalized his approach to journalism. Working with I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson, a West Indian Marxist who had worked for a Communist newspaper in Paris, Azikiwe turned the sleepy Gold Coast paper into a champion of African rights. While their predecessors had published well-reasoned appeals for constitutional reform, Azikiwe and Wallace-Johnson employed fiery, inflammatory language to inveigh against the iniquities of the colonial system. When he was prosecuted for libel in 1937 Azikiwe moved to Lagos, where he became the editor of the *West African Pilot*. In Gold Coast and in Nigeria his controversial editorials resonated with urban audiences, and soon inspired journalists throughout the region to copy his style.

Journalism in Francophone Africa also experienced an important change in tone during the 1930s. By the late 1920s, there were several small African papers outside of Senegal, many of which were in the colony of Dahomey. These and other fledgling newspapers in the region received a boost in the early 1930s, when Africans in Senegal were allowed to elect representatives to the French National Assembly. Though confined to Senegal, the election campaign inspired interest and discussion throughout the region. Political associations began disseminating their messages through party-sponsored periodicals. However, the political aspirations of these papers remained much more conservative than those of their English-speaking neighbors. It was not until after World War II and the formation of the interterritorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain party that journalists in French West and Central Africa began demanding independence. The 1950s saw a dramatic rise in the number of nationalist newspapers in French Africa, and many of the future leaders of Francophone nations, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, and Léopold Senghor of Senegal, published their own papers during the final decade of colonial rule.

When most African states achieved their independence during the 1960s, the newspapers of the victorious political parties became important organs for disseminating official information. In the former French territories the colonial power provided equipment and technical expertise to the new regimes. The independent press, which in many colonies had played an important role in the liberation movements, soon found itself falling under the control of the new postcolonial

regimes. Anxious to consolidate their power, and concerned with the fragile nature of their multiethnic nations, the leaders of independent states discouraged the existence of an independent press in the name of nation-building. The poverty of many of the new states of Africa also meant that there was little capital to support an independent press. Therefore, until 1990 journalism in most African countries consisted of one state produced national newspaper. Typical of these party papers was *Fraternité Matin*, a government tabloid published in Côte d'Ivoire that routinely trumpeted the accomplishments of the leader and former journalist Houphouët-Boigny.

With independence, many of the settler-owned newspapers were taken over by African governments. While minority rule continued in South Africa and Rhodesia, the press remained in the control of the large newspaper syndicates. However, in both countries the press remained heavily censored. With independence in 1980 the *Rhodesian Herald* became a state newspaper and was renamed the *Zimbabwe Herald*. Though democracy brought a freer press to South Africa in 1994, many of the strict laws governing the press remained in effect.

In 1990, the end of the Cold War inspired many African nations to begin taking steps toward democratization, and the independent press in Africa immediately began to revive. Throughout the continent new independent newspapers began appearing. Most of these papers positioned themselves in opposition to the ruling regimes and attracted readers by exposing the corruption of government officials. Papers like Cameroon's *Le Messager* established a reputation for fearlessly criticizing public figures. However, these new journalists have faced considerable opposition from entrenched regimes. Since 1990 journalists have been imprisoned, tortured, and murdered in dozens of countries throughout the continent.

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See also: Azikiwe, Nnamdi; Journalism, African: Colonial Era; Media as Propaganda.

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Pretoria

In 1855, the purchase of two farms by President Marthinus Pretorius in the Apies River Valley to accommodate a permanent building for the South African Republic's Volksraad (colonial legislative assembly) heralded the establishment of South Africa's administrative capital. Named after its founder's father, Andries Pretorius, a *voortrekker* leader, over the next half century Pretoria acquired a population of 50,000 as well as the infrastructure of a modern city: a Dutch Reformed church (1857); public schooling (1859); postal services (1864); a telegraph (1877); railway links (1893); electric lighting (1892); a daily newspaper (1898); waterborne sewage (1904); and electric tramways (1910). The planting of the 70,000 Jacaranda trees that still constitute the city's most attractive feature began in and around its 350 public parks in 1888.

Throughout most of its history, Pretoria's status as the bureaucratic headquarters of government, as well as its especially discriminatory boundary demarcation, ensured that it was the only major South African city to be predominantly white. It was the first to institutionalize racial hierarchy: a law prohibited blacks and "coloreds" (those of mixed blood) from using pavements until 1925. During the twentieth century it became a major industrial center, beginning with such pioneering enterprises as the Eerste Fabriek distillery, a munitions factory founded during the Anglo-Boer war, and an iron furnace established in 1918. Pretoria's significance as a manufacturer was confirmed in 1928 when an Afrikaner nationalist government decided it should be the site for the state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation; the steelworks began operations in 1934. During the 1960s, Pretoria became the hub of South Africa's transportation and defense industries, as well as Africa's largest producer of barbed wire. The civil service, heavy industry, and a huge complex of military bases just south of the city shaped the city's social and cultural character decisively. A modestly paid and partly transient population of officials (their livelihoods protected by racial job preservation) created a demand for cheap housing and prompted the construction of the apartment block neighborhoods that define Pretoria's white suburbs. Notwithstanding the existence from 1930 of a full-fledged local university, Pretoria's high culture was to be dominated by national institutions headquartered in the city as well rival genres of imperial and nationalist monumental architecture: since 1949, Gerard Moerdijk's Voortrekker Monument has balefully confronted Herbert Baker's Union Buildings

(1913) from its hilltop perch across the Apies River Valley. As with its cultural life, from the 1940s, municipal politics chiefly reflected the preoccupations of apartheid's main beneficiaries, blue-collar and lower-middle-class Afrikaners; they ensured National Party predominance in Pretoria parliamentary and municipal elections until a black challenge to local bus segregation prompted a swing to the conservative right in 1989.

Contrasting with the social conformity of a white community largely composed of functionaries in and out of uniform, Pretoria's black inhabitants represented a livelier historical vein of social dissent. One of the first of the African National Congress's campaigning successes occurred in the city when a local leader, S. M. Makgatho, organized a civil disobedience offensive against segregated pavements. The 20,000 freehold black landowners recorded at the time of the 1913 Land Act constituted a substantial layer of middle-class leadership. They lived mainly in the northwest suburb of Lady Selborne as well as the inner city ghetto of Marabastad, childhood home of the writer Es'kia Mphahlele. These and other "black spots" began to be subjected to clearances from the 1940s (after two decades of white agitation), and dispossessed African landowners, together with their tenants, were resettled in Atteridgeville (est. 1939) and Mamelodi ("mother of melody," est. 1953), respectively east and west of the city, each secluded from the outlying white suburbs by belts of heavy industry. During and just after World War II, political activism by a local multiracial branch of the Communist Party drew upon the broader social tensions that underlay the Marabastad municipal compound riots of December 1942 and the two-week 1947 Atteridgeville bus boycott. Slum clearances and the harsh imposition after 1945 of municipal pass laws more or less extinguished a militant trade union movement, but the African National Congress (ANC) remained busy in Lady Selborne, supported as it was by finance from Chinese traders, and making a brave showing during the Defiance Campaign as well as mobilizing black Pretoria's contribution to the 1957 Witwatersrand bus boycott. By the 1960s, however, most of its notables were gone. Designated for white occupation, Lady Selborne had become a demolition zone by 1963. Meanwhile, African communal politics shifted its fulcrum to the more regulated municipal townships: in 1963 a local branch of the Pan-Africanist Congress attempted to mount a military uprising from its bases in Atteridgeville's secondary schools. A parallel sabotage campaign by local Umkhonto we Sizwe adherents ended with the arrest of its participants in 1964. During a succeeding period of apparent political docility, secondary industrialization spurred by the

introduction of car assembly lines and the expansion of black tertiary education facilities (Medunsa, Vista and UNISA) around the city supplied new seedbeds for political activism. Trade unions and student movements were in the vanguard of a sustained insurrectionary rebellion in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville between 1984 and 1990. The cultural accompaniments to local political assertion included Mamelodi's emergence as South Africa's jazz capital.

Postapartheid Pretoria remains a government city, but that feature itself has accelerated its social transformation: given the pace of affirmative action within the public bureaucracy, Pretoria's middle class of black professionals is the largest in the country. In 2000, a reconfiguration of its municipal boundaries to incorporate Centurion to its south and the commuter dormitories of Ga-Rankua and Mabopane to the north tripled its population (to around two million) and ensured the future ascendancy of the ANC in municipal politics as long as it can hold the loyalty of Pretoria's industrial workers and junior officials. Reborn as an African city, in 2000 it was re-christened Tshwane, the Northern Sotho name for the fertile valley in which Marthinus Pretorius built his parliament.

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See also: **South Africa.**

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Production and Exchange, Precolonial

Production, whether purely for subsistence or as a means of generating surpluses for exchange for other products, is a fundamental element of any society's

economy. The level and types of inputs and the eventual distribution and consumption of goods, services, and materials, as well as the division of labor and the manner in which production is organized and time is allocated, can all vary widely from one society to another and in relation to differences in social and political organization.

Scholars attempting to distinguish production systems in different societies frequently talk in terms of their "mode of production." The concept derives from the work of Karl Marx, but has been elaborated by various anthropologists and historians, most notably those aligned with the French school of structural Marxism. There are two components to a mode of production—*the forces of production* and *the relations of production*. The former refers to the range of raw materials, technologies, and labor employed within a particular system's approach to the appropriation of nature. The latter refers to the ways in which surplus is extracted and distributed among different sections of the community, and thus encapsulates different modes of exchange.

The reconstruction of precolonial African modes of production and their associated exchange systems relies on a combination of written and oral historical sources, archaeological evidence, and inferences drawn from colonial ethnographies and modern anthropology. Archaeological data have played a particularly important role, partly because they provide tangible evidence for the technologies employed, raw materials exploited, and produce exchanged by different societies at different times in the past, but also because of their ability to greatly extend the time depth of our knowledge of the continent well beyond that available from historical sources alone.

Anthropological studies of the social basis for trade and exchange also make it possible to infer the existence of a particular mechanism, such as tribute payments or market exchange, from other evidence concerning the prevailing pattern of social organization. As the American anthropologist Karl Polanyi observed, exchanges can take many forms, ranging from simple reciprocal exchanges between close kin, through prestige gift exchange and the collection and redistribution of tribute to commercial, market trading. Not only are these different modes of exchange, the social relations that exist between exchange partners in these different systems are normally markedly different and they can also generate different spatial patterns.

Virtually all known modes of production, with the notable exception of the variants of industrial capitalism, were represented among precolonial African societies. In broad terms, archaeological research indicates that prior to approximately 8,000 years ago, all African

societies relied on wild resources for their food supply, through a combination of gathering, hunting and, where appropriate, fishing. From at least 20,000 years ago, there is evidence that certain items were being exchanged between individuals who, given the distances involved, probably belonged to different social groups. Tools made of obsidian from sources around Lake Naivasha and Mt. Eburru have also been recovered from Middle Stone Age contexts at Muguruk and Songhor in western Kenya some 190 kilometers away, suggesting a much longer history of exchange.

The existence of exchange networks may also have played a significant role in the emergence of food production among many foraging societies. The earliest evidence on the continent comes from sites on the dry, drought-prone steppes of the Egyptian Western Desert, especially those at Nabta Playa and Bir Kiseiba. By approximately 8000BCE and possibly up to a millennium earlier, inhabitants of these areas were deliberately herding wild cattle, and even digging wells so as to extend their grazing areas into drier areas. Well-laid-out villages with semipermanent architecture and storage pits appear for the first time, indicative of population growth and increased sedentism. Analysis of the faunal assemblages from these sites also suggest that the herds were being exploited for their milk and blood rather than their meat. The remains of a wide spectrum of wild plants recovered from these sites, including the progenitors of domesticated sorghum and millet, point to the continuing importance of gathering in these economies.

Similar evidence for localized groups of specialized herders, hunters, fishers, and incipient cultivators has been documented at various points across the Sahara to its western edges around Dhar Tichitt in Mauritania. Although these clusters range quite widely in date, and appear to have been associated with different phases of climatic amelioration and deterioration, they share a number of characteristics. In particular, it appears that the exploitation of these semiarid regions, and the ability to survive quite long periods of climatic deterioration, were greatly facilitated by the existence of reciprocal exchange links between groups with different subsistence strategies. This not only enhanced food security, but even seems to have encouraged increased sedentism and population growth.

For the most part, production among these and other early farming communities would have been geared toward the reproduction of the lineage or some other similar kin-based group. Land and its produce would have been collectively owned and held in trust for future generations, and labor divided principally on gender lines. Nevertheless, through their control over symbolic resources (such as the means of propitiating ancestors and/or the spirits) and access to the kin

group's surpluses for payment of bridewealth, elders would have exercised considerable power and authority over junior members of the domestic group. Most craft production, such as potting, woodworking, bark cloth (and later textile) manufacture also appears to have been organized at the household level, principally for domestic consumption. Exchange, in the form of barter or gifts of both locally produced and exotic items such as beads, nevertheless took place for both economic and social reasons.

One significant exception seems to have been metal production, principally of iron and copper, and there is copious evidence to suggest the emergence of regional specialization in this craft at a relatively early date. One of these areas was in Buhaya, in northwestern Tanzania, where evidence for ironworking has been dated to at least 500BCE, and perhaps earlier. Analytical studies of the slag, iron objects, and smelting furnaces from archaeological sites in this area suggest a very capable understanding of the technology and chemical processes required to obtain low-grade steel—an invention that predates the European invention of forced-draught furnaces by roughly two millennia. Such was the scale of production, the concomitant demand for charcoal, and the associated expansion of agriculture and settlement that the surrounding landscape had become sufficiently degraded by the year 500 that iron production virtually ceased and large swaths of countryside were depopulated. Only after a lapse of several centuries was there a resurgence in iron smelting and an associated rise in population.

West Africa was another important center of iron production, especially during the mid- to late second millennium CE. One area that has received extensive study is the Bassar region of Togo, where a combination of archaeological, historical, and ethnographic research has provided a detailed picture of the growth of the industry from the late thirteenth century onward, the organization and social relations of production and the symbolism of iron manufacture. The number and size of slag heaps and the number of smelting furnaces attributable to the fifteenth–eighteenth centuries, in particular, suggest a massive increase in the rate of production over this period, perhaps by as much as 300–600 per cent compared with earlier periods, probably attributable to the rise during the same period of the neighboring states of Gonja, Mamprusi, and Dagomba, and the demand for iron tools and weapons that this precipitated. Three other factors may also have contributed to the rise in prominence of the Bassar region, however—the exhaustion of wood supplies for charcoal in neighboring areas, the quality of the ore used by Bassari smelters, and the region's access to preexisting long distance trade routes. Such was the vibrancy of the industry that it managed to flourish

even during the nineteenth century in the face of increasing competition from European imports, and at the time of German contact in 1890 villages across the area were still differentiated according to the distinct specializing of their inhabitants in either charcoal making, smelting, or smithing.

Copper artifacts were also important commodities from a relatively early date, especially across central Africa, where sources of the raw material are common. On present evidence, the earliest examples from the region, such as the Kipushi copper mine in northern Zambia and its smelting furnace, remains from Naviundu Springs near Lubumbashi, all date to around the fourth and fifth centuries. By the eighth century, copper mining and smelting was common. However, unlike iron, copper was used almost exclusively either as currency, jewelry, or for similar ornamental purposes rather than for tools. It was probably because of the nonutilitarian and ceremonial associations of copper that items such as bracelets, beads, wire, rings, ceremonial axes and various types of ingots were all traded widely and often occur as grave goods. As well as indicating the considerable geographical extent of the regional trade networks, an interesting feature of the copper artifacts is that they exhibit much greater formal standardization than in the previous centuries, which would imply an increasing tendency toward their use as currency, of which the X-shaped ingots are the best known. The fact that some of the richest burials are those of children and young adults also suggests that social status was inherited rather than achieved and, as later historical sources indicate, that copper was regarded as a sign of rank.

Almost without exception, the establishment of farming communities across the continent witnessed an intensification of production and exchange. As a consequence, this often led to the emergence of craft specialists, or, as in West Africa, distinct craft castes, who became reliant on the exchange of products for their livelihood. In many parts of the continent, there was also a shift in the relations and organization of production from kin- and age-mate based systems to tributary, mercantile, or slavery modes, or some combination of these. In turn, this facilitated the accumulation of surpluses by certain individuals or groups, typically members of the ruling elite, and the emergence of social ranking. At the same time, the expansion of trading networks needed to satisfy the demand for prestige goods increasingly drew African societies into contact with other parts of the world, thereby helping integrate local production with the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea mercantile systems.

Of these, the Red Sea was probably the first to emerge as a major shipping route, linking the Mediterranean world with that of the Indian Ocean. At Ras Hafun on the

Somali coast, the remains of two sites ranging in date from the first to the fifth century, with quantities of pottery of Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Iranian origin as well as a few examples of Mediterranean and South Asian manufacture, indicate the importance of the route at least since Roman times. The recent discovery of a shipwreck containing Roman/Byzantine amphorae off Assarca Island, Eritrea, dated to between the fourth and seventh centuries, and ongoing excavations at the third to sixth century port of Berenike, on the Egyptian coast, provide additional confirmation of the importance of this route. These and related discoveries also confirm the historical value of the first-century manuscript known as the *Periplus of the Erthryean Sea*, which provided mariners with topographic information and sailing instructions concerning these seaboards, as far south as central Tanzania. Later texts, and especially the tenth-century accounts by the Arab geographer Al-Mas'udi, contain additional detail, particularly concerning the range of commodities being traded.

From these sources, and the results of numerous archaeological excavations at sites along the Swahili coast, it is evident that a wide range of manufactured goods, including glazed ceramics from the Gulf, Chinese porcelain and Indian earthenware as well as glass and copper artifacts were being imported. Beads—made of glass, shell, carnelian, and other types of stone, in various sizes and types—were also a common trade item, many of them probably originating in India. Cotton cloth was imported from India, and silk from China. As demand for textiles grew, however, they were also produced from locally grown cotton, as attested to by the large number of spindle whorls discovered on sites along the Indian Ocean coast. In exchange for imported goods, the documentary sources suggest that ivory, mangrove poles, tortoise shell, ambergris, gold, and slaves were among the major exports. As far as one can tell, the main sources of slaves were from communities living inland and from the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, many of whom were used to drain the swamps of southern Iraq during the ninth century. The primary source of gold was the Zimbabwe Plateau, where thousands of ancient mine workings have been recorded. This particular trade was especially instrumental in the emergence of the Zimbabwe state in the thirteenth century, and the corresponding rise in prominence of the Swahili trading port of Kilwa on the southern Tanzanian coast. The exchange and manufacture of ivory products, such as bangles, is also attested, particularly at the eleventh century site of Bambandyanalo near the Shashe-Limpopo confluence and Ingombe Ilede, but also at a number of sites fringing the Kalahari, including that of Mosu 1 on the edge of the Makgadikgadi Pans (Botswana).

Access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade also played an important part in the rise of the Axumite kingdom in the Ethiopian highlands, which flourished between the first and tenth centuries. Archaeological and textual evidence indicates that the principal imports were iron, precious metals, textiles, glass, and a wide range of ceramics. Exports included ivory, obsidian, gold, rhinoceros horn, various exotic live animals and slaves. The importance of long-distance, external trade to the Axumite economy is also attested by the presence of a local monetary system. Axum was the first state in sub-Saharan Africa to mint its own coinage, with the earliest known examples dated to the third century. The system appears to have been closely modeled, in terms of weights, forms, and standards, on that employed in the Byzantine world, with which the kingdom had well-established links.

Long-distance trade was also critical to the economies of a number of West African states in both the forest and savanna zones. Although extensive regional exchange systems had existed well beforehand, the direction, level and intensity of trade began to change toward the end of the first millennium CE with the expansion of the trans-Saharan caravan routes. Settlements situated near the forest-savanna or desert-savanna ecotones, such as Begho (Ghana) and Kong (Côte d'Ivoire) in the south and Tegdaoust (Mauritania) and Timbuktu and Gao (Mali) in the north, flourished precisely because of their geographical position and the opportunities this offered to access and control the movement of raw materials and products from a variety of ecological zones. As on the east side of the continent, the principle exports were raw materials, including gold, slaves, kola nuts, and ivory, which were exchanged for a variety of finished goods. Rock salt, extracted using slave labor from various mines deep in the Sahara, such as those at Idjil (Mauritania) and Taghaza (Mali), was also taken south and used to acquire goods from the forest zone. Aside from the stimulation of production, the expansion of trade in the first millennium had a number of social consequences, including facilitating the spread of Islam and the creation of groups of specialized traders, who often had their own residential areas within the major towns.

After 1500, the trans-Saharan trade began to decline in importance, largely because of increased competition from European traders who had begun to explore Africa's Atlantic seaboard. The Portuguese were the first to establish permanent trading stations along the coast, the fort at Elmina (Ghana) being perhaps the best known of these. Excavations here and at a number of other sixteenth- through eighteenth-century towns, trading posts, and villages between the Senegal and Niger deltas, have provided a wealth of information that supplements the various documentary sources concerning

the range of imports, their regional distribution and the economic and social impacts of this trade. Of these, the increase in warfare and raiding from the mid-seventeenth century, following the advent of the Atlantic slave trade and all its other associated consequences, were the most profound and far reaching. The demographic changes initiated by the introduction of new food crops, especially maize and cassava, also contributed to the transformation of West African societies during this era of contact. Nevertheless, participation in this trade also offered novel economic and political opportunities, enabling certain communities to increase their wealth and power at the expense of their neighbors, and the overall impression gained from the different sources is one of considerable cultural dynamism, entailing a combination of innovation, continuity, and resistance to foreign interference. Factors which in many ways could be said to have characterized exchange and production over the millennia throughout Africa.

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See also: **Gold: Production and Trade: West Africa; Iron Age (Later): East Africa; Salt; Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade.**

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Professions, Africans in: Colonial

Professions can be defined as salaried intellectual work requiring formal training and certification

beyond a level of secondary education. The core professions that fall under this definition in Africa during the colonial era include: lawyers, medical doctors, certified teachers, engineers, ministers of religion, journalists, and higher-level clerks. Some professions were not monolithic, but incorporated wide variations in training, income, and status; for this reason, lower-level clerks, interpreters, teachers, clerics, and catechists may be excluded. Also excluded are non-Western professions such as scholars of Islam and traditional healers or “native doctors,” who were rarely counted as professionals by colonial authorities. During the later colonial period more professions were added, such as nurses, social workers, dentists, pharmacists, and accountants. Most professionals were male; the only significant areas of professional employment for African women in the colonial period were nursing (including midwifery), teaching, and social work.

The professions were most developed in areas which saw the most extensive degree of Westernization and social change. Professionals tended to be concentrated in urban areas, and particularly in administrative and trading centers. Their rise was also linked to the establishment and development of local institutions to provide training and certification, though some students went to Europe or the United States for training throughout the colonial period.

In Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha established a system of schools to train a new professional elite, including administrators, military officers, engineers, veterinarians, doctors, midwives, and translators, from the 1820s onward. The Abu Za’hal Hospital was reported to have trained 420 medical students by the time of its move to Cairo in 1837, where it became the Qasr al-Aini Medical School. Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha also sent students to Europe for training. By the end of the Pasha’s reign in 1848 the nucleus of an indigenous professional elite had been established.

French settler colonialism ensured that the new professions emerged more slowly in the Maghrib. In Morocco, a steady trickle entered the professions from the time of Mawlay Hassan (1873–1994) on. In Tunisia, Franco-Arab schools formed a rudimentary school system beginning in the late nineteenth century, with the Sadiqiyya College at its apex. These schools began educating a new Tunisian elite that thereby gained access to professions; the future nationalist leader Habib Bourguiba is an example. In Algeria the Muslim *évolués* demanded improved educational opportunities after World War I. Some went to study in France, while others went to modern Islamic schools in Egypt or elsewhere. By 1955, 25,000 Muslims were said to be working in the “liberal professions” in the Maghrib, the majority being in Morocco and Algeria. Meanwhile, in Libya the indigenous professional elite

remained of negligible proportions throughout the relatively brief period of Italian colonialism.

The first Africans in the professions in West Africa appeared in the 1850s. They were drawn from Westernized Creole communities in Liberia and Sierra Leone, supplemented by members of the indigenous Gold Coast elite. Some settled in Lagos, where they formed the nucleus of the new professional class there. Eight of nine African medical doctors to practice in Nigeria before 1900 were from Sierra Leone, while the first African lawyer in Nigeria returned from the Gold Coast in 1886. As late as 1921 there were still only 73 persons classed as professionals in Southern Nigeria, a third of whom were “native foreigners.” In Northern Nigeria, the professions hardly developed at all before independence. By 1955 there were only 150 barristers and 160 physicians in the whole country, almost all of whom were Yoruba or Ibo. However, there was a growing number in professions such as teaching and nursing, as well as in engineering, surveying and other technical areas.

In the French territories of West Africa, as in the Belgian Congo, the colonial authorities were generally hostile or indifferent to the development of an independent professional class. However, training was provided for employment in the government service. By 1945 the *École William Ponty* (1903) had granted 2,800 teacher training certificates, while the *École de Médecine de l’Afrique Occidentale Française* in Dakar (1918) had graduated over 400 “medical aids” (called “doctors” but unable to practice outside the government service), as well as some midwives. African lawyers were rare in the French speaking territories, though a few were able to train in France before World War II.

The first African doctor in South Africa began practicing in the early 1880s, and the first barrister in 1910. However, the numbers in all professions grew only slowly before World War II. Although there were 48,714 listed as in professional or technical employment in South Africa by 1960 (the vast majority being nurses or teachers), both their training and salary scales were adversely affected by segregation and apartheid policies so that most had only a tenuous claim to professional status.

In East Africa, Makerere College offered a form of medical training to the Bugandan elite from 1913; by 1956 there were 48 Ganda doctors. African physicians in other East African territories also tended to be products of Makerere, including most of the 14 Africans practicing medicine in Tanganyika by 1961. Even so, Makerere graduates were not fully accredited as doctors by the colonial authorities until 1963. The legal profession was even less developed; the first African lawyer in Kenya did not begin practice until 1956,

while there were fewer than ten African lawyers in Tanganyika by the time of independence.

Finally, in British, Portuguese, and Belgian central and equatorial Africa, the virtual exclusion of Africans from secondary education until almost the end of the colonial period ensured that the professions were almost nonexistent there before the 1960s.

Although the professions were numerically insignificant in many parts of Africa throughout the colonial period, this did not prevent those who did acquire professional status from becoming the nucleus of a new social and political elite. Almost everywhere the nationalist movements that agitated against and ultimately overthrew colonial rule were led by members of the professions. Ultimately, their historical importance lies in this role.

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See also: **Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Thirty Years War for Southern African Liberation; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Northern Africa; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Sub-Saharan Africa; Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle.**

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Prophetic Movements: See Religion, Colonial Africa: Prophetic Movements.

Ptolemaic Dynasty: See Egypt, Ancient: Ptolemaic Dynasty: Historical Outline.

Punt and Its Neighbors

The name Punt occurs in ancient Egyptian sources to identify a region in eastern Africa that existed as a

distinct entity for a thousand years, c.2500–1170BCE, during which time the Egyptians traded with Punt to obtain myrrh, incense, gold, ebony, other rare woods, and animals. Originally, the mention of aromatics had suggested that Punt was located in the Middle East. But then came the discovery of the panorama of the land of Punt among the sculptured scenes in the memorial temple of Queen Hatshepsut (c.1470BCE), which included giraffes, baboons, rhinos, and palm trees, all indicating an East African setting.

Expeditions to and from Punt moved along the Red Sea. A port of the Middle Kingdom period (c.1900BCE) at Mersa Gawasis has inscriptions about ships visiting Punt, while the vessels sent by Queen Hatshepsut are portrayed as sailing over a sea full of various species of Red Sea fish. At a much later period, there is a description of rain falling upon the “mountain of Punt,” which drained into the Nile to augment the Nile flood. This indicates a location for Punt in the eastern Sudan, running south into northernmost Eritrea and Ethiopia, from the coast of the Red Sea inland, westward, toward the Nile south of the Fifth Cataract and the Atbara. This corresponds to the presence of various kinds of frankincense and myrrh trees on the borderlands of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and to that of ebony in northwest Ethiopia and Eritrea bordering on northeast Sudan.

The great mercantile expeditions to Punt were usually sent at times of Egyptian greatness and prosperity, when the pharaohs could stage such enterprises. Hence our most explicit records come from the height of the Old, Middle, and New Kingdoms, respectively. The earliest of these was that sent by Sahure (Fifth Dynasty), c.2450BCE, in the Old Kingdom or “Pyramid Age.” Then we have expeditions sent through the Red Sea port at Mersa Gawasis (ancient Sawaw) under Mentuhotep III, c.1975BCE, in the Eleventh Dynasty, and under Sesostri I, c.1920BCE (Twelfth Dynasty) in the Middle Kingdom. In the New Kingdom, there is the famous expedition celebrated in sculptured scenes by Queen Hatshepsut (Eighteenth Dynasty, c.1470BCE), and the report of another such under Ramses III (Twentieth Dynasty), the last of its kind, c.1170BCE. As the texts of Queen Hatshepsut make clear, the aim of such expeditions was to establish a direct link with the suppliers of the exotic products desired, to cut out middlemen (and thereby cut down on costs) and obtain significant quantities of merchandise. At other times, the trade was carried out, stage by stage (doubtless through many such middlemen) down the Nile into the Egyptian domain. During the New Kingdom at least, the inhabitants of Punt sometimes took the initiative, by sending their own modest-sized trading expeditions north up the Red Sea coast, directly to Egypt’s Red Sea port at Sawaw, where they would

trade with the Egyptian officials, who then sent on the products so obtained westward through the desert valley of Wadi Hammamat to the Nile at Koptos, for transit to the royal capitals at either Memphis or Thebes.

From the Egyptian sources it is clear that Punt was a large area divided up among various groups ruled by local chiefs; there was no centralized “kingdom” of Punt. Pile houses were in use, and cattle herding was practiced. The reason for the dissolution of Egypt’s links with Punt in the twelfth century BCE is unknown at the time of this writing. It has been suggested that South Arabian trade up to Palestine may have eclipsed it, or that climatic changes played some part.

The Egyptian records also permit a glimpse of other named regions and groups in eastern Africa, especially in the later second millennium BCE. Thus, between Punt and Egypt’s Nubian empire (to the Fourth Cataract) there existed an area called ‘Amaw, a source of gold that was outside Egyptian control, but traded through Punt. ‘Amaw probably occupied an area of the northeast Sudan between the Nile (from Abu Hamed to the Fifth Cataract) and the Red Sea mountains behind Sudan’s Red Sea coast from north of Ras Shagara south to near Suakin. Between Egypt’s border at the First Cataract, along the Nile south to the Second Cataract (and reaching into the Eastern Desert), was Wawat (Lower Nubia, in modern terms). The Nile Valley from the Second to the Fourth Cataracts (and adjoining Eastern Desert) was Kush (Upper Nubia), a name that could also be used to include Kush and Wawat together. These formed, at times, the two provinces of Egypt’s Nubian domains. Kush was also a kingdom in its own right at various periods, most visible from the first millennium BCE onward (the kingdom of Napata).


A much-discussed entity is Irem. It seems most likely that this ancient chiefdom (or even kingdom) was based in the Nile Valley from about Berber to Khartoum but reached north across the Bayuda desert routes toward the Nile. The wells on some such routes were disputed by Irem, and Sethos I and Ramses II of Egypt, in the thirteenth century BCE Irem repeatedly resisted Egyptian domination. The area of Medjau was probably that of the Red Sea hills between Wawat and the Red Sea, a land populated by Bedouins and marked by desert wells; Medjau is often compared with modern Beja. Finally, Kenset, also mentioned in ancient texts, may be the desert region west of the Nile, opposite Wawat. Parallel with the Nile, in Nubia, there is a line of lesser oases that may have fallen within its general limits.

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See also: **Egypt, Ancient, and Africa; Egypt, Ancient: Old Kingdom and Its Contacts to the South: Historical Outline; Kush; Nubia: Relations with Egypt.**

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Qalawun: *See* **Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty: Baybars, Qalawun, Mongols, 1250–1300.**

Qayrawan

Arab armies sweeping across North Africa from bases in Egypt began entering what is today Tunisia in the mid-seventh century (c.640–650), moving through the steppe regions that separated the coastal plain from the mountains. The first commanders set up military encampments at a site called al-Qarn (the hill), which afforded protection from enemy attack and was also safe from the floods that periodically devastated the area. The founding of the city of Qayrawan, a few miles to the southeast, is traditionally attributed to Uqba ibn Nafi, a veteran soldier appointed governor of the province of Ifriqiya (the Arabized form of the Latin “Africa”) in 670. Qayrawan served as a garrison city for Uqba’s bedouin troops and became the first permanent Arab administrative center in North Africa. It contained the first major mosque west of the Nile Valley (named, after its builder, Sidi Uqba), and was the point from which Islam and Arab rule spread farther west, into Algeria, Morocco, and Spain, as well as south, into and across the Sahara. Qayrawan’s links with Tunisia’s earliest Muslims made the city a place of pilgrimage—a popular local belief equating three visits to Qayrawan with one to Mecca—and clothed successive generations of its religious dignitaries, the *ulama*, with great prestige.

For more than a century after its founding, nearby Berbers subjected it to attacks. These were, at first, acts of resistance to the conquest, but they continued even after the Berbers’ conversion to Islam. On a number of occasions, the hostile Berbers occupied Qayrawan. The later forays were frequently inspired by ideas advocated by the Kharajis, a Muslim sect that emphasized the equality of all believers regardless of racial or familial

background. This doctrine proved particularly appealing to many Berbers, who believed that, despite their embrace of Islam, Arab rulers sent to Qayrawan from the east discriminated against them, and the Sunni religious establishment of the city held them in low esteem.

In 800, the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad named Ibrahim ibn Aghlab governor of Ifriqiya. Ibrahim stabilized the situation and laid the groundwork for his descendants to assert their independent control over the province, acknowledging the caliph’s spiritual, but not political, authority. The Aghlabids turned Qayrawan into a major commercial center through which goods from Sub-Saharan Africa passed en route to markets in the Middle East. Revenues earned from taxing commerce and agriculture, along with booty taken in their conquest of Sicily, enabled the Aghlabids to enrich the city with religious monuments and to undertake large-scale public works projects. During their era, Qayrawan became a center of Muslim intellectual life. Among the important scholars and thinkers who resided there were Malik ibn Anas, the founder of one of the four legal schools of thought recognized throughout the Muslim world, and Asad al-Furat and Imam Sahnun, jurists who synthesized Malik’s work and wrote commentaries on his teachings. The Aghlabids built a royal suburb, Raqqada, which acquired a reputation for luxury and decadence, in striking contrast with the austere religious atmosphere of Qayrawan. The dynasty’s excesses fueled a wave of unrest that culminated in its overthrow by the Fatimids, Shi’i Muslims who seized power in Ifriqiya in the early tenth century. When the Fatimids captured Egypt and moved their capital there in 969, they designated the Zirids, an allied Berber community, as their lieutenants in Ifriqiya. Like all of their predecessors since the Arab conquest, the Zirids used Qayrawan as their capital, but spent considerable amounts of time at Mansuriya, another royal suburb added to the city by the Fatimids.

In the years after the Fatimids' departure, the growing power of the Almoravid Berber confederation in western North Africa produced a shift in trans-Saharan trade routes toward Morocco, causing a reorientation of Ifriqiya's commercial activity from Qayrawan to cities on the Mediterranean. This setback was aggravated by the advent of the Banu Hilal, a group of Arab bedouin dispatched to Ifriqiya by the Fatimids to punish the Zirids for their insolence in acting as independent sovereigns. The Banu Hilal defeated the Zirids at the Battle of Haidaran, northwest of Qayrawan, in 1052, and captured and sacked the city itself five years later. The Zirid rulers retreated to Mahdiya, a coastal stronghold. In the centuries that followed, Tunis, with its Mediterranean focus, eclipsed Qayrawan as the province's center of political and economic gravity—so much so that the name Tunisia replaced Ifriqiya as the standard designation for the entire area. Nonetheless, Qayrawan's role as a religious center continued long after its political and economic power had dissipated.

Not until the early eighteenth century did Qayrawan again figure prominently in political affairs. Husayn ibn Ali, the founder of the Husaynid Dynasty (1705–1956), sought refuge there in the midst of a civil war instigated by his nephew Ali. The latter's forces besieged Qayrawan between 1735 and 1740, finally capturing and executing not only Husayn, but many of the city's prominent citizens who had approved of sheltering him. Qayrawan was a leading center in the 1864 revolt in southern and central Tunisia brought on by the imposition of heavy taxes on rural regions by the central government in Tunis. Qayrawan was also one of the few Tunisian cities where efforts, albeit unsuccessful ones, were made to resist the French occupation in 1881. The *ulama* of Qayrawan saw it as their task to safeguard the city's

rich Islamic heritage against foreign, non-Muslim encroachment.

After Tunisian independence, Qayrawan was the scene of the first serious demonstrations against President Habib Bourguiba's secularizing policies, which aimed at circumscribing the power of the *ulama*. His 1961 exhortation that Tunisians ignore the practice of fasting during the month of Ramadan because of its deleterious effect on the economy produced particularly strong resentment in the city. Two decades later, in the waning days of Bourguiba's presidency, Islamist groups formed to reverse what they regarded as Tunisia's abandonment of Islamic values and traditions enjoyed considerable support in Qayrawan.

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See also: **Maghrib.**

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R

Rabih ibn Fadl Allah

Rabih Fadl Allah (1845–1900), known as Rabih Zubayr, was of Hamaj origin born in an undesirable quarter of Khartoum, *Salamat al-Basha*, who sought his fortune from the slave trade in the upper Nile.

Rabih joined the slaving empire of Zubayr Pasha Rahma Mansur in the Bahr al-Ghazal and rose to prominence as his chief lieutenant by military skill and organizational abilities. He led Zubayr's personal army in its conquest of Darfur in 1874 until the incarceration of Zubayr in Cairo by the Khedive and the execution of his son and heir by Egyptian forces under Gessi Pasha in 1879. Rabih rallied the remnants of Zubayr's slave soldiers, and armed with rifles, muskets, and a few cannons welded them into an army personally loyal to him. He first plundered the Azande country, where he established a sultanate from 1880 to 1884 before moving westward with his *basinqir* (slave troops) to distance himself from the Egyptian army in the Bahr al-Ghazal. Rabih swept through Dar Banda in 1882 and the following year occupied Dar Kuti and Dar Runga until defeated by the forces of the Sultan of Wadai. He retired to Dar Kuti and Dar Runga, where he systematically enlisted the population into his slave regiments or sold them and their ivory for firearms and ammunition. In 1892 his army of 20,000-armed *basinqir* destroyed the neighboring state of Bagirmi and occupied the rich agricultural region between the Chari and Logone Rivers. The previous year his chief lieutenant, Muhammad al-Sanusi, had massacred the French mission of Paul Crampel coming up the Ubanghi under auspices of the Comité de l'Afrique Française that was to open relations with the sultans of the Sudanic states before crossing the Sahara to Algeria. He had no wish to provoke the French, and, consistent with his policy to remove himself from any authority other than his own, he marched northwest

into Borno. Between 1884 and 1896 his *basinqir* defeated the armies of Borno, destroying its capital at Kukawa. By 1896 Rabih was the ruler of Borno from his capital at Dikwa, south of Lake Chad, and for the first time in his career he settled there as a sultan of a Sudanic kingdom to plan further conquests in the west (to Kano and Sokoto), with which he most likely would have succeeded if not for the appearance of the French.

French policy in Africa was neither consistent nor formulated in Paris, but shaped by the colonial caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, commercial interests, and the geographical and scientific societies all organized by the Comité de l'Afrique Française to promote France overseas. More decisive in French African policy were not the civilians in Paris but the ambitious French officers in the Western Sudan, the *officiers soudannais*. They were men of action equipped with modern arms and modest intellect who raised insubordination to a heroic art in order to lead the patriotic expansion of France through the Sahara and into the Sudan to the exasperation of timid civilians more concerned with the eastern frontier of France than acquisitions of light soil in Africa. Although Rabih had plundered central Africa since 1880, he had not come to the attention of the French until 1893. Thereafter his whereabouts, alive or dead, remained unclear until 1896 when Emil Gentil, a naval officer with an insignificant rank, *enseigne de vaisseau*, left Brazzaville to establish a French presence on the Lower Chari River and Lake Chad. Gentil was not alone. At the turn of the century, France, Britain, and Germany were active sending expeditions into the African hinterland to occupy the spheres delimited to them on the map of Africa in Europe before any interloper might poach unsecured territory. Imperialism in Central Africa was a race along the spokes of a wheel of empire; its hub was Lake Chad, whose shores were ruled by none other than Rabih Zubayr.

Two other French expeditions had been launched to consolidate French claims in the Sahara and Sudan and then to rendezvous with Gentil to secure Lake Chad. The Central African mission, led by Captain Paul Voulet and Lieutenant Charles Chanoine, marched eastward from Say on the Niger in January 1899, cutting a swath of blood and destruction across Hausaland that equaled the ravages of Rabih's basinqir. Lieutenant Colonel Klobb, sent in haste to stop their slaughter, was killed by orders from Voulet, and the brutality continued as they advanced on Zinder until their *tirailleurs* (Africans, mostly from Senegal, recruited to serve in the French West African army) mutinied and shot both Voulet and Chanoine. The remnants of this ill-fated mission were reorganized, and managed to struggle on to Lake Chad to join the Foureau-Lamy Mission on February 18, 1900.

The Comité de l'Afrique Française organized another *missionnaire scientifique*, ostensibly led by the experienced Saharan explorer Fernand Foureau. In fact the expedition, under the command of Major François Lamy, bore a philanthropic facade in order to break the historic independence of the Tuareg, press on to Lake Chad, and rendezvous with Voulet and Gentil to overwhelm any African opposition. Lamy and his *tirailleurs* defeated the Tuareg but did not subdue them. His determined but much diminished contingent met the remains of the Voulet Central African Mission on the eastern shore of Lake Chad to march south, where the combined expedition established a camp on the right bank of the Chari opposite Guelfi on February 24, 1900. They crossed the Chari to capture Kusseri, Rabih's stronghold at the confluence of the Chari and Logone rivers 50 miles (80 kilometers) south of Lake Chad. On April 20, Emil Gentil arrived at Kusseri as the French administrator. His expedition was weary, decimated by disease, and Rabih Zubayr had massacred its advance guard under Henri Bretonnet in the Niellim Hills in July 1899. But by April 1900 the French *rendevous de Tchad* was complete.

The loss of Kusseri was the beginning of the end for Rabih Zubayr. Gentil authorized Major Lamy to take command of the three French missions and destroy Rabih Zubayr. The battle began at dawn on April 22, 1900. The *tirailleurs* attacked Rabih's stockade at Lakhta three miles from the walls of Kusseri and ended in the early afternoon when the severed head of Rabih Fadl Allah was brought to the dying Lamy to be carried on a stick through Kusseri. His body was thrown into the Chari. Commandant Lamy is largely forgotten, for the capital of colonial Chad in his name was replaced by Ndjamená in 1973 to commemorate the great spreading tree that provided the shade for the original fishing village of Am-Djamina across the river from Kusseri.

Rabih is still remembered. To some his implacable opposition to the French is heroic, but to the Africans of southern Chad his rule is a tragic tale of depopulation and devastation along the banks of the Chari and in Bagirmi and Borno. Not unlike Voulet and Chanoine in Hausaland, Rabih in Chad was known as *Le Maudit*—the Accursed.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

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Railways

Africa's rivers to its coasts are not navigable throughout the year, and early on did not provide access to the areas that European imperialists wanted to reach; railways were built to facilitate annexation and exploitation. In northern, western, and eastern Africa, imperial conquest and defending territorial claims against European rivals were the primary motives for railway building. Farther south, conquest was achieved largely without railways, which did help support imperial territorial claims but were built primarily to facilitate the exploitation of mineral resources. In central and parts of southern Africa, anticipation of profit from minerals attracted private finance. Reality did not always meet expectation, leaving some lines only partially built or financial failures, while inadequate planning meant that some lines were unable to achieve their intended purpose.

The imperial state financed construction in cases where it was considered essential to retain control or the prospects of financial returns were too low to attract purely private finance. In East Africa, imperial governments built the line from Mombasa to the Kenya-Uganda border, and later beyond the frontier and the line from Dar es Salaam to Lake Tanganyika. The lines helped to establish "effective occupation," protecting British and German claims against possible encroachment by the French, Portuguese, or one another, and facilitated rapid troop movements into the interior as needed for defense or suppressing African unrest.

In Algeria and elsewhere in North Africa the French awarded concessions for strategically essential railway construction, sometimes involving British capital. Many people involved had grandiose schemes for lines across the Sahara to connect with lines in French West African colonies, but ultimately the government had to

subsidize rail operations heavily. In Ethiopia the Italians also built railways for military purposes, but not necessarily successfully. Defeat by Menelik II at Aduwa in 1896 was largely a consequence of the railway having only been completed to Saati.

In North Africa, railways came to link areas farther from the coast, serving commercial as well as strategic purposes and joining the French colonies by rail. Post-conquest mineral development was facilitated by the existence of railways but had not been a motive for their construction. The same was true elsewhere: Gold Coast's line to Tarkwa, built to aid the conquest of Ashanti, also supported gold mining there. Lines without mineral traffic required continued government support, while a lack of initial planning frequently required substantial reorganization between the time of the two world wars and later. Any local traffic they generated was minimal and had little impact on railway or government revenues, though some wider economic development did result. Substantial mineral traffic, by contrast, made it possible for railways to be profitable and to carry agricultural produce at acceptably low rates.

This was the case farther south, where the Cape government built lines connecting the Kimberley diamond fields to Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London to facilitate the importing of machinery and other goods. The East London connection was built only to satisfy demands by Europeans in that area to link their port to a valuable hinterland. Revenues from mineral traffic effectively subsidized agricultural traffic, which was able to expand and continue to make a significant contribution to the economy. Natal agriculture benefited similarly from the rail link between Durban and the Transvaal, which neither needed nor substantially used the route.

The shortest railway between the Transvaal and the coast was to Lourenço Marques (Maputo), and was preferred by President Paul Kruger. After the Second South African (Boer) War, poor port facilities, rate manipulation on the Cape line, and cheaper European freight rates to Port Elizabeth meant that the Portuguese line did not attract substantial amounts of Transvaal traffic. It was only by linking railway traffic to permission to recruit Mozambican labor for the Rand gold mines that the Portuguese were able to redress the balance. Recruiting rights had been negotiated with the Chamber of Mines in 1897, but a *modus vivendi* confirming those rights, guaranteeing rail traffic, and giving Mozambique a preferential trade position in the mining area was reached in 1901. A formal agreement was signed in 1909 and, modified over the year, continued to operate—primarily in South Africa's favor—until shortly after Mozambique's independence.

The British South Africa Company (BSAC) was required to build a railway line to the northern (unspecified)

border of the area it was to administer and exploit. To bypass the Transvaal and as part of a vain attempt to get Bechuanaland included in chartered territory, Cecil Rhodes of the BSAC built the line through the protectorate to Bulawayo and on to Salisbury (Harare) to connect to the line through Mozambique to Beira, with a branch to Victoria Falls through the Wankie coal fields. The failure of Rhodesia's Second Rand to materialize drew the line to Broken Hill (Kabwe), but difficulties in separating zinc and lead ores there meant that the railway companies and chartered were only rescued from severe financial difficulties by reaching an agreement to link to the rich copper mines of Katanga (Shaba) in the Belgian Congo. From 1911 on, the line to Beira carried virtually all Katanga traffic. In 1928 two other lines became available.

The Benguela Railway was begun in 1904 with the intention of providing the shortest route from Katanga to the coast. World War I and opposition from Jan Smuts in South Africa delayed completion until 1928, by which time the Congo's own Bas-Congo to Katanga (BCK) line joined the mines to the navigable Kasai River. There copper was loaded on barges, shipped to Léopoldville (Kinshasa), loaded on trains, and taken around the rapids of the Lower Congo River to Matadi seaport. Politics and the need for BCK profits ensured its preference over the more direct Benguela route. Rhodesian Railways continued to benefit because of Katanga's reliance on Wankie coal to smelt copper ores.

Smaller lines in various places served as feeders for the main lines or navigable rivers, while others were started from the coast but never completed. Economic realities and political demands determined the structure and use of Africa's rail network, ultimately leaving many African countries better connected to the outside world than to their neighbors.

SIMON KATZENELLENBOGEN

See also: Ghana, Republic of: Colonial Period: Economy; Kenya: East African Protectorate and the Uganda Railway; Nigeria: Colonial Period: Railways, Mining, and Market Production; Peasant Production, Colonial; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Senegal: Colonial Period: Railways; Smuts, Jan C.; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899.

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**Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur: See Mauritius:
Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur, Government of.**

**Ramphela, Dr. Mamphela Aletta (1947–)
South African Doctor, Activist,
Intellectual, and Educationalist.**

As a college student, Mamphela Aletta Ramphela met Steve Biko, the founder of the black consciousness (BC) movement, and worked closely with him on a range of the South African Students Organisation's matters. She was married (unsuccessfully) to an old friend, then resumed her relationship with Biko after she qualified as a medical doctor in 1972. While a medical intern in Durban and then Port Elizabeth, she worked as an activist in the BC movement, then set up and ran Zanempilo, a health center near King William's Town, while also working toward a commerce degree with the University of South Africa. She was hoping that her relationship with Biko would be regularized when she was banished by the state to a remote area near Tzaneen in the northern Transvaal. There, in September 1977, when pregnant with their child, she heard the terrible news of Biko's murder by the police. Their son Hlumelo was born shortly afterward. She subsequently had another son by a second husband, but that marriage, like her first, did not last long.

After Biko's death Ramphela slowly built a new life for herself in Lenyenye township, continuing her work with the rural poor of the district and setting up the Ithuseng Community Health Programme, which opened in 1981. She obtained diplomas in tropical health and hygiene and public health from the University of the Witwatersrand. After her banishment was lifted in 1983 she moved, first to Port Elizabeth in 1984 and then to the University of Cape Town, where she worked with Professor Francis Wilson on the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa. She was formally appointed a research fellow at the university in 1986, where she collaborated with Wilson in the writing of *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge* (1989), which won the

Noma Award for Publishing in Africa. The two also coauthored *Children on the Frontline: A Report for Unicef on the Status of Children in South Africa* (1987).

Ramphela obtained a doctorate in social anthropology for a dissertation entitled "The Politics of Space: Life in the Migrant Labor Hostels in Cape Town," subsequently published as *A Bed Called Home* (1993). She also coedited and contributed to *Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko* (1991), and edited *Restoring the Land* (1992), a book on the ecological challenges facing postapartheid South Africa. As South Africa entered a new political dispensation, this forceful woman began to serve on the boards of major corporations and nongovernmental organizations. She rose to become chairman of the board of the Independent Development Trust, and was a member of the boards of Anglo American, the Old Mutual Foundation, and the Open Society Foundation.

Dr. Stuart Saunders, vice-chancellor of the University of Cape Town, saw in Ramphela a possible successor, suitable for the new democratic South Africa about to be born. Appointed a part-time deputy vice chancellor in 1991, she mainly concerned herself with issues of gender and race. She began to argue that the staff profile should be fundamentally transformed to bring the university in line with the demographics of the country. In September 1996 she took over as vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town, the first black woman to hold such a post in South Africa, at a ceremony graced with the presence of Nelson Mandela, with whom she had had close relations for some years. She was critical of many BC positions, and remained an independent voice, refusing to join the African National Congress. She spoke out against corruption in government, and in December 1999 against the "culture of silence" that she saw as a threat to the consolidation of democracy.

At the time that she was appointed vice chancellor, Ramphela had never taught in a university, headed an academic department, or been a dean, and was now thrust into a position in which she was mainly dependent on white men. After serving an eight-month overlap period with Saunders, she showed her determination to transform the university. She got the budgetary council to agree to balance the budget and set aside considerable funds for special projects, which included rebuilding the library and promoting the African Gender Institute and the African studies program. In early 1999 she was elected chair of the South African Vice Chancellors' Association. By then she had received a number of honorary degrees, the first from Hunter College (of the City University of New York) in 1984. Once vice chancellor, she received an award from Princeton University in 1997; an honorary doctorate of medicine from

Sheffield University in 1998; and an honorary doctorate of law from the University of Michigan in 1999.

In May of 2000 Ramphele was appointed managing director for human resource development at the World Bank, where she manages development programs in the areas of education and health.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

Biography

Born near Pietersburg in the Transvaal (now in Northern Province) on December 28, 1947. Attended a local high school, then the University of the North, before moving to the University of Natal to study medicine. Qualified as a medical doctor in 1972. Currently holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology from the University of Cape Town and has received numerous honorary degrees. Since 2000 has served as managing director for human resource development at the World Bank.

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Ramses II

Egyptian Pharaoh

The third ruler in Egypt's Nineteenth Dynasty, Ramses II reigned for just over 66 years in the thirteenth century BCE, from approximately 1279 to 1213. The Eighteenth Dynasty had extended Egypt's rule far south of its own border at the First Cataract, far up the Nile (through Nubia) to the Fourth Cataract, and also into the Levant, over Palestine, up the Mediterranean coast and into Syria. The sun-worshipping Akhenaten lost part of the Levantine possessions, and (with no heir of his own) the last Eighteenth Dynasty Pharaoh, Horemhab, appointed a military colleague to succeed him. This man, Ramses I, reigned only 16 months, but his strong-minded son Sethos I conducted war in the Levant and suppressed a revolt in Nubia; from him, Ramses II thus inherited the entire Nubian empire of his predecessors, and much of their Levantine holdings. Of military origin, the family hailed from the eastern delta area of Avaris on the main route to the Levant.



Ramses II (1290–1224BCE). Head of black granite from Karnak, Egypt. Now in the Museo Egizio, Turin, Italy. Anonymous. © Erich Lessing/Art Resource, New York.

Ramses II is remembered primarily for his wars, his vast construction program, and his extensive family. The most famous of the wars were those conducted in the Levant, where the main opposition came from the Hittite Empire, based in Anatolia (now Turkey), which had taken over north Syria and laid claim to central Syria, the source of the rivalry with Egypt. Ramses II had achieved a superficial success there on his first campaign in year 4 of the reign (c.1276–1275BCE). But close to the strategic center of Qadesh on the River Orontes, which Ramses intended to capture on his second campaign in year 5 (c.1275–1274BCE), the Hittite king sprang a trap on him, from which the young pharaoh only narrowly escaped, at the notorious Battle of Qadesh. Pharaohs never admitted loss or defeat; thus, he celebrated his personal bravery in a florid literary and pictorial record, using the walls of Egypt's great temples as a canvas. Later wars in Syria were indecisive. Eventually, the two powers signed a treaty of lasting peace and became allies.

A prosperous reign of over six decades enabled Ramses to honor the gods with large new temples and spectacular additions to old ones in important cities. Elsewhere, there was hardly a temple that did not receive some refurbishment in his name. In the eastern delta, Ramses II built an entirely new capital city, planned to rival the traditional centers at Memphis (near modern-day Cairo) and Thebes (at modern-day Luxor). South of Egypt, a series of temples in his name lined the Nile Valley between the First and Fourth Cataracts.

In his long reign, Ramses II had eight principal queens that included Nefertari, Istnofret (mother to his

successor), four princess queens (his own daughters), and two Hittite princesses. This takes no account of other consorts only briefly mentioned in the texts. He fathered approximately 50 sons and over 50 daughters.

The strong Egyptian belief in an afterlife often stimulated immense investment in elaborate tombs and funeral furnishings. Thus, Ramses II had his own great corridor tomb excavated deep in the rock in the Valley of the Kings at Thebes, and opposite his own tomb he created a huge underground mausoleum for the burials of many of his sons.

Under Ramses II, a traditional firm control over the Nubian Nile (First through Fourth Cataracts) was strenuously maintained by military means. In northern Nubia, just south of the First Cataract, Ramses as crown prince crushed a petty local revolt as part of his military training. Many years later, it was the pharaoh's regular state governor of these southern lands, the Viceroy of Nubia, who crushed other local revolts.

Otherwise, an enforced peace reigned. Egypt's interest in dominating the region was twofold: to mine the gold found in the eastern deserts between the Nile and the Red Sea, and to control downriver trade that brought goods northward from inner Africa. Taxes were also levied on the local chiefdoms along the Nile, both major (e.g., Irem) and minor, to the extent that (eventually) a proportion of the inhabitants may have moved southward, beyond Egyptian control, leaving fewer people to work the Nile-bank fields and bear taxation.

In Nubia as in Egypt, Ramses II emphasized the dominance of Egypt's gods and of himself as their representative and earthly manifestation. His own temple buildings in Nubia fall into three groups. First there are, in his father's last years and the early years of his own reign, the Beit el-Wali temple of Amun (state god of Egypt) and a temple at Quban for the local falcon god, south from the First Cataract. With these belong the temples at Aksha near the Second Cataract (for Ramses II as "Lord of Nubia"), at Amarah West and Napata (for Amun) between the Second and Third Cataracts, and below the Fourth Cataract, respectively. Second, there are the spectacular twin temples at Abu Simbel for the king (as Amun and Re) and Queen Nefertari (as the goddess Hathor), and the king as the sun god Re at Derr (all well north of Aksha). Third, there are two further temples to the king as Amun and Re, which were dedicated at Wadies-Sebua and Gerf Hussein, in northern Nubia. Thus was the ideology of royal supremacy stamped on the Nubian landscape in this reign.

K. A. KITCHEN

See also: Egypt, Ancient: New Kingdom and the Colonization of Nubia.

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Rawlings, Jerry John (1947–)

Ghanaian Politician and Former Coup Leader

Considered by many as the leading figure of the "new generation" of African leaders, Jerry Rawlings was born in June 1947 to a Scottish father, who had been a chemist in Accra, Ghana's capital, and an Ewe mother. Rawlings attended the prestigious Achimota Secondary School, leaving in 1966 to join the air force the following year. Following his initial cadet training he was posted to the No. 1 Communication Squadron. At the time of a military mutiny that he led in May 1979, he had achieved the rank of flight lieutenant and was attached to the No. 4 Jet Squadron in Accra. There he had begun to identify with a group within the armed forces who considered that there was an urgent need for radical political change in Ghana.

The genesis for a growth of radicalism in the armed forces was the dramatic decline in Ghana's economic and political fortunes. Ghana achieved independence from Britain in 1957, but by 1977 real wages were estimated to have fallen to a quarter of their 1972 value and authoritarian, military-led governments had become the norm. In an economic world of shortages and a political world of unaccountable governments, black markets and corruption, a demand grew for fundamental changes. With the government decidedly unpopular for its denial of democratic rights, the ever-growing economic hardship, and corruption among the military leadership, the military ruler, General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong was replaced by his deputy, General Fred Akuffo. The new administration promised to hold multiparty elections, but public dissatisfaction had reached the point where there were demands not just for civilian government but for the punishment of Acheampong and his colleagues for their corruption and mismanagement.

It was chiefly a burning sense of outrage and injustice occasioned by such events, as well as a serious and prolonged decline in living standards, that led Rawlings to lead a small-scale armed forces mutiny on May 15, 1979. Although Rawlings was arrested, two weeks later, on June 4, a successful military uprising erupted that resulted in his release. Appointed head of state by

the coup leaders, Rawlings sanctioned the executions for corruption of the three surviving former heads of state: Generals A. A. Afrifa, Akuffo, and Acheampong. While Rawlings claimed not to be personally in favor of such killings, he was aware that the anger of the ordinary soldiers was barely under control. Consequently, had those judged guilty for Ghana's decline not been killed, Rawlings believed that the "entire officer corps would have ended up being eliminated because they [the ordinary soldiers] would have seen this as just another example of officers' solidarity, another conspiracy of the officer corps to protect itself" (quoted in Okeke 1982, 52).

Following a brief, intense, yet unsuccessful, period of attempted "house cleaning" to rid the country of corruption, elections were held in September 1979. An elected civilian government led by Hilla Limann, whose People's National Party was molded on the Convention People's Party of the late president Kwame Nkrumah, came to power. The incompetence and corruption of this regime contributed to its short life. In addition, its assiduous hounding of Rawlings helped to precipitate a further military coup, led by him on December 31, 1981. This time Rawlings said he wanted a revolution, something that would lead to an appreciably more just equitable order in Ghana, in which ordinary people would have a say in the formation and execution of government policies.

The second phase of Ghana's postcolonial history, from 1981, is a story of evolving political stability and growing economic steadiness. But the period is nonetheless intensely controversial, centering on the figure of Rawlings: nothing divides Ghanaians more than their opinions regarding their ruler of the last two decades. All would agree that he has been a pivotal, absolutely central, figure in the country's political and economic fortunes; but he is a hated figure for some, a hero to others. Yet even his greatest critics might well agree that his initially chaotic, then authoritarian, and finally democratic rule has managed to take Ghana through the uncertainties of the 1970s to the political balance and comparative economic equilibrium of the 1990s.

Ghana's dire economy improved under Rawlings's leadership. By 1985, two years after the commencement of a highly controversial economic "structural adjustment program," Ghana had become the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) star pupil in Africa, held up as a staunch exponent and regional showcase example of economic reform. As a reward, over the next decade Ghana received more than \$9 billion (U.S.) in foreign loans, principally from the IMF and the World Bank. Primarily as a result of the economic reforms and foreign injections of funds, Ghana achieved significant growth between 1984 and 1993, with the economy

growing by an average of 5 per cent annually. With the population increasing by about 2.6 per cent a year, annual real growth of around 2.5 per cent was a highly commendable achievement, one of the best in Africa at the time. Since then, however, progress has been less swift.

Initially it appeared that the second Rawlings government would institute a one-party system, but later its political focus changed: an early socialist orientation gave way to a concern to build local-level democracy with a "developmentalist" focus, with mixed results. Under pressure from both home and abroad, Rawlings set in motion a transition to multiparty national politics in 1990, which resulted in presidential and legislative elections in 1992 and again in 1996. Both presidential elections were won by Rawlings, and the parliamentary polls by his party, the National Democratic Congress. This characterized the progress from personalist rule with socialist pretensions to an increasingly stable pluralist democracy under Rawlings's leadership. Under the 1992 constitution, Rawlings could not serve for a third term; John Kufuor won the presidency in the 2000 election.

JEFF HAYNES

Biography

Born in Accra in 1947. Formally educated at Achimota School, before joining the air force, where his involvement in radical politics developed. Led armed forces mutiny in May 1979 and was imprisoned. Released soon after to lead successful military coup d'état in June of that year. Handed over power to elected civilian government in September 1979. Led a further successful coup in December 1981. Served as head of Provisional National Defence Council government from 1982 to 1992, during which he presided over growing economic and political stability. Elected president in elections in 1992 and 1996.

See also: Ghana, Republic of: Achaempong Regime to the Third Republic, 1972–1981; Nkrumah, Kwame.

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**Red Sea: See Egypt, Ottoman, 1517–1798:
Nubia Slavery: Mediterranean, Red Sea,
Indian Ocean.**

Refugees

Refugees are people who are forced to leave their homelands owing to various reasons such as war, conflict, persecution, poverty, famine or environmental or social disintegration. The phenomenon of refugees reflects the major upheavals of modern times: World War I; the Russian Revolution (1917); the persecution of Jews under fascism and the horrors of World War II; the partition of India (1947); the partition of Palestine (1948); wars of liberation in Asia and Africa; the partition of Pakistan (1971); wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and Central America; the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; foreign intervention in Kosovo (1999); and the widening economic disparities within and among nations. All of these have caused massive refugee movement.

In the mid-1970s, only 2.5 million people could claim refugee status, about the same number as in the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1990s, the world's refugee population had risen to an alarming 27 million. In addition, there are even more who are victims of mass expulsions, forcible relocation programs, and internal flight within their own countries. According to 1999 estimates, there are probably more than 50 million people around the world today who might legitimately be described as "displaced" or "uprooted." As many as another 50 million refugees have been resettled or repatriated since the end of World War II.

In order to understand and analyze the phenomenon of refugees in the modern world, it is important to examine the causes of these mounting sources of human suffering. What conditions do these vulnerable people face? And what needs to be done to avoid this human tragedy?

No continent is immune to the mass displacement of people for one reason or another. Statistics reveal that the overwhelming majority of refugees today come from poor, developing countries and that most of them end up in other parts of the same Third World. Some of the countries least able to financially cope with asylum seekers have been most accepting of them. This is particularly true of the refugee situation in Africa.

Africa today has a refugee population (according to the United Nations High Command for Refugees, or

UNHCR) of over 7 million, in addition to some 15–18 million internally displaced. The vast majority of the refugees in Africa also come from the poorest countries on the continent such as Rwanda (2.2 million), Liberia (0.8 million), Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi, Angola, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mali. Most of the African refugees are also accommodated by countries unable to financially cope with the burden, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire; 1.7 million), Tanzania (0.9 million), Uganda, Sudan, Liberia, Kenya, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Burundi.

The refugee problem in Africa is predominantly a phenomenon of the postcolonial epoch, with the exception of a few cases, such as Rwanda, which was torn by civil strife shortly before independence; the North African states of Algeria and Morocco; Tunisia, in its anticolonial struggles; and the Portuguese and minority ruled countries of southern Africa. Colonial oppression and liberation wars apart, the root causes of the refugee problems in Africa derive directly from the prevalent concrete conditions in independent African countries. This results partly from Africa's colonial heritage and the manner in which the states are organized. The policy of "divide and rule" followed by colonial powers did not lead to a reasonable measure of national integration, a situation that created a fertile ground for interethnic conflicts once the heterogeneous groups gained independence as political units.

The most spectacular example of the complex mix of reasons why people leave their homes could be found in Africa. In some places hunger and malnutrition alone have created refugee flows. Overpopulation is another. Ethiopia, for instance, made the news in the 1970s and 1980s for its large flows of refugees seeking relief from a vicious circle of famine and civil war. By the end of 1993, almost 230,000 Ethiopians lived outside the country—mostly in Sudan—and at least half a million were internally displaced.

Just as desperate, but perhaps more complex, is the plight of Somalia. Clan warfare forced approximately half a million Somalis out of the country by the end of 1993, with another 700,000 internally displaced. After surviving years of civil war in the Somali capital Mogadishu, a large number of people fled the country by boats crossing the Red Sea to Yemen through the town of Bosaso early in 1999.

In the wake of the power struggle between the Hutus and the Tutsis, some 1.7 million Rwandans remained refugees in 1994. But despite the speed with which the crisis broke in April 1994, it had its roots in long-term trends. The hatred between the Hutus and the Tutsis was based on Rwanda's colonial history, the inequalities of its educational system, the ownership of

its land, the control of its government, and other deep, long-standing tensions. Popular analysis of the disaster neglected to take most of those contributing stresses into account. The various tensions were compounded by class conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. The underlying tension remains unresolved.

As a result of civil war since 1989 in the West African state of Liberia, more than 50 per cent of the country's 2.3 million people have been uprooted. Civil war in the neighboring state of Sierra Leone since 1997 led to massive refugee flows. Continuing civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, and the Sudan are taking a heavy toll of refugees. After about three decades of liberation war, Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopian occupation in 1993. However, new fighting erupted in 1998 between the two countries as a result of a border dispute creating new refugee flows. In North Africa, over 200,000 relatively unknown refugees from the war in Western Sahara have been living in camps in Southern Algeria.

In short, the refugee problem in Africa is indeed grave. Underdeveloped and burdened with the precarious task of welding numerous heterogeneous groups into viable modern states and confronted with both internal and external destabilizing forces, Africa is likely to have to deal with larger numbers of refugees unless urgent preventive and curative measures are taken.

In seeking durable solutions to the refugees' problems, the UNHCR has been attempting to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees and reintegration into their country of origin or, where this isn't feasible, integration into their country of asylum or resettlement in a third country. Thus, by the end of 1997, the UNHCR offered emergency assistance to some 3.5 million refugees worldwide, particularly in Africa (and especially in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Burundi).

However, attempts at a solution should be realistic enough to tackle the root causes and underlying problems rather than mere symptoms. Africa undoubtedly has a serious and continuing refugee problem, but there are also a certain number of elements that indicate the way to a solution. The first is the existence and work of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which provides a forum for African political leaders to tackle delicate and difficult questions—including that of refugees—in the spirit of the African tradition. The OAU Commission of the Fifteen on Refugees; the OAU Bureau on Refugees; and the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa (1993) have been making significant contributions.

The second positive element is the adoption by the OAU in 1969 of the OAU Convention on Specific Problems of African Refugees, which is the principal

legal instrument in Africa dedicated to refugee issues. It represents a pragmatic response to the realities of social, political, and economic turmoil that have pervaded the continent since the beginnings of the decolonization process in the 1950s and 1960s. This convention rightly stresses the need for an essentially humanitarian approach to the problem of refugees.

The third positive element is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Banjul Charter) adopted by the OAU in 1981, which came into force in 1986. Among others, the Banjul Charter significantly advanced the status of refugee law on the continent. The most important advance relates to the granting of asylum. While the 1969 OAU Convention only imposed a duty upon member states to receive refugees, Article 12(3) of the Banjul Charter confers the right to seek and obtain asylum in other countries when persecuted. Further, under Article 12(5), "the mass expulsion of non-nationals is prohibited."

However, reforming the legal mechanisms must be viewed as only one facet of the comprehensive effort to solve the refugee crisis. Moreover, even a seemingly foolproof legal system can at best only alleviate, not resolve, the crisis. Attempts at solution should, therefore, be realistic enough to tackle the root causes and underlying reasons for refugeeism in Africa as elsewhere. Today's refugee policy mainly consists of responding to crises as they happen rather than trying to prevent them.

Once refugees have left their homes, no amount of money or assistance can fully restore their past lives. The real solutions are those that will enable people to avoid flight in the first place. It is ironic that emergency assistance is siphoning away the funds needed to prevent future emergencies. Without concerted action to improve the stability of countries and the security of individuals, the problems that produce refugees, particularly in Africa, will continue to recur. As events in Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere indicate, today's human rights violations are tomorrow's refugee problems. Therefore, resolving refugee problems will mainly depend on a range of human rights activities, including developing pluralistic political systems, strengthening civil societies and education, reinforcing legal and government structures, and empowering local grassroots associations. The agonizing problem of refugees in Africa deserves at least as much attention as the OAU has given to the problem of colonialism in earlier days. Ultimately, it is a political problem, one that requires a political solution.

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See also: Rwanda: Genocide, Aftermath of; Rwanda: Genocide, 1994; Somalia: Independence, Conflict and Revolution.

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions

Statistics on the growth of numbers of Muslims and Christians in Africa at the period of the consolidation of colonization (i.e., in the decade around 1900) are impressionistic rather than accurate. What is reasonably clear, however, is that in Sub-Saharan Africa during the first half of the twentieth century the pace of growth of Christianity outstripped that of Islam; numbers of Christians increased from around 10 million in 1900 to more than 250 million by the 1990s, while the total number of African Muslims grew from about 34 million to nearly 300 million over the same period. Many of Africa's Muslims live in North Africa, but a substantial minority live below the Sahara. The continent is predominantly Muslim above the tenth parallel, which cuts through the northern regions of Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The same line roughly separates Muslim from non-Muslim in Sudan and Chad. Above the tenth parallel, Gambia, Senegal, Mali, and Niger are preponderantly Muslim.

During the colonial period in Africa (c. 1880–1960), conversion to Christianity and Islam was facilitated among Africans for various reasons. For many, conversion to Islam during this time was a manifestation of antipathy to European colonialism, an alternative modernizing influence opposed to the hegemony of the European Christian missionaries and their system of putative or actual enculturation. Islam provided converts with an alternative modernizing worldview, not defined by the colonial order and its foreign norms, but by a perceived “indigenous” religioculture that many Africans perceived as authentically closer to their existing cultures than the alien-imposed creed of Christianity. Conversion to Christianity, on the other hand, was seen by many Africans not only as a means

to acquire spiritual benefits, but also to gain access to both education and welfare, which, during the colonial period, were under the almost exclusive control of the various Christian missions.

Various parts of the continent received greater proselytization from one faith or the other; rarely were the faiths in direct competition once the embedding of colonial administrations had established religious spheres of influence from whence Christian missionaries were strongly encouraged to refrain from proselytizing by the colonial authorities. This was because the introduced system of “indirect rule” relied greatly on good relations between colonial authorities and local Muslim rulers. The best example of a mutually beneficial relationship between Europeans and local Muslim rulers is probably to be found in northern Nigeria, where Lord Lugard's system of indirect rule (actually first developed in Uganda, following Britain's Indian colonial experiences) owed much of its success to the fact that it tampered hardly at all with preexisting sociopolitical structures and cultural norms. The local Fulani elite, albeit slave owners, become intermediaries with the colonial administration as a reward for putting down a Mahdist revolt in Satiru in 1906. While northern Nigeria emerged as a testing ground for the efficacy of the policy of indirect rule, the Fulani political leaders were able to enlarge their sphere of influence—and to convert more Africans to Islam—by extending their supremacy over groups of previously autonomous non-Muslims, especially those in what were to become Plateau and Borno States.

Conversion to Christianity was greatly facilitated by the existence of colonial regimes, not least because the Europeans themselves tended to see their presence in Africa as necessary to “civilize” African “pagans.” While one kind of Christianity or another was rarely the “official” religion of European colonies in Africa, it was certainly the case that the faith's growth was encouraged by administrations in many, if not most, colonies, as it was regarded as a central facet of European civilization. As part of the claimed European mission in Africa was to enable Africans to one day run their own affairs, it was quite appropriate that Christian conversion would de facto be an integral facet of European rule.

However, until colonial rule was firmly established between approximately 1900 and 1920, Christian missions generally made relatively little headway. Nevertheless, the influence of the early missionaries was of importance. They were aware that teaching a love of Christ was insufficient on its own, realizing that many Africans regarded themselves as in need of material as well as spiritual assistance. It was therefore in the missionaries' interest to seek to improve material knowledge, skills, and well being via the potential African

converts' ability to read, write, and have access to Western methods of health protection. In this way, Africans would develop into more useful members of Christian society. Over time a class of educated Africans emerged, people who owed their upward mobility to the fact that they had converted to Christianity and been able to absorb the benefits of a mission education.

Turning to Islam, the faith spread from North Africa southward from the seventh century, predating European colonialism by hundreds of years, while its diffusion was multidirectional. Over time, Islam strongly established itself (reflected in both sociopolitical organization and religiocultural developments) among many communities in much of western and, to a lesser yet still significant degree, eastern Africa. Attempts at mass Christian conversion in those areas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were, on the whole, singularly unsuccessful. Islam made much less progress during the colonial era in central southern and southern Africa. Its relatively late arrival from the north came up against the rapid spread of European Christianity from the south in the last decades of the nineteenth century; as a result Islam's influence was minimized.

Islam followed preexisting trade routes, such as the North African and Indian Ocean ways; conversion was also by jihads (holy wars) during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth prior to World War I. In the late nineteenth century, the wider Muslim world experienced the slow demise of the Ottoman Empire and the near contemporaneous emergence of Saudi Arabia as champion of Wahhabist reformist ambitions. The growth of the Sufi brotherhoods and their reformist rivals were two developments in African Islam more or less contemporaneous with the consolidation of European rule; others were the extension of Muslim networks throughout much of Africa and beyond, and the introduction of new modernizing ideas. Many Muslims joined Sufi brotherhoods to further their own commercial networks, and were often receptive to the reformist ideas of the Wahhabiya and of pan-Islamic ideals in the context of urbanization and the development of ethnically oriented Muslim associative groups. Sufi brotherhoods prospered under colonial rule in many areas, including Senegal, Mauritania, Northern Nigeria, Tanganyika, Sudan, and Somaliland.

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See also: **Nigeria: Lugard, Administration and "Indirect Rule"; Religion: Islam, Growth of: Western Africa; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898.**

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches

There are three major ideological sources for what have commonly been called African Independent Churches. These Christian movements, which have an exclusively African membership and the appearance of freedom from white control, could have originated from a combination of mission Christianities and ideas from African traditional religion; selected elements from within mission Christianities resulting in a different emphasis; or, counterestablishment Christian movements in Europe and the United States. Initially, scholars placed emphasis on the first explanation, arguing that Christian Independency was syncretistic in a pejorative sense—a confused mixing of ideas. This thesis, which was often advanced by theologians who had a stake in defending religious boundaries, has been discredited. Increasingly, explanations have focused on the second and third sets of ideological sources.

What has often been called the Ethiopian or separatist type of Independency took wholesale from the mission churches from which it seceded. Movements such as the Native Baptist Church founded in Lagos in 1888 or the Wesleyan-derived Ethiopian Church, founded in Pretoria in 1892, did not challenge the doctrine, theology, or organizational structures of their mission church "parents." In fact, they often clung to them with great loyalty. Their separation was more a protest against white missionary arrogance, which had hardened in the imperialist age, and a desire to have a degree of synthesis with African culture and aspiration. Perennially short of resources, even if they did link up with African American churches, these separatist movements remained a minority option attractive to more politically minded black Christian elites.

The other major type of Independent Christian movement, often known as Zionist, Aladura, or spirit churches, is also selected from mission Christianities. Although their characteristic religious enthusiasm might resemble African traditional spirit possession, it derived in part from missionary revivalism. Thus, the Zimbabwean *Vapostori* (Apostolic) movements founded

by the Shona prophets Johanne Maranke and Johanne Masowe in the 1930s were influenced by Dutch Reformed Church and Methodist revivalism, respectively, while their members' "exotic" white robes and staffs derived from Catholic and Anglican sources. The robe-wearing Aladuras of West Africa likewise drew much from their Anglican heritage.

The third source of Independency was counter-establishment Christianity. This wave of mission activity had its social sources in late-nineteenth-century North America and Europe, and it reflected the aspirations of the proletariat and the petite bourgeoisie, who had been sidelined by industrial society. It was also a protest against the privilege and secularization of establishment churches and an increasingly "established" nonconformity. Counterestablishment Christian movements were often millennial, believing in the imminent return of Christ and the commencement of a thousand years of peace and justice. The urgency of this adventist message gave the movements a strong missionary impulse. The Chicago-based Zionists arrived in South Africa in 1904 to help spawn a host of southern African Zionist movements. Another millennial movement was Elliot Kamwana's Kitawala, an Africanized version of Watchtower, which he founded in Malawi in 1908. His message of future black liberation in contrast to the present-day excesses of forced labor, taxation, and the rule of chiefs was one of the more politically explicit variants of Independency, which the colonial authorities found unsettling.

The most vital strand of counterestablishment Christianity was Pentecostalism, which rapidly evolved into a global movement at the turn of the twentieth century. Its apostolic message of adventism, divine healing and emancipation by the Holy Spirit combined with mainline missionary revivalism to animate South African Zionism, Zimbabwean apostolic Christianity, and the West African Aladura Church into movements of baptism and witch cleansing.

The causes and motivations for Independency are as diverse as its ideological sources. First, the movement was clearly Protestant, having little effect in Catholic or Islamic areas. Separation on the grounds of truth was a defining feature of Protestantism, and once Africans had their own vernacular versions of scripture, they found ample reasons for contesting the missionary message, polygamy being a prime issue.

The second major factor was the pressure from African traditional religion. Contrary to early scholarly explanation of Independency, it did not adopt aspects of African traditional religion as much as compete with it, engaging with the same material and existential issues such as health and healing, purity, and protection from evil. Pioneer missionaries had spent much time with

the sick, their often imprecise medicine not so dissimilar from that of the traditional healer. As missionary medicine became professionalized and secularized in the mission hospital, so did African Christian prophets institute movements of healing in the villages. In west central Africa there is a centuries-old cyclical pattern of societal renewal. Simon Kimbangu's millennial movement of witch cleansing and the destruction of fetishes, founded in the 1920s, stood within this tradition, though its conceptualization of evil went further, collapsing all traditional cults into the category of demonic.

Finally, Independent Christianity must be integrated into a spectrum of popular Christianities. Missionaries were always overstretched, taken up with building, administration, and Bible translation, with the result that evangelization was often left to African catechists and evangelists. In the early decades of the twentieth century, movements of mass conversion moved at such a pace that even missionary supervision was not possible. It was at this juncture that the Independent Church prophet often took on the missionary's task. Some of these African leaders, such as the Grebo Episcopalian William Wade Harris, did not even view their mission as schismatic. Many of Harris's converts initially joined the Catholic Church in the Côte d'Ivoire and the Methodist Church in the Gold Coast, with the formal Harris Church only emerging subsequently. It is noteworthy how Christian Independency took strong root during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when mission Christianity was shrinking, along with its health and educational services.

While Independent Churches continued to multiply throughout the 1940s and 1950s, these were often small-scale movements born out of schism with larger ones. The last major movement was the Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina, founded in Zambia, one of the last colonies to be thoroughly missionized. The 1950s were more important for institutionalization of the major movements. Bible colleges, the ownership of buildings, bureaucratization, and the implementation of routine meant that Independency became more like the missionary movements it was so critical of a generation earlier.

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See also: **Kimbangu, Simon, and Kimbanguism; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Religion, Colonial Africa: Prophetic Movements; Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Independence and Churches, Mission-Linked and Independent; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Neo-Pentecostalism; Zambia: Religious Movements.**

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Indigenous Religion

Understanding indigenous religion at any time in African history is difficult for several reasons. First, its practitioners usually passed their traditions orally from one generation to the next and kept no written records of their beliefs and practices. Second, when we do have written accounts of African religious beliefs, they are often seen through the prism of either Christianity or Islam. Christian missionaries, in particular, were interested in understanding the locals' beliefs in order to communicate better their own religion to their would-be converts. African religious belief systems, then, are almost always in the shadow of one of the two world religions that are practiced on the continent. A further complication is that scholars rarely study African



Fetish market in Benin, 1930s. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

religions in historical perspective, but rather use an anthropological or synchronic approach (Ajayi and Ayandele 1974; Magesa 1997). The result is that they are often seen as timeless and unchanging. Unfortunately, we currently have little understanding of historical changes in African religion.

By the colonial era, Islam had established itself as a significant religion in North, West, and coastal East Africa. Christianity, on the other hand, had just recently been introduced to most of the continent. The era of colonialism, then, was one in which three major religious traditions influenced the history of the continent. In some cases, the perceived parallels between Islam and African beliefs or Christianity and African beliefs eased conversion to the world religions. For example, in Ufipa, Tanzania, Fipa likened Fipa ancestors to Catholic saints (Smythe 1999). On the other hand, such congruence could also lead to conflict. Christian missionaries and African chiefs often vied for religious and political power in African societies because their sources for authority overlapped in multiple ways. For example, chiefs' rain-making abilities in southern Africa were threatened by the missionaries' claim that prayer to God brought the rain (Landau 1995, pp.23–27).

While not given equal attention in the literature, the importance of African religious beliefs during the colonial period cannot be overestimated. We know from incidences like the Maji Maji rebellion in southeastern Tanganyika, the Shona rebellion in colonial Southern Rhodesia, and the Mau Mau in colonial Kenya (Kibicho 1978, pp.380–382) that religious beliefs played a role in constructing anticolonial resistance. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, Shona rebelled against the British South Africa Company. One of the leaders of the rebellion was a spirit medium of one of the most eminent *mhondoro* (royal ancestors) (Lan 1985). Another lesser-known movement, the Nyabingi spirit cult, offered the most sustained challenge to British colonial power in Uganda (Hansen 1995). In most cases, these were not reactionary movements drawing exclusively on beliefs and ideology of the past, but they incorporated new elements as well. During the Maji Maji rebellion, for example, Bokero, the priest of a nature spirit, began to distribute water (*maji*) that would repel German bullets. While the appeal to medicine linked the movement to African beliefs in medicine that repelled evil, the attempt to conquer European military might with sacred water was new. As a result of these and other activities that colonial authorities deemed a threat to their power, much African religious activity was circumscribed during the period and driven underground (Vansina 1995, p.476).

The health of the community lay at the heart of African spirituality from early in the common era

(Magesa 1997, pp.66–71). This involved maintaining the health and reproductive capacities of the living, ensuring communication between the living and the ancestors, and protection of the land and living resources. During the colonial period, new political, economic, and spiritual authorities in African societies challenged the effectiveness of indigenous ideas to meet Africans' spiritual needs. Yet, these beliefs, throughout the colonial era, provided a means of dealing with individual and community fears and difficulties resulting from the morally bewildering colonial onslaught.

For example, the social and economic dislocation that occurred as a result of resettlement for transportation and taxation purposes, disease management, and labor migration all contributed to more heterogeneous communities where the fear of witchcraft was much greater. Africans believed that evil originated in witchcraft. It is not surprising, then, that as Africans faced rapid changes, fears of evil surfaced from time to time as witchcraft accusations. In colonial Northern Rhodesia, for example, the *mucapi* movement was popular among the Bemba in 1934 and caught the attention of the colonial authorities (Richards 1935). The *Bamucapi* (the witch-finders), according to Audrey Richards, wore European clothing, sold their medicine in Western-style bottles, used mirrors, and preached before administering medicine—all factors reflecting Western influence and power. At the same time, the Bamucapi called on the Bemba God and insisted that the medicine would only work if certain cultural taboos were kept. The syncretic nature of this witch-finder movement indicates that Bemba recognized dual sources of power. More important, though, the Bamucapi movement, while drawing on indigenous beliefs of evil and social alienation, marks a period of heightened personal and communal difficulty as the British colonial economy disrupted Africans' lives.

One of the phenomena of the colonial era that has continued into the postcolonial era is the creation of Christian churches under African leadership. Africans founded them throughout the continent. One of these churches, the Roho Church of Western Kenya, emerged in the 1930s. Like so many of these religious movements, it began with the prophetic and charismatic leadership of a missionary-trained man, Alfayo Mango. The Roho Church, like other religious movements that developed in Eastern Africa in the 1930s, emphasized the role of the Holy Spirit as a messenger from the sacred world, just as African ancestors were. In addition, in the early years of the church, evangelization often included church leaders' healing of the sick, which blended Luo and Roho practices of possession, singing, and sacrifice. Healing was a fundamental aspect of

African indigenous beliefs and directly linked to reproduction. Frequently, an individual's conversion to movements like the Roho Church followed an illness and successful treatment by one of the church's members. Rather than signaling the demise of indigenous religions, these churches manifest the importance of these beliefs to Africans as well as the importance of local autonomy in African religion. It is also important to recognize, however, that these churches also had Christian roots, as demonstrated by their doctrine and use of the Bible (Hoehler-Fatton 1996).

By the end of the colonial period, half of Africans remained practitioners of their indigenous religions (Vansina 1995, p.475). Currently, whether official censuses reveal it or not (Kibicho 1978, p.371) the number of Africans who practice African traditional religious beliefs—while members of a world religion or not—is substantial, and reflects the close link between culture and religion in African societies. That the records we have of the colonial period, predominantly written by foreigners, indicate a persistent maintenance of belief in ancestors, witchcraft, and the connection between spirituality and healing suggests the dynamism and durability of African indigenous religions.

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements

Islam first came to Africa during the conquest of Egypt in the seventh century, from where it spread across North Africa toward what is now Mauritania. Two hundred years later, the religion had spread across the continent to the nomads of the central and western Sahara regions, and further east into the Horn of Africa; by the eleventh century, Islam had begun to travel southward into Sub-Saharan Africa. Spread sometimes through warfare but primarily through trade, Islam became the religion of many of Africa's great historical states, such as Mali, the Songhay empire, Ghana, the Hausa states, and Kanem-Bornu. Islam provided not only a religion, but also a linguistic and cultural framework that facilitated economic transactions and the exchange of political and social ideas. By the time the French invaded Algeria in 1830, ushering in the era of European colonialism in Africa, Islam was well established. During the colonial period, various Islamic orders and movements (often Sufi) served to articulate and organize political opposition to foreign rule and to provide followers with an alternative model of social organization.

One of the best examples of this is in the Sudan. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a boatbuilder's son, declared himself to be the Mahdi ("divinely guided one") and began mobilizing supporters against what he viewed as the two primary enemies: Anglo-Egyptian control of the Sudan, and the orthodox *'ulama* who supported the administration. The Mahdi advocated a return to the ways of the prophet Muhammad as the only means of solving Sudan's internal problems and denounced the visible manifestations of foreign rule (e.g., prostitution, gambling, and alcohol consumption). By 1882, the Mahdi had mobilized enough support to take control of most important parts of the country; in 1885, his forces succeeded in taking the capital city of Khartoum from an Anglo-Egyptian force under the command of British general Sir Charles George Gordon (who was then killed by the Mahdists). Shortly after taking Khartoum, the Mahdi also died, but his role as a political and religious leader was taken by the *khalifa* 'Abdullah, who vowed to continue upholding the late Mahdi's ideology and to expand the Mahdist state from its new capital at Omdurman. In accordance with the Mahdi's beliefs, the only law of the new state was the Shari'a. Though Britain invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882, it did not mount a campaign to retake the Sudan until 1897. In 1898,

at the Battle of Omdurman, the British, armed with modern military equipment, succeeding in devastating the Mahdist forces, and the Sudan was restored to Anglo-Egyptian control. Nonetheless, the Mahdi's short-lived state provides an excellent example of the ability of reformist religious leaders to mobilize resistance to foreign rule.

In Libya, the Sanusiyya brotherhood also called for a return to the essentials of Islam, organized resistance to colonization, and played an important role in state formation. The Sanusiyya brotherhood (a rather puritanical sect of Sufism) was established in 1837 by Sidi Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Sanusi with the goal of leading people back to the simple beliefs and lifestyles of the early years of Islam; in doing so, the movement built upon the teachings of the Moroccan jurist and Sufi shaykh Ahmed ibn Idris. Al-Sanusi alienated the orthodox *'ulama* by asserting his right to *ijtihad* (individual judgment) and rejecting Islamic law based on the *ijma* (consensus) of the *'ulama*. The Sanusiyya was also a missionary order in that it aimed at converting the non-Muslim inhabitants of the region to Islam, and it is a prime example of the new orientation of many rising Sufi orders in nineteenth-century Africa: rather than focusing purely on spiritual matters and the next world, these reformist Sufi orders instead redefined their focus as activism in this world. Led by a man known as the Grand Sanusi (a religious and political figure to whom many pledged personal allegiance), the Sanusiyyah brotherhood and their lodges (called *zawiyas*) spread throughout Cyrenaica (and to a lesser extent throughout Tripolitania) in the nineteenth century. In fact, the shaykhs of the *zawiyas* held enormous political and spiritual influence at this time and remained the de facto political leaders of Cyrenaica throughout the nineteenth century and during Italian colonization. The *zawiyas* provided material assistance and spiritual and political guidance to members. They thus helped create a sense of unity among their members and became a focal point for resistance to French influence from the south (during the Ottoman period) and later to Italian colonization. The Sanusiyyah leadership were the political spokespeople for Libya in negotiations with the Italians and with the British after World War II. The first (and last) king of Libya, Idris I, was the Grand Sanusi, or leader of the Sanusiyyah brotherhood at the time he was made king, which illustrates the importance and influence of the order. In short, the Sanusiyyah brotherhood helped foster religious and political unity, established a framework for organized resistance to colonization, and provided political and religious leadership, and its leader became the first political head of postindependence Libya.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Fulbe people mounted a series of jihads (holy wars)

from Senegal to Cameroon. Like the other two movements mentioned, this movement was geared toward social and religious reform; unlike the Mahdiyya movement and the Sanusiyyah brotherhood, however, the Fulbe jihads were not directly tied to European colonialism. The most notable of the Fulbe jihads took place in northern Nigeria and was led by Usuman dan Fodio. Dan Fodio was among a generation of Islamic reformers in Africa who were influenced by the increasing presence of European influence (mainly missionaries and traders) and who sought to reform Islam in order to strengthen society and respond to political problems. Dan Fodio had served the Hausa *sarki* of Gobir and the *sarki*'s son Yunfa. When dan Fodio became disenchanted with Yunfa's rule, he and a group of his supporters withdrew to the remote area of Gudu, where they were numerous enough to comprise a sizable fighting force. The result was the appointment of dan Fodio as *Sarkin Musulmi* (Commander of the Faithful) and the proclamation of jihad against the Hausa ruling elite. The movement gathered to itself not only religious reformers but also a variety of disenchanted groups: educated urban Fulbe, who opposed Hausa corruption; urban Hausa, who wished to free themselves from the domination of the Hausa ruling families; and rural Fulbe, who supported their urban kinfolk. The result was the formation of a number of Fulbe emirates under the nominal control of Usuman dan Fodio (later under his son Muhammad Bello and his brother Abdallah, ruling from Sokoto and Gwandu, respectively). The leaders of the new "state" (it lacked any real centralization and had no unified military or bureaucracy) then focused on spreading Islam from urban centers further into rural areas. The religious reformers then became themselves a ruling elite and their reformist zeal fizzled out; when British forces came to northern Nigeria, they used the Fulbe emirs in colonial government. The emirs taxed, policed, and administered justice to the Hausa subjects.

In Algeria in 1832, 'Abd al-Qadir, the emir of Mascara and the son of a well-known *marabout* (saint) began another jihad, this time against the French invasion and occupation of Algeria that had begun in 1830. Though perhaps a more overtly political movement than the Mahdiyya and the Sanusiyyah, the jihad of 'Abd al-Qadir succeeded in drawing numerous supporters and used Islam as a rallying point for opposition to foreign rule. The emir succeeded in forming his own state in western and central Algeria; in 1841, French forces began systematically crushing the new state. The net result of the French policy of total colonization in Algeria was the effective eradication of any real Algerian national identity by about 1870. When large-scale organized resistance to French colonization mobilized again after WWII, it was not explicitly religious

in nature and cannot properly be called an Islamic movement. Yet since independence was linked to the recovery of Algerian culture, including the reassertion of an Islamic identity, it must be mentioned here.

Other movements can be mentioned as well. Sayid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, another Sufi leader, organized groups of Somali tribesmen around himself and his reformist ideas in 1900; he succeeded in preventing European takeover until 1920. Shaykh 'Umar Tal used the reformist teachings of the Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood and called for jihad against non-Muslim states to found a vast centralized empire (the Futaanke or Tukolor empire) centered at Dingirai; in the process, Shaykh 'Umar came into conflict with the French on the Senegal River. (Though the military conflict was indecisive and the French remained in control of the river, Shaykh 'Umar continued his conquests in nearby areas.)

In addition to these political movements, there was also a vast amount of intellectual energy being expended in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on how to best reform Islamic societies. Though not centered around any particular order, the writings of men like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh surely are excellent examples of calls for reform in response to western encroachment and internal political and social disorder. The activist Sufi orders, the less explicitly religiously oriented movements that used Islam as a way to mobilize support for secular political goals, and the intellectual movements toward reform are all testament to the ability of religious orders, leaders, and movements to rally support for social and political change in colonial Africa.

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries

Missions were an important physical presence in colonial Africa, both in terms of the number of white mission workers in the field (10,000 men and women in 1910) and the size of their landholdings: by the

1920s, missions owned 400,000 acres in colonial Zimbabwe, while the Church of Scotland's Kibwezi mission in Kenya held 64,000 acres.

Not surprisingly, many Africanist commentators have epitomized white missionaries as the spiritual arm of colonialism, echoing the traditional African saying, "In the beginning we had the land, and the missionaries had the Bible; now we have the Bible and they have the land." This view has been questioned by more recent research, which suggests, to the contrary, that where cooperation between mission and imperialism did occur (for instance, in western Zimbabwe in 1889–1890), this did not signify identical objectives. At partition, the goal of missionaries was, quite simply, to foster the Christian evangelization in Africa through the best means they could find.

However, the sheer scope of the enterprise, the rapidity with which colonial rule was established, and, for most of Africa, the dearth of official agencies on the ground served to deflect missions from this objective. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the provision of school education quickly became *a priority*, initially to enable potential converts to read the Bible (in the case of Protestants) or the Catechism (in the case of Roman Catholics). Postpartition economic development created a need for literate Africans, and in many parts of the continent the colonial state provided grants-in-aid to mission schools to facilitate this output. Education thus became a central mission concern, and represented the missions' major contribution to the colonial order. As late as 1945, 96.4 per cent of pupils in British tropical Africa were attending mission schools. Missionaries were also responsible for starting some of the pioneer secondary schools in Africa, destined to become cradles of black nationalism, such as Lovedale in South Africa and Achimota in Ghana. It has been claimed that, in acting as admittedly unwitting midwives to this process, missionaries made their major contribution to postcolonial Africa.

To a lesser extent they also pioneered the provision of health care, Albert Schweitzer's hospital at Lambaréné (Gabon) being the best known example. Up and down colonial Africa, the often rudimentary mission dispensary treated hundreds of outpatients, while women missionaries advised mothers on baby and child care.

The bulk of Christian conversion under the colonial order seems, ironically, to have stemmed from the work of black evangelists and catechists (rather than white missionaries) who often worked far away from mission stations. Their efforts were supplemented by those of the many black independent churches that emerged from the 1890s onward, starting in South Africa and Nigeria. The result was a series of largely spontaneous mass conversions in the first forty years of

the colonial period. It has been estimated that in 1950 there were at least 23 million Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa, a testimony to this work (though it should be noted that few inroads were made into Islamized areas). From this evangelization emerged the village Christianity that has become a significant feature of rural areas in postcolonial Africa.

Missions contributed in other ways to the colonial order by becoming, consciously and unconsciously, agents of acculturation. The "square" house, as opposed to the traditional "round" hut, became a symbol of "civilization" on the Cape's Eastern Frontier. To this could be added the strict isolation of black Catholic seminarians from the temptations of village life, the frequent censure of traditional dancing as immodest, and the condemnation of polygamy (properly, *polygyny*) as a sign of sexual license and/or the degradation of women by black males.

With few exceptions (such as the missionary poet Arthur Shearly Cripps, who believed that the receipt of grants-in-aid from colonial governments made them less effective champions of African interests), missions played a generally subservient and unquestioning role in the colonial order between the two world wars. J. H. Oldham, secretary of the International Missionary Council, epitomized this stance in his belief that the interests of colonial government, missions, and white settlers alike could be harmonized. A similar relationship developed in the Belgian Congo and Portuguese territories after Concordats were reached with Rome in 1908 and 1940, respectively; in both instances this enabled a particularly aggressive form of local mission work that prevailed up to the threshold of Vatican II in the late 1950s.

The post-World War II period was one of considerable strain, with black nationalists accusing white missionaries of being paternalistic at best and hypocritical accomplices of imperial oppression at worst. Relations were particularly sour in areas where there were large white settler communities, as expressed in the Kikuyu saying, "There is no difference between missionary and settler." In return, conservative missionaries accused nationalists of being power hungry, or of acting as tools of international communism. However, with the sole exception of the Congo, where missions were attacked by rebels in the postindependence civil war, the end of colonial rule in black Africa passed peacefully for white missionaries. And once the impediment of colonial rule had been removed, they found that they were more than welcome to stay on and continue to contribute to the development of the new states.

Meanwhile, the missionary movement itself was undergoing a kind of spiritual decolonization, typified by a more understanding attitude toward traditional religion; the incorporation of African forms into worship,

including dancing and drumming; and, after a considerable interval, the Africanization of local churches, as exemplified by the consecration in 1951 of the first Anglican diocesan bishop in Nigeria since Samuel Crowther, and Pope Paul VI's appointing of Laurean Rugambwa as cardinal.

The so-called white south held out, seemingly disregarding the winds of change in black Africa. In South Africa, the English-speaking mission churches found themselves poised uncomfortably in the middle of a debate between black antiapartheid churchmen such as Desmond Tutu, and the Dutch Reformed Church, which held that racial separation had been ordained by God. It was only after the political crisis of the mid-1980s, and the publication of the Kairos Document calling upon churches to employ civil disobedience against the apartheid regime, that they began to respond more effectively.

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See also: Congo (Brazzaville), People's Republic of: Independence, Revolution, 1958–1979; Education in Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa; Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule; Zimbabwe: 1880s.

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Prophetic Movements

During the colonial period in Africa (c.1880–1960), prophetic movements emerged in various geographic locations in response to changes (often encapsulated under the term *modernization*) galvanized by the novel presence of Europeans and their administrations. Evolving in response to some kind of social crisis, prophetic movements were founded by men and women claiming to have had a mystical experience that gave them the status of an authentic prophet to their followers. Reflecting this, such movements had clear millenarian hopes, in which a divinity would help its followers to improve their lot on earth. Followers of prophetic movements would normally reject established authority, especially if, like European colonial

power, it was not regarded as authentic. In such cases, there was a selective rejection and retention of aspects of traditional culture, with the rejection-retention balance corresponding to popular demands. Social solidarity expressed itself in membership of the prophetic group, which might offer healing and other, more material, advantages to followers, in addition to spiritual benefits.

Prophetic cults arose, employing local religious beliefs as a basis for anti-European protest and opposition, led by prophets and stimulated by colonialism and the social changes to which it had led. Of particular importance in the appeal of prophetic movements in Africa was their dual attraction as both a materialist and a spiritual healing force. The most tenacious elements of “traditional” religion were those that touched a common bedrock of African traditional religions which involved the individual's concern for divinatory and magicomedical assistance. The existence of prophetic movements in Africa during the colonial period also reflected continuing popular adherence to traditional religious ideas, symbols, and rituals, often juxtaposed to modernist accretions from the European intruders. The result was that hybrid religious beliefs developed, often developing into formal organizational structures. Prophetic movements in colonial Africa were an example of how religious beliefs are not static but continually develop and redevelop over time, melding religious and cultural resources in response to changing sociopolitical and economic conditions.

Prophetic movements were found among both Muslim and non-Muslim communities in colonial Africa. As the Muslim faith spread from its Middle Eastern heartlands from the seventh century AD, it was periodically “purified” by *jihad* (holy wars). Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, from Mauritania to present-day Sudan, until the coming of the Europeans put an end to such forceful means of religious reform, there were jihads for religious purification purposes. This was the result of a militant tradition that had long emerged, involving a determination to found Islamic states by defeating non-Muslim rulers, converting populations to Islam, and ruling them according to the tenets of Shari'a law.

These jihads were finally brought to a close by the European conquest of Africa, though Islam continued to spread by way of the Sufi brotherhoods, founded by exemplary figures regarded by their followers as saints. The brotherhoods facilitated the provision of commercial opportunities and offered material assistance to new arrivals from rural areas to urban centers. As African societies rapidly urbanized during the colonial era, Sufi brotherhoods established for themselves a reputation as the single most important facilitator of credentials necessary for newcomers to the city. In the

postcolonial period, Sufism came to represent a form of “uncaptured” Islam beyond the control of the reformist elites dominating state-controlled national Muslim organizations. For this reason they were widely targeted by state authorities and the ‘*ulama* as examples of “corrupt” Islam.

While the Muslim faith ostensibly allows no reinterpretations of the fundamental tenets of belief, especially that Muhammad was *the* prophet of God and that there is but one God, other (albeit lesser) “prophets” have periodically emerged within Islam. The beginning of the Muslim thirteenth century in 1879 stimulated an intense period of jihad. Islamic literature had long prophesized the emergence of the “awaited deliverer” (the Mahdi) who would prepare the world for the end of time. At about this time there emerged a self-styled Mahdi in the Sudan, a man named Muhammad Ahmad ben Abdallah, who led a determined revolt against British colonizing power. Ultimately unsuccessful, Muhammad Ahmad died in 1885, but amid the political uncertainties following the partition of Africa, Mahdism retained a populist appeal that endured until after World War I.

Prophetic movements flourished away from Islamic areas, especially in many rural locales in eastern and southern Africa. Like Mahdism, they were not simply religious movements but tended to have overtly political aspirations linked to dissatisfaction with aspects of colonial rule. For example, in present-day Zimbabwe, erstwhile foes the Shona and the Ndebele combined forces to try to resist British domination in the 1890s. Spirit mediums, utilizing mystical “medicines” to try to enhance fighters’ martial efforts, created a national network of shrines to provide an agency for the transmission and coordination of information and activities, a structure later reestablished during the independence war of the 1970s.

The use of various alternative forms of medicine also helped galvanize the anticolonial Maji Maji rebellion of 1905–1907 in German-controlled Tanganyika. The diviner and prophet Kinjikitili gave his followers treatment that was supposed to render them invulnerable to bullets and anointed local leaders with medicinal *maji* (water). This helped to create and develop solidarity among some 20 different ethnic groups, encouraging them to band together to fight in the common anti-European cause. In neighboring Uganda, the cult of Yakan among the Lugbara people in the north of the country also focused on the use of magic medicine, encouraging them in their short war against the British colonialists in 1919.

Prophetic movements were by no means exclusively led by men. Colonial era and postcolonial female prophets, such as Gaudencia Aoko (of Maria Legio in Kenya), Alice Lenshina (of the Lumpa Church of

Zambia), and Alice Lakwena (of the Holy Spirit Church in Uganda) used the vehicle of religion to enhance their own personal (and by extension, their gender’s) social position in one of the only means available in their male-dominated societies. However, the use of religion as a means of social enhancement for women was not a novel phenomenon in colonial Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Dona Beatrice, the alleged incarnation of Saint Antony, was burned to death at Mbanza Congo (in present-day Angola) by the Portuguese as a heretic at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Her “crime,” which later led to her proclaimed status as national heroine during the anticolonial war, was to preach an Africanized Christianity.

Prophetic movements during both the colonial and postcolonial periods were sometimes vehicles of ethnic solidarity. The Lumpa Church of northern Zambia; the Holy Spirit Church among the Acholi in northern Uganda; the followers of Manuel Antonio in northeast Mozambique; the Ovimbundu Church of Christ in the Bush in southern Angola; and Dini ya Msambwa among the Bukusu of western Kenya, led by Elijah Masinde, were all examples of ethnically orientated prophetic movements with political overtones.

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See also: **Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907.**

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Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule

Conversion to Christianity and Islam was facilitated during the period of European colonialism in Africa (c. 1880–1960). During this time, conversion to Islam often became a symbol of anti-Europeanism, an alternative modernizing influence opposed to the hegemony of the European Christian missionaries and their system of putative enculturation. Islam provided its followers with an alternative worldview not defined by the colonial order and its norms. For many Africans,

the primary perceived benefit of Christianity was the access to both the education and rudimentary welfare systems that it would provide. During the colonial period, such institutions were under the almost exclusive control of the various Christian missions, the Roman Catholic Church, and various Protestant churches.

Before the coming of the Europeans, Islam spread southward in Africa, from western Asia and North Africa, by proselytization, trade, and conquest. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, as Islam became Africanized, orthodox reformists, from Mauritania to present-day Sudan, sought to “purify” Islam. As a result, the faith spread, typically by converting African communities into constituent parts of Islamic states by defeating non-Muslim rulers, converting their people to Islam, and then ruling according to Muslim law.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many among Africa’s Islamic communities opposed what they perceived as European-Christian rule; later, however, they learned to live with it and to benefit from it where and when they could. Earlier, jihads (holy wars) led by Muslim reformers aiming to purify what they saw as examples of corrupt Islam had erupted. They had led to widespread political, moral, and social reconstruction of Muslim societies in various parts of northern, western, and eastern Africa. During this period, the wider Muslim world also experienced the slow demise of the Ottoman Empire and the near contemporaneous emergence of Saudi Arabia as champion of Wahhabi reformist ambitions. Widespread growth both of Sufi brotherhoods and their reformist Wahhabist rivals were also contemporaneous with the emergence and consolidation of European rule.

In the context both of urbanization and the development of ethnically oriented Islamic associative groups, many African Muslims became receptive to the reformist ideas of the Wahhabiya. In addition, the spread of Pan-Islamic ideals around the time of World War I was of serious concern to British colonial rulers, who worried that, acting together, Germany and the Ottoman Empire would manage to recruit Muslim leaders and their communities as allies to their war efforts. In the long run, however, ethnic, religious, and regional divides prevented the emergence of a durable and robust Pan-Islamic movement in Africa.

Followers of African traditional religions appeared to exhibit to the Europeans all the worst aspects of a lack of appropriate religion and its civilizing influence in their lives. As a result, once religious challenges to their domination from Islam had been quelled, French and British colonial administrations preferred dealing with Muslims rather than with so-called pagans, as they recognized that the latter followed a relatively “civilized” religiocultural code. But this is not to imply that Muslim resistance to putative Christian hegemony

soon dropped away. From the 1890s until as late as the 1920s, Muslim resistance to European imperialism flourished in Sudan, Somaliland, Libya, and Morocco. Both Libya and Morocco were then in the first flushes of an Islamized militancy, following the recent founding of polities espousing a purity of Muslim values. In Morocco, it was the feeling that the Sultan had been compromised too far by successive European demands that led to Islamic resistance. In Somaliland, what focused Islamic militancy were the deprivations of Muhammad Abdallah Hasan (called by the British the “Mad Mullah”), which unleashed a reign of terror against local people who refused to join his Salihyya brotherhood. The British were compelled to send four expeditions between 1900 and 1904 to attempt to quell the jihad, but Hasan retained his influence in the north of Somaliland until 1920.

If the situation involving Muslims and colonial administrations was, to some extent, the result of the inequality of the power attributes of each group, that regarding the Christian mission churches and the European authorities was based on a different range of relationships. There were differences in the nature of the association between missionaries and colonial authorities that probably escaped many Africans. Although these were differences of degree rather than anything more fundamental, there were various kinds of relationships between the Christian churches and the different colonial authorities, ranging from very good (in Northern Rhodesia and Nigeria, for example) to significantly worse (in Kenya, for example, where ownership of land was a burning political issue).

The Christian mission churches were perceived by many Africans to be in the vanguard of the advance of European dominance, yet frequently regarded with ambivalence because the Europeans not only brought desirable innovations—such as Western-style education and health care—but also took native people’s land, often compelling them to work on their farms and plantations. During the colonial period the mission churches were in charge of education and health care provision in virtually all African colonies. This gave them both ideological and material power—the latter deriving from collection of school fees, grants, ownership of land and buildings, and so on, which was of obvious and great importance. In the face of the multifaceted changes—both domestic and international—of the times, it is hardly surprising that the ideas of many educated African Christians vis-à-vis European domination gradually underwent a sea change.

After some initial animosity, African responses to colonial rule and the advance of the mission churches in many parts of the region became generally favorable. While Europeans were perceived as de facto representatives of foreign cultural and political hegemony,

to some Africans this was not unwelcome in itself. Many educated Africans, at least initially, regarded the Christian missionaries as welcome representatives of civilization and modernization. But African society began swiftly to polarize from the 1880s and 1890s as a result of the impact of European colonization and rule. On the one hand there was a small but growing educated and professional elite and, on the other, there was an overwhelmingly large traditional and illiterate group among Africans. The educated elite was subdivided between Christians and Muslims, the latter focused initially in the coastal regions of West and East Africa. The majority of educated Christians initially welcomed colonialism, while their Muslim counterparts were often more ambivalent. Sometimes educated African Christians, in tandem with European missionaries, put pressure on both the local administrations and the metropolitan governments in the 1880s to annex adjoining areas before other European powers could move in.

The West Indian Pan-Africanist Edward Blyden went so far to claim that West Africa had been “partitioned, in the order . . . of providence, by the European powers. . . . this partition has been permitted for the ultimate good of the people and for the benefit of humanity” (quoted in Boahen 1987, p.36). Largely as a result of their teaching at the hands of Christian missionaries, educated Christian Africans had been led to believe that Africa could only be “civilized” through the combined activities of Christianity, education, capitalism, and industrialization—in short, by a process of fundamental modernization directed by European Christians. Fifty years later, however, in 1936, I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone bitterly attacked the role of the mission churches for the way that they had used Christianity as the justification for a brutal ideology of domination, using force to subdue and convert pagans to Europeanized Christianity. He wrote:

I believe the European has a god in whom he believes and whom he is representing in his churches all over Africa. He believes in the god whose name is spelt Deceit. He believes in the god whose law is “Ye strong, you must weaken the weak.” Ye “civilized” Europeans, you must “civilize” the “barbarous” Africans with machine guns. Ye “Christian” Europeans, you must “Christianize” the “pagan” Africans with bombs, poison gases, etc. (Quoted in Furedi 1994, p.35)

Wallace-Johnson was by no means an extremist by the 1930s. Europeans were widely regarded no longer as the benign purveyors of civilization, but increasingly as the problem of Africa’s future development rather than its solution. Scattered, often religiously motivated anticolonial actions (such as the Maji Maji rebellion and the founding of African Independent Churches), had occurred from around the time of

World War I; they were to intensify from the mid-1930s on. One of the chief catalysts of a wider African nationalism, led for the most part by educated African Christians and Muslims, was the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935; before then only a relatively small number of African nationalists had demanded a complete overthrow of the colonial system.

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See also: Maghrib: Muslim Brotherhoods; Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907; Wallace-Johnson, I. T. A. and Radical Politics: West Africa: 1930s.

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Religion, History of

Traditional African religions use antiwitchcraft movements as a means to right social wrongs. During the Great Depression, for example, these movements were found throughout Africa. In east Africa, drought, locusts, and the Great Depression evoked fears of witchcraft in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Antiwitchcraft cults arose, drawing on traditional religious and cultural beliefs and values to offer hope to the generally poor population. In many parts of Africa there is a belief in an *otiose*, or neutral god, who has withdrawn from the day-to-day activities of the world and has left its working to lesser gods and spirits. This High God is unapproachable, and therefore lesser deities and spirits are approached to help with the concerns of the day. Thus, turns to magic and antiwitchcraft movements were logical moves for people faced with inexplicable disasters.

In common with people of other traditionally non-literate cultures, Africans see their traditional spiritual beings as either helpful or malevolent according to circumstances. The Yoruba of western Nigeria, for example, view the god Eshu as either a protective, benevolent spirit or as a spirit with an evil power that may be directed toward one's enemies, depending on the situation. These beings possess what is called *mana* (pure supernatural power).

Christianity, like Islam, found it had to work within the context of indigenous beliefs. By the twentieth century, Christianity had reached most of South Africa and was well entrenched in many of its areas; new mission societies blossomed. These societies propelled an expansion of Christianity not only in South Africa but also throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Catholic missions, in particular, began a strong renaissance as colonialism was consolidated after the Congress of Berlin. In the colonial context, missions found that they were responsible for most education and health services in the colonies.

Any sect that wanted to spread in the continent had to adopt one of two methods used by Christianity and Islam. Christianity was successfully spread throughout Africa because the first missionaries indoctrinated young children. Later, as adults, these children passed on the new beliefs to their own offspring, thus creating a tradition from generation to generation. The spread of Islam was often initially accomplished by warfare and intimidation; those who resisted conversion were often harshly punished.

Christianity had been in Sub-Saharan Africa long before Muslims or Western missionaries arrived. Ethiopia was Christian by the fourth century and Monophysite Christianity had spread to Eritrea shortly after. With the coming of Islam by the eighth century, religion began to be used as an ethnic identity marker, with pastoralists often being Muslims and peasants often Christian.

Missionaries brought with them not only their version of Christianity but that of civilization as well. For missionaries, European civilization of the Victorian variety was at the top of the evolutionary ladder. It carried with it the notion of progress—namely, entry into the labor markets. In South Africa the Khoisan and Griqua peoples were among the first converted to Christianity. Missionaries then used these people to convert other groups to Christianity. Among the heroes of Christian conversion were two nineteenth-century Scottish missionaries, Robert Moffat and David Livingstone, who worked among the Tswana.

Often, converted African leaders used their power to persuade their people to become Christians. The Tswana convert King Khama III (who reigned from 1875 to

1923) established a theocracy. In the second half of the nineteenth century, missionaries made great progress among the Xhosa and Zulus. Missionaries usually preceded colonists and colonial administration; they also proved to be strong critics of both groups, and advocates for African rights.

At first, Christianity made its converts mainly from those on the margins, the poor and women. As colonialism progressed, however, the damage it did to the belief systems of African groups led many to turn to Christianity. Ironically, much of Christianity as the missionaries presented it helped undermine African indigenous systems. Missionaries favored individual salvation and accepted the stratification that capitalist labor markets engendered. Moreover, Christian ideology tended to support the colonial hierarchy and color bar. Many African Christians, however, used Christianity to attack the colonial system and its evils.

In Lesotho, for example, the Basotho used Christianity as a means to keep independent of South Africa. The people distinguished themselves from their neighbors and used Christianity to forge a new ethnic identity. The majority of Basotho profess to Roman Catholicism. Others have joined the Lesotho Evangelical Church, or the Anglican Church. There are also members of independent churches and Zionist sects. As elsewhere, people still hold traditional beliefs but merge them with Christianity.

Given that missionaries moved away from supporting black leadership in African missions—thus practicing their own form of segregation—many Africans turned to the independent churches. These generally began in rural areas and then spread to the cities. In 1892, for example, the Ethiopian Church, linked to the African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States, began in South Africa. It had a “back to Africa” ideology that was an essential part of Ethiopianism. Ethiopianism was a Christian movement that emphasized African political solidarity and religious autonomy. Whites were troubled by the message of African independent churches, which were marked by a millenarian vision. Not surprisingly, they often sought to suppress these churches, which openly subverted the very foundations of colonialism and offered a new vision of reality.

In African religions, prophets tend to arise when foreign systems present a challenge to established beliefs. African religions have long had diviners who dream the future and serve as counselors for their peoples. Prophets have frequently been found in anticolonial movements as well as messianic ones in Africa. Their goal was and is a return to traditional African culture and religion. Many prophets used themes of the world ending and great disasters while taking up Christian ideas for their purposes. Nxele, for example,

a nineteenth-century Xhosa prophet, preached the return of the dead on a day he foretold. These prophets also tended to be healers and miracle workers. Many African prophets founded churches that broke away from Christianity and opposed colonialism; these churches took on strong political tones and used African themes and symbols to convey their messages.

Islam has succeeded among pastoralists on the Horn of Africa while Christianity has been the religion of peasant farmers. Muslims are also well represented among the trades and commerce in towns. Under colonialism, Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed to convert Eritreans to their version of Christianity. They succeeded among the Kunama tribe and among some townspeople.

Islam had originally come into Sub-Saharan Africa as a commercial religion. Members of the ruling class had also been quick to grasp its advantages in organizing and centralizing their rule. In western Africa, for example, Islam had been spread by merchants who were content to adapt their practice of their religion to the social and political realities in which they found themselves. For the most part, these merchants lived in towns and adapted themselves to the religious practices of the “pagans” in the town. In these towns, merchants had great influence on the various kings and artisans with whom they came into contact and Islam spread in one form or other among the influential classes.

However, with the Moroccan occupation of the Niger Bend in 1591 the political and religious situation of the western Sudan changed dramatically. Ghana, Mali, and Songhay no longer controlled the western Sudan. The entire power situation changed, and Berber and Tuareg tribesmen—all Muslims—began to assert their power in the region. The pagan tribes found themselves pushed by stronger polities as the remnants of the great empires began to seek new power bases. Descendants of Moroccans settled in the Niger Bend; known as the Arma, they paid tribute to the Berbers and Tuaregs and were prominent in trans-Saharan trade. Some of the Arma were leaders in western African Islam. The Kunta tribe of Arabized Berbers, for example, was dominant in the salt trade to Timbuktu, and through the influence of Sidi Mukhtar (d.1811) had become so respected among the Muslims of the western Sudan that they mediated quarrels among the pastoral tribes, benefiting both commerce and urban society. Mukhtar owed his influence to a combination of personal and social factors. He was learned and holy, but also a leader of the Qadiriyyah, one of the Muslim *tariqas* (brotherhoods). These brotherhoods passed on their own traditions of sanctity and learning. They had arisen in the eleventh century and continued to grow as a form of mystical Islam spread from the eastern areas of Islam.

Mysticism was compatible with Berber society in North Africa. In the eighteenth century another brotherhood, the Tijaniya, arose there. The tariqa entered the Sahara, arriving in western Africa by the beginning of the sixteenth century. The arrival of the tariqa signaled that the days of relative tolerance were coming to an end. Well-organized groups of devout Muslims who were both specifically trained and morally compelled to work toward a true Islamic society if people resisted their preaching, these tariqa preached the doctrine of jihad (holy war).

The Fulani found this doctrine appealing. They felt they were unduly taxed by the Hausa states. They resented the increasing wealth of these states. Muslim clerics among the Fulani felt a kinship with the Berber and Tuareg mullahs who preached jihad. In addition, the Fulani were related to the long Islamized Tukulor of Futa Jalon. Fulani clerics were renowned in the region and easily contacted members of their ethnic group who shared their grievances.

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See also: **Futa Jalon; Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers; Khama III; Maghrib: Muslim Brotherhoods; Missionary Enterprise: Precolonial; Monophysitism, Coptic Church, 379–640; Religion, Colonial Africa.**

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Religion: Indigenous Beliefs: Sub-Saharan Africa

There are a number of widespread religious beliefs throughout Africa. There is, for example, a widespread belief in a supreme god; there is a belief in some sort of afterlife, as evidenced in myths and funeral ceremonies. Rituals form an important part of life; there are crisis rituals, rituals for life stages—indeed, rituals for every occasion. Rituals involve the entire person, body, and soul, in their performance.

Every traditional African religion has a concept of god. There are many different names for this supreme being, even within the same ethnic group. There are lesser deities and spirits, but the concept of one high god is indigenous to African religions. The high god is generally a distant one. Representations are made to help people comprehend god, but no one can actually see god or have contact with him or her. (In some African societies, god is perceived as both mother and father.) God is both intimately involved in creation and above it. Finally, evil comes from the spirits, not from God. God is considered to be all merciful and kindly disposed toward humans.

African beliefs attempt to link all the spheres of human existence: spiritual, psychological, physical, and political. The spiritual world is filled with minor spirits who control nature. Ancestors are a link with these spirits. Africans traditionally believe that spirits are found everywhere and cults are centered on where these spirits are found. Africans do not see anything contradictory about holding simultaneous beliefs in one God and numerous spirits. Spirits are involved in the daily lives of the living, and can cure the ills that beset everyday life.

Most precolonial African religions were animistic in one sense or another. They partook of what scholars call shamanism, totemism, or ancestor propitiation. Each of these were aspects, or institutions, within the broader religion. In fact, it is impossible to separate religion from other aspects of African life.

Shamanism, with its reliance on the ecstatic, often uses part-time practitioners who partake in the daily work of the community. Animism, in general, attributes importance to categories of supernatural beings. The individual members of a given group find themselves attached to particular locations or people.

Animism teaches that people can communicate with supernatural beings. Moreover, these beings can aid people in dealing with the realities of their everyday

lives: procuring food, curing illness, and averting danger. These beings are real and have distinct personalities in the eyes of their devotees. Creator gods, however, tend to be distant and dealt with from afar.

Animistic spirits have an egoistic sense of rewarding those who remember them and take care to perform appropriate rituals. Similarly, they have no compunction about punishing those who fail to show proper respect. Their power is quite particularistic in common with ancestors. Spirits are intermediaries between God and people. The earth, for example, is often a female spirit: Mother Earth. Notably, in some African religions she is the spouse of God; in others, his enemy. Therefore, since a spirit possesses the earth, it is revered and cared for as God's gift. Since a spirit inhabits the earth, the earth is respected. There is an obligation to care for and to improve it as a sacred trust. Therefore, the Akan and Ashanti ask the earth's permission before digging a grave, or pouring a libation to the earth. The purpose is to make sure that a child will reenter the earth's womb. They also ask permission before tilling and swear oaths while touching the earth as a guarantor of truth.

Spirits also inhabit great waters. For example, Olokun is the owner of the sea to the Yoruba and the Benin in Nigeria. He lives in an underwater palace with a great entourage of human and fishlike attendants. In fact, the Yoruba make so many sacrifices and offerings that they are often called the essence of the Yoruba religion. Libation is common in Africa. Prayers accompany libation and sacrifices, for example, "Olodumare, ajuba gbogbo iku mbeleshe." (God, we give homage, we salute the ancestors that sit at your feet in counsel.)

People can pray at any time, and the act of prayer can substitute for sacrifice or offering. Prayers may be directed at God, to ancestors, or to other spirits. Usually, a priest or another official prays on behalf of the community or a family. Prayers can be made for a number of desires: food, a good life, health, the weather, assistance in dealing with life's problems. Some daily expressions are prayers such as, "God, give us rain;" "Oh, Great God"; and "God preserve you and keep you until you see your children's children."

In precolonial Africa, chiefs and other political leaders had a spiritual basis for their powers. Their communication with ancestors and enlistment of ancestors in their cause provided a continuity to life. People expected their leaders to protect them from natural and supernatural evils, to fight witchcraft and wizardry, and to enlist diviners and others to aid in that protection.

Similarly, the connection between control of the supernatural and spiritual power meant that those who were most powerful controlled those who were weakest. Witchcraft was often a tool of the powerful while it was the least powerful who suffered under witchcraft

control. People often used diviners to help weed out witchcraft.

As in many African societies, the most respected doctor among the Zulus is the diviner, or *isangoma* (the word means “someone who wanders about the mountains and who lives on roots,” a clear description of what those seeking to become a diviner did). The diviner is also known as an *isanusi*, an “unraveler.” A diviner is also an herbalist, with an extensive knowledge of roots and herbs to aid in curing diseases. Diviners are generally chosen by the spirits, and then undergo lengthy initiations.

In most of Africa, there are several methods of divining. There are thumb, stick, and bone divinations. Each method depends on receiving a positive or negative answer from the spirits. The person may hear voices calling him to a particular location or giving him other instructions. Additionally, the chosen one may act strangely, avoiding certain foods and manifesting other signs of spirit possession.

Religion in Africa embraces all aspects of human life. There is no clear separation among the spheres of life; it is a holistic and humanistic concept. There is a clear understanding that good and evil are opposites and that doing good is its own reward.

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See also: Religion, Colonial Africa: Indigenous Religion; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: African Theology, Indigenization.

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Religion: Islam, Growth of: Western Africa

The growth of Islam in West Africa predominantly follows a north-south pattern whereby the earliest conversions were in the Sahara, followed by the inhabitants of the Sahelian fringe of the desert, and then in the savanna and forest zones. Yet this is also something of a simplification, as Islamic conversion also appears to have varied according to socioeconomic group. Initial converts were frequently nomads, exposed to Muslim



Mosque on the Niger River. Sekoro, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

influence through their acting as guides for Muslim trans-Saharan traders, for example. Local rulers and merchants might also be early converts to Islam as frequently were town dwellers, with the last group to adopt Islam being the bulk of the population, the sedentary agriculturists, for whom, it has been suggested, the greatest upheaval was involved in abandoning traditional religion and practices in favor of the new faith of Islam.

Arabic historical sources record that the first contacts between Muslims and the inhabitants of West Africa began in the ninth century. These first contacts were primarily undertaken by Ibadi merchants. The Ibadis were a Kharidjite group who, though Muslim, held differing beliefs from the orthodox Sunni Maliki tenets that prevail today in both North and West Africa. All trace of Ibadi beliefs in West Africa have now disappeared, but one possible indicator of their former influence in the region persists: certain features in the so-called Sudanese style of architecture, which have parallels with the architecture of the Mzab and other Ibadi strongholds in North Africa, and include the staircase minaret and the three-tiered mosque structures. This could, however, also be due to similarities in the construction material used in the two areas, *banco* (liquid mud) and palmwood, a factor that limits both architectural expression and building technology.

Ibadi contacts were on a small scale, as would have been conversions to Islam in the ninth century. Evidence for Islam is scarce and confined to the northern Saharan fringe at sites such as Essuk/Tadmekka in Mali. After this point in time the popularity of Islam gradually grew, and both the Arab historical sources and archaeological evidence indicate that the local Muslim community expanded in the urban centers of the Sahel. Mosques and Muslim burials are found dating from the late tenth and eleventh centuries onward at sites such as Gao in Mali, and Tegdaoust and

Koumbi Saleh (reputedly the trader's town attached to the capital of the empire of Ghana) in Mauritania. Local rulers, as in Ghana and Gao, began to convert to Islam, even if the bulk of the population remained animist. Muslim functionaries were employed to administer local kingdoms and treasuries, and access to literacy via Arabic was an accompanying benefit of royal conversion to Islam.

Over the following two to three centuries, conversion to Islam gradually grew, becoming entrenched in the urban environment. Similar patterns are evident farther to the east in Kanem-Borno, centered around Lake Chad, for example. Here, an early Ibadi influence also appears to have been of significance but is little understood, although by the late eleventh century the ruler of this state had, according to tradition, become a Muslim.

Away from the Sahel, Islam was spread by indigenous Muslim merchants and clerics rather than Arab or Berber merchants, as had tended to be the case in the former area. Among the most successful of these disseminators of Islam were the Mande merchants (sometimes also referred to as Dyula or Wangara), who succeeded in spreading Islam throughout the Savannah and forest of West Africa from their homelands on the Middle Niger, beginning in the late fourteenth century. Trade rather than missionary zeal appears to have provided their impetus as they sought gold and kola nuts to take north with them. In so doing, many Mande established settlements in the regions in which they traveled. Mosques were built and conversions to Islam among the local population occurred, mirroring processes that had taken place several centuries earlier in the Sahel. The impact of the Mande was felt in Northern Ghana, where sites such as Begho indicate their former presence, and also in Burkina Faso and the Côte d'Ivoire.

Possible Mande influence on the growth of Islam in West Africa has also been suggested for Nigeria, where the Hausa began to convert to Islam from the mid-fourteenth century on. Besides a potential Mande influence on Islamization, the seven original Hausa city states, the *Bokwoi* of Daura, Zaria, Biram, Kano, Rano, Katsina, and Gobir were also under the sway of Kanem-Borno, their neighbor to the north, and Songhay, with Gao as its capital, to the west. Initially, following the pattern noted elsewhere, the influence of Islam was restricted to the court circle, but by the sixteenth century it appears that Islam dominated in the cities of Hausaland while paganism was still tolerated in the countryside. In fact, perceptions of the lax Islam of Hausaland and the continuation of traditional religion in its rural areas were to have severe implications for the inhabitants of the region. This came in the form of the Fulani jihad (holy war), begun as a reaction against their perceptions of the impurity of Hausa Islam in the

early nineteenth century. Hausa forces were to sweep across much of the savanna of West Africa during this century. Powerful military and religious leaders such as 'Uthman dan Fodio created vast empires on the ruins of Hausa and other states, and a more orthodox Islam was preached and practiced.

Yet the impact of the Fulani jihads, though profound in terms of increasing conversion to Islam, often by coercion, did not wholly succeed in eradicating the special characteristics often apparent in West African Islam. The blending of traditional and Muslim religious beliefs and practices continued, and indeed, continues, to be a feature of Muslim practice in many areas of West Africa.

TIMOTHY INSOLL

See also: **Fulbe/Fulani/Peul; Hausa Politics: Origins, Rise.**

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Religion, Postcolonial Africa: African Theology, Indigenization

One of the most significant recent developments within African Christianity has been the mushrooming of African independent churches (AICs). There are now thought to be more than 20,000 of these new congregations. Their growth has been swift in a number of countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. From small beginnings, some have now reached an impressive size. Among them are Benson Idahosa's Church of God Mission in Nigeria, which has more than 2,000 branches; others, including Andrew Wutawunashé's Family of God Church and Ezekiel Guti's Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (both in Zimbabwe), and Mensa Otabil's International Central Gospel Church and Bishop Duncan-William's Action Faith Ministries (both in Ghana), have also grown swiftly.

African independent churches offer a distinctive reinvention of an externally derived innovation,

moulded and adapted to offer spiritual rebirth, potentialities for material improvements, and the growth of a new community spirit among followers. Regarding their theology, while adhering to the Bible as an unimpeachable theological source, many such churches also preach the effectiveness of experiential faith, the centrality of the Holy Spirit, the spiritual gifts of glossolalia and faith healing, and the efficacy of miracles. Their worldview is also often informed by personal conversion as a distinct experience of faith in Christ as Lord and Savior (being “born again” in the sense of having received a new spiritual life), and in helping others have a similar conversion experience. Rather than relying on foreign donations, as many of the former mission churches still do to some degree, most AICs are primarily reliant on members’ donations for their upkeep.

Members of AICs often have a strongly moralistic worldview: lying, cheating, stealing, bribing (or being bribed), adultery, and fornication are frowned upon. Because members of the churches conceive of a clear division between what is right and what is wrong, they tend to be opposed to public corruption. There is a strong sense that the well-being of society is highly dependent upon good standards of personal morality. The nature of social interactions within some of the AICs also helps to reorient traditional gender relations and, in the process, transform sexual politics. While some of the churches continue to promote a doctrine of female submissiveness, many do not. This appears to be one of the main attractions of such churches for young urban women in Lagos, the capital of Nigeria. It is particularly in the spheres of marriage, family, and sexuality that one finds doctrines and practice in some AICs transforming gender relations quite dramatically.

Millions of Africans have joined AICs in recent years because of the intensity of the prayer experience they offer; the attraction of a simple and comprehensible message that seems to make sense out of the chaos that many perceive all around them; a moral code that offers guidance and the resuscitation of community values; and a sense of group solidarity exemplified in the way that individual followers often call each other “brother” and “sister.” In addition to spiritual and social objectives, members of AICs often also seek material goals. For some, the hope of prosperity is one of the churches’ main attractions, leading to charges that their message of hope is little more than a mindless and self-centred appeal to personal material well-being.

Although it would be misleading to try to standardize all these churches, some things are generally clear. First, such churches often function as an alternative for those seeking a religious and social experience that the former mission churches often appear unable to offer. Most AIC members formerly belonged to the Roman Catholic Church or one of the various Protestant

denominations. Second, many of their followers are young people. Third, regarding their theology, while there is a need for more research, it is clear that the faith gospel of “health and wealth” is central to many, perhaps most. In Lagos, Nigeria, for example, AIC members run their own catering companies, hospitals, kindergartens, and record companies. Employment is offered first to coreligionists because they are considered likely to be honest and to work hard.

The faith gospel was originally an American doctrine devised by the media evangelists in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet much of Africa’s traditional religion has always been concerned with fertility, health, and plenty. It is by no means clear to what extent such a gospel is still an identifiably American doctrine or whether it has now been thoroughly Africanized. The class make up of the AICs is diverse: they do not simply minister to the poor, the middle classes, or some other identifiable societal group, but find adherents from among all social classes. Another key theological feature is the understanding of spirits in the churches. Like the notion of “health and wealth,” spirits are an essential part of African religious culture. It is by no means clear what the relationship is between this traditional thinking and the demonology of Western Pentecostalism.

The members of AICs are often concerned with social issues, involving a communal sharing of fears, ills, jobs, hopes, and material success. Earthly misfortune is often perceived to be the result of a lack of faith; God will reward true believers. Such believers appear to estimate that people’s redemption is in their own hands (or rather in both God’s and the individual’s hands), and that expectations that government could or should supply all or even most of people’s needs and deal with their problems is misplaced.

AICs challenge the Christianity of the former mission churches both intellectually and materially. Such is the concern with the hemorrhaging of followers, that the mainstream Christian churches attack them on two fronts. On the one hand, AICs are accused of being little (if anything) more than Trojan horses of American fundamentalist churches. However, the fact that some AICs are patronized by wealthy foreign (especially North American) pastors probably helps confirm to many followers the desirable association between religion and personal prosperity. At the same time, the mainstream churches rush to incorporate glossolalia, faith healing, and copious biblical allusions into their services.

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See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Independence and Churches, Mission-Linked and Independent.**

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**Religion, Postcolonial Africa:
Independence and Churches,
Mission-Linked and Independent**

The role of Christian churches, both mission-linked and independent, at the time of the drive to African independence in the 1950s and 1960s was the result of a number of discrete yet related factors. Whether the churches were early (principled) or late (opportunist) supporters of African independence depended on a number of issues, including, in the case of the mission-linked churches, the attitude of the European parent church and whether individual leaders of the local churches themselves welcomed independence.

The Catholic Church, controlled from the Vatican, was initially highly suspicious of the notion of African independence, as it was thought likely that some independent African countries, under the influence of the Soviet Union, would find communism attractive. However, the Church sought to make the best of a situation that was beyond its control, seeking—and generally obtaining—close ties with postcolonial governments in African countries where there were significant numbers of Catholics, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo-Kinshasa).

Following independence, the Catholic Church (the largest in Africa, at over 100 million baptized members), with its foreign historical, institutional, and financial links, was perceived with a high degree of suspicion by some African nationalist leaders, such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. Elsewhere, such as with Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, the Catholic Church managed to maintain close ties with postcolonial leaders. This was because, in many cases, ideological, religious, and class affinities were pronounced and of greater practical import than the somewhat idealized conflict

for power between whites and blacks that nationalist leaders officially portrayed as their main postcolonial struggle.

While many of the Protestant mission churches tended to be rather disinterested in African independence, some at least had a theologically derived worldview more liberal than that of the Catholic Church. As a result, Protestant churches generally became accustomed to the idea of African independence relatively quickly. In the postcolonial period, like the Catholic Church, they attempted to fit in with new political arrangements as best they could, not least by a process of swift Africanization of religious hierarchies.

Relationships among the various Protestant churches and postcolonial African leaders were diverse. This is because the mission-linked Protestant churches were not a unified force like the Catholic Church and, as a consequence, individually had much less spiritual and religious clout. In addition, whereas the Catholic Church possessed its own (albeit tiny) state—Vatican City—that aided its unity vis-à-vis both colonial authorities and African nationalists, the main Protestant mission churches (Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran) were in competition with each other, as well as with Catholicism and Islam. Protestant churches individually achieved close relations with some postcolonial administrations, such as that of the Kenya African National Union, yet sectarian divisions between them meant that they never individually had the same corporate significance as the Catholic Church.

Independent African churches were for the most part strong supporters of independence, as their leaders believed that the postcolonial era would facilitate their advance at the expense of the mission-linked churches. Such churches were often close to nationalist leaders, such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC) in Zambia. The AMEC had some 50,000 members by the 1960s, and was renowned for its nationalist militancy. The growth of the AMEC, and of other independent churches in Zambia, was in part a reaction to the impact of a substantial white settler community and its links with the mission-linked churches. The latter had long been considered by most Africans to be part of the white establishment. The result was that nationalist leaders turned to African alternatives for both spiritual and organizational purposes. Kenneth Kaunda was both a local preacher and choir leader at the Lusaka branch of the AMEC in the 1950s, which gave him an opportunity to hone his political skills. Yet following independence in 1964, the AMEC refused to join with a number of other Protestant churches to form the United Church of Zambia, which later became more or less the state church. The significance of the AMEC and its role as a focal point for many nationalist politicians was that once independence was

won, its political purpose came to an end as nationalist leaders sought to establish a church that could be counted upon to work closely with government.

Leaders of independent churches, like practically every other organization, religious and secular, quickly realized the necessity of cultivating close links with political leaders in the postcolonial era where the importance of the concept of *mange d'abord* ("eat first") propelled them into the hurly burly of political competition. Charged with such concerns, the Musama Disco Christo Church of Jehu Appiah, for example, was very close to Kwame Nkrumah, leader of Ghana, for a decade between 1957 and 1966. The Church of Africa was another church close to senior figures in Nkrumah's Convention People's Party government, while the F'Eden Church taught obedience to those in both secular and religious authority, counting among its followers several senior state figures. Over time in Ghana, such independent African churches have often retained their close links to senior politicians

Religious allegiance was sometimes an emblem of political factionalism and competition during the run up to, and immediately after, independence. This situation is illustrated by the experiences of Uganda in the 1950s and 1960s, when political rivalry between Protestants and Catholics was the main political issue. Conflict focused on the role of the Baganda people and their king in the political structure of the country, independent in 1963. The temporary exile of their *kabaka* (king), Mutesa—judged necessary by the British colonial authorities who were concerned (and rightly so) that he was a powerful symbol of nationalism—achieved what the British most feared: an upsurge of Baganda nationalism with Protestant overtones. Catholics felt discriminated against, and as a result they used the opportunity occasioned by the Kabaka's exile to organize themselves into a predominantly Catholic party, the Democratic Party in 1955, founded by a leading Catholic politician, Matayo Mugwanya. The Democratic Party was to lead the colony's first internally self-governing administration in 1961–1962, with the mainly non-Baganda Protestant Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) and the Baganda-led Protestant party, Kabaka Yekka (King Alone) taking over at independence in 1962, until Milton Obote seized power for the UPC alone. (Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971, but returned to power in 1980.)

Elsewhere, the political acumen of some Catholic politicians was illustrated in Congo-Brazzaville, where the priest-politician Foulbert Youlou led the country to independence in 1960. Three years later, however, he was deposed in a populist coup d'état led by a number of trade union activists. In neighboring Congo, where the Catholic Church was the largest, the withdrawal of the Belgian colonial administration in 1960 was the

signal for an all-out battle for political power. Representatives of the Catholic Church—identified by some Africans as a bastion of authoritarianism and racism—were notable victims of the outbreaks of violence. Dozens of Christian missionaries were killed during the civil war, which reflected the "overbearing manner in which missionaries had often behaved: 'You are as wicked as a priest' (Tu es aussi méchant qu'un père) was commonly heard at the time" (Hastings 1979, p.136).

JEFF HAYNES

See also: Houphouët-Boigny, Félix; Mutesa (Kabaka); Nkrumah, Kwame; Obote, Milton; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979; Uganda: Buganda Agreement, Political Parties, Independence; Zambia: Religious Movements.

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Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Islam

There are a number of versions of Islam extant in Africa, both north and south of the Sahara. In both regions Africans have long belonged to Sufi brotherhoods; in addition, many ethnic groups, especially in West and East Africa, converted to Islam en masse before and during the colonial era, giving religious belief among such people an ethnic dimension. Some of them would also be members of Sufi brotherhoods, so the latter may also have an ethnic aspect. However, orthodox conceptions of Islam (nearly always Sunni in Africa) are the province of the religious elite, the *'ulama* (religious-legal scholars) who tend to look down on the "uneducated" followers of Sufi Islam who practice "degenerate" or "impure" versions of the faith.

Differing manifestations of Islam point to the fact that the faith in Africa in fact covers a variety of interpretations of what it means to be a Muslim. Outside the Arab countries of the north, Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into distinct categories, corresponding to extant social, cultural, and historical divisions. The first includes the dominant sociopolitical and cultural



Hassan II Mosque. Rabat, Morocco. © Charlotte Thege/Das Fotoarchiv.

position of Islam in the emirates of northern Nigeria, the lamidates of northern Cameroon, and the shaykhdoms of northern Chad. In each of these areas religious and political power is fused in a few individuals; over time a class structure has developed based on religious differentiation. Second, there are the areas where Sufi brotherhoods predominate—generally in West and East Africa, and especially in Senegal, the Gambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Kenya, and Tanzania. Third, in a number of African states, Muslims, fragmented by ethnic and regional concerns, are politically marginalized as a bloc.

Such is the situation in a number of Sub-Saharan countries, including Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire. In Sudan, on the other hand, it is the country's Muslim rulers of the National Islamic Front who seek to use Islam as an ideology of conquest and of Arabization, against southern Sudanese peoples, including the Dinka and the Nuer. The latter groups have fought a long civil war against the northern Sudanese Muslim-dominated state, aided by Iran, which has long wished to establish an Islamic state throughout the country. Even though northern Sudanese leaders claim that Islamic (*Shari'a*) law would not be introduced in non-Muslim areas of the country, it has become clear that their aim, involving forced conversion of Christians and "pagans" to Islam, is eventually to Islamize and Arabize the entire country; in effect, it is a putative policy of "ethnic cleansing." Culturally and religiously distinct southern Sudanese would regard such an objective as tantamount to an assault upon their way of life, even their very survival.

The campaign of the Sudanese state over the last few years to Islamize their country is but one manifestation of the growing importance of what is commonly, if unhelpfully, referred to as "fundamentalist" Islam or, better, "Islamism." In recent years of great religious and political importance in several North African Arab

countries, including Algeria and Egypt, and to a lesser but still significant extent in Tunisia and Morocco, Islamism is less influential in most Sub-Saharan countries with the exception of Nigeria. In that country, political and religious conflict between Muslims and Christians has in recent years become a serious issue; the country has also seen the emergence of various Islamist groups in recent years. Sufi Muslims have found themselves targeted by Islamists who regard Sufism as a primitive, degraded form of Islam in need of "purification."

Broadly speaking, there are two types of Islamist groups to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand there are the reforming groups, often influenced by Iranian or Saudi Arabian concepts of Islamic orthodoxy, which attract mostly the educated, who are intellectually convinced of the desirability of attaining a "pure" Islamic society. On the other hand, another kind of Islamic fundamentalism has also emerged, notably in Nigeria, in response to growing polarization between Christians and Muslims over the issue of which religion is to dominate in the country. This is an Islamism less concerned with the introduction and promulgation of orthodox Islamic purity than in championing the "rights" of Muslims in relation to those of Christians. Generally speaking, however, Islamism has made relatively little impact in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, unlike in the Arab north, because its aims (namely, the imposition of Islamic orthodoxy) are not welcomed by many of the region's Muslims, who are either followers of traditional Sufi Islam or who live in small Muslim communities where local Islamic norms predominate.

In the north of the continent there is a diversity among Islamists. Some groups propose (or practice) armed struggle to wrest power from government (in, for example, Algeria and Egypt), some believe in incremental change through the ballot box (in, for example, Morocco and Tunisia), while others seek to achieve their goals by way of a combination of extraparliamentary struggle, societal prozelytization and governmental lobbying (in, for example, Algeria and Egypt). However, despite differences in tactics, North African Islamist groups tend to share two broad ideas: that politics and religion are inseparable, and that *Shari'a* law must be applied to all Muslims, whether they accept it voluntarily or by force.

Islamist groups in North Africa recruit members and supporters from a range of professions and backgrounds; but they tend to come from lower middle- or middle-class backgrounds and are found predominantly among teachers, university students, graduates (especially from scientific and technical backgrounds), military and police officers, and shopkeepers. Many live in urban areas but have a recent history of a rural

past. The arguments and appeals of the leaders are couched in theological language, but the chief concerns of followers are probably in some cases more prosaic: social and economic goals predicated upon fundamental political change. In other words, bolstering and strengthening the overtly theological and religious terminology are a range of basic political issues and socioeconomic grievances that account for the widespread political support in North Africa for Islamist groups' programs and policies. Islamist groups seek participation in what are essentially closed political and economic systems dominated by an often cohesive political and economic elite, including the upper echelons of the military.

Political parties with Islamist concerns have fought elections in a number of African countries in the 1980s and 1990s—for example, in Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia; several have registered a degree of electoral success. Islamists in these countries (with the exception, controversially, of Algeria) have gained seats in legislatures in recent times, and this has helped to sustain public support for their movements' aims and objectives. The effects of this have been twofold: on the one hand, pressure is kept up against the governing elites which may lead to further concessions, while on the other, Islamist victories help both to sustain the support of the existing followers while making it more plausible for others to add their weight to the fundamentalist campaign for change.

Islam has also been the rallying cry of a number of minority ethnic groups in several African countries in recent times. Whereas during the 1960s and 1970s regimes were apparently successful in subjugating ordinary Muslims' concerns by helping to exacerbate religious and ethnic divisions, by the 1980s increasing economic decline, growing political repression, and authoritarianism combined with international moves toward democratization and growing universal Muslim assertiveness to produce a number of popular Islamic groups that confronted orthodox religious leaders as well as their temporal rulers.

In Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Tanzania, popular Islamic groups have recently led opposition to one-party states when the systems they represent were already beginning to fracture as a result of both domestic and international pressures. In Burkina Faso the catalyst for Muslim opposition was the self-styled revolutionary military government of Captain Thomas Sankara, which grabbed power in a military coup in 1983. Muslims, about 30 per cent of the country's population, were galvanized into confrontation with the state because of its attempts to diminish the social and political status of Islam during a period of putative revolutionary transformation.

In Kenya, which is around 10 per cent Muslim (concentrated in the coastal, northeast and eastern provinces), opposition to single-party rule was linked to some groups' perceived economic marginalization. Certain non-Muslim ethnic groups (e.g., the Luhya, Kamba, and Kalenjin) were commonly regarded as benefiting disproportionately during the rule of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The legalization of political activity in December 1991 was the catalyst for the emergence of popular Islam groups with strong ethnic connections. In February 1992, a senior KANU official warned mosque guardians not to allow their premises to be used for political meetings, as this would be illegal. Religious parties were not allowed to register for the 1992 elections, which prevented the newly formed Islamic Party of Kenya, led by Khalid Salim Ahmed Balala, from competing.

Although about a third of mainland Tanzania's population is Muslim, they are scattered among the country's numerous ethnic groups; the greatest concentrations are found in the coastal areas. In Zanzibar, 97 per cent of the population (about 650,000 people) are Muslim. As in Kenya, the general context of the emergence of Islamic-based opposition was the fracturing of the one-party system and the tentative beginnings of political pluralism. As in Kenya, Tanzania's Muslims argued that they were discriminated against economically. Yet until recently there appeared to be little tension between Tanzania's Muslim communities and the government, no doubt in part because Muslims enjoyed senior political positions, or between Muslims and Christians—a reflection of the almost unique social consensus achieved under the former president, Julius Nyerere.

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See also: Kenya: Islam; Nyerere, Julius; Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements.

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Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Neo-Pentecostalism

Pentecostalism is by no means only a postcolonial phenomenon. American missionaries bearing news of the "Apostolic Faith" arrived in South Africa only two years after what is commonly accepted as the beginning of the Pentecostal movement: the great outpourings of the Holy Spirit in the African Methodist Chapel in Azusa Street, Los Angeles. By 1920, missionaries from the earliest Pentecostal denominations in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Britain were at work in Africa, proclaiming their distinctive "foursquare gospel" of justification by faith, sanctification by the spirit, divine healing, and the Second Coming. This missionary Pentecostalism often combined with revivalistic tendencies in mainline Christianity to stimulate the rise of a host of "spirit-" or "Aladura-" type independent churches in Southern and West Africa, but on the whole the Pentecostal denominations themselves remained relatively small.

It was not until the late 1970s that Pentecostalism took off. In part, the growth can be explained by the steadily increasing missionary input from the older Pentecostal denominations, such as the American and British Assemblies of God and the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada. Some African pastors and evangelists broke away from these missionary movements to found their own churches, retaining part of the original name, such as Ezekiel Guti's Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa. The rise of Pentecostalism can also be traced to such ministries as Scripture Union and Campus Crusade, which targeted Africans in higher education. These African elites, joined by others with a similar Christian experience in higher education in the West, began ministries in cities among the educated middle classes, forming movements like the Redeemed Christian Church in Nigeria. The growing momentum of Pentecostalism caused still others to leave mainline churches to found new movements. Mensa Otabil, one of Africa's leading Pentecostals, left the Anglican Church to found the Ghana-based International Central Gospel Church in 1984.

These new movements were also catalyzed and shaped by a large variety of evangelical, charismatic and Pentecostal organizations, which, although different in theology and practice, agreed on the centrality of the born-again conversion experience. First, an interdenominationalism was fostered by parachurch bodies like Woman's Aglow, the Full Gospel Business Men's

Fellowship International, and the Haggai Institute. Second, American Bible Colleges such as Gordon Lindsay's Christ for the Nations Institute in Dallas, provided new Pentecostal leaders such as Benson Idahosa (in Nigeria) and Nevers Mumba (in Zambia) with training, but also—and more important—with a vast pool of resources and international contacts. Finally, numbers were boosted by the teaching and proselytizing activities of Western-based charismatics and Pentecostals such as Reinhard Bonnke, Benny Hinn, John Avanzini, and Oral Roberts.

Some scholars have argued for the existence of a neo-Pentecostalism that distinguishes the newer movements from the older ones. The first marker of neo-Pentecostalism is its association with media technologies. Although other churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, have made good use of print media and religious broadcasting, Pentecostals have come to appropriate the electronic media with such a zeal that it is almost a defining characteristic. Audio- and videotapes, produced locally and internationally, now augment gospel tracts, Bible study guides, and Christian monthlies as tools of teaching and proselytism. Religious broadcasting is particularly strong in West Africa, though Pat Robertson's *700 Club* appears on television in numerous African countries, and gospel music is on the airwaves throughout the continent.

The strong reliance by African Pentecostals on literature and electronic media derived from America contributes to two other markers of neo-Pentecostalism: its supposedly global and homogenous character and its interdenominationalism. These tendencies are enhanced by the itineration of African Pentecostal leaders around born-again conventions and conferences in Europe, Asia, and America, and the activities of Western born-again leaders in Africa. African Pentecostals are proud to be part of a global born-again community. Their convention centers are decked out in the flags of other nations and many ministries include the label *International* in their name.

The final characteristic of neo-Pentecostalism is its embrace of the faith gospel. The older missionary-derived Pentecostal denominations often had a strong holiness strand that placed emphasis on the socially humble person and was suspicious of material success. More recent strains of African Pentecostalism have drawn from the teachings of Oral Roberts, T. L. Osborn, Kenneth Hagin, and Kenneth Copeland to argue that material success is a both a sign of faith and of God's blessing. This prosperity gospel is often accompanied by rituals of deliverance (exorcism) that liberate believers from the heritage of their ancestors, and the demands of their extended families to redistribute wealth and participate in acts of traditional commensality. The stereotype of the African Pentecostal who drives to

church in a Mercedes dressed in the finest clothes and jewelry is often not far from the truth.

In some respects, the faith gospel both facilitates and legitimates the accumulation of young upwardly mobile middle-class Pentecostals and their leaders in a time of general economic decline. But contemporary Pentecostalism has a far greater force than this. As African states retreat in the face of demographic pressure on resources and the demands of structural adjustment programs, so have Pentecostals taken on welfare provision, providing education and health care. Moreover, the Pentecostal community replaces the extended family or “tribe,” helping the believer with access to jobs and accommodation and operating as a burial society in times of bereavement. The “puritan ethics” of sobriety and industry Pentecostalism engenders in believers makes them socially mobile, or at least keeps them from falling over the edge into poverty. Although Pentecostal leaders like Guti, Mumba, Otabil, and the late Benson Idahosa have accumulated through their church members and their international connections, their wealth is usually not despised by their followers, who view them as born-again “big men.” They are seen as effective leaders, able to represent their movement to the authorities and dispense vast amounts of patronage such as jobs, bursaries, and travel abroad.

Although African Pentecostalism might initially look like American born-again Christianity, the faith gospel resonates with “traditional” culture. While the Pentecostal middle classes aspire to prosperity, the majority of believers in townships and villages seek security. The poor make offerings to their leaders in the hope of receiving protection from witchcraft and evil spirits, and to secure fertility, healing, employment, success in public examinations, and harmonious marriages. As such, Pentecostalism stands in the trajectory of African personal security movements. Moreover, as mainline churches become increasingly fixated upon the gospel of development, so do ordinary Christians flock to Pentecostal churches, which are more inclined to address traditional concerns of purity, empowerment, well-being, and longevity. Thus, in both its engagement with existential questions and its creation of religious communities Pentecostalism does not represent a radical disjunction with African Christian independency, but stands in continuity with it.

Given the high profile of some of Africa’s “born-again” political leaders such as Gatscha Buthelezi, Daniel arap Moi, and Frederick Chiluba, the question arises as to whether Pentecostalism contributes toward the politics of authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism. In states such as Ghana and Kenya, where some of the historic denominations have distanced themselves from regimes with poor records of human rights, political accountability, and financial management, certain

Pentecostal movements have filled the legitimacy gap in order to obtain respectability and recognition. In Southern Africa, the Rhema Church espoused the causes of the American Religious Right. And in Nigeria and Zimbabwe Pentecostal leaders have joined the dominant elite in a culture of corporatism and clientelism, their personalized bureaucracies mirroring those of secular “chiefs.”

Yet Pentecostalism’s relation to politics is far from clear cut. In many of its daily practices it contributes to a culture of democratic pluralism and egalitarianism. At the level of the local assembly the disciplined believer participates in a culture of pragmatism and competition. Here also, in an autonomous space free from the state, social relations are remade. Ethnic and class differences are repatterned through the language of Christian brotherhood. Women and youth are empowered through the spirit. The reliance of many pastors on local tithes and offerings makes them vulnerable to capture from below and hence sensitive to local political agendas. In the same way that independent prophets undermined the sacred legitimation of kings and chiefs, Pentecostals make a vicarious attack on contemporary politicians, demonizing the spiritual forces through which they lay claim to authority. Some Pentecostals even espouse an explicit political theology. Otabil is renowned for his message of black pride and self-reliance and his repudiation of neocolonialism.

But it is in the sphere of gender and generational politics that Pentecostalism is most significant. With its central concern of personal rebirth, Pentecostalism begins with the remaking of the individual and the renewal of the family. In the home, the man is domesticated. He ceases to drink, is no longer promiscuous, and focuses his energies on work and education. Beyond the family and the community, Pentecostalism’s critique is directed first and foremost at other elements in the religious field, such as Islam and traditional religion, which it demonizes, and the historic mission churches, which it casts as “worldly.” Here the state is often used instrumentally to gain an advantage over rivals through access to public broadcasting and authorization for proselytizing activities.

It is clear that, since the late 1980s, Pentecostalism has had a significant impact on African societies. Politicians treat Pentecostals with respect, and other elements in the religious field have innovated in response to the Pentecostal upsurge. Anglicans, Catholics, and Methodists have instituted charismatic renewal to acquire “gifts of the spirit” for themselves. In West Africa, Islam has cultivated transnational connections and rapidly adopted print and electronic media to compete with Pentecostal proselytism.

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See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent and Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Islam; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: African Theology, Indigenization; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Church and State Relations; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Independence and Churches, Mission-Linked and Independent.**

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Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Church and State Relations

Four great historical forces have shaped the postcolonial church in Africa. The first is the dramatic shift in clerical leadership, from foreign missionary leadership to indigenous African leadership. The second is the pressure on the church to link the Christian faith to African culture (enculturation). The third is the challenge for the church to increase its role as an active moral force on African political and social life. The fourth is the challenge of the Islamic purists, who would like to impose the Shari'a (Islamic law) and their religious understanding about the nature of the state on their fellow citizens. In the face of all these challenges, the African Church has frequently sought to promote the common good.

At the time of political independence, many of the nationalists who had been exposed to Christian traditions wished the church well. The church, on the other hand, applauded the nationalists for promoting principles of justice, equality, and unity. Both church and state recognized each other as legitimate partners in the task of nation-building. This partnership came under stress as African societies were gradually subjected to racial autocracy, civil wars, and political and military tyranny. The political thinking of certain African political leaders had to be urgently challenged. The church opted to become a "watchdog" of the political scene, rather than a mere "lapdog," so to speak, and in so doing put African Christians at the center of African politics. Christians, the church insisted, were bound by their conscience to resist tyrannical government policies. Clerics such as Cardinal Bayenda of Brazzaville

and Archbishop Luwum of Kampala lost their lives in the face of hostile Congo and Ugandan governments, respectively. In the Republic of Zaire, the government of Mobutu temporarily exiled Cardinal Malula and stripped him of the National Order of Leopard.

Marxist regimes, such as Seku Touré's in Guinea and Ethiopia under the Derg-military junta of Mengistu, attacked the clerical leadership. In such attacks Archbishop Tchidimbo of Conakry was imprisoned, in 1971, while Abuna Teoflos of the Ethiopian Orthodox church was murdered in July 1979. The Ethiopian government of the Ethiopian Progressive Revolutionary Democratic Front continued to interfere in the internal politics of the Orthodox Church. It was such intervention that led to the resignation in 1991 of Abuna Mekorios and the government's subsequent appointment in 1992 of Abuna Paulos Gebrehiwot as the fifth patriarch. Individual African clerics had been targets of attack, but in the cases of the Jehovah's Witnesses and Alice Lenshina's Zambia Lumpa Church, a whole church came under government attack. The Jehovah's Witnesses were threatened in Kenya and Malawi for their rejection of political party membership and refusal to salute the national flag. In Zambia, the Lumpa Church condemned worldly materialism, which precipitated a conflict with the Zambian government.

The church found itself in the center of Africa's two bloodiest civil wars. In Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, the church, especially the Christian leadership in Eastern Nigeria ("Biafra") supported the cause of "Biafra." The federal government of Nigeria declared many foreign clerics in Eastern Nigeria *persona non grata*. The federal government of Nigeria followed this with the seizure of mission schools. Similarly, the Republic of Sudan was engaged in a bloody civil war. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the most vigorous opposition to the Islamic State, had been supported by the Christian clerics, while the Christian leadership was also engaged in positive peace negotiation with the state. It would be too simple to portray the civil wars in Nigeria and the Sudan as purely religious conflicts, but the need to establish a democratic and secular state was a serious concern for the opposition factions in both states. Islamic purists in both states have been insisting that the Shari'a should become the social and political framework. Sudanese Christians have taken a stand against such a proposition in the south. In Nigeria, the Christian Association of Nigeria, under the leadership of the Catholic Archbishop of Lagos, Anthony Okogie, has actively sought to maintain the secular character of the Nigerian state. The Copts of Egypt have lived in a predominantly Muslim state, and have requested constitutional guarantees for their membership. In one such confrontation, President Anwar Sadat removed Pope Shenouda III of Alexandria and the

patriarch of the see of St. Mark from his post in 1981 and exiled him to a desert monastery. Amnesty International and the Vatican protested his detention, and he was released in 1985.

The question of Muslim-Christian conflicts in Africa has raised issues of dialogue. In Nigeria, the government had instituted instruments for such a dialogue. The appointment of Cardinal Arinze of Nigeria as the Vatican's point man for Muslim-Christian dialogue shows the significance attached to this issue.

The church in Africa since political independence has stood steadfastly on the side of human rights. It soon became clear that the state theology of the apartheid regime of South Africa would be vigorously opposed. That decisive moment came with the leadership of Black liberation theologians such as Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Catholic Bishop P. F. J. Buthelezi, and Dutch Reformed Church clerk Allan Boesak. Apartheid was theologically delegitimized and declared a heresy. Meanwhile, many church leaders had become exile casualties of the tyrannical apartheid regime, such as the Anglicans Abrose Reeves, Trevor Huddleston, Gronville F. French-Beytagh, and Collia Witner, and the Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley.

African church leaders have intensified their efforts as "watchdogs." Unfortunately, the involvement of certain Rwandan Hutu clerics in the genocidal onslaught of the Tutsi in 1994 has stained the recent record of the clergy in Africa. Yet the majority of the church leaders in Africa see their main duty to be that of protecting and nourishing Christian life in Africa. In promoting this mission of the church, the church leaders are joining African political leaders in their projects of development, reconciliation, and liberation. The church of Africa continues to invest heavily in educational, medical, and social services. The reconciliation capacity of the African church was exemplified in South Africa, where Archbishop Tutu was appointed to head the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Pope John Paul's clarion call during his various visits to Africa for reconciliation and the restoration of constitutional order and democratic freedom is now the model to which the church in Africa aspires.

Religion, despite rising secularism, still speaks from the center of African societies, and as such the church will continue to have a voice in African political life. Even as the church focuses on the individual soul and transformation, that focus will always be based on Christian principles of justice and when necessary structural change. In that respect, Africans should expect more church-state confrontation. Christianity is one of among effective instruments of moral critique regarding African political life.

AUSTIN METUMARA AHANOTU

See also: **Religion, History of; Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; Religion, Postcolonial Africa: Independence and Churches, Mission-Linked and Independent.**

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Renamo: See Mozambique: Renamo, Destabilization.

Resettlement of Recaptives: Freetown, Libreville, Liberia, Freretown, Zanzibar

The abolition of slavery by European powers in the nineteenth century led to a massive effort by the British and French to suppress the slave trade on the coasts of Africa. This antislavery campaign was marked by the resettlement of thousands of recaptive slaves on the west and east coasts of Africa. Sierra Leone was one of the earliest settlements of these "liberated slaves." These recaptives came to revive a troubled colony created in 1787 by the British to settle freed blacks from England, Nova Scotia, and Jamaica, who created a self-governing community in a site called "Freetown." But financial difficulties, the hostility of local populations (the Temne) and the ravages of the fever threatened the existence of this settlement.

It was only saved in 1791, when it was reorganized as property of the Sierra Leone Company, a joint-stock enterprise of British philanthropists. Ruled with a heavy hand by Zachary Macaulay, the company kept the colony alive. The company hoped to use these settlers to develop a commercially profitable venture. Unfortunately, it lost heavily and was forced to turn its undertaking to the

British government. In 1808 this settlement became a crown colony, an event that coincided with the abolition of slavery in Great Britain. Freetown became a convenient rehabilitation center for recaptive slaves who were being rescued by the British antislavery naval patrol in the Atlantic Ocean. The abolitionists transformed this settlement into a center for the radiation of Christianity and Western culture throughout West Africa.

The Church Missionary Society (CMS), created in 1799, was to carry out this “civilizing mission.” The missionaries found recaptive slaves to be more receptive to the Christian gospel than the Nova Scotians and the natives, and these captives lived under missionary guidance. By massively converting to Christianity they began to emulate the Nova Scotian settlers in their assimilation of Western culture. These liberated slaves learned English, and progressively created a culture (Krio), which is a mixture of African and European experiences.

Another rehabilitation center for former slaves was being set up some 200 miles south of Freetown. In 1822, a small group of American blacks arrived in Liberia. Their voyage, organized by the American Colonization Society, was guided by the idea that free blacks and manumitted slaves in the United States might begin a new life on African soil, away from the discrimination and persecution they experienced in the United States. The beginning of the settlement of these freed blacks in “Liberia” (named for the freedom this establishment symbolized) was as difficult as in Sierra Leone. Diseases, poor leadership, and hostility from local populations almost provoked the extinction of these settlers. But they were saved by a young white Briton, Yehudi Ashmun, who assumed control of the settlement at the time the agents of the Colonization Society deserted their responsibilities. Ashmun forced the colonists to work together, organized a resistance against local tribal groups, and slowly put together a permanent community. When Ashmun departed in 1828, Liberia was established. But the political heat surrounding the issue of slavery in the United States made impossible any substantial financing of the Liberian venture by the U.S. government. This was complicated by the fact that few American blacks were interested in colonization unless it was in exchange for manumission, and as late as 1850, the Liberian settlement numbered less than 3000 individuals. By 1847, however, despite a faltering economy, political instability, and chronic troubles with local people, Liberia had become an independent African nation that, despite its weaknesses, instability, and troubles with the local population, symbolized the freedom many African nations aspired to after World War II.

The British action in Sierra Leone inspired the French in the Gabon estuary. They also created a “civilizing

center” called Libreville (Freetown), which has its origins in the capture of a Brazilian slave ship (the *Elizia*, or *Ilizia*) by the French Naval Patrol. The *Elizia* had 300 slaves, who were taken to Senegal in 1846. In order to solve Gabon’s chronic labor problem, 50 of these captives were resettled in the Gabon estuary in 1849. French authorities gave this project a political character, because the Libreville sought to become a center for the radiation of French culture and Christianity in the region. But early on this project faced difficulties, because the very existence of the village was threatened. Indeed, that same year, 17 of the captives, working in the hospital ship *l’Adour*, rebelled against the mistreatment they were receiving. These rebels broke their relationships with the French and created a separate village in the forest. After deserting, the Loango attacked Libreville itself in 1849, and the French authorities assisted by the Mpongwe repressed these aggressions. Despite the violent nature of the counteroffensive, 14 Loango managed to escape, but 3 were killed. Nonetheless, life was taking shape in Libreville. The Loango received food from French authorities and agreed to form unions among themselves. In 1850, however, the French naval officers suspended their food supply, leading to a revolt among the captives. They viewed the French action as despotic and even asked to be returned to Senegal. But French authorities adopted a reconciliatory approach and convinced them to stay. The change in the leadership of the Comptoir du Gabon created more problems for the Loango. Abuses of power multiplied and the Loango began abandoning the village of Libreville to live among the Mpongwe at the Louis, Glass, and Denis villages. Some of these Loango even became traders, while others worked as crewmen in ships trading with the Mpongwe. In 1851, Libreville was almost completely deserted, and those who decided to stay were mainly invalid inhabitants experiencing different kinds of social disorders. Libreville was a failure for the French administration, but its name was extended to Mpongwe villages as the French comptoir grew in the second half of the nineteenth century and became the capital of the French Congo, between 1885 and 1910.

While the combat against slavery on the west coast of Africa was carried out by both the French navy and the British antislavery squadron, in East Africa the abolition of slavery was solely a British crusade against a massive “asiatic evil.” If, around 1850, suppression of the slave trade was well established and resettlement areas were being developed in West Africa, this crusade took more time to accomplish in East Africa. Even though it was a long and difficult enterprise, the British antislavery squadron became involved in the massive stopping of Arab dhows carrying slave cargoes between 1860 and 1897. But the main problem was the

resettlement of recaptive slaves, a task given to the missionaries. Some of these slaves were resettled in Zanzibar, while the majority of them found new homes in Christian centers in the mainland. Among them there was, Bagamoyo and mainly Freretown.

Situated just outside Mombasa, Freretown was founded in 1874 by Sir Bartle Frere as a settlement for freed slaves. After a special mission to Zanzibar in 1872 to negotiate a much more effective treaty for the abolition of slave trade, he urged the CMS to provide a refuge for liberated slaves. The CMS station at Freretown, under the Reverend Salter Price, received its first 500 freed slaves in 1874, and by 1888 there were over 3000 settled there. It continued to receive freed slaves until the end of the nineteenth century, but because of its tendency to forcibly disrupt slave caravans this mission was a matter of contention with slave owners. The main mission of the CMS was to teach Christianity to the recaptives, who also received basic education from the missionaries and worked on the mission's plantations. Freretown became a center of the Christian missionary movement, and freed slaves were used as missionary agents throughout East Africa.

In Zanzibar, the end of the slave trade was more difficult to obtain because of the Sultan of Zanzibar's interest in this commerce. Nonetheless, the British and the sultan signed a treaty abolishing slavery in Zanzibar in 1873. Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890, and additional pressure was put on the Sultan Ali bin Said to abolish the legal status of slavery; he signed a decree to this effect in 1897. This decree was a major blow to slave traffic, and slavery progressively disappeared from the island. After the 1897 decree, slaves who wished to acquire freedom had to apply to the district court and would be issued freedom papers. European slavery commissioners were to oversee the emancipation process. Despite difficulties, a slow but steady number of slaves asked for freedom papers and this process continued throughout the twentieth century. But the majority of freed slaves became prostitutes. Drinking became widespread, and terrorism and banditry increased. Nonetheless, the work of emancipation was well underway, even though many slaves asked to return to slavery and others were simply reemployed by their former masters. Those who crossed to the mainland to work on the Ugandan railway or the Uganda transport department did so under the strict orders of a European caravan leader. These former slaves became "free laborers," and discovered new forms of hardship imposed by the capitalist colonial economy.

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See also: **Sierra Leone: Origins, 1787–1808. Sierra Leone: Development of the Colony, Nineteenth Century.**

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Resistance to Colonialism

By about 1890, the European colonial powers were united in their determination to conquer a then divided Africa. They not only agreed which parts of the continent each power should have, but also promised to help each other against African resisters. In contrast, African states generally stood alone, though there were a few isolated attempts at cooperation between Muslim rulers in parts of both West and East Africa. The result was that, while actual conquest was delayed by up to 30 years in some areas, most of the African continent was under some form of European administration by 1920. Even then, a few territories on the fringes of the Sahara—for example, in Morocco and Somaliland—had still to be fully "pacified."

Forms of African resistance to colonial rule were present from the beginning. Initial African military opposition to conquest is sometimes known as "primary resistance." It was usually organized by the precolonial state, however small, and it was, nearly everywhere, brief. Other examples of primary resistance included examples of state-building resistance. In these cases, leadership had to create a new political structure, and relevant examples include state-building attempts by 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, the Maji Maji revolt in Tanganyika, and later phases of the Shona and Ndebele rebellions in Rhodesia. Later, after World War II, the final victory for African independence had its roots in modern nationalism. This was a form of political organization, borrowed from the West or adapted from other non-Western countries (like India). The goal of African nationalists throughout the continent was to take over the colonial state and replace European rule by new frameworks of renewed and independent African political life.

The first phase of anti-European resistance in Africa lasted roughly from the late 1880s to the time of World War I. During this time, the existing West African

states were defeated in battle or forced into submission. In 1890, after a brief campaign, Segou, the principal city in the Tukulor empire, fell to the French. Between 1891 and 1898 Samori Touré was driven back, despite skillfully fighting rearguard actions and seeking to maintain his supply of the precious modern arms and ammunition from European traders on the coast. However, in 1896 the European arms blockade became fully effective against Samori and, in 1898, he surrendered. The Mossi empire of Ouagadougou was overthrown by the French in 1896 and a powerful British force occupied Asante in the same year. In 1892, the British broke the power of the Ijebu kingdom, and between 1892 and 1894 the kingdom of Dahomey was occupied after a strong resistance. Buoyed by its greatly superior military capabilities, the British colonial government at Lagos was able to penetrate the whole of Yorubaland. In 1896 the Royal Niger Company defeated the Nupe army and entered the city of Ilorin. In 1897 the kingdom of Benin fell and the following year, Rabih ibn Fadlallah, who had recently established his power in Borno using rifles imported across the Sahara, was slain by the French. Soon after this, between 1901 and 1903, a series of major battles around Kontagora, Yola, Kano, and Sokoto left the great emirates of northern Nigeria under the control of the British.

While the states of West Africa were collapsing, European powers, including Britain, France, and Germany, attempted to extend and deepen their domination in East and Central Africa. London sent a large Anglo-Egyptian force into the Sudan and broke the khalifa's power at the battle of Omdurman in 1898, while newly established Arab states, located in the eastern Congo basins, were destroyed by European invaders. The British managed to maneuver themselves into a dominant position in the interlacustrine kingdoms in the early 1890s and, by 1900, had managed to impose themselves over the chief state in the area, Buganda. On the coast of East Africa, anticolonial resistance was defeated by 1890. Later, during the 1890s, the Germans defeated both Isike, leader of the Nyamwezi people, and Meli, the Chagga chief. Further south, in Rhodesia, the Ndebele suffered a heavy defeat in 1893 and in 1898 the resistance of the Ngoni, west of Lake Malawi, was also broken.

In the 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century, as European colonial power developed and deepened, conversion to Islam became, for many Africans, a potent symbol of anti-European resistance. For many pagan Africans, Islam was an alternative modernizing influence in opposition to the hegemony of the European Christian missionaries and their system of putative, hegemonic enculturation. Islam provided its followers with an alternative modernizing

worldview, not defined by the colonial order and its norms.

Conversions to Islam encouraged a particular kind of resistance to European rule across the Maghrib and the Sudanic belt: jihad (holy war). This development was further encouraged by the beginning of a new Islamic century and Islam-inspired resistance flourished in Sudan, Somaliland, Libya, and Morocco. Both Libya and Morocco were in the first flushes of an Islamized militancy at this time, following the recent founding of polities espousing Muslim values. In Morocco, it was a feeling that the Sultan had been compromised too far by successive European demands that led to Islamic resistance. In Somaliland, Islamic militancy was focused by the actions of Muhammad Abdallah Hasan (called by the British the "Mad Mullah"), who unleashed a reign of terror against local people who refused to join his Salihiyya brotherhood. The British sent in four expeditions between 1900 and 1904 to attempt to quell the jihad, but Hasan retained his influence in the north of Somaliland until 1920.

The effect of jihad was initially both to stiffen the resolve of Muslims to fight European encroachment, as well as to identify Islam more generally with a militant anticolonial stance. Aggressive European intrusion against various African peoples sometimes led to their mass conversion to Islam as a potent signal of continued resistance. In West Africa, for example, the Mandinka people converted en masse following French campaigns against them in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. In German East Africa, the bloody repression of the Maji Maji revolt of 1905–1907 led the persecuted Ngindo people to convert to Islam en masse. In addition to localized Islamic militancy there was also the threat of militant Pan-Islamism to worry the Europeans. Not only were there links between militant Islamists in the Sudan and in Northern Nigeria in 1900–1920, but also Pan-Islamic influences associated with the Ottoman Turks. At the outbreak of World War I, the Ottomans issued a call to jihad against the Europeans that circulated widely in North Africa and parts of Kenya and Mozambique, although without conspicuous numbers of African Muslims heeding the call. The crushing of the Ottomans during World War I, coupled with the apparently inexorable spread of European power, confirmed to many African Muslims that the Europeans could not be defeated by force and gradually they came to accept European rule.

In sum, by the early years of the twentieth century, preexisting African states had been destroyed throughout the region by the European invaders. However, the small European forces were not immediately capable of effectively occupying all parts of Africa. They were especially slow to change the more remote areas and the territory of small self-governing communities

whose complex social and political organizations often baffled them. Once paralyzing blows had been struck to the major African states, colonial officials went out with small escorts over a large part of the continent ordering chiefs great and small to arrest opponents of the new regime; provide labor; collect taxes; change laws; abolish tolls; permit European mining or settlement; admit missionaries; grow certain crops; give land for railways; or protect telegraph lines—in short, to become agents of colonialism. Despite periodic strikes, mutinies, and riots, the conquest was over. The business of actually imposing their authority throughout Africa would take the new colonial rulers much longer.

Once colonial power was ensconced, generally by the advent of World War I, various forms of secondary resistance to colonial rule emerged. In many cases, such movements had a cultural dimension, often involving new, syncretistic religious movements. Many emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century as vehicles of anticolonial resistance and, in many cases, flourished in the context of growing and widespread dissatisfaction with many aspects of colonial rule. On occasion, erstwhile foes, such as the Shona and the Ndebele in Rhodesia, combined to resist British colonialism in 1896–1897. In this case cultural identification was an important facet of the rebellion's organization, with spirit mediums employing "medicines" to enhance the martial efforts of the fighters. The mediums created a national network of shrines to provide an agency for the transmission and coordination of information and activities; a structure later rejuvenated during the independence war of the 1970s.

Use of "medicine" also helped stimulate the anti-colonial Maji Maji rebellion of 1905–1907 in German-controlled Tanganyika. The diviner and prophet Kinjikitili gave his followers "medicine" supposed to render them invulnerable to bullets. He anointed local leaders with the *maji* ("water"), which helped to create solidarity among about 20 different ethnic groups and encouraged them to fight together in a common anti-European cause. A further example comes from northern Uganda, where a cult known as Yakan among the Lugbara people, centering on the use of "magic medicine," helped stimulate their short, unsuccessful, anti-colonial war in 1919. The list of such forms of secondary resistance could be extended, but the overall point is, one would hope, clear: various movements arose, often led by prophets and stimulated by anticolonialism and the social changes that the Europeans brought with them. Local anticolonial movements employed local cultural and religious beliefs as a basis for anti-European protest and opposition.

In conclusion, primary resistance came to an end in most of Africa before World War I, and modern nationalism did not find success until after 1945. The

period in between—the 1920s and 1930s—was a time of various forms of resistance to European rule. This period can be labeled one of "secondary resistance," though it is an inconvenient category. This is because its forms were so varied, to the extent that it hardly deserves to be identified as a specific category. During the interwar decades, some resistance was organized around elite political parties like the West African National Congress or the African National Congress in South Africa. Other acts of protest (or resistance) included anticolonial cultural movements, strikes, riots, and mutinies. Additionally, peaceful opposition to colonial rule was expressed via the press or the political process.

These developments were encouraged by a process of modernization during the first 50 years of the twentieth century, almost revolutionary in its medium- and long-term effects. Urbanization was an important effect of this process, leading to mass migrations and gradual industrialization. Preexisting towns expanded and new urban centers grew. Abidjan, Takoradi, Port Harcourt, Lusaka, Nairobi, and many other towns and cities were founded as ports and harbors, administrative and mining centers, and as transportation—especially railway—focal points. Urban centers expanded swiftly. The population of Accra, for example, increased from about 18,000 in 1901 to nearly 136,000 only 50 years later; Nairobi's population more than doubled in little more than a decade in the 1930s from around 12,000 people to more than 25,000; while Casablanca's population rose a hundredfold from just over 2,000 to a quarter of a million people between 1910 and 1936.

Migrants flooded into the urban centers, while traditional communities were disrupted and consequently changed as a result both of gradual insertion into the modern world economy and via the effects of an increasingly centralized political environment. The overall result of population growth, urbanization, cultivation of cash crops, and new educational and employment opportunities, was that a new social order developed. Numerous Africans found employment in the modern economic sector, but often encountered poor working conditions. Especially after World War II, both strikes and anticolonial riots broke out (for example, in the Gold Coast and Kenya) that were widely regarded as expressions of emerging nationalism.

In sum, the variety of forms of African resistance to colonial rule developed over time from primary to secondary forms of African opposition to colonial rule. In the interwar decades, such secondary resistance is most easily identified by what it was not; it was neither primary resistance nor modern nationalism.

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
See also: **Colonialism.**

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Réunion: Nineteenth Century to 1946

Originally known as Ile Bourbon, Réunion was first settled under the administration of the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales in 1664. The settlers were of European origin; their slaves, who at times outnumbered them by as many as three to one, were from Madagascar and eastern Africa. In the early eighteenth century, coffee was the principal crop, but disease and competition from the Caribbean islands led to the collapse of the coffee industry in the 1740s. By then France had established sovereignty over the neighboring island of Mauritius and diversification into food production for export to Mauritius led to renewed prosperity for Réunion, although in 1764 financial difficulties obliged the Compagnie des Indes to sell both islands to the French crown.



Réunion.

At the end of the eighteenth century the French revolutionary government established a colonial assembly in Réunion, granting the island a significant degree of autonomy. At the same time it attacked the privileges of the large landowners and in 1794 slavery was abolished. The island's economy depended almost entirely on slave labor, and this highly unpopular law was ignored locally. However, while proslavery sentiment united the island, the accompanying constitutional reforms that called for the integration of the island as a French department divided it, and a counterrevolutionary, proslavery group called for independence. The independence movement was eventually defeated, and with the reestablishment of slavery in 1802 the principal object of contention was finally removed.

Under the restoration, the administrative system of 1766 was reestablished, removing the local assemblies and thus significantly reducing the island's autonomy. Subsequent conflicts between the two representatives of the crown—the governor and the intendant—led to the suppression of the latter post in 1818 and a concentration of power in the hands of the governor. In 1825 the administration was reformed to restrict the powers of the governor, but although a general counsel was created, its 24 members were chosen by the king, and legislative and executive power both effectively remained with the governor.

Further changes in the 1830s granted more rights to the population: deputies sent to Paris were nominated rather than chosen, and a colonial council was established with 30 elected members; but renewed conflicts led to its disbanding under the Second Republic (1848–1852), and under the Second Empire (1852–1870) the autonomy of the colonies was further reduced; prospects of integration with France were rapidly disappearing. Although a general council, with 24 nominated members, was reestablished in 1854, their decisions were still not binding on the governor.

The most durable effect of the Napoleonic Wars had been to deprive Réunion of its market in Mauritius, which was lost to the British. However, France's loss of Mauritius also deprived the country of a source of sugar, and in Réunion large tracts of land were planted with cane; in some areas, previously untouched land came under cultivation, while in others coffee and food crops were replaced. Industrialization and a general improvement in techniques led to improved yields, but the emphasis on sugar meant that by 1848 Réunion had become a net importer of food.

By the early nineteenth century the population had increased to the point at which there was insufficient land to meet demand. If early settler families possessed large estates, more recent arrivals often found themselves with unworkable holdings hundreds of meters long but only a few meters wide. There developed a

class of white settlers who, unable to exercise trades that were already the preserve of slaves or freed slaves, were obliged to move to higher ground where they eked out a meager existence on the fringes of society. The creation of a class of poor whites was exacerbated by the growth of the sugar industry, which was capital intensive and benefited from economies of scale. Land was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large estates, while the abolition of slavery in 1848 created another class of poor blacks almost overnight as former slaves abandoned the cane fields.

To provide more land, the interior of the island was opened up to settlers. Although there were restrictions on the amount of land that could be cleared, and on the steepness of slopes cultivated, these rules were not respected and the ensuing erosion was severe, exacerbating the poverty. In an effort to ease the labor shortage and meet the needs of the sugar industry, indentured laborers were imported from Madagascar, but abuses led to a ban on the recruitment of labor in Madagascar by 1859. Under an agreement with the British, Réunion turned to India, but again, abuses led to the British abrogating the agreement in 1885.

The period of prosperity, like the preceding ones, did not last. By 1860 sugar production was dropping: competition from other producers and a fall in prices were accompanied by disease, both of plants and laborers. As France acquired a new empire in Africa and Asia, Réunion was increasingly ignored; poor port facilities discouraged shipping, and the opening of the Suez Canal further isolated the island. By 1900, other crops were being introduced to reduce the dependence on sugar. Fragrance crops and spices—notably geranium, ylang ylang, vetiver, and vanilla—did well; tea, cotton, and tobacco were less successful, although tobacco was still an important crop for the local market.

The introduction of new crops demonstrated the islanders' resourcefulness in the face of neglect, as did the engineering works carried out at the same time. An artificial port in the west of the island was completed in 1884, and a 78-mile (125-kilometer) railway line linking St. Benoit to St. Pierre via St. Denis, including a tunnel more than six miles (ten kilometers) long, was a technical triumph.

Both World War I and the interwar period proved profitable for Réunion. Export crop (particularly sugar) prices rose, and sugar production peaked at 110,000 metric tons in 1940. But high population growth rates and extreme inequalities of wealth meant that when the slump came, as it did during World War II, the effects were severe. Sugar production virtually ceased, unemployment was extremely high, and famine threatened. During the prosperous years not only had investments in infrastructure ceased, but even basic

maintenance had been ignored. Poverty, malnutrition and disease were rife among the majority of the population, while the rich elite lived in comfort. The island was crying out for political and economic reform. It was considered that this could only be achieved by full integration with France as a department.

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See also: Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth century; Slavery, Plantation: East Africa and the Islands.

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Réunion: 1946 to the Present

After World War II, Réunion was transformed into a French *département* (ministry) in a law passed on March 15, 1946. This course of action appeared to be the best way to modernize the island's economic and social system, which at the time was still based on the old colonial structure. The economy was primarily dependent on the production and exportation of cane sugar, and society was sharply stratified into a few wealthy families (*les Grands Blancs*) and the rest of the population (*Ti Moun*), whose living and educational standards were low and who depended on the former for their subsistence.

The local population favored full integration into the French Republic. This integration meant that main decisions concerning the island were to be made in France, according to the centralized nature of the French state. It also meant that French law, institutions, administration, public services, and public expenditures were to be transferred to the island in order to improve the local situation and bring about the social assimilation of the population.

As a result, public investments were made to renovate infrastructures, increase agricultural production, and diversify the economy. New roads were built, and extensive irrigation and electricity programs were set up. Productivity increased, allowing for more cane sugar exportation, and attempts were made to develop other products for local consumption, and thus reduce the dependence of the island on imported food.

However, this attempt, much like efforts at promoting industrial development, has remained limited. The island has generally continued to export agricultural products and import manufactured goods, which accounts for one of its major economic problems—namely, the deficit in its balance of trade. In fact, its economic growth for the last 20 years has mainly come from the development of tourism. The majority of the population works in the service industry, as opposed to agriculture or manufacturing.

The transfer of French public services to Réunion also resulted in the creation of a new social class, with living standards similar to those of France. At the same time, French social legislation was introduced to the island. Education and health services greatly improved. In 1954, 43 per cent of the population was literate; by 1999, that number had increased to 79 per cent. Similarly, infant mortality has greatly decreased from an estimated 149 deaths per 1000 live births in 1946 to 6.9 per 1000 in 1991.

However, despite the overall increase in the gross domestic product, social problems have remained acute, due partly to the high birthrate of the population (from 1946 to 1999 the population increased from 22,7000 to 717,723) and to a huge disparity in revenues. Réunion does not have enough qualified people to implement its economic and social development programs, and this has been the case since the 1950s. Approximately 20,000 French citizens have moved to the island to work. They have traditionally held the key posts in the private and public sectors, which accounts for lingering resentment and tension between them and the local population.

Indeed, unemployment has remained a major problem, especially for the young generation. More than 60 per cent of that population still depend for their living on social benefits. Moreover, the fact that most decisions concerning the island have for a long time been made in Paris, by individuals unfamiliar with local customs and circumstances, has made the implementation of many measures take longer than expected, and has increased resentment among the native inhabitants of Réunion.

Regionalist movements have emerged, calling for more consideration of, and respect for, the local culture. From 1958, the Communist Party, which previously approved transforming the island into a French

departement changed its position. As the main opposition party, it asked for more political autonomy, considering that reform as the only way to achieve the quick development of the island. For a long time, its program of action remained unclear; the party did not offer any specific proposals until March 1981. During an extraordinary government session on March 29, 1981, the Communist Party stated that the current status of the island as a departement essentially denied the very existence of a Creole people with its own distinct personality, culture, language, customs and history. It proposed the creation of an island-based legislative assembly composed of locally elected officials that would be entrusted with significant governmental power and its own executive council.

In 1982, the Communist Party supported the French law on decentralization, which transformed Réunion into a *collectivité territoriale*—that is, a territory with its own financial resources and some political autonomy. This led to the creation of a regional council composed of 45 members, each elected for a five-year term. A law passed on August 2, 1984, outlined the role and duties of this body. It is entrusted with specific tasks and powers, especially the promotion of social, economic, intellectual and scientific development, education and local culture. It is assisted by a social and economic council and a committee for education, culture, and environment. The regional council can make proposals for modifying or adapting laws passed in France. It has independent financial resources, but also receives financial transfers from the French state.

VÉRONIQUE DIMIER

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Rhodes, Cecil J. (1853–1902)

Founder, De Beers Mining Company

As a young man, Cecil John Rhodes, who would later become a mining capitalist, colonial politician, and imperial ideologue, was imbued with the racial pride and imperial enthusiasm of his times. He believed that the English were “the finest race in the world” and advocated the formation of a secret society to bring about British world domination. These ideas governed Rhodes’s ambitions for the rest of his life, and between 1878 and 1888 he accumulated the wealth and power with which he hoped to realize them.

Building on already substantial holdings in Kimberley, Rhodes and his partner, Charles Rudd, formed the De Beers Mining Company, and opened that which

would become the most highly capitalized mine in Kimberley and would enable Rhodes to monopolize diamond-mining in 1887 and 1888. At De Beers, Rhodes pioneered the migrant labor system and established “closed compounds” in which black workers were rigorously searched before and after being incarcerated for the duration of their contracts. These labor controls provided the model for twentieth-century southern Africa. Such draconian controls were made possible by imperial conquests in southern Africa, and Rhodes’s election as a member of the Cape’s parliament, after it incorporated Griqualand West in 1880.

Rhodes’s earliest political involvement concerned the affairs of Basutoland and Bechuanaland; diamond interests undoubtedly shaped his regional perspective. Between them, Basutoland and Bechuanaland provided labor, food, and wood for Kimberley, while in Bechuanaland Afrikaner mercenaries threatened the route to the north. Imperial indecisiveness over these territories convinced Rhodes, by this time one of the wealthiest men in South Africa, of the need for a local power base. Aware of the growing political importance of the newly formed Afrikaner Bond, he championed a Cape subimperialism in partnership with Afrikaners.

The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the South African Republic (SAR) in 1886 opened a new phase in the history of the subcontinent. Initially Rhodes underestimated its importance, and the inadequacy of his Rand holdings spurred him to look further north, where he hoped to find a “second Rand.” Fearing Transvaal expansion across the Limpopo, he persuaded the British High Commissioner at the Cape to secure a treaty with the Ndebele king, Lobengula, ensuring imperial sovereignty over his kingdom. Shortly thereafter, on 30 October 1888, Rhodes’s own agents, secured a concession granting them exclusive rights to exploit minerals in Lobengula’s realm, in which they included Mashonaland. This greatly strengthened Rhodes against his rivals, and in October 1889 his newly formed British South Africa Company (BSAC) obtained a royal charter to “develop” a vast area of southern and central Africa. In 1890 his “pioneer column” occupied Mashonaland.

In 1888 and 1889, Rhodes’s agents staked out the whole of present-day Malawi and Zambia for crown and company, securing mineral and land concessions for the BSAC. These treaties greatly increased Britain’s bargaining position in the European scramble for Africa, and helped establish the modern frontiers of Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

It was, however, events in South Africa and Rhodesia that absorbed most of Rhodes’s energies and finances. In Mashonaland, settlers soon realized the absence of gold, and in 1893 deliberately provoked war against

the Ndebele. This was followed by a boom in BSAC shares and huge mining speculation, but by the end of 1894 it was evident that there was no “second Rand” north of the Limpopo, and Rhodes’s policies toward the SAR hardened.

Until the mid-1890s, Rhodes’s expansionist schemes were supported enthusiastically within the Cape Colony, where he became premier in 1890 and 1894. In 1894 he annexed Pondoland, the last independent African territory between the Cape and Natal, and in 1895 introduced the wide-ranging Glen Grey Act, an astute way of satisfying his disparate constituencies, introducing individual landholding for Africans and forcing out labor. Rhodes’s railway between the Cape and the Transvaal was also popular with Cape Afrikaners, who hoped to sell their agricultural products on the Rand. When the SAR responded by raising tariffs on colonial produce and blocking the Vaal crossings, war between the two states was only narrowly averted. Despite this, Rhodes continued to enjoy the support of the Afrikaner Bond and was a leading exponent of a white South African nationalism within the British Empire.

Like many magnates with deep-level mining interests on the Rand, from the mid-1890s Rhodes found the SAR’s policies increasingly costly. With the secret backing of Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, he plotted its downfall. At the end of 1895 his lieutenant, Leander Starr Jameson, entered the Transvaal with a small band of armed followers, hoping to precipitate an armed insurrection. There was, however, no uprising, and the raiders were quickly arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, though they were released when Rhodes paid their fines. Rhodes was forced to resign from the premiership of the Cape, his Anglo-Afrikaner alliance destroyed. South African politics became increasingly polarized on ethnic lines. Rhodes was also forced to resign as managing director of the BSAC, as a parliamentary enquiry into the raid was enacted.

In Southern Rhodesia, the absence of the BSAC Police who joined Jameson facilitated an uprising by the Ndebele in March 1896. Three months later the Shona also rose. For a time the small white colony seemed doomed, and after the battle of Taba zi ka Mambo on July 5, Rhodes sought peace. In mid-October the Ndebele accepted his terms although the Shona uprising continued until 1898. By this time Rhodes had rejoined the board of the BSAC and regained political influence at the Cape, where he became president and patron of the Loyal Colonial League, founded in 1896 to promote British supremacy in South Africa. Together with the Cape newspapers, which he largely controlled, the league fomented war against the SAR.

Rhodes also led and funded a new grouping of Cape Progressives in the 1898 parliamentary elections, during

which he announced that he favored “equal rights for all white men.” He later reformulated this as “equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambezi,” in the hope of gaining African electoral support. To the same end he also funded the African newspaper, *Izwi la Bantu*.

Had he lived longer, Rhodes may well have recaptured his former position. He had a weak heart and was increasingly aware of his own mortality; his last years seem filled with almost frenzied activity, including four months under siege in Kimberley during the South African War. He also found time to write his eighth will, in which he established scholarships to Oxford University for young men (women were explicitly excluded) from the colonies and the United States, which he still hoped would be restored to the British Empire. In addition Rhodes left money for proimperial projects; it was used in the twentieth century to fund a variety of imperial causes.

In his lifetime, Rhodes acquired vast wealth and power, often by unscrupulous means, and justified it in terms of his imperial vision. Although he was revered by his supporters and his use of power was often tempered by his ability to empathize with and bestow patronage on those he dominated, in southern Africa his ventures accelerated the pace of capitalist and colonial expansion, and were accompanied by conquest and exploitation, sharp business practice and civil corruption, with long-term consequences for the subcontinent.

SHULA MARKS

See also: Botswana: **Bechuanaland Protectorate, Founding of, 1885–1899; Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Kimberley and Diamond Fields; Kruger, Paul; Lewanika I, the Lozi, and the BSA Company; Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand; 1886–1899; South African War, 1899–1902; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): British Occupation, Resistance: 1890s.**

Biography

Born Cecil John Rhodes at Bishop Stortford in Hertfordshire, the son of an Anglican clergyman, in 1853. Joined his brother in South Africa at the age of seventeen, rapidly making his mark on the newly discovered diamond fields of Kimberley in Griqualand West. With funds accumulated in Kimberley, returned in 1873 to study at Oxford University, finally graduating in 1881, having spent the intervening years building up his fortune in Kimberley. With his partner, Charles Rudd, formed the De Beers Mining Company. Died on March 26, 1902 in Muizenberg, outside Cape Town. According to his request, was buried in the Matopos in Rhodesia on April 10.

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Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia

The white seizure of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) occurred swiftly between 1889 and 1893, but the pressures which led to this rapid sequence of events had been building up for some time. Disillusioned by their violent conflicts with the Boers, the Ndebele under King Mzilikazi had moved into the Matopos region in southwestern Zimbabwe in 1837. There they established a fluid state system in which some Shona peoples were incorporated some moved into a peaceable relationship of trade and tribute, and others, generally more distant from the heartland of the state, were periodically raided. Europeans were to treat this system as a quasi European-style state from which concessions and treaties, supposedly relating to the entire region of the modern Zimbabwe, could be secured. Alternatively, when it suited them, they saw the Shona peoples as “underdogs” in need of protection from the Ndebele. European interest was stimulated by the fabulous stories of rich gold-bearing regions that emanated from Central Africa. The German prospector Carl Mauch, who traveled in Zimbabwe between 1864 and 1870, brought out tales both of the Zimbabwe ruins and of gold-bearing reefs. Both Mzilikazi and his son and successor Lobengula (who ruled after a succession crisis in 1868–1870) had attempted to control, often with some success, the activities of white hunters, ivory traders, and prospectors, eager to make their fortunes in Central Africa. They were invariably sent off into Shona country. There had also been desultory efforts to secure mining rights from Lobengula as early as 1880.

International competition was relatively slow to develop, but by the 1880s it was clear that the Portuguese were attempting to establish their supposedly historic claims to a great band of south-central Africa, stretching from the Angolan Atlantic coast to that of Mozambique on the Indian Ocean. By that time, the extraordinary land hunger of the Boers was beginning to lead some of those in the Transvaal to cast covetous eyes across the Limpopo. Moreover, the Germans had unexpectedly

arrived on the coasts of Tanganyika (Tanzania) and southwest Africa (Namibia) in 1884 and appeared to have further ambitions in the interior. Although Cecil Rhodes had exhibited little interest in the interior until the mid-1880s, he was then moved to act by a combination of these international rivalries, his megalomaniac vision of British rule stretching from the Cape to Cairo, and his belief that an outflanking movement against the Boers would ultimately help in the refederation of the entire southern African region. He may also have been influenced by dreams of riches that might help to redress his comparative failure to secure the best claims on the newly discovered Rand goldfields. The British acquisition of Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1885, designed partly to deter the Boers from making contact with the Germans, gave Rhodes his opportunity. He called it his “Suez Canal to the interior,” and he was soon sending representatives to Lobengula’s capital in Bulawayo.

The rapid escalation of these tensions was all too apparent at Lobengula’s court between 1887 and 1889. Various British figures, including John Smith Moffat (the son of the missionary Robert Moffat, who had been a friend of Mzilikazi), argued that a protectorate should be declared over Lobengula’s territory. Other Britons, convinced that the Rand gold fields offered confirmation of vast riches in the interior, sought mining concessions. In 1888, a Boer representative called Pieter Grobler succeeded in persuading the king to sign a treaty that would have given the Transvaal a privileged relationship with the Ndebele. In the same year, Rhodes’s three agents, Charles Rudd, Rochfort Maguire, and Francis Thompson, negotiated a concession from Lobengula that offered highly restricted prospecting rights in exchange for arms, ammunition, an annual subsidy, and a steamer for the Zambezi. The king later made several efforts to repudiate this concession. He soon recognized its dangers, attempted to exploit the divisions among the various concession-seekers, and sent two of his indunas as emissaries to London. However, Rhodes was able to neutralize all of Lobengula’s efforts: he bought his rivals out and was so successful in manipulating politicians in London that he secured a royal charter, establishing his British South Africa Company, in October 1889. The geographical region covered by the charter was necessarily vague and it ultimately helped him to acquire the territories of both Southern and Northern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe and Zambia).

Rhodes dispatched Leander Starr Jameson, an Edinburgh-trained doctor who had practiced in Kimberley, to persuade Lobengula not only to accept the charter, but also acquiesce regarding the arrival of white settlers in Mashonaland. Jameson used his medical skills to establish influence over the king by

relieving some of the symptoms of his gout. Rhodes organized a “pioneer column” comprising fewer than 200 men, well armed with machine guns and equipped with a searchlight and a generator, to invade Mashonaland, supposedly under the terms of the concession. Each of its participants was heavily bribed with offers of fifteen mining claims and a farm. It set out in June 1890 and succeeded in peaceably skirting Matabeleland, largely because of the restraint of Lobengula. By September, the column had established a settlement at Fort Salisbury (now Harare) and its members spread out in search of their fortunes. Others of Rhodes’s followers indulged in a sequence of aggressive acts against the Portuguese and African peoples that, in effect, established the modern northern and eastern boundaries of Zimbabwe.

The first administrator of the territory was a civil servant from India, Archibald Colquhoun, but he quickly fell out with Rhodes’s representative Jameson, who duly replaced him in 1891. Jameson was profligate in his land grants and was largely incompetent as an administrator. The settlement soon suffered from excessive rains, dramatically high prices, failures to find the expected gold reefs, and many other problems. Moreover, the settlement’s uneasy peace with the Ndebele could not last.

In July 1893, a Matabele *impi* (regiment) raided Shona people in the vicinity of the European border township of Fort Victoria. They pursued the Shona into the township and allegedly also attacked the servants of the whites. Jameson ordered the Ndebele out and threatened war. Rhodes (now premier of the Cape) concurred, particularly as the chartered company was passing through a period of severe financial difficulty and there was talk of further goldfields in Matabeleland. Jameson tempted the white settlers with more gold claims, farms, and the promise of extensive booty, particularly in the form of cattle, from the Ndebele. Jameson’s men made effective use of the new maxim gun, and Lobengula’s armies were soon defeated. There were few losses on the European side, except for Major Wilson’s Shangani patrol, which was cut off and killed, thus becoming the major heroic icon of Rhodesian whites. The king himself died in flight, probably of smallpox, in 1894 and the whites added Matabeleland to their conquests. The territorial area of southern Rhodesia was now complete, acquired through a combination of duplicity, violence, and greed, together with the acquiescence of an imperial government that was anxious to keep others out.

JOHN M. MACKENZIE

See also: **Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War, 1895–1899; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Rudd Concession, 1888; Zimbabwe: 1880s; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Ndebele and Shona Risings: First Chimurenga.**

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Rinderpest and Smallpox: East and Southern Africa

Rinderpest probably entered Africa early in 1888, in cattle shipped from India to supply the Italian army in Eritrea. Once established, the disease moved southward through east and central Africa at an average speed of about 20 miles a day. Early in 1891 it was destroying herds in western Uganda and in the Maasai areas of Kenya and northern Tanzania; 18 months later it had reached northern Zambia. The Zambezi River formed a barrier that it did not cross for three years, but rinderpest eventually broke into Zimbabwe and Botswana in 1896, reaching Cape Town by the end of 1897. It was Africa's most spectacular, though not its worst, plague of modern times. Together with smallpox, drought, and civil strife it temporarily destroyed local economies and ripped the social fabric from Ethiopia to South Africa. The names given to it evoke the horror of watching prosperity and security disappear almost overnight. Maasai remember the time as *emutai* (wipe out); and with grim appropriateness the disease was called *masilangane* (let us all be equal) in the Cape.

Rinderpest is a viral disease of cattle and wild ungulates, like buffalo. It is transmitted only through immediate contact with infected matter. Animals that survive acquire permanent immunity. In its first appearance, rinderpest was extraordinarily virulent and sudden. Mortality varied, but in many areas it seems that nine out of ten infected cattle died. Fortunately, the pandemic soon burned itself out. Communities restocked with fresh animals from elsewhere, and by the early 1900s in Maasailand, for example, large herds were again in evidence. The method of direct-contact transmission also meant that some areas, where herds were widely dispersed or isolated from infection, would escape. The Nandi and Turkana herds in Kenya

were unaffected, and the Lozi of western Zambia and the Nuer of the southern Sudan appear to have suffered lighter losses than their neighbors. Rinderpest returned periodically, either to new areas or to sweep up a new crop of susceptible animals in old areas.

For all its fury, however, rinderpest was neither Africa's worst threat to cattle nor its greatest veterinary challenge. That distinction belonged to endemic vector-borne diseases like East Coast Fever and trypanosomiasis, whose eradication required a greater degree of continuous expenditure and of ecological and political control than most states could muster; and to bovine pleuro-pneumonia, another directly transmitted disease with a long incubation period that made it much more difficult to detect in the dormant state. Pleuro-pneumonia had also entered Africa from outside several decades before rinderpest and had cut a swathe through the herds of southern and eastern Africa, moving from south to north. Rinderpest, however, could be controlled fairly simply once cheap and effective immunization techniques were developed. The first attempts were risky and crude, a matter of simultaneously injecting both the disease and its antidote. High losses created widespread opposition, but after 1930 safely attenuated vaccines were becoming available. They conferred reliable immunity and could be used repeatedly in mass inoculation campaigns. Rinderpest remained endemic and locally dangerous, but its worst days were over by 1950.

The impact of the rinderpest pandemic of the 1890s must be seen within a wider context. Disasters were common in African history, often caused by prolonged drought. The patient colonization of Africa by Africans has been an epic of human achievement and tenacity, largely unknown. To survive and prosper required careful planning, the accumulation of stores of inherited information and the establishment of complex mechanisms of exchange and reciprocity within and between small communities. The pandemic came as one more challenge, and it tested existing survival mechanisms to the limit. But rinderpest also came at a particular point in time. For almost everywhere in eastern and southern Africa, the 1880s and 1890s were decades of transition and uncertainty. While communities were able to draw on long experience of survival, they were also assimilating the differentiating effects of the mid-nineteenth-century expansion of long distance trade and, in the some regions, the ravages of increasingly destructive slaving and the dissolution of familiar forms of authority. Moreover, as rinderpest moved south in space, it crossed a line in time that separated those regions that had not yet faced colonial conquest from those that were either in the process of conquest or had already been shaped into colonial states. Response to rinderpest was thus partly shaped

by the constraints and opportunities of different worlds. In Ethiopia, the famines of the late 1880s coincided with, and perhaps supported, the beginning of the rapid accumulation of state power in Shoa under King Menelik. In central Kenya, a land of small “stateless” communities, the need to rebuild the herds led many to take up arms as “auxiliaries” for colonial invaders rather than against them; but in Bunyoro in Uganda, rinderpest immediately preceded the beginnings of a prolonged resistance to colonial conquest that left the kingdom a wilderness for a generation. Much farther south, rinderpest destroyed what was left of the Ndebele herds, which had already been pillaged by Cecil Rhodes’s “pioneer columns” of settlers and looters from South Africa, and perhaps played a role in the Chimurenga risings of 1897. South of the Limpopo River, rinderpest entered a world already partly reshaped by colonialism. Here state structures were already in place, though they proved equally ineffective at halting the disease or ameliorating its effects. In the north, one response to the loss of livestock was to raid for more; in South Africa the same impulse was interpreted, and was punished as stock theft. Survival in the south might be measured in the cash price of food rather than in the strength of social networks, and one option was to sell labor on an existing market, something that hardly existed in eastern Africa.

It was not so much rinderpest itself that wreaked havoc but its effect on the human and natural environment and the way in which it combined with other troubles (drought, smallpox, and colonial invasion) to disrupt and destabilize. The abrupt removal of one part of the ecosystem (cattle and some wildlife) and the disturbance of another (the human communities dependent on them) profoundly affected the functioning of the whole. In pastoral and semipastoral areas especially, settlement contracted, the bush encroached on cultivation, and pasture and grassland left ungrazed grew rank. Community management systems—in northeastern Tanzania and eastern Zambia, for example, which had previously organized production and kept disease and hunger at bay—broke down. In the long term, and in combination with other factors, this loss of control facilitated the spread of the tsetse fly and ticks, the vectors of trypanosomiasis and East Coast Fever.

Communities, families, and individuals coped as best they could. Pastoralists were the hardest hit—without cattle they might starve and their social systems would collapse—but almost everyone was linked to or dependent on livestock in some way, from plough cultivators in highland Ethiopia to transport riders in South Africa. Those who could fled to find food or fought others for what cattle remained. Reciprocities and obligations were discarded with the carcasses of

the animals that sustained them. Cattle debts had to be written off or were collected by force. Families split up, and children and women were pawned.

Famine refugees spread smallpox, the second scourge. Smallpox was endemic in more densely settled areas, where it was kept in circulation by contact but also conferred immunity on those who recovered. Scattered populations, however, were highly susceptible. When population densities were sharply altered by an influx of susceptible refugees, as in Kenya Kikuyuland, or by the congregation of the poverty-stricken around what resources survived, as among the Herero in Namibia, smallpox became epidemic and overwhelmed the crude methods of vaccination (variolation) that had previously kept the disease in check in endemic areas. Smallpox finished what drought and rinderpest had begun. While the rinderpest destroyed the herds, smallpox then wiped out the herders and protectors. It was an invitation to further turmoil as the stronger preyed on the defenseless. Yet, in public disaster there is always private profit. Effective leaders in East Africa found new followers and strengthened their positions in what was soon to be a colonial world. In southern Africa, famine refugees made cheap and docile laborers on colonial farms and government projects.

The demographic and moral effects of the pandemics lasted long and struck deep. Explanations for disaster brought fears and suspicions to the surface, sharpening racial antagonisms in southern Africa and questioning the benevolence of power in the north. Apocalyptic visions seemed to have stayed south of the Zambesi, but in many areas missionaries made converts, more perhaps because they offered food and shelter than for their religious consolation.

The rinderpest pandemic was in some respects a forerunner of the droughts and famines of modern Africa. It was the first to be extensively reported by foreign observers. It shook belief in the predictability of the environment. It enriched some and ruined many. But Africans survived, and by their own efforts.

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See also: Drought, Famine, Displacement; Ethiopia: Famine, Revolution, Mengistu Dictatorship, 1974–1991.

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Rock Art, Saharan

In the Sahara, the Palaeolithic era (prior to 10,000BCE) ended with a long and arid climatic episode, the Post-terian Hyperarid Phase, during which all fauna and human life disappeared. However, toward 10,000BCE, rain returned and groups of nomadic hunter-gatherers reoccupied the desert. They practiced specialized hunting and collected local wild cereals, which led them to adopt a sedentary lifestyle. Around 5000BCE they embraced animal domestication. The economic and social disruptions provoked by this change found expression in the phenomenon of rock art in the Saharan region. Rock art also served to mark the territory of sedentary or semisedentary ethnic groups.

The development of Saharan rock art coincided with the start of an important wet fluctuation, the so-called Neolithic Wet Phase, which lasted from c.5000 to 3000BCE. Plains turned into semiarid steppes, making extensive pastoral exploitation with mobile herds possible. Saharan rock pictures are only found on well-sheltered overhangs, not in caves. The birth of this art was sudden. Since its earliest origins, some schools practiced a perfectly naturalistic style, executed through accomplished technical means. This absence of a "primitive" or "precocious" phase is usual in terms of art history and development. Perhaps this phase did indeed take place, but it is lost to contemporary scholars and archaeologists, as it was practiced on fragile or perishable materials such as wood, hide, or sand, which have disappeared.

Two main periods of Saharan rock art can be distinguished, delineated by a long arid episode between them. The ancient period corresponds to the Neolithic Wet Phase. This is the time of the finest engravings,

attributable to a school covering Rio de Oro, southern Morocco, the Saharan Atlas, Fezzan, and northern Tassili (generally speaking, a chiefly northern area) that is named Naturalistic Bubaline—*Naturalistic* on account of its realistic style, the aim of which was to faithfully reproduce the subject, and *Bubaline* because it abundantly pictures an extinct species, the giant buffalo (*Bubalus antiquus*). It mainly represents wild animals, but domestic cattle are artistically rendered as well. For the most part, the animal figures are accurately drawn, with a deep polished outline and sometimes a few internal details.

The ancient period also includes paintings that are mainly found in Tassili. These paintings fall under the rubric of the Early Bovidian school, which is primarily composed of works marked by depictions of livestock, and battle scenes involving bowmen. The figures in this school suggest a "negroid" type. Outside this category and region, Saharan rock art generally represents only Europoid types.

Another remarkable school of paintings of the ancient period is also confined to Tassili and its surroundings: the Round Heads school. It mainly represents figures, but in a schematic, original, expressionist style. They are involved in mysterious compositions that appear to religious, mythical, or symbolic connotations, including humans with animal heads, horned goddess figures, and figures floating in the air.

The Neolithic Wet Phase was interrupted throughout the Sahara by the Postneolithic Arid Phase, which lasted from c.3000 to 1500BCE. Populations took refuge in oases, or migrated into the fringes of the desert, the Maghrib or the Sahel. However, a last, minor wet fluctuation around 1500–1000BCE marked the beginning of the most recent period of Saharan rock art. It allowed a last extensive occupation of the massifs. New populations, from the Berber group, were then arriving in the central Sahara. One of them, the Iheren-Tahilahi group (the name refers to two important Tassilian sites) settled in the central and northern Tassili. This school of paintings (it belongs to the Final Bovidian in the art sequence) produced numerous paintings, finely drawn in a sophisticated, naturalistic style. It chiefly represents pastoral scenes, campsite scenes and lion hunting. The bow was then gradually being replaced by the throwing spear, as represented in the rock art.

This most recent period also includes engravings. They are mainly those of the Tazina school, chiefly spread throughout the same northern area as the ancient school of the Naturalistic Bubaline. Like the latter, the Tazina school almost exclusively carved animals, with a polished and well-finished outline, but the drawing had now turned schematic, accompanied by artistic stylizations.

To the south, in Air (Niger) and Adrar of Iforas (Mali), regions where no artistic school had yet emerged, this recent period saw the rise of the wall engravings of what has been termed the Libyan Warrior school. The engravings mainly represent armed warriors, crudely engraved in pecked lines, heavily decorated, shown in symmetrical front view and in a schematic style. A warrior often holds a horse by a leading rein, with the horse generally minimized. Riders are represented as well.

By this point, ideologies and lifestyles have changed, as reflected in the rock art. Pastoral scenes are lacking, women are generally not represented, and the most represented are dignitaries or warriors, who appear much magnified. This next period, already in the protohistoric age (prior to the keeping of written records in an area, but after that area has been mentioned in writings from other regions), is called the Horse Period. It is marked notably in the central Sahara, throughout Tassili and Ahaggar, by the Caballine school of painting. This school abundantly represents figures of a schematic aspect, often including “bitriangular” types (broad shoulders shown in front view, thin waist, ample skirt) with only a vertical line for the head. These Caballine figures often drive two- (sometimes three- or four-) horse chariots. These chariots are similar to the many ancient chariots used at this time throughout the Mediterranean region, and therefore allow dating of the Caballine school to later than 700BCE.

After the Horse Period, aridity intensified, leading to the so-called Actual Arid Phase. Saharan populations fragmented, again taking refuge in oases. A new domestic animal, which would prove very important to the Saharan economy, was introduced around the third or second century BCE: the camel. In rock art, the Camel Period is characterized by compositions in a technically impoverished style, as subjects grew more succinct, representing isolated figures or animals, signs, and writings. Indeed, an alphabetic writing system was used for inscriptions (called *libyco-berbers* or *tifinagh*). It was introduced approximately at the same time as the camel. This alphabet was only used in the Sahara for writing short messages, exclusively carved on the rocks, mainly by lovers. It is still currently used by the Tuaregs in Ahaggar and Air. The most recent paintings and engravings of the Camel Period have been made in modern time, and reflect modern innovations and developments, such as airplanes and guns.

ALFRED MUZZOLINI

See also: Art and Architecture, History of African; Garamantes: Early Trans-Saharan Trade; Herding, Farming, Origins of: Sahara and Nile Valley; Stone Age (Later): Sahara and North Africa.

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Rock Art: Eastern Africa

The largest concentration of prehistoric rock art (both painted and engraved) in eastern Africa is found in and around the Ethiopian/Eritrean plateau; fewer rock art sites have been recorded to the south in Kenya and Tanzania, or to the west in Uganda and southern Sudan (Willcox 1984, pp.55–71). There is little academic consensus as to the dating and meanings of these paintings; direct scientific dating of pigment is still an experimental technique, and while some scholars suggest that these images embody a graphic language (Hassan 1993), other scholars see these images as codifying economic information, or even representing depictions of shamanistic-style trance states (Lewis-Williams and Dowson, 1988). Within the rock art corpus of eastern Africa there is a single image that keeps recurring, that of the cow, so it is probable that cattle were of more than a *secular* importance to the people who made these images.

Within the corpus of Ethiopian/Eritrean rock art, it is generally held that naturalistic representations of cattle are earlier than the more stylized, abstract images; occasionally this is borne out by a superimposition of styles. A particularly large concentration of rock art sites exists around the Eritrean capital (Asmara). Two phases of stylistic development are clearly recognized at these sites; on the one hand are naturalistic herding depictions with humans and (humpless) cattle juxtaposed, while the schematic (probably later) cattle images concentrate exclusively on the abstract depiction of a small bovid head with highly elongated horns (Graziosi 1964). The naturalistic images clearly show the socioeconomic relationship between human and beast; a rather “seminaturalistic” depiction at the site of Baahti Facada shows a pair of oxen yoked to a type of plough that can still be seen in these highlands today. The later stylized cattle paintings, however, could be seen as iconic representations; they are not faithfully depicting animals, rather conveying an idealistic conception of their identities.

A similar picture of naturalistic versus schematic depiction can be seen at the southern Ethiopian rock art sites. The earlier naturalistic forms again depict scenes of milking and herding; cattle, fat-tailed sheep, humans, and even dogs are all identifiable. The more

stylized southern images are markedly different from those observed in the Eritrean sites; cattle may be rendered by pecking at the rock or by painting in outline. The stylized southern cattle outlines are often filled with paint or shapes—some of these marks have been interpreted as being cattle brands—and are associated with a bewildering variety of geometric shapes and symbols. It has been suggested that the rock art of these highlands shows clear affinities with rock art from Southern Arabia, indicating, perhaps, some form of prehistoric culture contact. Although this may be true to a small extent, it is clear that the distinctive rock art of the Ethiopian/Eritrean highlands belongs firmly in the African milieu.

Around the fringes of the Ethiopian/Eritrean highlands, broadly similar styles of naturalistic paintings may be observed. The site of Karin Heegan in north-eastern Somalia has yielded a rich corpus of rock art; naturalistic herding scenes predominate, although there is a clear trend toward abstraction in the image of the cow (Brandt and Carder 1987). In Djibouti, a number of rock art sites have been located and described in detail. The naturalistic paintings here show cattle-herding scenes, camel caravans and hunting scenes (especially giraffe), but it can be problematic using such paintings for economic reconstruction; the artist's choice of subject material may have differed from the day-to-day diet of his contemporaries. It has been suggested that this art formed a socioideological role in these societies; during periods of climatic deterioration this art would have served as a central ideological focus for disparate social groups in the region.

Away from the Horn of Africa, the picture of eastern African rock art is rather more scant. Around Lake Victoria a number of rock art sites have been located and cataloged; at most of these sites abstract symbols and schematic cattle/human figures predominate, and many of these abstract forms bear comparison with the Ethiopian/Eritrean images (Chaplin 1974). Naturalistic (humpless) cattle depictions have been observed on Mount Elgon in northwestern Kenya; a number of petroglyphic representations have been noted at later prehistoric sites around Lake Turkana; and a few schematic painted (humped) cattle paintings have been discovered in southern Sudan. In north-central Tanzania a number of rock art images have been described which seem to bear comparison with southern African paintings; eland predominate (in naturalistic style), and highly schematic humans are also present. The antiquity of the Tanzanian paintings is attested to by the discovery of an ochre "pencil" that was associated with deposits at the site of Kiseso 2 dating to around 17,000 years BCE (Masao 1982).

It is virtually impossible to physically date these images, and one is often left with the rather unsatisfactory method of attempting to link the images to associated (datable) archaeological material. Another problem is attempting to try and read meanings into this art; it is possible that on one level these images are purely aesthetic, while on another level they could subtly encode various social rules and ideological statements. It is clear that the most redundant motif in African rock art as a whole is that of the cow; this is no different in eastern Africa. This image is repeated both spatially and temporally over vast distances, and this cannot be a coincidence. It is clear that cattle played more than an economic role in the lives of the artists who painted these pictures.

NIALL FINNERAN

See also: **Art and Architecture, History of African; Cushites: Northeastern Africa: Stone Age Origins to Iron Age; Eastern Africa: Regional Survey; Neolithic, Pastoral: Eastern Africa; Stone Age (Later): Eastern Africa.**

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Rock Art: Southern Africa

Southern Africa has long been noted for the abundance, diversity, and beauty of its rock art. Recent research has opened up new insights into the well known hunter-gatherer (*San*) rock art and, moreover, identified pastoralist and agriculturalist traditions that have hitherto been overlooked. After three decades of intensive historical and ethnographic research, the hunter-gatherer traditions are among the best understood rock arts in the world. Numerous attempts have been made to divide southern Africa into hunter-gatherer rock art regions, but the results tend to reflect research interests



Rock and cave paintings of the San, Drakensberg, South Africa. © Markus Matzel/Das Fotoarchiv.

rather than empirically defined regions. Still, certain observations are valid.

A fundamental distinction exists between rock engravings (petroglyphs) and rock paintings (pictographs). These two techniques of execution are found in broadly defined, but overlapping, regions. By and large, the dominant technique of the central interior of southern Africa was engraving. A number of subtypes are distinguishable: pecked (or hammered), incised (or fine line), and scratched. All three techniques depend upon the removal of the outer patina of rocks so that the lighter interior rock shows through. Engravings are, with a few rare exceptions, found on rocks on low, open hilltops that rise above the plains, or sometimes on glacial pavements in riverbeds; they are not usually found in rock shelters.

Rock paintings occur on the walls and ceilings of rock shelters of the more mountainous periphery of the central plateau. On the plateau itself they occur sporadically in the few small shelters that do exist. The pigments used included various shades of ochre, manganese oxide, charcoal, and white clay. The media with which they were mixed is less certain, but antelope blood was historically recorded.

Generally speaking, the paintings of the Drakensberg (South Africa), the Malutis (Lesotho), and parts of Zimbabwe, such as the Matopos, are more elaborate, polychromatic, and detailed than those of the southern Cape mountains and of the Cederberg, respectively just inland from the southern and western coasts of South Africa. This difference may be partly, but not entirely, explained by the poorer preservation of the art in the southern and western ranges.

The age of this art is difficult to establish. The earliest date that has been reliably ascertained comes from southern Namibia and relates to five flat stones, or plaquettes, about the size of a hand. Radiocarbon dates obtained for charcoal in the same stratum as the

painted stones suggests that they are possibly 27,000 years old, which would make them 10,000 years older than the generally accepted date for the French Upper Palaeolithic cave of Lascaux. The most recent southern African rock art was made about 100 years ago in the Drakensberg and its foothills. The images of southern Africa therefore represent one of humankind's longest art traditions.

Most of the subcontinent's rock art was made by hunter-gatherers. The early Dutch settlers named these hunter-gatherers *Bosjesmans*, the word that now takes the English form *Bushmen*. For many of the people themselves and their descendants, *bushmen* has become a distasteful term, though some wish to rehabilitate the word, imbuing it with the meaning "first freedom fighters." To avoid this controversy, many writers now prefer *San*, a word deriving from a pastoral Khoekhoe language. Unfortunately, its meaning is close to that of the term *vagabond*, though this does not seem to be widely known. The nonjudgmental, subsistence term *hunter-gatherer* is perhaps preferable because until comparatively recent times the makers of the art kept no domestic animals and, like other foragers, moved seasonally from place to place according to a carefully planned strategy.

For many decades, researchers who emphasized the "simplicity" and "primitiveness" of the art makers' way of life concluded that the images were "simply" idle art for art's sake. The argument is, however, circular. Researchers inferred an aesthetic imperative from the art and then used it to explain the making of the images. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s researchers have adopted a different approach. They have attempted to explore the significance of the images from the standpoint of authentic, not inferred, San beliefs and rituals.

Contrary to a long held view, many of the beliefs of the people who made the images are not lost. Apart from some valuable reports by early travelers and missionaries, the earliest and largest collection of hunter-gatherer ethnography was compiled in the 1870s in Cape Town by the Bleek family. Working with informants who had been brought to and imprisoned in Cape Town, Wilhelm Bleek and his sister-in-law Lucy Lloyd recorded over 12,000 pages of verbatim beliefs, myths, personal histories, and accounts of rituals in the (now extinct) Xam language. Along side these vernacular texts they prepared line-by-line English translations. Toward the end of Bleek's life (he died in 1875) he was able to show his informants, who by that time had been released from jail to live with him in his suburban home, copies of rock paintings and to note down their explanations.

As twentieth-century work with Kalahari hunter-gatherers confirms, the belief system of the artists

centered on a spiritual realm that interpenetrated the material world. Access to this realm was afforded to those who mastered the appropriate ritual techniques. They “activated” a supernatural power, and it carried them into an altered state of consciousness. In this condition they healed the sick, went on extracorporeal journeys, made rain, and controlled the movements of antelope herds.

Imagery relating in diverse ways to these experiences and beliefs accounts for much of the art. In many regions, for instance, the eland was the most frequently depicted creature; it was believed to embody a great deal of power. It also referred to girls’ puberty ceremonies, boys’ first-kill rituals, and marriage observances. In some instances, images of eland became “reservoirs” of supernatural power on which people could draw in times of need. The ways in which these and other meanings (such as gender statements) are encoded in the art constitute a topic for continuing research.

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See also: Art and Architecture, History of African; Stone Age (Later): Central and Southern Africa.

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Rock Art: Western and Central Africa

Western and central African rock art is often overlooked in studies on the art and archaeology of the African continent. Although several research projects have been undertaken during the past century, they are widely scattered over this vast region that encompasses several ecological zones, from the savannas of Sub-Saharan West Africa to the tropical rainforest of the Congo River Basin. The known rock art of western and central Africa differs from the art traditions of northern and southern Africa in that narrative art with scenes involving human and animal figures is rare. Instead, the rock art is characterized by highly variable geometric forms, including lines and dots, and to a lesser

degree by often strongly abstracted anthropomorphic and zoomorphic motifs. Recognizing this difference, J. Desmond Clark referred to southern central African rock art as the Central African Schematic Art Group. However, this term masks considerable differences in motifs within the rock art of central Africa, and obscures similarities with motifs in other regions of the continent, such as Sub-Saharan West Africa.

Western African rock art is known from the Sahel and savanna belts of Sub-Saharan West Africa, but has only rarely been reported from the forest zone to the south. Rock art in central Africa has been recorded along the periphery of the Congo River Basin. Broad similarities in the rock art of this region can be postulated, such as its focus on geometric forms, particularly rectangular and circular shapes, and stick figures. However, an immense range of motifs is encountered throughout the region, while techniques of manufacture, the locations of motifs at the sites, and the attributes of the sites themselves are also highly variable. Both pictographs (paintings, drawings, stencils, etc.) and petroglyphs (peckings, incisions, abrasions, etc.) are known from western and central Africa.

Pictographs resembling highly abstracted horse riders have been reported from the Gambaga escarpment of northern Ghana, the vicinity of Nambouanga in northern Togo, northeastern Nigeria, Aribinda in northern Burkina Faso, several sites in southern and central Mali, and west-central Angola. Stick figures and rectangular, circular, or triangular geometrics with or without interior subdivisions or exterior appendices occur throughout the region. Groups or lines of dots are known from southern and central Mali, northern Togo, and southeastern Burkina Faso. White and red dots and lines in a rock shelter in Mayombe in the Democratic Republic of Congo seem to have been regularly repainted within living memory. So-called saurian motifs are common in western and west-central Africa, having been recorded at numerous rock art sites in central and southern Mali, Gabon, and Angola. They resemble lizards or crocodiles viewed from above, or humans. To the south of the Congo River Basin a wide range of motifs of varying style and date are encountered, some resembling motifs of traditional sand painting. A number of rock shelters feature post-contact rock art. At the site of Cambambi in west-central Angola, for example, numerous zoomorphs, as well as horse riders and anthropomorphic figures with rifles, apparently in battle, have been recorded.

What is often called “naturalistic” rock art is rare in western and central Africa. The site of Birnin Kudu in northeastern Nigeria is often mentioned for its lively representations of bovids, primarily of domestic humpless cattle. More recently, narrative rock art has been identified in the Massif de Kita, in southwestern

Mali. At the site of Folonkono, a group of anthropomorphic figures holding bows, arrows, and other objects seems to move toward an elephant. These male figures are characterized by their protruding calves, buttocks, and bellies, as well as their elaborate headdresses. Two possibly female figures with similar characteristics are found at the rock shelter of Fanfannyégéné Donsoma. They hold sticklike objects in front of their bodies and seem to follow a male figure with bow and arrows. At present these motifs are the only known examples of narrative art in the region.

Pecked, incised, abraded, or polished petroglyphs are particularly well known from southern and central Mali and southern Burkina Faso, as well as from numerous sites in west-central and central Africa. Petroglyphs in Sub-Saharan West Africa include primarily circular cup marks of varying size and depth, oblong or spindle-shaped grooves in a variety of arrangements, and pecked motifs, some of which resemble saurians, bovines' heads, and rosettes. Circular grooves and cup marks combined into rosette shapes have been located in southwestern Burkina Faso, while incised triangular motifs are located at Aribinda in the north of the country. Petroglyphs resembling fish have been reported from Bamako (southern Mali), the vicinity of Akure (southwestern Nigeria), and Angola. Intricate combinations of rosette-like circular and linear forms have been recorded at Bidzar in Cameroon, together with cup marks and other motifs. A large number of petroglyphs, mostly pecked, have been located in the Ogooué valley in Gabon. While many of these petroglyphs are circular in form, comprising lines of circles, concentric circles or spirals, a number of triangular, zigzag, and saurian motifs are found as well. Saurian motifs are also encountered in the southeastern part of the Central African Republic. Additionally, petroglyphs have been reported from Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, the north of the Republic of Congo, and Angola, where concentric circles and other circular motifs prevail at the sites of Tchitundo-hulo in the south and Calola in the east of the country.

The dating of rock art and its attribution to particular groups of historically or archaeologically known peoples is generally difficult. In some cases the content of the motifs gives clues as to their age. Horses or firearms, for example, have been introduced to different regions of western and central Africa only recently and depictions of these are thought to date back no more than a few hundred years. Also, the technique of manufacture may give an indication as to the age of petroglyphs. Those that are thought to have been made with iron tools can be dated to after the introduction of iron use and production to an area, such as in the case of the Ogooué Valley in Gabon. In other cases rock art has tentatively been linked in date to archaeological

layers at rock art sites, such as in the Boucle du Baoulé of southwestern Mali, where the first rock art has been ascribed to Late Stone Age peoples. Such attributions remain hypotheses, however, since no direct relationship of the pictographs and petroglyphs to these layers can be proven. Only exceptionally have paint samples from rock art sites been dated, such as in the case of pictographs from Opeleva (Angola), which have yielded a date of about 1900 years old.

West Africa is exceptional in the presence of some direct ethnographic information on contexts of rock art making as well as the significance of motifs. Until recently, young grooms among the Marghi in northeastern Nigeria painted the walls of specific rock shelters during a preparation period for the *mba* marriage ceremony. The motifs, mainly stick figures and geometric forms, were said to represent humans, animals, weapons, and shields. In a number of instances, resonating rock slabs (so-called rock gongs) were struck by the young men during the ceremonies. Among the Dogon of central Mali, rock art was made or remarked in a variety of contexts, often associated with the fabrication of masks for a variety of funerary ceremonies. To a lesser extent rock art was made during circumcision, as well as in a range of nonritual contexts. The pictographs are mostly monochrome red, white, or black, but in some instances all three colors have been combined in polychrome paintings. The motifs are said to represent a variety of masks, humans, animals, supernatural beings, objects used during particular rituals, and tools. The extent to which Dogon rock art traditions are still alive today is unclear. Available information is restricted to the large rock shelter of Songo, where polychrome pictographs are currently remarked and added every three years, during a circumcision ritual. While this information gives invaluable insights into aspects of rock art making and use, it is likely that rock art in western and central Africa was made in a host of different contexts over time and space.

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See also: Art and Architecture, History of African; Stone Age (Later): Western Africa.

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Roman Conquest: See Egypt, Ancient: Roman Conquest and Occupation: Historical Outline.

Roman Empire: See North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire.

Rovzi: See Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rovzi.

Royal Niger Company, 1886–1898

The Royal Niger Company occupies an important place in the history of the British colonial acquisition of Nigeria. Although it was chartered in 1886 and thereby obtained sovereign administrative authority over the areas of its commercial activity, a full assessment of the company must start in 1879.

That year, Sir George Taubman Goldie arrived on the Niger. Trade on that river was marked by bitter rivalry between a number of British and French companies. Goldie, a major shareholder in the smallest of the British companies and an astute business negotiator, persuaded the British companies to merge to form the United Africa Company in 1879, renamed the National Africa Company (NAC) in 1882. Goldie also persuaded Lord Aberdare, a British industrialist, influential politician, and president of the Royal Geographical Society, to become the chairman of the new company. Goldie himself took up the administration of the company in Nigeria. From then on, the story of Goldie becomes the story of the company. Against the French companies that had declined to join the merger, Goldie waged a relentless price war and eventually bought them out in 1884. The purchase made NAC the sole European trading firm in the lower Niger. The era of free trade was thereby ended, as the company went on to establish a monopoly hitherto unknown in the history of the Niger trade. In time the company established about a hundred trading stations on the Niger, employing a labor force of 1500.

Contemtuously of the local people, the company dictated the prices it paid for their produce, and sold imports to them. To impress and intimidate the local population, Goldie established a well-drilled constabulary force of 241 men equipped with sophisticated heavy artillery and machine guns, specially designed by the inventor Hiram Maxim in a way so that the shells ignited the thatched roofs of the native houses. Goldie also acquired twenty gunboats which could ply the Niger all year round. Between 1879 and 1886, most communities in the Lower Niger Valley were sacked for resisting the company's harsh monopoly.

Goldie was as much a businessman as an imperialist. His arrival on the Niger coincided with the era of mounting European imperialism in Africa. To him, British dominion over the Niger Basin was of supreme importance, key to gaining access to the rich west African interior. To preempt other European powers, by 1886 Goldie had foisted 237 "treaties of protection" on local chiefs in the area. The treaties were of doubtful legal validity, as they were extracted from the people mostly under duress. Largely as a result of the NAC's influence at the Berlin West African Conference of 1884–1885, Britain was recognized as the de facto power in the Niger region.

To cement its control of the Niger trade, the NAC sought a charter from the British government. This was granted, giving the company sovereign rights to levy customs duties, acquire and develop lands, and exploit the mineral and agricultural resources of the area under its jurisdiction. The company was renamed the Royal Niger Company (RNC). The charter enabled Britain to exclude other European powers from the area by creating a facade of effective administration at a minimum responsibility and cost to the British taxpayer.

Goldie took up the new responsibilities entrusted to his company with zeal, quickly enlarging the company's domain through exclusive treaties with the Yola, Adamawa, Borgu, Sokoto, and Gwandu. By 1892 Goldie had signed some 360 such treaties, which the British Foreign Office quickly ratified. The company then evolved a range of measures to exclude all other trading firms from the Niger trade and to silence its critics. Its employees were bonded to silence with £1,000 each, and some Christian missionaries were compromised through material benefits they received from the company. Duties levied on companies venturing into the RNC's domain were so excessive as to make such ventures uneconomic. Trade on the Niger was permitted only at designated "ports of entry," and the most lucrative oil markets were declared "closed ports" to other trading interests. Defiance of the regulations resulted in the confiscation of the offender's trade goods. Local traders received no exemption from the restrictions and so found themselves unwelcome

strangers on the Niger, which had been their ancestral heritage.

The RNC represents a classic case of exploitation without redress. The company exploited its absolute monopoly to make profits far in excess of what it could have made in a free-trade situation. The company effected no positive social transformations in the area, building no roads, schools, nor hospitals. Until 1905, it stuck to the barter system of trade with the local people because this enabled it to exploit them fully. It spread terror and resentment all along the valleys of the Niger and the Benue Rivers. Having received the charter, the company became even more high-handed and vicious. The slightest local dissent against the company was visited with great venom. In 1888, half of Asaba, where the company had its administrative headquarters, was decimated, and Obosi was razed to the ground the next year, in both cases on the specious charge of the practice of human sacrifice. The soldiers lived off the people's livestock and food crops, and sexually assaulted their women. In 1897, led by Goldie himself, the company forces invaded Ilorin and Nupe. The pretext was to stop slave raiding in both kingdoms, but the actual aim was to keep the French and the Lagos government off the area.

However, the company's tactics boomeranged on the trade of the Niger. Many communities resorted to subsistence production to achieve self-sufficiency. Palm oil exports fell from 2,500 tons in 1886 to 1000 tons in 1888. But not all the communities could achieve self-sufficiency. The Brass people, situated on the margin of the saline delta water, depended on the Niger trade for their livelihood. After years of futile negotiations with the company for a fair trade deal, the people resolved to die in battle rather than in hunger. In 1895, they sacked the company's station at Akassa, and the company's reprisal action was predictably draconic. By the late 1890s mounting storms of protest against the company forced the British government to revoke the company's charter, effective December 31, 1899.

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See also: Delta States, Nineteenth Century; Lagos Colony and Oil Rivers Protectorate; Nigeria: British Colonization to 1914.

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Rubber: See Liberia: Firestone.

Rudd Concession, 1888

Zimbabwe's rapid transformation into colonial Rhodesia in the late nineteenth century was due largely to the political and economic ambitions of Cecil Rhodes and his support from British officials, at home and in Southern Africa, who wished to expand the empire without incurring imperial expense or responsibility. The Rudd Concession, a mineral rights award from King Lobengula of the Ndebele, was the means toward this end, since it was utilized by Lord Salisbury's government, in 1889, as the convenient precondition for issuing a royal charter creating the British South Africa Company to function as an economic and governmental organization for much of south-central Africa.

During the height of the "Scramble" for African empire in the 1880s, British officials in London and Southern Africa, as well as Rhodes in Kimberley, feared expansionist activities by other Europeans in Zimbabwe—particularly the Portuguese, with their ambition to connect their Angolan and Mozambican colonies and the Transvaal Boers of Paul Kruger's South African Republic. The latter claimed to fall heir to an 1853 agreement between Piet Potgieter and Lobengula's father Mzilikazi, protecting Boer hunting and trade interests in Matabeleland. Another Transvaaler, Pieter Grobler, began to visit the Ndebele king on Kruger's behalf in 1886. During a later meeting, Grobler obtained from Lobengula a "peace and friendship" treaty dated July 30, 1887. The British feared this as the first step toward unwelcome Boer expansion in the north. Their concern was increased by a report from a close ally of Rhodes, Sir Sidney Shippard, the Bechuanaland commissioner, that Boer advances were imminent into gold-rich and fertile Mashonaland, a region adjacent to Lobengula's kingdom and partly subject to it. Alternatively, the Grobler agreement can be viewed as a cooperative effort, or even protoalliance, by two nineteenth-century leaders threatened by overseas imperialism.

Alarmed by the Grobler Treaty, the British sent an envoy to deal with Lobengula. John Smith Moffat, the son of the Reverend Robert Moffat of the London Missionary Society (LMS), brother-in-law of David Livingstone and a close confidant of Mzilikazi, was himself a former London missionary in Matabeleland who had joined the British colonial service in 1879 and became the assistant commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, stationed at Khama's capital of Shoshong. Lobengula, who trusted no Europeans like he trusted the Moffat family, signed the Moffat Treaty of February 11, 1888, by which he agreed not to alienate any of his domains without the consent of the British

government. London then considered Matabeleland its colonial sphere of influence and warned away potential rival powers.

Salisbury's government, including its high commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Hercules Robinson, was now prepared for an act of "imperialism on the cheap" by supporting Rhodes north of the Limpopo. Grobler himself, and perhaps the supposed Boer threat as well, were soon eliminated as a result of an attack on Grobler's party by Ngwato warriors while crossing King Khama's country on his return from a visit to Lobengula in July 1888. Shippard reported the Grobler incident as an unfortunate accident, and Kruger sent no new representative north.

Rhodes sent his party of concession seekers north from Kimberley in August 1888, with a supply of liquor and £10,000 in gold sovereigns. This group was headed by Charles Dunell Rudd, an early business partner of Rhodes in the De Beers Mine. Rudd represented Griqualand West in the Cape Parliament during 1883–1988 and had recently gone to the Witwatersrand to foster Rhodes's interest in the gold fields. James Rochfort Maguire, the lawyer in the group, had met and befriended Rhodes in his days at Oxford University. Francis Robert "Matabele" Thompson was considered an old "Africa hand," despite his pathological fear of Africans.

Arriving at Bulawayo on September 20, 1888, they found a number of fellow Europeans present in Lobengula's capital, including missionaries, traders, and rival concession seekers. Urged by some of his warriors and advisors not to sign an agreement with whites, but by others—particularly *Induna* Lotshe Hlabangana—to strike a bargain with the Rudd party, Lobengula wavered for over a month. A letter of support from High Commissioner Robinson and efforts by the LMS missionary Charles D. Helm, and Shippard, who arrived in full uniform accompanied by a detachment of his troopers, persuaded Lobengula that Rudd and his associates represented Queen Victoria. The king—assured by Shippard that the British wanted only a political alliance and none of his land (as well as, apparently, by Rhodes's delegation that digging for minerals would be confined to a single location)—eventually agreed to the Rudd treaty, which was dated October 30, 1888.

Under its terms, Lobengula and his successors were to receive shipments totaling 1000 Martini-Henri rifles and 100,000 cartridges, a monthly payment of £100 in gold sovereigns, and an armed steamboat or an additional £500. In exchange, the king conferred on Rudd and his associates an exclusive mineral concession within his domain, "together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same."

Rudd hurriedly delivered his concession to Rhodes at Kimberley, who assumed ownership of it through

his Central Search Association. Supported by an array of officials, financiers, political leaders, and even former rivals in Britain during the next year, Rhodes used the Rudd Concession as his crucial bargaining tool to obtain a royal charter creating the British South Africa Company (BSAC).

Lobengula's increasing skepticism, and efforts to nullify the concession during the months of the charter negotiations, including his repudiation of it in April 1889, and his massacre of Lotshe Hlabangana and his household in September, were to no avail. As detailed in its royal charter issued in October 1889, the powers of the BSAC extended far beyond the bounds of the Rudd Concession. The BSAC was designated as the effective government for a vast new British area on both sides of the Zambezi. Rhodes and its other directors were empowered to exercise the functions of government over an undefined area north of Bechuanaland for an initial period of 25 years. These included the military, diplomatic, and settlement actions necessary to establish colonial Rhodesia during the following decade. The settlement of neighboring Mashonaland in 1890 by the BSAC created white Rhodesia and sparked the 1893 Matabele War, Lobengula's death, and the conquest of his kingdom.

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See also: **Kimberley and Diamond Fields; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899; Zimbabwe: 1880s; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Ndebele and Shona Risings: First Chimurenga.**

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Rufisque: See Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque.

Rumfa, Muhammad (1463–1499)
Sarkin of Kano

Muhammad Rumfa was the *sarkin*, or chief, of Kano, one of the Hausa Bakwai, or true Hausa states. Rumfa sought the help of the famous Muslim teacher al-Maghili. Under Rumfa, a strong Islamic ruling tradition

began. Kano became important in the trans-Saharan trade, famous for its cloth, dyeing pits, and Moroccan leather.

Rumfa is generally considered one of the greatest of the Hausa kings. Leo Africanus, for example, noted his power and the strength of his mounted knights. Rumfa initiated a number of reforms, which contributed to his strength. He intensified the influence of Islam and, therefore, the centralization of state power. He did so through enjoining the public celebration of the *Id al-kabir*, Islam's major festival, extending the city's walls, creating a council of state, building and protecting a public market, appointing eunuchs to positions of power, and introducing *purdah*. Moreover, Rumfa welcomed the coming of the Fulani and the special knowledge of Islam contained in their books of theology and grammar. Furthermore, Rumfa courted visiting scholars from the University of Timbuktu.

Through increasing the role of Islam, Rumfa could extend his trade ties and thereby increase the wealth of the state. Rumfa also found sanction for his various practices, part of his famous twelve reforms, such as taking women from conquered groups, putting them in his harem, and putting women in *purdah*. He also had the first-born virgin of families taken to his harem. These practices tied different families to him. Moreover, al-Maghili became his closest advisor for a number of years and directed his actions carefully to bring Kano into line with Islamic orthodoxy and strengthen its ties with North African kingdoms. Al-Maghili wrote *The Obligation of Princes* as a guidebook for Rumfa.

Rumfa became the benchmark against which other kings were judged. The power of Kano and its preeminence were established under his administration. He became the model for future leaders—especially the Fulani, whose *jihad* (holy war) led to successor states in the Hausa area.

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See also: **Hausa Politics: Origins, Rise.**

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Rural Development, Postcolonial

National agricultural policies implemented in the postcolonial era have generally been based on ambitious objectives of increasing production and diversifying agricultural activities. In addition to agricultural development plans, national administrative institutions in

charge of rural development have been put in place in many cases.

The rural development schemes of postcolonial African nations share some general characteristics, as they were shaped in the early years of independence. In the absence of contractors and adequate economic structures, the state played a determining role in the development process. The objectives of rural development, and the strategies implemented, were defined in a similar way for the entire nation. Technical training bodies were created, and economic organizations (cooperatives) were set up to execute tasks related to supply and commercialization. In most countries, attempts were made to involve more of the population in training schemes.

In the second decade after independence, a great number of varied development projects emerged. Sectoral projects sometimes involved only one cash crop. Integrated projects for agricultural development included nontechnical aspects of infrastructure development (such as road construction), as well as initiatives in the fields of health, literacy, and education. The projects were often designed under the assumption that, by mobilizing specific material means and tools, acquired via external funding, it would be possible to implement the technical plans and increase production. The era of project development was also characterized by a technocratic approach that disregarded traditional peasant production methods. The objectives of the project, its content, the systems of its structure, and its operations generally were defined without taking into account peasant reactions to new means of production.

The third stage of development was reached around the year 1980, marked by questioning of assumptions, and multiple orientations. Positive results were recorded for certain crops, such as cotton. In some areas, such as south Mali, production increases was noticeable and generally the result of the adoption of advanced, technical means of production. Producer organizations were set up and strengthened.

However, development projects were marked by several hindrances. The systems set up to popularize new development methods, and to familiarize the peasantry with said methods, are often expensive, and the mixed results they produce do not always justify the expense. In some cases, development aid has not always been profitable to rural populations but has, too often, contributed to strengthen the bureaucratic power of central state administrations. Several negative side effects have been traced to the implementation of new development systems, including degradation of the natural environment and decreases in fertility. The juxtaposition of autonomous projects has made consistent planning difficult. Coherent agricultural policies

(i.e., those that would set up systems of exchange between zones with a surplus of a product and zones in need of that product) have been lacking.

Several factors distinguish recent rural development. Participation has become the key issue. The participation of peasants through associations and professional organizations, and the presence of clear and fair contracts for workers, are recognized as key to effectiveness and lasting development plans. Nationally based policies are prevalent. Governments, such as in Senegal and Burkina Faso, define policies for land management, for the funding of local development, for agricultural credit, and for research. However, such nationally based plans are often accompanied by actions by the state to disengage itself, by breaking up state and parastatal institutions into privately run bodies. New actors, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have appeared. They are generally viewed as a positive presence, and they have increased the amount of funding available for postcolonial agricultural development. NGOs tend to prefer organizational structures based on decentralized cooperation, and they generally employ for the local-level approach.

Finally, this most recent period of postcolonial development has been characterized by the revival, by the World Bank, of classical popularization methods known as *methods training and visits*, which have had remarkable results elsewhere in the world, such as Asia. New development policies are introduced and explained through several actions including support for research, reform of agricultural services, and structural adjustment programs.

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See also: Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment; Peasant Production, Postcolonial: Markets and Subsistence; World Bank, IMF, and Structural Adjustment.

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
Rwanda: To 1800

The early history of Rwanda (formerly Ruanda) often suffers in the telling due to a scarcity of archaeological evidence and the repetition of earlier, untested theories, some of which continue to be widely propagated. One thing that is certain is the centrality of both ethnicity and cattle to this history, and the indivisibility of these two from each other.

The original inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa, formerly described as a pygmy race. They were forest dwellers who flourished as hunter-gatherers in the forests around the Virunga mountain range in the west of the country. Their numbers were reduced significantly as Bantu-speaking Hutu started arriving in the fifth century and began clearing forest for farming.

The Hutu, whose lifestyle was based around small-scale cultivation and animal husbandry, developed a mutually beneficial relationship with the Twa, with the latter providing the farmers with game and honey in exchange for crops such as bananas and corn. Hutu society was governed by a clan system with kings (*bahinza*) ruling over small groups of clans. The Hutu believed that the *bahinza* were also invested with magical powers, such as the ability to create rain or protect crops and livestock from disease. Their settlements were built around a hill or group of hills, providing an easy means of differentiating between clans and also a means of settling local disputes.

It is thought that the Tutsi began to arrive in this area in the early to mid-fifteenth century and their ancestry, while not certain, is likely to have been Lwo. The Lwo



Rwanda.

were earlier migrants to the interlacustrine, or Great Lakes, region, formerly from southern Sudan. The Tutsi arrival used to be widely described as an invasion, in which they overran and subjugated the weaker Hutu. This tidy view of migration and conquest was popular for a long time, partly because it seemed to support wider theories of racial superiority that were especially prevalent among many nineteenth-century colonists; in reality, the first Tutsi arrivals would have been few in number and in no position to impose their will on any preexisting group of people, had they wanted to.

More certain than the origin of the Tutsi is the fact that by the end of the fifteenth century these pastoralists were arriving in ever greater numbers, straining the peaceful relations that had characterized early dealings between them and the Hutu farmers. Cattle in East Africa had long come to represent an obvious symbol of wealth and status. They were also that rare form of wealth that, in the absence of disease, is self-generating. With increasing numbers of cattle, however, comes the need for more land. As well as raising cattle pastoralists were traditionally soldiers too; used to taking other people's land when the need for more pasture arose. Farmers, on the other hand, were unlikely to be well versed in war and no match for an opponent that was. That said, the takeover was not entirely violent.

Many Hutu beliefs and traditions were adopted by the Tutsi, such as the principle of divine kingship and the powers over climate and agricultural production that were also attributed to him. The use of drums, allowing the king to make announcements across the land, was also of Hutu origin. At other times a fusion of the two traditions was reached, as with the *abiru*, or law-making council. The imposition of a nationwide Tutsi king (*mwami*) who was given lordship of all land was the last stage in the movement of power in favor of the Tutsi. At the same time, numbers of Hutu chiefs were brought into the new, Tutsi-controlled regime, becoming Tutsi in the process. From this point on it becomes more apparent that the terms Hutu and Tutsi were less about ethnicity and more about power and social status. Marriage, which was not uncommon between the two groups, was one further way to change one's social group.

This combination of land seizure and more peaceful means saw the Tutsi hegemony firmly in place by the sixteenth century. The relationship that now grew more definite between Hutu and Tutsi was known as *ubuhake*, a patron-client arrangement. Under this system, which came to control the lives of most people and became increasingly feudal, the (Tutsi) patron would give (or rather, lend) a cow or cows to a (Hutu) client. The client would then do the bidding of the patron by providing crops and performing military service in return for protection and the use of the cow and the

land. In this way land and cattle became the de facto tools of power, and they were both held by the Tutsi.

The downside to this arrangement, however, was the fact that at any time the patron could demand a client's entire stock of cattle as his repayment, and not just the one initially lent out. Such absolutism was open to extreme abuse, but as long as all cattle (that is to say wealth) remained in the hands of the few there was very little that those on the receiving end could do to reverse this situation. What had once been purely tribal groups now tended to appear increasingly as occupational and social delineations, especially when the opportunity to change class remained an option. The Twa remained somewhat outside of the equation; they kept to the forest and the hunting-foraging ways they had always known, as well as making pottery.

As the system of *ubuhake* grew in importance for the general population so did the power of the Nyiginya tribe who were eventually to extend their sphere of influence to cover an area roughly the size of the modern state of Rwanda. Over a period of several centuries, and starting from their homeland in the center of the country, they engaged in a series of policies, some diplomatic and others violent. In the seventeenth century, Mwami Ruganzu Ndori was responsible for huge extensions to the tribe's territory, the spoils of a series of invasions on independent Hutu land in the west and the north of the country. This was the land and the system that was firmly established at the start of the nineteenth century, and which proved too convenient to be ignored by later colonists.

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See also: Great Lakes Region: Growth of Cattle Herding.

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Rwanda: Precolonial, Nineteenth Century

It is often anachronistic to speak about precolonial times, as if the start of the colonial era had been expected. In the case of Rwanda, one might say this view

would not be entirely inappropriate. Indeed, by the end of nineteenth century, the situation of the country had deteriorated so much that millenarianism was calling for a change, and the first few Europeans to enter the country were not unwelcome if they were kept at bay by the court.

Another objection to the use of the word *precolonial* to qualify history before the establishment of colonial rule would be to convey the impression that history started with colonial times. Historians such as Jan Vansina have demonstrated that oral traditions, when carefully used, are valuable historical sources, and he applied his methods to the history of Rwanda. Confronting the traditions, and putting them to the test of a confrontation with archaeological data whenever possible, has allowed Vansina to detect the emergence of kingdoms in the Great Lakes area in the seventeenth century.

One of them would take shape when a powerful pastoralist of Hima descent, Ruganzu Ndori, settled in Central Rwanda and increased its domination through gifts of cattle and military conquest. His ruling lineage, belonging to the Nyiginyia clan, strengthened its grip on this core area, and by the end of the eighteenth century was making an increasing use of military power to expand. The court, which was benefiting from the conquests, supported the efforts. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Nyiginyia kingdom had extended its influence on what is now known as Rwanda, and even beyond. This influence, however, remained quite uneven depending on the areas, varied over time, and remained looser on parts of Western Rwanda, as well as on the Northern part of the country. Some small political entities remained governed by Hutu heads of lineages, for ritual motives, up to 1926.

During the nineteenth century, governance also varied, with an intricate system of control, taxation, and bondage being progressively imposed. Land, cattle and labor were increasingly used by the ruling class to tighten their grip on farming lineages. The wealth drawn to the top of society through this imposition resulted in increasing rivalries between powerful families at court, in an exacerbated class consciousness, and in a widening gap between rulers and ruled. This was especially the case in central Rwanda, where high fertility rates combined with the length of settlement to produce a land shortage that made it difficult for farmer lineages to maintain themselves. According to Vansina, by the middle of the nineteenth century a first distinction between Hutu and Tutsi had become institutionalized, referring to respective occupations within the army, and not to origins.

This distinction shifted progressively to the entire society, with farmers being called Hutu, and pastoralists Tutsi. It seems the link between denomination and

origin had become more prominent by the end of the century, especially at court and under circumstances relating to political matters, with variations in their use in everyday life. This shift testified to the expansion of court customs as the result of military conquest. Studies on peripheral areas, such as Kinyaga, illustrate the dynamics of penetration of those customs. When the first Europeans entered mountainous Rwanda (1894, Götzen) in defiance of its military reputation, King Kigeri Rwabugiri had been reigning for almost thirty years. Wars had increased the wealth of rival families exerting power at court, but Rwabugiri had taken care to master their rivalries, with shifts in positions that involved periodical persecutions and executions. Under Rwabugiri, external wars and internal politics had intertwined to determine the dynamics of power.

Other circumstances combined with those dynamics to alter Rwandan society. Epidemics affected men and cattle. The loss of herds meant many small pastoralists were ruined and became Hutu agriculturalists. Wealth became even more concentrated in the hands of a few. Meanwhile, merchants were at the doorstep of the country, and some campaigns testified to the opening of the country to interactions meant to bring luxury goods to the court, in exchange for ivory and slaves. The last campaigns were directed at Ijwi Island. By the end of a century marred with increasing violence against the powerless and anarchy at court, rivalries between factions culminated in a coup after Rwabugiri's death. After his designated successor had been destroyed, young king Yuhi Musinga was put on the throne. By the time the German lieutenant von Ramsay proposed an alliance to the regent queen mother (1897) revolts were raging in the north, and she was happy to accept.

This was the start of the colonial era. The Germans, however, were very few and did little to interfere with internal matters. Intrigues went on, as did the influence of the diviners and other ritual practitioners. In this kingdom where violence was the usual tool for oppression, religious beliefs related to the person of the king and to fertility were indeed central, and justified the submission of the people. At the turn of the century, missionaries entered Rwanda. In the beginning, however, they got very little opportunity to interact with the powerful ones. In 1900, three Catholic missionaries were allowed to settle in Save, an area known as inhospitable. Rwanda had lost its splendid isolation.

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See also: Rwanda: To 1800; Rwanda: Colonial Period: German and Belgian Rule.

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Rwanda: Colonial Period: German and Belgian Rule

Germany's rule in Rwanda began in 1896, when the government of German East Africa founded a first military post in Usumbura, Urundi. From there German officers established relations with *Mwami* (King) Musinga of Rwanda. Musinga recognized German sovereignty, and the Germans reciprocated by exercising a kind of indirect rule. In view of their military weakness, they were wary of any military conflict with the ruling Tutsi. Throughout the German period the policy of indirect rule favored the Tutsi monarchy and continued in the vein of the precolonial shift toward annexation of the Hutu principalities and an increase in Tutsi chiefly power. Along with the soldiers, missionaries penetrated the country, and by 1904 the White Fathers had established five missions in Rwanda. Peaceful relations between Musinga and the Germans were disturbed around 1904–1905, when missionaries were attacked by several of Musinga's subchiefs, who opposed the influence of missionaries and ruthless Asian and European traders. The German administration in Usumbura reacted by issuing licenses to foreign merchants in March 1905, and by extending its network of military posts. During this affair it became clear that Musinga was more of a marionette to several competing court fractions and subchiefs than an absolute ruler. On account of their mwami-friendly treaties, these fractions considered the Germans to be



Tutsi dancers, Rwanda, 1958. © Lode van Gent/Das Fotoarchiv.

enemies that stood in the way of their ambitions. From 1907 onward Rwanda was no longer governed from Urundi, but from the new residence in Kigali. In the years between 1909 and 1912 several of Musinga's rivals as well as rebellious Twa groups were defeated by German forces. By 1914 missionary work was the only thriving European activity in Rwanda-Urundi with a total of 80 missionaries, while economic development was failing.

The German forces withdrew from Rwanda and Urundi in April and May 1916 to avoid the concentric attack of superior Belgian and British troops. The Belgian military conquest of Rwanda was made official by a League of Nations mandate in 1919. Between 1919 and 1926 the Belgians adopted a wait-and-see policy, supervising the Tutsi chiefly courts. From 1926 onward Governor Voisin took a series of reform measures. Nearly all political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the Tutsi chiefs, which meant that the Hutu peasants were strictly controlled by a Tutsi chief with Belgian backing. Furthermore, *ubuletwa*, the hated forced-labor system, was enforced more intensively and introduced in places where it had not existed previously. With the help of the Belgians the Tutsi were able to gradually change traditional land rights in their favor, to the disadvantage of the Hutu. Thus the Tutsi chiefs could gain control of the traditional *ubukonde* Hutu landholdings in the northwest and southwest of Rwanda. This resulted in the individualization of economic resources and the destruction of the traditional collective folds of the ancient Rwandese society. Furthermore, the Belgians and Tutsi created the myth of a superior Tutsi "master race" and transformed this myth into administrative politics. The Hutu were told that they were inferiors who deserved their fate and, as a consequence, they started to hate all Tutsi regardless of their financial status. In November 1931 the Belgians deposed Musinga, who had never been sympathetic to them, and replaced him with one of his sons, who ruled as Mutara III Rudahigwa. He converted to Christianity, as did many of his Tutsi subjects, since Christianity was a prerequisite for the attainment of a higher social rank. The church, which monopolized the system of education, regarded the Tutsi as "natural-born chiefs" and gave them priority in education. This meant that the church could enhance its control over the future elite of the country. Hutu also graduated, but rarely found adequate employment.

World War II brought a vast expansion of the cash economy in which the Hutu had to share. The old clientship system, which was basically part of the nonmonetary economy, therefore became increasingly obsolete. In this stiffening atmosphere the church began to favor the growth of a Hutu counterelite. Many

priests were now recruited from the Tutsi elite. They acquired new ideas of racial equality, colonial political devolution, and self-government. The white portion of the clergy had meanwhile shifted from conservative, upper-class Walloons to lower-class Flemish priests, who were sympathetic to the Hutu rather than to the Tutsi. With this backing the Hutu began to found periodicals and social associations. The ultraconservative Tutsi courts reacted by ousting progressive Tutsi chiefs, who had supported this development.

In 1957, two Hutu parties were created: the Mouvement Sociale de la Masse (MSM) by Grégoire Kayibanda and the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) by Joseph Gitara. In the same year, the Tutsi reacted with the formation of the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) which was strongly monarchist but anti-Belgian, and therefore received money from communist countries. To counter the UNAR the Belgians had released the liberal Tutsi chief Banakwari, who in September 1959 founded the Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais as a liberal Tutsi party that, however, was trusted neither by monarchist Tutsi nor by the Hutu. In October 1959 the MSM had become the Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU).

By late 1959, tension had built considerably. When a PARMEHUTU activist was attacked by members of UNAR, false news of his death spread quickly. In the Hutu uprising which followed, Tutsi houses were burned and 300 people killed. Afterward, however, the Belgians arrested mostly Tutsi. This marked a serious break between the Belgians and their former protégés, since the former felt that they had protected a combination of backward traditionalists and communists. In the face of imminent chaos the helpless Belgians launched the idea of self-government on November 11, 1959. In the meantime, Hutu went on hunting down Tutsi and burning down their houses. Starting in early 1960, the colonial government began to replace most of the Tutsi chiefs with Hutu ones. The latter immediately organized the persecution of the Tutsi, which resulted in a mass exodus of 130,000 Rwandese Tutsi to the neighboring countries until late 1963. The communal elections in June and July 1960 were won by the PARMEHUTU. At the urging of the United Nations, Brussels organized a "National Reconciliation Conference" in Ostend, Belgium in January 1961. After its failure, the Belgians and PARMEHUTU leader Kayibanda arranged a legal coup to prevent any further interference by the UN. In Gitarama, Kayibanda's birthplace, the "sovereign" Democratic Republic of Rwanda was declared on January 28, 1961. On September 25, 1961, legislative elections were held. PARMEHUTU received 78 per cent of the votes,

UNAR only 17 per cent. Rwanda became formally independent on July 1, 1962.

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See also: Rwanda: Genocide, 1994.

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Rwanda: Civil Unrest and Independence: 1959-1962

It is necessary, in order to understand the unrest that surrounded the revolution and the independence of Rwanda, to bear in mind the changes that took place during colonial times. Many changes had been taking place in Rwandan society at the eve of colonization. Primary among them was the hardening of social divisions, according to classifications that, in many areas of the country, took racial overtones and combined well with the European mentality of the times.

Administrators and missionaries were few, and relied, for their understanding of the country they wanted to govern, on information provided by those nearest and most useful to them, the people in power. Famines provided opportunities for reforms. The territory was put for the first time under a unified mode of governance, and the status of the chiefs, some newly appointed on the basis of their skills in reading and writing, became more rigid. Reports of the administration testify to confusion between the ruling class and the Tutsi people. Subsequent discriminations had as a consequence that the better positions in the high schools and in the administration were reserved for those qualified as Tutsi. The clergy, the administration, and the Rwandan chiefs acted hand in hand to maintain the newly acquired positions. Religious seminars still provided an opportunity for Hutu people to progress. They would, however, soon be dominated by the increasing influence of the Tutsi clergy.

This situation was prevailing mainly where the influence of the central institutions was the strongest, with the northern cultural pride of the Kiga Hutu people,

who had never been fully assimilated, remaining untouched. This specificity was to play a role in focalizing the ethnic divides, giving its own connotations to a revolution that had more social overtones in central Rwanda.

After World War II, changes in European society at large were reflected in the social origins of the missionaries. Social commitments induced changes in attitudes toward, respectively, the Tutsi elite, and a rising modern Hutu elite that had promoted itself by seizing the new opportunities commerce, religious education, and ideological changes offered them. The “indigenization” of the clergy left Hutu and Tutsi to themselves, and the first ethnic tensions took shape within the Church.

A split also occurred between the Tutsi court and the traditionalists and the more modern Tutsi elite. The United Nations visiting missions in the country entrusted to Belgium provided both sides, but specially the party in power, with opportunities to voice their demands. Pressures for reforms forced the Rwandan king to abolish the *ubuhake* system of bondage resting on the gift of cows (this only linking, in different ways, a small fraction of the population), but kept the rights on the pastures in the hands of the Tutsi chiefs, making this reform merely apparent.

Hutu expectations and feelings of frustration were rising. Civil unrest and social claims taking ethnic overtones started as soon as 1955. The Catholic press had, for quite a time, provided the Hutu elite with a channel to express their claims and discontents. A target date for independence was fixed, but the introduction of democratic procedures prior to this was differently felt by the two groups of population, with the Hutu seeing the benefits they could reap from a majority rule. Their claims became increasingly articulated, and synthesized, eventually, in the Hutu manifesto forwarded to the governor general in March 1957. At the eve of the elections, the Rwandan elite was very much divided along ethnic lines, with only a few populist Tutsi mitigating the divide. Soon would the Tutsi elite claim a quick independence for Rwanda, and look for international allies, while the Hutu reaffirmed their fidelity to Belgium, who would lead them to democracy. The manifesto, published in papers that traveled down to the hills where more than 95 per cent of the people lived, changed the atmosphere dramatically.

In July 1959, King Mutara Rudahigwa of Rwanda died suddenly in Burundi, and different interpretations were given to his death. His successor was almost immediately designated, without any consultation of the Belgian administrator. From September onward, the respective interests were represented by different political parties, with, at their extremes, the most conservative ones. Tutsis founded the National Rwandan

Union (UNAR), and the Hutu, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu people. As the UNAR was referring to tradition and fidelity to the *mwami* (king), the first Hutu attacks against Tutsi houses were done as a token of conformity. The Tutsi reaction was swift and violent, as the leaders were appealing to the mobs to avenge the chiefs. Belgian troops intervened to restore order. A special resident, Colonel Logiest, inclined to favor the Hutu, was appointed. He had “emergency interim chiefs” appointed, almost all of them Hutu people.

The consequences of the November 1959 riots and their political aftermath were important and far-reaching. They put many Tutsi families, deprived of their lands, on the road of a long exile, and fed their resentments against Belgian authorities. This exile was going to prove itself not only a multiple individual tragedy, but also a national tragedy, as the events of the last decade of the twentieth century have shown. The elections were organized in a climate of violence and intimidation using the lines of personal clientelism. On January 28, 1961, the Hutu government proclaimed Rwanda a republic, and took the lead. The country gained its independence on July 1, 1962. The first republic did not break with the habits of previous times, paving the way for the coup led in 1973 by the northerners. However, this change of leadership did not bring an end to the essential problem faced by Rwanda—namely, deeply rooted social inequalities in a context of extreme poverty.

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Rwanda: 1962–1990

The origins of conflict in postindependence Rwanda may be traced to the colonial legacy of partition and intercommunal division, and the creation in Rwanda of a sectarian, one-party regime that depended for its survival on the exclusion or elimination of its opponents. Ethnicity, although generally considered a cause of conflict, has often been used to obscure the Rwandan conflict’s core causes: authoritarian institutions and political cultures, and those external influences that have played a significant role in supporting authoritarian regimes.

The country’s eight million (pre-1994) inhabitants are categorized typically as Hutu (84 per cent), Tutsi (15 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent). However, the current Rwandan government is seeking to eradicate categorization by ethnic grouping, and argues that Rwanda’s

ethnic groups—commonly perceived, most catastrophically, by many within those groups as mutually antagonistic throughout history—are instead “three strands of the same rope,” and of one common Rwandan nationality, Banyarwanda, determined most obviously by a shared language, Kinyarwanda. By this reckoning, the ethnic division of this nation was not inevitable, but was a deliberate policy of colonialism.

Rwandan independence in 1962 was achieved on the colonists’ terms, via the Belgian-sponsored overthrow and exiling of those favored (but, by 1959, proindependence) Tutsis who previously had administered on the colonists’ behalf. The accession to power of the hitherto downtrodden Hutu majority reinforced sectarian divisions, reinforced despite generations of intermarriage by a Rwandan citizen’s compulsory identity card, upon which his or her ethnic category was displayed, as in colonial times. The idea that the majority Hutu population had been oppressed not by Belgium but independently by the Tutsi was embraced enthusiastically by the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu (PARMEHUTU). It was led by Grégoire Kayibanda, who founded the Rwandan First Republic and became its president following the 1959–1962 “social revolution,” during which an ethnic transfer of power was accompanied by the killing or exiling of over half a million Tutsi. Violent expulsions recurred during the 1960s and early 1970s, and the exclusion of those remaining Tutsi from employment, public life, and political, economic, or military power created a quasi-apartheid system of discrimination. A Tutsi required a Hutu patron in government in order to gain access to state jobs or economic assets. The client-patron relations that existed during the colonial and precolonial periods were reproduced, but in reverse. Interethnic tension became the definer of the country’s problems, and sectarian prejudice and exclusion key features of the state because deemed essential to the state’s survival. Accordingly, some observers argue that 60 years of colonial and Tutsi rule, and 35 years of Hutu supremacy following the 1959 revolution (which consigned half the Tutsi population to exile), have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between them. Political conflict since independence, punctuated by intercommunal violence, has created distinct and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which are identifiably “ethnic.” By this analysis, it is impossible to interpret recent events without recourse to these labels, as they are the labels used by the people themselves.

Fearful of betrayal, Kayibanda had surrounded himself with supporters and family members from southern Rwanda, distributing patronage disproportionately to those he felt he could trust. As a result, erstwhile PARMEHUTU supporters from the north

and center of the country grew isolated from the president and distant from the levers of political and economic power he controlled. Crucially, Kayibanda failed to retain control over the army, allowing his chief of staff, Juvénal Habyarimana, to build a power base for family, friends, and allies drawn from the latter’s home region in Gisenyi, northwestern Rwanda. By the early 1970s, northern and central Rwandan Hutu were conspiring to topple the Kayibanda establishment, claiming the president was unable to protect the country against attacks from without by *inyenzi* (cockroaches—small bands of exiles seeking his overthrow) or to guarantee peace and stability in the climate of sectarian revenge within. As a result, Habyarimana was able to seize power in a military coup on July 5, 1973.

The political tensions that led to the overthrow of Kayibanda, and the shift from an ethnic to a regional basis of distribution of patronage, weaken the argument that conflict in Rwanda is and always has been ethnically driven. Habyarimana re-created a one-party state, ensuring political, military, and—by extension—economic power was concentrated in his own hands and those of a close inner circle largely composed of family members: the *akazu* (little house). His Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) published its manifesto on July 5, 1975, the second anniversary of the coup; it made clear the regime’s readoption of a quasi-apartheid agenda, which severely limited access to education and state employment for ethnic minorities, and promised a robust official response to any perceived internal threat to national security.

Also in 1975, Rwanda signed cooperation agreements in terms of aid, trade, and cultural exchanges with France, which marked the formal expansion of France’s African sphere from its own former colonies to include Belgium’s ex-colonial territories. Franco-Rwandan military cooperation was formalized in a military technical assistance accord which entailed an initially modest annual transfer of arms and military equipment from France to Rwanda.

Over 15 years, the tranquility and introspection of this “little Switzerland of Africa” concealed a hardening of its authoritarianism as it failed repeatedly to address the basic injustice upon which it was built: the forcible exclusion of up to 600,000 citizens on the basis of sectarian discrimination. The central, enduring issue of Rwanda’s exiles resurfaced at regular intervals, when tolerance for those exiles in surrounding countries was strained. Habyarimana and the party he founded insisted that “the glass was full”: densely populated, high birthrate Rwanda, with a population of eight million in 64,200 square kilometers, was too overcrowded to allow the exiles to return.

However, in 1986, Rwandan refugees were in the vanguard of the successful campaign by Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM) to overthrow President Milton Obote. The Rwandan exiles in Uganda were driven to support the rebellion in large numbers (eventually providing 3000 of the 14,000 troops of the National Resistance Army, or NRA) by Obote's mistaken efforts in 1982 to force potentially disloyal Rwandans back into Habyarimana's hostile Rwanda. A disproportionate number of the NRA's senior commanders were drawn from these Rwandans—notably, chief of staff Fred Rwigyema and intelligence chief Paul Kagame (now Rwandan president). Militarily experienced and aware of growing resentment of the prominence—perceived as dominance—of Rwandans in the new Uganda's army and administration, Rwigyema and Kagame represented a generation of exiles radicalized by combat and aware that, as Rwandans, they would always be stateless until their “right to return” was granted or seized. Accordingly, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in Kampala in December 1987, and although recruited initially from Rwandan exiles in Uganda, the RPF also attracted support from the significant Rwandan diaspora in Tanzania, Burundi, Europe, and North America. Rwandan exiles had sought advancement through education, and many, prosperous professionals, were prepared to bankroll the new movement.

On July 27, 1987, the Central Committee of the MRND again announced, despite growing international pressure, that it would not allow the immigration of large numbers of exiles. By the late 1980s, pressure on the Habyarimana regime was growing, compounded by a series of bad harvests and a drop in the international price of coffee, the country's principal export upon which the cash crop economy was over-reliant. The regime also displayed an inability or refusal to address the country's chronic poverty and frequent shortages. Crucially, the issues of underused and unexploited land (including large areas of undrained swamp), and primitive agricultural practices, went unaddressed, despite the availability of studies advocating workable changes.

Under pressure for democratization from Rwandan civil society and some of his foreign backers, Habyarimana allowed the creation of opposition political parties and renamed his MRND the National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy. However, he banned the nascent RPF and detained opposition supporters who proved too critical of the regime. On September 7, 1990, Pope John Paul II visited the fervently Catholic Rwanda, and although the pontiff made no call for greater democracy or observance of human rights by his hosts, Habyarimana felt the unaccustomed glare of international attention

merited a general amnesty for prisoners, excepting those charged with subversion or endangering state security. This gesture had the practical benefit of freeing space in the country's prisons for the mass detentions which would follow the launching of the RPF's first offensive three weeks later, on October first.

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See also: **Uganda: Obote: Second Regime, 1980–1985.**

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Rwanda: Genocide, 1994

During approximately 100 days from April 7 until mid-July 1994, the government of Rwanda carried out a systematic campaign of extermination of citizens whom it declared to be national “enemies.” In massacres conducted throughout the country, at least 800,000 persons lost their lives. The targets of this killing were, initially, actual or potential political critics of the government, particularly prominent members of opposition parties, and their families, characterized as “political enemies.” Subsequently all members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group, regardless of age, gender, or ideas, were demonized by the ethnically Hutu-dominated regime as “historical enemies.” The killing, which began in the capital city of Kigali and then expanded into a government-directed nationwide genocide, took place in the presence of international witnesses—including diplomats, aid workers, and even United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops—who failed to prevent it, despite numerous warning signals, and who failed to stop it once it was underway.

The context in which the identification of “enemies” and the formulation of plans to exterminate them coalesced was one of intense international pressure on Rwanda's authoritarian single-party regime to “open up” to multiparty democracy and to negotiate with an armed group of refugees who had attacked from neighboring Uganda and proclaimed their right to return. These two initially unrelated developments burst onto the scene nearly simultaneously in late 1990. Over the course of the next four years, the two became inextricably interconnected in the “official” discourse of a

Rwandan government that grew ever more paranoid, defensive and extreme. The government propagated the notion that the two were elements of a single complex conspiracy meant to destroy the nation and reestablish the oppressive exploitation of the Hutu majority by a small group of Tutsi aristocrats that had existed in Rwanda under seven decades of colonialism, from the 1890s to 1961.

The independent Rwandan government that promulgated these fearsome images, however, was itself directed by a small elite group known popularly as the *akazu* (or “the family,” in the sense of the mafia). This small circle of close associates of then president Juvenal Habyarimana exercised tight, essentially unchallenged control over all things political, military, administrative, and financial. From late 1990, this control was increasingly challenged (or, in the eyes of the *akazu*, threatened) by members of newly established opposition parties and incursions of the armed refugee group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

Opposition party adherents aggressively pursued the building of their party membership and the securing of government posts, often through intimidation and violence. Several parties, both the mainstream Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement and its major opponents, including the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, concentrated resources in their youth wings, relying on them to both encourage and intimidate potential members. Party activists also worked to intimidate, undermine, or openly attack local-level administrators of competing parties, angling to gain political capital by rendering them ineffective. By mid-1992, persistent challenges by political opponents had paralyzed administration of many locales, leaving residents free to defy authority.

As Rwanda plunged into widespread civil disobedience and political violence, its president faced continued incursions by the RPF, which in early 1992 seized a solid foothold in the north of the country. This accomplishment gained the RPF enough international leverage to force Habyarimana to the negotiating table at a series of internationally brokered peace talks held in Arusha, Tanzania in mid-1992. In July of that year, he was pressured to accept a cease-fire. In August 1992, he signed the first of a set of agreements called the Arusha Accords. The accords laid out the a new structure for the Rwandan government, which ensured power-sharing with the RPF as well as with internal opposition parties.

Although outside Rwanda these concessions generated goodwill (and, more important, economic aid), inside the country they were greeted with scorn. Keenly aware of the political cost of negotiating peace, Habyarimana disavowed them at home even as he touted them to please international donors.

During 1993 the “double” processes of negotiating peace with the RPF, while quietly tolerating and even committing acts of political and ethnic violence, intensified. In February, the RPF violated the cease-fire and killed hundreds of civilians. This transgression destroyed an alliance that had been forged between the RPF and the Rwandan opposition, ripped apart opposition parties, and catalyzed a “Hutu Power” coalition.

Proponents of Hutu Power sought to foster anti-Tutsi fear and hatred in order to bridge political differences. New doubts about the RPF’s intent predisposed many to listen to the anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi rhetoric churned out incessantly by a new, *akazu*-controlled radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which began broadcasting in April 1993. The station targeted the young, who were attracted by its trendy music, fast-paced format, and facetious commentary. Many adults paid little attention to it.

This changed dramatically, however, in 1993, when political tragedy struck in neighboring Burundi. On October 21, Burundi’s first democratically elected president, a Hutu, was assassinated by his country’s Tutsi-dominated army. Rapidly, Burundi’s painstakingly built Tutsi-Hutu political coalition shattered, replaced by widespread violence. This enormous tragedy was all the Rwandan Hutu Power movement needed to convince their countrymen that to cooperate with the Tutsi-dominated RPF was to deliver themselves to into the jaws of the beast.

Distrust, belligerent rhetoric about the Hutu need for preemptive self-defense against all Tutsis, stepped-up militia training, and secret arms caches abounded in late 1993 and early 1994. International peacekeepers of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), deployed to Rwanda in December 1993 to assist with the implementation of the Arusha Accords, soon reported evidence of clandestine arming of civilians. As the weeks passed, UNAMIR’s reports on covert civilian defense activities became increasingly direct, specific, and urgent. The reports received minimal response from UN headquarters, however. International attention was focused on the peace accords.

On the evening of April 6, 1994, as President Habyarimana returned from peace talks in Tanzania, his plane was attacked with missiles fired from a location near Kigali airport. Everyone aboard the plane was killed, including Habyarimana, his chief of staff, and the Burundi president. The identity of the assassins is not certain as of this writing. Within hours of the attack elite military units, including the presidential guard, moved through the streets of Kigali, setting up roadblocks, blockading prominent members of the political opposition inside their homes, and evacuating important Hutu Power figures. Later in the night, joined by regular army units and members of youth

militias, they began assassinating opposition leaders and their families.

By the morning of April 7, armed soldiers and militia members bearing lists of named “enemies,” most of them Hutu political leaders who had refused to embrace Hutu Power, as well as some prominent Tutsis, trolled Kigali’s middle-class neighborhoods, breaking into houses and killing their targets. Meanwhile, key Hutu Power and akazu members gathered to strategize as well as to propose their presidential selections. UNAMIR officers urged the Rwandan military (Forces Armées Rwandaises, or FAR) to restore calm, even as they coped with the kidnapping, torture and murder of UN soldiers by the FAR. UNAMIR also struggled to convince decision makers back at the New York headquarters of the UN to broaden its mandate, to enable the organization to respond effectively to the highly charged situation.

By the evening of April 7, and over the next few days, with UNAMIR troops present but under stringent orders restricting their ability to respond, the killing spread from the capital city to select regions of the countryside where Hutu Power had been particularly active and organized. RTL M announcers incited this expansion, urging listeners to locate “enemies”—specifically, Tutsis and their moderate Hutu “accomplices” who were characterized as clandestine agents of the RPF—and to “defend” themselves vigorously. Reinforcing this message was the news that the RPF had recommenced hostilities.

Initially, many Hutus, having heard that the first wave of killings had targeted Hutu politicians, feared for their lives. But by the end of the first week, with the aid of the radio, the interim government disseminated the message that Hutus were not the target, and should not allow differences among them to distract them from attending to the “real” enemy—namely, all Tutsis.

Thus, within days of Habyarimana’s assassination, Rwanda was plunged into a complex series of interlocked crises. The small country faced an internal power struggle among opportunistic and extremist political patrons who were willing to order their clients to commit massacres so as to outmaneuver their rivals. It faced abandonment and apathy from an international community that opted to evacuate most foreign nationals, limit the mandate and reduce the size of the UNAMIR force, and even lobby the UN (unsuccessfully) for a complete UNAMIR withdrawal. This disinterested international response created a permissive environment in which the massacres expanded into a full-fledged genocide.

In the days and weeks that followed the evacuations, Tutsi civilians were killed in large-scale massacres at public sites such as churches and schools where they had gathered spontaneously, seeking protection, or had

been ordered to gather. In a pattern of killing that replicated itself in many locales, hundreds of Tutsi civilians were concentrated at a particular site, detained or “protected” by police and/or soldiers for several days, then attacked with grenades, followed by close-range assault by a civilian crowd armed with machetes, clubs, hammers, and an occasional gun. As the killings multiplied and expanded, Rwandans who steadfastly opposed them—including some police, military and regional administrative officials—were isolated, intimidated, undermined, dismissed, or killed. In the hands of a small group of extremists, notably Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, the state apparatus was mobilized to exterminate an entire minority group.

As this complex catastrophe unfolded on the hillsides of Rwanda, the UN and prominent governments of the world focused not so much on halting it, but instead on how to refer to it. If what had now become the systematic massacre of Tutsis was acknowledged to be a genocide, then the UN, as well as countries that had been signatories to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, were legally bound to intervene. But apart from France (which had helped to arm and train the FAR, and launched the unilateral Operation Turquoise in late June) those governments with the means to lead a UN intervention distanced themselves from the crisis.

Humanitarian agencies, however, did mobilize to assist Rwandan refugees (one group fleeing the genocide, and the other fleeing the advance of the RPF) who escaped to neighboring countries. It was not until June that the UN Security Council agreed to characterize the Rwandan situation as genocide. By this time, it was generally too late: more than 80 per cent of all victims had been killed in the first six weeks of the crisis.

As the RPF advanced successfully against the FAR in May and June, more civilians continued to die. Hutu officials stridently called for the “patriotic” elimination of any Tutsis who had managed to survive earlier massacres. The RPF, as it gained ground, massacred Hutu civilians along its line of advance, as well as behind the line.

On July 4, 1994, after intense fighting hill by hill and street by street, the RPF seized Kigali. In response, the genocidal “interim” government fled northward, then westward into Zaire. As it fled, the defeated government broadcast over the mobile RTL M radio station that the fate all Hutus had feared, a “Tutsi takeover,” had now occurred. Hutus needed to run for their lives to avoid slaughter. Terrified, traumatized and fearing retribution, one million Rwandans, nearly all of them Hutus, fled in the course of a few days. The humanitarian catastrophe that ensued from their flight was poignant and captured on world television. The corpse-strewn country that they left behind was not to capture

the world's attention until later, as the full extent of what had occurred was only gradually acknowledged.

MICHELE WAGNER

Rwanda: Genocide, Aftermath of

Although the pursuit of justice has dominated the political agenda within Rwanda since the genocide of 1994, other objectives, including security and economic recovery, as well as the quest for revenge, regional power, and financial gain through plunder, have also driven decision-making processes, as various factions within the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government have competed among themselves since gaining power.

In mid-July 1994, after three months of intensive combat, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), under the brilliant leadership of General Paul Kagame, conducted a massive military sweep northward that pushed the former government and its armed forces (the Forces Armées Rwandaises, or FAR) over the border into neighboring Zaire. With this final campaign, the RPF emerged victorious from a four-year war and established a transitional government. The new leaders immediately announced plans to apprehend those who had supported the former government's genocidal program and bring them to justice.

Explicitly marking its difference from the xenophobic former regime, the Tutsi-dominated RPF declared its intent to pursue pan-ethnic cooperation and followed up rapidly by naming Hutu politicians to key posts, including the presidency (Pasteur Bizimungu), the prime ministry (Faustin Twagiramungu), and the ministries of interior and justice. These men had been prominent members of the political opposition to the prior government and had themselves been targeted for killing in the purges of April 1994. Hence, in the early days of the RPF government there prevailed a climate of optimism, and a hope that cooperation, determination, and a shared quest for justice would lead Rwandans to rebuild their war-torn nation.

Responding positively to these declarations were members of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora living in other parts of Africa and abroad, many of whom had sacrificed young family members and financial resources to the RPF cause. In 1994–1995, Tutsis first trickled, then poured, back into Rwanda. For some, it was the first time they had stepped on Rwandan soil for several years. For others, particularly the younger generation, their main link to Rwanda had been from its role as the setting of their parents' narratives of the past. Many of the incoming refugees harbored romantic or patriotic notions of a heroic return to the homeland. In time these newcomers, referred to as "Tutsi returnees," would become a dynamic force in emerging economic and political developments.

The elation of homecoming, however, soon gave way to shock and grief as a sense of the immensity and the horror of what had occurred in the months of April through July 1994 began to emerge.

Rwanda was a country literally strewn with rubble and corpses. Village after village harbored hastily dug mass graves, unburied corpses, the ground-up debris of human bones, and living survivors suffering from serious physical and psychological injuries. There were displaced and wandering adults and children who had been separated from their families in earlier torrents of refugee flight. In addition to this shocking human damage, there was also widespread destruction of the physical infrastructure: broken water systems, mangled electric lines, dynamited and collapsed public buildings, and cratered roads. Everywhere there was evidence of extensive pillage.

The immensity of the destruction was overwhelming, but even more disturbing for those of new RPF-governed Rwanda was the response to this tragedy by the international community. It appeared to many living inside Rwanda that the world was much more concerned about their countrymen who now lived outside the country: the primarily Hutu refugees.

Since April, desperate individuals bearing chilling tales of escape and survival had begun to straggle across the borders into neighboring countries. Initially, the outflow was comprised of those fleeing politically and ethnically targeted killing, many of whom were Tutsi. By late April, with the renewal of military conflict and the successful advance of the RPF through eastern Rwanda, there were new, much larger refugee outflows composed mostly of Hutus. On the single day of April 29, 1994, more than 200,000 individuals fled across a bridge at the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. By May, more than 470,000 refugees had fled to Tanzania, where the largest of the several refugee camps in the region, Benaco, became almost overnight the largest refugee camp in the world.

As aid agencies scrambled to cope with the refugee crisis on Rwanda's eastern border, the axis of military activity inside the country shifted westward and then northward. Fleeing before the RPF's final advance on July 13 and 14, 1994, more than 10,000 persons per hour crossed over the northwestern border into Goma, Zaire. This unprecedented outflow was met with inadequate aid personnel and provisions. By July 26, 1994, the Rwandan refugees at Goma, weakened by dysentery, exhaustion, malnutrition, diarrhea, and cholera, were dying at a rate of 2,000 persons each day. The Goma crisis ultimately claimed 46,000 lives.

The tragic plight of the refugees, in whose midst mingled former government and army officials and extremist Hutu militiamen, riveted international attention—and infuriated RPF supporters. From the

RPF perspective, “the international community” (which it rhetorically constructed as a single entity) had in April 1994 turned its back on those in imminent danger of genocide, callously evacuating foreign nationals while leaving their Rwandan colleagues behind to die. United Nations (UN) troops were prevented from intervening to stop genocidal killing, and now in July engaged in a gripping televised drama of rescuing the killers. Meanwhile, no significant international assistance was flowing to Tutsi survivors of a genocide that had claimed an estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 lives. Instead, donor governments called for reconciliation.

Security and justice, not reconciliation, were the RPF government’s most immediate objectives in the second part of 1994. Pursuing these goals with the means available to a civilian government was new for the RPF, which until recently had relied on the enforcement tactics available to a guerrilla army. Allegations of RPF atrocities, including torture and summary executions, had proliferated both before and during the fighting of 1994. Now as a government, the RPF had to make the transition to utilizing other tactics. By late 1994, although clear evidence suggests that it continued to rely on familiar tactics of summary justice, the new government was beginning to make use of arrest as well. Indeed, mass arrests, including the rounding up of all Hutu men in market-day sweeps and nocturnal attacks, became commonplace by late 1994. By October, an estimated 10,000 detainees populated the nation’s official jails and prisons. Two months later, the number of detainees had risen to 15,000. Unofficial detention sites—including private houses, latrines, and shipping containers—proliferated, although the number of “unofficial” detainees could not reliably be estimated.

As the new government’s pursuit of justice grew increasingly aggressive, making flagrant use of summary, extrajudicial, and inhumane tactics carried out by soldiers empowered in the civilian sphere, its official policy of pan-ethnic cooperation began to erode. In March 1995, the Hutu chief prosecutor of Kigali fled the country under threat of death after he denounced human rights violations by the army. Also in March, a prominent Hutu governor (Dr. Jean-Pierre Rwangabo) was assassinated after he protested against mass arrests by soldiers of civilians against whom there was little or no evidence. In August, the three most prominent Hutu ministers, the prime minister, the minister of interior, and the minister of justice, were forced out of office. This erosion extended beyond the small circle of elite politicians into the broader society, in a political discourse that became prevalent in 1995: for every victim there is a killer, and with at least a million Tutsi dead, there were at least as many Hutu killers.

This discourse, which facilitated the generalization that most Hutus were murderers or accomplices to murderers, came to rationalize widespread callousness toward the extrajudicial detention and killing of Hutus. For example, in April 1995, in forcibly closing a cluster of camps of internally displaced people in southwestern Rwanda, RPA soldiers repeatedly fired on Hutu crowds over the course of six days. In the largest of the camps, Kibeho, which had housed 120,000 residents, international eyewitnesses, including UN soldiers assigned to bury the bodies, estimated 8000 dead—a figure later revised, under RPF pressure, to 2000. The official government death toll was 360, many of whom it claimed had died as a result of their own panic in a rainstorm-induced stampede.

Coinciding with the camp closures and an August 1995 expulsion of select refugees from Zaire, the arrest rate increased to 2,000 per month. This swamped the nation’s jails and prisons, which had an official capacity of 12,250, but held 62,000 by the end of the year. Particular prisons, such as Gitarama, which housed 7,000 inmates in cellblocks built for a maximum capacity of 600, became notorious for neglect, illness, and death. Likewise, communal lock-ups, when filled far beyond their maximum capacity, became sites of suffocation. In 1995, at least 2,300 people died in government detention.

Despite aggressive political rhetoric emphasizing the pursuit of justice, as 1995 drew to a close not one of 62,000 detainees had been tried. Most detainees continued to be held without charge or judicial file. In its defense, the government explained that it lacked the resources to unblock its paralyzed judicial system and to create humane conditions in its prisons. It pointed out that its priority was to assist the genocide’s Tutsi victims, not the Hutu killers, whose plight the humanitarian relief organizations had amply addressed. By the end of 1995, approximately \$2.5 billion had been spent to support the refugee camps. In contrast, \$572 million had supported programs inside Rwanda. Nevertheless, this callous response to the horrendous conditions in which primarily Hutu detainees who had never been charged were forced to exist convinced Hutus both inside and outside Rwanda that the Tutsi-dominated government was bent on revenge. Some two million refugees remained in camps outside Rwanda, unwilling to return home.

With so many of its citizens outside Rwanda, including most members of the former government and army, security became the dominant issue by 1996. Intelligence sources reported that in Zairian camps former soldiers and militiamen were rearming and training new recruits. Their intent, it was believed, was to conduct cross-border raids aimed at gaining a foothold inside the country—precisely the tactic used by the

RPF in its rebel days to force the then government into negotiations. Cross-border raids and RPA reprisals centered on the northwestern regions of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, adjacent to the Goma camps. There, during the course of 1996, infiltrators killed at least 278 persons. The RPA responded with mass arrests, such as the detention of some 10,000 on a hilltop without food or water for several days in August. It also conducted search-and-cordon operations during which 600 persons, mostly civilians, died. Another element that became characteristic of this conflict was attacks on communal lock-ups, which involved tossing grenades or shooting into crowded jail cells.

By late 1996, the Rwandan government made the decision to stop the cross-border threat at its source. Under the guise of a Zairian rebel movement called the Alliance des Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), the RPA launched series of attacks on Rwandan Hutu refugee camps inside Zaire. This attack quickly expanded into broader conflict in both Rwanda and Zaire.

Within Rwanda, the mass return of approximately 1.7 million refugees from both Zaire and Tanzania (which seized the opportunity to expel 500,000 Rwandans from its camps) in the two months between November 1996 and January 1997 fueled the existing conflict in the northwest and exacerbated the crisis within the prisons. By January 1997, arbitrary arrests and killings in the northwest had escalated into a daily occurrence. Large-scale massacres of unarmed civilians—such as those that took the lives of 1,853 civilians in the neighboring Ruhengeri villages of Nkuli and Nyamutera in early May, and another that took the lives of 120 persons inside a church in Karago, Gisenyi—seemed so strikingly reminiscent of the events of April 1994 that even the most optimistic Rwandans began to abandon

hope of reconciliation. In prisons, the number of detainees rose from 83,000 in October 1996 to 130,000 one year later. With international assistance, the nationwide prison capacity was increased, but only to 17,000. Detainees continued to die at an exorbitant rate, about 3,300 per year. Although the judicial system had begun to function, only 320 detainees had been tried by the end of the year, of which one-third received death sentences. Their public executions commenced in early 1998.

Within Zaire, having attacked refugee camps with relative impunity, the RPA and the AFDL penetrated farther into the vast, resource-rich eastern part of the country, ostensibly to apprehend the fleeing ex-FAR, and ultimately to combat the army of the discredited Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. With careful military and political tactics, and allegedly at the cost of hundreds of thousands of civilian lives, the allied RPA/AFDL managed to seize control of lucrative mining regions, and ultimately the nation itself, which it renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this way, by 1998, Rwanda, with a per capita gross domestic product of \$190 and itself still struggling to recover from war, managed to conduct a protracted armed struggle within the borders of its enormous and resource-laden neighbor—a war which, as of this writing, has continued.

With input from an eclectic assortment of sources and partners, in 1998 Rwanda was actively engaged in rebuilding its economy and infrastructure several regions of the country. In July 2002, the presidents of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a peace agreement. In October of that year, Rwanda pulled the last of its troops out of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

MICHELE WAGNER

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Sa'adians: *See Morocco: Sa'dians.*

Sadat: *See Egypt: Sadat, Nationalism, 1970–1981.*

Sadiq Al-Mahdi: *See Sudan: Sadiq al-Mahdi Regime, 1980s.*

Sahara: Peoples of the Desert

The economic basis for life in the Sahara, although constantly changing in response to ecological crises and political tensions, has been traditionally twofold: pastoralism (in camels, goats, and sheep) and trade. Some oases support permanently sedentarized populations who practice oasis (irrigation) gardening; many of these settled farming peoples on oases formerly were subjugated peoples, who until recently gave tribute to nomadic noble and tributary groups.

The population of the Sahara is about 2.5 million, living in oases or in the moister highlands. The main population groups are Arab, Moor, Berber, and Tubu/Teda. Constant fluctuations in ethnic/cultural identities, however, make it most useful to consider these distinctions primarily as linguistic. The Arab-speaking peoples live mainly on the northern edge of the desert, major groups being the Bedouins of the Libyan Desert and the Chamba of Algeria. In the west (southern Morocco, Mauritania, and parts of Mali) the majority language is Hassaniyya, an Arabic dialect with a strong Berber influence. The Hassaniyya speakers called Moors are internally divided between the *bidan*, who traditionally had a higher social status, and vassals, with the *haratin* (freemen) or former slaves on oases, in the lower positions. The Moors constitute

30 per cent of Mauritania's total population, and the mixed Moor *haratin* make up 40 per cent. The term *Moor* derives from the people and country known in Roman times as Mauretania, which comprised the present country of Morocco with the Western Sahara and the coast of the present Republic of Mauritania as far as its capital, Nouakchott.

The Arabs conquered Egypt in 640BCE, but they made no effort before 670 BCE to penetrate farther west than Libya. North Africa was not subdued by the caliphate until the end of the century. In 712BCE a majority Berber army crossed into Spain. By 756BCE the Islamic state of Al-Andalus had been constituted in Spain by an Umayyad dynasty of Syrian descent. The newcomers, to whom the term *Moors* was now more broadly extended, included not only Berbers from northern Africa but also Syrians, Yemenis, and Jews. A further Berber invasion by the Almoravids lasted only half a century. In its turn it was overthrown by a new Berber group, the Almohads, in 1145. Thereafter the Christian kingdoms—first Portugal, and then Spain—slowly eroded Moorish power, culminating in the fall of Granada and the unification of present-day Spain in 1492. In the following year all Jews who would not convert to Christianity were expelled, followed by the expulsion of the Moors in 1502. The Moors who were expelled from the kingdom of Granada first migrated to their ancestral homelands, of which Fez was the center. Thus, the relatively narrow original sense of the word *Moor* was extended over time, as a gloss, to designate peoples who were distinct but related in their connection with Saharan migrations and Islam.

Many Berber groups (Shluh or Tashelhayt, Tamazight, and Znaga) live on the desert edge in the north and west. One group, the Zwaya of the western Sahara, preserved their Berber language and the memory of their heroic past. By the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, *zaway* (or *zwaya*) became the name

commonly given to those descendants of the Almoravids, the Berbers of the western Sahara, who yielded their status as warriors to the incoming Arabs of the Banu Hassan, preferring instead the pursuit of Islam. Out of the original genealogies of the Zanaga or Znaga (the Berber form of Sanhaja), many of which appear to have been matrilineal, developed the lineages of religious scholars who traced their ancestry back to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, just as the Almoravids had claimed descent from the kings of the Yemen. In this way they established themselves and their clansmen and descent groups in a hierarchical Saharan society of Arab warriors, Berber clerics, and servile cultivators. The largest group of Berber-speaking peoples in the Sahara is the Tuareg, of which there are between one-half and one million. The Tuareg cover the region from the Niger River Bend in the west to the Azben (Air) highlands in present-day Niger in the east, with some small Tuareg groups living beyond these borders. They can be divided into the northern groups—namely, the Kel Ahaggar and Kel Ajjer (mostly in Algeria)—and the southern groups, consisting of the Kel Adrar near the Niger River Bend, the Ioullimiden to their east, and the Kel Air or Kel Azben. Of these, the Ioullimiden has the largest population.

Evidence from geology, archaeology, and rock art suggests that the Sahara before 8000 years ago was wetter; rivers flowed, and farming and fishing were practiced. Rock art portrays these activities, and also depicts cattle raising and charioteers. These latter are widely believed by scholars (Bovill 1956; Briggs 1960; Bates 1970) to be the Garamantes, referred to in Greco-Roman classical literature. Archaeological evidence such as artifacts like metals and beads in the tomb of an ancient Berber queen named Tin Hinan in present-day Algeria indicate the importance of early matrilineal ancestress culture heroines and trade with the Mediterranean and the Sudanic worlds. Heinrich Barth (1857), Camille Jean (1909), and Lord Francis Rodd (1926) provide secondary source material, which at times presents conflicting views of some early origins and migrations. But most authors agree on the existence, at an early date throughout North Africa, of proto-Hausa, Sudanic peoples much farther north than their present distribution, up into the Sahara. These people, the Gobirawa, were an aristocratic division of Hausa-speaking groups, and their domain was known as Gobir, located in and around the Air. In addition, there were also at that time some Sanhaja (western Muleththem), in the region. Both these groups were in the region of Air before the arrival of the first Tuareg groups. Ibn Battuta's accounts, as well as those of Barth and Rodd, maintain that the Gobirawa were later either driven back into the Sudan region or became

servile groups of the more nomadic conquerors, incorporated into the Tuareg groups as tributary (*imghad*) groups.

Leo Africanus regarded both Ahaggar and Air Saharan massifs as inhabited by the Lemta groups. The migration of Lemta in late classical times is intimately connected with the history of the Air Tuareg. The Azgar represent the old Lemta stock in the northern part of the area. The central African histories of Leo Africanus placed them in Bornu in the early eras. The southern end of the area extending to the Sudan between Lake Chad and Damargu (Zinder, in present-day Niger) was lost to the Tuareg under progressive ethnic pressure from the east, driving the boundary of Tuareg westward and forcing the Lemta to find room in the west for their expansion. Some of the latter entered Air from the south; others went on to occupy Tademekka and drove the inhabitants westward. Rodd maintains that the Lemta movement was of long duration and directly involved the first invasion of Air by the Tuareg; it took place south and then west, and not, as Barth maintained, southeastward, directly from North Africa (Rodd 1926, p.359). Before these movements took place, Ahaggar was held by a Hawara group. Thus Air, first occupied by a group of Lemta from the southeast, was then invaded by another wave of Tuareg from the north, of Hawarid stock. Therefore, by the time of Leo Africanus, Air was largely already occupied by the same ethnic group as Ahaggar, and like the latter was described as held by the "Targa people."

It has been suggested that the first Tuareg to come to the Air massif of the Sahara were caravan traders attracted by the region's excellent grazing grounds. The invasions, however, cannot be dated precisely, but sources such as the *Agadez Chronicle* (a compilation of Arabic manuscripts kept by the current Sultan of Agadez) suggest that as early as the seventh century there were extensive migrations of pastoral Berbers, including the two important tribal groups of Lemta and Zarawa. The Zarawa reached the Lake Chad country, where the state of Kanem Bornu was created. At that time, pastoral Berbers also arrived in Air, where new states were created. The name of one of them, the Hausa state of Gobir, existed up to the twelfth century.

The Tubu (Teda) peoples inhabit the eastern part of the desert, in Kowar (Niger) and northern Chad; their name means "man from Tibesti." They are a nomadic and seminomadic people in the present-day states of Chad, Libya, Niger, and Sudan, and are divided into two main groups based on dialect: the Teda and the Dazaga. The Tubu/Teda reside above the eighteenth parallel of the African continent. Most Tubu/Teda are concentrated in the southeastern central Sahara, notably in the Tibesti massif in northern Chad, and frequent the Tenere region of the Niger Sahara for

trading with the Tuareg; they are predominantly Muslim. Historically, they also lived on the northern edge; thus, they inhabited the Kufra Oasis until the nineteenth century, and had a strong presence in Fezzan (both in Libya). The Dazaga are closely related to the people to the south of the Sahara in language and culture.

The political history of these groups is the history of encounters between the Saharan region and its desert-side neighbors. Early kingdoms south of the Sahara, like Ghana in the west and the Zaghawa (nomadic peoples of Chad and points east) probably had a strong presence in the Sahara. The desert also served as a refuge for political and religious groups. Farther east, the new kingdoms south of the Sahara stretched across the desert. During the last half of the thirteenth century, the central Sahara, as well as Fezzan to the north, were ruled by the king (*mai*) of Kanem. In the eastern Sahara west of the Nile Valley, outside control was limited, and the Tubu/Teda clans ruled unchallenged. Only in the nineteenth century was the region brought into a more united framework, through a religious movement, the Senoussi Sufi brotherhood, which worked among the Bedouin from the 1840s and later led resistance movements against Turkish and French rule in parts of the Sahara.

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Sahara: Salt: Production, Trade

The importance of salt in the history of the Sahara cannot be overestimated. It has been variously responsible for the growth of cities and the rise and fall of more than one empire, and a central component in the gold and slave trades as well as a vital element in the spread of Islam south and west across the continent. A daily intake of salt is as essential for life as is water; without either people cannot live more than a very few days. For the hunter-gatherer, whose diet contained significant quantities of meat and/or fish, the ingestion

of additional salt was not necessary, as animals' flesh contains a sufficiency of sodium chloride. With the movement toward more sedentary lifestyles, made possible with the advent of crop cultivation, farmers had reduced access to meat and so a need arose for alternative sources of salt.

Salt has been produced in the Sahara for at least 2,500 years and, despite the lack of archaeological evidence to substantiate the claim, salt production is thought to significantly predate this. Such production has also always been widespread across the Sahara, and centers of production can be found from Mauritania to Sudan. The two major methods of production are mining and evaporation (both natural and artificial), which tend to occur in mutual exclusivity of one another. The widespread availability of salt across the Sahara has meant that since the demand existed, initially from the forests and savanna to the south where it was not readily available, there has been a need to produce it.

Where possible, salt is always first produced through mining; this is only possible if the salt is present in sufficient quantities and of the right constitution. The reason for the preeminence of mining is twofold: first, digging slabs of salt directly from the earth is by far the easiest means of production, and second, rock salt is of a higher quality than other kinds of salt (e.g. those produced through evaporation). There are even instances where coastal dwellers who had the means of processing salt through evaporation did instead pay for the importation of rock salt. A number of salt mines are justly famous for their antiquity and size. The earliest salt mine for which definite records exist is Idjil, in Mauritania, which has been active since at least the eighth century. Of equal renown is Taghaza, Mali, described by Ibn Battuta as an established center of



Timbuktu, arrival of a salt caravan. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

salt production by the mid-fourteenth century. The huts and the mosque of the settlement were, he notes, all made from blocks of salt. The town was destroyed in the sixteenth century and replaced by Taoudenni, in the same area to the north of Timbuktu, as the region's leading salt producer.

Evaporation is the other method of salt production widely employed across the Sahara. In several locations (for instance, Bilma, Niger) this is achieved through the "farming" of natural salt pans—large, circular briny depressions from which the salt is harvested as it is left behind following solar evaporation. Where such pans are not present other methods have been developed. In Manga, Niger, and Darfur, Sudan, evaporation takes place in conjunction with the filtration of saline-laden earth through ash. This residue is then subjected to partial evaporation and the remaining brine is boiled. This method of production is the least favored both because of the need for fuel (a scarcity in the desert) to aid the evaporation process and because the end product is of a generally poor quality.

Due to the impossibility of life without it, there is little doubt that salt was one of the earliest goods traded in and across the Sahara. Although as the trade developed it became instrumental in the growth of empires, it was also active on a small-scale local level, with individuals traveling relatively short distances in order to collect or produce as much as they required for their own use. Although archaeological evidence of the early salt trade is hard to come by, a 2,500-year-old account from Herodotus talks about the existence of a 450-mile "salt road" that connected the salt mines to the trading center at Timbuktu, that place in the Western imagination that marked the end of the known world and was known, if at all, through the stories of its unparalleled wealth.

The variety of goods that moved along the trade routes and were exchanged for salt is staggering: cowrie shells, ostrich feathers, glass, kola nuts, slaves, and gold. Prices that could be charged may seem hard to believe, and perhaps there is an element of hyperbole in some of the travelers' tales, such as salt being exchanged weight for weight with gold, but then again perhaps not. The introduction of the camel to the region had an enormous impact on the trade scene, with the distances that could now be traversed growing considerably. With a substantial increase in trading activity, a number of urban centers grew where previously there had just been a regular water supply.

Although other factors also had a role, the salt trade was at least partially responsible for the rise of such empires such as Ghana, Mandingo (Mali), and Songhai. Ghana established itself as being of some regional importance in about 650, and in its early history the

rulers of the state decided to impose a tax on goods that passed through its territory, of which salt was one of the largest. The decision to charge a transit tax, which was only made when they felt strong enough to enforce it, quickly made them both rich and unpopular with merchants who, however, had little choice but to pay it. The Mandingo empire, which rose to prominence at the start of the thirteenth century, managed to do so by controlling the salt trade from Taghaza. In the Songhay Empire (c. 1450–1590) salt was used for currency, resulting in the location of the salt mines being the kingdom's most jealously guarded secret. And in spite of the rise and fall of these individual kingdoms the importance of the salt trade itself was hardly diminished until well into the twentieth century, when various technologies conspired to overrun the ancient ways.

EAMONN GEARON

See also: **Sijilmasa, Zawila: Trans-Saharan Trade; Tuareg: Takedda and Trans-Saharan Trade.**


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Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade

Studies of trans-Saharan trade from the development of the Iron Age in Western Africa to the end of the 1700s focus on the connectivity between northern Africa and the West African Sahelian societies of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay; the role of Islam as a unifying factor among African peoples north and south; and the discrete nature of the products traded, of which gold, slaves, and salt were the most notable.

The long run of relations between the peoples of the Sahara and those of the adjoining Sahel are characterized by periods of cooperation alternating with competition. In the background to human affairs lies the enlarging nature of the desert and the recoiling nature of the savanna and Sahel environments, beginning at the end of the post-Pleistocene pluvial, now dated generally at 3000BCE. Where sedentary black people had previously inhabited north to about 20 degrees latitude, Berber-speaking nomads progressively enlarged their domain at the expense of sedentary environments as desert life pushed south in a general desiccation of Africa between 15 and 25 degrees latitude. These



Trans-Saharan trade, ninth–nineteenth centuries.

environmental changes played in favor of the nomads, the enlargement of whose realms were further facilitated by the introduction of the camel, first to North Africa and then the entire Sahara, during late Roman times. Trade between the two broadly distinct African regions and peoples of North and West Africa, is thus set against a general framework of environmental change and more local social relations between adjoining peoples, nomad and sedentary Africans, at the moving southern margins of the desert.

Before Islam, trade between tropical Africa and North Africa across the Sahara was effectively nonexistent. The largely unknown history of relations between black sedentary folk of the Sahel and Berber-speaking nomads of the Sahara was interrupted by the emergence of Islam, which penetrated partially and differentially throughout the Sahara and the Sahelian fringe of tropical Africa during an initial period of Islamization, which can be dated from the 660s to the emergence of the Almoravid Islamic movement in the 1030s. With the eruption of the Almoravid movement among the Sanhaja people of the southwestern Sahara, Islam became more codified and widespread among Saharan peoples. Islam is significant because it unified geographically and socially disparate peoples and unification furthered trade.

In the east, the route through Zawila became the primary conduit by which black African slaves were traded north, especially with Ifriqiya (Tunisia) and the eastern Islamic lands, for horses south. So it was that in the Chad Basin, Kanem arose as a slave-raiding state connected to North Africa and today's Middle East through Zawila and Tripoli. As first noted in the writings of Herodotus, the Libyan (Berber) peoples of the northern fringe of the Sahel raided for slaves

among their neighbors still farther south, a practice that continued until the early 1900s.

In the west, the interest was on gold. In the earliest Islamic empire, the Umayyad, considerable progress was made tying the newly conquered Maghrib to Sudanic peoples trading in gold. Ghana, first identified in the Arabic sources in the 830s by al-Fazari and al-Khwarizmi, was the likely destination, although nothing is sure about places in western Africa at this early date. The last in 'Uqba's line, great-grandson 'Abd al-Rahman, final Umayyad (and first Abbasid) governor of the Maghrib (747–754), ordered wells dug along trade routes running south from Morocco to the Sudan. The last of these was about 16 days' south from the Draa River Valley.

The earliest routes across the Sahara from Morocco crossed territory, largely in Mauritania, covered by light grasses in which water was relatively plentiful. This route allowed connections between the Maghrib and the Senegal River to flourish, and may well have led to the conversion of the people north of the Senegal River and the intervening Sanhaja nomads of the western Sahara to Islam early on, before significant cross-desert relations began with Ghana. The end of this route landed caravanners in Tarkrur, in the Senegal River lowlands. What was traded here is unknown, but the sedentary people of Tarkrur became the core of the modern Tukolor, as they have become known. The Takarir (people of Tarkrur) were Islamized as early as, or earlier than, the nomads to the north of them; they strengthened Islam outward from their far western homeland to other peoples north and east of them, and formed the core for the construction of modern Senegalese identity.

Equally early was a route from Ghana leading east to Gao and then northeast through the Air and Tibesti highlands of Niger and Libya to the Egyptian oases of Kharga and Dakhla. Described in early Arabic sources, this route was then prohibited by Ahmad ibn Tulun, the Abbasid ruler of Egypt between 868 and 884, perhaps because of its environmental hazards or because of raiders plundering camel loads of goods. It was, in any case, to Sijilmasa's benefit that the Ghana-Egypt route dried up.

The main trade route connecting Sijilmasa and Ghana ran due south from Morocco, from the Draa Valley to Awdaghust and then onward to Ghana. The route, more dangerous than the Mauritanian, was shorter: Ghana lay some 50–60 stages, or daily marches and stops, from Sijilmasa and some 10–15 stages south of Awdaghust. Eight stages passed through land without water. Caravans organized like fleets in the desert, composed of hundreds of camels bearing trade goods in both directions, are described in the medieval literature. These were sent out by Sijilmasa merchants on schedules with, as the tenth

century writer Ibn Hawqal informs us, letters of credit of very high value. In 951, Ibn Hawqal estimated the revenue of the independent emir of Sijilmasa at approximately 400,000 dinars, half the annual income of the Maghrib. Undoubtedly, most of this value was in gold.

The King of Ghana extracted levies on salt and other goods coming in and going out of Ghana; he may have held the trade in gold nuggets (as opposed to gold dust) as a monopoly. Ghana, presumably at the site known as Kumbi Saleh in southeastern Mauritania (excavated by Mauny and others in 1949–1951 and 1970) was a break-in-bulk point in the trade in gold. Gold dust and gold nuggets, culled from placer deposits in the streams of the Guinea Highlands and particularly along the Bambouk gold fields in the upper Senegal River watershed, were brought to Ghana by black African traders, ancestors of the Juula (Dyula) merchant class, and traded in the Sahelian capital for salt, copperware, cloth, and spices brought south along the trade route. Slaves, ivory, cowrie shells (used as currency in the Sudan) and ambergis accompanied the movement of gold north, but in contrast with Kanem, far to the east, the trade in slaves out of Ghana appears to have been distinctly secondary to gold. However, al-Idrisi, writing nearly a century after al-Bakri, notes that Ghana (and Takrur and Silla, a city in the Senegalese lowlands converted to Islam by Takrur) raided people living in stateless societies to the south and sold them to Maghribi traders. Likewise, gold, some 18 days' distant, was from lands probably not directly controlled by Ghana, although clearly within its sphere of influence.

Salt—not gold—may lie at the urban genesis of Ghana some centuries before Ghana's connections with northern Africa over gold. Rock salt, absent throughout the Sahel and West Africa generally, is prevalent at a number of sites in the south central Sahara. The most prominent of these was Tegahza, in the center of the desert, toward which a caravan route was directed to pass and from which Maghribi traders carried slabs of salt south to Ghana.

By the thirteenth century, Ghana had passed into oblivion and the focus of trans-Saharan trade pushed east to Malinke-speaking chiefdoms incorporated into the Mali empire. By the early 1200s, the Soso, earlier a tributary people of the Soninke, ruled Ghana; they were defeated by a Malinke warrior destined for greatness, Sundiata Keita. One hundred fifty years after the emergence of the Almoravids, ancient Mali emerged as a second great empire of the western Sudan. New sources of gold in the Bure region in the upper Niger had opened up, favoring Mali's location in that area; the merger of its two parent chiefdoms,

Do (Daw) and Malal, may have yielded overwhelming strength.

Songhay was the last of the great empires of the western Sudan. In the late 1300s, Mali had been invaded by Tuareg raiders; the former allies of Mali sacked and held Timbuktu for a generation. As in the past, the nomads attacked along the edges of empire in a time of weakness but did not penetrate beyond the fringe of the desert. In this human ecotone arose Sunni 'Ali, who, with the help of Niger fishermen, chased out the Tuareg and established a new polity along the Niger Bend. His successor, Askiya Muhammad (r. 1493–1528), established Songhay power from the borders of modern Nigeria in the east to Senegal in the west. Songhay power, greatest in the 1500s, was eventually eclipsed by forces new and different to the dynamics of a realm of society and trade that had endured for 1000 years. In 1591, Timbuktu was invaded by Moroccans themselves, intruders from the Maghrib, who attempted to conquer the trans-Saharan trade for themselves in an attempt that petered out over 30 years of fragile control over Timbuktu. Timbuktu, however, came to radiate cultural strength as a city where Muslims—both Berber and Sudani—lived and worked together. By this time Europeans, previously entirely unknown in the western African scheme of things, had established footholds along the West African coast.

JAMES A. MILLER

See also: Sahara: Salt: Production, Trade; Sijilmasa, Zawila, Trans-Saharan Trade; Tuareg: Traders, Raiders, and the Empires of Mali and Songhay; Tuareg: Takedda and Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Saifawa Dynasty: See Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Saifawa Dynasty: Horses, Slaves, and Warfare.

Salafiyya: See Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood.

Salah al-Din/Saladin (1138–1193)

Sultan of Egypt

Saladin (Salah al-Din Yusuf Ibn Ayyub, 1138–1193), whose name means “bounty of religion,” was born in Tikrit, Mesopotamia, in 1138 to Kurdish parents. His father was an official of the Seldjuk Turks. While still an infant, his parents moved to Ba’albak in Syria (now Lebanon) where his father served as commander of the garrison. They later settled in Damascus.

A devout Sunni Muslim, he left his theological career in 1164 when his uncle, Shirkuh, ordered the young Saladin to accompany him on a military campaign against the unorthodox Shiite Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, and the occasional ally of the Latin Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1168, Shawar, the Fatimid Wazir of Egypt, sought the support of Nur ed-Din, then the Sultan of Damascus, against the Christian King Almaric of Jerusalem. Nur ed-Din sent Shirkuh and Saladin defeated all before them, entering Cairo on January 8, 1169. Three months later Shirkuh died, leaving his office to his commander and nephew, Saladin. Two years later, when the last Fatimid caliph, al-Adid, died, Saladin seized control of the government of Egypt and founded the Sunnite Muslim Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1250).

Even before the Egyptian campaign, Saladin had demonstrated his capacity to rule. He had been appointed by Nur ed-Din as chief of police in Damascus, where he supposedly levied a tax from the earnings of prostitutes. A contemporary account of Saladin attests to his resolve to be tough-minded, warning the thieves of Syria to “go softly” or Saladin would cut off their hands. Other accounts write of the austere piety of Saladin who, at his appointment, abandoned “wine-drinking” and “frivolity” so that he might “assume the dress of religion.” When he succeeded Shirkuh as ruler of Cairo, he demonstrated his political aptitude, winning over the populace by distributing to the poor money amassed by his uncle. He methodically removed the Fatimid troops from Cairo, and ruthlessly suppressed any conspiracies against his authority that emanated from the palace.

When Nur ed-Din, sultan of Damascus, died in 1174, Saladin was summoned by its emirs to replace his ten-year-old son and heir, al-Salih, in the expectation that Saladin, in control of Cairo and Damascus, could erode the entrenched power of the Christian Franks in Palestine. Supported by the Damascene army, Saladin conquered Muslim Syria and northern Mesopotamia as far as Mosul. The caliph in Baghdad accepted his defeat and confirmed Saladin as sultan of Egypt and Syria. He could now mobilize his armies to surround Palestine

from east and west. He was the only possible Muslim leader, the *mujahid*, to organize a jihad (holy war) against the Christian Franks.

On July 4, 1187, he defeated the forces of the Christian king of Jerusalem, Guy de Lusignan (r.1186–1192), and his allies at the Battle of the Horns of Hattin. The king and Renaud de Chatillon, Prince of Antioch (r.1153–1160), lord of the stronghold of Krak des Chevaliers, who had recklessly plundered Muslim caravans, were captured; Renaud was executed. On October 2, 1187, without pillage or looting, Saladin entered Jerusalem on the anniversary of Muhammad’s ascent to heaven from the Dome of the Rock, ending 88 years of Christian control by the Franks. His humane treatment of the Frankish inhabitants was in sharp contrast to their treatment of the Muslims massacred in 1099 when the city fell to the Crusaders. His advisors urged him to demolish the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, but he simply closed it for three days, only to reopen it to pilgrims (for a fee).

Although he retained control of the interior of Palestine and the city of Jerusalem, Saladin ceded the important coastal towns between Acre and Jaffa to the Crusaders, who maintained a distinct advantage by their fleet, which dominated the Mediterranean. He failed to retain Acre, which fell to the Crusaders in July 1191 after the victory of the English king Richard I (the Lionhearted) and his allies at the Battle of Arsuf. He concluded an armistice with Richard in 1192 that demonstrated the extent of his achievements, for the Crusaders were left in control of the coastal castles along the shores of Palestine.

Saladin lived less than six years after his dramatic capture of Jerusalem. On March 3, 1193, he died in Damascus, where his tomb, adjacent to the Ummayyad Mosque, remains a place of pilgrimage. Deeply devout, he consolidated Sunni Islam in Egypt and the Middle East and revived the pilgrimage, the *Hajj*, to Mecca, but his authority rested in the army rather than the religious elite, the *‘ulama*. Despite his confrontations with the Crusaders, his empire prospered from peace, his support of learning, and the revival of Indian Ocean trade. His last words record his career with modest brevity: “In the end I did go with my uncle. He conquered Egypt, then died. God then placed in my hands the power that I have never expected.”

ROBERT COLLINS

See also: Egypt: Ayyubid Dynasty, 1169–1250.

Biography

Born in Tikrit, Mesopotamia in 1138. Gave up his theological career to accompany his uncle on a military campaign in 1164. Captured Cairo in 1169. Seized control of Egypt and founded the Sunnite Muslim Ayyubid

dynasty in 1171. Conquered Muslim Syria and northern Mesopotamia after being named ruler of Syria in 1174. On July 4, 1187, defeated the forces of the Christian King of Jerusalem, Guy de Lusignan, at the Battle of the Horns of Hattin. On October 2, 1187, entered Jerusalem, ending 88 years of Christian control of the city. Died in Damascus on March 3, 1193.

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Salt: See Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Salt; Iron Age (Later): East Africa: Trade.

Samkange, Rev. D. T. (c.1893–1956)

Methodist Minister and Pioneer Black Nationalist

Mushore Samkange was born in about 1893 near the modern town of Chinoye, in northern Mashonaland. His father was a renowned hunter who, like many prominent traditional figures in the area, rejected Christianity when it arrived in the early years of the colonial occupation. However, Samkange became a Christian some time in his late teens after going out to work in Kadoma (Gatooma), and took the name Douglas Thompson in place of his traditional name.

Between 1922 and 1928, he served as a detached Methodist evangelist at the Hwange (Wankie) colliery. This was an important period in his career: he was operating at some distance from his home in one of the least hospitable parts of the country, and without local white supervision, ministering to a polyglot labor force. Samkange's many gifts here reached fruition. He became a Zimbabwean, rather than a Zezuru Shona, fluent in Sindebele, the language of western Zimbabwe; and an inspirational preacher fired by a determination to serve God and the needs of the poor and destitute. Not surprisingly, this propelled him toward the Christian ministry. In 1928, he was accepted as a candidate for ordination, and moved to Bulawayo, where he fearlessly attempted to bring both sides together in the 1930 Ndebele-Shona ethnic conflict. His leadership qualities were further recognized in his appointment as secretary of the new Native Missionary Conference set up in 1928, the first of many such positions he was to hold up to his death. In 1936, he was ordained and posted to the rural Kwenda mission in Mashonaland.

Samkanke was selected to attend the 1938 International Missionary Conference at Tambaram, Madras,

an experience that brought him into contact with Indian and other nonwhite Christians and opened his eyes to the prospect of an indigenized church in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). These views were, on his return, to lead him into growing conflict with the more conservative elements of the white Methodist establishment in Zimbabwe, exacerbated by the enforcement of official policy requiring direct European supervision over mission education. However, unlike some his colleagues, like Esau Nemapare, he remained loyal to the missionary authorities to the end of his life.

His political activity began in April 1925, when he joined the very moderate Rhodesian Native Association, and together with Aaron Jacha helped to form the Southern Rhodesian Bantu Congress in 1938. The initial moderation of the congress was assailed by wartime radicalism, inspired in turn by events in the wider world and within the colony itself, and Samkange was chosen as president in July 1943. Under his leadership, the congress adopted a more critical stance. It mounted an attack on unpopular government policies—especially the use of compulsory black labor on wartime aerodrome construction, and the threatened destocking of cattle in the reserves. Prime Minister Huggins's plans to seek the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland (respectively, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi) and to remove blacks from the common voters' roll also earned vehement Congress dissent. It also attempted—at that stage without great success—to build up a mass membership.

By the end of World War II, however, Samkange and the congress leadership themselves came under fire from a generally younger, more militant, generation of activists—like Charles Mzingeli and Benjamin Burombo—who were typically from a trade union background and often hostile to missionaries and their black “protégés.” They believed that Samkange, with his missionary background, was inherently too acquiescent to adequately serve black political interests. The short-term result was a fatal weakening of the nationalist cause at a time when it could least afford it, as the divisions over the April 1948 general strike showed. Shortly after this, Samkange decided to stand down from the congress presidency, and at the beginning of 1949 a new generation of younger leaders, including his son Stanlake, took over.

The final years of his life were marked by further conflict with the colony's Department of Native Education, involving school standards and proper financial accounting at his Pakame Mission, during which the support of the Methodist authorities began to waver. In 1954 he surrendered his educational work and returned to evangelism in Bulawayo. His sudden death from a heart attack on August 27, 1956, occurred at a time when several friends had been urging him to

reenter politics and give fresh impetus to the faltering African National (formerly Bantu) Congress.

Perhaps inevitably, D.T. Samkange has been dismissed by some as an essentially petit bourgeois figure, an elitist who was temperamentally unable to escape from missionary leading strings to respond to the many challenges of the mid-to-late 1940s. Terence Ranger's account has shown that, on the contrary, he was an important figure appearing at the transition point between the "participation" politics of the 1920s and the confrontationist politics of the late 1950s and early 1960s, one whose effectiveness as a leader was undermined by the factional nature of black Zimbabwe politics during and after World War II.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Urbanization and Conflict, 1940s.

Biography

Entered the Nenguwo Institution (later, Waddilove), outside Marondera, in 1915, eventually becoming a teacher at Nenguwo. Married Grace Mano in 1919; his wife became an important personality in her own right, and a prominent and well-respected *Ruwadzano* (African Women's Prayer Union) leader. Their children included Stanlake, historian and writer, whose novel *The Mourned One* captures much of the spirit of Waddilove between the two world wars; and Sketchley, a leader of the NDP who died young in 1961. Named president of the Southern Rhodesian Bantu Congress in July 1943. Died suddenly, from a heart attack, on August 27, 1956.

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Sanhaja

The Berbers of North Africa and the Sahara were originally divided into three major ethnic groups, the Lowata, Sanhaja, and Zanata, and each group was subdivided into many smaller groups. For a long time the majority of the Berber groups remained independent,

although all were somewhat influenced by the civilizations that flourished successively along the shores of the Mediterranean.

The Sanhaja Berbers inhabited the land mass of the Sahara between Mauritania and Ahagar as far north as the Sudan. By the ninth century, the Sanhaja Berbers had formed a loose confederation consisting of the Lamtuna, Masufa, and Godala in order to control the Saharan trade route originating from Zanata and terminating in Ghana in the south.

The arrival of the Sanhaja nomads in a predominantly agrarian area necessarily upset the whole western Sahara region. The pastoralist Sanhaja roamed the most suitable regions occupied by farmers. Under the rule of the king Telagagin and his successor Tilutan, the Sanhaja imposed their authority throughout present-day Mauritania.

Ghana, however, successfully resisted Sanhaja domination, and by the year 900, when internal strife broke apart the Sanhaja confederation, Ghana emerged as the dominant power. During the tenth century, certain Sanhaja chiefs were converted to Islam, with Audoghost becoming a principal commercial and religious center.

The overlordship of Ghana soon provoked the consummation of a united action by leaders of the Lamtuna, Godala, and Masufa. It was probably during this period that Tarsina, a Lamtuna, emerged as the first important Muslim Sanhaja ruler.

Although Audoghost maintained superficially friendly relations with the Soninke of Ghana, there were instances of constant friction between the Lamtuna and the Soninke. The Soninke waylaid caravans from the north as they approached Audoghost; in retaliation, the Lamtuna intervened in Ghana's internal affairs. The inability of the Sanhaja to establish a formidable and united opposition gave the Soninke enough time to gradually become the dominant power in the area. Ghana recovered some of the outlying districts that had earlier been taken from the Soninke, although no attempt was made to occupy Sanhaja, the capital city of Audoghost, until at least 1054.

Tarsina went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, ostensibly to justify his campaigns against the Soninke and others. Upon his death in 1023, his son-in-law Yahya ibn Ibrahim succeeded him; he, too, made a pilgrimage, in 1035, not as an act of religious devotion so much as a political gesture.

Ibn Ibrahim displayed an embarrassing ignorance of the doctrines of Islam. When he realized how deeply he had shocked the learned Abu Amran of Mecca, he implored his assistance in employing a theologian who would teach his people the religion. On the recommendation of Abu Amran, a pupil of Wajaj Ibn Zalwi named Abd Allah ibn Yacin accompanied Yahya Ibrahim back to Audoghost. Ibn Yacin's mission was not immediately

successful. Resistance to his teaching forced Ibn Yacin to relocate to an island in the Atlantic, where a *ribat* (fortified center for gathering) was built and maintained.

The ribat soon won a great reputation as a recruiting center for a jihad that attracted new followers, and a place of refuge for the Lamtuna. Ibn Yacin and his motley crowd of followers became known for their dress code and puritanical Islamic doctrines based on Sufism. Seclusion in a place surrounded by water encouraged spirituality and meditation; among the Sufis, a ribat is a place in which a man shuts himself up for the purpose of worship. When the disciples of Ibn Yacin swelled to one thousand, the preacher called them together and gave them a new name, El-Morabethin, or the Morabouts, and instructed them:

Go under the protection of God and warn your fellow-tribesmen, teach them the law of God and threaten them with His Chastisement. If they repent and return to the truth and amend their ways, then leave them in peace; but if they refuse and persist in their errors and infidelity, let us invoke the aid of God against them and make war upon them until God decides the issue between us.

In 1042, Ibn Yacin and his followers, now known as the Almoravids, undertook a jihad against the pagan Godala and were successful in their campaigns. The offered alternatives of death or conversion to true Islam resulted in remarkable victories for the Almoravids. Ibn Yacin, however, did not allow his followers to indulge in looting or rape, two common “benefits” of warfare.

Wajaj ibn Zalwi enjoined Ibn Yacin to return to Sijilmasa, where he found both sympathy and many eager followers. Wajaj endorsed Ibn Yacin and threatened to expel from Islam those who refused to obey him. He even sent his own disciples and new adherents back into the desert, with strict orders to destroy anybody who opposed the teachings and religious observances of Ibn Yacin and the Almoravids.

Ibn Yacin carried out his master’s instructions to the letter, such that within a short period of time most of the tribes of the western desert had accepted the new doctrine and were united under the banner of the Almoravids. Ibn Yacin soon had an army of 30,000 positively motivated men who were fanatical in their loyalty to the leader. The well-ordered army was intended to assist in spreading the orthodox religion to the pagan tribes of the north.

In 1056, Ibn Yacin set out to liberate the people of Dra’a in southern Morocco, who were under the oppression of the Emir of Sijilmasa. Ibn Yacin defeated the army of Sijilmasa, killed the emir, and occupied the capital city. He returned to Audoghast, leaving behind a garrison of his force to protect the newly liberated citizens against further abuses of power.

Ibn Yacin was, however, killed in 1057 while on one of his numerous battles. At his death, Ibn Yacin was one of the most remarkable characters in African history. He was a brilliant organizer, an empire builder and a patriot. The great movement that he established, led and inspired had, by 1057, spread across the whole of the western Sahara region, as well as the fertile northern districts of Sus, Aghmat, and Sijilmasa.

The leadership of the Almoravids passed into the hands of Abu Bakre ibn Omar, who eventually led the assault against the Soninke kingdom of Ghana in 1076, when Kumbi Saleh fell to the superior force of the Almoravids. Several Soninke were either killed or sold into slavery; many were forced to adopt Islam. The Kingdom of Ghana collapsed, leading to the emergence of the successor states of Tekrur, Diara, and Kaniaga. Sumanguru Keita of Kaniaga filled the void for a period before Mari Djata eventually assumed political dominance in the western Sudan. While Abu Bakre ibn Omar was in the western Sudan, Yusuf ibn Taclifin led a section of the Almoravids into the heart of the Maghrib, reestablishing Marrakech as an important commercial and clerical center. The Almoravids split into two factions when Yusuf ibn Taclifin refused to relinquish leadership of the movement to Abu Bakre ibn Cemar.

AKIN ALAO

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
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Sankara: See Burkina Faso (Upper Volta): Independence to the Present.

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São Tomé and Príncipe, to 1800

The Gulf of Guinea islands of São Tomé and Príncipe were among the first territories colonized by Portugal in the late fifteenth century. In 1470 and 1471, the Portuguese navigators João de Santarém and Pedro Escobar discovered the then uninhabited archipelago. Not before the first contacts with the kingdom of Kongo in 1482 did São Tomé gain strategic importance for the Portuguese. They intended to create there a Christian European society, sustained by a sugar export economy



São Tomé and Príncipe.

that used African slave labor and would be an entrepôt for their navigation in the South Atlantic. However, the first Portuguese who settled in 1486 in the Northwest of São Tomé succumbed to the unhealthy tropical climate. Not before 1493 did the third feudal lord (*donatário*), Álvaro de Caminha, succeed in establishing a colony in the northeast of the island. Apart from volunteers, many convicts and deported Jewish children, who had been separated by force from their parents, were transported to São Tomé. The colonization of Príncipe began in 1502 when this island was granted to the donatário António Carneiro.

The new colonists began to cultivate sugarcane on plantations where labor was provided by slaves from Benin, Gabon, Congo, and Angola. São Tomé was the first plantation economy in the tropics. Due to tropical diseases, the mortality rate among whites was very high. Therefore, only a few whites went voluntarily to São Tomé, since they were terrified of the dangerous tropical climate. Consequently, the Portuguese encouraged mixed unions between blacks and whites as a strategy to populate the islands. King João II (r.1481–1495) ordered that a slave woman be given to every white settler. In 1515 these African women and their children were manumitted by royal decree. Another royal decree of 1517 determined that the male slaves, who had come with the first settlers and their offspring, were also manumitted.

Consequently, a group of free Creole blacks, locally known as *forros*, was created. In the early sixteenth century there were 1,000 settlers (mostly convicts), 2,000 slaves on the plantations, and some 5,000 slaves on São Tomé for the regional trade with Elmina. In

the 1530s the export of slaves from São Tomé to the Americas began. However, since 1520, sugar had become the most important factor of the flourishing economy. In the late sixteenth century, annual sugar production reached a peak of 12,000 tons. At that time, rich planters had up to 300 slaves.

Until 1522 the donatário exercised the civil and criminal jurisdiction over São Tomé. Subsequently, the local representative of the Portuguese crown was a governor appointed by Lisbon. In 1525 King João III (r.1521–1557) granted city rights to São Tomé town, including the right to have a city council with full legal and legislative powers for the entire island. The great Creole landowners controlled the city council. In 1548 the king granted the city council the right to exercise the powers of the governor whenever this office was vacant. As a result, local Creoles frequently assumed the office of governor.

From the beginning of the settlement, the evangelical project of the Catholic Church was an integral part of the archipelago's colonization. In 1534 the diocese of São Tomé was founded, the first in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it existed until 1677. The local clergy dominated by the Creole elite was plagued by internal conflicts and engaged in power struggles with the governor and the town council. The fragmentation of local political power among the church, the governor, and the municipality; the distance from the central government in Lisbon; the frequent power vacuum due to the early death of office-holders caused by tropical diseases; and the polarizing effects of a small and insular society facilitated all kinds of conflict. In addition, assaults by escaped slaves and slave revolts contributed to the political instability.

Slaves frequently fled into the mountainous and inaccessible interior of the island. There, the *maroons* (the Spanish term for runaway slaves) organized themselves into gangs that assaulted the plantations. From 1530, the local government waged a bush war against the maroons, who were finally defeated in the late seventeenth century.

The documented first slave uprising in São Tomé occurred in 1517. In 1595 the greatest revolt, led by a slave called Amador, threatened the city. Finally, the slaves were defeated and Amador was arrested and hanged.

The prosperity of the islands provoked several assaults by the English, French, and Dutch. From 1641 to 1648 the Dutch occupied São Tomé's fort, from where they controlled the local sugar and slave trade. At that time the sugar industry was already in decline, due to the increasing competition from Brazilian producers, the relatively poor quality of the local product, and the constant assaults by runaway slaves who later became known as *Angolares*. Finally, most planters

migrated to Brazil, and the plantation economy virtually ceased to exist. Following the reduction of white settlers, the local Creoles mixed more frequently with Africans. By this time, the forro society and culture had been firmly established.

The direct and prolonged encounter of the dominant Catholic Portuguese culture and of the various African cultures resulted in the emergence of a distinctive Creole society with its own culture and languages. The islanders cultivated the former plantations that were not overgrown by tropical forest for subsistence and the provision of ships with food supplies. Meanwhile, most former slave markets were controlled by foreign powers, while only Gabon and Calabar continued to supply slaves to the archipelago. At the end of the sixteenth century, São Tomé had already lost its position as an entrepôt for the slave trade to Luanda. In the seventeenth century, the elite Creole families dominated the city council, competing for power with each other, the church, and the governor. Due to frequent political unrest, in 1753 the residence of the governor was transferred from São Tomé town to Santo António on Príncipe, which simultaneously reverted to the crown.

GERHARD SEIBERT

See also: Kongo, Teke (Tio), and Loango: History to 1483; Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century; São Tomé and Príncipe, 1800 to the Present.

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São Tomé and Príncipe, 1800 to the Present

São Tomé and Príncipe had been a Portuguese colony since the mid-seventeenth century, but the local Creoles, known as *forros*, had exercised virtual control over local affairs. The move of the capital from Príncipe back to São Tomé in 1852 marked the beginning of the second colonization of the islands. The independence of Brazil in 1822, the abolition of the slave trade in the

Portuguese territories in 1836, and the end of a long period of political instability in Portugal in 1852 contributed to the political conditions for the recolonization. The introduction of coffee in 1787 and cocoa in 1822, both from Brazil, made the production of new cash crops possible. Large-scale coffee and cocoa cultivation with slave labor began around 1850. Following the abolition of slavery in 1875, the Portuguese began immediately to recruit contract workers in Angola, and from the early twentieth century on also in Cape Verde and Mozambique. The newly liberated slaves, as well as the local forros and *Angolares* (runaway slaves) refused manual fieldwork on the estates, since they considered it beneath their status as free men. By 1890, cocoa production had surpassed that of coffee, thanks to increasing world market prices, and since then cocoa has always dominated the local plantation economy.

Before the second colonization of the archipelago, many lands had been in the hands of the *forros*. During the expansion of the plantations in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese planters gradually dispossessed the landholding Creoles through land purchase, fraud, and force. By 1898 the Portuguese owned 90 per cent of the land. By that time they had established the financial system, the administrative infrastructure and the communications for an effective colonization. Unable to regain their economic power based on agriculture, the educated forros sought employment in the colonial administration, from where they derived their social status. Unlike the sugar plantations in the sixteenth century, the cocoa plantations covered almost the entire archipelago at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1909, the cocoa production peaked, with 30,300 tons. Subsequently, however, dropping prices led to a decline of cocoa production. Cocoa exports decreased from 26,283 tons in 1921 to 9,234 in 1961. Since the 1930s the estates had been inefficient and unprofitable, and were unable to compete with the more efficient West African smallholders. The large estates that employed hundreds of workers constituted states within the state, as they maintained their own infrastructures. The recruitment of thousands of African contract workers from 1875 changed the demographic balance in favor of these immigrants. In 1900, the archipelago had a total population of 42,100, of whom 19,430 were natives, 21,510 contract workers, and 1,190 whites. Until the 1940s, the contract workers outnumbered the native Creoles. The workers lived in barracks within the estates, while the forros lived in the towns and dispersed communities. In 190, reports of the harsh living and working conditions of the plantation workers, as well as the fact that they were rarely repatriated, provoked a boycott of São Tomé cocoa by British chocolate manufacturers.

In response, the Portuguese improved the situation of the contract workers. Not until 1961, however, did the Portuguese formally grant equal status to the plantation workers.

In February 1953 the colonial government's attempt to break the *forros*' resistance to plantation labor resulted in their spontaneous uprising. At the order of Governor Carlos Gorgulho (1945–1953) the police, white volunteers, and contract workers put down the rebellion with excessive violence, killing numerous innocent people. The bloody event became known as the Massacre of February 1953, which later served to justify nationalist demands for independence. In 1960 a few elite *forros* in exile created the *Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe* (CLSTP), which merely agitated within the diplomatic arena from abroad. The CLSTP, which had offices in Accra and Libreville, was plagued by constant personal conflicts and virtually ceased to exist in 1966. It was 1972 before the exiled nationalists reconstituted the CLSTP as *Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe* (MLSTP) and Manuel Pinto da Costa became its secretary general. Six months after the military coup of April 25, 1974, the revolutionary Lisbon government recognized the Libreville-based MLSTP as the sole and legitimate representative of the people. In March 1975 a conflict on the dissolution of the native troops placed a radical faction within the MLSTP in opposition to the moderate faction led by Pinto da Costa. With the support of the Portuguese government the latter successfully ousted the radicals from power. Meanwhile, the 2,000 Portuguese had departed due to the turmoil preceding independence depriving the country of trained personnel in virtually all sectors.

On July 12, 1975, São Tomé and Príncipe gained independence and constitutionally became a one-party state based on the Soviet model. Manuel Pinto da Costa became president and Miguel Trovoada the first prime minister. The MLSTP regime announced the diversification of the economy, including agriculture, the development of industrial fishing, and the promotion of tourism. In September 1976 the Portuguese-owned plantations were nationalized and subsequently regrouped into 15 large state-owned plantations. Externally, the regime favored political relations with Angola and the socialist countries, while it maintained economic ties with Western countries. Internally, the first years after independence were marked by constant orientation and power struggles within the party leadership that were accompanied by real and alleged coup attempts, increasing the repressive and authoritarian character of the regime. Following the threat of an alleged imperialist invasion, in March 1978 Angolan troops were sent to São Tomé to protect the regime. In August 1979 a population census, which was perceived by the *forro* population as an

attempt to introduce forced labor, resulted in antigovernment riots. The next month Miguel Trovoada was accused of connivance in the census turmoil and detained without charge or trial for 21 months before he was released into exile to France. Following Trovoada's imprisonment the regime radicalized considerably, and Pinto da Costa reached the climax of his dictatorial powers. At the same time exiled opponents of the regime in Portugal and Gabon created three opposition movements. Although they were divided by personal and political quarrels, their agitation abroad worried the MLSTP regime, which was struggling with serious economic problems. Due to mismanagement and a lack of investments the cocoa output had decreased from 7,000 tons in 1979 to 3,400 tons in 1984. Equally, investments in the diversification of the economy proved to be a failure since they were ill-designed and poorly managed.

The consequent economic crisis forced the government to redefine its policies, as its socialist allies were unable to sustain the regime. From 1984 the regime gradually liberalized the economy, shifted away from its socialist allies, turned to Western countries for aid funds, and reconciled with the former dissidents. Between 1986 and 1990 the regime signed contracts with foreign and local companies for the private management of seven estates. The objective was to rehabilitate the plantations to increase cocoa output; however, the privately managed estates did not show the expected improvements. In 1987, the government signed an agreement on a structural adjustment program with the Bretton Woods institutions. The economic reform opened business opportunities for foreign investors and local politicians, but also created new possibilities for corruption. Unimpressed by the political change, in March 1988 a dissident group waged an amateurish invasion attempt to overthrow Pinto da Costa, but was easily overwhelmed. In December 1989 the MLSTP announced the introduction of a multiparty democracy. The political transition that occurred without unrest or violence culminated in the approval of a democratic constitution by a popular referendum in August 1990. In October the MLSTP transformed itself into the neoliberal Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD). The following month, President Pinto da Costa withdrew his candidature for the presidency.

In the first free democratic elections, held in January 1991, the opposition *Partido de Convergência Democrática—Grupo de Reflexão* (PCD-GR) swept the MLSTP/PSD out of office and formed a government headed by Prime Minister Daniel Daio. In March 1991, Miguel Trovoada, who had returned from exile the year before, was elected uncontested president. Since then, the struggle for power and funds have placed the president in conflict with successive governments creating continuous political instability. In April 1992, President

Trovoada dismissed Daio due to the alleged lack of consensus with the prime minister. Subsequently, Noberto Costa Alegre was appointed prime minister of a new PCD-GR government. In July 1994, President Trovoada discharged Prime Minister Costa Alegre, alleging a lack of institutional loyalty in some government actions. The early elections of October 1994 brought the MLSTP/PSD back to power. In August 1995 young officers staged a one-week military coup that was ended when the coup plotters returned to the barracks in exchange for a general amnesty. In July 1996 President Trovoada was reelected president. After serving the maximum two terms as permitted by the constitution, he stepped down. The election of 2001 was won by Fradique de Menezes, a wealthy cocoa exporter.

Free elections have been held regularly since 1991, but the country's public institutions have remained weak and inefficient, while corruption and other malpractice has flourished. Liberal democracy has not resulted in a sound economic policy and a flourishing market economy; attempts to boost cocoa production and to diversify agricultural exports have largely failed. Despite large amounts of foreign aid, there has been almost no real economic growth, while mass poverty and external debts have increased since 1991.

GERHARD SEIBERT

See also: São Tomé and Príncipe, to 1800.

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Sassou-Nguesso, Denis (1943–)

President of the Republic of Congo, 1979–92, 1997–

Denis Sassou-Nguesso was born in 1943 in the village of Edou. He claims that he was the last-born child of

his father's six wives, and enjoyed a carefree childhood with a doting mother and stern father. Sassou also claims that his father enjoyed great local respect as a village headman and president of a local hunter's association.

Sassou was initiated into an Mbochi brotherhood at the age of ten, and left home shortly afterward to study at a regional school, 60 miles from his native village. Proving himself an able student, Sassou won a place at the Normal College for Teachers in Dolise (now Loubomo).

By his account, Sassou graduated first in his class, but was denied a place at the lycée in Brazzaville for lack of political connections. Instead, he was allowed to test for a place in a military training school, which he won. He first trained at Bouar, in the Central African Republic, and then at Cherchell, Algeria, after which he became a second lieutenant. Sassou served one year in Congo, and then undertook more advanced training at Saint-Maixent in France, where he gained a very favorable impression of that country and its military establishment. Upon his return, Sassou joined a paratrooper unit, which he later commanded as a captain in 1968.

Following the rise of Marien Ngouabi that same year, the military became increasingly involved in politics, and Sassou became a member of the National Revolutionary Council. When Ngouabi created the Marxist-oriented Congolese Worker's Party in 1970, Sassou was named a member of its Politbureau. As a military man and a nonintellectual, Sassou seems never to have been a committed Marxist, though he was far more ideological than his predecessor, Joachim Yhombi-Opango. In his military career, he was promoted to commander of the Brazzaville Military Zone, and then to chief of political security. In 1975, he was named minister of defense.

At the time of Ngouabi's assassination in March 1977, Sassou was perhaps the most influential figure in the army and the party, but he was outmaneuvered by Yhombi-Opango, who became the leader of the Parti congolais du travail's (PCT's) military committee and head of state. Sassou remained Defense Minister and was also named first vice president. Yhombi never fully consolidated his grip on power, and was forced to share real power with other military leaders, including Sassou. In February 1979 Yhombi's opponents organized a meeting of the PCT Central Committee in which he was ousted in favor of Sassou. Using classic Stalinist techniques, Sassou had soon purged his most important ethnic and military rivals from the party, of which he assumed supreme control. Sassou's rise was then interpreted as a return to strict Marxist-Leninist policies after the uncertain Yhombi interlude. As significantly, it represented a triumph of Mbochi officers over their Kouyou rivals.

In the first half of the 1980s Sassou's regime was buoyed by high world petroleum prices, which allowed him to undertake a massive expansion of the state sector and patronize his political cronies. Meanwhile, his Marxist and anticolonial rhetoric resonated well in Africa. Congo also benefited from substantial Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban aid in this period, even as French companies invested in the petroleum sector. After 1985, falling petroleum prices hit the Congolese hard, and Sassou's popularity waned. Meanwhile, his putatively Marxist orientation hurt him as the end of European communism loomed. At home, Sassou bloodily put down an attempted coup in 1987, and turned to more repressive measures in quelling public dissent.

By the end of 1990, public sentiment had turned completely against Sassou, and even his army chief of staff refused to stand in the way of a transition. He was forced to allow the convening of a sovereign national conference in 1991, which he did not succeed in controlling. The conference ended up wresting real power from him, though he remained as nominal head of state through August 1992. He competed in the presidential elections of 1992, but finished third. He then threw his support to Pascal Lissouba, who prevailed in the second round against Bernard Kolélas. Sassou remained head of a reformed, non-Marxist PCT. When Lissouba failed to award the PCT with a sufficient role in his new government, Sassou joined with Kolélas's party in the opposition in the assembly. Upon losing power, Sassou retrained his presidential guard, made up entirely of Mbochi kinsmen, as a personal militia.

Sassou spent much of the 1993–1996 period in quasi-exile in France, fearing for his security in Congo. In France he maintained close ties with officials in the various governments of Mitterrand and Chirac, as well as with French industrial leaders. Sassou made a triumphal return to Brazzaville in early 1997 to begin his presidential election campaign, scheduled for July. He also readied his militia for a possible cancellation of the elections. In May, Sassou's campaign visit to the northern city of Owando, the hometown of Yhombi, then Lissouba's campaign manager, led to violent clashes. On June 5, 1997, Lissouba sent an armed detachment to Sassou's residence to arrest several of his associates said to have been implicated in this violence. At that point, Sassou's militia resisted these forces, and a civil war was soon underway. The war raged from June through mid-October, and was essentially stalemated. Sassou's forces only seized control of the presidential residence and other key installations after Angolan government forces joined the battle against government forces. Angola's critical intervention at this stage was probably motivated by issues related to its own civil war: Lissouba had allowed Angola's rebel

UNITA movement to set up an office headquarters in Pointe Noire in 1997, and appears to have allowed UNITA forces to operate from within the Congo. Most Congolese believe that Sassou received aid from official French contacts, executives in Elf-Aquitaine, and some regional leaders, particularly Gabon's president Omar Bongo. In early 1998 Sassou seemed to be consolidating his grip on power, but in December the opposition militia began to actively contest Sassou's forces in the south and center of the country. Sassou is fawning toward France in his autobiography, and Franco-Congolese relations have improved markedly since his return to power.

In March 2002, Sassou won the presidential election, initiating a seven-year term in office. Two other primary contenders for the office, former president Pascal Lissouba and former prime minister Bernard Kolélas, were excluded from the race by a residency law. Andre Milongo had left the race, claiming irregularities in the election process. When he took office, Sassou put in place a revamped constitution that grants him more power.

JOHN F. CLARK

See also: **Congo (Brazzaville), Republic of.**

Biography

Born in 1943 in the village of Edou. Studied at the Normal College for Teachers in Dolise (now Loubomo). After attending military training school, named captain of his paratrooper unit in 1968. Promoted to commander of the Brazzaville Military Zone, and then to chief of political security. Named minister of defense in 1975. President from 1979 to 1992. Lived in France from 1993 to 1996. Won presidential elections again in 1997 and 2002.

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Savimbi, Jonas (1934–2002)

Angolan Politician and Guerrilla Leader

Jonas Savimbi was born on August 3, 1934, the son of a railway station master and Evangelical Church pastor, in

Munhango, situated along the Benguela railway in Bié Province. He was a member of the Ovimbundu, who are the largest single ethnolinguistic group in Angola but do not represent an overall majority of the population. His movement, UNITA, was to draw heavily on this regional support base.

On May 18, 1958, Savimbi left for Portugal to pursue his studies in Lisbon at the Passos Manuel Secondary School, briefly pursuing medicine before abandoning his studies. The United Church of Christ provided him with a scholarship, but he never completed his studies as a doctor. He nonetheless used the title *doctor* throughout his life.

In 1959, he met with other Angolan nationalist leaders, was detained for a short time by the Portuguese secret police, and then left for Switzerland, where he enrolled in the Legal Faculty in Lausanne. The following year he joined up with Holden Roberto's Angolan People's Union (UPA) movement. Subsequently he was appointed secretary general. Following the fusion of the UPA with the Angola Democratic Party (PDA) into a movement called the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in March 1962, almost immediately thereafter the FNLA declared itself the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), and Savimbi was appointed its foreign minister.

In July 1964, Savimbi resigned from the GRAE, taking some colleagues with him; he claimed as his reasons for leaving the U.S. imperialist influence on the GRAE, the failure of the GRAE and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to unite, GRAE's Bakongo domination, and the singular lack of serious military effort to oust the Portuguese. He and eleven colleagues then departed for guerrilla warfare training in China. In March 1966, Savimbi began guerrilla operations in eastern Angola, taking advantage of the neighboring country of Zambia's independence in 1964 by using it as an external base. He also recruited supporters from refugees in western Zambia. Following a brief detention by Zambian authorities in 1967, Savimbi visited Cuba, returning the following year to Angola, where he led an armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial regime. There is evidence that at times he collaborated with the Portuguese in a secondary struggle against the MPLA, and herein were sown the seeds of future distrust in UNITA's dealings with the MPLA.

After the dictatorship of Caetano in Portugal was overthrown, Savimbi signed a cease-fire in June 1974. In January 1975, he signed the Alvor Accords, granting Angola independence, along with Agostinho Neto of the MPLA and Holden Roberto of the FNLA. The nationalist struggle in Angola was complicated not only by the existence of three nationalist movements but by becoming embroiled in the Cold War struggles of the time. Savimbi gained support from the United States,

South Africa, and China, and entered into an alliance with the FNLA in opposition to the MPLA with its Soviet and Cuban backing.

Following the collapse of the Alvor Accords, fighting between the contending nationalist movements ensued and Savimbi retreated to his base in Huambo in the central highlands. Then, in March 1976, under MPLA government attack, he began the "long march" to the south, mirroring the Chinese leader Mao Zedong's heroic feat, in UNITA mythology, with only 79 surviving the journey. He established his new base at Jamba near the Namibian border under the protection of the South African military shield. A long period of civil war ensued. The MPLA government of President Neto and later President dos Santos faced continuing armed opposition by UNITA and the FNLA.

With the newly elected U.S. president Ronald Reagan avowing a "roll-back" of communism globally, Savimbi successfully courted increased U.S. backing for his cause, visiting the United States in 1981 and again in 1986, at which time he was received in the Oval Office by President Reagan himself. Savimbi and UNITA rapidly eclipsed Roberto and the FNLA as the chief opposition force. Inside UNITA Savimbi maintained an iron rule by using his obvious charisma and by eliminating any potential leadership contenders.

Following a period of bitter armed conflict and civil war in the 1980s, heightened by the Cold War struggle, initial efforts at reconciliation began. In June 1989, at the Gbadolite summit, organized by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Savimbi and dos Santos, head of the MPLA and president of Angola, met for the first time. Eventually, on May 31, 1991, the Bicesse Peace Accord was signed by the rival leaders in front of all the key international organizations. In September 1991 Savimbi returned to Luanda for his first visit after sixteen years of independence.

United Nations-supervised democratic elections were held in September 1992, but Savimbi refused to acknowledge that he and UNITA had lost the vote to dos Santos and the MPLA. He relaunched the war using troops and armaments hidden from the UN peace process mechanisms. There followed the two most destructive years in Angola's history. Savimbi's forces took the initiative, occupying most of the country, including the provincial capitals. Funding for his war effort came from control of diamond producing regions in the northeast of the country. The military initiative eventually swung back to the government and under pressure on the battlefield, and with international diplomatic pressure also, a new peace agreement was signed in Lusaka in November 1994.

Yet Savimbi never accepted the Lusaka agreement. He pretended to go along with it out of necessity, but he continually procrastinated in fulfilling the terms of the

agreement and kept ensconced his core army and control of his territory. Dos Santos attempted to isolate Savimbi by closing off his potential external sanctuaries and re-supply bases. This led to military overstretch for dos Santos, who committed his troops in Congo Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo while facing simultaneous escalating military offensives inside Angola from UNITA from 1998 onward. Armed confrontations began in April, and by December 1998 the peace agreement officially broke down. Astutely Savimbi bought logistical access through Zambia from his diamond revenues, and purchased arms from the Ukraine and elsewhere to reequip his forces. In a parallel with what happened in 1992, Savimbi once again initially managed to seize the military initiative. The international community placed sanctions on UNITA, and the countries of the Southern African Development Community passed a resolution proposed by the government of Angola to declare Savimbi a war criminal in 1999. He was killed in battle on February 22, 2002.

BARRY MUNSLow

See also: Angola: Cold War Politics, Civil War, 1975–1994; Angola: Independence: Civil of War: Impact of, Economic and Social; Angola: Independence and Civil War, 1974–1976; Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Angola: Peace Betrayed, to the Present.

Biography

Born on August 3, 1934, in Munhango. Left for Portugal to pursue studies in Lisbon in 1958. Joined the Angolan People's Union (UPA) movement in 1960, then appointed Secretary general. The UPA and the Angola Democratic Party joined together to form the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in March 1962. The FNLA declared itself the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), and Savimbi was appointed its Foreign Minister. Resigned from GRAE in 1964. Began guerrilla operations in eastern Angola in 1966. After the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal was overthrown, signed a cease-fire in June 1974. Signed the Alvor Accords granting Angola independence in January 1975. Signed the Bicesse Peace Accords on May 31, 1991. Refused to acknowledge his loss in the UN-supervised elections of 1992. Relaunches armed warfare, signed a new peace agreement in Lusaka in November 1994. Resumed armed confrontation in 1998. Declared a war criminal by the Angolan government in 1999. Mortally wounded in battle and died February 22, 2002.

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Schreiner, Olive Emilie Albertina (1855–1920) *South African Novelist, Feminist, and Political Activist*

Olive Emilie Albertina Schreiner was the author of *The Story of an African Farm*, hailed by many as South Africa's finest novel. She was born of German/English missionary parentage at the Wittenbergen Wesleyan mission station, located on the Cape's eastern frontier. Following the death of her younger sister she set aside her parents' faith in favor of a personal humanist philosophy characterized by a deep spirituality evident in much of her writing. Thus, from an early stage, Schreiner marked herself as an unconventional individualist woman in a conformist patriarchal society. At the age of 17, she entered employment as a governess in a frontier homestead, and embarked on an intensive program of self-education, during which she came under the influence of the Darwinist Herbert Spencer. A brief sojourn at the New Rush (Kimberley) diamond field in 1873 provided her with material for her first novel, *Undine* (published posthumously). On her return journey, she experienced for the first time the chronic asthmatic condition that was to become a lifetime affliction.

Started in 1874–1875, preparation of *The Story of an African Farm* occupied several years; like *Undine*, it was written during what time she could spare from her governess duties. On completion of her final draft, Schreiner decided to leave the mentally confining environment of the Cape frontier and seek professional training in Britain. Although she did not avail herself of an opportunity to take up a nursing course, her exposure to conditions in a London maternity hospital in 1881 seems to have contributed to her empathy with the cause of disadvantaged women. The publication of *African Farm* in 1883, initially under the pseudonym Ralph Iron, caused a literary sensation in London as well as South Africa, and brought her into contact with some of the leading intellectuals of the day. It won Schreiner the lifelong, and almost certainly platonic, friendship of Havelock Ellis, one of the two major figures in her life. The pattern of her future life was now set: she conducted a voluminous correspondence with friends and acquaintances, but the scale of purely literary work on which she intended to build her reputation was restricted by persistent ill health

and a deep-seated reluctance to revise what she had written lest the original inspiration be lost.

The 1890s, spent mostly in South Africa, witnessed several changes in Schreiner's life. Her sympathy with the Boer Republics grew in response to the bullying tactics employed against them by Cecil Rhodes, Cape Colony premier (1890–1995), and organizer of the Jameson Raid; and high commissioner Milner, who eventually presided over the South African War. Her widely publicized pro-Boer views induced the authorities to place her under virtual house arrest during the final stages of the conflict. Prior to this, in 1894, she had quite suddenly decided to marry the Cape liberal politician Samuel Cronwright. Their marriage became strained due to her inability to give birth to a child. Her childlessness is reflected in the strong maternal feelings evident in much of her later writings.

Following the South African War, Schreiner laid aside the cause of the Boers, feeling they could defend themselves, and returned to the cause of women. *Woman and Labour* (1911) attacked the “sex parasitism” of upper-middle class housewives in Britain (and, by implication, in settler societies) who accepted male patriarchy in exchange for a cosseted and essentially idle existence. Her final years were focused on the quest for an environment in which she could work while her health continued to deteriorate. The outbreak of war found her stranded in Britain, isolated by an antiwar stance that alienated her from many former friends. Cronwright brought her back to South Africa after the war ended, and she died in her sleep at Wynberg, on the Cape, on the night of November 10, 1920.

Schreiner's political reputation has been somewhat affected by her attachment to her Social Darwinist views, which she espoused until about 1895. These views changed radically thereafter, influenced by her own intellectual development and growing antipathy to the hypocrisy of the imperialist “civilizing mission,” exemplified by the activities of Rhodes inside and beyond the boundaries of South Africa. She was especially critical of the way white politicians abandoned the African cause to reach an agreement about South African union at the 1908 National Convention, and in the last year of her life was collecting money to defend an African National Congress leader who had been arrested for organizing a strike.

Her literary reputation rests on *The Story of an African Farm*, which faithfully captures the atmosphere of frontier life in the 1870s, with its white overseers and itinerant peddlers. It is remarkable also for its portrayal of strong women, a feature in her other literary work, and for its deeply passionate humanism. However, mention should be made also of her more mature, though unfinished, *From Man to Man*, in

which her feminist message is most clearly conveyed in the bond—transcending race—between its main character and her errant husband's mixed race daughter. Also notable are her collections of allegories (*Dreams* [1890] and *Stories, Dreams, and Allegories* [1924]), which set out the essence of her philosophy that in all relationships, the strong should help and offer a helping hand to—and not oppress—the weak.

Her influence over later generations of southern African writers has been acknowledged, especially by Doris Lessing and Nadine Gordimer. The standard biography, by Ruth First and Ann Scott (1980), has helped rescue her reputation from the omissions evident in her husband's biography and edited collection of letters, and the curiosity, some of it prurient, about her sexual orientation and sexuality later commentators have exhibited at the expense of a more balanced assessment of her life and work. First and Scott's rather matter-of-fact approach fails, however, to capture the essence of Olive Schreiner, evident in her lifelong passionate commitment to the cause of the underprivileged, whether Boer, poor, black, or female.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: *Cape Liberalism, Nineteenth Century; Rhodes, Cecil J.; South African War, 1899–1902.*

Biography

Born at the Wittenbergen Wesleyan mission station, located on the Cape's Eastern frontier, in 1855. At 17, entered employment as a governess in a frontier homestead, and embarked on an intensive program of self-education. Started writing *The Story of an African Farm* in 1874–1875. Moved to Britain, and worked in a maternity hospital in London in 1881. *The Story of an African Farm* was published in 1883. Married the politician Samuel Cronwright in 1894. Published *Woman and Labour* in 1911. Died at Wynberg, on the Cape, on November 10, 1920.

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Scramble: *See Zanzibar: Britain, Germany, “Scramble.”*

Sebetwane: *See Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo.*

Segregation: See South Africa: Segregation, Political Economy of.

Segu: Origins and Growth of a Bamana Kingdom

Bamana peoples were present in the middle Niger region of West Africa as early as the twelfth century, and during the thirteenth century they were integrated into the Mali Empire. With the decline of Mali, Bamana chiefdoms regained their independence, which they largely maintained despite the rise of the Songhay empire to the northeast. After the sixteenth-century Moroccan invasion of Songhay, the Bamana raided northward to the city of Jenne in the Middle Niger Delta. Local oral tradition indicates that in the mid-seventeenth century the Bamana may have established an ephemeral chiefdom in the neighborhood of Segu under KalaJan Kulubali, a descendant of Barama Ngolo. However, it was not until the early eighteenth century (c.1712) that kingship (*mansaya*) emerged at Segu, when Mamari Kulubali developed a power base by reorganizing a men's association, or *ton*, that became the dominant force in society. Mamari became the *ton's* leader, received the name Biton, and from his position of power defeated opposing factions and began establishing Bamana Segu as an important state that expanded over the delta of the Middle Niger and held sway over important trade routes and commercial centers.

The city of Segu, which is located on the south bank of the Niger River in Mali, originally consisted of four



Bamana Hunter. Segu, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.



Street Scene. Segu, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

villages: Sekoro (Old Segu), Sebugu (Segu Hamlet), Sekura (New Segu), and Segu-Sikoro (Segu under the Si Trees). Nine other towns, commercial centers run by Maraka traders, were located in the immediate vicinity and were also regarded as central to the larger Bamana state. The four great *boliw* of Segu, potent sacrificial altars in which resided the spiritual force essential to political power and the judicial process, were kept at the administrative center because they were controlled by the *faama*. The Bamana rulers of Segu, who imposed and maintained their authority through force of arms, were known by the military title *faama* in preference to the more benign *mansa*, which is the usual term for “ruler,” “king,” “chief,” or “Lord.”

One of the most eventful periods in Segu history was the period of transition between c.1757 and c.1766, which saw the demise of Kulubali power and the rise of the Jara dynasty. Biton Kulubali (d.1755) was succeeded by two sons: Cekoro was a leper whose despotic rule (c.1755–1757) led to his eventual assassination by members of the *ton*, who were known as *tonjonw*. Bakari ruled for a short time in 1757, but he was a Muslim, which complicated his relations with the non-Muslim *tonjonw* and made it impossible for him to rule effectively. Concluding that the governing style introduced by Biton was unacceptable and wishing to restore the previously egalitarian system of the *ton*, the *tonjonw* killed Bakari Kulubali along with the rest of Biton's family.

Ton Mansa Demebele then became the first of several former slaves elected to rule at Segu, but he insisted on living at Ngoin, about 7 kilometers from Segu. This and Ton Mansa's determination to build a canal to bring water from the Niger to Ngoin caused other *ton* members to fear the emergence of a new center of power. One source claims that Ton Mansa was ambushed by the *ton* members, and another says he died of infection from an arrow in the ear that was possibly shot by one of his own men.

The next slave chief to be elected was Kanubanyuma Bari (c.1760–1763), who was a Fula. He is said to have been particularly occupied with raiding his predecessor's territory for slaves, and was regarded with suspicion by Bamana tonjonw, who feared that his leadership meant too much Fula influence in the ton. Kanubanyuma died in mysterious circumstances, possibly helped along by his chief rival Kafajugu, who became the third successive slave chief to be faama of Segu (c.1763–1766). Kafajugu died after two or three years in power, and again there is disagreement about whether he died a natural death or was killed by another ton chief.

A period of uncertainty followed, when nobody dared to assume authority, the elder ton members due to prudence, and the younger ones because they were not sure if they had the necessary support. Ngolo Jara, who had once been a slave of Biton, was just one ton chief among many. It does not appear that Ngolo had any reason to believe that if he became faama his fate would be any different than that of his immediate predecessors unless he did something to forestall his rivals and enemies. Sources differ about how Ngolo outwitted his rivals and forced them to swear their allegiance to him and his descendants, but the entire sequence of events that transpired during the period of transition between the death of Biton and the rise of Ngolo contributed greatly to Segu's reputation as a place of treachery and intrigue.

Ngolo Jara established a dynasty, the Ngolosi (descendants of Ngol) that would rule Segu for nearly a century. During his reign, which lasted some 25 years, Ngolo successfully reasserted *Bamanafanga*, or power of the king, reorganized the army and political administration (putting his sons in command of each of the five central districts), placed important commercial towns under state protection, and expanded the Segu state through military conquest. The oral sources agree that Ngolo died while leading his army into Mossi country, apparently sometime before 1790. Ngolo had chosen his son Monzon to succeed him, but three of Ngolo's other sons wished to divide the power among themselves. This resulted in a civil war in which one of the brothers allied himself with the neighboring Barnana state of Kaarta. After a prolonged struggle against numerically superior forces, Monzon conquered Kaarta, overcame his brothers, and reestablished his power at Segu in 1794–1795. When the intrepid Scottish explorer Mungo Park passed by Segu in 1805, it was Monzon Jara who sent him a message assuring him protection as far as Timbuktu.

Monzon died in 1808 and handed over power to Faama Da, whom oral tradition recalls as being the "favorite son." According to some sources, the eldest son was Cefolo, who would normally have been next

in line, but Da was by far the more accomplished in military matters, providing strong support for his father's exploits as well as leading successful campaigns himself. The tonjonw wanted to consider the elder Cefolo and several of Monzon's brothers for the succession, but Faama Da gained control of Segu and consolidated its territorial possessions. Upon Faama Da's death in 1827 his brother Cefolo finally took power (1827–1839). During the reign of Cefolo's successor Nyènèmba, the neighboring Fula kingdom of Masina staged a strong rebellion against Segu authority in 1839. Masina was subdued by Bakari Jan Koné, hailed by oral tradition as one of Segu's greatest heroes. Following the brief rule of Nyènèmba there were five more Ngolosi rulers of Segu: Kirango Ben (1841–1849), Naluma Kuma (1849–1851), Masala Demba (1851–1854), Torokoro Mari (1854–1859), and Ali Jara, who was in power when Segu was conquered in 1861 by the Tukolor army of Alhaj 'Umar Tal.

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Sena, Tete, Portuguese, and Prazos

In the fifteenth century, Swahili traders from Kilwa and Angoche used the Qua Qua River to gain access to the Zambesi; one of them met Vasco da Gama there on his epic first voyage in 1499. From river ports caravans were organized to the gold fairs on the edge of the Zimbabwe escarpment. The Portuguese, who established a trading factory at Sofala in 1505, became aware of the Zambesi route through the journeys of António Fernandes between 1511 and 1513, but they only began to establish trading establishments on the river after about 1540. At first they merely copied the established Swahili traders, settling at Sena and Tete from where

trading caravans departed for Manica and Karanga country. Sena and Tete both became considerable towns, and many of the Muslims and Portuguese established large rural residences in their neighborhood.

Portuguese and Muslims also established themselves permanently at the gold fairs and at the courts of the Karanga rulers. At fairs such as Masapa and Luanze, they acquired jurisdiction over their own affairs and at court formed factions which competed for the support of the ruler. In 1561 a Jesuit mission was sent to Zambesia to try to convert the *monomotapa* (paramount Karanga chief), but the mission came to an abrupt end with the murder of one of its members.

In 1569, the Portuguese dispatched an army under a former viceroy of India, Francisco Barreto, to try to conquer the gold fields and the supposed silver mines. Most of Barreto's army, including the commander himself, died of fever. A second expedition, led by Vasco Fernandes Homen, reached Manica by way of Sofala but withdrew peacefully when it discovered the small scale of the mining operations. Although the Barreto/Homen expedition had failed in its main objective of conquering the mines, it had secured control of the Zambesi Valley and had eliminated, through massacre, most of the independent muslim traders.

Sena and Tete now became Portuguese captaincies and most of the Tonga chiefs (*fumos*) of the valley submitted to Portugal, paying tribute and offering services to the Portuguese captains. From about 1585 the trade of the Zambesi Valley and the High Veld was declared to be a monopoly of the captains of Mozambique, and they now sought once again to dominate the trade with the interior and to gain control of the main mining areas.

The opportunity came in the 1590s, when invading bands from north of the river, which may have formed part of the advancing Maravi chieftaincies, began to endanger the survival of the Karanga chieftaincies. The Portuguese and their armies of Tonga soldiers recruited in the valley succeeded in defeating the invaders and placing the monomotapa, Gatse Lucere, securely on his throne. In return the Portuguese demanded a cession of the mines, which was formally made to them in 1607.

Over the course of the next 30 years, various factions of the Portuguese fought to gain control of the Karanga chieftaincy. The captain, who held the trade monopoly, sent his soldiers; the local Portuguese traders raised their own armies to defend their settlements; and the Dominicans also intervened, trying to gain a dominant position for their order through the conversion of the Karanga ruling family. Briefly successful in 1629 when Mavura recognized his vassalage to Portugal, the Portuguese seldom cooperated with one another for long and their divisions led to their

being driven out of the country and back to their river ports in 1631. The local Portuguese were able to raise forces among the valley Tonga. With these forces the Portuguese commander, Diogo de Sousa Meneses, overwhelmed the Karanga in a campaign in 1632 and secured control of most of northern Zimbabwe as well as the Low Veld as far as Sofala. The Karanga paramountcy now became tributary to the Portuguese, as did the chieftaincies of Quiteve and Manica.

Portuguese rule in the gold-bearing regions of the High Veld lasted 60 years. During that time the Portuguese established mining towns and fairs throughout the region, the most important being Dambarar, and subjected the chiefs and peasantry of the region to their overrule, levying tribute and labor services upon them. From the Portuguese crown the settlers sought titles for the lands they had conquered in the form of three life leases, which came to be called *prazos*. From their bases on the High Veld the Portuguese intervened in the southern kingdom of Changamire and became king makers—and, effectively, overlords—over most of the High Veld.

The collapse of Portuguese rule came in the years 1693–1695, when a series of successful wars were waged against them by Changamire Dombo, ruler of the Roswi. The Portuguese were driven from the High Veld, their towns and trading fairs were destroyed, and they were confined to the river towns of Sena and Tete and to the two coastal ports of Quelimane and Sofala.

During the eighteenth century the Roswi never allowed the Portuguese to trade directly with the High Veld but permitted two trading fairs—one in Manica and the other at Zumbo at the confluence of the Zambesi and the Luangwa Rivers. Here a prosperous Portuguese trading town grew up that soon exceeded both Sena and Tete in importance and profited by the gold trade of the Roswi and the newly discovered mining areas north of the river.

During the eighteenth century the Zambesi Valley and the Low Veld south to Sofala was controlled by the prazo families, many of them headed by women to whom the leases were granted. The larger and more prosperous prazos, like Gorongosa and Cheringoma, became powerful chieftaincies with private armies of *chicunda*, professional soldiers recruited and maintained by the *prazo senhor*. The wealth of the prazos came partly from the agriculture of the peasant population, but mostly from the trade with the inland fairs and the opening of new gold fields north of the river. Prazos were also owned by the religious orders, but some of these were secularized when the Jesuit order in Portugal was abolished in 1759.

Although the Zambesi towns were made municipalities in the 1760s, their prosperity began to decline in the second half of the century. Chronic banditry made

the river route to Zumbo precarious, while in the 1790s a cycle of drought began that would lead to chaos in the Roswi state and ultimately to the abandonment of Zumbo and the collapse of most of the gold mining activity at the fairs.

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
See also: Mozambique: Nineteenth Century, Early; Swahili, Portuguese and: 1498–1589.

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Senegal: Nineteenth Century

The foundations of the independent republic of Senegal were established firmly in the later nineteenth century. Between about 1860 and 1900 the political, religious, and economic map of Senegal was changed completely by a series of Muslim movements and expanding French imperialism. Both Muslim reformers and Europeans sought to topple the traditional nobilities, whose leadership was rooted in slave raiding and trading, and they were both successful. Al-Hajj Umar Tal, a Muslim military leader who waged a jihad (holy war) in his native Senegal in the mid-1850s, served as a model for later religious reformers, with his attention focused on indigenous rulers and frequent pragmatic accommodation with colonial rule. Governor Louis Faidherbe, who served in Senegal from 1854 until 1865, launched aggressive military campaigns combined with treaty negotiations, a pattern followed by his successors. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, a new generation of local rulers from Senegal faced the challenge of working under a new and more powerful set of rulers, the French. Religious leaders, many of whom initially came into conflict with the colonial military, shifted their policy toward one of accommodation and cooperation. The colonial administration likewise had to deal with the new Muslim reform leaders to further their own economic agenda. The collaboration between religious and secular authorities has characterized Senegal ever since.



Senegal.

Following the model of Al-Hajj Umar Tal, Ma Ba launched a Muslim reform movement in 1862 in the northern Gambian region and eventually to Saloum in central Senegal. Ma Ba, while successfully defeating the traditional leaders, was defeated and killed by the French when he attempted to invade Sin in central Senegal in 1867. Ma Ba's followers included Lat Dior (Joor) who conquered Kajoor (Kayor) and Alburi N'Diaye (Njay) who seized Jolof in western Senegal. The French supported the existing rulers, with whom they had signed treaties, but the Muslim reform movements were too powerful and overthrew the traditional nobility. The French then had to deal with the new leadership. The interactions between the colonial rulers and the Muslim reformers were often ambiguous and cautious, but generally cooperative. Lat Dior soon came into conflict with the French over the colonial plan to build a railroad through Kajoor linking Dakar and Saint-Louis. For its French sponsors, the railroad was a means of dominating the still-independent Kajoor, first militarily and then commercially. In 1886, when Lat Dior attacked a French ally in eastern Kajoor, he was killed in battle. Albury N'Diaye overthrew the old leadership of Jolof and ruled the state as a charismatic military and religious leader. When N'Diaye threatened to become too powerful, he was overthrown by the French.

Another Muslim reform movement erupted in eastern Senegambia in 1887. A Soninke cleric, Al-Hajj Mamadu Lamine Drame, who cited Umar Tal as his inspiration, launched his attack against pro-French rulers in the Upper Senegal Valley. The French

intervened to support their allies and actively pursued Lamine throughout the region, killing him in late 1887. In the process they brought the entire valley under their control. By 1890, the area of modern-day Senegal, with the notable exception of the Casamance, was under firm French control. Groups in the Casamance resisted colonial rule until World War I.

The most important religious figure in modern Senegal, Amadu Bamba M'Backe, a follower of Lat Dior, established himself in the late 1880s in central Senegal and quickly attracted a loyal following as well as the attention of the colonial authorities. While evidence suggests Bamba's resistance was primarily spiritual and directed against traditional leaders, many of his followers hoped that an active struggle of resistance against colonial rule would develop. In 1895 the French, deciding to end any threat, deported Bamba to Gabon, only allowing him to return in 1902, by which time his stature had grown considerably, especially among the Wolof of central and western Senegal. Bamba would later encourage his followers, who formed the immensely influential Murid brotherhood, to cooperate with colonial authorities.

The greatest colonial presence was in the coastal region, especially near Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River and in the vicinity of Dakar and the Cap Vert Peninsula. In 1848, Saint-Louis and Gorée, off the Cap Vert Peninsula, were declared communes of France. In 1880, the commune of Rufisque and in 1887 that of Dakar were created. The French policy of assimilation was most fully enacted in the Four Communes, whose residents were considered French citizens rather than subjects, as in the rest of Senegal, and elected a deputy to the French Assembly. Saint-Louis served as the capital of Senegal as well as of the Federation of French West Africa until 1902, when the federation capital was moved to Dakar. Saint-Louis remained the capital of the colony. Senegal continued to occupy a privileged position within the French empire in West Africa throughout the colonial period.

It was during the later nineteenth century that Senegal's economy, previously based on the export of gum arabic and other agricultural products from the Senegal River region and coastal areas, became almost exclusively dependent on peanuts, introduced by the French in 1848. All areas of the colony, except the tropical Casamance, witnessed the rapid growth of peanut production for export, particularly in the central area of the colony. Religious authorities who controlled the peanut basin urged their followers to cooperate with colonial economic policy and grow peanuts, gaining the Muslim leaders colonial support for their religious activities. The economic fortunes of the desert-side river region declined while that of western and central Senegal rose considerably. The colony's

entire infrastructure, especially railroad construction, was based on the transport of peanuts from the central peanut basin to the coast. Other areas of economic development were neglected in favor of peanut production. Senegal became a single-crop economy in the later nineteenth century and has remained so ever since.

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See also: **Senegal: Faidherbe, Louis and Expansion of French Senegal, 1854–1865.**

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
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Senegal: Faidherbe, Louis and Expansion of French Senegal, 1854–1865

Louis Faidherbe served two terms as governor of Senegal, from 1854 to 1861 and from 1863 to 1865. He instituted a “forward policy” that certain critics labeled “peace or powder.” He took decisive steps to advance eastward from Saint-Louis through the Senegal River Valley and the vast Sudan region to Lake Chad. He even dreamed of a French African empire stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. He would create a firm basis for its future development culturally as well as politically and economically.

Faidherbe's career in Senegal had begun in 1852 as a subdirector of engineers. He participated in seizing Podor and constructing its fort, attacking Diman's capital, and reinforcing Bakel's defenses in 1854. He wrote *Les Berbères* (1859), began learning Wolof, Pular, and Sarakolé, and became interested in exploring the Niger River. Admiring Faidherbe's activities, major Bordeaux firms doing business with Senegal recommended him for Senegal's governorship.

Militarily, Faidherbe first sought to protect the gum trade along the Senegal River and quell the Moorish Trarzas who were raiding Wolof peasants living along the river's south bank. In February 1855 Faidherbe ordered his forces to expel Trarza military clans from Walo. War ensued with Walo, whose leadership rebuffed Faidherbe's plan to “liberate” them; in April Faidherbe had to fight the principal Trarza warrior clans. By the end of 1855 he overcame Walo, making it



Senegal and the French, nineteenth century.

the first Sub-Saharan state dismembered and annexed by France.

In 1858, having warred and used divide-and-conquer tactics, Faidherbe made treaties with the Trarzas of southern Mauritania. The Trarzas agreed to respect French traders and commute the controversial “customs” charges into a fixed export duty of 3 per cent.

Faidherbe’s endeavor to end all African controls over French navigation along the Senegal River, particularly the toll at Saldé-Tébékout in central Futa-Toro, brought greater hostilities. Conflict erupted with the traditional leaders of Futa-Toro and the Tukolor Muslim reformer and state builder, Al-Hajj Umar. In 1858-1859, Faidherbe forced the confederation of Futa-Toro to make peace on French terms, and divided the confederation into four client states of France.

Faidherbe’s greatest adversary was Al-Hajj Umar, charismatic leader of the Tijaniyya in west Africa. Before Faidherbe’s governorship, Umar had attacked the French because of their prohibiting the firearms trade in the Senegal Valley. Faidherbe gallantly led a small force in relieving Médine from Umar’s three-month siege. In 1860, Faidherbe negotiated a demarcation line along the Bafing River with Umar’s emissary, and provisionally agreed to send his own envoy to discuss future relations with Umar.

Faidherbe hoped that Umar, in return for political support and firearms, would permit France to erect a line of fortified trading posts from Senegal to a base for navigation on the Niger. With Umar’s cooperation, Faidherbe envisioned pushing French trade and influence downstream and averting the monopoly that Britain, through its traders in the delta, threatened to establish over the Niger.

Returning as governor in 1863, Faidherbe sent Lieutenant Eugene Mage to contact Umar; eventually Mage negotiated a treaty with Umar’s successor,

Ahmadu Tal. Ahmadu renounced holy war against France, and permitted French trade and exploration in his territories, while France allowed him to buy goods in Saint-Louis.

While fighting Umar, Faidherbe’s forces had gutted the principal villages of Buoye, Kaméra, and Guidimakha. Thereupon Faidherbe made treaties with new client rulers in each state.

By 1859 Faidherbe gave attention to the kingdom of Cayor. He aimed to prevent its warriors’ interference in the collection of peanuts by peasants and to open a trail featuring three small forts and a telegraph line linking Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Gorée via the coast. Faidherbe first tried peaceful means, but rebuffed by Damel (King) Biraima, he used force. When Biraima died, Faidherbe claimed that Biraima had agreed on his deathbed to France’s demands. Biraima’s successor, Macodu, would not recognize the treaty. Faidherbe declared war and sought to replace Macodu with Madiodio. However, Lat Dior rebelled. Faidherbe’s replacement, Governor Jean Jauréguiberry, allowed Lat Dior to expel Madiodio and become ruler. Returning as governor, Faidherbe moved to restore Madiodio, who ceded more territory to France. As disorder still prevailed in Cayor, Faidherbe retired Madiodio and annexed the remainder of Cayor in 1865.

Faidherbe’s military successes owed much to his ingenuity. In 1857 he organized the Senegalese Riflemen. He created two battalions of volunteers recruited as much as possible from Senegambia’s free population. The first recruits were paid relatively well; served short, two-year terms; wore special, colorful uniforms; underwent looser discipline than European troops; and received traditional food.

Faidherbe labored in multifold ways in Senegal. He founded a school for the sons of chiefs, and lay schools for Muslims. He established scholarships for primary education in Saint-Louis and secondary education in France. He built small technical schools at Dakar, and opened a museum and newspaper at Saint-Louis. Faidherbe organized the Bank of Senegal; laid out Saint-Louis afresh as befitted a capital city; promoted the export of groundnuts; made valuable and detailed studies of the indigenous people; and founded Dakar, future metropolis of French Africa.

Faidherbe stood at the center of modern French imperialism. He initiated firm French control of the Senegal Valley, which became the springboard for further expansion in West Africa. By opening up Senegal’s trade he provided the means for reaching the Niger Basin. His plan for railroad construction eventually materialized. His proposal, rejected by his superiors, for France and Britain, and France and Portugal, to mutually arrange exchange of territories in West Africa would have created the French Gambia Valley.

Faidherbe grappled sympathetically with Islam in West Africa; he used war and diplomacy to stop the westward push of the great Al-Hajj Umar. Faidherbe's policy of opposing Christian proselytizing Muslims caused a prestigious Francophile Muslim community and tradition in Senegal.

Faidherbe further affected West Africa. In Senegal his governorship distinguished priorities and discriminately allocated limited resources. Faidherbe started new public works and aided the peasants. His policies of non-French settlement and restricted assimilation into French citizenship became models for French West Africa.

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Senegal: Colonial Period: Railways

French railway construction in Senegal and its Sudanese hinterland was driven by the desire to conquer the Niger Valley, and later, to develop West African trade. The railway was built in three stages: a coastal railway between Dakar and the mouth of the Senegal River, a second railway between the Senegal and Niger Rivers, and finally, a third railway to link the first two. To reduce costs and speed up construction, the French built a narrow-gauge line with lightweight rail along a route that eliminated the need for tunnels and most bridges. To further reduce costs, the French relied on African labor to build most of the three lines and to operate them once they were finished.

The first segment connected Saint-Louis, the commercial city at the mouth of the Senegal River, to Dakar, with the best deepwater harbor in the region. In the spring of 1882, the government awarded a contract to the private construction firm Société des Batignolles. Using a combination of European, Moroccan, and Chinese labor, the firm laid 264 kilometers of rail near the coast, completing the Chemin de Fer Dakar–Saint-Louis in July 1885.

At the same time, the French government dispatched troops of the colonial marines to build a second railway from the Upper Senegal River to the Niger River. When low river levels forced them to unload prematurely in March 1880, the marines began building the Chemin de Fer Kayes–Niger near the village of Kayes. Progress was slow due to disease and poor planning, and by the time the National Assembly cut the project's funds in 1884, only 54 kilometers of the railway were finished. The 1890 conquest of Ahmadu Tall's empire at Segou revived interest in the railway, and after engineers completed a bridge over the Bafing River in 1896, the work proceeded rapidly. The first train reached Bamako in November 1904, and the tracks were completed to the Middle Niger Valley at Koulikoro during the following month.

The government immediately began to plan a link between the two railways, but military engineers and French merchants disagreed on the route and who should build it. Eventually a compromise was reached and in 1907, military engineers employed African laborers to start a new spur at Thiès, 70 kilometers east of Dakar. The following spring, a second construction site opened at Kayes, and by July 1909, the Chemin de Fer Kayes–Ambidédi extended the line 44 kilometers downstream from Kayes. Construction ceased during World War I, but resumed after the war and the two spurs were joined at Gouloumbo, 660 kilometers east of Dakar, on August 15, 1923. From that date on, the railway provided a year-round transportation link between the Middle Niger Valley and the Atlantic Ocean. Two years later, the government combined the two interior railways into the Chemin de Fer Thiès–Kayes–Niger, and took over the Chemin de Fer Dakar–Saint-Louis in May 1933 to form the Chemin de Fer Dakar–Niger.

The railway provided the administration with a potent tool for economic planning. Although ports like Kaolack and Rufisque were closer to the interior, the government adjusted shipping rates to promote the use of Dakar. During the 1920s, the government promoted rail shipments of peanuts for export, which favored the growth of Dakar while Saint-Louis stagnated.

Much of the original construction work was of poor quality however. In some places, rails had been laid directly on the ground without any ballast. Termites rapidly consumed untreated wooden ties, lightweight rail was prone to failure, and simple bridges and culverts washed out during the rainy season. Between 1923 and 1956, most of the original rails were replaced and the system was extended with feeder lines in Senegal from Louga to Lingéré in 1931 and from Diourbel to Touba in 1933. More ambitious plans were drafted to extend the railway to the Casamance region of Senegal, Segou, Timbuktu, and Algeria, but except for some grading in the Sahara during World War II, none of these plans materialized.

The railway employed Africans in construction as early as 1882 and in skilled positions such as locomotive drivers by 1900. During the 1920s thousands of forced laborers built the Chemin de Fer Thiès–Kayes, and by the end of World War II, nearly 8,000 Africans worked on the Chemin de Fer Dakar–Niger. Railway workers staged the first of many strikes in 1888, and some of their later actions presented a serious challenge to French authority. The 1938 strike at Thiès produced martyrs when government troops killed six strikers and injured more than one hundred others. The 1947–1948 strike mobilized more than 15,000 workers from French West Africa and shut down the railway for more than five months. By the time of the 1952 general strike, railway workers had a reputation for militancy and solidarity.

After World War II, the administration upgraded the railway by rebuilding the Kayes–Niger line, creating new technical training schools and introducing new equipment. The railway obtained its self-propelled diesel passenger cars in 1940 and diesel locomotives in 1947. In 1951, the last steam locomotives were shifted to freight switching, and by 1960, there were none left in service.

The railway contributed to the development of several towns in Senegal. Thiès was founded to house the main repair shops of the Chemin de Fer Thiès–Niger in 1923. Tambacounda grew at the intersection of the railway and the main overland route to the Casamance region. Kidira developed next to the bridge that carried the railway over the Senegal River into Mali. Other cities like Dakar, Kaolack, Diourbel, and Louga benefited from handling freight that was carried on the railway.

The railway also promoted close ties between Senegal and the French Sudan. At independence, those ties contributed to the decision to form the Mali Federation in June 1960. When the federation dissolved two months later, Senegal and Mali broke off diplomatic relations and severed the railway at Kidira. During the next three years, the Malian portion declined, and after the railway reopened in 1963, its usefulness was greatly reduced by increased competition from trucks and the railway from Abidjan to Ouagadougou. The Senegalese railway remained viable, and twice-weekly express trains still operate between Dakar and the Niger River.

JAMES A. JONES

See also: **Kenya: East African Protectorate and the Uganda Railway; Nigeria: Colonial Period: Railways, Mining, and Market Production; Railways.**

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Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque

The Four Communes enjoyed a distinct legal status during the colonial period, which set them apart from other townships in French West Africa. The Four Communes were ruled under French law and were considered full-fledged municipalities, with the right to elect a mayor and town council and to vote in elections for the Legislative Assembly, which sat in Saint-Louis, and for a deputy. Africans born in the Four Communes were considered French "citizens," distinct from the African "subjects" who made up the vast majority of the population.

The special legal status of the Four Communes was a product of history. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Saint-Louis and Gorée were important French commercial settlements. They were considered part of the French Empire in 1848 when slavery was abolished and when their inhabitants were declared citizens for the first time. Legislation passed between 1872 and 1880 extended the privileged status of Saint-Louis and Gorée to Dakar and Rufisque, largely to accommodate the large resident population of French merchants in both towns. Dakar and Rufisque had close ties to Gorée, which was too small to accommodate the growing French merchant community. Legislation intended to make life comfortable for French residents had the unintended effect of creating political rights for Africans born in the townships (Johnson 1971). In the late nineteenth century the most prominent citizens were merchants of mixed ancestry, referred to as *métis*, who were Catholic. African merchants, artisans, fishers, and laborers, many of them freed slaves or migrants, made up the bulk of the local population. The vast majority of the population was Muslim. Saint-Louis was the largest city in Senegal in 1890, with a population of 25,000. Dakar grew rapidly after it became in capital of French West Africa in 1904 and the terminus of the railway and port system. By 1920 the population of Saint-Louis had declined to 20,000 and Dakar's had expanded to 37,000.

During the conquest of the interior the Africans of the Four Communes allied themselves with the French, even though the merchant community feared the consequences of French political power. French

merchants moved into the interior after the conquest and took over the leading positions in the import-export trade. Africans from the Four Communes, who were now called *originaires*, were welcome as employees of French merchants or as clerks in the administration if they were literate in French. These were perceived as dead-end positions, because *originaires* could not serve as chiefs, despite the ambitions of some, because of their “citizen” status. Declining economic opportunities combined with political frustrations related to their anomalous legal status led to political activism. Galandou Diouf was the first African *originaire* to win a political office as the legislative councilor of Rufisque in 1907. Along with other political militants he encouraged fellow *originaire* Blaise Diagne to run for deputy in 1914. Diagne’s candidacy was a response to French efforts to restrict *originaire* political activism outside of the Four Communes and to contest their status as “citizens.”

Diagne was elected deputy only a few months before the outbreak of World War I. He used the issue of military recruitment in the Four Communes to win formal acknowledgment of the “citizenship” of *originaires*. They served in the French army during the war, not in colonial military units alongside African subjects. African citizens received higher pay and more benefits than ordinary African soldiers. They paid the “blood tax” of military service, but they received concrete political benefits for their service. After the war, Diagne created a political party, the Republican Socialist Party, which won a resounding victory in the legislative and municipal elections of 1919. In the immediate postwar period Diagne tried to consolidate his power by challenging the political influence of French merchants and by demanding that all Africans in Senegal receive the same rights as the citizens of the Four Communes. French colonial officials countered Diagne’s demands by granting more authority to African chiefs in a new colonial Legislative Assembly. By 1923 Diagne felt obliged to reach a political compromise with French merchants, who were invited to join his party, and to accept the political realities that confined his power to the Four Communes.

From 1919 until his death in 1934, Diagne dominated politics in the Four Communes. In the later part of his career he formed close working relationships with French administrators and merchants, leading to charges that he had “sold out.” His critics included former allies like Galandou Diouf, who formed a rival political party. Diagne’s alliance with the colonial administration and French merchants meant that he was virtually invincible. When Galandou Diouf and Lamine Guèye protested that Diagne had received French aid in the elections of 1928, their complaints were dismissed with the comment that the *originaires*

were the “spoiled brats” of the French Empire. Diouf, who succeeded Diagne as deputy in 1934, found that his own power was hemmed in by the same mechanisms that the French had used to limit Diagne’s ambitions. Galandou Diouf died during World War II and was replaced by Lamine Guèye, another prominent African “citizen” who was the last of the *originaire* politicians. The political credo of the citizens was their demand for equality with the French colonizers in Senegal.

African subjects resented the privileged political status of the *originaires*, which was based only on their place of birth. The political reforms that gave the vote to African subjects after 1946 prepared the way for the demise of the *originaires*. Léopold Senghor’s defeat of Lamine Guèye in the elections of 1948 owed much to Senghor’s status as a former “subject” and his ability to identify his cause with that of the rural majority. Lamine Guèye saw himself as the designated heir to the political leadership of Diagne, but most voters saw him as arrogant and out of touch. Since independence the special status of the Four Communes has disappeared, but the political tradition of elections and lively debate that they represented has continued to exert an influence on the political behavior of urban residents in postcolonial Senegal.

JAMES SEARING

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Senegal: World War I

World War I accelerated the process of economic and political change in the early twentieth century occurring in Africa, which was largely colonized by 1914. The war signaled the end of the final phase of French colonial expansion in Africa; it also caused the recruitment of French Africa’s first great conscript army and the first concerted effort to exploit the colonial empire’s resources on a massive scale. Because of its long tradition of colonial rule and its close ties to France, the colony of Senegal particularly felt the

impacts of World War I. The influences, however, differed somewhat between the coastal Four Communes (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Rufique, and Gorée), where the colonial presence was most keenly felt, and the rural interior of the colony, where most of the residents lived.

By 1914, the entire colony of Senegal was firmly under French colonial control. Residents of the coastal Four Communes, regardless of race, were considered citizens, rather than subjects, of France. They had the right to elect a deputy to the French Assembly in Paris. In 1914, the African electors sent Blaise Diagne, a former colonial official, as their deputy to the National Assembly. Military conscription had first been introduced to French West Africa in 1912 in hopes that colonial troops would eventually take over the garrisoning of the colonies in order to release French contingents for service in Europe. The colonial troops could also augment French forces in Europe if necessary. The decree mandated compulsory military service for all African males between the ages of 20 and 28. With the outbreak of war in 1914, Diagne and residents of the communes insisted that urban residents should fight as voluntary enlistees in regular units at the side of their French co-citizens. However, very few *originaires*, as the residents of the Four Communes were known, actually served at all until Diagne pushed through the Law of October 19, 1915, which resulted in a massive recruitment drive. In return for assistance in recruiting Senegalese soldiers for the war effort, Diagne obtained confirmation of French citizenship of this urban minority, even if they chose to retain their status under Muslim law as well. When the *originaires* did begin to serve in larger numbers after the law passed, their privileged conditions antagonized their countrymen from the rural areas. Subjects residing outside the coastal communes were subject to involuntary conscription into colonial units, received less pay and endured harsher conditions.

In the rural areas of Senegal, war recruitment had a marked impact on domestic slavery, or involuntary servitude, which persisted after official abolition. Village chiefs were required to fill quotas for war recruitment, and often sent descendants of slaves to the posts to meet the requirements. The servants were freed if they enlisted in place of free-born men. Sometimes masters of people of slave descent promised their subordinates freedom if they enlisted. Other slave-descended men enlisted on their own to escape servitude. In some cases, *serviles* had to turn over their enlistment bonus, usually the sum of 200 French francs, the price of a male slave, to their owners. This payment insured the *servile's* freedom from his master.

War recruitment also influenced migration patterns throughout Senegal. Both free-born and *servile*-descent

men migrated to other areas of the colony or to other colonies to avoid conscription. Many men and their families migrated into the central peanut basin of Senegal to escape recruitment. Desertion after enlistment was also very high, contributing to migration from areas firmly under colonial control to more rural remote regions. Returning veterans, especially those of *servile* descent, also migrated to other areas, especially the coastal region and peanut basin.

In 1918, France's manpower needs for the war became desperate, and Diagne agreed to become commissioner for the recruitment of African troops, with the rank of governor general, in exchange for a French pledge to improve social services in Senegal. Diagne conducted a sweepingly successful, but much criticized campaign across French West Africa, drawing more than 100,000 enlistments, while simultaneously insisting on veterans' benefits and other privileges to be won by fighting for France. Eventually, over 200,000 Africans from French West Africa fought for France, with about one-third coming from Senegal.

The intense war recruitment, combined with a mobilization of colonial resources to meet metropolitan needs, had a marked impact on Senegal's division of labor. Taxes were not reduced during the war, and even families with members serving in the military had to meet their financial obligations. Subsistence crops were requisitioned and paid for at prices below the free market price. Women took an increased role in agricultural production and herding in the rural areas to make ends meet. Government revenues declined during the war. The war effort also meant increased pressures on the land to produce and soil erosion became a serious problem for many areas of the colony during the war years.

Because it seriously disrupted economic links between Senegal and France, World War I marked the end of Senegal's most dynamic period of economic growth, which had begun in the late nineteenth century with a marked increase in peanut production and export. Even with increased migration to the peanut basin, the production of peanuts dropped precipitously after the outbreak of the war, largely in response to the deteriorating terms of trade and falling peanut prices on the world market. Throughout the colony, and even in the peanut basin, farmers abandoned the cash-crop production of peanuts for food crops to feed their families. Peanut exports dropped from over 300,000 tons in 1914 to 126,000 tons in 1918. The war also had a negative impact on the nascent industrial sector in Senegal. Most of the European personnel running the colony's banks and industries either left or were recalled to France, leaving the colony without an experienced entrepreneurial class until well after the war had ended.

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See also: Senegal: Colonial Period: Administration and “Assimilation”; **Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque;** **Senegal: World War II.**

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Senegal: Colonial Period: Administration and “Assimilation”

When the French regained possession of their colonies in 1818, the colony of Senegal consisted of two coastal islands, Saint-Louis and Gorée, and several trading posts. When France agreed reluctantly to abolish the slave trade in the Treaty of Paris (1815), it deprived Senegal of its commercial base. The mixture of *metis* (those of mixed blood) and French traders who dominated the colony had to find a new source of wealth. After the failure of a colonization scheme, Saint-Louis thrust itself into the trade in gum, produced from acacia trees on the north bank of the Senegal River. Gorée lived off coasting trade until the development of peanut exports in the 1840s provided Senegal with the crop that was thenceforth the basis of its economy.

France depended on its relations with neighboring African states, to whom it made annual payments for the right to trade. In 1848, these relations were briefly disrupted by the French abolition of slavery. Fearing flight to the French towns, several African states cut off trade. In 1854, a new governor, Louis Faidherbe, decided to force a change in these obligations. In a three-year war, he forced the Moors to accept suppression of customs payments, occupied Walo, the kingdom opposite Saint-Louis, and established French hegemony over the Futa Toro, a kingdom that stretched along the Senegal River. Later, he occupied parts of Kajoor and forced the kings of Siin and Saalum to accept French posts. War in Europe and military defeat suspended the forward movement, and the French were forced to allow their major enemy, Kajoor’s Damel, Lat Dior, to return to power. A decade later, Lat Dior objected to French plans to build a railroad for the export of peanuts from Kajoor. The railroad was built, Lat Dior was defeated and killed in 1886, and by 1891, almost all of Senegal was in French hands.

The 1880s and 1890s also saw the conquest of what became French West Africa. The federation was established in 1895 and received a definitive form in 1904.

Senegal, however, differed from the other colonies in two ways. First, Senegal was France’s partner in the conquest. France conquered West Africa with an army of Africans, mostly of slave origin and largely recruited in Senegal. Dakar was the capital and Senegal provided the clerks, telegraph operators, riverboat captains, and railway workers. There was a Senegalese quarter in Bamako and Senegalese traders and officials through western and equatorial Africa. One Senegalese, Mademba Sy, was made *fama*, or king, of the Sansanding in the French Sudan.

The second difference is that the Four Communes, the old coastal towns, had a measure of self-government shared by no other colony in Africa. The colony had representatives to French parliaments the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, and then after the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, won the right to municipal self-government, to an elected General Council, and to a representative in the French parliament. The General Council had control over part of the budget, though the lines of authority were regularly contested. The existence of African elected officials served to limit the arbitrariness that marked colonial rule elsewhere and softened many of the harsh edges. Senegal experienced much less brutality and discrimination. The deputy was French until 1902, when a *métis* lawyer was elected and then, in 1914, an African, Blaise Diagne. Up to this time, the rights of people in the Four Communes were not clearly defined, but Diagne made a condition of his support for military recruitment in World War I confirmation of the citizenship of his electors. Thus, they were not subject to the *indigenat*, the law code that ruled most of French Africa and had all of the rights of other French persons. The French often talked of assimilation as a goal, but only in Senegal—and mostly in the Four Communes—did much assimilation take place. After the war, the General Council was renamed the Colonial Council and was emasculated with the addition of a series of appointed chiefs who could be counted on to support the colonial government. Diagne, however, was regularly reelected until his death in 1934, when he was succeeded by another African, Galandou Diouf.

The rest of Senegal was divided into *cantons*, headed by chiefs recruited mostly from traditional ruling families. The cantons were grouped into *cercles*, each headed by a French administrator. Increasingly, however, real authority devolved on Muslim leaders called *marabouts*. The most effective resistance to the French conquest was from a series of Muslim reformers. Faidherbe realized early that if he wished to govern Senegal he had to find allies in the Muslim community. The most important was Bou-el-Mogdad, who was *cadi* of Saint-Louis and undertook several missions for Faidherbe. Not all of his successors

agreed with Faidherbe's policy, but eventually it prevailed. The colonial state used Muslims as agents, built mosques, financed the pilgrimage of the most loyal to Mecca, and was sensitive to their religious sensibilities. As the superiority of French arms became evident, more religious leaders decided to yield the political sphere to the French. The most important of these was Malik Sy, a disciple of the *tijaniya* religious brotherhood. His major rival was Amadu Bamba, son of Lat Dior's former *cadi*. He founded his own religious order, the Mourides, which preached piety, submission, and hard work. The French feared his popularity and deported him twice, but with time accommodation prevailed. Mouride colonies spread peanut cultivation into east and south into areas hitherto used mostly by pastoralists. Mourides were recruited for the French army and the French, in turn provided money for the construction of a large mosque at Touba, the order's capital. Politicians from Diagne on generally sought Mouride votes and financial aid.

In 1946, the constitution of the Fourth Republic extended the vote to all parts of the empire. In the first election, socialist candidates Lamine Gueye and Leopold Sedar Senghor prevailed. A poet, grammarian, and former teacher of Greek and Latin, Senghor became known as the deputy for the peasants. In 1951, with Mouride support, he challenged Gueye and won. He served in the French parliament until 1958, when Senegal was given self-government and Senghor became its first president.

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Senegal: Colonial Period: Economy

The colonial economy of Senegal, which was based on the export of peanuts, had its historical roots in the transition from slave exports to what historians have referred to as "legitimate commerce." In Senegal this transition was facilitated by the fact that exports of gum arabic were already important in the eighteenth

century and expanded rapidly in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Although gum came from the Saharan region to the north, the expansion of gum exports intensified the grain trade between the desert and the savanna. French and African merchants based in Saint-Louis bought surplus savanna grain, establishing relations with African producers which were later used to encourage the adoption of peanuts as a new export crop. The crucial role was played by Wolof merchants and Wolof-speaking merchants of mixed European and African ancestry. French merchants dominated the gum trade, so the peanut trade represented a new opportunity (Searing 1993).

Wolof cultivators, from the aristocracy to ordinary peasants, welcomed the new trade. The price paid for peanuts was high, particularly when compared to the price paid for millet, which was the only commercialized agricultural product before the 1840s. Peanut prices were based on the price paid for peanuts in London and Marseilles, discounted by the import-export firms to cover their expenses. Although the price paid to producers was further reduced by the profits of merchants who bulked the crop for export, it was sufficiently attractive to begin an export boom that was only interrupted by the colonial conquest, by World War I, and by the Great Depression. Exports reached 82,000 metric tons in 1882, 140,000 metric tons in 1900, 280,000 metric tons in 1914, and 508,000 tons in 1930. The expansion of exports reflected the extension of peanut cultivation to new regions as the colonial infrastructure of railways and ports was completed in stages between 1886 and 1915. The peanut boom began in Kajoor in the 1870s. By World War I, peanut cultivation was expanding most rapidly in the Sine-Saloum region, where the railway reached Tambacounda in 1915.

Not all regions participated in the peanut economy. Wolof and Sereer peasants were most favorably located in relation to the railways and Atlantic ports. The peanut basin coincided with the territory of the Wolof and Sereer kingdoms, including the "frontier zones" in the east where many migrants settled in underpopulated lands. Patterns of labor migration in Senegal reflected the new economic realities. Long-term migrant laborers were almost invariably from homelands that were too distant from the railways and the ports to make peanut exports a viable source of income. Migrants who came to the coast for one or several farming seasons or who sought full-time wage labor were also more willing to migrate to distant colonies. Wolof and Sereer, by contrast, migrated over short distances within the peanut basin in search of new land and could seek out seasonal wage labor in the cities (Manchuelle 1997)

The export economy brought together European commercial firms and peasant household production.

The dynamics of the peasant household are crucial for understanding African participation in peanut farming. Households grouped husbands and wives with their children and other dependents that accepted the authority of the household head. The household head was responsible for feeding household members by providing his wives with the grain staple millet. In exchange his dependents could be called on to work on his fields four days a week, from early morning to mid-afternoon. In practice, male dependents spent more hours farming for the household head. Women's garden plots were located near the residential compound and women were tied up with labor intensive chores like pounding millet and separating peanut shells from the plant. This work was carried out in the compound, where cooking and child care took place. Women contributed more labor time to agriculture overall, but spent less time working on the large plots where millet and peanuts were cultivated. Household dependents who were considered adults were given their own plot of land to cultivate. In the colonial period young men grew almost nothing but peanuts, because cash from peanuts became the quickest means to accumulate the wealth required for marriage. Whether bride-price was paid in cash, as was common for the Wolof, or in cattle, as preferred by the Sereer, cash from peanuts became the major source of wealth for social transactions. The cash crop economy was integrated into the reproduction of the peasant household.

Historians have judged the cash cropping of the colonial era through its long-term outcome, which was bleak, as the peanut boom did not generate any self-sustaining process of development. Overreliance on one export had negative consequences, especially since the crop was processed in France (Cooper 1993). The peanut trade did not create a modern economy, but the social consequences were profound and have been underestimated. Slavery was still a vital institution in Wolof society at the beginning of the peanut boom. Many slaves ran away and were able to acquire land as migrant farmers working for peasant households. When they accumulated enough wealth to move on they could merge into other currents of migration. Slaves who stayed with their masters stopped working for them, and the influence of the runaways was a powerful check on exploitation. Cash cropping also encouraged young people to migrate to regions where they could acquire land and social independence.

One of the negative consequences of cash cropping was peasant debt, which took the form of advances of food and seed at the beginning of the rainy season. Peasants agreed to repay the loan with a fixed amount of peanuts at a fixed price. This price, well below the market price paid to peasants, disguised the interest on the loan, which ranged from 100 per cent to 300 per cent.

French administrators condemned these practices and began creating rural cooperatives around 1910 to provide cheaper loans of seed grain. During the Great Depression of the 1930s the cooperatives began purchasing some of the crop. Worries about low prices and peasant debt led the colonial state to intervene for the first time on a large scale. State management was a trend of the late colonial period that continued after independence, but the peanut export economy never recovered the vigor it had in the decades between 1880 and 1930.

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See also: "Legitimate Commerce" and the Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century.

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Senegal: World War II

World War II was an important watershed in the political history of Senegal. At the beginning of the war, Africans in the Four Communes (the so-called *originaires*) lost their privileged status as French citizens. The war gave rise to an upsurge in anticolonial activity, the outcome of which, just 15 years after the end of hostilities, was to be political independence.

The war in Senegal can be divided into three periods. During the first phase, from 1939 to 1940, some 100,000 Africans were called up in French West Africa, a significant proportion of whom came from Senegal. Although some desertions were reported, these do not appear to have been widespread, as African pledges of loyalty to France reportedly flooded in from throughout the colony.

The armistice of June 1940, which marked the beginning of the second phase of the War in Senegal, was greeted with dismay, particularly by African

assimilés and *évolués* who did not understand why France had surrendered to Germany without a fight. Most *colons*, on the other hand, rallied to Vichy and colonial officials for the most part acquiesced in the change of regime, seeing their essential task as the maintenance of the colonial administration. Acts of resistance among the French population of Senegal were relatively rare. Pierre Boisson was appointed commissioner for the whole of French Africa on June 25, 1940, and arrived in Dakar in July to take up his post, in place of Léon Cayla. The latter, who had initially hesitated over whether to respond positively to overtures from Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill, was demoted to the governorship of Madagascar. The aim of the new administration, like its counterpart in metropolitan France, was the abolition of the republican regime and the restoration of the rights of custom and tradition. In fact, elections in the Four Communes, which was the only part of Senegal to enjoy full political rights, had already been suspended by decree on September 8, 1939. The Vichy administration went further, however, by establishing an authoritarian regime in which the use of forced labor increased and public order became the paramount consideration. Following the British attack on the French naval ship the *Richelieu*, which limped into the port of Dakar on July 8, and the bombardment of Dakar by a combined British and Free French force on September 23–25, Vichy propaganda against the British and the Free French intensified in French West Africa, and any manifestation of pro-Free French activity was repressed, particularly among Africans who risked imprisonment or death if found guilty.

This second phase of the war effectively came to an end on December 7, 1942, when, following the Allied invasion of North Africa, Boisson rallied French West Africa to General Darlan in Algiers. There was then a short interregnum before the Vichy regime formally ended and the Free French appointee as governor general, Pierre Cournarie, arrived in Dakar to take over from Boisson on July 17, 1943. The assassination of Darlan on Christmas Eve 1942 led to his replacement by General Giraud, who visited Senegal in January 1943, raising hopes of an improvement in political conditions in the territory. However, Giraud refused to receive a delegation of Saint-Louis *évolués* during his visit, thereby forfeiting any goodwill toward him that may have existed among the *évolués* of Senegal. Republican liberties were restored in March 1943, and this was followed by the rapid resumption of political activity, notably under the guise of “patriotic associations,” which quickly split along racial lines as Africans sought to use the associations as a vehicle for the expression of their political grievances. A Bloc Africain was formed under the leadership of Lamine

Guèye, to prepare the list of demands to be presented to René Pléven in Algiers by a delegation of Senegalese *assimilés* and *évolués*. Hopes of a rapid improvement in conditions were soon dashed, however. The new governor general’s overriding concern was with production for the war effort: the “battle for groundnuts” intensified the pressure on farmers to increase production and the use of forced labor increased. At the same time, apart from the change of governor general, there was virtually no purge of Vichy colonial officials. Thus, despite the “return to republicanism,” these were trying times for most Senegalese: political change was slow to come and the situation remained very difficult in economic and military terms. Prices were high, African wages and the prices paid to African farmers for their produce remained low, and few imported goods were available for purchase. Aware that Africans would have to be rewarded after the War for the sacrifices they were making for France, the provisional government organized the Brazzaville Conference in January 1944 to discuss the changes to the colonial regime that would be needed. However, no Africans were present, and the conference’s main recommendations met with resistance from *colons* and colonial officials. It raised hopes among African *assimilés* and *évolués*, but its immediate impact in Senegal was limited.

At the end of 1944, the government general was confronted with the problem of the repatriation of some 12,000 French West African soldiers, many of whom had spent long periods as German prisoners of war (POWs). The first contingent of 1280 ex-POWs arrived in Dakar and was transferred straight to a military camp at Tiaroye, just outside Dakar. The soldiers were angry about the nonpayment of back pay and pensions, and refused to be sent home until their demands were met. On December 1, the African soldiers’ “rebellion” was brutally repressed, leaving 35 of them dead and another 35 wounded. Measures were taken to avoid any further such incidents, but the way France treated returning soldiers who had served it loyally in Europe lived on in Senegalese folk memory and a film about the events, *Camp Tiaroye*, was made by the Senegalese filmmaker Sembène Ousmane in 1988.

The war had far-reaching effects in Senegal. France as the colonial power emerged from the war in a weakened position: the armistice of 1940 and the dependence of the colony on the Allied Forces after 1942 demonstrated the weakness of the French position, and American and Soviet anticolonialism at the end of the war further undermined French authority. Within the colony, the crisis within the colonial administration after December 1942; the economic and military pressures on the population; the ending of the Four Communes’ special political position within the

colony; the resumption of political activity along racial lines, which was symptomatic of a growing anticolonialism; and the mishandling of returning African soldiers were all signs that the old colonial order had changed permanently. In this respect, World War II can be considered the prelude to decolonization in Senegal.

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See also: Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque; Senegal: Nationalism, Federation, and Independence; World War II: French West Africa, Equatorial Africa.

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Senegal: Nationalism, Federation, and Independence

The assimilationist tradition gave rise to a complex, third form of nationalism in Senegal, which had a profound effect on the postwar political development of the territory. Assimilation operates at a number of different levels, but in Senegal essentially referred to the fact that African residents of the Four Communes of Senegal (the so-called *originaires*) had, since 1916, had full French citizenship rights and, with the exception of the World War II years, they had also, since 1914, been represented in the French National Assembly by a black African *député*. A recurrent demand of the Senegalese French-educated elite throughout the twentieth century was for assimilation to be made a reality—not necessarily, as has sometimes been suggested, in the sense of wanting to become "Black Frenchmen," but in the sense of wanting full equality of rights with Europeans. However, assimilation also entailed a certain emotional attachment to, and cultural identification with, France. Thanks to the strength of this assimilationist tradition, postwar Senegalese nationalism was thus a complex phenomenon.

The first postwar legislative elections to take place in Senegal were the Constituent Assembly elections of 1945. At these elections, French citizens, which meant mainly the *originaires*, voted in the first electoral college for their *député*, while certain categories of subject (mainly those with a French education or who had fought for France) voted in the second college. Lamine Guèye, a longtime advocate of assimilation who had joined the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, or SFIO) and helped to found the Senegal section of the SFIO in 1938, was elected from the first college, while Léopold Sédar Senghor, whom he had chosen as his running mate, was elected from the second college. By the time of the Second Constituent Assembly elections in 1946, all inhabitants of the French colonies had become citizens of the French Union, as the empire was now to be called. Citizenship of the French Union did not, however, confer the same rights as French citizenship: for example, citizens of the former were not represented proportionally in the French parliament on the same basis as citizens of the latter and only certain categories of citizens of the French Union (mainly those who had voted in the 1945 election) were allowed to vote. On this occasion, as for the National Assembly elections in November 1946, there was a single electoral college, and Guèye and Senghor were elected on both occasions. However, Senghor quickly sought to distance himself from the straightforward assimilationism of Guèye and left the SFIO to found his own party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), in 1948. Despite its stated commitment to assimilation, Senghor felt that the SFIO leadership was only interested in the African empire to the extent that it delivered votes in Paris for the SFIO, and that it paid little heed to what was in Africa's best interests. It had, for example, voted against a single college for African elections and against equal pensions for French and African war veterans. In contrast to the SFIO, the power base of which was the Four Communes, the BDS was to be a mass party organizing throughout the territory. Senghor was no secessionist, however, and his new party aimed to work within the French Union for the restoration of African dignity and for the implementation of the 1946 constitutional commitment to a "Union based on the equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion."

It should be noted that, in following this path, Senegal's political leaders isolated the territory from the mainstream of French West African politics. In 1946, the political leaders of the other territories of French West Africa had gathered in Bamako to create the interterritorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA). Pressure from the SFIO minister for overseas France, Marius Moutet, meant that Guèye

and Senghor did not attend the meeting. As a result, Senegal was never a lead player in French West Africa's first interterritorial political organization and, although the RDA, in the form of the Union Démocratique Sénégalaise (subsequently renamed the Mouvement Populaire Sénégalais, or MPS) led by Doudou Guèye, was present in the territory, it was always overshadowed by Senghor's BDS. In the 1951 and 1956 legislative elections, the BDS (subsequently renamed the Bloc Populaire Sénégalais, or BPS) easily defeated Lamine Guèye's Socialist Party, and the RDA, which swept the board in most of the rest of French West Africa in 1956, gained only one per cent of the vote in Senegal.

There were two main foci of the nationalist campaign during the first ten years of the Fourth Republic: on the political front, it was for Africans to be given a greater say over their own affairs, while on the socio-economic front, trade unions demanded equal economic and social rights with Europeans: equal pay for equal work, the right to metropolitan family allowances, and the adoption of a new overseas labor code were key demands. The leitmotif of these demands was equality with Europeans, and Africans made important breakthroughs in each of these areas during this period: for example, the new overseas labor code was adopted by the National Assembly in 1952 following a five-year coordinated campaign by political parties and trade unions. These African successes, which promised greatly to increase the cost of colonial rule, and the deteriorating situation in Algeria, which provoked fears in France of a similar explosion in Black Africa, led the government to introduce the first major political reform in black Africa since the 1946 Constitution. This was the *loi cadre* (enabling act) of 1956. In the run-up to its adoption, a debate took place between African political leaders and in the wider nationalist movement over whether powers should be devolved to Africans at the level of the federation, the position favored by Senghor, or whether they should be devolved down to the constituent territories, as Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire wanted. This debate was of crucial importance to Senegal, because devolving powers to the federation would have kept the federation together and, given that the federal government was traditionally based in Dakar, Senegal could hope thereby to retain its dominant political position within the federation. Devolving powers to the territories, on the other hand, promised to marginalize Dakar. In the end, it was the Houphouët-Boigny proposals that were adopted, which led Senghor to accuse the French government of setting out to "balkanize" West Africa.

The elections to the new territorial assemblies established by the *loi cadre* took place on March 31, 1957. The BPS won a resounding victory, and Mamadou

Dia became the African vice president of the new government council. (Senghor chose not to take a portfolio.) In an effort to promote territorial unity and cement support for the new African-led government, there was now a drive for political unity, as a result of which the BPS joined forces with Lamine Guèye's Socialists to form the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), although neither the MPS nor the newly formed Parti Africain de l'Indépendance, which was committed to immediate African independence, joined. The UPS became the Senegalese section of the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA), which was a coalition of most of the non-RDA parties in French West Africa. The UPS quickly split, however, over strategy for the campaign for the constitutional referendum of September 1958. With the collapse of the Fourth Republic, Charles de Gaulle returned to power and called a referendum over the question of membership of the French Community, as the French Union was now to be called. Gaulle made it clear that a yes vote would ensure continued cooperation from France, while a "no" vote would mean immediate independence "with all its consequences." Senghor and Dia, fearing the economic consequences of an abrupt French withdrawal, called for a yes vote and were immediately denounced by a section of the party, which favored a novote and left to form the PRA-Sénégal. The result was a crushing defeat for those campaigning for a novote, since nearly 98 per cent of those voting voted yes. Radical nationalists who, out of a commitment to the Pan-African ideal, wanted to keep the federation together as a first step on the road to a united Africa and who campaigned for a no vote as the best way to hasten African independence, now found themselves politically marginalized. The position of the UPS was unassailable, and when its leaders decided, a little over a year later, to ask France for independence, it was on their terms—that is, through negotiation and in cooperation with France.

Following the vote, several French West African political leaders put forward their own proposals for a West African federation, but these plans collapsed in the face of opposition, notably from Houphouët-Boigny, who put pressure on neighboring territories not to join by playing on their fears that any such federation would be dominated by Dakar. In the end, only Sudan and Senegal remained committed to the idea, and they formed themselves into the Fédération du Mali in January 1959. It was as part of the Fédération du Mali that Senegal gained its independence on June 20, 1960. The federation did not last long, however. Historical differences, personal rivalries, and ideological disagreements led to its collapse before the end of the year, amid recriminations on both sides. Senegalese independence thus brought with it the collapse of Senghor's dream of an African federation.

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See also: Senegal: Colonial Period: Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Rufisque; Senghor, Léopold Sédar.

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Senegal: Independence to the Present

Senegal achieved political independence from France in April 1960, first as part of the Mali Federation with the French Sudan, and then as a separate nation when the federation collapsed in August 1960. Léopold Sédar Senghor, a prominent intellectual and poet, was named the first president.

The country owed much of its political stability in the first two decades of independence to Senghor's presidency. The first two years were marked by a power struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, which ultimately resulted in the ascendancy of Senghor and the arrest and imprisonment of Dia. In 1963 a new constitution established a strong presidential regime, and an election shortly thereafter gave Senghor an overwhelming majority. Until the mid-1970s, Senegal was transformed into a virtual one-party state, with Senghor treated as the "father of the nation" and the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS) the only viable political organization in the country.

The new republic experienced difficult economic circumstances as a result of the Sahelian drought of 1966–1973, France's abandonment of colonial price supports in 1967, the rise of oil prices in the early 1970s, and worldwide inflation. Halfhearted efforts at diversification of the single-crop economy based on peanuts had to contend with entrenched political and religious interests as well as French dominance of Senegal's foreign aid. A marked decline in peanut prices in the mid-1970s and a resultant decline in production had a severe impact on the nation's economy. Population growth outstripped economic growth, and constant inflation contributed to a declining real per capita income.

When Senghor resigned in December 1980 in favor of his prime minister, Abdou Diouf, the country's political stability was threatened by worsening economic stagnation and deterioration. Yet Senegal, and especially its capital Dakar, became a center of culture. The country hosted the third Festival of Negro Arts in 1966 and produced some of the continent's most respected artists, including the filmmaker Ousmane Sembene and Senghor himself.

Abdou Diouf, labeled a brilliant technocrat during his term as prime minister, quickly set about instituting political and economic reforms after becoming president on January 1, 1981. He liberalized the political process by allowing an increased number of opposition parties. Fourteen political parties were recognized in the elections of 1983. Increased urban unemployment, rising inflation, and falling groundnut prices, in addition to strict structural adjustments imposed by the International Monetary Fund, caused an economic downturn. Diouf was also criticized for his intervention in an attempted coup against Dawda Jawara in Gambia in 1981. The coup was suppressed, Jawara was restored as leader, and Senegal retained a strong military presence in Gambia. The resulting Senegambian Confederation was beset by difficulties, mainly owing to Gambian fears of being absorbed into Senegal, and the federation was dissolved in 1989.

The 1983 elections, the first test for Diouf and his reforms, gave the ruling PS an overwhelming majority and the president an 82 per cent approval rating. Diouf continued to impose economic and political reforms, but a deteriorating economy and a growing separatist movement in the southern Casamance region posed serious problems for the government. Protests and strikes by university students, and then the police, in 1987 caused the government to crack down on opposition forces. However, Diouf retained the overwhelming support of the rural population as well as the traditional religious leadership, a powerful force in the country. In the 1988 elections, Diouf and the PS received 73 per cent of the popular vote, though the absentee voter rate surpassed 40 per cent. Charges of vote rigging and other irregularities sparked serious rioting in Dakar. The city was placed under a three-month state of emergency, and many opposition leaders were arrested, tried, and convicted, but amnesty was eventually granted to all political detainees. Diouf pursued further reforms and reshuffled his cabinet. Critics called for radical changes to make Senegal a genuine participatory democracy, whereas Diouf preferred incremental constitutional and electoral reforms. A series of drought years, spiraling inflation, and rapid population growth, especially in the Dakar region, thwarted efforts to improve Senegal's economic outlook after the elections.

In 1989, Senegal faced a serious crisis with its Arab-dominated neighbor, Mauritania. Long-standing hostility and border disputes between the two countries erupted into a massacre of Senegalese in Mauritania, and revenge attacks against Mauritians in Senegal. In the aftermath of the killings several thousand Senegalese and Mauritians were repatriated, property and assets were confiscated, and borders were closed. The two countries appeared on the brink of war, but the violence came to an end. Despite mediation efforts and the restoration of diplomatic ties, tensions remain high between the two countries.

In the 1993 elections, Diouf won with almost 60 per cent of the popular vote, and the PS again dominated the legislative elections. The elections were not marred by violence, but turnout was low. The religious authorities, who had always publicly supported Diouf and urged their disciples to vote for him and the PS, remained conspicuous in their silence during the 1993 elections. In 1994, the country suffered from the devaluation of the CFA franc by the French, which resulted in the most serious uprisings in the country since independence. Hundreds were arrested; chief among them were urban youth and some radical Muslims who called for an Islamic state and the imposition of Islamic law in Senegal. Radical Islam is not especially influential in Senegal, which is dominated by the traditional leadership of the Muslim brotherhoods, notably the Murids and the Tijaniyya, who wield enormous political and economic power.

Senegal's economic problems continued throughout the 1990s. The separatist movement in the Casamance strengthened considerably with a coup in neighboring Guinea-Bissau in 1998. Senegalese intervention in the Bissau rebellion was harshly criticized by many in the region. Diouf invoked a mutual defense treaty, and the goal of keeping an apparently democratically elected civilian president in power. It was also an opportunity for the government to weaken the Casamance resistance, which reportedly received arms through Bissau and sought refuge there. In late 1999, further outbreaks of violence in the Casamance were cause for concern. Although a peace treaty was signed between President Wade and the MFDC in 2001, it has not been followed with any sustained effort to end the conflict. The government has refused to discuss any form of autonomy or independence, and the rebels have not agreed to turn over their weapons.

While Senegal has suffered economic stagnation and deterioration, it remains one of the few democracies, however flawed, in Africa. The military has never threatened to overthrow the government and opposition parties, though weak and divided, do exist and contest elections. The country has largely avoided internal ethnic conflict among the various indigenous groups in the country. Over the past two decades,

Senegal has also peacefully resolved its earlier difficulties with its neighbors, Mali and Guinea-Conakry. It has contributed forces to ECOMOG for peacekeeping missions in West Africa and has also sent forces to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Senegal has remained on very good terms with its former colonial ruler, France, and plays an active role in francophone summits and organizations. Some would argue the ties to France are too close, but both Senghor and Diouf have reaped the benefits of close cooperation with France by securing relatively generous amounts of foreign aid. The United States and Western donor countries also have excellent relations with Senegal because of its democratic traditions and civilian government, making the country one of the largest recipients of Western foreign assistance in West Africa.

Senegalese society remains largely Muslim and family centered. Urban migration, especially to the Dakar vicinity, has disrupted life in many villages, especially in the Senegal River region, yet close ties are maintained between urban migrants and their relatives in the rural areas. While Dakar has the potential to provide excellent health and educational services, especially at the University of Dakar, economic and political upheaval often disrupt the facilities. A newly created university in Saint-Louis increased higher education opportunities, but most university graduates face unemployment. Health and educational services are sorely lacking in the rural areas where most of the population still resides and works in agriculture, mainly in peanut cultivation. AIDS has recently become a concern, but the country has not been as hard hit as some other African nations. The arts, most notably the cinema and performing arts, have thrived in independent Senegal. Dakar is a bustling cultural center with a national theater, several museums, and numerous cinemas, though recent economic troubles have diminished the city's cultural scene. Sports, especially soccer and basketball, are widely popular in Senegal, as is traditional wrestling. The country periodically hosts championship events.

The country faces enormous economic and demographic problems in the next century, yet a tradition of civilian democracy, as well as a thriving culture and dynamic society, support a cautiously optimistic view of the future.

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See also: **Diop, Cheikh Anta; Diouf, Abdou; Négritude; Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict in; Senghor, Léopold Sédar.**

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Senegal: Casamance Province, Conflict In

The Casamance is the southernmost region of Senegal, lying along the Casamance River between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and extending eastward from the Atlantic Ocean to eastern Senegal. The name Casamance derives from the Portuguese corruption of Kasa Mansa (King of Kasa), the principal Portuguese trading partner in the area in the fifteenth century. The Portuguese influence remained strong even after the French conquered the area in 1903 and attached it to their colony of Senegal. Pockets of resistance remained through World War I. The French administered the province differently than other parts of Senegal because of its distance from the capital at Dakar, its location south of the British-controlled Gambia, and the historical and ethnic background of the people. The region was generally inhabited by non-Muslims belonging to distinct ethnic and linguistic groups, primarily the Jola, not found elsewhere in Senegal but who did live in Guinea-Bissau and French Guinea. Senegalese, both within the Casamance and elsewhere, have historically considered the area socially, politically, economically, and culturally different from other regions in Senegal. The nation of the Gambia separates most of the province from the rest of Senegal, reinforcing the sociocultural differences among ethnic groups living on either side of the Gambia River.

Several movements for greater autonomy for the Casamance emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, primarily among the Jola living near the region's capital and largest city, Ziguinchor. The war of independence in neighboring Portuguese Guinea at this time, and the large number of refugees who sought refuge in southern Senegal, also caused some tensions in the region, and between the region and the central government. With the independence of Guinea-Bissau in 1974, many of the refugees returned home, while others stayed in the province, increasing their calls for more autonomy for Casamance from the central government in Dakar. The Sahelian drought of the 1970s, which crippled the economy of the central peanut basin and the northern Senegal River region, encouraged development planners to see the relatively rain-reliable

Casamance as a major hope for the future. Tourism in the Casamance was also developed. Yet, to many people in the region, the benefits appeared to flow northward to the central government in Dakar. The collapse of the ill-fated Senegambian confederation in the 1980s, designed to merge Gambia into Senegal, contributed to an increasing sense of isolation and neglect in the Casamance.

Beginning in the 1980s, unrest escalated, only to be brutally crushed by Senegalese soldiers. Since 1982, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance, or MFDC), which, in extreme calls for secession and the creation of a separate Casamance nation, has dominated the military struggle. In December 1982, serious clashes in Ziguinchor between the rebels and Senegalese soldiers left over 30 people dead. With every crushed uprising, tensions mounted, with each side accusing the other of human rights violations and terrorizing civilians. The government's response has fluctuated between aggressive military campaigns and a series of diplomatic initiatives to isolate politically the most radical elements. The government of President Abdou Diouf has consistently refused any talk of independence or autonomy, viewing the issue as a threat to Senegal's territorial and sovereign integrity. The rebel movement has agreed to temporary cease-fires but has not endorsed any comprehensive peace settlement until moves toward independence begin.

Cease-fires in 1993, 1995, and 1996 all broke down. The renewal of MFDC attacks and reprisals by the army have continued since 1996, with little progress toward resolution. The Senegalese government has always been convinced that the fighters were seeking refuge in Guinea-Bissau and receiving arms through Bissau, permitting the rebels to continue the armed struggle and to refuse to negotiate. The people of the Casamance straddle both sides of the Senegal-Bissau border, including areas where the mangroves and swampy terrain provide ideal grounds for tactical guerrilla activity.

In late 1997, Senegal called on Guinea-Bissau to take serious action against arms smuggling from its territory into Casamance and to arrest suspected fighters living in Bissau. In December 1997 and January 1998, the Bissau government arrested over 20 people, including Bissau soldiers and civilians, and Senegalese civilians suspected in arms trading. The Senegalese government also stepped up detention of people in the Casamance. In January 1998, President Vieira of Guinea-Bissau fired the armed forces chief of state, Brigadier Asumane Mane, for suspicion of being involved in the smuggling of arms to separatist groups in the Casamance. There were some talks between rebels and the Senegalese government but these collapsed in

mid-1998 when an armed uprising erupted in Guinea-Bissau.

The conflict in Casamance became closely interconnected with events in Guinea-Bissau in mid-1998 and 1999. In June 1998, General Mane, who was dismissed earlier in 1998, led a mutiny of most of the Bissau army against the unpopular Vieira. Within a few days, the rebels, assisted by armed Casamance guerrillas in and from Senegal with whom they sympathized and overlapped in many cases, gained control of most of the country. Several thousand Senegalese troops were brought in to support Vieira and crush the rebels. The Senegalese government clearly saw the opportunity to eliminate, or at least dramatically weaken, the Casamance rebels and their supporters as well as their support system in both Casamance and Bissau. After several weeks of fighting, a cease-fire agreement was reached, Vieira remained in power, and Senegalese troops were withdrawn. However, in early 1999, fighting erupted again in Bissau. President Vieira was overthrown and a new military regime, under General Mane, took power.

In 2000, hopes for a peaceful resolution were renewed when Abdoulaye Wade was voted in as president, pledging to devote significant attention to ending the Casamance conflict. In 2001, his government signed a peace treaty with the MFDC. Unfortunately, the treaty signing has not been significantly followed up, while the separatist movement has undergone a series of leadership changes. The rebels' demands for total independence and the refusal to disarm, and the Senegalese government's unwillingness to discuss any change in the region's status within Senegal or to withdraw its large forces, pose formidable obstacles to a permanent peace.

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See also: Senegal: Independence to the Present: Senegal: World War I.

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Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Former President of Senegal and Poet

When Léopold Senghor was born in Joal on October 9, 1906, the alienation characteristic of colonial areas had

begun to affect the interior of Senegal. Senghor later cried out poetically that it was "white hands which pulled the triggers that destroyed the empires" of traditional Africa, "white hands which cut down the black forest to make railroad ties." The advent of the Franco-Senegalese railroad propelled the Africans into a world of economic progress and a period of acute social change.

Senghor's first seven years, spent in traditional villages, were the only happy ones of his life until he rediscovered traditional Africa in books (in Paris) and formulated his theory of *Négritude*. Throughout the rest of his life he longed for "the paradise" of his African childhood, which kept him "innocent of Europe." Sent to a Catholic mission school by his father so that he might become "civilized," Senghor later wrote that he was "torn away from the mother tongue, from the ancestor's skull, from the tom-tom of my soul." Senghor was, nevertheless, a successful student.

When he was 13, Senghor felt "the calling" and began preparing to enter the Catholic priesthood; his assimilation of Western civilization was well under way. In 1922 at Dakar, the colonial capital of French West Africa, Senghor entered the seminary and plunged into Catholic theology and philosophy. He believed firmly in his calling, but his African pride made him protest against the racism of the Father Superior, who one day called Léopold's parents "primitives" and "savages."

Obligated to leave the seminary in 1926, the adolescent Senghor entered the public Secondary School of Dakar. In 1928 he obtained his high school degree with honors. Placing his faith in Senghor's intelligence, his classical languages teacher exerted much effort to persuade the colonial administration to grant Senghor a scholarship to do what no African had previously been allowed to do: pursue literary studies in France.

With the trip to Paris began Senghor's second uprooting, he boarded at the Parisian Lycée Louis-le-Grand, along with some of France's most brilliant students. From December 1928 on, his closest friend was Georges Pompidou, who would become president of France in 1969.

The French university education completed his "Frenchification," and his greatest ambition was to become a "black-skinned Frenchman." But it was not long before he realized that this was impossible and he reacted against assimilation, beginning his quest for "Africanness," or *Négritude*, as he put it.

The avant-garde Paris of the 1930s had begun a love affair with jazz, Josephine Baker (the African American singer), and African art. This fashion and a very popular Colonial Exhibition in the Parc de Vincennes reawakened Senghor's long-suppressed love of Africa. He rediscovered his "Childhood Kingdom" and his

“pagan sap which mounted and which pranced and which danced.” He pleaded that the “protecting spirits” not let his blood “fade” like that of an assimilated person, like that of a “civilized man.”

He conscientiously sought to develop a scholarly foundation for this emotional return to Africa, plunging into the works of anthropologists and avant-garde anti-rationalist artists and thinkers. He also avidly read the works produced by the African Americans of the Harlem Renaissance. He followed them along the path that led to the flat rejection of cultural assimilation but simultaneously advocated political integration and civil rights. He would hardly depart from this path until 1958.

Secure in his newfound philosophy, Senghor appealed to God to forgive “those who have hunted thy children like wild elephants, and broken them in with whips, (and who) have made them the black hands of those whose hands were white.” He had conceived of a new universal civilization: modern Western civilization would recognize its debt to African music and sculpture, and modern black civilization would assimilate European technological tools to hasten African progress: “New York! I say New York! let the black blood flow into your blood so that it might unrust your steel joints, as a life-giving oil.” In 1948 the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre explained this Négritude phenomenon in a 50-page preface to Senghor’s first major publication, *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache de Langue Française précédée de Orphee Noir par J.-P.Sartre (The Anthology of New Black and Malagasy Poetry in the French Language preceded by Black Orpheus by Jean-Paul Sartre)*.

Three years prior, Senghor had added a political dimension to his budding academic and literary career. After World War II, Senghor (who had lived in France from 1928 on) was persuaded to return to Senegal to enter the political arena and run for a seat in the French parliament. French colonial policy had taken the route of token African representation, and Senghor became part of the African caucus in the Assemblée Nationale. Worldwide anticolonialism enabled Senghor and other Africans to obtain increasingly generous reforms, providing full French citizenship for all Africans in the French overseas territories. He successfully opened a small breach in the wall of the colonial system, which he then progressively widened. It was not Senghor’s tactic to make a frontal assault on the French system; instead, he proceeded by obtaining increasing civil rights rather than by advocating independence. Until 1958 his quest was for full statehood, on the order of the incorporation of Hawaii into the United States.

Unlike his British colonial counterpart, Kwame Nkrumah of the British West African colony of the Gold Coast (which became independent Ghana in 1957),

Senghor did not push for independence. Rejection of independence did not, however, mean that Senghor accepted complete assimilation into France. Instead, he advocated a new political federation linking Africa and France as equal partners. Nationalism for Senghor was an “outdated weapon . . . an old hunting gun.” It was to be replaced by a multiethnic, intercontinental union of equals. Neither the European politicians who balked at the enormous cost of bringing African incomes up to European levels nor the African nationalists who wished to break away from their former master found his “Eurafrica” at all palatable. The winds of change bringing independence to dozens of former colonies were too strong to resist. By September 1960 Senghor bowed to “micronationalism” and became the first president of independent Senegal.

While president, Senghor developed his theory of African socialism, which borrowed some socialist ideas but refused to reject capitalism entirely. Although harshly criticized by radical Marxist economists, Senghor brought a relatively stable economy to his country. French investment continued to favor his efforts at development.

After 20 years as president of Senegal, Senghor retired in 1981. He wished to lead humanity to a “promised land” devoid of racism, economic inequality, nationalism, and war. In the course of that effort, the Académie Française, an association of France’s most honored intellectual leaders (known as “the Immortals”), elected him the first black member in its almost 400 years of existence.

Senghor died at the age of 95 on December 20, 2001.

JACQUES LOUIS HYMAN

See also: **Senegal: Independence to the Present.**

Biography

Born in Joal on October 9, 1906. Entered a Catholic seminary to study for the priesthood in 1922; left the seminary in 1926. Moved to France to attend the Parisian Lycée Louis-le-Grand in 1928; remained in France after completing his education. Returned to Senegal in 1945. Became the first President of independent Senegal in 1960. After 20 years as president of Senegal, he retired in 1981. Died December 20, 2001.

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Seychelles: 1770 to 1960

The granitic and coralline islands about a thousand miles north-northwest of Madagascar known as Seychelles, which were settled by France in the 1770s, never quite lived up to the promise of the geographical position that seemed to make them a key to the Indian Ocean. After capitulating to a British squadron in 1794, and doing so again whenever the Royal Navy reappeared, Seychelles still served as an intermittent base for French warships and privateers until the capture of the parent islands of Ile de France and Bourbon in 1810. Under the influence of the existing French colonial courts, Seychelles were used as secret depots in the illicit slave trade to those islands until the early 1820s. Slavery's abolition in the 1830s hit Seychelles hard; later political indications are that some old white families passed their resentment down through generations in the form of rhetorical anticolonialism.

A remote dependency of Mauritius under the British until it became a crown colony in its own right in 1903, with terrain ill-adapted to extensive sugar plantations and a hand-to-mouth economy but an admirable climate, Seychelles preserved at least the


shell of its eighteenth-century social structure. The self-styled *grand blanc*, or landed white families, struggled to preserve estates of coconuts, coffee, and essential oils with unwilling African slave-descended labor. (They were much happier with the short-term tied labor of freed Africans captured from slave dhows by the navy in the 1860s and 1870s.) Colored families with land of their own looked to the British administration for support, which they sometimes received.

For a brief period in the 1850s, the Haitian example was spoken of by people of color, and revolution against the grand blanc was promised. But the vast ex-slave majority of the population had borrowed their former masters' surnames yet still knew their own place in a pyramid that was solidified by the Catholic Church and a structure in which French was the language of the propertied while all the rest were supposed to speak a Creole patois.

After 1903 there was a direct government attempt to bring Creoles (here meaning the black majority) into the social and administrative or even political mainstream by providing far better secondary education than had ever been open to anyone through the rival Catholic and Anglican Churches. The former was heavily oriented toward the propertied, and the latter had little means. King's College taught in English, was free from priestly influence, and was fondly remembered as a model even by grand blanc pupils long after its demise at the hands of a Catholic governor. One of its masters had been, as a young man, the post-World War II champion of the unprivileged Charles Evariste Collet, a black barrister and leading light of the League for the Advancement of Colored Peoples, while studying in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s, when he was bombarding the latterly receptive Colonial Office with savage depictions of the social pyramid in Seychelles.

Creoles bore the weight of taxation before World War II; and the jail, with its incorrigible thieves, received the hungry in almost the same proportion; the undernourished physical state of people at large was revealed when almost half the pioneers leaving for the army in East Africa during World War I died. A magistrate objected to flogging a starving young thief to please a planter, and disapproved of plantations' paying workers in tokens redeemable in drink at the plantation store. He was promptly diagnosed as a dangerous socialist by a leading planter and dismissed, then committing suicide.

Government proposals for social welfare schemes in the shape of community centers, resettlement schemes, and an ambitious education plan much opposed by the Catholic Church were held up by World War II. And postwar reconstruction ran into trouble when the Labour Party government sent the



Seychelles.

Fabian Socialist Dr. P. S. Selwyn-Clarke to be governor of Seychelles; Selwyn-Clarke made Charles Collet his attorney general, with a Collet-inspired mandate to modernize law, society, and the taxation system. (Income tax had been evaded by those best able to pay it.) But since Collet turned out a poor lawyer and open to charges of venality himself, the campaign turned out very badly; and since he had not stooped to establishing any real party organization within his Seychelles Progressive Association, there was no political force to protect him from the consequences of his own actions or for him to fall back on.

After alarms and excursions in the mid- and late 1940s, while government tried dragging Seychelles into what British and a few Seychellois socialists thought the modern world should be, the political future fell back into the hands of propertied people represented by the powerful, well-organized Planters and Taxpayers Association, which dominated the new, elected Legislative Council. At the same time, the unfettered birthrate and restricted physical makeup of the islands meant that pressure on limited resources was only increasing. In 1958 the colony received grants-in-aid—with treasury control agreeable to few—after getting itself into a situation where it imported more than it exported and made up the difference by government expenditure on developmental works that, for the sake of maintaining the poor, were funded by grants from London and by drawing on revenue reserves that some landed proprietors regarded as more properly their own exclusive bank account.

DERYCK SCARR

See also: Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth Century; Colonialism: Ideology of Empire: Supremacist, Paternalist. Mauritius: Slavery and Slave Society to 1835.

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Seychelles: Independence, Revolution, Restoration of Democracy: 1960 to Present

Socialist sands having run out in Seychelles in the 1950s with the discrediting of Attorney General Charles Collet and Governor P. S. Selwyn-Clarke, there was a renewed sense at the government house ten years later that the clocks would not stand still. When people became interested in political issues, the police would have their hands full, reported Governor Sir John Thorpe. Flames from the admiralty fuel depot illustrated his point that advancement in social welfare

was essential for its own sake, and to prevent social conflict when actual hunger was rising under impact from the church's prohibition on family planning, the continued absence of significantly increased production, and the effective closure of East Africa to emigration as colonies there came to independence under, among others, Britain's desire to be gone from the region east of Suez.

What galvanized Seychelles in the 1960s was the Planters and Taxpayers Associations' assumption that internal self-government would devolve to them, if anyone. New political parties appeared amid cries from *petits blancs* and African spokesmen that "*grands blancs* [the landed white gentry] want to enslave us all over again." Alarmists, and people with their ears to the ground, heard cries for rebellion. To the British who were embarrassed by the fervor for continued close association with Britain among the Seychellois it all seemed very mild in comparison with the decolonizing processes in Africa; and in negotiations toward devolution of authority that ensued until independence in 1976, the record gives a strong sense that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office hardly took Seychelles very seriously nor imagined that much difficulty could arise there.

Continued close association with Britain was the policy embraced by the young emerging leader and first but short-term president of Seychelles, J. R. M. Mancham (*b.*1939), an English-educated lawyer and son of a leading merchant who was himself part French by descent from a pioneer family and part Cantonese. He was very conscious of Britain's desire to rid itself of colonies but unclear how independence could be sustained so close to doctrinaire Africa and with so little in the way of economic resources, but he was aware of the power vacuum around the present political elite of the Taxpayers. Mancham's Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP), with its emphasis on building a new Seychelles personality uncircumscribed by existing social divisions, set out to fill it with sound social comment satirizing church and the grand blancs. The SDP won every general election. Prosperity seemed to come in with an international airport and high global profile—even if prosperity's major tourist component brought the usual social problems.

Not merely consciousness of these questions, but a curiously atavistic and ahistorical glorification of a mythical French past, seemed to characterize the narrowly defeated rival Seychelles Progressive Party, led by the British-educated lawyer F. A. René (*b.*1935), who had declared for independence immediately upon his arrival 1963, uttering stereotypical railings against colonialism. Much of SPP's leadership in the 1970s came from educated young *grands blancs* who may have been drawing on the student movement in Europe

and appeared to have been nourished at home on anti-British resentment traceable to the ending of slavery, among other things. Leninist undertones were not diminished by narrow electoral defeats in which boundaries played a large part. And a rhetorical reaching toward nonalignment in the immediate form of new African states was rewarded by armed support from Tanzania one Saturday night in June 1977 with the goal of removing the SDP's majority share in the coalition government, which, under British prompting, had taken Seychelles to independence on June 29, 1976 with Mancham as executive president and René as prime minister.

The British idea of a stabilizing coalition government with a majority for SDP had been a naive one, on the whole; and the coup was not bloodless, nor was the sequel to be without "disappearances" and assassinations in Seychelles and London, both before and after a failed mercenary counter-coup from South Africa in 1981. Tanzanians in the Seychelles army put up a fairly poor show, but the mercenaries were not there to be killed, either. As a self-styled revolutionary under the Seychelles Peoples Progressive Front, Seychelles now had a totalitarian single-party regime, with President René sometimes speaking plaintively to his people about his need for personal guards and several of his erstwhile lieutenants leaving his government. And there were ten years of apparently ill-managed nationalized assets amid stark income inequality until the USSR's collapse in the early 1990s, coupled with pressure from the commonwealth and from France forced a return to multiparty elections in 1992 and 1993. René returned as president and his party won handsomely. Mancham and his party lost, but he preached national reconciliation.

DERYCK SCARR

See Also: Colonialism, Overthrow of: Nationalism and Anticolonialism.

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Al-Shadhili: See Abu Madian, al-Shadhili, and the Spread of Sufism in the Maghrib.

Shaka and Zulu Kingdom, 1810–1840

Shaka Sensangakona, born probably in the latter half of the 1780s, presided over the emergence of the powerful

Zulu kingdom during a period of unprecedented political, social, and environmental change in southeastern Africa. A controversial figure in both contemporary and present-day assessments, Shaka has been credited variously with being the "African Napoleon," a military genius, a founding statesman, a tyrant, and a potent myth. He is the central figure in historical interpretations that place an emphasis on the "Zulucentric" foundations of state formation in eastern and southern Africa in the early 1800s.

The Zulu kingdom emerged in the 1810s in what is now the KwaZulu-Natal region of South Africa. Bantu-speaking, Iron Age farming communities had established themselves in this fertile, well-watered region by about 300 and developed agropastoralism by about 1000. By 1800, the inhabitants had established numerous small communities that ranged in size from under a thousand to over several thousand people. Chiefdoms consisted of homesteads that were bound to the wider community through ties of kinship and marriage, and to the chief through clientage and the partial reciprocity of accumulated tribute.

In the early 1800s a number of factors combined to create the conditions for rising social stratification, and increased competition over natural resources and trade for these chiefdoms. Since the mid-eighteenth century, ivory trading with Europeans had been an important stimulus to generating wealth and power for some chiefdoms at the expense of others. Control over trade routes and the declining elephant population were crucial for the consolidation of political power. Moreover, a series of severe droughts and famines intensified the process of political amalgamation, whereby strong leaders, such as Shaka, sought to transform existing social relations between chiefs and people into militarized states to safeguard resources. Young men in the *amabutho* (circumcision age sets under the authority of the chief), which were previously schools for rites of passage into manhood, were employed in elephant hunting and also in military regiments needed to defend and expand control over hunting grounds, trade routes, and fertile land. This culminated in the formation of powerful, expansive military states that competed violently for control of territory. The genesis of the Zulu and other major states in southeastern Africa, therefore, is to be found in the conditions that created an increasing need to control trade, land, and labor.

It was in this context that Shaka rose to prominence. Following his obscure beginnings, which have since been mythologized, Shaka and his mother Nandi left his father Sensangakona's home. He later returned from exile and honed his skills as strategist and warrior, eventually taking over the minor Zulu chiefdom, a tributary of the Mthethwa paramountcy, in about 1816. A man of extraordinary skill, power, and ruthlessness,

Shaka moved quickly to exploit both political advantage and the innovative in-close spear fighting that proved successful in combat. During a conflict between the Mthethwa and the Ndwandwe chiefdoms, Shaka held back the subordinate Zulu from supporting the Mthethwa. This enabled Shaka to escape Mthethwa overlordship and to fend off and eventually rout the invading Ndwandwe after the Mthethwa were vanquished. Thereafter, Shaka sharpened his command over the young warriors of his regiments and the productive forces of society, thus transforming the Zulu kingdom into an efficient and formidable fighting force. The Zulu then consolidated their control of the region and its people and extended their hegemony north- and southward. They conquered much of KwaZulu-Natal, driving some chiefdoms away and enforced tributary relations over a society increasingly stratified between the Zulu kingdom and the remaining client chiefdoms.

This series of events, and Shaka's seemingly pivotal role in them, has been seen as the focal point for the explosive series of wars and migrations in the 1820s and 1830s referred to as the *mfecane*. It is now, however, generally acknowledged that European raiders, slavers, traders and settlers had (to varying degrees according to different interpretations) a significant influence on African societies and state formation in southeastern Africa. Thus, Shaka and the Zulu kingdom alone were not responsible for the widespread social and political dislocations that led to the rise of major African kingdoms in the region. Rather, it was the complex interplay of African societies with white labor raiders and traders in ivory and slaves that led African statesmen variously to defensive or aggressive strategies to consolidate their emerging kingdoms.

Following Shaka's rise to power, the Zulu intensified raiding, primarily for cattle, and expanded their domination by garrisoning Zulu warriors throughout the region. Yet this was a tenuous power, beset by internal dissent and external opposition. Deep-rooted divisions and inequalities emerged within the kingdom as the dominant Zulu ruling house enforced distinctions of ethnicity, status, and wealth between themselves and subjected peoples. Shaka and the Zulu aristocracy's increasing sensitivity to internal opposition was exacerbated by the resurgence of an external threat when the Ndwandwe attempted to invade in 1826. Tensions remained high despite the defeat of the Ndwandwe. Shaka resorted to extreme brutality with the massacre of Zulu political opponents during a period of mourning following his mother's death. Nevertheless, anxieties within the ruling house over Shaka's excesses culminated in his assassination in 1828 by two of his half brothers and his personal assistant. The kingdom was, however, well enough established to survive the

crisis of succession, and Dingane, one of the assassins, succeeded Shaka as king.

Dingane consolidated his rule and legitimacy as king through some conciliatory gestures to his *amabutho* and the chiefs, but mainly through punitive violence against opponents and refugees returning from the upheaval of Shaka's rule. Through aggressive campaigns against neighboring chiefdoms, Dingane provided his warriors with the opportunity to acquire cattle, the mainstay of the Zulu society and economy. He, moreover, cultivated trade, established under Shaka, with the fledgling British settlement at Port Natal (Durban) to the south in order to acquire firearms and training for his men.

By the later 1830s, increasing white involvement with, and expansion into, the kingdom marked the decline of Zulu authority in the region. Frustrated with British efforts to halt the gun trade—and, more important, for their harboring a substantial number of Zulu malcontents—Dingane strictly limited their tenuous relations by the mid-1830s. It was, however, the arrival of the Boer voortrekker settlers under Piet Retief in 1837 that proved to be a more formidable challenge to the Zulu kingdom and led to Dingane's undoing.

Dingane, acutely aware of the expansionist predilections of the voortrekkers, put to death Retief and a party of his men who had negotiated a tentative cession of Zulu land for settlement. The Boers, under the new leader Andries Pretorius, then exacted a major reprisal against the Zulu at Ncome (Blood) River. Thereafter, relations between the Zulu and white encroachers remained unsettled. In a curious twist, the competing dynastic ambitions of Dingane's half brother Mpande converged with Trekker ambitions. In 1839, Mpande fled the kingdom, forged an alliance with the Boers, and with a combined force returned to defeat Dingane. This was a significant turning point for the Zulu kingdom. Although Mpande and his successors retained independence until 1879, his coronation by the Boers signaled that white intervention would play an increasing role in the compromised kingdom.

ARAN S. MACKINNON

See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Mfecane; Natal, Nineteenth Century.

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
Shilluk: See Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anywa.

Shoa: See Ethiopia: Shoa Plateau, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries; Ethiopia: Muslim States, Awash Valley: Shoa, Ifat, Fatagar, Hadya, Dawaro, Adal, Ninth to Sixteenth Centuries.

Sidi Muhammad: See Morocco: Sidi Muhammad and Foundations of Essawira.

Sierra Leone: Origins, 1787–1808

Sierra Leone became a settlement with the arrival of a British naval vessel carrying 411 blacks on May 10, 1787. These people had experienced poverty and unemployment in Britain, where they had found little



Sierra Leone.

support from private charity and were usually ineligible for “poor relief” because they did not have a parish of settlement. They ended up migrating to Sierra Leone as a result of philanthropic endeavors by a group of British abolitionists including Thomas Clarkson, William Wilberforce, and Granville Sharp. These abolitionists were members of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor, which was concerned about the plight of black people in London in the aftermath of the American Revolution (a conflict in which many blacks had fought with the British forces). The abolitionists thought that blacks stood a better chance of independence in a free community based on Christian principles in Sierra Leone. The British government funded the initial expedition. The Sierra Leone settlement was augmented by two further waves of migrants. In 1792 some 1,200 blacks sailed from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone. They relocated to West Africa because it seemed to offer better security, land, and independence. The third group of black settlers in Sierra Leone was maroons exiled from Jamaica after the Maroon War of 1795. Initially deported to Nova Scotia after the conflict was put down, they requested transfer to Africa. Some 550 maroons were consequently sent to Sierra Leone in 1800.

The Sierra Leone settlement began with high ideals. In 1787, Sharp wrote a constitution through which the settlers would be guided by the laws, customs, and traditions of Britain. He made provision for settlers to enact laws through common councils and to elect a governor plus a governing council. He suggested that the form of government should follow the old English system of frankpledge. The first settlers followed these

instructions. They elected Richard Weaver as their first governor, and divided their settlement into tithings (groups of ten families) with a leader elected each year called a “tithingman.” They named their original settlement Granville Town, after Sharp. Slavery and slave trading were not permitted. The early years of the Sierra Leone settlement, however, were beset by recurrent problems.

Arrangements for government were upset by more pressing difficulties of survival and working the land. Half of the original black settlers from Britain died on the voyage or within four months of arrival; various diseases—notably dysentery—claimed their lives. English seeds imported to Sierra Leone to establish viable agricultural production proved unsuitable. Conflicts arose between settlers and local Africans over access to land. In 1790, a native settlement near Granville Town was burned; in return, Africans razed that town to the ground.

By 1790 these problems led the British abolitionists, who had backed the enterprise to set up the St. George’s Bay Company, to promote Christianity, commerce, and Western civilization in Sierra Leone. In 1791 the company sent out Alexander Falconbridge to refound the settlement. He established a new Granville Town near Fourah Bay and helped the settlers to plant crops, but he died in 1792. The arrival of the black loyalists from Nova Scotia compounded Sierra Leone’s travails. John Clarkson, the brother of abolitionist Thomas Clarkson, was the naval lieutenant in charge of this wave of migrants. When the St. George’s Bay Company changed its name to the Sierra Leone Company in 1792, he was appointed as its superintendent. But he found settlers in Sierra Leone were not as industrious as he had hoped; he also had to cope with quarrelsome councilors and pilfering from stores. Given enhanced powers as governor of the Sierra Leone Company in 1792, he worked hard to make the colony viable. But Clarkson was recalled to Britain by his company directors in 1793 because they were unhappy with his offer of free land to settlers, something that had been promised in Sharp’s constitution.

Zachary Macaulay served as governor in 1794–1795 and again in 1796–1799. A former bookkeeper and manager on a Jamaican slave estate, he tried to rebuild Sierra Leone but faced difficulties. Rations and building supplies from Britain were inadequate. In September 1794 Sierra Leone was devastated by a two-week attack from a French naval squadron. After 1796, disputes between the settlers and the governor arose over the new policy of the Sierra Leone Company to charge quitrents, whereby settlers had to pay one shilling for every acre of land used. After Macaulay’s return to Britain in April 1799 the Sierra Leone Company received a new charter from the British crown that

effectively returned authority to the company and its governor. Dismayed at the erosion of representative government and upset by the quitrent issue and the free land that had been promised but not received, the Nova Scotians rose up against the Sierra Leone Company in 1800. The rebellion was crushed, and the company decided not to send any more blacks to West Africa. The company also became involved with quarrels with the Koya Temne (whose land had been sold to settlers). The Temne attacked the company’s fort on Thornton Hill on November 18, 1801; the company’s forces retaliated and destroyed many Temne settlements. In 1807 the Temne signed a dictated peace treaty with the British in which they renounced all claims to colony land.

On January 1, 1808, Sierra Leone became a crown colony. The British government, looking for a naval base in West Africa, hoped that a new constitutional arrangement would resolve some of the political and financial failure that had been endemic in the first 21 years of the Sierra Leone settlement.

KENNETH MORGAN

See also: Sierra Leone: Development of the Colony: Nineteenth Century.

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Sierra Leone: Development of the Colony, Nineteenth Century

January 1, 1808, marked the formal transfer of the colony of Sierra Leone from the ailing Sierra Leone Company to the British crown. British legislation abolishing slave trading also became effective that year, and the newly acquired colony became a depository for “recaptives” rescued from slave ships by the Royal Navy. The original group of emancipated slaves from Britain and the New World (settlers) numbered less than 2,000 in 1811. Nearly 40,000 “recaptives” (liberated Africans) had joined them by 1833, and more were to arrive in subsequent decades. Many of these new arrivals were found homes in small villages designed to emulate pastoral Europe, but the steep and

thickly forested slopes of the Freetown Peninsula were never going to support an agricultural colony. Freetown's estuarine location and excellent natural harbor were better suited to commerce, and the liberated African population soon began to gravitate to Freetown to take up trading.

Freetown developed as an entrepôt for the Atlantic trade by tapping into the produce economy of its African hinterland. Principal exports in the early nineteenth century were timber and palm oil, later supplanted by rubber, hides, groundnuts, and palm kernels. British sovereignty was at first a positive factor in the colony's economic development. All traders engaging in "legitimate" commerce enjoyed military protection, and African rulers and merchants of the interior were courted by diplomatic missions financed by the British government. Yet, the growing prosperity of nineteenth-century Freetown also owed much to its African population. In an era when overland traders frequently ran the risk of theft, extortion, or worse, honest brokerage was highly prized. Having few alternative sources of income, settler and liberated African traders worked assiduously at building commercial networks in the hinterland. The growing population of Freetown also created opportunities in retail trade and food marketing, and successful merchants tended to invest in residential property rather than European securities. Commercial prosperity therefore generated urban growth, and this process continued as the city began to attract African immigrants from the hinterland. The most successful of these served as "landlords" (i.e. brokers, translators, and providers of accommodation) for traders from their home areas. African businesses competed on level terms with European firms based in the colony for much of the nineteenth century, and many Sierra Leone traders expanded their operations along the West African coast.

Freetown fostered many brilliant careers. For example, in 1828, a boy from Egba country in Nigeria was rescued from a slave ship and sent to Murray Town, near Freetown. Taking the name William Lewis, he began work as a fisherman after leaving the village school. He soon took up trading in the hinterland, exchanging European imports for foodstuffs destined for Freetown markets. In 1847, he bought a store in west Freetown, moving on to the city center in 1859. By 1870, Lewis was operating two ships, had served a term as vice president of the Freetown Mercantile Association, and had become a trustee of a new Wesleyan chapel. Samuel Lewis, one of his sons, was educated in Britain and called to the English bar in 1871; Queen Victoria knighted him in 1896 for political and legal services to the colony.

This example is also indicative of the cultural processes underpinning the colony's economic development. Most of the original settlers had embraced

Christianity before arriving in the colony, but the liberated Africans reflected the diversity of Africa's peoples, languages, and cultures. Once deposited in the colony, recaptives faced a pressing need to find a common medium. With the encouragement of the colonial government, European missionaries set about building schools and churches in Freetown and the liberated African villages. Many liberated Africans soon embraced Protestantism and the cultural values of contemporary bourgeois Europe—especially the work ethic and esteemed notion of individual responsibility. This acculturation process did not elide their African heritage, however, but instead gave birth to a distinctive Krio (Creole) identity and culture. Krio culture was founded upon a lingua franca whose African grammatical structure was wedded to English, French, Portuguese, and African lexical elements. Krio Christianity also incorporated much traditional African ceremonial, and many of the mutual-aid associations supporting family and commercial life in the colony were organized on a distinctively African basis. The Krio social spectrum remained broad, covering both the descendants of the original settlers and the Akus. The latter were liberated Africans of Muslim Yoruba origin who built an Islamic community in east Freetown in partnership with Fula and Mandingo immigrants from the interior.

The colony also developed into a center of intellectual exchange. African inhabitants of the colony supplied information for the first systematic accounts of West African flora and indigenous African medicine to appear in print. Krio scholars also number among the pioneers of African-language analysis. Fourah Bay College (which offered university degrees from 1876 onward) took students from all over West Africa, and helped earn nineteenth-century Freetown the sobriquet "Athens of West Africa."

In the final analysis, however, the European agencies that had facilitated the early development of the colony proved to be a constraint. Freetown was first constituted as a municipality in 1799, but its offices soon withered as the colonial government assumed full executive powers. It was not reestablished until 1893, three years before a British Protectorate was declared over the territory adjoining the colony. Krios working in colonial administration had petitioned for greater self-government, but they now found their responsibilities diminished by racist legislation specifically designed to consolidate British colonial rule. Krio businesses also went into decline in this period. International demand for African produce was falling, and Krio retailers were also facing increasing competition from European firms and Levantine (Syrian) traders, both of whom tended to enjoy better credit facilities at European banks.

The nineteenth-century Sierra Leone colony exceeded all the expectations of Granville Sharp's

philanthropic experiment of 1787. Its development was subsumed under intensified European colonialism at the close of the century. Yet it remains a testament to the energy and resourcefulness of ex-slaves forced to build a new society from the ground up.

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See also: **Freetown; Religion, Colonial Africa: Religious Responses to Colonial Rule; Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions; Resettlement of Recaptives: Freetown, Libreville, Liberia, Freretown, Zanzibar.**

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Sierra Leone: Christianity, Education, Krio Diaspora

The Sierra Leone colony was from the start a Christian enterprise. Granville Sharp's 1787 settlement was founded on Christian principles, as was the subsequent Sierra Leone Company venture. The settlers, originally from Nova Scotia, organized themselves into their own independent churches (Methodist, Baptist, and the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion) under their own pastors, and used them as units of local government. They built their own churches and conducted their worship separately from that provided by the company's chaplain.

The colony was also seen as a base for Christian missionary outreach. After several abortive attempts in the 1790s, missionaries arrived in 1804 from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) founded in London in 1799, which took Sierra Leone as one of its chief stations. Making Freetown their base, they established a mission to the Susu people in the Rio Pongas country, a slave-trading center north of Sierra Leone, where their efforts were chiefly confined to educating the slave-traders' children. Meanwhile, at the request of the Nova Scotian Methodists, Methodist missionaries were sent to Freetown from London in 1811 by the Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS).

After 1808, when the British Crown took over and Sierra Leone became a center for enforcing the campaign against the Atlantic slave trade, there was a steady influx into the colony of the recaptives taken from slave ships, liberated, and settled in villages round Freetown. They represented an obvious target for missionary work. In 1816 the CMS gave up the Susu mission and, encouraged by governor Sir Charles MacCarthy and with substantial government finance, embarked on an ambitious program to convert the recaptive population. The colony was divided into parishes with villages laid out as Christian villages, each sited around a stone-built church, parsonage, and school built by the villagers themselves. These parishes were under the control of missionary magistrates who combined secular with religious authority to preach their message. But the people had little need for such authority: lacking a common language and cut off from the religions of their homelands, they were eager to learn English and to listen responsively to preaching that offered a new life of salvation to match their new life of freedom.

Mortality was high among the early missionaries. The CMS could not recruit enough to carry on the work, and laypeople were eventually substituted. But the missionary impetus remained, supplemented by the pastors of the settler churches, which some recaptives preferred to join, seeing in the settlers a black reference group with whom they could identify. Moreover, recaptives, once converted themselves, would take those newly landed from the slave ships into their homes and instruct them in the faith of their new homeland. Thus the conversion of the recaptive community to Christianity was a joint enterprise in which government, CMS and WMS missionaries, settler pastors, and—above all—the people themselves collaborated with astonishing success. In 1834 the then governor could describe them, without too much exaggeration, as "a nation of Free Black Christians."

A Christian community required education in Christian schools. The Sierra Leone Company had provided a school in Freetown for the settler children, which the colonial government continued to maintain. It also accepted responsibility for educating recaptive children. The Liberated African Department, which supervised the care of the recaptives, financed schools and teachers. All the schools provided a Christian education, and every church had its school. The missionaries were the main educational agents, the WMS operating in Freetown, the CMS concentrating on the villages. People clamored for schools to educate their children, undeterred—indeed, growing more insistent—when the missions began charging fees. By 1840, over 8,000—about a fifth of the population—were in school (while in England only three-fifths of the population was literate).

The CMS opened a Christian Institution in Leicester village in 1814 to give a more advanced schooling and eventually train teachers. It closed after a few years, but in 1827 was reopened on a waterside site at Fourah Bay. (One of the first students was the later Bishop Samuel Adjai Crowther.) Still, it remained a small affair until 1845, when the CMS put up a substantial new building and turned it into an institution to train clergy as well as teachers. In the same year a fee-paying CMS Grammar School was opened in Freetown for the sons of the emergent bourgeoisie, offering an education similar to that provided in an English grammar school, and in 1849 a Female Institution (renamed in 1877 the Annie Walsh Memorial School), was founded for their daughters. The WMS opened a secondary school, the Wesleyan Boys High School, in 1874, and a Wesleyan Female Institution, run privately, opened in 1880.

The mid-nineteenth century was a period of prosperity in Sierra Leone, and the growing bourgeoisie, enriched by import-export trade, began seeking higher education for their children. Some sent them to Britain whence, from the 1860s, an increasing number returned qualified as lawyers or doctors. But there was also a demand for a local institution of higher education, and in 1876 the CMS turned Fourah Bay College (as it had been renamed in 1864) into a nondenominational university college, accepting students from any part of West Africa.

Compared to the enormous missionary outlay for education (provided ultimately by mission subscribers in Britain), government financing was minimal once the influx of recaptives ceased and the Liberated African Department closed. In the 1870s the government school was upgraded as a model school, and a school inspector was appointed (though during the economic depression of the 1870s education grants ceased altogether for several years). But not until the twentieth century, with the institution of an education department in 1909, did the government begin to undertake any serious responsibility for education.

The recaptives' children became known as *Creoles*, a word first used with this meaning in the 1830s (and today rendered *Krios*). Educated and socialized into a new lifestyle, within a generation they had transformed themselves into a cohesive community with their own Krio culture based on English models but adapted to their own ways. Their own distinctive religious practices were incorporated into Christian worship, while their speech evolved as the Krio language, giving the community its own identity. Not all were Christians. Some, who had been Muslims in their homelands before capture (perhaps 10 per cent of the population), retained their religion. Known as *Aku*, they settled together in East Freetown with their own mosques and Quranic schools. Nor did the the Krio community form one socioeconomic unit; differences

of wealth divided them by class, but they retained a common identity, conscious and proud of their own culture, which they articulated publicly through a flourishing newspaper press. Investment in house property gave the community stability. Moreover, at this period the government was ready to recognize their achievements and appoint those who were qualified to senior official posts. By the early 1890s nearly half of those posts were held by Krios.

The Krios' cosmopolitan culture suited the enterprising and was bounded by no frontiers. Economic opportunities within the Sierra Leone colony were limited, but the ambitious could seek their fortunes inland, trading for produce, or, more commonly, overseas. In 1839 a group of recaptives ventured down the coast to Badagry in the Yoruba country of what became Nigeria, whence many of them had been shipped as slaves, and settled there as traders. At their suggestion the CMS founded a Yoruba mission where some of them were employed as missionaries, attracting others to trade in the Yoruba hinterland where they became known as the Saro. A large Saro trading community grew up in Lagos where, as at home, they invested in house property. After Lagos became British in 1861, opportunities opened for the Saro in government service and as pastors and teachers. A grammar school had already opened in 1859 under a Saro principal. They did not only build churches in Lagos, though; *Aku* traders built the first mosque.

When the Niger was opened to steamship travel in the 1850s, Krio CMS missionaries of Igbo origin established a mission to the Igbo people, supervised by Bishop Crowther. Krio traders followed, trading on their own or as agents for European firms, along the Niger and in the rivers country. When British administration extended to Northern Nigeria, Krios flocked there to provide the necessary literate office staff. All along the coast they found opportunities as entrepreneurs, officials, professional men, and skilled craftsmen. In Gambia (where they were confusingly all called *Aku*) they formed the elite of Bathurst (Banjul), and in the Gold Coast (Ghana) they competed with the local elites. In Fernando Po (Bioko) there was a large Krio community of traders and cocoa planters. By the twentieth century the *Sierra Leone Weekly News* sold more copies abroad than in Freetown, linking together the far-flung diaspora whose families were also regularly linked by marriage, a Pan-West African community not defined by geography but by its distinctive culture.

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See also: **Crowther, Reverend Samuel Ajayi and the Niger Mission; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missionaries.**

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Sierra Leone: Temne, Mende, and the Colony

Temne (Atlantic language family) and Mende (southern Mande) speakers together account for approximately 60 per cent of the population of the Republic of Sierra Leone. In the nineteenth century their ancestors occupied much the same area of the Sierra Leone Guinea plain the Temne and Mende now inhabit. The early Portuguese traders encountered the Temne in the Sierra Leone estuary; the Kpaa Mende crossed the Jong/Taia River only in the early nineteenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century the Temne and Mende languages expanded at the expense of the coastal Bullom, Sherbro, Krim, and Vai. The Temne and Mende lived in villages, sometimes stockaded for defense, aggregated in larger political units, usually referred to as *chiefdoms*. These were of various origins, and of varying and changing boundaries and structures. In Temne, political authority often rested with lineages of Mande origin perhaps going back to the Mani invasions. In other polities, both Temne and Mende—as, for example the Gbinti under *Almami* Rassin Bundu—power had come to lie with more recently arrived Pular or Mande speaking Muslim religious or trading families (*juula*). Such *juula* families had earlier established themselves north of the Rokel as agents in the trade between the Upper Niger and the Atlantic. Elsewhere—for example, in Upper Mende—power lay with warrior leaders such as Nyagua or Kai Londo. Male secret societies, *ragbenle* in parts of Temne and *poro* in Temne, Mende, Sherbro, and Vai, played major social and political roles. The women’s secret society *Sande/Bundu* had a social significance, and, in some Mende areas, political functions. Everywhere

populations were mixed, multilingualism common, political boundaries permeable, and ethnic identities fluid.

The settlement at Sierra Leone was established in Temne territory in the late eighteenth century. From its earliest days Sierra Leone depended on trade. The staple food, rice, was imported from neighboring areas. Long-distance northern trade routes provided gold, hides, and ivory for export overseas. But bulkier commodities, traded by river, soon became much more significant. Until 1830, timber, particularly from Temne, predominated. After the forests were depleted, groundnuts, palm oil (and after 1850 palm kernels), and—later still—rubber replaced timber. North of the Rokel, *juula* played an important role in the export trade as well as in the interregional exchange of cattle for kola. Sierra Leoneans (Krio) were largely confined to heads of navigation towns such as Kambia and Port Loko. South of the peninsula, Sierra Leone traders were more significant and widely dispersed, though here too *juula* played an important part. The Sierra Leone government sought to promote trade and develop relationships with local societies. European and Sierra Leonean merchants established close relationships with *juula* living in Freetown. Emissaries were dispatched to major inland centers: the earliest was sent to Futa Jalon in 1794. Government also sought to extend its influence over Temne and Mende polities closer to the colony in order to keep the long-distance routes open and to promote the peace necessary for produce trade. In 1831, during a pause in the Temne-Loko war, Temne chiefs signed a treaty with the colony promising to refer disputes to the governor. Between 1830 and 1880 similar treaties were signed with Temne and Mende rulers in the coastal zone. Despite the efforts of T. G. Lawson, government interpreter from 1852 to 1888, the treaty system operated erratically and intermittently.

Major changes came in the 1880s. French advances in the Guinea rivers, acknowledged in the Anglo-French agreement of 1881, confined Sierra Leone’s coastal control to the area between the Great Scarcies and the River Mano, which had been effectively established as the border with Liberia in 1879. In 1884 the dramatic expansion of the Samorian *Almamate* through Falaba and Biriwa Limba to the borders of Temne country threatened the hinterland. Governor Rowe declined to make the alliance with the Samori that many Krio wished him to do. The boundaries between Sierra Leone and French Guinea were left to be determined by the Anglo-French negotiations of 1889.

Within those boundaries, the Sierra Leone government became more assertive and more willing to use force. The spread of trade and the greater availability of firearms increased the reward available to military

leaders as well as to traders. Rulers of Mende towns such as Bumpé, Tikonko, and Lago hired out mercenaries to competing families in Sherbro and Galinhas. The depression in trade in the mid-1880s sharpened competition for access to its reward and exacerbated tensions among European and Sierra Leonean traders and local Africans, as well as between competing African rulers. The Yoni Temne sought access to the waterside, first in the Rokel and later in the rivers leading to Yawri Bay. In 1887, the Yoni attacked Senehun, a Kpaa Mende town under Madam Yoko, an ally of Sierra Leone. The Colonial Office authorized a military expedition. Robari was captured, with Mende assistance, and a garrison installed. In 1889, a small party of colonial police drove the Makaia from Lago, again with African assistance, in this case from the Fula chiefs of Pujehun. In 1893 force was used to drive the remnants of the Samorian presence under Porekere from Upper Mende.

In 1890, the creation of a quasi-military frontier police, initially to patrol the road linking the towns at the heads of river navigation, consolidated effective control. The appointment of Governor Cardew in 1895 and the proclamation of the Protectorate Ordinance in 1896 signaled a further major transfer of authority from African rulers to colonial officials. Temne and Mende rulers believed that the ordinance trampled their sovereignty and destroyed their social and political authority. In 1898 the first collection of direct tax, undertaken by the hated frontier police, was met with violent resistance. In February, Bai Bureh of Kasse led a well-sustained attack on British positions in the north. In late April and early May, the Mende and Sherbro carried out a series of attacks on government posts, Christian missions, and European and Krio trading establishments. The so-called Hut Tax War shocked the colonial authorities. The first and fundamental reaction was to punish the rebels with military campaigns, during which large numbers of Temne and Mende were killed either in fighting or, after a form of judicial process, by hanging. Temne and Mende areas were then incorporated into the new Protectorate of Sierra Leone. The new communication system and the colonial fiscal regime disrupted long-standing links, particularly in the northwest to Futa Jalon and beyond. The new administrative arrangements were based on the "chiefdom" and largely ignored the wider alliances and broader hegemonies that had grown up in the course of the nineteenth century.

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See Also: **Futa Jalon; Sierra Leone: Protectorate: Administration and Government.**

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Sierra Leone: Protectorate: Administration and Government

The year 1787 was a landmark one in the history of Sierra Leone. The advent of the black poor, a freed slave settler group from Britain, necessitated the imposition of colonial rule on the territory. The Nova Scotians from Canada; maroons from Jamaica; and recaptives, or liberated Africans, who arrived later constituted a unique group of freed slaves who inhabited the colony of Sierra Leone. They were ruled by Granville Sharpe, a British humanitarian, the British-owned Sierra Leone Company, and later the British government, which colonized the settlement in 1808. At the time the British assumed control of the colony there were other indigenous residents in the settlement. They were the Temne, Mandingo, Susu, Mende, Fula, and Kru. The settlement was later called Freetown.

In order to implement swift administrative policies emanating from the governor and his council, the colonial government established villages around the newly proclaimed colony. Leicester Village was founded in 1809, Wilberforce and Regent in 1812, Gloucester in 1816, Charlotte in 1818, and York, Kent, Waterloo, and Hastings in 1819. Christian mission posts and schools were established in these villages.

The Church Missionary Society (CMS) was instrumental in aiding the colonial government with the education of children resident in the colony. The

Christian Institution at Leicester, where clergymen and teachers were trained, was transferred from that area. It was subsequently replaced by the CMS-administered Fourah Bay College, which was established in 1827. The CMS also founded a Grammar School for boys in 1845, and Annie Walsh Memorial School for girls in 1849.

Apart from the CMS, the Roman Catholic, Methodist, and Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion Churches, as well as Muslims, also operated schools in the colony and its environs peacefully. Literacy in Western education was important because the colonial administration wanted educated Africans to work as interpreters, clerks, supervisors, teachers, preachers, and noncommissioned officers in the military. The encouragement of religion and Western-style education in the colony was essential to the survival of the colonial administration. It was therefore not surprising that, by 1868, there were 95 elementary schools in Sierra Leone, supervised by the different religious denominations. The existing education ordinance applied to all educational institutions; there was to be regular inspection of all the government-assisted schools by the Department of Education.

By 1872, the governor of Sierra Leone, who resided in Freetown, was given full power and authority to establish ordinances not antithetical to the laws of England. The governor's Legislative Council was given power to establish courts and appoint officers for the proper administration of justice in Sierra Leone. In 1874, the Legislative Council consisted of the governor, lieutenant governor, chief justice, senior military officer, the colonial secretary, and an advocate of the settlement. An executive council was also established to advise the governor on policy matters.

The governor also had power to make grants of land, appoint judges and other officers of state, and impose fines on offenders. He had power to pardon offenders and suspend government officers, and to appoint a deputy in the event of his temporary absence from Sierra Leone. All government officers and others were to obey the governor. The governor was the head of government and commander in chief of the forces.

On August 31, 1896, a protectorate was proclaimed over the territory adjacent to the existing colony of Sierra Leone. Five districts were created for administrative purposes: Karene, Ronietta, Bandajuma, Panguma, and Koinadugu. Each district was placed under a district commissioner. Traditional rulers were renamed paramount chiefs under the direct supervision of the district commissioners.

Some of the traditional rulers did not favor the reduction of their powers, the slave clause in the proclamation, and the imposition of a house tax of five shillings. Led by Bai Bureh, the chiefs and their

subjects engaged in warfare with the colonial administration. After the "Hut Tax War" of 1898, the colonial administration ruled both the colony and protectorate. An order in council of 1895 gave power to the Legislative Council to legislate for the protectorate.

Sierra Leone achieved representative government in incremental stages. In 1808, it was administered by a governor and his council, which served as both an executive and a legislative body. In 1821, the governor's council was increased to nine members. In 1863, two distinct councils—the Executive and the Legislative—were established. The Executive Council consisted of the governor, chief justice, queen's advocate, colonial secretary and officer commanding the troops. The legislative council consisted of the executive and minority of the members appointed by the governor with the approval of the secretary of state for the colonies.

Due to the activities of the British colonial administrators on the coasts of Africa, many Africans who were educated became exposed to political developments in countries like India and South Africa. The National Council of British West African was formed in 1920 by leading West African nationalists, whose activities led to constitutional improvements in the West African territories. Sierra Leone was granted a new constitution in 1924; for the first time there was protectorate representation in the Legislative Council. Three unofficial members were elected to the Legislative Council, which also consisted of 11 official members and 7 nominated unofficial members, of whom 3 were paramount chiefs.

More constitutional improvements were made in 1951. The Legislative Council was increased to 30 members, not including the governor. There were 7 official members and 7 unofficial members elected in the colony; the protectorate elected 14 members indirectly. While 12 of the protectorate members were elected through District Councils, the remaining 2 were nominated by the Protectorate Assembly. In 1952, some Sierra Leoneans were given cabinet positions for the first time.

In 1957, the Legislative Council was replaced by the House of Representatives, which consisted of 57 members. They included a speaker, 14 colony representatives, 25 protectorate representatives, and twelve paramount chief representatives. The constitution was replaced later by the 1961 independence constitution.

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Sierra Leone: Protectorate: Economy

The creation of the Protectorate of Sierra Leone in 1896 cut the port of Freetown off from the role it had once enjoyed as entrepôt for the trade of the Guinea Rivers, Futa Jalon, and beyond. Freetown's trade now derived from the protectorate itself.

Before the 1930s, Sierra Leone's major export was palm kernels, with a subsidiary role for palm oil, kola nuts, ginger, piassava, and, after 1945, coffee and cocoa. The volume of exports and the penetration of European firms were greatly enhanced by the building of the government railway. Begun in 1895, the railway reached Pendembu, close to the Liberian border, in 1908, and the spur line north from Bauya reached Makeni in 1914. The line ran through the area where export-oriented agriculture was most firmly established. Railway towns, often also administrative centers, supplemented the older river towns as nodes of the trading network.

European firms, hitherto confined to Freetown, Bonthe, and a few river towns, now established themselves along the line of rail; so did an increasing number of Lebanese traders. The first Lebanese (or Syrians, as they were called in Sierra Leone until the 1950s) arrived in Freetown in the 1890s. They came to dominate Freetown retail trade, thus generating the capital to exploit the opportunities the railway provided. Rather than compete directly with the European firms, the Lebanese supplemented them, penetrating where Europeans declined to go, gathering in produce and distributing imported goods. Lebanese also grasped opportunities European firms failed to see—notably, in the internal trade in rice, supplying the Freetown market by rail, and in the export of kola by sea to Gambia and Senegal.

Krio (Creole) traders were aware of the new opportunities, but were for the most part unable to sustain their position against Lebanese competition, most spectacularly demonstrated by the rapid retreat of Krio women kola traders in Sherbro in the years leading up to 1913. The Fula retained control of the cattle trade from the north to Freetown. They and other Muslim traders adapted their trading networks, moving to railway towns and later to the mining centers while maintaining their position in the rivers north of Freetown, largely ignored by European firms.

Commercial penetration was further enhanced by the development of the road network. The first roads were “feeder roads” for the railway, but also for the river towns, which were thus enabled to maintain their (diminished) position, particularly after motor launches were introduced in the 1920s. Trucks were first imported in 1916, but became a significant factor only in the late 1920s. Road and river transport provided a further opportunity for Lebanese entrepreneurship. The major increase in road building, the replacement of ferries by bridges, and the creation of an integrated road network came only in the late colonial period. River and rail transportation declined, and the railway finally closed in 1969. Africans, in particular the Fula, played a more and more significant part in trucking ownership and management.

An export trade and government customs revenues largely dependent on palm kernels were vulnerable to price movements. Like many other colonial economies, Sierra Leone suffered badly from the influenza pandemic of 1918, the slump of 1921, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 1921 downturn hit African firms that had managed to survive the first impact of the imposition of colonial rule. In the 1930s the European firms replaced European employees “up line” with Africans. Diminished returns did not destroy the export trade; exports of palm kernels attained their highest volume in 1936. Moreover, farmers responded to the pressures of the Depression years in a positive way. The agriculture department adopted policies more sympathetic to the needs of food-crop farmers than it did in earlier or subsequent periods. Production of rice expanded, and from 1934 to 1938, Sierra Leone was a net exporter of rice.

The major change produced by the Depression was the development of mining. Government provided the first stimulus by organizing a geological survey. Major deposits of iron were discovered in Marampa chiefdom in 1926, while diamonds were found in Kono in 1930. Smaller alluvial deposits of gold and platinum were identified. The low barriers of entry to alluvial mining enabled Africans as well as Europeans and Lebanese to participate in, and in some cases profit from, platinum and gold. The platinum deposits ran out quickly, and gold was largely exhausted by 1940. Iron and diamonds were the major contributors to mining exports in the longer term. But the high capital costs of mining (notably, the railway from the iron mine at Lunsar to the port at Pepel), and strong government support gave the major companies, Delco and SLST, a dominant role. Mining companies made little direct contribution to government revenue until after independence in 1961. They did employ substantial quantities of labor, and wages and other local spending stimulated economic activity and contributed to government revenue though import duties.

The strategic importance of Freetown's harbor in World War II promoted an expansion of the city that has continued ever since. From 1939 until 1956 demand for iron ore and other exports was buoyant, and prices high. Changes in Colonial Office policies after 1945 promoted public investment in infrastructure, education, and health services. The diamond rush of the 1950s to the alluvial deposits of the Sewa and Moa valleys, as well as to the SLST concession area in Kono, brought prosperity, together with a sharp increase in imports and in government revenue. The movement of young men to the diamond fields deprived agriculture of necessary labor and both food production and agricultural exports, now organized through the Produce Marketing Board, declined. The chaotic character of the diamond rush, much of which was formally illegal, promoted smuggling of diamonds through Liberia, often by Lebanese illicit buyers. The basis of the relative prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s turned out to be transitory. Iron mining declined, and the mines closed in 1974. Exploitation of diamonds became more and more destructive of the environment and of society, and effective government control of the diamond areas gradually diminished.

JOHN DAVIDSON

See also: **Freetown.**

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Sierra Leone: Margai, Sir Milton: Independence, Government of

Doctor and First Prime Minister of Sierra Leone

According to colonial and historical records, Sir Milton Augustus Strieby Margai worked in most of the

government hospitals in Sierra Leone. In fact, while working as a government medical doctor, he was involved in modernizing midwife service. He trained local instructors who taught the *sande* women about hygiene, delivery, child care, and literacy. He also prevailed on the women to include the literacy program in their initiation ceremonies. Consequently, he wrote a book (*Mavulo Golei*) that explained midwifery methods among the native women.

Margai retired from active government medical service in 1950 and established his own private practice in Bo; he was a well-reputed surgeon. During his free time, he engaged himself in politics, and he was listed as a Bonthe district council representative in the protectorate assembly in 1947. He was also a founding member of the first protectorate newspaper, *The Sierra Leone Observer* in 1949. Margai participated actively in the Protectorate Educational Progressive Union. A skillful politician, he was able to convince Etheldred N. Jones (Lamina Sanko) to merge his People's Party with the Sierra Leone Organization Society to form the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) with the slogan "One country, one people"; Margai became the party's first chairman. He became leader of government business after the 1951 elections. There were six other members of his party who were given government departments to administer.

A tactful politician, Margai's rise witnessed an atmosphere of antagonism and acrimony between the Krio (Creole) educated elite and the protectorate politicians and chiefs. In 1947, when the colonial administration ushered in constitutional reforms that would give the protectorate assembly members a majority of the seats in the legislative council, the Krio community vehemently opposed the idea. Led by Bankole Bright, the Krio looked down on the illiterate chiefs, whom they described as savages and unfit to sit in the same legislative council. Margai rebuked the Krio faction, and the protectorate chiefs and educated elite united against them. With the introduction of the Stevenson's constitution in 1951, which provided for an African majority in the legislative and executive councils, it was not surprising to see the SLPP emerge victorious in the subsequent general elections. The party captured 41 seats (versus 9 for the opposition). The protectorate chiefs supported the SLPP overwhelmingly; in fact, it was widely believed that any political party that won the support of the populous protectorate would emerge as the winner. This was why the SLPP had an edge over the Krio opposition forces.

In 1954, Margai became chief minister. He held the post until 1957, when he was appointed premier. Due to personal problems between Margai and his younger brother, Albert (later, Sir Albert), the latter broke with

the SLPP and formed the People's National Party (PNP). In 1959, Margai skillfully used tactful methods to win the support of the moderate Krio opposition elements and his brother Albert; they joined Margai's United Front coalition. The aim of the coalition was to proceed to London for the constitutional conference.

Margai rewarded the Krio opposition leaders C. B. Rogers Wright (leader of the United People's Party, or UPP) and G. Dixon Thomas with cabinet positions in his government. His brother Albert was appointed minister of agriculture. All of them then became members of the SLPP. The coalition was now ready to proceed to London for constitutional talks for Sierra Leone's independence.

In 1959, Margai was awarded a knighthood. The only opposition force remaining was that of Siaka Stevens, who formed the All People's Congress Party in 1960 with the slogan "Elections before independence." He tried to win the support of young men, women, and teachers in the urban areas.

The Sierra Leone constitutional conference was held in Lancaster House, London, in 1960 and a new constitution was drawn up for the country. The independence constitution provided for a governor general as head of state with ceremonial functions, and a prime minister, and a cabinet. Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 1961, with Margai as prime minister. Sierra Leone also became the 100th member of the United Nations. Margai's cabinet was broadly based; Kandeh Bureh became minister of transport and communications, while Dr. John Karefa Smart was appointed minister of external affairs. Ahmadu Wurie was appointed minister of education, and Albert Margai minister of finance. G. Dixon Thomas, Mohammad Sanusi Mustapha, and paramount chief Madam Ella Koblo Gulama were also given cabinet position; Gulama became the first female cabinet minister of Sierra Leone.

Margai's ministership witnessed the visit of Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh to Sierra Leone in 1961. Njala University College was established in 1963. Sierra Leone was a stable and progressive nation during Margai's tenure as prime minister. He died on April 28, 1964, a day after the third anniversary of Sierra Leone's anniversary. His brother Albert Margai succeeded him as prime minister.

MICHAEL J. JUSU

See also: **Sierra Leone: Christianity, Education, Krio Diaspora; Sierra Leone: Stevens, Siaka and the All People's Congress.**

Biography

Born December 7, 1895 at Gbangbatoke, Moyamba district. Attended the Evangelical United Brethren School,

Bonthe and Albert Academy, Freetown. Subsequently attended Fourah Bay College, where he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1921, becoming the first candidate from the protectorate to earn a degree at the institution. Entered King's College in England, where he graduated with a Master's degree in 1926. Set another record by becoming the first protectorate man to earn a degree in medicine, from the Armstrong School of Medicine. Appointed medical officer for Sierra Leone in 1928. Named prime minister of Sierra Leone upon its independence in 1961. Died on April 28, 1964.

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Sierra Leone: Stevens, Siaka and the All People's Congress

Siaka Stevens (1905–1988) was cofounder of the United Mine Workers Union, which contributed to his appointment to Sierra Leone's Protectorate Assembly in 1946 to represent the workers' interests. He was elected to the Legislative Council in 1951, and in 1952 he was appointed minister of lands, mines, and labor. He won the 1957 general election to the House of Representatives as member for the Port Loko East constituency; an election petition, however, resulted in his losing the seat. He later became the deputy leader and secretary general of the Peoples National Party (PNP).

In July 1960, Stevens, who was a member of the PNP delegation to the London constitutional talks for Sierra Leone's independence, refused to sign the independence arrangement with Britain, citing the defense clause as a factor. He returned to Sierra Leone and launched his "elections before independence" movement as a protest against the United Front Coalition. The movement eventually crystallized into a formidable political party, the All People's Congress (APC), with Stevens as its leader.

The ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) accused the APC leadership of attempting to sabotage the independence celebrations of 1961. Consequently, 43 APC leaders, including Stevens, were arrested and detained under a state of emergency act.

The 1962 general election returned Stevens as a parliamentary member for the Freetown West 11 constituency, and he was elected mayor of Freetown in 1964. The APC was in total control of northern Sierra Leone by 1966.

The APC campaigned for nonalignment and socialism, and advocated equal opportunity for all Sierra Leoneans irrespective of tribe, class, color, or creed. The party also expressed distrust of foreigners. The party's appeal to those on the lower rungs of the educational, social, and economic ladder was a clear manifestation of galvanizing mass support from the populace by using the bottom-to-top approach. This tactic was very successful, and the party eventually had a membership of thousands.

In the 1967 general election, Stevens retained his Freetown West 11 constituency seat. The general election gave the APC 32 seats out of 66 in the parliament. Although the election was won by the APC and Stevens was appointed prime minister by the governor general, the military commander Brigadier David Lansana disputed the results. The governor general and Stevens were put under house arrest on orders of the military commander. The latter was in turn arrested together with Albert Margai, outgoing prime minister and leader of the SLPP, on March 23 of the same year. The constitution was suspended and a National Reformation Council (NRC) was formed with Colonel Andrew T. Juxon-Smith as chairman. The NRC was in turn overthrown in April 1968 by junior army officers who formed the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement.

Stevens was reinstated as prime minister in 1968, after the National Interim Council, headed by Brigadier Bangura restored the constitution. Before the end of the year, by-elections were held after most of the SLPP members of parliament lost election petitions. This led to the appointment of an all-APC cabinet. Due to subsequent provincial disturbances and the government's alleged discovery of a plot to overthrow the regime in 1971, a state of emergency was declared. Bangura was tried, found guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the government, and subsequently executed. Sierra Leone was proclaimed a republic in 1971 by Stevens, who became its first executive president. Meanwhile, another plot to overthrow the government was discovered in 1974, and the coup leaders were arrested, tried, and executed.

The SLPP boycotted the 1973 general elections due to widespread violence. APC thugs and stalwarts were accused of intimidating opposition party supporters. In fact, it became widely known that the APC was kept in power by election rigging and violence. After appointing Christian Kamara-Taylor as prime minister in 1975, Stevens was reelected president in 1976. In the 1977

general elections, the APC won 74 seats and the SLPP 15 seats. The constitutional referendum of 1978 gave Stevens's government approval for a one-party state. Consequently, the new 1978 constitution came into force, and SLPP members of parliament joined the APC party.

In July 1980, Stevens hosted the seventeenth summit meeting of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), representing 50 countries, in Freetown. This was followed by general elections in 1982 that were marked by large-scale violence and irregularities, which led to the cancellation of elections in 13 constituencies. By-elections were held on June 4, 1982.

Steven's new cabinet reflected ethnic balance between the Mendes and the Temnes. The new Finance Minister was Salia Jusu-Sheriff, former SLPP leader who crossed over to the APC in 1981. His presence in the cabinet was significant because many people began to view the APC as a true national party.

Some scholars believe that Siaka Stevens tried to open the ranks of the APC to people of all walks of life. His aim was to maintain ethnic balance, and he tried to solicit the support of the academics, clerics, businessmen and traditional rulers. While trying to extend an olive branch to those who opposed him, he was actually an unsympathetic leader. He also succeeded in molding the diverse ethnic groups into a unified nation. Cultural and regional tensions were minimized.

Other observers described Stevens as a unique man in African politics and an evil genius who should have made Sierra Leone better instead of destroying it, but his regime was all about politics and power. For political purposes, he actually took disastrous economic decisions, like the phasing out of the railway. Many people saw this as his determination to punish the Mende to the south and east, who persistently opposed the APC. The railway was to be replaced by an efficient network of roads, but road construction stopped at Kenema; Kailahun was left out completely. Stevens played a Machiavellian hand of politics to reduce wrong things in the state to trivialities or jokes.

The latter years of Stevens's reign saw Sierra Leoneans cautiously accepting the rule of the APC. Stevens actually dominated the ruling All Peoples Congress party. He retired from office in November 1985 and continued his role as chairman of the party. He died on May 28, 1988; by then the APC had endorsed Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh as the sole candidate for party leadership.

MICHAEL J. JUSU

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Sierra Leone: Momoh, Joseph Saidu: Regime, 1986–1992

Brigadier General Joseph Saidu Momoh, president Siaka Stevens's hand-picked successor, was first perceived as the person who would rescue Sierra Leone from the jaws of authoritarian rule and instill transparency and accountability in government. On the political front, Momoh introduced a political philosophy he called "constructive nationalism." According to this philosophy, Sierra Leoneans were to put the country above their own self-interests in all matters. However, even his own ministers did not practice this philosophy. Instead, they gave birth to an intraparty political club named *Ekutay* to further their own personal interests. At the height of the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule around the world, Momoh clung to the view that a one-party system was more appropriate in societies with multiethnic cleavages, such as Sierra Leone. In the end, however, he helped to pave the path toward multiparty democracy in Sierra Leone when he signed a new constitution in September 1991.

Momoh was inaugurated as president on November 28, 1985. In March 1986, Momoh's government announced that it had foiled an attempted coup; more than 60 people were arrested. Of these, 18 were later charged. In early April, Francis K. Minah, the first vice president, was arrested and charged with treason. A government reshuffle led to the appointment of a new finance minister and the creation of the Ministry for Rural Development and Social Services. In October 1989, Minah and 15 others were implicated in a plot to assassinate Momoh and overthrow the government. Minah and 5 others were executed, and the remaining 10 were sentenced to life imprisonment.

To combat corruption in the public sector, Momoh initiated several measures in 1987. In July, the first casualty of the measures, the minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Forestry, was forced to resign for accountancy irregularities in the distribution of domestic sugar supplies. In August, a deputy minister and a number of senior officials in the civil service and the Bank of Sierra Leone were charged with financial corruption. During that same year, Momoh clamped down on the press by introducing severe penalties for the publication of "defamatory" articles. He also ordered government censorship and the inspection of private mail. In January 1988, the deputy minister of Development

and Economic Planning was forced to resign; he and five other people were later indicted for fraud. Prompted by accusations of official corruption, Momoh reshuffled his cabinet in November, leading to the removal of a number of ministers. At the January 1989 All Peoples Congress (APC) conference, Momoh was unopposed as secretary general of the party. An official code of conduct for political leaders and public servants was also adopted at the conference.

In the early part of 1990, popular support for the establishment of a multiparty system became widespread. This desire was first rejected by Momoh, who urged instead broad-based participation in the one-party system. However, by the middle of August, Momoh had bowed to both national and international pressures and announced an extensive review of the constitution. The APC central committee approved a number of proposed constitutional amendments, allowing Momoh to appoint a 30-member national constitutional review commission. In the latter part of 1990, the constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 years was adopted.

The constitutional review commission submitted a draft constitution in March 1991. This provided for the restoration of a multiparty political system, and also stipulated that the president be elected by a majority of votes cast nationwide and by at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in more than one-half of the electoral districts. The president's tenure in office was limited to two five-year terms. In addition to appointing her or his own cabinet, the president was to have one vice president—not two, as in previous administrations. While accepting a majority of the proposals, the Momoh government rejected the call for the formation of an upper legislative chamber. Instead, the Momoh government opted for the establishment of a 22-member state advisory council to be made up of 12 paramount chiefs (representing each of the 12 districts) and 10 members appointed by the president. The government presented the draft constitution to the House of Representatives in early June and announced that the parliamentary term, which was due to expire that month, would be extended for one more year to compensate for the disruption caused by the conflict between the government and the Liberian-supported rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front in the southern region of Sierra Leone. The government also declared that the general elections, initially scheduled for May, were to be postponed for one year to facilitate the transition to a plural political system.

In mid-July 1991, Musa Kabia, the minister of social affairs, rural development and youth, resigned from the cabinet due to disputes within the APC over the new constitution. Kabia and ten other members of the House of Representatives were temporarily

suspended from the APC on the grounds that they had engaged in activities perceived to be contrary to the party's interests. The House of Representatives approved the new constitution in August; it was to be endorsed by a national referendum at the end of that month. Meanwhile, political activities by other parties besides the APC remained illegal until the new constitution became effective. By the time the constitution was published in March, about ten opposition movements had been created. When the national referendum was conducted between August 23 and 30, it was approved by 60 per cent of the voters, with 75 per cent of the electorate participating in the process. In September, the new constitution was formally adopted, yet the 1978 constitution remained officially in effect. By the latter part of 1991, many members of Momoh's administration, including the first and second vice presidents, had resigned from the government and the APC. In December, following legislation to provide for the registration of political associations, Momoh and his APC agreed with the leaders of the other registered political parties to cooperate in the establishment of a multiparty polity.

In the economic realm, two-thirds of the country's labor force employed in agriculture suffered the most from the nation's faltering economy during Momoh's regime. Poor producer prices, coupled with an international slump in demand for cocoa and coffee, cut into rural incomes. Momoh's promise to improve producer prices as part of a "green revolution" program went largely unfulfilled. Like its agricultural products, much of Sierra Leone's minerals were being smuggled out of the country. By 1989, the cost of servicing the country's debt had reached 130 per cent of its total exports.

Due to his administration's failure to improve the serious economic situation, Momoh's initial popularity declined precipitously in 1986. He was forced to implement economic austerity measures under the rubric of the structural adjustment program (SAP) recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The measures included the introduction of a floating exchange rate, the elimination of government subsidies on rice and petroleum, the liberalization of trade, and increases in producer prices with the hope that they could encourage self-sufficiency for those trading in rice and other food products.

In November 1987, Momoh declared a state of emergency, as workers in the public sector engaged in strikes precipitated by the government's inability to pay their salaries. He also announced measures to prevent the hoarding of currency and essential goods, and intensified his campaign against smuggling. Under the new measures, corruption was declared a criminal offense, and those accused of any crime could be tried in absentia.

By 1988, the IMF had withdrawn its support for the SAP on the grounds that Sierra Leone was ineligible for assistance because it had not made payment on its arrears. In 1989, the Momoh administration announced additional economic measures, including increasing the revenue from the mining sector and reorganizing unpredictable state-owned enterprises. This SAP, initially approved by the IMF, had to be postponed because the IMF was concerned about the government's failure to reduce expenditure and to control debt.

On April 29, 1992, Momoh's regime was ended when members of the armed forces seized a radio station in Freetown and occupied the presidential offices. The leader of the coup, Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser (age 27 at the time), subsequently announced that Momoh's government had been replaced by a five-member military junta. Momoh sought assistance from the Guinean government, which dispatched troops to Freetown. In the ensuing violence, more than 100 people were killed. On April 30, Momoh fled to Guinea, leaving Strasser to announce the establishment of the National Provisional Ruling Council.

ABDUL KARIM BANGURA

See also: **Sierra Leone: Stevens, Siaka and the All People's Congress; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

Biography

Born 1937 at Binkolo, near Makeni, in the Northern Province of Sierra Leone. Educated at the Government Rural School at Wilberforce; the West African Methodist Collegiate School and the Technical Institute in Freetown; the Nigerian Military Academy in Kaduna (winning the baton of honor as best cadet in 1962); and the Mons Officer Cadet School in Aldershot, England (winning the sword of honor for best overseas cadet in 1963). Commissioned as second lieutenant in the Royal Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) in November 1963. Appointed commanding officer of the First Battalion of the RSLMF in 1969; deputy force commander in 1970; acting force commander in 1971; and force commander in 1972. In a cabinet reshuffle in 1975, appointed to the cabinet as minister of state. In 1985, recommended by president Siaka Stevens as his successor. On April 29, 1992, overthrown by the National Provisional Ruling Council, led by Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser.

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Sijilmasa, Zawila: Trans-Saharan Trade

Trans-Saharan trade dates back to antiquity. We know from numismatic evidence that from the end of the third century, an irregular gold coinage was issued at Carthage, and by the end of the fourth century there was a significant, if not regular, trans-Saharan gold trade. The solidus, a coin first issued in 312, provided the standard used for weighing gold dust in West Africa from then until now. The trade was evidently flourishing before the Arab conquest, but it is with the arrival of Arab traders and Islam that this trade became based in new Islamic centers of commerce that were built in the mid-eighth century.

There were essentially two routes or systems of routes crossing the Sahara by the mid-eighth century. The most important connected the Maghrib to Ghana, where Muslim merchants sought gold, slaves, ivory, and ostrich feathers. The westernmost route went directly to Audaghost, and a more eastern route went to Ghana by way of the salt mines of Toghaza, halfway across the desert. Both routes converged at Sijilmasa in the Tafilelt Oasis in southeastern Morocco. A second system of routes crossed the central Sahara connecting Ifriqiya (Tunisia) and Tripoli to the kingdom of Kanem. A subordinate route, running west from the Fezzan to Tadmekka and Gao and east to Egypt, where it entered the Fatimid city of al-Qahira (Cairo), intersected the north-south road at Zawila. Both of these hubs, Sijilmasa and Zawila, were established as new Islamic cities in the middle of the eighth century.

Before Sijilmasa became an urban center it served as a seasonal gathering place for Berbers at least as early as 500. It became a city when Sufriya Kharijite Muslims settled there after their failed revolt against the central authority of Islam. For the first 200 years Sijilmasa was an independent city-state under the control of the Berber Bani Midrar. Its position at the head of the trade routes crossing the Sahara placed it in an ideal position to control the flow of West African gold into the Muslim world. Control of the city-state became the object of intense competition between the Fatimids of Ifriqiya and the Umayyads of Cordoba, who alternately controlled Sijilmasa in the tenth century, either directly or through client Berber communities. This competition is vividly reflected in the gold



Trekking caravan. © Knut Mueller/Das Fotoarchiv.

currency struck by these two regimes, alternately in greatest quantities when they controlled the routes passing through Sijilmasa. The increasing need for gold by them and other Muslim regimes beginning to strike dinars (gold coins) in the tenth century made the Sijilmasa trade system the dominant one from this time on.

The other crucial commodity was salt. The rise to predominance of the route through Toghaza coincided with the advance of the Almoravids (from modern Mauritania) who conquered Sijilmasa in 1054–1055. Until then, much of the salt exported to the Sudan came from Awlil, on the Atlantic coast, within the sphere of the Bani Gudala. When that tribe revolted against the Almoravids, the salt route that they controlled became more isolated from the network in the central Sahara under Almoravid protection. That network traded gold in the north for manufactured goods and food products which they exchanged for salt in the desert, which they in turn traded in the south for more gold.

For the next 250 years, under the Almoravids, Almohads, and Merinids, the city flourished as a provincial capital within a much larger empire and a broad economic network from the Ebro River (Spain) to the Niger. In 1393, the Merinid sultans lost control of Sijilmasa in a civil war. The period following the civil war is the least known in Sijilmasa's history. The sixteenth-century Arab writer Leo Africanus describes the city in decline, and it was neglected by the Moroccan Saadian dynasty. In the seventeenth century the Alaouite dynasty refortified the garrison of Sijilmasa and extended its rule over Morocco.

Tradition dates routes going through the central Sahara at least as far back as those in the west. The kingdom of Fezzan goes back to antiquity; it is the Phasania referred to by the Roman author Pliny. Herodotus recounts the Garamantes driving horse-drawn chariots from this region against the "Ethiopians" as far south, perhaps, as Kanem.

But again, it is with Islam that a sustained economic network is established. The city of Zawila was founded in the late seventh or early eighth centuries. It first appears in Arab sources when the Ibadi Kharijite Berbers of Zawila were defeated by the Abbasids in 761–762. Yet the city remained a center for the Ibadi sect for a long time. By the start of the tenth century, Zawila was still an important Ibadi town, now in the hands of the Berber dynasty of the Bani Khattab. That dynasty controlled Zawila until the last of its rulers was killed in 1190 by a Mamluk commander of the late Ayyubid regime in Egypt.

If gold was the driving commodity in the Sijilmasa trade system, in Zawila it was slaves. Authors of the late twelfth century describe Zawila as a city of modest size but with numerous, flourishing bazaars, specializing in the slave trade. Recent scholarship confirms that the Fezzan region was the largest avenue for slave traffic into the Maghrib and Egypt through the nineteenth century.

The north-south route from the Fezzan to Kamen/Bornu continued to flourish beyond the decline of Zawila. The kingdom of Kanem maintained relations with the Hafsid dynasty of Tunis into the sixteenth century. The rulers of Bornu did likewise with the Ottoman province of Tripoli into the nineteenth century.

Islam was vital in the beginning of both Sijilmasa and Zawila. The Kharijite Berbers in both hub cities not only traded with Sub-Saharan Africa but also brought their version of Islam with them. Kharijism was predominant among Muslims in the trade centers south of the Sahara until at least the late eleventh century. A shared ideology on both sides of the desert undoubtedly made the arduous journey across the Sahara less daunting.

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See also: Ibn Khaldun: History of the Berbers; Kanem: Slavery and Trans-Saharan trade; Maghrib; Slavery: Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Sirikwa and Engaruka: Dairy Farming, Irrigation

The Sirikwa culture flourished between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, and disappeared by the eighteenth century at the latest. To judge from material remains, the settlement area of the Sirikwa extended throughout the western highlands of Kenya between Mount Elgon in the northwest and Lake Nakuru in the southeast. The Southern Nilotic Kalenjin groups living in this region today refer to the Sirikwa as their ancestors.

The Sirikwa culture may well represent a development from the local pastoral neolithic (the so-called Elmenteitan Culture), as well as a locally limited transition from the Stone Age to the Iron Age. Thus far, however, only a few iron remains have been found.

The main archaeological sites lie on Hyrax Hill near Nakuru in Kenya. Hyrax Hill comprises a series of prehistoric sites that date back to the Stone Age. The Sirikwa sites are characterized principally by shallow round depressions, the so-called Sirikwa holes (better termed "Sirikwa hollows"), which have a diameter of 30 to 40 feet (10 to 20 meters) and an average depth of 7.9 feet (2.4 meters). These depressions always lie on hillsides; they show the outline of an entrance of some sort, always pointing downhill, one side of which is always flanked by low rubbish mounds with a height of about one meter. Other features of these sites are potsherds in the Sirikwa/Lanet style, crude obsidian implements, bone tools, domestic faunal remains, and structures indicating remains of houses. The depressions occur in groups of five to one hundred. Surrounded by wooden fences or stone walls, they served as cattle enclosures; small farmsteads, encompassing two or three buildings, were situated on the perimeter of the enclosure and could only be entered through the latter. The enclosures both kept the flocks together and protected them from cattle raids.

The Sirikwa culture is documented mainly by evidence from archaeology and oral history. Excavations at Hyrax Hill over the last 60 years have yielded little in the way of grain remains, while grindstones and

mortars are lacking entirely. Isolated botanical samples like food plants and medicinal plants, which were found at the beginning of the 1990s near Hyrax Hill, provide no indication of a real agrarian-based culture. Instead, archaeologists have found a series of animal remains, mostly of cattle, sheep, and goats, leading to the conclusion that cattle raising was the economic mainstay of the Sirikwa. Pollen analyses indicate that wild plants such as fruits, nuts, berries, and tubers were also gathered as dietary supplements. Small-scale agriculture, however, must have been carried out in the wetter regions of Nandi and Kericho, for here mortars, grindstones, and the remains of longer-term dwellings have been found.

The Sirikwa certainly were not the first Highlands people to raise cattle, sheep, and goats, but they were the first to pursue an elaborated economy based on the production of milk and fresh meat. They did not lead nomadic lives, but founded new settlements every few years, which explains the great number of depressions over such a large area. A settlement would probably be abandoned when the rubbish mound at the entrance to the enclosure became too large, or when the grazing lands needed recovery.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these cattle-raising techniques were given up, presumably because of an increase in large-scale cattle theft, against which the traditional defensive measures were ineffective. The Maasai in particular are said to have acted as cattle thieves. The Sirikwa must have responded to this threat with more mobile cattle-raising techniques.

Engaruka is situated in Northern Tanzania, on the floor of the Rift Valley near the base of the escarpment; archaeological sites occur in great number, particularly along the Engaruka River and at the northern tip of Lake Eyasi. This mainly savanna area, characterized by dust and thornbushes, offers little opportunity for conventional agricultural techniques. From the crater highlands, however, rivers flow down to the bottom of the Rift Valley—some only seasonally, others, such as the Engaruka River, throughout the year. Between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries these wild rivers, gushing naturally out of clefts in the escarpment, were regulated in stone channels by levelling, diking, and regular maintenance. A few of these channels had a length of several kilometers and ran along the base of the escarpment and through the foothills of the mountains.

The channels were further subdivided to supply small, leveled fields, which were laid out in gridlike form. These fields were delimited by stonewalls, which helped to prevent erosion of the soft and dusty ground. Archaeologists have identified these formerly irrigated sites over an area of at least 5000 acres (2000 hectares). The abandoned fields and irrigation facilities

point to a highly specialized and integrated agricultural economy. The main crop was sorghum, grains of which have been found in village fireplaces at old Engaruka. In addition, a few cattle, goats, and sheep were kept. Excavation at Engaruka has revealed seven large villages, which were built on the hillsides in series of terraces, just above the highest fields and channels. Several thousand people must have lived there.

In approximately 1700, Engaruka was abandoned, probably because economic success brought about a population increase which led to overexploitation of land resources. The gradual drying out of the natural water supply, caused in part by deforestation over the centuries, may have been another factor contributing to this exodus. The agricultural system of Engaruka has been copied by several contemporary ethnic groups of the East African savanna; thus the irrigation systems described above can be found today among the Sonjo and Marakwet of southern Kenya.

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See also: Iron Age (Later): East Africa.

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Slave Trade: Arms, Ivory, and (East and Central Africa)

The trade in ivory, slaves, and firearms in East and Central Africa displays strong parallels in respect to the persons and the ethnic groups involved, as well as in commercial structures and trade mechanisms.

Ivory was supplied from the nearer and farther hinterland of the coastal strip stretching from Somalia to Mozambique. Hubs for this trade were Mozambique Island and Kilwa in the south, and Mombasa, Zanzibar, and the Lamu Archipelago in the north. When exactly the ivory trade in Eastern Africa began is not known;

estimates reach from Greek antiquity to the tenth century. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the southern trade route ran from the hunting areas in Zambesia and Malawi to Portuguese-controlled Mozambique Island. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Kilwa became the main export center for ivory. By the end of the seventeenth century a well-organized system underlay the trade, in which Europeans, Arabs, the Swahili, and Indians figured as wholesale buyers of the ivory. In this they cooperated with the Yao and Makua peoples of Malawi and Mozambique, who also did the elephant hunting. The latter transported the tusks from the regions west and south of Lake Malawi to Kilwa and Mozambique Island, where they were conveyed to farther destinations, particularly Zanzibar.

The more northern centers like Pate and Lamu were probably supplied, even in pre-Portuguese times, with ivory primarily from the area between the Tana and Juba Rivers. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lamu, Pate, Siyu, and Mombasa were the principal competitors for control of the ivory trade. The Oromo retained a role as middlemen; the Arabs and Swahili in the coastal towns were thus dependent on them. In about 1860, however, the Sultan of Zanzibar succeeded in uniting under his control the whole coastal strip from southern Somalia to Kilwa, and consolidating the ivory export business at Zanzibar. While the Oromo retained their supremacy over the ivory trade routes in the hinterland, they increasingly had to deal with competition from the Pokomo. In the 1867–1869 war with the Somali, the Oromo suffered a severe defeat and were completely driven out of the ivory trade. Arabs and the Swahili filled the gap, with the Swahili in particular now acting as middlemen between the hunters in the hinterland and the Arabs on the coast.

The ivory trade experienced a particular boom in the 1840s. The main beneficiary of this boom was the Sultan, who profited handsomely through taxation of imported and exported ivory that passed through Zanzibar. Until that time, the Indian subcontinent had been the main buyer for ivory. However, in the 1840s more and more North American and European vessels began anchoring at Zanzibar; the industrial revolution in America and Western Europe had also engendered a fashion revolution, which required ivory as the raw material for billiard balls, piano keys, and carvings.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the ivory routes, particularly in the south, were increasingly used for slave trading. Starting in about 1770, the demand for slaves grew rapidly owing to the expansion of plantation economies on the French islands in the Indian Ocean, and later in Zanzibar and Pemba. At first it was mainly the French traders who appeared as slave buyers and the Portuguese as slave suppliers. The slave

expeditions and trade were increasingly financed by coastal Arabs, Indians, or Swahili, with Zanzibar functioning as both distributor and consumer. The Yao, Makua, Bisa, Ngindo, and Nsenga were significant victims of the slave trade; they were sold as the captives of slave expeditions, as prisoners of war, as debtors or even as items of barter during times of famine. Ironically, the Yao and Makua themselves came increasingly to be the main slave hunters and dealers in the hinterland. Arabs brought the human booty across Lake Malawi to coastal settlements like Kilwa, Lindi, or Mikindani. The slave routes from Lake Malawi to the coast connected the southern end of the lake with Mikindani, the northern end with Kilwa, and proceeded straight across the lake to Lindi.

During the 1880s, the penetration of these territories by the English became more and more pronounced. Although at Zanzibar their antislavery policy had considerable success, the southern slaving routes from Malawi and Mozambique still remained largely intact and supplied a whole chain of smaller harbors between Kilwa and Sofala. Modern sources estimate that, even at the time of the intensification of British antislavery pressure (*c.*1875), 2,000 to 4,000 slaves were smuggled from these small coastal deposit centers Zanzibar and overseas. Ultimately, however, the political and military pressure upon slave hunters and dealers on the part of colonial administrators and missionaries intensified to such a degree that by the turn of the century the slave trade was virtually extinguished.

The consequences of the slaving expeditions for the regions affected are still controversial. Certainly it resulted in the depopulation of whole areas and in disturbances in the ivory trade. The actual numbers of people sold and the effects on the economy of the region are difficult to assess; they have, however, frequently been exaggerated. Between 1862 and 1875 slave exports from Kilwa presumably amounted to something between 10,000 and 20,000 annually, mostly to Zanzibar and Pemba. In the 1860s and 1870s some 20,000 to 30,000 people were enslaved annually on the East African coast.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the coastal strip between Mogadishu and Lamu became another focal point for the slave trade and the slave economy. At that time Lamu became a grain exporter and supplier to the growing populations of Zanzibar and Pemba. Slaves were therefore needed for cultivation, and were imported from southern Tanganyika; some of these were re-exported to Arabia. When in the 1880s the slave trade was suppressed, many areas could no longer be cultivated. Slaving expeditions aimed at the peoples in the hinterland of Kenya and southern Somalia were relatively rare because of their low population density, and presumably because

preying on well-organized peoples like the Oromo or the Masai was too dangerous.

The spread of firearms in East and Central Africa was due, on the one hand, to African internal factors, such as elephant hunting, slave trade, endemic wars, and the characteristic love of self-display on the part of African despots. External factors also played a role. For instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century the weaponry of the European and North American armies underwent a process of modernization, creating a surplus of now-obsolete weapons. Large quantities of these firearms were delivered to eastern and central Africa—first muzzle-loaded weapons, then the breech-loaded, and, finally, repeating rifles.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, large numbers of firearms reached Mozambique and Zambesia via French merchants. The customers were chiefly the Makua and Yao, who increasingly used guns for elephant hunting; the guns were paid for with ivory and captured slaves. The armament of the Makua in particular constituted an increasing threat to the Portuguese colonial power in Mozambique from the second half of the eighteenth century on. This threat resulted in several armed clashes and produced many casualties and brought the trade between the Portuguese and the Yao to a standstill. Nonetheless, starting in 1787 the Portuguese authorities allowed selling guns to the Makua, a measure that can only be explained by the immense profits gained through the exchange of firearms for slaves.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century firearms were also common in the territories of present-day Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. Here, too, Europeans (both private dealers and, later, colonial administrators) were involved in the trade with Zanzibar as one of the main transshipment centers. The trade shifted increasingly to East and Central Africa owing to the breakdown of the South African market, which had been supplied by the Portuguese, and to Muslim revolts against the advance of the European powers in East Africa. In the 1880s firearms were so common in East Africa that missionaries and administrators foresaw great danger for the stability of the region. By that time presumably 80,000 to 100,000 firearms annually were finding their way into the interior via the East African seaports. In 1890 the import of firearms to Africa was restricted by the Treaty of Brussels. Despite this prohibition firearms continued to flow into East Africa, brought inland mainly by Arab traders in exchange for ivory and slaves, and financed by Indian businessmen at the coast. Only at the end of the 1890s did this trade die out in the English, Belgian, and German territories, through rigorous controls and the collapse of the Arab hegemony on the coast.

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See also: Slavery: East Africa: Eighteenth Century; Zanzibar: Trade: Slaves, Ivory.

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Slave Trade: Arms, Ivory, and (Southern Africa)

Ivory is known to have been exported from southern Africa since at least the tenth century. An Arab chronicler of that time, al-Masudi, reported keen competition for the high-quality ivory obtained from towns as far south as Sofala on the central Mozambique coast, the tusks being transported by sea to China and India. Coins from Fatimid Egypt found at some of these towns provide evidence that the trade continued through the eleventh century; Ibn Battuta records that large quantities were still exported from Kilwa and Sofala in the thirteenth century. There is evidence to suggest that some of this ivory came from the far interior. Cowrie shells and glass beads made in Fatimid Cairo and southeast Asia (which could have been obtained in exchange for ivory) are found at Schroda in the Limpopo Valley, as well as the northern Botswana sites at Matlapaneng on the Okavango Delta and Nqoma in the Tsodilo Hills. These sites all produced ivory, much of it presumably for trade.

Around the end of the fourteenth century, Islamic traders began to move up the Zambezi; a number of trading centers arose where gold, tin, ivory, hides, salt, and sometimes slaves were sold for cloth, glass beads, and other items of great value in the interior. These centers, called *ferias* by the Portuguese who occupied them at the beginning of the sixteenth century, continued to be the main foci of trade until the mid-eighteenth century. An impression of the volume of ivory exported can be obtained from later reports on Delagoa Bay (Maputo) where 22,500 kilograms were shipped between 1721 and 1729; it is estimated that by 1770 this increased to 45,400 kilograms annually. A century later, one trader bought 18,000 kilograms on the Zambezi in a single year.

European consumption of ivory increased dramatically during the first half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the wealth created by industrialization; billiards and pianos became passions of the rich, for which ivory was required to make the balls and keys. To meet this demand, from the 1860s through the 1880s about 8,000 kilograms were exported annually from the comparatively small area west of the Okavango Delta, and another 36,000 kilograms annually from eastern Botswana. This ivory was sent out mainly through Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. By 1890, elephants were all but extinct in southern Africa, and the ivory trade came to an end.

Trade in slaves also developed early, perhaps in association with that in ivory; al-Masudi mentions slaves, but it is unclear if he included the southern African port of Sofala in his brief account. In any case, captives would have been obtained comparatively near the points of export and would have been few in number relative to other regions until late in the eighteenth century. Portuguese accounts suggest that from the 1790s to about 1830 perhaps on average 1,000 slaves were taken annually from Zambezia and sent out through Quelimane (some 400 kilometers north of Sofala). This should be balanced against records indicating that in the first decade of the nineteenth century—shortly before slave exports from Mozambique reached their peak—the value of exported ivory was more than twice that of slaves; by this time, the value of exported gold was less than that of ivory or slaves. And during the 1720s, when ivory exports from Delagoa Bay were robust, a total of only 288 slaves passed through that port. It is widely accepted that the slave trade through southern Mozambique reached its peak in the early 1800s, but its scope and consequences for native peoples is strongly debated.

At the Cape, the situation was quite different. Slaves were imported, rather than exported, almost from the founding of the colony in 1652—first from Mozambique, Madagascar, and southeast Asia, and then from India. In addition, many indigenous Khoisan-speaking peoples were enslaved—initially those within the Cape colony itself, and then, after Britain abolished the practice in 1807, those captured on the frontier. To aid in the latter process, peoples of mixed European and Khoisan parentage, who came to be called *griqua*, *bergenaar*, and *kora*, were enlisted as procuring agents in association with their extensive interior trade.

In the far northern part of the subcontinent, from the vicinity of Victoria Falls through the Okavango Delta to the Atlantic mouth of the Kunene, slaving was reported by the first Europeans to reach the area from the south in the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, native

oral histories indicate that the trade had begun a quarter century or so earlier. The Portuguese, with Chokwe and Mbwela associates operating from Benguela and Luanda, were the principal agents of this trade, but they were often supplied by local providers, including Khoisan-speaking peoples. It must be stressed that slaves were never taken here in quantities comparable to those in other parts of southern Africa, and many were used to resupply labor shortages within Angola itself. There was also a small trade to the south, but this was miniscule compared with that of the rest of the region.

Although all European colonial administrations took steps at various times to ban or limit the conveyance of firearms to natives, guns were closely tied to the expansion of the ivory and slave trade. Arms, gunpowder, shot, and lead were sold at the *ferias* in the eighteenth century. Toward the end of that century, griqua and other frontier peoples were heavily armed by Europeans at the Cape for the express purpose of hunting for ivory and raiding for slaves. On the northern margins, gunpowder was in such abundant supply by 1850 (obtained through links to Angolan Portuguese) that Cape traders found their stocks of little value in exchange for ivory unless they increased the supply of guns. Firearms were, of course, also used to further the expansion of their owners both in territory and in trade. Competition for power and wealth in the combined markets for ivory and slaves, abetted in the nineteenth century by an abundance of arms, led to profound demographic displacements throughout the subcontinent and to the strengthening of those native polities that were in a position to control local terms of trade. Most other peoples were either absorbed into those polities or subjugated to them.

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See also: Cape Colony: Slavery; “Legitimate Commerce” and the Export Trade in the Nineteenth Century; Slavery, Colonial Rule and.

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Slavery in African Society

Slavery is an age-old institution in many African cultures. It usually involves the acquisition and maintenance of men, women, and children, often nonkinsmen of the host society, in involuntary servitude by capable individuals. The existence of slavery in Africa can hardly be dated precisely, but it can be easily attested to by the varied appellations for it in different societies in the continent. In Nweh society in Cameroon for example, a slave is called *efueht* (pl. *befueht*) and slavery is known as *lefueht* (Fomin 1996). The people of Nso, also in Cameroon, refer to a slave as *kwan* (pl. *akwan*) and slavery as *vikwan*. And we find these appellations wherever slavery was deeply rooted in the continent.

Despite these varied appellations, the notion of slavery and the perception of slaves by owners can be discussed in two broad perspectives: that of the centralized polities and that of the noncentralized societies. In the centralized polities, they were perceived as acquired members of the host states. Here slavery was therefore a means of recruiting and integrating outsiders into the corporate group in the state-building enterprise. In the noncentralized societies, where kinship was the basis of nationhood, slaves were perceived as outsiders in the affairs of the corporate group of the freeborn (Fomin 2002). Thus, while the slaves remained permanently on the margin of corporate life in noncentralized societies, they lived in a continuum (Miers and Kopytoff 1977) from being outsiders to insiders in the centralized states. Both types of polities acquired slaves largely from purchase, capture, gifts, and pawns, and in some cases through procreation. The polemic of acquisition and perception of slaves in Africa is, however, not as hairsplitting as that of the origin of slavery.

The origin of slavery in African society was never uniform. In some polities, slavery evolved from indigenous servitude in a process referred to by some scholars as institutional continuity. That is, from voluntary to involuntary servitude, the distinction in origin between slavery per se and voluntary servitude is in the procurement of slaves. The slave was procured involuntarily, but the freeborn went into servitude voluntarily and could theoretically terminate it at will. But the circumstances that led them into servitude—hardship, abject poverty, and insecurity—could hardly be corrected within a brief servitude. Thus servitude preceded slavery in many African societies, especially in the centralized kingship system where servitude was an integral part.

Some societies developed slavery in the process of taking part in the trans-Saharan, transatlantic and

trans-Red Sea slave trade. They either played the role of middlemen as in the case of many West African coastal societies (Austen 1995) or intermediary forest states, which provided sojourns and markets for slave dealers from the far hinterlands. In this transaction, they developed slavery without a previous system of indigenous servitude. The societies that built their slavery system in this way can be identified today with the history of separate slave settlements. These distinct slave settlements were not farm settlements but parallel communities to those of the freeborn (Fomin 2002).

Slavery in African society was really the product of interactions between indigenous practices and extraneous influences. By the eighteenth century the impact of these foreign influences on the organization and functioning of slavery had reached their zenith in Africa. The trans-Saharan slave trade, though much declined by the eighteenth century, had left great and lasting impact on the continent. The transatlantic trade that had been going on for over 200 years had deeply penetrated the continent and involved many societies in a capitalist slave business and its ramifications. It was from the reckless and callous transatlantic system that some coastal societies built a slavery system in which slavery was essentially an economic venture.

The Arabs, who were the main torch bearers of the spread of Islamic faith in Africa, had dominated the much older trans-Saharan trade (Lavers 1994) and their merchants-cum-clerics tied enslavement to conversion. They used their slaves in a variety of purposes and left an Islamic oriented slavery system in many societies in the Sahel and Sudanic Africa. Along the Indian Ocean coast of Africa, Arabs used slaves in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to run clove plantations but did not seem to have reduced them to absolute chattels. Slaves were considered persons with recognized minimum privileges (Lovejoy 1993).

Despite these foreign influences, slavery in Africa still maintained its essential indigenous values. It was largely benign and more a social and political, rather than an economic, institution in many centralized states. Slave owners in centralized states also exploited slave transactions for wives, concubines, soldiers and retainers. Slaves performed many economic services for their masters, but no economic activity in the centralized states was reserved for slaves. It was in some noncentralized societies that slaves had specific jobs that were reserved for them alone.

Many African societies had inherent cultural values that ensured the general benignity of slavery and also worked in favor of its decline in the continent. The cruel sacrifice of slaves in rituals is known (Lovejoy 1983), but it was the exception rather than the rule. The rapid integration of slaves into the corporate life and

the freedom that slaves had in their own affairs made the lot of slaves generally less irksome in Africa.

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Slavery, Atlantic Basin in the Era of

The Atlantic basin in the era of the slave trade was characterized primarily by shifting commodity exchange pursued within civil society over a period of three centuries, climaxing in the eighteenth century.

Prior to the rise of "legitimate" trade relations during the nineteenth century, West Africans exported numerous commodities including elephant ivory, wood timber, color dyes, vegetable gum, beeswax, and food spices. Gold and leather were especially prominent exports. In Gambia, for instance, the Portuguese purchased between 5,000 to 6,000 gold doubloons annually from 1456, while Senegambia produced a record total of 150,000 leather hides in 1660. Throughout the eighteenth century, the vegetable resin gum marketed in Senegambia became central to the Atlantic trading system because of its importance as raw material for the booming textile industry.

The central export commodity in the Atlantic basin, however, became slaves. According to recent estimates calculated by David Eltis (1987) around 5,595,477 slaves were exported from the five major regions of West Africa to the New World between 1662 and 1867. The Bight of Benin accounted for 33 per cent of these human exports; the Bight of Biafra, 30 per cent; the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, 13 per cent apiece; and Senegambia, 11 per cent. This export business peaked at certain times, with the heaviest exports taken from the Bight of Benin in the 1690s through 1730s; Senegambia and Gold Coast from the 1720s through 1740s; Sierra Leone in the 1760s and 1770s; and the Bight of Benin again in the 1770s and 1780s. Such estimates of slave exports have been hotly debated for a generation—calculations of slave exports from Senegambia between 1681 and 1810 range from 304,330 (Curtin 1969) to 361,090 (Eltis 1987) to 500,000 (Barry 1998), and will no doubt continue to do

so. Revisionist historians have also begun to turn their attentions toward slave revolts against slavery, emanating out of high concentrations of labor power in domestic units and coastal slave factories, as recorded in 1756 and 1785 in Senegambia. Although new research and old debates will continue, most historians agree the slave trade increasingly dominated the export business of West Africa in the Atlantic basin during this era.

The major cause of this slave trade expansion was the rise in demand for slave labor in the Americas. Eltis (1987) estimates that some 10,247,500 slaves were forcibly removed from Africa and dispersed throughout the Atlantic basin between 1451 and 1870. Around 2 per cent went to Europe, the Atlantic islands (Maderia, the Canaries, and the Azores), and São Tomé. Most ended up in Brazil and the West Indies, which accounted for 39 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively, of all slave imports. Around 16 per cent went to Spanish America and 5 per cent to British North America. These slaves were mainly taken from west Africa prior to the eighteenth century, and from then onward increasingly from west central Africa. Along with demand for slave labor, the emergence of popular consumer tastes for the fruits of empire played a central role in slavery's expansion. Annual sugar consumption among Britain's growing middle classes and wage-earning proletariat rose from 6 pounds per head in 1710 to 23.2 pounds per head in the 1770s.

West Africa also imported goods from Europe during this era. Such goods included dozens of types of textiles during the seventeenth century. Textiles accounted for one-half to three-quarters of all goods sent to West Africa from Rouen and Le Havre in the eighteenth century. The Gold Coast absorbed around 20,000 meters of European and Asian cloth annually by the early to mid-seventeenth century. Metal goods, whether raw as iron bars and copper *manillas* (horseshoe-shaped ingots) or in the worked form of knives, swords, copper basins, and bowls, were important imports. Senegambia imported a record 150 tons of European iron every year by the last half of the seventeenth century. Then there were nonutilitarian goods such as jewelry, mechanical toys, and alcoholic beverages. Guns and gunpowder accounted for about one-fifth of cargoes shipped from Britain to Africa during the zenith of the slave trade in the eighteenth century.

The first major merchants in the Atlantic basin were sponsored by European state authorities through their policies of mercantilism. The Portuguese were the leading European power in West Africa throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Dutch in the seventeenth century, and the English and French during the eighteenth century. State interests were represented by chartered companies that were guaranteed trading

monopolies. The Netherlands was represented by the Dutch West India Company (formed in 1621); the French by the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales (1664), the Compagnie du Senegal (1673), and the Compagnie du Guinee (1684); and the English by the Royal African Company (1672). Despite their official patronage, these companies proved of limited effect because of their unattractiveness to capital investment, stuffy bureaucracy and poor staffing, unrealistic production targets, and stiff opposition.

Private traders and independent merchants were among the harshest critics of these mercantilist policies. Their success can be appreciated from the rise of slave entrepôts rimming the Atlantic basin. Old Calabar, in the Bight of Biafra, was dominated by British merchants, whose adaptation of the local institution of debt bondage or “pawnship” underpinned the region’s burgeoning involvement in the transatlantic slave trade from the 1740s onward.

Slave ports on the slave coast included Little Popo, Agoue, Great Popo, Jakin, Porto-Novo, Badagry and Lagos, but the principal one was Ouidah. This port became prominent in the last part of the seventeenth century and continued to be so until the mid-nineteenth century, with slave exports amounting to 14,000–15,000 slaves annually from the 1640s through the 1720s.

The merchant activities in these slave ports commercially threaded the Atlantic basin. In 1750s coastal western Europe, Liverpool assumed the lead in slave trading, with its ships carrying over half the slaves exported from Africa, while Nantes carried over 10,000 slaves annually across the Atlantic accounting for over half of all French shipping. Slave merchants in both slave entrepôts were also landowners, manufacturers, tradesmen, and other commercial citizens. But slave trading required increasing specialization so that, by the 1750s, 50 merchants dominated the trade in Nantes, while Liverpool’s trade was dominated by about 10 firms with a dozen partners by the 1780s.

During the eighteenth century, these shifting merchants of slave trading contributed to the establishment and consolidation of slave entrepôts in the eastern coastal regions of the Americas. Between 1698 and 1707, private traders delivered 34,157 slaves through Bridgetown, Barbados, and 37,522 slaves through Port Royal, Jamaica. Over 110,000 African slaves were landed and marketed at Sullivan’s Island, near Charleston, South Carolina, during the eighteenth century. Portuguese merchants shipped slaves from Luanda and Benguela in West Central Africa to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil and from Ouidah to Bahia. An average of eighteen ships sailed from Bahia to the slave coast annually in the eighteenth century.

Trading between Europeans and Africans in the Atlantic basin was facilitated by the emergence of

Afro-Portuguese *lancados* and *tangomaos*. By the 1520s, these unofficial traders were working western and west central Africa. They often originated from the Cape Verde islands, married local women, and formed their own settlements. These mixed traders and agents acted as important commercial and cultural links. They were significant in the Southern Rivers area of Senegambia, dominating trading circuits from Casamance to Rio Grande and active as far as Gambia in the north and Rio Pongo in the south. These traders included Abee Coffu Jantie Seniees, a leading African merchant on the Gold Coast in the late seventeenth century, and merchant princes John Jabes and John Konnywho. It is generally agreed they played a crucial role in commodity exchange relations in the Atlantic basin during the era of the slave trade.

The impact of the Atlantic basin on West Africa during the era of the slave trade was immense. The forced labor of African slaves in the Americas transformed nature into commodities for popular consumption. British industrial and commercial dominance rested on the received goods of empire—especially the slave plantation complex of the New World. The role of west African and west-central African slave labor was critical to this process of extended primitive accumulation.

Despite continuing echoes of imperial benevolence or the region’s insufficient incorporation, it is difficult to deny the tremendous transformative impact of the Atlantic complex upon West African peoples. Commercial disputes and wars were directly linked to the slave trade. Although John Thornton (1998) claims that the Dahomey wars during the eighteenth century had “more conventional diplomatic, cultural, and even ideological goals,” we cannot overlook the broader context of heavy firearm imports from the British as well as the Bight of Benin region serving as the prime slave exporting region in eighteenth-century West Africa. More generally, without the external demand and presence of imperial powers, it is hard to see what forces in West Africa could have transformed traditional social relations of slavery, labor, and gender to the same extent as the area’s incorporation into the Atlantic basin. Whether the result was the development of continental underdevelopment, West African enclave development arresting external-domestic economic links (Hopkins 1973), or Senegambian regional economic regression (Barry 1998), this transformative impact was overwhelmingly destructive.

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See also: **Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Transatlantic Passage.**

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Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Transatlantic Passage

The transatlantic passage, also known as the Middle Passage, was one of the most horrendous continuous phenomena in human history. It lasted for three centuries, peaking in the eighteenth century, a period within which the largest number of Africans was sent across the Atlantic into slavery in the Americas. The number of Africans who were captured, sold, and brought to the Americas and resold into chattel slavery defies quantification because of the manner of their capture and the survival rate in crossing the Atlantic as well as the difficulty in retrieving exact figures from ship logs. Estimates of Africans who survived the transatlantic passage into enslavement during the eighteenth century, however, are put around 6,133,000.

Along the African coast, Europeans built fortresses that were holding ports for Africans sold to slavers. These forts were open bleeding wounds on the body of Africa from which millions of men, women, and children began the forced voyage westward across the Atlantic in chains. Slave-buying middlemen who lived along the coast procured the captured Africans. They were put in dungeons in the slave castles awaiting either the arrival of slave ships, or for the numbers to reach the maximum capacity the slave ships could transport. The waiting period varied from a few days to months, while the Atlantic crossing took between three to six weeks, sometimes even longer depending on



Fort Elmina, in Ghana. Built by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century and later owned by the Dutch and the English, the fort held Africans before shipment to the slave markets of the Americas. © Friedrich Stark/Das Fotoarchiv.

weather conditions. Shipwrecks were common, which meant some slaves and sailors never completed crossing the voyage.

The arrival of slave ships at the slave fortresses from European ports signaled the last days for the captured and sold Africans in their homeland. Before being forced into the holds of the ships, their heads were shaved. They were branded by impressing on their bodies the owner's initials using fashioned red-hot pieces of silver or iron. The Portuguese baptized their slaves in compliance with the laws that required all slaves being brought to Brazil be christened. On the day of departure, after being fed, slaves were chained in pairs by ankles and embarked. Once aboard the slave ship, they were stripped naked, with the justification that nudity would ensure cleanliness and health during the long voyage ahead. The women and men were, therefore, separated and women and boys, in some cases, were allowed to stay on deck protected only by a tarpaulin from the elements during the voyage.

The slave ships were custom-built for the transportation of humans across the Atlantic. The holds of the ship contained the slave holds that were divided horizontally into shelves and fitted with chains. Each slave hold could be less than four feet in smaller ships and seldom not taller than five and one-half feet in larger ships. This meant the slaves could hardly sit upright or had no room to shift and move their bodies freely. For the duration of the voyage, they lay on their backs or sides on the raw wooden shelves in chains for weeks on end. In good weather, slaves were brought up onto the deck in the morning to exercise by singing and dancing. Whipping was used to force those who refused to be cooperative. The slaves were often used to satisfy the sexual proclivities of sailors and those who

refused were often severely beaten and raped more brutally. The slaves were constantly and closely monitored, as revolts were common. It is estimated that 20 per cent of slave ships experienced slave revolts during the transatlantic crossing.

Meals consisted usually of rice, farina, and horse beans served twice a day—breakfast around ten in the morning and another meal at about four in the afternoon. Each slave was given a ration of half a pint of water twice a day. Buckets of salt water were passed around, with which the slaves could wash their hands after meals. Food consumption was monitored closely to hinder those who would starve themselves to death. Those who refused food were severely whipped and forced to eat by holding a shovel of hot coal near the lips so that the mouth was scorched and burned or food was forced down the throat by a mouth-opening speculum. Disease and death filled the holds of the slave ships.

While slavers wanted the slaves to arrive at the American ports alive and healthy, the conditions under which slaves made the Atlantic crossing were so deplorable that many lost their lives. “Tight packers” and “loose packers,” two terms that describe how slavers loaded their ships and the conditions under which the slaves made the voyage, seemed not to affect the death rate of the slaves significantly. It is estimated that the total mortality rate of all slaves during the crossing was about 24 percent and that men died at a higher rate, 19 per cent, when compared to 14.7 percent of women. Children and older people died at the same rate as men. The mortality rate per slave ship was used to gauge pay to captains and ship surgeons, so the records were manipulated in favor of higher slave survival rates. Insurance claims for lost slave lives also involved a distortion of figures, and even the murder of slaves.

The barbarism and horrors included the practice of throwing sick slaves overboard, as exemplified by the massacre on the slave ship *Zong*. The ship left Africa in September 1781 with 440 slaves, arriving two months later in the Caribbean with 380 alive, but most of those were sick or dying. Since insurance compensation excluded sick slaves or those killed by illness, 78 slaves were chained together and thrown overboard into a watery mass grave. Later, in Liverpool, England, an insurance claim for a total of 132 drowned slaves was made. While the transatlantic passage of the eighteenth century ensured a constant flow of slaves and wealth to slave masters, slavers, and others involved, it deprived Africa of a considerable amount of human resources. The exposure of the horrors endured during the passage contributed to efforts to end the transatlantic slave trade.

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See Also: **Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas; Slavery, Atlantic Basin in the Era of.**

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Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas

The transatlantic slave trade was a global economic system of forced migration that shipped approximately 12 to 15 million Africans to the Caribbean, North America, and South America. The Atlantic trade in human cargo from Africa began during the 1450s, peaked during the 1780s, and then gradually declined until a rise during the 1850s, followed by an eventual termination of the practice after 1900. However, between 1600 and 1800 the transatlantic slave trade, at its height, impacted Africa culturally, demographically, socially, and politically.

The plantation economic system based on slave labor that developed in the Caribbean during the late sixteenth century and eventually spread to South and North America drove the demand for African labor occasioned by the transatlantic slave trade. Sugar was one of the early cash crops instrumental in the development of these plantation systems.

The techniques of sugar production and the use of slave gang labor on plantations were first developed in the Levant during the twelfth century. The use of slave labor for sugar production then spread to the Mediterranean when Italian states, like Genoa and Venice, began to promote sugar plantations on islands including Cyprus, Sicily, and Crete. The techniques of sugar production and slave gang labor eventually spread to southern Spain and Portugal, where they were co-opted by the Portuguese. Despite the proliferation of sugar plantations based upon slave gang labor, it was not until the end of the fifteenth century that West Africa became a primary market for slaves.

The spread of sugar production coincided with Portuguese exploration of the coast of West Africa. The Portuguese developed sugar plantation systems based upon slave gang labor on islands like São Tomé and Príncipe, using African labor from adjacent sources, and eventually spreading into the Caribbean and South America. By the early sixteenth century, sugar production was developed on the island of Hispaniola. From there, it would spread to other islands in the Caribbean and eventually to Brazil. In Brazil, sugar production would take off by the late sixteenth century on a scale far superseding its Atlantic roots.

Centered around the production of cash crops like sugar, these plantation economic systems were highly labor-intensive, requiring a constant supply of cheap labor. Europeans initially tried Native Americans as labor sources. These proved unsuitable for various reasons, as did indentured European servants. African slaves, however, were found to be a much more practical and cost-effective solution to the labor demands of the plantation system.

Many of the slaves came from the Senegambia region, Upper Guinea Coast, Gold Coast, and the Bights of Benin and Biafra in western Africa. Slaves were also taken from the Angola and Mozambique regions in west central Africa. The regionalization of the source populations of Africans was felt in the New World as well. For example, large numbers of Yoruba slaves came out of the Bight of Benin during the nineteenth century and ended up in Brazil. This had an effect on the strong influence of Yoruba religions in the area of Bahia in Brazil. The effect of African culture was also seen in language and social customs throughout the New World. The predominance of the gullah language, spoken among descendants of slaves on the South Carolina coast in the United States, is a reflection of this.

The effects of the slave trade varied according to the regions and also through time, but there are some generalizations that describe the impact of the slave trade as a whole upon Africa. Europeans preferred young males for work on plantations in the Caribbean and the Americas. This consequently had a demographic effect upon African populations targeted as labor sources as the number of males within a society were reduced. The depopulation of young African males led to the development of skewed sex ratios. In some areas targeted for the slave trade, like the Loango area of Angola, female-to-male ratios shifted on the order of two females to one male. Conversely, in the Americas the result was a sex ration among slaves heavily skewed toward males over females. For Africa as a whole, the slave trade reduced the population of Africa between 1600 and 1800 and led to virtually no population growth, particularly for the time period 1700 to 1800.

The European market preference for African males led to social and cultural changes as well. With depopulation of African males some areas experienced an increase in the scope of polygyny. With a dearth of young males, African social systems adapted. For example, in the Luanda region of Angola, some men were able to acquire more wives than would have been possible before the depredations of the slave trade. The increase in polygyny, however, weakened some societies, particularly in west central Africa, that were based upon matrilineal descent. For instance, in some cases, instead of property being handed down to the son of a man's sister, as would be the case in a matrilineal society, it would go to his progeny from slave women instead.

The onset of the transatlantic slave trade in some areas led to alterations in systems of justice. With the pressure for human commodities occasioned by the trade, some areas witnessed an increase in sanctions for crimes that resulted in enslavement. For example, the Aro traders of the town of Aro Chukwu in the Niger Delta became powerful through the manipulation of an oracle that helped to decide disputes and mete out justice in the region. During the era of the slave trade an accusation of adultery or theft would usually result in a pronouncement of enslavement.

The slave trade targeted communities that were least able to organize politically against encroachment from slave raiders. In areas where many communities were not able to organize centrally, on a large scale, coupled with a lack of large, strong centralizing powers, slave raiding proliferated. The transatlantic slave trade led to more political violence and instability as so-called warlord states, like the Ibangala in west central Africa and the Bambara state of Segou in the savanna region of West Africa, arose organized around slave raiding as the primary economic function. As slave trading intensified and target communities increased their ability to defend themselves or moved further away, slave raiding increased and led to more political violence. Some African polities, like Oyo and Dahomey in the Bight of Benin and Ashante on the Gold Coast, were able to enhance their political status to some degree by becoming involved in the slave trade as conduits. However, in case of Oyo and Dahomey their inability to completely dominate the market in the bight of Benin contributed to instability and furthered slave raiding among the Aja speakers of the area. Although Ashante was eventually able to dominate the slave market on the Gold Coast after the 1750s, the period of instability that accompanied the consolidation process led to intensified slave raiding in the area. Once Ashante was established, moreover, slave raiding stopped within its borders but was now carried to its neighbors.

Politically, African slaves were able to organize and resist enslavement only in areas where the European control or population was weak. As a result, there were more maroon societies in the Caribbean and South America. However, in North America, maroon societies were difficult to maintain and as such were not as pervasive as in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Culturally, the involvement of African communities in the transatlantic slave trade also led to the increase of servile populations among slave-catching societies. Although Europeans preferred young males, within the African domestic slave market the preference was for young females. Consequently, with the maturation of the transatlantic slave trade African slavery increased to the point where, for Africa as a whole, as much as 10 per cent of the population would have been in servile status. This figure was almost equal to the number of slaves living in the New World.

The increase in African slavery was concomitant with a transformation in its utility. In many social formations in Africa the slavery transformed from an institution of marginality rooted in concepts of lineage or kin to a central institution where slaves' importance was in the economic product of their labor. For example, with the official close of British involvement in the transatlantic slave trade, slaves became more important in production on plantations for commodities like palm oil, rice, and kernels. States like Ashante and Dahomey in West Africa were able to adapt to the close the slave trade by shifting to slave based production of commodities.

The economic system of slave gang labor used for the production of commodities was at the core of the transatlantic slave trade. This economic system had its roots in the Mediterranean and the Levant before being transferred to the New World. However, the difference between the Old World origins of sugar and slavery was in the scope of the enterprise. The transatlantic slave trade was on a much larger international scale, involving far-flung geographic regions like Africa, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Americas. In addition, the products of slave labor were produced for an international market that drove demand to new heights.

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See also: Anti-Slavery Movement; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Transatlantic Passage; Slavery: Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean.

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Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Opposition, African

The slave trade took at least 12 million people, and affected many millions more in Africa. As such, it involved a great deal of violence and brutality and, not surprisingly, resistance as well. Resistance took many different forms depending on the social relations within African society. At some points, the African elite took actions that resisted or restricted the slave trade; at others, it fell to religious leaders, or occasionally the common people, to act. In addition to the resistance coming from those who ran society or sought to change it, there was an ongoing and not unexpected resistance from the people who were recently enslaved, both before and after their embarkation on slave ships.

The majority of Africans who were enslaved and sold to the Atlantic slave trade were captives in wars. Where the attackers were Europeans whose principal motive was enslavement, such as the earliest Portuguese sailors along the coast of Senegambia in the mid-fifteenth century, or the armies led by Portuguese officers who conducted wars in Angola in much of the seventeenth century, the connections are fairly clear. Likewise, it is obvious that the occasional punishment of rogue European slave shippers who sought to attack African coastal points from time to time throughout the period represented resistance to the slave trade. However, most wars that resulted in the enslavement of Africans were between African powers, or civil wars in which all participants were African. Since it was well known that the prisoners taken in wars of all sorts would be enslaved, all who participated in a war might be said to be resisting enslavement, as they defended their territory against attackers or sought victory to avoid enslavement.

Resistance against direct European aggression was rare, however, because for the most part the trade with European dealers was conducted peacefully under

African law supervised by African state officials. But there were times and places where the traders violated these rules, and African leaders sought to curb this disorder. For example, during the early years of the trade, King Afonso I of Kongo (1509–1542) protested against the illegal enslavement of people within his country by unruly elements acting with the support of Portuguese merchants. In 1526, he issued a series of strong restrictions on the activities of the Portuguese and established a system of inspections to insure that all those people sold as slaves were legally enslaved. This concern for legal and orderly enslavement represented a stream of central African concerns about the trade, including, protests made by Queen Njinga Mbandi of Ndongo (1624–1663) and Garcia II of Kongo (1641–1661).

The second most common way in which people were enslaved was through banditry, or the illegal use of force, usually by small armed gangs that operated through kidnapping or highway robbery. Clearly, all attempts on the part of African states to rid themselves of such banditry can count as suppression of the slave trade, such as took place, for example, when King Alvaro XII of Kongo ordered the men of Mbwa Lau, a bandit, to desist from their activities and lay down their arms.

Ultimately, even the orderly use of state authority to supervise the slave trade causes sufficient larger social disorder that might lead to protests from a lower level in society. The institution of slavery, for example, is a concept that takes as a starting point unequal opportunities, wealth, and authority, and states that accept it as an item of law, as African states did, can expect that the sort of social pressures that operated against such inequalities would apply to slavery and the slave trade. Mandinga slaves working on estates in Sierra Leone in the 1780s, for example, revolted against their masters and built armed camps to protect their freedom, even though they were not in immediate danger of being sold into the Atlantic trade.

The Islamic reform movement of Nasr al-Din (1673–1677), known locally in Senegambia as the Tubenan, grappled with the larger issues of exploitation within societies as well as the linkage between such issues and the Atlantic slave trade. Nasr al-Din and his disciples preached against the misrule of the authorities by arguing that kings were made for the people, not vice versa. Even though Nasr al-Din owned slaves himself and did not oppose slavery in principle, he did oppose the sale of Muslim slaves to Christians, and thus the Atlantic branch of the trade. While this might be seen simply as a form of chauvinism on the part of the Islamic al-Din, it also recognized the link between the greed of rulers, their disregard for what was accepted in Islam as the fundamental rights of

subjects, and the Atlantic slave trade. The Tubenan, in addition, was a popular movement, and the rank and file followers of Nasr al-Din probably sought to put an end to war and enslavement in general.

Most movements that followed Nasr al-Din's drew at least partially on his ideology. The movement in Futa Jallon (after 1726) was torn between a recognition of the evils of the slave trade and a desire to sell slaves in order to purchase munitions to protect their reforms or defend their country. A more principled resistance developed in the movement in Futa Tooro led by Abd al-Qadir after 1776, which opposed warfare and the resulting enslavement as well as the sale of Muslims to Christians. In a celebrated letter to English traders, Abd al-Qadir threatened those who would seek to buy slaves in his country with death and confiscation of goods.

In other cases, social resistance to war might lead to resistance that affected the slave trade as well. The Christian reform movement led by Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita in Kongo from 1704 to 1706, for example, ostensibly addressed only the problem of civil war, which in Beatriz's view was caused by the greed of rivals to take the Kongo throne. But it was obvious to most Kongo in her day that enslavement and deportation was a natural and frequent outcome of such wars, and that stopping the wars would also lead to an end of enslavement. The fact that war and enslavement were entangled with each other, and that war had many other negative impacts as well as enslavement of some of the participants, makes it hard for modern annalists to separate social movements with more general aims from resistance to the slave trade in general.

The most obvious and unambiguous forms of resistance to the slave trade were those made by the recently enslaved, beyond the obvious ones that arose from their participation in war. There were often revolts in the barracoons on the coast, for example, especially in the Gold Coast area, and these, in turn led to frequent shipboard revolts, of which the largest number took place in the eighteenth century. These revolts of people who were unarmed, in environments where they were unlikely to have any effective assistance from anyone else, were often violent and desperate, even though only a tiny fragment ever succeeded in long-term freedom for the rebels. Because many of the slaves were enslaved by armies and had recent military experience, often having served together, they were better able to cooperate and to see military options. Recent research has shown that as many as 1 in 15 slave ships faced some sort of violent resistance, which reached proportions that they caused or threatened loss of life or loss of a ship. This was frequent enough that slave ships carried complement and weapons sufficient to suppress rebellion, and took fairly elaborate security

measures against them. English shippers, for example, commonly included slaves from another part of Africa on ships whose cargo was to be made up of people from a particular part of the coast, called “guardians.” Gold Coast slaves were purchased to oversee those from the slave coast; Sierra Leoneans guarded slaves from the Bight of Benin. Even when guardians were not deliberately purchased, sometimes interethnic differences spoiled or diverted revolts.

Given the great differences in social origins and motivations of the various Africans involved in the slave trade either as participants or victims, it is difficult to discern a single pattern. The trade cannot be simply delineated in terms of Europeans against Africans, nor was it generally marked by direct invasion. Rather, it was a complex outgrowth of African politics crossing with European economic demands that led to changes in both. The resistance that is easiest to discern is that of the enslaved people themselves against their enslavers, but under conditions that made armed resistance difficult, and even hopeless.

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Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Abolition: Philanthropy or Economics?

The first major achievement of the antislavery movement lay in the campaign to end the British slave trade. Analysis of this topic has shifted between explanations that emphasize either the moral arguments and effective propaganda of the abolitionists as the key to success, or the economic considerations relating to the slave trade and the British Caribbean as a more compelling reason for the demise of the British slave trade. The historiographical debate on philanthropy, economics, and abolition reveals the arguments made with regard to the abolition of the British transatlantic slaving. Though economic conditions in Britain and the West Indies were much more at the forefront of the debate than anything specifically linked to Africa, the impact of abolitionism clearly affected Africans in an important way.

Before World War II, the chief explanation given for the abolition of the British slave trade lay in the humanitarian work of the antislavery campaigners. Sir Reginald Coupland, the leading advocate of this point of view, traced the abolitionist campaigns both inside and outside the British Parliament after the formal campaign against the slave trade began in London in 1787. He argued that the statutory ban on the British slave trade 20 years later was a moral triumph for saintly Christian evangelicals and Quakers, clustered around the Clapham Sect and the leadership of William Wilberforce in the Commons. According to

this interpretation, humanitarianism triumphed in 1807. Philanthropic individuals had thus achieved a striking success in organizing a moral campaign to eradicate what was seen as an evil blot on British national life.

A challenge to these arguments came with the publication of the Trinidadian Eric Williams’s *Capitalism and Slavery* in 1944. Williams presented a strong case for the economic reasons why Britain abolished its slave trade. Aimed as a direct counterpoint to Coupland’s ideas, *Capitalism and Slavery* adapted material from a previously published book by Lowell Ragatz to argue that the British West Indian plantation economy was in serious decline after the Seven Years War. The causes of decline included soil exhaustion on sugar estates, interruptions to the marketing of sugar during the American War of Independence, and planter indebtedness during the period of 1793–1807. Williams also argued that the late-eighteenth-century British economy was undergoing a shift from mercantilism to industrial capitalism, with an accompanying change from an emphasis on slavery to free wage labor in the empire: thus Britain abolished its slave trade primarily for economic reasons.

The arguments supporting either philanthropy or economics as the prime movers behind early British abolitionism have continued since *Capitalism and Slavery* was published. In the late 1960s, Roger Anstey argued that Williams had not provided systematic statistics to support his case, and that little evidence was produced in the parliamentary debates over slave trade abolition to suggest that economic matters were paramount in the minds of politicians. In his book *The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition* (1975), Anstey traced the sources of antislavery ideas and provided a novel explanation for the passing of the Abolition Act in 1807. Much abolitionist thought was pervaded by an emphasis on Christian benevolence and a belief in God’s providence. These beliefs drew antislavery campaigners to single out the slave trade as an act of national wickedness. The difficulties of war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France delayed the progress of the campaign against the slave trade in Parliament but a turnaround in fortunes occurred in 1806–1807, when the newly formed coalition ministry (the Ministry of All the Talents) resolved first to restrict the supply of slaves to foreign territories in wartime and then to abolish the British slave trade altogether. According to Anstey, a particular and fortuitous set of politicoeconomic circumstances impelled the British to abort their slave trade in the national economic interest.

The most direct attack on Eric Williams’s views about the abolition of the British slave trade came in Seymour Drescher’s *Econocide* (1977). Marshaling an

impressive array of statistical evidence, Drescher argued that the British slave trade met its demise at a time of propitious economic circumstances for the British Caribbean economy. Soil exhaustion was a temporary phenomenon; so, too, was planter indebtedness. Evidence on the profitability of sugar plantations showed them still making profits on average even during difficult wartime periods. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain was expanding its plantations in the British Caribbean into newly acquired territories such as Trinidad and British Guiana. Moreover, British West Indian trade comprised as significant a share of total British foreign commerce as it had in the 1770s. For these reasons, Drescher argued, the abolition of the British slave trade must be seen as an act of economic suicide.

The implication of this conclusion, of course, was to return the arguments over philanthropy and economics full circle to a position favorable to Coupland's emphasis on the primacy of humanitarianism. Recent work on the campaign to abolish the British slave trade has pointed to the sheer effectiveness of the philanthropic campaign in the diffusion of its oral, visual, and written propaganda, and to the popularity of this crusade as evidenced by the number of signatures appended to petitions presented to Parliament on this issue. In the years 1787 to 1792, for instance, approximately 1.5 million out of 12 million people in Britain signed antislave trade petitions, a higher proportion than for any other reform issue of the time. Barbara Solow and Stanley Engerman's 1987 collection of essays reassessing *Capitalism and Slavery* reached a consensus that serious economic decline did not occur in the British Caribbean economy in the late eighteenth century. But the notion that the British abolished their slave trade for economic reasons is not yet dead and buried as a possible interpretation. Recent research has shown that a serious economic crisis occurred in the British imperial economy between 1803 and 1807, and that sugar prices in Jamaica (and hence the profits to planters and merchants) were declining steeply from 1793 through to 1807. Given the longevity of the debate over philanthropy, economics, and British abolitionism, these new findings suggest that the arguments will continue.

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Slavery, Abolition of: East and West Africa

The impact of the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade on the spread of slavery in East and West Africa has been an issue of great intellectual interest and debate. The crux of the matter is how the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, rather than bringing to an end of the institution of slavery, instead produced an increase in the internal slave trade, and the continuation of slavery as an institution.

The abolition of the Atlantic slave trade left East Africa almost completely unaffected. It is instructive to note that, from the onset, Arabs dominated slave trade in the Indian Ocean region. While Europe and North America were increasingly responding to the dictates of industrial capitalism, and the humanitarian climate and political exigencies of their own milieu, the Arab world was marked by mercantilism, labor-intensive enterprises, and the harem culture. The Europeans and the Arabs, having different agendas, moved in opposing directions. By 1840, Seyyid Said, the Arab ruler of Oman, wishing to exploit the resources—especially the potential slave resources—of East Africa, decided to transfer his court from his capital, Muscat, to the island of Zanzibar, off the coast of present-day Tanzania. The increasing cultivation of cloves and other crops meant the intensification of demand for African slaves. Zanzibar became the largest producer of cloves in the world, primarily because of the expansion of slavery in East Africa. To meet the labor needs of the plantations, as well as to feed the large slave markets in the Middle East and Arabia, Seyyid Said undertook a large-scale procurement of slaves. With Seyyid Said's protection and Indian financial assistance, Arabs organized caravans and penetrated almost every portion of East Africa. Their slaving activities reached the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and beyond, and they established "colonies" for the collection of ivory and slaves. The Arabs, through their slaving activities, ravaged large areas of East and Central Africa. In the upper regions of the Congo River, for instance, the Arabs raided villages, taking the population for slaves. The demise of slavery in East Africa was not helped by the fact that the British abolitionists entered compromise treaties with Zanzibar that allowed for a gradual, rather than an immediate, end to the slave trade. The gradualist approach allowed Arabs to carry on slave trading within their domain with impunity, and to smuggle slaves to the north through the interior slave routes.

The impact of the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade on the spread of slavery in West Africa was uneven. The major theme that dominates historiography of West Africa between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries is the Atlantic slave trade. The histories of Old Oyo Empire, the Aro hegemony, Asante, the Niger Delta states, and Old Calabar are all tied up with the slave trade. The rise and decline of these states had much to do with slave trade. During the era of the abolitionist movement, the British naval squadron stationed on the west coast was usually able to rescue about 3,000 slaves a year. As there was still a demand for slaves in some regions of the Americas (such as Brazil, which did not abolish slavery till 1888), it was not unexpected that the African coastal middlemen, who were profiting from human traffic, would resort to all kinds of stratagems to continue their slave trading activities. For instance, they were provided with hiding places in the numerous creeks any time they sighted the British naval squadron. Internally, West Africa had a number of slaveholding societies that depended on slave for economic and political ends. The slave plantations at Akpabuyo in Old Calabar and the Sokoto Caliphate-run plantations in Hausaland, for example, required slave labor (slave plantations in Hausaland, which were of the absentee landlordism variety, metamorphosed into serfdom). Slave laborers were also required as potters in long distance trade. In the Niger Delta states, slaves were used as paddlers of war and trading canoes. With increased patrolling of the west coast, the population of slaves in some societies increased so much that the servile population outnumbered that of the indigenes. The successful take off of the "legitimate commerce" in West Africa owed much to the use of slave labor. Decades into the operation of the "legitimate commerce," slave labor was still in great demand and in use. Indeed, slavery and the slave trade survived into the second decade of the twentieth century. For instance, between 1906 and 1912, 63 slave-dealing cases were heard at the police court in Calabar, Nigeria. Out of this figure, there were 44 convictions and 19 acquittals. In the same period, Oba Native court in Calabar Province of Nigeria heard 13 similar cases, convicting 11 and acquitting 2.

In the final analysis, it is reasonable to state that the impact of the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade on the spread of slavery in East and West Africa owed much to the political, social and economic situations in the individual African societies in question, as well as the external political and external climate. As a result of the interplay of the internal African factors and the external influences, slavery and the slave trade survived into the twentieth century.

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See also: Anti-Slavery Movement; Slavery: Atlantic Trade; Slavery in African Society.

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Slavery: Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean

Slavery existed in many ancient and medieval societies. Ancient Egypt acquired slaves from Nubia, from the Red Sea coast, and probably from the Horn of Africa. There were some black slaves in ancient Greece and Rome, but not many. Some slaves were also probably traded back and forth in the Indian Ocean trade. In fact, many early trade routes saw slaves moving in different directions. None of these slave trades ever achieved the numbers that marked the Atlantic trade, and it is unlikely that slaves were the major item of trade on any of these routes until the eighteenth century.

The slave trade into the Middle East and Mediterranean was stimulated by the introduction, toward the beginning of the common era, of the camel, which facilitated desert pastoralism and trade across the desert. It was also encouraged by the appearance of Islam in the seventh century. This was not because Islam encouraged the slave trade, but rather because Islam prohibited enslavement of other Muslims and allowed only the enslavement of captives taken in a just war. It also strictly delineated the characteristics of a just war.

Nevertheless, the Islamic conquests initiated a period of great prosperity. Wealthy Muslims sought concubines, servants, and eunuchs to guard their harems. Rulers sought male slaves who could be trained as

soldiers. Forbidden to enslave their fellow Muslims, they looked outside the Muslim world. The majority of slaves were women, who became wives, concubines, and servants.

Christians faced similar restrictions. They also had a concept of just war and were prohibited from enslaving their fellow Christians. One result was that Christians and Muslims raided each other, and took prisoners on the seas. Both also sought slaves from societies that were neither Christian nor Muslim, and both traded with each other for slaves as for commodities. Slaves were used by both Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean.

Until the fifteenth century, the most important sources of slaves for the Mediterranean and the Middle East were Slavic eastern Europe and the Caucasus. There was also a constant trade in slaves to the Mediterranean and the Middle East from Africa. The opening of trade and the conversion of some African states to Islam created trading partners capable of providing slaves. African slaves were more numerous in North Africa, but were found in all of the Muslim states of the region and in Christian cities and kingdoms bordering the Mediterranean. African states desired both the products and the knowledge of the Middle East, Europe, and India. To acquire these products, they often raided non-Muslim peoples and sold them to Arab traders.

Slaves crossed the Sahara with the camel caravans that maintained commercial contact between North and West Africa. Most of them were women. These crossings were usually on foot, the camels being used to carry goods. A considerable number also went into the Sahara, where the oases had a significant demand for slave labor, in large part because of the high slave-mortality rate. Some Saharan communities, such as the Ghadames, became important centers of the trade. In the Sahara, slaves tended date trees, mined for salt and copper, and worked as herders and servants. Others went to North Africa or were sold to other Mediterranean societies. In North Africa, they were sought not only as concubines and servants, but also as cultivators and laborers. Slave labor was particularly important in desert-side areas. Because Islam encouraged manumission, many of them became *haratin*, or freed slaves, with a client relationship to their former owners. It is difficult to make a precise statement on the number of slaves who crossed the desert, but Ralph Austen has estimated 3.5 to 4 million over a 12-century period.

The trade across the Sahara followed a series of fixed routes between wells and oases where the caravans stopped to replenish their water supplies. The nomads encountered throughout the desert could either act as protectors and guides for the caravans, or, if they were not paid and appeased, could attack the caravans.

Many caravans perished because wells had run dry, because they got lost, or because they were attacked by nomadic tribes.

There were a series of major routes. In the medieval period, the most important was the so-called Gold Road that led from Sijilmassa in southern Morocco to Awdaghust and Ghana. With the fall of Ghana, the southern terminus shifted first to Walata and then to Timbuktu. From Timbuktu, caravans could also go north to Ghadames and Tunis or Tripoli. Routes from northern Nigeria went through Agades and usually to Tripoli.

The Nile above Aswan was marked by cataracts and was difficult to use for transport. The Sahara in that area was also very dry. Thus, much of the trade from Ethiopia and the southern Sudan moved via the Red Sea or across it. This was a much easier route. Slave trade has taken place on the shores of the Red Sea since ancient Egyptian times; the area was a modest source of slaves for the Hellenistic empires and Rome. In more recent centuries, the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia and the Muslim kingdoms of Sennar and Darfur have all used and sold slaves. At the end of the eighteenth century, Darfur alone was sending 5,000 to 6,000 slaves a year to Red Sea ports. The slaves were generally a product of raids on and wars against people farther south who had not converted. As with the trans-Saharan trade, they were mostly women, though from time to time the demand for African soldiers was strong. Slaves were sometimes taken along on the pilgrimage to Mecca and sold there to pay the pilgrims' expenses.

Trade in the Indian Ocean goes back to at least the beginning of the common era. Almost half of the year the winds blew out from central Asia; the other half they blew in, making navigation easy. Most of the sailors were Arabs, whose boats were called *dhows*. On this route, slaves were secondary to gold, ivory, spices, and metal goods. When slaves were traded, they were traded primarily to the Middle East. Many went to the Persian Gulf, where some were used as pearl divers. Some slaves also went to India and even farther east to Indonesia or China. Both the Indian continent and East Asia had high population densities and were generally able to get slaves from local sources.

In the ninth century, slaves known as Zanj were brought to lower Mesopotamia to work salt pans and dredge irrigation canals. They revolted in what was probably the largest slave uprising in Arab history. The successes of the rebels may have discouraged similar large-scale use of slave labor, but some slave exporting persisted to Mesopotamia, Persia, the Persian Gulf, and India. Slaves also moved between various Asian societies. In India, there were ex-slave communities as

early as 1100. Slaves were used as soldiers and several became generals. An Ethiopian ex-slave named Malik Ambar even became the ruler of an Indian state in the early seventeenth century.

In the seventeenth century, with the colonization by the Dutch of South Africa and Mauritius and by the French of the Ile de Bourbon (now known as Réunion), and then the occupation by the French of Mauritius, there was a sharp increase in the demand for slaves. All three areas had a very low population density and could only be put into production if labor were acquired. The two French islands developed a plantation economy and had large slave majorities, replicating the experience of the West Indies. In the Cape the farms were small, but slaves provided most farm and urban labor and were a majority of the population. Both expansion and the high mortality of slaves meant that demand for slaves was great in all three colonies. While some slaves for these areas came from India and Indonesia, most were purchased in Madagascar or on the coast of East Africa. Kilwa, and the Portuguese settlements in Mozambique became particularly important sources of slaves. This stimulated a penetration of the interior and the development of slave sources there, which grew dramatically in the nineteenth century with the development of a plantation economy on Zanzibar and the East African coast. Madagascar was both an exporter of slaves and then, as the Merina kingdoms became more powerful, an importer. The Dutch also used slaves in the East Indies, but few were brought in from Africa because there were well-developed slave markets in South East Asia.

Over the course of 12 centuries, the slave trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean probably involved the forcible removal of over eight million slaves from their African homelands. Due to high rates of manumission and intermarriage, the progeny of these slaves have generally blended in to the population, creating few groups that today are of distinct African descent.

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Slavery: Trans-Saharan Trade

Contact between the peoples who live north and south of the Sahara Desert dates back to approximately 1000BCE. Tentative at the beginning, trade between these peoples became systematic and sophisticated over the centuries, especially following the introduction of the camel by the Romans in the first century. This animal, so well suited physiologically and physically to the inclement Saharan environment, revolutionized the trade. By the eleventh century, a network of caravan trade routes across the desert had emerged. In general, the importance of the routes shifted from west to east according to political changes in the Sahara and the western Sudan.

During the Carthaginian and Roman eras in North Africa, the main exports from the western Sudan were precious stones, elephant tusks, and ostrich feathers. The Romans had other sources of gold and slaves, such as Britain and the Balkan countries. In the seventh century, the Arabs emerged as the dominant power in North Africa and spearheaded the spread of militant Islam. The trade across the Sahara entered a new period of sustained growth characterized by swelling demand for slaves in the Muslim cities of North Africa and the Levant, where slaves were used as domestic help, laborers, and soldiers in state armies.

One of the earliest sources of direct evidence of slave export from the western Sudan across the Sahara comes from al-Yakub, a ninth-century Arab writer who observed that Berber traders from Kowar brought back black slaves from Kanem to Zawila, the capital of Fezzan. In the twelfth century, Ibn Battuta witnessed a trans-Saharan caravan of 600 black women slaves. Although Ghana's foreign trade was dominated by gold, many merchants from the Maghrib still went there to buy slaves. Kumbi had a famous market kept fully supplied through raids on its southern neighbors. On his much publicized pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324, Mansa Musa's entourage included about 500 slaves. He returned to Mali with 30 Turks to serve as royal slaves. Leo Africanus described how Muslim traders from North Africa traversed the Sahara to Borno kingdom to trade horses for slaves. Their arrival sent the Borno king raiding neighboring kingdoms for slaves to exchange for the horses. On that occasion, the traders had to wait for a year until the king procured a sufficient number of slaves to exchange for their horses. Slaves continued to serve as the single most important export of Borno across the Sahara well into the nineteenth century.

From the seventh century on, raids between Christians and Muslims became characteristic of

cross-Mediterranean warfare. These produced slave harvests, and became a favorable source for the Muslims of southern Spain. Black slave soldiers in the army of Almoravid Seville were noted for their bravery. Christian recrudescence in the Mediterranean in the twelfth century led to the capture of a growing number of blacks of western Sudanese origins. In the wake of the Crusade, Italian merchants of Venice and Genoa established sugar plantations on a number of Mediterranean islands. Initially the plantations were supplied with labor, especially slaves, from central Europe, the steppes of Asia, and Africa. From the eleventh century on, the European and Asian sources all but dried up, as the Slavic peoples became Christianized and no longer sold to Muslims, and as the Turkish peoples embraced Islam and were thereby exempted from enslavement. As was to be the case in the Americas, Africa became the main source of labor for the plantations. North African trans-Saharan merchants intensified their drive for Sudanese slaves.

Due to a lack of firm statistical data, it is difficult to provide a satisfactory assessment of the number of slaves siphoned across the Sahara from the Sudan, and also the impact of the population hemorrhage on the communities involved. It has been estimated that, during the Middle Ages, a total of 2 million slaves were exported across the Sahara. Lewicki has guesstimated that between 12 and 15 million slaves passed through Cairo in the sixteenth century. Since a substantial proportion of these passed through Tripoli and Algiers, they were probably brought across the Sahara.

Given their conjectural nature, it is best not to make much out of these numbers. A few million slaves were likely transported from the Sudan across the Sahara to North Africa and the Levant by the end of the eighteenth century. The absence of black populations in North Africa and the Levant may well underscore the relatively small scale of the trans-Saharan slave trade. But it should be borne in mind that, unlike in America and the Caribbeans, the African slaves were denied the power and the opportunity to reproduce.

The popular tendency to assess the impact of the slave trade with an emphasis on numbers tends to ignore and underplay the miseries and the indignities to which the victims were subjected, as well as the societal dislocations the slave-induced raids and wars caused. Many Sudanese Muslim states raided non-Muslim or nominally Muslim communities at will for slaves, inevitably causing devastation and the disruption of normal life. The sale of consumer—often perishable and meretricious—goods in exchange for virile labor could not have brought any tangible benefits to the slave-exporting communities. And no meaningful economic progress could be made when the most virile segment of the population was

constantly skimmed off. Moreover, the capture and sale of slaves created a climate of fear and nurtured a culture of violence, as stronger states preyed upon weaker ones. The system not only brutalized and dehumanized the enslaved, it robbed the slavers themselves of sensitivity to human suffering.

Two features of the trans-Saharan trade appear more repulsive than those of the transatlantic. First, the overwhelming majority of the slaves were young women, the most reproductive segment of society. A large proportion of the remainder were male children under 15 years of age. Second, a large number of the male slaves were made eunuchs through gelding. In North Africa and the Levant, the keeping of large harems by the higher classes in the society provided a steady demand for males who could be trusted with nubile women. The main centers of demand were Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, and Smyrna. At first these centers were supplied from the Balkans, Asia, and then the western Sudan. But from the eleventh century until the end of trade in the nineteenth, the western Sudan became the main source of supply. Thus by the seventeenth century, the most famous of all the harems in the Near and Middle East, the Ottoman Sultan's Seraglio at Constantinople, was staffed entirely by gelded Africans. Castration centers existed in the Mossi country, in Damagaram (Niger Republic), in Borno (Northeast Nigeria), and, especially Baghirmi (Chad Republic).

In comparison with their counterparts in the Americas and the Caribbean, much ado has been made of the relative leniency of slave owners in North Africa and the Near East. Greatly trusted because they could not produce progeny, slave eunuchs rose to high positions of state authority. However, it must be remembered that castration was an excruciatingly painful operation. Extensive hemorrhage which could not be stopped by traditional cauterization was rampant, and produced high mortality rates.

The journeys across the Sahara were one of the most hazardous enterprises in the world. All the travelers, both free and enslaved, faced severe privations and physical dangers. Sandstorms were a common occurrence and sometimes built up pyramids of sand that could bury alive an entire caravan. They could also obliterate caravan routes, causing travelers to lose their way. Whirling sand particles sometimes covered valuable oases, smote the eyes, and blistered the skin. The temperatures fluctuated wildly: in the day they could get up to 110°F, occasioning acute thirst and asphyxiation; at night they could drop to as low as 20°F. Not surprisingly, many caravan routes were found to be strewn with hundreds of human and animal skeletons. To these problems posed by nature were added those caused by marauding bands. The desert-dwelling

nomads, especially the Berbers, often lived off the pillage of travelers crossing the Sahara.

In addition to these general perils, there were others to which slaves alone were exposed. While the traders were clothed and mounted on camels and horses, the slaves traveled naked and barefoot, and were chained around their necks and burdened with heavy loads on their heads. The hot sand and rugged tracks blistered their bare feet, while the severe heat in the day and the cold in the night took heavy tolls on them. Naturally, the slaves were the first to suffer from exhaustion and fatigue. Those who became too incapacitated to continue the trek were abandoned after whipping had failed to get them to their feet. When a caravan ran short of food and water, the slaves were the first to be excluded from such rations. Not surprisingly, the mortality rate among them was quite high, estimates varying widely from 20 to 90 per cent.

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See also: Africanus, Leo; Berbers: Ancient North Africa; Borno (Bornu), Sultanate of: Saifawa Dynasty: Horses, Slaves, Warfare; Carthage; Ibn Battuta, Mali Empire and; Kanem: Slavery and Trans-Saharan Trade; Mansa Musa, Mali Empire and; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire; Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade; Sijilmasa, Zawila: Trans-Saharan Trade; Tuareg: Takedda and Trans-Saharan Trade.

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Slavery: East Africa: Eighteenth Century

The East African slave trade in the eighteenth century was composed of two elements: a traditional slave

trade toward the mostly Muslim countries on the northern rim of the Indian Ocean, and the slave trade to the Mascarenes Islands.

Since the start of recorded commerce in the first centuries CE, slaves had been exported alongside luxury commodities like gold and spices, from East Africa to countries on the northern and eastern rims of the Indian Ocean, and even as far as China. African males were valued for their strength, and many were employed as soldiers and laborers, while female slaves (possibly more numerous than males) were most frequently sold into harems. Many young boys became eunuchs. Most East African slaves initially originated from the Somali and Ethiopian hinterland, though the slave export frontier quickly expanded south down the East African coast as far as Sofala and to the Comoro Islands and Madagascar. However, expansion south was limited by distance from the main slave markets, which lay on the northern rim of the Indian Ocean, and by the monsoons (upon which maritime shipping largely depended) that extended south of the equator only as far as northern Madagascar and the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel.

Muslims and Hindus originally from Arabia and the Indian subcontinent dominated the trade. Indians, with strong links to family enterprises, chiefly on the north-west coast of India, largely financed Arabs and Swahili traders. Europeans, who entered the region from the close of the fifteenth century, commenced exporting slaves to their colonies. The Portuguese exported predominantly Mozambique slaves to their Indian colonies, the Dutch exported Malagasy slaves to Batavia and to Cape Town where, by 1834, an estimated 12 per cent of the slave community was of Malagasy origin, and the British shipped occasional cargoes of East African and Malagasy slaves to the New World. However, in comparison to the predominantly Muslim trade to the north, the number of slaves exported by Europeans was small and irregular.

The structure of the slave traffic, and of trade in general in the western Indian Ocean, was radically altered in the eighteenth century with the development by the French, from the 1730s, of a major plantation economy and military base on the Mascarene Islands of Réunion and Mauritius. This established a new and major market for slaves. Although some were drawn from the Swahili coast, the major markets were Mozambique and Madagascar, which together accounted for over two-thirds of total slave imports, Madagascar alone accounting for about 45 per cent of the 160,000 slaves imported into the Mascarenes from 1610 to 1810.

As slaves could only be exported in the nonhurricane season from March to October, those collected in the other months were stockpiled on the coast. In contrast to East Africans, Malagasy slaves gained a reputation for being difficult and uncooperative. Many preferred to

commit suicide rather than leave Madagascar because they feared that Europeans were going to eat them, and there were numerous cases of revolt aboard ship; in one instance in 1784, over 600 slaves were suppressed only after the loss of many lives, both European and Malagasy. Once on the Mascarenes, they frequently fled, either attempting to sail back to Madagascar or forming maroon communities in the mountains.

The traditional northern slave trade helped form the material basis for the rise along the Swahili coast of a number of small city-states, and in western Madagascar of the Sakalava dynasties. The Mascarene demand for slaves helped boost foreign trade in Mozambique, which was also a major center for the export of ivory. However, French traders in the region turned increasingly to the east coast of Madagascar, the nearest and cheapest source of slaves and an area where Muslim middlemen were not entrenched. Mascarene demand for slaves and provisions directly stimulated the rise of the Betsimisaraka and Merina polities in Madagascar. Slave exports to European traders (North Americans and Réunionnais) had formed one of the chief economic activities of the European pirate community in Madagascar from approximately 1685 to 1720. On the northeast coast, where pirates intermarried with women of leading local families, their offspring founded the Betsimisaraka federation, which between 1795 and 1816 launched maritime slave raids, each comprising up to 500 outrigger canoes, 23 to 33 feet long, and each with a crew of 30, against the Comoros and East Africa. The federation also stimulated trade with the central highlands of Madagascar, the chief source of Malagasy slaves for the Mascarenes. By the early nineteenth century, up to 2,000 slaves were being exported annually from Antananarivo to the east coast by French traders, in exchange for cloth, muskets, and gunpowder. At the same time, the Betsileo under Prince Masoandro traded to their south for slaves, whom they shipped north to Imerina, at the rate of 400 to 500 per annum, in return for cattle and cloth. The fight over control of this trade was a major cause of the Merina civil wars of the second half of the eighteenth century and the emergence of the Bezanozano as major middlemen. It also underpinned the rise of Imerina, when Andrianampoinimerina, one of the most powerful Merina warlords, emerged toward the 1790s as king of Imerina after consolidating control over the major slave routes to the coast.

The development of Malagasy states, notably the Sakalava and the Merina kingdoms, resulted in an expansion of both slavery and the slave trade in Madagascar. Domestic slavery had hitherto been limited in scope because of the lack of large plantations or industries. However, the emergence of states resulted in increased demand for servile labor to produce food for, and service the personal needs of, ruling elites. This

trend was particularly marked in the central highlands from the mid-eighteenth century, with the development of a labor-intensive state managed system of hydraulic rice cultivation. The slave export trade laid the foundations for the emergence there of a powerful Merina state that from 1817, in alliance with the British, attempted to forge an island empire.

GWYN R. CAMPBELL

See also: **Asians: East Africa; Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth Century; Mauritius: Slavery and Slave Society to 1835; Seychelles: Slavery: Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean; Slavery, Plantation: East Africa and the Islands**

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Slavery, Plantation: East Africa and the Islands

It was only toward the end of the eighteenth century that eastern Africa and the islands began to be incorporated into the world economic system. Plantation economies began to emerge in the Mascarene Islands (composed of Mauritius, Réunion and Rodrigues islands) toward the end of the eighteenth century, leading to a massive expansion in the slave trade from East Africa to these islands. In East Africa itself, plantation agriculture emerged rather later, in the nineteenth century.

During the early years of French settlement in the Mascarenes, plantation agriculture had not been encouraged, as the French East India Company had instructed governors to concentrate on growing provisions. Several factors led to the development of plantation agriculture. Coffee cultivation succeeded beyond expectations on Réunion (then known as Bourbon island). Sugar became the preferred crop in Mauritius. Slaves also worked on indigo plantations.

According to Daniel North-Coombes, the suspension of the French East India Company's charter in 1769 is considered to be the main factor contributing to the emergence of plantation agriculture in Mauritius. This development paralleled the expansion in trading activity and benefited from it. Many merchants were

also owners of sugar estates. The island was in need of exportable products. Coffee cultivation never expanded at the same pace as sugar or with coffee production in Reunion. Spice cultivation was also attempted by Pierre Poivre and others, but it never succeeded, partly due to the indifference of the settlers. Settlers in Réunion however, established clove plantations which was successful for a short period of time. Indigo cultivation was again attempted by Cossigny and others and by 1790, it was the principal export crop.

Sugar cane cultivation, which was later to be the sole export crop, did not expand, as it could not compete with the West Indies. Most sugar on the island was used in the production of spirits and *argamasse*, which was a paste made up of chalk and sugar, which was used for rooftop construction. Spirits were used extensively in the slave trade in the Western Indian Ocean region, as a gift as well as a method of payment. During the American War of Independence, there was a decrease in spirits export from France to the Mascarenes, which stimulated a rise in the production of locally produced rum. The 1790s was thus marked by an increase in sugar cane cultivation and an increase in the number of sugar mills.

There was a decline in the indigo cultivation and production, chiefly due to the availability of cheap and high-quality indigo from Bengal. Indigo growers in Mauritius switched to sugarcane cultivation. The acreage devoted to sugarcane cultivation jumped from 422 hectares in 1789 to 5,000–6,300 hectares by 1803. Another crucial factor in the expansion in sugarcane cultivation was the Haitian Revolution in 1791. French planters in Mauritius reacted to this revolution by shifting from producing cane-distilled spirits to manufacturing sugar. Statistics give the clearest evidence of this: sugar production jumped from 300 tons in 1789 to 3,000 tons in 1803; by that point, it was the most important crop in Mauritius.

Slavery was the dominant labor system in Mauritius. Slave labor was used for every type of work, even those which could be performed by plows or animals. No labor-saving devices were employed. At the end of the eighteenth century, the number of slaves on the island doubled, from 33,823 in 1787 to 65,367 in 1807. This was directly linked to the rise of commercial agriculture and the rise in the slave trade even though, in 1794, the Colonial Assembly had banned slave trading.

The slave population was sustained by continuing imports, both legal and illegal. It has been estimated that 62,387 slaves were brought between 1773 and 1810, alone although this figure is today considered conservative.

We have little detailed information on the conditions affecting slaves during this period. One early

account came from Bernandin de St. Pierre who stated that slave owners did not respect the clauses of the Code Noir (the “Black Code” governing slaves and slave owning) and slaves had no right of redress. According to M. J. Milbert (1812), however, most slave owners were “humane.” Even he was forced to admit, however, that the Code Noir was not respected.

Owners neglected their slaves particularly in times of crisis. Famine was a permanent threat as supplies did not arrive on a regular basis, and natural disasters, such as cyclones, were frequent. Slaves probably supplemented their rations with crops they grew or cattle and poultry they bred. Their movements outside their plantations were restricted. The slave diet was made up almost entirely of manioc and other starchy foods, and was short on mineral salts, protein, and vitamins. Epidemics contributed to the already weak health of slaves, and to a higher mortality rate. There were also abdominal diseases. The poor state of health was further aggravated by the absence of adequate provision for health care. Only a few plantations had hospitals for sick slaves, and even fewer were staffed by qualified by medical practitioners. Natural healing methods were used by “herbal” doctors, older Malagasy, and Indian slaves.

Slavery was threatened when the French Revolution occurred, and in 1794 slavery was abolished in French colonies. The French colonists in Mauritius and Réunion, particularly the plantation owners, sent away the two representatives of the French government, Baco and Burnel, who had come to implement the abolition laws. The islands became semiautonomous until the advent of “imperial” rule under Napoleon I. The revolutionary period had brought about one positive development, a relaxation in emancipation laws, and a larger number of emancipations seem to have occurred. These laws were, however, tightened again when Governor Decaen took over in 1803. Plantation slaves were not numerous among the emancipated however; most freed slaves were women who had worked as domestic servants. In 1810, the British took over Mauritius. With the entry of Mauritian sugar into the British market, sugarcane cultivation increased, and thus so did the system of plantation slavery.

VIJAYA TEELock

See also: Bourbon, Ile de France, Seychelles: Eighteenth Century; Mauritius; Seychelles.

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Slavery, Colonial Rule and

By the time of the “Scramble” for Africa, all the colonial powers had outlawed slavery in their own countries, and its suppression was one of the justifications for their conquest of the continent. African slavery was widespread and took many forms, some more exploitative than others. Slaves were farmers, porters, canoe men, miners, trusted trading agents, soldiers, privileged officials (royal slaves), and concubines. There were slaves consecrated to deities, and slaves earmarked for human sacrifice. Some were treated as junior kinsmen or wives and never sold. Others, usually first-generation or “trade” slaves, were worked hard and lived miserable lives. In some areas slaves formed over half the population and performed all the manual labor. Everywhere they were an important capital investment, and item of trade. They were also status symbols, since a man’s prestige depended on the number of his dependents. Slavery thus served economic, political, social, and religious purposes.

During the wars of conquest, the colonial powers were short of manpower and resources, and heavily dependent on African allies and auxiliaries. To keep their allegiance they often allowed them to keep prisoners of war. They also returned runaways belonging to their allies, and liberated those of their enemies. Sometimes they even appointed chiefs and gave them the arms with which to raid and enslave their neighbors. They also “freed” or hired slaves to use as soldiers, policemen, porters, and laborers. Once established, however, it was in the interests of the colonial rulers to end slave raiding and large-scale trading, as well as the export of slaves. In most areas these were outlawed.

Slavery, however, was a different question. The new rulers needed the cooperation of African elites, the main slave owners, to keep the peace, to serve in the lower ranks of administration, and to develop the economy. They believed that Africans were inherently lazy and that if slaves were freed the economy would languish and owners would rebel. They thus faced a dilemma. They had to attack, or seem to attack, slavery to placate Western public opinion. However, to prevent their colonies from being a drain on the metropolises, they needed to keep slaves in place and working until they could introduce other forms of labor and social control. Each colonial power solved the problem differently, and their policies changed over time, depending on the extent of their control, the local economic situation, the amount of scrutiny exerted by humanitarian groups in the metropole, and the degree of international interest. The British, with the lion’s share of the

continent and the most active antislavery lobby, adapted a system developed in India. Slavery had to be outlawed in actual colonies, so, as the empire expanded, they established protectorates in which they simply did not recognize it as a legal status. Slaves could remain with their owners, but those who left could not be forced to return. This was acceptable to humanitarians, who believed African slavery was “benign,” and could be allowed to die out as the supply of new slaves was cut off with the imposition of peace, the outlawing of the slave trade, and, in some colonies, the freeing of persons born or imported after a set date. Moreover, slaves would not be suddenly deprived of their livelihood, and good masters would not lose their labor. This policy was applied differently everywhere. In Zanzibar and the Kenya coast, for instance, Swahili/Arab owners whose slaves left were compensated, whereas in Northern Nigeria slaves had to ransom themselves. Elsewhere there was no compensation, and often no set ransom. Slaves were simply not encouraged to leave or helped to reestablish themselves, and sometimes fugitives were returned to their owners. Whether slaves could leave depended on whether they could get access to land, wage labor, or other means of livelihood, and, sometimes, on whether they could get a sympathetic hearing in a native or Muslim court or before a European official.

The French adopted a variation of this policy, officially not recognizing slavery, but in practice supporting it. However, the departure of large numbers of discontented slaves in the Sudan from 1905, and the failure of their efforts to stop the exodus, led administrators to change their policy. Henceforth they refused to recognize slavery, but did not interfere with slaves who chose to remain with their owners. In Morocco, however, they did not explicitly outlaw slavery until 1925, while in Mauritania and the Sahara the laws were not enforced and slavery, and even small-scale slave trading, remained a fact of life until the end of colonial rule. The Portuguese outlawed slavery completely in 1878 but did not enforce the laws; and it continued, together with an active slave trade supplying “contract labor” to São Tomé and Príncipe, well into the twentieth century. The Germans in Tanganyika recognized slavery but eroded it by official manumissions. In Cameroon they passed laws against it, but only sporadically enforced them, and even slave trading continued for many years. The Italians in Somaliland outlawed the slave trade in 1903–1904 as the result of the revelations of a journalist, and declared that all slaves born after 1890 were free. The Spanish ended slavery in Fernando Po in 1859 to avoid having to return fugitives from the Portuguese island of São Tomé, and to open the way to recruiting contract labor. They did little in their other colonies,

however, and in 1926 they excluded Spanish Morocco from the provisions of the Slavery Convention. The Belgians in the Congo never recognized slavery, but often used freed slaves for their own purposes.

Although colonial policy and laws set the context in which slavery was gradually eroded, the more important factors in its demise were the economic and political changes that accompanied colonial rule, and the initiatives of the slaves themselves. As wars and raids ended, and as new forms of transportation were introduced, so the need for slave soldiers and porters declined. Economic development helped slaves to depart by offering them new opportunities for wage labor or independent peasant production. It also provided owners with new forms of investment, new trade goods, and new status symbols. In some cases colonial taxation policies added to the expense of keeping slaves. Forced labor policies had a leveling effect, as freemen and slaves were both conscripted. Famine and the disruptions of World War I also eroded the institution in some areas.

Slaves played a key role in their own emancipation. Thousands departed spontaneously, or renegotiated their terms of service with their former owners. Scholars are divided as to whether more departed or stayed. Much depended on their prospects of finding other employment and on their level of discontent. In some areas, such as Nkanu in Southern Nigeria, masters retained control far into the colonial period through their ownership of land and the monopoly of ritual functions. They even used slaves for human sacrifice in the early 1920s. In contrast, in parts of Northern Nigeria, many thousands of slaves went home during the disorders of conquest. Others decamped when the railway offered them access to the market as independent producers. Possibly the majority remained in place but renegotiated their relations with their owners.

Prospects of achieving freedom varied with the sex, age, and location of the slave. Men fared better than women; they were more likely to find jobs or be able to set themselves up independently. Women, when freed, were usually consigned to or sought the care of a male protector. In some cases slave children were sent to Western schools, and they and their descendants became more prosperous than the descendants of their former masters. Some owners were ruined. Others prospered—particularly chiefs who managed to retain control over land and “traditional” labor services. The fate of royal slaves, whose prosperity depended on resisting emancipation, has only begun to be investigated.

Humanitarian organizations, principally the British Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, brought the issue before the League of Nations in 1922. This resulted in the Slavery Convention of 1926,

which bound signatories to end slavery “in all its forms” as circumstances permitted. The League of Nations also appointed three slavery commissions, which met in the 1920s and 1930s. Each of them asked the colonial governments for reports on their antislavery policies. In response, administrations reviewed their laws and practices, and the British, in particular, revised them to ensure that slaves knew they had the right to claim their freedom. By the end of colonial rule, slave raiding had disappeared in all but the remotest areas. Slave trading had been reduced to small-scale underground traffic, and slavery was no longer legal anywhere. In some areas, however, the descendants of slaves still suffered discrimination in matters of marriage, inheritance, access to land, and the performance of religious rituals.

SUZANNE MIERS

See also: Anti-Slavery Movement; Brussels Conference and Act, 1890.

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Smuts, Jan C. (1870–1950)

Politician

Jan Christiaan Smuts was a scholar, scientist, and soldier, and white South Africa’s leading statesman. He played a prominent role in the confrontation between Britain and the South African Republic (SAR), which culminated in the South African War (1899–1902). As attorney general he played a prominent part in the negotiations before the war, and helped frame the

republic's strategy. After the capture of Pretoria in 1900, he joined the Boer commandos, leading troops a thousand miles into the Cape Colony in the following year.

Smuts showed an exceptional aptitude for war. He emerged from it physically robust, with added authority among Afrikaners and a formidably anti-British reputation. He displayed his soldierly skills again in World War I, when he put down civil war in South Africa, helped capture southwestern Africa from the Germans, and led imperial troops in eastern Africa. In 1917 he joined the imperial and then the British war cabinet. War developed Smuts's sense of masculinity, and perhaps his arrogance and sense of invincibility.

Nevertheless, Smuts thought of himself as a man of peace and a lawgiver. In May 1902, convinced the Afrikaners faced annihilation, he helped persuade the Boer commanders to sign the peace treaty with the British at Vereeniging in the Transvaal. He believed that reconciliation between the "white races" was crucial if white supremacy was to be maintained, and drafted the clause in the treaty that ensured that decisions about an African suffrage would be left to colonists; the exclusion of the majority African population from citizenship in the act unifying South Africa in 1910 was the inevitable result.

Throughout his life Smuts opposed extending political rights to Africans. His views on native policy never rose beyond notions of "trusteeship," paternalism, and segregation, while his actual native policy was mostly pragmatic and short-term. His relations with Indians were not much better. Despite declaring in 1943 that segregation had "fallen on evil days," Smuts retained his opaque views on race and his incapacity to provide vision and leadership on this, South Africa's most crucial issue, throughout his life.

After the South African War, Smuts played a major role in Transvaal politics, securing the region's self-government from Britain in 1906. In 1910 he was the architect of the union. In the Transvaal and then in the union, he held key ministerial posts under the premierships of his comrade-in-arms and confidante, Louis Botha, and established their racially exclusive legislative and constitutional frameworks.

Despite his blinkered vision on matters of race, after 1910 Smuts was acclaimed as an internationalist. He helped refashion the modern British Commonwealth, establishing the notion of dominion status during and immediately after World War I, and assisting in the birth of the independent Irish state in 1921.

He was present at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, representing South Africa with Botha. There he argued in vain for a magnanimous peace and opposed the punitive reparations imposed on Germany, recognizing its threat to European peace and social order. Largely

responsible for establishing the framework of the League of Nations in 1918–1919, in 1945–1946 he participated in the discussions that set up the United Nations, and both suggested and drafted its human rights charter.

Nor did he ever forget his intellectual activities; during the South African War he had reputedly carried Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and the New Testament in Greek in his knapsack. A busy minister, between 1906 and 1911 he wrote a philosophical treatise, *An Enquiry into the Whole*, based partly on his unpublished manuscript on Walt Whitman written at Cambridge University. This in turn formed the basis of his *Holism and Evolution*, published in 1926, in which he attempted to synthesize Darwinian science and metaphysics. Highly regarded by contemporaries, it attracts few admirers today; nevertheless, it paved the way for Smuts's presidency of the prestigious British Association for the Advancement of Science in its centenary year in 1931. By this time he was widely extolled for his capacity to synthesize knowledge across a range of scientific disciplines. A champion of South African science, he understood its importance in promoting white nationhood.

Smuts's reputation was always more lustrous internationally than at home, where his political life in the interwar years was far from distinguished. Succeeding Botha as premier in 1919, he was soon outflanked by the more extreme nationalism of J. B. M. Hertzog's Afrikaner National Party, and forced into an alliance with the party of mining capital that had supported him during the war. In office, he ruthlessly suppressed black millenarians at Bulhoek in the eastern Cape in 1921, striking white mineworkers on the Rand in 1922, and the Bondelswartz people in Namibia in the same year. In 1924, he was ousted from power. In 1933 he accepted office under Hertzog, despite the differences between them, especially over the Commonwealth connection, and to the dismay of more liberal members of his party who saw in it the betrayal of any hope of a more progressive racial policy.

Smuts's hour came again with the outbreak of World War II, when he persuaded the parliament, by a majority of 13 votes, to join Britain against Nazism, and became Prime Minister. He built up South Africa's defense forces, oversaw the dispatch of South African troops to North Africa and the Middle East, and visited the front on several occasions, frequently advising Winston Churchill on war strategy. Despite this, he lost the all-white South African elections in 1948 to Afrikaner nationalists using the slogan of apartheid. The election results came as a shock to Smuts. Not only did he underestimate nationalist sentiment; he also failed to take the precaution of altering the constituency boundaries that greatly favored rural areas.

He died two years later; the nationalists remained in power until 1994.

Revered in his lifetime, especially in Britain and the Commonwealth, in South Africa Smuts was reviled by nationalists as the “handyman of empire,” and by white workers as a “lackey of capitalism”; in the apartheid era he was largely forgotten. His belief in white supremacy and refusal to accept South Africa’s majority black population as fellow citizens greatly tarnished his image, while the speeches and writings that struck his contemporaries as profound frequently appear overblown or even banal. Nevertheless, in recent years, as white South Africans have once more faced the wider world, his life is attracting renewed attention.

SHULA MARKS

See also: **South Africa: Africa Policy; South Africa: Afrikaner Nationalism, Broederbond and National Party, 1902–1948; South Africa: Gandhi, Indian Question; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910; South Africa: Segregation, Political Economy of; South Africa: World Wars I and II; South African War, 1899–1902.**

Biography

Born near Malmesbury in the Cape Colony. A scholarship took him to Cambridge, where in 1894 he was the first candidate to achieve distinction in both parts of the law tripos simultaneously. Secured the Transvaal’s self-government from Britain in 1906. In 1910, was the architect of the union. Held key ministerial posts under the premierships of Louis Botha. Held the presidency of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1931. Named premier in 1919, and ousted from power in 1924. Reinstated as prime minister with the outbreak of World War II. Lost the all-white South African elections in 1948 to Afrikaner nationalists. Died in 1950.

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Soba and Dongola

Upon the collapse of the Kushite state in the fourth century CE, political power was usurped by the Nubians. By the sixth century they were divided into

three states, Nobadia, Makurra, and ‘Alwa. Faras, the capital of Nobadia, had been an important town for millennia, in contrast to Soba (Soba East) and Dongola (now termed Old Dongola to distinguish it from the modern city 120 kilometers to the north), the capitals of ‘Alwa and Makurra, respectively. Although a bark stand inscribed with the name of Taharqo (690–664BCE) was found at Dongola, and a granite statue base, a Hathor headed capital and two criosphinxes, one inscribed with Meroitic hieroglyphs, have been found at Soba, both these towns seem to be new foundations dating to the earlier years of the Nubian kingdoms.

The earliest structural evidence for occupation at Dongola is the massive defensive wall built on the prominent hill overlooking the Nile, which has been dated to the early sixth century on the evidence of associated pottery. At Soba, remains of circular timber huts can be dated to about the same period. There is a complete absence at both sites of pottery and other artifacts of earlier periods; we must assume that the Kushite monumental sculptures and inscribed blocks were brought to these sites from elsewhere.

Dongola occupies an excellent defensible position from which it dominates the Nile, making it ideally situated to control riverine traffic. It is also at the point where trade routes from Darfur in the west and Kordofan to the southwest join the Nile. Immediately to the north of the town is the fertile Letti Basin, an old palaeochannel of the Nile. The reasons for the choice of the site at Soba are less easy to ascertain. It lies on the right bank of the Blue Nile, 22 kilometers upstream from the confluence of the Blue and White Niles at present-day Khartoum. The featureless countryside at Soba does not appear to especially favor this site above many others in the vicinity, and the adjacent Wadi Soba is not a significant feature of the landscape. Although Wallace Budge, who excavated on the site in 1903, claimed to have found traces of a defensive wall and gate, further study has failed to substantiate this claim.

An historical outline of Dongola is available partly from the Arab sources who mention it frequently, usually in the context of Arab attacks on the town, and partly as a result of the extensive and ongoing excavations by the Polish Mediterranean Research Center on the site that were begun in 1964. By contrast, Soba, far to the south, is rarely mentioned by Arab sources and has seen much less extensive excavation.

Although defense seems to have been of primary importance to the early inhabitants of Dongola, large churches were, by the later sixth century, constructed outside the walls in the plain to the north. The sense of security that this implies was rudely shattered in 652, when an Arab army laid siege to the town and destroyed at least one of these churches. However, when the conflict ended, the town developed to the

north, eventually covering an area 2.8 by 0.9 kilometers in extent, though much of this may not have been densely occupied. The most dominant structures in the town were churches and monasteries. The grandiose churches, frequently demolished and rebuilt on an ever greater scale, reflect the considerable vitality of the town and of the Kingdom of which it was the capital. Dating from its heyday in the Classic Christian period (85–1100) is the throne hall of the rulers, an impressive two-story building approximately 10 meters in height; fine houses also date from this period.

According to Ibn Selim el Aswani, who visited 'Alwa around 970, 'Alwa had "fine buildings and large monasteries, churches rich with gold and gardens." In the eleventh century, Abu Salih noted that in the town was "a very large and spacious church, skillfully planned and constructed . . . called the Church of Manbali." Excavations in the 1980s by the British Institute in Eastern Africa uncovered the remains of three of these churches, two of which are of a size and style directly comparable with the finest churches known at Dongola. Clearly both towns followed the same artistic traditions, although it is unclear whether one was directly influenced by the other, and if so which was the dominant partner in this cultural exchange. Five churches have been excavated at Soba as well as a large palatial structure, which in view of its close physical proximity to the three churches was perhaps the residence of the archbishop of Soba, or of the king. Reused within the building was the marble tombstone of a king of 'Alwa, David, who reigned probably from 99 to 1015. Soba appears to have attained its greatest extent in the early medieval period, when it covered 2.75 square kilometers. Later it was more nucleated, though perhaps with an equally large population.

The demise of Dongola went hand in hand with a general impoverishment of Makurra, brought about by incessant attacks from the north beginning in the late twelfth century that caused considerable destruction to a number of the major buildings, perhaps exacerbated by earthquake damage. In 1317 the throne hall was converted into a mosque and in 1323 the first Muslim ruler ascended the throne. Before the end of that century the city was abandoned as the capital of Makurra, with the transfer of the royal court to the northern town of Derr. We have much less information on the collapse of 'Alwa and the destruction of Soba. However, excavations within one of the major churches suggested that that building was already occupied by squatters during the twelfth century; rich Christian graves were being plundered at about that time. When the traveler David Reubeni passed through the town in 1523 the fine buildings were long gone; he described the inhabitants as living in crude huts.

DEREK WELSBY

See also: **Nubia.**

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Sobhuza I: See Swaziland: Sobhuza I, Foundation of Ngwane Kingdom.

Sobukwe, Robert and the Pan-Africanist Congress

The Pan-Africanist Congress was an anti-apartheid political organization founded in 1959 and led by Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who was born in 1924 in the Eastern Cape town of Graaff-Reinet. Sobukwe's background was quite modest, but he was able to gain admittance to Fort Hare, at that time (the late 1940s) South Africa's premier African university.

At Fort Hare, Sobukwe was exposed to a wide range of political ideas and organizations, the most important being the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League. At the time, the Youth League was under the dynamic leadership of Anton Lembede. The Youth League, which was formed in 1942, would prove to be a crucial factor in shaping the resistance to racial inequity. It would provide the political start for many future leaders, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo, as well as Sobukwe himself. The Youth League differed from the main body of the ANC in that it argued that African solidarity must be the basis of action against repression. Although the Youth League clearly stated that it welcomed cooperation with other racial groups, it felt that the liberation of Africans had to be led by Africans themselves. In 1948, the year that the National Party formally introduced apartheid, Sobukwe and his classmates founded a branch of the Youth League at Fort Hare.

Shortly after the Fort Hare chapter joined the larger Youth League, the organization developed its Program of Action in 1949. This policy was designed to encourage a much more direct confrontation with government

repression than the ANC had undertaken in the past. This policy was implemented with the Defiance Campaign of 1952, when large-scale refusal to honor pass laws began. Although these protests were successful in raising consciousness among Africans and their sympathizers, there were those among the ANC that were unhappy with the way the organizations' leadership had coordinated their activities so closely with Asian activists. In addition to problems with coordination with Asians, there were misgivings among some ANC members over the influence of some whites, especially those in the Communist Party. According to Sobukwe's biographer, Benjamin Pogrand (1991), many Africans were uncomfortable with the South African Communist Party's close ties to the Soviet Union, which caused local communist activists to modify their positions according to directives from Moscow.

Those ANC members who were unhappy with the direction of their organization were known as the "Africanists." The area where Africanist sentiment was strongest was the Orlando community of greater Johannesburg. The initial leader of the Africanist faction was Potlako K. Leballo, but Robert Sobukwe would eventually become their leader when he moved to the area after gaining a position as an instructor of African Languages at the University of the Witwatersrand.

The acrimony between the Africanists and the ANC mainstream increased throughout the 1950s. The Freedom Charter movement, which was based on a union of all South Africa's communities, was dismissed by Africanists as a deviation from the 1949 Program of Action. The friction of the two cliques finally erupted in 1958, when Leballo was expelled from the ANC by Transvaal President Nelson Mandela and Africanist members were met with force at an ANC meeting that year.

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) held its inaugural meeting in April 1959. At that meeting Robert Sobukwe was elected president and Potlako Leballo was elected secretary general. The PAC differentiated itself from the ANC not only by emphasizing African nationalism and leadership; it was also more internationalist in its orientation, stressing a desire for an eventual continent wide African state. The PAC also received messages from Presidents Sekou Touré of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who expressed support for the PAC's vision of a United States of Africa.

Less than a year after its founding, the PAC would initiate an antipass protest that would lead to the Sharpeville Massacre, an event that would display the brutal repression of apartheid before the world. On March 4, 1960, Robert Sobukwe called on the PAC membership to go without their passes to police stations and demand their arrest. When a large crowd of

protesters appeared before the police station in Sharpeville, the police reacted by opening fire, killing 69 and wounding 180. Among the casualties were 40 women and 6 children. Although the nationalist government under Prime Minister Verwoerd tried to justify the shooting with claims of violence on the part of demonstrators, investigation would eventually prove that the protesters were unarmed, and were primarily shot in the back while fleeing the police.

The African population of South Africa was naturally outraged by the Sharpeville Massacre, and both the ANC and PAC sponsored strikes and other actions to express their dissatisfaction with the apartheid government. The government, in response, declared a state of emergency and eventually banned both the PAC and ANC. Additionally, the PAC leadership was sentenced to hard labor. Sobukwe was given a sentence of three years. In response to continuing repression of the minority government, the PAC organized an armed unit commonly known as Poqo.

The fallout from Sharpeville devastated the leadership of the PAC. After finishing his prison term, Sobukwe was forced to spend the rest of his life under strict security-force supervision until his death from cancer in 1978. Potlako Leballo was able to move to Maseru in Lesotho after his release from prison in 1962; here he established the PAC in exile. The PAC headquarters were then moved to Dar es Salaam in 1964. Once in Tanzania, the PAC set about the business of trying to develop an effective fighting force for the struggle against apartheid, but the organization found itself caught up in conflicts among factions, which resulted in deadly violence. The major split involved David Sibeko, the PAC's observer to the United Nations, and the supporters of Leballo.

Leballo and his supporters wanted to maintain the emphasis on armed struggle, while Sibeko began to move toward negotiated settlement. This rift was exacerbated by the large influx of military recruits as a result of the Soweto uprising of 1976. Sibeko would eventually be assassinated in 1979.

With the lifting of the ban on the PAC, ANC, and South African Communist Party in 1990, the PAC once again became an openly functioning political organization. It also posted candidates in the open elections of 1994, in which it won five seats in the parliament.

ANTHONY CHEESEBORO

See also: **Luthili, Albert; Mandela, Nelson; South Africa: Sharpeville Massacre.**

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Socialism in Postcolonial Africa

In the immediate postcolonial period, the language of socialism was attractive to nationalist elites and emergent intellectuals in Africa as a means of further distancing themselves from the colonial powers (and the “imperialist system”) from which they had now won their independence. Often this reflected the sincere belief that a socialist system promised a more just and humane society than any other likely alternative. It could also seem, in light of the apparent strength and rising ascendancy of the Soviet and Chinese models, to offer an effective growth strategy and a convincing rationale for the kind of “developmental state” thought necessary on the Left (and even, at the time, on the Right) to realize socioeconomic transformation.

In many of its earliest expressions the goal of socialism in Africa intersected with the ideological discourse of *African socialism*; this term came to summarize a claim (now much discredited) that there is a socialism distinctive to Africa, one that springs, quite spontaneously, from egalitarian cultural predispositions and communal social practices antedating European penetration of the continent. These predispositions and practices were said to have survived the impact of colonialism and to provide the basis for giving a promisingly collectivist tilt to the policies of postcolonial governments.

Sometimes these notions reflected the cultural-nationalist preoccupations of certain members of the first generation of successful African nationalists, less eager to advance a deeply critical analysis of their own societies than to develop an indigenous alternative to left-wing discourses (Marxism, for example) they considered too Eurocentric or too potentially divisive. Leopold Senghor of Senegal best exemplified such a tendency, perhaps, though it should also be noted that this perspective was, from the very earliest days of African independence, viewed with suspicion by other putatively socialist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea. These leaders employed a rather more universalistic, if still hazily defined, “progressive” discourse in outlining their own (ultimately unrealized) left-populist and anti-imperialist goals.

More often, the rhetoric of African socialism was adopted quite cynically by opportunistic elites, on the rise everywhere in Africa, to give a veneer of progressiveness and apparent concern for popular aspirations

to their otherwise self-interested and increasingly capitalist policies. By means of this ideological rationale these elites sought to mask the workings of new class structures and continuing imperial linkages that a more rigorous socialist discourse might more readily have revealed to popular scrutiny. A particularly notorious example of this more manipulative use of the concept was the Kenyan government’s “Sessional Paper #10” on “African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya” (1965), which, substantively, had almost nothing to do with any recognizably socialist intention. It was not long before the Kenyan leadership itself began to rationalize its policies in much more straightforwardly capitalist terms. And certain other much-touted variants on African Socialist themes (the “humanism” of Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, for example) also proved to have little or no genuine socialist content.

Probably the most sincere and well-developed of all variants of African socialism was the philosophy and practice of *ujamaa* (familyhood) generated by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. Suspicious, in part on religious grounds, of Marxism and “class struggle,” Nyerere nonetheless evinced a high moral tone, a certain skepticism as to the bona fides of Western economic interests and strategies, and a genuine concern for the fate of the mass of the population in his impoverished country.

As Nyerere sought to balance his perspective against his own deepening awareness of the profound contradictions inherent in modern African society, he produced a series of widely quoted analyses of rural questions, education, leadership, and democracy. In policy terms, he sought to curb elite aggrandizement and encourage equality, to make foreign investment serve positive social ends, and to encourage a new pattern of collective life for rural dwellers. Nyerere was to sustain his eloquent critique of capitalist-induced global inequalities until his death in 1999. In Tanzania, however, his project—which intersected in practice with weak administrative capacities, all-too-authoritarian political methods and only rather mildly social-democratic interventions in the economy—was not successful, either economically or in terms of realizing socialist ideals.

There had always coexisted in postcolonial Africa a more Marxist socialist current, however. This had contributed to the leftward inflection of radical populism in nations such as Algeria, where an interesting form of collectivism and autodetermination was briefly attempted in the rural areas, for example. It was to resurface in the rejection of Nyerere’s ideas by a later generation of socialists, many of them linked to the liberation movements and postliberation governments of Southern Africa, such as Mozambique’s FRELIMO,

led by President Samora Machel. Deeply suspicious of western capitalist dictates and anxious to address the needs of its impoverished population, FRELIMO found in Marxism an alternative to the vague nostrums of African socialism and a possible guide to realization of the collectivist aspirations that had developed in the course of the movement's armed struggle against the Portuguese. This led to a heightened role for the state in the economy and an attempted practice of egalitarianism in class, gender, and racial terms.

Unfortunately, once in power (after 1975), Frelimo failed to avoid the authoritarian and vanguard practices, the stiff intolerance toward cultural diversity, and the economic strategies, top-down and technocratic, that had come to characterize the "Marxist-Leninist" brand of Marxism elsewhere. Moreover, before it could even hope to correct such mistakes and root its Marxism more firmly and effectively in the concrete realities that presented themselves on the ground, socialist Mozambique also found itself (like its counterpart regime in another former Portuguese colony, Angola) besieged by apartheid South Africa's ruthless destabilization policy in the region. In the end, Frelimo would abandon its progressive perspectives under South African and American pressure and capitulate to the new global economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism. Meanwhile, several other regimes (those of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, for example) that presented themselves in socialist terms in the 1980s seemed, unlike Mozambique, merely to manipulate Marxist rhetoric in the attempt to legitimate their high-handed political methods and/or to sustain aid flows from the east in the last years of the Cold War.

Socialists on the continent came, therefore, to look for the immediate vindication of their hopes in the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa. There the principal liberation movement, the African National Congress, was linked both to the South African Communist Party and to a highly mobilized and radicalized network of mass organizations on the ground (including the country's vibrant trade union movement) and seemed to promise both a clearer version of socialist theory and a more effective socialist practice than elsewhere. Many of the ANC's preliberation formulations emphasized the need to impose a strong measure of social control upon the workings of the market and over a capitalist economy that was very much more developed in South Africa than elsewhere on the continent. Much was heard of the prospects for nationalization, and for economic strategies designed to produce "growth through redistribution." Yet the difficulties of confronting the post-Cold War global economic power structure were soon apparent and, in combination with the increasingly self-interested ambitions of at least some among the ANC leadership,

produced a markedly neoliberal postapartheid development project, one premised on "global competitiveness," the centrality of foreign investment, and the rule of the market.

Some sharp debates did continue over the likely efficacy of such a policy package to provide economic growth sufficient to redress the extreme inequalities that still characterize South Africa. But that country was, in any case, merely part of a broader pattern. Given the global and continental defeat/failure of regimes and movements that presented themselves as socialist, and faced with the hegemony of neoliberal orthodoxy worldwide, the language of socialism had, by century's end, lost a great deal of its credibility on the continent. At the same time, there are those in Africa who argue that any such setback may prove only temporary. Global capitalism shows no more sign of producing socioeconomic transformation in Africa than it has heretofore, and the costs of ongoing socioeconomic crisis for the continent are mounting. In this context, the claims of the social over those of the marketplace, and of the leftist developmental state over those of capital, may yet reassert themselves as crucial dimensions of emerging popular-democratic demands in Africa. If so, the analytical categories and political practices linked to socialist critique and practice (albeit freer, one hopes, of authoritarian propensities and of the often narrowly economic and statist orthodoxies that characterized such initiatives in the past) will ultimately have to be revived in Africa.

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See also: Cold War, Africa and the; Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sekou, Era of; Mozambique: Frelimo and the War of Liberation, 1962–1975; Nkrumah, Kwame; Nyerere, Julius; South Africa: African National Congress; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Arusha Declaration.

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Soga, Tiyo (1829–1871)

Xhosa Missionary, Writer, Translator and Composer

The first African from South Africa to become an ordained missionary, Tiyo Soga was an important transitional figure who left a significant body of writings. He was born close to the Mgwali River, a tributary of the Tyumie, in what is now the Eastern Cape, in the heart of the old eastern frontier or, as it became known, the Ciskei.

Soga went first to a United Presbyterian Church of Scotland mission school at Chumie, and then to the Free Church of Scotland secondary school at Lovedale, which he entered in 1844, three years after its establishment. During the War of the Axe (1846–1847) between the western Xhosa and the British, he fled with his mother to the Kat River Settlement, but by then the principal of the Lovedale school, the Rev. William Govan, had recognized Soga's potential. Govan arranged to take him to Scotland for further education. In Glasgow he was taught at the Free Church Seminary, and baptized in May 1848. In October that year he returned to South Africa as a catechist. He then worked at the mission stations of Uniondale and Igqinbigha, where he ran into criticism from fellow Xhosa speakers because he had not been circumcised and for collaborating with the colonists. When war broke out again between the Xhosa and the British in December 1850, Soga again sided with the colony, and fled to Grahamstown. At the suggestion of the Rev. Robert Niven, who had been his superior at Uniondale, he left in June 1851 for Scotland, now to train for the ministry. After theological study, he was ordained a minister in December 1856. The following February, on the eve of his departure for South Africa, he married a Scotswoman, Janet Burnside.

The couple was the victim of racial prejudice when they arrived back in South Africa, but they soon went inland, to the area of Soga's birth, and on the Mgwali River he established a new Presbyterian mission among the western Xhosa, in what was now the high commission territory of British Kaffraria. His return took place in the aftermath of the Xhosa cattle killing, and he saw in its tragic consequences—large numbers of Xhosa left starving and uprooted from their homes—new opportunities for expanding mission

work. And partly as a consequence of the changed circumstances, he was successful as a missionary at Emgwali, amassing a large congregation. Soga built a number of schools and outstations and a large church building, for which he collected over £600 from white supporters. He established a reputation as a fine preacher, equally at home with both the English and Xhosa languages. He kept a journal, and began writing occasional articles, some of them published in *Indaba*, the English-Xhosa periodical produced at Lovedale.

In 1865 Soga developed chronic throat trouble, yet he never took adequate rest from his demanding job. In 1867, Sarili, head of the Gcaleka (eastern) Xhosa, who had in 1864 been allowed to return to a portion of the lands from which he had been ejected after the cattle killing, asked for a missionary. Soga reluctantly left Emgwali in 1868 to establish the new mission east of the Kei River. He chose a site on the Tutura River, the later Somerville, and there lived in a mud hut while he sought to build up the new mission. He soon grew despondent as he encountered much opposition from Sarili, who continued to see mission work as the vanguard of colonial penetration, and the Gcaleka. He also grew increasingly ill, and suffered from depression as he battled to make converts. A new mission church was opened in April 1871, but in June on his way to establish an outstation he was trapped in a damp hut for some days and fell ill. He did not recover, and died in August of that year.

In 1866, Soga had completed the Xhosa translation of the first part of John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, which became a classic of Xhosa literature and was to be published in a number of editions. He also composed a number of popular hymns in Xhosa, and translated a large part of the four Gospels for the Xhosa Bible. When he died at the early age of 42 there was an outpouring of grief in the colony, for he had become a revered figure.

In the eight articles that he had published in *Indaba*, and in other writing, Soga expressed his pride in being African and called on Africans to work together to promote the interests of their "nation." It was on the basis of such writing that Donovan Williams, a recent biographer and editor of Soga's writing, has argued that he was "the progenitor of black nationalism in South Africa" and a contributor to ideas of black consciousness and *Négritude*. The new generation of educated Africans who would pass through Lovedale in the 1870s—men such as Elijah Makiwane and John Tengo Jabavu—did see in Soga a role model, but there is no evidence that they or others drew on his ideas, and Williams's claims rest largely on a small body of writing, much of which remained unknown or forgotten until Williams himself rescued it. What is clear is that Soga was a man who was able to reconcile the two

worlds in which he found himself. On the one hand, he retained a deep affection for Scotland and its culture; on the other, he remained proud of his Xhosa and African heritage, rejected criticism of African culture as barbarous and any idea that it would be replaced entirely by Western culture. He urged his children to be proud of the African side of their ancestry. He was the first African in South Africa to grapple with such dilemmas on paper; in this, John Knox Bokwe in the later nineteenth century and Sol T. Plaatje in the early twentieth would follow in Soga's footsteps.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

See also: **South Africa: Missionaries: Nineteenth Century.**

Biography

Born in 1929 close to the Mgwali River, a tributary of the Tyumie, in what is now the Eastern Cape. Upon the recommendation of a missionary teacher, moved to Scotland to study, where he was baptized in 1848; returned thereafter to South Africa. Left in June 1851 for Scotland again, to train for the ministry. After theological study, was ordained a minister in December 1856. The following February, on the eve of his departure for South Africa, he married a Scotswoman, Janet Burnside. From 1865 on, developed chronic throat trouble. Left Emgwali in 1868 to establish a new mission east of the Kei River, choosing a site on the Tutura River (Somerville). Died in 1871.

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Sokoto Caliphate: Hausa, Fulani and Founding of

From the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, centralized states emerged around the walled cities that had become important commercial centers in Hausaland (present-day northern Nigeria). The most prominent of these states were Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, Zamfara, Kebbi, and Gobir. The Hausa states were also the home of many immigrants of diverse ethnic origin.

The pastoralist Fulbe (Fulani in the Hausa language), who had spread from Futa Toro across much of the West African savanna, were among the most significant of these groups.

Although Islam had grown (at least in urban areas) from the faith of a small circle of merchants and scholars to the generally established religion of the various Hausa states, by the end of the eighteenth century indigenous religious rites were still commonly practiced. Within the Torodbe community, which produced many of the Fulani *mallams* (learned Muslims) in Hausaland, this syncretism was often equated with being an infidel, and many Torodbe agitated for the creation of Muslim states in which rulers would uphold the *Shari'a* (Islamic law). However, Shehu 'Uthman dan Fodio, who became the spiritual leader of the Sokoto jihad (holy war), initially refused to become embroiled in political disputes. Hence, in the early 1780s, while he was an adviser at the court of the Sarkin Gobir Bawa, there was little reason to believe that he would lead a movement against the Gobir government. Yet, as it became clear that the Hausa rulers were unwilling to dispense with the non-Muslim religious practices that buttressed their authority, 'Uthman began to sanction the establishment of autonomous Muslim communities throughout Hausaland.

His support among the Fulani was, however, uneven. Many of the Torodbe doubted 'Uthman's mission of reform, while others were comfortable enough at court to dislike the prospect of change. Many, however, supported the movement because their income was dependent upon the whims of their wealthy Hausa hosts since farming, trades, and commerce were seen as detracting from the pursuit of a religious life. Likewise, many of the Fulanin Gidda (settled Fulani) were unmoved by religious criticisms of a political and economic order though which they had become relatively successful. However, many Fulanin Gidda, who were desirous of more political power, also joined the jihadist movement. Conversely, the non-Muslim Baroji (pastoral Fulani), who were spread throughout Hausaland, remained largely separated from town life and maintained a symbiotic relationship with the Hausa peasantry. Nevertheless, *jangali* (cattle tax), forced military service, and restrictions on the use of water and grazing land often led the independent clan leaders to rise in sympathy with Usman.

Although the Sokoto jihad was waged primarily by Fulani-led independent armies, it also attracted many of the Hausa peasants, who were oppressed by slavery, excessive taxation, governmental corruption, and the imposition of customary rights that entitled the aristocracy to the pick of their daughters as well as their beasts of burden. Consequently, when 'Uthman taught of an Islam in which fellow Muslims would not be

enslaved and government would be administered with social justice, he was also articulating Hausa discontent.

By the turn of the century there had been an alarming increase in the number of 'Uthman's followers in Gobir. In 1803, Sarkin Gobir Yunfa summoned 'Uthman to the palace and made an attempt on his life. The failure of this assassination attempt was ascribed to divine providence and, in the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, the shehu, accompanied by his brother Abdullah and his son Muhammad Bello, resorted to flight. Still, it was not until Yunfa declared war on the Muslims in 1804 that the jihad began and 'Uthman became "commander of the faithful." In the military encounters that followed, however, Abdullah and Bello made most of the critical decisions.

In 1804 at Tabkin Kwatto, the shehu's followers, relying almost entirely on archers, defeated the numerically superior Gobirawa. Next, they attacked Alkalawa, Gobir's capital, but were defeated, losing over 2,000 of their best men. The shehu's forces then retreated to Zamfara, which they ultimately conquered. From Zamfara the jihadists moved to Gwandu, in southern Kebbi. The Gobirawa, aided by the Tuareg and the dissident Kebbawa and Zamfarawa, attacked Gwandu. The town was poorly fortified, but the hilly terrain was extremely difficult for the Gobirawa's heavy cavalry and Tuareg camel corps. The result was complete victory for the shehu's archers.

The flagbearers of the shehu invaded Zazzau in 1805. When the Sarkin Zazzau's son and heir, Makau, was surprised by the reformers on his way to a ceremonial prayer ground outside the city walls, he was forced to flee and the city of Zaria fell without a struggle. In 1806, after Kebbi and Zamfara had been subdued in the west, Bello proceeded to Katsina to reinforce the shehu's supporters there. A combined force of Fulani, Zamfarawa, and Kanawa defeated the forces of the Sarkin Katsina at Dankama. By 1807, the great city of Kano had also been captured. With the Kano, Zazzau, Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara firmly in the hands of the reformers, Gobir was completely surrounded. In 1808, Bello captured Alkalawa and Sarkin Gobir Yunfa was slain with all of his followers by his side.

With the fall of Gobir all of the Hausa states had become emirates of the caliphate, which was ultimately headquartered at Sokoto. However, other emirates had also been created: in the north, Ahir and Adar; in the south, Yauri, Gombe, Adamawa, and Bauchi; in the west, Gurma; and in the east (in areas formerly controlled by Bornu), Hadejia and Katagum. Consequently, when Bello became "commander of the faithful" upon the death of the shehu in 1817, the empire was divided, with Yauri and Gurma, in addition to most of Kebbi and its former provinces, becoming Abdullah's western sultanate of Gwandu. The bulk of the empire fell to

Bello; his eastern sultanate included the former states of Gobir and Zamfara, which along with parts of Kebbi had been merged to form the metropolitan sultanate of Sokoto, as well as Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, Bauchi, Adamawa, Daura, Hadejia, and Ahir.

During this early period of expansion, the emirates of the newly formed Sokoto caliphate were relatively autonomous, polytheism persisted among the peasantry, and there were also unsubjected non-Muslim enclaves within the caliphate's borders. Nevertheless, this vast empire, which stretched from Bornu in the east to Songhay in the west, united all of the Hausa states for the first time in their history, replacing their individual indigenous religious underpinnings with a common Islamic superstructure.

LAMONT DEHAVEN KING

See also: 'Uthman dan Fodio.


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Sokoto Caliphate, Nineteenth Century

The Sokoto caliphate was situated mostly in present-day northern Nigeria and parts of southern Niger. It was founded as a result of the Fulani jihads (holy wars) in the first decades of the nineteenth century. By 1808 the Hausa states had been conquered, although the ruling dynasties retreated to the frontiers and built walled cities that remained independent. The more important of these independent cities included Abuja, where the ousted Zaria dynasty fled; Argungu, in the north, the new home of the Kebbi rulers; and Maradi, in present-day Niger, the retreat of the Katsina dynasty. Although

SOKOTO CALIPHATE, NINETEENTH CENTURY




Sokoto empire, nineteenth century.

the Borno *mai* was overthrown and Birni Gazargamu destroyed, Borno did not succumb. The reason, primarily, was that a cleric, Al Kanemi, fashioned a strong resistance that eventually forced those Fulani in Borno to retreat west and south. In the end, Al Kanemi overthrew the centuries-old Sayfawa Dynasty of Borno and established his own lineage as the new ruling house.

The new state that arose during 'Uthman dan Fodio's jihad came to be known as the Sokoto Caliphate, named after his capital at Sokoto, founded in 1809. The caliphate was a loose confederation of emirates that recognized the suzerainty of the commander of the faithful, the sultan. A dispute between Muhammad Bello and his uncle, Abdullahi, resulted in a nominal division of the caliphate into eastern and western divisions in 1812, although the supreme authority of Bello as caliph was upheld. The division was institutionalized through the creation of a twin capital at Gwandu, which was responsible for the western emirates as far as modern Burkina Faso and initially as far west as Massina in modern Mali. When 'Uthman dan Fodio died in 1817, he was succeeded by his son, Bello. The eastern emirates were more numerous and larger than the western ones, which reinforced the primacy of the caliph at Sokoto.

The allegiance sworn by Fulani elites and recognized by the caliph in the form of sending flags, as symbols of recognized powers and rights, constituted the elementary framework of the caliphate's leadership. It was these families that were to provide the Fulani aristocracy of the different emirates. The system of Wazirs, who served as a direct link between the caliph and the emirates, was initiated by 'Uthman dan Fodio already during his reign. Regular correspondence between the caliph and the emirates enabled a relatively unified policy for most of the century.



View of Kano, Sokoto, Nigeria, 1850s; sketch by Dr. Heinrich Barth. © Das Fotoarchiv.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were 30 emirates and the capital district of Sokoto, which itself was a large and populous territory although technically not an emirate. All the important Hausa emirates, including Kano, the wealthiest and most populous, were directly under Sokoto's administration. Adamawa, in present day Cameroon, which was established by Fulani forced to evacuate Borno, was geographically the biggest, stretching far to the south and east of its capital at Yola. The influence of the caliphate reached the southern bank of the Niger when Ilorin became part of it in the 1830s. It was the Yoruba Oyo's cavalry, based in Ilorin and largely composed of Muslim slaves, that initiated this move when it swore allegiance to Sokoto following a series of internal clashes after 1817.

The caliphate remained divided into two major parts: former Islamic lands, composed mostly of Hausaland, and those lands on the peripheries that did not have an Islamic tradition, thus making their integration into the caliphate more difficult. As a result of the jihad, Islam was entrenched in Hausaland in the form of the Shari'a's introduction. However, the former Hausa society never fully abandoned its earlier approach to religion. The frontier states of Bauchi or Adamawa, for example, presented continuous problems up to the 1850s. An additional persisting internal problem of the caliphate was succession disputes. Although these were most often settled in the emirates themselves, there were open revolts defying the caliph's authority in Kano, for example.

Recent research, especially by Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn (1993), has called attention to slavery. Unlike in the earlier history of the region, when slaves were often used as currency, they now played an increasingly important role in the economic production of the caliphate. The percentage of slaves in the total population in several states was estimated at around 50 per cent by several European travelers, such as

Clapperton and Barth in the 1850s. It is estimated that by the 1890s the largest slave population of the world, about two million people, was concentrated in the territories of the Sokoto Caliphate. The use of slave labor was extensive, especially in agriculture. The growth of small plantations (*rinji*) occurred around the newly established core cities and commercial centers, like Zaria, Kano, and Gwandu. In the later period of the caliphate, slave settlements (*tungazi*) were established in Nupe, a phenomenon that attracted much attention from European visitors and traders and would eventually provide the *casus belli* for European conquest starting in 1897. While the *rinji* functioned as a small, private owned estate, the *tungazi* concentrated a dense population in small region of scattered villages. The agricultural sector produced goods like sorghum, millet, and shea butter. The most important aspect of the caliphate's economy was, however, its textile industry, also based on the slave labor of cotton plantations. In addition, the salt and livestock trades became more prominent by the late nineteenth century.

'Uthman dan Fodio's jihad created the largest empire in Africa since the fall of Songhai in 1591. By the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Sokoto Caliphate was at its greatest extent, it stretched 1,500 kilometers, from Dori in modern Burkina Faso to southern Adamawa in Cameroon. In present-day Nigeria, it covered the Nupe lands, Ilorin in northern Yorubaland, and much of the Benue River Valley. The jihad, and subsequently the states of the Sokoto Caliphate, influenced the political and social development of the region significantly. In addition, 'Uthman dan Fodio's jihad provided the inspiration for a series of related holy wars in other parts of the savanna and the Sahel that led to the foundation of Islamic states in Senegal, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. The immediate states of the caliphate functioned as the most important polities in the nineteenth century and played a major economic role in agriculture, the labor movement, and the reinstitutionalization of slavery. They were also a key element in the arguments of the British for conquering the caliphate in the first years of the twentieth century.

LÁSZLÓ MÁTHÉ-SHIREŠ

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Soldiers, African: Overseas

Virtually every colonial power in Africa maintained a standing African army for internal security. Colonial forces cost only a fraction of their European counterparts and helped reduce the overall cost of colonial rule. France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and Germany all maintained such armies, but only Britain and France employed African soldiers overseas in significant numbers.

Although these African soldiers have often been described as mercenaries, many were coerced into joining colonial armies. This was particularly true in France's colonial African army, the Tirailleurs Sénégalais. Meaning "sharpshooters" or "riflemen," the *tirailleurs* were a branch of France's greater overseas colonial forces known as the Troupes de Marine. Created by Napoleon III in 1857, the Tirailleurs relied almost entirely on lottery-based conscription to select recruits in West and Equatorial Africa. French recruiters justified the practice under the doctrine of assimilation, which obliged service to France in return for the "civilizing" benefits of empire.

Over the course of World War I, approximately 170,000 Africans of the Tirailleurs Sénégalais served on the battlefields of France. They fought in segregated units until 1917, when mounting casualties and mutinies in French units forced French commanders to split them up among units. With casualty rates approaching 17 per cent, approximately 29,000 Africans died in France during the conflict. France again relied on conscripted tirailleurs when threatened by the Germans during World War II. Approximately 200,000 Africans served in the regular, Vichy, and Free French forces, and roughly 25,000 died during the war. During the German invasion of 1940, approximately 15,000 of the tirailleurs were taken prisoner when France fell. The Nazis executed many of these men in retaliation for France's decision to garrison the Rhineland with African troops in the 1920s. Tirailleurs stationed in French Equatorial Africa comprised a large part of General Charles de Gaulle's French forces that fought in North Africa, Italy, and France later in the war, and French generals continued to rely on them into the 1950s, when 18,000 Africans fought in France's failed effort to keep Vietnam within the empire.

In comparison, Britain was much less willing to use African soldiers overseas. While the French doctrine of assimilation justified conscription, Britain's

governing ideology of indirect rule was much more restrictive. Under the terms of Frederick Lugard's Dual Mandate, Britain committed itself to protection of "less advanced" African "tribes." Christian missionaries argued that Britain had no right to involve Africans in foreign wars, and colonial officials worried that military service would breakdown the "tribal" units that were the cornerstone of indirect rule. Thus, African soldiers in Britain's combat units had to be volunteers, and only noncombatant military laborers could be conscripted. In reality, however, British recruiters often relied on African chiefs and headmen to coerce recruits into joining the army.

While the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* were drawn from all of French Africa, Britain's colonial African forces were divided into the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), the King's African Rifles (KAR) in East Africa and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. Settlers opposed arming the African population and succeeded in keeping the South African and Rhodesian armies all-European. This opposition helped ensure that Britain did not use African combat soldiers in Europe during World War I, and the only Africans in the European theater during the conflict were longshoremen from the South African Native Labour Contingent. Conversely, Britain sent roughly one-fifth of its approximately 500,000 African soldiers overseas during World War II. Faced with isolation in Europe and the loss of extensive territory in the Far East, British generals relied heavily on African manpower. The Axis threat silenced temporarily the moral arguments against embroiling Africans in foreign wars. The African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps and the South African Military Labour Corps provided frontline labor and military garrisons in the Middle East. Assuming that Africans were natural jungle fighters, British generals also committed three and a half infantry divisions of the RWAFF and KAR to fight the Japanese in Burma in 1944. Overall, approximately 15,000 African soldiers were killed during the war. The relative success of the African forces, coupled with the loss of India in 1948, convinced British military planners to send African soldiers back to the Middle East and Southeast Asia in the 1950s. In 1951, members of the KAR and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment fought communist guerrillas in Malaya, while the East African Pioneers ran Britain's bases in the Suez Canal.

There has been considerable debate over the impact of overseas service on African veterans of both colonial armies. On the whole, these men had training, experience, and wealth that set them apart from their civilian peers. Many had interacted freely with European comrades and were far less tolerant of racial discrimination. During World War I, the *Tirailleurs*

fought in part because they expected political and social equality in return for their service. They were profoundly disappointed when they returned home, but Blaise Diagne, the first African to sit in the French Chamber of Deputies, did convince the French government to give them exemptions from forced labor, and hiring preferences for civilian jobs. After World War II, most French African veterans had the right to vote. As 5 per cent of the total electorate, they became a potent political force in the last decades of the colonial era. Britain, on the other hand, did not make similar concessions to its African ex-servicemen and instead followed a policy of "reabsorption" that sought to reintegrate veterans into rural African society with a minimum of disruption. Although former members of the RWAFF did play a leading role in riots in the Gold Coast in 1948, for the most part, veterans were largely absent from nationalist and anticolonial movements in the British colonies. British combat veterans were a much smaller percentage of the population than in the French colonies and, on the whole, were limited to seeking economic concessions rather than political change.

TIMOTHY PARSONS

See also: World War I: Survey; World War I: North and Saharan Africa; World War II: French West Africa, Equatorial Africa; World War II: North Africa; World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Impact.


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Solomonid Dynasty: See Ethiopia: Solomonid Dynasty, 1270–1550.

Somalia: Pastoralism, Islam, Commerce, Expansion: To 1800

Although pastoralism played a large part in the economy of Somalis and other related peoples, Somalis, being also coastal people, had always traded with other peoples in the vicinity of the Red Sea, the Gulf of



Somalia.

Aden, India, and as far east as what later became Indonesia, especially after the spread of Islam to those parts of Asia. Thus, the same Somalis who had been characterized as mostly nomads had always practiced varied economic activities, depending on the layout of the land. On the coast, they were traders, seafarers, and entrepreneurs, although still without an emperor or a highly centralized government; in the interior, they practiced animal husbandry and agriculture where conditions permitted.

Culturally, as Cushites, they had a monotheistic religion whose central deity was the *waaq* (sky god), as well as spirits of two types: good spirits called the *ayaan* or *ayaana*, and evil spirits called the *busho* or *bushi*. Thus, it was easy for them to espouse the monotheistic religions that sprouted from the Semitic Middle East. It may be surmised that the first religion to arrive from the Middle East was Judaism, judging from its survival among the Falasha of Ethiopia. This was to be followed by Christianity, and centuries later by Islam. However, nothing has survived among Somalis that has much in common with Judaism. Likewise, no noticeable vestiges of ancient Christianity remain among Somalis, except for a ceremony in which people make crosses on their foreheads when making a pilgrimage to one of the holiest Somali saints, Shaykh Yusuf al-Kownin (literally, “he of the two worlds”). Shaykh Yusuf al-Kownin invented a system of vulgarizing the reading of Arabic, and thus the Qu’ran, still in use today.

There is no exact date for the arrival of Islam among Somalis; however, given the proximity with Arabia,

and the fact that Muslims first arrived in the area during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad himself, it can be estimated that Islam arrived in the seventh century. However, the period between the tenth and fourteenth centuries corresponds to an era in which Muslim sultanates such as Ifat, known later as Adal and based in the Northern city of Zeilah (itself one of the most ancient coastal towns in northeast Africa), developed and prospered. By the fourteenth century, Muslim Somalis were an expanding people and were propagating the Muslim faith to their non-Muslim neighbors, notably the Oromo.

Somalis not only spread Islam, but also contributed to Islamic literature and jurisprudence. For example, Imam al-Zayla’i al-Hanafi, from the city of Zayla’ (Zeilah), produced *Tabyin al-haqa’iq*, a well-known six-volume work, used in particular by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. His student, Fakhr Abdalla ibn Yusuf ibn Muhammad ibn Ayub ibn Musa al-Hanafi az-Zaila’i, also wrote a reference work for Islamic jurisprudence in the fourteenth century (Hersi 1984, p.134). In addition, Somali scholars from Zeilah were among the top scholars and teachers in Yemen from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries (Hersi 1984, p.132). Other Somali literati wrote a number of religious eulogies, or *manaqib*, in praise of various saints. Thus, Somalis, far from being a mostly oral society, were a society with scholars who wrote not in their own tongue, Somali, but in Arabic, the liturgical language.

Under Islam, the various Muslim city-states prospered by trade and Somalis built sizable cities. By the fourteenth century, Somali clans, such as the Ajuuraan clan, had migrated to the southern areas of today’s Somalia, wresting control from the Oromo and Bantu-Swahili peoples in the interior of the south. In 1331, the famous Arab traveler, Ibn Battatu, visited the port cities of Zeilah in the north and Mogadishu in the south. He described the populations of these cities as Berbers, who spoke the Berber language (medieval Arabs knew Somalis and Afars as Berbers).

Eventually, the growing importance and prosperity of Ifat would warrant fearful reactions from the Christian Amhara-Tigrean highlanders. Thus, from 1415 to 1543, there was continuous warfare and rivalry between the Christians and Muslims of the Horn. In 1415, Negus Yeshaq, king of the Christians, invaded Zeilah and killed its ruler; Yeshaq’s court jester would compose a victory poem, which gives us the first recorded occurrence of the word *Somali*. In 1530, Somalis and Afars, under the command of Iman Ahmed Gurey (known to the Christian Amhara-Tigreans as Gragne), would conquer all of the Christian highlands except for a few hilltops, as is well chronicled by Shihad Ad-Din, in his *Futuh al-Habash (The Conquest*

of Abyssinia). However, by then the Portuguese had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and found the way to India; they would come to the rescue of the Christian king. Armed with superior cannons, they burned and sacked prosperous coastal cities such as Berbera, Zeilah, Brava, and Mogadishu, in their efforts to appropriate for themselves the Indian Ocean trade. Their efforts would disrupt the ancient trade between Africa and Asia, and throw the coastal Somali towns into a downward spiral of decline.

By the eighteenth century, Somali migrations had changed the demographics of most of the southern areas, especially along the coastal Benadir region, which includes the formerly Swahili cities of Mogadishu, Merca, and Brava. As a result, we have today the coastal Benadir people who speak a variety of Somali known as Coastal Somali, which is a kind of a creole or “contact” language, after their Swahili tongues disappeared completely save in the locality of Brava; and, around Kismayo, there is the tiny Bajuni community that still speaks a language of Bantu origin. In the interior, to the west of Benadir Coast, Somalis made contact with populations of Oromo origin that had preceded the Somalis in the area, as well as other peoples—notably, leftovers from the Oromo expansion, such as Bantu agriculturalists and hunter-gatherers, the latter being the most ancient inhabitants of the southern areas. The admixture of Oromo populations and migrating Somalis gave rise to today’s Maay people, as well as other minority groups such as the Jiido, Garre, Dabarre, and Tunni, whose languages, despite strong Somali influence, still lack the sounds from the pharynx that are characteristic of the Somali language.

MOHAMED DIRIYE ABDULLAHI

See also: Arab and Islamic World, Africa in; Islam: Eastern Africa; Religion, History of.

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Somalia: Nineteenth Century

As the nineteenth century came into view, Somalis were, as they had always been, “a race of fierce and turbulent republicans” (Burton 1987), which meant that they did not have a centralized form of government. In the interior, pastoral clans, structured along a set of alliances and obeying a set of common laws known as *heer*, were engaged in a pattern of transhumance, still in existence today.

However, these same clans would, when needed, raise a pastoral parliament, or *guurti*, to discuss issues of common concern to the clan or group of clans. Complimenting the *heer* was another set of rules that the Somalis obeyed: Islamic law. The practice of Islamic law was in the hands of the *wadaad*, the man of religion, immune from the feuds of the clan warriors, the *warranle*. These two sets of laws held also sway over city folk who in most cases, except for some families in on the Benadir coast, were also members of the clans mostly through birth, but also sometimes through marriage and adoption.

Along the coasts and occasionally in the hinterland, nineteenth-century Somalis had many cities and villages. Some of the cities were actually city-states with a governor, a corps of law-enforcement officials consisting of soldiers, and a *qadi*—a judge with a stipend. The inhabitants of these coastal cities and villages were able mariners who sailed their own boats to the Arab world and India. The main *raison d’être* for these cities since ancient times had been commerce, both with the countryside and with the outside world in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, and as far east as what later would become Indonesia. Among the exports were frankincense and myrrh, the trade of which dates back to the time of the ancient Egyptians. Additionally, at some during the Greco-Roman era, the coastal towns were entrepôts for precious products from India, especially cinnamon; in turn, the country was named “terra cinnamome,” though no cinnamon cultivation is known among Somalis.

During trade time, which coincided with the cool winter months, northern coastal towns such as Zeilah and Berbera would be transformed into teaming cosmopolitan towns, as Somalis, Afars, and flocks of sailor-merchants from Yemen, Oman, the Persian Gulf, and India mingled with the locals. From the interior would arrive camel caravans laden with coffee from the Highlands of the Amhara-Tigreans and the Oromo, Somali ghee (clarified butter); ostrich feathers, Arabic gum, and ivory. Other produce exported notably in the

northern coastal cities for millennia were such famous goods as frankincense and myrrh, whose trade had already given the land the name Terra Aromatica (“the land of aromatic plants”) in ancient times. The imports brought in by both Somali and foreign boats were usually rice, clothing, and dates.

In the south, trade was similar, except that textiles were an important export industry until the textile export trade was killed in the nineteenth century by cheap American cotton clothing, from slave-produced cotton; this was variously known as *Wilaayaati* (in Arabic, “the States”) and *Maraykaani* (“American”).

In the nineteenth century, while most Somalis lived just as they had done centuries before, politically the era of strong city-states and sultanates such as Zeilah and Mogadishu was over. In 1875, Ismail Pasha, the Egyptian *khedive* (viceroy), in a scheme to carve out an Egyptian empire in Northeast Africa, took control of the northern ports, with British encouragement; his troops even went inland to capture the city-state of Harrar, one of the most historic Muslim cities in the region. However, the Egyptians evacuated their Somali possessions in 1885, and in 1887, Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia attacked Harrar, defeating its defenders in a way reminiscent of past Muslim-Christian wars in the region. In the south, the Omanis of Zanzibar came to have a rather nominal suzerainty over Mogadishu. All in all, the major events of the nineteenth century were the arrival of spy-explorers from the main Europeans and the expansionism undertaken by the Amhara-Tigreans, encouraged by the armaments provided to them their Christian brethren; this would lead to a division of the Somali lands and the beginning of the colonial era for Somalis.

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1867, Britain became more interested in the northern Somali coasts, especially after the British established Aden in Yemen as a coal station for their ships bound for India and the Far East and an outpost for monitoring the region after the defeat of the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan. Britain then added the northern region, called the British Protectorate of Somaliland, to its dominions so it could supply its Aden garrison with fresh mutton meat from the Somali coast. In the south, Italy, with British acquiescence and assistance, established its colony of Italian Somalia whose consolidation would end in the beginning of the twentieth century, because Britain was more afraid of Germany and France.

Other Somali areas were carved between Emperor Menelik, who saw Europeans as his coreligionists and sought help from by arguing that his kingdom was an island surrounded by Muslims. In the end, he was able to acquire, with European arms, a large tract inhabited by Muslim Somalis, Afars, and Oromos, as well as other non-Muslim peoples. Britain also occupied

another region inhabited by Somalis and Oromos in the extreme south and incorporated into its colony of Kenya. The British would call that southernmost Somali region the Northern Frontier District so that it could be designated a special region, under different regulations, whose aim was to halt the advance of Somalis and Muslims in the region. In the extreme North, France set up its French Somali Coast Colony, in a territory inhabited by Somalis and Afars, including the ports of Tadjoura and Obock.

As the twentieth century dawned, Somalis were living under five regimes; this division of Somali territories would give birth to the sentiments of a divided nation that became known as Somali irredentism.

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Somalia: Hassan, Muhammad Abdile and Resistance to Colonial Conquest

On April 7, 1864, Muhammad Abdile Hassan was born at Kob Faradod, about 180 miles southeast of Berbera. At an early age he became interested in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and, in 1897, became an Islamic teacher. Muhammad Abdile quickly established a reputation as a religious scholar and gained the honorary title of *shaykh*. In 1891, he embarked on a long journey that took him to Harrar and Mogadishu, two centers of Islamic learning. In 1894, Muhammad Abdile made his *hajj*, or pilgrimage, to Mecca, where he joined the fundamentalist Salihya sect of the Ahmadiya brotherhood.

The following year he returned to Berbera, and established a Qu'ranic school. Apart from preaching strict adherence to precepts of Islam, Muhammad Abdile condemned the growing influence of the colonial powers and Western missionaries. Such attitudes

gained few adherents among Berbera's Somalis, who belonged to the more liberal Qadariyah order. After leaving Berbera in frustration, he moved to the interior and settled among the Dolbonhanta people. At Bohotleh, his teachings found a more receptive audience. Muhammad Abdile's influence also spread to the Darod clan, which inhabited parts of Ethiopia and British and Italian Somaliland. By April 1899, his followers numbered about 3,000. He claimed he was the *Mahdi*, or chosen one, who would unify the Muslims and lead them to victory over the Western infidels.

As his power and authority grew, Muhammad Abdile became increasingly critical of British colonial rule. British officials feared that he wanted to establish a presence in southeastern British Somaliland in preparation for a military campaign against them. Reports of Muhammad Abdile's mystical and supernatural powers provoked further suspicion among the British, who named him the "mad mullah." After occupying Burao, a village between Bohotleh and Berbera, Muhammad Abdile declared a jihad (holy war) against the British infidel and their Somali supporters. In early 1900, his dervish followers launched numerous attacks in British Somaliland and the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, which caused trade in both areas to come to a halt.

To end dervish marauding, the British mounted four military expeditions. The first occurred in 1901, and involved some 15,000 Ethiopians, 1,000 Somalis, and 200 Anglo-Indian troops. After two encounters with the British, Muhammed Abdile withdrew to the friendly Majeerteen Sultanate. In February 1902, the British assembled a 2,300-man force that the dervishes attacked at Galcaio. Heavy losses forced the British to retreat to Bohotleh.

The third expedition, launched in January 1903, involved a two-pronged attack. Some 5,000 Ethiopians left Harrar, moved down the Webi Valley, and repulsed a dervish attack at Beledweyne. A 1,900-man British column landed at Obbia and proceeded inland while another 2,000-man British column marched southwest out of Berbera. However, fatigue and logistics problems forced the British to retreat to the region between Bohotleh and Berbera. Meanwhile, the dervishes occupied the Nogal Valley.

In January 1904, the British deployed nearly 8,000 troops who occupied Galcaio and then scored a victory over the dervishes at Jidbali by killing at least 1,000 of them. The survivors retreated to the Majeerteen Sultanate and eventually to Illig, from where they were expelled by a 500-man British force.

On March 3, 1905, with his forces in disarray, Muhammad Abdile and Giulio Pestalozza, the Italian consul at Aden, concluded a peace agreement known as the Ilig Accord. For more than three years, there was

an uneasy peace, frequently interrupted by dervish raids, in northern Somalia. In September 1908, however, Muhammad Abdile launched a series of attacks in British and Italian Somaliland and in the Ogaden. On November 12, 1909, the British colonial government received orders from London to evacuate the interior and concentrate its forces in coastal towns. The withdrawal accelerated the growth of dervish influence throughout British Somaliland.

British and Italian strategy concentrated on facilitating local opposition to the dervishes. In December 1910, for example, the Warsangeli (in British Somaliland) and the Majeerteen (in Italian Somaliland) concluded a defense pact against Muhammad Abdile. Subsequent Warsangeli-Majeerteen military operations drove the dervishes out of Italian Somaliland. Muhammad Abdile's followers fled to British Somaliland and occupied Bohotleh. In January 1913, he moved his headquarters to a fortress in Taleh, where he remained for the next seven years.

The outbreak of World War I afforded Muhammad Abdile the opportunity to improve relations with Addis Ababa. With the British occupied elsewhere, he received scores of Muslim Ethiopian leaders. In April 1916, the Ethiopian Emperor, Lij Iyasu, announced his conversion to Islam, which raised the prospect of an alliance between Ethiopia and Muhammad Abdile. To achieve this goal, the two leaders explored the possibility of a marriage compact. Although the Ethiopian emperor sent a mission to Taleh to get the bride, the scheme floundered after Christian elements in Ethiopia deposed Lij Iyasu, who fled into the Danakil country.

After the war, however, the British government decided to renew military operations against the dervishes. In October 1919, London approved an operation that included the 700-man Somaliland Camel Corps, a 700-man composite battalion (the 2nd and 6th Regiments of the King's African Rifles), a 400-man half battalion (the 1st and 101st Grenadiers of the Indian Army), a 1,500-man irregular Somali tribal levy, and 300 *illaloes* ("scouts"—though these men were actually intelligence agents). In support of this ground force, the British deployed the Royal Air Force's Z Unit, which had 12 aircraft and 6 spare machines. The king's ships *Odin*, *Clio*, and *Ark Royal* also were active off the Somali coast.

The expedition, which lasted 21 days, ended on February 12, 1920, when British forces occupied the dervish stronghold at Taleh. Muhammad Abdile and a small group of his followers eluded capture by fleeing into the Ogaden. A 3,000-member British tribal levy pursued the dervishes and, in late July, reached Muhammad Abdile's camp near Gorrahei on the Fanfan River. Once again, he escaped and went to the Imi region at the headwaters of the Shebelle River.

Suffering from pneumonia, Muhammad Abdile died sometime between November 1920 and January 1921.

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Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution

The modern history of Somalia began in the 1880s, when Britain, France, Italy, and Ethiopia occupied Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa. Britain established the colony of British Somaliland in the north, while Italy occupied the southern region, which came to be known as Italian Somaliland. The French established a colony around the port of Djibouti on the Red Sea, and Ethiopia occupied the Ogaden region in the interior. In 1960 British and Italian Somaliland merged and gained independence as the Somali Republic. The French colony became the independent nation of Djibouti in 1975 while other Somali areas were incorporated by Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia has never given up its claims to those territories and has supported local rebel movements seeking to unite all Somali under one flag.

Somalia has been unique in that it is the only country in Africa that is ethnically and culturally homogenous. Virtually all citizens speak the same language, claim the same ethnicity, and follow the same religion (Islam). Many thought that the country had a solid foundation for political stability, but this was not to be the case.

Somalia was a parliamentary democracy until 1969, when the president was assassinated in a military coup led by Mohamed Siad Barré, who became the head of a new socialist state. Siad Barré also continued the irredentist policies of his predecessors by demanding the incorporation of all Somali speakers in a “Greater

Somalia.” By the mid-1970s, a single-party state had been created. Henceforth a combination of factors set Somalia on its tragic course toward catastrophe. These included the authoritarian character of Barré’s government, compounded by the narrowing of the political base of the regime in terms of clan support; a number of wars with Kenya and Ethiopia (particularly, the disastrous war with Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978 over the Somali dominated Ogaden region of Eastern Ethiopia and the resulting influx of thousands of refugees from Ogden); and a regional arms race fueled by the superpower rivalry of the Cold War leading to increasing militarization of the country.

As economic, social, and political conditions deteriorated in the 1970s and early 1980s, traditional clan loyalties came to the fore, thus fragmenting the Somali nation. In the aftermath of the Ogaden war, many clans, having for a long time felt themselves deprived, especially in view of the preeminence in government of Siad Barré’s southern Marehan (Darod) clan, began to assert their traditional clan autonomy by resisting the government. By 1988, the country was in the throes of a civil war. In May 1988, the northern-based Somali National Movement (SNM) launched a military campaign by capturing the northwestern town of Burao. The government reacted in the most savage way, butchering the northern Ishaak clan members and their livestock. Hargeysa, Somalia’s second largest town, was virtually razed by government forces. As many as 50,000 people lost their lives in the fighting and an estimated 500,000 were driven from their homes; some 370,000 fled to Ethiopia.

In central Somalia, a movement drawing its main support from the Hawiye clan, the United Somali Congress (USC) also took up arms against Barré’s government, forming an alliance with the SNM and the Ogaden-based Somali Patriotic Movement in 1990. After much fighting, in January 1991 Barré’s army crumbled and he fled from Mogadishu, the capital. A large quantity of heavy weaponry fell into the hands of the victorious factions.

The USC, which took control of Mogadishu after the fall of Barré, was itself divided into several factions based on different subclans of Hawiye. The two main rival factions—one headed by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, who had led USC’s military operations against Barré’s government, and the other headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed—soon became engaged in violent conflict. From 1991, Somalia was torn apart by battles among rival militias and by widespread looting and banditry in the absence of a central government. Rival factions seized or fought over different regions of the country. And at a conference in Burao in May 1991, the SNM proclaimed an independent state in the northeast known as Somaliland, the region formerly

administered by Britain until independence. Even though many efforts at mediation were undertaken, the crisis in the country only deepened. From November 1991, a four-month-long war between the forces of Aidid and Ali Mahdi led to the killing of an estimated 25,000 civilians in and around Mogadishu. The city's estimated 500,000 inhabitants were left without even the most basic services.

The international community's collective conscience was sufficiently stirred by the human suffering in Somali, thus leading to the United Nations' involvement, which evolved through three different phases: the period of the first United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM-I) through much of 1992; the joint UN-U.S. Operation Restore Hope from December 1992 to May 1993; and UNOSOM-II from May 1993 to March 1995. The basic objectives of these operations were apparently humanitarian—that is, to protect aid workers and to ensure that food and medicine reached those in need without being intercepted by warring factions.

In mid-March, a national reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, agreed to the establishment of a 74-member Transitional National Council as the supreme authority in Somalia with a mandate to hold elections within two years. The agreement, however, was violated and fighting between pro-Aidid and pro-Mahdi factions escalated. The UN forces were withdrawn from Somalia early in 1995. Although Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM-II saved lives (as had the earlier UNOSOM-I), they also caused unnecessary loss of life and destruction, and were heavily criticized. Most of 1995 and 1996 witnessed intensification of faction fighting. General Aidid himself died in fighting on August 1, 1996. His son, Hussain Aidid, replaced him.

In December 1996 representatives of some 26 Somali factions, except the SNA, held protracted negotiations in Sodere, Ethiopia, and in January 1997 agreed to the formation of a 41-member National Salvation Council (NSC) with an 11-member executive committee and a 5-member joint chairmanship committee to act as interim government to draft a transition constitution and organize a national reconciliation conference etc. However, the Aidid faction rejected the agreement. International mediations efforts nonetheless continued. In December 1997, some 26 Somali factions signed an accord in Cairo establishing an end to all hostilities and for the eventual formation of a transitional government charged with holding general elections within three years. A national reconciliation conference was to be held in Somalia in February 1998, but it was repeatedly postponed.

In August 2000, senior authority figures, including clan elders, named Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president. A transitional government was set up, with the

aim of making peace among the various warring factions. However, as the three-year deadline approached, Hassan's administration had made little progress toward the goals of unification and peace.

KAY MATHEWS

See also: Somalia: Barré, Mohamad Siad, Life and Government of; Somalia: 1990 to the Present.

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Somalia: Barré, Mohamed Siad, Life and Government of Former President of Somalia

Mohamed Siad Barré (c.1910–1995), was born to a nomadic family that raised camels, sheep, and goats. His birthplace was a nomad settlement in the countryside of what is today the town of Shilaabo in the Somali region of Ethiopia (Greenfield). He had no formal schooling at all, like most Somalis of his time. When he reached adolescence, he left his nomadic settlement to seek a career in the colonial police in Italian-ruled Somalia. When the Italians were forced out of Somalia by the British forces during World War II and their colony was placed under a British military administration, he succeeded in being retained and sent to a training camp in British Kenya.

After Somalia was restored to an Italian trusteeship by the United Nations in 1950, Barré became head of the Special Branch of Police, an intelligence agency, the main aim of which was to spy on Somalis agitating for independence. In 1960 Barré and all the junior officers from the colonial police were promoted to senior commanding officers, in a bid to outrank young officers from British Somaliland, who had actually graduated from prestigious British military academies. This catapulted Barré into the position of second in command of the newly created army of the Somali Republic. After the death of General Daud in 1965, Barré was confirmed as chief of staff of the Somali army.

On October 16, 1969, President Abdirashid was assassinated; five days later the army staged a coup

d'état. The officers agreed on Barré as a transitional compromise figure, seeing him as an older individual who would be easy to manipulate, and easy to dispose of later.

A group calling itself the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) arose, with Barré as chair president of the Somali Republic, now renamed in the same leftist fashion as the Somali Democratic Republic. However, cognizant of their lack of experience in civilian rule, the junta appointed a 15-member Council of Secretaries to run the different ministries and departments of the government.

On January 1970, draconian laws of security were introduced and the NSS, which would become a feared organization, was created. With the NSS and its laws in place, the freedoms of press, expression, association, and the right to form a trade union or initiate a strike were made punishable by death.

On April 20, 1970, General Jama Ali Korshel, the first vice president of the SRC, was arrested and charged with plotting a coup. This was the beginning of Barré's consolidation of power into his hands and those of his close followers. A few months later, General Mohamed Ainanshe, the vice president of the SRC; General Salad Gabeyre, another senior SRC member; and army officer Major Abdulqadir Dheel would be accused of treason, tried, and the executed by firing squad on July 23, 1972.

Barré's Machiavellian tactics even extended to foreign policy: He adopted an anti-United States stance, ordered American aid workers out of the country, and accused Washington of imperialism. In turn, the Soviet Union rewarded him with more armaments, and more assistance in setting up and training security agencies. To appease the Soviets, who wanted to see a worker's party in place, Barré created the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1976; its members were hand-picked from government security agencies and government-controlled organizations.

In 1977, sensing that his popularity was waning, Barré sent the army into Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited region, which was easily captured with help from the Somalis therein; Barré thus increased his popularity. However, the victory was short-lived. The Soviets, the regime's main ally and major arms supplier to the Somali army since the 1960s, instead threw their support behind Ethiopia, now ruled by a regime committed to a more genuine version of communism than was Barré's veneer of socialism (behind which was a naked clan dictatorship). To help Ethiopia, the Soviets mounted their largest military campaign since World War II, airlifting a huge arsenal of weapons and thousands of troops, mostly from Cuba and South Yemen, into Ethiopia. After the Somali army withdrew from Ethiopia, a group of officers, led by Mohamed Shaykh

Osman, a Majeerteen, organized a coup against the regime; it failed, and most of the ringleaders, all from the Majeerteen, except for one, were executed.

Unluckily for Barré, by 1980 the majority of the Somali population had no more tolerance for his repressive methods and clan hegemony. In 1982, the northern Isaaq clan, through a newly created guerrilla movement, the SNM, started active resistance against the regime. After the destruction of northern towns and villages in 1988, Barré's grip became tenuous, with much of the northern countryside in the hands of the SNM. Eventually, active resistance spread to the south, as the Hawiye clan confederation established another armed front, the USC. By 1990, Barré was bogged down with the war in the north, and faced southern insurgents at his door, and his MOD alliance of clans falling apart as the Ogaden region shifted, becoming actively oppositional.

Barré, now senile and suffering from multiple ailments, had become a captive to his own followers and greedy family members. His fall came in early 1991, when his hilltop palace barracks was stormed; he fled with his family from the popular uprising in Mogadishu, led the USC to the west of the city first and finally to the Gedo region that he had carved out for his clan, the Marehan, in the southwest; and made his new headquarters at Bardera. It was in Bardera that an Italian journalist found him in March 1991, living in squalid conditions and vowing to fight until death.

There he would contemplate a comeback, and his forces actually launched several counterattacks against General Aidid's forces; finally Barré's forces were defeated, and he was driven out of Somalia and into exile on April 28, 1992.

He first fled to Kenya, and then later to Nigeria, where he died on January 1995, never to be judged for his crimes by a nation in which he created such deep rifts that it remains divided today, more than a decade after his fall from power.

MOHAMED DIRIYE ABDULLAHI

Biography

Born in the Somali region of Ethiopia, c.1910. No formal education. Enrolled in the Italian and British colonial police forces and received police training in British Kenya and in Italy. Worked as a policeman, chief of a police station, and head of a special branch of the police during the colonial period. Transferred to the newly created army of the Somali Republic in 1960, and became second in command. Appointed chief of the army after the death of General Daud. The coup of October 1969 brought him to the presidency of the Somali Republic. His regime became increasingly repressive after 1970; popular resistance movements

fought it from 1979 until he was toppled on January 1991. Fled first to Kenya with his family, and then to exile in Nigeria, where he died in 1995.

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Somalia: 1990 to the Present

At the beginning of the 1990s, Somalia was a country deep in turmoil; the regime that had caused so much anguish and destruction was experiencing its death throes. Most of the country was caught up in the popular rebellion, with only Mogadishu still a stronghold of the regime. On January 27, 1991, the regime collapsed.

The fall of the regime did not, however, bring peace and stability—especially in southern Somalia. Instead a power vacuum developed and the capital city became essentially a place without government, filled with roving clan militias, looters, and people bent on revenge killings. Soon after, in a unilateral move, Ali Mahdi, a politically obscure merchant, at the behest of a coalition known as the Manifesto Group, proclaimed himself president of Somalia. The Manifesto Group consisted of 1960s-era politicians, merchants, and ex-officers—mostly from the south—who had played no part in the active resistance against the regime.

In the south, Ali Mahdi's self-proclamation, seen as a kind of coup d'état, had two immediate effects. First, it caused a deep split in the USC guerrilla movement, which had waged war in the south against the regime; it drew its members from the Hawiye clan. More important, the USC's military man, General Aidid, who had actually coordinated most of the fighting in the south against the regime, rejected Ali Mahdi's claims. Although both belonged to the Hawiye clan, they differed in subclan affiliation. Additionally, another rebellion faction, led by Colonel Jess, leading a largely Darod Ogaden guerrilla, and based in the extreme south, also rejected Ali Mahdi's claims.

Neither Ali Mahdi nor Aidid was willing to make a compromise in order to bring peace to Mogadishu. It has been said that Aidid was an arrogant soldier who saw Ali Mahdi, a civilian, as someone who could be

easily cast aside. Unluckily for Aidid, Ali Mahdi's clan was not so willing to let go of Ali Mahdi, one of their own. With each of the two now relying exclusively on militia members of his subclan, and the honor of each subclan in question, a new and deadly civil war started again in Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, events unfolded differently in the north. The notable difference was the immediate intervention of community and clan elders after of the fall of the regime. Additionally, the guerrilla movement that had started the fight against the regime in earnest and actually brought the regime to its knees in the first place, the SNM (located in the north and drawing most of its members from the Isaaq clan), went along with population consensus and the wishes of the elders; thus, instead of the guerrilla leadership dictating a political program for the people of Somaliland, community leaders and clan elders from all the northern clans—even from those that had fought on the side of the regime, took the unprecedented step of formally constituting themselves as a permanent sovereign assembly, the *Guurti* ("senators"; previously, the word meant "a committee of wise men chosen to tackle communal issues," a kind of a pastoral parliament).

After several congresses, the assembly of northern community leaders declared formally that the unrati-fied political amalgamation that they had with Somalia since 1960 was being overturned. In further conferences, the northern leaders established permanent peace, and constitutional structures for their region, which now had all of the attributes of statehood: a bicameral parliament, a constitution, a flag, and a currency. Unknown to them, by forging a bicameral parliament based in part on tradition and in part on Western democratic ideals, the elders of Somaliland had started what might has termed as a unique indigenization of democracy in Africa.

From 1991 to 1992, constant battles raged between several militia groups in the south. In Mogadishu, the urban war between the factions of Ali Mahdi and Aidid destroyed large parts of Mogadishu and killed many people; it also rendered impossible the use of Mogadishu's airport and seaport. In the deep south, to the west and south of Mogadishu, other ferocious battles were fought between a coalition led by Aidid and Mohamed Siad Barré's loyalists attempting a comeback, and led by Barré's son-in-law, Said Hersi (alias General Morgan). The battles over the riverine areas, inhabited mostly by the agropastoral Maay and other minorities, disrupted the fragile cycles of sowing and harvesting in the riverine areas of the south; the result was the famine that was viewed around the world, unfolding on television screens in 1992. Most of the deaths from that famine occurred in and around

Baidoa, dubbed “the city of death” by Western non-governmental organizations. As a result, on December 3, 1992, the United Nations authorized a humanitarian international intervention led by the United States with the aim of bringing humanitarian assistance to the famine-stricken populations of the South.

After an initial stage dubbed Operation Restore Hope and essentially coordinated by the U.S. intervention force, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) began. However, in essence the whole operation remained in the hands of American policy makers, since the head of UNOSOM was Admiral Howe, a retired U.S. officer. At the same, all the top decisions were being coordinated by Howe and the head of the U.S. contingent.

The operation turned ugly when Howe adopted a militaristic approach. One of the main reasons that the operation went wrong was because Aidid’s faction and those of his ally, Jess, were especially targeted for disarmament while at the same time, General Morgan’s forces were allowed to occupy the port city of Kismayo in the southern extremity of the country, previously held by Jess’s forces. Thus, another urban war followed in Mogadishu, in which this time the combatants were intervention forces and Aidid’s supporters—especially after Howe placed a bounty on Aidid’s head.

The new urban war proved to be as disastrous as the previous one; helicopter gunships would fire into Somali crowds; missiles would strike civilian sites. In the end, the international intervention forces became another faction involved in the civil war in deed, if not in intent. Thousands were killed by indiscriminate fire from the intervention forces. The mostly Western forces were comprised of young men with no cultural preparation for an African and Muslim environment. Charges of atrocious acts, including unwarranted shootings, rape, and child molestation, have been levied against Western forces.

The final act that brought about the end of UNOSOM would be the October 3, 1993, raid to capture Aidid and his lieutenants. The operation, prepared in secret by Howe and the head of the American contingent without consulting the other international forces, did not go as planned. The U.S. soldiers on the mission fought what was termed the biggest firefight that U.S. Army forces had engaged in since Vietnam. When the smoke cleared, 18 U.S. soldiers had died, but so did thousands of Somalis caught in indiscriminate fire from the U.S. side. Four days later, U.S. president Bill Clinton ordered troops out of Somalia by March 1994, effectively spelling the end of international intervention there, which would finally be terminated in 1995.

During the international intervention and after, several conferences were held to bring peace and civil governance to Somalia. To date more than a dozen

conferences have been held since the collapse of the regime, but none of them has succeeded in providing a national government, making Somalia a country without a government since the fall of the Barré regime in January 1991. Of course, all of the territory of the Somali Republic of 1960 is not without governance: there is Somaliland (the north), which, though it has not been recognized by the international community, has not only given itself a government but has embarked on an ambitious road of reconstruction and democratization, with assistance from only a few non-governmental organizations. In May 2001, voters in Somaliland overwhelmingly endorsed a new constitution for their country, declaring Somaliland as a sovereign nation, further diminishing any hopes of restoring the Somali Republic of 1960. Municipal elections followed in 2002, as did presidential elections in 2003.

In the south, after the different factions had drawn themselves into a military and political stalemate, the next stage was the consolidation of fiefdoms and the establishment of some order in some areas. In the northern areas, adjacent to Somaliland, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf of the Majeerteen clan established a regional state called Puntland; this regional state drawing on the experience of Somaliland established a regional parliament composed of elders; however, Puntland, unlike Somaliland, is claiming to be only a regional state of Somalia with its own local administration. In turn, the experience of Puntland would inspire the inhabitants of the riverine areas, the Maay and other minorities. After having first organized a resistance movement against other factions occupying or fighting over their areas, the Maay people’s Rahanwein Resistance Army established the second regional state of Somalia in 2002. Unluckily, after some initial success in establishing a semblance of order at the local level, fighting between local factions in both of these regional states broke out in 2002 and 2003. As for Mogadishu, it is still a divided city controlled by several factions and has no local government of its own. Other areas, such as Kismayo and parts of the central regions, also remain controlled by factions that have been unable to produce any local administrations, and are not immune to the attempts of annexation by other warlords.

From recent events, it is evident that war and chaos are not yet over, and they seem unfortunately likely to continue in such a way as to forbid the establishment of one central authority in Somalia proper any time soon; as for Somaliland, it is at this moment a de facto state with a firmly established central administration that collects taxes and pays its civil servants. It has been even described as one of the safest countries in Africa. Thus, the Somali Republic of 1960 has been reduced to two regions: one without the rule of law, and

the other enjoying all the attributes of a state, as well as civil peace, but without international recognition—a fact that is impeding the republic's development, as it is neither able to get into international investment nor receive any bilateral aid.

MOHAMED DIRIYE ABDULLAHI

See also: **Somalia: Barré, Mohamad Siad, Life and Government of; Somalia: Independence, Conflict, and Revolution.**

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Songhay Empire, Gao and Origins of

The origins of the Songhay empire are intimately linked with the fortunes of Gao, its capital city. The empire, the largest of the three great West African empires of the later Iron Age, flourished between the mid-fifteenth and late sixteenth centuries, but the foundations were laid some hundreds of years earlier. Today, the Songhay are the dominant ethnic group in the vicinity of Gao and their fortunes are intimately associated with the River Niger, especially in the area known as the Niger Bend, encompassing eastern Mali and northwestern Niger. Songhay origins are unclear, but according to tradition they developed from contact among different groups: hunters, farmers, and fishers.

According to oral tradition and local historical sources written in Arabic—notably, the *Tarikh es Soudan* and *Tarikh el Fettach*—the proto-Songhay left their homelands in the Bentiya/Kukiya region south of Gao and traveled north, establishing a settlement in the vicinity of Gao in about 690. The whereabouts of this settlement (if such a migration took place) have been much debated. Archaeological research has indicated that the area around Gao has been almost continuously occupied since the late Stone Age (c.5000–1000BCE). Although it is difficult to be precise about ethnicity based upon archaeological evidence, it would appear from the material recovered that it was a settlement occupied by the Songhay from the first.

Following the foundation of the city, it rapidly grew in size and prosperity. This affluence was based upon trade, which was initially interregional in focus. Starting in the late eight or early ninth century, these local trade networks were supplemented by trans-Saharan trade routes directed to North Africa, but indirectly continuing much farther within the Muslim world and beyond.

Local trade was in commodities such as foodstuffs, pottery, beads, copper, and iron. Trans-Saharan trade predominantly followed a pattern in which finished items were imported from the north and raw materials were exported from the south.

Both the Arab historical sources and the archaeological evidence indicate the importance of trade to the inhabitants of Gao. Ivory, gold, and slaves were the dominant commodities exported, providing labor and materials that fueled the Muslim world economy. In return, glazed ceramics from Al-Andalus (Islamic Spain), Egypt, and Tunisia were carried south by camel caravan, along with glass vessels, glass, and semiprecious stone beads, items of metalwork, cloth, paper, cowrie shells, and spices. Gao also benefited from control of the salt trade. Salt was mined in the Sahara, sent to centers such as Gao, and from there was traded onward throughout the savanna and forest zones to the south. The importance of the trade in salt to the inhabitants of Gao is indicated by an observation recorded by the Arab historian, Yaqut, writing in the early thirteenth century, who noted that “the King's treasure-houses are spacious, his treasure consisting principally of salt” (cited in Levtzion and Hopkins 1981, 174).

By the late eleventh century, Gao had developed into a major urban center, and was composed of a variety of different quarters. Archaeological research has uncovered parts of the city, and the traders town, Gao Ancien, was found to contain buildings constructed out of fired brick, finished with colored plaster, with the whole area surrounded by an enclosing dry-stone wall. Neighboring this was a local Songhay settlement, which contained less trade-related evidence and where architectural styles also differed, with building in mud, and round houses rather than buildings employing the right angle constructed. Some 6 kilometers to the east of Gao was a further settlement, Gao-Saney, where the remains of a royal cemetery dating from the twelfth century was uncovered (including ready-carved tombstones imported from Islamic Spain) next to a large habitation mound, or tell. This site functioned as a residential area, a place of burial, and a manufacturing center, and indicated the considerable size of the population in the area.

Islam was gradually accepted by the population of Gao, a process starting possibly as early as the ninth century. The first historical reference to the acceptance of Islam by a ruler of Gao is by Al-Muhallabi who, writing in the late tenth century, recorded that, “their king pretends before them to be a Muslim and most of them pretend to be Muslims too” (cited in Levtzion and Hopkins 1981, 174). This suggests that Islam had not penetrated very deeply. By the eleventh or twelfth centuries, the historical sources are more equivocal in

asserting that the ruler and part of the population of Gao were Muslims, and this is supplemented by archaeological data, such as dated Muslim tombstones, mosques, and trade-related evidence of contacts with the Muslim world.

As already noted, the prosperity generated by the local and long-distance trade was to lay the foundations for the Songhay empire. Until the mid-thirteenth century, Gao was an independent Songhay kingdom, ruled by the Za or Dia dynasty. But by the middle of the thirteenth century, its increasing affluence was to attract the attention of its powerful neighbor to the west, the empire of Mali, which extended control over the Gao region. Gao was, however, a remote province and periodically asserted its independence; one such rebellion, in about 1275, led to the rise of the Sonni dynasty, which replaced that of the Za. The rebellion was short-lived and Mali reasserted its control, but eventually lost its eastern provinces, of which Gao formed a part, at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Songhay military strength was built up and this was accompanied by territorial expansion. The period of empire had begun.

TIMOTHY INSOLL

See also: **Mali Empire: Decline, Fifteenth Century.**

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Songhay Empire: Sunni Ali and the Founding of Empire

Founded by the Sunni dynasty, Songhay was the last of the three great empires of the Western Sudan. Under Sunni Ali (r. 1464–1492), Songhay became an empire, totally eclipsing Mali, which had been in decline by the early fifteenth century.

Much of Sunni Ali’s reign was taken up by wars of conquest. The Sonni dynasty had built up a powerful army of horsemen and war canoes with which Suleyman Dandi had extended Songhay territory upstream along the Niger bend. Soon after his accession to the throne,

Sunni Ali turned his attention northward and marched on Timbuktu, which had been captured by the Tuareg in the last days of Mali. Sunni Ali was repeatedly successful in his wars. In 1468, he brought the city under his control. Some of the leading families of the city had exerted very little energy in defending themselves when the Tuaregs took the city and Sunni Ali. Probably they saw the Tuareg as a useful Muslim ally against Songhay overlordship. After the conquest of Timbuktu Sunni Ali treated the *qadis* and ‘*ulama* harshly. Scholarship in Timbuktu undoubtedly suffered in Sunni Ali’s time. This action, perceived as a lack of respect for Islam, earned Ali harsh criticism from the Muslim clerics and writers.

Next, Sunni Ali’s army moved into the turbulent Mossi region and pushed the Mossi to the south of the Niger in the late 1480s. However, he failed to subdue the Mossi, and pushed on across the Niger and conquered the Hausa state of Kebbi.

Sunni Ali’s army was repeatedly successful in war. Certainly, he was a formidable military general who extended the Songhay empire deep into the desert in the north and as far as Jenne in the southwest, and pushed the Mossi back south of the Niger in the late 1480s, but never subdued them.

Sunni Ali devised a new method of administration. He divided his conquests into provinces, appointing the former rulers as governors over some, and his military officials over others. He appointed a special governor, the *tondifari* (governor of the mountains), for the troublesome Mossi region. He also appointed a *hi-koy* (chief naval officer) for his fleet.

Sunni Ali’s raids on the Muslim educational and religious center of Timbuktu and his high-handed treatment of the clerics, coupled with his pursuit of the Tuareg, led to his being harshly criticized by Arabic historians. They portrayed him as a ruthless tyrant and oppressor, in contradistinction to Askia Muhammed.

In spite of the criticism of the Muslim clerics and ‘*ulama*, Sunni Ali is remembered in Songhay oral tradition as a great conquering hero and founder of the Songhay Empire. He died in 1492 and his heir was quickly ousted in a power struggle by one of his generals, Muhammad Ture, a devout Muslim of Soninke origin. Muhammad Ture then took the title Askia and is better known as Askia the Great.

EDMUND ABAKA

See also: **Mali Empire: Decline, Fifteenth Century.**

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SONGHAY EMPIRE: SONNI ALI AND THE FOUNDING OF EMPIRE

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Songhay Empire: Ture, Muhammad and the Askiya Dynasty

As founder of the Askiya dynasty, Muhammad Ture (Askia Muhammad, 1493–1528) strengthened the administration of the empire and consolidated Sunni Ali's conquests. By promoting Islam and going on a pilgrimage to Mecca, Muhammad Ture put Songhay on the map of the Islamic world.

Drawing on Sunni Ali's conquests, Muhammad Ture extended the Songhay empire into the desert, drove back the Tuareg of the southern Sahara, and captured the salt-producing center of Taghaza in the north. By that conquest, he maximized Songhay's benefit from trans-Saharan trade. Ture also sent an army as far west as Takrur, and fought off the Middle Niger raiders, the Mossi and the Dogon. In the east, Muhammad Ture's armies conquered the Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina, and, eventually, Kano. These conquests brought Songhay into the broader trading network of trans-Saharan trade.

After the wars of expansion, Ture strengthened the administrative system set up by Sunni Ali. He divided the empire into four vice royalties, each under a viceroy or governor, usually chosen from the royal family or a trusted servant. In terms of central administration, Muhammad Ture established a council of ministers composed of the *balama* (commander-in-chief), *fari-mundy* (chief tax collector), *hi-koy* (navy chief), *korey-farma* (minister responsible for foreigners), *warrey-farma* (minister in charge of property), and *hari-farma* (minister in charge of fisheries).

Unlike his predecessor, Muhammad Ture recognized the importance of Islam as an important ideology

for purposes of state formation and development. He used Islam to reinforce his authority, unite his far-flung empire, and promote (trans-Saharan) trade. Soon after his accession, Ture displayed his concern for the faith by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. While in Cairo, he persuaded the Caliph of Egypt to recognize him as the "caliph" of the whole Sudan.

On his return from Mecca, Muhammad Ture revived Timbuktu as an important educational and Islamic center. This spread the fame of Songhay far and wide, and Muslim scholars and clerics were attracted to the city for educational pursuit as well as for trade. He bestowed honors and favors on the *'ulama* and clerics of Timbuktu. Not surprisingly, while seventeenth-century Timbuktu writers excoriated Sunni Ali as a tyrant, they showered praise on Askia Muhammad. This is not to say, however, that many of the people converted to Islam.

Songhay derived government revenue from several sources. Muhammad Ture raised revenue for administration from tribute from vassal states, taxes on peasants, and contributions from his generals. The state also derived substantial revenue from royal estates in the Niger floodplain and the Songhay heartland that were possibly worked by slaves. The brisk trans-Saharan trade yielded substantial revenue. The items of trade included gold (a major impetus for the trans-Saharan trade) and kola nuts from the southern forest, and captives (mostly from raids into Mossi territory south of the Niger Bend) for sale as slaves in Muslim North Africa. From North Africa, Saharan salt, luxury goods, cloth, cowrie, and horses for the military were imported into the Songhay empire. Cloth from local Sudanese cotton—and, in towns like Jenne, Timbuktu, and Gao, woolen cloth and linen from North Africa—was also part of the trade.

After a 35-year reign, Muhammad Ture, who was old, blind, and infirm, was deposed by his children in 1528 and sent into exile to the Island of Kankaka on the Niger, but later returned home, and died in 1538.

The successors of Muhammad Ture did not have the courage, devotion to duty, and competence that he had demonstrated as ruler. They were involved in feuds and fratricidal struggles for the throne. Ture's successor, his son Musa, was assassinated in 1535 for his cruelty. Askia Bankouri, who succeeded him and exiled his uncle Muhammad Ture from Gao, was in turn deposed in 1537. Askia Ismail, the next ruler, not only brought back Muhammad Ture from exile but also proved to be a capable ruler. Unfortunately, he died after two years on the throne.

Fortunately for Songhay, Askia Daud, who succeeded Ismail, ruled for a long time (1530–1584), succeeded in suppressing turbulence, and imposed a long period of peace and stability. However, the Moroccan Sultan Al-Mansur invaded Songhay ten years later, at a



Sankoré Mosque. Timbuktu, Mali, 1984. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

time when Songhay was once more wracked by dynastic disputes, leading to a weakening of the court. Al-Mansur's first attempt in 1584 failed, but a more elaborate and better-planned invasion in 1591 succeeded and brought the Askia dynasty to an end.

EDMUND ABAKA

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Songhay Empire: Moroccan Invasion, 1591

The year 1591 witnessed the fall of the last of the great empires of the western Sudan. The uniqueness of the fall of Songhay is not just that it was shot down at the peak of its glory, but that the collapse was a product of direct military aggression from North Africa. This unprecedented military adventure marked the first time a North African country would attack one in West Africa.

The primary reason for Morocco's hostilities against Songhay was due to economic interest. El-Mansur, the ruler of Morocco, coveted and sought to control the salt mines and gold deposits within Songhay's territory, which was erroneously believed to still be in abundance at the time of the attack.

The first attempt at invading Songhay was a failure. This was due to inadequate preparations for the expedition. However, in December 1590 a more carefully planned military campaign was embarked upon, with an impressive army of musketeers, many of whom


were renegade mercenaries from Spain. Commanded by Judah Pasha, the Moroccan army was very well equipped with the most sophisticated firearms of the time. Consequently, when both troops clashed at the battle of Tondibi in 1591, the Songhay soldiers were forced to succumb to the superior firepower of their invaders. With the defeat of Songhay at Tondibi, Moroccan forces went on to capture other important cities such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Jenne.

The first consequence of Moroccan conquest was the establishment of a protectorate over a substantial part of what used to be the Songhay empire. Songhay thus became a province of Morocco, with Judah Pasha acting as the governor. The nonrealization of Al-Mansur's fortuitous ambition, and his consequent loss of interest in Songhay, resulted in the lack of effective administration of the territory and subsequent breakdown of law and order. By 1615, there was evidence of increasing internal weakness and confusion. Many of the former dependencies seized the opportunity to declare their independence as the empire disintegrated into small insignificant states. Among such states are those of the Tuaregs, Bambarra, Fulani, and the Hausa. The western Sudan never again had a political unit as large as the Songhay Empire.

Furthermore, the conquest and the rebellions which it occasioned took a heavy toll on the population of the western Sudan. Many lives were lost; some were sold into slavery and others taken to Morocco. There was a general displacement of the population. The breakdown of law and order, coupled with the general insecurity that pervaded the territory had grave economic effects. Agriculture suffered a setback, and this occasioned a period of famine. There was concomitant plundering of economic crops and valuables. In addition, trans-Saharan trade seriously declined because of the series of attacks connected with the invasion. The various routes were rendered unsafe, as pillaging of caravans and activities of brigands became a frequent phenomenon along trans-Saharan trade routes. This eventually led to a shift in trade traffic from the western routes linking Songhay to Marrakech and Fez to the eastern routes from Hausaland and Bornu to Egypt and Libya.

Again, none of the successor states had enough resources to support large-scale commercial activity. The Moors drained Songhay of the available gold. Moreover, there was the lure of the European presence along the Atlantic coast of the western Sudan that provided a better alternative to the cataclysmic state of affairs in Songhay and was not conducive to profitable economic activity. The totality of all these factors was a considerable decline in the volume of trade and loss of wealth in the Western Sudan.

In the realm of religion, Islam suffered a temporary setback. The Moroccans showed no enthusiasm for the



Songhay, c.1464–1591.

promotion of religion, or for providing for the security and welfare of its agents. The Muslim scholars who did not welcome the Moroccan onslaught were regarded as foes and dealt with harshly. Their libraries and wealth were confiscated, while those found to be against them were exiled to Morocco. Prominent among such Muslim scholars were Ahmed Baba, the illustrious Timbuktu historian, Umar bin al Hajj Ahmed, Abdal al-Rahman bin Mahmud bin Umar, and many members of the Aquit family, who had previously enjoyed power and influence in Timbuktu as a result of their Islamic learning. Furthermore, the destruction of their libraries, and their deportation had a calamitous effect on Islamic learning in the region. The exiling of these renowned scholars, who had been the pride of Sankore University at Timbuktu, meant the death of learning and a gradual extinction of the scholarly reputation of Timbuktu.

Nevertheless, development in the post-Moroccan period suggests that Songhay's defeat at Tondibi did not inaugurate a completely dark chapter in the sociopolitical life of West Africa. Politically, there was a shift of force from the Sahel region and the savanna to the forest region of West Africa. In the religious sphere, the collapse did not mean the end of Islam. The fleeing Muslims, especially the Fulani group, dispersed all over West Africa, spreading Islam southward to places like Futa Jalon. Islam was therefore carried at a grass-roots level; the stage was set for the eighteenth and nineteenth century jihads (holy wars) in West Africa.

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See also: **Morocco: Ahmad al-Mansur and the Invasion of Songhay.**

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Sonni Ali: See Songhay Empire: Sunni Ali and the Founding of Empire.

Soshangane, Umzila, Gungunhane and the Gaza State

The Gaza state was the result of a military conquest carried out around 1821–1845 in southern Mozambique. In the third generation of rulers, the kingdom

succumbed to a military campaign organized by the Portuguese government in 1894–1895 against the last king, Ngungunyane (Gungunhana).

There were numerous lineage-based states in Southern and Central Mozambique previous to 1821, including a few larger ones that may have had some 20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants. South of the Save River most of these belonged to what was to become the Tsonga linguistic group. The populations north of the Save included remnants of earlier Shona states like Manyika, Vumba, Uteve, and Madanda or were Portuguese subjects like most Shona. All were shaken by attacks made by the founder of the Gaza state, Soshangane (r.1821–1858) and some of his Nguni competitors during the period known as the *mfecane*. In Mozambique south of the Zambezi this period may be dated to around 1821–1840.

The name *Gaza* is derived from Mangwa Gaza, the name of the grandfather of Soshangane and the founder of a chiefly sublineage of the Nqumayo or Ndwandwe clan who seems to have resided close to a southern outlier of the Libombo range in present day South Africa. The first king, Soshangane, Mangwa Gaza's grandson, known in Mozambique after 1840 under variants of the name of Manukuza (Manukhuse, Manikhosi, and, in Portuguese, Manicusse). He seems to have initiated warfare in southern Mozambique in Tembe in 1821 and operated in association with a fellow subchief of the Ndwandwe kingdom, Zwangendaba Jere, until 1827 or 1829. The emigration or flight of Zwangendaba (1829), the defeat of Nqaba Msane (c.1835–1836), and finally the crossing of the Zambezi by the successor of Ngwane Maseko in 1839 at the Lupata Gorge left the area between the Nkomati and the Zambezi to Gaza. Soshangane sent armies composed of soldiers recruited from the Tsonga south of Save (known as Landins on the Zambezi), often under the command of one of his older sons, to obtain the subjection of chiefs and collection of tribute during the dry period (July–September). The Sena in the Portuguese *prazos* south of the Zambezi were under double tribulation to Gaza and the Portuguese crown (c.1845–1894).

The rapid expansion and stabilization of the political system was made possible by age corporations or regiments called *butho* into which all males were integrated irrespective of their origin; royal and aristocratic houses to which individuals and chiefs were attached in addition to allegiance to the Gaza king. Many positions in the new state offered some chance of security, rank, and promotion, and remuneration from the spoils of war.

The state suffered a succession crisis in 1859–1862 because influential personalities at the court selected as successor Mawewe, a young man with little experience

in government activity. At least three brothers and a sister senior in age rebelled or fled north but were killed. Mawewe then attempted to take over the areas formerly administered by them, which may have amounted to almost half the kingdom's territory. He did not manage to eliminate his brother Muzila, who was an experienced politician and war leader who had participated in warfare and administration at least since 1845. Muzila sought refuge with the Afrikaner in Zouthpansberg and formed an alliance with a refugee Tsonga chief, Magude Khosa, and elephant hunters (which included the governor of Lourenço Marques) and managed to shift the balance of power in his favor after winning two battles in the second half of 1861. He moved into the Limpopo Valley, but had to retire to the headwaters of the Buzi River, north of the Save, in the face of a Swazi incursion. It took his troops several campaigns to fight back the Swazi and he stayed north of the Save for the remainder of his reign. Muzila governed from Mussapa, or Mussurize, in the borderland between Mozambique and Zimbabwe and successively had residences at both sides of the border near modern Chipinge and Espungabera.

Major economic changes took place in Muzila's reign, which ended in 1884. The hunting of elephants on a large scale survived only in the north. In the south and center of the kingdom income from work in the South African mines, plantations, and railway-building projects permitted import, the payment of tribute, and payment of bride-prices. Muzila maintained diplomatic relations with the Ndebele, the Afrikaner of the Transvaal, the British in Natal, and the Portuguese on the coast. He intervened militarily among the Venda in 1869.

Ngungunyane (port Gungunhana) succeeded in late 1884 and was officially installed in 1885. In 1889, possibly in order to avoid the effects of a possible massive influx of miners near Macequece (Manica) and in order to consolidate his hold in the South, Ngungunyane shifted his capital, always called Mandlakazi, and central aristocracy to the south. Between 1889 and 1895 he moved the capital several times within a range of 12 kilometers in the modern districts of Mandlakazi (Manjacaze) and Chibuto.

Immediately after his accession, contacts with the Portuguese were taken up; these were manipulated during the scramble for this area in 1889–1892. Gaza lost part of its territory in the frontier settlements of 1890 and 1891. Ngungunyane tried to counterbalance Portuguese and British interests, but this was ultimately unsuccessful and in 1895 the kingdom was conquered by the Portuguese, who were reluctant to accept an autonomous chief who supported chiefs rebelling against their rule in the southern Lourenço Marques district. Ngungunyane was exiled to the

Azores in 1896, together with his son, an uncle, and a rebel chief, one of two such chiefs who had triggered off the campaign against the Gaza state. Ngungunyane died in the Azores in 1906, followed by his son and presumptive heir Godide in 1910.

The Gaza kingdom had the most important of its two centers in the present Gaza province of Mozambique, but also extended into part of the Maputo, Inhambane, and Manica provinces and, around 1840–1884, also northeastern South Africa and southeastern Zimbabwe. The Mozambique Company, which administered the area north of 22 degrees south, substituted and punished chiefs loyal to Gaza in 1896. In the south the destruction of the Gaza state took several phases between 1896 and 1900.

The post of senior military commander had gone, around 1886, to Magigwane Khosa, descended from the assimilated indigenous population of the Limpopo Valley and not one of the members of the Nguni aristocracy. Magigwane commanded a royalist revolt from March to August 1897 organized under the idea of forcing the Portuguese to return the exiled king. Magigwane was killed by the Portuguese in the last phase of the revolt, when he and others tried to escape to South Africa. There a number of refugees settled. The Gaza state system was dismantled by the Portuguese, and male age groups ceased to be named in 1897.

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
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Soudan Français: See Mali (Republic of): Colonial Soudan Français.

South Africa: Missionaries: Nineteenth Century

The roles missionaries played in creating South African society have long been controversial. Some observers consider missionaries to have been agents of colonialism; others aver that missionaries were benign humanitarians. Missionaries were not a monolithic group and did not form a unified movement. Converts and missionaries forged the meaning of Christianity and missions, and this meaning varied greatly across time and place.

SOUTH AFRICA: MISSIONARIES: NINETEENTH CENTURY



South Africa.

Before the end of the eighteenth century there was very little missionary activity in South Africa. The white Christians showed little inclination toward converting non-Christians: slaves, the Khoisan, and Africans. The evangelical revivals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries inspired Protestants in northern Europe and North America, including many future missionaries to South Africa, to spread Christianity throughout the world. The London Missionary Society (LMS) and the Moravians began work among the Khoi in the Western Cape in the late eighteenth century. The LMS also worked in the Northern Cape among the Griqua and the Tswana and attempted work among the Xhosa. By the 1850s, missionaries from the United States, Germany, Scandinavia, France, and the United Kingdom, representing various denominations, worked throughout South Africa. These early missionaries were clergymen and laity, often from the middle or working classes, who were sometimes accompanied by their wives and families.

The missionaries' primary goal was to convert people to Christianity. They associated conversion with "civilization" and encouraged Africans to adopt Western clothing, housing, gender roles, and labor

patterns. Missionaries challenged African practices such as polygyny, dancing, beer drinking, and initiation ceremonies. Some people converted because they desired the resources and shelter of the mission, because they were marginal in their own society, or because Christianity offered useful spiritual insights. People who were in great cultural, economic or political distress, such as the Mfengu and the Khoi, often converted to Christianity as they adapted to South Africa's changing social order. Many African Christians were converted as the result of the preaching of other Africans. One of the most important of these early proselytizers was the Xhosa councilor Ntsikana.

By the mid-nineteenth century, missionaries worked among the major African polities of southern Africa, including the Zulu, Ndebele, Xhosa, and Tswana. However, in areas where African polities were intact, missionaries usually had limited success. Even when few people became Christians, Africans saw missions as valuable resources. Some leaders, such as Moshoeshe of the Sotho, used missionaries as intermediaries in their dealings with Europeans. Missions became important sites for disseminating Western education and technologies, such as plow agriculture, irrigation, and medicine.

Missionary perspectives on colonialism varied greatly. Some early missionaries, such as the Moravians, were quietists. The LMS missionaries, especially Dr. Johannes van der Kemp and John Philip, vigorously protested the abuses to which Africans, Khoi, and slaves were subjected. By the mid-nineteenth century, many missionaries were frustrated by the slow pace of conversion and asserted that Christianity would never gain a foothold as long as African polities retained their independence. Thus, many missionaries went from being critical of colonial policies to supporting colonial rule.

The defeat of African polities and the industrialization of South Africa had a profound impact on missions. Missionaries established work in mining compounds and the locations of South Africa's growing cities. As people throughout the region migrated to South Africa for work, some became Christian and spread the religion when they returned home. When Indian indentured servants and immigrants came to Natal and the Transvaal, several Christian missions made work among Indians their special focus. The number of mission societies in South Africa increased steadily. By the 1860s, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Church of England, and the Roman Catholic Church began mission work. Thirty years later, diverse groups such as the Salvation Army and African American missions of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the National Baptist Convention worked in South Africa. Most societies began sending single women to work as missionaries, in addition to the male missionaries. These women, including nuns and deaconesses, made African women the primary focus of their work. Many missions added social service work and education to evangelizing. Missionaries provided most of the schools and hospitals for Africans.

Mission perspectives on race relations generally became more conservative throughout the century. The early missionaries usually believed that all Christians, black and white, were equal in faith. They abhorred aspects of indigenous culture, but did not believe that nonwhites were inherently inferior to whites. As the century progressed, missionaries absorbed the racial ideologies developing in the West and tended to support the racial inequality and segregation that was developing in South Africa. Some missionaries believed that Africans were racially inferior to whites; others argued that segregation protected Africans from injurious colonial influences. Still others maintained that Africans should play a subservient role in the economy of the region. The missionaries usually accommodated themselves to the racial order.

African Christians, often independent of missionaries, made their religion an important part of their identity. In many communities there were stark divisions

between non-Christian "traditionalists" and Christian "progressives." In the Eastern Cape, the "progressives," called "school" Africans, often became peasant farmers. Africans educated in mission schools such as Lovedale formed an influential elite that included teachers, ministers, clerks, lawyers, and doctors. Members of the elite ran newspapers, established agricultural, educational, and political associations, and assiduously defended Africans' rights. Many Africans framed their protest against European rule in terms of Christianity. African Christians also adapted the religion to suit their spiritual needs. African women formed prayer groups (*manyanos*) that became an important element of their experience of Christianity. Some Christians, such as the Pedi, formed independent communities. A group of Africans, frustrated by the racial prejudice and paternalism in the church, broke with missions and formed their own African-led churches. These Christians called their churches "Ethiopian," in reference to Psalm 68:31, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God."

By the beginning of the twentieth century, over 30 missionary societies worked in South Africa. Most of the people working to promote Christianity, however, were Africans. Missionary influence was profound, resistant to easy categorization, and continually negotiated and shaped by African Christians.

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See also: Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions; Religion, Colonial Africa: Missions.

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South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881

Closer association as a mechanism for imposing order, enhancing security, and thus bringing about a keenly desired reduction in military expenditure had been placed on the imperial agenda for South Africa by Sir George Grey in the late 1850s. The diamond discoveries of the late 1860s and the subsequent annexation of Griqualand West (1871) provided some momentum, but it was the arrival of Lord Carnarvon at the Colonial Office in April 1874 that saw it reinstated as an immediate objective of imperial policy. Carnarvon had presided over the formation of the Canadian confederation in 1867, bringing together two different white communities. He now took on the more intractable task of uniting Boer and Briton, with the added complication of a third—black—population.

His primary motivation has been the subject of some debate. The pioneer historian C. W. de Kiewiet noted his concern about the Boer treatment of Africans in the Transvaal, and his belief in a uniform native policy to reduce the risk of black revolt. Robinson and Gallagher have stressed the strategic importance of South Africa as a keystone of imperial communications. Norman Etherington (1975) and others have discussed the central role of Natal official Sir Theophilus Shepstone, an early visitor to Carnarvon's Colonial Office, who acted as a spokesman for Natal settlers concerned at the possibility that interior white communities might divert their labor supplies and thus threaten their own farming activities; while Benyon has credibly suggested that, in the initial stages at least, the interests of British imperialism and Natal sub-imperialism ran conjointly. Whatever its motivation, Carnarvon's eventual grand design for Southern Africa was breathtakingly ambitious: in addition to existing British colonies and Boer republics, and surviving independent black polities in South Africa, it envisaged control of the whole coastline between the southern borders of Angola and Mozambique, plus (possibly) the inclusion of modern Botswana and western Zimbabwe.

Following his discussions with Shepstone, Carnarvon embarked on a campaign to "sell" confederation in South Africa, in advance of a conference scheduled for 1875 but later postponed to August 1876. The Natal settlers were favorable, if rather apprehensive about possible Cape domination. Cape Colony politicians had major reservations about the likely dilution of their recently acquired self-governing status, plus likely additional financial burdens, and stayed away from the conference. The Orange Free State attended, but would not discuss it; while no one remembered to invite the Transvaal, an oversight that was to have important consequences. In the following month, Carnarvon appointed Shepstone special commissioner, with wide-ranging powers to execute his scheme in South Africa. Upon arrival, Shepstone selected the Transvaal as the likeliest prospect: it was virtually bankrupt; its president, Thomas Burgers, was deeply unpopular; its northern area had reverted to black rule; and the Pedi to the east and the Zulu to the southeast threatened its security.

Burgers's failure to defeat the Pedi gave Shepstone the opportunity to intervene in January 1877, and to formally annex the whole territory, claiming that his action had the support of the majority of Boers. Shepstone's assumption was not immediately challenged, and Carnarvon pushed through the parliament the (enabling) South Africa Act (1877), which provided the framework for a future confederation: Section 55 gave the crown an oversight of legislation affecting non-white people. A new high commissioner and governor of the Cape, Sir Bartle Frere, arrived and gave further impetus to confederation: in February 1878, he was able to get rid of the skeptical Cape premier Sir John Molteno on a technicality and replace him with the more amenable Sir Gordon Sprigg.

Meanwhile, Frere played a leading role in a concerted attempt to consolidate imperial interests by disarming and demilitarizing more powerful black communities on the fringes of, or adjacent to, areas of white settlement. He was able to exploit rumors of a possible black invasion, founded on reports of laborers returning with guns from the diamond fields, and African rulers importing weapons from the coast. White anxieties stemmed from the (incorrect) news at the end of 1876 of a Pedi victory over the Boers, and a threatened black incursion into the Cape's eastern frontier. The scare provided an opportunity for a number of actions launched in the later 1870s to demilitarize and/or break up potentially "dangerous" black polities, on the pretext that they were engaged in a concerted antiwhite conspiracy. Frere identified the Zulu monarch Cetshwayo as its head, and provoked a war in 1879 designed to smash the Zulu regimental system. Prior to this, and assisted by other black

communities on the frontier, in 1877 the Cape government broke up Sandile's Gcaleka Xhosa, and by 1884 had extended its frontier to the Umtata River. It also enforced legislation passed in 1878 allowing its magistrates in Lesotho (then under Cape administration) to order the surrender of guns. The resulting Gun War (1880–1881) cost the Cape authorities £3 million and induced it to return Lesotho to the Imperial government at the end of 1883.

The breakup of the Zulu kingdom in 1879, and Sir Garnet Wolseley's defeat of the Pedi in November of that year, removed major black threats against the Transvaal Boers, who had become more and more antagonistic to British rule. However, influenced by Bartle Frere and Lanyon, the British administrator of the Transvaal, the imperial government had dismissed their leader Paul Kruger and his colleagues as unrepresentative, as well as irredeemably hostile, and even Gladstone's new government, formed in April 1880, allowed itself to be persuaded by the "men on the spot." Exasperated, Transvaal Boer leaders declared their independence at Paardekraal (December 1880); an outbreak of violence, after British authorities seized a Boer wagon, led to the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). This comprised three main engagements, of which the most significant in exposing the deficiencies of British military strategy was that at Majuba Hill (February 26, 1881). Ironically, Gladstone, fearing a wider conflict between Boer and Briton, had already decided to give a limited independence to the Transvaal, an objective achieved in the Pretoria Convention (August 1881). Its main feature, an assertion of British suzerainty, was to be the subject of intense controversy a generation later.

By this stage, confederation was already dead: in June 1880, Sprigg's motion in favor of it was withdrawn, after it received a hostile reception in the Cape Assembly. Closer association was now to be delayed for more than a generation; its outcome, the 1910 Act of Union, took place in an environment greatly different from that of Carnarvon's day.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Kimberley, Diamond Fields and.**

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South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand: 1886–1899

The search for Transvaal gold began in the 1860s with initially promising finds at Lydenburg, Pilgrim's Rest and Barberton following over the next decade. By 1885, hope for success in the eastern Transvaal faded and the search shifted westward to the Witwatersrand. There, after initial prospecting success in 1886, major gold reserves were considered well proven by the early 1890s. Many of the people financing early developments on the Rand were using profits gained from the battle between Cecil Rhodes and Barney Barnato that put De Beers Consolidated in control of Cape diamond mining. Investors included friends and associates of Rhodes, such as Alfred Beit as well as Barnato himself. Others among a small investment community whose interests intertwined included friends of President Paul Kruger, such as Sammy Marks.

In the De Beers struggle Rhodes had been helped by the Rothschild family, which also invested in the Transvaal. Only a relatively small number of financiers, individuals, and banks, were prepared to face the high risks of mining investment. Those who did tended to operate on an international scale without regard to national boundaries, or to which of the imperial powers claimed a particular territory. British capital dominated the Transvaal, followed closely by German banks and individuals who found the Rand much more promising than the minerals of Germany's own colonies.

Rhodes himself, involved in various grandiose schemes and fearing a repeat of earlier eastern Transvaal disappointments, went late to the Rand. His company, Consolidated Gold Fields, secured claims in the



Stock exchange, Johannesburg, Transvaal, South Africa, c.1890s. © Das Fotoarchiv.

less promising western Rand, and it was only dividends on Consolidated Gold Fields holdings of De Beers Consolidated shares assigned to the company by Rhodes that enabled the company to survive and pay its own dividends until the 1930s when, employing new technology, substantial gold reserves were located at great depth beneath a thick layer of rock.

The Rand gold reserves were extensive, but of very low grade, particularly as alluvial and weathered deposits closer to the surface were worked out and the search for gold extended to ever greater depths. Lingering doubts about the mines' longer term viability were put to rest with the widespread use of the MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process for separating the very fine particles of gold from the surrounding rock. Deep-level mining inevitably required increased investment, and in turn efforts to reduce operating costs to protect profitability. Because the price of gold was fixed on world markets, higher production costs could not be passed on to purchasers. Mining companies also had no control over the cost of the machinery or "mine stores" consumed in mining operations—most significantly, dynamite. Efforts to minimize costs faced a major obstacle in the dynamite monopoly, part of Transvaal president Kruger's concession policy intended to promote industrial development and ensure Transvaal control over key aspects of the country's economy.

The dynamite monopoly was initially granted to Edouard Lippert, a cousin of Alfred Beit whose interests were not primarily in mining. The operation of the concession initially caused considerable difficulties, including charges of corruption. Because the quality of explosive that the domestic industry was able to produce was very poor, virtually all the dynamite needed in this period was imported, with a high protective tariff adding to the cost. The dynamite monopoly was one of the bones of contention between the Kruger government and the mining industry that was used as a justification for the Jameson Raid of 1895 and the [Second] South African [Boer] War in 1899. In the very complex personal, political, and financial interests and pressures leading to those events, the monopoly was a factor whose importance can easily be exaggerated.

The Jameson Raid has also been seen as a reflection of conflict between the interests of the owners of deep level mines and those of the outcrop companies. While these companies did undoubtedly have different priorities, it is important to remember that most individual mine owners had interests in both outcrop and deep level operations, making it necessary to look to personal and perhaps political considerations to explain why a particular individual supported the raid or not. The simple distinction between outcrop and deep-level interests also does not take account of the group system of mine ownership. Although separate companies

were floated for individual mines, they were grouped together under the primary ownership of one or another of six holding companies. The group structure made it less difficult to bring together the relatively massive amounts of capital required while overlapping mine ownership among groups ensured that within any group mines of varying depth and grade of ores helped even out cost and profit differentials, helping minimize risk as much as possible.

Railways were essential for the success of mining as the cheapest way to carry imported machinery and supplies into the interior from coastal ports. The Cape government had already linked the Kimberley mines by rail to Cape Town, Port Elizabeth (the closest to the mines), and East London, more than meeting the needs of the mines and satisfying the demands of the different port cities for whom the mines were a potentially profitable hinterland. From Kimberley the line reached the Transvaal border in 1895; here Kruger held it up to allow the completion of the shorter link to the coast at the Mozambique port of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). Kruger preferred this line primarily because the greater part of its length was within the Transvaal, but also because its terminal port was outside direct British control. Close relations between Mozambique and the Transvaal went back to 1875 and included preferential trading ties. Both railway lines were completed in the course of 1895, followed by a third line from the Natal port of Durban. Manipulation of rates on the Cape routes and the fact that European shipping was considerably cheaper to Port Elizabeth than to Lourenço Marques meant that the railway to the Portuguese port did not benefit as much as it might have by virtue of being the shortest route to the coast. This disadvantage was ultimately offset by the importance of Mozambique labor for the Transvaal mines.

Rand mine owners sought to minimize capital requirements by using labor-intensive mining methods. As labor costs were the only significant factor of production over which they had any effective control at all it was generally regarded as essential for the industry's future to keep wages as low as possible while at the same time trying to convince African workers to accept longer contracts. The Rand, like most African mineral areas, was higher in altitude, relatively cold, and therefore relatively less populated. To attract African workers, the more profitable mines offered higher wages and shorter contract periods than those available either from farmers who were also competing for African labor or from mines with higher operating costs and narrower margins.

The desire to halt the resulting wage spiral was a major factor in the formation of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines in 1889. African men were more interested in satisfying whatever need they had to earn wages

during those times of the year when they were not heavily involved in their own family's agriculture, and preferred shorter contracts and high wages. Efforts to fill the mining industry's demand for African workers was, particularly until 1895, also limited by the restrictions the Transvaal government imposed on the areas in which the chamber's recruiting agents were allowed to operate. President Kruger, contrary to many claims made about him, was not opposed to the mining industry, but did have to balance its demands against those of his primary constituency, Boer farmers.

Some workers came to the mines independently. Many others were under contract to labor "touts"—generally merchants and others with strong local contacts—who used debt, false wage and working-conditions promises, and bribery of officials to convince (entrap) men to agree to accept a contract. Touts paid the men much less than they received from the mine owners. In trying to establish recruitment on a more solid basis, the chamber began looking outside the Transvaal. Efforts in German Southwest Africa and Angola met with little success, but in Mozambique the result was very different. Mozambicans had been traveling to various parts of southern Africa, including the Kimberley diamond mines, for many years. Apart from a desire to travel and earn higher wages than those paid in Mozambique, for many Mozambicans migrant labor enabled them to escape the harsh labor regime imposed by the Portuguese.

In 1897 agreement was reached with the Portuguese for the RNLA to recruit in Mozambique. Success was limited because touts continued to operate independently and because most of RNLA's agents had been toutswith highly unfavorable reputations. Nonetheless, by 1899 a pattern of migration was well established. Mozambicans were well on their way to becoming the most important single group of African workers on the Rand. The outbreak of war in 1899 disrupted but did not completely stop either the flow of migrants or mining itself.

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See also: Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Kruger, Paul; Labor, Migrant; Railways.

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South Africa: Peasantry, African

Although much of what would later become the Republic of South Africa was conquered, claimed, or settled by whites between the 1830s and the 1880s, most blacks living in these territories did not feel the full effects of conquest until some decades later. In fact, African-run farms generally thrived until the 1880s, producing more tax revenue and food for market than European-owned farms did during this period. In later decades, however, the diamond (from 1870) and gold (from 1880) revolutions, as well as growing white settler control over the region's governments, ultimately created a situation in which Africans were increasingly unable to live off the food they grew on their own farms. As a result, most Africans were forced to rely on wage labor to make up the difference.

Until the 1830s, white settlement in southern Africa was almost entirely confined to the area of the the present-day Western Cape province. Over the course of that and the following decade, however, whites consolidated their control over the Ciskei in the Eastern Cape province, and pushed their settlements and land claims into what were to become Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. In due course, in all these regions, the consequences for Africans were largely similar: the loss of the great majority of their land, confinement to increasingly overcrowded reserves, and growing dependence on wage labor. Nevertheless, some areas felt these consequences sooner than others. Consequences also varied within each area: some households prospered while many others suffered greatly, and men and women, old and young, felt the effects differently.

The prosperity of African agriculture between the 1830s and 1880s varied according to the balance of power between settlers and Africans in each region. Whites held the upper hand in some areas because of their relatively large numbers, military strength, proximity to agricultural markets, and familiarity with the land. This was certainly the case in much of the Ciskei, and in the immediate hinterland of such towns as Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Potchefstroom. Here, in the nearby towns, white

farmers found ready markets for their agricultural produce and were able to evict Africans from their lands, forcing them into reserves. The reserves, in turn, were inadequate for the Africans' needs, especially in the context of war and, often, famine. The white farmers' access to markets allowed them to acquire cash with which to pay farm workers real cash wages. Such wage labor offered many of these African households virtually the only means for survival, but it also came to mitigate some of the harsher effects of conquest. Some young African men were able to accumulate enough cash to pay bride-price to marry several wives, gain access to larger plots of land, and expand their cattle herds.

African agriculture was much stronger in most of Natal, the Orange Free State, and the southern and central Transvaal. In these places few white farmers had the know-how with which to farm their lands as well as Africans could, the labor with which to work the lands, or the means to pay for such labor. Neither did most whites have the military power with which to evict Africans from their lands wholesale and coerce some of them into returning as mere agricultural laborers. The result was that most Africans became tenant farmers on white-owned lands, paying taxes to the state in cash and rent to the landowners in cash, kind, or labor. African agriculture was prosperous enough in these areas for most African households to meet these demands by selling their surplus instead of turning to wage labor. Meanwhile, even though reserves existed, they were not yet overcrowded because so many Africans still lived outside them. For Africans, little changed in the way of residence patterns and means of subsistence. They produced more taxes and marketable produce than their white counterparts and managed to avoid becoming the agricultural workforce that white farmers wanted so desperately.

The situation was much freer for African farmers in the eastern, northern, and western fringes of the Transvaal. The government of the South African Republic might claim authority over these lands, and white settlers might claim ownership of some of them, but none of these claims carried much weight with the Africans who lived on the lands. Indeed, for all intents and purposes most Africans of the Transvaal borderlands were as independent as those in still nominally independent areas such as the Transkei, Zululand north of the Thukela River, and in what are now Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana. Migrant wage labor from these areas was limited and strictly voluntarily, much of it going to the diamond mining city of Kimberly in the 1870s, which, most notably, enabled Africans to accumulate guns that would allow them to fend off white armies. For its part, Lesotho became a major grain exporter, finding Kimberly a ready market.

The effects of European conquest on African agriculture varied not only from region to region, but also within each region according to religion, class, gender, and generation. Consider, for example, the plow, a major technological innovation adopted by many African farmers during this period. For the still-tiny Christian minority, the plow was both cause and effect of a whole host of social transformations they were experiencing. The plow gave males a central role in cultivation, which had been a strictly female domain in most southern African societies up to this point. Along with the connections and cultural capital that Christianization brought with it, the plow enabled a small minority of Christian landowners to prosper even when the vast majority of their African neighbors were struggling.

Nevertheless, the adoption of the plow and the accumulation of wealth in the form of livestock and access to land, by both Christian and non-Christian Africans, did not benefit all Africans. Women still did the greater part of agricultural labor, such as planting, weeding, and harvesting, even in plow-using households, and reproduction and maintenance of the household likewise remained female tasks. It tended not to be prosperous, married men who did the plowing, but rather young men, whether adult sons or hired hands. It was also the young, unmarried men who undertook migrant wage labor when times were tough. Indeed, generational tensions increased during the nineteenth century: in order to maintain control over the labor of youths for a longer time, elders increasingly delayed giving their sons enough cattle to pay bride-price, marry, and set up their own households. As a result, young men came to see the wages of migrant labor as a means to gaining independence. As much as the situation varied within a household, it varied even more between those households that were getting richer and those that were getting poorer.

The conditions that allowed many African farmers to prosper between the 1830s and 1880s changed drastically with the South African mineral revolution. The diamond and gold booms (especially the latter) from the 1870s and 1880s created huge nonagricultural populations who needed food and had the cash with which to pay for it. White farmers now had access to enough capital to allow them to evict their African tenants, make technological improvements, and hire (mainly African) wage labor. The evicted Africans were forced into reserves, which became overcrowded during this period if they were not already. Deforestation, overgrazing, and soil exhaustion on ever smaller plots of land left African farmers increasingly unable to meet their subsistence needs, not to mention pay the taxes they owed. The only alternative was migrant labor on the farms, in the mines, in the towns, and on the railroads.

It was not only purely economic factors that forced African farmers to become wage laborers; racist legislation contributed to the process as well. Large tracts of government-controlled land were thrown open for purchase by whites only. Settler-dominated legislatures passed laws designed to put pressure on landowners (especially absentee landowners) to evict their African tenants. This movement reached its climax in 1913, when the South African government passed the Natives Land Act, which limited African land ownership, whether communal or freehold, at first to 7 per cent and later to 13 per cent of South African territory. Outside these lands, Africans were not only prohibited from being landowners, according to the law, but neither could they be tenants or sharecroppers.

Nevertheless, though the mineral revolutions and racist legislation dealt a serious blow to African farming, its subsequent decline was gradual, and in some senses it continued to survive through the twentieth century. In the poorer parts of South Africa that were the farthest from markets, white landowners ignored laws against African tenancy or sharecropping well into the 1930s, if not later. In the reserves, the boom in migrant labor around the turn of the century relieved pressure on the land and allowed for some accumulation and improvement. Migrant labor thus bought something of a reprieve for African agriculture from the early to mid-twentieth century. However, the situation in the reserves has been in sharp decline ever since. The “influx control” system under apartheid hindered and delayed for decades the resulting tendency toward urbanization, making urbanization since the fall of apartheid far more rapid and traumatic than it might otherwise have been.

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See also: **Kimberley, Diamond Fields and; Lesotho (Basutoland): Peasantry, Rise of.**

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South African War, 1899–1902

The South African, or Anglo-Boer, War of 1899–1902 is a crucial event in South African history, for it both completed the British imperial conquest of modern South Africa and lay the foundations for the construction of a segregationist union state in 1910. In the most extensive colonial war of late-Victorian “new imperialism,” British forces crushed territorially based Boer (Afrikaner) settler republicanism after a mutually costly and wasteful struggle. Thereafter, Britain turned to reconstruction and reconciliation with its former radical nationalist enemy, winning over reliable Boer collaborators who would uphold Britain’s vital imperial interests in South Africa. The price of accommodation between white colonial society and the British Empire was paid by disenfranchised black inhabitants, many of whom had hoped in vain for improved rights in the wake of Britain’s victory.

The origins of the war lay in the 1886 discovery of gold in Boer republican territory and its impact on the balance of power in late-nineteenth century South Africa. While the agrarian Boer republics had hitherto been weak and of little consequence, within little more than a decade the Witwatersrand mines of the South African Republic (Transvaal) had become the world’s largest single source of gold, tilting South Africa’s economic center of gravity from the coastal British colonies of the Cape and Natal toward an increasingly nationalist, republican Boer state. Transvaal strength posed several grave problems for British interests. It opened the door for pro-Boer imperial rivals to wield commercial and political might in a customary British sphere of influence, and to challenge the Royal Navy’s strategic command of the Southern African seaboard. However, the South African Republic government under Paul Kruger was tied to a conservative landowning oligarchy that enjoyed the income provided by the mines but was otherwise fairly cool toward their modernizing industrial order. The Boer ruling class would tolerate no liberalizing dilution of its monopoly of power through an enfranchisement of mining-based British *Uitlanders* (foreigners) on the Witwatersrand, a political reform demanded by Britain as a strategy to engineer a more proimperial political structure. Increasingly, some disgruntled mining capitalists concluded that the long-term success and efficiency of the gold mines as a British interest could only be secured by the removal of the Transvaal regime. For many

imperial politicians and officials, it was also becoming quite intolerable for a great power to be defied by a tiny African settler state run by upstart Dutch farmers.

After the 1895 Jameson Raid, a botched plot hatched by some conspiring capitalists and gambling imperial politicians to unseat the Kruger government, every strategic eventuality led toward war. As diplomacy ran into the sand at the end of the 1890s, force was the only option left to a blustering Britain and a cornered Transvaal, now in a military alliance with its sister republic, the Orange Free State. To preserve republican independence, the anti-imperialist Boers declared war on Britain in October 1899. In seizing the initiative, their command hoped to knock back the British before the arrival of reinforcements to strengthen their fragile garrison position. The Boer hope lay in surprise, and the forcing of a negotiated peace.

Metropolitan observers who anticipated a rapid and easy war of conquest received a devastating shock. In the opening stage of hostilities, Boer armies struck deep into British colonial territory, inflicting several major defeats on badly organized and ineptly led British troops and creating a great domestic fuss over the failings of imperial power. But the Boer offensive was not a showcase for decisive generalship either. Failing to exploit their initial gains, republican command became bogged down in pointless diversions, giving the British time to feed in massive reinforcements, to regroup, and to adapt more effectively to the trying conditions of the vast South African countryside.

Under more competent leadership, British forces began to turn the tide early in 1900, launching a concerted assault to take the Boer states. By June, their heavily outnumbered enemy had been pushed back and, unable to stop their territories from being overrun, retreating Boer field armies began to disintegrate under pressure. With the Transvaal and Orange Free State State in his pocket, Britain's commander in chief, Lord Roberts, now considered the war at an end.

However, a dedicated core of younger generation republicans was still committed to the struggle. Encouraged by defiant Boer women, mounted forces under resourceful leaders like Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, and Christiaan de Wet reinvigorated the Boer effort through sure-footed irregular warfare. For nearly two years of guerrilla war, dispersed commandos kept the occupying imperial army on the run, lashing out with running attacks and sabotage. To cut Boers off from the lifeline of support and subsistence thrown out by their farming population, the British commander, Lord Kitchener, resorted to general doctrines of colonial wars of conquest against rural opponents. In the second half of the war, the imperial army instituted a sweeping scorched-earth policy, destroying crops and livestock and torching thousands of farms. Displaced women

and children were bundled into concentration camps while thousands of African refugees, also uprooted by scorched-earth tactics, were driven into segregated black camps. Appalling internment conditions produced high mortality rates and, when hostilities ended, some 28,000 Boers and at least 20,000 Africans had perished, mainly from disease.

Britain's unflagging determination to crush Boer republicanism and the enormous imperial resources used to achieve this end eventually whittled away the will and means of even the most diehard (or *bittereinder*) leaders to continue fighting. Their position was also worsened by two other crucial factors. Numerous Boers had lost faith in their cause, and were either laying down their arms or turning out for the British Army as collaborating National Scouts, fighting their erstwhile compatriots. The war therefore fractured Boer society. Second, African and "colored" (mixed-blood) inhabitants were increasingly resisting Boer authority and assisting the British war effort. With the conflict threatening to eliminate the very Boer existence it had been launched to defend, Boer military leaders yielded and made peace in May 1902. Although the republican states had to surrender their independence, Britain funded generous postwar reconstruction, which culminated in the creation of a white imperial dominion, the Union of South Africa in 1910.

By the end, Britain had put almost 450,000 soldiers into the field, and the Boers about 70,000 combatants. Some 22,000 imperial troops and 7,000 Boer soldiers perished. To this can be added a further toll of black casualties as a consequence of hostilities. It had never been a simple Anglo-Boer War, and both sides made considerable use of blacks as labor and as combat auxiliaries. The Boers pulled well over 10,000 men into the servicing of commandos, while the British engaged more than 100,000 black people in their war effort, as many as 40,000 of whom bore arms. In this sense, the contest was a true South African War, its political and social reach such that the neutrality of the majority black population in a supposed "white man's war" was never anything other than fiction.

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See also: **Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Kruger, Paul; Smuts, Jan C.; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910.**

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South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910

In 1902, a bitter and costly war between Britain and the Afrikaner Republics in South Africa ended in victory for the imperial forces. On May 31, a treaty was signed at Vereeniging, which brought the republics under imperial rule as the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. The British conquest of the Afrikaner republics created the framework for the construction of the new form of state in South Africa sought by mining capital since the 1890s. Now in control, the British held unprecedented power to intervene in South African society and shape its future. Under the British flag, white supremacy would be assured, property rights secured, mining costs reduced, and black labor controlled.

Although in their wartime propaganda the British claimed to be fighting for the rights of both black and white British subjects, many Africans who had supported the imperial army soon found their hopes betrayed, as the British quickly restored the racial hierarchy, which had eroded during the war. This was already signaled in Clause 8 of the Treaty of Vereeniging, which left any decision about a black franchise to self-governing white colonists. The exclusion of the majority African population from South African citizenship in 1910 was the inevitable result. Africans hopes of having their land restored were equally disappointed. A threatened jacquerie was quickly quelled and Africans disarmed. The pass laws, inaugurated in the 1890s at the behest of the mining industry, were more efficiently administered, and taxes more systematically collected.

Even before the war was over, Sir Alfred Milner, the British high commissioner, had appointed a closely knit circle of young men from Oxford, dubbed the “Milner kindergarten,” to join him in “reconstructing” the Afrikaner republics. Initially their role was to establish an efficient bureaucracy in the new crown colonies, set up municipal government, address the

most obvious prewar grievances of the mining houses and restore order in the countryside.

The mining industry was at the heart of Milner's plans for economic and political reconstruction. In 1902, shortages of investment finance and African labor had resulted from overheated speculation and the decision of the Chamber of Mines to reduce black wages drastically during the war. In response to the crisis in profitability and labor shortage, between 1903 and 1907, the industry succeeded in importing some 60,000 indentured Chinese workers on three-year contracts.

The importation of Chinese labor had far-reaching consequences for the future of labor relations and white politics in South Africa. African bargaining power was undermined and the use of unskilled white workers to fill the labor shortage was also preempted. In response to the clamor of white workers, the “color bar” that reserved work defined as skilled for whites and relegated “unskilled” work to others was greatly extended. This prevented Chinese and Africans from being recognized and paid as skilled workers, and gave the mine magnates a powerful incentive to employ cheap black labor at the expense of white unskilled labor. Milner may have wanted South Africa to be a “white man's country,” but the white men had to be “the right kind of Englishmen,” those who would maintain racial purity and pose no challenge to property, stability, and order.

The policy deeply divided English speakers, and unified nascent Afrikaner opposition to the Milner administration, giving their political organization Het Volk (which emerged between 1903 and 1905) an anticapitalist thrust that enabled it to attract non-Afrikaner support. Thus, the importation of Chinese labor jeopardized what have conventionally regarded as Milner's political objectives in South Africa: the securing of imperial supremacy through an immigration policy which would ensure a British majority in any future election and an Anglicization policy which would swamp Afrikaners in the Transvaal and the Cape.

Milner's plans to restructure the countryside were equally contradictory. He hoped British immigrants would stimulate capitalist agriculture among Afrikaner rural populace, and draw South African support for the empire. Despite imperial efforts, however, agricultural settlement was largely a failure. Only some 1200 settlers were established on the land as a result of these schemes, largely in the Orange River Colony (ORC). Most became as dependent as the Boers on sharecropping, forced labor, and state subsidies.

The dissatisfaction aroused by Milner's policies and a postwar slump spurred demands for increased political representation. In March 1905 the British

government agreed to a new constitution, but this quickly proved inadequate. With the accession to government of the British Liberal Party, it was scrapped. Campbell-Bannerman, the new prime minister, who had referred during the war to British “methods of barbarism,” swiftly conceded to the demand for self-government and white adult male suffrage, and in 1906 and 1907, the Transvaal and ORC were granted self-governing constitutions based on white adult male suffrage. This persuaded Generals Jan C. Smuts and Louis Botha, the leaders of *Het Volk*, of the “magnanimity” of the British government and opened the way for their collaboration with the imperial authorities.

In the elections that followed, the Afrikaner parties led by the Boer generals won handsomely, despite the many class and gender divisions that had emerged during and after the war within the Afrikaner community. Their support came from their wartime followers, as well as a literate intelligentsia, to whom the language issue and a sense of ethnic identity were of particular importance. In the decade after the war, this intelligentsia was responsible for a flurry of nationalist poetry, sermons, and historical writing, while a group of Afrikaner women began building new philanthropic institutions, designed in part to reconstitute the Afrikaner moral order.

This was all the more necessary because after the war another wave of indigent, unskilled, and barely literate whites had flocked to the new industrial centers, where they faced competition both from organized, skilled, and largely English-speaking labor, and from equally poor, unskilled, and illiterate black workers who still had some access to land. Unemployed and to some extent unemployable, “poor whites” constituted a major problem of social control for government and a volatile constituency for political mobilization whether by Afrikaner nationalists or English-speaking socialists.

As early as 1900, with the war still raging, the high commissioner had begun to enunciate a new language and education policy for the conquered territories, and in 1901 he brought a leading educationist to South Africa to restructure education in both of the ex-republics and to undertake the Anglicization of the children in the camps. This undoubtedly fueled demands for autonomous Christian National Schools in which Dutch would be taught and the religion of the Dutch Reformed Church fostered.

It was as a propagator of the Dutch (and later Afrikaans) language that the ORC leader, General J. B. M. Hertzog, most distinguished himself from the nationalism of Botha, Smuts, and *Het Volk* in the late 1900s, seeing in language a way of unifying a fractured community.

For Botha and Smuts, language was less crucial. In 1906, the importance of non-Afrikaner support and the

centrality of the gold mining industry on the Rand led them to accept the primacy of the English language. They appealed for “reconciliation” between the white “races,” in a common white South African nation in a unified South African state. Although this call was not new, it was given urgency by the exigencies of politics in the postwar Transvaal, and the need to restore white supremacy in the face of the threat from black resistance during and immediately after the war.

The appointment of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) in 1903 to provide a blueprint for a unified “native policy” in the different British colonial states was a further indication of the centrality of “native policy” in the reconstruction of South Africa. Rejecting overt coercion or forced labor, the commission recommended a series of policies on land and the franchise that were subsequently to be elaborated by the South African state under the general rubric of *segregation*, a new word that crept into official discourse at this time.

If SANAC foreshadowed the unification of the South African colonies, the outbreak of a poll tax rebellion in Natal in 1906, and the brutality of its suppression, hastened the movement for unification, which was already being advocated by the major interests in South Africa, if for different reasons. Local politicians hoped a more powerful nation-state would curb the imperial intervention while the British, like the mining capitalists, saw the advantages of “closer union” in the interests of building a unified economic infrastructure and a common “native policy.” After Milner’s departure, members of the “kindergarten” began maneuvering for closer union behind the scenes, encouraged by his successor as high commissioner, Lord Selborne; they saw this as the best way of retaining South Africa within the empire.

Electoral victories by Afrikaner parties in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State (as it became under self-government), and the Cape Colony in 1907–1908, provided a major impetus, and by the middle of 1907, the *Het Volk* leaders were collaborating with their political opponents and the “kindergarten” over union. By 1908, the Transvaal delegation to the National Convention that was called to discuss a nationwide constitution had a carefully agreed-upon position that incorporated the demands of *Het Volk*, the mining industry, and the “kindergarten.”

The draft constitution that emerged, with subsequent amendments recommended in the colonial parliaments, was given legal force by the British parliament as the Act of Union in 1909. It provided for a sovereign central bicameral legislature, based on a first-past-the-post constituency model, but with considerable weighting in favor of rural areas. The legal equality of the Dutch and English languages was similarly safeguarded, with

both languages being entrenched by a clause that prevented any change without a two-thirds majority of both houses sitting together.

Natal's preference for federalism was given short shrift in favor of unification, and the Cape property-based but nonracial franchise, while also protected by a two-thirds majority, was restricted to that province. The Cape's support for the extension of its franchise was overruled, as was Natal's attempt to introduce suffrage for women. A delegation of black political leaders and the ex-prime minister of the Cape, the liberal W. P. Schreiner, attempted to persuade the British government to veto the "color bar" in the constitution, but in vain. It was to take another 20 years before white women were enfranchised, and another 80 before Africans could enter parliament.

There were those who wished for the immediate incorporation of the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland, imperial-controlled enclaves that were resented by more ardent colonial nationalists. A combination of African resistance and British humanitarian opposition added to imperial caution over the inclusion of the High Commission Territories, however. In any event, a schedule to the Act of Union setting out the conditions for their ultimate transfer served over the years to ignite South Africa's demands for incorporation—and to frustrate them. Southern Rhodesia, still under chartered company rule, also had observers at the National Convention. When, in 1923, the British South Africa Company charter lapsed, Southern Rhodesians decided in a referendum to remain outside the union.

The British government, like the majority of whites in South Africa, supported the new union. Nevertheless, as an editorial in the *Times* asserted in 1909, "A handful of leaders may fashion a state but they cannot create a nation." Reconciliation among Afrikaners, let alone between English-speakers and Afrikaners, was extremely fragile. Blacks were almost completely excluded from the new nation-state. Nevertheless, the self-governing white community underpinned by black labor, as envisaged by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, was now a reality. Initially created by disparate and contradictory interests, and constantly reshaped by the contest between them, the new socioeconomic and political dispensation nonetheless lasted for much of the century.

SHULA MARKS

See also: Rhodes, Cecil J.; Smuts, Jan C.; **South African War, 1899–1902.**

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South Africa: Gandhi, Indian Question

When Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) arrived in South Africa in 1893 there were approximately 62,000 Indians in South Africa distributed among the self-governing British colonies of Natal and the Cape, and the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (OFS). Of this total, 42,000 were in Natal, and 15,000 and 5,000 in the Cape and the Transvaal, respectively. There was only a handful of Indians in the OFS. Most of the Natal Indians were either indentured laborers on five-year contracts working on sugar plantations and industries, or ex-indentured individuals engaged in the free labor market and petty trade. A much smaller percentage of the immigrants was made up of traders, among whom about a dozen rose to establish substantial commercial enterprises. Those in the Transvaal and the Cape were traders or workers. There was enormous cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity among the immigrants as they came from at least three widely separated regions on the Indian subcontinent.

The London-trained barrister came to the country to help settle a dispute between two Indian business partners, but was to become directly involved in South African Indian politics until he finally left for India in 1914. Gandhi's role can be conveniently divided into two phases: before and after 1906.

In the period before 1906, Gandhi's organizational efforts went toward protecting the interests of the Indian commercial elite through the Natal Indian Congress (NIC; founded 1894) and the British Indian Association (founded 1903) in the Transvaal. Such interests were accommodated by loosely structured bodies before Gandhi came, but they lacked an efficient organizer, and a spokesperson proficient in the English language. In Gandhi, the commercial elite found such a person with whose views they agreed. Gandhi's use of "Indianness" was an attempt to place the rights of the subcontinent's immigrants within an imperial framework. He started the *Indian Opinion* in 1903 to promote "Indian-ness" among the divergent groups of the immigrants, and to propagate the idea

that as British subjects, the Indians in South Africa enjoyed equality within the empire. In thus connecting Indian South Africans to India and Britain, he hoped to influence developments by means of polite constitutional protests. This strategy failed to halt anti-Indian laws in Natal. In the Transvaal, the British imperial authorities yielded to segregationist tendencies in the interest of Boer-Briton amity after the South African War (1899–1902). Indeed, the white authorities moved inexorably toward restricting the influx of Indians (who numbered over 149,000 in 1911) into South Africa.

In the period after 1906, Gandhi combined his moral and ethical beliefs with political considerations. The search for justice, Gandhi argued, required strict adherence to *satya* (truth) and *ahimsa* (nonviolence); and duty called for sacrifice and faith in God. These were the broad principles on which he launched the *satyagraha* (truth force) campaign in 1906 in the Transvaal. When that campaign went into effect in 1907, he had the support of some 3000 resisters, including the commercial elite.

By 1909, however, Gandhi lost the support of members of the merchant class for most of whom the political rather than the moral imperative was always more important. They found his approach idiosyncratic and his endeavors to widen the campaign inimical to their interests. They increasingly withdrew their political and financial support. By the end of April 1913, the NIC repudiated his leadership, though a formal split was to occur only in October 1913 after which Gandhi formed a new political organization, the Natal Indian Association.

Long before the split occurred, however, Gandhi had successfully appealed to prominent individuals in India for funds. Among his supporters was Gopal K. Gokhale, who as member of the Imperial Legislative Council had considerable influence in India and England. His visit to South Africa in 1912 did much to enhance Gandhi's leadership role. But Gandhi recognized that he would need allies in South Africa to make an impression on a government more firmly united on the Indian question after political unification had been achieved in 1910. Until 1911, the small Transvaal Chinese community joined Gandhi. But he did not seek support from among the African and "colored" (mixed-blood) leadership because, as he explained later, he did not want to confuse issues that affected the "children of the soil" with those of immigrant communities.

With the erosion of support, Gandhi reached out to the ex-indentured Indians in Natal. As individuals who considered themselves South Africans rather than Indians, their concerns revolved around the lack of educational facilities and interstate travel restrictions.

But Gandhi was wary about widening the scope of the campaign to include unrealizable goals. He bided his time with provisional settlements after 1911. His foremost adversary in the government, Interior Minister Jan C. Smuts, was counting on Gandhi losing support.

A series of developments was to help revive the campaign, however. The Cape Supreme Court decision delivered by Justice Searle in March 1913 ruled that all marriages contracted under Hindu and Muslim rites were invalid. Gandhi moved quickly to capitalize on the issue by getting Indian women involved. In June 1913 he resolved "to do something for the indentured men" and decided sometime thereafter to embrace the three-pound tax issue that directly affected the indentured and ex-indentured Indians. When in September 1913 Gandhi formally resumed the campaign, the three-pound tax became an important part of the movement. His trusted supporters lobbied the indentured Indians working on the mines to strike. By the end of October, the number of strikers had risen to 5000. Then, for reasons that are not entirely clear, some 15,000 Indian workers in the coastal sugar districts joined the strike. Services and industries in many parts of Natal were paralyzed. Gandhi was determined to take the campaign to the government. In November he marched with over 2,200 strikers from Natal into the Transvaal in defiance of the law. A general strike of white railway workers had compounded the government's problems, and Smuts decided to reach an agreement with Gandhi. Gandhi agreed to the settlement despite misgivings. The Gandhi-Smuts agreement was formalized in the Indian Relief Act of 1914.

It was a significant victory for Gandhi and his supporters. Yet there were many who were displeased with the settlement because it did not go far enough in establishing the inherent rights of the South African Indians. His legacy continued directly and indirectly in the 1920s and 1930s, most notably in the continued use of the imperial framework as a basis of the South African Indian politics. Gandhian ideas also inspired resistance to apartheid in the decades ahead.

SURENDRA BHANA

See also: **Smuts, Jan C.**

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South Africa: Colored Identity

Contrary to international usage, in South Africa the term *colored* does not refer to black people in general. It instead alludes to a phenotypically diverse group of people descended largely from Cape slaves, indigenous Khoisan peoples, and other blacks who had been assimilated to Cape colonial society by the late nineteenth century. Being also partly descended from European settlers, "coloreds" are popularly regarded as being of "mixed race" and hold an intermediate status in the South African racial hierarchy, distinct from the historically dominant white minority and the numerically preponderant African population.

There are approximately three and a half million colored people in South Africa today. Constituting less than 10 per cent of the population and lacking significant political or economic power as a result of a heritage slavery, dispossession and racial oppression, coloreds form a marginal group in South African society. There is, moreover, a marked regional concentration of colored people, with approximately two-thirds resident in the Western Cape and about one-third in the greater Cape Town area.

Although colored identity crystallized in the late nineteenth century, the process of social amalgamation within the colonial black population at the Cape that gave rise to colored group consciousness dates back to the period of Dutch colonial rule. It was, however, in the decades after the emancipation of slaves in 1838 that the various components of the heterogeneous black laboring class integrated more rapidly and developed an incipient shared identity based on a common socioeconomic status. The emergence of a full-fledged colored identity was precipitated in the late nineteenth century by the sweeping social changes that came in the wake of the mineral revolution. It was especially the incorporation of large numbers of Africans into Cape society that drove acculturated colonial blacks to assert a separate identity in order to claim a position of relative privilege to Africans on the basis of their closer assimilation to Western culture and being partly descended from European colonists.

Because of their marginality and the determination with which the state implemented white supremacist policies, the story of colored political organization has largely been one of compromise, retreat, and failure. The most consistent feature of colored political history has been the continual erosion of the civil rights first bestowed upon blacks in the Cape Colony by the British Administration in the mid-nineteenth century. The process of attrition started with the franchise

restrictions of the late nineteenth century. A spate of segregationist measures in the first decade of the twentieth century further compromised the civil rights of colored people. The most significant were the exclusion of coloreds from the franchise in the former Boer republics after the Anglo-Boer War and the denial of their right to be elected to parliament with the implementation of union in 1910. In the 1920s and 1930s the economic status of coloreds was undermined by the pact government's civilized labor policy and a number of laws designed to favor whites over blacks in the competition for employment. Furthermore, in 1930 the influence of the colored vote was greatly diminished by the enfranchisement of white women only. It was during the Apartheid era, however, that coloreds suffered the most severe violations of their civil rights. The most important of these measures were their classification under the Population Registration Act of 1950, the prohibition of mixed marriages, their removal from the common voter's roll in 1956, the forced relocation of tens of thousands of colored families under the Group Areas Act of 1950, and the segregation of public facilities under the Separate Amenities Act of 1953.

Because their primary objective was to assimilate into the dominant society, politicized coloreds initially avoided forming separate political organizations. By the early twentieth century, however, intensifying segregation forced them to mobilize politically in defense of their rights. Although the earliest colored political organizations date back to the 1880s, the first substantive colored political body, the African Political Organization (APO), was established in Cape Town in 1902. The APO dominated colored protest politics for nearly four decades, becoming the main vehicle for expressing this community's assimilationist aspirations as well as its fears at the rising tide of segregationism. The failure of the APO's moderate approach resulted in the emergence of a radical movement inspired by socialist ideology within the better-educated, urbanized sector of the colored community during the 1930s. The National Liberation League, founded in 1935 and the Non-European Unity Movement established in 1943 were the most important radical organizations. Prone to fissure and unable to bridge the racial divisions within the society, the radical movement failed in its quest to unite blacks in the struggle against segregation. Extraparliamentary opposition by colored political organizations was effectively quelled by state repression following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and only reemerged in the wake of the Soweto uprising of 1976.

From the late 1970s on, with the popularization of black consciousness ideology, the nature of colored identity became an extremely contentious issue as increasing numbers of educated and politicized people

who had been classified as colored under the Population Registration Act rejected the identity. It was increasingly viewed as an artificial categorization imposed by the ruling elite as part of its divide-and-rule strategies. The growth of a mass, nonracial democratic movement through the 1980s and conflict over the participation of coloreds in the tricameral Parliament of the government of P. W. Botha from 1984 on intensified the controversy.

In spite of this, the salience of colored identity has endured. During the four-year transition to democratic rule under president F. W. de Klerk, political parties across the ideological spectrum made ever more strident appeals to colored identity for support. Postapartheid South Africa has, furthermore, witnessed a resurgence of “coloredism.” This has been due partly to a desire to assert a positive self-image in the face of the pervasive negative racial stereotyping of colored people and partly as a result of attempts at ethnic mobilization to take advantage of the newly democratic political environment. It is also, however, to a significant extent due to fear of African majority rule and a hitherto unfounded perception that, as in the old order, coloreds are once again being marginalized. A common refrain among disaffected colored people is, “First we were not white enough and now we are not black enough.”

MOHAMED ADHIKARI

See also: **South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959.**

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South Africa: African National Congress

In January 1912, the inaugural conference of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was convened. Its purpose was to provide a platform for African opinion in South Africa and to create a vehicle through which to oppose discriminatory legislation being passed by the formed union of South Africa. No constitution was adopted by the congress until 1919,

but this largely ratified the character and composition of the organization established in 1912. Then as later, its membership was confined to African men; it was subdivided into four provincial congresses; it sought and enjoyed the active support of chiefs; it aimed to overcome “tribal” divisions; it was unwaveringly committed to nonracial ideals; and it confined its protests to constitutional channels, and at the most extreme, passive resistance.

The first major issue confronting the new congress was the Land Act that was hastily piloted through Parliament in 1913. This imposed territorial segregation and confined African land ownership to 7.3 percent of the union. It also banned African sharecropping in the Orange Free State. The Land Act struck hardest at African cultivators in the Free State, where sharecropping was widespread, and in the Transvaal, where only 3.5 percent of the land area was allocated to African reserves, and where chiefs had been trying to buy back land from which they had been previously dispossessed. In both provinces the congress campaign quickly attained the proportions of a mass movement. In the Transvaal, chiefs were particularly conspicuous in raising money to finance two delegations sent to petition the British Government in 1914 and 1918. The Eastern Cape, which was exempt from the provisions of the Land Act and also enjoyed the Cape African franchise, held aloof from these campaigns and, in 1919, formed its own separate political organization, the Bantu Union.

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the SANNC resolved to suspend agitation until hostilities were over. However, from 1917 on inflation rocketed and urban living conditions went into steep decline. Unrest mounted in towns and industries all over the Union—above all, on the Witwatersrand. Strikes punctuated the period of 1918 to 1920, culminating in the massive African miners strike of February 1920. SANNC members were prominent in all of these as well as in a major antipass campaign in 1919. Membership in the SANNC soared, as the congress experienced its most militant phase prior to 1950.

Militancy subsided in the early 1920s, in step with falling prices, recession, and the building of more African housing in the towns. In addition, the liberal Joint Council movement co-opted former radicals from the African elite. SANNC activity flickered on fitfully, mainly in the Transvaal and Western Cape.

At its 1925 conference the SANNC changed its name to the African National Congress (ANC). A brief resurgence of activity occurred after Josiah Gumede, the leader of one of the congress factions in Natal, was elected the organization’s national president. He became radicalized by two trips to the Soviet Union in 1927 and 1928. Gumede played a leading role in the League of African Rights, which was sponsored by the

Communist Party of South Africa in 1928. This earned him the opprobrium of more conservative congress leaders (including the chiefs, who were rapidly losing influence) who succeeded in ousting him in April 1930, and electing in his place Pixley Seme.

Under Seme, the ANC became moribund and riddled with factions. Rival leaderships confronted each other in all of the provinces. This, along with the Great Depression, which struck South Africa in the early 1930s, virtually extinguished all political activity. In the Western Cape these divisions were ideological between radicals (B. Ndobe) and conservatives (J. Thaele). In the Transvaal such ideological differences were overlain by ethnic rifts between S. P. Matseke's Pedi/Kgatla group and S. Makhatho's multiethnic caucus. Despite numerous efforts at reconciliation, this paralyzing split was not closed until 1943.

The publication of the Herzog Bills in 1935, which stripped Cape Africans of their franchise, finally galvanized the ANC into action. At its 1936 annual conference, Seme was replaced as secretary general by the Reverend James Calata, who embarked on a program to revive dormant branches. In 1937 the Transvaal provincial congress received an injection of new purpose and new blood with the formation of the Transvaal Coordinating Committee for the Revival of the ANC, in which several communists were prominent. The ANC now took back center stage from the All African Convention (founded in 1935), which had, for a time, threatened to eclipse it. An important factor facilitating the revival of the ANC in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were the electoral campaigns now permitted for the newly formed Native Representative Council. Additional stimulus was provided by accelerated industrialization and urbanization in the late 1930s and 1940s, and the reemergence of African trade unions, which coalesced into the Council for Non-European Trade Unions in 1941.

These advances were consolidated by the election of A. B. Xuma as secretary general in 1940. Under his leadership provincial splits were gradually resolved, the Cape was brought back into the ANC as an active member and national membership gradually inched up, to reach around 5000 by 1945, over half of which was concentrated in the Transvaal. In 1943 Xuma introduced a new constitution that gave women full membership and abolished both the Upper House of Chiefs as well as racial restrictions on membership. The central objective that this proclaimed was full participation for Africans in the government of South Africa. By 1949 the shift of direction was complete. By that stage the young radicals of the Youth League (formed in 1944) and the CPSA were on the point of gaining control of the congress, the Programme of Action that committed the ANC to mass action had

been passed, and the relatively cautious Xuma was about to be replaced. The era of mass nationalism was about to dawn.

PHILIP BONNER

See also: **Dube, John Langalibalele; Matthews, Z. K.; Plaatje, Sol T.**

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South Africa: Industrial and Commercial Workers Union

Trade unions were imported to South Africa by immigrant workers from Britain, Australia, and elsewhere. These took the form of often racially mixed craft unions in the Cape, and racially exclusive craft and mining unions on the Witwatersrand. In 1922 white miners on the Witwatersrand went on strike, and began the "Rand Revolt" to prevent African workers being employed to perform deskilled parts of white miners' jobs. Until World War I, African workers remained almost wholly unorganized, apart from piecemeal efforts by the communist Industrial Workers of Africa during and immediately after the war. In 1924 the Industrial Conciliation Act was passed by the new Pact government, which granted formal recognition and statutory bargaining rights to white, "colored," and Indian worker, but excluded most Africans from its terms.

The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICWU) was formed in January 1919, through the joint endeavors of Albert Batty, a trade unionist of English extraction, and Clements Kadalie, a mission-educated Nyasa immigrant. Kadalie was its first secretary. The ICWU recruited its membership from the mainly "colored" workforce of Cape Town's docks and railways. Both sectors were ripe for unionization. Wartime inflation had bitten deep into wage packets and employers repeatedly refused compensatory wage rises. In December 1919 the ICWU launched a strike that lasted 14 days and brought out 2,000 men. Although the strike was broken, it secured modest increases in wages and won the esteem and support of Cape Town's black working class.

In July 1920 a conference was convened in Bloemfontein with the aim of establishing a national black labor organization. Representatives from the ICWU and from the Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, and East London unions attended. A new federation was formed, but soon foundered on disputes over who should occupy the leadership positions. Up until 1923, the ICWU was a Cape organization. At its January 1923 conference it resolved to extend itself nationwide, after which it set up a new branch in Bloemfontein. Only in 1924 did it embark on serious expansion. Between June and November Kadalie undertook a tour of the Union, establishing 12 new branches in his wake, the most important of which were in Durban and Johannesburg.

A major shift in the composition and distribution of the ICWU occurred in 1926–1927. In March 1926 it claimed 171,760 members. By January 1927 membership had risen to 571,760. The main expansion occurred in the Transvaal and Natal, although several new branches also opened in the Orange Free State. The Cape branches went into a correspondingly steep decline. A second, related change can also be noticed that overlapped with the first. Until 1926, the ICWU had a discernible urban bias. In late 1926 and 1927 the major thrust of its expansion was centered among the increasingly impoverished farm labor populations of the Highveld and Natal. These contributed the vast bulk of its new members, which swelled to between 100,000 and 200,000 strong in 1927. It was at this time that the ICWU also achieved its greatest territorial spread, extending to every corner of South Africa, and even into Southern Rhodesia. The ICWU thus became the first mass movement of blacks to have arisen in South Africa.

The strategy and tactics of the ICWU shifted markedly over this period. The early 1920s were years of rising unemployment and declining prices, a context that did not favor the use of the strike weapon. In 1923 and 1924 South Africa's government implemented "civilized labor" policies whereby Africans were displaced from central and local government employment in an effort to reduce levels of white unemployment. African artisans and clerical workers were particularly hard hit by these measures. They flooded into the ranks of the ICWU, with many assuming leadership positions.

One key to the ICWU's success in these years was the public meeting. Here ICWU leaders pilloried government officials often in abusive and derisive terms, much to the delight of their audiences, who relished "a taste of freedom" and returned again and again. ICWU offices also took up legal cases, either on an individual or collective basis. The Natal provincial leader A. W. G. Champion was particularly adept at mounting such legal actions through which he secured the abolition of the night curfew for Africans in Durban, the ending of

the compulsory disinfecting of Africans entering Durban, and a variety of other gains. Similar tactics won fleeting successes in staying the evictions of farm laborers in Natal and the Transvaal, and this again massively boosted the ICWU's rural support.

Apart from lawyers and rhetoric, the ICWU had few weapons at its disposal. Even in the urban areas most non-mineworkers were migrants, and were rarely concentrated in sufficient numbers in any one sector of employment to permit orthodox trade union organization. On the mines and farms, systems of surveillance and control were sufficient to contain and crush any incipient worker organization. The ICWU reacted to these constraints in two related ways. The first was to recruit generally, and not according to occupational sector, and to mobilize around broader political issues such as the abolition of passes. The second was to seek external sources of support. The first of these was the Cape Federation of Labor Unions; this was replaced in 1925 by the South African Communist Party (SACP). Late in 1926 the communists were expelled for criticizing ICWU leaders' corruption and inaction, and their place was taken by a group of white Johannesburg liberals led by Ethelreda Lewis, who secured the ICWU its affiliation to the International Federation of Trade Unions, which Kadalie visited in 1927. Kadalie returned from that tour having secured the services of a Scottish trade union organizer, William Ballinger. Ballinger soon fell out with Kadalie, who now formed the breakaway Independent ICWU in 1928, which again turned to the SACP.

The third tactic of ICWU leaders was to encourage yearnings for freedom, which sometimes assumed almost millenarian form. This was especially evident in the countryside, where labor tenants often believed the ICWU would deliver land. More generally, ICWU leaders often preached the general strike, which they had no idea of how to accomplish, in what can be described as millenarian syndicalism.

The ICWU collapsed and fragmented in 1928. The ICWU remained active in Johannesburg, East London, and Bloemfontein until 1931. Thereafter it faded gradually away, although its memory remained potent among African workers and political activists for another two decades.

PHILIP BONNER

See also: Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent and Millenarian/Syncretic Churches; South Africa: Mining; South Africa: World Wars I and II.

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South Africa: Afrikaner Nationalism, Broederbond and National Party, 1902–1948

The year 1902 represented the lowest point in Afrikaner fortune, following the surrender of the Boer commandos and the Treaty of Vereeniging, which extinguished the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. High Commissioner Milner's subsequent Anglicization policy, designed to cement the imperial connection, seemed to threaten the very essence of Afrikanerdom. Ironically, Milner's policy had the contrary effect of provoking a popular movement for the protection of the Afrikaner language, culture and religion.

Aided by the magnanimity of the new Liberal government in Britain, Louis Botha's moderate nationalist Het Volk party won power in the Transvaal whites-only election of 1907, on a platform of Anglo-Afrikaner reconciliation. J. B. M. Hertzog's more radical Orangia Unie party won a parallel victory in the Orange River Colony's (also whites-only) election of 1908. The decade closed with the formation of the Union of South Africa, hailed as a landmark in the process of British/Afrikaner reconciliation.

Meanwhile, the Afrikaner community was experiencing considerable social and economic change that was to bring into existence a more radical, less accommodating nationalism based on a continued animosity toward British imperialism, anxiety about nonwhite economic competition in urban areas, growing concern among middle-class Afrikaners about the condition of Afrikaner "poor whites," and a continued determination to foster Afrikaner language and culture.

In political terms, this led to Hertzog's secession from the governing South African Party (SAP) and the formation of his Nasionale Party (National Party, NP) in January 1914 with the slogan "South Africa First." The NP won increasing electoral support and came to power in alliance with the (white racist) Labour Party in 1924. Hertzog's first premiership (1924–1929) witnessed some reduction in hostility toward British imperialism, helped by contemporary movement toward imperial devolution. Further attempts to advance the cause of Anglo-Afrikaner reconciliation brought about the fusion of the NP with General Jan C. Smuts's SAP in 1934 to create the United Party, but also witnessed the reemergence of radical nationalism in the form of D. F. Malan's Gesuiwerde Nasionale (Purified National) Party.

In social terms, Afrikaner nationalism embraced a policy of strict racial segregation that brought it into alliance with white labor in the mid-to-late 1920s, and

further developed the white protectionist racial pattern of South Africa's industrial system. In the cultural sphere, it helped to engender institutions parallel to those of the English-speaking establishment, such as the Voortrekkers, an Afrikaner Boy Scouts movement. The Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, formed in 1929, coordinated this wide range of voluntary associations. Given the high incidence of church attendance among Afrikaners, the Dutch Reformed Church exerted a powerful influence; its theologians were beginning to refine the Biblical defense of racial separation later expressed in Dr. Gert Cronje's *A Home for Posterity* (1945) and *Justifiable Race Separation* (1947). Work on an Afrikaans Bible and dictionary was completed, and in 1925, Afrikaans became an official language, alongside English. In economic terms, the interwar period witnessed the continued urbanization of Afrikaners and the development of *volkskapitalisme*, the mobilization of Afrikaner capital and the endeavor to bring Afrikaner employers and workers together in what Dan O'Meara (1983) calls a "national capitalism," challenging the grip of "international capitalism" and its imperialist backers.

The Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) played what some commentators, such as J. H. P. Serfontein (1978), have regarded as a commanding role in the mobilization of radical Afrikaner nationalism, articulating the various political, economic, and social institutions of Afrikanerdom within the Purified National Party. Started in 1918 by working-class Afrikaners in English-speaking Johannesburg, the AB became a secret society with an exclusively male membership open only to "pure" Afrikaners recommended by existing members. Its enemies declared that it was a sinister organization aimed at dominating South Africa through a process of infiltration into key areas; its friends declared it was merely a cultural body. Nevertheless, the AB seems to have played an important political role, both directly and indirectly. O'Meara has demonstrated its success in helping the Purified Nationalists establish themselves in what became their Transvaal power base in the mid 1930s.

The ten years leading up to the Nasionale Party victory at the polls in 1948 witnessed further developments of these trends in Afrikaner nationalism, launched by the 1938 Great Trek centenary celebrations, which extreme nationalists had effectively hijacked. However, a new influence, from Nazi and fascist Europe, was to shape nationalistic Afrikaner thinking on race issues, leading to a greater emphasis on race separation and "purity." Several future leaders, such as Hendrik Verwoerd, P. J. Meyer, and Nico Diederichs, had studied in Germany before World War II, and the term *Volk* began to appear regularly in the party's political lexicon. In an extreme form it was expressed by the

Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Sentinel), a paramilitary organization that had emerged in the wake of the Trek centenary and blended Nazi and Great Trek symbols. Although divided among themselves politically, radical nationalists were united in their determination to end the imperial connection, and some were not averse to the prospect of a German victory to secure this aim.

However, the imminent collapse of Nazism in Europe led to a gradual reassembly of Afrikanerdom behind Malan's restyled Herenigde (Reunited) Nasionale Party, and a refiguring of nationalist philosophy into a "Christian Nationalism," emphasizing the place of Afrikaners as a people placed by God in southern Africa. From this emerged the policy of apartheid, which became the official policy of the Reunited National Party at the end of the war. In preparing for the 1948 election that brought him to power, Malan decided to highlight apartheid as a solution to South Africa's racial "problems." He was helped by the growing threat posed to white workers by an increasingly urbanized and skilled black labor force. The result of the election was nevertheless a surprise to those who thought Smuts's United Party would win again: the Reunited National Party and its allies secured a majority of eight seats over the UP and its allies, helped by Afrikaner working class voters in six key urban seats, and were to remain in power continuously for the next 46 years.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Afrikaans and Afrikaner Nationalism, Nineteenth Century; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: World Wars I and II.**

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South Africa: World Wars I and II

South Africa's participation in the first and second world wars is marked by striking similarities. Although geographically far removed from the central theaters of fighting, South Africa quickly entered both conflicts on the side of Great Britain. In each case the decision to support Britain was controversial and contested within South Africa's Afrikaner community. In both wars South African troops fought in campaigns throughout Africa and in Europe. When the conflicts ended the same South African leader, Jan C. Smuts, championed high-minded ideals for promoting international peace while maintaining harsh forms of racial segregation and discrimination at home.

Of the two conflicts, World War II, along with the rise of Nazism in Germany, played the more decisive role in influencing internal developments in South Africa and setting the stage for the climactic human rights struggle between the proponents of apartheid and the advocates of racial equality. Further, World War II spurred South Africa's second industrial revolution, diversifying the economy, expanding the exploitation of the country's African population, and generating growing labor unrest.

At the outset of World War I in 1914, South Africa was led by Prime Minister Louis Botha and Minister of Defense Smuts. Both had been Afrikaner commanders who fought the British during the Boer War (1899–1902), but at its end they had emerged as supporters of reconciliation with Britain and English-speaking white South Africans. Consequently, when fighting broke out in Europe they agreed to a British request to seize German South West Africa (today Namibia).

This action provoked a potentially serious rebellion of Afrikaners still bitter against Britain. Although a number of their influential leaders, including the commander of the armed forces, joined the uprising, Botha reacted swiftly and defeated the rebels. He then assumed command of the campaign in South West Africa, capturing the colony in 1915. British appreciation for this assistance increased when Smuts assumed command of the campaign in East Africa in 1916 and drove the Germans south from the Kenyan border. Later, South African troops fought in Europe.

South Africa's armed forces were made up not only of white soldiers but included both "Colored" and African units. Some joined out of patriotic reasons, others because of government pressure or reward, and

many to escape the drought in the northern Transvaal. Although they often faced dangerous situations, these forces were restricted to noncombatant activities. The attitudes of South Africa's leaders were both racist and paradoxical: While arguing that Africans were incapable of fighting in modern wars, they feared the future ramifications of military training for large numbers of Africans.

Among Africans the war provoked a variety of responses. For some in the working class and peasantry, resentful at their economic exploitation, the war offered opportunities for the expression of anti-British sentiments and even consideration of revolts. Others saw the war foreshadowing millenarian visions that would lead to African liberation, while many viewed it as simply a white man's conflict. The Western-educated leaders of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), predecessor of the African National Congress (ANC), however, supported Britain from the outset. They hoped that in recognition Britain would intervene with the South African government to address black grievances.

At the war's end SANNC leaders, such as Sol Plaatje, pressed their demands for reforms in South Africa as well as their hopes for an African voice in colonial adjustments, but they were largely ignored by the British government. Instead, London claimed it could not interfere in the internal affairs of a self-governing dominion. Smuts, on the other hand, found himself a respected figure among Allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference. His proposals for the League of Nations strongly influenced the views of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Yet Wilson radically transformed Smuts's mandate program, insisting that it include the former German colonies in Africa and thereby preventing South Africa's annexation of southwest Africa.

The beginning of World War II in 1939 brought Smuts back to power in South Africa. During the early interwar years he had served as prime minister, but he joined a coalition government with Afrikaner nationalists during the Depression. They now opposed "England's war" and advocated neutrality. With Smuts determined to support Britain, the government split. By 80 to 67, Smuts prevailed. South Africa declared war on Germany, and he again became prime minister.

Deep divisions within the Afrikaner community took on a contemporary character. Beyond traditional resentment against Britain, Hitler's Nazi ideology proved attractive to many. A number of Afrikaner intellectuals had studied in Germany during the 1930s and later emerged as architects of apartheid. Before the war, fascist-type organizations had sprung up in South Africa, the most significant being the Ossewabrandwag, or Ox-Wagon Sentinels. Hoping for a German

victory, they undertook subversive activities and some of their leaders were interned.

Other Afrikaners supported Smuts and joined his volunteer army, which fought in Ethiopia, North Africa, and Italy. Again racial prejudice prevented Africans and "colored" troops from serving in combatant roles. Still, almost half of the soldiers killed were black.

At home, war transformed the economy and accelerated social upheavals already under way. Although gold mining retained its leading position, manufacturing surged as South Africa was forced to produce many goods it had previously imported. Union organizing among African workers and rapid urbanization accompanied industrial expansion. Urban migration exacerbated overcrowding in African areas and led to the creation of new shantytowns on the outskirts of South Africa's cities.

The ANC responded to these changing conditions, and the South African government's continued determination to deny blacks their most basic rights, with increasing militancy. After Britain and the United States issued the Atlantic Charter, with its democratic statement of war aims, the ANC formed a committee that demanded the right of self-determination be applied in Africa.

During the war, the ANC Women's League and the ANC Youth League were formed. The former organization saw its special objectives as organizing women in the struggle for African freedom and equality while addressing social issues that affected women. The latter organization, which included a new generation of leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo, pressured the movement to adopt more radical tactics. Petitions had failed to move the government; the time had arrived for organizing mass actions such as boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience.

At war's end Smuts was again a respected figure within the British Commonwealth and contributed significantly to the drafting of the United Nations charter's preamble. At home, however, his politics were about to be swept aside as South African history approached a decisive turning point. Despite his segregationist policies, many Afrikaners viewed Smuts as a moderate on racial questions and too closely associated with Britain. In 1948 they rejected his leadership for that of the hard-line proponents of apartheid found in the National Party. At the same time the advocates of racial equality, led by the ANC, sought new methods of mobilizing the African population in the struggle for justice and democracy.

BRIAN DIGRE

See also: **Plaatje, Sol T.; Smuts, Jan C.; South Africa: African National Congress; World War I: Survey.**

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South Africa: Segregation, Political Economy of

Racial discrimination in South Africa in the years following union in 1910 and preceding the institution of apartheid in 1948 was enforced through a policy of segregation. Although implemented to varying degrees throughout the new country, the policy of segregation generally separated races to the benefit of those of European descent and to the detriment of those of African descent. Segregation policies affected the rights of Africans to own land, to live or travel where they chose, and to enjoy job security. While segregation was not as sweeping or inclusive as apartheid, neither was it an informal system of discrimination. Segregation policies were implemented through a series of laws passed to limit increasingly Africans rights during the first half of the twentieth century, and they were enforced through the power of the state, often with great brutality. Although sometimes viewed as more benign than apartheid, segregation nevertheless shaped South African society in fundamental ways that still affect the country into the twenty-first century.

Segregation policies attempted to protect white political and economic interests while at the same time drawing Africans increasingly into the country's economy as the chief source of labor. Throughout the twentieth century, whites represented no more than 10 per cent of the South African population, yet they controlled the majority of the country's economic resources. Key to this development was the use of African labor at very low wages and under extremely strict control. One of the first pieces of legislation to

emerge from the new South African government aimed to restrict African employment to menial and unskilled jobs was the 1911 Mines, Works, and Machinery Ordinance. Under this legislation, Africans were excluded from most skilled categories of work in the mines, in effect “reserving” those jobs for whites. In the same year, the Natives' Labour Regulation Act set down the conditions under which Africans could work: they were to be recruited in the rural areas, fingerprinted and issued with a “pass” allowing them to enter the cities, and if they broke their employment contract or stayed in the urban areas beyond the length of the contract they were to be arrested and forced to do hard labor for up to two months. As Africans increasingly protested and resisted these oppressive terms of employment through union organization and industrial strikes, the South African government responded with the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, restricting African rights to organize or to negotiate their terms of employment. Under this act, “pass-bearing” African males could not be considered under the legal term *employee*, thus excluding them from all rights of labor representation, mediation, or organization. Under segregation, African workers were limited to unskilled jobs, were punished if they quit their jobs, and were robbed of their rights to protest these conditions.

Not surprisingly, Africans tried to avoid such terms of employment and it was necessary for the South African government to take drastic measures to force Africans into the wage workforce. Key to these efforts were restrictions on Africans' ability to earn their own livelihood, as they had before white occupation, on their own farms. Heavy taxes on African farmers had been introduced by the British prior to 1910, including taxes on dogs, on huts, and even on heads in an effort to force them into employment on the mines or white farms. African farmers had responded to these pressures by increasing their agricultural production and successfully participating in the commercial sale of their crops in competition with white farmers. Thus in 1913, the South African government passed the Natives' Land Act, restricting African ownership of land to designated areas comprising 6 per cent of the country's total land area. Although the government justified the act by arguing that these lands approximated African landholdings prior to white occupation, and even increased the percentage of land up to 13 per cent in 1936, most land reserved for Africans was of poor quality and could not meet the needs of the growing African population. As the productive capacity of this land waned and taxation proved unrelenting, Africans were increasingly forced into work on white farms, in factories, and in the growing mining industry.

The impact of segregationist policies became most apparent in the cities, as white municipalities struggled

to deal with the steady influx of Africans seeking work to support their families. While the system of labor contracts and passes encouraged and often forced Africans to return to the rural areas at the completion of their contract, many stayed in the cities rather than return to sure poverty and starvation. In 1923, the government passed the Urban Areas Act to establish a uniform policy toward urban Africans. The government had agreed that Africans should remain in the cities only to “minister to the needs of the white population.” Under this act, employed Africans were restricted to segregated townships or locations where they could rent accommodation provided by the municipality. Africans coming to town to seek work could stay for only limited periods of time and were returned to the rural areas or imprisoned if they remained without work. The right to live in town was precarious and opportunities for advancement were circumscribed by segregationist limitations on land ownership and business licenses.

As segregation became increasingly broad, affecting Africans in the rural areas, urban areas, and at the workplace, the government sought to create a more comprehensive system of rule throughout the country. In 1927 the Native Administration Act was passed, giving the department of native affairs control over all matters pertaining to Africans. In effect, this act separated all policies concerning Africans from the rest of the government. Under this act, the government ruled by decree rather than by law in the African rural areas (deemed tribal reserves) and established separate administrations in these areas, staffed by bureaucrats and appointed chiefs. As Africans increasingly lost the right to reside in the cities and were pushed into the reserves, these policies left most under despotic rule. In 1936, the few political rights left to Africans under a color-blind voter franchise in the Cape province were removed under the Representation of Natives Act. Although Africans were allowed to elect a limited number of white representatives, by 1936 they were substantially segregated in the political as well as economic aspects of South African society.

The impact of segregation was devastating for Africans. The rural areas quickly became unable to support the African population and as Africans sought work elsewhere they were forced into a system of migrant labor, moving between workplaces where they had no rights back to rural homes where they could not survive. By the close of the segregation era, African workers and politicians increasingly and aggressively demanded greater rights, staging strikes, protests, and boycotts. Laying the foundations for the apartheid era, segregation systemized discrimination and strengthened the African resistance that would both intensify under apartheid.

NANCY L. CLARK

See also: **South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959.**

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South Africa: Industry, Labor, Urbanization, 1940–1946

Between 1940 and 1946, South Africa underwent a massive economic and social transformation as the result of the country's participation in World War II. Prior to the war, the South African economy was based primarily on agriculture and mining, with the majority of the population, both white and African, still living in the rural areas. Most manufactured goods were imported from Europe and the local population worked on farms or in the mines on a racially segregated basis. During the war, factories expanded to fill the need for many goods, including military supplies, drawing workers into the cities from all over the country. As Africans and whites alike were employed in the new factories, the racial lines between workers became a source of great contention and South Africa experienced serious labor strikes and industrial action. By the end of the war, manufacturing had become the country's most productive economic sector, nearly half of the population was living in the cities, and competition for jobs between African and white workers worried the white electorate. While the war spurred tremendous economic growth, it also challenged the country's strict segregationist policies in the workplace and in the expanding cities.

As the demand for goods expanded during the war, South Africa's factories responded by more than doubling production. The number of factories grew, but most of the increase in production came about as a result of the expansion of existing factories. All sorts of goods were produced, including blankets, ploughs, dishes, and clothing, as well as supplies for the army in the form of ammunition, helmets, trucks, and boots. The greatest growth was experienced in the industries producing machinery, vehicles, and tools, which had

been cut off from the European suppliers during the war but were crucial for all of South Africa's industries. During the war, imports in the machinery category were cut by more than half and the local factories had to make up the difference, with heavy manufacturing accounting for nearly one-third of all factory production by the end of the war. At war's end, manufacturing had become the most productive segment of the economy, eclipsing the mining industry for the first time in South African history since the discovery of diamonds and gold.

While production swelled, the factory workforce grew by 50 per cent, mostly as a result of the expanded recruitment of African workers. Prior to the war, Africans had been prohibited from skilled and even semiskilled jobs, relegated to menial work and legally categorized as temporary workers. The growth of factory production, however, required workers who were trained to use complicated machinery for the mass production of goods. With more than 200,000 white males serving in the military, employers sought out women war workers to fill some skilled jobs but also increasingly relied on Africans without always paying them at the higher skilled rates. During the war years, from 1939 through 1945, the number of African males working in industry grew by nearly 70 per cent, while the number of women, both white and black, grew by 50 per cent. By comparison, white male employment in industry grew by only 30 per cent as many men joined the military. By the end of the war, Africans constituted over 50 per cent of the industrial workforce outside of the mining industry, for the first time in the country's history.

Changes in the South African economy began to affect the face of South Africa's cities, as increasing numbers of rural dwellers were drawn into the urban areas seeking work. A combination of opportunity in the cities with the expanding numbers of jobs in the war factories, and devastation in the countryside as South Africa experienced one of the worst droughts in its history, succeeded in driving nearly a million more South Africans into the cities during the war. Both Africans and whites moved to the urban centers, and for the first time Africans began to outnumber whites there. The massive influx of Africans created serious problems due to the myriad legal restrictions limiting African entry and residence in the cities. Africans were prohibited from entering cities without proper documentation and could live only in specially designated townships, or locations, controlled by the local municipality. Since the strict enforcement of these laws during the war would have overwhelmed the police and seriously impeded the war effort, the government relaxed most restrictions for the duration of the war. The result was the growth of the urban African population under trying conditions, with little accommodation or

services provided. Africans were forced to find shelter anywhere and "squatter" camps (a collection of impromptu shacks without proper sanitation or running water) emerged around the major industrial centers. One of the largest, in Orlando near Johannesburg, with more than 20,000 residents, resisted government clearance and eventually became the basis for the later township of Soweto. While the government and the local authorities were unwilling to recognize that African workers were becoming part of the permanent urban population, Africans themselves took matters into their own hands and created their own urban communities.

Africans increasingly organized to resist their appalling conditions of work and standard of living throughout the war years. Boycotts against the high bus fares charged African workers continued in the Johannesburg townships for most of the war years and after. Strikes and industrial disturbances rose to an all time high during the war, despite strict government emergency regulations prohibiting strikes. In 1941, the African Mineworkers' Union was formed for the first time, organizing the migrant workers who repeatedly staged work stoppages for higher wages. The union gained some wage increases during the war, and staged its most dramatic action in 1946, when 60,000 workers went out on strike. And in 1943, the African National Congress established a Youth League, led by young leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu who were intent on invigorating the organization and organizing forceful popular protests against government segregation and discrimination. The inequities of life at the workplace and in the residential areas intensified during the war years and prompted serious efforts at resistance and political change.

The impact of the war years was dramatic. While the country experienced massive growth in national production, jumping nearly 80 per cent during the war, South Africa also became more divided than ever. Africans found a government unwilling to relent on the implementation of segregation and, more ominously, a growing sector of the white community that sought to further entrench segregation under the concept of apartheid. The economic and social transformation of the country frightened a large segment of the white population that welcomed growth and prosperity but rejected any recognition of African rights. Nevertheless, the integration of Africans into South Africa's economic and social life during the war years would prove impossible to reverse and African demands for greater rights would not go unanswered.

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See also: **South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: World Wars I and II; World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Impact.**

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South Africa: Capitalist Farming, "Poor Whites," Labor

In South Africa, the late-nineteenth-century discovery of diamonds and gold, and the ensuing industrialization, did not provide all white settlers with wealth. By the early 1900s, perhaps as many as one in four Afrikaners lacked the skills and resources necessary to compete in a capitalist economy. Nonpropertied whites in the rural Cape, who had slid further into penury in the nineteenth century, remained on the margins of the industrial boom. In the interior republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, Boer small landholders struggled to move from subsistence farming to market profitability. Many "poor whites," as they became known, experienced near-famine conditions after British troops devastated Afrikaner agriculture during the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). While some poor whites sought menial work in the emerging urban mining centers, the majority still labored on farms. Although poverty was long endemic to agrarian settler society in South Africa, "poor whiteism" in the early twentieth century was seen as a new social phenomenon in a rapidly industrializing world.

Poor whites lagged behind during a time of accelerating capitalist transformations. In agriculture, capitalizing farmers expanded yields to meet the food needs of burgeoning towns, evicting by-owners, their white sharecroppers and labor tenants, in order to use all available acreage for staple-crop production. Squeezed from the land, poor whites were now expendable, as large-scale white landowners discharged their employees when machinery made labor-intensive tasks obsolete. Seeking employment and a better life, landless Afrikaners drifted to cities, where they were alienated from far more affluent English-speaking immigrants.

In rural and urban areas, poor whites were often stigmatized, ridiculed by some landowners as lazy and

feckless; *poor white* became a derogatory term. Commercial farmers favored low-paid and reputedly more productive African labor. Employers' preference for Africans also shaped an industrial sector now dependent on the extraction of precious minerals and metals. Unlike farming, mining was not subject to seasonal hazards such as cattle diseases, drought, or summer floods. Its main product, gold, commanded a ready market in overseas financial centers. Poor whites learned that in the diggings, as in capitalist farming, the bosses relied on machines and black workers.

In the years immediately after the union of South Africa in 1910, the continuing degradation of poor whites posed a paradox in the hardening racial hierarchy, challenging government native policies that stressed the inferiority of Africans. Such state attitudes underpinned the landmark 1913 Native Lands Act, which confined chiefdoms to small, barren reserves and drove increasing numbers of Africans into labor migrancy and urban employment. Early advocates of racial segregation, particularly Afrikaner politicians and clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church, were alarmed by the mingling of poor whites, "coloreds," and Africans in city slums. Race mixture, according to Boer general Jan Smuts, a leader in the union government's reigning South African Party, took place in the shared environment of squalor and threatened to spawn a labor movement that could unify working whites and blacks. Facing common deprivations and restrictions on upward mobility, poor whites and blacks could have created an alliance. Yet to a large extent, poor whites advocated racial segregation, to conform with the belief that their cultural and racial superiority would advance their economic interests.

It was against the background of the poor white problem that the Pact government came to power in 1924. The Pact was a two-party alliance of the Nationalist and Labour Parties, prompted by the discontent of Afrikaner landowners and working-class whites against what they saw as the antilabor and antifarmer regime of Smuts. The Labour Party, organized by protectionist-minded white trade unionists, sought votes from white workers in mining and related industries. The Nationalists represented a range of white farming interests, but primarily the Afrikaner rural electorate. These two parties shared a main objective—namely, safeguarding white South Africa, which included rescuing poor whites from indigence. Fulfilling its pledge, the Pact government initiated the "civilized labor" policy to replace black workers with whites (and some "coloreds") wherever possible—usually at a higher wage.

The Pact encouraged the development of secondary industries to create employment for rural whites migrating to urban areas. However, out of the 72,000

positions created between 1926 and 1928, only a small fraction went to poor whites; most new jobs were filled by skilled Europeans who were encouraged by the white government to emigrate to South Africa. In the late 1920s, the mining industry and the Pact frequently clashed over compliance with “civilized labor” guidelines as the mine owners, facing a falling rate of profit since World War I, undertook to keep their operations capital intensive and their workforce black, cheap, and tractable.

Nonetheless, a powerful bloc of Afrikaner nationalists in the government maintained the “civilized labor” policy as a means to uplift poor whites. In 1928 Pact officials, along with concerned private organizations, sought to broaden their understanding of “poor whiteism.” Supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Carnegie Commission on Poor Whiteism included representatives from the union government, the University of Cape Town, and the Dutch Reformed Church. The Commission’s report focused on five areas: sociology, economics, public health, psychology, and education. Its members determined that destitute whites had few employment qualifications other than for jobs held by unskilled Africans who were willing to work for lower wages. At the onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, Pact officials extended the “civilized labor” policy to public relief projects such as road building, demanding that local government employ only poor whites, despite protests from small-town authorities that the regular African road workers were far more productive.

By the late 1930s and 1940s, the expansion of manufacturing enterprises and a swelling state bureaucracy, dominated by Afrikaner nationalists, increasingly provided work for poor whites. The protected status of whites in the labor market solved the problem of “poor whiteism” in the 1940s, and foreshadowed the strategies of apartheid-era politicians who seduced the white vote, in part, by entrenching a regime built upon sheltered white employment and repression of black labor.

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South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959

In its 1998 report, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission declared apartheid “a crime against humanity.” This system of racial oppression and exploitation is sure to be remembered as one of the most monstrously inhuman systems of government to operate in the twentieth century.

After winning the 1948 election, D. F. Malan’s National Party (NP) government set about tightening South Africa’s racial order. Measures introduced between 1948 and 1959 amounted to a more rigid, systematic implementation of earlier segregationist policies. For instance, the policy of racialized political exclusion and black disfranchisement was taken further. After some dubious constitutional, judicial, and political machination and maneuvering the NP government was eventually able in 1956 to disfranchise “colored” (mixed-race) voters at the Cape.

Racialized spatial separation was also advanced. A key measure was the 1950 Group Areas Act, which provided for demarcated urban areas to be set aside for particular racially defined groups. In this decade urban policy became geared increasingly toward limiting the African presence in urban areas. The 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act was designed to tighten influx control by restricting the right of permanent urban residence to Africans who fulfilled certain strict conditions relating to place of birth and duration of residence and employment in a particular urban area. The act also made stronger provision for the expulsion from urban areas of Africans who were deemed surplus to labor requirements. Restrictions on African labor were further tightened during the 1950s. The government strengthened the racial division of labor through industrial conciliation legislation, which gave the minister of labor effective powers to reserve specific jobs for particular race groups, thereby denying people of color entry into certain skilled positions. There were also measures prohibiting mixed-race trade unions, outlawing strikes by African workers, and withholding official recognition for African trade unions.

The segregation of education became more rigid in the 1950s. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 provided for a system of schooling for Africans that would be under strict central state control and would introduce a racially differentiated syllabus geared to prepare Africans for subservient, menial roles. The 1959 Extension of University Education Act brought apartheid to the tertiary sector. The measure served to

tighten the segregation of universities, and to ethnicize the sector by providing for the establishment of separate universities for specific ethnic groups.

Few areas of basic human activity and social life were left untouched by apartheid. Laws passed in 1949 and 1950 prohibited either marriage or sexual relations between whites and persons of color. Mixed sports clubs were banned, as were sporting contests between whites and blacks. Most places of entertainment were almost entirely segregated. And the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act required that racial segregation be implemented in a whole range of public facilities: toilets, elevators, public transportation, post offices, beaches, and park benches (but not shops). Although seemingly absurd, these “petty apartheid” laws could have tragic consequences. There were, for instance, cases where an ambulance would arrive at the scene of an accident and refuse to convey an accident victim to hospital if the victim’s color was wrong for that particular ambulance.

While much of the apartheid system amounted to a tightening of previous segregation policies, there was one significant new departure—the development of the bantustan/homeland system. The first step was taken with the passing of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, which set up a three-tiered authority structure in the reserves at tribal, regional, and territorial levels, with government-appointed chiefs in effect becoming the state’s administrative agents in the reserves. Then the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act proclaimed the existence of eight African “national units,” each of which was presumed to be ethnically and culturally distinct. These units would have their territorial base in the reserves and would gradually gain greater powers of self-government, perhaps even independence.

The bantustans would come to serve a number of functions in the greater apartheid order. They were part of a divide-and-rule strategy whereby the African majority was deemed to comprise a set of ethnic minorities. This was an attempt to undermine the broader African nationalist movement. According to official ideology the bantustans were also supposed to provide a “political home” for all Africans—a place where they could exercise political rights—thereby weakening the African claim to the vote and citizenship rights in greater South Africa. At the same time the bantustans would become dumping grounds for Africans considered surplus to labor requirements in white urban and rural areas.

Apartheid was never to be a smoothly functioning system. That it functioned at all was due much to four key pillars on which it rested. The first was the system of racial classification. If people were to be separated along racial lines every person’s racial identity

had to be clearly defined. Under the 1950 Population Registration Act, everybody was designated as a member of one of four racial groups—white, African, “colored,” or Asiatic. Second, apartheid policies required tougher repressive measures to quell growing opposition. One such measure was the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, which enabled the minister of justice to use a very broad definition of communism to declare opposition organizations unlawful. Third, apartheid depended on an expanded bureaucratic apparatus. After H. F. Verwoerd became minister of native affairs in 1950, his department took on a new importance. Its staff expanded, and its administrative style became more centralized and authoritarian. Fourth, apartheid’s defenders made vain attempts to offer ideological justification for the system. In the 1950s crude notions of white superiority and black inferiority were articulated in defense of white domination (known as *baaskap*). Other justifications rested on rigid ideas of racial difference, seemingly ordained by scripture and science—ideas that assumed a strict correlation between physical and cultural difference.

Although apartheid appeared to be a well-planned program of racialized social engineering, recent research suggests that the NP government was not following a master plan. During the 1950s the future direction of apartheid policy remained a matter of debate within NP circles, between those who wanted total, vertical separation, and the pragmatists who saw that total apartheid could not be implemented without ending the economy’s dependence on cheap black labor. In the end, the pragmatists won, and apartheid policy makers were left to continue grappling with the fundamental contradiction in the system—between the insistence on racial separation and the necessary exploitation of cheap black labor. This contradiction would prove unable to resolve, and would lead to the ultimate collapse of apartheid.

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See also: **South Africa: Afrikaner Nationalism, Broederbond and National Party, 1902–1948; South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: 1952–1960; Verwoerd, H. F.**

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South Africa: Homelands and Bantustans

The establishment of “homelands” for various African communities was a device to divert internal opposition to apartheid and a failed attempt to convince the international community that South Africa was addressing, on its own terms, the demands for emancipation of its majority population. It provided for the bogus fragmentation of the population into a collection of ethnically distinct “minorities.” Only the white population had political rights in the Republic of South Africa. The indigenous peoples were deemed not to be South Africans at all, but “nationals” of self-governing “Bantustans.” Africans living and working in “white South Africa” were regarded as “temporary sojourners” (migrant workers) always at risk of deportation to a “homeland” that many had never even seen.

The idea was first conceived by Afrikaner intellectuals in the 1940s; they would later establish a think tank called the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA). It was based on the notion of separate territories for Africans (the reserves), which had provided much of the ideological justification for segregation. In 1947, the Sauer Commission outlined the National Party's “color policy.” The existing limited African representation in Parliament (indirectly by whites) was to be curtailed further, and the advisory Native Representative Council would be abolished. There would be an *eie* (own or native) system of government and administration, based on local councils comprising of the “chief” and his acknowledged *indunas* (officials or councilors), and eventually, larger councils “for each of the [African] ethnic groups and chief sub-groups.” Although the commission prevaricated concerning the ultimate destiny of the new councils, the aim was to grant “each race in its own homeland . . . the inalienable right to self-assertion and self-determination.”

The implementation of the policy is particularly associated with H. F. Verwoerd (minister of native affairs, 1950–1958 and prime minister, 1958–1966). The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 provided for the abolition of the Native Representative Council and the establishment of individual “tribal authorities,” based on the government's own ethnological surveys, as the foundation of a tiered system of local councils to be topped by “territorial authorities” for different “ethnic units.”

The further extension of the policy faced formidable obstacles. Whites, who benefited from a plentiful supply of cheap African labor, feared the possible

expulsion of their workers and servants to rural reserves. Second, the scheme was justified by the notion of “separate development,” which implied the economic development of the reserves, which had become impoverished and functioned primarily as labor reserves. Third, the plan involved securing the agreement of rural African communities at a time when African leaders were calling for an end to racial discrimination. Last, many whites feared the ceding of territory to “independent,” and potentially hostile, “Bantu statelets” on South Africa's borders.

The first problem was avoided when the government continued to allow Africans with established residential rights to remain in segregated townships in the cities. The development issue was more problematic. In 1956, the government rejected the recommendations of its own Tomlinson Commission for extensive economic development in the reserves. Verwoerd judged the Tomlinson plans too expensive. Moreover, he prohibited investment by outsiders in the reserves, wanting to maintain a black/white political division between the reserves and the rest of the country. It was also feared that new industries in the reserves would threaten the established industrial centers and undermine the privileged position of white workers. Under Verwoerd, development was limited: the state financed agrarian improvement schemes geared toward subsistence production; the Bantu Development Corporation was to subsidize indigenous development; and “border industries” were to be constructed in “white areas” adjacent to reserves, to employ Africans who would commute daily. SABRA leaders argued against Verwoerd's policies and even called for negotiations with African leaders.

The African National Congress opposed Bantu authorities and the majority of rural African communities refused to accept the new scheme, despite an intensive official propaganda campaign and increasing administrative pressures. Many chiefs were deposed, and they and others were sent into internal exile on the grounds of “agitation.” Some communities were threatened with the withdrawal of state support for local services, while others were promised new services subject to their compliance. The scheme of course provided opportunities for some to accumulate local economic and political power, while others succumbed to official threats. In some areas, there were violent uprisings and Bantu Authorities were restored by force. “Mobile units” of police were deployed causing significant casualties; thereafter, “punishment arrangements” were instituted, including imprisonment and death sentences by the score.

As prime minister, Verwoerd pushed through the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act of 1959, presenting the homelands scheme as the only alternative

to majority rule, against the background of decolonization elsewhere in Africa. The indirect African representation in the parliament was ended. In 1963, amid increased state repression following the Sharpeville crisis, the Transkei was the first territorial authority to be granted “self-government.”

The program of mass removals was a particularly lamentable aspect of the policy. Once labor requirements had been met, Africans were removed from white-owned farms. Others were uprooted from their homes in a campaign to eliminate “black spots” from areas deemed to be “white,” or became caught up in rezoning exercises in efforts to consolidate the often fragmented homeland territories. Unemployed individuals and families, especially the elderly, always remained at risk of being “endorsed out” of the cities. Around two million people were removed to the dumping grounds of apartheid, housed in scarcely planned rural slums with few facilities, no access to productive land, and little prospect of waged employment locally.

Under Verwoerd’s successors, B. J. Vorster and P. W. Botha, the homelands adventure continued. By 1984, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and Venda had accepted “independence,” and there were six other “self-governing” homelands; all these territories were eventually incorporated into the “new South Africa” in 1994. Homeland governments failed to secure international recognition and were regarded as illegitimate by the majority of Africans. Although external investment was permitted from the late 1960s on, the dominant source of capital was the billions of rands transferred by Pretoria. Yet, with ever increasing population pressures, homeland economies remained starved of investment, most people depending upon the remnants of smallholder agriculture and remittances from migrant workers. As homeland elites competed for control of the capital transfers and the inflated bureaucracies they financed, the scene was set for financial and political corruption. The political history of the homelands is marked with emergencies, effective dictatorships and one-party governments, coups and countercoups.

Yet government based on ideas of “tribe” and chieftaincy had a certain residual legitimacy among those who became resigned to operate within the new dispensations. In the past, ethnicity was often involved in the defense of rural resources against white encroachment; it could now be mobilized to compete for control in the new local states. Rival ethnic claims often led to violent competition over scarce economic and infrastructural resources. In KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the most successful exploiter of the system, invoked Zulu symbols and emphasized Zulu cultural renewal; while he secured popular support for his

Inkatha movement, he refused to accept independence, which gave him considerable purchase with Pretoria, anxious for him to take this path. Ironically, General Bantu Holomisa, who seized power in Transkei (allegedly with Pretoria’s connivance), announced in 1989 that he planned a plebiscite on Transkeian reincorporation into South Africa.

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South Africa: Mining

Over many years, mining transformed the rate and nature of South African economic growth. Initial capitalization of gold mining drew heavily on overseas capital and, to a lesser extent, existing diamond companies. Between 1887 and 1934, 60 per cent of gold investment was external, but the trend reversed in the 1940s, helped by wartime exchange controls and expanding domestic financial corporations. Domestic investment in gold rose, with 55 per cent of dividends remitted locally by 1950, 69 per cent by 1960. South Africa’s 1932 departure from the gold standard stimulated gold price rises that bolstered capital investment in mining and manufacturing. In 1941, the gold price was set at \$35 per fine ounce. Fixed prices, limited mechanization, and labor shortages checked expansion, although state subsidies kept marginal mines viable. New capital raised by the mines was only £5 million from 1940 to 1945, but grew to £370 million in the period 1946–1959.

Gold production expanded by 84 per cent in the 1950s as major new mines were developed in the Orange Free State and Far West Rand. Foreign investment increased in the political stability of the 1950s and 1960s. The floating of gold in 1968 saw its price leap, reaching \$150 in 1973 and averaging \$613 in

1980. In the 1970s, gold doubled its share of gross domestic product from 10 to 22 per cent and state profits from gold rose from 1 billion to 10 billion rand. Capital investment in the 1980s targeted mechanization and new technologies of extracting gold from waste ore, helping to extend the life of old mines, but production fell as price swings destabilized the economy through fluctuating revenues and exchange rates, while rising inflation limited expansion. Mine employment fell from 534,255 people in 1986 to 473,685 in 1990, and further price falls and sales of gold reserves by some countries in the 1990s fueled mine closures and large-scale retrenchments.

Industrialization and overseas demand fueled increased output of minerals such as coal, platinum, and uranium. The Anglo-American Corporation, South Africa's largest gold producer and biggest company, also helped develop these sectors. Coal production tripled between 1930 and 1960, as low production costs based on large reserves and cheap labor aided capitalization. Exports rose from 1.3 to 44 million metric tons from 1970 to 1985 due to new technologies, construction of a port at Richard's Bay, and electrified railways, mechanization, removal of price controls, and new markets. Antiapartheid sanctions hit uranium exports but platinum production boomed in the 1980s, outstripping coal in exchange earnings. De Beers dominated world diamond production and marketing, but local output declined; still, the company's value rose 300 per cent from 1960 to 1985 and control of new mines in Botswana enabled De Beers to weather an industry crisis from 1978 to 1985. Overall, mining's share of GDP fell steadily, relative to manufacturing from the 1940s: in 1972 it comprised only 10 per cent, although this grew to 18 per cent by 1979 with rising prices.

The gold mines' workforce was overwhelmingly African and migrant in nature. It fluctuated in size—from 394,000 people in 1940; to 437,000 in 1960; 377,000 in 1980; and 474,000 in 1990—and was drawn chiefly from Mozambique, Lesotho, and Malawi. Foreign workers comprised 60 per cent in 1960, 80 per cent in 1973. Thereafter, the share of local labor grew, rising to 61 per cent in 1986, a shift stimulated by labor shortages, temporary withdrawal of Malawi labor in 1974, and Mozambique's independence in 1975. Real wages of African miners had remained static from 1910 to 1973, but the mines were then forced to offer higher wages to attract local workers. Helped by rising gold prices and increased productivity the average real wage of African miners tripled in the 1970s contributing to the stabilization, and thus eventual unionization, of the workforce.

The coercive nature of mine recruitment and workplace control made organizing on the mines hazardous.

African miners, unable to openly organize until 1982 and with their strikes illegal until the 1970s, faced enormous obstacles such as state and employer hostility, low wages, debilitating diseases, and high rates of work accidents (9,000 deaths from 1973 to 1985). They were forced to live in regimented compounds (98 per cent lived in single-sex hostels in 1985) that fostered horizontal divisions in the working class and interethnic tensions, though the high concentration of workers aided interaction. Job "color bar" legislation such as the Mines and Works Act of 1911/26 reserved privileged occupations for a small stratum of white artisans who in 1984 received five times the wages of African miners, and whose union spurned cooperation with blacks.

Sporadic unsuccessful attempts by unionists, communists, and African National Congress (ANC) radicals to organize African miners between 1918 and 1940 finally were realized in 1941, when the African Mine Workers' Union was formed. In 1946, the refusal of the state and the Chamber of Mines to recognize the union or extend wage rises granted to other blacks to miners precipitated a major strike involving at least 75,000 workers. The strike was savagely repressed and the union smashed, but its impact helped reinvigorate African politics. Further intermittent organizing campaigns and isolated strikes took place, and in 1972–1973 a strike wave sparked rapid union growth, but it was not until the 1982 formation of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) that miners effectively were unionized. Led by Cyril Ramaphosa and tolerated by the Anglo-American Corporation, NUM grew rapidly to 250,000 members in 1986. Behind this growth was the union's skilful organizing, and the liberalization of labor laws after the Wiehahn Commission in 1979 recommended abolition of job reservation (not extended to the mines until 1987). NUM gained support by vigorously championing miners' safety and health, and representing them after disasters such as the 1986 Kinross accident. It won wage increases but these barely kept pace with inflation, forcing the union in 1987 to call the longest and largest strike in South African history, involving 340,000 workers for three weeks, which was violently repressed. NUM allied itself closely with the UDF, joined COASTU, and adopted the ANC's Freedom Charter. The union's militancy and political stance brought it into conflict with both the Chamber of Mines and the state.

Mining played a crucial part in the economic life in the South from the 1940s through the 1980s, contributing to gross domestic product and capital investment in manufacturing, and nourishing the growth of cities such as Johannesburg and Welkom. Its profits were achieved at the expense of mineworkers, but in the 1980s they organized and became an integral part of

democratic forces that dismantled apartheid. In the 1990s mining retained a major role in the economy, earning 42 per cent of export income in 1995.

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See also: Mining; Mining, Multinationals, and Development; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899.

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South Africa: Rural Protest and Violence: 1950s

With the election of D. F. Malan's National Party in 1948 and the subsequent implementation of numerous apartheid laws, the 1950s became a decade of intense protest against white minority rule in South Africa. In urban areas, the African National Congress (ANC), which was transforming itself from a moderate African elite organization into a broad-based liberation movement, orchestrated the famous Defiance Campaign of passive resistance to unjust laws. In rural areas, where the ANC was just beginning to make significant contacts in the 1950s, African people protested against apartheid laws that were adversely affecting their lives, albeit usually in a less focused and organized manner.

There were a number of common grievances that motivated rural protest at this time. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 sought to set up a system of self-government for rural and ethnically defined African homelands. Many African traditional leaders were co-opted into this system and given sweeping new powers over their subjects. Legitimate chiefs that refused to participate in this system were deposed by the government and replaced by men who often had tenuous claims to traditional leadership. Under this new system, chiefs were frequently seen as corrupt lackeys of the apartheid state. In order to shape the homelands into viable self-governing territories, a host of often ill-conceived betterment and rehabilitation schemes were imposed on rural people, such as resettlement and the culling of livestock to reduce overgrazing. Such programs were usually resented by rural Africans, to whom cattle represented a traditional form of wealth; they perceived the programs as just another way to reduce self-sufficiency in order to increase the number of migrant workers.

Rural people also came to despise the Bantu education plan, which replaced mission schools with government ones designed to reinforce the subordinate position of black people in South African society. Chiefs were also resented, because their duties involved enforcing the Bantu education system. In addition, many Africans were removed from the cities and white-owned farms and forcibly moved to rural homelands, where they became a radicalizing influence.

The protest methods used by rural Africans involved cutting fences; setting fires on common land; refusing to cooperate with, or even threatening, officials from the Native Affairs Department; raising grievances at public meetings; and boycotting cattle-dipping stations, white-owned stores, and local councils. Frequently, tensions boiled over into violence that was often directed against local African people, who were seen as agents of the state. In all these cases, the state security forces intervened aggressively to suppress resistance, and numerous people were imprisoned and even executed for their part in these disturbances. Examples of major peasant uprisings in this period occurred in the western Transvaal in 1957–1958, Sekhukuniland (in northern Transvaal) in 1958–1959, KwaZulu/Natal in 1958–1959, the Pondoland and Thembuland areas of Transkei (in today's Eastern Cape) in 1959–1962, and Ciskei (also in today's Eastern Cape), which was almost constantly in a state of alarm.

In Sekhukuniland, among the Pedi people, an organization called Khuduthamaga ("Red and White Tortoise") feared that chieftaincy was becoming an instrument of Bantu Authorities and attempted to

reinforce the local belief that “a chief is a chief by the people.” However, as historian Peter Delius (1996) points out, this underground organization did not attempt to democratize chieftaincy, as it was a traditionally hereditary institution. The subordinate place of women and young people in Pedi society was not challenged. Rebels in this area labeled anyone who approved of Bantu authorities as “rangers” (named after the African agricultural assistants of white government officials). Sometimes, people who were perceived as agents of Westernization, such as prominent Christians, teachers, and traders, were included in this category.

Rural communities became polarized and a belief spread that the so-called rangers were using witchcraft to undermine traditional values and advance their own interests. The long established fear of witches in the area contributed to the outbreak of violence. By May 1958, nine men had been killed, many had been injured, and the property of rangers had been destroyed. During this uprising the police, who would later grossly exaggerate the conspiratorial nature of Khuduthamaga, arrested 300 people, of whom 21 were eventually placed on death row. Notably, beginning in the 1960s, this area became a fertile recruiting ground for the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), which initiated an armed struggle against the apartheid state.

In Pondoland, where there had been a long history of independence from government, the Mpondo people strongly resented the implementation of Bantu authorities and Bantu education plans. Toward the end of 1959, violence broke out in the town of Bizana when the chairman of the district authority and an open supporter of Bantu authorities, Saul Mabude, failed to attend a public meeting on this issue and an angry crowd burned his house. The security forces began to terrorize the people of Eastern Pondoland, who in turn formed themselves into an alternative governing structure called the Hill Committee and informed Botha Sigcau, the paramount chief, that he was the “boot-licker of [H. F.] Verwoerd,” the South African prime minister. It is interesting that people in the area also referred to this movement as *iKongo*, which was a Xhosa version of the word *congress* and seems to suggest that ANC influences were gaining popularity. Initially, the Hill Committee invited government officials to hear their list of grievances, but when they were ignored, they began to attack policemen, chiefs and anyone suspected of supporting Bantu authorities. The most famous incident of the Pondoland Uprising occurred at Ngquza Hill in June 1960, when police fired on a Hill Committee gathering that was displaying a white flag of truce. At least 11 people were killed, 30 were wounded, and 21 were arrested. At the commission of inquiry into this massacre, the Mpondo people demanded an end to Bantu Authorities; relief from taxes;

dismissal of their paramount chief; and representation in the South African parliament. The uprising was subdued by force; thousands were imprisoned and 20 sentenced to death. However, assassinations of unpopular chiefs and councilors continued up to 1969. The exact role of the ANC in this rural rebellion seems to have been ambiguous as Chief Albert Luthuli, the ANC president, urged the rebels to stop fighting while at the same time some members of the ANC Youth League participated in the violence.

TIM STAPLETON

See also: South Africa: Homelands and Bantustans.

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South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: 1952–1960

The Defiance Campaign was launched jointly in June 1952 by the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). This civil disobedience campaign set out to mobilize mass defiance of discriminatory laws, targeting in particular pass laws, stock limitation laws, the Bantu Authorities Act, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, and the Suppression of Communism Act. The organizers of the campaign called on volunteers to court arrest by deliberately breaking these unjust laws. The strategy was to disorganize the state and cripple the criminal justice system by filling the courts and prisons to overflowing thus making segregation unenforceable.

The Defiance Campaign did not achieve its main objectives. First, it drew responses mainly in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape. There were not many more than 8,000 arrests for offenses relating to the Defiance Campaign of which about 6,000 occurred in the Eastern Cape. Second, although it was firmly the intention that protests be peaceful there was violence, mainly as provoked by the police. Police action in Port Elizabeth

on October 18, 1952 resulted in a riot that claimed 11 lives and on November 9, 1952, 10 people were killed when police opened fire on a meeting in East London. Third, state repression of the Defiance Campaign was swift and effective. In November of that same year 52 black leaders were banned from attending meetings or leaving their districts of residence. Another 50 leaders were arrested and charged with launching the Defiance Campaign. Two new laws, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Laws Amendment Act introduced harsh new measures for civil disobedience. The Defiance Campaign ground to a halt by mid-November 1952.

Despite these shortcomings, the Defiance Campaign was nevertheless of great significance for the development of the antiapartheid movement. It gave the ANC a great deal of publicity and drew international attention, especially at the United Nations. The Defiance Campaign also initiated the ANC into the politics of populism. The willingness of volunteers to defy the law openly and to confront the authorities head on changed the image of the ANC as the preserve of educated and more affluent Africans. Urban working-class people were drawn into the organization, swelling its membership from a mere 7,000 before the campaign to about 100,000 by the end of the 1950s. The Defiance Campaign, in addition, helped to cement solidarity against apartheid across racial lines because it was not just an African initiative but was carried out in partnership with the SAIC and drew support from white communists and some liberals.

The conviction that interracial cooperation was the most effective way of fighting white supremacy led to the formation in 1953 of a broad nonracial front against apartheid, the Congress Alliance. It consisted of the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Colored People's Congress, and the Congress of Democrats, which housed radical and liberal white supporters. In 1955 the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Federation of South African Women joined the Congress Alliance.

Considering ways of carrying the struggle forward in the light of problems encountered during the Defiance Campaign and of harnessing the mass support the Congress Alliance was attracting, it was decided that the alliance should convene a congress of the people, at which a freedom charter for a democratic South Africa should be adopted. The idea was for organizers to canvass the South African people as widely as possible for their grievances and demands, that these be assimilated and then drafted into the freedom charter, to be adopted at a congress representative of the South African nation.

The Congress of the People was eventually held at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 26, 1955, by a

gathering of about 3,000 elected delegates from a wide range of organizations that supported the Congress Alliance. Key leaders such as Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC, and Yusuf Dadoo, president of the South African Indian Council, could not attend because they were serving banning orders. Busloads of delegates and supporters from various parts of the country were prevented from reaching Kliptown by police roadblocks. Surrounded by an armed cordon of police, this momentous meeting was convened and the freedom charter adopted.

The freedom charter affirmed that South Africa belonged to all its people, both black and white. It called for the scrapping of all forms of racial discrimination, the institution of a democratic system of government, and equal protection for all before the law. The charter demanded equal access to education, social security, and employment. It also asserted a need for a fairer distribution of wealth through the nationalization of industry, mines, banks, and the redistribution of land. The last-mentioned demand was an indication of the influence of Communist Party radicals within the Congress Alliance.

The Congress of the People had a sequel in the form of the marathon Treason Trial that lasted from December 1956 through to March 1961. In an attempt to intimidate the Congress Alliance and to neutralize its leadership, the police spent a year and a half after the Kliptown Congress collecting what it considered incriminating evidence and then on December 5, 1956, swooped down on homes all over South Africa, arresting 156 leaders and organizers of the movement on charges of high treason. The prosecution charged that the freedom charter was a communist document, that the ANC planned the violent overthrow of the state, and that the plot was inspired by international communism. These charges were ludicrous and were exposed as such in court proceedings. After a year, charges were withdrawn against 61 of the accused; as time passed, charges against others were dropped, and the remaining 30 accused were finally acquitted in March 1961. Although the state did succeed in disrupting the liberatory movement in the late 1950s and neutralizing a large part of its leadership, it failed, however, to intimidate the movement. This succeeded only in strengthening solidarity within the Congress Alliance, publicizing its cause internationally and elevating it in the eyes of the broad mass of the people.

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See also: **Luthuli, Albert; Mandela, Nelson.**

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South Africa: Apartheid, Education and

Apartheid-era education policy was based on a need to preserve and promote the cultural and economic interests of the Afrikaner nationalists who came to power with the victory of the National Party in 1948. Yet it is also important to recognize that it was also an attempt to apply many of the principles of modernization and centralized state planning to South Africa.

When the party unexpectedly came to power it did not initially have a blueprint for education. It was only after a hastily convened conference on Christian National Education (CNE) that guidelines emerged. That policy represented a blend of Dutch traditions from the nineteenth century and the educational legacy of the prisoner-of-war camps in the South African War (1899–1902). It emphasized the significance of the more fundamentalist and xenophobic Afrikaner cultural traditions. Those local traditions were blended with aspects of the “pillarization” policy, which sought to address issues of religion and ethnic identity in the Netherlands during post–World War II reconstruction and the American innovations regarding school governance and management. Borrowings from the “culture contact” school of social anthropology were also significant.

These elements all proved to be most influential in shaping policy at this time. While there was no formal blueprint for white education beyond the vague and informal CNE document of 1948, the official government commission of enquiry into native education in South Africa, the Eiselen Report (1951), soon set out the direction of policy for the Bantu education plan. Two years later, the recommendations passed into legislation in the form of the Bantu Education Act (1953), which was to be the basis of segregated educational transformation for the next 20 years. Legislation was also passed to segregate universities and institutions of higher education along racial lines.

The education policy under apartheid sought to privilege Afrikaners by promoting Afrikaans language schools in place of the bilingual (English and

Afrikaans) schools, which had been dominant since the establishment of the union of South Africa in 1910. White children were to go to separate English-language and Afrikaans-language schools, and the curriculum was to reflect a Calvinist and patriarchal outlook. “Poor whites” were to be “rescued” through the mechanism of schooling. In regard to the provision of schooling for the rest of the population, apartheid policy sought to end the “liberal” influences of missionary education and to promote the secularization of schooling, the mass expansion of rural education at the lower levels, and a degree of vocationalization of the curriculum under the control of separate educational authorities responsible for each “racial” group. That control was eventually extended to the various Bantustan authorities.

In the 1950s, these policies were crafted by the minister of native affairs (and later prime minister) Hendrick Verwoerd, and the chief architect of the Bantu education plan, the anthropologist Werner Eiselen. Through the Eiselen Commission they promoted the view that had been advocated since the 1920s by the Phelps Stokes Commission on *Education in Africa* (1922–1924) and the Native Economic Commission (1932), which favored the adaptation of education to the variety of cultural and economic circumstances, or so-called needs, of the various ethnic communities in South Africa. Just as schooling for Afrikaners was to prepare them for life in the Afrikaans community, so was Bantu education to prepare black youths for a life in the countryside “among their own people,” where they would not come into economic and political conflict with whites. Critics were quick to point out that such educational differentiation in the context of rapid urbanization, industrialization, and racial discrimination in the wider society and in industry simply meant that education was being politicized as part of an overall effort to avoid any kind of competition between whites and blacks in the social, political, or economic spheres, and as such to the advantage of the white community.

During the 50 years of apartheid dominance (from 1948 to 1994) it is possible to identify two major phases of educational policy. The first, referred to above, is to be associated with the period of “grand apartheid” (from the 1950s to the mid-1970s); the second is associated with the era of the reform and modernization, as apartheid was put on the defensive in the 1980s.

During the era of grand apartheid there was a massive expansion of education. Nearly all white children, including the “poor whites,” who were a source of great anxiety to the government, were provided with places at high school, and the number of university students increased dramatically. New Afrikaans

language universities were established for the new urban white working class. There was also a dramatic expansion of black education, particularly at the primary level, and a mass education system was put in place, but the differentials in state support and finance between black and white education highlighted by South African Institute of Race Relations and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization reports in the 1960s, as well as the opposition from political organizations like the African National Congress and the Unity Movement, were to provide a major indictment of government policies by the 1970s.

By 1976, apartheid was in deep crisis and the massive youth uprising that began in Soweto schools demonstrated that questions of educational provision and policy were a central aspect of the political problem. Language issues sparked the crisis, but it had deep roots in resistance politics and the black consciousness movement. This marked the beginning of an intensification of the war of resistance that had been launched in the 1960s. In response, the National Party launched a slate of reform policies relating to labor legislation, constitutional transformation, and urban renewal. In addition, an important set of recommendations for educational reform were introduced in the 1980s, in the form of the Human Sciences Research Council report on the provision of education in the RSA (the De Lange Report) and the Department of National Education's *Educational Renewal Strategy* report (1989). Although these were in large part still constrained by the racist parameters of apartheid policy and a lack of political will for reform on behalf of strong sections of the political establishment, they did mark a significant shift toward international norms in educational policy development.

During the 1980s there were massive increases in the finances for black education, attempts to reform the school curriculum in favor of an emphasis on work preparation, and decisive shifts in policy to place the control of school governance in the hands of local authorities and parental groups, but most of these reforms were unacceptable to the majority in a context where politics and educational policy were seen to be closely linked. The Peoples' Education movement took up the banner on behalf of the United Democratic Front to pursue the cause of radical change in education as part a total democratic transition. The call for peoples' history as an aspect of that curriculum demonstrated the desire for a new kind of school knowledge that would reflect the experience of the majority of South Africans. The transition to democratic rule in 1994 marked the end of apartheid education, but it will be many years before the legacy is erased. Policies to promote access to educational institutions for greater

numbers of children and adults, for a new curriculum, and for anew form of school governance are currently being implemented.

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South Africa: Sharpeville Massacre

In 1960, Sharpeville was an African township of 21,000 people situated between Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark, two industrial and mining towns in the southern Transvaal. At the time this area was one of the strongholds of the newly formed Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

In December 1959, the African National Congress (ANC) announced its intention of holding a series of single-day “antipass” marches beginning on March 31, 1960. In keeping with its stress on militant mass action and keen to make its presence felt, the PAC preempted this initiative by announcing that it would launch a sustained antipass campaign on March 21. It called upon its supporters to leave their passes at home on this day and to present themselves en masse, but peacefully, at police stations for arrest. The southern Transvaal and the Western Cape were the only regions where there was a significant response to the PAC's campaign. These were both areas where ANC organization was weak and where antipathy to pass laws ran especially deep.

The PAC's call drew a ready response from the residents of Sharpeville because the pass laws were a particular source of frustration to them. Rents were high because this was one of the newer townships and was relatively well serviced with running water, sanitation, and other amenities. Residents from the nearby area of Top Location, where rents were much lower, had in the previous year been forced to move to Sharpeville. As many as 5,000 Top Location residents who could not

SOUTH AFRICA: SHARPEVILLE MASSACRE

afford the higher rentals were moved to the reserves creating deep feelings of resentment among friends and relatives left behind. Also, there was a particularly high level of unemployment among younger work seekers. Influx control prevented them from going to the Witwatersrand to look for work.

On the morning of March 21, a crowd of about 5,000 gathered at the Sharpeville police station. At nearby Evaton, 20,000 protesters assembled at the police station, and 4,000 residents from the townships of Bophelong and Boipatong marched on the Vanderbijlpark police station. In Vanderbijlpark the protesters were dispersed by a police baton charge and in Evaton by low-flying jets. At Sharpeville the police were caught off guard by the size of the crowd; they refused to arrest pass offenders and reinforcements were called in. A stand-off ensued between 300 armed but nervous policemen and the crowd, the mood of which, according to eyewitness accounts, was not overtly hostile.

At 1:15 P.M. a scuffle broke out at the gate of the police station; a police officer was pushed to the ground, the crowd surged forward to see what was happening, the fence was trampled, stones were thrown, and it appears that inexperienced constables panicked and opened fire. No order to fire was given, and the firing did not stop when the crowd turned to flee. Sixty-nine people were killed; of these, 52 were shot in the back. A further 180 people were wounded.

At Langa in Cape Town two people were killed when police dispersed a crowd of 6,000 late that afternoon. Subsequent raids and brutality by police toward Langa residents resulted in two largely spontaneous marches by protesters to the Caledon Square police station in the center of Cape Town. On both occasions—the first a march by 5,000 on March 25, and the second a march by 30,000 five days later—bloodshed was averted when the protesters dispersed peacefully.

The Sharpeville shootings represent a dramatic turning point in South African history. The shooting was universally condemned and resulted a sharp escalation in the international campaign to pressurize the South African government into abandoning apartheid policies. There was a massive flight of capital forcing the South African government to impose currency controls. Calls for economic sanctions against South Africa within the United Nations were, however, vetoed by Britain and the United States. South Africa's isolation intensified as it was expelled or forced to withdraw from a number of international bodies including the British Commonwealth.

Strikes, "stayaways," mass marches, and various forms of social unrest throughout the country followed the massacre. After an initial moment of indecision,

when the pass laws were temporarily suspended, the National Party government responded with harsh repression. On March 30, a state of emergency was declared and as many as 2,000 dissidents were arrested. The ANC and PAC were banned when the National Party government, with the support of its main opposition, the United Party, passed the Unlawful Organizations Act on April 8. The crisis impressed upon the liberatory movement the limitations of nonviolent protest. Unable to operate legally within the country, both the ANC and the PAC went underground and embarked on armed resistance. They established military wings, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) and Poqo (Standing Alone) respectively. Both organizations also moved to set themselves up in exile.

The wave of bombings and sabotage by Umkhonto we Sizwe and the seemingly nihilistic, antiwhite violence of Poqo of the early 1960s did not seriously challenge white control of the state. The government used this threat as an opportunity to put into effect draconian security laws that virtually destroyed African nationalist resistance within the country. The political quiescence that followed was an important ingredient in the ensuing decade of rapid economic growth as foreign capital flowed back into the country.

The Sharpeville Massacre has remained a symbol of the brute force that lay behind apartheid and has always held deep symbolic meaning for the liberatory movement. March 21 was commemorated annually as a day of mourning and defiance and was accompanied with stayaways, strikes, and protest marches. Indeed, on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, at one such protest in the Langa township near Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape, 20 people were killed when police opened fire on marchers. The significance of the Sharpeville massacre to the African nationalist cause was demonstrated by Nelson Mandela on December 10, 1996, when he went to Sharpeville to pay tribute to those who had fallen in the struggle. There he formally announced the signing of South Africa's new democratic constitution. In the "new" South Africa, March 21 is a public holiday celebrated as Human Rights Day.

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See also: **Luthuli, Albert; Mandela, Nelson; South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959.**

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South Africa: Soweto Uprising

During the 1960s, the South African apartheid state reached the height of its power. Once it had weathered the Sharpeville crisis at the beginning of the decade, it was able to take advantage of years of rapid economic growth to strengthen considerably the country's security apparatus. It was a difficult decade for the black liberation movement as well. The African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had been banned, and their key leaders imprisoned, forcing the organizations to operate either in exile or underground.

During the 1970s, however, the once firm grip of the apartheid state began to weaken. There were two significant developments in this decade. One was the growth of the black worker movement. The other was a rising tide of black assertiveness and militancy, instilled in part by the black consciousness movement and gaining full expression in the Soweto uprising of 1976.

Black worker organization had been largely stifled by the state security clampdown in the 1960s. But there was a revival in the early 1970s. In 1972 there were strikes by dockworkers in Durban, and by bus drivers in Johannesburg, the latter winning a one-third pay raise. In the same year the trade union wing of the black consciousness movement was established, with the launching of the Black Allied Workers Union—though worker organization would not turn out to be a successful field for the black consciousness movement.

A crucial year in the revival of black workers' militancy was 1973, a year best remembered for the Durban strikes. These began in January at a brick factory where workers demanded a 100 per cent increase in their minimum wage, which then stood at a paltry 8.97 rand per week. Two thousand workers came out on strike at this factory. The strike soon spread to some of Durban's textile factories, where wages were also appallingly low. Here an intransigent management refused to negotiate and called in the police, forcing the strikers back to work. By the end of 1973, 100,000 workers had gone on strike in Durban alone. It appears that much of the strike action had been largely spontaneous. It had not been orchestrated by a trade union or by any prominent leaders. This made it difficult for the authorities to impose a clampdown because there were no particular individuals or organizations that could be targeted.

The Durban strikes had a significant impact. They were a catalyst for further strikes around the country—in Johannesburg and East London in particular. Short-term gains were achieved. Some employers conceded significant wage increases to avert strike action, but others dug their heels in, displaying the authoritarian management style so common in South Africa at the time. The government passed legislation granting black workers the right to strike (albeit a severely curtailed right). The strikes gained considerable press publicity, which served to highlight the miserable conditions of black workers. This was particularly embarrassing for foreign companies revealed to be paying starvation wages to their South African workers. However, the most important consequence of the 1973 strikes was that they gave momentum to the revival of the black trade union movement. A number of unions were established, such as the National Union of Textile Workers, launched in Durban in 1973. By the middle of 1976, 75,000 African workers belonged to 25 trade unions. In 1979, 11 of these unions affiliated themselves with the newly established Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). One significant feature of the FOSATU was their concern with concentrating on workplace issues and, for the most part, their desire to steer clear of larger political campaigns. However, this stance did not prevent workers from becoming drawn into the 1976 Soweto uprising.

On June 16, 1976, Soweto school students embarked on a mass demonstration: a march to protest against the government's imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools. The police opened fire, killing a 13-year-old boy, Hector Petersen. At least 25 Soweto students (and probably more) were killed as a result of police action on that day. What began as a peaceful demonstration escalated into a rebellion, marked by a series of attacks on the symbols of state power—particularly police vehicles and government buildings in black townships. Within a week the rebellion had spread to other parts of the Transvaal. On June 21, there was a mass student march in Atteridgeville near Pretoria. In August there was an uprising in the Cape Town townships of Guguletu, Langa, and Nyanga. Student calls for a worker "stayaway" in the same month met with an 80 per cent response from workers in Johannesburg. In September there were student-led marches in the center of Johannesburg and Cape Town. Acts of rebellion also occurred in the eastern Cape and Natal. At least 160 communities around the country were affected by the uprising. Over a period of about 16 months from June 1976, about 700 people were killed as a result of the rebellion, and at least half of the deaths were in Soweto.

Education was clearly a key issue in the revolt. While the government edict on Afrikaans-medium instruction had sparked the protest, there was massive popular anger toward the Bantu education system, which entailed a grossly inequitable allocation of resources between black and white schools. Such was the level of anger that at least 350 schools were damaged or destroyed during the rebellion. A school boycott between August and December 1976 brought Soweto schools to a standstill. There were other issues and targets. Black policemen, viewed as apartheid collaborators, were attacked. Liquor outlets were damaged, with children complaining that drink made their elders oblivious to wider problems.

It was very much a rebellion driven by the youth. The Soweto Students' Representative Council played a key organizational role. There is no evidence that other political concerns (the ANC, the PAC, or the black consciousness movement) were significantly involved in the revolt, but the black consciousness movement had undoubtedly inspired a new mood of assertiveness and militancy among many black people. Workers were drawn into the struggle during August and September, at a time when the trade union movement was wary of broad political campaigns. The relationship between trade unionism and community struggles would become an important issue within the liberation movement over the next 15 years.

The Soweto uprising was accompanied and followed by massive government repression. There were numerous arrests and detentions. In October 1977, a few weeks after the murder of Steve Biko while in police detention, the government banned organizations linked to the black consciousness movement. In the short term, the apartheid state regained a measure of control. However, the 1973 strikes and the 1976 uprising mark a watershed phase in the history of the liberation movement. These events gave a new momentum to the liberation struggle and so hastened the collapse of the apartheid system.

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See also: South Africa: Sharpeville Massacre; Trades Unionism and Nationalism.

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South Africa: Africa Policy

When the unification of the four states in South Africa was being planned in 1908–1909, Jan C. Smuts and Louis Botha hoped that the new union might include the High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Britain in effect vetoed this, but a schedule to the South Africa Act, creating the union of South Africa, provided that they might at some future time be incorporated. Successive South African governments made proposals for such incorporation, sometimes for Swaziland and at others for all three territories. But it was never to happen, because of the policies of racial segregation pursued by successive South African governments and because it was known that the people of the territories wished to continue under direct British rule rather than fall under the control of Pretoria.

Smuts in particular had an imperial vision of a greater South Africa, stretching as far as the Congo. Ideas of obtaining southern Mozambique from the Portuguese came to naught, as did his hopes of incorporating South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In World War I, South Africa sent troops into German South West Africa, and Louis Botha and Smuts took over the territory, which they then ruled as if it were a part of South Africa. But at the end of the war the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, would not let any ally take over ex-German territory, so instead of being included in South Africa as a fifth province, southwest Africa became a C-class mandate under the League of Nations, though ruled by South Africa as if it were an integral part of South Africa itself. This disappointment was followed by another in 1923, when the white voters of Southern Rhodesia voted against joining South Africa, preferring to rule themselves separately under nominal British control. At the end of the World War II, Smuts again tried to incorporate southwest Africa: local leaders were consulted and he went to the new United Nations (UN) in New York to put the case for annexation. But again he was thwarted, for the UN rejected the case he made and insisted the territory not be annexed but instead fall under the new system of “trust territories.”

Smuts's dreams of a greater South Africa failed to materialize, but South African influence did, of course, extend far beyond its borders. Many whites from South Africa settled in southwest Africa and the Rhodesias and close ties were established with the Portuguese regimes in Angola and Mozambique. The last South

African leader to propose a form of incorporation of the High Commission territories was H. F. Verwoerd, in the context of his Bantustan scheme. In the early 1960s, however, he had to accept that Britain would lead them to independence instead, but he continued to refuse to deal with any of the new decolonized nations under black governments. Verwoerd rejected a request by Abubakr Balewa of Nigeria to visit South Africa in 1962, for example, as well as Kenneth Kaunda's later offer of diplomatic relations. Verwoerd's successor, John Vorster, was more pragmatic. He not only met Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho in 1966 and Seretse Khama of Botswana in 1968, but agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the government of Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi, who made a state visit to South Africa in 1971. Such relations meant accepting a black ambassador in Pretoria, which at the time was seen as a remarkable breakthrough. But Vorster's policy—successively called “outward looking,” “dialogue” and “détente”—was based firmly on the idea that there was no question of any other government influencing the policy of apartheid, and he rejected the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969, even though it agreed to recognize South Africa as an independent African state and supported peaceful means for change in South Africa, because it seemed to be interference in South Africa's domestic affairs.

Vorster realized that the 1974 coup in Portugal would transform the situation in southern Africa and increase pressure on the white regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. He therefore stepped up attempts to establish contacts with leaders of other African countries, hoping such contacts might deflect international criticism of apartheid. He secretly visited the Côte d'Ivoire in September 1974 and in February 1975 he went to Liberia and met President Tolbert. But nothing substantial came of these visits, and South Africa's intervention in Angola in October 1975, when units of the South African Defence Force drove north almost to the capital, Luanda, brought an abrupt end to such efforts. It also alienated Dr. Kaunda of Zambia, who had met Vorster in a railway carriage at Victoria Falls in August 1975 in an effort to bring about a settlement in the Rhodesian conflict.

The South African forces withdrew from Angola in early 1976, but by then a sizable Cuban force was in place and the MPLA in place as the new Angolan government. The SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement, was able to establish bases in southern Angola. South Africa's willingness to negotiate with the Western Contact Group in 1977–1978, and its agreement to the western plan for a transition to independence in Namibia, won it some credit from other governments in the region, which persuaded the SWAPO leadership to support the plan, which was

then given UN backing. But the South African government's refusal to allow the implementation of the agreement produced years of bitterness and frustration, which added to the anger Africans felt at the brutal repression inside South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising of 1976.

At a conference in Johannesburg in November 1979, P. W. Botha set out a plan for a “constellation” of southern African states to meet and defeat what he set out as a Marxist challenge to control all of southern Africa. But within months Robert Mugabe had come to power in Zimbabwe and made clear that he would have no formal ties with racist South Africa. He joined the Front Line States (FLS) instead, a grouping designed to free South Africa's neighbors of dependence on it, and to coordinate action against it. From the FLS emerged the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference. Some of the states in that grouping agreed to allow guerrillas from South Africa to train and establish bases on their territories; others, such as Zimbabwe, merely allowed an African National Congress (ANC) office to operate. But it was to challenge any support for the ANC and its armed wing MK that Botha embarked on his policy of destabilization.

Destabilization took many forms. The most obvious was retaliatory raids for MK operations in South Africa: alleged MK bases in Maputo were bombed from the air, and attacked from the ground in Maseru and Gaborone. ANC and MK officials were the target of assassination attempts, some of them successful. South African mercenaries participated in a coup in the Seychelles in 1981, using weapons obtained from the South African Defence Force (SADF). Economic might was used to prevent any other black-ruled neighbor emerging as a new power in the region. Destabilization was seen in its most brutal and overt form in the repeated raids by the SADF into southern Angola, and the military occupation of part of that country from 1981 to 1985. South African military intervention in that country climaxed with the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987–1988 (the largest land battle in Africa since World War II), in which the South African army and air force sought, unsuccessfully, to defeat a combined Angolan-Cuban-SWAPO force.

Such pressure was exerted on Mozambique that its president, Samora Machel, was driven to sign the Nkomati Accord, which spoke of noninterference in each other's affairs, with Botha in March 1984. Mozambique consequently expelled MK guerrillas, but elements in the SADF continued to supply arms to the Renamo rebels fighting the Frelimo government, and many suspected that South Africa had a hand in the October 1986 downing of the Mozambique aircraft that crashed just within South Africa when preparing to land at Maputo, resulting in Machel's death.

It was in 1988 that South African policy changed, as the wishes of the Department of Foreign Affairs won out against those of the military. Destabilization was replaced with negotiation, and a new policy in which friendly relations with neighboring countries was sought so that South Africa could be projected as an African country. In September of that year, for example, P. W. Botha and Chissano, Machel's successor, reaffirmed their commitments to the Nkomati Accord. The change of policy was seen most clearly with the signing in New York in December 1988 of a tripartite agreement with Angola and Cuba, providing for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola and the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, as part of the long-delayed implementation of the UN plan for that territory. This agreement also meant also that the MK had to relocate from Angola. As it became clear that South Africa was going to allow Namibia to move toward independence, relations with its neighbors continued to improve. By 1993 the constitutional negotiations in South Africa itself had led to the decision that South Africa should withdraw from Walvis Bay and allow its reincorporation in the new Namibia. With the coming into office of the government of Nelson Mandela in 1994, the transformation in relations with other African countries was completed: South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community and the Organization of African Unity, and established full diplomatic relations with all its neighbors.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

See also: Angola: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the War of Liberation, 1961–1974; Namibia: SWAPO, Freedom Struggle; Smuts, Jan C.; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: Peace, Reconstruction, Union: 1902–1910; South Africa: Capitalist Farming, “Poor Whites,” Labor.

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South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle: Townships, the 1980s

Although the Soweto Uprising, which began on June 16, 1976, had been effectively suppressed by late 1977, small-scale resistance to the apartheid regime continued throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s and fed into the next major resistance, the insurrection of 1984–1986. This, more than any other single event, precipitated the downfall of apartheid.

In the late 1970s, Africans in a number of townships formed civic organizations in order to address local grievances, and many individual school and consumer boycotts took place. Then, in August 1983, hundreds of local resistance groups came together under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF), launched in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town. The UDF led national campaigns against a number of different government policies, including the new tricameral system of government itself, from which Africans were excluded. By 1984 resistance to the new constitutional system was fueled by an economic recession, caused in part by the fall in the gold price from 1983. The recession in turn increased unemployment, and as the rand collapsed against other currencies, interest rates were pushed up to over 20 per cent. With inflation soaring, rents for the small township houses were ratcheted up, beyond the means of many to pay.

In keeping with the Community Councils Act of 1977, Africans were put in charge of local matters in a number of townships, especially on the Witwatersrand. But they were elected to their positions on very low polls, for most blacks saw them as collaborators with the apartheid system, and many of the new councillors used their positions to enrich themselves. When they increased rents, they became one of the prime targets of local resistance. As pass laws and influx control broke down, millions of people poured from the countryside into the cities, leading to large new squatter settlements, especially on the east Witwatersrand and on the Cape Flats outside Cape Town. In September 1984, opposition to rent rises combined with protest against the new tricameral parliament then being inaugurated, and young men clashed with the police on the East Rand. Councillors were killed in Sebokeng and Sharpeville townships. The army was called in, and the insurrection had begun. It quickly spread to most urban centers in the country, as well as to many small villages. It reached its apogee in 1985, when the police found it difficult to control many parts of the country.

As a result, a state of emergency was declared in July 1985, giving the police even greater power than

they already had. The state of emergency was renewed, and extended to the entire country, the following year. Though the state tried to pin the insurrection on the UDF, and charged some of its leaders with treason for provoking it, it was in fact spontaneous protests that sparked off the greatest crisis to face the apartheid state.

Resistance took many forms. One of the most striking images from that time is of crowds of young people running and singing in the streets, or *toyi toying* (dancing in a particular style) at funerals. T-shirts of the banned African National Congress, or even of the Communist Party, began to be worn openly. Speeches often began with the slogan *Amandla Ngwehu* (the power is ours) and the word *Viva*, taken over from resistance in the ex-Portuguese colonies. The red Communist Party flag was unfurled in public at the funeral of the martyred teacher and local community leader Matthew Goniwe, one of the UDF leaders assassinated by security forces in 1985. Unarmed protestors sometimes picked up stones to throw; on occasion guns were used—some homemade, others (usually AK-47s) brought into the country by members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (the armed wing of the ANC), or by gangsters.

In what became a typical pattern, the police would open fire on demonstrators, and some would be killed. Their funerals would then become occasions for mass public protest, otherwise forbidden, and more people would be shot, leading to more funerals. Government officials and structures were prime targets, as were schools in the despised Bantu education system. In the townships, little education took place in the 1980s, as school boycotts became routine. In some townships, informal “people’s courts” were set up to administer rough justice. The most notorious method of dealing with “collaborators” was the use of the “necklace”: a tire would be placed around the neck of the victim and set afire.

In response to the resistance, security forces (the police and army) began using “extralegal” methods, including the assassination of activists and the use of “dirty tricks,” such as using informers to lure activists to their deaths. In one notorious incident in 1985, police in Cape Town hid on the back of a lorry and waited for stones to be thrown at them, then emerged and opened fire, killing three youths. More information about such atrocities came to light when witnesses, victims, and perpetrators gave evidence about them to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the late 1990s. A significant number of the over 25,000 people who were jailed in the first year of the state of emergency in the mid-1980s were tortured.

By late 1986, through such drastic means, the state had managed to bring the resistance movements in the

townships under control, although Umkhonto we Sizwe continued its operations, and sporadic acts of resistance continued. The suppression had been at enormous cost to the country, however: sanctions had been imposed by its main trading partners, and even more serious had been the refusal of international banks to roll over short term loans. Apartheid was the target for international action as never before. The insurrection led the government to think of what would happen if there was another similar act of resistance, perhaps on a larger scale, in the future. Those in the ruling National Party who argued that in the long run such resistance could not be suppressed and that a political solution was therefore needed were ultimately victorious over the hard-line “securocrats” who did not believe in “concessions.” It was at the height of the insurrection of the mid-1980s that government officials began talking to the jailed Nelson Mandela, and other contacts with the African National Congress in exile from 1985 on helped lead to the breakthrough to a negotiated settlement in 1990.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS AND REMDANI MOSES
RALINALA

See also: **Madikizela-Mandela, Winnie.**

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South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle, International

The international campaign against apartheid in South Africa was one of the largest and most successful people’s campaigns of the twentieth century; it made apartheid a global political issue, and it forced reluctant governments to impose sanctions against South Africa.

Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the African National Congress, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960. That year, he also called for an “economic boycott of South Africa,” which he said would cause suffering, but would be “a price we are willing to pay. In any case, we suffer already.” In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly backed Luthuli and called for an economic boycott.

Isolation was already beginning. India had banned trade with South Africa in 1946. South Africa was forced to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in 1955, from the British Commonwealth in 1961, and from many other international bodies in the 1960s. The first consumer boycott was of students closing accounts with Barclays Bank in Britain in 1969. But the international campaign against apartheid got off to a slow start; the first actual trade embargo was an Arab oil boycott in 1973, though Iran continued to supply oil to the apartheid state.

It was only the massacre of school children in Soweto in 1976 that caused enough revulsion to trigger a serious international campaign. In 1977 the two most important sanctions were imposed: the United Nations Security Council imposed its first-ever mandatory sanctions against a UN member—an arms embargo against South Africa, and the British Commonwealth began organizing a sports boycott.

Throughout the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain led vociferous campaigns against sanctions, which initially blocked further governmental and UN actions. But the repression of township uprisings led to a wave of antiapartheid activity, with popular opinion repeatedly overriding government reluctance. Progressive governments started a wave of action: Sweden and Ireland banned the import of South African fruit, then Denmark banned all imports, and the lead was followed by all Scandinavian countries. The British Commonwealth agreed to sanctions packages, and in 1986 the U.S. Congress overrode President Ronald Reagan's veto to the approval of new sanctions.

It was public pressure that forced international professional, sporting, and governmental bodies to exclude South Africa. Consumer boycotts grew in Europe and the United States; actions were also taken by hundreds of local governments to refuse to buy South African products and then to refuse to deal with banks and other companies that still traded with South Africa.

States and city councils, as well as the United States, began to withdraw their large accounts from banks active in South Africa. The response came in August 1985, when at first a few and then all major U.S. and European banks refused new loans to South Africa and even refused to roll over old ones. There was also a rush to quit by U.S. and European companies; the UN Economic and Social Council estimated that 500 transnational corporations withdrew from South Africa, including big names like IBM, General Motors, and Coca-Cola. The chairman of the British Barclays Bank, whose subsidiary was the largest bank

in South Africa, admitted that “political pressures on Barclays . . . to withdraw from South Africa finally became irresistible.”

Sanctions took a long time to work, but, in different ways, four sanctions proved critical: those on oil, arms, sports, and banking. South Africa successfully broke most sanctions, but only at a very high cost. In 1979, the Shah of Iran was overthrown, and the new government of that nation joined the oil embargo, which suddenly became effective; breaking the embargo cost South Africa \$25 billion, admitted former president P. W. Botha.

The arms embargo was tightly enough enforced to stop South Africa from buying the most modern weapons systems. In July 1987, South Africa invaded southern Angola and tried to capture the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale. In previous invasions, South Africa had depended on air superiority to limit casualties on the ground; this time the Soviet-supplied Angolan air force and antiaircraft defenses were so superior that South Africa lost several planes that it could not replace. Without air cover, South Africa was forced to withdraw; the military was no longer invincible and South Africa quickly started negotiations over Namibian independence.

White South Africa was sports mad, and the sports boycott was the most damaging psychologically because it constantly reminded white South Africa of its increasing isolation and of the cost of maintaining apartheid. By the late 1980s South Africa was banned from 90 per cent of world sport.

The 1985 ban on loans had little practical impact. New investment had dried up in 1977 and South Africa responded to the 1985 loan ban by refusing to make repayments on old loans. But the political impact was huge, because it showed the business community that it could no longer remain above politics; within a year, South African business leaders were publicly calling for the release of the jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela.

Although sanctions were undoubtedly the main, and most effective, form of international action against apartheid, there was also international support for both major liberation movements, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. The UN General Assembly had repeatedly called on member states to provide “moral, political and material assistance” to the liberation movements. The Soviet Union and eastern European countries provided extensive training as well as arms and other material support; most of the independent southern African states (Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Tanzania) allowed one or both of the liberation movements to set up bases for raids into South Africa, supporting a low-level armed struggle inside the country

as well as several spectacular raids, such as one on the heavily guarded Sasol oil-from-coal plant in 1980.

Yet it was sanctions and the inability to control the uprisings in the townships, not the “armed struggle,” that eventually convinced the white rulers to accept change. On February 7, 1994, outgoing president F. W. de Klerk admitted that “one of the main problems was the effect on our economy of the international sanctions campaign spearheaded by the ANC.”

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South Africa: Transition, 1990–1994

By the late 1980s a stalemate had been reached in South Africa. The mass movement for democratic change, increasingly grouped behind the African National Congress (ANC), had provoked a near-insurrection in the mid-1980s and had survived the especially brutal repression of the latter part of the decade. However, it could not expect to overthrow the apartheid state easily. As for those in command of that state, they could, up to a point, contain mass opposition, but they could not hope to stabilize the situation sufficiently to reassure nervous investors, or to placate the growing international distaste for their racist project. Important, in particular, were greater tensions within both Afrikanerdom and the ruling National Party (NP) itself. The new Afrikaner business class (a principal beneficiary of NP rule over the years) had, together with its English-speaking counterparts, begun to sense that the historical marriage between the twin structures of capitalist exploitation and racial oppression, so long a profitable (if contested) one, was no longer viable economically or politically.

The NP, led ultimately by F. W. de Klerk, who succeeded P. W. Botha to the presidency in 1989, increasingly understood that it would be necessary to

deal with the ANC. Indeed, a certain rapprochement with the latter had begun from the mid-1980s, through meetings abroad of members of the Afrikaner and business elites with ANC representatives, and through more secretive conclaves of NP leaders with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela. Nonetheless, de Klerk’s announcement, in February 1990, of the lifting of the ban against the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison came as something of a shock to most observers.

The following four years were turbulent ones. It was clear that in the ensuing negotiations de Klerk, despite his repeal of some of the most offensive of apartheid legislation, would seek to retain the initiative and as much as possible of white minority privilege, his NP still holding the reins of state power throughout the period and only slowly moving toward acceptance of a more democratic outcome. The state’s military and police apparatuses continued to harass opponents while also backing the brutal undertakings of Chief Mongosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu and his Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which moved to manipulate Zulu nationalism to advance its own interests and to render difficult the consolidation of the ANC as a national political force. Levels of violence rose precipitously, particularly in Natal and the East Rand. Meanwhile, among whites, de Klerk’s victory for his reform strategy in a whites-only referendum in March 1992 consolidated the NP’s central place in the negotiations—though some further on the right threatened civil war, forged bizarre alliances with corrupt Bantustan leaders, and/or argued for creation of a separatist white *Volkstaat*.

For its part, the ANC continued to consolidate itself at the head of the forces pressing for change, but negotiations between the two chief protagonists remained intermittent, and progress was slow. The initial Convention for a Democratic South Africa, created in 1991 as a forum for negotiations, broke down on several occasions. But mid-1992 witnessed a massacre at Boipatong and the shooting of demonstrators at Bisho in the Ciskei, as well as a massive trade union-led general strike in support of meaningful change. Both parties central to the process now sensed the need to guide a volatile situation toward compromise, their respective elites having developed a mutual vested interest in a smooth transition under their own joint control. The Record of Understanding they signed in September 1992 produced more serious negotiations at Kempton Park in 1993. Their intentions further focused by the massive outcry that followed the assassination of popular SACP leader Chris Hani by white extremists, the negotiators soon produced guidelines for a transition premised on the holding of national elections in April 1994, the appointment of an Transitional

Executive Council to help supervise the interim period, and an agreement on a set of constitutional guidelines designed to structure the final constitution-making process after the elections.

In the end, this “interim constitution” had not compromised the ANC’s position of one-person, one-vote within a unified South Africa, although the ANC did agree to a Government of National Unity for five years that would guarantee cabinet representation for all parties, with significant support, and also conceded a measure of (rather guarded) federalism. Details regarding amnesty and compensation, as well as the further fleshing out of the important draft bill of rights, would remain for the new parliament (which would also sit as constitutional assembly) to address. Meanwhile, the IFP, despite boycotting the final stages of the negotiations, entered the electoral process, albeit at the very last minute and in part because of the overthrow of other Bantustan leaders in the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana. General Constand Viljoen’s white separatist Freedom Front did the same, thereby splitting the white right and further undermining it.

The ANC had thus achieved its long-term goal of creating a democratic political system—a historic accomplishment of staggering proportions that the world quickly and vocally acknowledged as such; so too did the vast majority of African voters. While Buthelezi was ultimately awarded a negotiated victory in the violent and chaotic provincial election in KwaZulu-Natal, and while the NP, with considerable black support, took the Western Cape, the ANC won seven of nine provinces and an overwhelming national majority of 62.6 per cent of the 20 million South Africans who voted. Although short of the two-thirds majority that would have enabled it unilaterally to rewrite the constitution (had it been so inclined), the ANC now dominated the government, and its leader, Nelson Mandela, became the first president of a democratic South Africa on May 10, 1994.

Less publicly noted was the framing of these constitutional negotiations and electoral politics by what was, in effect, a second set of negotiations, a much more informal process that found the ANC, during the transition, reassuring various international capitalist actors (the bourgeoisies of both South African and international provenance, Western governments, and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) of the modesty of its claims—which had sometimes seemed to be rather more radical in exile—to challenge the existing economic status quo. The road to a successful political-cum-constitutional transition was eased, both locally and internationally, by this increasing domestication of the ANC to the requirements of global capitalism. Some, perhaps too charitably, have

suggested that the ANC had little room to maneuver in this arena. Yet the fact remains that, by 1994, the movement/party had bound itself to an economic strategy with doubtful promise of changing for the better the material conditions of the mass of South Africans in the postapartheid period.

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See also: **Buthelezi and Inkatha Freedom Party; Mandela, Nelson.**

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South Africa: 1994 to the Present

Following the 1994 election, the African National Congress (ANC) entered power with a massive parliamentary majority and a mandate to construct a new South Africa. The party was immediately constrained by a number of factors—notably, the negotiated commitment to a Government of National Unity (GNU) and the “sunset clauses” that entrenched significant numbers of Afrikaner bureaucrats in their previous posts. Although Nelson Mandela had hoped that the Democratic Party, the Freedom Front and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) would agree to be members of the GNU, only the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP) took up positions within the coalition administration. F. W. de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki were appointed as deputy presidents.

The GNU worked more effectively than many had predicted. Eventually, however, the tensions proved too great and in May 1996, F. W. de Klerk announced the NP’s withdrawal from the coalition. Two months later, Bantu Holomisa left the ANC government and joined forces with Roelof Meyer of the NP to form the United Democratic Movement (UDM). Meanwhile, Mandela began the slow process of handing over

power to his deputy. Increasingly, Thabo Mbeki handled day-to-day administration in the South African government as Mandela traveled overseas.

Although Mangosuthu Buthelezi was appointed minister for home affairs in the GNU, he continued to campaign for international mediation to settle the question of KwaZulu-Natal's autonomy. During 1995 the situation remained tense, with a number of deaths occurring from ANC-IFP local conflicts. Eventually, a peace of sorts was struck between the ANC and the IFP. The IFP retained a role in government following the collapse of the GNU in 1996. On a number of occasions when Mandela and Mbeki were visiting other countries, Buthelezi served as acting president.

The ANC faced many challenges in power, the most significant being in the area of economics. It quickly became apparent that the Reconstruction and Development Plan designed by the ANC when they were in opposition was overambitious: nationalization was abandoned, the targets of the house-building program were not met, and new jobs were not created in anything like the numbers required. Meanwhile, the government continued to pay the interest payments on the apartheid debt; this amounted to 20 per cent of the national budget. No new European or American version of the Marshall Plan was forthcoming to assist the establishment of the "Rainbow Nation." In mid-1996, the government introduced a neoliberal policy titled Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Inspired by the World Bank and South African business, the GEAR policy promised privatization, wage flexibility, deficit reduction and cutbacks in public spending. Despite GEAR, South Africa experienced the aftershocks of the East Asian economic crisis and the rand continued to tumble in value. Unemployment remained high and growth consistently failed to match the government's ambitions.

Mandela concentrated upon reconciliation as the key theme of his presidency. He visited or played host to many of his ex-enemies, demonstrating an important element of forgiveness while also neutralizing political opposition. The most famous of Mandela's gestures toward reconciliation was his appearance at the Rugby World Cup Final in June 1995 wearing a Springbok shirt. This had a profound impact upon many fanatical Afrikaner rugby supporters.

In February 1996, the ANC launched the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In essence, the TRC was dominated by the concept of "forgiveness without forgetting." Gillian Slovo acknowledged, "The TRC was never supposed to be about justice; it's about the truth." Unlike comparable investigatory bodies in Latin America, the TRC possessed judicial powers to grant individual amnesties. In order to attain these amnesties, applicants were required to provide a full

confession. For more than two and a half years, the TRC held hearings throughout South Africa; the five-volume report of its findings was published in October 1998. The report, which constituted an alternative history of the country, revealed aspects of National Party and ANC activity of which neither party could be proud.

South African society had been transformed by the collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s. The transparency of the first ANC government and South Africa's newfound freedom of the press tended to promote an unfair picture of a rapid deterioration in standards. Although cases of corruption were exposed in the lower echelons of the government these were relatively small in comparison to the corruption of the last National Party administrations.

Crime was a much more serious problem. Although the murder rate had increased dramatically during the early 1990s, the South African and international media were preoccupied by the political struggle and had not focused on crime. Following the 1994 election and the ensuing decline in political violence, crime became the subject most associated with South Africa in the global imagination. Johannesburg was regularly portrayed as the most dangerous place on earth. The reasons for the crime wave were manifold: a discredited, underfunded, corrupt police force; the influx of international crime and drug syndicates; the number of demobilized and thereafter unemployed soldiers; and the abundance of weapons in South Africa.

South Africa's second majority-rule general election was held in June 1999. The ANC won 66 per cent of the vote and secured 266 seats in the parliament. The leading opposition parties were the Democratic Party (9.55 per cent; 38 seats); the IFP (8.6 per cent; 34 seats); the New National Party (7 per cent; 28 seats); and the UDM (3 per cent; 14 seats). Thabo Mbeki succeeded Mandela as president of South Africa.

JAMES SANDERS

See also: **Buthelezi and Inkatha Freedom Party; Mandela, Nelson; South Africa: African National Congress; South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle: Townships, the 1980s; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959.**

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SOUTH AFRICA: 1994 TO THE PRESENT

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
Southern Africa: Regional Survey

Early hominids probably appeared in southern Africa about one million years ago, but the processes by which *Homo sapiens* emerged remain obscure. Early *Homo sapiens* fossils from the eastern Cape have been dated to around 100,000 years ago, marking the origins or the Stone Age. The early (Acheulian) and middle (Mesolithic) Stone Age periods saw a progressive development of more sophisticated stone tools and a widening of the techniques of food gathering and scavenging and therefore the range of diet. These early humans probably learned the controlled use of fire in order to adapt their environment to their needs. With the later Stone Age, probably beginning somewhere between 17,000 and 20,000 years ago, we begin to recognize characteristics of familiar southern African peoples such as the San (the so-called bushmen) and, later, the Khoi. These people were hunting more successfully, using spears and arrows with fine stone blades and tips. They appear to have created more sophisticated social organization, as well as producing the leisure time to indulge in forms of religious ritual, some associated with deaths and burials, as well as decoration such as ostrich eggshell beads and cave paintings. Indeed, cave paintings and rock engravings constitute some of the artistic glory of the human past in southern Africa. They are to be found in many parts

of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and some of the adjacent states, in both abstract and naturalistic styles.

Some of the later rock paintings offer evidence of the arrival of pastoralists and cultivators. People of larger stature appear herding sheep or cattle, while cultivators are shown using iron axes to chop down trees. The first pastoralists, herding sheep and goats and then later cattle, were pre-Iron Age and are often seen as the origins of the Khoi community. Their earliest sites come from eastern Botswana and southwestern Zimbabwe, but they soon spread down to the western Cape and elsewhere. From an early period, the Khoi and San peoples intermingled, both in economic and social terms. Their lives often became closely intertwined and they established symbiotic systems of mutual exchange. This is why, in modern times, they came to be known as Khoisan.

Iron Age communities seem to have been established in the region about 1,800 years ago. These peoples were the ancestors of the Bantu-speaking inhabitants of southern Africa, arriving in the region via western and eastern streams of migration. It is clear from linguistic and other evidence that many of these Bantu speakers mingled with the hunter-gatherers and pastoralists who preceded them. Moreover, their modes of production were never exclusive. Many Iron Age peoples continued to hunt and forage, particularly in times of want, though hunting may also have come to develop wider social and ritual connotations in this period. It is also clear that the conventional gender divisions of labor (women as gatherers, agriculturalists, and basket makers; men as clearers of the land, hunters, iron workers and sometimes potters) do not always hold up. Some crafts (but never, it would seem,



Southern Africa, c. 1800-1840.

iron production) were interchangeable, and hunting could be so labor-intensive as to involve women and children as well as men.

The shift from the early to the later Iron Age took place about 1,000 years ago. This period is symbolized by the evidence of new pottery styles in many parts of southern Africa, together with the development of larger communities with obvious class distinctions, the ownership of larger cattle herds, and evidence of trade, including long-distance trade to the East African coast.

Two principal forces can be identified as influencing this period of relative transformation. One is the undoubted growth in the numbers of cattle, which offered opportunities for a step change in elite power and influence. Systems of clientship could be established through the circulation of cattle in bride-price and also in loan arrangements to subsidiary peoples. This new class of chiefs, who extended their power beyond that of just the extended kin, was also able to arrogate to itself power over trade. Much of this trade was with the East African coast, where Muslim communities (originally from the Persian Gulf and South Arabian areas) had established significant commercial towns as far south as the Mozambican coast, trading gold and ivory, and to a lesser extent copper and skins from the interior. The Save and Limpopo Rivers now became important trade routes, and southern Africa was beginning to be pulled into the international economy.

Significant trading sites appeared in the Limpopo Valley, and the important towns of Mapungubwe (in the modern northern Transvaal), Manekweni (in Mozambique), Great Zimbabwe (in central Zimbabwe), and Ingombe Ilede (at the junction of the Zambezi and Kafue Rivers, in what is now southern Zambia) flourished at different times between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. All these sites reveal wide social distinctions between elites and common people, symbolized by their respective living areas, by the wealth of the goods associated with the ruling groups, their diets, and possession of trade goods. Crafts had reached a high state of excellence, with fine pottery, impressive soapstone sculptures, bone tools, and artifacts suggesting that one of the skills of the people was weaving. The existence of large quantities of cattle bones at Great Zimbabwe illustrates the access the elite had to plentiful quantities of meat.

Evidence of long-distance gold and ivory trading is confirmed by the presence of a fifteenth-century Islamic coin at Great Zimbabwe, as well as of Persian and Chinese pottery, traded across the Indian Ocean, at many sites. Hundreds of mine workings, for both gold and copper, are known throughout the Zimbabwean and Transvaal Highveld and were clearly exploited by Iron Age miners. After the decline of Mapungubwe and the fall of Great Zimbabwe (perhaps as a result of

an environmental crisis), other cultures, still involved in trade, appeared in Zimbabwe. The Butwa state (and there is now greater evidence of a state structure), with its ruling Torwa dynasty, was established in southwestern Zimbabwe with its capital at Khami, near present-day Bulawayo. Another was that of the Mutapa ruler established close to the Zambezi Valley, with trading connections to the Muslims and also to the newly arrived Portuguese.

While these trading cultures and states are prominent through their notable sites, the great majority of Iron Age peoples in southern Africa continued to live in smaller-scale societies, represented by extended kin groups, with a tendency for groups to break away and establish new political organizations. By now the distinction—marked by linguistic, social, and economic differences—between the Tswana peoples in the west, with their related Sotho peoples settled farther east, and the Nguni groups of the east coast, in what is now Swaziland, Natal, and the Eastern Cape, had become apparent. The Tswana economy was based more heavily upon pastoralism. They lived in larger communities in order to exploit rare water sources in their more arid region.

The Nguni had a mixed agricultural and cattle economy, and were settled in smaller communities in the river valleys for their better-watered lands. To the north, the extensive Shona subgroups, some of them associated with the Zimbabwe culture or with Butwa and Mutapa, were settled throughout Zimbabwe and parts of Mozambique. Other Bantu speakers such as the Ovambo, the Herero, and the Tsonga lived in what are now Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique.

The Islamic presence on the East African coast was joined in the early sixteenth century by that of the Portuguese. Bartolomeu Dias first rounded the Cape in 1488 and was followed within a few years by Vasco da Gama, who reached India. During the succeeding century, the Portuguese (who avoided the Cape as a region of storms) established settlements in Angola and Mozambique and even penetrated the Zimbabwean Highveld, established trading posts to attempt to tap the gold resources of the region. But they never fully succeeded in overcoming opposition from Muslim traders and their alliances with African chiefs in the region were not always successful, leading to violence and revolt. This attempt to divert the trade of the interior of southern Africa failed and by the end of the seventeenth century, they had been swept off the Highveld and even their coastal positions had become highly precarious. However, the Portuguese established south Atlantic connections between Africa and their major colony in Brazil. Slaves were taken to South America and crops from that region, such as cassava and maize, were introduced to the subcontinent.

These crops, originally designed to feed the slaves, proved popular in Africa and soon came to be grown in many parts of the region. In the later sixteenth century we have evidence from sailors from a number of shipwrecks (Dutch, English, and Portuguese) who survived the experience and subsequently reported on their observations of African peoples and their crops, mainly on the eastern coasts of what is now the Cape and Natal. From them we learn of the settlements and social organization of the Nguni peoples, and also of the rapid spread of maize into these areas. Meanwhile, at the Cape itself, many ships were calling in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to take on fresh water and to trade with the Khoisan inhabitants. Sheep, cattle, ostrich feathers, shells and seafoods were traded for metal goods and beads, sometimes for liquor. Most of these ships were English and some of the Khoisan traders even picked up elements of the English language.

In 1652, however, a more permanent settlement was established by the Dutch. The Dutch East India Company (DEIC) decided that it needed a station where its ships could be replenished on the long journey to the East Indies. In 1657, seven "freeburghers" were permitted to settle permanently in order to create a more fully developed agricultural economy. They were the first of many, including Huguenot and Moravian Protestants fleeing from persecution in France and Germany. Cape Town began to develop as a significant port, the first Western-style township in southern Africa, though it took some time to reach the size of Mapungubwe in the far interior.

The Dutch introduced slaves to the Cape. Although they decided not to enslave the local population so as not to inhibit trade, they brought slaves from elsewhere in Africa (notably Madagascar) and from the East Indies. By the early eighteenth century, there were some 1,779 settlers and 1,107 slaves at the Cape. By this time, further settlements had been founded at Stellenbosch (1679) and Drakenstein (1687). Moreover, though the DEIC had tried to restrain the settlers, expansion was now so rapid that townships appeared much farther inland, at Swellendam (1745) and Graaff-Reinet (1785). By the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch settlers, by then often known in Dutch as Afrikaners, had penetrated territory up to 600 miles from Cape Town itself.

Dutch and other European people, who themselves had often come from regions of intensive settlement, developed an extensive system in which farmers required at least 3,000 *morgen* (over 6,000 acres) of land. Khoisan peoples were subjected to intense frontier violence, and by the end of the eighteenth century had either been cleared from the land or had become virtual serfs of the Dutch farmers. By the 1770s, Cape

settlers and migrants (the "Trekboers") were already beginning to show signs of unrest as regarded DEIC rule. They were also beginning to encounter Bantu-speaking peoples on the Cape frontier and began a long succession of so-called Cape/Xhosa Wars that were to be endemic for another hundred years.

By this time, the DEIC was in decline. Although DEIC administrations attempted to regulate the frontier, they had little success. With the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars, the Cape was highly vulnerable and it was taken by the British (1795–1802) and again, permanently, in 1806. This was an era of evangelical activity, and missionaries now became an important medium of social and economic transformation, both in the colony and on its frontiers.

This ferment of ideas and legislative and administrative activity stimulated a great deal of opposition among the Afrikaner community (the British now called them "Boers," or farmers). In 1833, slavery was abolished throughout the British Empire, but it may have been other discontents, particularly in the regulation of employment, the use of English, and missionary activity among the Khoi and other black people that caused many Boers to decide to leave the colony. From 1835 on a number of Boer columns, the Voortrekkers, headed for the interior, and after a period of dispersed political activity in a series of small republics, these coalesced into the Transvaal (later the South African Republic) and the Orange Free State.

During this period of extraordinary white expansion, in which the political outlines of the modern South Africa were laid down, dramatic events had also been taking place in the interior of southern Africa. From about the 1790s on, processes of centralization occurred among the northern Nguni peoples. A ruler called Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa people began to create a larger state structure, which was later expanded further by Shaka of the Zulu. A considerable debate as to why this should have happened has considered the roles of population growth, environmental pressures upon limited grazing territory, slave trading, and particularly the ivory and cattle trades associated with the southern Mozambiquan port of Delagoa Bay, as well as the innovative military tactics and charismatic leadership of these rulers themselves.

What became the Zulu state was forged out of repeated conflict. These wars sometimes resulted in incorporation, but more often in setting up waves of migration that resulted in the dispersal of Zulu-type states throughout many parts of southern and central Africa. The Swazi state of Sobhuza to the north of Zululand, the Ndebele of Mzilikazi to the west, and the Gaza state of Soshangane in southern Mozambique were some of these. Other groups headed northward across the Zambezi, and established states, known as Ngoni,

in Malawi, eastern Zambia, and Tanzania. When the Ndebele came into conflict with the Boers in the western Transvaal, they moved on into southwestern Zimbabwe. The Boers also came into conflict with the Zulu state when they attempted to secure land in Natal. In 1838 a Boer party under Piet Retief was killed by Shaka's successor Dingane and the Boers secured their revenge through their victory at the Battle of Blood River, which duly entered the Afrikaner mythology.

Other peoples affected by the *mfecane* or *difaqane* (or "crushing of peoples") included Sotho refugees who congregated in the mountains of Lesotho under the remarkable king Moshoeshe. Further participants in the general violence of the interior were peoples of mixed race known as the Griqua. They were caught between the British trying to control the frontier and the ever land-hungry Boers establishing themselves in the trans-Orange region. Ultimately, they lost their lands.

Another zone of violence was the eastern Cape frontier. In 1820, the British had attempted to settle immigrants from England and Scotland around Grahamstown, but this move was of limited success. Frontier wars continued to break out in almost every decade to the 1870s and environmental problems and cattle diseases placed the Xhosa people under great pressure, culminating in the cattle killing of 1857, when a prophetess suggested that this was the only way that a new dispensation could be achieved. This frontier region was not fully conquered and annexed by the British until the 1890s.

While these events were occurring in the interior, the Cape economy had become more closely connected with international trade through the export of merino wool, various agricultural products, ivory, and wine. Cape Town became an even more important port as its significance in relation to the British Empire, including the new colonies in Australasia, southeast Asia and the Far East was enhanced. But the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the greater use of steamships seemed about to reduce this role. By then, however, one of the most striking events in southern African history occurred, the discovery of diamonds just beyond the Cape Frontier. The British soon annexed the region and the frontier town of Kimberley became the powerhouse of the Cape economy.

The results of these events were revolutionary. A modern infrastructure of railway lines and ports was established, with Port Elizabeth and East London developing to circumvent the overloading of Cape Town. Banking and other financial institutions; brick making and building contracting; and social services like education and hospitals were all considerably developed. White migrants were enticed into the colony, and representative institutions were developed in an attempt to avoid political resentment against the colonial power.

But perhaps the greatest change was to take place in respect of black-white relations.

As the diamond mines were concentrated into fewer hands and their operations became larger in scale, the demand for unskilled labor grew. Africans were drawn to the mines in large numbers. But this migrant labor system developed a number of key characteristics. One was that the workers seldom became permanent urban dwellers; they were contracted for a period and then returned to what were supposedly their "tribal" areas. While at the mines they were kept in closed compounds, both to prevent them stealing diamonds and also so that they did not constitute a threat to the whites. Their wages were kept to the minimum. They were forced to buy their requirements from mine shops, at high prices, and often fell into debt. This system was later transferred on a much larger scale to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand.

The wealth generated by the diamond mines briefly ensured that the Cape was by far the most powerful of the four territories (two British and two Boer) of white-controlled southern Africa. In the 1870s, this encouraged British rulers to attempt to reestablish their power over the impoverished and little-developed Boer states. The British had attempted to exert control in the middle of the century, but had conceded sovereignty to the Boers in the early 1850s. In 1877, the British governor, Sir Bartle Frere, ordered the invasion of the Transvaal. It was duly annexed with very little struggle. But the British were soon involved in a much more serious war with the Zulu in an attempt to settle and "pacify" the northern Natal border. Initially experiencing reversals, the British finally defeated the Zulu at Ulundi in 1879, thereby removing a major threat from the Boers of the Transvaal. The latter now resisted the British occupation in what became known as the First Boer War. They defeated a British force at Majuba Hill in 1881 and the Liberal Party government in London resolved to withdraw. This event set the stage for the conflicts of the future.

The power balance in southern Africa was transformed not by force of arms, but by a new stage in the "mineral revolution." Gold had been known in various parts of the interior since the 1870s, but now vast gold reserves, though of low-grade ore, were discovered on the Witwatersrand near present-day Johannesburg. Within a very few years the South African Republic had become richer than the Cape. Once more there was tremendous urban growth and infrastructural development connected with this, and, from the British point of view, there was a real danger of the Boers establishing close connections with other powers—notably, the Dutch or the Germans. The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw the rapid completion of the white conquest that had begun with the arrival of

the Portuguese in Central Africa and the DEIC at the Cape several centuries earlier.

The Germans acquired southwest Africa (Namibia) in 1884. This event, together with westward pressure from the Boers of the Transvaal, prompted the British to secure their control over the Tswana people of Bechuanaland (Botswana). The Portuguese attempted to assert claims to a band of territory across Central Africa from west to east, but were frustrated by the British in the shape of the so-called Cape imperialism of Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company, chartered in 1889. In the course of the 1890s, Rhodes established tenuous control over Zimbabwe and Zambia, ambitious for further mineral resources and anxious to frustrate the expansionist designs of the Portuguese and the Transvaal Boers. Rhodes's company fought wars with a number of African states (notably, the Ndebele and the Ngoni), forming alliances with others, and coping with serious revolts such as that of the Ndebele and Shona in 1896–1897. Some gaps in territorial control—for example, between the Cape and Natal and between Natal and Mozambique—were now closed. Basutoland (Lesotho) came under imperial control in 1868, after attacks by the Boers, and efforts to hand it over to the Cape failed, largely as a result of Sotho resistance. Swaziland was heavily penetrated by concession seekers and was dominated by the Transvaal until coming under British control in 1903. Both these territories became closely tied into the economy of South Africa, contributing large numbers of migrant workers to southern African mines and towns. It may well have been the desire for more labor that led to the conquest of the Venda and Pedi peoples of the northern Transvaal in the 1890s.

Indeed, the insatiable labor demands of the mines drew almost all the peoples of southern Africa into their economic system. Migrant workers, initially stimulated by the desire to “earn a gun” and later by the taxation demands of colonial administrations, were drawn from the entire region. The Portuguese and other colonial authorities made arrangements for deferred pay to be given to migrants upon their return, and as a result these territories became economically dependent on the mines.

The diamond and gold mines also had profound effects for the lives of women throughout the region. Some were drawn to the urban locations, where they brewed beer (usually illegally), became prostitutes, and established small businesses such as laundries. In the rural areas, women found themselves forced to take on new responsibilities with respect to children, the elderly, and control of meager family finances because of the absence of the men at work. They also found themselves coping with the increasing environmental

problems of the so-called African reserves, which were becoming increasingly overpopulated and (from the white point of view) overstocked, with the land heavily eroded, as well as suffering from soil exhaustion.

All of these effects, already beginning to become apparent by the beginning of the twentieth century, were to be massively exacerbated in subsequent decades.

The gold resources of Southern Rhodesia proved to be a disappointment, though they were still a significant element of that economy. White settlers grew maize and ranched cattle, but tobacco soon became the most significant agricultural product. By the early years of the twentieth century almost the entire region was pulled together by railway lines, connecting the main production centers to harbors on the coast. German southwest Africa and southern Angola were less affected by these economic forces. The Germans exercised a brutal control of their colony and suppressed revolts by the Nama (a Khoisan group) and Herero people with a ferocity bordering on genocide. Many Nama and some Herero fled into the modern Botswana.

Natal, and its leading port of Durban, had also been pulled into this system. The colony had coal reserves which were significant in the economic development of the subcontinent. It also had good agricultural land that, from 1860 on, was extensively cultivated for sugar. Since African labor would not accept low agricultural wages, Indian indentured laborers were brought from India, further adding to the ethnic diversity of the region.

There was, however, a disjunction between the economic integration of the region, the power of international capital and its associated companies, and the political arrangements of the separate territories. Moreover, the white population had grown considerably in these years. In the 1780s, there were probably little more than 20,000 whites in southern Africa. By 1870, there were at least a quarter of a million. By 1891 this had risen to 600,000, and by 1903 to over a million. At this time, the black population of the entire region would probably not have exceeded four million.

The years between 1895 and 1910 were devoted to the solving of this political and demographic “problem.” The Jameson Raid (1895–1896), an attack upon the South African Republic allegedly in support of the mining companies and their white immigrant workers who lacked political and other rights, was a disaster. But it has often been seen as the first blow of the Anglo-Boer War, which followed between 1899 and 1902. These events were supposedly restricted to the white population, but in reality Africans were heavily involved. They played many roles in the war itself and were caught up in the sieges of Kimberley, Mafeking,

and Ladysmith. Many of them lost their lives. Africans were also the principal losers of the war. In the Peace of Vereeniging, the British effectively abdicated any prospect of improving the lot of blacks in the former Boer republics and ultimately the British colonies, even though that was one of the propagandist reasons for going to war. In the reconstruction era, the migrant labor system and segregationist tendencies were confirmed. The arrival of 60,000 Chinese indentured laborers to the mines reduced any prospect of wage bargaining power. Moreover, as the whites moved toward political union, black rights were increasingly threatened.

This union was achieved in 1910, when the two British and two Boer territories came together in a single unified state. The effect of this was to place political power largely in Afrikaner hands, but economic power remained with the British and the London markets to which South Africa was tied. Africans were again the losers, for though certain reserved powers were retained by the imperial government, these were never put into effect.

By this time, a considerable African educated and professional elite had emerged, largely the product of missionary education. Africans had been seeking various modes of resistance, including the founding of independent churches, syncretic breakaways from the standard denominations. There had been a serious tax revolt, the Bhambatha rebellion, among the Zulu in Natal in 1906. Various organizations had been founded, among them one to protect the voting rights of blacks at the Cape. In 1912, many of these elite figures came together to found the South African Native National Congress (later the word *Native* was dropped) to work for black political rights and to lobby the imperial government in London to exercise its reserved powers.

These aspirations were soon frustrated. In the Native Land Act of 1913, the new union government set about a major redistribution of land that was to produce considerable dispossession, migration, and much suffering. This was masked by the events of World War I and received little or no publicity in Britain or elsewhere. In the aftermath of this war, in which the South African government (despite opposition from many Afrikaners) participated in campaigns in southwestern and eastern Africa, the principal problem seemed to be the disaffection of both white and black labor. African workers had struck on various occasions, and there was a major strike in 1919. In 1922, a major strike of whites on the Rand was suppressed with considerable brutality, and this helped to ensure that the expansionist designs of Jan Smuts (who wanted to create a United States of Southern Africa) were frustrated. The white Rhodesian settlers declined,

in a referendum of 1923, to join the union, and the British government refused to hand over the so-called High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland) or the territories in central Africa (now Zambia and Malawi).

The period between the two world wars saw a considerable tightening of white and settler controls. In South Africa, the right wing Afrikaner Nationalist Party began to assume power, partly because of the disaffection of white labor, partly because of the economic pressures of the great depression. African workers also began to unionize effectively for the first time, notably in the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, led by a Malawian Clemens Kadalie, but this union ultimately failed partly because it became disunited, and partly because of the repressive measures taken against it.

In Southern Rhodesia, the white minority, constituting only a small fraction of the total population, also used the depression era to consolidate its economic power—not least over the land. The Portuguese, British, and South African administrations continued to encourage white migration and settlement in this period, as they would continue to do after World War II. The Union Government in South Africa had also acquired the League of Nations mandate over southwest Africa. After World War II, the South African government declined to transfer this mandate into a United Nations trusteeship territory and the stage was set for international pressures and violent resistance in more modern times.

South Africa participated in World War II, despite major opposition from Afrikaner nationalists, the leaders of whom often felt sympathetic to the Nazi regime in Germany and were consequently interned. In 1948, the victory of the nationalists in a general election brought some of these men to positions of power. The South African government now embarked on its apartheid policies of full racial segregation. Although this was given a greater legislative underpinning than it had ever received before, it was in essence based upon earlier colonial policies, which had included separation upon the land, job reservation, and separate arrangements for education, health care, and so on. Now, all South African peoples were classified according to color, as white, colored (mixed race), Indian, and black, and separate facilities had to be made available to all of these groups. The nonracial franchise of the Cape (which had had property and income qualifications restricting it to a small elite) had been abolished in the 1930s, but now all Africans were theoretically attached to "homelands" or "Bantustans" based upon ethnicity. They supposedly came from these and were to return there at the end of a period of working in the allegedly white parts of the country. Thus Africans

were rendered alien in their own state, and the idea was even linked to the prevailing ideas of decolonization at work in the colonial world: the Bantustans were to become “independent” under a form of self-rule.

Farther north, the British attempted to stave off majority rule by creating, in 1953, the Central African Federation, which brought together Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. The Portuguese argued that their African colonies were part of metropolitan Portugal and that independence was consequently unthinkable. They also continued to encourage white migrants to settle in Angola and Mozambique. The South African government also attempted to integrate Namibia, where diamond mining had become a significant economic activity, into a greater South Africa. But the Central African Federation, which was dominated by the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia, encountered serious black resistance. Declarations of states of emergency in 1959 signaled the start of the processes of decolonization. Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland all emerged as politically independent states in the course of the 1960s, at a time when the South African regime seemed to continue to be intransigent.

Guerrilla campaigns, however, became an increasing feature of resistance in southern Africa. The Portuguese faced major resistance in Angola and Mozambique, and South Africa found itself committing troops, particularly in southern Angola. Campaigns also developed around Zimbabwe in opposition to a white supremacist regime that had declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1965. The African National Congress also decided that only violent resistance could force the political pace in South Africa. Movement came rapidly once the Portuguese *Est_do Novo* regime in Lisbon was overthrown in April 1974. Portugal’s African colonies became independent in 1975, although rebel movements, with South Africa support, continued to be active. Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980. Attempts by the South African government to buy off rising internal opposition with minor “reforms” of the apartheid system in the 1980s met with what amounted to open rebellion in the townships. The government responded with further repression and a “state of emergency,” but by the end of the decade a combination of mounting internal and external pressures forced the South African government to face the inevitable. South Africa withdrew from its occupation of Namibia, and after free elections Namibia became independent in 1990. That year Nelson Mandela and other political leaders were released from prison, bans were lifted on free political activity, and some apartheid legislation was repealed. After fully democratic elections in 1994, South Africa emerged as a black-ruled state under President Mandela.

Although the political arrangements had been transformed, and interracial tensions had, to a certain extent, been ameliorated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, under the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the economic and class system changed very little. The gulf between the haves and have-nots remained very wide, which helped to explain the high levels of crime in South African society. AIDS had become a major scourge and many felt that the South African government, particularly under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, was doing insufficient work to counter this problem. However, some improvements took place in freer access to certain sectors of employment, to education, and to some health services.

Angola and Mozambique both faced internal civil wars until comparatively recently. Namibia was destabilized by the violence on its northern frontier, but also experienced some genuine economic advance. In Zimbabwe, old strains between the Shona and Ndebele people reemerged, and the government of Robert Mugabe dealt brutally with any hint of political dissidence in Matabeleland in the southwest or anywhere else in the country. Mugabe also embarked on policies to redress the unequal and wholly unfair distribution of land within the country, overturning decades of white occupation of much of the best land. But the violent methods he adopted had a damaging effect on the Zimbabwean economy, producing runaway inflation, very high unemployment, and famine. Fellow African rulers, such as Mbeki in South Africa and Sam Nujoma in Namibia elected to take a diplomatic approach to the problem and Mugabe’s regime continued to inflict considerable suffering upon the people of Zimbabwe.

Four imperial systems—those of the Portuguese, the British, the German, and the local one of the expansionist Afrikaners—had carved up southern Africa among them, subjecting African peoples not only to rule by whites, but also to oppressive and dislocating connections with the international economy. Efforts to create larger political systems throughout the subcontinent were only partially successful, and a single major state, like that in Canada or in Australia, failed to appear. Nevertheless, the power of diamonds and above all gold created high levels of economic integration that surpassed political boundaries. But throughout all of this, Africans, with the exception of the Khoisan peoples, maintained their population levels, despite all the checks of war and disease, as well as their capacity to resist. After a long tradition of warfare and oppression against indigenous peoples, southern Africa now boasts no fewer than eight independent states.

But in the process considerable environmental change has occurred throughout the region. The great

game resources that had previously covered all areas right down to the Cape have been beaten back and confined to a number of game reserves. Whereas humans and animals had formerly coexisted, people were generally removed from the game parks. Forests have also been cut down, providing timber for fuel, railway building, and the construction of towns. The concentration of Africans in overpopulated reserves has also had negative environmental effects. The African practice of moving their settlements and rotating their crops and pasture had been much more ecologically friendly. Alien botanical species have made a dramatic mark upon southern African land. Cities, towns, and denser human settlement have increased pollution levels, while mining has frequently scarred the landscape. Thus, the challenges facing the new states of southern Africa are environmental as well as economic and social.

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See also: **Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Cape Colony: British Occupation; 1806–1872; Difaqane on the Highveld; Humankind: Hominids, Early, Origins of; Iron Age (Early): Herding, Farming, Southern Africa; Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Mandela, Nelson; Mfecane; Nonqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing, 1857; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand; 1886–1899; South Africa: Homelands and Bantustans.**

Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Community is Africa's newest attempt at fostering development through collective self-reliance for a particular area—in this case, the nine southern African countries that were founding members (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) plus Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.

The organization was born in 1979 and formalized in 1980 as the Southern Africa Coordinating Conference (SADCC), out of economic and political necessities resulting from apartheid in South Africa. SADCC countries either shared common frontiers with South Africa or were geographically within range of South Africa's military power. Except for Malawi, they initially were staunchly opposed to the apartheid regime in South Africa, and in different practical ways helped South Africa's liberation movements in their efforts to bring down the apartheid government. They allowed South African liberation organizations, especially the African National Congress (ANC), to use their

territories to train antiapartheid fighters or to launch military attacks against targets in South Africa. But the states were militarily very weak and economically too dependent on South Africa; their citizens were, for a large part, employed in South Africa. For some countries, the only way in which they could receive imports or export their products was via South African ports. Others (Angola and Mozambique) had internal armed challenges to their legitimacy, which South Africa exploited to undermine them. In response to increased antiapartheid military attacks during the 1970s, South Africa adopted the strategy of launching military attacks deep inside neighboring countries considered to be the source of such attacks. Swaziland, Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique were forced by the new South African strategy to expel or prohibit antiapartheid groups from using their respective territories as staging grounds for armed incursions into South Africa.

The motivation behind the creation of SADCC was to reduce member countries' dependence on South Africa and on other powers outside the region. This was to be done by the SADCC members coordinating their economic activities in ways that would enhance their collective and individual strengths. They sought to accomplish that by assigning each country a different sector to develop and to collectively mobilize external funding for the respective sectors. The principal sectors that were earmarked for development were assigned to member countries as follows: Angola—energy; Botswana—agricultural research and animal disease; Lesotho—soil conservation and land utilization; Malawi—fisheries wildlife and forestry; Mozambique—transportation and communications; Swaziland—labor; Tanzania—industrial development and trade; Zambia—mining; and Zimbabwe—food security. The arrangements also put the secretariat in Botswana and made that nation the SADCC chair.

Transportation and communication were given priority because the region's infrastructure for these was either poorly developed or had been destroyed by civil wars. The principal accomplishments of the SADCC during its first decade of existence took place in this sector and it consumed around 64 per cent of the organization's total project portfolio. Of the greatest expense was the corridor of regional rail and transportation systems that were developed to link Maputo, Beira Nacala, Dar Es Salaam, and Lobito. SADCC's approach through sectoral development meant less competition among several countries in the region for limited external funds in the same sector.

In August of 1992, SADCC member states converted the organization from a loose entity based on conferences to a more formal regional integration organization and assumed the new name of the Southern

African Development Community (SADC). The objective was to harmonize trade and monetary policies among members with the eventual goal of establishing a common market. This change in status was a reflection of internal developments in South Africa with the prison release of Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress, and the beginning of talks to establish majority rule. After the election of 1994 that formalized the transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority in South Africa, with Mandela now as that nation's president, South Africa was admitted as the SADC's 11th member. Soon after, Mauritius followed suit and became the 12th member.

The SADC's mission has continued to expand since the 1992 changes and so has its prestige, especially with South Africa's membership. This was further enhanced in 1996 when Nelson Mandela took over from Botswana's President Sir Ketumile Masire as the organization's chairman. South Africa's membership adds significant weight to the organization in various ways. It has a market size of over 42 million, with a high consumption pattern. It has an economic, industrial, and scientific capacity that is unparalleled in Africa. Its military power and communication infrastructure is also the best in the region. In addition, when Nelson became chairman, his status and reputation as a leader of impeccable integrity around the world provided the SADC with exactly the type of image the organization needed at a time when Africa was perceived to be suffering from a leadership crisis. South Africa also became the coordinator of a new sector within the organization known as the Organ for Politics, Defense, and Security. South Africa and Botswana invoked this provision to intervene militarily in Lesotho to restore order and electoral integrity when in May of 1998 disputed elections led the Lesotho military to attempt a coup d'état. The new role of the SADC on political military matters signifies that member countries are no longer going to remain aloof while wars and conflicts destroy the fabric of their region and render difficult their economic objectives. Only time will tell how successful the organization's new mission will be.

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Soviet Union and Africa

The African continent became a factor in Russian foreign policy for the first time at the end of the nineteenth century during two wars, the Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–1896) and the second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). In both cases, a strong anti-British sentiment among the public and a cautious but obvious anti-British stand of the government made the Russians consider first Ethiopia, and then the Boer republics, as potential allies against their common powerful enemy, Britain.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the young Soviet state perceived Africa, as well as other parts of the colonized world, as its natural ally in its struggle for survival and social progress because of the revolutionary potential of the colonized peoples, and their presumed ability to undermine and disrupt the capitalist world. The Communist (Third) International (Comintern), a union of communist parties of the world founded in 1919 in Moscow and to a large extent expressing its interests, was deeply involved in the ideological debate on the "national and colonial problem," in spreading socialist—and with it Soviet—propaganda, and in preparation of cadres for both national and social revolutions. In 1928, the Red International of Labor Unions, which acted under the auspices of the Comintern, created the International Trade Union Committee of Working Negroes, which played an important role in Moscow's African connection. Several future leaders of anticolonialism in

Africa were educated in the Comintern's schools, Jomo Kenyatta and George Padmore among them.

South Africa occupied the central place in Comintern's African policy for it was the only country in Africa south of the Sahara that had a well-developed working class, a well organized labor movement, and a vibrant and vociferous communist party. The Communist Party of South Africa gave the Comintern its only direct link to politics in the region but it was mainly the Comintern's rigid control over the party that led to the latter's demise in the 1930s.

In 1943 the Comintern was disbanded, because during World War II the Soviet Union was more interested in maintaining relations with its Western allies than with the communist movement. In Africa this new line found a reflection in the opening of Soviet consulates in South Africa which existed from 1943 until 1956.

The Comintern's greatest contribution to the cause of African liberation may have been its slogan of the "independent native republic," its official goal for South Africa from the late 1920s until 1935. However, until the 1950s the Soviet stand against colonialism was inconsistent. The USSR rejected the mandate system of the League of Nations, but it did join this organization despite the fact that it condoned colonialism. The Soviet Union was the only big European power to denounce Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935–1936, but even after the war it explored possibilities of territorial acquisitions in Africa for itself.

After the war, from the mid-1950s on, the center of attention of the Soviet government in Africa moved from South Africa to other African countries. Soviet strategists and policy makers saw them as allies in the struggle against its opponents in the Cold War and as potential members of the socialist camp because, one after another, they declared their desire to be socialist or "to build socialism" after proclaiming their independence. This new approach led to an upsurge of direct Soviet involvement in Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s.

The most important aspect of Soviet policy at that time was its assistance to liberation movements. The Soviet Union initiated the Declaration of Independence of Colonial Countries and Nations, which was passed by the United Nations in 1960, and championed every case of anticolonial struggle on the international arena. It provided liberation movements with funds, consumables, vehicles, air tickets and stationery, and granted scholarships for the study in Soviet tertiary institutions. From the 1960s on it became instrumental in providing military assistance: arms, advisers, and relocation of guerrilla forces. This was particularly significant in the case of the MPLA, Frelimo, SWAPO, and the African National Congress. In the context of the Cold War, assistance and support were always offered

to a particular allied party as a measure against the influence of other power—first and foremost the United States and China, which often led to fragmentation of nationalist movements.

The spirit of the Cold War dominated Soviet relations with independent African countries as well, first of all in the sense that the USSR attempted to create a chain of allies in Africa, as it did elsewhere in the world. Countries that embarked on the program of reforms that Soviet authorities considered to be directed at building socialism, or just expressed their wish to do so, as well as those that did none of these but had tried to cut their ties with the West were pronounced "countries of noncapitalist development" (or, later, "countries of socialist orientation") and put into the category of "revolutionary democracies" (as distinct from the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe). At different periods different countries fell into this category including Ghana, Mali, French Guinea, People's Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Somalia. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique enjoyed special attention and received the most in economic and military aid from the USSR.

There is little doubt that, both before and after World War II, Soviet policy in Africa was to a large extent dictated and motivated by the interests of the Soviet state itself. It is equally obvious, however, that Soviet assistance and its confrontation with the West where Africa's colonial powers belonged did make a difference for the outcome of Africa's struggle for independence. Soviet aid, on the other hand, did not help to alleviate economic problems of independent African countries and in some cases exacerbated them, and its ideologized approach and virtually unlimited supply of arms contributed to internal conflicts.

After the end of the Cold War, the center of Soviet interests in Africa moved to southern Africa once again. Due to its leverage in the wake of the Cold War and its involvement in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation were able to play an active role in the Namibian settlement and in South Africa's peaceful transition to the majority rule. However, from the beginning of the 1990s on, Russia's interest in Africa and its role on the continent began to decrease.

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See also: Cold War, Africa and the; Socialism in Postcolonial Africa.

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Soyinka, Wole K. (1934–)

First African Nobel Laureate

The 1986 Nobel Laureate for Literature, Wole Soyinka, is a frontline Nigerian scholar, writer, social and literary critic, and activist whose literary works span drama, poetry, and prose, though he is better known as a poet and playwright than as a novelist. And of these he is primarily a poet: the poet in him always emerges in his nonpoetry writings—hence the much talked-about “obscurity in his works that results from his avid use of images, condensed words, and elliptical syntax. Soyinka’s writings may be described as “writerly” in the sense that they make demands on the reader, who always has to be on the alert mentally, working out all the cues that may lead to purposeful decoding.

As a writer, Soyinka is pragmatically rooted in his traditional Yoruba culture despite his universal outlook. He draws copiously from the Yoruba traditions and cultural practices for the material contents of his writings, and demonstrates the influences of his culture on his philosophy. Elements of traditional African religion permeate his works, especially the belief in pantheon of gods, goddesses, and spirits. Ogun, the god of iron, with his ambivalence of creativity and destructiveness, can be regarded as Soyinka’s muse, his patron god. References to Ogun, whether explicit or implicit, are common features of his individual works and collections—for example, “Ogun Abibiman,” *Idanre and Other Poems*, *The Interpreters*, and *The Road*.

But it is interesting to note that Soyinka is a product of both traditional African culture and Western culture (notably, of Western Christian religion and education) as demonstrated clearly in his family memoirs *Ake* (1981) and *Isara* (1990). Although he may not be a practicing Christian, biblical echoes punctuate most of his works. He creates Christlike figures and gives in-depth treatment to the theme of willing self-sacrifice, as demonstrated in *Death and King’s Horseman* and *The Strong Breed*, among others. Soyinka shuns religious dogmatism, and ridicules religious hypocrisy, as shown in his *Jero Plays*.

Soyinka’s exposure to Western education and culture has contributed immensely to the development of his philosophy of life, but he does not subscribe to simple oppositions like white versus black, present versus

past, modernism versus tradition. Rather, he reflects different sides of these oppositions, depicting their positive and negative possibilities with a view to enabling the reader to synthesize them. With this he reveals the complexities embedded in human life. Such a motif is apparent in such works as *A Dance of the Forest*, *The Lion and the Jewel*, *Kongi’s Harvest*, and other works. This compels the reader to judge the positive and the negative elements encapsulated in the past and the present, tradition and modernism, in order to derive a new vision enshrined in the complex pattern of seeming contradictions. The different cultures that meet in Soyinka produce in human a form of cultural symbiosis such that as a broad-minded literary scholar, critic, and activist he shuns the cutting off of any source of knowledge, whether Oriental, European, African, or Polynesian. It is on this principle that his universal eclecticism and a strong belief in the adaptability of human culture are anchored.

It is important to note that Soyinka’s life cannot be divorced from his art and it can be said that he believes in art for the service of humanity. Indeed, Soyinka lives his art; the artist and the man in him coalesce to expose and condemn all forms of social, political, and economic ills in society. Soyinka evinces graphically his abhorrence of any form of the exploitation of individuals as well as oppression and victimization, especially at the hands of an entity of great power; this may have accounted for his being regarded as an antiestablishment figure. Soyinka’s *The Man Died* contains his dehumanizing and harrowing prison experience with the oppressive agents of government. As metaphorically illustrated by his poem “Abiku,” in which he assumes the mask of an *abiku*, foiling all attempts to change his nature and make him conform, Soyinka is not ready to condone any political repression of an individual’s free will. He can be regarded as an iconoclast who does not subscribe to conventions that tend to violate the individual’s will.

Soyinka returned to Nigeria in the 1960s, after studying at Britain’s Leeds University, to take up the mantle of struggle against what he considered the forces of retrogression within the university, his primary constituency, and the larger society. He actively opposed various attempts of governments to erode the autonomy of the university system.

He was also a strong voice of opposition to the government of the Western Region, led by Chief Ladoke Akintola in the 1960s. The government was seen as institutionalizing corruption and disorder, as well as attempting to perpetuate itself in power through the massive rigging of elections. In the ensuing scenario, Soyinka was accused of holding up the region’s broadcasting corporation at gun point, hijacking the recorded

audiocassette of the premier's speech ready for transmission, and replacing it with another carrying the message that the premier should quit office. He was consequently arrested and charged, but the case could not be successfully proved against him.

Soyinka also carried his "crusade" to the road by being instrumental in the establishment of the Oyo State Road Safety Corps during the tenure of Major General David Jemibewon as the military governor of Oyo State of Nigeria. The Unity Party of Nigeria civilian administration of Chief Bola Ige took over the corps in the Second Republic and reinvigorated it before it was crippled by the National Party of Nigeria's federal government. But during the regime of General Babangida, the corps was resurrected as the Federal Road Safety Commission and the indefatigable Soyinka was appointed chairman of its governing board on February 18, 1988. As a practical demonstration of his belief in commitment and self-sacrifice, he declined any remuneration for his services as chairman.

A study of Soyinka's works and life will no doubt reveal undeniable consistency and harmony. He demonstrates unequivocally his basic concern for human beings, celebrating life and deprecating its opposites. Sarcasm and wit are also prominent features of his drama, and its often biting tone has earned Soyinka the accolade "the tiger on stage."

AYO OGUNSIJI

See also: Achebe, Chinua.

Biography

Born in Nigeria in 1934. Educated at Government College, Ibadan; the University of Ibadan; and Leeds University in Britain. Worked briefly with the British theater before returning to Nigeria in 1960 to begin a series of struggles against what he regarded as anti-progressive forces. A prolific writer, his numerous dramatic works, among others, include *The Road*, *The Lion and the Jewel*, *The Jero Plays*, *Madmen and Specialists*, and *Death and King's Horseman*. His prose works include *The Interpreters*, *Season of Anomie*, *The Man Died*, *Ake*, *Isara*, and *Ibadan*, the last three being "faction," a subgenre of literature that blends fact and fiction. Soyinka's collections of poetry include *Idanre and Other Poems*, *A Shuttle in the Crypt*, and *Mandela's Earth*. In addition, he has written many critical essays and delivered lectures on literature, culture, religion politics and so on—for example, *Art, Dialogue and Outrage* (1988) and *The Credo of Being and Nothingness* (1991). Soyinka has won many prizes and awards, the most prestigious being the 1986 Nobel Prize for Literature.

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Sports: Postcolonial Africa

Sports in Africa have been characterized by widely uneven geographic distribution, as programs, facilities, traditions, and competitive results vary across nations. Organized sports developed more recently in several countries, including Botswana, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan. Generally the strongest sporting programs emerged in former British and French colonies, from Algeria and Tunisia in the north to Nigeria and Cameroon in the west and Kenya and Tanzania in the east.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, organized sport in Africa was constrained by the political considerations of the European colonial powers. In much of Africa, colonial culture, including sports, played an intrusive role destroying many aspects of local or traditional cultural activity. Where local or traditional sports were less overwhelmed by colonial practices, local sports had a greater chance of surviving and developing alongside colonial sports. Local pastimes often lost standing, prestige, or meaning among generations influenced by, or oriented toward, national and international developments.

In countries with multiple ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic groups and marked differences between urban and rural areas, sports can contribute to national cohesion and a sense of commonality. In practical terms, sports networks also contribute to overcoming regionalism. Social scientists have suggested that for new African nations, international athletic activity served as an unofficial complement to the work of diplomats and government officials, bringing a certain international notice and prestige to their nations. Sport

has been viewed as a means to develop international relationships and friendships with other countries and to achieve diplomatic recognition. It is also valued as a venue for developing trade relations.

Regional divisions and rivalries marked African competition prior to the 1960s. The Jeux Inter-Africains held in the Central African Republic in 1959 was only open to French-speaking participants. In 1960, the Jeux de l'Amitié, an event cosponsored by the French government and 16 former French colonies was held in Madagascar with participation from 800 athletes competing in 8 sports. The following year saw English-speaking athletes from Nigeria and Liberia take part in the games in Côte d'Ivoire. By 1963 the Jeux de l'Amitié in Senegal enjoyed the participation of 2,400 athletes from France and 24 newly independent African nations, including the English-speaking countries Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Notably, the 1963 games saw African women compete in an international competition for the first time.

From the Jeux de l'Amitié of 1963 arose the notion of Pan-African games open to every African nation except the apartheid state of South Africa, and Rhodesia, and in 1964 representatives from 22 countries met to elect a planning committee for the Jeux Africaines (All-Africa Games). The first All-Africa Games took place in Brazzaville in 1965, with competitions involving over 3,000 athletes from 30 independent African nations.

The planning committee for the All-African Games was succeeded in 1966 by the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa (SCSA). This body, recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1967, would play a crucial part in coordinating and promoting Pan-African sport and developing prominence in global arenas. The SCSA played a major part in the attack on racially segregated sport in Africa, devoting energy and resources to secure the expulsion of South African sports organizations from participation in the Olympics and membership in international sports federations.

Sports played a significant part in developments toward Pan-Africanism, and this contributed to the shift in sports from local to global prestige. Notably, the growth of regional athletic gatherings in the late 1950s, as well as the emergence of All-African games in the 1960s, occurred simultaneously with the supranational conjoining of African states across regional and linguistic barriers in attempts to pursue common economic and political goals. Sport was viewed as a means to develop and promote Pan-African unity through international contacts and pursuit of common goals, such as the struggle against apartheid.

The expansion of Soviet and African sports relationships began in the mid-1950s, influenced by Cold War geopolitics and the emergence of vital independence movements in Africa. Soviet diplomatic relations were first established with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia, the only sovereign black states in Africa before the 1950s, though various attempts to play a role in developments in Africa were made by Soviet governments between 1920 and 1950. Beginning in 1961, the Soviet Union lobbied the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to adopt a resolution to assist the development of amateur sports in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Under this resolution, finally adopted in 1973, the national Olympic committees of countries with well-developed sports programs would provide material aid along with training and skills sharing for countries lacking developed programs or facilities. This "Olympic solidarity" program was financed by the IOC, receiving one-third of the television revenues from the Olympic games.

From the 1960s through the 1970s the Soviet Union developed sports relations with more than 30 African countries. The major area of Soviet and African sports initiatives came in the delegation of Soviet coaches and sports experts to African countries. Institutes of higher physical education, such as the Algerian Institute of Sports Science and Technology, were founded and developed with assistance of Soviet specialists who provided most of the training. Assistance was also given in building and equipping the new sports facilities.

Crucial in the development of international recognition for national sports programs has been performance on the world stage of the Olympic games. The rise to Olympic prominence coincided with the emergence of major movements for African independence. A hundred Africans participated in the 1960 Rome Olympics, at which Abebe Bikila was the first black African to win a gold medal. Four years later in Tokyo there were 150 competitors from African countries. The emergence of African athletics to Olympic—and world—prominence was signaled at the 1968 Mexico City games, where 13 African athletes won 16 different medals.

An important aspect of African involvement in the international sports arena was related to the elimination of racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The 1964 vote of the IOC to ban South Africa from the Tokyo games provided an indication of the emerging global strength of united action by independent African nations. When the IOC invited South Africa to return for the 1968 summer Olympics in Mexico City, the OAU initiated a boycott of the games. Within weeks of the IOC announcement, all 32 members of the SCAS had committed to the boycott. This united African front against apartheid presented the most

formidable opposition force ever to confront the modern Olympic movement.

Pressure was also placed on South Africa through attempts to curtail sporting contacts with other nations. The most prominent example of this came in response to a sporting tour of South Africa by the New Zealand rugby team in 1976. Both the OAU and the SCSA issued calls to boycott the upcoming Montreal Olympics if New Zealand were not asked to withdraw. The refusal to act by the IOC led to the withdrawal of 30 African nations from the 1976 Montreal Olympics in what was the largest sports boycott up to that time.

On the eve of the 1972 Munich games, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia announced their plans to boycott the games over the inclusion of athletes from Rhodesia. Again, support was forthcoming from the Soviet bloc and African American athletes, and again the IOC reversed its decision. Rhodesia was finally expelled from the IOC in 1975.

Attesting to the growing power of African athletes as a political force following the boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, the Soviet Union put substantial resources into avoiding a boycott of the 1980 Moscow games by African states. This included sending delegations to visit countries to encourage the participation of African athletes and ensure countries of the Soviet Union's commitment to struggles against apartheid.

Sports cooperation agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and individual African countries as well as with the SCSA. Agreements included commitments to exclude South Africa from international competitions, to fight racism, apartheid, and commercialism, and to strengthen the unity and democratization of the Olympics movement. African initiatives against apartheid brought the attention of the world. A variety of nations with differing backgrounds, economies, and politics were able to make common cause in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

Ongoing and expanding athletic successes at global sports events such as the Olympic and Commonwealth games have brought further attention to sports in Africa. Recently, much recognition has been won on the soccer pitch. Successful entries to recent World Cup championships—notably, Cameroon's in 1990 and Senegal's in 2002—have brought much notice to African soccer. While no African nation has hosted a World Cup since its inception in 1930, Morocco was runner-up to the United States in 1994, and there is growing support at the top levels of the Fédération Internationale de Football (International Football Federation) for an African nation to host an upcoming World Cup soccer match.

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**Saint-Louis: See Senegal: Colonial Period:
Four Communes: Dakar, Saint-Louis,
Gorée, and Rufisque.**

Stanley, Leopold II, "Scramble"

The name of Leopold II, King of Belgium (r.1835; 1865–1909), is closely associated with the "Scramble" for Africa, the formation of the Congo State, and Belgian colonial expansion. His father, Leopold I, initiated him into the operation of government and provided him with military training. Early on, Leopold II developed an interest in international affairs. He visited England and other parts of Europe and appreciated the contribution of their overseas territories to the accumulation of their national wealth; he also visited Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. He nourished an ambition to provide his country with reliable sources of raw materials and outlets for its industrial production and surplus population. His accession to throne in 1865 provided Leopold with the opportunity to achieve his dream. He had important assets—his charismatic personality, the prestige of his position as the king of a neutral country, the service of loyal collaborators at home and abroad, his personal wealth, and his reputation as a philanthropic and generous monarch—but he had to overcome tremendous obstacles, including the constraints of the Belgian constitution, the reluctance of his entourage, the indifference of the business leaders and the public regarding overseas expansion, and the rivalry between European powers.

One of the most successful strategies Leopold II used to dissimulate his intentions was the convocation of a

geographical conference in Brussels (September 12–14, 1876) to examine the economic potential of Africa. He spoke of the creation of bases to serve as the points of departure of the campaign to eliminate slavery and the slave trade and to spread "civilization." The conference resulted in the creation of the International African Association (IAA), the objectives of which were purely scientific and humanitarian. The participants appointed Leopold II as the chair of its executive committee and encouraged the creation of national branches of IAA across Europe. Although the IAA was a Belgian organization, it also included English, French, and Dutch shares. The king undertook to recruit his collaborators, and in June 1878, he hired Henry Morton Stanley.

Stanley had a difficult childhood because of his illegitimacy, and he had experienced difficult working conditions in the workhouse, on the farm, and in Liverpool. His life history made him a brutal and quick-tempered man. In Liverpool, he worked on a ship called the *Windermere*, which took him to New Orleans in 1858. He ran away from the ship and started a new life in the city, working as a clerk in a warehouse. In 1865 he went to work in New York, first as a freelance reporter and later for the *New York Herald*, which made him a permanent roving foreign correspondent based in London. He became famous with his well-publicized expedition in search of Dr. David Livingstone in 1871 and his exploration of the Congo River in 1877, which was financed by the *New York Herald* and *Daily Telegraph*.

In June 1878, Stanley met King Leopold II who, unlike the British, showed interest in the Congo River Basin. Stanley convinced the king that the exploitation of the immense resources in the Congo Basin required the construction of a railroad. On November 25, 1878, Leopold II created the Committee for Studies of the Upper Congo to study the feasibility of the project. He hired Stanley for five years to build stations and communication networks and to sign treaties with native chiefs on behalf of the committee. But after some European governments objected to the committee's political character, the king dissolved it in November 1879 and replaced it with a new organization, the International Association of the Congo (IAC), using the flag of the defunct IAA in order to promote "civilization" and commerce. Although "international," the IAC was managed by Leopold II and his close collaborators, such as Banning and Lambermont. The king succeeded in acquiring political rights through a sovereign organization by extending its territorial base from "free cities" or stations (November 1882) to "stations and free territories" (February 1883), Free States of the Congo and "independent states" (November 1883), and the Confederation of Free Negro Republics and

the Congo Free State (January 1884). He also promised free trade for all in a state without customs duties and played off the European powers against each other. He granted the right of first refusal to France, in case of failure of his Congo project, in exchange for its recognition of the association's power in the Congo basin, thus minimizing Portugal's threat. In 1884 the United States and Germany granted recognition to the IAC as sovereign power. By June 1884, when he returned to Europe from the Congo, Stanley had concluded 450 "treaties" with native chiefs on the defunct committee's behalf. Leopold II chose Sir Francis de Winton, a Belgian army officer, to replace Stanley.

The increasing rivalry between the European powers, especially the competition among Portugal, France, and the IAC in Central Africa, led German chancellor Otto von Bismarck to convene, on November 15, 1884, a Berlin West African Conference to resolve the conflicts and establish a new *modus operandi*. One of the most significant decisions taken by the participants, in February 1885, was the recognition of the IAC as an independent and sovereign power and of King Leopold II as sovereign of the Congo Free State, responsible for the implementation of the Berlin Act in the conventional basin of the Congo. It was an important diplomatic victory for the king. The Belgian government lent to the Congo Free State its officers, officials, and diplomatic personnel. But the king's new duties were strictly personal and did not engage the responsibility of the Belgian government and parliament. The king was represented in the Congo by a general administrator, later replaced by a governor general. After 1884 Leopold II used Stanley mostly in public relations, except in 1887, when he gave him permission to lead the British-sponsored Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (1877–1890) in the southern Sudan in the secret hope to integrate Equatoria into the Congo. But the mission failed, to Leopold's great disappointment.

Trading companies that operated from Stanley Pool created trading posts along the Congo River and its tributaries and engaged in the trade of ivory and rubber. The effective occupation and administration of the Congo and the exploitation of its human and natural resources proved to be more costly than the king had imagined. By 1890, despite the financial aid and loans from the Belgian government, the authorities in Congo were faced with chronic cash shortage. The financial crisis forced the king to renounce free trade and to adopt a new economic policy based on the appropriation of the land (crown domain), state commercial monopoly over ivory and other products, and the imposition of customs duties. The king's decision was inspired from the Dutch experience in Java, where the government had granted the monopoly trading concession to a private

company, gave bonuses to the supervisors to stimulate production, and imposed forced labor. The new system, later referred to as the “Leopoldian system,” established bonuses on the quantity of ivory and wild rubber obtained by the state officials in the rain forest and established a “hostage-taking system” for defaulting natives. Forced labor was exacted from natives in violation of the Sixth Article of the Berlin Act. It resulted in atrocities and other human rights abuses committed against the local population between 1895 and 1908 by agents of rubber companies such as Anversoise and Anglo-Belgian Indian Rubber that were monopolist companies created by the state. These abuses were contained in a report published in 1904 by British consul Roger Casement. The publication of the report provoked an international anti-Congolese campaign animated from England by E. D. Morel, secretary of the Congo Reform Association, who coined the expression “red rubber” to describe the economic scandal in Congo. In July 1904 the king created a commission of inquiry to verify the accusations made by Casement and the Protestant missionaries based in Congo who provided Morel with direct evidence. The commission recognized that abuses were committed, which led to Belgian annexation of the Congo territory in 1908. Congo Free State thus became the Belgian Congo.

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See also: Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Administration and Society, 1908–1960; Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Belgian Congo: Colonial Economy, 1908–1960.

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Stevens, Siaka: See Sierra Leone: Stevens, Siaka and the All People’s Congress.

Stone Age, Middle: Cultures

In Africa, the “middle Stone Age” represents an ill-defined stage in early human development that, until recently, has received comparatively little attention from archaeologists. It saw the development of regional cultural traditions recognized in the first

instance by variation in lithic technology, but also marking important developments in socioeconomic practice as well, by implication, as in conceptual ability and communication. The establishment of absolute dates for these developments is particularly problematic, since they are too old for the application of radiocarbon and too young for reliable use of potassium-argon and other methods used to date earlier stages of hominid evolution and development.

Consideration of the typological issues involved in the processes that led to the emergence and eventual replacement of recognizable middle Stone Age industries is best undertaken with reference to the numbered “modes” of lithic technology proposed by the late Sir Grahame Clark in 1969. In this system, the technology of the Acheulian core-tool complex was designated mode 2, while the fully backed microlithic technology of the late Stone Age represented mode 5. In Europe, there intervened mode 3, a technology where the form of a desired flake tool was predetermined by preparation of the core from which it was to be struck; it thus represented a shift from emphasis on core tools to flake tools, an increase in ability to visualize the desired end product, and greater economy in the use of raw material. There was also a greater number of distinct tool types, each intended for a particular purpose. These trends continued in Europe into the more specialized mode 4 industries of the Upper Palaeolithic, based on the production of numerous punch-struck blades from a single core, seen as ancestral to the Mesolithic mode 5 technology.

In much of Africa, Clark’s homotaxial sequence holds true, but the stages are less well defined, especially in the Sub-Saharan regions. This may have been because the cultural developments leading to mode 3 initially took place south of the Sahara, whereas in Europe they were introduced at a later stage in their development. Also, many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa lack lithic raw materials suited to the production of mode 4 blades.

Despite the chronometric difficulties noted above, it is now possible to state that the African transition from mode 2 to mode 3 was an enormously drawn-out process that proceeded at different times and speeds in various parts of the continent. In general terms, it seems to have begun as far back as 400,000 years ago, but it was probably not until 100,000–150,000 years ago that mode 3 industries were ubiquitous throughout the habitable continent. At the other end of the scale, trends leading to the development of mode 5 began as far back as 100,000 years ago but were not complete in all areas until about 6,000 years ago or even more recently.

Complete single-site sequences through these lengthy processes are rare and the correlation required

for the establishment of composite sequences is hampered both by variation in the pace of change and by the chronometric problems already discussed. The best overview of the rise of mode 3 at a single site is probably that investigated by Desmond Clark at Kalambo Falls on the border between Tanzania and Zambia, close to the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. Here the process seems to have followed the course characteristic of the more densely wooded terrain of the major river valleys and, insofar as their archaeology is known, the fringes of the equatorial forest. The flat, sharp-edged bifacial core tools of the Acheulian were initially gradually replaced by thicker, comparatively crude core axes characteristic of the transitional industries known as Sangoan. At Kalambo, these eventually gave way to foliate bifacial points characteristic of industries known as Lupemban. As greater emphasis was, in due course, placed on the flakes removed in the process of manufacturing such core axes, smaller unifacial tools came into vogue, their overall shape predetermined by core preparation as well as by subsequent trimming.

In more open savanna areas of the continent, development took a somewhat different course, although the end product was often remarkably similar. Massive discoidal cores appeared in the late Acheulian industries; their preparation involved processes closely analogous to those involved in the production of hand axes. Eventually, the making of handaxes ceased and the discoidal cores became progressively smaller and more varied in shape. In the savanna country of eastern and southern Africa these post-Acheulian cultural stages are often classed as proto-Stillbay and Stillbay, although this terminology masks a considerable amount of interregional variation.

Other regions lack relevant data, either because their human occupation was not continuous (as in much of the Sahara) or because insufficient research has been undertaken (as in parts of West Africa).

In recent years it has been recognized that these archaeological materials represent social and economic developments of the greatest importance. Increased diversity and specialization is probably attested to in the African archaeological record well before corresponding trends are apparent in other parts of the world. Specialization carries implications for concomitant cooperation and communication. Development of prepared-core techniques of stone-tool manufacture has major implications for reconstructing human ability for visualizing abstractions and thus for interest in spirituality. These, in turn, suggest that art and language may have been approaching the complexity attained among more recent populations.

Speech is often regarded by archaeologists as a single phenomenon that originated at a single time;

increasingly this development has been linked in recent years with the emergence of *Homo sapiens sapiens*. Such a view must be a gross oversimplification. Human speech covers an enormous range, from simple communication of needs (as for food, warmth, or sex) to the expression of complex ideas and abstractions. If, as argued above, the latter was associated with the middle Stone Age, the former must have a far greater antiquity, probably extending back to the growth in cranial capacity that accompanied the initial emergence of humanity.

Parallels have been noted between the processes outlined above and the conclusions based on analyses of mitochondrial DNA in modern human populations that are interpreted as suggesting that anatomically modern people (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) may originally have evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa before spreading out to other continents. The time depth tentatively attributed to this process by geneticists is broadly analogous with that of the middle Stone Age.

The African middle Stone Age has thus been transformed from an archaeological backwater, so to speak, to an area of major importance for understanding the origins of modern humans on a worldwide front. In due course this will presumably provide an impetus for increased research activity within Africa. Already, innovations such as use of specialized bone tools, previously considered as restricted to the late Stone Age, have been demonstrated to be far earlier both in eastern Congo and in South Africa.

It is noteworthy that later developmental stages similarly appear to have been pioneered in Sub-Saharan Africa. True mode 4 industries are generally absent other than in restricted areas where suitable raw materials were available, such as parts of South Africa where blades form an important component of certain middle Stone Age assemblages, and certain Kenyan and Ethiopian highland regions where blade-based industries, as in Europe, precede those of mode 5. The development of mode 5 technology, based on the production of backed microliths, took place at widely disparate times (apparently more than once) in different regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The earliest such event was in the southern coastal regions and elsewhere in South Africa, in the Howiesons Poort industry that may be more than 100,000 years old. Comparable technology was a gradual development with less than half this antiquity in the savannas and forest fringes of eastern Africa, but it was not until Holocene times that it became ubiquitous. These observations confirm that the conventional division between middle Stone age and late Stone Age has outlived its utility.

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Stone Age (Later): Central and Southern Africa

The later Stone Age of central and southern Africa represents a continuation and amplification of behaviors first expressed by hunter-gatherers in the middle Stone Age, including increased regional specialization in technology, greater use—and survival—of organic materials, deliberate burial, and the systematic use of art. Later Stone Age tools first appear in central Africa about 40,000 years ago and continue to be made until about 100 years ago in regions still populated by hunter-gatherers. The historical and contemporary presence of hunter-gatherers in the Kalahari Basin and tropical forests of central Africa provide a link between the ethnographic present and the archaeological record which enables archaeologists to model social, ideological, and economic changes in the more recent later Stone Age. In particular, the southern African ethnographic record has been used to explain the social context of the region's later Stone Age rock art.

The transition from Middle to later Stone Age technologies takes place between 40,000 and 20,000 years ago. A shift occurs in techniques of producing stone tools with greater emphasis on smaller, more standardized flakes and blades used as inserts in handles and shafts of bone, horn, ivory, or wood. Small inserts or microliths were made in central Africa between 40,000 and 30,000 years ago, and slightly later in southern Africa between 30,000 and 20,000 years ago. The earliest evidence for microlithic technology comes from Matupi Cave on the edge of the Ituri forest in north-eastern Congo. Pollen and animal remains from Matupi show that 40,000 years ago this region was drier and the cave was situated in a mixed habitat of forest and grassland savanna. Early evidence of microlithic technology is also found in west central Africa at the Shum Laka rock shelter in the highlands

of Cameroon. The lowest deposits, dated to 31,000 years ago, provide evidence for a grassland environment.

Microlithic technology may have enabled hunter-gatherer communities to extract more types of food, and more efficiently, from a wider variety of habitats. A broadly based diet would have been an advantage during periods of climate change when availability of plant and animal foods would be unpredictable and pressure from other human groups may have grown. The increasingly dry and cool conditions that affected central and southern Africa 30,000 years ago may have stimulated the subsequent widespread adoption of microlithic technology but cannot explain the earlier origin of the later Stone Age. The lack of well-dated sites with preserved environmental data for this early period, especially in the tropical lowlands of the Zaire River Basin and the dry interior of southern Africa, makes any explanation of the development of the later Stone Age largely conjectural.

Around the eastern and southern fringes of southern Africa, the shift to microlithic technology had taken place about 22,000 years ago, as can be seen at sites in Zambia and South Africa. Between 20,000 and 12,000 years ago, regional differences emerge in the types, frequencies, and techniques of making microliths. North of the Zambezi, a distinctive tradition of microlith manufacture, the Nachikufan industry, develops in central and eastern Zambia. Small blades were trimmed to form narrow pointed inserts and some flakes were shaped into geometric forms such as crescents and triangles. Other characteristic tools include small scrapers and bored stones that may have been weights attached to digging sticks. Nachikufan-like assemblages also occur in northeast Zimbabwe.

In South Africa, the earliest recognizable expression of later Stone Age microlithic technology, called the Robberg industry after the area of its discovery on the southern Cape coast, dates to about 22,000 years ago. Unlike the contemporary Nachikufan, Robberg microlithic technology is less standardized, with few formally shaped inserts and few scrapers. Bone tools, pigment, and ostrich eggshell artifacts are found in Robberg sites, and the faunal record suggests the hunting of large migratory game on the plains of the highlands of far southeast Africa. Robberg sites are absent from the Karoo and Namibia, areas that are today scrubland and desert, respectively. Here, nonmicrolithic tool making continued until about 10,000 years ago. These hunter-gatherers may have been isolated from groups to the south and east or simply chose to retain a successful technology suited to the rigors of the region.

By 14,000 years ago, the prevailing cool dry climatic conditions ended, as warmer and wetter conditions returned to central and southern Africa. North of the

Zambezi, variants of the Nachikufan industry continued with no interruption to the microlithic tradition. In equatorial central Africa, a later Stone Age variant known as the Tshitolian, develops from a local middle Stone Age adaptation to a forest environment. Flared triangular microliths are among the distinctive artifacts of the Tshitolian, which includes larger hafted tools, possibly used as axes for felling trees or for wood-working. Sites in the heartland of the Tshitolian, the Kinshasha plain and northeast Angola, are poorly dated and rarely preserve organic remains because of acidic soils. Kalahari sands underlie this region and reflect previous northward incursions of the desert during arid phases from its current location in Botswana. South of the Zambezi, a break in the microlithic tradition occurred between 12,000 and 8,000 years ago. Polished bone points took the place of microlithic arrowheads and large hand held scrapers made on coarse raw materials replaced small-hafted scrapers. A shift toward hunting smaller game is also part of the 4,000-year interlude known as the Oakhurst Complex in South Africa and the Pomongwe in the Matopos region of southern Zimbabwe. The Oakhurst is named after a southern Cape farm where the distinctive nonmicrolithic industry was first recognized. Regional variants are found across South Africa, including numerous undated open-air sites in the interior. Resettlement of the interior followed the end of the arid phase that had made this an inhospitable area for hunter-gatherers. The population of southern Africa as a whole rose about 13,000 years ago. Explanations for the shift from microlithic to nonmicrolithic technology from southern Zimbabwe southward stress climatic and demographic stimuli but there is no direct correlation between these forces and the preference for large over small scrapers or bone over stone points. The Oakhurst could be a social response to environmental changes and population growth analogous to those seen among living hunter-gatherers. Indirect evidence exists in Oakhurst for the formation of alliances between widely dispersed groups, seasonal gathering of large groups for ritual and social exchange and complex religious beliefs, reflected in deliberate burials with grave goods and the making of portable art.

By 8,000 years ago the nonmicrolithic traditions of southern Africa are replaced by microlithic assemblages characterized by highly standardized inserts, especially scrapers, blades, and flakes trimmed into a variety of geometric shapes. Where organic preservation is especially good, such as at the waterlogged site of the Gwisho hot springs in southern Zambia, there is evidence of the use of a variety of materials including wood and bark for tools, leather for clothing, and grass for bedding. From the Zambezi southward these microlithic industries are grouped into the Wilton

Complex, named after two rock shelters in the Eastern Cape. The complex encompasses rapidly changing regional and chronological variants that span the period of the Wilton from 8,000 to 2,000 years ago. The return to microlithic technology takes place earliest in southern Zimbabwe about 10,000 to 9,000 years ago and at the same time in Namibia followed by a southward spread. This is a time of generally hot and dry conditions across central and southern Africa with the semidesert interior and its margins abandoned briefly between 6,000 and 4,000 years ago. Explanations for the dramatic reversal in tool-making traditions stress the interaction of environmental, demographic, and social trends, as in the case of the appearance of the Oakhurst. The readoption of microlithic technology may be part of wider strategy for coping with declining resources, which included increased reliance on extended social networks, and the clear demarcation of territorial rights through deliberate burial and highly visible rock art.

The rich archaeological record of the Wilton is the prehistory of indigenous hunter-gatherers and herders of southern Africa known collectively as the Khoisan. Pottery and sheep herding was introduced into the region about 2,000 years ago by herders moving south from Botswana. Cattle herding, ironmaking agriculturists followed, originating in central Africa. The later Stone Age hunter-gatherer way of life changed irrevocably, with some groups becoming acculturated into the new herder economy and others engaging in trade with agriculturists. Later Stone Age peoples no longer lived in a world of hunter-gatherers. The colonization of southern Africa by Europeans led to the final destruction of Khoisan communities. North of the Zambezi, the microlithic Nachikufan remained largely intact into recent centuries in northern and eastern Zambia, but the presence of pottery indicates interaction with farmer communities. In the forests of central Africa, hunter-gatherers of small stature—"pygmies"—today live in close contact with settled indigenous farming communities. Central African hunter-gatherers differ genetically from the Khoisan, and this reflects a long separation of the forest and savanna communities of the later Stone Age, a distinction that may have its roots in the middle Stone Age.

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Stone Age (Later): Eastern Africa

The criteria for defining the "late Stone Age" are technological rather than chronological. It should be remembered that the late Stone Age is not a time period, but represents instead an attempt to bring a broad three-age definition to the vast range of later prehistoric African stone tool industries. The later Stone Age at its simplest technological level of definition subsumes all lithic industries of a microlithic character. Microliths are small stone tools in a range of shapes, which are frequently backed (blunted) along one edge; this backing is believed to have facilitated the hafting of the tool to a wooden stock/handle; traces of mastic have only rarely been found on these backed edges.

Although the use of the term *later Stone Age* (hereafter, LSA) is broadly accepted, and commends itself by its simplicity, it ignores a great deal of stylistic variation; LSA technologies in certain parts of eastern Africa also include blade industries underlying these microlithic industries. The earliest microlithic industries in Africa are observed as far back as 70,000BCE (in the case of the enigmatic Howison's Poort industry at Klasies River Mouth, South Africa), and nearer to our region at around 30,000BCE at Matupi cave, eastern Zaire (Phillipson 1993, pp.60–101); in many areas of Africa some populations still use microlithic stone tools in their everyday lives, yet one would recoil at the thought of defining the African modern world as the LSA. This is a vast temporal canvas on which to work, and emphasizes the unsuitability of the term *late Stone Age* as a chronological indicator.

The period during which LSA industries were fabricated fits in geologically with the later Pleistocene and Holocene periods. Paleoenvironmental data—derived mainly from lake cores—indicate a marked cool and dry period in eastern Africa (the hypothermal) at around 16,000BCE, which on a global scale was a phenomenon associated with the maximum extent of the ice sheets during the later Pleistocene. The onset of the Holocene at around 10,000BCE was marked in eastern

Africa by the melting of the mountain glaciers and an increased rate of precipitation that led to an increase in size of local lake and river systems. A number of arid, cooler periods are noted throughout the Holocene, and these varied in duration and severity until the onset of neothermal conditions at around 3000BCE (Brooks and Robertshaw 1990). It should be noted that the region under consideration here offers a vast spectrum of ecological and raw material resources, and only a very generalized cultural outline may be presented here. It should be noted that there are still large gaps to be filled in the archaeological record, and the extant radiometric dates can only provide a bare chronological frame in which to work. Let us now consider the nature of cultural and economic change within eastern Africa during this period, starting in the north of the region with the relatively unknown Ethiopian/Eritrean highland/Rift Valley and Somalian sequences.

The key source for understanding the later Stone Age cultural succession in the Horn of Africa remains Desmond Clark's seminal 1954 work *The Prehistoric Cultures of the Horn of Africa*; it is a testament to the quality of this synthesis that it should still be of relevance today. Of late, new information from the present writer's research in the Aksum region has thrown new light on the LSA of the Ethiopian/Eritrean highlands; an LSA blade industry has been noted in stratified sequences dating to around 10,000BCE, and the makers of these industries were essentially hunter-gatherers who exploited plentiful animal resources in a highland zone that was probably wetter than today (Brandt 1986). At around 8000BCE a fully microlithic industry emerged in the area, essentially building on local cultural foundations; this industry was based almost exclusively on quartz, an ideal material for the fabrication of small, sharp-edged tools, and associated faunal evidence would seem to indicate a shift in preference toward smaller ungulates. Similar microlithic tool forms (generically termed "Wiltonian") have been noted at sites across highland Ethiopia and Eritrea, but these stone tool industries remain poorly understood, as does the emergence of the first pottery in this area, which is held to have occurred sometime after 4000BCE. We can only be imprecise because of the lack of good associated radiometric dates, and this problem applies additionally to evidence for plant exploitation, which is nonexistent until pre-Aksumite times (i.e. after 500BCE). Along the Rift Valley, and into the Red Sea coastal hinterlands, similar developments are noted; blade industries are recognized in southern Somalia—the Magosian industry, and in the north at Midhishi 2—and the Hargeisan, though the integrity of the former industry is at best dubious (Brandt 1986). It is possible that the earliest manifestation of an LSA industry in the Rift/lowland zone of Ethiopia is represented by material

from Lake Ziway, dating to around 25,000BCE. In southern Somalia, microlithic industries are represented by the Eibian/Doian industry—dating from around 7000BCE—and in the north by the broadly contemporaneous “Wilton” industries. Economic evidence from Lake Besaka in the Ethiopian Rift points to a gradual shift away from hunting and fishing toward stock keeping by around 1500BCE (Brandt 1986). From a social orientation, perforated ostrich eggshell beads have been discovered at LSA sites in the lowlands, human burials were observed at Lake Besaka and Bur Eibe, and the region is home to an extensive concentration of rock art that was associated with LSA *sensu lato* stone tool–using populations.

Moving southward, the pioneer of LSA studies in the Kenyan Savanna and highland zones was the noted archaeologist Louis Leakey, who in the 1930s attempted to establish a rough chronology of technological development with old shore-lines on Rift Valley lakes. Leakey’s excavations at Gamble’s Cave yielded the “Upper Kenya Capsian” (latterly called Eburran) industry, the first LSA industry to be satisfactorily defined in this region. The recently excavated cultural sequence from Enkapune Ya Moto (Marean 1992) would appear to indicate that an LSA industry was in place by at least 14,000BCE, and that these early LSA industries were overlain by this morphologically distinctive Eburran industry. In many cases, the antecedents of the Eburran industry are poorly known, and many disparate underlying LSA industries have been observed at a number of sites in Kenya (e.g. Nderit Drift, Lukenya Hill). The Eburran would appear to be essentially a functionally specialized, mainly obsidian-based industry of hunting populations concentrated around the eastern Rift Valley in south central Kenya from around 11,000 to 7000BCE. Other microlithic industries in the area remain poorly defined, and are generically subsumed under that very loose term *Wilton*.

Evidence for a strikingly different economic strategy in the region at this time is witnessed by contemporary lakeside settlements around Lake Turkana in northern Kenya. These specialist sites, which include Lothagam and Lowasera, yielded wavy-line pottery akin to that witnessed at Khartoum Mesolithic sites in the central Nile Valley, and they date from somewhere between the ninth and fifth millennia BCE. Cultural remains at these sites included quantities of bone harpoon points, and faunal evidence points to economies based on extensive utilization of aquatic resources including a range of fish, crocodile, and hippopotamus (Stewart 1989).

Within Tanzania and Uganda the picture is somewhat sparse. Excavations at the rock shelters of Kisese and Nasera would seem to indicate early occurrences

of microlithic industries as far back as 18,000BCE, based broadly on earlier local lithic traditions and associated with a hunting economy based on a wide range of fauna including large and small land game, birds, fish and reptiles. The sequence from the Ugandan site of Munyama Cave on an island in Lake Victoria would seem to indicate the emergence of a microlithic industry at around 13,000BCE.

A number of key points may be made from this generalized overview. Toward the south of our region, microlithic industries emerged between the eighteenth and fifteenth millennia BCE, much later than is observed south of the Limpopo. Into the Horn, these industries appeared later still and were frequently preceded by blade industries. All these microlithic industries subsume a wide range of variation in form and in raw material preference; these two factors are clearly linked.

Two key contemporary economic components may be noted: broad-spectrum generalist hunting-gathering economies of the highland and savanna zones, and specialist fishing settlements around the lake margins. Direct archaeological evidence for plant utilization in this region until at least 500BCE (northern Ethiopia) is exceptionally sparse; this could be a simple question of assuming negative evidence, or may point to problems concerning the preservation of African-origin cereals. It is certain that these peoples were, to a degree, beginning to manage their economic resources and plan their resource procurement strategies. Essentially, the foundations of the later eastern African agricultural economies were being built on these local protointensive, or “preadaptive,” hunter-gatherer economies.

From a social aspect, the wide-ranging raw material procurement strategies in certain areas may point to the building of incipient trade/exchange links (Barut 1994); this would certainly be reflected in the widespread ornamental use of beads, and the cases of human burial and rock art representations may point to a deeper ideological sense in these hunter-gatherer peoples than we have given credit for. What remains clear is that a great deal more research on this fascinating period is required, with special emphasis on the retrieval of early plant material, well-dated cultural sequences, and integrated programs of palaeo-environmental research.

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See also: Permanent Settlement, Early; Rock Art: Eastern Africa.

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Stone Age (Later): Nile Valley

Long before the first human beings existed, the Nile River Valley was a major route by which Lake Victoria drained through the longest riverbed in Africa into the Mediterranean far to the north. From the highlands of equatorial Africa, where today Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania are located, it eventually coursed through thick vegetation and swamps before reaching a series of rapids known as cataracts where ancient Nubia would in time emerge. Continuing its descent through arid lands where Upper Egypt would emerge, it eventually entered the delta that would become Lower Egypt before emptying into the sea. Long known for its unique importance to the unfolding of human evolution, Eastern Africa, including the Nile Valley, is equally important to the study of human prehistory.

Corresponding with an extended period of heavy rainfall widely known as the Mousterian Subpluvial between 50,000 and 25,000 years ago, mountains of Ethiopia's central plateau where Lake Tana is located captured so much water that for the first time this lake developed its own course of drainage into the Nile. After this second source for the Nile came into being, a distinction was eventually made between the so-called White Nile flowing from Lake Victoria and the so-called Blue Nile cascading from the mountains of Ethiopia. It is the river valley north of where the Blue and White Niles have their confluence that is the focus of this article about the late Stone Age of the Nile Valley.

In this particular area, the late Stone Age extends roughly from 30,000BCE to 5,500BCE. Alternatively, it is also known as the Upper Palaeolithic or late Palaeolithic stage in the cultural development of

ancient Nubia and Egypt. The unfolding of late Stone Age cultural innovations in this valley, while pivotal to an understanding of prehistoric civilization in ancient Nubia and Egypt, also has relevance to our understanding of the emergence of civilization globally.

Though by the late Stone Age our ancestors were anatomically modern human beings, their subsistence remained centered on the foraging of wild plants and wild animals, also known as hunting, gathering, and fishing. Associated with contrasting environments, resources, and biodiversity within the valley, toolmaking evolved so as to reflect considerable variation from one Nilotic subregion to another. While relative changes in patterns of toolmaking during the late Stone Age were many, probably none was more important overall than the increasing emphasis placed on the manufacture of small stone tools classified as microliths. More specifically, the increased emphasis on greater reliance on microlithic blades and small projective points that were sometimes hafted on shafts represented a major technological advance during this stage of prehistoric subsistence and development.

As early as the middle Stone Age, the Nile Valley had been home to an array of coexisting cultures, as illustrated on the Kom Ombo Plain just south of ancient Egypt. However around 30,000 years ago, when the late Stone Age was beginning, the coexistence of different traditions near each other became more widespread. In large parts of Upper Egypt and Nubia people developed localized specialization in exploiting new plants and riverine foods with microliths as large mammals on which their ancestors had depended became increasingly scarce. Overall, all such specialization merely represented variation within a pattern of broad spectrum foraging that was the focus of subsistence throughout the valley.

In addition to the emergence of Sebilian, Silsilian, and Sebekian stonemaking or lithic traditions, by 17,000BCE the Fakhurian and two subtypes of the Idfuan, one of which was well represented at Wadi Halfan, were also apparent. Similar innovations also took place at the Dabarosa Complex, at some eight or so camps reflecting Gemaian culture in Upper Nubia, and at Ballanan sites in Lower Nubia. During the period from about 14,000 to 12,000 years ago, other innovations tied to the needs of particular subregions became apparent in traditions known as Qadan, Afian, and Isnan. While during this same period, Nubians at Jabel Sahaba manufactured bows and arrows, it was only some three to five millennia later that bows and arrows were manufactured in Europe.

Although foraging remained the dominant subsistence pattern throughout the valley's late Stone Age, some evidence points in the direction of indigenous experimentation with plant domestication in the Isna

area as early as 16,000 years ago that may have been the earliest such activity in the world. Though any such precocious experimentation was not sustained here, during the still early period of between 11,000 and 9,000 years ago, other evidence points in the same direction. That Nilotic foragers did this is suggested by grinding stones used for plant preparation both in the Arkinian (10,580 years ago) and Shamarkian (8860 years ago) industries just north of the Second Cataract in the center of Nubia. Arkin 8 finds in northern Sudan are also outstanding for evidence of the most ancient house-like shelters ever discovered in the valley, in fact, the second most ancient ever discovered in Africa.

Between around 7000 and 6000BCE, when heavy rainfall enabled the Nile to deposit copious amounts of rich silt along its banks, residents of Nubia and Upper Egypt, whose numbers by this time were augmented by Saharan immigrants with a history of herding, used the changed environment both to expand herding and to supplement herding and foraging with farming. In these ways, indigenous herding and experimentation with farming in the valley as well as the Western Desert helped to establish the foundation of later civilization that would be based on agriculture.

There remains much to be learned about the transition from Epipalaeolithic lifeways like those at El Kabian and in Badari villages to Predynastic cultures that would follow, but at least in the south some important continuities are suggested at Bir Kiseiba and Nabta Playa in southwestern Egypt before 6000BCE and at Nubia's Catfish Cave around 5110BCE. While sustained agriculture associated with a truly Neolithic way of life, including settled farming communities, has been confirmed in the Nile Valley from only around 5,000BCE or in the early predynastic era, some indigenous antecedents already existed in Upper Egypt and in Nubia. In northern Egypt, in contrast, the predynastic era made its early appearance in Merimde Beni-Salama and Fayum A developments thanks largely to domesticated introduced from nearby southwestern Asia.

Alongside this north-south contrast, as the late Stone Age gave way to the succeeding predynastic period, some trends were shared throughout the valley. These included more toolmaking through polishing as well as earlier chipping methods, large increases in the proportion of microliths and composite tools manufactured, and the emergence of larger and more permanent communities relying more on farming than foraging and having considerable investment in storage facilities.

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Stone Age (Later): Sahara and North Africa

During the early Stone Age, humans had reached the Sahara, but their remains in this region are few, and we know them almost exclusively through surface finds of diverse stone tools. These lithic assemblages have been given names borrowed from European prehistory: *Lower Palaeolithic* and *Acheulean*. These terms only point to typologic analogies, not to actual links with European groups. Some bones of *Homo erectus* accompany these finds.

However, toward the end of Palaeolithic times, a specifically African group was emerging: the Aterian. Its tools were smaller (5 to 10 centimeters), and still lacked blades; their exact function is unknown. It is clear that the Aterian moved in groups of nomad hunters. Remains of their campsites have been found from the Atlantic coast to the Nile Valley, in all regions of the Maghrib, and through the southern Sahara (Mauritania, northern Mali, Air, and southern Tibesti). Aterian sites are particularly numerous in the Mediterranean region Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. However, the cultural features they have in common are very few, except for a degree of homogeneity in lithic assemblages.

Two sites, Dar es Soltan and Temara (near Rabat, Morocco), have provided bones of Aterian individuals. Contrary to accepted opinion, which linked Aterians to Neanderthals, it was eventually discovered that these bones were attributable to the "modern" physical type *Homo sapiens sapiens*. The Aterian developed during several successive wet episodes between c.175,000 and 70,000BP. A long, severe arid episode, the Post-aterian Hyperarid Phase, followed in the Sahara, which was devoid of fauna and humans until around 9000BCE.

It was only around 15,000BCE that other populations, called the epipalaeolithic, appeared in the

Mahgrib, characterized by new lithic traditions. The earliest epipalaeolithic group is the Iberomaurusian. They were initially given this name because they were thought to be linked with Iberian groups, though this theory has since been discredited. The main feature of the Iberomaurusian is a profusion of small blades, 2 to 5 centimeters long, that are often retouched on one edge. They equipped diverse multifunction tools, adapted to the needs of this group of seminomad hunter-gatherers. The remains of both men and women are marked by a distinctive practice, the meaning of which is unknown: the upper incisors were extracted at around 12 to 15 years of age. Their physical type is fairly uniform: the Mechta el-Arbi or Mechta-Afalou type, which refers to a tall, robust man, close to the European Cro-Magnon type, with which it was contemporaneous. Iberomaurusian sites are scattered in Algeria on the Mediterranean coast, and in Morocco along the Atlantic coast, as well as in the inland mountains. They are not found in the central Sahara, which was in this period still uninhabited.

The end of the Iberomaurusians is obscure. They disappeared around 10,000–8000BCE, when the lithic tradition of the Capsian, also epipalaeolithic, took their place. One view as to the demise of the one group and rise of the other values lithic typology, setting it in the position of a major cultural feature for defining the identity of ethnic groups. This theory posits the Capsians as an ethnic group of newcomers, probably arriving from the Middle East, and driving out and replacing the Iberomaurusians. However, other scholars only describe a trivial evolution in the technology of stone tools within diverse ethnic groups, who were simply at approximately the same stage as far as lithic typology is concerned. The latter position was strengthened by systematic studies conducted by a Canadian team (Lubell, Sheppard, and Jackes 1984) on Capsian sites in the Constantine region (Algeria). They could show that, even if only lithic assemblages are taken into account, statistical differences between some layers with exclusively Capsian tools are larger than differences between Iberomaurusian and Capsian sets considered in bulk.

Besides small blades, the Capsian sets include genuine blades (about 5–10 centimeters long) and also geometric microliths (triangles, trapezes, crescents). The latter have small dimensions, often of 1 to 2 centimeters, and are finely chipped. Adornment objects, notably made from fragments of ostrich egg shell, are also found, sometimes decorated with geometric patterns.

The Mechta el-Arbi physical type is still frequent among the Capsians, but types similar to current Mediterranean people were increasing in number. Capsian sites date from 10,000 to 8000BCE and 5000 to

4000BCE. The sites are mainly found in southern Tunisia, the Constantine region, and the eastern Saharan.

Animal domestication and plant cultivation were still unknown, and therefore the Capsian were classified as a group still belonging to the epipalaeolithic. Southward, the Capsian assemblages are not found beyond the Saharan Atlas. However, toward 9000BCE the Saharan space, which the Postaterian Hyperarid Phase had cleared, became alive again. Rains were coming back, and the period 9000 to 6000BCE is known as the Great Wet Phase of the beginning of the Holocene era. Fauna and humans repopulated massifs and even the plains. Groups that used tools of the epipalaeolithic type, diverse and small in size, are now perceived throughout the great plains of the eastern Sahara, Tibesti, Tassili, Hoggar, Air, and around the large lakes of northern Mali. Groups of nomad hunters were living in the mountains, mainly hunting Barbary sheep. Throughout the whole southern Sahara and current Sahel, from the Sudanese Nile to Mauritania, the rains of the Great Wet Phase maintained an abundance of rivers and lakes, where sedentary populations of fishermen and hippopotamus hunters were active. This group, linked with sources of water, has been called Aqualithic.

As early as 8500BCE, pottery appeared at El Adam in the western Egyptian Desert and at Tagalagal in Air. The domestication of cattle occurred later, perhaps as early as 8000BCE at a site in the western Egyptian Desert, Nabta, but more certainly around 5500BCE in other Saharan regions.

The Neolithic replaced the Stone Age. Its earlier phase, characterized by the presence of pottery but still a lack of animal domestication, is called the Saharo-Sudanese Neolithic. Toward 6000BCE, the Great Wet Phase came to its end, and the vast Saharan areas gradually became the great desert we know today. However, between 5000 and 3000BCE, a last wet fluctuation called the Neolithic Wet Phase supported the continuing existence of a steppe, which allowed the rise of the earliest pastoral societies and the birth of Saharan rock art. The era of the ancient hunter-gatherers of the prehistoric times had come to an end.

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See also: **Rock Art: Saharan.**

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Stone Age, Later: Western Africa

The West African later Stone Age (hereafter, LSA) covers a wide variety of assemblages that include one or more of the following: microliths, large flake tools, core tools such as axes and picks (flaked or ground), bone tools, pottery, and remains of domesticated plants and animals. Generally speaking, sites with microlithic or Levallois flaked stone artifacts are earliest (from c. 6,000 to 13,000 years ago), followed by the addition of pottery (between 4,500 and 6,000 years ago) and the appearance of domestic millet and cattle, sheep and goats in a number of sites in the northern half of Sub-Saharan West Africa (between 4000 and 3000 years ago). These three aspects of the LSA cannot be considered to be time-successive stages, as there is evidence for contemporaneous sites with and without food production, for example. Only in the past decade has it been realized that the adoption of new tool and subsistence technologies may have occurred in a complex mosaic fashion rather than along a simple advancing front. Thus, patterns of change and chronology cannot be extrapolated from one documented site to an entire region or beyond, as used to be common practice. Recent research focuses on documenting the range of sites within regions and describing variability in tool kit and subsistence. In the few areas where this kind of research is underway, a detailed picture of LSA lifeways has begun to emerge. For much of West Africa, however, our understanding of this period rests on a handful of excavations at sites widely separated in space and time.

The LSA developed against a backdrop of significant climate change. From 12,000 to 8000 years ago, conditions were much cooler and wetter than at present, and perennial rivers flowed in the Sahara. Between 8000 and 7000 years ago, there is evidence for a dry

period, the intensity of which varied from region to region. Renewed wet conditions after 7000 years ago appear to be correlated with the spread of pastoralism in the Sahara. Another period of desertification began around 4500 years ago, and within two millennia, rainfall and vegetation zones had reached approximately modern positions.

Microlithic Late Stone Age

Early LSA assemblages typically contain a variety of small flake tools, with at least one blunted edge and a sharp edge that were probably hafted for use. Where good quality stone was available, these microliths occur in a limited number of standardized geometric shapes, such as crescents and trapezoids. In many places, however, the available raw material was a poor quality quartz, which may account for the high proportion of unstandardized small flakes at these sites. Both kinds of microlith may be present in a single assemblage. At a few sites, larger flake tools were made using a Levallois technique, and it is not clear what the relationship between large flake tool and microlithic tool users might be. Notably, there seems to be little effort to procure better quality stone through travel or exchange during this period. At Shum Laka in Cameroon, one of the few sites where raw material studies have been done, obsidian, though present within 5 kilometers of the site, does not increase in frequency through the many millennia of occupation, nor is it used to produce more standardized or more efficient tools with less waste.

All groups at this early period (6,000–13,000 years ago) were hunter-gatherers living in small bands whose archaeological traces are known mainly from rock shelters and caves. These groups likely recolonized northern West Africa from the south after the end (c. 12,000 years ago) of a cold, hyperarid period that pushed the desert margin 500 kilometers south of its present location.

Ceramic Late Stone Age

Pottery first appeared in Africa in the central Sahara 9000 to 10,000 years ago. In West Africa, ceramics and ground stone axes were added to microlithic toolkits between 5,000 and 6,000 years ago. At some sites, large numbers of hoe- and pick-like core tools and axes are present. There have been various attempts to assign these microlithic and core tool assemblages to different "cultures" used by groups with different ways of life. Early researchers reasoned that the axes, for example, were for forest clearance, and the hoes for cultivation of yams. These large tool sites were thus assigned to the "Guinea Neolithic." More recent research emphasizes the co-occurrence of core and microlithic tools in many sites, with an increase in large tools through time. This may in fact be related to the

cultivation of crops, such as yams, that are difficult to detect archaeologically. Although there is no hard evidence for domesticated plants during this period, the increasing exploitation of oil rich seeds and oil palm nuts around 5000 years ago at sites such as Bosumpra and Kintampo (Ghana) suggests subsistence intensification. At the important site of Shum Laka (Cameroon), however, a subsistence economy based on hunting forest hog and dwarf forest buffalo continued without apparent change after the introduction of pottery around 6000 years ago. For English-speaking archaeologists, this lack of subsistence change provides a powerful reason for not automatically identifying as Neolithic all sites with pottery. French-speaking archaeologists, in contrast, consider the ceramic LSA to be “Neolithic.” It is not until around 4000 years ago that we have definite evidence for domestic plants and animals, a shift to greater sedentism in some areas, and increased involvement in regional and long-distance exchange.

Food Production and the Neolithic

Between 3000 and 4000 years ago, subsistence diversified in many northern regions of West Africa with the introduction of domestic livestock by herding populations moving out of the increasingly arid Sahara. Sites with domestic cattle and sheep or goat became concentrated in southerly, well-watered environs, such as the Tichitt Lake plain (Mauritania), the Tilemsi Valley (Mali), the floodplain of the Middle Niger (Mali), and the Lake Chad plain (Chad, Cameroon, northeastern Nigeria). Arrival of domestic livestock prior to the appearance of domestic plants (*Pennisetum millet*) is documented on the western margin of Lake Chad, where a pastoral economy that included hunting, fishing and collecting wild cereals was established five centuries before the appearance of domestic millet. Along the Middle Niger, several different, partly contemporaneous subsistence economies may have coexisted between 2,500 and 3,500 years ago, including semisedentary hunter-gatherer groups specializing in the exploitation of aquatic resources such as shellfish and fish; mobile hunter-gatherers; and agropastoralists with stock and domestic millet. Farther south, small sheep or goat appear approximately 3,600 years ago as new elements in a continuing hunting-gathering economy in the Kintampo region of central Ghana. The continued importance of wild resources long after the appearance of food production is a recurring pattern in West Africa.

A number of new trends accompany the shift to food production in West Africa. There is a rise in ornamentation as stone and shell beads, stone arm rings, bracelets, and pendants become common after 4,000 years ago. Trade and exchange networks

expand, such that raw materials from sources 250–400 kilometers away are present at many sites. Labor specialization is suggested by the occurrence of stone-and-shell bead-working ateliers, as well as stone ax quarry sites, where roughouts were produced. Residential mobility decreases through time, attested by an increase in the quantity of domestic material deposited, the appearance of storage pits, and a shift in some areas from thatch or wattle structures to more durable wattle and daub, banco, and, on the Tichitt escarpment where it exfoliates naturally, stone. House groupings within hamlets and villages have been mapped in the Kintampo region (Ghana) and on the plateaus around Tichitt in southeastern Mauritania. In this latter area, some arrangements of dry-stone walled residential enclosures form very large aggregations of over 200 compounds.

The large range of settlement sizes at Tichitt has prompted hypotheses of centralized political organization and the existence of a vast site hierarchy. One of the difficulties in evaluating these interpretations is the lack of agreement by different researchers over the interpretation of chronology at these settlements. Additionally, the identification of the elites expected in a chiefdom or state has proven elusive at Tichitt, because imported “prestige” items are extremely rare in domestic contexts and no burials have yet been excavated. While big and small residential compounds do exist, differences in compound size are hard to interpret without information on which parts of the settlement were occupied contemporaneously. Some settlements may have been occupied for over a millennium. Additional research to resolve chronological issues will be necessary before the interpretation of sociopolitical organization at Tichitt can advance much farther. A similar set of issues hampers the interpretation of some quite extensive LSA sites in the Méma region of the Middle Niger. There, as in several other regions where burials have been excavated, lack of grave goods suggests that social stratification had not yet developed. However, a larger excavated sample may, in the future, change the current picture substantially and will do much to solidify current assessments.

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Sudan, nineteenth century.

Structural Adjustment: *See World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.*

Sudan People's Liberation Army: *See Garang, John, and the Sudan People's Liberation Party (SPLA).*

Sudan: Turco-Egyptian Period, 1820–1885


Between 1820 and 1885, most of present-day Sudan was under Turco-Egyptian colonial rule. The annexation of the country to Egypt was begun in 1820–1821 by Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, and later completed by his grandson Khedive Isma'il. Muhammad 'Ali's primary motives in undertaking the conquest were to obtain black slaves for a new army and to find new sources of revenue to finance his projects in Egypt. It is also probable that he wanted to crush the survivors of the Mamluk massacre, who had established themselves at Dongola.

The invading force, under the command of Muhammad 'Ali's son Isma'il, occupied Dongola and scattered the Mamluks without serious opposition. Indeed, in his relentless march southward, Isma'il encountered no serious military resistance, except two pitched battles with the Shayqiya. The Funj, already weakened by internal strife and intrigue, capitulated without a fight. The last of their sultans, Badi VI, made the submission in person before Isma'il at

Wad Medani. Meanwhile, after taking Dongola and the Shayqiya country, Muhammad 'Ali sent his son-in-law Muhammad Khusraw ad-Daramali, the Bey Daftardar, to Kordofan. At Bara, the Fur governor of the province, the Maqdam Musallim, was defeated and the Daftardar entered El-Obeid unopposed on August 20, 1821.

Having attained the military objectives of the conquest, Isma'il turned his attention to consolidating the conquests. The capital was moved from Sennar to Wad Medani and a rudimentary administration established. In late October 1822, however, he was assassinated at Shendi while en route to Cairo. The incident triggered widespread rebellion among the riverine Sudanese, who had already become restive because of an oppressive new tax system. The rebellion was eventually crushed, but at high cost in life and property.

As its position steadily grew stronger, the regime added new territories to the original conquests: Kassala and Suakin (1840), Equatoria (1871), Bahr al-Ghazal (1873) and Darfur (1874). A highly centralized bureaucracy, headed by a governor general or *hukumdar* directly answerable to Cairo, was developed to administer the country. Cairo also depended on the army to maintain its authority in the Sudan. The troops consisted of the *jihadiya*, of slave origin, and Shayqiya irregulars, who replaced the Turkish and Albanian irregulars of Isma'il's army. Both served the Turco-Egyptian regime with devotion and loyalty until the end of its tenure.



Sudan.

Their position consolidated, the Egyptians proceeded to exploit Sudan's natural resources. Considerable sums of money were spent on gold prospecting in the Fazughli area and around Jabal Shaybun in the Nuba Mountains, but nothing came of the search. In agriculture some success was achieved. From the early years of the conquest, Egyptian experts were sent to the Sudan to teach new methods to Sudanese farmers. The strategy paid off. The irrigation system was improved and new basin lands along the Nile were brought into use. The result was a marked expansion in the area of cultivable land available to the riverine communities. Pests, plagues, and locusts were effectively combated, and experiments with new crops led to the successful growing of sugarcane and cotton. Veterinary services were extended to the Sudan, as was expertise for the preservation of hides and skins. Coupled with the construction of watering and feeding places along the principal routes, these measures facilitated the export of cattle, camels, and hides to Egypt.

Livestock exports to Egypt were only part of the growing volume of trade between the two countries made possible by the improved security on trade routes. The Egyptian government was anxious to expand it in order to generate more revenue. Partly because of this, steamer services were introduced on the Nile and linked to the Egyptian railway system. Trade goods could now flow both ways with relative ease. The development of an electric telegraph system, with a network of up to 3,000 miles of telegraph line by 1880, further boosted trade since it improved contacts between merchants. Trade was aided also by the

construction of warehouses along the main trade routes to which goods bound for Egypt were first collected before shipping northward.

Much of the profits from this expanding economy went to the Egyptian state which, between 1821 and 1838, had an exclusive monopoly of Sudan's external trade. A small number of private traders—Sudanese, Egyptians and some Turks—prospered, too, through selling to and buying from the state trading company and participating in domestic commerce. After 1838, European traders entered the field and established themselves in Khartoum, where the presence of foreign consulates served to support and protect their commercial interests. The main attraction for them was ivory, readily available in abundance in the southern Sudan. The quest to obtain it inevitably led in 1839–1841 to the opening of the White Nile route to the south.

Traders and missionaries soon flocked southward to exploit the natural and human resources of the southern Sudan. The traders were the first to go. They organized regular commercial expeditions to the south in search of ivory and made handsome profits. Missionaries followed later and established a mission station for the Roman Catholics at Gondokoro in 1851; but death from fever and growing resentment and hostility among the Bari forced its eventual closure in 1860.

Bari hostility was partly the result of deteriorating relationship between the southerners and the traders caused by a set of interrelated circumstances. As nearby sources of ivory were depleted and the traders became increasingly dependent on intermediaries in their search for it, the Bari demanded higher prices for less tusks. At the same time, rivalry between Turkish officials and European traders and their unscrupulous manipulation of promising middlemen like Nyigilo destroyed Bari trust in both groups of intruders. This in turn undermined all efforts to establish a proper basis for a mutually beneficial commercial relationship. To compound the situation, the invaders adopted a hostile contemptuous attitude toward the southerners, regarding them as racially inferior. Henceforth, violent confrontation could hardly be avoided.

With ivory still much sought after but its search blocked by the stalemate that had developed between the invaders and the southerners, the traders began to acquire it by force. From *zaribas* (fortified bases) established away from the Nile stations they raided surrounding peoples for grain and cattle to exchange for ivory. The relationship between the southerners and the invaders had begun to fray into violence, which spread outward from the advancing frontier like a whirlwind. Trade and robbery had been fused together and a policy of divide and rule adopted to perpetuate it.

The extension of the trading frontier into the interior spurred demands for slaves to supply the domestic needs of the trading communities. Moreover, faced with rising expenditure, decreasing profits, and high credit interests, White Nile traders soon realized that slaves could be used as a form of payment to their employees to reduce the actual cost of their services. As in raids for grain and cattle, European traders took the lead in the taking of slaves. The result was that a secondary slave trade developed as a by-product of the ivory trade. By 1864 all traders on the White Nile combined the export of slaves with that of ivory and zaribas could be found scattered throughout Equatoria.

A similar sequence of violence and conflict was taking place about the same time in the Bahr al-Ghazal under the auspices of Arab traders. Like their counterparts on the White Nile, the Bahr al-Ghazal traders constructed zaribas from which they traded in slaves. But while the White Nile traders exported their slaves by way of the Nile, they channeled theirs overland through Darfur and Kordofan. The trade was so lucrative that large firms soon emerged whose powerful and wealthy owners became virtual rulers of the areas in which they traded.

Viceroy Muhammad Sa'id had begun to take steps to stop this ignominious trade, but it was only Khedive Isma'il who exerted the most concerted efforts toward that goal. In 1864 a river police force was established on the Nile at Fashoda to intercept vessels carrying slaves. A heavy capitation tax on personnel was also levied on the traders' employees as was a property tax on their zaribas. These measures reduced, but did not end, the White Nile slave trade. Isma'il then decided that annexation of the Southern Sudan was the answer to the problem. Consequently two expeditions, one under Muhammad al-Hilali and the other commanded by Sir Samuel Baker, were respectively dispatched to the Bahr al-Ghazal and Equatoria to extend khedivial rule there and to suppress the slave trade. Both expeditions met with failure. Hilali was killed by the most powerful of the traders in the Bahr al-Ghazal, al-Zubayr Rahma Mansur, in the inevitable conflict that ensued between the Turco-Egyptian forces and the traders. Baker lacked tact and statesmanship and quarreled with almost everyone: governor general Ja'afar Mazhar Pasha, the slave traders and the southerners whose interests he was supposed to protect. His only achievement was the establishment of a few isolated military garrisons.

Baker's successor as governor of Equatoria, Charles George Gordon, achieved some success in suppressing the slave trade. By declaring the collection of ivory a government monopoly, banning the importation of firearms and ammunition, and breaking up private armies, he put the traders out of business. Nonetheless,

they remained in Equatoria sulking at the antislavery policy and waiting to foment trouble at the earliest opportunity.

Meanwhile, after Hilali's death, Khedive Isma'il constituted Bahr al-Ghazal as a province and appointed Zubayr as its governor (December 1873). Zubayr eventually went on to defeat and occupy Darfur for Egypt (October 1874) before his unexpected incarceration in 1876 while on a visit to Cairo. The resulting anarchy in the province added to the serious problems facing the khedive in the Sudan. The treasury was collapsing, exhausted by expenditure on wars in Abyssinia and Darfur and the wadi Halfa railway project. Desperate measures imposed to increase revenue, including the suspension of all salaries, alienated government officials. To make matters worse, Gordon's zeal as governor general in continuing the antislavery policy pushed the traders to support rebellions that broke out in the Bahr al-Ghazal, Darfur and Kordofan.

Though all three revolts were suppressed, Isma'il was nevertheless the loser for he lost the all important struggle to avoid bankruptcy. In June 1879, bowing to European pressure, Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II deposed him. Shortly thereafter, Gordon resigned as governor general of the Sudan. His successor was Muhammad Ra'uf Pasha, a man who had served under both Baker and Gordon. It was under his administration that the Mahdist Revolution broke out in June 1881.

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See Also: **Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: Imperial Expansion.**

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Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898

Literally, *Mahdi* means "the guided one." In Islam, it refers to one chosen and guided by God to restore the community to its pristine purity (as it existed in the days of the Prophet Muhammad). Mahdism is thus the Islamic equivalent of the Judeo-Christian expectation of a messiah, a "deliverer" who would restore the "golden age."

The Mahdist revolt in the Sudan was a by-product of Egyptian imperialism. Muhammad 'Ali, who governed Egypt (1805–1848) is known for his expansive Westernization policy, which overhauled the country's economy and society. A former army officer, he considered a new military the cornerstone of his reforms. An Albanian, Muhammad 'Ali initially considered Egyptians unreliable as his soldiers. Motivated by the need for conscripts for his military and by a general need for gold, he invaded the Sudan in 1820. Within a year, much of the Sudan was under Egyptian jurisdiction. In 1822, Khartoum was founded as the headquarters of Egyptian operations; in 1830, the first Egyptian governor of the Sudan was installed there. The military success did not yield the 20,000–30,000 conscripts Ali had anticipated. Many Sudanese died resisting the Egyptians; transportation difficulties resulted in the deaths of many thousands more before they reached Egypt; and of the 20,000 who reached Aswan, only 3,000 remained alive by 1824. The hopes for gold were similarly disappointed because the deposits had long been exhausted.

The Egyptians were more successful in improving agricultural productivity in the Sudan. But this was for Egypt's benefit. Not only did Egypt control all external trade, considerable quantities of Sudanese products were also sent there. The severity of the taxes imposed on the Sudanese was only matched by their disillusionment. The end of Ali's tenure in 1848 brought no relief to the Sudanese. Thus, over the years, Sudanese resentment deepened and became the basis of popular support for the Mahdist movement. The antislavery campaign of Ismail, who came to office in Egypt in 1863, was the last straw. Slavery had long been the basis of the economies of large portions of the Sudan, which meant that there was a powerful mercantile class with a vested interest in it. Matters were further complicated by the brutal methods employed to eradicate slavery, and Ismail's extensive reliance on Europeans for his Sudanese operations. For the Sudanese who were mostly Muslims, Egyptian overrule was thus hardly distinguishable from Christian domination.

By 1879, much of the Sudanese population had been totally alienated from the Egyptian administration. Muhammad Ahmad provided them the framework for the ventilation of their anti-Egyptian feelings. On June 29, 1881, Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi. Although his movement was cast in religious idioms, its causal dimensions were complex.

Ahmad was born in 1844. His early formal education, like that of his peers in the Sudan, followed the basic Islamic pattern. By 1861, his religious interests had led him to a Sufi brotherhood, the Sammaniya. By 1870, when he settled at Aba, an island 160 miles south of Khartoum, Ahmad had become a highly regarded

religious leader. Like other religious leaders, he urged a return to the ideal Islamic life; but he also preached that a holy war upon the Egyptians and their local agents was one of the means to this end. This way, Ahmad attracted a large following and forged the diverse strands of Sudanese disillusionment into a movement and ultimately into an army.

Ahmad's audacity in finally proclaiming himself the Mahdi was certainly encouraged by Egypt's financial and political difficulties, which reached a head with Ismail's deposition in June 1879. Cairo's inability to militarily contain this incipient revolt further emboldened Ahmad and rallied more Sudanese support to his camp. Thus, by 1882, when Britain occupied Egypt, the military initiative belonged to the Mahdi. In 1883, Khedive Tawfiq raised an impressive military expedition under William Hicks, a retired British colonel, to crush the Mahdist revolt. The ensuing conflict was disastrous for Egypt, which lost virtually all the soldiers, including Hicks, sent against the Mahdists. Britain immediately decided to evacuate the Sudan, a task entrusted to Charles Gordon, one of Ismail's former governors of the Sudan. Gordon arrived in the Sudan in 1884; he understood his mandate as one of military offensive against the Mahdi. Without adequate resources for this purpose, he was soon isolated and killed in Khartoum in January 1885. Gordon's death removed any immediate challenge to the Mahdist state, which now established its capital at Omdurman, a few miles from Khartoum.

In June 1885, the Mahdi himself died. He had earlier named three of his ablest subordinates as *khalifa* (successor), and was succeeded by one of them, Abdallahi. Fundamentalist in his enforcement of the Shari'a at home, the khalifa and his entourage saw themselves as the vanguard of a universalistic (Islamic) revolution. He therefore wrote letters to Queen Victoria of England, the khedive, the Ottoman sultan, and the Emperor of Ethiopia, inviting them to come to Omdurman, to submit and convert to Islam. This aggressive policy brought the Mahdists into conflict with internal dissidents in Darfur, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria, as well as with both Ethiopia and Egypt.

The European "Scramble" for Africa spread into the Sudan in the early 1890s with the Belgians from the Congo probing the Congo-Nile watershed. In 1895, France sent an expedition into Bahr al-Ghazal. Consequently, Britain, in 1896, instructed Horatio Kitchener, the commander in chief of the Anglo-Egyptian army, to occupy the Sudan. He went into action against the Mahdists in September 1896, and captured Dongola. It took another two years before the Mahdists were routed by the well-supplied Kitchener. In the final battle on September 2, 1898, at Karari, near Omdurman, about 11,000 Mahdists were killed and 16,000 wounded, against 48 dead and 382 wounded on the Anglo-Egyptian

side. To fully avenge Gordon, Kitchener and his men exhumed the Mahdi and pulled out his fingernails. Meanwhile, the khalifa fled after the defeat of his forces; he was found and killed, along with his many supporters, in November 1899. Thus ended the Mahdist state.

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See also: Sudan: Turco-Egyptian Period, 1820–1885.

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Sudan: Omdurman and Reconquest

In 1877, Khedive Isma'il, viceroy of Egypt, appointed Englishman Charles George Gordon governor general of the Sudan (conquered by Egypt in 1821 under Muhammad 'Ali). In order to fulfill the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Convention signed that year by Isma'il (which called for an end to slavery in the Sudan within three years), Gordon launched an energetic antislavery campaign. However, in closing the markets and imprisoning traders, Gordon's campaign set off an economic crisis in the country. Because the antislavery movement was led by a European Christian, it also generated much hostility, and many came to believe that the antislavery actions were un-Islamic.

By 1879, Isma'il's profligate spending had bankrupted Egypt and he was forced into exile; Gordon resigned his post that same year. By 1881, the administration of the Sudan had become lax, the government unable to deal with the looming threat of revolt in the countryside, and a man named Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a boatbuilder, had declared himself to be the *Mahdi* ("divinely guided one").

His supporters viewed the Mahdi as someone whose arrival heralded the end of an age of darkness and the beginning of a new era of enlightenment. The Mahdi, for his part, was a staunch opponent of both the

orthodox *'ulama* (the learned scholars, whom he viewed as infidels for supporting government by foreign Christians) and the administration of the Sudan. The problems of the Sudan, he believed, could be solved only by a return to the ways of the Prophet Muhammad. Discontented elements in the Sudan allied themselves with the Mahdi, and a military campaign was launched to take control of the Sudan from what the rebels viewed as a corrupt and infidel administration. By 1882, the Mahdists had taken over most of the important parts of the Sudan; Khartoum fell to the Mahdi in 1885, and Gordon (who had been sent to save Khartoum) and his supporters were killed two days before the British-led military mission dispatched to rescue them arrived.

The Mahdi died shortly after taking Khartoum and political leadership fell to the *khalifah* (caliph) 'Abdallah, who viewed his mission as the expansion of the Mahdist state and Mahdist ideology from its new capital of Omdurman to the rest of the world. The khalifa's armies met with little success. The British were content to leave the Sudan to itself, even after Britain invaded Egypt in 1882. By the late 1890s, however, British officials had determined that the reconquest of the Sudan was a necessary, though not particularly appealing, step. This reluctant conclusion was forced upon Britain in part because of French efforts to obstruct the waters of the Nile. When it became evident that the British were not likely to withdraw from Egypt after 1882, the French, who were opposed to British control of Egypt, devised a plan to construct a dam on the waters of the Upper Nile near Fashoda; this, it was thought, would force Britain to withdraw from Egypt. The French launched their expedition under the command of Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand in 1896, and the British realized that despite their nominal control of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, they were, in fact, powerless to stop Marchand's forces. Taking the Sudan back from the khalifa thus became a necessity in order to safeguard the waters of the Nile; popular British sentiment in favor of avenging the murder of Gordon and the dreams of those like Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), the British consul general in Egypt, to establish British colonies from the Cape to Cairo, may have played roles as well.

In October 1897, Major General (later Lord) Herbert Kitchener was dispatched to head the Anglo-Egyptian forces in their reconquest of the Sudan; he began his march on the Mahdist capital on August 28, 1898. The Battle of Omdurman, which took place in a few short hours the morning of September 2, was the decisive battle in Britain's war against the Mahdist forces. It was also a demonstration of how effective and devastating modern military technology could be. The Anglo-Egyptian forces under Kitchener's

command numbered some 25,000; their opponents fielded about twice that number. But Kitchener's troops were equipped with the new Maxim guns, an early machine gun capable of firing 600 rounds per minute. Kitchener's army was equipped with Maxim guns mounted both on carts and on nearby gunboats in the Nile, howitzers firing high explosive shells, and soldiers armed with new rifles featuring ten-round magazines; the Mahdist forces had only outdated gear (flintlock rifles, muzzle-loading cannons, spears, and swords). While historians have criticized Kitchener's planning and strategy, the use of modern weapons doubtless made the battle both short and devastating.

Kitchener deployed most of his forces in a semicircle around the village of Egeiga, on the west bank of the Nile, while a smaller contingent from the Egyptian Camel Corps was situated in the nearby Kerreri Hills. The Ansar (Mahdist forces) launched the first attack, advancing on Egeiga from both sides of Jebel Surgham (southwest of the village) and simultaneously sending forces against the Camel Corps in the Kerreri Hills. The advance of the Ansar was halted by machine gun and other fire, both from the land forces and from the gunboats on the Nile, and the Mahdist forces retreated. It was clear to Kitchener that his modern weaponry had inflicted heavy losses on the khalifa's armies. In the meantime, the Camel Corps was almost trapped in the Kerreri Hills by the initial Ansar advance, but supporting fire from the gunboats rescued the corps.

The second phase of the battle began with the Twenty-first Lancers advancing to the south in the direction of the city of Omdurman. Encountering some three hundred men, the Twenty-first Lancers viewed the moment as their chance for glory. They rode directly at their opponents, not realizing until it was too late that the force of 300 was but a small fraction of the khalifa's forces there. These warriors had been stationed on the crest of a shallow valley, and they concealed a much larger army below, an army of some 4,000 men. The Twenty-first Lancers rode directly into this army, a mistake that cost 22 lives, wounded 50 men and over 100 horses, the highest loss of any Anglo-Egyptian regiment in the entire battle (one member of the Twenty-first who survived was a young lieutenant by the name of Winston Churchill, who had also been supplementing his military pay by working as a part-time war correspondent). Several Anglo-Egyptian brigades then pushed to the southwest, following the khalifa's retreating armies toward Jebel Surgham; this was quickly followed by a more concentrated advance in a southerly direction designed both to clear the slopes of Jebel Surgham of Mahdist forces and to cut off possible routes of retreat to Omdurman. While the Camel Corps rejoined the main body of forces, the khalifa's armies succeeded in cutting off the First Egyptian Brigade, under the command of Hector Macdonald.

The final phase of the Battle of Omdurman began with the main body of Kitchener's army advancing upon Jebel Surgham, the First British Brigade reinforcing Macdonald's troops, and the First British and First Egyptian Brigades together holding off the attack by the Ansar northwest of Egeiga. This combined force, with the help of the Camel Corps, then turned their attentions to the west to defend themselves against an attack by the "green flag Ansar," led by Ali wad Ullu and Uthman al-Din. This combination of the assault by the Anglo-Egyptian forces to the southwest on Jebel Surgham and the successful repulsion of the attack in the northwest brought victory to Kitchener's forces. The khalifa's armies were forced to retreat behind the Kerreri Hills, were driven from Jebel Surgham, and the way south to Omdurman was left open for the victorious Anglo-Egyptian forces.

The Anglo-Egyptian casualties in the Battle of Omdurman were 48 killed and 382 wounded. The khalifa's armies were devastated: an estimated 10,000 were killed, another 15,000 wounded, and some 5,000 taken prisoner. The casualty rate for the Mahdist forces was thus about 50 per cent, which illustrates at once the courage and dedication of the warriors and the immense destructiveness of modern weaponry.

In addition to its devastating human toll, the Battle of Omdurman brought significant changes to the Sudan. Mahdism was virtually eradicated, the khalifa himself, who survived the battle, was hunted down and killed by British forces in 1899, and British control over the Sudan was firmly established. Though few realized it at the time, the devastation caused by modern weaponry in the Battle of Omdurman also eerily foreshadowed the destruction that would be caused by World War I less than 20 years later.

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See also: **Religion, Colonial Africa: Islamic Orders and Movements.**

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Sudan: Condominium Period: Administration, Legacy in South

On September 2, 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian force led by General Herbert Kitchener defeated the forces of Khalifa Abdullahi at the battle of Karari, marking the end of the Mahdist state in the Sudan. Eight days later Kitchener went south to Fashoda to confront the French (Major Marchand and a small force) and to hoist the Egyptian and British flags. Symbolically, this began the long process of the occupation of the southern Sudan. Meanwhile, by the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of January 19, 1899 (commonly known as the Condominium Agreement), Britain and Egypt declared joint sovereignty over the Sudan. In reality, however, Egypt had only nominal authority, as real power was vested in a British governor general who. Moreover, all higher levels of the administration were occupied by British personnel, while Egyptians were confined to the lower ranks and after 1924 expelled from the country.

In the south, provincial administrations were set up in Upper Nile (Malakal), Bahr al-Ghazal (Wau), and Equatoria (Mongalla), with identical structure to that in the north: governors, inspectors (later called district commissioners) and *mamurs* (mostly Egyptians). The extension of government authority to the outlying districts was a slow process, however, and was not completed until 1928, when the last Nuer resistance was finally crushed. Because of the long period of pacification, the government tended to rely on periodic patrols rather than the establishment of effective administration, which would have required more staff and money as well as improved communications, all of which were lacking in the south. The government's preoccupation with northern affairs convinced some officials in the south of the need for a separate southern policy, but for such a policy to succeed it would have to rely on local funding and the use of southern, rather than external, labor. This, of course, called for the development of the southern Sudan.

Inevitably this raised the question of how compatible was such a goal with the presence of Muslim northern Sudanese in the south. To many British officials who deplored the spread of Muslim influence up the Nile, especially as it was associated with the Nilotic and East African slave trades, such a presence could hardly be positive. Until the formulation of Southern Policy in 1930, British officials' response to the problem of an Islamic south was neither consistent nor coherent. For governor general F. R. Wingate, who was still concerned about the threat of neo-Mahdist risings in the north, the main issue was internal security. Allowing the expansion of Islam to the south might threaten the still fragile British position there. It was this consideration that motivated him to accept Mongalla province governor R. C. R. Owen's proposal of 1910 for an English-speaking force (the Equatorial Corps), composed of southerners and Christian in outlook, to replace northern Sudanese troops in the south.

Also taken with security considerations in mind was the decision to promulgate the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, which declared the southern provinces, Darfur and parts of Kassala and White Nile provinces as "Closed Districts," entry into which were forbidden to outsiders except with the permission of the governor general or his representatives. Despite restricting movement between north and south, the ordinance had no significant effect on the *jallaba* presence in the south due to the ambivalent attitude of the government on the issue. While some officials favored their expulsion and replacement by Greeks and Syrians, others worried that it might adversely affect southern development. Thus between 1924 and 1927 the number of *jallaba* in the south actually increased in spite of the passports and permits ordinance.

In administration, government practice was also at variance with policy. From the beginning government policy in the south was to work through native rulers. In practice, however, officials tended to limit, rather than support, the powers of traditional authorities. In the 1920s, once it was generally agreed to insulate the south from "harmful" Arab Muslim influences, they sought to bring practice into line with policy. The aim now was to devolve more power to the chiefs and to gradually replace northern officials with trained southerners. The expulsion of Egyptians from the Sudan and the shift in policy to native administration in the wake of the assassination of governor general Sir Lee Stack in Cairo in 1924 improved the chance for implementing the policy. Yet while efforts were made to institutionalize chiefs' judicial powers through the establishment of chiefs courts, not much of it was devoted to developing the executive functions of these courts. The result was that the district commissioner remained the locus of the administration while the

courts became the means through which he communicated new rules or decisions to the people. Even the avowed goal of replacing northern staff with trained southerners suffered, too, because the 1924 crisis provoked an illiberal attitude toward education, which was heavily circumscribed in attempts to extirpate the educated elite. Furthermore, that the leaders of the first nationalist organization in the country, the White Flag League, and of the 1924 pro-Egyptian demonstrations that erupted following their expulsion, were southerners like Ali Abd al-Latif and Zein al-Abdin Abd al-Tam did not endear them to the British. As a result the south was neglected even further in the field of education and economic development, thus making it harder to fill the posts vacated by expelled northern officials.

In education there was even greater division of opinion within the government over the question of the proper role of mission schools in the development of southern education. The prospect of government education appeared dismal due to cost but also because, by requiring teachers from the north, it would undermine government policy in the south. By 1930, therefore, mission education with government financial assistance and supervision became the accepted policy for education in the south. But the folly of lack of government direct involvement in southern education soon became so glaringly apparent that mission monopoly of education simply had to be terminated by 1944.

Connected to education was the language issue: was Arabic or English to become the official language of the region? Once it decided, after 1926, to intervene in southern education and the Rejaf Language Conference (1928) determined group languages for the south, the government was forced to deal directly with the language question. The British foreign secretary, Arthur Henderson, took the final decision to approve English in late 1929. A program to implement it and other aspects of government policy in the south was drafted, and promulgated in January 1930 as the Southern Policy.

The Southern Policy was a comprehensive plan that reiterated much that had already been set in motion. It aimed at building units based on indigenous laws and traditional customs and beliefs. To promote that aim it was necessary to exclude the Arab and Muslim influences from the south. British officials were enjoined to familiarize themselves with local beliefs, customs and languages and to communicate in English whenever possible. Except in the Arabicized western district of Bahr al-Ghazal, the implementation of Southern Policy posed no serious problems.

Within a decade of its formulation, however, the Southern Policy was caught up in the maelstrom of rising northern Sudanese nationalism. To the emerging

nationalists, Britain, by its Southern Policy, intended to amputate the south and attach it to Uganda. This seemed to be confirmed when in 1943 the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was formed, and southern Sudan excluded from its scope of discussion. A chorus of criticism followed.

Yet in fact, the prospect of a separate future for southern Sudan was fast receding. On April 3, 1944, the civil secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold, won the governor general's council's approval for a new Southern Policy. While not claiming to prejudice the future status of the southern Sudan, Newbold's proposed policy, by seeking to fund the economic and educational development of the south with northern money, would in fact bind the south to the north.

Increasingly, this appeared to his successor, Sir John Willy Robertson, to be the only viable alternative. Robertson's inclination toward union was more clearly revealed at the first Sudan Administrative Conference on April 24, 1946. When pressed on the matter by northern representatives, the chief justice, Charles Cumings, volunteered that there was no legal difference between the north and the south and that the conference's terms of reference obliged them to discuss the whole Sudan, both north and south. When southern governors concurred, too, Robertson issued a new policy for the southern Sudan on December 16, 1946 affirming the idea of union between north and south. British officials in the south were generally supportive of Robertson's decision, but when the third administrative conference failed to even consider the question of safeguards that they had pressed for to protect the south's integrity, they demanded a separate southern administrative conference be held in the south.

The result was the Juba Conference of June 12 and 13, 1947, which, however, could only consider whether and how southerners should be represented in the legislative assembly proposed to replace the advisory council. Although the future status of the south was now decided and efforts were made to prepare the southerners to participate as the equal partners in the Sudan of the future, it was by no means certain that the process of unification would be easy. Isolated from the north for nearly two decades, the south had developed its own distinctive identity as a "Christian-Afro-English" culture and hardly any sense of identification with the Sudan.

As the transition to self-government gathered momentum, there was no pretence of consulting southerners. In October and December 1952, the Umma Party, independents, and the National Unionist Party reached agreements with the Egyptian government on the Sudanese right to self-determination. This was followed on January 10, 1953 by the All Parties Agreement reaffirming self-determination. On February 12, 1953 the

codominant powers signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement recognizing this right and prescribing steps to terminate the condominium. The south was neither represented nor consulted in these meetings. When combined with the wrenching process of Sudanization, in which of 800 positions vacated by the British, southerners got only 4 minor posts, the rising discontent inevitably boiled over into revolt on August 18, 1955.

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See also: **Nilotes, Eastern Africa: Western Nilotes: Shilluk, Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak; Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898.**

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Sudan: Condominium Period: Economy

At the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Period, the Sudan had largely fallen out of the world economy. The government of Khalifa Abdullahi was the product of a revolt against the old Turco-Egyptian state and naturally did not deal with those it considered oppressors. Not surprisingly, the new regime under the governor general, Lord Kitchener, was able to collect very little revenue during its first few years of existence. For example, in the year 1900, the condominium was only able to collect US \$550 in taxes. This limited economic activity was further complicated by the continuing reality of armed resistance to Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan.

Although the Sudan was still unstable, the British, who dominated the condominium, began to investigate the possibility of economic projects in the Sudan very early in their tenure. In 1899, the government in Egypt sent a hydrological engineer, Sir William Garstin, to survey the Nile throughout Sudan. During this survey he observed the entire Nile system in Sudan, which includes the main Nile from Khartoum northward and, South of Khartoum, the Blue Nile to the east and the White Nile to the west. After he completed this task in 1904, Garstin released a report in which he said that the area south of Khartoum, the Gezira (Arabic for

“island”) would be an ideal location for an irrigated agricultural project. He specifically said that the dam should be built on the Blue Nile at Sinnar, since the eastern half of the country is higher and this would cause the water to flow westward throughout the Gezira.

The major crop to be grown on the Gezira was long-staple cotton, the raw material for expensive cotton fabrics. By the late nineteenth century, Great Britain was no longer competitive with the newer textile industries in countries like Italy and India in the lower price ranges, and was being forced to focus on more expensive cloth; the result was a need for greater crop sources. The northern Sudan, which is ecologically quite similar to Egypt, was an ideal location for such an expansion. Obviously, the needs of British industrialists fit quite well with the condominium’s desire for a revenue base.

Although the government was active in promoting the idea of an irrigated cotton plantation in the Gezira, the actual management of the project, which came to be known as the Gezira Scheme, was done by a private corporation, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. The majority of the land in Gezira technically remained under Sudanese control, but in reality, the government strictly regulated how much land could actually be held by any one tenant in the scheme.

By the late 1920s, the Gezira would become the dominant engine in the Sudan’s economy, generating the great majority of the nation’s foreign exchange. The success of the Gezira, however, led to Sudan developing into a classic monocrop economy. This became readily apparent during the Great Depression, when the price of cotton fell precipitously. The amount of revenue generated by the Gezira was decreased 75 per cent from 1928 to 1938 and Sudan’s prosperity correspondingly declined.

As a monocrop economy, the Sudan underwent very uneven development. The region between Khartoum and Sinnar saw massive infrastructure development. The great majority of Sudan’s electrical power grid was placed in this area also. Outside of the Gezira region, development was much more spotty. There were major railroad lines built to Kassala and Port Sudan. Another significant railroad line was built to reach the southwestern cities of El Obeid, Wau, and Nyala. These southern railways were important because they facilitated the export of groundnuts from Kordofan. The southern Sudan was largely outside of the international export economy during the condominium, since significant portions of the region were not pacified until the late 1920s. Although gum arabic and groundnuts were important regional crops, cotton produced in the Gezira region remained Sudan’s major source of revenue during the condominium.

Since cotton was so overwhelmingly important, the condominium government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate sought to expand the area that could be brought under cotton cultivation. In the period after World War II, the condominium developed the Five Year Plan of 1946 to expand the area of irrigated agriculture to the Northwest of the Gezira. This expansion of the Sudan's cotton production was quite fortuitous because the price of cotton rapidly rose during the period from 1946 to 1953 from LE8,300,000 to LE46,340,000. In individual terms, the income of farmers increased from LE29 yearly to LE800. This sharp upswing in the economy coincided with a rapid increase in Sudanese nationalism, which eventually resulted in the cancellation of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate contract in 1950 and the introduction of Sudanese as the managers of the Gezira. This culminated in the appointment of Mekki Abbas as the Gezira's first Sudanese managing director in 1953.

As Sudan began to move toward independence in 1956, the price of cotton started to decline. This resulted in a complicated situation because the Sudanese naturally looked toward the Gezira cotton crop as the source of funding for expanded social services and education. The result was that by the early 1950s, there were plans to expand irrigated cotton agriculture to the Southwest in what became known as the Managil expansion. More important, this expansion once again reinforced the Sudan's overwhelming dependence on crop and would leave nation at the mercy of the changes in the world commodities market.

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Sudan: Civil War, Independence, Military Rule, 1955–1964

Sudan's transition to independence was marred by the outbreak of a nationalist uprising in the southern Sudan on August 18, 1955, which marked the beginning of the Seventeen Years Civil War (1955–1972). While the immediate cause of the revolt was an order to relocate Number 2 Company of the Equatorial Corps to the north, it was the result of overhasty political change. The southerners had not been represented at the talks between northern politicians and the Egyptian government that preceded the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement. After the November 1953 elections, the administration of the region was speedily Sudanized between June

and November 1954. Coming in the wake of outlandish election promises made by northern politicians, the results of Sudanization was a great disappointment for the southern elite. The newly formed Liberal Party began to cash in on the inevitable southern disaffection and to channel it into a demand for federation between the north and the south. Regarding such talk as foreign inspired, the National Unionist Party (NUP)-led government of Isma'il al-Azhari warned against sedition and secessionism, and threatened those southerners criticizing the government. When this was followed by the arbitrary and illegal imprisonment of a southern member of parliament, the summary dismissal of 300 southern workers in the Zande agroindustrial scheme, and the shooting to death of 6 of them at a demonstration against the management's action, whatever confidence the southerners still had in the administration disappeared overnight. By August 18, 1955, when the revolt broke out, a growing spirit of unrest had thus gripped southern Sudan. The British airlifted 8,000 northern troops to the south, in effect inaugurating the present-day military occupation of the southern Sudan by the north.

The northern faction in parliament was eager and determined to achieve independence, even if this meant bypassing the steps outlined in the agreement of 1953. When southern opposition threatened to block this, they inserted a clever ploy in the independence resolution to the effect that the claims of the southern members would be fully considered. The southern members dropped their opposition, and the Sudan became formally independent as a parliamentary democracy on January 1, 1956.

During the period of parliamentary rule (1956–1958), however, the government devoted little attention to the south. To gain southern support, the government relented on its refusal to allow discussion of a federal constitution. A 46-member constitutional committee, of which only three were southerners, was appointed in September 1956 to write a draft constitution. When the committee considered federation and the northern members rejected it as an expensive facade, the three southern members subsequently boycotted its meetings. The northern members continued their work and eventually produced a draft constitution that called for a centralized unitary system of government and a predominant role for Islam and Arabic over other religions and languages. By then, a more politically militant and better-educated group of southerners had been elected to parliament and formed themselves into a federal bloc. When this group walked out of parliament during discussions of the draft constitution, a new 40-member committee was set up to study it and report back to the assembly. No report, however, came from the committee as its work was paralyzed by

disagreement between northern and southern members on the federal issue.

The parliamentary system was soon rendered unstable by the constant political bickering, maneuvering, and corruption in high places. In February 1956 Al-Azhari had formed a government of national unity, but five months later a new coalition made up of Umma and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) ousted him from power. The two parties differed on many policy issues. By 1958 the coalition had reached the breaking point, and Umma politicians began talks with their NUP colleagues about the possibility of an Umma-NUP coalition. About the same time, a section of the PDP was also scheming to form a coalition with the NUP. Their contacts in Cairo, during October 1958, with President Abdel Nasser and Al-Azhari roused suspicion in the mind of prime minister Abdalla Khalil that the ground was being prepared for Egypt to play a much more influential role in Sudan's affairs. A small group of senior army officers shared the prime minister's misgivings as well and the possibility of a military takeover began to seem attractive. It was against this background that the army seized power in a bloodless coup d'état on November 17, 1958, a day after the agreement to form an Umma-NUP coalition government had been concluded.

The first year of army rule was preoccupied with struggles between competing military factions and personalities for control of the Supreme Council, the body for ruling the country. By December 1959, a relative degree of stability prevailed and the regime began to tackle pressing issues. In October 1959 they had resumed negotiations with Egypt on the utilization of Nile waters. On November 8, 1959 a new Nile Waters Agreement was concluded which divided a reasonable share of water between the two countries.

In the economic field, military rule brought some progress in the north. To sell the backlog of unsold cotton, the regime abolished the fixed price for cotton and allowed it to be determined by market forces. Within six months all accumulated cotton had been sold and the foreign exchange surplus rose. In agriculture, more land was cultivated, lending facilities were established and foreign investment in agro-industrial projects was encouraged. New industrial development projects were financed and constructed with bilateral economic assistance agreements.

But these economic achievements were concentrated in the north, while the south languished. There the regime's priority was to reverse the disintegrative effect of Southern Policy. The solution was to eliminate those aspects—language, culture, and religion—that set the south apart from the rest of the country. In pursuit of this objective, the Arabization and Islamization of the south was stepped up. Despite the vigorous and

widespread protest that followed, the regime banned all religious gatherings outside church for prayers, and catechist teaching, while Muslims were free to pray anywhere and to proselytize. Missionaries on leave were refused reentry into the country. Governor Ali Baldo of Equatoria went so far as to order southerners to adopt Muslim names. In May 1962, the Missionary Societies Act was enacted which gave sweeping power to the authorities to regulate all missionary activities. On February 27, 1964 the government expelled all the remaining foreign Christian missionaries working in the south from the country.

Unaccompanied as it was by economic and educational development, Arabization and Islamization provoked resistance that was met by violent repression. In February 1962, under the leadership of Joseph Oduho, Father Saturnino Lohure, and William Deng, southern dissidents formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (later transformed into the Sudan African National Union, or SANU), which called for the independence of the south, but only if federation was unattainable. For the next two years, the SANU tried in vain to convince the northern elite to accede to the southern demand for a federal system of government.

In September 1963, at a meeting convened by Oduho, former soldiers of the Equatorial corps who were resident in East Africa founded a guerrilla movement known as the Anya-Nya. Their ranks were swelled by an influx of students, officials, prison warders, policemen, and politicians fleeing the repression of the military regime. Military attacks began in Equatoria on September 19, 1963 and soon spread to the other southern provinces. Shocked into a sharper awareness of the seriousness of the southern resistance and its inability to impose a military solution, the regime eventually appointed a commission in September 1964 to investigate the causes of unrest in the south. Bereft of civilian support and divided over whether to employ force to suppress the opposition, the military was forced by massive demonstrations to step down from power on October 29, 1964. A transitional government led by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifa took over, under an agreement to rule under the provisional constitution of 1956. Thus ended the first military dictatorship in Sudan's modern history. A second period of parliamentary democracy was set to begin in earnest.

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See also: **Sudan: Condominium Period: Administration, Legacy in South.**

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Sudan: October Revolution, 1964

The October Revolution of 1964 was an unprecedented period of hope and excitement in postindependence Sudan, but in the end it was a source of disillusionment. The hopes lay in the sense of failure attaching to Sudanese politics from independence in 1956. Sudan had then a liberal, democratic government, but politics proved extremely chaotic and gave rise to unstable coalitions. In an effort to resolve one such crisis, then prime minister Abdullah Khalil invited the army commander, General Ibrahim Abboud, to take power. Khalil intended this to be an interim measure to tackle the pressing problems, but once in power the army proved reluctant to retire to the barracks.

At first Abboud's regime had some success. Economic development accelerated with the Managil Extension to the cotton growing Gezira Scheme. Agreement was achieved with Egypt on the difficult question of sharing the Nile waters, and the inundation of Sudanese Nubia above the Aswan Dam. And the former politicians were quite well treated—at least initially.

By the early 1960s, however, the situation was beginning to sour. The troubles really started in southern Sudan, where there had been a mutiny shortly before independence, and where there was growing insecurity. Abboud decided to tackle the problem by a vigorous policy of coercion on the one hand and Islamization and Arabization of the region on the other. This brought new opposition, especially from the Western educated elements in the south, who were mainly Christian and English-speaking. Resistance in the south grew, and from 1963 there was a situation of civil war in the region.

Meanwhile, opposition was also growing in the northern Sudan. There was a feeling that it was time to return to the political freedom enjoyed at independence. This was backed by the activities of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), one of the largest and best-organized communist parties in Africa or the Middle East. It took advantage of the repression to win new

underground supporters in preparation for a confrontation with the government.

The opportunity came on October 21, 1964. Students gathered at the University of Khartoum to protest at the civil war in the south. There was a police ban on the protest, and when the students tried to carry on, two were shot by police and killed. This opened the way for fresh demonstrations, and soon the SCP in particular had called for strikes and mass demonstrations in the capital.

The military rulers debated how best to respond. Some wanted to take a hard line and confront the demonstrators, but others sought to avoid further confrontations. There were also doubts about the willingness of junior officers in the army to obey orders to repress the students and workers on the streets. On October 26, Abboud and his fellow senior officers agreed to stand down in favor of a new civilian government. They were allowed to retire, and Abboud moved first to Port Sudan and later to Khartoum, with few signs of animosity toward him.

Military rule had been ended by a broad coalition of civilian groups, and when the soldiers retreated the civilians decided to establish a transitional government rather than simply handing power back to the old party politicians. It was headed by an educationalist, Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa, and contained a wide range of groups, with the Western-educated intelligentsia of the Professionals' Front being the major one.

However, rifts soon opened in the new government. The Professionals' Front wanted a new constitution based on representation of occupational groups. In this way they hoped for a more progressive program than the old parties, with their uneducated rural followings, were likely to produce. But the parties, especially the Umma and the National Unionist Party (NUP) began to regroup, and put pressure on Al-Khalifa's government by organizing more demonstrations. In 1965 Al-Khalifa was forced to return Sudan to the old geographical constituencies, which meant the success of the old parties once more, against the Professionals' Front and the Communists. Elections were held in 1965, and the old parties returned to share power.

However, the problem of the civil war in the south, which had triggered the October Revolution, was still unresolved. The Professionals' Front in particular had wanted the war ended before holding any elections, but the insistence of the old parties had defeated that idea, even though elections could not be held in areas of the south. In March 1965 a Round Table Conference was held in Khartoum with northern and southern representatives and international observers, but it proved inconclusive, with differences among northerners and southerners as well as between the two regions. Its failure saw the continuation of the war.

The aftermath of the October Revolution returned northern Sudan to a situation similar to that which had existed before Abboud's coup of 1958. No northern party was able to win a clear majority, and there was thus once more a succession of weak coalition governments, with little by way of policy to develop the country's resources. At the same time, there was no progress toward peace in the south, and governments in Khartoum intensified the conflict in unavailing attempts at military victory.

Given these circumstances there was little surprise when a further coup in 1969 brought Jaafar Nimeiri to power. Initially he was supported by the Communist Party, which saw an opportunity for progress following the frustration after the October Revolution. But it was only after a coup and countercoup of 1971, which saw the elimination of the communists from government and much destruction of the party, that peace could be made with the south in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. It seemed like the end of the problem which had most directly triggered the October Revolution, but peace lasted only a decade, and Sudanese politics returned to the old ways of civil war in the south and party maneuvering in the north.

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Sudan: Nimeiri, Peace, the Economy

President Jafar Nimeiri had governed Sudan for three years, from 1969 to 1972, before peace was finally made in the south. Yet from the time of the coup which brought him to power, peace had been high on his agenda.

In his first two years in office Nimeiri was in a close alliance with the Sudan Communist Party, which had its own views on peacemaking in the civil war in the south. The minister appointed with responsibility for the region was a leading communist, Joseph Garang, and he had his own ideas on how peace should be achieved. Garang was not impressed by the existing group of southern politicians, or by the Anya Nya guerrillas. Instead, as a committed Marxist-Leninist, he believed that class analysis could be applied to Sudan, and the south was essentially an exploited

periphery. His solution was therefore to link steps toward making peace with the adoption of a socialist program for the country and the region.

However, Garang's approach won limited support; and with Egyptian and Soviet backing, which reflected the foreign policy of the new regime, the war in the south was stepped up. But Garang's approach came to an abrupt end in the coup and countercoup of 1971. Following Nimeiri's return to power, Garang was arrested and swiftly executed.

Nimeiri then reversed various policies, including the approach to peace in the south. He turned to Abel Alier, a senior lawyer and pragmatic politician, who had a fresh and different approach to the south. Instead of seeking to promote socialism, quiet contacts with the Anya Nya were made, especially utilizing church contacts as intermediaries. Circumstances were more propitious within the Anya Nya as well; Joseph Lagu, its leader, had consolidated his control with aid from Israel via Uganda and Ethiopia; and he then came under pressure from Uganda in particular to move toward peace, and thus talks moved ahead quickly.

The eventual peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa in 1972 and saw the creation of an autonomous southern region, later enshrined in the Permanent Constitution of 1973. In addition to peace in the south, it was tacitly agreed that Ethiopia's backing would see Sudan less favorable to the Eritrean Liberation Front; while Sudan's break with the Soviet Union, following the unsuccessful coup of 1971, brought recognition from the West.

Peace in the south also meant the ending of a severe drain on Sudan's economy. The economy had been affected not only by war, but the program of nationalization which had been encouraged by the Communist Party from 1969. But with the communists out of power, and with growing friendship among Sudan, the Western powers, and the Arab states (enriched by oil price rises after 1973), a new economic strategy was pursued.

The Arab states were keen to develop food supplies in the Arab world, and Sudan with large areas of fertile land, both naturally watered and irrigated from the White and Blue Nile Rivers, seemed a prime area for investment. The recycled oil money was to be invested in Sudan mainly through contracts handed out to Western companies. Thus there was a triangular process—with Sudanese land, Arab capital, and Western businesses—to try to make the country the "breadbasket of the Arab world."

There were some successes—most notably, the giant sugar producing Kenana scheme on the White Nile. Other projects were only partially successful, such as the attempt to develop textile factories; and some, like the brewery at Wau in the south, never

functioned at all. But in the process a great deal of capital had flowed into Sudan, and some had corruptly flowed back out. The upshot was that by the end of the decade Sudan's balance of trade was heavily in deficit, and the country was sliding into debt and turning to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for assistance.

There was, however, still economic hope. After many years of exploration, in 1978 significant quantities of oil were established, especially around Bentiu in the south, and the oil company Chevron prepared to begin to extract it. At the same time Sudan and Egypt agreed that the long discussed Jonglei Canal would be built to carry White Nile water around the Sudd swamps in the south, thus reducing losses by evaporation, and making more water available for irrigation in northern Sudan and Egypt.

Instead of proceeding, both these schemes were halted by political developments. In the south there was a growing feeling that the region was being economically exploited, and that insufficient benefits were reaching the region. At the same time the south thought that the Addis Ababa agreement was failing. Nimeiri wanted to undermine the autonomy of the southern region by introducing a new regional program for the whole country. At the same time in the north he had forged "national reconciliation" with major Islamic groups in 1977; and as economic pressures worsened he introduced Islamic law in 1983. Opposition in the south to both political and economic policies was rising fast, and in 1983 southern units of the army mutinied and launched a new civil war that has continued up to the time of writing. Early targets of the rebels were the oilfield at Bentiu and the Jonglei Canal, both of which were successfully attacked. Reopening civil war once more also proved a huge drain on the indebted economy.

Nimeiri had thus taken Sudan from war, to peace and back to war again, at the same time leading the country through an economic experience of boom and bust from which it has never recovered. The importance of peace in southern Sudan for Sudan's economy had also been clearly demonstrated.

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See also: **Sudan: Cotton, Irrigation, and Oil, 1970s.**

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Sudan: Cotton, Irrigation, and Oil, 1970s

By the 1970s, Sudan had an economy that was heavily dependent upon the export of cotton from a series of irrigated agricultural areas in the north central area of the country dominated by the Gezira Scheme between Khartoum and Sennar. Although Sudan also exported other items such as gum arabic and groundnuts, cotton provided the great majority of the country's foreign exchange.

The Sudanese government had realized the vulnerability of its single-crop economy to international fluctuations in commodity prices, and in the 1960s it had attempted to avoid such a weak position by implementing a policy intensification and diversification in the Gezira Scheme. This policy eventually failed due to difficulties related to growing an extra crop (groundnuts in the Gezira), and the fact that there were physical limits to the amount of land that could be efficiently fertilized.

In addition to the basic weakness inherent in an economy based on a few agricultural exports, Sudan was burdened by a civil war between the majority Arabic speaking Muslims of the north and the practitioners of traditional religion and Christians in the south. This war had begun shortly before independence in 1956 and continued throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s.

It was in this atmosphere that Jafaar al-Nimieri came to power in 1969. Nimieri initially presented himself as a leftist and maintained close ties to the Sudanese Communist Party; after a communist-led coup attempt against him in 1971, however, he began to move into more of an Arab nationalist position. Nimieri's initial economic policy, the Five Year Plan of 1970, reflected the leftist direction early in his regime. The goals of the Five Year Plan were to increase Sudan's capacity to feed itself, and also increase the production of export crops. By the 1972, the initial emphasis on government coordination of the plan diminished, instead, the initiative in development was taken by wealthy merchants from Khartoum and Arabs from outside Sudan, especially those from the Persian Gulf region.

The increasing influence of wealthy investors in agriculture was important because it signaled a great increase in the level of mechanization in Sudanese agriculture. Although the initial impetus for mechanization stemmed from the government prior to Nimieri in 1968, mechanization gained momentum in the early 1970s. Mechanization was an attempt on the part of commercial farmers to increase their levels of productivity in both irrigated and rain-fed agriculture.

Although actual agricultural production remained in the hands of commercial farmers, the Sudanese government under Nimeiri did return to its traditional role of facilitator of irrigated agriculture. During the 1970s a number of new irrigated agriculture projects came into being, the most significant being the Rahad Scheme on the Blue Nile that opened in 1973. Rahad was significant because unlike Gezira, it depended on pump, not gravity, irrigation. This would leave Rahad very vulnerable to the great increase in oil prices that would occur during the 1970s.

The Yom Kippur War with Israel and the oil embargo against the West in 1974 had the effect of clearly demonstrating the power of the oil producing nations within the Arab world. The government of Nimeiri sought to take advantage of this new power by attempting to establish Sudan as the “breadbasket of the Arab World.” Sudan secured loans and increasing levels of direct investment from oil rich Arab nations in its agricultural sector.

This investment ultimately would prove disappointing to Sudan. The heavy reliance on mechanization had the effect of making rural unemployment higher, and when costs of maintenance were considered, mechanization actually proved less efficient than human labor. Droughts in the western regions also exacerbated problems because it forced large numbers of workers to move to the east and compete for already scarce jobs. In addition to job loss, the rapid expansion of mechanized farming into regions of traditional rain-fed agriculture encouraged less than optimal soil management in an area that is very susceptible to soil erosion. The final major problem for the rapid expansion of mechanized farming in Sudan was the sharp increase in oil prices that came during the 1970s. This made it increasingly difficult for commercial farmers to use or maintain tractors, combines and pumping equipment. The result of these factors was that Sudan ended the 1970s with a sharply increased burden of debt.

The Nimeiri period was very different from any other period in the history of the independent Sudan because for a short period, 1972–1983, it was actually possible for the national government to make substantive plans for the development of southern Sudan. When Nimeiri first took office, the Sudan was still involved in the civil war. By February 1972, Nimeiri had arranged for a conference between himself and the southern leaders in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The result was the Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces, which was ratified in March 1972. This act provided for a regional assembly and autonomy for the south. This was the basis for the longest period of peace that Sudan has experienced since independence. Once peace was achieved, it was possible to begin

development plans for the south. The major hydrological project put forward at this time was the Jonglei Canal. This idea, which was first suggested by the British in 1901, was that a canal should be built between the Bahr al Ghazal and the White Nile; such a canal would allow for the movement of a greatly increased flow of water into the northern Sudan. Not surprisingly, the people of the southern Sudan were quite hostile to the idea and would eventually riot against the construction. The canal has yet to be built.

During the Nimeiri period, there was the possibility of oil production in the south. The Chevron Corporation found oil in the Bentiu district of the Upper Nile Province. The response of the national government was to redefine boundaries so as to place Bentiu in the north, but southern politicians prevented this move. The national government responded by insisting that the pipeline deliver oil to the north. By 1983, the peace between the south and north had collapsed, Nimeiri was deposed, and any chance of development in the south was once again gone.

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See also: **Oil.**

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Sudan: Sadiq Al-Mahdi Regime, 1980s

In 1969 General Jafar Nimeiri seized control of the Sudan government in Khartoum, determined to end the debilitating civil war in the southern Sudan. In February 1972 at Addis Ababa he agreed to grant autonomy to the southern Sudan in return for peace. Ten years later Nimeiri unilaterally revoked the Addis Ababa agreement to renew the civil conflict in the Sudan. By 1983 Nimeiri had dissipated in the Sudan and abroad the good will generated by the Addis Ababa agreement. He considered the south to be an impotent giant that he could manipulate to gain control of water and the newly discovered deposits of oil. He reorganized the administration of the southern regional government and ordered units of the former southern insurgents, the Anya-Nya, integrated into the Sudan army, to be relocated in the Northern Sudan where they would be immobilized by culture and climate. In March 1983 Nimeiri sent Colonel John Garang de Mabior to

resolve the hostility over economic neglect, the dissolution of regional autonomy, and the dislocation of the troops. On May 16, the garrison at Bor rebelled, and fled to sanctuary in Ethiopia where John Garang consolidated the insurgency by founding the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military forces, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). One month after the rebellion at Bor, Nimeiri promulgated his "September Laws" to apply the Shari'a to all Sudanese—Muslims and non-Muslims. Southern Sudanese of every ethnic, political, and religious persuasion renewed the war in 1983 that continues into the twenty-first century.

The resumption of war in the South was another failure by Nimeiri to govern. Disastrous economic decisions, famine ignored, foreign supporters disillusioned, and his arrogance by assuming the Islamic title of *imam* (leader) were dramatized by the execution in January 1985 of Muhammad Taha, a 76-year-old supporter of the regime who objected to the imposition of the Shari'a. During Nimeiri's visit to Washington, D.C., in late March 1985, the Alliance of National Forces for National Salvation organized massive demonstrations in Khartoum against the government that the army refused to suppress. On April 9, the army commander in chief, 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Siwar al-Dahab, announced the formation of a Transitional Military Council that would administer, with a civilian Provisional Council of Ministers, a transitional government for one year only. Nimeiri went into exile in Cairo.

The transitional government suspended the constitution, freed political prisoners, dismantled Nimeiri's moribund political apparatus, and promised to hold elections in April 1986. The prospect of democracy produced a plethora of political parties but the inability to hold elections in the southern war zone resulted in no clear majority that forced Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Umma party into a coalition government on May 15, 1986. He was 50, the great grandson of the *Mahdi*, and undisputed head of the Umma Party whose three years as prime minister demonstrated the ambiguity produced by his traditional Islamic heritage and his Western secular education and experience. His fragile coalition was overwhelmed by fundamental, irreconcilable issues—civil war in the South, the implementation of the Shari'a, and a stagnant economy that polarized the government and the Sudanese. After his first year Sadiq could not resolve the civil war without repealing the Nimeiri's "September Laws." Sadiq's search for consensus in 1987 failed when his facile rhetoric to implement a modified Shari'a deepened the divide between the Islamists of the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hasan al-Turabi, and the African non-Muslims, led by the southern Sudanese. Confronted by

organized NIF demonstrations in the summer of 1987, he declared a state of emergency on July 25. To remain in power he resorted to political manipulation in the Constituent Assembly that reelected him prime minister on April 28, 1988, in return for a national constitutional conference and greater participation in his government by the NIF, including its leader and his brother-in-law, Hasan al-Turabi. The religious issue, symbolized by the Shari'a, and economic stagnation could not be resolved without an end to the debilitating civil war. The Islamists were determined to pursue the war in search of the new Islamic Sudan, a vision that was not shared by Sadiq's coalition partners—the professional associations, the trade unions, and the army, who pressed him throughout the summer of 1988 to end the war. In November he reluctantly agreed to seek a political agreement with the SPLA for a new constitution by March 1989 that would presumably return the Sudan to a secular state.

Faced with popular frustrations and the dissipation of his coalition if the peace process failed, Sadiq in February 1989, not unlike Numaryi in 1980, sought ever more support from Islamists and the NIF. This shift in the balance of power within his coalition government provoked a strong reaction from the military to bring a quick resolution to the civil war. The civilian opposition allied with the army. On May 1, the SPLA announced a cease-fire to which Sadiq did not respond, while in Khartoum his ambivalence about the Shari'a, fundamental to the Islamists and the NIF, provoked calls for his resignation in the Constituent Assembly and the complete abrogation of the "September Laws" of 1983. On June 30, 1989, the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown in a coup led by Brigadier 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and his fellow officers of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Salvation Revolution to restore to the Sudan the lost values of Islam.

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See also: Sudan: Mahdist State, 1881–1898.

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Sudan: Turabi's Revolution, Islam, Power

The Islamist movement, which has held power in Sudan since 1989, is more the product of Hassan al-Turabi's work than of any other individual. Turabi

was born in 1932 into a family of Muslim holy men in the village of Wad Turabi, south of Khartoum. He had an Islamic education before going on to study law at the Universities of Khartoum and London and the Sorbonne in Paris, where he received his doctorate.

Turabi joined the Muslim Brotherhood while he was a student, and became a leading figure in the movement during the October Revolution of 1964, which overthrew Ibrahim Abboud's military regime. Turabi then led the small Islamic Charter Front in Parliament, where he campaigned for an Islamic constitution; however, Nimeiri's coup of 1969 forced him into exile.

After playing an active role in opposition, Turabi returned to Sudan in 1977 when Nimeiri sought "national reconciliation." It was from this time that Turabi led the Muslim Brotherhood in a policy of "entryism." He became attorney general, and many other Muslim Brothers moved into positions in government, the civil service, the armed forces, and the new Islamic banks. At the same time the Muslim Brotherhood actively recruited in schools and universities in particular.

The way forward for Turabi's Islamic revolution was not smooth. He was pleased when Nimeiri introduced Islamic law in 1983, but the two men later broke ties. However, since Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985, the break was politically useful for the Muslim Brotherhood; and in the democratic period from 1986 to 1989 it was active as the National Islamic Front (NIF). During that time it was in and out of the unstable coalition government of Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi.

In 1989, with the civil war in the south continuing since 1983, there were moves by the government toward peace with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). These involved suspending Islamic law, and it is widely believed that it was this development that triggered the military coup of Omar al-Beshir on June 30 of that year. The NIF was then out of government, and Beshir and his fellow officers were known sympathizers with the party, even though as cover Turabi and others were briefly arrested.

In fact, Turabi took no formal position in government, but it was widely believed that he led the group of senior NIF figures who were the real power behind the soldiers. It was also clear that NIF supporters were taking over in many areas of the state. Up to 4,000 were dismissed from the armed forces, to be replaced, in senior positions at least, by Islamists. In addition, the Popular Defence Force was established, numbering up to 150,000, to defend the National Salvation Revolution, as the new rulers proclaimed their coup. At the same time, a number of new security networks were established, and there was a good deal of repression which has been widely documented by international human rights organizations and the United Nations.

The political system also was changed. Federalism was proclaimed; it grew to 26 states, though the NIF was alleged to remain in effective control. A "no-party" parliamentary system was established, though with multiple candidates, but in reality with limited powers. In 1996 Beshir was elected president, with a cabinet full of known NIF figures; Turabi became speaker of the National Assembly.

In civil society there was a sustained attack on those often referred to in Sudan as the "modern forces," many of whom were regarded by the NIF as secularists and leftists. The existing leaders of professional organizations and trade unions, who had been prominent in the democratic eras in Sudan, were vigorously persecuted. Many were detained and tortured without trial; thousands more chose to leave the country for exile abroad. In their places NIF people were promoted who were often far less qualified for their posts in such areas as civil service and education. The NIF also firmly controlled the media. At the same time, Islamic organizations were encouraged to emphasize the sense of Islamic renewal. NIF supporters were also favored in the economic system, and many were enriched at a time when overall the Sudanese economy continued on an accelerating downward path, worsened by the continuing war in the south.

In the early years of the regime Turabi himself pursued an international agenda. He traveled widely, promoting his call for an Islamic revolution; and in 1991 founded the Popular Islamic and Arabic Conference with himself as secretary general. Sudan was widely associated with the Islamist movement around the Middle East in particular, and was soon being connected with acts of Islamist terrorism, especially by the United States. The resulting international isolation of Sudan came to a head in 1995 with the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, in which Sudan was implicated.

While Turabi's Islamic revolution was consolidating itself it remained clear that it was still not all-powerful. Initially it was hoped that the war in the south could be won, but in spite of intensifying the conflict the SPLA survived, and even reversed, initial setbacks. At the same time the ousted northern Sudanese politicians came together to form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which in time linked up with the SPLA. By 1997 the NDA was opening new fronts in eastern Sudan. Sudan's international isolation meant that there was considerable support for the NDA, especially from neighboring states that were concerned by Sudan's international Islamic agenda.

As a result, the Islamist government has publicly announced changes to its policy. Domestically it has moved toward a "managed" multiparty system; and internationally it has tried to be more conciliatory toward

neighboring states. It has also announced its wish to negotiate with the SPLA and encouraged northern politicians to return to Sudan.

In 2000, President Bashir declared a state of emergency and dissolved parliament. Turabi was placed under house arrest in May 2001.

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See also: Islam in Eastern Africa; Sudan: October Revolution, 1964.

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Sudan: Civil War: 1990s

Sudan's civil war pitted the Muslim and Arabized north against the south, where Christians and followers of various African traditional religious beliefs live, and where the rebel Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) fought for more religious and political freedom. Under British colonial rule, the Southern Policy barred northern Sudanese from entering or living in the South. In 1946, a decade before Sudan became independent, this policy was reversed under the pressure of a growing Sudanese nationalist movement in the North. Movement between the two regions was allowed. When independence came in 1956, northerners hurried to resume all the activities that the Southern Policy had interdicted. Arabic was imposed as the only official language of administration and education, Muslim preachers flocked to the south, and northern merchants poured in to exploit southern resources. With large numbers of Arabs, who were better educated under colonialism, overwhelming the region, they managed to monopolize all the institutions in the south. The Arabs soon controlled the civil service, finance and banking, education, and security.

Southern fears of Arab domination, which they had expressed to the British before independence, were now confirmed. Southerners were aware that the objective of northern leaders in their drive for independence was not only to free Sudan of colonial domination, but also to establish an Arabized and Islamic culture throughout the country. This was obvious during preindependence negotiations on self-determination of the country in the 1950s. During the negotiations,

southerners were often excluded and did not become a part of the "Sudanized" administration. These and other measures taken against the south soon led to the development of a secessionist sentiment. This sentiment inspired an armed struggle in 1955 when southerners in the army mutinied in the southern town of Torit. Armed secessionist activity grew stronger after the organization of a guerrilla army known as the Anya Nya. The war between Anya Nya forces and the successive governments in Khartoum went on for 17 years (1955–1972) before it was ended through an accord signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between then president of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri, and the Anya Nya forces. The agreement granted the south autonomy, but had too many loopholes and Nimeiri was quick to take advantage of these weaknesses. He contravened the pillar clauses of the agreement, including the integrity of the autonomous government itself, without consulting with the southern leaders. For example, in the early 1980s, Nimeiri redesigned the north-south boundaries, planned to build a refinery in the north for exploitation of the southern oil resources, divided the south into smaller and weaker states, and finally declared the imposition of Shari'a Islamic law all over the country.

Nimeiri's policies angered the southerners, and although they had initially been strong supporters of Nimeiri for ending the first civil war, many people in the south organized into underground opposition groups. The period of relative calm brought by the Addis Ababa agreement and the serious attempts to pacify and unite the country through the autonomous status for the South were interrupted in 1983. A group of former Anya Nya officers who had been absorbed in the National Army mutinied in the southern town of Bor, and shortly afterward, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, were formed under the leadership of Colonel John Garang. A full-fledged second round of war between the North and the South ensued immediately, and with the Ethiopian and Libyan support for the SPLA, the latter made significant military gains against Nimeiri's government in 1984.

This phase of the war revealed another face of the southern struggle. The SPLA claimed that it was not fighting for the secession of the south, but for liberation of the whole country and creating a new Sudan free from any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or cultural background. Although this stipulation was perceived by many southerners as a diplomatic tactic necessary to win the support of countries that opposed the breakup of Sudan (e.g., Libya), it appealed to other people that had also been economically neglected by the central government. Many nonsoutherners, including the Nuba of central Sudan, joined the SPLA.

SPLA military gains, the burden of war on the national economy, and the political achievements within the north as the SPLA's ideology gained some support among the northern opposition groups led to the fall of Nimeiri in 1985 through a popular uprising. A succession of governments have come to power since then, including the Transitional Military Council, the elected government led by Sadiq el Mahdi, and the present military regime of General Omar Hassan el Bashir, backed by the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF). The latter came to power through a military coup on June 30, 1989.

Although the deposed and current governments had differing ideologies, they agreed on two things. First was their shared Islamist stand, and second their commitment to the military solution to the conflict in the south. They displayed no intention of entering into serious peace negotiations with the SPLA. The presently ruling military junta, in association with the NIF, pursues a policy of Islamization and holds very little respect for other faiths. Their religious zeal heightens their willingness to fight.

The year 1991 was a turning point in the history of the SPLA for two reasons. The first was the loss of its main supply lines and military bases in southwestern Ethiopia, following the collapse of Mengistu's Dergue government in May of that year. This event provoked the mass exodus of southern Sudanese refugees from their Ethiopian hiding places into southern Sudan where they fell prey to the bombing by the Khartoum government. They sought refuge in Kenya and Uganda. The second, and most debilitating, was the split in SPLA's ranks in August 1991. Formation of rival factions along ethnic lines led to militarization and polarization of the two largest ethnic groups in southern Sudan, the Nuer and the Dinka. John Garang (Dinka) controlled the SPLA mainstream and Riek Machar (Nuer) led the SPLA-Nasir. Leadership wrangles between the two men prompted them to reach for the ethnic card, and each started preying on the other's civilian population. The Khartoum government fanned the flames of these conflicts between southern rebel leaders, and the southern opposition was greatly weakened, causing the SPLA to lose military ground until 1997, when it regained its footing. Unfortunately, SPLA's military gains have not halted the ethnic clashes, nor have they prevented the continued raiding by the government and its militia on the southern civilian population. These raids were the cause of a major famine in the Bahr el Ghazal region, which led to the death of 60,000 people in 1998.

Since it resumed, the war has caused the death of two million southerners, according to the U.S. Refugee Committee. The bombing of civilians has

driven one million southern refugees to the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea, Congo, Egypt, and Central African Republic and another three million southerners have fled to northern Sudan. About two million of the latter struggle to make a living in Khartoum. Displaced southerners complain of the lack of schools, place of worship, decent living spaces, and drinking water. Those living in the camps around Khartoum face more horrors. People are forced to renounce their faith and embrace Islam before they can receive food aid. Their churches and schools run by the churches are bulldozed down by the city under the pretext of violating zoning policies and are denied permits to build churches in the zoned parts of the city.

Since 1989, opposition parties have been banned and their leaders exiled. A tight security system ensures that all internal opposition is suppressed and ethnic and religious minorities are persecuted. The regime pursues a policy of forced Islamization of the country, strengthening the Islamic laws, and declaring the war in the south to be a holy war (jihad). As a result, leading opposition parties in the north joined the SPLA's call for change of the whole system of governance and the establishment of a pluralistic, secular state with equal rights for all citizens. It is the view of this opposition that referendum will resolve whether the "marginalized" groups want secession or a united Sudan with a federal structure. In 1995, the parties in exile formed a united opposition front with the SPLA, called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which is based in Asmara, Eritrea. This group seeks to overthrow the NIF government by all means, including the military option. John Garang was chosen to command the NDA forces.

The NIF, in its quest for governance, and in order to maintain it, have used all and any means at its disposal, including jihad against unbelievers, and in this process human rights appear to count for nothing. As long as the NIF is at the helm of state affairs in Khartoum, the production and reproduction of conflict in the Sudan with an inevitable spill over into neighboring countries will continue unabated.

Countries neighboring Sudan have also felt the pinch of Sudan's war, whether through the burden of hosting a large number of refugees or through economic upheavals. They have also been exposed to political destabilization created by Sudan's moral, material, and financial support to various rebel groups. Uganda in particular has been hit hard. The Lord's Resistance Army has for several years been headquartered on the government's side of the front line in Sudan. Their activities in the northern part of Uganda have forced the country to remobilize more than 3,000 of the soldiers who had been demobilized, and have

stopped development efforts in the affected areas. Sudan rejects criticism about supporting rebel forces, claiming that it is self-defense against its neighbor's support of the SPLA.

Sudan also supports the operations of extremist Islamic groups within Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Libya in retaliation for support these countries have allegedly given to the SPLA. Recently, the regional conflicts of interest have openly been displayed in Congo with Sudan and its neighbors supporting different groups. Some of these countries have therefore decided to mediate in an effort to bring peaceful solution to Sudan's conflict. A regional group calling itself the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) was formed in 1989, consisting of Sudan and its eastern and southern neighbors, to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. One of the most significant steps taken by IGAD has been the initiative called the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reached in Asmara in 1995. It includes points accepted by all parties as common ground for a settlement such as abandoning the military means, unity of the country, pluralism, and the right of the southern people to self-determination through a referendum. However, Sudan has stalled the initiative by wavering between implementing and dropping the DOP.

Instead, the NIF government launched what it called a "peace from within" initiative. This was intended to achieve a peace agreement with the small breakaway factions of the SPLA, but without involving the northern opposition parties or the SPLA mainstream. "Peace from within" includes provisions for a referendum to determine the future of Sudan, but it is unacceptable to SPLA since it contradicts some of their key demands, besides the fact that it was agreed to and signed by representatives of a minority of the people of the south. As the war continues, it seems that political settlement is even further away, and a decisive military victory by one side is unforeseeable.

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See also: Garang, John, and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Party.

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Suez Canal

The Suez Canal, crossing the isthmus that joins Africa and Asia, was formally opened in 1870. The canal at once assumed a strategic significance. In 1854 the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps was given an act of concession by the Egyptian government to construct the canal. In 1856 a further concession was given to the Suez Canal Company to operate it. Construction of the canal began in 1859; it was completed in 1869. Shortly before his death in 1865, the British statesman Lord Palmerston warned that Britain should not try to control the canal or, he argued, it would become embroiled in 100 years of problems. His advice was to be ignored. The composer Giuseppe Verdi was commissioned to compose an opera to mark the opening of the canal, and composed *Aida*, with a suitable Egyptian theme for the occasion. The concession to the Suez Canal Company was to run for 100 years. Initially only France purchased shares in the company.

The canal, 105 miles in length, cuts across the Suez isthmus to connect the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. It provides the shortest sea route between Europe and the Indian Ocean, the Far East and the Western Pacific. The canal does not follow the shortest land route but uses several lakes, especially the Great and Little Bitter Lakes. The Suez isthmus and the Sinai Peninsula form the sole land link between Africa and Asia.

When Khedive Ismail of Egypt went bankrupt in 1875, Britain's prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, purchased the 44 per cent of Canal Company shares then owned by Egypt, with the result that Britain and France shared a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company. It was from this time onward, spurred by Disraeli's newfound interest in imperialism, that Britain came to regard the canal as the "lifeline" to its Indian Empire. Many of its subsequent policies (such as the occupation of Sudan at the end of the century) were motivated, in part, by a determination to control Egypt and the canal. In 1882, Britain began its occupation of Egypt, which would only come to a complete end just prior to the 1956 Suez Crisis.

During the next 70 years the canal was to be internationalized. In 1898, it was opened to all international shipping, but closed to Spanish warships for the duration of the Spanish-American War of that year. In 1905 it was closed to the Russian Navy during the Russo-Japanese War. In 1911–1912 it was closed to Italian ships during the Italo-Turkish War and it was closed to the Central Powers throughout World War I (1914–1918) as a result

of the British presence in Egypt and its superior naval power. The canal was closed to the Axis powers during World War II (1939–1945), again due to the British presence in Egypt.

In 1949, Egypt was reinstated on the board of the Canal Company, from which it had been absent since 1875. It was agreed that Egypt would receive 7 per cent of the canal's profits. Following the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948–1949, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping. By this time, growing nationalist agitation in Egypt was directed against the British, who still maintained a huge military base in the Canal Zone. Then came the Suez Crisis of 1956.

It was the height of the Cold War. President Abdel Nasser of Egypt wished to construct the Aswan High Dam to bring new land under cultivation and provide hydroelectric power for his country's rapidly expanding population and industries. In February 1956 the World Bank offered a loan of \$200 million for the construction of the dam with the United States and Britain contributing a further \$70 million, while Egypt undertook responsibility for all local costs. In September 1955, however, Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia that included the provision of Soviet tanks and aircraft. When this became known, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles objected to the deal, though Nasser refused to cancel it. In June 1956 the last British troops were withdrawn from the Canal Zone of Egypt to Cyprus. Egypt, meanwhile, launched propaganda attacks upon the West because of the formation of the Baghdad Pact. On July 20, 1956, the United States and Britain withdrew their offers to finance the dam and were followed by the World Bank. On July 26, in retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company and claimed he would use the canal revenues to finance the Aswan High Dam.

Britain, France, and the United States protested and an international conference of was called in London under the chairmanship of Australia's prime minister Robert Menzies. Menzies subsequently went to Cairo in an attempt to persuade President Nasser to accept international control of the canal, but Nasser refused. A second London conference in September proposed that a Canal Users' Association be established, but this proposal was rejected by Egypt.

Britain, France, and Israel now entered into a secret agreement, and on October 29, Israeli forces crossed the border into Sinai and advanced on the canal. On October 30, Britain and France called on Israel and Egypt to cease warlike actions and withdraw from either side of the canal. Egypt was then asked to agree to an Anglo-French force being stationed at key points along the canal. Nasser refused. In the United Nations Security Council, Britain and France vetoed a U.S./USSR resolution calling for an Israeli withdrawal. On October 31,

Anglo-French air attacks were launched against Egyptian positions along the Canal Zone, and on November 5, Anglo-French forces landed at Port Said.

The UN General Assembly, which had already called for a cease-fire, adopted a Canadian resolution on November 4 to create a UN emergency force, and on November 6, under intense U.S. pressure, Britain's prime minister Anthony Eden called a halt to the invasion. The first UN units reached Egypt on November 15, and in December, the British and French forces were withdrawn and Israel withdrew from Sinai, except for the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba, although it eventually withdrew from those two places in March 1957. Egypt, meanwhile, had blocked the canal by sinking old ships along its course; these were removed by a UN salvage operation and the canal was reopened in March 1957. From that time on, Egypt exercised full control over the canal.

From its opening, the canal became one of the most used shipping routes in the world. In 1884 the first widening of the canal took place. Oil became the principal commodity transported through the canal, and in 1913 northbound oil from the Gulf accounted for 213,000 tons; by 1966 that figure had risen to 166,000,000 tons. However, after the second reopening of the canal in 1975 (it was again closed during the 1967 Six Day War) the amount of oil transported through the canal declined: giant tankers had to go around the Cape; oil discoveries in Algeria, Egypt itself, the North Sea, and Mexico lessened demand in Europe for oil from the Gulf; while overland pipelines had replaced some of the need for sea transportation. Principal northbound cargoes apart from oil were ores, metals, fabricated metals, wood, and oil seeds; the main southbound traffic consisted of empty tankers (up to 175,000 deadweight tons), cement, fertilizers, fabricated metals, and cereals. Further works to deepen and widen the canal were carried out through the 1980s and 1990s, to enable it to handle the largest oil tankers.

The canal had again been closed as a result of the Six Day War of 1967 and was only reopened in 1975, though not to Israeli shipping, which was only allowed to use it after the 1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.

The economic importance of the canal has to be seen from two points of view: that of its international users and that of Egypt. The shortened route for voyages from Europe to the Gulf and the Far East and the volume of traffic using it testify to its international significance.

The impact of the canal upon the Egyptian economy has been substantial. Canal dues from this shipping form a significant part of Egypt's total revenues. Except for Suez itself, all the towns and settlements along the canal have grown up since and as a result of

its construction, so that an essentially barren area has been turned into one of growth and development that supports a sizable population. This development, as well as the settlements, were greatly damaged as a result of the Six Day War, though by 1978, after the re-opening of the canal, most of the people returned and the settlements were rebuilt.

GUY ARNOLD

See also: Egypt: Nasser: Foreign Policy: Suez Canal Crisis to Six Day War, 1952–1970.

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
Sundiata: See Mali Empire, Sundiata and Origins of.

Swahili: Azania to 1498

The Swahili: People and Society

More than 400 Swahili towns and villages, many of them ancient ruins, lie perched on islands, inlets, and beaches along more than 3,000 kilometers (1864 miles) of the East African coast, from Somalia to Mozambique. Many Swahili are fishers and farmers, but others are urban traders, craftsmen, and Muslim clerics. Some live in simple timber and daub thatched houses in small villages, while others inhabit stone houses in large towns. Each local community has its own distinctive history, dialect, culture, and social structure, but all participate in a wider coastal culture and tradition, speak Swahili as their mother tongue, and are Muslim.

While Swahili communities are diverse, they are bound by common traditions and culture, language, and religion that often appear to owe their inspiration more to the Middle East than to Africa. Swahili have long traded with peoples around the Indian Ocean, and their urbane Muslim lifestyle contrasts dramatically with the lifestyles of their mainland neighbors. Many Swahili trace their descent from Persian forebears, and their dense urban settlements and elegant stone houses decorated with fine Persian, Arab, and Chinese pottery



Swahili Coast to the fifteenth century.

all seem to derive from the Middle East. The Swahili language was first written in Arabic script, and it contains a large number of Arabic words. And Omani Arabs have exercised a dominant economic and political influence on the coast from their capital on Zanzibar.

Such appearances are deceptive, however. At the earliest archaeological levels, going back to the eighth century, Swahili towns were local fishing and farming communities, sharing a common culture widely spread among peoples of the coast and interior, and subsequent levels show a tradition of local cultural development to the present, with local pottery and building styles predominant throughout. While Middle Eastern Muslim influences clearly began to be felt by the tenth century, most Swahili remained farmers and fishers, living in small villages or in the mud and wattle sections of the stone towns. Similarly, Swahili is a Bantu language, closely related to the languages spoken by their closest neighbors, and it acquired most of its Arabic vocabulary and script only after the seventeenth century, when Omanis first began to assert their political and economic influence along the coast. There is little evidence of Persian cultural influence among the Swahili.

Focusing on foreign origins thus misses the complex economic, social, and cultural dynamics that marked the historical development of the Swahili. Rather, in settling on the coast, the Swahili slowly developed an urban, mercantile, maritime culture (the name Swahili comes from the Arabic for “people of the coast”). Abundant stocks of fish and shellfish allowed them to support concentrated settled populations, and marine transport allowed them to settle on

remote islands and inlets and to travel quickly and easily among them, thus allowing them to maintain close contact among scattered settlements along thousands of kilometers of coastline. In this way, the Swahili have remained part of a widely dispersed, but tightly knit and relatively homogeneous culture for over 1,000 years.

Settling on the coast also facilitated trade: inland, with hunters, pastoralists, and farmers producing a variety of goods in different ecological zones; laterally, along the coast with other Swahili communities; and outward across the Indian Ocean with Arabia, Persia, and India. Gold, ivory, slaves, skins, copal, ambergris, timber, aromatics, spices, and dyes passed from East Africa through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and traversed the Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf, and India as far as China.

Overseas trade was governed by the monsoons and existing maritime technology. Oceangoing dhows left Arabia and the Persian Gulf on the annual northeast monsoon between November and March to exchange pottery, cloth, beads, and iron tools for gold, ivory, timber, slaves, skins, dyes and perfumes in East Africa before catching the southeast monsoon home between April and September. Dhows were not able to sail farther south than the Lamu Archipelago, where the monsoon winds were more reliable and beyond which currents from the south and west restricted further progress, but over time, they sailed farther along the coast, eventually reaching as far as Kilwa on the southern Tanzanian coast early in the second millennium. Therefore, the earliest Swahili towns were concentrated on the northern Kenyan and Somali coasts, where local goods and those from farther south were gathered during the year in anticipation of the annual trading season. The most valuable single commodity, gold, was traded from the Zimbabwe plateau down to the Mozambique coast at Sofala and then slowly north along the coast until it reached northern Kenya and Somalia, while most other export goods were obtained locally.

Each Swahili town was the hub of its own commercial network, extending inland via its immediate neighbors into the interior, along the coast to other towns, and across the Indian Ocean. Thus, while the coastal towns were never incorporated into a larger state, each town was linked with a wide array of different peoples and cultures. As such, Swahili communities became classic “middleman” societies, serving as commercial and cultural brokers for those who traded with them. African hunters exchanged ivory, skins, and copal for meat and grain, iron arrowheads, and decorative beads, while herders and farmers traded meat and hides or grains and timber for beads, pottery, ironwork, and cloth. All could be found trading and living in

Swahili towns, and most enjoyed extended social relations with different Swahili families and groups.

Similarly, Arab and Indian traders visited Swahili towns during the annual trading season and stayed with Swahili trading partners who brokered their trade with African suppliers and provisioned and serviced their boats. Some settled to become local agents themselves, marrying into local families and adopting local customs while also introducing their own customs, Islamic faith, and Arabic language.

As a result of such economic and social relations, early Swahili villages soon became sophisticated industrial and mercantile towns with diverse cosmopolitan populations. At their center, living in the stone town, were the old Swahili families, or *waungwana*, whose commercial and agricultural activities, urbane ways, stone houses, cultivated speech, and Islamic faith identified them as the social and political elite. Surrounding them were the local craftsmen, weavers, shipbuilders, farmers, and fishers who occupied mud and wattle dwellings and workshops in the adjacent ward. Arab and Indian merchants, ship owners, and financiers had their own ward as well. And mainland fishers, farmers, hunters, and herders who supplied many of the trade goods from the interior clustered among themselves on the outer edges of town. As trade increased and towns became more prosperous, newcomers were attracted by the economic opportunities. And as people became more economically specialized and differentiated, they also became more socially stratified. What distinguished the Swahili from their neighbors, then, was not alien origin, but settlement by the sea, trade, and urbanization, leading to social and cultural interaction, economic growth and differentiation, and social stratification.

Early Coastal Trade, Farming, and Ironworking (c.100BCE–800CE)

The earliest recorded trade in East Africa was Greco-Roman trade down the Red Sea and along the northern Somali coast to Rhapta (a site probably on the Tanzanian coast) from the first century BCE. It was followed by trade from the Persian Gulf from the second to the fifth centuries. Traders either camped on the shore or built temporary dwellings and traded with local peoples for frankincense, myrrh, and other fragrant gums and spices. Traders shifted their focus to Zanzibar Island from the fifth to the ninth centuries, but no permanent settlements were built there, either. Thus, trade throughout the first millennium was largely small-scale, coastal trade, conducted on the beach between scattered local peoples and visiting seafarers.

At the same time as foreign traders began to explore the Somali coast, however, important developments

were taking place farther south, as the first Bantu-speaking farmers settled in the Kenyan-Tanzanian borderlands in the same areas where people were also beginning to smelt iron ore, forge iron, and produce Kwale Ware or Early Iron Ware (EIW) pottery (the two are part of the same tradition, termed Kwale Ware in Kenya and EIW in Tanzania). These two may have been the same people, settling alongside earlier stone tool using hunters, who continued to occupy the area. Over time, Bantu-speaking people began to expand north through eastern Kenya, where their speech slowly evolved into Sabaki, and by the end of the first millennium, they were speaking Swahili and the other Sabaki languages (such as Comorian, Mijikenda, and Pokomo) spoken in the area today.

The material culture of the area evolved as well, as Kwale Ware/EIW, which flourished from the first century BCE to the fifth century CE, slowly evolved into Tana Tradition (TT) or Triangular Incised Ware (TIW) (also the same tradition, with TT generally used in Kenya and EIW in Tanzania). TT/TIW had replaced Kwale/EIW and was widely distributed by the eighth century, indicating the development of a common regional culture along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts and their hinterlands. It was then that the Swahili began to establish their first coastal settlements and emerge as a distinctive maritime, urban culture, heirs to regional linguistic and cultural traditions extending at least eight centuries into the past.

Shanga: An Early Swahili Town (c.760–1425)

The town of Shanga, on Pate Island in the Lamu Archipelago, is an excellent example of the early development of such settlements. Shanga was first settled between 760 and 780 by a small group of local people who gathered shellfish and fished along the beach, produced early TT/TIW pottery typical of the region at the time, made shell beads and iron tools (probably for trade with their mainland neighbors), and lived in mud and wattle houses within a small enclosed area. They also traded with the Persian Gulf, exchanging ivory, mangrove poles, tortoise shell, ambergris, rock crystal, gum copal, and ironwork for Persian Sassanian-Islamic pottery and cloth. By 850, a few Muslims, probably foreign merchants, built the first small wooden mosque for their own use.

As iron production and trade increased from 850 to 1000, Shanga grew and people began to use carved porites coral to build a new town wall, a mosque, and household residences. By 1050, they had built a new Friday Mosque, the first that was large enough for all the adult men in the community. They also began to produce cloth, developed more refined versions of Tana Ware, and imported larger quantities of Persian

pottery. Shanga was becoming a prosperous Muslim trading community.

The town was destroyed shortly thereafter, when the Friday Mosque was burned and the town leveled, but it quickly recovered. A new, larger mosque was built and new coral houses were constructed. By 1250, trade had shifted from the Gulf to southern Arabia, eclipsing local iron and textile production and turning Shanga into a mercantile town. Shanga reached its peak between 1325 and 1375, when people built large houses of coral rag and lime mortar and erected new mosques at either end of town. Subsequently, the town went into its final decline, and by 1425, it was a ruin, its Friday Mosque burned, its houses abandoned, and its inhabitants displaced to nearby Pate and Siyu, which then dominated area trade and production.

Thus, Shanga had slowly developed over nearly eight centuries from a small beachside fishing community to a large and prosperous mercantile town before it was overtaken by neighboring communities in the archipelago. Through it all, building styles evolved in situ, as people adapted new materials to older forms. The first coral houses were built on older mud foundations, their roofs continued to be pitched and thatched, and most people continued to live in timber and daub buildings throughout. Similarly, the overall town plan remained the same, even as individual mosques, tombs, and houses were slowly reoriented to face Mecca. And the first small timber mosques built by foreign merchants were repeatedly redesigned, rebuilt in coral, and enlarged to accommodate an expanding local Muslim population. The cultural foundations of the town were thus well established before foreigners began to exert much influence on the community, and local cultural patterns continued to coexist with Muslim ones throughout.

Early Swahili Towns (Ninth and Tenth Centuries)

Shanga was not the only Swahili town to emerge during the ninth and tenth centuries. Some 20 other towns also developed along the coast, including Mogadishu on the Somali coast, Manda and Pate in the Lamu Archipelago, Ungwana at the mouth of the Ozi River, Unguja Ukuu and Mkokotoni on Zanzibar Island, Kilwa on the southern Tanzanian coast, Dembeni and Sima in the Comoro Islands, and Chibuene on the Mozambique coast.

These early communities, arising almost simultaneously along the length of the coast, shared a great deal in common, forming a single emerging culture. Manda, Pate, and Ungwana were contemporary with Shanga, and all produced iron and copper work, timber, ivory, beads, and Tana Ware for local consumption and export. Contemporary finds at Kilwa, 800 kilometers

(497 miles) south of Shanga, are remarkably similar to those at the northern sites, including TT/TIW (termed “kitchen ware”), timber and daub houses, bead grinding, ironworking, weaving, and Persian pottery. Chibuene at the southern end of the coast, over 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) south of Kilwa, was first occupied at the same time, and the first settlements in the Comoro Islands also arose in the ninth century. While Comorians were not Swahili speakers, they spoke a closely related Sabaki language and their early communities were classic Swahili sites. People lived in rectangular pole and mud houses; fished with hook, line, and net; raised goats; cultivated rice, millet, coconut, legumes, and probably bananas and taro; produced iron; and made TT/TIW identical to that at Manda, Kilwa, and Chibuene. While the Comoros are 300 kilometers (186 miles) off the northern Mozambique coast, they lie astride the sailing routes north from Mozambique to Kilwa and were thus an integral part of the expanding Swahili commercial and cultural world.

Early Swahili towns were generally small, largely self-sufficient, non-Muslim communities. Few were larger than 40 acres or comprised more than a few thousand inhabitants. Located on beaches, inlets, and islands, they were not primarily sited for trade, and none had a good harbor. Rather, they were sited to take advantage of inshore fishing and gathering of shellfish, which comprised a large part of the local diet. People fished using spears, nets, hooks, and traps, using small dugout canoes and sewn planked boats for navigating inside the reefs. They also hunted wild game, including elephants, using spears and bows with poisoned arrows. They farmed, raising sorghum, millet, eleusine, rice, peas, beans, pumpkins, sugarcane, castor oil, coconuts, bananas, and taro. They cleared the bush with iron machetes and axes, cultivated and weeded with iron hoes, planted seeds with wooden digging sticks, threshed and winnowed grains, and pounded them in mortars with pestles. They also raised some chickens, goats and sheep, and a few cattle. Aside from fishing and trade, then, they differed little from their Sabaki-speaking, farming and ironworking neighbors, with whom they continued to trade and interact socially, and both continued to live alongside preexisting stone tool using hunters, gatherers, and herders. The Swahili were still predominantly non-Muslim, though small communities of foreign Muslim traders had begun to settle in the larger towns.

***Mogadishu: A Northern Entrepôt
(Ninth to Fifteenth Centuries)***

The expansion of overseas trade from the eleventh century led to the emergence of some towns as major regional trading centers, where traders bulked goods

from smaller towns and villages along the coast in preparation for the annual trading season. Most of the early entrepôts were along the coast northeast of the Tana River, which dhows were easily able to reach, then returning to the Persian Gulf within the same year. Mogadishu was one of the earliest of these, based almost exclusively on its position and ability to bulk and break cargoes for other towns along the coast rather than on the wealth of its own hinterland. Among other things, Mogadishu was the primary supplier of gold from Zimbabwe, slowly amassed during local trading expeditions throughout the year.

Foreign visitors commented widely on Mogadishu’s stature and wealth. Yaqut noted about 1220 that Mogadishu was the most important city of the coast, inhabited by local nomads as well as foreign Muslims. A Friday Mosque was built in 1269, and by the time of Ibn Battuta’s visit in 1331, Mogadishu had grown into a large and prosperous Muslim town ruled by a pious shaykh. Mogadishu’s merchants had become wealthy hosting overseas traders, producing cloth, and exporting sandalwood, ebony, ambergris, and ivory in addition to gold.

***Expansion of Trade and Islam
(Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries)***

Like Shanga and Mogadishu, established Swahili communities grew rapidly between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and a large number of new ones emerged for the first time as Swahili continued to expand along the coast. While this was the peak period of trade with the Persian Gulf, however, there is little evidence of Persian cultural influence on Swahili artistic styles, culture, or language, and by the thirteenth century the focus of trade had shifted to southern Arabia.

Settlement by foreign Muslims and gradual adoption of Islam by local Swahili were among the most dramatic cultural developments of the period. Foreign traders had settled along the coast from the earliest days of Swahili trade, but Swahili communities remained largely non-Muslim until the eleventh century. While the first small wooden mosque appeared in Shanga in the ninth century, for example, one large enough for the local community was not built until the mid-eleventh century. But with the expansion of trade, the East African coast became progressively incorporated within an expanding Islamic world system, as traders and religious scholars journeyed from southern Arabia to the far reaches of the Muslim world and overseas Muslims made the pilgrimage to the homeland of the faith. By the thirteenth century, most Swahili communities were at least nominally Muslim. Increasing numbers of Muslim scholars, teachers, qadis (jurists), and sharifs (descendants of the Prophet

Muhammad) were settling in them, and local scholars were traveling to southern Arabia to study, but Swahili continued to live in a plural religious environment where beliefs in the powers of ancestral spirits also continued to hold sway.

At the same time, Swahili towns began to take on their characteristic layout and appearance. At the center was an open square containing the market and Friday Mosque, while radiating out from this were a series of residential wards, each containing people from a particular family or group, like so many residential village homesteads clustered within the larger town, the whole bound together by a town wall.

The most prominent central wards were occupied by the *waungwana*, the oldest and wealthiest families who were the first to build in stone. Stone houses all along the coast had the same basic design, with a series of long thin rooms the width of the house laid out parallel with one another from front to back. The outer vestibule and adjacent inner courtyard were for entertaining nonfamily members, while as one proceeded toward the rear one passed through progressively more private areas of the home inhabited by women.

Other wards were inhabited by craftsmen, fishers, newcomers to town, or people from surrounding towns or neighboring areas. In these, most people lived in rectangular timber and daub houses with thatched roofs, which usually combined residences and workshops where people produced ironwork, pottery, shell beads, cloth, furniture, boats, and fishing nets.

Kilwa, Sofala, and the Gold Trade (Ninth to Fifteenth Centuries)

Like Shanga and Mogadishu, Kilwa slowly grew from rural roots in the ninth century to become one of the most prominent towns of the coast. From about 800 to 1150, it was primarily a fishing and farming village whose inhabitants produced ironwork and beads, made TT/TIW pottery, and conducted local trade along the nearby coast. Kilwa began to come into its own around 1150 to 1300, however, when it became the main transshipment point for gold from Zimbabwe. Gold was mined on the Zimbabwe plateau and exchanged for cloth, ironwork, and beads at regional trade fairs with Swahili from Sofala and other Mozambique ports. From there, it was transshipped along the coast to Kilwa and beyond, eventually arriving in Lamu or Mogadishu in time to be shipped across the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and India during the annual trading season.

As people in Kilwa became more prosperous, they built large houses of coral rag and lime mortar, produced cloth to trade with their neighbors, minted their own copper coins, and imported increasing quantities

of Persian and Chinese pottery, rich cloths, and expensive glass beads. Kilwa enjoyed its greatest prosperity around 1300 to 1500, however, when dhows became able to sail as far as Kilwa before having to catch the returning monsoon home, and it soon eclipsed Mogadishu in the gold trade. Imports of Chinese and Arabian pottery increased; extensive new buildings arose; dramatic new building and pottery styles emerged; but like Shanga, local iron and cloth production declined as Kilwa came to rely more on trade. During the fourteenth century, two of the architectural marvels of the Swahili coast—the Great Mosque and the huge complex known as Husuni Kubwa—were both built, and in the fifteenth century, an entirely new stone town was erected on the nearby island of Songo Mnara. Kilwa's end was near, however, and in 1505 it was sacked by the Portuguese, putting an end to seven hundred years of increasing trade and prosperity.

The first ruling dynasty of Kilwa was known as the Shirazi. These were not people from Shiraz in Persia, however, but Swahili from the northern coast who had adopted the name for its prestige. As an oral tradition of Kilwa relates, Kilwa was founded by three different groups of local people from the mainland, but one day Ali bin Selimani, a Shirazi, arrived by ship with his trade goods and children. He gave the local ruling elder, Mrimba, presents of cloth and beads and asked to be allowed to settle with his family. Mrimba agreed, and soon Ali married Mrimba's daughter while continuing to give trade goods to the local people. Then Ali persuaded his father-in-law to move to the mainland to avoid possible conflict, but Mrimba agreed only if Ali spread cloth all the way to the mainland so he could walk across.

Ali complied with Mrimba's wish, and Mrimba departed, but subsequently he changed his mind and made war on Ali. Ali retaliated by making sacrifices and reading a spell from the Qu'ran to prevent Mrimba from crossing back to the island. Ali then ruled on the island while Mrimba ruled on the mainland. Subsequently, Ali had a son by Mrimba's daughter, who then ruled on both the island and the mainland as the heir to both Mrimba and Ali. All of this happened before Kilwa became a trading town, for the people remained farmers and fishers, paid no taxes, and did not live within a town wall.

This oral tradition establishes with elegant simplicity the fundamental bases of Kilwa society. While the town was founded by local people, foreign traders arrived and gained the right to settle and trade by paying tribute in beads and cloth. Later, the two intermarried, with local people continuing to exercise authority over the land, while Shirazi gained control over the people of the town. Muslim Shirazi then consolidated their power through their superior wealth, religion and

magic, but ultimately, the two groups became joined in their descendants, who were heirs to both the land and the people. Swahili society thus represented the fusion of local hunters, farmers, and fishers with immigrant Muslims and traders, each of whom played a distinctive role in the historical development of the wider town and society.

Wealth, Power, and Belief on the Swahili Coast (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries)

The developments of the previous five centuries reached a peak in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as Swahili societies became even richer, more socially diverse, and more culturally complex. In the process, different individuals and groups of people within each town struggled with one another to gain and retain dominance over others.

Swahili communities were relentlessly competitive. Each town was divided into two opposing halves (or *moiety*s) that competed with one another in poetry competitions, religious festivals, and political power. Each descent group sought to expand its own status and power by negotiating wider kinship links, marrying well, and attracting new clients through patronage, and each residential ward sought to ally itself with other ward. Waungwana asserted their right to rule through their claims to prestigious “Shirazi” origins or to descent from the town’s earliest residents, their control of the elaborate brass or carved ivory side-horns (*siwa*), flutes, drums, and cymbals that symbolized power, or their display of silk girdles, fine sandals, and turbans. As trade continued to expand, wealthy merchants used their wealth to build impressive stone houses, wear fine dress, and sponsor town festivals.

Claims to superior status and power were based on religious factors as well. Study with prominent Muslim scholars, sharif status, or patronage of religious scholars, schools, and mosques all contributed to one’s social and religious status. In the process, local religious authorities, especially women, who acted as mediums of ancestral spirits and as healers, were challenged by Muslim teachers and healers, but Swahili continued to embrace religious pluralism in such ritual events as the annual circumambulation of the town or the competitive Maulidi celebrations of the birth of the Prophet, both of which merged Swahili rituals with Muslim ones. In the end, religious powers became widely distributed among different peoples and communities, as seen in the complex array of spirits, representing different peoples, powers, and rituals, to which most Swahili appealed in time of need. And the Swahili ritual calendar continued to combine the Persian solar calendar for local rituals, farming, fishing, monsoons, and navigation with the Arabic lunar one for Muslim religious celebrations.

Thus, as small fishing villages became prosperous trading towns, Swahili society and culture became progressively more economically diverse, socially complex, and culturally plural. Villages became ward within larger towns, lineage politics became the politics of patronage and alliance, egalitarian values gave way to values based on status and rank, and leadership became the politics of competing factions, classes, and religious powers.

Following their conquest of the coast between 1498 and 1505, the Portuguese established their main settlements on the Mozambique coast to control the gold trade from Zimbabwe. Trade declined elsewhere along the coast, and many prominent towns, like Kilwa, went into decline until Omani Arabs helped to drive the Portuguese out of the northern Indian Ocean between 1650 and 1698 and began to exert their own influence over the coastal towns from Zanzibar. While individual towns remained largely independent, Omani suzerainty led to an upsurge in trade and Arab influence in religion, law, commerce, architecture, dress, and vocabulary in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such that many came to believe that Swahili was fundamentally an Arab culture, contrary to a thousand years of prior coastal history.

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Swahili, Portuguese and: 1498–1589

When the first Portuguese vessels arrived along the coast of eastern Africa in 1498 under the command of Vasco da Gama, the Swahili city states were ill-prepared to defend themselves. While a few towns

probably had acquired rudimentary firearms, they were not proficient in their use. Those towns protected by stone walls often were fortified only on their landward side as defense against mainland neighbors rather than any seaborne invaders. In any case, there are suggestions that the power of Swahili states was based more on socioreligious factors than on politicomilitary ones. While foreign “magic” might have intimidated the peoples of the hinterland, it made no impression on the Portuguese, however. In addition, there are indications that a new, perhaps more orthodox, Muslim mode of dominance was spreading through some Swahili towns, exacerbating already existent commercial rivalries, and working against the formation of effective alliances among them.

Gama’s expedition essentially was an armed reconnaissance to establish a sea route to India, where, it was hoped, the Portuguese could supplant Venetian and Genoese traders who were monopolizing Asian imports into Europe. Finding that the inhabitants of the Swahili towns were Muslims (the Portuguese called them *Moors*) who were determined to defend their commercial and political integrity, friction quickly developed. Gama’s ships bombarded Mozambique and Mogadishu, but one town, Malindi, whose trade was being captured by Mombasa to the south and whose very political survival was threatened by Pate to the north, saw the Portuguese as potential allies, and gave the fleet a cordial reception.

Other expeditions followed. In a subsequent voyage in 1502, Gama established the basic approach the Portuguese would use in their dealings with Swahili towns for the next two centuries. The submission of each state and the payment of annual tribute were demanded; any who refused were attacked and plundered. Larger flotillas, including one under Francisco D’Almeida in 1505, and the combined fleets of Tristao da Cunha and Affonso de Albuquerque the following year, ravaged the coast in their turn. Some towns, including Mombasa and Barawa, offered determined resistance, only to suffer orgies of looting by the vengeful Portuguese after their capture. In some instances, Portuguese soldiers chopped the hands and ears off their victims to get their jewelry. The invaders established forts and garrisons at Mozambique, Sofala, and Kilwa, and, helping in quarrels with rival towns, solidified their alliance with Malindi. Other Portuguese forays, such as that by Ruy Lourenço Ravasco in 1503, were conducted without official sanction and amounted to open acts of piracy.

Distressed by their loss of Indian Ocean commerce, several states tried to reverse the growing Portuguese domination. Aided by Venetian shipbuilders, Egypt assembled a fleet to regain its position in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Egyptians joined forces with

Indians and Persians, but their combined naval forces were smashed at a climatic battle off Diu in 1509. The Portuguese had gained unrivaled control of the sea-lanes.

Albuquerque, now viceroy of India, established a strategy of constructing fortified naval bases along the various coasts of the Indian Ocean to support his warships and merchantmen. The East African coast was accorded low priority, however. In fact, he ordered the station at Kilwa abandoned in 1512. The Portuguese retreated south to Mozambique and many Swahili city states now entered a period of abysmal decline. Under tight restrictions, their formerly vibrant commerce stagnated. For awhile, a few, including Kilwa, tried to continue the gold trade with the interior by bypassing coastal regions under Portuguese control. Others resisted as best they could through smuggling, noncooperation and flight. Most towns atrophied, however, and some disappeared altogether. When they appeared at all, Portuguese vessels called at the ports merely to extort or pillage. Most interactions entailed blatant greed, corruption and violence, and all too often they resembled those of gangsters engaged in a protection racket.

While superior in terms of naval technology and the science of fortification, the Portuguese lacked the weaponry, tactical sophistication, and logistical organization to permit any significant penetration of the African interior, except up the Zambezi River where they seized control of trading posts at Sena and Tete in the 1530s. Therefore, some towns, including Kilwa and especially Mombasa, developed important commercial relations with their hinterlands from which they continued to derive surprising vitality. Despite the Portuguese presence at Malindi, towns along northern parts of the coast, such as Mogadishu, remained unconquered and defiant.

Major expeditions against the Swahili towns abated after about 1530, but political tensions and a sense of instability steadily increased. By about 1580, the Portuguese had suffered several major reversals that appeared to threaten the very continuation of their dominance along the coast. As early as about 1570, a widespread conspiracy among various peoples of the Indian Ocean Empire who had long suffered Portuguese oppression flared up. A few years later, Portuguese attempts to push further up the Zambezi to gain control of the Monomotapa gold mines ended in failure and unleashed increasing ferment in the interior. In 1578, a disastrous Portuguese invasion of Morocco resulted in the death of her young king, paving the way for Spain to seize control of Portugal in the period of “Spanish Captivity” from 1580. Many Portuguese garrisons in Asia and Africa were sharply reduced.

Meanwhile, an outside force was abetting the growing Portuguese insecurity. From about 1540, the Ottoman Turks had extended their control over Egypt. More of a naval power than their Mamluk predecessors, the Turks began a determined drive down the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean. Battling Portuguese galleons and disrupting shipping, they even besieged naval bases on the Indian coast. Sensitive to the deep animosity of Swahili towns after long years of Portuguese tyranny and neglect, the Turks presented themselves as potential liberators. By the 1570s they were poised to support the rebellious Indian Ocean peoples in their conspiracy, but were thwarted temporarily by their own catastrophic naval defeat at the battle of Leponto.

Turkish vessels were soon back in East African waters, however. In about 1585, a single Turkish ship promising support was sufficient to bring on a general revolt of Swahili towns, which the Portuguese promptly quelled. A couple of years later, Amir Ali Bey—whom some sources picture as an Ottoman official, but others as a mere buccaneer—appeared with a small force. Again, several city states immediately broke away from Portuguese control. At Pemba, the townspeople annihilated the occupying garrison, and an attack was mounted against Malindi, Portugal's staunchest ally. Again a Portuguese fleet from India restored control with appalling brutality. At Faza, they slaughtered the entire population, destroyed its vessels and plantations, and sent the head of its king as a grizzly trophy to Goa.

Ali Bey returned with a somewhat larger force two years later and took possession of Mombasa. Another Portuguese relief force was dispatched, and sailed into the harbor to find the Turks had come under siege by invaders they called *Zimba*, reportedly a savage people who had already destroyed Kilwa. The Portuguese fleet attacked and pillaged the city, and then, as they departed, the *Zimba* rushed in to complete the devastation. Advancing farther north, the *Zimba* finally were defeated at Malindi by a force of warlike pastoralists whom the Portuguese called *Massegejos*, perhaps identifiable as elements of Bantu-speaking Segeju.

The Turkish incursions had pointed out, once and for all, the inherent weakness of Portuguese control along the East African coast. Obviously a strong naval station was needed along the northern coast to complement those farther south. In 1594, therefore, on the instruction of the Viceroy of India, construction of a powerful citadel, Fort Jesus, was begun at Mombasa to house a permanent garrison. With this stronghold anchoring Portuguese rule, the Swahili city states would continue to endure repression and brutality for another century.

JOHN LAMPHEAR

See also: **Portugal: Exploration and Trade in the Fifteenth Century.**

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Swahili: Mombasa, Fort Jesus, the Portuguese, 1589–1698

In 1589, Mombasa was sacked by the Portuguese for the fourth time in less than a century, this time in punishment for the hospitality shown to a fleet of Turkish raiders. This sacking was particularly destructive as it coincided with conflicts on the hinterland, improbably reported by Portuguese sources as the ingress of a wandering cannibal horde from Mozambique and perhaps more usefully understood as a period of exceptional violence in agropastoralist relationships. Having reestablished their dominance on the East African coast, the Portuguese made Mombasa the center of their new and reinforced presence, moving to this superior harbor the erstwhile ruling family of Malindi, who had been close allies of the Portuguese.

The period from 1593 to 1631 was the apogee of Portuguese power on the Kenya coast. Basic work on the impressive new fortress of Fort Jesus at Mombasa was begun in 1593 and completed in 1596. The Fort commanded the channel which led to the harbor on the north side of the island, and its guns also dominated the town, which lay around this harbor. Early seventeenth-century Mombasa also boasted a monastery and a Portuguese town of 70 houses; regrettably we have little idea of what these settlers might have been growing or how far they were engaged in trade. The most comprehensive account of Mombasa in the early seventeenth century was a semi-retrospective piece, written in 1635, that suggested that in terms of the ivory and other luxury goods the

commerce of Mombasa was of limited value and that the considerable investment made in building the fortress was intended to provide a forward defense for Portugal's other possessions and to guarantee the supply of foodstuffs in the region.

These foodstuffs were not grown on the island, much of which was not cultivated. Supplies of grain, which from Mombasa fed into a complex coasting trade that varied in direction and intensity with the vagaries of weather and politics, were drawn partly from the immediate hinterland of Mombasa, from which grain might easily be transported on the little network of creeks around the island. The island and immediate hinterland were settled by a population described both as "Moors" and "Cafres." The term *Swahili* was not used in Portuguese records of this period, but the Moors of their accounts were surely African Muslims, people who would later be called Swahili, living among a non-Muslim population. These Muslim and pagan settlements were considered to be part of the domain of Mombasa, to which they paid tax. Beyond them, farther inland, lived Mozungullos, to whose leaders tribute was paid to secure a degree of peace. The Portuguese never exercised authority beyond the narrow domain of Mombasa itself, and indeed seem hardly to have ventured off the island, in contrast to their policies in Mozambique. But there was considerable interaction between the peoples of the hinterland and the African populace of Mombasa. Tribute to the Mozungullos was paid through "headmen" in Mombasa, so there may already have existed at this time the pattern recorded in the nineteenth century, according to which each Swahili kin group claimed a political and economic relationship with a particular hinterland ethnic group.

A member of the Malindi family brought to Mombasa by the Portuguese was installed as king. It is not clear how far this post was an invention of the Portuguese: sixteenth-century accounts of Mombasa mentioned a king, but this may well have been a misinterpretation, and Mombasan society has shown a remarkable historical tendency to political decentralization along kinship lines. The Portuguese were in effect trying to build a protectorate at Mombasa, and initially the king was allotted a portion of the duties on trade collected by the Portuguese. By 1630 he was a kind of tax farmer, paying the Portuguese crown for permission to tax trade, and collecting a tax in produce from his subjects. The Portuguese tried to Catholicize and integrate this new "kingdom," and in 1626 a new king, a Catholic educated in Goa, with a Portuguese wife, was enthroned. But the relationship between the kings and the Portuguese captains of the Fort was an unhappy one: each captain sought to enrich himself through trade and tax,

and in doing so infringed upon the king's privileges. In 1631 this tense relationship exploded when the king, Dom Jeronimo, massacred the Portuguese garrison and population. This abrupt annihilation revealed very clearly the fragility of Portuguese power in the region, a fragility underlined when an attempt to retake Mombasa was successfully repelled. But it revealed too that there was no immediate contender for domination. Without the support of the Portuguese, Dom Jeronimo was unable or unwilling to continue as king of Mombasa, and he sailed off to pursue a brief career as a pirate. When a small Portuguese force arrived to retake Mombasa in 1632, there was no resistance.

The fort was strengthened, but the Portuguese presence never regained the pretensions of the early seventeenth century. A handful of settlers were concentrated at Mombasa and a system of direct rule was introduced, with the captain of the fort as a waged administrator responsible for collecting duties and tax, and for enforcing the onerous restrictions which were intended to privilege Portuguese trade. But the trade was negligible, and the revenue very much less than the cost of maintaining the fort and its garrison. By the 1660s the captains were collecting tax on their own behalf and conducting private trade, but here, as elsewhere, the effect of Portuguese attempts to tax and monopolize was the destruction of commerce. Mombasa must have seemed a singularly unattractive post for officials bent on profit, and it is perhaps unsurprising that when Omani forces began to pursue their conflict with the Portuguese into East Africa, they met little effective resistance. The Portuguese town was sacked in an Omani raid in 1661. The Omanis returned in 1696, and Fort Jesus was besieged for 30 months, holding out for so long more because of the desultory nature of the siege and the ambivalent attitude of the populace of Mombasa than because of the half-hearted attempts at relief by fleets sent from Goa. When the fort fell in 1698 Portuguese power on the coast north of Mozambique was effectively ended; and the coast fell under an Omani hegemony that, while fragile and divided, was to persist for the next two centuries.

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See also: **Zanzibar.**

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Swahili Language

Kiswahili, the most widely spoken African language on the continent, has a long and complex history that interweaves with that of the development of long-range trading networks throughout East Africa. Over the last ten centuries, the language spread from its East African coastal origins to become a lingua franca for both East and Central Africa. Today, mainland coastal Tanzanians and those who live on the island of Zanzibar speak Kiswahili as their mother tongue, while English and numerous other local languages besides Kiswahili continue to be spoken throughout mainland Tanzania. Kiswahili shares official state language status with English, and is considered the language of education and administration. Kiswahili, written in Arabic script until early in the twentieth century, represents a significant literary tradition. It stood as one of Africa's few written languages before the colonial period.

Historians trace the beginnings of a distinct Swahili language to the ninth century. Although related to other Bantu languages of the region, and especially to the Sabaki subgroup of languages, Kiswahili has a distinct grammatical structure that incorporates numerous loanwords from Arabic, Portuguese, German, English, and Hindi. The presence of these foreign words reflects not only the Swahili people's significant involvement in the ancient Indian Ocean trading system, but also the later period of European colonial rule. Swahili settlements along the East African coastline stretched from the southern Somali coast to the southern Tanzania coast. Mainly Muslim, the inhabitants of these settlements engaged in both inland and maritime trade. Around 1800, expanded trading networks developed by Yao and Nyamwezi traders from the interior of Tanzania resulted in permanent connections with coastal Swahili peoples.

During the 1820s, European and Zanzibari demand for ivory and slaves stimulated the further development of long-distance caravan routes between the Mrima coast opposite the island of Zanzibar and the interior of Tanzania. Permanent Swahili trading settlements in the interior grew during this period as well, with the most famous located at Ujiji, on Lake Tanganyika. By 1860, a complex central trading system existed, linking important interior trading towns across Tanzania with Swahili coastal towns. As this network became more entrenched in Tanzania, Kiswahili spread along the same paths. By the 1880s, peoples of

the interior who lived near the trading routes used Kiswahili as a lingua franca for the purposes of conducting business with coastal Swahili. Besides the practical impetus to speak the language to facilitate trade, evidence also indicates that interior peoples may have also begun to speak the language as a means of enhancing their personal prestige and status. The coastal Swahili had achieved quite a high standard of living, and some non-Swahili sought to emulate them by acquiring some of their cultural attributes, such as adherence to Islam and command of the Kiswahili language.

When European missionaries and explorers began to arrive in Tanzania in the 1840s, they found that command of Kiswahili improved their ability to function in East Africa. They could, for example, reduce the need for interpreters, who the Europeans sometimes deemed untrustworthy. Thus, explorers like Sir Richard Burton sought to learn the language well enough to take advantage of its capacity as a lingua franca in furthering their own selfish goals. Europeans sometimes even used Kiswahili among themselves when they could not communicate in European languages.

Missionaries set about the work of writing dictionaries and grammars in order to improve communication between themselves and potential converts. The linguistic work done by these early missionaries and their successors resulted in the first formalized European renditions of the language. Their efforts became the foundation of later colonial educational and administrative plans to educate an African elite as colonial functionaries, and their dictionaries and grammars became the standard. Missionaries also employed converted Africans who spoke both Kiswahili and the local language to act as intermediaries between themselves and their converts. Many of these mission-educated and Christianized Africans later became educators and administrators in the colonial apparatus.

Germany established its claim to Tanganyika at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. By 1903 it split the colony into 28 districts, with a German administrator at the head of each. The small number of resident Germans in the colony available for administrative duties made necessary the training of a cadre of African civil servants. Although students in government schools received instruction in German, and the German government encouraged German language instruction by offering monetary incentives, the primary language taught to Africans was Kiswahili. In this way, and with the partial cooperation of Christian missions operating schools in the colony, the Germans built an efficient and flexible colonial apparatus of Kiswahili-speaking civil servants, teachers, and soldiers who easily navigated

the language barrier between the German rulers and their subject peoples.

As an increasing number of Africans learned Kiswahili during the German colonial period, they spread the language to all corners of Tanzania. Because the Germans often posted their employees far away from their homes, Kiswahili spread widely as a medium of expression among diverse African ethnic groups, and its status as a lingua franca became further entrenched throughout polyglot Tanzania, reaching beyond the traditional trading routes and missionary communities.

When the British took over the colony as a mandate in 1918, they praised this aspect of German colonial rule and followed suit. However, the British also began educating African secondary school students in English. English came to be perceived, at least among Africans who wanted to succeed within the colonial structure, as the superior language, and Kiswahili correspondingly came to be viewed by those same elites as inferior and potentially limiting during the mandate period.

Tanzanians reversed this assumption during the independence movement of the 1950s. Recognizing the potential nationalist benefits of a language so widely spoken across Tanzania, leaders used Kiswahili to communicate their politics to the masses. Taking pride in the distinguished and rich written literary tradition of Kiswahili, and touting its attributes as a lingua franca, Tanzania's postindependence leaders sought to imbue the language with a status at least equal to English. In fact, as a young man, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere translated several of William Shakespeare's works into Kiswahili in order to show the peoples of Tanganyika, and arguably the former colonial rulers, the aesthetic quality of this African language.

Later government efforts to make Kiswahili the medium of instruction for secondary and university-level education have not, however, been very successful. Some scholars express concern that Kiswahili cannot accommodate the highly technical terminology of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and thus will not serve Tanzanians well as they try to further integrate their nation into the global system. Yet the language continues to expand as a true lingua franca for East and Central Africa, and surpasses English as the most spoken language in Tanzania. It stands as a living and meaningful symbol of African heritage and history to millions of Africans.

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See also: **Language, Colonial State and; Nyerere, Julius.**

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
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SWAPO: *See* Namibia: SWAPO and the Freedom Struggle.

Swazi Kingdom: *See* Swaziland: Swazi Kingdom, Survival of, 1839–1879.

Swaziland: Sobhuza I, Foundation of Ngwane Kingdom

Sobhuza I was born around 1800 at Ngetfwese, near modern Mlosheni. His biological mother was Lojiba Simelane, the sister and junior wife (*inhlanti*) to Somnjalose Simelane, his legal mother, who was barren. His father was Ndvungunye (alias Zigode). Sobhuza's birth is shrouded in some mystery. His father Ndvungunye is reputed to have had a short and violent reign. He died unexpectedly after being struck



Swaziland.

by lightning in a thunderstorm. Few adult sons survived. In one account Lojiba was still pregnant with Somhlolo at this point. After his birth Sobhuza was given the additional name of Somhlolo (The Wonder) because the top of his head remained soft. Somhlolo is reputed to have been taken away to the Vryheid district by Ndvungunye's *sicile* (body servant) Lohija Nsibandze to protect him from jealous rivals. Little is known of this early period of Sobhuza's reign. His mother, Somjalose, who had earned the gratitude and respect of the Ngwane people by persuading Ndvungunye to "cool down," acted as leading regent and her personal stature may well have cemented the "dual monarchy" of king and queen mother, for which the Swazi have become renowned.

The first decade of the nineteenth century was politically turbulent. Large numbers of people resided in and around the king's residence (*Hhohlo*), all sharing homes. The *amabutho* (age regiments) that had been initiated by Ndvungunye were often under arms and residing in the vicinity. These two features of the Ngwane kingdom probably facilitated the rapid incorporation and acculturation of conquered and refugee groups. The main threat to the Ngwane kingdom came from the Ndvandwe under their king Zwide, whose capital was across the Phongola River near modern Nongoma. When Sobhuza was in his teens a diplomatic marriage was arranged between Sobhuza and Zwide's daughter Tzandile. The objective on the Ngwane part was to preempt attack by their powerful neighbor. This proved unrealistic. At some point around 1818 Zwide executed a sequence of violent attacks against his in-law. The trigger of conflict was control over the fertile banks and floodplain of the Phongola, whose value may have become suddenly heightened by a period of acute drought. In one of the first of these attacks the royal capital Zombodze was burned—its charred ruins being given the name of *eShselweni* (place of ashes).

Sobhuza fled first to Ephungalekazi near Hlatikhulu, in the southwestern region of modern Swaziland, but thereafter was pushed farther north by repeated attacks from Zwide's forces. Ultimately he was forced to seek refuge with a Sotho chief named Magoboyi living around the Dlomodlomo Mountains far to the northwest. Sobhuza was accompanied by a relatively small band of soldiers during these wanderings. Some of his military officers and subchiefs were instructed to remain behind to protect his former domain against Zwide's marauding troops. Others remained behind of their own accord. Among these was Sobhuza's brother Nkwekazi, who before long decided to assume the mantle of kingship. Many of Sobhuza's subjects were reluctant to accept Nkwekazi's elevation, Maloyi Nkhosi (later Mamba) among them. When Zwide was finally routed by Shaka Zulu in 1820 and forced to flee

across the Phongola River to the northern tributary of the Nkomati River, Maloyi Nkhosi sent an army to fetch him back. Their combined forces returned along the headwaters of the Phongola, and routed Nkwekazi. Zombodze and other royal villages were resuscitated near to their old sites.

After Zwide's flight to the northwest, Sobhuza continued to be threatened from the south, this time by Shaka. To counter this he entered into marriage alliances with the Zulu king, and probably became tributary at the same time. Some oral traditions speak of him actually visiting Shaka at his capital. As with Zwide, there was little to assure Sobhuza that he would remain immune from Zulu attacks, which ultimately materialized in the late 1820s. Soon after his return from the south he therefore took the momentous decision to colonize the Zulwini Valley (near modern Mbabane) and the region farther to the north, which among other things offered the sanctuary of near impregnable cave fortresses in the Mdzimba Mountains. Sobhuza began this exercise cautiously entering into a marriage alliance with and recognizing the autonomy of the Maseko chief Mgazi, who controlled the cave fortress of Nqabaneni. Besides Mgazi, his most powerful adversaries in the region were Mnjoli and Moyeni Magagola. He conquered both, the second with external (possibly Portuguese) support. With these subdued Sobhuza gradually extended his control to the Lebombo mountains in the east, the Dlomodlomo mountains in the northwest, and Simakade (Piet Retief) in the southwest.

For much of this time Sobhuza's kingdom remained a nation under arms. Little of the conquered territory was settled, and the bulk of the Ngwane core clustered for security in military towns. Only relatively late in his reign did Sobhuza begin "placing" his brothers and leading indunas in their own chiefdoms in this new domain. The bulk of the newly conquered population thus remained partially unassimilated, a situation that would continue until the reign of his successor Mswati.

After the assassination of Shaka and the installation of Dingane, in 1828, Sobhuza gained some respite from Zulu attacks. These resumed in 1836 in what the missionary Brownlee described as "an exterminating mission against the Swazies." This failed in its main intention due to a lack of coordination between the three invading groups. Warfare resumed in earnest after Dingane's defeat at Blood River in 1838. Now Dingane sought to acquire new territory in southern Swaziland, at a greater distance from the Boers. The plan was to set up villages and colonize. Realizing the gravity of the situation the Ngwane mobilized their entire military strength, with which they succeeded in defeating Dingane's forces at the pivotal battle of Lubuya in 1839. It was at this point that Sobhuza died.

His final legacy were the envoys he dispatched shortly before his death to seal an alliance with the trekkers. With that a framework of domestic governance and foreign policy was set in place on which his successor Mswati could build.

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See also: Mfecane; Shaka and Zulu Kingdom, 1810–1840.

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Swaziland: Swazi Kingdom, Survival of, 1839–1879

When Sobhuza died in 1839, he bequeathed a territory with roughly delimited borders, a rudimentary political and administrative structure, and a brief moratorium on external threats. His heir apparent was Mswati III, son of Zwide's daughter Tzandile, and still a boy of 13. Mswati's inner circle of supporters was soon engulfed in a sea of troubles. His regents (Tzandile, his brother Malambule, and his uncle Malunge Dlamini) were immediately confronted with a regional rebellion in the south, led by Mswati's elder brother Fokoti. Even after this was crushed, other elder brothers continued to eye his position covetously, and would conspire against him on at least three more occasions.

Mswati's regents quickly sought to reestablish their authority. They posted wives and sons of Sobhuza to govern chiefdoms all over the conquered territory, thereby strengthening and deepening Swazi administration. They overhauled the military system of the *amabutho* (age regiments), and they reformed the annual *incurala* (first fruits) ceremony, thereby strengthening the military and ideological powers of the king.

Swaziland's respite from external pressures was relatively short-lived. At the beginning of 1842, Dingane's brother and successor Mpande gave notice of his intention to launch a new attack on Swaziland. The new British colony of Natal acted as a brake on Mpande's ambitions until 1846. Then, renewed restiveness among several southern chiefs following a series of raids that accompanied Mswati's circumcision and a further princely revolt led by Malambule, the most senior brother to Mswati, gave Mpande the opportunity to intervene. When Malambule was defeated and fled toward the headwaters of the Phongola, Mswati's armies followed on their heels. This provided Mpande with the pretext he needed to launch a massive attack in the first half of 1847. The Swazi weathered the

attack by taking refuge in caves, and seeking sanctuary with the Boers of the neighboring Ohrigstad Republic.

The Ohrigstad Republic was founded in August 1845, and quickly became a pivot of Swaziland's external relations. In the early part of 1846 sharp factional cleavages emerged within the ranks of the Ohrigstad Boers between the followers of commandant general A. H. Potgeiter and the Volksraad Party. When Swazi envoys arrived in Ohrigstad seeking support against Mpande and offering the cession of a massive tract of land (on which no Swazi lived) between the Crocodile and Olifants Rivers, the Volksraad party jumped at the opportunity to outmaneuver their rivals (who themselves claimed to have obtained a treaty of cession from the Pedi paramount Sekwati) by offering cattle and protection in return for the land. Shortly after this setback Potgeiter retired to the north.

The Volksraad treaty had been negotiated by another of Mswati's elder brothers, Somcuba. Somcuba's ambitions, possibly along with Mswati's suspicions, seem to have induced Somcuba to indulge in acts of defiance to Mswati, leading to an attack on Somcuba late in 1849. Upon this Somcuba promptly sought sanctuary with the Ohrigstad Boers, where he would remain until 1855.

The offer of asylum to Somcuba ruptured the relations that had been developing between Mswati and the Ohrigstad (now renamed Lydenburg) Republic. It also removed a major check on Mpande's ambitions in the north. In July 1852 he embarked on a new invasion of Swaziland, which proved so destructive that Mswati at one point even contemplated seeking sanctuary with the British in Natal. Had Mpande been able to press home the advantage, Swaziland might well have fractured and collapsed. In the end, Swazi diplomacy and renewed divisions in Zululand saved the day. In an inspired gambit Mswati dispatched his sister to marry the chief *induna* of Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's secretary for native affairs. This both reinforced and symbolically highlighted Natal's commitment to Swazi independence. At the same time, Zululand began to polarize into two camps led by Mpande's sons Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi. Now most of Mpande's political energies were absorbed at home.

Mswati took advantage of the political space that this opened up by invading the Lydenburg Republic and finally dispatching Somcuba, probably in July 1855. Any possible reprisal was apparently preempted by a new and even more massive cession of land negotiated in the same month, in which Swaziland's current borders were roughly laid down. Neither the Swazi nor the Boers abided by its terms. The Lydenburgers were too destitute and weak even to hand over all the cattle specified in its terms. Mswati, who by now had consolidated his domestic position, raided extensively in the north and

west and continued to occupy and administer notionally ceded land. The Transvaal civil war of 1862–1864 further weakened the Boer position, to a point at which they enlisted the aid of the Swazi auxiliaries in campaigns against other African chiefdoms.

Mswati died in August 1865, and this immediately plunged the country into a new succession dispute. The eight-year-old Ludvonga was recognized as heir. Mswati's eldest son Mbilini staged a revolt, and once this failed sought refuge first with Lydenburg and then with Cetshwayo. In 1866 the republic took advantage of Swazi weakness by extracting a new treaty which for the first time provided a detailed border delimitation.

By the late 1860s the balance of power in the region shifted sharply against the Swazi. Boer society to the east of the Transvaal was consolidating politically and economically. In Zululand, Cetshwayo was likewise strengthening his position, one index of which was Zulu colonization on the north side of the Phongola River. Finally, two major military reverses against the Pedi and the Lowveld chiefdoms further undermined the Swazi position.

From the early 1870s the South African Republic stepped up its efforts to secure concessions from the Swazi kingdom including political suzerainty, a strip of land along the Phongola and the right to build a railway to Delagoa Bay. The Swazi regents warded off these demands with increasing difficulty. In March 1874 Ludvonga inexplicably took ill and died, prompting a witch hunt in which many leading Swazi figures were killed. After a period of uncertainty Mbandzeni, a political unknown, was installed. Taking advantage of the situation, Zulu and Republican pressure continued to mount. By 1875 Cetshwayo was proposing an invasion of Swaziland. The South African Republic responded by dispatching a military expedition to Swaziland that wrung out of the Swazi their subjection to Republican suzerainty, a railway crossing to the sea, and other concessions. After the departure of the expedition the Swazi repudiated the treaty, successfully invoking the support of the British in this regard. They nevertheless were unable to resist Republican pressure to provide a large force of auxiliaries in the unsuccessful 1876 war against the Pedi.

The Swazi were spared these increasingly insistent pressures from the Zulu and the Boers by the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1876. Following annexation, the British were quickly embroiled in wars with the Zulu and Pedi in 1878–1879. The Swazi provided limited support in the first and a huge army of 8,500 men in the second. The latter act created a huge debt of gratitude on the part of the British toward the Swazi, and this would be exploited to great affect after the retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881. The last act of the British before leaving the Swazi to face an

independent Boer republic in the Transvaal was finally to delimit the border between the two states.

PHILIP BONNER

See also: **Natal, Nineteenth Century; South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881.**

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Swaziland: Concessions, Annexation, 1880–1902

In the late nineteenth century, nearly all the African communities surrounding the Swazi were subjugated to European rule by force. The British defeated the Zulu at the Battle of Ulundi in July 1879, overran the Pedi in 1879–1881, and, following the prolonged war between the Boer communities of the Orange Free State and Moshoeshe's Basotho, had annexed Lesotho. In Swaziland's case, however, the Europeans accomplished conquest as a direct outcome of the numerous concessions granted by King Mbandzeni (1875–1889). It was his failure to exert any real control over the English-speaking and Afrikaner concession-seeking whites flocking to his court that finally led to the country's annexation.

From 1882, the discovery of gold in northwestern Swaziland saw the beginning of a major rush of concession seekers to the Swazi court. While seeking the king's favor, however, the concessionaires were reluctant to obey his political or judicial authority. Mbandzeni therefore requested Sir Theophilus Shepstone, previously diplomatic agent of the native tribes in Natal (1845–1853) and secretary for native affairs (1853–1875), as an adviser. Shepstone duly sent his own son, Offie Shepstone, who took the title of resident adviser and agent of the Swazi nation. In this role, Offie became Mbandzeni's adviser in all matters concerning white settlers in Swaziland. A fluent Zulu speaker, he was an enthusiastic confidante of the Swazi nation, based on the strength of his father's influence on the ruling house rather than his own ability. His duties were to curb the concessions that were beginning to overwhelm Mbandzeni; in fact, however, he approved the largest number of concessions ever in the two-year period from 1887 to 1889. Moreover, Offie personally acquired six concessions in his own name and witnessed several others for various white concessionaires. The discovery that he had been encouraging

concessions soon soured his relationship with the Swazi ruling house. Offie Shepstone knew fully well that the more concessions the king awarded, the more he would personally gain from the Swazi nation, for at the start of his employment, the two sides had agreed that the Swazi would pay him half the nation's entire income. As the bulk of this income came from the concessions, it was no surprise that far from helping control concessions granting at Mbandzeni's court, Offie Shepstone abetted the activities of the concessionaires. He was dismissed in February 1889, only to be reinstated later in October. He already had earned large sums of money from the Swazi royal house. By the time of his second dismissal in 1894, his payment had accumulated to as much as US\$30,645.

The Swazi repeatedly told the late Hilda Kuper, doyenne of Swazi studies, that "the concessions killed us." It was only a short step from the concessions era to the formal imposition of European colonial rule over the nation. Although the Swazi rulers later argued that King Mbandzeni had never granted any permanent concessions and that Swazi sovereignty had never been forfeited, the whole country had in fact been handed over to the concessionaires. The rights so granted to European individuals and companies in the late 1890s included those that governments ordinarily exercised. The king had ceded posts, telegraphs, railways, customs, land rights, farming, grazing, and mineral rights to foreigners during the concessions rush. Realizing the dangers posed by the concessions-seekers, Mbandzeni later bitterly complained that they were disrupting the peace in his country and threatening his independence. Britain and the South African Republic, the two foreign powers involved in southeastern Africa at the time, signed the Conventions of Pretoria (1881) and London (1884), seeking to guarantee Swazi independence and sovereignty. By then, however, white intrusion into the kingdom had so eroded the nation's social and economic integrity as to render the conventions completely meaningless.

An interim period of joint rule in Swaziland by the two powers followed from 1890 to 1894. However, this arrangement was far from satisfactory as a solution to the concessions squabble at Mbandzeni's court. The continuing confusion led directly to the two white powers' decision to conclude a third agreement, the convention of 1894, by which the South African Republic (alias Transvaal) assumed "the protection, legislation, jurisdiction and administration" of Swaziland. The document pointed out that this "control" by Transvaal did not mean the incorporation of Swaziland. As Noel Garson (1957) has argued, however, this convention did nothing to guarantee or salvage Swazi independence or sovereignty. The convention of 1894, like the two previous ones, had been concluded by the two

imperial rivals (Britain and Transvaal) without taking into account the Swazi people's views.

The outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 signaled the end of Transvaal's five-year control of Swaziland. The next three years were a period of uncertainty concerning the country's future. The Swazi interpreted both powers' abandonment of their country in 1899 as marking the end of Transvaal control. They saw the Boers' defeat at the hands of the British in the war as a signal for the return of their own independence and sovereignty. However, the British assumed control of Swaziland soon after the end of the war; the first British Special Commissioner for the country, F. Enraght-Moony, arrived in June 1902. Since the country's old administrative headquarters, Bremersdorp (modern-day Manzini), had been destroyed during the war, the new British administration was now established at Mbabane. As elsewhere in British colonial Africa, the colonial state here was initially quite feeble: the special commissioner had at his disposal a small force of the South African Constabulary and a skeleton support staff of administrators. Thus, the European involvement in Swaziland, attributable largely to the concessions saga, had culminated in the annexation of the country by the British.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: South Africa: Confederation, Disarmament and the First Anglo-Boer War, 1871–1881.

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Swaziland: Colonial Period: Land, Labor, Administration

The expansion of Western imperialism into southern Africa was manifested by the struggle for land between the incoming whites and the indigenous population. In Swaziland this process was highlighted by an

influx of concession seekers of both British and Boer origin. They crowded the palace of King Mbandzeni, who in collaboration with his councilors issued numerous concessions which covered almost the whole country. The Swazi indigenous leadership, especially that of Queen Labotsibeni, contested the validity of the concessions arguing that the Swazi only gave occupancy rights to the whites.

When the British assumed control over Swaziland in 1903 they were faced with the difficult task of determining the validity of the concessions. In 1904 they established a commission to determine which concessions were valid. The work of the commission culminated in the Crown Lands Order, and the Concession Partition Proclamation of 1907. These proclamations legitimated most of the concessions such that approximately two-thirds of the land area of the country was alienated and shared between the British crown and concessionaires. The Swazi objected, claiming that the British government did not take cognizance of traditional Swazi systems of land allocation under which the concessions were given. Nevertheless, the British government appointed George Grey as special commissioner to demarcate the land; his work resulted in the creation of 32 reserves for Swazi occupation. The Swazi resident on land designated as private land were given a grace period of five years, after which they had to vacate the land.

From 1914 to the 1940s the negative impact of land alienation became evident. The number of landless peasants rose to over 20,000 by 1914; they were forced to enter into tenancy arrangements with the white owners. By the 1930s the majority of the reserves experienced overstocking, soil erosion, population congestion, and decline in land productivity. At the same time, most landowners were forcing peasants out of their farms in response to the capitalization of settler agriculture.

The British government was forced to address the problem of landlessness. This led to the establishment of the Native Land Settlement Scheme in the 1940s. By 1950 a little more than 50 per cent of the total land area was in the hands of the Swazi.

The land question in Swaziland remained problematic throughout the colonial period. The problem continued into the postcolonial period and the leadership of an independent Swaziland has failed to find a lasting solution.

The imposition of British colonial rule had a fundamental impact on labor relations in Swaziland as well: it intensified the process of labor migration to South African mines. The main focus of policy was to satisfy the labor demands of the South African mining industry while attempting not to upset the supply for local employers.

From the beginning of the colonial period the Swazi labor market was dominated by South African recruiting agents. The Swazi colonial state attempted to regulate the recruitment of labor with the aim of protecting the interests of the recruits and those of local employers.

However, colonial labor relations were not completely a matter of migration to South African mines. From the 1920s there was a growing local demand for labor which complicated the Swazi labor market. This local dimension was manifested after World War II, when the Swazi economy became more capitalized. The development of agroforestry industries on the Highveld and the sugar industries in the Lowveld opened up employment opportunities locally.

The concentration of labor in local enterprises was accompanied by a growing level of labor organization and labor militancy. This resulted in the formation of the first labor union in the country, among the workers at Usuthu Forests at Bhunya in 1962. Labor organization was received with displeasure by both the colonial government and the indigenous leadership. The outbreak of strikes between 1962 and 1963 intensified such negative attitudes. Official attempts to frustrate the unionization of labor became a characteristic of labor relations in colonial and postcolonial Swaziland.

After the conclusion of the South African War, the British took over the administration of Swaziland. They were reluctant to set up an independent colonial administration, thus Swaziland was administered as part of the Transvaal. In 1906 Swaziland, Basutoland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate were placed under the British high commissioner and referred to as the High Commission Territories.

The type of colonial administration that emerged was structurally confusing, because it appeared to be largely dualistic, though power relations were unequal. There was the colonial government, the daily administration of which was carried out by a resident commissioner who was responsible to the high commissioner. There was also an assistant government secretary and a financial secretary. At the same time, the indigenous Swazi political structure was not destroyed but enjoyed administrative privileges on all matters pertaining to Swazi law and custom. The Swazi were administered through the monarchy and local authorities. The initial aim of preserving the indigenous hierarchies was to make sure that the Swazi were encouraged to establish internal self-government to suppress crimes and settle intertribal disputes. The first colonial officials were instructed to respect any Swazi laws provided they did not conflict with British sovereignty or were not injurious to the welfare of the Swazi population.

This type of administrative structure was sometimes referred to as "parallel rule" or "dual rule." The British government was determined to keep the cost of

administration to a minimum and thus confined the functions of colonial officials to maintaining law and order, leaving actual administrative responsibility for Swazi affairs to the indigenous leadership. This created power centers which at times did not work to a common purpose. The Swazi king was expected to implement colonial policy, while at the same time, his subjects regarded him as king and turned to him for protection against the colonial administration. The structure left the colonial government less effective, because the traditional leadership remained in control of the areas occupied by the Swazi.

Parallel rule characterized colonial administration in Swaziland up to independence. Even though revisions were made from time to time, the general framework of the administrative structure remained the same. One of the major additions which took place was the establishment of the European Advisory Council in 1921. The main purpose of this body was to advise the colonial government on matters concerning the white population. This body grew to play a very prominent role in the administration of the country because it was consulted by the colonial government on most issues. It gave the settlers a political muscle especially for the purposes of lobbying for settler interests. Its establishment gave the administrative structure of the country a tripolar character, which continued up to independence.

HAMILTON SIPHO SIMELANE

See also: **Labotsibeni.**

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Swaziland: Kingship, Constitution, Independence

When Swaziland regained its independence from Britain in October 1968, King Sobhuza II was recognized as both *Ngwenyama* ("Lion," the Swazi traditional ruler) and the new head of state. The new constitution gave Sobhuza executive authority and allotted him complete political power in the country. Since 1968, Swaziland has seen a steady entrenchment of the king's position in the political development of the country, and a general consolidation of the power of the chiefs and other traditional rulers over the Swazi people. At the same time, the modern political parties' role has shrunk. In April 1973 the late Sobhuza II repealed the constitution and assumed all judicial, executive and legislative powers. Shortly after this, the king dissolved parliament and abolished party politics. He introduced a new system of rule through the Swazi *tinkhundla* (local traditional government structures), a mechanism that secured royal hegemony in the country even more firmly. In the postindependence period, Swazi kingship has thrived, while the prospects for multiparty politics have receded into the background.

The critical role of Swazi kingship and its centrality in Swaziland's social and political history in the twentieth century is best reflected in the Swazi saying that "without a king, we are no longer a people," and that in Swazi politics "kingship is the father, the people are the children." From precolonial times, the Dlamini ruling clan acquired for themselves a preeminent position through a variety of claims. During the early part of the nineteenth century, these included their ability to extract tribute from the surrounding peoples and to provide them with protection from the more powerful neighbors such as the Zulu. Having survived the social and political upheavals known as the *mfecane* (crushing, or forced migration), affecting the entire African population of the region from the 1830s to the 1850s, the Swazi kings continued to occupy this dominant role in Swazi affairs up to the period of European conquest and beyond. Throughout colonial rule, the Swazi royal house remained the focus of the nation, forging for itself a special position as both the champion and the protector of Swazi interests. One such key interest was the land question, which dated from the late nineteenth century and remained a major theme running through the country's history until the time of independence. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the British colonial state formally declared that two-thirds of Swaziland belonged to the white

concessionaires (mining prospectors, land speculators and Boer farmers) who had arrived in the 1880s and 1890s and later settled in the country. Under the 1907 Land Partition Scheme, only one-third of the country would be reserved for the Swazi. This was clearly inadequate. From the early colonial period, therefore, the royal house led the “purchase back land” campaign, started by Queen Labotsibeni, and continued later by King Sobhuza II himself. This campaign earned the ruling house a fair measure of popularity among the ordinary Swazi, who began to regard the king and his adherents as their true leaders in the anticolonial struggle. A second area where the royal house seems to have played an equally outstanding role during the colonial period was in the Swazi resistance to the prospects of transfer from being controlled by the British to the Union of South Africa. From the formation of Union in 1910 up to the 1950s, transfer seemed a distinct possibility. Just like their counterparts in the other two former High Commission Territories of Botswana and Lesotho, the Swazi adamantly opposed the idea of their being incorporated into South Africa. Again, from Queen Labotsibeni’s regency to Sobhuza II’s reign in later years the Swazi ruling house always spearheaded the Swazi protest against this move. Throughout the colonial period, the Swazi “traditional” hierarchy successfully retained its separate identity and, in the eyes of its followers, was never really associated with the colonial authority. The royal house was therefore able to command a strong sense of loyalty from the country’s largely rural and intensely conservative population.

A striking feature of the decolonization of Swaziland, then, was that the monarchy not only played a prominent role in the nationalist politics by directly participating in the leadership of the independence-winning party, the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), but survived to take over political power from the departing colonialists. The INM, based upon the ideology of traditionalism, sought to mobilize the Swazi through a network of chiefs that paid allegiance to the king. By mid-1965 it had emerged as the prime mover in Swazi preindependence politics. Sobhuza maintained that this movement was not a political party but merely an extension of the “traditional” Swazi National Council, to be used as a weapon in political struggles. By stressing that it was an institution open to all Swazi, the only qualification for joining being “Swaziness,” the INM appealed to the conservative elements in Swazi society, which meant the bulk of the Swazi populace. It was prepared to collaborate, if only temporarily, with the European settlers in Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa to crush the political parties. The INM strove for Swazi unity above all else and set about fighting the trade unions and the modern parties. Of all

these political parties, Ambrose Zwane’s Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) was probably the strongest. Swazi traditionalists regarded it as their archenemy. The NNLC espoused militant Pan-Africanism and commanded considerable support from the working class. In the end, King Sobhuza II successfully outmaneuvered not only the NNLC but also smaller political organizations such as J. J. Nquku’s Swaziland Progressive Party, Allen Nxumalo’s Swaziland Democratic Party, and Dr. George Msibi’s short-lived Mbandzeni National Convention. Besides these African-dominated parties, a white settler political organization, the United Swaziland Association also emerged in the early 1960s. Starting as a social organization seeking to preserve the privileged position of the Europeans in Swaziland, the United Swaziland Association initially opposed the idea of independence for Swaziland, arguing that the choice here was—as in South Africa—between “white control and black nationalism.” It wanted parity with the Africans in the parliament, despite their being overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Swazi population. Although the INM at first agreed to work with the United Swaziland Association and even accepted their idea of preserving a special position for whites, Sobhuza later changed his mind and pressed for a universal franchise. In the last preindependence elections held in Swaziland, the INM swept into power by winning all 24 seats in the parliament. At independence, therefore, both the European settlers and the African political party leaders had been either incorporated into Sobhuza’s government or otherwise rendered completely ineffectual. The modern elite had been outwitted and political control had remained in the hands of the “traditional” authorities, the old elite, who had enjoyed access to some administrative power over the Swazi even under colonialism. The triumph of “tradition” over “modernity” had been achieved, but this victory had clearly sown the seeds of what was to be a continuing interfactional conflict in Swaziland’s politics in subsequent years.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: Swaziland: Sobhuza II, Life and Government of.

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Swaziland: Sobhuza II, Life and Government of

Nkhotfotjeni or Mona—later King—Sobhuza II of Swaziland was born on July 22, 1899. He was chosen as heir to the Swazi throne in 1899 and was installed as king in 1921. The choice of Sobhuza as heir to the Swazi throne was controversial, as his father left behind six widows with one child each—all with a legitimate claim to the throne. The council of princes given the responsibility to appoint the heir failed to make the final decision; it was left to Labotsibeni Mdluli, his grandmother, to decide. The selection followed Swazi law and custom, and because Sobhuza was still a minor, Labotsibeni ruled the country as queen regent. The British accepted that Sobhuza was the rightful heir to the Swazi throne but they felt that the title of king should be reserved for the British crown and that Sobhuza should be addressed as paramount chief.

Sobhuza was the first Swazi king to have a formal education. During World War I the high commissioner and the queen regent concluded that he should be sent to a school outside the country. In February 1916 he was sent to Lovedale in South Africa, where he stayed until 1918 when he was called back home following the death of Labotsibeni's daughter Ntongontongo. At the same time Labotsibeni's health began to deteriorate and she recommended that Sobhuza should not go back to school, but should be prepared to take over the leadership of the state.

Sobhuza took over from Labotsibeni in 1921 at a time when the Swazi were still bitter about land alienation suffered at the hands of the British. His first action was to continue Swazi requests for the restoration of the land alienated through the 1907 proclamation. The request for more land was made urgent by a growing problem of landlessness among the Swazi. Most of his attempts were not successful except for the establishment of the Native Land Settlement Scheme in the 1940s.

Sobhuza devoted a significant effort to the preservation of political institutions. He was aware that in most of Africa colonialism had destroyed traditional systems of governance. Preserving and strengthening the

monarchy was the main priority of his leadership. He insisted that colonial officials had no authority to deal directly with the Swazi population in the reserves; he wanted the Swazi in the reserves to pay allegiance to the traditional power structure and operate through traditional institutions. He also insisted that the traditional land tenure system should prevail in the reserves.

Sobhuza's determination to preserve traditional political institutions was demonstrated in the 1940s, when he resisted attempts by the British to revise some aspects of the traditional authority. They proposed that the paramount chief and the chiefs in general should be appointed as opposed to inheriting the position. This proposition was rejected by Sobhuza; he insisted that Swazi law and custom should continue to govern the selection of Swazi kings and chiefs.

During the process of decolonization, Sobhuza continued to show his determination to preserve traditional political structures. The emergence of modern political parties was viewed by the traditionalists as a threat to the monarchy. Sobhuza reacted by forming his own political movement to contest for elections in the movement toward independence. He was successful in these attempts. The traditionalists inherited power from the British in 1968.

Sobhuza oversaw the Swazi state up to 1982. His reign was eventful partly because of its longevity and partly because of the aggressiveness with which traditional institutions were made operational in a predominantly volatile regional political atmosphere. The period from 1968 to 1982 was characterized by contradictions of an economically modernizing state and an undemocratic political organization.

From 1968, Sobhuza entrenched the traditional political structure while at the same time systematically eliminating all political opposition. The management of the state was divided into a traditional structure and a modern one. Sobhuza emphasized the primacy of Swazi tradition in conducting the affairs of the state.

Another important characteristic of Sobhuza's reign and government was personal rule. Modern political parties could only be tolerated as long as they upheld the authority of the king. The centralization of power in the king was reinforced by the independence constitution, which gave the king executive and legislative powers: Sobhuza had the power to make the final decision on all matters of the state. Such powers were even incorporated in his praise songs, which stated that he was "the mouth that spoke no lie." He enjoyed the power to appoint the cabinet, and loyalty to the king was central in such appointments. Up to his death in 1982, the political institutions of

Swaziland were a direct reflection of Sobhuza's thinking.

Sobhuza's reign can also be identified with intolerance of opposition, an intolerance presumably justified by tradition. He argued that political parties had no place in Swazi tradition and, therefore, could not play a role in the political organization of the Swazi state. He argued that the Swazi leadership was not a matter to be contested, because tradition was clear as to who should form the leadership. He pointed out that political parties were foreign entities and were unsuitable for Swaziland. He urged the Swazi to follow their traditional institutions in all their attempts to bring about change. His negative attitude regarding political parties led him to take steps to eliminate all forms of opposition.

The first such assault came through the overthrow of the constitution incorporated at independence through a decree in 1973. It was argued that the constitution did not allow the Swazi to be governed through their traditional institutions, as it allowed for the existence of political parties which could contest for leadership of the state. With the overthrow of the constitution, subsequent governments of Swaziland were handpicked by Sobhuza. From 1973 the traditional oligarchy reigned supreme, as opposition was suppressed.

This development was followed by the implementation of laws that generally deprived the Swazi of their freedoms of expression and association. It became illegal to hold demonstrations, and to have gatherings of more than five people without the permission of the commissioner of police. Those who violated these laws were subjected to detention for sixty days without trial. The majority of those opposed to Sobhuza were forced into silence; thus, the country appeared to be enjoying peace and stability.

While the opposition was being silenced, the traditionalists moved further to attempt to give legitimacy to the traditional political order. This was done through the activation of the *Tinkhundla* system of political organization. This system began operating in 1978 and it became one of Swaziland's versions for democracy; it was a system in which the parliamentarians are elected in rural localities called Tinkhundla and are expected to represent their specific regions in parliament. It was a continuation of the strategy of entrenching the power of the traditional oligarchy, and more particularly, that of the king.

When Sobhuza died in 1982, political organization and state management were still characterized by the supremacy of traditional institutions, as embodied by Sobhuza. The ministers who formed the government paid allegiance to the king, as he enjoyed the power to appoint cabinet ministers. La-

bor organizations, and political formations were suppressed as they were seen to be a threat to the monarchy.

HAMILTON SIPHO SIMELANE

See also: **Labotsibeni.**

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Swaziland: Mswati III, Reign of

The Death of King Sobhuza II in 1982 left the nation of Swaziland in a state of uncertainty, as the entire government machinery had revolved around him. Some individuals in the royal family began to fight for supreme authority and they managed to gain support from some members of the Swaziland National Council. People such as Prince Mfanasilili wanted to impose themselves as the final decision makers in the absence of a substantive king.

The infighting was promoted by the rise of a political body called the Liqoqo, which had existed before colonial rule and was reconstituted in the colonial period into the Swaziland National Council. Its main responsibility was to advise the king on all matters of the state. It was made up of selected princes and regional chiefs, all of whom were appointed by the king. The confusion that resulted after 1982 arose from the fact that in the same year Sobhuza issued a decree elevating the Liqoqo to supreme council of state. His aim was to ensure the continuity of traditional rule. Although the decree defined the powers of the king and the manner of succession to the throne, it did not clarify the authority of the Liqoqo in the absence of a king, nor harmonize the relationship between the Liqoqo, as a supreme council of state, and the cabinet.

On Sobhuza's death, the queen regent Dzeliwe assumed her role, the 15 members of the Liqoqo were appointed by the queen regent, and Prince Sozisa was appointed as "authorized person," which meant he was to perform the functions of regent when she was not able to perform those functions. In this setup, the Liqoqo regarded itself as above all the other organs of the state including the office of the regent. Members of the Liqoqo also saw themselves as above the office of the prime minister. They accused the prime minister, Prince Mabandla, of organizing a coup to eliminate traditional leadership. This began a vicious struggle between the prime minister and the Liqoqo. Prince Mabandla was dismissed, and Prince Bhekimpi, a puppet of the Liqoqo, was appointed in his place.

Upon Mabandla's dismissal, the Liqoqo began to purge the civil service and other institutions of all those suspected of anti-Liqoqo feelings. It dismissed the head of state, Queen Regent Dzeliwe in August 1983. In her place they installed Queen Ntombi, mother of Sobhuza's son Makhosetive. He was announced as the heir to the Swazi throne. The ousting of Dzeliwe provoked protests from the general public, especially university students. The response from the Liqoqo was decisive, as over 30 students were arrested. A number of popular democratic movements emerged, such as the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), to push for democratic reforms and good governance.

The crisis of the regency, and the manner in which civil society reacted, demonstrated that, in the absence of a king, the Swazi political system was on the verge of collapse. The traditionalists saw their political authority gradually slipping away. The only solution, according to those who supported the monarchical system of government, was to crown the heir as king, even at a tender age. On April 25, 1986, 18-year-old Prince Makhosetive was recalled from boarding school in England and crowned as King Mswati III. In the same year the Liqoqo was disbanded and a new prime minister was appointed.

The reign of Mswati III has not produced a fundamental departure from the reign of his father. The country is still in a state of emergency, as it has been since the 1973 decree. Mswati III's reign faced opposition from different sections of the Swazi population, especially workers and university students. The same kind of repressive mechanisms employed by Sobhuza have continued to be applied against opponents of the old order. For instance, in 1990 the executive leadership of the PUDEMO was charged with treason after seditious pamphlets were found by police in different parts of the country. It was alleged that PUDEMO wanted to overthrow Mswati III and his government.

Mswati III has realized the need to review certain political institutions. The first to come under review was the Tinkhundla system, a traditional form of political organization which rejects modern party politics. This followed widespread opposition to the system and a realization that the system was not efficient. In 1991 Mswati III established the Tinkhundla Review Commission, popularly known as Vusela, to gather general opinion from the regions as to how the system could be transformed. When the commission submitted its conclusions in 1992, almost all the views of the proponents of democratization were ignored. According to the findings of the commission, the majority of the people in Swaziland were in favor of the Tinkhundla system.

The call for political transformation continued to trouble Mswati III's reign into the 1990s. Of particular significance were the calls for the nullification of the 1973 decree, which prevented the citizenry from engaging in free political dialogue. Even though the traditionalists, especially advisors of the king, continued to argue against political change, it was clear that the voices of protest could not be ignored for long. The situation was made more volatile by the mushrooming of new political groupings claiming the right to political participation. For instance, the majority of political parties came together to form the Swaziland Democratic Alliance, aimed at pressing for the democratization of the political institutions of the country.

Mswati III was forced to address the issue of political transformation. He decided to give priority to the formulation of a constitution, and in 1996 established the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). The first step was a major source of controversy. The conflict arose when the traditionalists insisted that the king should appoint the commissioners, while a large number of people argued that the political organizations should be represented in their own right. Political groupings also insisted that the review process should be preceded by the removal of the 1973 decree, but the traditionalists felt that the decree should remain in force. The king went ahead and appointed the commissioners.

In 2001, the chairman of the CRC, Mangaliso Dlamini, announced that the powers of the king would be expanded, though few details were provided. Soon thereafter, King Mswati III announced that a new commission would be formed to draft a new constitution. However, no concrete results, or new constitutions, have as yet been presented.

The post-Sobhuza era in Swaziland can be generally characterized as a period of confusion in which questions of the past have resurfaced, while answers have not been forthcoming. Civil society has increased

its demand for political transformation and democratization, while these processes have continued to be seen as a threat to the monarchy, and there is a continued reluctance to allow political participation within the framework of a modern state apparatus. Mswati III has attempted to bring about political transformation, but only toward the goal of strengthening and perpetuating the traditional order. This has put Swaziland in a very precarious position in light of changing political configurations in Southern Africa, as the majority of Southern African Development Community states have moved decisively toward democratization.

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Takedda: *See Tuareg: Takedda and Trans-Saharan Trade.*

**Tanganyika (Tanzania):
Early Nineteenth Century**

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed some of the most far-reaching changes in the history of Tanzania. During this period the two main regions of the territory—the coast and the interior—were economically, and to some degree culturally, united into one whole. The coast had long been an active participant in Indian Ocean trade, but from the late 1700s the interior was gradually incorporated into the world economy, initially under quite favorable conditions. The international price of ivory, the region's main export, continued to rise against that of cotton sheeting, the main import. By the 1850s along the internal trade routes it was rare to find people dressed in skins or bark cloth. At the same time guns were beginning to enter the region in large numbers. This, along with the slave trade, Ngoni migrations from southern Africa, and increasing commercial competition between Swahili and Arab traders and interior peoples such as the Nyamwezi, initiated a period of intermittent violence later in the century.

Until recently, the history of precolonial Tanzania was written in terms of outsiders initiating change, whether it was the putative introduction of *ntemi*-ship (chiefship) from the interlacustrine (Great Lakes) region to the Sukuma and others south of Lake Victoria, the military innovations of the Ngoni, or “Arab” initiative in the caravan trade. Such views no longer hold. The main dynamics have come from the people of Tanzania themselves. The most basic force up until the middle of the nineteenth century was gradual population growth. After that time increasing violence and—more important—the ravages of small pox, cholera, tick-borne

fever, and other diseases, spread along the busy trade routes and checked the earlier advances. Population growth added to demand and hence further stimulated local, regional, and long-distance trade. Larger and mixed populations, and increased surplus production and trade in well-watered regions such as the northeast highlands (Pare, Kilimanjaro, and the Usambara Mountains), the southwest (Ubena, Usangu), the shores of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika (Karagwe, Usukuma, Ufipa), and the western interior (Unyamwezi, Uha), stimulated processes of state building. In addition, further colonization and settlement of lowland bush country—by cultivators, elephant hunters, and warrior bands (*ruga ruga*), with their slaves and followers—took place, particularly along important trade routes such as in Unyamwezi, and in Uzigua in the northeast. In this regard the south remained exceptional. Here, slave raiding from Kilwa and other coastal towns combined with Ngoni predations began to empty large tracts of countryside.

Settlement of wilderness areas had another significant consequence. African cultivators living in permanent communities and with mutually beneficial relations with their political or ritual leaders carefully managed their environment, keeping at bay stock-infesting trypanosomes spread by the bush-loving tsetse fly. Active environmental control meant that livestock herds could be built up even in hostile areas, as farmers created islands of tsetse-free pasture and fields in the wilderness. This balancing act was as important as anything else in the settlement of large parts of Unyamwezi and the northeastern plains in the first half of the century. The collapse of these systems of environmental management, depopulation, and the spread of cattle diseases (East Coast fever, rinderpest) were to have a devastating effect later in the century.

If demographic growth underlay everything, the main motor of change was long-distance trade. In the eighteenth century local and regional trading networks

were already well developed. In the far interior, the position of the Nyamwezi between the producers of salt and iron in the west and the consumers of iron to the east and south made them ideal intermediaries. In the northeast, trade among peoples occupying different environments, including highland peoples such as the Chagga, the pastoral Maasai, and the Dorobo hunter-gatherers, was also significant. Arrangements such as these stimulated and in turn were enriched by long-distance trade, which connected regional networks from the end of the eighteenth century. In the north, Arabs and Swahili from Tanga and Pangani were beginning to venture as far as Mount Kilimanjaro. In the central parts of the territory, the breakthrough had been made some time in the mid-eighteenth century, when Sagara highlanders from the east migrated to Unyamwezi, bringing news from the coast. By 1800 at the latest, Nyamwezi and Sumbwa pioneer caravan operators were carrying elephant tusks down to coastal towns such as Pangani and Mbwa Maji in response to the demand for ivory in India. In the first decades the caravan trade remained the preserve of interior peoples (except in the north), although in the 1820s coastal traders such as the Indian Musa Mzuri reached Unyamwezi. The trade was well established by the 1830s, and large caravans regularly arrived at the coast from the far interior, bringing ivory, gum copal, and other products for new, rapidly expanding markets in North America and Europe. In 1839 Seyyid Said, Omani ruler and the sultan of Zanzibar, sent his own exploratory expeditions into the interior, following earlier attempts to seek allies among the Nyamwezi. From that time coast-based Arabs and Swahili increasingly sent their own caravans up-country. A pattern developed of dry season travel along set routes by increasingly specialized traders and porters, often accompanied by their families. Entrepôts, market towns, and caravan stops soon emerged in a hierarchy of incipient urbanization along the main central trade routes. When in the late 1830s the line of the route moved north from the Great Ruaha River due to Sangu raiding and the great *Ilogo* famine, and passed instead through dry Ugogo in the center of the territory, the whole framework of the trading system altered. Established trading centers such as Zungomero declined while others, including Tabora and Ujiji, were founded. The older routes in the south converging on Kilwa and Lindi diminished in importance, even though Yao traders continued to be active, while the domination of the Nyamwezi and eventually the Arabs and Swahili of the northern (Mrima) coast was cemented.

By the middle of the century the long-distance trading system had reached maturity. Increasing commercialization along the routes familiarized people with the market, wage labor, and the profit motive. Peasants, including women, responded to market

opportunities and sold provisions to the armies of porters. In the interior the rise of independent traders and elephant hunters undercut traditional routes to authority and power. In the most commercialized areas, accumulating strong men with access to trade goods and guns challenged hereditary chiefs recognized as descendants of founder settlers. One such was the Nyamwezi trader Kiringawana, described as a “usurper,” who established himself at Kisanga in Usagara sometime before 1830. The increasing movement and intermixing of people, not only as traders and porters or slaves, but also within host communities, helped break down the old isolation. Innovations contributing to interethnic mixing and regrouping included joking relationships (*utani*) utilized for hospitality and aid in stranger communities, a common caravan work culture, the spread of trading languages—first Kinyamwezi, then Kiswahili, and the spread of religious cults.

The history of the Shambaa kingdom in the Usambara Mountains illustrates the new pressures. Mbegha, a wandering hunter, had founded the state, and in response to the threat presented by the arrival of the Cushitic-speaking Mbugu, united the Shambaa clans. The royal clan continued to dominate the state and the surrounding peoples, especially during the long rule of Kimwari, from 1815 to 1862. But even then the kingdom was being undermined, as neighboring Zigua lowlanders acquired guns from the 1830s, and were better placed to control trade along the Pangani Valley. When Kimwari died the kingdom collapsed amid chaos and slave raiding.

Change was also occurring at the coast and on the offshore islands. Seyyid Said made Zanzibar his permanent capital in 1840, and led the economic development of his dominions. Well before then an export economy based on clove plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba had been established. Wealth from cloves, ivory, and slaves led to the emergence on the islands of a landed elite, largely Arab but with Indian and Swahili elements. Indian merchants supplied capital and ran the Sultan’s customs service, and labor came from the annual importation of about 10,000 slaves from the mainland. A much smaller number of slaves were exported to Oman and other Middle Eastern destinations from Kilwa, Zanzibar, and other ports. The British had already, by 1810, suppressed the French slave trade from East Africa to their Indian Ocean sugar islands. From early in the century the slave trade became subsidiary to the expanding ivory trade. European consuls, traders, and sailors were largely confined to Zanzibar during the 1830s and 1840s, but their presence foreshadowed increasing intervention later in the century. In the meantime Zanzibar, as the dominant commercial power in the region, was able to

influence developments in the interior through its discriminatory customs duties and role as the region's central entrepôt.

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Ngoni Incursion from the South

While migration in African history often was a gradual, peaceful process, that of the Ngoni from South Africa to Tanzania was quite different. In a mere 20 years, the Ngoni traveled nearly 2000 miles, raiding and absorbing other societies. In Tanzania, their impact was profound. In some places they brought devastation, but in others their administrative and military systems were closely emulated. Often they provided the catalyst for the tighter coalescence of local communities.

The migration began about 1820, following the victory of the Zulu over their Nguni-speaking rivals, the Ndwandwe. Zwangendaba, an Ndwandwe *induna* (commander) fled north with a band of refugees who became known as the Ngoni. Having clashed with another band of fugitives in Mozambique, the Ngoni entered Zimbabwe and shattered the Rozvi federation of Shona speakers before crossing the Zambezi in 1835. Zwangendaba then led his followers northward up the corridor between the Luangwa River and Lake Malawi until finally establishing himself on the Fipa plateau in southern Tanzania. En route the Ngoni had become a relentless predatory state, consuming resources and incorporating outsiders to swell their numbers. With a superior military system based on the revolutionary

Zulu model of Shaka, the Ngoni easily overwhelmed decentralized peoples in their path; even more centralized ones, including some who had acquired firearms, proved no match for them. Their age-class system, which provided Zwangendaba with corporate, well-disciplined regiments, also facilitated the assimilation of strangers. By 1840 his followers were essentially a multitribal nation, held together by a common subscription to a superior Ngoni military culture.

As the migration progressed, however, it proved impossible to maintain the old Zulu-inspired system intact. Central control over age regiments became weaker; younger warriors established greater independence from their indunas. During his lifetime, Zwangendaba had managed to hold the society together, but with his death in the 1840s, damaging quarrels tore it apart into five major segments. Three of these returned south to establish Ngoni kingdoms in Malawi. The other two, the Tuta and Gwangara, pushed ahead into other parts of Tanzania.

The Tuta, advancing northward, continued for a while the tradition of predatory migration. One band of them, penetrating through Unyamwezi to the shores of Lake Victoria, eventually settled in the area west of Kahama, where, unlike other Ngoni groups, they maintained a cohesive identity, until finally dislodged by the Germans in 1891. Elsewhere, Tuta raids were launched against many western Tanzanian societies and they temporarily disrupted commerce along the central trade route from the coast. Increasingly, however, most Tuta disintegrated into smaller autonomous communities, and it became clear they would not be able to establish the same easy dominance over local peoples as they had to the south. In 1858, Ngoni raiders were defeated at Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika by slave musketeers in the service of coastal traders. They were also repulsed by reinvigorated Tongwe, Ha, and Rundi communities. Some Nyamwezi chiefs were stimulated into improving their military systems to repel Ngoni raids. Other societies constructed stout fortifications against their attacks. Still others, such as the Holoholo and Lunga, adopted Ngoni military techniques and sometimes began to surpass the skill of the Tuta groups themselves.

Gradually, many of the Tuta bands were subsumed by local societies. Into the 1870s some kept a degree of autonomy by forming military alliances with Nyamwezi and other communities. From these alliances emerged *ruga ruga* mercenary bands upon whom emergent nineteenth-century leaders in western Tanzania, including Nyungu-ya-Mawe and Mirambo, built their power. But while derived from Ngoni military tradition, the disciplined order of the original Nguni system quickly gave way to a more individualistic military professionalism: firearms supplanted

stabbing spears; fantastic costumes replaced prescribed regimental uniforms. Increasingly the ruga ruga comprised rootless brigands drawn from many different sources, the products, ironically, of the restlessness which Ngoni intrusion into the region had helped foster in the first place.

In the meantime, the Gwangara segment of the Ngoni had been raiding and advancing into south-eastern Tanzania, eventually forming two separate kingdoms, Njelu and Mshope. Here they encountered yet another far-ranging group of Nguni speakers from South Africa, the Maseko. While Zwangendaba's Ngoni had advanced northward to the west of Lake Malawi, these Maseko had migrated up through Mozambique, conquering and absorbing elements of the societies they encountered, and crossing the Rovuma River in the 1840s. Reaching the Songea plains, they subdued such groups as the Ndendeuli, Ndonge, and Nindi, and, when the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni arrived from the northwest, subjugated them as well. Internecine quarrels rapidly developed, however, and most of the Maseko were pushed back across the Rovuma in the 1850s. The Ndendeuli and other subject peoples, having learned much from their conquerors, now began to emulate them. Proclaiming themselves Ngoni, they formed their own chiefdoms. So fearsome was their reputation that they sometimes intimidated their neighbors merely by threat. In a series of conflicts, the Njelu and Mshope Ngoni established domination over the Songea region. Much of southeastern Tanzania was in turmoil. Outsiders, finding it impossible to distinguish between "true" Ngoni and their imitators, called them collectively *maviti* (robbers). Raids pushed nearly to the present border of Kenya in the north, and to the south ravaged Yao, Makonde, and Makua societies well into Mozambique. To the east, forays reached the outskirts of coastal towns such as Kilwa and Lindi. At first disrupting commerce, some Maviti eventually took to slave and ivory trading, sending caravans of their own to the coast.

To the west, the picture was different. Peoples such as the Sangu and Hehe adopted aspects of the Ngoni system to form more centralized and powerful states. By 1878 the Hehe were strong enough to take the offensive against Ngoni chiefdoms. A new military balance was created by the establishment of an *utani* (joking relationship) between them by about 1882.

By then, however, the Ngoni and their imitators were attracting the attention of powerful outsiders. The raids on the coastal towns had brought an intervention from the Sultan of Zanzibar, in whose sphere of influence they lay. Then, in 1882, an Ngoni raid on the neighborhood of an English mission station at Masasi brought about a growing European involvement.

Many of the Ngoni communities were beginning to turn away from pillaging to more sedentary cultivation, and the ongoing process of political disintegration was resulting in ever smaller and more localized chiefdoms in many places. From the early 1890s the Germans sought to encourage such fragmentation by recognizing local *indunas* as independent "sultans" in their new colonial order. Although initial control over Songea was established without Ngoni resistance in 1897, some communities eventually rebelled in 1905, but were decimated by German forces.

Nevertheless, a powerful legacy of Ngoni cultural identity persisted in southeastern Tanzania through the eras of colonialism and independence. Peoples descended from Zwangendaba's migration, or, of equal significance, those who had been merely affected by it and subsequent Ngoni incursions, continued to take pride in traditions of a military and administrative sophistication hardly surpassed in this part of Africa.

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Nyamwezi and Long-Distance Trade

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Nyamwezi long distance trading caravans dominated the central routes through Tanzania, stretching from Mrima coast ports to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika and beyond. The Nyamwezi carried prodigious quantities of ivory, hippopotamus teeth, and other products of the interior down to the coast to exchange for imported trade goods including cloth, firearms, wire, and beads. By the middle of the nineteenth century, East Africa

had become the largest supplier of ivory in an international market rapidly expanding under the forces of industrialization. The terms of trade favored expansion of the system, as ivory prices increased, while the cost of imported mass-produced cloth declined. Despite the inroads of Omani Arab and Swahili trading enterprises from the middle of the century, the Nyamwezi maintained a position of strength, and their caravans ranged as far as Uganda, the eastern Congo, and Zambia.

The fortunes of Nyamwezi traders and porters (the latter were largely wage earners paid in cloth currency) were linked not just to trends on the coast and changes in the international economy, but also to adaptability in the face of these changes, and a favorable labor market. Developments within the Nyamwezi domestic economy facilitated long-distance trade and migrant labor. Like colonial migrant laborers, porters combined wage earning with continued access to household production on the land. In Unyamwezi, increased cultivation of *mbuga* marshlands and the adoption of white rice increased agricultural production. Many Nyamwezi traders and porters used their earnings and profits to invest in cattle and their farms, the more successful paying for additional labor in the form of wives, slaves, and client Tutsi cattle herders. In turn, access to these sources of labor made travel possible. Thus, the nature of gender and other social roles were crucial.

The Sagara migrations, the distribution of natural resources in western Tanzania, and the central position of the Nyamwezi in the regional trading system of western Tanzania were key factors leading to the rise of the caravan system. The Nyamwezi were essentially cultivators, producing among other crops various grains, pulses, potatoes, pumpkins, and tobacco. But because Unyamwezi is a little more forested than neighboring territories, they were able to exploit forest products such as honey; to make baskets, wooden utensils, and bark cloth; and to hunt wildlife. Lacking iron ore and good quality salt, the Nyamwezi exchanged their products for Sumbwa and Konongo iron, and salt from the Uvinza pans. Other neighbors, especially the Gogo, Sukuma, and Ha, kept large cattle herds. The Nyamwezi exchanged their grain, bark cloth, honey, and other products for the cattle and hides of the herders. The position of the Nyamwezi in the center of the regional trading system between the producers of salt and iron in the west, and the consumers of iron to the east and south, made them ideal intermediaries. The organization of the gender division of labor, the absence at first of large herds of cattle, and the utilization of immigrant Tutsi and slave labor, left them free to travel during the dry season when there was little work in the fields.

A further factor that may have encouraged long distance travel and caravan portage was the prevailing condition of peace and stability. There is no evidence

for attacks by outsiders until the mid-nineteenth century, when the migrating Ngoni invaded parts of Ukimbu, Unyamwezi, and Usumbwa. Prior to this, conflict was limited to occasional small-scale raiding of one Nyamwezi chiefdom by another. A long period of peace enabled the Nyamwezi to utilize other advantages that they possessed.

The Nyamwezi trading system developed its own unique cultural characteristics, shared among the people of the caravan and host communities. These included the institution of the caravan and its labor culture, common trading practices, joking relationships that facilitated trade and hospitality between various groups along the trade routes, the practice of blood brotherhood, and the spread of a lingua franca—first Kinyamwezi, then Kiswahili. The presence of women in the caravans was crucial for the penetration of this multiethnic caravan culture. The spread of cultural influences was multidirectional. Caravan culture, basically Nyamwezi in origin, influenced people from the coast, just as up-country porters were exposed to the values of coastal civilization. Nyamwezi social and cultural norms prevailed because the peoples of the western interior pioneered the caravan system, and the majority of porters and caravans working the central routes were Nyamwezi. Nyamwezi influence on the culture of caravan travel diminished only toward the end of the nineteenth century as the colonial invasions began, and as structural and political change associated with early colonial rule undermined the independence and economic vitality of the peoples of the western interior.

There was no single pattern of Nyamwezi caravan organization, though many porters preferred dry-season travel, with agriculture the priority during the wet season. A range of options existed between occasional journeys and full time specialization. Nyamwezi caravans could be small-scale ventures of a dozen or so traders and porters, or massive undertakings of a thousand or more people. Many Nyamwezi entrepreneurs were members of the ruling class, but lesser citizens, such as subordinate chiefs, hunters, medicine men, and ordinary people, also operated trading caravans. Often the caravans were formed by individuals carrying their own trade goods, and small employers who hired just a few porters each. These numerous petty traders banded together for protection, and selected a caravan leader from among themselves. In minor chiefdoms such as Ndala, where there were no indigenous traders as rich as those in Usumbwa, Unyamwezi, or Urambo, caravans remained cooperative affairs. A few weeks before harvest, in April, a drummer would tour the villages broadcasting the news that a caravan would soon depart. Porters would then gather at the appointed place. Some would have their own goods to trade at the coast or elsewhere.

During the period from about 1840 to 1890 the Nyamwezi also operated much larger caravans, representing the commercial status of the members of the trading elite of Unyanyembe and other large chiefdoms. The more powerful chiefs such as Mirambo, as members of the *vbandevba* (merchant elite), could mobilize a huge workforce, drawing on their status as chief, rich trader, and warlord. Caravans of 2,500–3,000 porters were not unusual.

After the merchants (*watongi*), the most important caravan officers were the *wanyampara* (literally, “grandfathers,” but meaning “headmen” or “elders”). The title was also used in caravans of coast-based porters, and was therefore accepted in a multiethnic environment, where its original meaning was lost.

Another important caravan official, the *mganga*, or traditional doctor and diviner, acted as advisor and provided ritual protection against the dangers of the road. Apart from protecting caravan personnel the *mganga* also ritually cared for the ivory. The fourth important caravan functionary was the *kirangozi*, the guide or leader on the march. The *kirangozi* was usually elected by the porters. He was not necessarily from a special rank or section of society. Any individual with experience and some standing among the porters, and with good knowledge of the road, could be chosen. While on the march the *kirangozi* led the caravan along the correct route. He might also negotiate *hongos* (taxes, fees) with chiefs along the route. Men such as these were professional porters, familiar with caravan life and possessing a deep knowledge of the roads.

Caravan labor was arduous, and the daily march averaged about 15 miles. Porters carried loads of up to 100 pounds, including trade goods or ivory, weapons, sleeping mat, cooking pots, and rations. Large tusks were carried by the strongest men; double loads carried by two men were abhorred, as they were difficult to maneuver along the narrow paths. Frequently women and children accompanied their men, and carried camp equipment and extra provisions. Camp life was highly organized, with porters eating in messes, with each member allocated a task. The routine of hard work was frequently broken by the excitement of the hunt, skirmishes, and new adventures.

Nyamwezi long distance trade embodied a way of life opening new doors to commercial success, the market, and wage labor, but by the end of the nineteenth century it was over. Once coastal competition, the colonial economy, and railway construction undercut the Nyamwezi and the Germans imposed restrictions on independent caravans and trading activities, the Nyamwezi turned to migrant labor to the plantations of the northeast, and to railway construction, neither so remunerative or fulfilling.

STEPHEN J. ROCKEL

See also: **Tanganyika (Tanzania): Early Nineteenth Century.**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): German Invasion and Resistance

The German conquest of East Africa lasted over twenty years, from 1884 to 1907. Characterized by the gradual extension of rule over a large territory encompassing some 120 different ethnicities, Germany’s initial goal was to gain control of trade and toll stations on the coast and secure caravan routes to Lake Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. The initial African goal with respect to German conquest was to preserve participation in the caravan trade.

German conquest began with the incorporation of the coastal strip ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar, ceded to Germany by a treaty of 1888. The major German player in this period was the German East Africa Corporation (DOAG), a private charter company founded to gather treaties from African societies in order to assert German rule in accordance with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. As the DOAG’s agents occupied coastal ports to control and tax caravan trade and to found cash crop estates, local societies reacted in 1888 with a two-year resistance led by influential traders and planters, especially Abushiri bin Salim and Bwana Heri bin Juma. DOAG trading stations and estates were burned, and German agents were killed or expelled from the coast. Abushiri was aided by inland societies, including the Mbunga, Zigua, and Yao, who offered a concerted resistance that necessitated the



Gogo with traditional weapons, Tanganyika, 1890s. © Sammlung Christoph/Das Fotoarchiv.

intervention of German forces, leading to the transfer of authority from the DOAG to the German state. Formal colonial rule began in 1891 with coastal ports in German hands.

The new colonial state, dependent on caravan revenues, immediately sought to extend control into the interior to revive trade. The Germans created the *Schutztruppe* to conquer the inland, a military force of about 1000 *askari* (soldiers), employing largely Sudanese and Shangaan mercenaries led by about one hundred German officers and uncommissioned officers. Armed with cannons, machine guns, and modern rifles, German forces confronted Africans rarely armed with more than muskets, and often using spears and poison-tipped arrows. Africans typically used guerilla-style tactics, using the landscape to great advantage. Martial law, which included summary executions of resisters, was prevalent on the frontier of expansion.

German forces generally sought quick submission of opponents followed by co-optation and alliance, so that conquest often occurred without a fight. Alliance or defeat was usually followed by the establishment of a *boma* garrison or police outpost. Once allied with the Germans, African leaders could expect recognition of their authority, a formal role in the colonial power structure, and aid against their enemies. Germans demanded that African allies participate in the conquest of other peoples. Those who resisted had their villages burned, crops and livestock confiscated, and often women and children taken hostage until formal submission was made. Throughout the period of conquest the Germans exploited internal African divisions. The Shambaa of eastern Usambara, for example, had long been embroiled in civil war and internal struggles for power, and the Germans avoided direct military conflict by playing off rivals to the throne. On Mount

Kilimanjaro the Germans absorbed the Chagga by supporting chief Marealle militarily against his rivals. Initial Arusha and Meru accommodation with the Germans gave way to armed resistance by 1896 as European settler and missionary encroachment began on the fertile slopes of Mount Meru. With massive Chagga aid, the Arusha and Meru were put down with great violence by 1900.

Aided by the rinderpest outbreak that devastated cattle-keeping societies of the interior, such as the Gogo and Maasai, the Germans moved to control the central caravan routes. German forces concentrated on breaking the power of Isike of Unyanyembe around the Tabora caravan entrepôt. After two years of sporadic conflict, *Schutztruppe* forces stormed Isike's fortress in 1892, whereupon Isike committed suicide by blowing up his gunpowder stores. The Germans appointed a compliant rival to the throne, as they typically did once a polity was defeated. Haya rulers west of Victoria Nyanza accepted the Germans as allies to ward off Baganda encroachment from the north. By 1895 German forces effectively controlled the trade routes of the western plateau.

Concerted resistance to German conquest came from militarized societies of the southwest. German control of the caravan route brought them into conflict with the Mbunga and Hehe, the latter who, under Mkwawa, had raided the route from a fortified base at Iringa. Mkwawa's destruction of a German military contingent in Usagara in 1891 dictated that the Germans confront the Hehe to recoup their prestige. In the next few years German forces secured the caravan route, forged alliances with Hehe military rivals among the Bena, Sangu, and Ngoni to the south, and defeated the Mbunga in 1893 in preparation for an assault on the more formidable Hehe. Politically isolated and unable to avoid conflict, Mkwawa refused a demand to allow a German military station at Iringa. German forces bombarded the Iringa boma and broke Hehe power, but were unable to subdue Mkwawa until 1898, when he committed suicide to avoid capture. The conquest of German East Africa was completed with the incorporation of the Great Lakes states. Rwanda was absorbed in 1897 when the Germans supported Musinga as king in exchange for acknowledgment of German rule. Although resisting German penetration until 1903, civil war among the *ganwa* elite of Burundi led the *mwami* (king) Mwezi Gisabo to accept German suzerainty under a residency system similar to British indirect rule.

New conflicts arose as Germany developed an administrative and economic infrastructure in the late 1890s. Germany implemented taxes and forced labor, claimed land for German settlement, and demanded labor for plantations and cash crops from villagers.

As the meaning of colonial rule was demonstrated for many people for the first time, a new phase of resistance began. Collective grievances associated with German policies led to the Maji Maji rebellion (1905–1907), the last colonial war of conquest in German East Africa, bringing many peoples who had previously acquiesced to German rule into direct conflict with the colonial state for the first time. The defeat of the rebellion after two years opened up the colony for concerted economic development.

THADDEUS SUNSERI

See also: **Resistance to Colonialism; Rinderpest and Smallpox: East and Southern Africa; Tanganyika (Tanzania): German Rule: Land, Labor, and Economic Transformation; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907.**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907

Maji Maji is the name that German colonial rulers gave to a rebellion that broke out in the Matumbi-Kichi region of Tanzania in late July 1905, spreading in the next few months to much of southern Tanzania. Named after the *maji* water medicine that many African fighters believed would give them immunity to German bullets, the rebellion was led by *majumbe* (village headmen) who had become caught between onerous German economic policies and villagers who bore the brunt of German rule. Those policies included a massive campaign to grow export cash crops, especially cotton, on village fields and on German and Arab estates in some regions of the south. Germans and their

appointed *maakida* required *majumbe* to send villagers to work on these estates for virtually no compensation. German rulers also curtailed African use of forests as a commons, the use of nets to hunt crop predators, and the use of fire to open up new fields for agriculture. The effect of these laws was to severely encumber African agriculture and to create an environment conducive to famine in the outbreak regions. Many *majumbe* who refused or were unable to implement German policies were whipped or jailed. Oral evidence has suggested that the rebellion was planned about a year in advance under the aegis of spirit mediums located on the Upper Rufiji River, especially Kinjikitile Ngwale, who distributed water medicine and sent out *hongo* messengers to encourage revolt among neighboring peoples. In this way, once fighting broke out, many *majumbe* were prepared to take up arms.

The rebellion began in the eastern Matumbi hills when a *jumbe* attacked the local German-appointed *akida*, who demanded that workers be provided for local cotton plantations and as porters for inland expeditions. As word of the conflict got out, other *majumbe* organized their forces to assault representatives of German rule, including missionaries, German settlers, Arab *maakida* and planters, *askari* police and soldiers, Indian traders, and German garrisons. *Majumbe* who did not rise up were also attacked. In some cases *majumbe* who heard rumors of war sent representatives to obtain water and commit themselves to fight. In this way the rebellion spread north of the Rufiji as far as the central caravan route, south to the Ruvuma River, and inland as far as Lake Nyasa, encompassing over twenty Tanzanian societies. For some people, such as the Mwera and Ngindo, Maji Maji was the first concerted resistance to German rule. In the southern highlands, patterns of patronage, alliance, and struggle over territory dating back to the nineteenth century determined whether leaders of militarized societies such as the Bena, Sangu, or Ngoni chose to aid the Germans or join the rebellion. Ngoni participation has been viewed as the effort by a chiefly class to reassert control over *sutu* common people who had experienced greater autonomy under German rule. Leaders of peoples who had only recently been defeated in German wars of conquest, including the Nyamwezi and Hehe, did not participate in the uprising and some aided the Germans. Rebels armed with muskets, spears and arrows confronted German forces, composed largely of African *askari* commanded by German officers, who put down the uprising with machine guns and modern rifles. While most of the fighting was over within a few months, the search for some rebel leaders continued until 1907. In localities of the uprising Germans confiscated food, burned villages and crops in the field, and sometimes took women hostage to prevent them

from aiding rebels. As a direct result of these tactics, many thousands of civilians died through dislocation and famine, which engulfed some regions for two years. German officials put the number of African casualties at 75,000, while critics of colonial policies in Germany put the figure at over 200,000.

The uprising came on the heels of the Nama-Herero war in German southwest Africa, at a time when critics assailed the German colonial state for poor administration and abuse. Although the goal of Maji Maji majumbe to end German rule failed, German policy in East Africa underwent important changes after the rebellion. Most historians have viewed Maji Maji as a break between an era that favored European settler immigration and compulsory labor and one privileging African peasant production. Governor G. von Götzen, whose forced-labor policies created the grievances leading to the uprising, was removed from office. The new administration of Albrecht von Rechenberg emphasized the production of cash crops grown by African householders as the backbone of the new economy. German settlers and plantations were assisted only inasmuch as they were prepared to accept a free labor market, as forced labor was discouraged as a means of recruiting labor for plantations. Following the uprising, German officials combated the influence of spirit mediums in rural societies, viewed as instigators of dissent, opening the door to the wider dissemination of Islam and Christianity as forms of African religious expression and leadership.

Maji Maji is central to Tanzanian national identity. During the independence campaign of the 1950s, Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) political movement invoked Maji Maji as its predecessor. Much of the subsequent historical literature on Maji Maji has been shaped by the nationalist tradition inaugurated by Nyerere. Citing the rebellion as the first example of a concerted interethnic Tanzanian resistance to colonial rule, the TANU depicted itself as the heir of the earlier movement. In the 1960s the History Department of the University College at Dar es Salaam responded to this comparison by launching an oral-history research project to record the memories of Tanzanians who had participated in or observed the uprising. The Maji Maji Research Project has become an important source for African perspectives on the uprising.

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See also: **Resistance to Colonialism.**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): German Rule: Land, Labor, and Economic Transformation

Germany began its conquest of East Africa in 1884 with little idea of the resources in the region. During the first decade of rule the colonial state relied on export tolls on products of inland caravan networks—especially wild rubber, ivory, copal, wax, and hides. Tolls were also exacted on imported goods, particularly Indian cotton cloth. After 1885 much of the trade in the colony was controlled by the German East Africa Corporation (DOAG), a charter company that ruled the coast until the German state took control in 1891 following the Abushiri rebellion. Local marketing in the colony was largely in the hands of Indian traders, whose networks predated colonial rule.

As the paucity of mineral resources in German East Africa became known in the 1890s, German rulers focused on fostering cash crops of value to the German market. Hoping to liberate the German textile industry from American cotton supplies, cotton seed was distributed to Arab and Swahili plantation owners along the southern coast, and to village headmen. The DOAG experimented with rubber, tobacco, coffee, tea, and cotton on a handful of estates in the northeast, the region of increasing European settlement in the late 1890s. Sisal, introduced in 1893, emerged over the next two decades as the major plantation cash-crop export from the colony.

The cash-crop policy opened the door to European settlement between 1896 and 1906. In that period some 100 settler estates and about 20 large plantations were founded, concentrated in the northeast mountains. Banking on German settlement as the economic base of the colony, the Usambara Railway, begun from the port city of Tanga in 1891, was extended toward Arusha in the next two decades, and thousands of acres

of land were appropriated for white settlement in the northeast. Although Africans were never completely expropriated of their lands, land given over to Europeans in the densely populated and fertile mountains necessitated changes in African farming methods, gendered uses of land, and crop mixes. Chagga, Shambaa, and Arusha peoples, for example, began their first efforts at coffee growing, which they integrated with banana and maize farming.

Labor policy paralleled white settlement. In the first decade of German rule estate owners forced local villagers to work on their estates, hired porters on the coast awaiting the departure of new caravans, imported Asian indentured laborers, and hired slaves of Arab and Swahili coastal estate owners. Even at this early stage labor scarcity created a bottleneck for cash-crop production. The state implemented taxation in 1898 to compel villagers to work periodically for a wage and to draw villagers into a cash economy. Taxation marked the waning of trade in natural products as the state moved to diversify colonial revenues.

By 1900, poor economic returns led German policy makers to begin a massive program to invigorate cash-crop production. The administration of Governor von Götzen began a cotton program that urged settlers and missionaries to take up the crop, and demanded that African villagers work for virtually no compensation on state-controlled fields. Meanwhile African agriculture was impaired by conservation ordinances that curtailed hunting, proscribed peasant use of forest reserves, and prohibited bush burning to open up new fields—the basis of peasant extensive agriculture for much of the colony. The pressures created by these measures led to the Maji Maji rebellion (1905–1907), which policy makers in Germany interpreted as stemming from the forced labor and agrarian policies of the previous decade.

With the appointment of Albrecht von Rechenberg as governor in 1906, economic priorities entered a new phase. European settlement, viewed as economically unpromising, was discouraged, though well-capitalized plantation corporations were welcomed, especially those that concentrated on the production of the industrial crops of sisal, cotton, and rubber. Forced labor, viewed as the cause of rebellion, was officially proscribed, and a free labor market was implemented with the labor ordinances of 1909. Rwanda and Burundi, where 40 per cent of the colony's population resided, were closed to labor recruitment. Tax levels remained essentially unchanged despite incessant settler pressure for significant increases. The new program banked on African peasant production of cash crops. The semi-official Colonial Economic Committee fostered peasant cotton growing by distributing seed, setting up ginning and marketing centers, and guaranteeing a minimum market price. The Central Railway, begun in 1905, was

extended into the interior to Lake Tanganyika to foster peasant cash crop production and draw trade away from the Uganda railway in Kenya.

As the Usambara and Central Railways advanced, more settlers and plantation corporations arrived, totaling some 700 estates by 1912, creating great competition for already scarce labor. A vociferous lobby in Germany kept settler interests in the public eye, while a humanitarian lobby publicized abuses of workers on plantations. Labor policy and the question of whether German East Africa would be a settler or peasant colony were at the core of policy struggles in the colony until the end of German rule, and were issues that were never conclusively resolved.

Many significant changes accrued under German colonial rule. From being a major exporter of grain to Indian Ocean trade networks, German East Africa became an importer of food as coffee, sisal, and cotton replaced millet and rice as cash crops. Labor migration patterns upset village economies as fewer men were engaged in agricultural pursuits and women produced less grain for the market. Such household disruptions led to a general population decline, and contributed to the spreading of the tsetse belt (a region of Sub-Saharan Africa particularly afflicted by the tsetse fly, where livestock are especially vulnerable to disease carried by the insect), impairing the cattle economies of the interior. German policies that were expanded under British and postcolonial rule included the peasant adoption of coffee as a cash crop west of Victoria Nyanza and in the northeast mountains and cotton south of Victoria Nyanza, the expansion of sisal as a plantation crop, especially along the Central Railway, and the opening up of the colony through construction of the Usambara and Central Railways. The Germans also created forest and wildlife refuges that far exceeded European plantations in extent, hemming in peasant and pastoral economies significantly.

THADDEUS SUNSERI

See also: Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Tanganyika (Tanzania): German Invasion and Resistance; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Maji Maji Rebellion, 1905–1907.

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): World War I

At the outbreak of World War I, the colonial officials in German East Africa (GEA; now Tanzania) were divided. Governor Heinrich Schnee wanted to remain neutral, but the *Schütztruppe* commander, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck believed that a guerrilla campaign would force the British to move men and material away from the western front to East Africa.

The British resolved this dispute on August 8, 1914, when the Royal Navy shelled a German wireless station near Dar es Salaam. Governor Schnee responded by declaring Dar es Salaam and Tanga open towns. On August 15, 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck attacked and seized Taveta, a small settlement along the GEA–East Africa Protectorate (EAP; now Kenya) border.

Meanwhile, the British were making preparations to go on the offensive. However, these efforts initially floundered because officers and men lacked an appreciation of the difficulties of fighting in GEA. On October 16, 1914, the 8,000-man Indian Expeditionary Force "B," comprised of two Indian army brigades and commanded by Major General (temporary) Arthur Edward Aiken, sailed from Bombay for East Africa. On November 2, 1914, the ill-prepared Force "B" attempted to land at Tanga. However, the better-trained *Schütztruppe* repulsed the attack. Force "B," which suffered 359 killed and 310 wounded, reembarked and withdrew to Mombasa. German casualties included only 71 killed and 76 wounded. Another British setback occurred on November 3, 1914, when a 1,500-man force failed to dislodge some 200 German troops and 200 to 300 *askaris* from Longido, an area near the GEA-EAP border.

These victories were vitally important to the Germans insofar as they stimulated recruitment into the *Schütztruppe*, which numbered 3,007 Europeans and 12,100 Africans at its peak in March 1916. From the British perspective, Tanga and Longido underscored their military ineptitude. On November 22, 1914, the War Office sought to improve the situation by assuming control of East African operations. However, the *Schütztruppe*, at least in the short term, maintained its

superiority over its hapless foe by repeatedly attacking the Uganda Railway and preventing the British from establishing a significance in GEA.

The next phase of the East African campaign began on February 6, 1916, when Lieutenant General Jan Smuts became commander of the British East African Expeditionary Force. Unlike his predecessors, Smuts had considerable combat experience in Africa, having fought the British during the Boer War and, more recently, having defeated the Germans in Southwest Africa (Namibia) in 1915. Initially, Smuts planned to envelop the *Schütztruppe* by advancing on either side of Kilimanjaro, the area from which Lettow-Vorbeck launched cross-border raids in the EAP. However, by the time British forces arrived in Moshi, German troops already had started withdrawing south toward the central railway to link up with *Schütztruppe* units in Tabora.

Smuts thwarted this scheme by deploying mounted troops to Dodoma, which cut off the escape route to Tabora. On September 19, 1916, allied soldiers from the Congolese Force Publique occupied Tabora, but the town's German garrison escaped to the southeast. By December 1916, the *Schütztruppe* was concentrated on Mahenge and the Rufiji Valley in southeastern GEA. Troop contributions from the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and the West Indies had increased allied strength to 98,800, while the *Schütztruppe* had dwindled to approximately 11,000 soldiers. Lettow-Vorbeck's reliance on guerrilla tactics ensured that this numerical disparity had little impact on the fighting.

However, both sides suffered tremendously from food and supply shortages. Also, bad weather, coupled with rampant diseases like dysentery, malaria, and sleeping sickness, took a tremendous toll on military effectiveness. Some 3,400 *Schütztruppe* personnel were unfit for service, while during the February–October 1916 period, the Ninth South African Infantry lost 90 per cent of its men.

In July 1917, the British launched a simultaneous attack from the coastal towns of Lindi and Kilwa to encircle the *Schütztruppe* from the south. However, Lettow-Vorbeck already had moved his troops south to confront the British coming from the east. Nevertheless, the war in GEA was drawing to an end. On October 9, 1917, Belgian soldiers from the Force Publique occupied Mahenge; shortly afterward, the *Schütztruppe* personnel who remained in the area surrendered to avoid starvation.

From October 15 through 18, 1917, British and German forces clashed at Mahiwa on the Mwera Plateau. It was the most savagely fought battle of the East African campaign. Of the 4,900 African, British, Indian, and South African soldiers who fought at Mahiwa, some 2,700 were killed or wounded. The *Schütztruppe* suffered 519 killed, wounded, missing, or captured.

In mid-November 1917, Germany sought to resupply Lettow-Vorbeck with 50 tons of arms, ammunition, and supplies. The scheme, codenamed the China Show, involved flying the 740-foot long Zeppelin airship L-59 nonstop from Europe to eastern Africa. The dirigible, which was aloft for four days, flew 4,180 miles before being recalled. The order to return supposedly came from the German admiralty. According to British sources, the wireless communication had been sent by British intelligence. With the failure of China Show, Lettow-Vorbeck had no option but to abandon GEA.

On November 25, 1917, the Schütztruppe, which was out of ammunition and low on supplies, crossed the Ruvuma River into Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique). Lettow-Vorbeck and his remaining troops became nomadic foragers who only succeeded in mounting a few low-level operations against the Portuguese. On September 28, 1918, he crossed back into GEA, but before he could launch a new offensive, the war ended.

The human cost was staggering. In more than four years of fighting, the Germans lost 439 killed in action and 874 wounded, while British forces suffered 3,443 combat deaths and 7,777 wounded in action. Disease claimed 256 German soldiers and 6,558 British troops. African losses on the German side included 1,290 askaris killed in action and about 7,000 carriers dead from disease; 3,669 Africans sustained wounds. British forces lost 376 African carriers in combat and 1,645 wounded; 44,911 died of disease. The Belgians and their Congolese troops lost approximately 3,000, killed or wounded. Portugal and its African soldiers lost 1,734 killed and several hundred wounded.

The most significant political ramification on the East African campaign concerned the British takeover of GEA, which they renamed the Tanganyika Territory on February 1, 1920. The British ruled the country as a mandated territory under the League of Nations.

THOMAS P. OFCANSKY

See also: **World War I: Survey.**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Colonial Period, British: “Indirect Rule”

German rule over Tanganyika was terminated in 1918 after a protracted military campaign, and, following the Versailles peace settlement, responsibility for making new administrative arrangements over it was vested in the new League of Nations. Considering its peoples “not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” (Article 22 of the League Covenant), the league awarded Britain the mandate to administer Tanganyika on its behalf in 1920, with the not very onerous requirement to furnish an annual report to a Permanent Mandates Commission.

In Tanganyika itself, the new district administration saw the indirect rule as the most effective way of meeting the objectives of the mandate, replacing what was rather generally regarded as the directive (and by implication coercive) German system. However, aside from introducing the necessary legislation permitting the establishment of native authorities (1923), the first governor, Sir Horace Byatt, took few steps to put an indirect-rule system in place. It was left to his successor, Sir Donald Cameron (1925–1931), one of Britain's most effective and innovative governors of the interwar years, to implement proposals put forward by his senior district officials and establish full-fledged indirect rule. In his various policy circulars, Cameron stressed the need to move away from the concept of *rule* altogether, preferring the term *indirect administration*, to be a means for training traditional leaders to become modern and progressive, working toward the advancement of their people under the overall supervision of (white) district officials.

Between 1925 and 1929, the structures of indirect rule were established: native authorities (NAs) would made up usually of one, sometimes more, chiefs responsible for law and order and making regulations in fields that would be increased as their overall “competence” was demonstrated; native treasuries would collect tax on behalf of the government; and native courts would exercise relatively minor civil and criminal jurisdiction, with channels for appeal limited (after 1929) to the executive level (up to the level of governor) and excluding the territory's high court. In return, the NAs received a “rebate,” varying between 20 and 33 per cent of tax collections at the end of the 1930s—amounts that tended to be swallowed up in chiefs' salaries and allowances. The actual implementation of the new system ran into several difficulties: first, there was the old problem of “finding the chief.” On the coast, the *akida* system had

submerged or fatally undermined indigenous authority; in other places “tribes” were manufactured and placed under chiefs; and the Maasai—who had had no chiefs before European rule—eventually had councils of elders recognized as the official NA. The existence of many small chieftaincies, especially in the north of the country, was a second difficulty, resolved by encouraging the formation of tribal federations: the Sukuma federation, set up in 1946, comprised 51 chiefs. Finally, the more powerful chiefs tended to become autocratic and/or resistant to change, a danger Cameron had recognized as inherent in the system, but to which his successors seem to have been oblivious.

However, the main shortcoming of indirect rule in practice was its failure to address the central issue of the link between local and national political development. Cameron had referred to the long-term possibility of a central native council, sending delegates to some kind of joint council with Legislative Council members, but had seen this, together with popular elections, as a distant goal, though one that had to be kept in sight. Thus, when his first Legislative Council was set up in December 1926, he restricted the selection of his nominated representatives to the European and Asian minority communities, arguing that the territory lacked any African of standing who had the necessary command of English to participate in debates. Cameron’s even more cautious successors maintained this policy of African administration at the exclusively local level, allowing indirect rule to become a generally unprogressive dogma, marked by a paternalistic defence of the “old tribal order,” supplemented by a growing hostility to the Westernized African elite emerging outside NA structures and a general distrust of “nationalist agitators.” NAs became agencies of the central government, carrying out the instructions of district officials, while the administration in turn, envisaging a timescale of generations or even centuries before Tanganyikans would be ready for independence, was reluctant to force the pace of political change.

The new world order that emerged after World War II led to a reappraisal of administrative policy, starting with the appointment of two educated chiefs to the Legislative Council (1945); a move to bring educated African commoners into chiefs’ councils; a move to stimulate local development; and an increase in the level of resources available to NAs. In 1946, the United Nations introduced a new supervisory structure, the Trusteeship Council, for the former mandates (now called *trust territories*), with a wider range of international representation and the right to send visiting missions every three years to each of the trust territories. Both of these changes substantially tightened up the previous system and markedly accelerated the pace toward independence throughout the 1950s. Then, in

March 1947, Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones replaced indirect rule with local government, consigning the former (a “static policy,” as he put it) to the dustbin. He believed that a local government system based on British lines would prevent the emergence of an oligarchy at the center. In practice, local government was only slowly introduced into Tanganyika after 1947: it was not until 1954 that the necessary legislation was introduced that would enable NAs to become local authorities. Attempts to create a higher—county—tier fell victim to the administration’s attempt to balance racial (African/European/Asian) interests and create a racial partnership at the district as well as the national level. All of these efforts to create a more effective system of local government were overshadowed and eventually eclipsed by the rapid growth of a nationwide body of Westernized and educated Africans, the Tanganyika African Association (the Tanganyika African National Union, after 1954), which concentrated its efforts on the winning of power at the level where it mattered, in the Legislative Council itself.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Nigeria: Lugard, Administration and “Indirect Rule.”**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Colonial Period, British: Economy

Tanganyika Territory’s new colonial rulers inherited an economy devastated by the most intense conflict waged on African soil during World War I. By the

mid 1920s the essential reconstruction tasks—feeding the hungry, reviving the plantation sector, and restoring the basic infrastructure—had been completed, but Tanganyika's root problem, that of extreme underdevelopment, defied solution and at independence the overwhelming majority of its people still lived at subsistence level.

Sisal had been the main export crop of the former German East Africa, and the authorities gave priority to the resumption of its production, though again under “immigrant” (Greek/Indian) management in place of the departed German plantation owners. It remained the principal export throughout the whole period, especially during and just after World War II, when Japanese victories cut off supplies from the Pacific area. However, the industry as a whole employed only small numbers, and immigrant communities were the main beneficiaries. The same remarks apply to other export crops, such as tea and coffee grown by the limited British settler population allowed in by the administration during the 1920s. The new government inherited also the beginnings of black peasant coffee production in northern Tanganyika, centered on the Bukoba district and the Chagga, who lived around Mount Kilimanjaro. Despite frequent settler protests emanating from Kenya as well as Tanganyika, the authorities continued to support Chagga farmers' attempts to produce higher grade arabica coffee for export, in preference to the less marketable robusta. By the mid-1920s, the Chagga had become the most commercially oriented African society in Tanganyika, although in comparative terms the (black) peasant sector represented only a small fraction of the total rural population, even after World War II.

Much of Tanganyika remained poor and underdeveloped throughout this period, in spite of Britain's stated commitment to the terms of the mandate, which called for the development of all its people. A major inhibitory factor was the physical nature of Tanganyika, a country with reasonably fertile fringes and corresponding population density but saddled with an infertile interior with a small and scattered population eking out a bare subsistence in a difficult environment. Other factors, more recent in provenance, included the effect of the East African Campaign, which had been fought through the interior into Mozambique; and the associated spread of the tsetse fly following wartime human and livestock depopulation and the resultant encroachment of brush and other secondary growth into grazing areas: between 1913 and 1937, infected regions increased from one-third to two-thirds of the territory's total area. The interior thus remained one of the most backward in British Africa with the most rudimentary of communications, little in the way of social services and few incentives for anything beyond production for own consumption.

The one major attempt to break through this cycle of underdevelopment, the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme (1947–1950) has become a byword for starry-eyed optimism and undue haste in development strategies. Implemented by the British government through its Overseas Food Corporation, the scheme was designed to provide essential oils for British industry and consumers, and equivalent opportunities for the economic and social development for black societies in Southern and Central Tanganyika. It failed because of hurried and inadequate research in the field, the setting of unrealistic targets for bush clearance and groundnut production, and the use of machinery ill suited to the area's iron-hard soils. The cost of the failure was borne by the British taxpayer, not the territory, though as Cyril Ehrlich (1976) has pointed out, the total amount written off (£36 millions) nearly matched the total expenditure of the Tanganyika government between 1946 and 1950. The scheme similarly made little impact on either the local population it was supposed to help, or the Territory's economy.

While the scheme demonstrated the reality that capital investment alone could not guarantee results, the Tanganyika government lacked the resources to engage in major development programme, even at the basic infrastructural level. At independence, the territory's road system had the reputation for being the worst in British colonial Africa. Part of the reason lay in its status as a mandate which did not “belong” to Britain in the sense that Kenya and Uganda did: this made it difficult for Tanganyika to attract outside investment, especially in the later 1930s, when its return to Germany became a distinct possibility in the current climate of appeasement. Naturally, there were some gains: its status made Tanganyika less attractive than Kenya and Southern Rhodesia for white settlers, and saved it from the land problems that were to bedevil these countries after World War II. But Tanganyika's structural poverty in turn had a negative effect on official economic policy, which mirrored the subsistence expectations of the majority of its people: self-sufficiency, balanced budgets, and general conservatism in the estimation of available local revenue became the order of the day. Only one interwar governor deviated from this policy: Sir Donald Cameron had increased expenditure of education and social services in the late 1920s to fulfill what he considered to be the terms of the mandate. The demerits of this extravagance had, in the opinions of a visiting commission (1932), been shown by the Great Depression, when the international price of sisal had collapsed: clearly the territory had to live within its means. Prudence became the watchword, prevailing through the war years when revenues (and prices) climbed steeply; and after the war, when the pace of development in British Africa generally quickened.

Government investment in social services, particularly education, certainly increased after 1945, but anticipated revenue was constantly underestimated in annual budgets by administrations wedded to the principle of financial caution. At independence in 1961, Tanganyika's economy was one of the least developed in British colonial Africa with an annual gross domestic product per head of only £21 (a quarter that of Ghana) and an infant mortality rate approaching 220 per thousand in parts of the country.

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See also: Tanganyika (Tanzania): German Rule: Land, Labor, and Economic Transformation.

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): African Association, 1929–1948

In British colonial territories administered through "indirect rule," Africans who felt that their interests were not well served by the chiefs routinely formed organizations to represent their interests. Usually these associations were small in scale, limited in membership, and did not last long, but some had more enduring legacies. In Tanganyika clerks, traders, urban residents, and rural dissidents formed the principal social base of the African Association. While it never fully overcame regional and sectarian differences among its members, and never articulated a coherent nationalist agenda, the African Association was the institutional progenitor of the party of mass nationalism and eventual independence, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).

The African Association was founded in the context of a proposed "closer union" among Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika (1929–1931). Disturbed by the prospect of the greater settler influence that would have accompanied integration with Kenya, both the government of Tanganyika and politically aware Africans opposed the plan. Of the latter, civil servants in government employment were an important constituency. In 1922 leading

African civil servants had formed the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Services Association (TTCSA). The TTCSA was an elitist organization that sought to protect its relatively privileged members from the type of racial discrimination that forced them to suffer such indignities as riding in third-class rail carriages. The African Association, on the other hand, claimed to speak for the interests of all Africans and aspired to represent African opinion in debates over government policy. Because they were on the same side of the "closer union" issue, the government showed some early signs of sponsoring the African Association, donating a plot of land for its first headquarters, for example. But the guardians of "indirect rule" were inevitably suspicious of any African group formed by voluntary association and aspiring to represent the African public: officially, Africans were members of tribes, properly represented by their chiefs.

Even lukewarm government patronage undercut the political potential of the organization. Civil servants were not allowed to join "political" associations. In order for African civil servants to be members, therefore, any taint of politics had to be avoided. For much of the 1930s the African Association, at least in the capital city Dar es Salaam, functioned as little more than a social club for Western-educated civil servants and urban notables. In the second half of the decade a radical faction under Erica Fiah attempted to move the African Association in a more activist direction. Fiah was unsuccessful, but to the extent that the African Association articulated an ideology, it was more Pan-African than nationalist, emphasizing the unity of all Africans across lines of social class and religion.

While the central office in Dar es Salaam was divided and ineffective during the 1930s, there were active branches in other parts of the country where the African Association had more of an impact. In Dodoma the association was relatively well organized, but remained primarily a social club for civil servants. In 1937 in Bukoba, however, it became involved in a large scale protest movement led by Muslim traders. Bukoba exemplified in extreme form a common pattern: African traders were both more radical and more connected to the rural areas than were the more educated members of the African Association. Lacking strong ties to the central organization, however, the radicalism of the Bukoba branch had no territorial effect.

A turning point came in 1939, when for the first time a national conference was held in the capital. Five such conferences were held over the next six years, as the war brought both austerity and greater exposure to radical ideas. This is the period when the African Association moved from being a social club to a political organization, formally recognizing the need to bring together the masses and the educated elite. There was still no talk of independence, but there was a stronger

emphasis on African participation in government. A branch of the organization was formed at Makerere University in Uganda in 1945, with a young Julius Nyerere as branch president.

After the war the African Association did not fulfill the promise of this more activist stance. Conservative civil servants once again dominated the main urban branches. The political initiative passed to local and “tribal” organizations such as the Sukuma Union, the Pare Union, and the Kianja Labor Association. While politics became increasingly localized, the organizational center was once again in disarray. In 1948 a dispute between the Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar branches led the former to break away and rename itself the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), and the annual conference for that year was canceled.

As the political pace quickened in the provinces, the need for stronger leadership was increasing. In the early 1950s a new generation of activists reinvigorated the TAA. The earlier Pan-African emphasis was being replaced by an emphasis on Tanganyikan nationalism. It became a more professional and effective territorial organization, with stronger links and better communications between the provinces and the center. When the British attempted to relocate some Meru villages to make room for European farmers, the TAA effectively made the connection between a local issue and territorial politics. The TAA also brought the Meru Land Case to the attention of the United Nations Trusteeship Council: for the first time, Tanganyikan nationalism had an international dimension. By 1954 Julius Nyerere, Kirilo Japhet, Oscar Kambona, and other young nationalists had set the stage for the creation of the TANU, the party that would lead Tanganyika to independence.

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See also: **Nyerere, Julius; Tanganyika/Tanzania: Nationalism, TANU, Independence.**

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Tanganyika (Tanzania): Nationalism, TANU, Independence

A mere seven and a half years elapsed between the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in July of 1954 and the independence of Tanganyika in December of 1961. During that brief

period the party went from a small initial base to a mass membership of over one million; established Julius Nyerere as a figure of continental importance; swept several elections; and helped make Tanganyika the first independent nation of East Africa.

A prenationalist tradition of political organization in Tanganyikan history was represented by the African Association. Founded in 1929, the African Association was more often a social club for urban elites than a rallying point for political protest. Nevertheless, the African Association did create a foundation on which the TANU could later build by bringing together members of such key social groups as African civil servants, professional men, and traders, and by organizing national conferences (between 1939 and 1945) that brought together representatives from around the territory.

In Tanganyika, as elsewhere, World War II was a political watershed. Returning soldiers brought fresh political energy, and the impact of the first cadre of Makerere University graduates was soon to be felt. Wartime privations, though generally accepted before 1945, created a general sense of dissatisfaction. The constitutional future of Tanganyika, formerly a mandate of the now defunct League of Nations, was open to debate. And rural political protest was on the rise, in the northeast as well as in the economically important Lake Province.

The African Association (renamed the Tanganyika African Association after a split with the Zanzibar branch in 1948) was initially incapable of profiting from these conditions. Centrifugal tendencies had long characterized the African politics of the territory, and these increased in the postwar period. Politics remained local. In Pare, widespread popular resistance to the imposition of a graduated tax, the *mbiru* controversy of 1946, was led by the Pare Union, with no connection to any territorial organization. On Kilimanjaro, the Chagga Union based its politics on the selection of a paramount chief, also in isolation from territorial politics. Governor Edward Twining’s policy of emphasizing local government reform through a new council system reinforced these parochial political tendencies. Coping with rapid change, it seemed that Tanganyikans were opting for an inward-looking neotraditionalism rather than a more expansive territorial nationalism.

However, important changes were occurring. In the Lake Province in the late 1940s, a nascent cooperative union brought together educated men with territorial connections and peasants resisting enforced agricultural schemes and the mandatory culling of cattle. For the first time, local grievances were combined with a call for political independence. The government reacted by prohibiting African civil servants from joining either the Tanganyika African Association. The Lake Province remained tense for most of the rest of the colonial period.

Meanwhile, another local African grievance gave the TAA an issue which it used to gain not only territorial but international publicity. An ill-conceived plan to consolidate settler landholdings in the northeast led the government to dispossess two Meru villages in the early 1950s. The local TAA secretary, Kirilo Japhet, coordinated an antigovernment campaign with the newly formed Meru Citizens Union: an effective interface between a postwar "tribal" society and territorial nationalism had been established.

Two other factors heightened the importance of the Meru Land Case. First, Japhet went to New York and carried the Meru complaint to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council, particularly in the form of Visiting Missions, would present the nationalists with an important forum in the coming years. Second, on a trip to London Japhet met with Julius Nyerere, who was soon to return to Tanganyika and become president of the TAA.

The centrality of the role played by Julius Nyerere in the 1950s can hardly be overstressed. Educated at Makerere and the University of Edinburgh, and a member of the Fabian Bureau, he could articulate grassroots grievances in a language comprehensible to the British. From both his student days at Makerere and his stint as a teacher at Tabora, Nyerere knew virtually the entire rising generation of his educated countrymen. He was familiar with the trends of mass nationalism elsewhere in Africa and the world. And perhaps most important he was a charismatic figure around whom Tanganyikans could unite, since he was not associated with any particular region or social group. In 1950 the TAA had been reinvigorated in Dar es Salaam by the participation of ex-servicemen and former Makerere students. In 1953 Julius Nyerere became president of the TAA, and the transfer of control to a new generation was complete.

Tanzanians would later celebrate Saba Saba Day (Seven Seven Day) in commemoration of the TAA annual conference held on July 7, 1954. On that day a new constitution was approved, and the name of the organization was changed to the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The new constitution both enhanced central control over policy by creating a National Executive Council which would meet between annual delegates' conferences and facilitated greater contact with the provinces by making a provision that trade unions, cooperative societies and tribal unions could join as affiliates. Youth and women's sections were formed, with the leader of the women's section, Bibi Titi Muhammad, proving a powerful organizing force at the territorial level. The goal of the organization was now explicitly stated: to fight for independence.

It was a time of great possibilities, but also of potential danger. The Mau Mau emergency in neighboring Kenya made mass nationalism in East Africa a high-stakes game. Official policy in both Kenya and the Central African Federation was to reconcile colonialism with nationalism through "multiracialism." This ideology was represented in Tanganyika by Twining (1949–1958). Portraying the TANU and Nyerere as "racialist," the administration appointed ten unofficial members from each race (European, Asian, and African) to the Legislative Council, and from this nucleus sponsored the creation of the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) as an alternative to the TANU. Nyerere's counterformulation was that Tanganyika, while indeed multiracial in population, was "primarily African."

In the mid-1950s the TANU quickly developed its mass base. The government responded by scaling back some of its more unpopular schemes of agricultural compulsion and seeking allies for its "multiracialist" policy. The inevitable confrontation between government "multiracialism" and the TANU's nationalism came when Governor Twining announced that a semi-representative Legislative Council would be formed in 1958, with each eligible voter to cast one ballot for a candidate of each race. The question was whether the TANU should participate in elections conducted in a format to which it was opposed on principal. Although there was a great deal of disagreement about that question at the conference held in Tabora in January 1958, Nyerere carried the day with his argument that participation was necessary. The TANU agreed to support (though not to nominate) Asians and Europeans in the election. To balance this concession, the delegates voted to mount a "positive action" campaign unless responsible government were implemented before the end of 1959. A dissident faction which disapproved of participation in the elections broke away to form the African National Congress. This party, under Zuberi Mtemvu, had virtually no electoral impact.

In the first phase of the voting in October 1958, The TANU won 68 per cent of the vote and thirteen of fifteen seats. By the time the second phase was completed in February of the next year, the UTP had collapsed and the TANU won all fifteen seats. The TANU's power was now a *fait accompli*, and it was clear that the country could not be ruled without Nyerere's cooperation. By now the Suez Crisis had come and gone, Ghana was independent, Harold MacMillan was sensing the "winds of change," and Richard Turnbull had replaced Edward Twining as governor of Tanganyika. In a concession that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier, the 1959 East Africa Governors Conference approved of responsible government for Tanganyika in 1963–1964 and independence by 1970. But events were moving too

quickly for the British to control. Riots in Nyasaland helped bring an end to official insistence on gradualism and multiracialism. The colonial secretary acceded to the demand for responsible government after the 1960 elections, and on December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became independent, with the TANU as the party of government and Julius Nyerere as prime minister.

In 1964, a union with postrevolutionary Zanzibar produced the new nation of Tanzania. In 1967, a TANU conference passed Julius Nyerere's Arusha Declaration, transforming the country from a de facto to a de jure one-party state. The end of the Tanganyika African National Union came in 1977 when it was integrated with the Afro-Shirazi Party on Zanzibar to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party).

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See also: **Nyerere, Julius.**

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Tangier

Tangier, a city in Morocco situated on the Atlantic coast, on the southern side of the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, was called Tingis in Roman times and was the capital of the Roman province of Mauritania Tingitana. It was ruled by Muslim dynasties from the early eighth century to 1471. In Arabic, the town is called Tanjah. From 1471 it was ruled by Spain and Portugal until 1662, when it was ceded to England as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, Charles II's Portuguese wife. In 1684 England returned Tangier to the Sultan of Morocco.

In the nineteenth century, Tangier, a seaport close to Europe, became the main base for European commercial and diplomatic activity in Morocco. By then it had a medina, an old Muslim quarter enclosed by fifteenth-century ramparts, dominated by the Casbah. The sultan had a palace there and was represented by a Pasha. Consuls of several European countries were posted in Tangier; in 1860 they became heads of legations. They

had extensive power because of the large numbers of Moroccans who were given consular protection under the then common system of capitulations. The consuls worked together to play a role in local administration, to deal with sanitary problems for example. During the nineteenth century a European trading community grew up and many European travelers went to Tangier. By the turn of the century there were about 10,000 foreigners in Tangier; there had for long been an important Jewish community, and Tangier was already becoming the cosmopolitan city that it was to be famously later on.

Tangier was a center of political intrigue, negotiations, and conflicts in the early twentieth century, when European powers gradually encroached on the independent Sultanate. The Rif Berber chieftain Raisuli held a wealthy American resident of Tangier, Ion Perdicaris, to ransom in 1904 and was then appointed Pasha of Tangier for a time. In 1905, after the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale had given French ambitions in Morocco the go-ahead, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany visited Tangier to declare support for Moroccan independence. After the subsequent Algeiras Conference (1906), Spain occupied the northern strip of Morocco but not Tangier, which was also not occupied by the French when they took over the greater part of the country. Tangier remained separate under the collective control of the Western consuls. A special neutral status for Tangier had been discussed for some time, and the idea was revived after World War I. The three Western countries most interested in Morocco for decades, France, Spain and Britain, agreed in talks in London in 1923 on a Statute of Tangier, which came into force on June 1, 1925.

Tangier was recognized as being under the authority of the Sultan of Morocco, who was represented there by an official with the title of *Mendoub*, responsible for administering traditional Moroccan law and collecting taxes from the Muslims; however, the Sultan was completely under French control. Within the Tangier International Zone, covering about 150 square kilometers, a Committee of Control and an International Legislative Assembly were in charge. The committee consisted of eight European consuls, the assembly of 26 members including six Muslims and three Jews. In the International Zone, foreign trading powers had economic equality, Moroccan francs and pesetas were legal tender, and the official languages were French, Spanish, and Arabic. Foreign control was asserted even more fully after an amendment to the statute in 1927.

Under this unusual arrangement, modern development proceeded in Tangier, including the building of new houses and roads. The newly developed European areas were very much segregated from the districts where Muslim Moroccans lived (including a famous

resident, the Salafi reformist scholar Abdullah bin Idris al-Sanusi, from 1910 to his death in 1931) and generally endured great deprivation. Elegant buildings filled the foreigners' districts; streets like the Boulevard Pasteur, the main street, and social landmarks like the Café de Paris were filled with both resident and visiting Westerners. In the early 1930s the population was estimated at around 50,000 (30,000 Muslim Moroccans, 8,000 Jews, and 12,000 "Tangerinos" of various nationalities). Tangier became a fashionable stopover for tourists from western countries, staying at the Hotel Rif (1937) and other modern hotels; 43,000 tourists called in 1934, two-thirds of them British.

During World War II, Spanish troops occupied the International Zone on June 14, 1940. Under Francisco Franco's effective rule, German influence increased, but the international administration continued to some extent, as did a British presence and the city was a center for espionage and intrigue, as it had been before. Spain withdrew its military and police forces by October 1945, when the Mendoub returned and the Committee of Control resumed charge. The Moroccan nationalist movement, encouraged by a speech made by Sultan Mohammed V in Tangier on April 10, 1947, won support in Tangier, where nationalists benefited from the uncensored postal services operated by three countries under Tangier's special arrangements. There was rioting against foreign rule in 1952, and later arms were smuggled through Tangier for resistance in French Morocco in the mid-1950s. But the international administration went on for some years, and under its light rule—characterized by low taxation and little regulation—the city became famous as a center for various sorts of business, including some that were disreputable and/or criminal. There was a building boom, while the city's population expanded, reaching 160,000–180,000 by 1952, including 100,000 Moroccans. Tourism also flourished again, with 100,000 visitors in 1952.

Following the independence of French and Spanish Morocco in March 1956, the Statute of Tangier was abrogated on October 29, 1956, and Tangier was fully integrated into Morocco once again. The special features that had made Tangier famous or infamous did not disappear quickly. Mohammed V issued a royal charter, giving Tangier a free money market and the right of unrestricted imports and exports from August 29, 1957 on. Speculators and entrepreneurs flourished again for a time, but when notice was given of abrogation of the charter in October 1959, merchants left, money was moved out, and many business collapsed. The government started municipal projects to employ some of those thrown out of work; a carpet industry has since grown up in the city. On April 19, 1961, Tangier was fully integrated into the Moroccan state.

Tangier had acquired a worldwide reputation as a raffish and disreputable place. While some of the business activities that had fed that reputation now declined or stopped, the city remained for long after 1961 a haven for Western expatriates—especially artists, writers, and intellectuals, including Paul Bowles, Truman Capote, William S. Burroughs, and Allen Ginsberg.

Tangier is still one of the most important cities of Morocco, its population now being about 500,000. Although the King of Morocco has a palace there, Tangier lies in a deprived region neglected by the government. Prominent natives of Tangier include the writer Tahar Ben Djelloun, the comedian Bachir Skiredj, and Mohammed Choukri, another writer, whose autobiography published in translation as *For Bread Alone* (Peter Owen, 1973) described the wretched life of Tangier's indigenous people, far removed from the seedy glamour of its formerly notorious expatriate society.

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See also: **Maghrib; Morocco.**

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
Tanzania (Tanganyika): Arusha Declaration

In the Arusha Declaration, approved by Tanganyika African National Union's (TANU's) National Executive Committee on February 5, 1967, Julius Nyerere set out a blueprint for a future Tanzanian socialism. Section 1 of the declaration summed up his objectives for Tanzania: socialism, equality, and an end to poverty. Section 2 then defined socialism as the control of the means of production and exchange by workers and peasants; and Section 3 qualified this by emphasizing the primary role of peasants, criticizing the emphasis that had been placed on industrialization to date.

While Section 4 called upon the TANU members to accept these principles, it was in the Leadership Code (Section 5) that Nyerere strove to embed socialism in the political structure. According to the code, leaders (party and state) should be either peasants or workers, not associated with "the practice of capitalism or feudalism." They should not own shares nor hold directorships in private companies. They should receive one salary only, and should not be in receipt of rentals from property.

In a subsequent policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development" (1967), Nyerere spelled out his concern about the social consequences of unrestricted urbanization, and advocated a policy of rural development

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based on the *ujamaa* village, which would start with communal, as well as individual plots, but evolve gradually into a single agricultural commune. Replacing the existing small village, the much larger *ujamaa* village's "economy of scale" would provide opportunities for the establishment of a wide range of technical and social services, helping to raise the peasant's overall standard of living.

Nyerere's socialist program grew out of the concept of *ujamaa* (familyhood), which harked back to what he believed were the guiding precepts of traditional, pre-colonial African society: respect, common property, and the obligation to work. He felt that these principles had been undermined by the colonial experience, which had encouraged individual enterprise at the expense of the common good, and had continued to flourish after the securing of independence with the emergence of a privileged elite operating in a neocolonialist milieu. Nyerere now sought to arrest this trend with the implementation of *ujamaa* socialism, emphasizing a number of related principles: mutual cooperation and public control; mass participation in the political process; self-reliance and self-sufficiency (with an end to reliance on foreign aid that he believed was trapping his country in a cycle of dependency); an emphasis on a socialist pattern of rural development (building on the foundations laid with the nationalization of land in 1962); an exhortation to Tanzanians (especially male peasants) to work harder; and the creation of a leadership oriented toward the public, rather than their own, interest. It was a socialism significantly different from the Marxist-Leninist model coming into fashion in the late 1960s, which sought to transplant from the Soviet

system the industrial and urban route to development, with a select, carefully screened ("vanguard") party membership.

In practice, the *ujamaa* village experiment succeeded in consolidating rural settlement: at the end of the process, in 1976, some 13 million Tanzanian peasants lived in 7684 villages, according to Nyerere's figures. However, as early as 1973, the communal principle had been dropped in response to peasant hostility. More seriously, in some areas at least, overzealous party and state officials had coerced peasants into moving to the new villages, particularly after 1973, when the TANU leadership had called for an increase in the pace of village development, an error of judgment that Nyerere later admitted to. The development aims of *ujamaa* were frustrated by a shortage of resources to meet villagers' requests, leading to their eventual disillusionment; this was aggravated by a policy change in 1972, which moved decision making from the village level, where peasants could negotiate with officials, to regional headquarters. Peasants could send in requests for projects, but little else, and thus became dependent on the wishes of regional bureaucrats.

The *ujamaa* experiment thus failed in its main objective—namely, to make a breakthrough in rural production. The image of the typical *ujamaa* village was that of poverty and low expectations. Ironically, most of the main beneficiaries had been the black commercial farmers, who were tolerated by the administration provided that they made no public criticism of *ujamaa*, whose expertise and existing farming capital enabled them to make good use of official technical assistance.

Analysts have been divided between those who seek to account for the *ujamaa* experiment's failure in terms of the operation of external factors, essentially beyond the control of Nyerere's government, and those who would attribute it to inherent weaknesses in the experiment as a whole. From 1973, Tanzania, like much of Africa, was exposed to the ravages of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries price rises and declining terms of trade in primary products, with the added local circumstance of a series of crippling droughts in the early 1980s and Tanzania's war against Idi Amin in Uganda. But *ujamaa* itself seems to have been undermined economically by a pricing policy for crops that benefited the country's parastatal purchasing organizations at the expense of peasant producers, and a national environment of mismanagement, overmanning, and overspending that left state corporations heavily in debt by the mid-1980s. Less easy to demonstrate is the impression of a utopian experiment fatally weakened by a bureaucracy operating at a remove from the peasantry, which feared making decisions that might rebound against it. The result was a growing

conservatism, and an unwillingness to entertain innovation, much less radical change.

Whether its failure was inherent, or caused by extrinsic events, Tanzania's peasants became increasingly disaffected with ujamaa socialism, and cut back their production of cash crops in response to the fall in real producer prices. By the early 1980s, Tanzania had become more, rather than less, reliant on external aid. The country's increasingly precarious economic position gradually pushed its leadership into more pragmatic policies, with the symbolic decision in 1986 (after several years of refusal) to accept the conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance. The Leadership Code, increasingly flouted by leaders forced to find supplementary sources of income in a deteriorating economy, survived until the reforms of the 1990s, when Tanzania moved toward a multiparty democracy.

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See also: **Nyerere, Julius; Socialism in Postcolonial Africa.**

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Tanzania (Tanganyika): Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), One-Party Politics

Popular votes created a virtual one-party state in Tanganyika, the mainland part of Tanzania, in 1960, when the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led the mainland to independence. The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) created a de facto one-party system on Zanzibar following their 1964 revolution. A presidential commission established on the mainland in 1964 to explore the desirability of a one-party system recommended that Tanganyika become a de jure, or legal, one-party state following the 1966 elections. Tanganyika was already a virtual one-party state. Although the law permitted multiparty democratic electoral politics, the TANU regularly won elections in 1958, 1960, and 1962. In fact, the TANU won all

parliamentary seats except one. Julius Nyerere, the father of Tanzania's independence, did not think that multiparty politics were good for Africa; he stated that "a struggle for freedom from colonialism is a patriotic struggle which leaves no room for differences." Nyerere believed that the Westminster model was divisive in an African context.

A small handful of people could pose a threat to the state, in Nyerere's mind, and a well-organized faction—or, worse yet, an opposition party—posed a more substantial risk for creating unrest. Each party, in his opinion, might become associated with one candidate, and his tribe would dominate that party. This might eventually lay the foundation for "a state of potential civil war." Where differences between parties were inconsequential, a multiparty system promoted "a spirit of purely artificial rivalry, like that which exists between a couple of soccer teams." Where the differences between parties were "fundamental," the potential for internal unrest was great.

Nyerere believed that democracy could thrive within a one-party system by encouraging vigorous competition within the party for nomination and office. He defended his position by arguing that overwhelming support of the TANU meant that opposing candidates stood a negligible chance of election. Nyerere believed that a one-party system whereby candidates belonging to the same party competed for election restored the principle of meaningful choice. Moreover, if all of the political tensions within the nation were contained within one party, then religious, regional, and ethnic groups would have to discuss their differences. Argument would lead to understanding and shared values. Nyerere elevated Kiswahili, making it the national language, so that members of parliament, like Bibi Titi, who did not speak English, could participate in national debate on important issues of the day. The TANU members would communicate in a common language, and tribalism, religious discrimination, and racism would be discouraged. Every Tanzanian would be accommodated within one system through the one-party state.

Nyerere was not alone in viewing new African states as fragile, and he was not merely rationalizing prolonged tenure in office for himself. He believed in freedom of choice, competition, and individual rights within the one-party state.

The one-party system did allow voters to express dissatisfaction. In successive elections between 1966 and 1980, many members of the Tanzanian parliament were voted out of office. Voters elected candidates who supported the Arusha Declaration of "socialism and self-reliance," launched in 1967. Tanzanian voters also elected leaders who supported the Leadership Code, which limited leaders to owning one house, one farm, and one directorship on a corporate board in order to

combat corruption and elitism. Voters had some choices within this system, and they took advantage of them.

Although the two one-party states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, the two political parties, the TANU and the ASP, did not merge until the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution), or CCM, was officially formed in 1977.

Tanzania was a de jure one-party State from 1977 to 1992. Throughout this time, the National Conference was the highest organ of the CCM. The National Election Commission (NEC), however, appointed candidates and reserved the power to remove members of parliament by revoking their party membership. In 1988, seven members of parliament were dismissed from the party, thereby also losing their seats in parliament. This demonstrated the power of the NEC.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1990–1991, this opened debate on the advisability of one-party States, and the CCM organized a national conference to discuss Tanzania's political culture. Conferences, workshops, and seminars provided other forums for discussing one-party vs. multiparty politics. In Kiswahili, these discussions are called *mageus* (the turning point). After more than a year of discussion, then President Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed a presidential commission to consolidate the views of the nation and to offer recommendations. At the 1992 CCM conference a 16-page document, the Report of the Extraordinary National Conference on the Recommendation of the National Executive Committee to Change the Political System in Tanzania, recommended that CCM's monopoly of power end. Subsequently, President Mwinyi implemented a new multiparty democratic system, despite the fact that 80 per cent of Tanzanians polled favored a one-party state. Political pluralism, a strong civic society, and a market economy replaced the old system. This trend reflected broader international reforms, as well as the conditionality of international donors who linked foreign aid to adoption of the new culture. A third of Tanzania's gross domestic product was conditionally underwritten by Western donors. Former head of state Nyerere found such international pressure "contemptible" and "hypocritical," but recognized the need to change to a multiparty system so long as new parties were not forced to adopt external conditions.

Tanzania made a smooth transition from a one-party to a multiparty state. The CCM has since undergone profound changes. CCM branches in the armed forces and workplaces were abolished in 1992; CCM members in the armed forces had contributed \$700,000 annually, and the loss of this money was a painful one. Moreover, party chairpersons, both

national and local, now no longer receive salaries; theirs are now part-time volunteer positions. CCM offices have a smaller staff. Party officials, on loan to CCM offices from state owned corporations, have had to either return to their former jobs or retire. To reduce operating cost party secretariats fired many employees. Of the seven ideological colleges, only Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam remains operational. Currently the Kivukoni Academy of Social Sciences functions like a private college. It offers courses on law, public administration, communications, development, management, and international relations, as well as a little ideological and political education. Students pay fees to attend.

It must be noted that the privatization of state companies, implementation of harsh economic reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the switch to a free market economy occurred with little or no tribalism or communal violence. CCM candidates promise voters many more years of peace and stability. Thirty years of socialist policies and Julius Nyerere's idealism maintained harmony among Tanzania's 120 ethnic groups. It minimized class divisions, openly fought public corruption, and encouraged religious tolerance. With a grassroots organization envied by rivals and a divided opposition, the CCM's hold on power seems secure.

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See also: Nyerere, Julius.

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Tanzania (Tanganyika): Uganda, Relations with

Uganda invaded Tanzania and attempted to annex the Kagera Salient in 1978. Tanzania protested this naked aggression and asked the international community to force Uganda to return its territory. Neither the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, nor any nation-state came to Tanzania's aid. To make matters worse, landlocked Uganda threatened to seize a huge corridor of Tanzania's land, containing railroad, road, and harbor facilities and ending at the Indian Ocean port city of Tanga. In self-defense, Tanzania first forced the Ugandan army out of Tanzania. Then, to end the chronic threat of invasion and illegal annexation of territory, the Tanzanian army invaded Uganda. The Tanzania Expeditionary Force captured Uganda's capital, Kampala, and drove Uganda's then ruler Idi Amin into permanent exile in Saudi Arabia. Once Amin was removed, amicable relations between Tanzania and Uganda were restored.

On October 30, 1978, Idi Amin Dada sent an invasion force of 3,000 Ugandan troops across the border into neighboring Tanzania. A primary target was the Taka Bridge, which had been used by anti-Amin Ugandans living in Tanzania to invade Uganda. The Ugandan army falsely accused the Tanzanian army of invading Uganda in early October 1978. This propaganda was meant to confuse Tanzania and divert attention from the impending Ugandan invasion.

Ugandan troops killed 10,000 Tanzanian civilians and stole 12,000 cattle as well as other livestock, household effects, cars, furniture, and any other valuables that they could find. An estimated 485 Tanzanians were held captive at the Ugandan army base at Mutukulu, just across the Tanzania border. Uganda is landlocked, and Amin felt that Uganda needed assured access to the Indian Ocean.

Julius Nyerere, then Tanzanian head of state, asked Amin to withdraw Uganda's troops from Tanzanian territory on the grounds that they had violated Tanzania's sovereignty. Amin refused and instead challenged Nyerere to a "boxing duel." Needless to say, no fight took place; rather, Nyerere asked the United Nations and the Organization of African States to mediate the dispute. But Amin would not permit this.

Consequently, Tanzania sent several squadrons of modern jets to intercept and stop the Ugandan invaders. Other nations refused to stop Uganda, so Tanzania decided to defend itself. In spite of being among the world's poorest countries, Tanzania spent

over \$1 million a day to fund the war. Inflation grew rapidly, and Tanzania felt that it could not afford to fight for more than one month. Massive force was used to repel the Ugandan army and rapidly depose Amin.

Tanzania trained every adult Tanzanian to use modern weapons. The Tanzanian government was not afraid of its own people, but Amin, however, feared the Ugandans he ruled. Tanzania's army had veterans who were former military advisors in a variety of African conflicts. Uganda's army's only experience fighting was against unarmed Ugandan civilians, whom they intimidated; the outcome was determined before the two armies engaged in battle. Aided by Ugandans who sought to liberate their country from Amin's brutal dictatorship, the Tanzanians easily defeated and demoralized Amin's forces. By Christmas Tanzania had captured Uganda and turned the governance of the country over to Ugandans loyal to Uganda's first elected leader, Milton Obote. This brief war marked a turning point in modern African history for it established the principal that one African nation could invade another independent African nation if it had "sufficient cause."

Upon independence, Ugandans elected Milton Obote president, who promoted Idi Amin to general of the Ugandan army. Eventually, Amin overthrew Obote and reassumed leadership. Faced with dissent within the military and the civilian populace, Amin attempted to divert attention from this situation by invading Tanzania on October 30, 1978.

Although Tanzania was the 27th poorest country on earth, it committed a huge proportion of its meager resources to the liberation of Africans in other countries. Cynical observers note that Nyerere was a leader of the "Front Line States": Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique. In 1978, these countries were embroiled in civil wars. Some scholars thus believe that it was not an accident that the Uganda-Tanzania war erupted during a critical moment in negotiations between liberation forces and Ian Smith's white minority government in Rhodesia. Tanzania sacrificed improvement in the standard of living of its citizens so that its support for African liberation forces would not be in jeopardy. Antiliberation forces therefore wanted to undermine Nyerere by any means possible. They argued that he retaliated against Amin for personal reasons. He was accused of building a political empire at the expense of African unity. The Uganda-Tanzania war came close to costing Nyerere his credibility. If Tanzania could be discredited, then millions of Africans would be forced to suffer oppression for an untold number of decades. In 1978 Rhodesia, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola had won independence with Tanzania's help.

Thus, the Uganda-Tanzania border war reflected the complexities of internal conflict within Uganda. It also

reflected regional tensions in eastern and southern Africa. Escalating Cold War tensions played a role, though the conflict never escalated into a war by proxy on the scale of Vietnam or Afghanistan. Tanzania invaded Uganda to defend itself and to rid Africa of Idi Amin (who eventually fled invading Tanzanian and Ugandan liberation forces and found refuge first in Libya and later in Saudi Arabia).

Uganda's invasion of Tanzania established a new precedent in African international relations. This incident highlighted the continuing significance of ethnicity and the tensions between groups that can result in civil war. It also underscored international tensions and conflicts associated with the birth of new states and nationalism.

The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda and its removal of a dictator whom Tanzania found intolerable establish a second precedent: African heads of state could now remove other African leaders whose policies and practices they found repugnant, and influence those who come to power. The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda created bold new possibilities for African relations. Africans could now create regional spheres of influence and use violence to maintain or expand them. The invasion was a turning point in African history.

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See also: **Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta; Nyerere, Julius; Obote, Milton; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979; Uganda: Tanzanian Invasion, 1979–1980.**

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Tanzania (Tanganyika): Democracy and Capitalism: 1990 to the Present

In the late 1980s, Tanzania's one-party political system—with Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM] renamed from the Tanganyika African National Union [TANU] in 1977, as the only permitted party—came under increasing criticism from a younger generation of Western-educated economists and financial technocrats within the ruling elite. Their views were shaped by a combination of considerations, such as the manifest inanity of CCM institutions, the move of



Forestry in Tanzania. © Charlotte Thege/Das Fotoarchiv.

Africa generally toward multipartyism, and reforms in Eastern Europe. The “Young Turks” received unexpected support from ex-president and now CCM head Julius Nyerere, who in February 1990 remarked that the one-party system “[tended] to go to sleep.” Following a public consultation, a CCM conference unanimously supported a proposal to restore multiparty democracy, and Tanzania's constitution was amended accordingly in 1992. To safeguard national unity, it was stipulated that to be registered, political parties should reflect a national, and not a regional or religious, constituency. An array of political parties quickly emerged, but they were fragmentary, often led by erstwhile establishment figures, and in any case found themselves trying to operate in an environment in which the CCM had usurped the reformist agenda. As a result, they found it difficult to mount a convincing challenge to the ruling establishment. The CCM easily won the first multiparty election in 1995, and won a similarly sweeping victory in 2000, securing 244 of the 275 National Assembly seats. Significantly, the only really substantial opposition party on the mainland, the National Convention for Construction and Reform, or Mageuzi (Change) was led by a former CCM minister who had been dismissed a few months earlier for “indiscipline.”

The growing domination of the reform movement was also reflected at the highest level—namely, the presidency. Nyerere's successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–1995) had introduced a measured program of economic liberalization, including some relaxation of the republic's very tight exchange control regulations from 1896 onward, but the final years of his presidency were overshadowed by charges of corruption and financial mismanagement. His successor, Benjamin Mkapa, campaigned on an anticorruption platform in the 1995 presidential election, and after winning a clear mandate (62 per cent of the popular vote), accelerated the pace of political and economic reform. However, as in Mwinyi's second term, his current

tenure (2000–2005) has witnessed renewed allegations of corruption, nepotism and—following disputed election results and unrest on the island of Zanzibar—abuse of authority.

In the 1990s Tanzania finally turned its back on socialism. President Mkapa acknowledged its failure, while claiming its success as a guarantor of social stability and a mechanism for building the Tanzanian nation. A declining number of diehard socialists predicted the replacement of Nyerere's utopian vision by a capitalist dystopia, pointing to the rampant corruption of Mwinyi's last presidency as evidence. The reformers disagreed, attributing the crisis of 1992–1995 to the atmosphere of disillusion and structural dissolution that had characterized the final years of socialism, an interpretation owing much to contemporary events in the Soviet Union and its successors. The new Tanzania would be one in which the state would ensure that modernization continued, the conditions for entrepreneurship and economic growth maximized, foreign investment welcomed, and trade liberalized, with the State taking a direct role safeguarding equal opportunities and the provision of social welfare for all people.

The most obvious sign of its departure from socialism has been the program to privatize its 350+ parastatals, few of which were making a profit when the privatization legislation was enacted in 1992. Implementation was slow at first, with the government testing the water and seeking to protect various interests. Some prodding from world financial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF), speeded up the process, helped after 1995 by Mkapa's wholehearted endorsement of modernization: by 2002, some 80 per cent of Tanzania's state corporations had passed into private hands. Recent proposed privatizations, involving sensitive areas such as public utilities (water, electricity), have led to charges of favoritism and corrupt practices, and the deadline of December 2003 for the winding up of the whole sector may not be achieved.

Similar allegations had been made earlier about the first beneficiaries of privatization and the move toward a freer market. The ability of Tanzania's Asian community to take advantage of these new commercial opportunities led to violence, attacks on Asian stores, and rioting in 1993–1994, and suggestions that only "indigenous" (i.e., non-Asian) Tanzanians should be able to buy into privatized parastatals. But young black would-be entrepreneurs were confronted by other obstacles, including a state bureaucracy that was reluctant to simplify regulations and procedures; a banking system that, albeit no longer a state monopoly, was inflexible and inefficient; and an environment in which established entrepreneurs had the wherewithal to grease palms when this proved necessary, a particular feature of the Mwinyi's second term. To these obsta-

cles should be added the foreign investor, wooed by the state and encouraged by a number of inducements, including partial or total exemption from taxation for which local firms were liable. At the same time, trade liberalization exposed Tanzania's infant industries to the full blast of competition from foreign imports, further curbing the country's development.

Tanzania's program of economic liberalization and reform has won it plaudits from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as other foreign donors, and by the turn of the decade had created an economic growth rate of 4.5 to 5 per cent per year, higher than the African average. The costs of these reforms have been high: a stagnating rural sector, beset by low and falling world commodity prices for Tanzania's main export crops; a growing urban/rural economic divide; a continuing dependence on external aid, with a third of public spending in 2002 coming from this source; the decline in social services—which had started in the later *ujamaa* period—continuing with cuts in state expenditure in years of financial stringency; and reports of increasing social tension, especially since the start of the new millennium.

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See also: **Nyerere, Julius; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Arusha Declaration.**

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Taxation

Taxation turned indigenous peoples into a "governable" population, although controlling and containing them was fundamental to colonial administration. Direct taxation, in various forms of "hut," "head" or poll taxes on adult males, and consumption taxes on imports, ensured that Africans paid for the "benefits" of colonial rule. Although philosophies of imperial administration differed throughout Africa, taxation, backed up by colonial law and policing, was used as a "soft" coercive force, pushing Africans into labor for whites or cash-crop production. There was no single revenue policy, and thus tax burdens varied from colony to colony. During the 1930s Africans were

further “squeezed” to compensate for the declining coffers of the colonial governments. However, even in the depths of economic depression, African colonies serviced their debts and balanced budgets as tax-collecting became more efficient. Africans thus saw little benefit from taxation, which became a focus of grievances articulated by African nationalist organizations.

In Britain (the major imperial power in Africa), the prevailing economic orthodoxy was that colonies should be self-supporting. An imperial subsidy was borne by British taxpayers, but defense constituted the largest component of this subsidy. The government also financed loans for imperial development, paid for primarily by African taxpayers, and made direct grants for public works and native education. Most colonial revenues came from taxes, but 30 per cent came from nontax sources such as licenses, fees, and mining royalties levied on private companies. European companies paid no taxes in the colonies in which they operated. In nonsettler colonies, consumption taxes and customs revenues on foreign trade, ultimately paid for by colonial consumers, constituted a major source of revenue. The burden of taxation fell almost wholly on the poor, as local middlemen were able to skim off profits on imports, widening the class and gender inequalities in African societies. Because of government dependence on customs revenues there was also less opportunity for import substitution than in the “white settler” colonies, perpetuating economic dependency.

The impact of taxation was most intense in the “white settler” colonies, where it was combined with land dispossession. In South Africa, all adult males, including urban migrants, paid poll tax, and in the “native reserves” such as the Transkei, the salaries of white administrators, “native” education, prisons, and policing were charged to Africans. In the 1930s, however, only 14.5 per cent was spent on education, as opposed to 29 per cent on prisons. Men had to travel to distant places to pay taxes (in a lump sum), involving loss of earnings, and, until 1939, default was a criminal offense punishable by fines or imprisonment. In the British South African High Commission Territories of Swaziland, Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Basutoland (Lesotho), and in Portuguese Mozambique, low levels of development and taxation created a dependency on migrant remittances from the South African mines which endured well into the postcolonial era.

The role of taxation in coercing African labor into the cash economy has been well documented, but its centrality to the wider culture of colonialism has received less attention. Taxation, suggests Sean Redding (1996), “imbued the colonial state with supernatural powers” that echoed widespread beliefs in witchcraft and drew Africans into participation in state rituals. Colonial censuses collected ethnographic information but also

facilitated the organization and extension of taxation. The connection between taxation and the wider “civilizing” project was clearly articulated by Frederick Lugard, the guru of British “native administration” in the 1920s. Lugard visualized an Africa where “horrible cruelties” were replaced by “order and justice.” For Lugard, taxation was a “common burden” and “universal necessity of civilisation” that African communities had to share. The moral foundation of “native development,” taxation stimulated individual enterprise and responsibility, emancipated Africans from slavery and forced labor (but also from “indolence”), enhanced “self-respect,” and promoted “pride” in progress. Taxes were to be paid only in cash and it was the duty of colonial officers to energetically encourage trade.

In keeping with the principle of ruling through existing African political and legal structures, native treasuries, supposedly managed by native authorities, were set up to finance administration and development, though they were carefully audited by white officers. This reflected a general lack of trust in placing even more “civilized” Africans in positions of authority. Colonial officials and white “friends of the native” alike saw Africans as financially naive or inherently corrupt, unable to comprehend Western principles of taxation and accountability. However, from an African perspective, taxation arguably represented a deep cultural imposition of alien accounting practices and concepts of individual agency that assumed that African societies were incapable of self-management of resources.

In West Africa, tax-collecting often provoked strong resistance and hostility and proved a disagreeable business. In more remote areas, widespread resistance was encountered and colonial officers would only travel with an armed escort. Resistance to taxation was punished by fines, imprisonment, or severe reprisals in the case of threats to colonial officers’ lives. The imposition of direct taxation was particularly problematic in the Gold Coast. The British only finally crushed the powerful Asante military resistance in 1895, and the Asante and Fanti peoples continued to assert their traditional democratic practices, refusing to accept the principle of direct taxation and white-controlled native treasuries. Gold Coast Africans favored duties on export products where part of the burden fell on the foreign purchaser. New forms of urban taxation, such as the 1934 Waterworks Ordinance, which levied a rate for water from street taps, were deeply resented. In the ongoing struggle to impose direct taxation, an ordinance was passed in 1935 authorizing the raising of revenue by “annual levies” and depriving Africans of any control over local revenues.

After 1929 the extension of taxation to untaxed regions to compensate for reduced budgets, combined with deteriorating economic conditions, resulted in a sharp growth of unrest. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast women

were actively involved in antitax protests as colonial interventions threatened to undermine their marketing activities, an economic sector in which they traditionally dominated. During the 1929 riots in Southern Nigeria, which Africans called the “Women’s War,” female protesters were shot dead by the colonial authorities. However, women’s grievances were part of a more generalized unrest resulting from the introduction of a new Native Revenue Ordinance, hostility toward collaborative African chiefs, and a drop in the price of palm oil, the main export crop. After the riots, punitive fines were imposed, houses burned down, and expeditions sent out to administer a severe lesson to the local population.

Conflict between Africans and white authorities also emerged over taxation and control of alcohol. Despite international humanitarian conventions to control liquor imports into Sub-Saharan Africa, colonial governments regarded duties levied on imported alcohol as a valuable source of revenue. However, import taxes on alcohol merely increased the number of illegal stills, threatening government revenues and raising the specter of crime, disorder, and prostitution. From the 1930s on, popular struggles in the expanding urban townships increasingly centered around government control of alcohol and impinged on nationalist politics. Beer boycotts were launched in urban centers in South Africa and Northern Rhodesia, where municipal beer halls provided a healthy revenue for city councils but threatened the livelihoods of African women, who survived in urban areas by brewing and selling beer.

During World War II, new forms of taxation were introduced, food costs rose, and there was greater direction of labor. African protest grew and the rapid development of trade unionism and mass nationalism accelerated changes in French and British colonial policy. In recognition of the increasing importance of the African empire, the British government passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940, which made available extra finances. However, development funds were firmly linked to capitalist interests and the expansion of the modern cash-crop economy and the colonized were still expected to pay for their own development through taxation. Order and profit thus remained at the heart of the imperial mission throughout the colonial era, and colonial revenue, accounting, and auditing are fundamental to debates around the profitability of the imperial enterprise and relations between government and business. But fiscal policies were also underpinned by cultural values that had irreversible impact on African societies and the established circles of poverty, debt, and dependency that have persisted into the postcolonial era.

BARBARA BUSH

See also: **Alcohol: Popular Culture, Colonial Control.**

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Taylor, Charles (c.1948–)

Former President of Liberia

Charles Taylor, the 21st president of the Republic of Liberia, has the singular honor of starting a bloody civil war on Christmas Eve 1989 and subsequently winning both the presidential and parliamentary vote in an election declared free and fair by the international community.

To appreciate the dynamics of this paradoxical transformation, one must trace the “rebellious” career of Taylor both as a student activist and in national politics. These activities formed the background that led him to plunge his country into a brutal seven-year civil war, an odyssey that resulted in the total destruction of Liberia and the displacement of large populations either internally or as refugees. Taylor is an Americo-Liberian from Arthington, one of the established settler communities along the St. Pauli River near Monrovia. He is a member of the elite group that ruled Liberia since its foundation in 1822 until the Armed Forces of Liberia overthrew the monolithic True Whig Party (TWP) on April 14, 1980.

Taylor’s nascent rebel activities started in the United States where he was a student first at Chamberlain

Junior College in Boston, Massachusetts. He subsequently studied economics at Bentley College, also in Massachusetts. As part of his political activities he joined the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas, becoming the chairman of its board of directors. Characteristic of the later insurgent movement of which he consequently became leader, Taylor was one of a few Americo-Liberians among an otherwise predominantly indigenous association.

In the aftermath of the coup d'état that overthrew the TWP, Taylor exploited his marriage to Tupee Taylor, niece of Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was then the army chief of staff, to secure an appointment as the director general of the General Services Agency (GSA), the government procurement agency. It is widely believed that the contacts established during the performance of his duties helped him during his recruitment drive and search for finances and weapons. Taylor was replaced as head of the GSA in November 1983 and eventually demoted to the position of deputy minister of commerce. Closely related to Taylor's demise was the escape of his mentor to the United States and a widespread assumption that he had used a transaction with a company to embezzle almost a million U.S. dollars. In the aftermath of the outcry that met this discovery, Taylor escaped to the United States only to be arrested and imprisoned awaiting extradition to Liberia after a request from the government of Samuel K. Doe.

The exact time and detail of Taylor's "escape from prison" in the United States and arrival in West Africa remain controversial. What is known for certain is that when Taylor arrived in West Africa, some time between November 1985 and April 1986, he went on an extensive tour of the subregion seeking support to overthrow the Doe government. Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Libya are known to have extended diverse kinds of patronage ranging from finance, training grounds, and the supply of traveling documents and armaments to Taylor's embryonic group. Sierra Leone is one of the few countries that denied Taylor active support because of an earlier bungled attempt to overthrow Doe by Liberian exiles in November 1985.

Further controversy surrounds the issue of why and how Taylor became the leader of exiled Liberian opposition groups. One school of thought argues that with his knowledge of procurement procedures and his extensive contacts he was seen by the exiled Liberian opposition groups as a good choice. Another argues that with the disarray of the exiled opposition groups, it was easy for Taylor to manipulate himself into a position of influence and power. With the leadership question resolved and political support secured, Taylor eventually led his men, who now constituted the

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), into Libya, where they were trained in guerrilla tactics and the use of weapons at the Wheeler Base in Tajura and also at the Mataba base outside Tripoli. After months of preparation, the NPFL insurgents, numbering about 150, invaded Nimba County, Liberia, through Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire on an odyssey that lasted eight years.

Taylor's guerrilla strategy, from the initiation of rebel activities on December 24, 1989 until August 2, 1997, when he was inaugurated as president of Liberia, underwent several changes. First, the NPFL managed, through an effective strategy of exploiting the natural resources of the territories under their control, to gain enough international credibility to dispose of these resources. Second, he managed to manipulate the media into presenting his side of the story. Third, Taylor's aims for starting this war were initially projected in a regional and to some extent international context as resisting Nigerian hegemony. Finally, through his extraordinary political acumen, he established the quasi-state of Greater Liberia under a National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) headquartered at Gbarnga. From this secure base, he launched different waves of attack against the West African monitoring group, ECOMOG. The most famous of these was what in popular parlance came to be known as Operation Octopus in October 1992, in which the NPFL launched a concerted attack to wrest Monrovia from its international protectors. Failure to militarily succeed and an increasing rapprochement with Nigeria facilitated through Ghanaian diplomacy convinced Taylor to join the political search for peace. As a result, the NPFL was converted into the National Patriotic Party (NPP), which convincingly won the national elections of July 19, 1997.

Upon his inauguration as president of Liberia, Taylor promised that no recriminations would be carried out against his opponents. His government made national reconciliation the key to rebuilding the nation. Two years after his inaugural reassurances, the NPP government proved unable to fulfill its campaign promises; it failed to introduce a national political program of inclusion, while several former opponents were driven into exile. While there were verbal promises of international support for the economic reconstruction scheme, concrete measures were not taken. Finally, the vexed question of reintegration of former combatants and the creation of a new armed force for Liberia was discontinued. In the aftermath of these problems, there were increasing insurgency attacks in Liberia, especially in Lofa County and from Guinea.

In 1999, African nations including Ghana, Nigeria, and others accused Taylor of lending assistance to rebels in Sierra Leone. In return, Taylor charged Guinea with supporting Liberian rebels in the north. In 2000, government forces battled rebels, as well as

Guinean forces in skirmishes on the border. Thousands of people were displaced.

International pressure on Taylor to step down increased as the conflict came to a head in Monrovia and thousands suffered from starvation and displacement. In August 2003 Charles Taylor stepped down and went into exile in Nigeria. Moses Blah, the former vice president, has acted as Liberia's interim leader.

EMMANUEL KWESI ANING

Biography

Born c.1948. Studied in the United States at Chamberlain Junior College and Bentley College, Boston, Massachusetts. Imprisoned in the United States, returned to Africa in 1985 or 1986. Inaugurated as president, August 2, 1997. Stepped down from office and entered exile in Nigeria, August 2003.

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Teke: See Kongo, Teke (Tio) and Loango: History to 1482.

Tewodros II: See Ethiopia: Tewodros II, Era of.

Thuku, Harry (c.1895–1970)

Anticolonial Activist

Harry Thuku was probably born in 1895 in the Githunguri administrative division of the Kiambu District in central Kenya. His father died in 1897, leaving him in the care of his mother and elder brother. He spent his early childhood taking care of his brother's sheep and goats. However, his fortunes changed dramatically when his subclan, Mbari mya Gatirimu, granted a hundred acres of land to the Gospel Missionary Society for the establishment of a mission center at Kambui. In 1907, young Thuku was employed by the missionaries as a herd and house boy. His time at Kambui Mission and interaction with the missionaries enabled him to

learn how to read and write. He next went to Nairobi, the headquarters of the colonial administration, in 1911 to seek his fortune. However, he was caught forging a check, and was sentenced to a two-year prison term.

His fortune changed for the better thereafter. The leading colonial newspaper, *Leader of British East Africa*, employed him as compositor and machine operator. This was a unique opportunity for keeping up to date with current affairs. In particular, he learned about the political battles then taking place between the Indian community and European settlers over the control and future of Kenya.

In 1918, he was employed at the treasury as a telephone operator. This was a good job that enabled him to widen his circle of friends and rent living quarters in Pangani among wealthy Africans drawn from different East African tribes.

During this period, several issues were causing tension and controversy. The Kikuyu community was chafing over their alienated land. The Carrier Corps, which took part in World War I, had experienced appalling casualties. Influenza was taking its toll, and settlers were threatening to reduce African wages by a third. In August 1920, Kikuyu chiefs from Kiambu District formed an organization called the Kikuyu Association (KA). Its purpose was to articulate their grievances, especially concerning land issues. It also joined in the chorus of protestation against the threatened wage cut.

These developments were not lost on Thuku. Moreover, he interacted with leaders of the East African Indian National Congress and Young Baganda Association. Barely a month later, he renamed it the East African Association (EAA) in order to embrace the multiethnic character of the African population then residing in Nairobi. In short, he was cognizant of the fact that the battle against the colonial system needed a joint effort of the oppressed, irrespective of their origin. He was thus prepared to cooperate with like-minded comrades. For example, he joined the KA leaders when they met with the colonial administration on June 24, 1921, at Dagoretti. Indeed, he played a prominent part in the discussions, having directly forwarded to the Colonial Office the memorandum that KA presented to the Kenyan colonial authorities for transmission on to London. In the cable he used the treasury's address and singled out missionaries and the Indians as special friends of the African, thereby infuriating the settlers. Finally, he kept in touch with prominent African Americans, such as Marcus Garvey, whose influence was suspect in colonial circles.

In his tour of Kikuyuland, Nyanza, and Ukambani he denounced the colonial government for its neglect of African welfare. In particular, he encouraged women not to participate in the hated soil conservation

projects then in vogue. Women were so grateful for this unexpected support that they named Thuku *Munene wa Nyacing'a* (leader or chief of the women).

People flocked to Thuku's meetings in large numbers, which alarmed the government, chiefs, missionaries, and settlers. The government mobilized chiefs against him but he outsmarted the officials by employing divide-and-conquer tactics. He, too, mobilized the Nyeri and Murang'a chiefs against those from Kiambu, who were his main protagonists. Eventually, chiefs and missionaries swore affidavits in order to create the legal grounds for arresting and deporting him. He was arrested on March 14, 1922.

Thuku's supporters viewed the new turn of events with dismay. Consequently, they went on strike as a mark of solidarity with their arrested leader. Moreover, they went to the central police station to demand his release. On March 16, they surged forward toward the station. The police panicked and opened fire. It is also alleged that European customers on the veranda of the hotel joined in the skirmish. The official report was that 21 people died, a figure that is disputed by eyewitnesses.

The aftermath of the shooting was that Thuku was immediately exiled to Kismayu, where he remained from 1922 to 1925. Thereafter, he was transferred to Lamu, Witu, and finally Marsabit. In Marsabit he struck a rapport with a Major Sharpe, the local district commissioner, and with his assistance was able to while away the time in minor farming activities. This became a lucrative pastime, and Thuku was able to accumulate some funds before he was finally released in December 1930.

The government watched him carefully when it realized that he was in touch with members of the Kikuyu Central Association, the successor to his EAA. This did not deter him from becoming its president in 1932. Wrangling within the party, and disagreement over its policies, led him to form Kikuyu Provincial Association (KPA) in 1935. Significantly, he distanced himself from the independent schools and churches movement that was sweeping through central Kenya in the aftermath of the female circumcision crisis of 1929 to 1931. Above all, the constitution of the organization pledged its loyalty to the British crown and vigorously supported colonial policies, such as soil conservation, which were anathema to many rural people. Rightly or wrongly, the political fire in his belly seemed to have been quenched by his detention in the far off and god-forsaken places. His later activities seemed to confirm this view.

In 1944, the Kenya African Study Union was formed to support Eliud Mathu, the first African member of the Legislative Council. Thuku joined it for only three months. He even refused to have anything to do with its successor, the Kenya African Union. He reconciled with his nemesis, Chief Waruhiu, the pillar of colonial administration in Kiambu District. The KPA was reprieved

from proscription like the other African political parties that were banned during World War II. He seemed to be only interested in personal and *Mbari ya Gathirimu* affairs. And finally, he denounced Mau Mau, which was spearheading the freedom struggle from 1952.

The upshot of this was that he was shunned by his former colleagues, and thus played no role in subsequent political developments. It is very telling that on independence day he celebrated it privately by planting coffee trees to signify his economic liberation. And in good measure, the independent Kenya government could only honor him by bestowing his name on the street that runs along the Norfolk Hotel, the scene of the confrontation between his supporters and the police in 1922.

And yet, Thuku towers over the history of the struggle for freedom. He had the courage to challenge the indomitable colonial system when very few would have dared to do so. He sacrificed a lucrative career in the civil service in order to articulate the grievances of his people. He thus became a symbol, an example, and pioneer of the nationalist movement in Kenya.

GODFREY MURIUKI

See also: **Kenya.**

Biography

Born c.1895 in the Githunguri administrative division of the Kiambu District in central Kenya. Moved to Nairobi, 1911. Met with the colonial administration on June 24, 1921, playing a prominent role in the discussions. Arrested on March 14, 1922. Riots resulting in deaths ensued. Exiled to Kismayu, 1922 to 1925. Released from prison, 1930. Named president of the Kikuyu Central Association, 1932. From 1944, increasingly alienated himself from the African political establishment. Died in 1970.

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Timbuktu

Timbuktu is a city located approximately 20 kilometers north of the River Niger, to which it is connected by a (now dry) channel. It is situated in the north of the modern Republic of Mali.

The origins of Timbuktu are obscure. According to local tradition and an indigenous chronicle written in



Timbuktu, a view of the city in the 1930s. © SVT-Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

the seventeenth century, the *Tarikh es Soudan*, the city was founded in approximately 1100 as a seasonal nomad camp. This was centered around a well maintained by a group of slaves, under the charge of an old woman, Buktu. *Tin Buktu* or *Timbuktu* translates as “the place of Buktu.” This seasonal camp then evolved into a more permanent entity owing to the town’s placement at the junction of riverine and land transportation routes. Archaeology has, as yet, to confirm this folkloric account of Timbuktu’s origin.

Following its original foundation, Timbuktu remained one among a number of trade centers scattered through the region. The city came under the control of the empire of Mali, a period (1325–1433) during which it appears to have grown significantly. This was a time of increasing prosperity and political stability, and this is reflected in a phase of monumental building that occurred in the fourteenth century. Both the Sankore (c. fourteenth century) and Djinguereber mosques (1327) were built, structures that stand to this day, along with a fabled royal palace, the Madougou, now lost.

After the collapse of the empire of Mali, Timbuktu fell under nomadic Berber control for a short period between 1433 and 1468, and the fortunes of the city declined. This process was exacerbated by the capture of Timbuktu by the Songhai ruler Sonni Ali in 1468 and its incorporation into the Songhay empire. According to historical sources, the capture of the city was accompanied by considerable bloodshed; Sonni Ali was severely castigated in the *Tarikh es Soudan*. Sonni Ali died in 1492, and following a brief and unsuccessful reign by his son, Timbuktu came under the control of a new Songhay dynasty, that of the Askias. Timbuktu entered what has been termed its “golden age,” when scholarship and trade flourished.

The Askias were devout Muslims, and Timbuktu developed into the most important center for Islamic

learning in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Qur’an, Hadith, Shari’a, and the Islamic sciences were studied and copied at the university, which was centered around the Sankore mosque. Trade likewise boomed, with gold and ivory exchanged for items obtained via trans-Saharan trade, such as beads, glazed ceramics, paper, books, and textiles.

The tales of the wealth of Timbuktu, and West Africa in general, which had been trickling northward across the desert for many years along with the traders, excited the interests of the Moroccans to the north. Thus, in 1590, an army was assembled under the leadership of Judar Pasha, and following an arduous trek across the desert, these forces defeated the Songhay armies at the battle of Tondibi in 1591.

Timbuktu soon came under the control of the Moroccans, with severe repercussions. Many leading Muslim scholars were exiled. Nevertheless, maintaining control south of the Sahara was costly for the Moroccans, and in 1618 this policy ended. The Moroccan garrison in Timbuktu was left to its own devices, with a living legacy of their presence being the Arma, a Songhai group who claim Moroccan descent.

From this point until the early nineteenth century, Timbuktu entered a quiet period, playing an insignificant role in historical terms. While it seems likely (although uncertain) that its intellectual and economic developments stagnated, its image in Europe was far from diminished. There, the vision of a proverbially “gold-plated” city was perpetuated, something that had persisted since the writings of Leo Africanus, a Spanish Moor, who probably visited the city in the early sixteenth century, were translated for a European audience (including an English translation in 1600). Various missions were dispatched in an attempt to reach Timbuktu. Individuals, notably Robert Adams, Shabeeny the Moor, and Mungo Park, also attempted to enter the city. It was not until August 1826, however, that a European, Major Alexander Gordon Laing, entered the city and left a verifiable account, which consists of a single, terse letter; his other papers were destroyed or lost after he was murdered on his homeward journey.

More fortunate was a Frenchman, René Caillié, who arrived in Timbuktu in 1828 disguised as an Arab (in contrast to Laing, who drew attention to himself in his European dress). Interestingly, Caillié was disappointed with the city; the reality did not match the preconceived image of Timbuktu that had been nurtured in Europe since the writings of Africanus were published. He found it had a “dull appearance” and its inhabitants were “indolent.” Many other European adventurers and travelers have since visited Timbuktu, with the German Heinrich Barth providing one of the most comprehensive accounts of the city, providing information on mosques, trade, markets, manufactures,

and the people following his eight-month sojourn in and around Timbuktu in the mid-nineteenth century.

With the exposure of Timbuktu through the writings of Caillié, Barth, and others and the expansion of French colonial rule in the region, the conquest of Timbuktu by this European power was only a matter of time. French troops first reached the city in December 1893, but part of the force and the relief column were killed by the Tuaregs; occupation was finally achieved the following year. Sixty years of colonial rule of the region then called French Sudan was initiated, with independence for Timbuktu and the new nation of Mali achieved in 1960. Since 1960 Timbuktu has continued to function both as a center of regional administration and of trade, serving the needs of both the nomadic and sedentary populations in the area. It is also increasingly a destination of “adventurous” tourists, and this aspect of the infrastructure is being developed as a potential source of income.

TIMOTHY INSOLL

See also: **Africanus, Leo; Europe: Explorers, Adventurers, Traders.**

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Tio: See Kongo, Teke (Tio), and Loango: History to 1483.

Tippu Tip (Muhammed bin Hamed) *East African Entrepreneur*

Muhammed bin Hamed, commonly known as Tippu Tip, was the most prominent member of a group of East African entrepreneurs who extended Swahili Arab commercial and political influence into the eastern Congo. Tippu Tip was born near Zanzibar around 1840. His father, Mohammed ben Juma, was a wealthy Swahili merchant whose commercial and political dealings extended well into the interior of modern-day Tanzania. Already by the age of 12, along with his brothers and uncles, Tippu Tip began trading gum copal. As a teenager, he accompanied his father on an ivory trading expedition to Ujiji. Returning to Tabora, Hamed and his father became involved in a conflict

that pitted the Swahili Arabs against the indigenous chief Manua Sera who had increased taxes on merchants passing through his territory.

By the age of 20, Tippu Tip had launched out on his own, traveling to the areas near the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika. It is possible that he reached the Mulongo region on the Lualaba River in the Congo before 1860. Borrowing capital, initially from relatives and then from Indian financiers in Zanzibar, he steadily increased his trade stock and weapon supply. At first, Tippu Tip followed the usual Swahili pattern of traveling to the interior, advancing trade goods to traders and chiefs, and later returning to collect the ivory acquired by his local suppliers. Although generally committed to peaceful trade, Tippu Tip was willing to resort to violence to protect his interests. For example, in 1867 he attacked and captured the Tabwa village of chief Nsama, who then granted Tippu Tip the right to trade and travel freely in the area. It was here, because of such violent encounters, that he gained the nickname Tippu Tip, which recalled the “tip-tip” sound of his guns.

By the end of the 1860s, Tippu Tip had made a number of trips to the Congo. His enterprise had become so large that he was able to attract the backing of Tarya Topan, head of one of the richest Indian financial houses in Zanzibar. While the interior trade in ivory and slaves was extremely lucrative, it was also a high-risk venture, both financially and physically. Disease, famine, war, and commercial ruin were common hazards. In about 1870, Tippu Tip set out from Zanzibar on an expedition that lasted 12 years. When he eventually returned to the coast, he had become the most powerful man in the Maniema area between Lake Tanganyika and the Lomani River.

In 1872, on his way to Maniema, Tippu Tip fought and defeated the forces of Kazembe’s Lunda warriors. Sometime early in 1873, he arrived at the village of the Songye chief Kasongo Lushi, a man Tippu Tip claimed transferred power in his favor. In 1874, he managed to assert his authority over the large group of Swahili traders who had established an important slave and ivory market at Nyangwe on the Lualaba River. Early in 1875, Tippu Tip moved north to Kasongo, which became his permanent center of operations in central Africa. Increasingly, instead of traveling to engage in direct trade, he supervised agents stationed along the Lomami and Lualaba Rivers. These men collected ivory that they sent either to Kasongo or directly to Tarya Topan in Zanzibar. Some of the ivory was obtained through trade, some through organizing bands of professional elephant hunters, and some (at least in more remote areas) by raiding and holding villagers hostage until they paid a ransom in ivory. Tippu Tip’s agents also procured slaves who were used as porters to transportation ivory to the coast.

Tippu Tip's headquarters at Kasongo soon took on the characteristics of a state. When the explorer Henry Morton Stanley arrived in the region in October 1876, Tippu Tip provided the large escort that enabled Stanley to proceed downstream along the Lualaba. Tippu Tip used this voyage as an opportunity to extend his own domain farther north into the forest region. In the territories near Kasongo, he installed or removed chiefs, imposed taxes, maintained roads, encouraged the cultivation of extensive fields, regulated elephant hunting, and supported the expansion of Islam. By the early 1880s, his control reached downstream as far as Stanley Falls. During the 1880s, Tippu Tip conducted political and diplomatic relations with other powers. Recognized as the most prominent figure in Maniema, he gained the allegiance not only of other Swahili traders but also of powerful African leaders such as the Songye chief Lumpungu. In 1882, while back in Zanzibar, he agreed to administer his territories as a representative of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Returning to Maniema, he and his subordinates attempted to extend their control in the region. Thus, in August 1886, Swahili forces attacked and defeated the International Association of the Congo post at Stanley Falls. Tippu Tip, himself en route back to the coast at the time, was not involved in the skirmish.

In spite of some initial Afro-Arab victories, it soon became clear that European forces would control central Africa. As a result, Tippu Tip elected to ally with the Congo Free State. In Zanzibar, where he worked through Stanley, he entered into a contract to serve the Belgian king, Leopold II, as Congo Free State governor at Stanley Falls. According to the 1887 treaty, Tippu Tip agreed to stop acquiring slaves below the falls. In addition, he promised to assist Stanley with the mission to relieve Emin Pasha in Sudan. Therefore, in February 1887, Stanley and Tippu Tip sailed from Zanzibar to the Congo via the Cape of Good Hope. From Matadi, traveling by land and river, they reached the base on the Aruwimi River where Stanley hoped to launch his rescue effort. Because it took Tippu Tip until March of 1888 to assemble a party of porters, Stanley blamed the Swahili leader for the eventual failure of the Emin Pasha venture.

In 1890, Tippu Tip left Maniema for the last time. Although a wealthy man, he recognized the fact that neither he nor any other Swahili Arab would be able to withstand the advances of the Europeans. For his part, because he was under increasing international pressure to avoid alliances with slave traders, Leopold II turned against the "Arabs" and defeated them in a conflict lasting from 1892 to 1895. Nyamgwé fell in March 1893 and Kasongo capitulated in April. Sefu, Tippu Tip's own son and deputy was killed in November of 1893. Tippu Tip, who never again returned to the

Congo, lived out his final years in Zanzibar, where he wrote his memoirs. He died of malaria in 1905.

JOHN C. YODER

See also: **Stanley, Leopold, "Scramble."**

Biography

Tippu Tip was born near Zanzibar around 1840. He was trading by the age of 12, and struck out on his own at age 20. He died of malaria in 1905.


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Togo: German Colonial Rule

During its 30-year occupation by the Germans, Togo was upheld by many European imperialists as a "model colony" primarily because the German regime produced balanced budgets after a limited period of "pacification" devoid of any major wars. In the eyes of these imperialists, impressive railway and road systems were also constructed. These achievements were realized, however, through a combination of forced labor and excessive and arbitrary taxation imposed on the native population of Togo.

Since British imperial efforts were focused on the largely Akan areas to the west, while the French were preoccupied with Dahomey to the east, part of the area known in European sources as the Slave Coast escaped the immediate attention of these would-be European colonizers. This situation provided an opportunity for Germany, the latecomer into the "scramble," to seize a



Togo.

31-mile (50-kilometer) stretch of the West African coast between the Volta River estuary (controlled by the British) and the mouth of the Mono River (occupied by the French).

In February 1884, a group of soldiers from the German warship *Sophie*, led by the explorer Gustav Nachtigal, kidnapped chiefs in Aného and forced them into negotiations. Farther west, a protectorate was proclaimed over the Lomé area in a treaty signed in July by Hans Gruner, a German imperial commissioner, and Chief Mlapa III of the town of Togo, after which the new colony was named by the Germans.

It was not until the early 1890s that the German regime began expanding its occupation from the coast. Through the Heligoland Treaty of July 1890 between Germany and Great Britain, part of the Peki Ewe state, including the important towns of Ho, Kpandu, and Hohoe, were transferred to German rule from the neighboring Gold Coast (present-day Ghana). Through so-called scientific expeditions farther north, German agents negotiated treaties of protection, many of which were later disputed and dismissed as fraudulent by African leaders, extending German territorial claims about 156 miles (250 kilometers) inland.

The Germans never established a formal military but instead relied on a police force, never exceeding 500 members, to forcibly occupy new areas. The native population of Togo resisted these campaigns, particularly in the north, where the Dagomba and the Konkomba, sometimes in alliance, fought several wars with the Germans until the turn of the century.

The borders of Togo were formally established by the European imperial powers by the end of the nineteenth century. In the east, Togo shared the Mono River

with the French colony of Dahomey (present-day Benin) up to the seventh parallel, where the river fell entirely into German-occupied territory. Togo bordered the French Sudan (in the area of what was to become Burkina Faso) in the north, while the Gold Coast was situated to the west. Although these boundaries were ratified in the Treaty of Paris in 1897, the Germans effectively occupied only about 10 per cent of the colony at that time.

The German regime attempted to link, both administratively and economically, northern Togo with the coast, especially by redirecting trade. In the southern part of the colony it pursued aggressive policies to expand the cultivation of cash crops. The Germans were especially interested in promoting increased cotton cultivation in order to reduce Germany's dependence on imports from the United States. In January 1901, they enlisted the services of African American scientists from the Tuskegee Institute, who operated several experimental farms, distributed seeds of new cotton species, and instructed farmers in Togo. The Germans also encouraged (and sometimes sought to force) the cultivation of cocoa, coffee, coconut, rubber, and sisal, but palm oil and palm kernels consistently remained the top export crops.

The Germans strove to control trade and labor in the colony. African merchants were prohibited from exporting produce and manufactured goods and were restricted to the retail trade. In 1907, the German regime decreed that compulsory labor should be salaried and used exclusively for public works projects, yet flogging was still employed as the primary means of coercing the colonized population of Togo into forced labor.

Crucial in the process of imposing the new colonial order were the government-recognized chiefs, who received a minimal share of the taxes collected and were allowed to maintain a small police force. While they had jurisdiction over civil cases, criminal matters were handled by the German regime.

The German district commissioners exercised nearly complete administrative, judicial, and military powers. The colony's penal code of April 1896 granted them absolute authority over the population they ruled and allowed district officers to punish the Africans by flogging, delivering sentences of hard labor, or imposing fines.

Both direct and indirect taxes were exacted, ranging from import duties, which remained the regime's main source of income throughout the occupation, to income, urban, emigration, and dog taxes, as well as a levy for flying the German flag.

The Germans invested minimally in social services for Africans. Health care was outrageously expensive, if at all accessible, since only a few hospitals provided services to Africans. The regime mostly relied on missionary groups, notably the North German

Missionary Society, to provide schooling at their stations. Toward the end of the occupation, the regime established several governmental schools, but educational opportunities remained extremely limited. Children were often sent by their families to the Gold Coast for postprimary education. Many other Africans emigrated to the British colony to escape the harshness of the German occupation.

An extensive infrastructure was built, mostly through the use of forced labor, in order to facilitate the delivery of agricultural goods to the coast. Between 1900 and 1914, three railways and 766 miles of roads were constructed. Lomé, the capital of the colony since 1897, became a commercial center boasting an efficient port.

This development, however, was mostly limited to the southern third of the colony and was vitiated by the violence and burdens which characterized German rule. When World War I began, the native population of Togo welcomed the combined forces of the British and the French, who had invaded from their neighboring colonies, as liberators. The Germans quickly surrendered, after only a few skirmishes, on August 26, 1914.

DENNIS LAUMANN

See also: **World War I: Survey.**

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Togo: Colonial Period: Dual Mandate, 1919–1957

World War I was fatal for the German colony of Togo. From August 1914, French and British occupation troops took possession of the territory and divided it, giving one-third to Great Britain and two-thirds to France. At the end of the war, the administration of

occupied territories was entrusted to the League of Nations, more particularly to its Commission of Mandates. This situation lasted until the eve of the territory's independence in 1960, since, after World War II, the mandate was handed over to the United Nations.

The partition line in Togo was definitely fixed by the Simon-Milner agreement in London in 1919. This line would undergo only a few modifications later on—namely, in 1920 and then in 1929. The party put in charge by the French agreed upon the actual territory. The mandate for Togoland, the British trust territory, was integrated de facto into the Gold Coast, today's Ghana, after a local referendum organized in 1956. Lomé, the capital (the main connection point for all principal communications lines of the territory), and Kpalimé (the principal city of the rich cocoa zone), first located within the British occupation zone, were incorporated into French Togoland only on October 1, 1920.

In fact, the League of Nations only intervened after the coup in 1922. The distribution negotiations in Togo were rather fully led by the victorious Allied forces. The obligation of the representatives to account for their administration vis-à-vis the Commission of Mandates (after World War II the Commission of Protection), as well as the consciousness of autochthonous people of the particularity of their status, profoundly marked the evolution of the territory, which in several respects distinguished itself from other ex-colonies.

To begin with, the text of 12 articles, establishing France's mandate over the territory, prefigured the particular character of the mission: to increase, by every possible means, the material and moral well-being of the colony's inhabitants. This mission stood in contrast to the situation of simple colonies for which no charter defined objectives, and where everything happened without control or professional ethics; each metropolis had its own practices and exigencies. In addition, the text expressly foresaw the taking into account of indigenous laws and customs, respect of the law, and the protection of autochthonous interests. The instituted control, in the form of an annual report to be sent to the League of Nations, did not foresee any restricting sanctions. But the very context of the postwar period sharpened the sense of responsibility among the successive administrators of the territory to take into account the statutory limitations of the mandate. Thus an opportunity was given to the autochthonous people, who on many occasions have inundated with petitions the Commission of Mandates/Protection in the name of the particularity of their territory, and have even sent representatives to legislative meetings to express their grievances in person.

In the economic realm, the equality of treatment of all nationals of the member states of the League of

Nations (and later of the United Nations) favored commercial competition and prevented France from establishing a de facto monopoly. The United African Company (UAC), a subsidiary of Unilever (a consumer goods company), was the biggest commercial company in Togo during this period.

Togo nationals did not hide their sympathy for British culture. Traditionally, residents had gone to the British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana) to study, work, or shop. A significant number of laborers from French Togo landed regularly in either the urban centers of the Gold Coast or the cocoa plantations.

The migratory stream was even more important during the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II. Between 1920 and 1945, the territory has benefited only very little from investments. The facilities inherited from the German period remained useful for a long time; some were refurbished or replaced, including the wharf, replaced by a new facility, which was set up in 1928, and the railway line, extended by 70 miles (112 kilometers) between 1930 and 1932. The majority of the work was financed by a budget surplus coming from customs duties. The territory had thus specialized itself as a transit country.

After World War II, the Fonds d'Investment pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES) invested heavily in the nation, and numerous economic and social infrastructures were realized. But, as everywhere, the raising of the standard of life of the population is relative, and the colonial administration—and even more so, urban commercial and industrial interests—benefited most. Nonetheless, an indigenous elite was doubtlessly emerging, ready to take the destiny of the territory into their own hands.

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Togo: Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, Life and Era of President of Togo

The fate of Togo from long “transition periods” to rather short “stable” phases can be reflected along the lines of the life of its president, Gnassingbé Eyadéma.

Eyadéma has played and continues to play a key role in the history of Togo. He has been president since seizing power in a 1967 coup d'état, and is in the meantime the longest serving ruling leader in Africa—and second worldwide only to Fidel Castro.

Born in the northern part of Togo, he joined the then colonial army. As a veteran of various colonial wars, he left the colonial troops and returned to Togo in 1962. At that time, Togo was under the leadership of Sylvanus Olympio and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT), in alliance with the Justice, Union, Vigilance, Éducation, Nationalisme, Ténacité, Optimisme Party.

Apparent irregularities in the payment of military pensions from the French army, as well as the political discrimination and unemployment of the former soldiers, provoked unrest among them. The first African postcolonial coup d'état in 1963, in which Eyadéma took part, was built both on an increasing discontent about the growing authoritarianism of the government of Sylvanus Olympio and on international—especially French—fears about its economic and diplomatic orientations.

After some days under a state of emergency, the junta handed power back to a civilian government under the leadership of two prominent personalities from a moderate and pro-French party, the Union Démocratique du Peuple Togolais. Antoine Méatchi and Nicolas Grunitzky were representing the two founding parties of this new union, the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord, a colonial creation for the northern part of Togo and its “traditional” authorities, and the Parti Togolais du Progrès, a French creation for the southern pro-French elites of the country. However, personal differences between the two ambitious leaders, combined with growing interference from the army and the French government as well as an economic crisis, led to a political crisis of the institutionalized system of “bicephalism.” Once again, the army seemed to be the ultimate solution for the resolution of the political emergency.

A second coup then was attempted in November 1966 by former CUT leaders, but the army intervened in the end in favor of the Grunitzky government. After a few months of political crisis the army took power itself, naming Gnassingbé Eyadéma as president on January 13, 1967.

The subsequent major change in the orientation of the regime were the so-called authenticité politics (borrowed from Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire), which looked to strengthen and deepen the power of the president, the ruling elite, and the state, on the basis of an essentialist and protofascist political mythology. The subsequent nationalization of the lucrative phosphate mining industry posed an economic threat to international and

colonial capital. The following international criticism against the regime lent its genuine political tone and motive to an accident officially known as the “assault of Sarakawa”: Eyadéma’s plane crashed in the north of Togo, near his home village of Pya. He managed to escape safely and was magnified as the “miraculé de Sarakawa,” “great leader,” and *timonier* (enlightened guide) of the Togolese people, who was by divine will saved—according to the regime’s mythology—from an attempt to end his life by an alliance of international capitalist and imperial powers and allies to the late Olympio.

In the wake of this event, the core elements of a totalitarian—but still relatively liberal in economic terms—corporatist state were established. The broad politicization of the country and the population was spearheaded by the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), the single political party at that time, created in 1971. The Eyadéma regime initiated a broad political mass mobilization and a mythologization of the founding events of the regime, which was supported by an extensive use of violence and widespread delation to strengthen its hold on the country: January 13 was celebrated as a national holiday, equal in importance to Togo’s Independence Day, as well as the anniversary of the “assault of Sarakawa.” Every Togolese person had to take up an “authentic” non-Christian first name. The “animation” (dancing and praise-singing sessions in honor of Eyadéma) was made part of the scholar curricula. The *école nouvelle* (new school) was established as a would-be contrast to the colonial school programs, aiming at large mass education and eradicating illiteracy.

This resulted in underground and informal networks becoming the only means of influencing politics from the bottom up, or of building top-down influence channels parallel to the official ones: Togo developed all the political characteristics of the African “postcolony” (Mbembe 2001), and became a paradigmatic “rhizome-state” (Bayart 1993). The regime was sustained by underground (and apparently apolitical) networks of support, an authoritarian leader ideology and by arbitrary imprisonments and extrajudicial executions. In this situation, a significant portion of the elite found a middle ground between cooperation with and overt opposition to the regime: it found refuge in public administration and the parastatal sector that for both ideological and practical reasons became the most desirable source of employment and status for highly skilled members of the elite, at least to those returning from studying or working overseas.

When it came under its first major economic threat and thus received major incentives to transformation, Togo, paradoxically, formalized and institutionalized the permanency of the “transition.” The Eyadéma

regime decided to stabilize the political life of the country by proclaiming, on January 13, 1980, a formal rule of law based on single-party rule (as laid out in the constitution) and a renewed economic liberalism. Soon after this, the third republic found itself facing a crisis. The government, in its attempts to establish a “controlled” pluralism within the single party, instituted a national and independent Human Rights Commission, froze salaries, and cut most public sector recruitment, thus denying the educated elite its largest and most desired source of employment.

Under growing popular pressure and discontent, 1991 saw the establishment of a national conference, which took over governmental duties and proclaimed itself ruler, actually stripping Eyadéma of his powers. The national conference nominated J. K. Koffigoh, one of the founders of the Human Rights League, as prime minister of the transitional government. The ensuing state of crisis—characterized by a “strategy of tension” marked by riots, marches, executions, and army assaults on the transition government and opposition parties—deepened the economic crisis, with a 20 per cent decrease in gross domestic product in the two years after the general strike in 1992. This almost destroyed the project of one of the most promising free trade zones in Africa (planned and promoted by U.S. agencies). But unpaid salaries in the public sector, the flight of foreign investment, and an interruption of pension payments are only some of the most important problems the Togolese population faced during this time (and still faces today).

In September 1992 a new liberal constitution was voted into law in a referendum. Eyadéma was nevertheless reinstated as head of the government, which was composed primarily of RPT-affiliated ministers. During this period, marked by conservative restoration, popular unrest, and a national general strike that lasted for nine months, Togo was in a state of emergency. More than 300,000 persons fled to Ghana and Benin. The existing north-south divide was exacerbated by being portrayed as a discourse of ethnic rivalry, almost leading in some parts of the country to ethnic cleansing, especially in some southern agricultural areas where the (northern) Kabyè traditionally worked as *métayers* (agricultural workers).

The legislative elections in 1994 were won by the (moderate) opposition, though they were boycotted by some opposition parties. However, Eyadéma succeeded in dividing the opposition by nominating internationally renowned politician and former Organization of African Unity (OAU) secretary general E. E. Kodjo as prime minister, even though he was leader of a minority party. It was believed that some stability could be regained under his direction. Kodjo

remained in power until partial legislative elections in 1996 brought back a full-fledged RPT government. After the highly contested and unfair presidential elections in 1998, Togo became even more of a pariah of the international community, although Eyadéma succeeded in being elected OAU president in 2000. Western nations and the European Union (with the notable exception of France) froze, or reduced to a minimum, assistance to Togo. This had the unintended consequence of enhancing the general political apathy of a population now essentially dedicated to survival, and furthered the spread of petty corruption and nepotism in a public sector whose employees go unpaid for six months or more.

Near the end of 2002, the RPT-dominated parliament voted in favor of removing a constitutional clause that would have restricted Eyadéma from running for a third (constitutional) term in 2003. In June 2003, Eyadéma was declared the winner of the most recent presidential elections. Nevertheless, the signs of decay of the regime become more and more obvious, since former RPT prime minister A. Kodjo and former RPT president of parliament D. Péré declared in 2002 their refusal to further support the regime as it is. Even if they were excluded from the party, Péré's electoral results—according to civil society sources—threatened the RPT's electoral ethno-regional basis in the north and within the army. Irrespective of the formal legalism of the regime, international cooperation is not on the agenda of neither (but France) cooperation partners: Togo's narrow political and economic future seems to be rather dark, despite the regime's efforts to build up an internationally respectable face.

PATRICK F. A. WURSTER

See also: **Olympio, Sylvanus.**

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Togoland: See British Togoland.

Toivo ya Toiva, Andimba (1924–)

Namibian Liberationist

Born in Umungundu in Ovamboland in northern Namibia in 1924, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo received a few years of primary education at St. Mary's Anglican Mission School at Odibo in Ovamboland. Thanks to his remarkable mother (who died in June 2000 at the age of 103), he was able to enroll in the Ongwediva teachers' training school. In World War II, he volunteered for the Native Military Corps of the South African Defence Force, and guarded military stores in regional southwest Africa and in South Africa. After returning to school in Ovamboland and completing standard 8 (grade 10), he taught briefly before going to work in the mines on the Witwatersrand. He moved to the more liberal Cape Town in the early 1950s, where he found work in a furniture store, and was befriended by Jack and Ray Simons, members of the Communist Party, who encouraged him to organize the Ovambo contract workers in the city. At a meeting in a barber-shop on Somerset Road, Green Point, in 1957 he was one of the founders of the Ovambo People's Congress (OPC), the forerunner of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). The OPC sought to bring Southwest Africa under United Nations authority and to end the contract labor system in the territory.

When in December 1958 the South African authorities found out that he had mailed a petition, critical of South African rule in southwest Africa (hidden in a copy of *Treasure Island*), to Mburumba Kerina, a Namibian student then in New York, Toivo ya Toivo was told to leave South Africa. Arrested for entering the Tsumeb mine compound without a permit, he was restricted to Ondongwa in Ovamboland. There he continued his political work, much of which was carried out from a shop he opened. He helped the first SWAPO guerrillas who returned to the territory, though he had doubts about the wisdom of taking up arms against the powerful South Africans. After the launch of the armed struggle in mid-1966 he was arrested, and with others was taken to Pretoria. They were tortured, then tried under the Terrorism Act of 1967, made to apply retroactively, charged with attempting to overthrow the existing government and install a SWAPO-led government. Before being sentenced in February 1968, the charismatic Toivo ya Toivo made an extremely eloquent speech from the dock, in which he challenged

the right of a South African court to try the Namibians, and spoke of their struggle for freedom and justice. His speech would long be an inspiration to those working for Namibian independence.

Sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, Toivo ya Toivo was sent to Robben Island, off Cape Town. There he learned much from Nelson Mandela. After serving sixteen years, he was released in March 1984, in the context of apparent advances in the negotiations relating to Namibian independence. He was released against his wishes, for he did not want to be free while other Namibians remained in apartheid jails. He was taken secretly to Windhoek and freed there. There was speculation at the time that the South African government hoped that his release would help split SWAPO and bring a moderate wing of the organization into the political process in Namibia. But as soon as he was free, Toivo ya Toivo stressed his loyalty to SWAPO and its leadership, and was soon appointed as SWAPO's secretary general.

Although he could have remained in Namibia, he chose to live abroad. Representing SWAPO, he spoke at the opening and closing of a major conference in London in September 1984, "Namibia, 1884–1994." Mainly involved in diplomatic work in the late 1980s, he kept a relatively low profile. He returned to live in Namibia in 1989, the year a film entitled *Toivo: Child of Hope* was made about his life. As Namibia moved toward independence, he explained that SWAPO's goal of socialism was a very long-term one, and that the new Namibia would have to proceed very cautiously. He was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly in November 1989, and then became minister of mines and energy in President Nujoma's first cabinet, which took office on March 21, 1990. He ran this key ministry competently, and was a voice of reason in his party and in the National Assembly. No longer believing in nationalizing the mines, he worked to encourage new foreign investment in the mineral sector. An arrangement was reached with the De Beers diamond company for joint ownership of the lucrative production of diamonds. Another controversial issue he had to deal with was the scheme to build a new hydroelectric power scheme at Epupa on the Cunene River, which would mean the relocation of large numbers of Himba people. Toivo ya Toivo managed to retain the respect of most people, and was one of the best-liked members of the government. He remained somewhat aloof from the daily round of politics, and outside the innermost circles of SWAPO. In December 1991, he gave up his post as secretary-general to devote his full attention to his ministry. His new wife, Vicki Erenstein, was in 1999 appointed government attorney. In that year he was moved sideways in a cabinet reshuffle, being made minister of labor at a time when some thought he

might, at 75, look forward to retirement. He is currently Honorable Minister of the Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services.

CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS

See also: **Namibia (Southwest Africa): South African Rule.**

Biography

Born in Umungundu, in Ovamboland in northern Namibia in 1924. Volunteered for the Native Military Corps of the South African Defence Force during World War II. Taught briefly, then worked in the mines on the Witwatersrand. Moved to Cape Town in the early 1950s. Cofounded the Ovambo People's Congress (OPC), the forerunner of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), in 1957. Assisted SWAPO guerillas and was arrested in 1966. Sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, and sent to Robben Island, off Cape Town. Released in 1984. Subsequently appointed SWAPO's secretary general. Involved in diplomatic work throughout the late 1980s. Returned to Namibia, after a period of living abroad, in 1989. Elected a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1989. Named as Minister of Mines and Energy in President Nujoma's first cabinet, which took office on March 21, 1990. Named Minister of Labor in 1999.

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Tombalbaye, F. Ngarta (1919–1975) *President of Chad*

In his youth, F. Ngarta Tombalbaye developed an interest in civic life. He frequented political discussion groups and led a youth movement inspired by the Social Christian traditions of French scouting.

By 1946 Tombalbaye had become the president of the Syndicat Autonome du Tchad, an independent trade union based in Sarh. The next year he was instrumental in launching the Parti Progressiste Tchadien (PPT), the Chadian branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, established to fight for independence in French Africa. The leader of the PPT was

Gabriel Lisette, an expatriate French citizen born and educated in the Caribbean. Tombalbaye was in charge of the party in Sarh and used his influence to gather support throughout the south, especially among his own clan. The French administration responded to these political activities by curtailing his employment as a teacher in public service, obliging him to take other work, including the manual fabrication of bricks.

Tombalbaye's political prospects flourished throughout the 1950s as the African nationalist PPT eroded support for Muslim and European parties, despite the divide-and-conquer tactics of the colonial administration. Elected as a deputy to the Territorial Assembly in 1952, he would be reelected in 1957, 1959, and 1962. Between 1957 and 1959 he was elected to serve as a member of the Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa in Brazzaville. December 1958 saw the formation of the first of four—preponderantly African—provisional governments in which the PPT played the leading role. At the same time, antagonism toward Lisette's foreign background and rivalry within the party saw the leadership transferred to Tombalbaye. Following victory at the polls in March 1959, he formed a permanent government. He became prime minister in June 1959, and assumed the presidency of newly independent Chad in August 1960.

Contrary to Lisette's intentions, the PPT had come to be seen as essentially a Sara party. Concern in the north that the Sara, dominated by the north for centuries, would exploit their control of government in order to exact revenge seemed justified following an extensive reallocation of middle-ranking southern administrators to the north. The urge to consolidate power led to dictatorship and repression. By 1962, Tombalbaye had reconstituted the National Assembly and banned competitive politics. The new assembly officially ratified this *de facto* one-party system in June 1964. Immediately following independence a thorough purge of the civil service and political opponents was initiated. Starting with political rivals in his own party, each stratum of Chadian society was sifted in turn. Lisette was stripped of citizenship, and refused residency in Chad. Despite comprehensive purges in the south, the image of southern domination of the north persisted. The impression was reaffirmed in May 1963. Following the discovery of an alleged plot, three ministers and the president of the assembly, all Muslim, were jailed on charges of conspiracy.

Popular disaffection in peripheral areas increased. In 1963 there were riots in N'Djaména and Am Timman, in the east of the country. A rise in taxes and a new levy on cattle compounded a growing distrust of the bureaucracy, which was seen as corrupt and, especially in the case of southern tax officers acting in the north, high-handed and disdainful of local customs.

In late 1965 a peasant revolt erupted in Malgami in central Chad. In retaliation for the murder of ten government officials several hundred local people were killed. As the unrest spread north a rebellion coalesced behind the Front de Libération Nationale (FROLINAT), founded in Sudan by exiled Chadians in June 1966. The scale of rebellion in the inaccessible Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region in the north was such that in 1968 and, again in 1969, Tombalbaye was forced to seek help from France under military assistance agreements concluded at independence. The price of assistance was a critical appraisal of Chad's administration by the French Mission for Administrative Reform. As a result, the percentage of Muslim troops in the national army was increased, a number of former political detainees incorporated into the central government organ, and a measure of administrative capacity sacrificed to traditional chiefs.

The early 1970s saw Tombalbaye embark on a series of ill-judged policies. He struck a secret deal with Libya, in which he seemed to renounce possession of the Aouzou strip between the two countries, in return for money and a loosening of links between Libya and FROLINAT. Unrealistic policies stymied the economy. Operation Agriculture sought to raise the cotton yield by 600 per cent in one year through a massive mobilization and relocation of farmers and town dwellers. Although the scheme was discontinued following Tombalbaye's defeat, wider cultivation laid the foundations for Chad's modern cotton industry.

In 1973, Chad underwent a "cultural revolution" called "authenticity" and based on Africanization policies developed in Mobutu Sese Sekou's Zaire. African names replaced European titles for people and places. Tombalbaye chose the name Ngarta, meaning "chief." The PPT was dissolved and a new party, the Mouvement National pour la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale (MNRCS), based on his personal rule was put in its place. Sara *yondo* initiation rites, including circumcision, were introduced for male government employees—even elderly noninitiates and those who had converted to Islam.

By the mid-1970s Tombalbaye faced armed opposition in all parts of the country. The repressive mechanisms of the security services and the extension of *yondo* to the wider southern population crystallized opposition among the Sara elite. In 1973, France withdrew much of its garrison in the country leaving a limited armored and air presence to support Chadian forces in the battle against FROLINAT. Nonetheless, by this time the rebellion held 90 per cent of the BET. On April 13, 1975, following a rumor of renewed purges in the army, junior officers from the south effected a coup d'état. Tombalbaye was either killed in crossfire, or possibly summarily executed. A man

whom he had incarcerated as a political prisoner, General Félix Malloum, replaced him. Tombalbaye's reputation was reestablished during the Sovereign National Conference held in N'Djaména in 1993. In April 1994, his body was disinterred from its secret grave and returned to Bessada for reburial.

SIMON MASSEY

See also: **Chad.**

Biography

Born in Bessada, in the southern prefecture of Moyen Chari in 1918. Received primary and secondary education in Sarh and Brazzaville. As a teacher in the late 1940s, developed an interest in public life. In 1946 became president of an independent trade union. A year later, helped to found the Parti Progressiste Tchadien, assuming senior positions in the south. Despite discrimination from the French colonial authorities that followed his entry into the political sphere, Tombalbaye was elected as a deputy in the Territorial Assembly in 1952, and reelected in 1957, 1959 and 1962. After ousting the increasingly isolated secretary-general of the PPT, Gabriel Lisette, Tombalbaye assumed the presidency of the provisional government in March 1959, and in June of the same year was chosen as prime minister of the newly elected Legislative Assembly. On August 11, 1960, he became the first president of independent Chad. After almost fifteen turbulent years in power Tombalbaye was killed during a coup d'état in April 1975.

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Tonga, Ila, and Cattle

It has been suggested (Langworthy 1972) that in the southern province of Zambia there was strong political power during the precolonial period, and that because of the relative lack of political organization among the Tonga and Ila, there was little significant history remembered. Most early studies emphasized this aspect and generally discussed the Tonga and Ila from the perspective of their raiders, particularly the Lozi

and the Ndebele from across the Zambezi River in the south, who raided for slaves and cattle. It is generally acknowledged that because the Tonga and the Ila lacked a strong central authority they became easy target for outside raiders who found it easier to play off one headman against another by encouraging local wars.

The Tonga and the Ila people are considered distant descendants of the Early Iron Age people who had developed new ways of community life, such the Kalolo culture. These Early Iron Age people had also embarked on long distance trade, and laid foundations for the future expansion. After 1500 they lived in scattered communities and developed a village economy under headmen or chiefs in settlements that rarely numbered more than a few hundred people. They grew millet and a few other crops, raised cattle, and hunted for many kinds of game. They had plenty of land to move around despite tsetse fly in their area. They were not involved in much trade, whether local or long distance.

The Tonga and Ila practiced agriculture and kept cattle. The plateau where the Tonga and the Ila settled was an area that was prone to famine and hunger. There were usually periods of hunger just before the next harvest, when labor demands were highest. To cushion themselves against hunger the Tonga and Ila resorted to keeping livestock, hunting, and even gathering. Cattle was the most important livestock kept, and these were generally shorthorn Sanga, which were small in size. They are believed to have weighed a maximum of about 350 pounds and were described by the missionary explorer David Livingstone as beautiful. The cattle were carefully corralled at night and were carefully herded during the rains so that they did not damage crops.

Elizabeth Colson (1962) has noted that several households often banded together to form a *kraal* group, which cooperated in the work of cattle keeping. The Tonga and the Ila also developed an elaborate system of tending cattle lent to them by others, and also lent out cattle themselves. The system was developed to minimize the risk of losing cattle through raids, which were very common among the plateau people. Despite this threat during the dry season cattle were usually allowed to roam freely. They could also be driven to areas where water and pasture were available during the dry season.

In the Tonga and Ila societies, herding cattle was not a strictly gendered activity. Although young boys often did the herding, it was not uncommon to find men or women herding cattle. In Tonga and Ila communities, most economic activities were carried out by all. Cultivation, for example, was not an exclusively female domain in Tonga and Ila culture. This was also true in cattle herding, which was not solely a male activity. In Tonga and Ila cultures the dichotomy typical of most of southern Africa did not exist. Adam Capar, for example, describes a fundamental opposition

between men and cattle on the one hand and women on the other. In such societies cattle were identified with men, and women were usually prohibited from coming into contact with such animals. Among the Tonga and Ila women not only herded cattle, but owned and handled them as well.

Possession of cattle in the Tonga and Ila cultures held great social and psychological importance. Cattle were also valued as a movable source of food and as insurance against famine. In theory cattle were something that could be exchanged in the form of a dowry, or lent out to other people. Most men in the Tonga and Ila communities strove to build up their herd in good times because it was the highest form of *lubono*, a symbol of wealth, social importance, and status. Those with large herds of cattle gained influence and control over others, especially their wives.

At the start of the twentieth century, cattle were very scarce due to warfare and disease. Kenneth Vickery (1986) has pointed out that on the eve of the European occupation of the area there were very few animals in the region; the large herds had been depleted in raids. The greatest blow, however, was the rinderpest epidemic of the mid-1890s, which swept through eastern and southern Africa. Despite this, the situation changed rapidly as the Tonga transformed the old and new utility of cattle. As stocks built up there was a reestablishment of cattle as an integral part of Tonga social fabric, particularly as a form of dowry.

Because cattle had numerous uses, they enabled the Tonga to participate in both the imperial and indigenous economies. Cattle were the Tonga's currency in a capitalist economy. They represented the wealth accumulated from income earned in wage employment, yielding interest, and were available when needed. Consequently, from the earliest years of the twentieth century the Tonga consciously strove to increase both the quantity and quality of their cattle, succeeding in this due to the fact that they always saw cattle as belonging to three separate spheres of their livelihood—subsistence, prestige, and human rights, particularly related to women and marriage. At all levels the aim was to convert whatever was earned into cattle which was then easily converted into status.

The importance of cattle among the Tonga led them to develop herding techniques that generally made efficient use of the soil, pasture, and water resources of the plateau. These techniques enabled the herds to stay in good condition and propagate rapidly. Cattle were usually allowed to roam freely during the dry season because this maximized the available grazing land, and because cattle were considered better judges of the whereabouts of dwindling food sources than any herder could be. The care of cattle that were already acquired contributed to the building up of cattle herds.

By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the Tonga had begun to improve their herd by acquiring graded stock from George Horton, colonial Zambia's premier cattle breeder. In some cases Tonga herders deliberately herded their cattle onto European farms to be serviced by pedigree bulls. This practice was widespread, and goes to show that the Tonga not only valued the numbers of their cattle but were equally conscious of their quality.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: **Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo; Zambia: Early Nineteenth Century: Survey.**

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Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rovzi

From the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, southwestern Zimbabwe was home to two powerful states. The region is essentially grassland; it merges with the Kalahari Desert margins, once occupied by people identified in archaeology with the Toutswe State (c.900–1200). The indigenous population is defined archaeologically by the Leopard's Kopje culture (c.950–1250), which is associated with the settlements of Mapela and Mapungubwe in the Limpopo Valley and at Ntabazingwe near Bulawayo. This region is probably the Guruuswa ("tall grass"), referred to as *Butua* in Portuguese sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is currently used for cattle ranching, an economic activity that is more than four centuries old. The low rate of rainfall and the common droughts dictate the growth of traditional drought-resistant crops such as millet and sorghum. These are supplemented by cattle, which rely on mopane leaves during the dry seasons. There is a rich gold belt, mentioned in Portuguese accounts, but it is cattle that formed the basis of the rulers' wealth and power. Cattle were easy to manage, multiplied quickly, and could be exchanged for other items. Rulers used cattle to reward the army, the miners, metal workers, and traders in addition to providing security in case of crop failure. The first of these states is identified as

Torwa, and its capital was Khami (c.1450–1660s). It was succeeded by the Rozvi State (c.1680–1830), founded by Changamire Dombo (d.1695).

The Torwa state was probably founded by rebels or outsiders (*vatorwa*) of the Mutapa state during the second half of the fifteenth century. By around 1494 a dynasty called Torwa broke away and established itself in Guruuswa in the southwestern periphery of the state. Between 1490 and 1547, a rebellion occurred in the Mutapa state, which is linked with the Torwa. From 1547 onward there is no evidence of their activity, until the middle of the seventeenth century, when their capital was destroyed during a civil war. A political dispute occurred in the early 1640s in the area controlled by the Torwa; one of the Torwa rulers was defeated in a power struggle and forced to flee. The Portuguese intervened in this conflict by sending a small Portuguese army led by Sismundo Dias Bayao. This event is linked to the fall of Khami. The capital area shifted about 150 kilometers east, where the Torwa continued to rule until the early 1680s.

Between the 1640s and 1680s, a military transformation occurred in response to the growing threat of the Portuguese *prazo* holders and traders from the northeast. There was concern about the politically unstable conditions in the Mutapa State and the increased Portuguese presence on the Zimbabwe Plateau. After 1684 the Karanga, led by Dombo Changamire, replaced the Torwa dynasty. Their followers were called the Rozvi. Dombo Changamire founded a powerful state whose influence reached the areas formerly controlled by the Mutapa State such as Mukaranga, Mbire, and Manyika. Information about Dombo Changamire is sketchy but historical sources suggest he was a descendant of one of the Torwa leaders who built his political career through cattle wealth. He is also linked with the Mutapa State, where Portuguese documents say he was a herdsman for the king. Oral traditions associate him with special powers such as rain making; and he was also renowned for his other magical powers and bravery. The Portuguese regarded him as a wizard, probably because of his military accomplishments; he seems to have transformed his army into such a powerful force that it managed to defeat and expel the Portuguese from the Zimbabwe Plateau in the 1680s.

Archaeological evidence shows the existence of stone buildings in southwestern Zimbabwe dating at least from the fifteenth century. These buildings are characterized by retaining walls built with well-shaped rectangular blocks, on top of which are platforms accommodating circular houses. The walls are profusely decorated with checkered, herringbone, dentelle, and other linear patterns. The biggest settlement is at Khami, near Bulawayo. Stone buildings of various sizes are located in the area once controlled by the Torwa. The Rozvi continued to build in stone in the same style and

made polychrome incised, band and panel decorated pottery. Their capital was at Danangombe and other important centers include Naletale, Zinjanja, and Manyanga. This cultural continuity between Torwa and Rozvi suggests they were the same people. The stone building architecture in the southwest represents an expansion of the culture once based at Great Zimbabwe.

The succession disputes that occurred after the death of Dombo Changamire undermined the power of the state. Many Rozvi migrated elsewhere, with some setting up chiefdoms in the areas they subsequently settled. One son of Dombo Changamire moved to Hwange in the northwest and established a polity among the Nambya and the Tonga. Another son crossed the Limpopo River and conquered the territory of the Venda, establishing a capital at Dzata, in the Zoutpansberg. This is the Thovhela State that is mentioned by the Dutch traders based at Delagoa Bay (c.1730). Among both the Nambya and the Venda, the Zimbabwe culture system has been identified, indicating continuity and expansion of the culture.

Torwa-Rozvi rule lasted almost 400 years in southwestern Zimbabwe. The Rozvi declined following the arrival of the *mfecane* groups from the south of the Limpopo. Direct attacks by the Sotho and Nguni and the subsequent Ndebele settlement saw the demise of the Rozvi in the 1850s.

INNOCENT PIKIRAYI

See also: Great Zimbabwe: Origins and Rise; Manyika of Eastern Zimbabwe; Mfecane; Sena, Tete, Portuguese, and Prazos; Zimbabwe: IncurSIONS from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele.


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Touré, Samori (c.1830–1900) and His Empire

Samori Touré is generally considered as one of the main opponents to the French during their occupation of the future French Sudan. However, the formation of Samori's empire should not be studied as a reaction to

TOURÉ, SAMORI (c.1830–1900) AND HIS EMPIRE



Samori Touré's empire, 1865–1898.

French imperialism. It is generally accepted that his warfare tactics were superior to those of France, and that only inferior armature led to his defeat.

Samori was born in approximately 1830 in the village of Sanankaro, southeast of Kankan in the present-day Republic of Guinea. Information on his early life is scarce. He is reported to have liberated his mother, who was captured in a slave raid, by serving in the army of Sori Birama, his mother's captor. After having served in the armies of various warlords, his personal political career started in the 1860s when he led increasingly bigger armies, thus being able to rule over increasingly larger areas.

Although Samori's empire was called Maninka (Malinké), Mandingue, or Mandinka (not to be confused with the Mandenka who live in Gambia), it did not have an ethnic base. It only took some ideological inspiration from the medieval Mali/Mandingue empire, the foundation of which has been attributed to Sunjata, as well, as it covered an area where the Maninka have been living. The organization of the empire followed patterns well-known in the region. However, the area occupied by Samori was relatively large, and his tactics were innovative. He set up networks of subjugated or collaborating rulers with regional power, resulting in structures that favored trade, which did not exclude small-scale banditry nor cooperation for major military expeditions. Collaboration between Samori and other rulers was never entirely voluntary; often Samori took the sons of collaborating rulers hostage, thus guaranteeing their loyalty and, at the same time, training their sons in warfare. Moreover, fortresses (called *tata*) were often built close to political centers to watch over allies.

Samori's "empire" was not the result of resistance against the French, who became his major adversaries after 1882, when they penetrated the Sudan. Samori's

realm grew impressively in the 1870s; in 1881 it stretched from the limits of Bamako southward into the forests of present-day Guinea, and the borders of Sierra Leone and Liberia, eastward almost to Sikasso; in the middle of this realm was Kankan. At first, the French made treaties with Samori, accepting the Niger River as a border, but when, in 1887, Samori moved his armies to the rising "state" of Kenedougou (with its strong fortified town of Sikasso as its political center), the French occupied the area that had been abandoned (and burned and depopulated) by Samori.

Equipped with some modern armature (often acquired with British aid), and skillfully exploiting the political rivalry between the French and the British, Samori forced the French to increase their military efforts during their occupation of the Sudan. Yet, partially because weakened by the siege of Sikasso, Samori had to cede from his territory; around 1892–1823 Samori and his troops moved eastward, thus creating, a few years later, a second empire in present-day northern Côte d'Ivoire, this time as a "foreign" ruler. In order to accomplish this new empire, the famous kingdom of Kong was occupied. The French persisted in their goal to occupy the entire Sudan, and after several battles (several of which won by Samori's armies) Samori was finally caught, in 1898, and exiled to the island of Missanga in the Gabon. He died there on June 2, 1900.

Samori is remembered in the area of his first empire as *lalmami*, the imam. This title he took at the end of his career; it invokes his spiritual leadership and his connection to Islam. To what extent Samori's wars can be seen as inspired by religious motivations is a point of ongoing discussion. In the beginning of his career he was a *kèlètigi*, an army leader. An intermediary stage was *faama*, an established ruler without hereditary rights to his realm. This three-step career also represents Samori's changing roles; first he was actively involved in warfare, but later his "younger brothers" led the armies, and Samori himself did not appear on the battle scene.

Historiographically, Samori's name is connected to Yves Person, whose detailed three-volume thesis (followed by many additional or popularized studies on Samori) is still the primary source for study. Person's analysis brought to the foreground the connections among warfare, trade, and Islam that characterized Samori's empire, thus setting the paradigm for later historical studies in the Southern part of the Sudan. A new and important field of study is being formed regarding the oral traditions on Samori; these traditions demonstrate his increasing importance in West African history. In particular, since the end of the 1950s when the former French colonies acquired independence,

Samori is celebrated as a resistance hero against French oppression, and his Maninka empire is pictured as a predecessor of such African republics as Guinea and Mali. In particular, under Sekou Touré, Guinea's first president, Samori gained a foothold in popular historical imagination: Touré himself even claimed to be a descendant of Samori, which he actually only is in a symbolic sense. Nowadays, extended epic narratives on Samori are recorded in Guinea and Southern Mali; these popular narratives mix data from the school-books with local or regional models for heroic behavior. In some regions the traditions do not focus on Samori, but on his brothers who functioned as army leaders, which demonstrates how his empire was organized.

JAN JANSEN

See also: **Mali (Republic of): Economy and Society, Nineteenth Century.**

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Tourism

In 1889, the German Hans Meyer was the first European to reach the top of Mount Kilimanjaro. Today, 15,000 tourists, assisted by some 35,000 guides and porters, attempt to climb the mountain each year. Approximately 40 to 50 per cent do reach the summit. It is one of Tanzania's major tourist attractions and exemplifies one of today's types of tourism in Africa: trekking. Others are culture, beach (in both summer and winter), and safari (photography and hunting) tourism.

In 1869, the year the Suez Canal was opened, Cook organized the first tour to Egypt (Gamble 1989, pp.26). The Cook family was also responsible for laying out the modern town of Luxor, today one of Egypt's major attractions due to its temples and tombs. Otherwise, tourism to Africa was mainly restricted to a small number of well-off Europeans interested in hunting big game. It was not until after World War II that tourist flows to Africa increased significantly. Commercial air transportation, improved tourism infrastructure, and increasing numbers of wealthy people stimulated holiday travel to distant countries (Popovic 1972, 188). In 1998, Africa (excluding Egypt's 3.7 million visitors) witnessed some 25 million tourists. This is equivalent to the United Kingdom figure for that same year, and is 4 per cent of global tourism arrivals of over 625 million, making US\$ 445 billion. By comparison, in 1950

international tourism stood at 25 million arrivals and US\$ 2 billion receipts (WTO 1994, 1). From 1970 to 1998, Africa more than doubled its share of arrivals (from 1.5 to 4 per cent), but its share in receipts fell from 2.7 to 2.2 per cent.

Among the top 40 tourism destinations for 1998 are four African countries: South Africa (5,981,000 arrivals—position 25), Tunisia (4,718,000—position 29), Egypt (3,766,000—position 34) and Morocco (3,241,000—position 38). Whereas the position of the latter three is rather stable, South Africa stood at position 55 in 1990. The abolition of the apartheid regime is among the major causes to explain this rise.

In 1998 almost 40 per cent of tourist arrivals originated in Africa itself (9.8 million). Europeans visiting Africa (8.9 million) constituted another major share at about 35 per cent. France (2.6 million), Germany (1.7 million), United Kingdom (1 million) and Italy (0.7 million) provided the bulk of European tourists in 1997. The total number of European tourist increased by 6.2 per cent annually in the last decade. The table below shows international tourist arrivals in Africa for the 1980–1998 period.

The northern Africa region includes destinations with relatively well-established tourism industries, such as Tunisia and Morocco. Among the major tourist attractions are Tunisia's sun-covered beaches and the Sahara to the south, Africa's oldest rock paintings at Tassili (Algeria) and the Moroccan Atlas Mountains. National residents working abroad and returning home for annual holidays are a major group among the tourists to this region (e.g., more than 1 million in Morocco and half a million in Algeria). In addition to the often once-in-a-life-time cultural visit to the pyramids, Egypt tries to develop beach tourism along the Red Sea shores in order to press tourists to return to the country.

The southern African (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland) share of arrivals in the African continent increased from 13 to 31 per cent in the 1989–1998 period. The mass of tourism flows in southern Africa arises from movements between countries in this subregion, as well as arrivals of tourists coming from Eastern African countries. Non-African tourists took a share of slightly over 26 per cent in 1997. The region offers beautiful scenery such as the Etosha National Game Park and Fish River Canyon (Namibia), Chobe National Park north-east of the Okavango Delta (Botswana) and Kruger National Park (South Africa). Lately the Peace Park Foundation Initiative attempts to link Kruger National Park (900,000 visitors per annum) with parks in Mozambique (5,000 visitors only) and Zimbabwe (*African Business* 1999).

In Eastern Africa the share of total arrivals rose from 18 to 23 per cent. In 1992, Kenya lost its position as main destination in favor of Zimbabwe. However, tourism in Kenya is much more profitable in terms of receipts, which reflects the predominance of European tourism there. For the whole of eastern Africa, non-African tourists accounted for over 60 per cent of tourism in 1997. This part of Africa is richly endowed with a wide variety of spectacular views such as the wildebeest trek in Serengeti National Park (Tanzania), Victoria Falls on the Zambezi (Zimbabwe/Zambia), the source of the White Nile (Rwanda/Uganda), the Ruwenzori and Virunja Mountain gorillas (Uganda/Rwanda), the ruins of Great Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia's St. George Church in Lalibella.

The western African share has remained stable from 9.4 to 9.5 per cent between 1989 and 1998, and tourists of non-African origin had a share of 47 per cent. The region's attractions are long sandy beaches in Gambia, castles and forts in Ghana, the tomb of Ahmadu Bamba in Touba (Senegal), the "Our Lady of Peace" basilica in Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire), the Bandiagara Plateau of the Dogon and the mosque in Djenné (Mali), among others.

Finally, central Africa (Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé, and Príncipe) market share is the weakest of all subregions. Tourist arrivals have remained practically unchanged, with an average annual growth rate of only 3.8 per cent, whereas receipts show a decrease of 4.5 per cent per annum.

Tourism is the fastest growing industry in the world (4.5 per cent annually in the last decade). Moreover, it now holds the number one position in world trade, ahead of the automobile and oil industries. In 1997 the tourism sector had a share of over 8 per cent of total world exports of goods consumed and almost 34 per cent of the total world exports of services. For Africa these figures stood at 8 and 45 per cent, respectively. However, there are huge regional differences.

Looking at Africa's place in international tourism receipts (excluding transportation), only Egypt (27th, US\$ 3,838 million) is in the Top 40 earners in 1998 (WTO 1999a). South Africa (US\$ 2,366 million) might soon enter this category as its annual growth was in the order of 15.5 per cent in the 1989–1998 period (WTO 1999b, 18). Other major African earners are Morocco (US\$ 1,600 million) and Tunisia (US\$ 1,550 million). Tourism's share in receipts of services increased from 35.1 to 45.4 per cent from 1989 to 1997, illustrating the importance of tourism for Africa. By investing in the tourist sector, African countries hope to create jobs and earn hard

currencies. It is forecasted that total tourist arrivals in Africa will triple and reach 75 million by the year 2020 (Cleverdon 1998).

Besides positive effects, however, negative aspects in the social, cultural, environmental, and economic spheres should be mentioned. Wildlife is Africa's greatest natural asset, though, according to Western conservation organizations, it is in constant danger of extinction.

Pollution is another negative environmental effect. Trekking routes, including some of Mount Kilimanjaro's, are increasingly littered. Even the smallest hotels generate daily waste and sewage while making demands on land, water, and energy.

The problem of leakage of foreign exchange to international companies and airlines also deserves attention. For example, foreign companies, sometimes in collaboration with the local elite, reap most of the economic benefits of beach tourism at the expense of the local population's commercial activity (e.g., fishing). Investments in roads and hotels are directed to tourist areas. Yet, the tourist sector operates in a risky market. The preferences of tourists fluctuate constantly, and an economic decline affects travel abroad. The outbreak of a disease or local conflicts may also affect the tourism sector. These often unexpected and uncontrollable events could weaken the local tourist sector and force a large number of (small) entrepreneurs into bankruptcy virtually overnight.

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Toutswemogala: *See* Iron Age (Later): Southern Africa: Toutswemogala, Cattle, and Political Power.

Trade: *See* Ghana (Republic of): Colonial Period: Economy.

Trade Unions: Postcolonial

After independence, some legal impediments to free labor organization that existed under colonialism were removed, yet in the postcolonial era trade unions across Africa continued to suffer repression. Nationalist trade union alliances that were formed during independence struggles dissipated as political leaders sought to control labor and restrict wages to attract investment, stimulate capital accumulation, and prevent rival power bases from gaining influence and support. Governments appealed to national, not class, interests, a trend encapsulated by Kenyan leader Tom Mboya's comment that "the trade union and the national movement are almost invariably linked in independent territories."

Low rates of union membership in Africa reflected limited industrialization and the effects of antilabor state policies, while repression and military conflict made union organizing hazardous. Agricultural and informal sectors, which predominated in Africa (the latter comprised 61 per cent of urban workers in 1990) remained largely outside unions, although efforts were made to enroll domestic and farm workers, who included many women. In 1995, total estimated union numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa were ten million, often reflecting the size of economies. Figures were low in Gabon (5,000), Mauritania (15,000), Eritrea (18,000) and Guinea (13,000), but high in Nigeria (3.5 million in 1990), South Africa (3.15 million) and Egypt (3.3 million). The medium-sized economies of Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Morocco, Tanzania, and Ghana had between 250,000 and 700,000 unionists. Membership tended to decline from 1985 to 1995, falling in Uganda by 38 per cent and in Kenya by 29 per cent, although rising in South Africa (by 131 per cent), Zimbabwe (54 per cent), and Egypt (29 per cent). In this period, democratization helped boost union membership, which rose in Ethiopia from 4,000 to 152,000 and in South Africa from 1.4 to 3.15 million. Yet democratization often came with the shedding of state sector jobs and this reduced union membership. Despite multiparty elections, Zambian union numbers declined from 320,000 to 273,000. Other problems included high unemployment and low wages, which made unions unattractive, and their exclusion from the export processing zones that flourished with globalization.

Globalization also encouraged unions to expand their ties. There were instances of international trade union solidarity. In 1997, South African unions supported Swazi union demands, and unions in many countries opposed the Abacha regime in Nigeria. The Cold War, and political and religious differences, created divisions, and African unions affiliated to rival international labor federations. Nevertheless, the African Trade Union Confederation (founded in 1962) accepted a range of different groups and the Organization of African Unity supported the All-African Trade Union Federation (founded 1961) and its sequel, the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (founded 1973).

Unionists across Africa faced victimization. In Tunisia, unauthorized strikes became illegal in 1967. In Algeria, where the right to strike was restricted, many died in conflicts between the state and Islamic fundamentalists after 1992. In Morocco, unions participated in national policy making in the first years of independence but thereafter suffered harassment, though in 1999 King Mohammed VI signaled a liberalization of society. In Egypt and Libya unions remained firmly under state control, with no right to strike.

Successive Nigerian regimes sought to repress unions. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah and subsequent state leaders sought to subordinate them. In Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, and Zaire unionists were subject to arbitrary arrest. Civil war in Liberia in the 1990s saw increased restrictions on union rights. In Equatorial Guinea, only ruling party members could obtain certain jobs. Unions in the Central African Republic were excluded from politics, in Benin the right to strike was restricted, and in Cameroon government refused to register some unions.

South Africa recorded a rapid growth in union membership until the late 1990s when there were substantial job losses, especially in mining. The powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions formed a strategic, albeit critical, alliance with the African National Congress and gained recognition of union rights in the 1994 constitution. Madagascar and Mauritius restricted union rights in export processing zones. In Swaziland, the monarchy sought to crush free unions. Botswana prevented public, agricultural, and domestic workers from joining unions. The Banda regime in Malawi brutally repressed unions, and while democratization in 1994 brought more freedom, police continued to harass unionists. Tanzania and Zambia sought to place unions under ruling party hegemony, but in the 1990s the monolithic state-controlled union center was dismantled in the former and in the latter, ex-unionist Frederick Chiluba ended the UNIP's rule. Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF installed party-dominated workers' committees to maintain hegemony, but the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions rejected the regime's harsh economic

policies and led labor and popular protests over rising prices and the lack of democracy. By 1998 its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, emerged as a rival to Robert Mugabe.

Similar restrictions on unions were imposed in eastern Africa. Kenyan public service workers could not join unions, and the state had the power to remove labor leaders. Ugandan unions had to belong to a single union center. Repression in Djibouti was fierce, with many unionists dismissed or detained. In Ethiopia, successive regimes sought to control unions, although the 1994 constitution allowed freedom of organization. Chad's new labor code in the 1990s ended long-standing violations of union rights, at least in principle. In the Sudan, a strong union movement developed after independence but was decimated by coups in 1958, 1969, and 1989, with independent unions abolished and many labor leaders detained.

After independence in 1974–1975, socialist-oriented one-party states developed in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, emphasizing nation building, and with production councils given greater attention than unions. Where unions (such as the Organization of Workers of Mozambique, formed in 1983) emerged, they were state-controlled. Democratization in the 1990s saw changes: the formation of independent unions, a tendency toward industry unionism, legalization of the right to strike written into Mozambique's new constitution, and, in Guinea-Bissau, union activity against the PAIGC regime.

Overall, African unions remained weak in the post-colonial era. Yet, their actions could ignite government crises, as in the Sudan in 1964, Ghana in 1971, Madagascar in 1972, and Ethiopia in 1974, and they continually fought repression. Unions were prominent in prodemocracy actions in Mali and Swaziland, a prominent source of opposition to the Abacha regime in Nigeria and the 1997 Sierra Leone coup, and thwarted attempts at greater state authoritarianism in Cameroon and Zimbabwe. By the 1990s, fewer regimes were able to use unions as their mouthpieces, and some improvements in labor rights were apparent. In 1993, Kenyan unions cut ties with government, and the 1999 demise of Abacha in Nigeria allowed unions greater freedom. In postcolonial times, unions occasionally provided input to national policy making, but in general, their influence was limited. International labor standards often were ignored by governments and employers, while working conditions for many continued to deteriorate.

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See also: **Algeria: Islamic Salvation Front, Military Rule, Civil War, 1990s; Mboya, Tom J.; Nkrumah, Kwame; South Africa: Industrial and Commercial Workers Union; Trades Unionism and Nationalism;**

Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): African Political and Trades Union Movements, 1920s and 1930s.

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Trades Unionism and Nationalism

African trade unionists and African nationalists both generally opposed colonial rule, but their relations were complex and uneven. Their growth roughly coincided, a congruence that aided the interpenetration of class and national consciousness among workers but also alarmed colonial rulers. Concerned with the militancy of an emergent African industrial labor force, especially among transportation, mining, and state-sector workers who occupied a strategic position in colonial economies, and at the prospect of their uniting with nationalists, colonial officials sought to stifle unions. They were harshly repressed in Portuguese, Italian, and German colonies, unable to operate freely in the Belgian Congo until 1957, and tardily legalized by France (in Algeria and Tunisia in 1932, West Africa in 1944, Equatorial Africa in 1947) and Britain (authorized in 1930 but not implemented until later: 1938 in Nigeria). South African black unions achieved legal recognition only in the 1970s. Those unions that did emerge were strongly discouraged from supporting national liberation (Uganda outlawed "political unionism" in 1952) and had their strikes suppressed. Nevertheless, these measures did not prevent the emergence of unions or their forging of links with nationalists.

African workers initially had little formal organization beyond kin-based groups, and their access to European craft unions operating in Africa was barred. Into this vacuum stepped African nationalists and their predecessors, claiming to speak on behalf of workers: in Mozambique, *Grêmio Africano* tried to mobilize laborers in 1911, while the Transvaal Native Congress defended strikers in 1918. From the 1920s on, African workers began to organize, at first in general associations such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in South Africa and Rhodesia and then, gradually, in trade-based unions. Limited industrialization spawned a small proletariat, and early unions were ephemeral due to inexperienced officials, low incomes, and migrant labor instability. Isolated African labor federations formed in Tunisia in 1924 and South Africa in 1928, but were short-lived.

Unionization accelerated during and after World War II, stimulated by rising industrialization and heightened class-consciousness. Trade unionists became more involved in nationalist movements that now sought a mass base and began to incorporate union demands in their programs. By the late 1950s, unionists such as Tom Mboya in Kenya, Sékou Touré in Guinea, and Joshua Nkomo in Rhodesia were prominent nationalists.

The attractions of nationalism were several. Unionists were inclined toward political action by repression of their right to organize. Workers in the state sector were likely allies as their industrial discontent invariably turned against their employer, the colonial state, while those with rural ties were attracted to nationalist agendas highlighting land reform. Independence appeared to offer the prospect of an improved life, while discriminatory colonial housing and labor policies pushed together diverse African social strata, temporarily masking class differences. Finally, unionists had few viable alternative political allies, as social democratic parties in Africa were largely ineffective.

Trade unions were useful to nationalists because they could be a conduit for nationalism among workers and, with their organization and militancy, act as a battering ram against government opposition to African demands. In Guinea, Benin, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, unions were important strategic allies of nationalists. The Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation actively supported nationalism. In Zanzibar, unions formed only in the last decade of colonial rule, simultaneous with rising nationalism, yet became a driving force in nationalist demonstrations. Strikes in Lagos (1945); Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and French West Africa (1947); and Accra and Nairobi (1950) protested not only economic grievances but also colonialism, and catalyzed support for nationalists. A 1948 general strike in Rhodesia boosted nationalism and a 1950 wage dispute in Ghana grew into a proindependence general

strike aiding Nkrumah's subsequent election victory. In return, nationalist leaders in many countries, including Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, and Guinea, pledged support for labor rights. This extended to the international arena. The Namibian nationalist movement SWAPO officially represented Namibian workers in the International Labor Organization (ILO).

However, the nature and extent of cooperation greatly varied. In Ethiopia, Somalia, Botswana, Seychelles, Libya, Mauritania, and Rwanda-Burundi, unions were weak and played a minor role in nationalism: Libyan unions formed only after independence. Some unions saw their primary duty to members, were ambivalent, and did not affiliate to nationalist parties. This inclined writers of the 1960s to stress labor's passive role in nationalism, a claim challenged by recent research: Egyptian unions, once seen as politically quiescent, had vigorous if contradictory ties with nationalists. Formal agreements were concluded in a few countries. South Africa, with greater industrialization, had a strong union movement with close unity between union federations and nationalists. Pacts also emerged briefly in Nigeria (1944–1950), Ghana (1950), and Kenya (1960), but these were between national bodies. More often, the pattern was informal alliances of varying intensity: in French West Africa—notably, in Guinea—these tended to be close; in Nigeria after 1950 they were more distant. Relations were more complex when rival nationalist parties wooed unions, or rival union federations adopted different approaches. In the 1950s in Uganda, the dominant Trades Union Congress took an apolitical position while the Federation of Labor sought alliance with nationalists. In French Cameroon, overlapping membership of the nationalist Union des Populations du Cameroun and trade unions induced a more radical nationalism, whereas colonial officials in British Cameroon successfully encouraged apolitical associations among plantation workers. Splits in Zimbabwean unions in the 1960s and 1970s reflected political divisions among nationalist parties as well as rivalries between international labor federations. Unionists tended to oppose conservative nationalists: in Swaziland, they backed the modernist Ngwane National Liberatory Congress against the monarchy, while in Côte d'Ivoire, they criticized President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. There were other reasons for rifts. Mine workers in Northern Rhodesia supported independence, yet their leaders remained aloof regaging nationalist parties partly due to personal rivalries.

A basic contradiction existed between the class orientation of trade unions and the broader policies of nationalist elites. As decolonization proceeded, the latter increasingly sought to co-opt the labor movement. In 1955 in Tanganyika, Nkrumah clashed with striking miners and thereafter demanded loyalty from unions. In Algeria, the National Liberation Front in the 1950s marginalized

the main labor federation. In 1960, the Tanganyika African National Union moved to control the labor movement in Tanganyika. Such moves prompted trade unions in many countries to redefine their relationship to nationalist parties. Overall, African unionists and nationalists found common cause against colonialism, but this was not without tensions and contradictions between them, which deepened as independence beckoned.

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See also: **Colonial European Administrations: Comparative Survey; Colonialism: Impact on African Societies; Guinea: Touré, Ahmed Sekou, Era of; Mboya, Tom J.; Nkomo, Joshua.**

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Transportation: See Ghana (Republic of): Colonial Period: Economy.

Transportation Infrastructure

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, modern transportation infrastructure in Africa was largely nonexistent. Travel occurred on centuries-old bush paths or caravan routes, major rivers such as the Nile, Zambezi, Congo, and Niger, or followed the coastline. Before the era of colonialism, Europeans were restricted largely to the coastal areas because of the reputed inaccessibility of much of the interior and by their susceptibility to endemic diseases. Those few Europeans who did venture further followed long-established routes used by African or Arab traders.

European communications methods were introduced to Africa in the form of steamships, railroads,



Transportation problems in early colonial east Africa, c.1927–1930. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

and telegraph cables in the nineteenth century, and macadamized roads and airplanes in the twentieth century. They also took the form of such large engineering projects as the Suez Canal and dams. The growth of European technology in Africa played a decisive role in the "Scramble" for Africa in the late nineteenth century and in the ability of the European powers to administer and derive economic benefit from Africa during the colonial era.

As the preeminent maritime power of the nineteenth century, Britain played the biggest role in introducing Africa to modern technology. Steamships first appeared in African waters as early as the 1830s in the Royal Navy's West Africa Squadron used to suppress the slave trade. Others were employed in the delta of the Niger River in the 1840s. Steamships gradually came to dominate trade between Europe and North Africa and Egypt in the 1850s and 1860s. Reliance on coal led to the establishment of a string of coaling stations at key points along the African coast. Many of these, especially Freetown, Cape Town, Durban, and Mombasa, came to support a permanent Royal Navy presence that frequently acted as an agent of the British government in dealing with African rulers. The strategic importance of South Africa on the sea route to India and China, as well as its uniqueness as a place of European settlement, ensured it a higher level of technological development than any other part of Africa.

Maritime traffic around Africa was altered by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which dramatically increased trade through the Red Sea and to the east coast of Africa as coaling stations were opened to support the trade to Asia and Australia. British companies such as P and O, the Orient Line, and Union Castle maintained substantial facilities along the routes, and the canal also spurred the construction of subsidiary canals, roads, and railways in Egypt. By the mid 1890s, four million tons of British shipping passed through the canal annually.

The perceived need to defend the canal profoundly affected British policy toward Africa; according to Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher's (1961) thesis of imperial expansion, defense of the canal led to a permanent British occupation of Egypt, necessitated the reconquest of the Sudan (1898), and required British preeminence in East Africa and Uganda.

As steamship trade with Africa expanded in the late nineteenth century, demand increased for improved port and passenger facilities. Some ports, such as those of Algiers, Lagos, and Mombasa, were expanded, while others (Dakar, Tema, and Port Harcourt) were newly constructed and quickly became major urban areas. This naturally had a significant social and economic impact on all the territories concerned. By 1900 ironclad steamships were a common feature in Africa, even plying far up the major rivers. Although natural routes for exploration, major rivers such as the Zambezi and Congo were only marginally useful for navigation and trade because of natural obstacles such as gorges, falls, and rapids.

An equally significant maritime development was the laying of submarine telegraph cables around Africa. Apart from one line under the Mediterranean to Algiers, this was an entirely British undertaking. Between 1879 and 1889 submarine cables were laid around the length of the African coast, connecting all major ports. No land lines were constructed, however. Most of these cables were owned and operated by the Eastern Telegraph Company and its subsidiaries.

Railroads were the most substantial transportation development of the colonial era. The first railway line in Africa was a short line built in Cape Colony in the 1850s, and from there South Africa quickly became the leader for railroad construction on the continent. The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold in the Witwatersrand provided the incentive for rapid rail construction from the 1870s. By 1919 South Africa had 10,000 miles of railroad. Southern Africa's rail demands provided a huge boon for the development of the Rhodesias, and for branch lines through Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. In all parts of the continent, railroads permitted the penetration of colonial rule and economic activity. They provided the easiest way to move troops to trouble spots, and proved decisive in the Ndebele uprising (1896–1897), the reconquest of the Sudan (1898), and the Boer War (1899–1902).

Railroads were crucial to the economic development of Africa by the colonial powers. In many places their construction overcame difficult geographic and financial odds and often involved a heavy loss of life for the African (and in East Africa, Asian) labor force. The most common pattern was a rail line from the coast to the interior to expedite the extraction of raw materials such as copper, cotton, and groundnuts. There was little effort outside South Africa to provide lateral or intercolonial

rail links. Modern Africa is still strongly affected by the trade flows created by the colonial railway systems.

Automobiles were introduced to Africa during and after World War I. However, modern roads were few and far between during the colonial era. They were concentrated in major cities and colonial capitals and tended not to go much farther. Only in South Africa the 1930s and 1940s were roads built to connect the major cities. Road construction that did occur in the colonial period tended to follow the existing rail lines, although many territorial governments had ambitious plans for the expansion of their road systems during the last phase of colonial development in the 1950s.

Commercial civil aviation came to Africa as imperial airline systems were gradually established. Virtually all were subsidized by the home governments. Britain was the primary aviation country in Africa, and the national flag carrier, Imperial Airways, developed routes to Egypt by 1921 and down the Nile Valley through East Africa to Cape Town in 1932 (a trip that took nine days). East and Central Africa were the most concentrated areas of aviation activity for Britain in Africa and included operators linked to Imperial Airways, such as Wilson Airways and Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways. Air routes to West Africa were opened after World War II. Only Air France and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines operated comparable air service to Africa, especially to North and West Africa. Internal aviation in individual colonies did not begin in a substantial way until the 1940s and 1950s, and many of these small local airlines formed the basis of national airlines after independence.

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See also: **Railways.**

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Transportation: Postcolonial Africa

During the postcolonial period in Africa, transportation has been associated with socioeconomic progress and decline. Changes in transportation have been geographically uneven; they have benefited some people and places but have disadvantaged others. The urban and rural poor have gained little from new transportation technologies and services. New transportation strategies are being put in place to tackle these and other failures.

In the last half of the twentieth century the African continent shared in the worldwide extension of motor vehicle use and ownership, and the elaboration of aviation services. As elsewhere, this technological modernization was accompanied by gradual decline in the significance of rail and shipping services, which had been the workhorses of the colonial period. Even so, the pace of technological development in global transportation in the last half-century has contributed to the marginalization of Africa. In the 1990s the formation of powerful global airline marketing and operating alliances weakened the viability and long-term survival of African civil aviation.

Increased motorization and flight in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s occurred at the same time as political decolonization. The transportation sector was used to express modernization and independence. Newly elected African leaders marked their ascension by building glamorous and prestigious urban motorways and airports, many of which bore their names. New flag-carrying national airlines were hived off from larger regional entities that had previously served

jointly several colonial territories in eastern and central Africa. In both the new and the old transportation sectors, employment profiles changed as expatriate managers, technicians, and workers departed, and as colonial hiring and contracting practices were abandoned in favor of Africanization of the entire transportation workforce rather than just laborers. Beyond the parasitical sector, African ownership and management of private road transportation companies increased quickly, becoming a prominent route into the middle class and to capital accumulation. On a larger scale, the assertion of “Africanness” in transportation was evident in the creation of multinational African shipping and aviation organizations to represent the continent on the world stage, to coordinate African transportation, and to negotiate favorable fuel purchase prices and vessel or aircraft purchasing and leasing.

The ending of colonialism was associated with other shifts in transportation. As the map of independent African states filled out, interest grew in Pan-African transportation projects. There were ambitious proposals to build international highways among countries that, in colonial times, were better connected to European metropolises than to other African colonies. Similarly, there were plans to develop better flight connections among African capitals. These schemes were complemented by trade and transportation realignments that linked newly independent African states to new socialist partners in the USSR and eastern Europe. The most prominent case involved Chinese funding, construction, equipping, and operating the new Uhuru Railway, giving Zambia an outlet to the sea via Tanzania. This project reflected the new political and economic conditions in which transportation was used to distance Africa from its colonial past. Political realignments in transportation also featured purchases of transportation equipment such as road vehicles and aircraft from nontraditional sources beyond western Europe.

In southern Africa, strenuous efforts were made by landlocked states to end reliance on the transportation networks of neighboring countries that were still under white minority rule: Zambia sought to avoid Rhodesian transportation and, in turn, Zimbabwe sought to avoid South Africa. Transportation was being used as a lever to force political accommodation or change. By denying hostile black African governments rail access to South Africa’s ports for vital raw material exports and imports (including food), the apartheid government hoped to curb antiapartheid protest and cross-border military action. In a cycle of retaliatory sanctions, independent African governments prevented South Africa’s state-owned airline from flying over or landing in their countries.

The transportation plans and starter projects that emerged in postcolonial Africa have been hard to manage, sustain, and extend in a context of increasing



The Niger River. Segou, Mali, 1976. Photograph © David C. Conrad.

economic stress. Transportation has had to compete with the military, education, housing, and health sectors for funds from a devaluing public purse. Political instability has deterred foreign investors. National budgetary, personnel, and material resources have failed to respond to the challenges, and in several instances transportation has been corrupted by nepotism and fraud. Lax regulation (notably of driver and vehicle licensing) has contributed to chaos. Aging taxi, truck, and lake-ferry fleets endanger personal and environmental safety. Roads have crumbled while the backlog of maintenance projects lengthens. Airline safety has been put at increasing risk by aging fleets and outdated navigational systems: in 1997, the average fleet age of airlines in Africa was the highest in the world. Only five African countries met international navigation standards.

Persistent mismanagement and underinvestment has meant that the quality of Africa's transportation infrastructure and services has worsened in the last 20 years. Transportation networks remain geographically sparse. Vehicles are butchered and recycled. Service is erratic. This is not least in countries where domestic warfare (including urban gangsterism) has decimated hardware and personnel; transportation infrastructure is very vulnerable to disruption. The Benguela railway in war-torn Angola has been nonoperational for 20 years. Fragile road infrastructure and services in the Great Lakes region, and in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have been damaged by persistent civil unrest. After a brief interlude when Mozambique's shattered inland transportation capacity was starting to revive after sixteen years of civil war, floods in 1999 set back the recovery program.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the United Nations made the restoration of transportation an African priority. In conventional manner, transportation investment was intended to promote economic development by speeding internal circulation and facilitating trade, and to allow social uplifting by facilitating access to schools and health clinics. In an era of neocolonial aid, international financial assistance for African transportation was made conditional on general economic reforms such as market liberalization and privatization of parastatal air, rail, road, and shipping services. Regulating urban passenger transportation was to be done alongside deregulation of long-distance road haulage and international aviation. Transportation monopolies and subsidies, and opaque contracting, licensing, and rate fixing, were to stop. Commercialization of transportation extended to infrastructure construction and operation. Several African airlines have survived only by agreeing to joint management, servicing and operating with a larger non-African carrier. User pricing was contemplated in the road transportation sector. In shipping

and aviation, reform was also to standardize diverse national transportation technologies and administrative operations. Country by country, fragmentation of transportation was extended rather than ended by the national vanity which succeeded colonialism; early postcolonial Africa was a transportation seller's market.

In the first proud flush of postcolonialism, African transportation policy focused on new transportation installations. Now the emphasis lies on making better use of existing local and regional transportation capacity through integration and improved management. Technical modernization no longer has an innately higher priority than organizational reform. The financial affordability, social desirability, and environmental sustainability of transportation projects and solutions are also emerging as key criteria. Nonexploitative facilities and services that meet Africa's needs will include transportation for the delivery of emergency relief aid to refugee populations and to zones of food insecurity. Deaths following natural disasters and civil insurrection have been higher because of transportation undercapacity, remoteness, and transportation inaccessibility. Transportation geared to ecotourism could capitalize on the continent's scenic beauty and wildlife; deregulating African skies to accommodate foreign charter airlines would be a notable step forward. There is potential also to exhibit the transportation history of a continent whose ports and railways were central to the operation of extractive colonial economies, were sites of cultural and racial contrasts and clashes, labor strikes, slave shipping, overland labor migrancy, racial labor practices and racial segregation.

During colonialism, African transportation was geared to enriching and empowering places and people beyond Africa's shores. The immediate postcolonial reaction was to emulate inward-looking national transportation systems overseas. Capital-intensive, showcase projects have proved unsustainable and inappropriate to many of Africa's requirements and resources. For local travel and transportation in and between towns and villages, nonmotorized transportation (including bicycles and animal-drawn carts) emerges as a technology that matches the needs and capabilities of many (female-headed) households and communities. Transportation is needed that is affordable, maintainable, and does not use costly energy. Instead of constructing expensive tarred roads designed to foreign standards, earth roads are being built whose surfaces and inclines are better suited to pedestrians, head loaders, and animal-drawn vehicles. Road construction and maintenance is in several instances being organized through a food-for-work program which alleviates local unemployment and poverty.

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Treason Trials: See South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials.

Tripoli

With a population of 1.5 million (1994), Tripoli is the capital of present-day Libya. The city, located on the northern fringe of the Sahara, acquired fame in the past due to its entrepôt status and for its political significance. In ancient times, Tripoli experienced Phoenician, Carthaginian, Roman, and Vandal conquests. Its more recent history also recorded rule by the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the French, Italians, and British. In spite of these invasions, the population and the pattern of existence in the city retained an overwhelmingly Arabic and Islamic characteristic.

A significant political development in the history of Tripoli was the creation in the sixteenth century of the Regency of Tripoli by the Ottoman sultan. From that period onward, the sultan usually appointed a pasha, who was in turn assisted by a body of janissary officers who helped in the supervision of the local administration. Turkish pashas continued to be sent to Tripoli until 1711, when the office became hereditary in the local oligarchy, the Karamanli family. This dynasty was to shape the history of Tripoli in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

With the ascendancy of the Karamanli family, Tripoli became a significant factor in the development of the trans-Saharan trade route, which provided a major link between North and West Africa. From the eighteenth century on, the route from Tripoli via Fezzan and Bilma to Lake Chad, Bornu, and Hausaland became one of the most important caravan routes of the trans-Saharan trade. Via this route came a consistent supply of Sudanese slaves who were distributed by the merchants of Tripoli to Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, and other regions of the Muslim world.

The mercantilist spirit of Tripoli was, however, extended into illegal activities and piracy. On the Barbary Coast of North Africa the rulers of Tripoli, just like those of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis, had for years promoted piracy and extortion. After the American Revolution, shipping fell prey to Tripoli's machinations. In May 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli not only demanded protection money from American ships, but also declared war on the United States. An exasperated Thomas Jefferson sent warships to blockade Tripoli, and a wearisome war dragged on till 1805. The plundering of American ships and the demand for tributes did not cease until 1815, when the U.S. Congress authorized a naval expedition against the Mediterranean pirates.

Tripoli became a distributing center for the leatherworks from Hausaland well known in Europe as "Morocco leather." Tripoli's exports to the Sudan

consisted mainly of arms, armor, mercenary soldiers who served as bodyguards to Sudanese rulers, and Arab horses. This rich and rewarding relationship continued until political upheavals disturbed the administration of the territory. After the death of Yusuf Pasha Karamanli in 1830, the disputed succession that followed led to several years of confusion. The Ottoman government thereafter decided to reassert its direct political control over Tripoli. It also took this step to counter Muhammed Ali's ascendancy in Egypt and the French presence in Algeria.

On May 25, 1835, an Ottoman squadron of 22 vessels, together with Turkish troops, stormed the Tripoli harbor. The reigning pasha was deposed and Tripoli was taken over on behalf of the Ottoman sultan.

The occupation of Tripoli by the Ottoman Empire had important consequences. First, the trans-Saharan trade suffered gravely. It also meant the abolition of the Karamanli dynasty. The overthrow of the dynasty marked the beginning of the second Ottoman occupation of Tripoli, and this continued till 1911, when the Italians replaced the Turks as the colonial rulers. However, World War II eroded Italian control of this territory.

In 1949, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution proposing to combine the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan into the independent state of Libya. The nation was formally pronounced as independent on December 24, 1951, with King Idris as ruler. The king ruled an impoverished land that had a population of slightly less than a million people at independence.

In 1969, a military coup led by Colonel Moammar Gaddafi overthrew the king. Upon assuming power, Gaddafi took it upon himself not only to challenge what he regarded as Western imperialism, but also to champion the cause of those he believed were oppressed by capitalism. His suspected implications in various terrorist plots, and support of terrorist activities, has earned him international condemnation, which has had grave implications for Tripoli, culminating in the American bombing of the city in 1986.

In Tripoli, as in the other principal cities of Libya, the cult of the leader is highly venerated. Social mores are relatively relaxed, though polygamy and the restriction and subordination of women in social and political affairs remain a reality. The desire of young Libyans to partake of the good life, brought about by the country's oil wealth, has led to rural-urban drift and this has put a lot of pressure on housing and social infrastructures. In what could also be regarded as the practical manifestation of the philosophy of Jahamariya, a regime officially based on grassroots democracy, every family in Tripoli, with the personal approval of Gaddafi and the official approval of the government, has at least one AK-47 assault rifle in its possession.

OLUTAYO ADESINA

See also: **Libya.**

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Tuareg: Takedda and Trans-Saharan Trade

Trans-Saharan trade between North Africa and the West African Sudan predated Carthaginian and Roman settlement in North Africa. It was the introduction of the camel to the Sahara in the first centuries that made regular and extensive trade possible.

Expansion of the trans-Saharan caravan trade, with the Arab conquest of North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries, was a major stimulus to the creation of political organization south of the Sahara. The main commodities were gold, slaves, spices, leather, and (later) ostrich feathers going north; and weapons, horses, textiles, and paper going south. From the eighth century on, North African Arabic writers make increasingly precise references to kingdoms in the Western Sudan straddling the Sahel-Saharan fringes: Takrur in the far west, on the Senegal, Ghana farther east in the open Sahel, and Gao, the nucleus of the later Songhay empire, on the Niger bend. Farther south, on the upper Niger and tributaries, an incipient kingdom of the Malinke people, the likely forerunner of the Mali empire, was mentioned in the eleventh century. These polities were to form the matrix of the western



A nineteenth-century Tuareg engraving. Hoggar, Algeria. © Das Fotoarchiv.

Sudanese politicocommercial empires until the 1590s (Curtin et al. 1984). Also significant were permanent settlements in Saharan pastoral nomadic areas such as Aoudaghost in Mauritania, Tadamakkat-Es-Suk in Mali, and Takadda-Azelik in Niger, which were vital centers of commerce, religious scholarship, and the arts. Timbuktu, Jenne, Takedda, and Gazargamu were among the centers of Islamic learning from where Islamic scholars emerged during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries as influential leaders serving as ministers, scribes, envoys, and peacemakers. The scholars and mystics in the Mali Adrar and the Air massif established cells and hermitages there. Of diverse Saharan origins, many came from Arab and Berber clans who had been settled in these districts for many centuries. They included the Massufa Sahnaja, who were reputedly ancestors of the Inessufa Icherifan. These latter, centered today around the town of In Gall in Niger, around Takadda (Azelik), and also in Agadez itself, formed the ruling class in the medieval copper and salt complex of Takadda. They were also citizens of the “town of scholars,” Anu Samman, the ruins of which lie west of Agadez. Before the rise of Agadez to prominence, Takadda held status as a town of commerce and Islamic scholarship (Norris 1990).

These settled centers and their infrastructures, as well as the organization of caravan trade, encouraged—indeed, enabled—commerce to occur between political parties that were sometimes in armed conflict. The point of contact with the trans-Saharan trade was the desert’s edge. A sedentary state near the desert would seek to control the desert ports and to control as long a section of the desert-savanna frontier as possible. With an exchange like that of gold for salt, bargaining was open, without a multiplicity of buyers and sellers to establish a market price. Salt could be monopolized because the Saharan deposits were few and easily controlled. Gold could also be monopolized in the same way, but no state south of the Sahara ever came to control the three principal gold fields in West Africa. The Saharan populations benefited from this trade by providing marketplaces in the oases, or by collecting toll and protection money from foreign traders. These revenues could be transformed into political capital, because the group that controlled the trade route could also control its neighbors. The revenues could also be invested in agricultural production in the desert-side regions.

The most important commodity in local and regional trade has been salt, which has been exchanged for millet or other foodstuffs in the south. Notable deposits are found in the deserts of Mauritania and Mali, the Saharan Tenere of eastern Niger, near Fachi, and Bilma in the Kawar region. The earliest-known rock salt mine was in Idjil (present-day Mauritania), where

laborers exploited the deposits from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries. Taghaza (in present-day Mali) was also in full production in the fifteenth century. After the destruction of Taghaza in the sixteenth century, Taodeni (Taghaza al Ghizlan) took its place and in the mid-twentieth century was still producing several thousand tons of salt a year.

In prosperous times, profits from salt and date sales enabled the Tuareg (who were active in the salt trade) to purchase many savanna products: indigo cloth, spices, household utensils, and tools. The large annual caravans of several thousand camels each carried salt and dates to urban commercial centers in the Sahelian periphery. Unlike other trans-Saharan business, however, Tuareg merchants reaped most of the profits from the salt trade. Originally, there were three trans-Saharan caravan routes for this trade; later, only two routes persisted in importance: the route east to Bilma and Fachi for salt and dates. Men from the Air region take leave in October or November, trade millet for salt and dates there, and then return briefly to the Air before proceeding on south to trade in millet, salt, and dates in Kano. Caravanners usually remain in the Hausa Southlands for five to seven months of the year, and bring back millet, utensils, tools, pottery, cloth, and spices. Before departure, camels were grazed in pastures to the west. One camel transported three sacks of millet from Hausaland; when trucks began crossing the Sahara, they did not replace camel caravans, but did diminish their importance, for one truck can take a load comparable to twenty camels’ loads. Some camel caravanners go in person, and some send relatives or former servile persons still attached commercially to the caravanner’s family. The caravanner who takes one camel is entitled to keep one-half a sack of millet; if, for example, he takes six camels, he keeps three sacks, and the owner who sent him received fifteen sacks, and so on. Formerly, nobles brought back one sack of millet for the smith/artisan client families. In the past, slaves accompanied the caravans to cook and watch over animals. Although traditionally Tuareg noble women have not gone on caravan trading expeditions (only slave women went, in the past, to cook and gather firewood), women may participate in the caravan trade indirectly, through sending camels with male relatives (Rasmussen 1998).

The Tuareg participated in the trans-Saharan trade primarily as transporters, guides, and hired security forces, and they also controlled a sizable proportion of desert-edge production destined for trans-Saharan export. Exports of ostrich feathers from the Sudan increased rapidly in the 1870s, declined again in the 1880s, and by the 1890s accounted for about half the total value of exports. The finance of the feather trade was largely in the hands of North African expatriates,

most of whom came from Ghadames. Few nomads possessed the capital needed to invest directly in the trans-Saharan trading; instead, camel owners received a payment for each load they carried and left organization to North Africans who had more specialized knowledge of market conditions and more financial connections. Trade was the driving force of the Mali and Songhay kingdoms. Once new regions of commerce were discovered, particularly in the Americas, the volume and importance of trade declined. Gold, for example, could be obtained from the trans-Atlantic trade, and by the middle of the fifteenth century the adoption of the lateen sail and the stern-post rudder allowed ships to sail to the West African coast and return to Europe. There was no need to cross the desert anymore to trade with West African entities. As a result, the focus of long-distance trade shifted to the coasts of Africa and away from the Sahelian areas.

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See also: **Sahara.**

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Tuareg: Traders, Raiders, and the Empires of Mali and Songhay

The Tuareg first came to prominence as nomadic stock-breeders and caravanners in the Saharan and Sahelian regions at the beginning of the fourteenth century, when trade routes to the lucrative salt, gold, ivory, and slave markets in North Africa, Europe, and the Middle East sprang up across Tuareg lands. As early as the seventh century BCE there were extensive migrations of pastoral Berbers, including the two important groups related to contemporary Tuareg, the Lemta and the Zarawa. Invasions of Beni Hilal and Beni Sulaym Arabs into Tuareg Tripolitania and Fezzan pushed

many Tuareg southward into the Air massif (Nicolaisen 1963, 411). The sedentary cultivators of the Sudan south of the Sahara depended on the salt of the desert; whereas the nomadic Tuareg of the Sahara had to supplement their diet with grains imported from the Sahel, those Sudanic lands immediately bordering the desert. Thus, the successful operation of the trans-Saharan trade required the cooperation of Berbers and Sudanese.

Steven Baier and Paul Lovejoy (1977) argue that the Tuareg and their neighboring societies cannot be treated in isolation, that distinctions between them are not fixed but fluid, closely related to economic specialization and interdependence, and that movement across cultural and political boundaries was frequent and necessary to the economy. The Tuareg and their neighboring peoples interacted within a large, composite society and economy in which cultural distinctions often reflected degrees of specialization. Tuareg society, constructed in a pyramid fashion with nobles on top and various levels of dependents and servile groups below, was dominated by a few aristocratic leaders who in effect acted as managers of large "firms." They invested in diverse activities, ranging from stock breeding to transportation; trade in salt, dates, and grain; manufacturing; land ownership; slave labor; finance of artisanal production; and commercial brokerage. Investments crossed cultural boundaries, however defined, so that Tuareg firms were heavily committed to the economic well-being of the whole Sudan, not just the desert edge of the nomads. Personnel for the firms was drawn from those on both sides of the Saharan-Sudanic frontier, including the Songhay, Hausa, Kanuri, Tubu, and North African peoples. Movement across the Saharan frontier was continuous and at times accelerated by droughts and economic cycles. A strong correlation existed between nomadic life and Tuareg cultural affiliation on the one hand, and sedentary life and non-Tuareg identification, on the other (Baier and Lovejoy 1977).

Climatic cycles of drought were of chief importance in the direction and extent of trading and raiding relations with neighbors. There were limits to the growth of the desert-side sector, which was always more severely affected by drought than the savanna. Since the desert sector could not grow beyond a certain point, the forging of close links with the Sudanic Sahelian savanna border zone and ever-expanding investments there were inevitable. The commercial networks uniting desert and savanna assumed a particularly critical importance in ecological disaster, serving as a safety value for migrating nomadic desert Tuareg in their escape from an environment temporarily unable to support them. Even in prosperous years, however, the desert and savanna were bound together through commerce, for the Tuareg secured a living from the harsh

environment of the Sahara and Sahel through specialization. During July and August, when some rain fell in the southern desert, herders took their animals to the areas with the best pastures. Rainfall in the Air massif of the Sahara was greater than in the surrounding countryside, so pastures there held up long enough for a large contingent of Air Tuareg, as well as others from the south and west, to make an annual trek across the arid Tenere in late October or November to Bilma and Fachi, two oases north of Bornu. Here they purchased salt and dates and sold grain.

The Tuareg sometimes raided and enslaved sedentary people, but the dominant mode of interaction was that of cooperation and peaceful trade. Although they obtained some grain and dates through taxation of sedentary oases peoples, the Tuareg traded for well over half of their requirements. Evidence suggests that raiding may have occurred more frequently on the eastern and western fringes of the desert economy (Baier and Lovejoy 1977). For in these peripheral areas, economic interaction between pastoralists and sedentary people was less intense than in the central area, so that Tuareg had less of a stake in the welfare of their western sedentary Songhay neighbors than they did in the case of more central Sudanic neighbors such as the Hausa, with whom they traded intensively on caravans, and where they resided for longer time periods on those caravans. Yet the Tuareg often promoted their commercial interests by alliances with the Songhay, whose authority during most the sixteenth century extended over the Sahara as far as the salt mines of Taghaza due to the collaboration of the Tuareg. As allies, the Tuareg chiefs were given daughters of the *askiya* (the ruling dynasty of the Songhai empire) in marriage and became more involved in the internal conflicts of the royal family of Songhay.

Peoples at the interface of desert and savanna therefore often interacted in complementary and mutually beneficial exchange: in markets centers such as Agadez, Timbuktu, Gao, and Kano; in caravan trading expeditions; and in marriage alliances. There were also, however, conflicts. Political hegemony oscillated between the nomads of the desert and the kingdoms of the Sudan. Whenever the states of the Sudan controlled the southern termini of the Saharan trade, they extended their influence into the Sahara. The nomads, by their own choice, became incorporated into the hegemonic state. But when the power of the state declined and it was unable to protect trade in the desert-Sahel interface, the nomads pressed south into the Sahel. Military conquest beyond the interface was almost impossible, however, as Sudanese troops were no match for the Tuareg in the desert, and as the camels of the nomads became ineffective as they advanced to the more humid climate in the south. Thus, there was a

delicate military balance between the Tuareg and the Songhay, as each side had the advantage in its own ecological zone.

The institutions of slavery and the slave trade were also common to almost all the states of both the Sahara and the Sudan. Tuareg raids on their neighbors were altogether different from raids on other Tuareg groups, for here new wealth could be created, particularly in slaves. Once these slaves had become integrated into Tuareg society, however, social mobility was possible and identity was negotiable and flexible (Nicolaisen 1963; Rasmussen 1997 and 1999). Within each cultural division, furthermore, other distinctions were recognized; for example, Hausa and Songhay societies also were organized into hereditary, stratified groupings cross-cut by occupations.

In response to military and commercial concerns in relations with their neighbors, the Sahel developed a tradition of a Sudanic imperial system from the eighth to the sixteenth centuries. Two early empires or states in the region of present-day Mali and Niger were Mali (1100–1700BCE) and Songhay (1335–1591BCE). Mali, originally a small kingdom located at the headwaters of the Upper Niger River at Kangaba, gradually expanded so that at its apogee in the fourteenth century it included most of the area of modern Mali as well as Senegal, Gambia, and parts of Mauritania. Songhay developed first around Gao, but it too ultimately extended its reach throughout most of the whole of present-day Mali and also into what is now Niger and Burkina Faso. In the Mali Empire, Sundiata's work as a military leader and lawmaker was considerable. He created a system of alliance both among Malinke clans and between Malinke clans and others, and converted to Islam. Mansa Musa (reigning 1312–1337BCE) shaped the Islamic outlook of the empire and gave it international fame, and developed the Niger River as a waterway between Timbuktu and Jenne, from where trade was carried to the edge of the forest. The rise of Mali was also crucial to the Islamization of the western Sudan (Curtin et al. 1984). At its peak, the authority of Mali extended into the desert. Berbers of the desert paid tribute to Mali and were recruited into its armies. Before the end of the fourteenth century, however, Mali lost its political influence over the Sahara.

The Tuareg, who had earlier acknowledged the authority of Mali, now took advantage of Mali's weakness, raided Timbuktu, and then captured Walata, and much of the northern portion of the Mali domain. During the 40 years that the Tuareg ruled Timbuktu, they did not extend their authority beyond the Niger River, as they were unable to rule lands farther south in the Sahel. As Malian power shrank in the fifteenth century, Timbuktu's economic advantage remained.

Three contestants emerged, seeking to control the strategic Niger bend: the Mossi states within the bend south of Timbuktu; the riverain Songhay; and the Tuareg nomads to the north. Songhay won militarily, and the reign of Sonni Ali (r.1464–1492) marked the passage of Songhay from a small riverain state to a great empire.

The Songhay leader Sonni Ali was succeeded by his son, whose rule only lasted a few months before one of Sonni Ali's generals, who became known as Askia Mohammed, usurped the crown. He divided the state into administered provinces, instituted a tax system, and standardized weights and measures. He encouraged Islamic scholarship and conversions in Timbuktu, Jenne-jeno, and Walata. Askia Mohammed eventually took all land that had once belonged to Mali. He then attacked the Hausa states to the east, and by 1515, he successfully defeated the Tuareg and took their stronghold at Agadez in the Air region. The Tuareg gave him control over the trade routes leading to Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt. Sonni Ali initiated the conquests of the Songhay empire from the Middle Niger region and chased the Tuareg from Timbuktu, but was unable to pursue them overland to the oasis town of Walata (in modern-day Mauritania), some 250 miles to the west.

In the first decade of the sixteenth century, Songhay extended its lateral control westward to the Senegal, thus blanketing Mali's access to the Saharan trade and establishing once more the dominance of the desert-savanna fringe, to last nearly to the end of the sixteenth century, when troops of musketeers, sometimes called *arma*, under Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1603) and the Sa'adis or Saadian rulers of Morocco, in 1591 marched across the Sahara to establish themselves in Timbuktu. The structure was fragile, however, and crumbled within a few years of the conqueror's death in 1603.

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See also: **Mali Empire; Songhay Empire; Timbuktu.**

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Tuareg: Twentieth Century

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Tuaregs began to gradually lose control over the vast area that they occupied. Once the French had set foot in North Africa and begun to expand from Senegal into West Africa, these nomads found themselves trapped between two branches of the same alien power, which was seeking to link its possessions on either side of the continent. Determined to retain their independence and their freedom, the Tuaregs were among those who resisted colonial penetration with the greatest ferocity and tenacity.

Nevertheless, in February 1894, following the massacre of Bonnier's troops by the River Tuaregs at Takoubaou, Colonel Joffre seized control of the city of Timbuktu. Farther East, Madidou, the *amenokal* of the Iwllammedan, signed a treaty in 1896 with Lieutenant Hourst of the French Navy, who was coming down the River Niger, and Madidou's group submitted to the French authorities in 1902. Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth century the French had control of both banks of the Niger.

Meanwhile, Saharan troops from Algeria had slowly been moving southward. The city of In Salah was occupied on December 28, 1899, by the Flamand-Pein mission, while the Eu mission established itself in the oases of Tidikelt and Touat. In 1901, Lieutenant Colonel Laperrine was appointed commander of the Saharan Oases and founded the Saharan Companies. In 1902, Lieutenant Cottenest penetrated the Hoggar and defeated the Tuaregs in the Battle of Tit (May 7). Shortly after this battle, Moussa ag Amastane, the prestigious warlord of the Kel Ahaggar, submitted to the French. The Sudanese and Algerian forces combined for the first time in April 1904, when Laperrine, coming from the north, met Captain Théveniaud, who had set out from the banks of the Niger, at Timiawin. However, the occupation of the Adrar des Ifoghas did not really begin until 1908, and the frontier between Algeria and French Sudan was not officially established until 1909, with the convention of Niamey.

The Tuaregs had not been truly suppressed, however, as the French still had to combat major uprisings. One was led by Firhun, the *amenokal* of the Iwllammedan, in 1916, and another, in 1917, was led by Kaocen of the Kel Air, who was allied by way of the Sanussiyya brotherhood to the Ottoman Turks and the Germans. Finally, it was only in 1920 that the city of Djanet was taken from Kel Ajjer.

Since the French never maintained more than a minimal physical presence in this enormous territory, colonial administration was conducted through the traditional chiefs, who were made responsible for gathering their subjects together for census enumeration and using that data to apportion taxes among their peoples. Similarly, justice was usually a matter of customary law. The territory saw few reforms and little development, while education remained no more than embryonic throughout the colonial era. The primary goal of the French administration was to maintain order, both internally and externally. During the first decades of colonization, its chief concerns were the struggle against the *rezzous*, coming mainly from Morocco to the south, and the settlement of internal disputes by the imposition of arbitration.

Nevertheless, colonization did have some significant effects. The Tuareg lands, which had formed the framework not only for economic activities and relationships but also for social and political bonds, were broken up by the creation of administrative frontiers across the Sahara, with profound consequences for the internal coherence of Tuareg society. Traditional relations between rulers, internal relations of dependence, and external relations of domination over the sedentary peoples of the Sudanese Sahel were all torn apart as new power relations were established. The marginalization of an entire people in relation to the new economic systems being introduced by colonization, and their continuing lack of adaptation to the new social and political arrangements of the settled population (who were being educated and opened up to influences from outside), imposed on the Tuaregs a time lag that was difficult to overcome. This was the fateful situation in which the French left them when, at the time of decolonization, a marginalized Tuareg population found itself having to face an expanding black society.

In 1963, the Tuaregs of the Adrar of the Ifoghas rebelled against the new government of Mali, but other Tuareg groups did not join in this first uprising and it was defeated, with considerable bloodshed, by the new Malian army. As a result, distrust of government spread throughout the Tuareg groups in the Sahel, while in both Mali and Niger the new regimes, having inserted themselves into the administrative and military structures inherited from the French, launched a new, African kind of colonization among the nomad populations. The Tuaregs were not integrated into the structures of these states: few Tuaregs joined the military or administrative elites. Their regions saw few development projects and were governed by the military.

This difficult situation was greatly exacerbated by the recurrent droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, which caused the disappearance of a large proportion of the livestock and the undermining of pastoral nomadism. Hundreds of thousands of Tuaregs took refuge in

neighboring countries (Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya), where they were forced to settle, without resources and in precarious conditions, on the peripheries of cities in the Sahel. Large numbers of young men went to Libya, knowing that they would be able to find work there. Many of them joined the army of Colonel Moammar Gaddafi, and were used in Libya's external campaigns, notably in Lebanon and Chad. Young Tuaregs took advantage of these experiences to acquire military training, with a view to future rebellion, and organized themselves politically, forming the Front populaire de libération du Sahara arabe central (FPLSAC) in September 1980.

The FPLSAC launched its rebellion in 1990. International public opinion was aroused by the army massacres at Tchén Tabaraden in Niger, but the revolt in fact began in Mali, in June 1990, with an armed raid led by Iyad ag Ghali on the city of Menaka. This was followed by dozens of attacks on Malian military bases in the Adrar of the Ifoghas. The Malian dictator, President Moussa Traoré, was already engaged in a confrontation with democratic opponents in the south of the country, and on January 6, 1991, he signed the Tamanrasset accords with the Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad and the Front islamique arabe de l'Azawad in order to give himself a free hand there. However, these accords, which had been drawn up all too hastily, had no effect. Moussa Traoré was overthrown in Banako on March 26, 1991, while in the North of the country there were continual confrontations between the army and the various movements and fronts into which the Tuaregs were divided. These internal divisions reflected a range of complex factors: differences over the ultimate goals of the struggle, individual strategies and personal rivalries, regional and kinship divisions, internal social struggles, and rejection of the traditional structures of chieftaincies and dominant lineages.

On April 11, 1992, after several months of negotiations, the new government of Mali, the Comité transitoire de salut public, headed by Amadou Toumani Touré, succeeded in signing an agreement with the Mouvements et Fronts unifiés de l'Azawad, known as the Pacte national (National Pact), just before the inauguration of Alpha Omar Konaré, the first democratically elected president of Mali. The Pacte national provided for the integration of the rebel fighters into Malian society and gave a special status to the north, which was transformed by a significant measure of decentralization. As a result, insecurity gradually diminished, and the return of peace to Mali was symbolized by the ceremony of the Flamme de la Paix (Flame of Peace) on March 27, 1996, when the rebel movements proclaimed that they were dissolving themselves.

Events unfolded in a similar manner in Niger. After numerous attacks in the north of the country, notably in the Air massif, the Front de libération de l'Aér et de

l'Azawakh signed an initial cease-fire with the state of Niger on May 15, 1992. This did not hold, and was followed by a second cease-fire in March 1993. The rebel movement broke up into several different fronts, but these were eventually successfully united in the Coordination de la résistance armée, led by Mano Dayak, who set out his political program in February 1994. Following lengthy negotiations conducted under the auspices of Burkina-Faso, France, and Algeria, a peace agreement was signed on April 24, 1995. However, the last remaining Tuareg dissidents in the Union des forces de la résistance armée, who were allied to the Toubou rebels, did not sign an accord with the government of Niger until November 28, 1997.

The Tuareg revolts did not raise the question of the national frontiers inherited from colonial times in either Mali or Niger. Instead, they demanded better political, economic, and social integration of the nomad communities that had been marginalized since decolonization. In both countries, such integration required the transformation of the Tuaregs into citizens in the fullest sense, with their identity being considered as one of the cultural components of the nation, and the genuine opening up of the Tuareg regions. By the end of the 1990s, with hundreds of Tuaregs having joined the regular armies of the two states and with the populations in the South beginning to take account of the existence of nomad societies as integral parts of their nations, it seemed that these goals were on their way to being realized.

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Tukolor Empire of al-Hajj Umar

The Tukolor empire of Al Hajj Umar (c.1796–1864) was formed in western Africa in the middle of the nineteenth century, against the background of major jihads (holy wars) and the beginning of colonial penetration. It was an era of political upheavals, during which some remarkable individuals, appealing both to Islam and to certain specific social groups, undertook large-scale conquests and founded political entities that amounted to states, complete with administrative structures. Umar Tal, who was to be one of these individuals, was born in 1796 or 1797 at Halvar (now in Mali) on the

Senegal River. This was shortly after an initial wave of jihad had been launched in western Africa, notably under the leadership of the *almamy* (ruler) Ibrahim Sori, who founded the Islamic state of Futa Jalon; and some years before Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817) and his successor Mohammed Bello (1817–1837) established the caliphate of Sokoto farther to the East.

Umar Tal was born a member of the Tukolor people (a name derived from the Wolof *Tekkrur*) and of a family of *hal-pularen* (speakers of the Pular dialect of Fulfulde) that had links to a clerical caste. This meant that he received a form of religious instruction that was enhanced by a long journey to the Qadiriya brotherhood's *zawiya* (monastic settlement) of Walata and, above all, to the holy places of Islam in the Arab Hejaz. In the course of this journey he passed through Bornu and Egypt, where he made contact with the literary men of the university of Al Ahzar. He stayed in Mecca for three years, residing with Muhammad al-Ghali, the Caliph of the Tijaniya brotherhood, who made Umar a *muqaddam* (headman) within the brotherhood, and commissioned him to destroy paganism in Sudan, upon which al-Ghali made Umar the Tijaniya caliph.

After his return from Mecca, Umar remained in Sokoto for seven years (1830–1837), forming an alliance with Mohammed Bello, who arranged for Umar to marry his daughter. It was also in Sokoto that Umar wrote his most important book, *Suyuf al Saïd*, in which he expounds his teachings. He was then received in the capital of Massina, in the home of Seku Ahmadu at Hamdalahi, and finally by the almamy of Futa Jalon. With the authorization of this ruler, he founded his own monastic settlement at Jegunko in 1840. This is where Umar wrote *Ar Rimah (The Spears)*, the work that became the basis for the Umarian branch of the Tijaniya brotherhood.

Al Hajj Umar's jihad began in 1852–1853 with the siege of Tamba, where the movement scored its first victory. New disciples, drawn by Umar's prestige, flocked to Dinguiraye, where he established himself next. Using the booty collected thus far, Umar reinforced his army and armed the troops with English shotguns bought in Sierra Leone. Following the conquest of the gold-mining region of Bambuk, they took Niore, the capital of the animistic Bambara state of Kaarta, on April 11, 1855; it became the center of Umar's government. Next, Umar turned west, toward Futa Toro, but he came up against the hostility of the Qadiriya *zawiyas* and, more important, of the French, based in Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal, who had strengthened their position by building fortifications at points along the river. In 1856 the French Governor Louis Faidherbe responded to the threat by ordering the construction of the fort at Médine, which allowed the French to drive a wedge between Umar's

two main possessions, Kaarta and Dinguiraye. Faidherbe entrusted the command to Paul Holle and made a series of agreements with local chiefs that began to change the pattern of regional alliances, undermining Al Hajj Umar's position.

Umar first repressed the Jawara revolt, which caused his movement significant losses, and then launched an attack on Médine in April 1857. His army, 15,000 strong, encircled the French fort, which was defended by a much smaller number of troops. However, the French were armed with cannons and were well protected by the steep fortifications. Following a series of unsuccessful assaults, Umar besieged the fort for two months, but in July the rising of the river waters permitted Faidherbe to send two gunboats, with several hundred men, up close to Médine. They succeeded in liberating the fort.

The caliph then launched a large-scale migration of his supporters toward the East, modeled on the Prophet Mohammed's *hejira* (journey from Mecca to Medina), in order to put some distance between his movement and the French. In October 1859, however, Faidherbe took the offensive once more, attacking and razing Gemu, Umar's main fortress in northern Senegal. With his expansion to the west blocked by the French, Al Hajj Umar moved east once again, to assault the Bambara kingdom of Segu. With this goal in mind, but also to protect himself, he entered into negotiations with Faidherbe, assuring him that he renounced all claims on Senegal.

Umar's armies then conquered the Marka cities of Nyamina and Sinsani, and in the battle of Woitala, in September 1860, they triumphed over the forces of the Bambara empire. Thus, Umar's influence was extended over the most important cities on the Middle Niger. He reached Segu on March 9, 1860, had the Bambara ruler executed and the animist fetishes destroyed, and made the city his capital.

In 1862, Umar's jihad took a new turn as he led his armies against the caliphate of Hamdalahi in Massina, which, like his own realm, was both Fulani and Moslem. This action was criticized by many Muslims on precisely these grounds, and it was not easy to justify it. On May 17, 1862, Al Hajj Umar entered Hamdalahi in triumph, after winning a battle, but he proved to be unable to maintain control of the country. An insurrection soon broke out, and the rebels won several of their battles with Umar's armies. By the end of 1863, Hamdalahi was under siege. On February 6, 1864, Umar succeeded in escaping from the city, but the insurgents caught up with him, and he met his death on February 10, among the cliffs of Degembere, near Bandiagara.

The succession to Umar was contested, and as a result his empire did not long survive him. His nephew Tijani initiated the reconquest of the territories that had gone over to the insurgents, an undertaking that lasted for several years and resulted in the devastation of

Massina. Matters were not made any easier for him by his quarrels with Umar's son Ahmadu Seku, who could not accept Tijani's claim to be Umar's successor. Meanwhile, conquests by the French as they advanced eastward reduced what was left of Umar's possessions. Niore was conquered in 1891, and Ahmadu fled to Bandiagara, where he had himself recognized as "commander of the faithful." However, he was compelled to flee still further to the East when the French approached that city too. He died in 1897.

Nonetheless, at its peak Umar's empire, a military theocracy that took the law of the Quran as its principle of government, had succeeded in establishing an administrative structure on the Egyptian or Turkish model, with a separation of powers between civilian pashas and military beys under the authority of the spiritual leader, who was assisted by a council. However, the empire did not last long enough for this attempted structure to become stabilized, while Umar laid himself wide open to criticism by transforming jihad into a war of conquest. His endeavors, coming too late, clashed with European imperialism, which struck the fatal blow against them.

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See also: Futa Jalon; Senegal: Faidherbe, Louis and Expansion of French Senegal, 1854–1865; Sokoto Caliphate: Hausa, Fulani and Founding of; 'Uthman dan Fodio.

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Tulunids: See Egypt: Tulunids and Ikhshidids, 850–969.

Tunis

The capital and largest city of Tunisia lies on the western bank of the Lake of Tunis, a shallow lagoon linked to the Mediterranean Sea by a narrow channel. A settlement already existed on the site in the ninth century BCE, when Phoenician merchants founded Carthage on the coast some ten miles away. The Romans destroyed

Tunis along with Carthage after their victory in the Third Punic War (146BCE). Although the revival of Tunis preceded that of Carthage itself, the city existed in the shadow of its more famous neighbor throughout the early Christian era.

The Arab invaders of the seventh century at first avoided the area around Carthage, focusing their attention on the steppes and deserts that were less well defended by the region's Byzantine rulers. In 698, Ibn Numan did capture Carthage, but ignored it in favor of Tunis, a site less susceptible to seaborne counterattacks. Tunis remained the second city (after Qayrawan) of the province the Arabs called Ifriqiya (Africa) until 1160, when the al-Muwahhid dynasty acknowledged its growing orientation toward the Mediterranean by making Tunis the capital. The Hafsid dynasty, which came to power half a century later, elevated Tunis to the rank of a first class Mediterranean urban center, creating a golden age by lavishing vast sums, generated by a flourishing maritime and trans-Saharan commerce, on the city's physical appearance and cultural atmosphere. The importance of Tunis was reflected in the increasing use of the word *Tunisia*, rather than *Ifriqiya*, to designate the whole territory.

Hafsid's deterioration in the sixteenth century exposed Tunis to a variety of external pressures. In 1534, the Muslim corsair Khair al-Din Barbarossa seized the fortress guarding the entrance to the Lake of Tunis at La Goulette, only to be ousted in the following year by the Hapsburg emperor Charles V, whose victory inaugurated a Spanish protectorate over the city and its immediate vicinity. The Turkish ruler of Algiers occupied Tunis in 1569, but failed to dislodge the La Goulette garrison. This failure enabled Spain to regain Tunis in 1573, but in the next year Ottoman troops compelled the Spaniards to relinquish both positions for the last time.

Direct Turkish rule over Tunis lasted only until 1591, when a military coup replaced Istanbul's governor with a succession of military officers, the *deys*. Their inability to exercise control beyond Tunis and a few other urban centers enabled the *beys*, soldiers responsible for the security of the countryside, to seize power. Murad Bey and his descendants made the city their headquarters, carefully cultivating links with its prominent families. Rivalries among Murad's heirs triggered a civil war in which the rulers of Algiers intervened, occupying Tunis in 1686 and again in 1694–1695. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the city thrived on the corsair raiding that had been a mainstay of its economy since Hafsid times. When the mercantilist philosophy of the European powers prompted them to take steps to limit such activities in the latter half of the century, Tunis's entrepreneurs compensated by increasing their participation in legitimate, if not always equally remunerative, commerce.

An upsurge in corsair activity during the Napoleonic Wars led to a British naval bombardment of Tunis in 1816 that brought the maritime raids launched from the city to an end. For the remainder of the nineteenth century, European influences in Tunis became increasingly apparent as Western commercial and political institutions proliferated. European speculators also promoted infrastructural development projects that included the construction of railway and telegraph lines expediting contacts between Tunis and Europe.

Although French troops entered the city in May 1881 and established a protectorate over the country, the policy of maintaining an appearance of continuity with the precolonial regime enabled Tunis to retain its position as the country's political and economic center of gravity. In the years that followed, the city underwent considerable physical expansion, as the mile or so of marshland between its walls and the lake was reclaimed to become the European residential and commercial quarter. Neighborhoods that already existed outside the walls were gradually incorporated into the capital, but the lake on one side of the city and several dry lake beds on the other severely limited its prospects for physical expansion.

The 1994 national census placed the population of Tunis and the governorates of Ariana and Ben Arous, which comprise its modern suburbs, at just over 1.8 million, or more than a fifth of the country's total population. In 2000, the population of Tunis proper passed the one million mark. These figures indicate that the capital is the overwhelmingly dominant urban center of the country. Industrialization has concentrated in and around Tunis, where the best-educated and most highly skilled members of the workforce live. Its easy access to European markets offers another valuable asset. The potential benefits of this process have been blunted by the city's magnet effect on the unemployed and underemployed elsewhere in Tunisia. Internal migration to Tunis has placed a great strain on the city's infrastructure, particularly in terms of housing and essential public services. While less acute than in many cities of the developing world, these issues nonetheless pose a serious ongoing challenge.

The temporary relocation to Tunis of several regional political organizations raised the city's international profile in the 1980s. To protest Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, the Arab League moved its secretariat from Cairo to Tunis in 1979. Its offices remained there until Egypt was reintegrated into the Arab world, making a return to Cairo feasible in 1990. When the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon drove the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) out of Beirut, the Tunisian government, at the urging of the United States, proposed its capital as the new site of the PLO's headquarters. In the years that followed, Tunis became the center of

Palestinian political and diplomatic activity and the home of several thousand PLO officials and their families. Pursuant to the terms of the 1993 peace treaty between the PLO and Israel, the Palestinian Authority was formed to administer territory recovered from Israeli occupation. Thereafter, a steady stream of PLO administrators, led by Yasser Arafat, left Tunis to take up residence in Palestine.

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
See also: Barbary Corsairs and the Ottoman Provinces: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in the Seventeenth Century; Carthage; Maghrib: Ottoman Conquest of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis; Tunisia.

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Tunisia: Ahmad Bey and Army Reform

Ahmad Bey (r.1837–1855), the tenth ruler of the Husyanid dynasty, came to power shortly after the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and the Ottoman occupation of Libya in 1835, both of which posed threats to Tunisia's autonomy. While the Ottomans envisaged an occupation of Tunisia, Ahmad Bey sought French diplomatic support to counter the Ottomans. The French supported Ahmad Bey because an alliance between Tunisia and France provided security for the



Tunisia.

eastern border of Algeria during the Algerian war of resistance between 1830 and 1848. To mark the alliance, Ahmad Bey made an official state visit to France in 1846, the first such visit made by an African head of state to Europe.

An essential part of Ahmad's policy to secure Tunisia's autonomy was the reform of the army. Husayn Bey (r.1824–1835) began reform along the lines adopted by the Ottoman army in 1826, which was referred to by the Ottomans and the Tunisians as the "new order" (*nizam-i cedid*). Ahmad Bey's reforms showed the influence of Ottoman reform, yet Tunisia had been impressed by the French defeat of the Ottoman *dey* (governor) in Algiers. Thus, upon assuming power in 1837, Ahmad Bey declared himself commander in chief of the army and sought French assistance for military reform. The size of the army was rapidly expanded by conscription to 26,000. While the highest ranks in the army continued to be filled by *mamluk* (slave) recruits from Istanbul, conscription of native Tunisians had a revolutionary impact upon Tunisian society. Conscription fell upon the agrarian population. Each family was obliged to furnish one adult male between 15 and 40 years of age, whose service in the army was of indefinite, and possibly of lifelong, duration. Resistance was intense, and fines and imprisonment were imposed on entire families to ensure that conscripts were made available for service. By such brutal methods a new social order was created. Ahmad Bey's government portrayed service in the army as a religious and patriotic duty, the latter indicating a major shift in cultural attitudes toward national patriotism.

The *mamluk* elite was not immune from the new order, either. In 1831 French officers began instruction of troops and officers at the military base at Muhammadiya;

in 1840 a military academy at Bardo was founded. An official French military mission arrived in 1842 to assist in training the officers. The impact this had on the mamluk officers is evident in the career of Khayr al-Din. Purchased in 1839 and trained in the military academy, Khayr al-Din was afterward renowned for his dedication to modernization of the administration as well as the system of government. In this way the reform of the military was instrumental in creating a new political cadre, trained in modern technologies, administrative methods, and political thought. This was perhaps the most enduring legacy of military reform, as the army itself was decimated at the end of Ahmad Bey's reign in the Crimea and the French military mission at Bardo disbanded.

The economy was also transformed by Ahmad Bey. Although already integrated into the Middle Eastern and European economies, Tunisia in the era of Ahmad Bey increased its trade with Europe to raise revenue for military reforms. Olive oil exports became the basis of a new, state-led commercial venture by which the *bey* (governor) endeavored to monopolize revenues by demanding olive oil as payment of state taxes. However, foreign investors also demanded olive oil in return for cash advances, which ruined many merchant and agrarian notables. The agrarian economy of Tunisia was thus drawn into an expansive international economy, increasingly controlled by the developing financial institutions of Europe. Likewise, in the free market system imposed by France in the treaty of 1830, Tunisian industries could not compete with European imports. Nor could Tunisians produce for the international market without borrowing from European financiers. For instance, the previously very profitable production of the *fez* (*shashiyya*), which was exported to Middle Eastern markets, declined with competition from European producers. Likewise, when factories were built to produce armaments and gunpowder, European speculators profited at Tunisia's expense. Much of the armaments purchased in Europe were second-rate, in some cases dating from the late eighteenth century, while the suppliers and contractors filling government orders made huge profits. Even more ominous for Tunisia's autonomy was the proposal by the bey to secure loans from European financiers to continue the development of the military and navy, as well as the construction of a series of palaces, which were draining the treasury of its reserves of gold and silver. This trend indicated that while Tunisia had made a positive response to new circumstances by developing the export economy, the necessary reorientation to Europe had weakened the national economy relative to Europe.

Before the European loan was proposed, Ahmad Bey had sought revenue by a reorganization of tax

collection, which transformed the customary relations between state and society. State involvement in agrarian society increased with the imposition of new taxes and tax collectors under a tax-farming regime, presided over by the state banker and supplier, Mahmud Ibn al-'Ayyad, and the treasurer, Mustafa Khaznadar. Tax reform increased the amount, as well as the number of different types, of taxes. New taxes were imposed on olive and palm trees, as well as on the sale of livestock, which brought nomadic pastoralists under the sway of the tax collector for the first time. Yet, the greatest burden fell upon the agrarian population. Khaznadar was committed to centralization of the regime to facilitate tax collection therefore tax-farming privileges were concentrated in the hands of his supporters, which broke the power of the hereditary, agrarian notables, such as the Jalluli family of Sfax. In Tunis new taxes were resisted when initially imposed in the 1840s. Revolts occurred in Tunis, its port La Goulette, and at Kabis. Tunis was thus exempt from the new tax regime. But this only increased the burden on the rural population, while tax-farmers, such as Ibn al-'Ayyad, made fortunes. Although a general inquest into the tax system was begun in the 1850s, the purpose was to consolidate the reformed tax system and increase state revenue.

The impulse of military reform had been straightforward. It was designed to increase the powers of the Husaynid dynasty against external threats, and to win from the Ottomans recognition of Ahmad Bey as an independent sovereign. But the methods Ahmad Bey employed to modernize the army and increase revenue had complex and multiple ramifications. The new practice of army conscription, as well as tax reform, increased the role of the state, which had a revolutionary impact upon relations between state and society. One important symbol of political and social change came in 1846, when Tunisia became the first North African state to abolish slavery, two years before slavery was abolished in French Algeria. Not only were domestic servants freed; abolition also meant an end to the practice of purchasing mamluks for military and administrative service. On the other hand, the development of the modern state brought with it commercialization of the economy, which opened the door to Europe's imperial expansion. This ultimately undercut the initial impulse of reform to strengthen Tunisia against foreign threats and secure its political independence.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: **Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900; Tunisia: Khayr al-Din and Constitutional and Administrative Reform, 1855–1878.**

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Tunisia: Khayr al-Din and Constitutional and Administrative Reform, 1855–1878

At the end of the reign of Ahmad Bey in 1855, Khayr al-Din had already established his reputation as an administrative reformer. With the accession of Muhammad Bey (1855–1859) a reform law was passed in 1857, known as the “fundamental pact,” that instituted judicial and political reform. Khayr al-Din participated in committees formed afterward to modernize the judiciary, particularly to reform criminal, commercial, and agricultural law, as well as sitting on a committee to draft the first Tunisian political constitution (*dustur*). The constitution of 1861 reiterated the declarations of the fundamental pact, which guaranteed equal rights for all subjects, as well as setting up a system of state tribunals which superseded the Islamic courts. In addition it created a supreme council, a new legislative body composed of 60 Tunisian notables, which limited the historic, autocratic powers of the *bey* (governor).

The reforms were supported by the French and British consuls as a means to bring about a market economy favorable to European commercial expansion. Thus, when Khayr al-Din opposed Tunisian loans from European financiers in 1862, the European consuls entered Tunisian politics on the side of the autocratic *bey* against the reformers, led by Khayr al-Din. Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey (1859–1882) and the prime minister, Mustafa Khaznadar, saw this as an opportunity to reestablish the hereditary powers of the ruler and therefore forced Khayr al-Din from office in 1862, with European support. The loan made by European financiers in 1863 imposed particularly excessive interest, which meant the *bey* was compelled to double the rate of the *majba* (capitation) tax. The result was the great insurrection of 1864. Initially a rural movement against the tax collector, the insurrection spurred the political reaction against the reformers. Such reaction had the support of the religious class, which

resented the imposition of state tribunals and laws above the Islamic courts. With this as a ready justification, Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey and Khaznadar suspended the constitution.

These events influenced Khayr al-Din’s political thought as expressed in his political treatise, *The Surest Path to Knowledge of the Conditions of Kingdoms* (1867), which argued that modern institutions and principles of government, such as parliamentary consultation, were the equivalent of original, Islamic political concept. The treatise also appealed to the religious class to take an active role in politics, which he described as compatible with original Islamic, if not customary, practice. He also argued that there was nothing in Islamic law that impeded modern finance, technology, and science as initiated in Europe, because knowledge and truth did not recognize cultural boundaries. Beside this attempt to reformulate Islamic ideology, he made an analysis of modern imperialism when he predicted that Europe’s industrial economy would make North Africa a target for European expansion.

Khayr al-Din sat as the sole Tunisian alongside British and French representatives on an international financial commission founded in 1869 after Khaznadar’s corrupt regime had bankrupted the country. Designed to reorganize Tunisia’s finances with European advice and supervision, the findings of the commission resulted in the dismissal of Khaznadar in 1873. In that year Khayr al-Din became the prime minister, beginning a period of administrative reform, which laid the foundations of the modern Tunisian state. His reorganization of rural administration reduced the executive authority of the provincial governors (*qa’ids*) by legally defining their revenue rights, which had been subject to abuse under Khaznadar. A law of 1860 regulating the provinces was revived, along with supplementary laws, which limited the governor’s share of taxes to 10 per cent of the total, as well as making the governor responsible for delivering the tax to the state treasury. As a result, what had formerly been an aristocratic sinecure was transformed into a bureaucratic office under tight supervision. The reform also reversed a trend under Khaznadar of appointing members of his clique, normally of *mamluk* (Ottoman slave official) origin, to these lucrative provincial seats.

In accordance with his political thought, Khayr al-Din sought the support of the religious class in his administrative reform. The elementary (*kuttab*) schools and the Zaytuna university mosque were placed under state administration, while a modern university, al-Sadiqiyya, was created to instruct civil servants. The government committees convened to bring about these reforms were staffed by moderate religious scholars, who inspected the application of reforms that touched

upon issues of Islamic personal status. Khayr al-Din's measures were designed to reduce the autonomy of the religious class and thereby decrease the potential for opposition, while bringing the jurisdiction of the Islamic courts under bureaucratic supervision. By incorporating the religious leadership into the bureaucracy, new opportunities were opened to native-born Tunisians; consequently, old distinctions between mamluk aristocracy and subjects, Turks and Tunisians, were broken down, engendering a more unified national elite. In sum, Khayr al-Din was responsible for the formation of Tunisia's modern, bureaucratic institutions, which was the first step toward creating a national community.

Khayr al-Din's relationship to Europe is complex. As the executive minister between 1869 and 1873, he worked with European commissioners to consolidate the national debt and reorganize Tunisia's finances. After 1873, as prime minister, his reforms increased the area under cultivation, which raised national productivity by perhaps as much as a third. Yet, by removing land from indigenous and peasant sharecropping systems to a private market economy, his agricultural reforms tended to play into larger financial interests. He became essentially an absentee landlord. Likewise, treaties with European powers ensured the relative weakness of Tunisia's economy, such as provisions that kept tariffs low—to the detriment of Tunisian commerce and industry. However, even while some of his reforms favored European interests, Khayr al-Din resisted European encroachments where he could. He limited the number of concessions made to Europeans, guarding against the kind of collusion between European financiers and Tunisian statesmen that had characterized the era of Khaznadar. As European competition for contracts and concessions grew intense in the late 1870s, Khayr al-Din resisted concessions for railways, ports, utilities, and mines, which were largely designed to enrich concessionaires and facilitate French imperial expansion in the region.

Nevertheless, Khayr al-Din's resistance to European influence brought about a coalition of interests against him in 1877, similar to those that brought about his isolation in 1862. In this case, however, it was the first step toward French colonial occupation in 1881. After his dismissal from office and exile in 1877, Khayr al-Din was forced to observe from Istanbul the spectacle of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany bargaining away Tunisia's independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. While the sale of his properties made him wealthy, as well as establishing a foothold for colonial speculators, his historical legacy as the founder of constitutional government, as an Islamic modernist and as

a statesman dedicated to Tunisia's independence, has made him a hero of the Tunisian nationalist movement.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: **Tunisia: Ahmad Bey and Army Reform; Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900.**

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Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the European powers acknowledged France's special interest in Tunisia because of its political assimilation of neighboring Algeria. Three years later, raids by Tunisians into Algerian territory provided the excuse to dispatch French soldiers across the frontier. Encountering only sporadic resistance, they marched on to Tunis. With this formidable force at the doorstep of his capital, Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey had little choice but to accede to French demands, which were embodied in the Treaty of the Bardo. Although the *bey* (governor) kept his throne, he was compelled to accept a French resident minister to oversee Tunisian contacts with foreign powers. In addition, the commander of the French troops, which remained in Tunisia, took charge of the Tunisian armed forces.

Significant resistance to the French occupation developed only among the groups of central and southern Tunisia. In the coastal cities, whose prosperity was linked to the maintenance of order, even foreign rule was preferable to tribal insurrection. French and Tunisian troops crushed the rural resistance in short order, but as many as 120,000 rebels (10 per cent of the total population) escaped the clutches of the government by fleeing to Tripolitania. Since neither the bey nor the French wanted large numbers of disgruntled Tunisians beyond their reach in an adjacent territory, the government issued a general pardon that induced most of the exiles to return within a few years.

Ali Bey, who followed Muhammad al-Sadiq to the throne in 1882, signed the La Marsa Convention formally establishing a French protectorate over Tunisia in 1883. Obligated by its terms to implement administrative, judicial, and financial reforms dictated by France, the bey now lost control over many domestic matters, as well as over foreign affairs. Responsibility for applying these reforms fell to Paul Cambon, the French resident general after 1882. Cambon carefully maintained the appearance of Tunisian sovereignty while reshaping the administrative structure in order to give France complete control of the country and render the beylical government a hollow shell devoid of real power.

French officials employed various tactics to assure their dominance of the beylical government. They urged the bey to place in key posts members of the pre-colonial ruling elite whose personal loyalty would cause them to follow his lead in offering no opposition to French plans, while those Tunisians who had supported the 1881 rebellion or had otherwise opposed the extension of French influence were dismissed from government posts. A Frenchman became the secretary general to the Tunisian government, an office created in 1883 to advise the prime minister and oversee and coordinate the work of the bureaucracy. French experts responsible to the secretary general and the resident general managed and staffed the government's technical services, which dealt with finances, public works, education, and agriculture. The resident general also had the power to promulgate executive decrees.

France also left the framework of local government in place, while devising similar mechanisms of control. Before the protectorate, *qaids*, or provincial governors, maintained order and collected taxes in jurisdictions defined either by tribal membership or geography. The central government appointed them and, on their recommendation, the shaykhs who constituted the next level of leadership. Because most of these men grasped the futility of resisting the French, as well as the possibility of benefiting from collaboration with them, most were able to retain their posts. To keep a close watch on developments outside the capital, however, the resident general relied on *contrôleurs civils*, French officials who closely supervised the qaids and shaykhs throughout the country, except in the extreme south. There, military officers assigned to a *service des renseignements* (intelligence service) performed the same task. Successive residents general, fearful of the soldiers' tendency toward direct rule, which belied the myth of continued Tunisian governance, strove to bring the service des renseignements under their control, finally succeeding late in the century.

Shoring up the debt-ridden Tunisian treasury headed Cambon's list of immediate priorities. In 1884,

France guaranteed the Tunisian debt and abolished the International Debt Commission, a multinational agency that had overseen the country's finances since 1869. Responding to French pressures to create a more equitable tax system that would stimulate a revival in productivity and commerce and would generate additional revenues for the state, the beylical government lowered taxes, including a particularly hated personal assessment, the *majba*.

In 1883, the introduction of French courts and French law, which subsequently applied to all foreigners, induced the European powers to abandon the consular courts that had been designed to shelter their nationals from the Tunisian judiciary. The protectorate authorities made no attempt to alter the system of Muslim religious courts in which judges, or *qadis*, tried cases in accordance with Islamic law. Under the watchful eye of the French, a beylical court handling Tunisian criminal cases operated in the capital and similar courts functioned in the provinces after 1896.

Persuaded that modern education would foster harmonious Franco-Tunisian relations by bridging the gap between Arab and European cultures, as well as creating a cadre of Tunisians with skills needed in the growing government bureaucracy, the protectorate authorities created a Directorate of Public Education, headed by a Frenchman, to oversee all Tunisian schools, including religious ones. The directorate set up a unitary Franco-Arab school system for French and Tunisian pupils in which French was the medium of instruction, the curriculum replicated that of schools in metropolitan France, and French-speaking students studied Arabic as a second language. In urban areas, even in such schools, racial mixing rarely occurred, because private religious schools, both Christian and Muslim, continued to flourish. Although they met with greater success in rural areas, the Franco-Arab schools never enrolled more than a fifth of Tunisia's eligible students. At the summit of the modern education system was Sadiqi College. Highly competitive examinations regulated admission, but Sadiqi graduates were almost assured of a government position by virtue of their advanced training in modern subjects and their mastery of the increasingly important French language.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: Tunisia: Nationalism, Growth of, 1881–1938.

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Tunisia: Immigration and Colonization, 1881–1950

European speculators had begun purchasing land around Tunis and in the Majarda Valley even before the inauguration of the French protectorate in 1881. To facilitate colonization, the protectorate government introduced voluntary land registration procedures in 1885. It also decreed that French, not Islamic, courts would adjudicate property disputes, but high fees limited the area registered. An 1886 beylical decree allowed foreigners to acquire *habus* lands (the revenues of which traditionally supported religious and charitable foundations or individual family trusts) through a system of permanent rental. When Europeans acquired property, they often charged Tunisians high rents to remain on the land or forced them into sharecropping arrangements.

Even after a decade of the protectorate, only about 1500 French, a minority of whom worked the land, lived in rural regions. Italians, who were more numerous, owned less land but more often farmed it themselves. Concern over the size of the Italian community prompted protectorate officials to take steps to attract French settlers. Tunisian state-owned lands were parceled into lots for sale at minimal cost to French citizens. To make still more land available, protectorate officials required the *Habus* administration to earmark at least 5,000 acres annually for purchase by French buyers. Consequently, the number of French settlers, or *colons*, on the land increased. Colon agriculture

centered around olive cultivation, especially in the Sahel, the region along the east coast.

Colons enjoyed numerous privileges. The protectorate government expended considerable sums to develop a transportation and communication network geared to their needs. A road system expedited the movement of their produce to market. Railways linking Tunis with the Sahel and Bizerte with the Majarda Valley, both areas with large settler populations, branched off the main line between Tunis and Algeria. Another railroad served the phosphate mines in the south. Improvements to the ports of Tunis, Bizerte, and Sfax during the 1890s benefited European commercial interests. Protectorate fiscal policy also worked to colon advantage. Farmers who utilized modern equipment, which included virtually all Europeans and almost no Tunisians, enjoyed a 90 per cent tax exemption on cereals. No taxes were levied on grapes, prompting settlers (but not Tunisians) to plant vineyards. Nor did colons pay the *majba*, a personal tax. Such concessions absolved the colons of all but minor assessments, placing the brunt of the tax burden on Tunisians, who, despite widespread impoverishment, often accounted for as much as four-fifths of the protectorate's revenues. The colons exercised political power through the Consultative Conference, an advisory body to the resident general created in 1891. Since Tunisians were not permitted to sit in the Conference until 1907, it served as a vehicle for the expression and protection of colon interests.

By 1900, French citizens owned 1.25 million acres, a fourfold increase during the 20 years of the protectorate. Only about 12 per cent of the French population worked the land, however, with most French residents still living in urban areas. By World War I, French property totalled 1.75 million acres, while all other Europeans in the country owned only 300,000 acres. Even with the steady growth of the French population, Italians remained more numerous until the 1930s.

The settlers' economic impact belied their numbers. Employing modern techniques on the rich land, they produced surpluses of exportable wheat and olive oil. To guarantee a market for Tunisian products, France granted them duty-free entry after 1890. A further integration of the two economies occurred in 1898 when French goods gained duty-free entry to Tunisia. In addition to their agricultural pursuits, the colons also built factories and mills, many for processing or packaging crops, and developed mines. But their hope that exporting Tunisia's substantial phosphate reserves would correct the country's trade imbalance was shattered when the mineral's value plummeted early in the twentieth century. In the mines and factories of the protectorate, as in its fields, the French acted as managers; Italians or other Europeans provided skilled



Plowing a field, Tunisia, 1922. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

labor; and Tunisians were relegated to menial jobs at the bottom of the economic ladder.

The colons continued to prosper after World War I and an increasing number of French worked an increasing proportion of the land. As part of its effort to augment the French population, the government made easy credit available to prospective settlers and continued to promote the sale of Tunisian products in France. The high price of and steady demand for wheat in the metropole encouraged capital intensive agricultural enterprises. Many Tunisian tenant farmers and sharecroppers lost their access to land, forcing them into day labor, the exploitation of marginal tracts, or migration to the cities. In search of large profits, the colons also sowed previously uncultivated lands used for pasturage, thus endangering the livestock on which many Tunisians depended for their survival.

The depression of the 1930s hit Tunisia hard. The market value of its most important products reached its nadir in 1934 and French quotas on imported wines hurt vintners. The price of olive oil fell drastically just as new trees, planted in the postwar boom, began bearing fruit. Most assistance programs were tailored to the needs of the export-dependent colons. To avert their total ruin, the government imposed a debt moratorium in 1934 and also intervened to stabilize the price of wheat. In another attempt to shore up settler agricultural interests, the government financed the uprooting of grape vines and their replacement with potentially more profitable fruit trees. The colons' plight improved after 1936, when the Spanish Civil War and League of Nations sanctions on Italy reduced the agricultural exports of two of Tunisia's main competitors.

World War II disrupted the recovery. Following the Allied liberation of the country in 1943, the colons' prospects brightened, but a surge in nationalist sentiment during the decade after the war created an uncertain political and economic environment unattractive to new settler projects. Even so, the relatively pacific nature of the Tunisian nationalist movement (at least until the very eve of independence) meant that there was no massive settler flight, with many Europeans choosing to remain in the country even after the termination of the protectorate.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: **Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900; World War I: Survey; World War II: North Africa.**

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Tunisia: Nationalism, Growth of, 1881–1934

The earliest calls for changes in the French protectorate came from a small group of loosely organized reformers who urged France to honor its unfulfilled pledge to introduce reforms liberalizing the beylical government and enhancing its subjects' well-being. At the same time, these Young Tunisians, as they were known, also insisted on protecting the country's Arabo-Islamic heritage. In the late 1880s they began publishing *al-Hadira*, a newspaper that stressed the need for social change within an Islamic context but also urged the selective adaptation of western ideas. In 1896, the movement organized the *Khalduniyya*, an educational society offering Arabic-language instruction in a variety of modern subjects to students in traditional Islamic institutions.

The Young Tunisians' efforts to straddle the cultural divide elicited strong criticisms. Conservative Tunisians attacked their enthusiasm for the West while European settlers, especially the poorer among them, feared the implications of the equitable relationship the Young Tunisians advocated. To disseminate accurate information about the movement's goals to French readers, Ali Bash Hamba, one of its most active members, established the newspaper *Le Tunisien* in 1907. Despite such efforts, the settlers sabotaged the expansion of modern education for Tunisians, severely restricting Tunisians' social, economic, and political opportunities and creating acute frustrations. As the Young Tunisians grew more strident, they alienated those protectorate officials who had at one time seen their movement as a potential link between the two cultures. Although their Muslim opponents accused the Young Tunisians of abandoning Islamic traditions, they demonstrated their commitment to their

religious heritage in their opposition to French plans to desecrate one of Tunis's Muslim cemeteries in 1911.

Soon thereafter, the Young Tunisians clashed with the government. When a tram driven by an Italian ran down a Tunisian child, the movement launched a boycott, demanding the removal of Italian workers and a pledge that French and Tunisian workers would receive equal pay for equal work. The Young Tunisian leaders who ignored the government's order to cancel the boycott were arrested. The government's subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, which remained in effect through World War I, brought an end to the Young Tunisians' activities.

Seeking a French commitment to apply the principle of self-determination to Tunisia, a delegation composed primarily of former Young Tunisians attended the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. Its failure prompted one of its members, Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi, to write *La Tunisie Martyre*, a work asserting that Tunisia had enjoyed a "golden age" in the nineteenth century, which the imposition of foreign rule had cut short. As evidence of Tunisia's precolonial accomplishments, Thaalbi cited the 1861 constitution, which he urged the *bey* to restore. Thaalbi soon assumed the leadership of the newly created Destour (Constitution) Party. Its program called for an elected assembly with real legislative powers; the formation of a government responsible to the assembly; elected municipal councils; equal pay for equal work; freedom of the press; and educational opportunities for all Tunisians. In 1922, the party attempted to strengthen its hand by enlisting the support of Nasir Bey, who announced he would abdicate if France ignored the Destour's demands. The ruler retreated, however, when protectorate officials made it clear they would not tolerate such threats. The Destour's attempt to co-opt the bey cost it the support of French moderates, who took the incident as a prelude to troublesome future behavior.

In 1922, France created a Grand Council with Tunisian and European sections. Reflecting political, if not demographic, realities, the council's European members outnumbered their Tunisian counterparts. Settlers elected the European representatives, but local advisory councils controlled by French officials or carefully chosen Tunisians appointed the Tunisian members. The Destour rejected this arrangement. Fearing a repetition of the harsh measures taken to muzzle critics of French policy after the 1912 tram boycott, Thaalbi fled the country in 1923. Although the repression did not materialize, the most effective subsequent opposition to the French came from labor organizations, not the party.

When European workers refused to support striking Tunisian longshoremen's demands for equal pay for equal work in 1924, the dockworkers formed

their own union, the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT) and sought to forge links with the Destour. But it proved difficult to align the two groups' agendas. The protectorate had economically and politically devastated the traditional Tunis bourgeoisie that formed the core of the Destour. Its adherents were interested in restoring their lost power and privileges, while the workers clamored for social justice, an issue in which few Destourians showed any interest. Moreover, party leaders, reflecting an ideal of public restraint and moderation on which the bourgeoisie prided itself, disliked any form of protest other than petition and supplication. Mass demonstrations were deemed vulgar and distasteful. Despite CGTT attempts to rally Tunisian workers behind the party, most Destourians were never comfortable with the support of the masses. A collective sense of class consciousness prevented the party from turning worker discontent to its benefit. When the French cracked down on the CGTT following a wave of strikes in 1925, the Destour distanced itself from the union to avoid being crushed along with it. In the following year, a series of decrees restricted press freedoms and criminalized a broad range of political activity, forcing the weakened and increasingly ineffectual Destour to adopt a low profile.

By the early 1930s a younger generation with more populist views and a more militant philosophy had risen to prominence in the party. Their demand that the protectorate be terminated led the authorities to threaten the party with dissolution, opening a rift in Destour ranks between its old guard, which had no stomach for a full scale confrontation with the French, and its younger militants, who believed their goals could be achieved in no other way. Many of the latter either resigned or were expelled from the party. Led by Habib Bourguiba, they formed a new party in 1934. The Neo-Destour Party completely eclipsed the older organization and its less parochial leadership subordinated class identification to opposition to foreign control, laying the basis for a far more formidable anticolonial movement.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: **Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900; Tunisia: Immigration and Colonization, 1881–1950; Tunisia: Neo-Destour and Independence, 1934–1956.**

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Tunisia: Neo-Destour and Independence, 1934–1956

In the early 1930s, Destour Party dissidents grew increasingly frustrated by their leaders’ failure to win concessions from the protectorate authorities. Unlike the Tunis bourgeoisie that dominated the Destour, most of these maverick party members were Western-educated young men from middle-class families of the Sahel (the coastal region between Sousse and Sfax). Because of their Western education, which in some cases included studying at French universities, they considered themselves more politically sophisticated than the party’s conservative elders. They recognized, for example, the importance of disseminating their ideas at the grassroots level and building a popular base of support, processes the elitist leadership disdained. Despite their immersion in Western culture, however, they valued Tunisia’s Arab-Islamic identity, which they feared French assimilationist policies would undermine.

One of their number, Habib Bourguiba, became the editor of the party newspaper, *L’Action Tunisienne*, in 1932. His outspoken attacks on the protectorate challenged the tentative approach of the Destour leaders. When *L’Action Tunisienne* called for independence in 1933, the French ordered the dissolution of the Destour. Bourguiba’s vigorous opposition to a French offer to allow the reconstitution of the Destour in return for a moderation of its policies ended in his expulsion from the party. In 1934, Bourguiba convened a meeting in Ksar Hellal at which the Neo-Destour Party was formed. Its founding members included Bourguiba’s brother M’hammad, Mahmoud Matari (its first president), Tahar Sfar, and Bahri Guiga. Its principal demands were independence, an end to official colonization, the promulgation of a constitution, and a larger role for Tunisians in the political process.

The party’s first goal was to create a countrywide organization. Copying the tactics of communist organizers Bourguiba had observed as a student in France, the Neo-Destour established local cells linked to a

central command in a pyramidal structure. The party benefited from its ability not only to organize Destour malcontents but also to garner support in regions the older party had largely ignored. While the urban-based Destour had had little involvement with the rural population, which had been especially hard hit by the deteriorating economy of the 1930s, the Neo-Destour worked assiduously to build party cells in Tunisia’s small towns and villages. Within a few months, Bourguiba and most other Neo-Destour leaders were jailed, but the party structure proved its worth by functioning in their absence. The decision of the French Popular Front government to release Bourguiba and his colleagues in 1936 paved the way for a resumption of Neo-Destour activity. In the following year, the return to Tunisia from a self-imposed exile of Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi, the Destour’s founder, presented a dilemma for the Neo-Destour. Despite an initial show of respect for Thaalbi, it quickly became apparent that the Neo-Destour’s secular, populist strategy precluded a permanent accommodation and party militants systematically disrupted Thaalbi’s public appearances. The Neo-Destour also experienced disagreements within its own ranks. Bourguiba’s insistence that the party not compromise on its demands alienated some prominent party members who wanted to endorse a reform program proposed by France in 1937. Mahmoud Matari, the party president, resigned in protest.

With the Popular Front no longer in power, the French authorities responded vehemently to renewed Neo-Destour demonstrations in 1938, imprisoning party leaders and disbanding the organization. Once again, the Neo-Destour’s highly developed organization enabled it to continue to operate, albeit at a much reduced level. The outbreak of World War II again divided the party, with some of its members regarding collaboration with the Axis powers as the surest route to achieving their objectives. But Bourguiba, steeped in the traditions of liberalism, decried such an alliance. From his prison cell in France, he urged his followers to stand by that country in its confrontation with fascism.

The incarceration of the party’s strongest leaders and a bid by Tunisia’s monarch, Moncef Bey, to gain control of the nationalist movement rendered the Neo-Destour quiescent in the early years of World War II. Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia just before its liberation by the Allies in 1943, Moncef’s deposition shortly thereafter and Thaalbi’s death in 1944 foreshadowed the party’s resurgence. By helping labor leaders to organize a new union in 1944 and 1945, the party not only reaffirmed its links with the workers’ movement but also assured itself of influence in an important group that could be employed to mobilize public opinion. As soon as the war ended, Bourguiba left Tunisia to solicit international support for the Neo-Destour.

Inside the country, party secretary general Salah Ben Yusuf continued to stress its demand, supported by virtually all politicized Tunisians, for complete and immediate independence.

Bourguiba returned in 1949. In contrast to the more fiery Ben Yusuf, he counseled a policy of negotiation and gradualism that became the Neo-Destour's official strategy for resolving conflicting French and Tunisian views on the protectorate's future. In 1951, France officially recognized the party, whose membership had been steadily increasing since the end of the war. Prominent Neo-Destour members served in Tunisian governments that sought to define a mutually acceptable formula of cosovereignty, but settler resistance to even minor concessions invariably thwarted these efforts. In early 1952, when the frustrated Neo-Destour leaders took steps to bring the Tunisian issue to the United Nations, the equally frustrated French authorities ordered their arrest, triggering a new wave of riots. After an abortive search for credible interlocutors among Tunisians unaffiliated with the Neo-Destour, the French government initiated talks that finally produced, in 1955, an accord granting internal autonomy. Party radicals, led by Ben Yusuf, denounced Bourguiba's assertion that such a status would inevitably lead to full independence. A bitter struggle between the two factions took place at the Neo-Destour Congress in October 1955. Following his victory there, Bourguiba expelled Ben Yusuf from the party, creating a monolithic political environment that endured for the next quarter of a century. When France agreed to terminate the Moroccan protectorate in 1956, Tunisian demands for similar treatment could not be denied. Full independence was granted in March 1956 and in the ensuing elections for a constituent assembly, Bourguiba loyalists within the Neo-Destour won a substantial majority.

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See also: Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Economic and Social Change; Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of, Government and Opposition; Tunisia: French Protectorate, 1878–1900; Tunisia: Immigration and Colonization, 1881–1950; Tunisia: Nationalism, Growth of, 1881–1938.

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Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Government and Opposition

The Tunisian Constituent Assembly deposed Amin Bey, the country's monarch, and established a republic in 1957, the year after independence. Habib Bourguiba, the popular nationalist hero, became the country's first president, a position endowed by the constitution with considerable powers. He was twice reelected without opposition and in 1974 the National Assembly made him president for life. From 1956 until 1970, Bourguiba also held the post of prime minister. In addition to these state offices, he presided over the country's only legal political party, the Neo-Destour or, as it was known after 1964, the Socialist Destour Party (PSD).

Many Tunisian political elites interpreted Bourguiba's appointment of Ahmad Ben Salah to direct the critical Planning Ministry in 1961 as the designation of a political heir. Ignoring warnings that Ben Salah's socialist agenda was breeding widespread resentment and antagonism, Bourguiba gave the minister complete and unequivocal support until he unveiled plans in 1969 to bring all private agricultural land under state control. The ensuing furor was so virulent that Bourguiba broke with his protégé, whom he accused of deliberate deception and misconduct. Ben Salah was imprisoned, but escaped and went abroad in 1973. In Europe, he formed the Mouvement d'Unité Populaire (MUP), a socialist party consisting primarily of exiled Tunisian intellectuals.

The Ben Salah affair prompted a small but growing contingent of critics within the PSD who demanded curbs on Bourguiba's extraordinary powers. They also pleaded for a liberalization of party procedures in order to break the monopoly on decision making enjoyed by the old guard that had crystallized around the chief executive. Bourguiba's recurrent bouts of ill health gave his adversaries yet another reason to urge that he

loosen his grip on both the party and the government. Bourguiba weathered this storm of protest, but fully grasped its significance. With his health restored in 1974, he strengthened his control over the party by expelling his most outspoken challengers and engineering his appointment as party president for life.

This reaffirmation of personal authority made it difficult for Bourguiba to dissociate himself from unpopular policies or shield himself from public resentment over economic conditions, which in the 1970s were affecting lower- and middle-class Tunisians particularly adversely. Rather than allowing a reprise of the challenges that had followed the Ben Salah debacle, Bourguiba condoned stiff measures against protestors. The failure of the leaders of the national labor union, most of whom were veteran party activists, to impress upon the president the seriousness of workers' grievances resulted in a general strike on January 26, 1978. In attempting to formulate an appropriate response to these "Black Thursday" demonstrations, the PSD leadership split between advocates of reforms to correct social and economic ills and proponents of a vigorous crackdown on the government's critics. Ahmad Mistiri, the leader of the PSD's liberal wing, tried to establish a loyal opposition party, but hardliners thwarted his plans. Bourguiba chose to address the situation by punishing protestors while making minimal concessions that did little to alter the status quo.

An armed uprising in the southern city of Gafsa on the second anniversary of Black Thursday, however, revealed the need for a more diligent approach. Bourguiba appointed a new prime minister, Muhammad Mzali, whom he charged with opening up the political environment and strengthening the economy. Mzali initially enjoyed some success in both endeavors. Mistiri's Mouvement des Démocrates Sociales was granted recognition as a political party in 1983, as was the Tunisian Communist Party and the Mouvement d'Unité Populaire-2, a splinter group of Ben Salah's MUP. These first legal opposition parties, however, were enjoined from attacking the president personally.

Despite his increasing infirmity, Bourguiba monitored the political scene attentively and intervened at will. In January 1984, the bloodiest rioting since independence erupted when Mzali yielded to pressure from international creditors to remove subsidies from basic foodstuffs as a condition of continuing economic assistance (the so-called Bread Riots). Bourguiba's order to reinstate the subsidies severely undercut Mzali's influence. When the president suffered a heart attack later in the year, Mzali reasserted himself, but in 1986 a coterie of Bourguiba's closest associates, who resented the political pluralism Mzali had tentatively introduced, persuaded him not only to dismiss the prime minister but also to divorce his wife Wassila and break

with his son Habib, both of whom had backed Mzali. For the next year, Bourguiba endorsed the heavy-handed efforts of Prime Minister Rashid Sfar to contain the opposition, which now centered on the unions, the opposition parties, and the increasingly active Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), which had first appeared in the 1970s.

Bourguiba despised the Islamic militants, viewing them as reactionaries and a threat to the progress Tunisia had made under his leadership. In September 1987 scores of MTI members were tried on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. Much to Bourguiba's satisfaction, several death sentences and many lengthy prison terms were meted out. But Interior Minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali convinced Bourguiba to commute the death sentence of MTI leader Rashid Ghannouchi to avoid giving the movement a martyr. The president accepted this advice and promoted Ben Ali to prime minister in October. Within weeks, however, Bourguiba seemed about to reverse his decision. Attributing this and other erratic behavior to poor health and senility, Ben Ali had the president examined and on November 7, 1987, had him declared medically incapable of executing his duties. In accordance with the constitution, Ben Ali succeeded him as chief executive.

The new president assured Tunisians that Bourguiba would receive the respect to which his long public career had entitled him. Responsibility for the worst abuses of the former president's last years in office was attributed to members of his entourage, several of whom were tried and sent to prison. Nonetheless, Ben Ali set about dismantling the cult of personality that had developed around Bourguiba. The concept of a lifetime presidency was abolished, the statues of Bourguiba that were fixtures in virtually every town in the country were quietly removed, and the many thoroughfares, public buildings, and institutions named in his honor were given new designations.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: **Tunisia: Ahmad Bey and Army Reform; Tunisia: Ben 'Ali, Liberalization; Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Economic and Social Change; Tunisia: Neo-Destour and Independence, 1934–1956.**

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Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Economic and Social Change

After Tunisian independence, Habib Bourguiba shifted his priorities from political issues to social change and economic development. Because the success of both endeavors hinged on an educated citizenry, schooling was free. Within 20 years, three-quarters of all children at the primary level and 40 per cent of those at the secondary level were enrolled, and the national literacy rate exceeded 60 per cent.

The 1956 Personal Status Code unambiguously established Bourguiba's commitment to social change. It outlawed polygamy, imposed minimum marriage ages, required women to consent to marriages, replaced the right of a husband to divorce his wife by oral declaration with court proceedings that either spouse could instigate, ended restrictions on interfaith marriages, and revised traditional Quranic inheritance laws. Efforts were also made to discourage veiling and other forms of traditional clothing. Although such apparel never entirely disappeared, Western dress became increasingly common, especially in urban areas and among the young.

In 1962, the government introduced a Ten Year Plan based on socialist development strategies. Despite some resistance, small farms were consolidated into cooperatives that, by the end of the decade, included more than a third of Tunisia's cultivable land and employed almost a third of the rural population. The plan also promoted capital intensive industrialization projects that fostered the image of a burgeoning modern economy but created relatively few jobs. A proposal to bring all cultivable land under state control in 1969 encountered such staunch opposition that Bourguiba personally rejected it and allowed disgruntled farmers to withdraw from the cooperatives entirely, leaving the socialist experiment in disarray.

A reorganization of the economy, directed by Prime Minister Hadi Nouria ensued. In rural areas, an almost

immediate increase in productivity and profits accompanied the restoration of private property. Legislation in 1972 appealed to private, particularly foreign, investors by offering tax exemptions and rebates as well as duty free import privileges, for companies manufacturing for export. Jobs were the major benefit of such ventures, since their products never reached Tunisian consumers and their owners paid few, if any, taxes. The economic liberalization sparked a dramatic growth spurt. By 1978, over 500 foreign-owned factories had been built and the industrial sector provided 20 per cent of all jobs. Gross domestic product rose steadily and national revenue doubled during the 1970s, partly because of these policies, but also because the value of petroleum exports registered a tenfold increase during the same period.

Severe socioeconomic traumas accompanied the shift from socialism to liberalism, however. Average income rose almost 4 per cent annually, but consumer prices climbed at twice that rate. Class disparities widened, with the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population accounting for over half of all expenditures and the poorest 20 per cent accounting for only one twentieth of expenditures. As unemployment hovered around 13 per cent, educated young men and women found few opportunities in the stagnant economy. In the agricultural sector, few small farmers had sufficient capital to survive in the transformed economy and the heads of many rural families migrated in search of work. Despite the official prohibition of strikes, workers frequently walked off the job. The use of force to end these protests fueled the conviction that the political leadership did not care about the problems Nouria's economic policies had created. In 1978, when the national workers' union launched the first general strike since independence, the protest degenerated into violent clashes with the police and army.

The unstable environment of the 1970s invited criticisms of the regime not only from an emerging political opposition, but also from a religiously based one. Islamist organizations asserted that Bourguiba's economic and social policies had supplanted traditional Arabo-Islamic concepts with imported ideologies that failed to meet the country's needs. Muslim leaders' dissatisfaction with Westernization and secularization had been simmering since the late 1950s, when Bourguiba had pushed through reforms undermining the religious establishment. The state had gained control over mosques and schools by seizing lands whose revenues supported these religious enterprises and assuming direct financial responsibility for them. Islamic courts were abolished and a unified national judicial system with civil, commercial, and criminal codes derived from Western models was established. The most serious opposition to these moves had erupted in 1961 when Bourguiba encouraged Tunisians to ignore the

Muslim obligation to fast during the month of Ramadan because of the decline in productivity its observance occasioned. Religious leaders strenuously objected to this suggestion, which they considered the last straw in a succession of government infringements on religion. Protest demonstrations in Kairouan were crushed, however, and critics in the religious establishment removed from their posts. The virulence of the government's response eliminated any religiously based opposition for the moment, but engendered feelings of bitterness and animosity that resurfaced in the deteriorating conditions of the 1970s.

When Nouria resigned in 1978, Bourguiba ordered his successor, Muhammad Mzali, to pursue an economic middle course between the socialism of the 1960s and the liberalism of the 1970s. Recurrent droughts, the residual impact of declining oil and phosphate sales, and an elaborate system of government subsidies on basic foodstuffs impeded development plans during the early years of Mzali's tenure. In 1983, the government reluctantly bowed to demands by the International Monetary Fund and other aid donors to withdraw some subsidies and reduce many others. The 115-per-cent rise in the price of bread and semolina, staples of the Tunisian diet, stimulated riots that paralyzed the country for almost two weeks in 1984. Unemployed workers formed the core of the demonstrators, but many factions, including the Islamists, participated in the hope that the disorders might topple the government.

The remaining years of Bourguiba's presidency were scarred by repeated confrontations with both secular and religious opposition groups, and by internal disputes within the national political leadership over how best to deal with the diverse threats to the Bourguibist tradition of secularization and Westernization. The enfeebled president's inability to provide effective leadership during this crisis resulted in his removal from office in 1987. His successor, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, vowed to continue Bourguiba's social and economic policies, but to loosen the political restrictions that had characterized his years in power.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: **Tunisia: Neo-Destour and Independence, 1934–1956.**

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Tunisia: Ben 'Ali, Liberalization

Prime Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben 'Ali took power from President Habib Bourguiba in the constitutional coup of November 7, 1987. As a director of Tunisia's security forces, Ben 'Ali was well placed to stage a coup and secure his hold on power afterward. Ben 'Ali had a military education, including training in France and the United States, and was the director of military security through the troubled years between 1978 and 1987. With his succession to the presidency, Ben 'Ali implemented a policy of economic and political liberalization. The new regime thus appeared to follow the dominant trends of the late twentieth century, which favored liberal economic and political reforms. Indeed, the Tunisian administration was reformed to better manage economic change, however Ben 'Ali's government did not favor political liberalization. Instead, a new council for national security was created in November of 1987 that secured the powers of the police and military personnel in the government.

Economic liberalization had the support of Tunisian reformers as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, who supported an adjustment of the economy from socialist to liberal models. Known as the "tranquil revolution," the reforms brought about financial and trade reform, privatization, and foreign investment in new export industries. The government therefore began to withdraw from industry to concentrate instead upon social services such as welfare, education, and health. The state-operated enterprises of

the Bourguiba era were dismantled, along with labor laws, price and currency controls, and import restrictions. Financial reform reduced inflation and trade reform opened foreign markets to Tunisian industry. However, the reforms also deepened Tunisia's integration into the European economy, forcing Tunisian producers to compete with foreign imports and adjust to fluctuations in European demand. Nevertheless, the new economic regime sustained economic growth and stability into the twenty-first century.

Ben 'Ali's coup was championed as a restoration of Tunisia's political institutions, which had been subverted by Bourguiba's authoritarianism. Political prisoners were released, including trade union activists and Islamists, while Bourguiba's closest associates were forced to resign from public life. Ben 'Ali used the language of democracy and reconciliation to build a broad base of support for his reforms. In a symbolic move, the word *Social*, implying socialism, was dropped altogether from the ruling Social Democratic Party, which was renamed the Constitutional Democratic Rally. The political system was reformed in the National Pact of November 1988. Conceived as a social contract of important national organizations, the pact declared a national commitment to multiparty politics, which ended the political monopoly of the ruling party. The party was also reformed to bring new, younger recruits into the party, reducing the influence of the old guard. At the same time the pact attempted to reduce the appeal of the Islamist opposition by asserting that the state was the guardian of the Arabic and Islamic character of Tunisian society. Ben 'Ali thus distanced his government from Bourguiba's uncompromising secularism, however, at the same time the pact prohibited the formation of political parties on racial, religious, or regional foundations while underlining the principle of women's emancipation, scientific advancement, and Islamic reform. In this way the pact indicated that the new government would continue the political tradition of a reformist Tunisian state, which dated to the mid-nineteenth century.

In the presidential elections of April 1989, Ben 'Ali took 99.27 per cent of the votes. In the parliamentary elections conducted at the same time, the Constitutional Democratic Rally took over 80 per cent of the votes, while the Islamist-oriented parties took 13 per cent of the votes, more than double that of the remaining secular parties. Although the elections indicated that the Islamists were the government's main opponents, the electoral system ensured that the Constitutional Democratic Rally took all of the 141 seats in the parliament. The elections disenchanting the secular and Islamic opposition. Yet the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria rallied support for a more authoritarian style of government, particularly among Tunisia's

business and political classes. The Algerian civil war also insulated Ben 'Ali from pressures for full-scale democratization from the West. At the same time that the Algerian government clamped down on Islamists in 1990, Ben 'Ali unleashed the security apparatus upon Islamic groups in Tunisia, with the complicity of the secular opposition. In a move away from the parliamentary system, the technocratic elite that stood behind the presidency withdrew from party politics. As a result, the government became increasingly dependent upon the military and the security apparatus. Marking the new style of politics, a referendum in May 2002 amended the constitution to extend Ben Ali's tenure in office. Due to step down in 2004, Ben 'Ali may now remain in office for an additional two terms after 2004. These events demonstrated that the presidential palace was the real source of political power, not the parliament.

The economic and political adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s brought stability, while at the same time increasing class distinctions between the upper 20 per cent of the population profiting from privatization and the lower 20 per cent. Stability depended upon the affluence of the middle class. From 1988 to 1998, Tunisia's average income doubled; it was the highest in North Africa. The size of the middle class increased as a result of annual growth rates of five to six per cent through the 1990s. The living standards of the middle class improved with industrial growth, particularly in the textile industry, as well as tourism and remittances from migrant workers in Europe and the Middle East. Foreign income, along with a reformed tax system, enabled the government to improve health standards. For instance, life expectancy increased by five years in the 1990s. In addition, the government increased educational and employment opportunities for women. Significantly, the number of unmarried women in the workforce increased. Such improvements highlighted the liberal character of the regime. The lower classes also profited from the social reforms of the regime, with the construction of modern, affordable housing for the poor. Relative affluence and improved living conditions were indicators of the success of Ben 'Ali's Tunisia, which enabled the government to head off possible resistance from Islamist groups.

The social and economic accomplishments of Ben 'Ali's government were remarkable, but at the cost of political and civil freedoms. Ben 'Ali relentlessly pursued his opponents, both among Islamist groups and human rights militants. The police force was dramatically expanded and the autonomy of the legal opposition, media, and unions was reduced. Nevertheless, the political class remained united behind Ben 'Ali's combination of authoritarianism and liberal social and economic reforms. Ben 'Ali's supporters, both domestic and foreign, justified his policies by claiming that

gradual social and economic development laid the foundations for more liberal political institutions. In the short term, therefore, those forces that threatened the gradual process of modernization, such as the Islamists, were suppressed. Further justification was found in the fact that international creditors and investors regarded Tunisia as one of Africa's most successful liberal economies.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Tunisia: Bourguiba, Presidency of: Economic and Social Change.

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Tunisia: Educational Policy and Development Since Independence

When independence from France was achieved in 1956, 25 per cent to 28 per cent of the Tunisian population was literate, thanks to the educational system set in place by the French during the Protectorate period. Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, believing it was necessary to create a strong workforce, put a strong emphasis on public education, working to make it available and free to all Tunisians. He felt that in order to modernize and instill nationalism, the population had to be well educated. One of the first steps Bourguiba took upon entering office in 1956 was to nationalize the schools. In order to extend education to the masses, in 1958, a law was passed that made public education free to all children. However, attendance was not made compulsory.

One of the primary emphases in educational policy was to expand the number of schools available to the Tunisian people. During the 1960s, in order to add more educational facilities, a double-shift school day was instituted. It has been estimated that this policy allowed about 75 per cent of children between the ages of 6 and 12 to enter the primary level of education. In the age bracket of 12 to 17 years, 40 per cent enrolled in secondary education. In these two categories, female attendance in Tunisian schools increased to 40 per cent. However, parents in rural areas tended to

pull their daughters out of school before the educational cycle ended, as tradition held that education for females was not as important as for males.

With the new open enrollment policy, Tunisian schools became overcrowded and it became necessary to place a limit on how many times a child could repeat a grade. In a related move, admission standards for secondary schools were raised. This eventually brought about a decline of school enrollments during the mid-1970s. The decline in enrollment forced the government to start implementing technical training programs in agriculture and industry. This pattern of education has led to an unequal standard of education, as young people from rural lower socioeconomic areas are not able to compete with those from the urban areas and higher socioeconomic levels.

Even with the inequity in education, by the mid-1980s attendance rose in primary education (ages 6–12) to 90 per cent and to 30 per cent for those (ages 13–19) receiving secondary education. There was also an enrollment of about 6 per cent of those (ages 20–25) receiving higher education. In 1988, there were over two million children receiving primary education and over 1.3 million receiving secondary education.

At independence, Habib Bourguiba and his colleagues maintained the French system of education that had been established during the Protectorate period, as they felt it would best support their goal of secularizing the educational program and removing religion from the curriculum. Therefore, Tunisia implemented a bilingual educational program, which is still used today. All children study the Arabic language alone until the third year of primary school, when French is introduced. One-half to three-fourths of all language instruction in secondary schools is in the French language. In universities, the majority of instruction is carried out in French, especially in technological and scientific subjects. Religion, literature, and many of the humanities are today taught primarily in Arabic. French-language instruction continues today primarily due to increased interest in scientific and technological fields of study. Therefore, the original goal of eventually conducting all teaching in Arabic has not been achieved. However, the Tunisian presence in the schools has become more pronounced, as teachers themselves are predominantly Tunisian.

Higher education has been improved upon since independence. Tunisia's only university, the University of Tunis, was founded in 1958 in a merger of other existing higher educational institutions. In 1979, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research was set up to manage the university. In 1984, there were 12 faculties or divisions at the University of Tunis, and many additional affiliated institutions and schools. There are today also various other schools of

higher education that confer degrees equivalent to those offered by the university. In total, there are fifty-four schools of higher education.

One of the most important schools is the National School of Administration, which specializes in graduate courses in the civil service discipline. In 1985, approximately 40,000 students were admitted to higher learning institutions. Admission to higher education programs has historically been, and still is, conducted as it was under the French Protectorate.

Originally the educational system relied on teachers from France, especially during the protectorate period and following independence. By the mid-1980s, however, the greatest number of teachers were Tunisian. On the primary level, most positions were filled by Tunisians. Out of 76,634 teachers on the secondary level, 19,000 (25 per cent) were still French in 1988. On the university level, however, the majority of the faculty was and still is foreign, being mostly French.

The success of education is in many ways illustrated through the rate of literacy. In Tunisia, literacy has increased significantly since independence. In 1980, it was estimated that the literacy rate had risen to 50 per cent for the population over the age of 15. The rising literacy reflects the push the Tunisian administration has made in not only educating men, but women as well. If broken down, the 1980 figures reflect that of that 50 per cent, 67 per cent were male, while 33 per cent were female.

BARBARA DEGORGE

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Tunisia: Modern International Relations

The Maghrib

Tunisia's constitution advocates Maghrib unity, but the divergent political and economic systems of its North African neighbors have impeded this goal. The Algerian revolution created a diplomatic dilemma for newly independent Tunisia. Tunisia attempted to maintain good relations with France, which continued to provide economic and technical assistance, but was also sympathetic to Algeria's governing FLN. Some Algerian troops operated from sanctuaries inside Tunisia and French planes bombed a border village in 1958,

causing extensive damage and civilian casualties. The bonds between Tunisia and Algeria eroded in the 1960s and 1970s as each embraced quite different economic and political philosophies. Relations improved with the advent of a more liberal leadership in Algeria in 1979, and in 1983 the two countries signed the Maghrib Fraternity and Cooperation Treaty establishing the framework for a Maghrib union. At the time, only Mauritania joined them in adhering to the accord.

Libya, with its oil-based economy and small population, provided jobs for thousands of Tunisians before Colonel Moammar Gaddafi's 1969 coup, but his regime's radicalism soon created problems. After President Habib Bourguiba refused to unify the two countries in 1974, Gaddafi began supporting the Tunisian opposition. In 1980, Libyan-backed dissidents briefly seized control of the southern city of Gafsa. When Tunisia expelled numerous Libyans on espionage charges in 1985, Gaddafi delivered a staggering blow to the country's economy by forcing 30,000 Tunisians working in Libya to return home. This rift was healed only in 1987 when Libya agreed to indemnify the deported workers. Two years later, Libya and Morocco joined the other North African states in forming the Union of the Arab Maghrib (UAM).

Despite strong Tunisian support for the UAM, it enjoyed limited success in the 1990s. This stemmed in part from serious disagreements among its members, particularly over the future of the Western Sahara, and in part from its members' need to concentrate on critical domestic issues. Some of the latter, such as the Islamist insurgency in neighboring Algeria and the United Nations ban on international air travel to and from Libya, had a significant impact on Tunisia, requiring the formulation of policies that protected the national interests while honoring regional commitments.

The Eastern Arab World

In the decade after its independence, Tunisia acknowledged the justice of the Palestinian struggle, but questioned the Arab League's confrontational approach to Israel. Like other Arabs, however, Tunisians found Israel's stunning victory in the June 1967 war humiliating. Thereafter, relations with the countries of the eastern Arab world improved dramatically. The 1970 death of Gamel Abdel Nasser, whom Bourguiba had regarded as a demagogue, further facilitated Tunisia's integration into the Arab fold. The country assumed a central role in Middle Eastern affairs in 1979, when the Arab League transferred its secretariat from Cairo to Tunis as part of a campaign to punish Egypt for making peace with Israel. The League offices remained in Tunis until 1990.

When Israel's 1982 assault on Beirut forced the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to withdraw

from Lebanon, it selected Tunis as its new headquarters. PLO officials remained until 1994, when successful negotiations with Israel enabled them to take up residence in Gaza. Soon afterward, Tunisia moved to normalize its own relations with Israel. Following a series of exploratory contacts, formal diplomatic links were established in 1996. Tunisian perceptions of Israel's dealings with the Palestinian authority determined the enthusiasm with which interstate ties were pursued, however, and a generally cautious atmosphere prevailed.

Tunisia's warmer relationship with the Arab East afforded opportunities for Tunisians to work in the Arabian Peninsula, thereby easing the country's unemployment problems. Economic aid from the oil producing states also increased, accounting for more than 30 per cent of all foreign assistance by the mid-1980s. Tunisia's condemnation of the dispatch of American and European military forces to Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 soured relations with the Persian Gulf states, however, and it was the middle of the decade before Tunisia found its way back into their good graces.

Europe

French control of the Bizerte naval base after independence complicated bilateral relations. Tunisian demonstrators blockaded the base in 1961, prompting France to deploy paratroops who captured large parts of the city, inflicting thousands of casualties on the civilians and paramilitary units defending it. Tunisia demanded an immediate evacuation, but France postponed discussions until after the Algerian War, finally ceding the base to Tunisia in 1963. Despite some bitterness over the Bizerte affair, France helped Tunisia attain associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1969. The experiment with a more open economy in the 1970s led to improved ties with other Western European countries whose economic and military aid and investments contributed significantly to Tunisia's development. In 1995, the country became the first Middle Eastern or North African state to sign an economic association agreement with the European Union.

The United States

From independence until the Gulf War, the United States was Tunisia's largest source of aid. American military assistance was expanded substantially in the late 1970s in response to Tunisian appeals for more advanced equipment to defend against neighbors, such as Libya, that were intent on meddling in its affairs. Opposition leaders argued that the acquisition of American weaponry diverted funds from important

social and economic programs, but also worried that weapons ostensibly acquired to defend Tunisia's frontiers might be turned against critics of the regime. The United States terminated military aid during the 1991 Gulf War, while economic assistance dwindled to a tiny fraction of its former levels. By 1995 many economic assistance programs had been restored, although military aid remained considerably below earlier levels.

Africa

Tunisia's traditional economic and political connections with Sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated during the protectorate. Although few strong ties existed at independence, Tunisia played an active role in the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Since his accession to office in 1987, President Zine al-Abidine Ben 'Ali has taken a particular interest in African affairs, serving as the OAU's chairperson in 1994 and speaking forcefully on behalf of African issues in international forums.

KENNETH J. PERKINS

See also: **Libya: Foreign Policy under Qaddafi.**

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Turabi: See Sudan: Turabi's Revolution, Islam, Power.

Turco-Egyptian Sudan: See Sudan: Turco-Egyptian Period, 1820–1885.

Ture, Muhammad: See Songhay Empire: Ture, Muhammad and the Askiya Dynasty.

Tutu, Desmond (1931–)

Archbishop of the Anglican Church of South Africa

Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu became the first African head of the Anglican Church of South Africa. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984 for his

leadership of nonviolent resistance to apartheid. For much of the 1980s, Tutu played a leading role in the internal campaign to end apartheid peacefully, at great personal risk. A churchman, not a politician, Tutu commanded moral authority, calling for a non-racial society in which race would no longer matter. His tireless Christian witness to the dilemma of a powerless black majority ruled by a powerful white minority helped end a system that Tutu said was “as evil as Nazism.”

Tutu became a deacon in 1960 and was ordained an Anglican priest in 1961. He joined Father Trevor Huddleston’s Mirfield Fathers and assumed their devotion to social justice. A brilliant student, he earned a scholarship to study at the University of London from 1962 to 1966, earned his M.A. there. Upon returning to South Africa he taught theology and became chaplain at Fort Hare University. He served a similar role at the National University of Lesotho at Roma from 1969 to 1972. Throughout the next three years, he acted as associate director of the Theological Education Fund for the World Council of Churches scholarship program in Bromley Kent, England.

Tutu returned to South Africa to become the first black dean of Johannesburg, in 1975. Consecrated Bishop of Lesotho in 1976, promoted to secretary general of the ecumenical South African Council of Churches in 1978, then bishop of Johannesburg in 1985, Tutu became archbishop of Cape Town in 1986. While serving as the dean of Johannesburg, he impressed the African population. Declining a huge house in a wealthy section of town, Tutu chose to live in Soweto, to be close to the common people. Weeks before the Soweto uprising, Tutu wrote an open letter to Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, warning him that racial tensions were dangerously high and volatile, a warning Vorster did not heed.

Tutu increasingly confronted the evils of apartheid and violence. Remaining committed to Christian principles of nonviolence, he openly admired and praised Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. Like his heroes, Tutu advocated peaceful civil disobedience, demonstrations, and racial reconciliation. His international reputation and stature grew. He was elected secretary general of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) in 1978, a group opposed by the South African government because, while refusing to supply freedom fighters with arms, the SACC openly sent them money for food, clothing, and medicine. Tutu’s support of this policy brought him under suspicion of supporting “terrorism.”

Furthermore, endorsing economic sanction against South Africa was a crime, but on a trip to Denmark in 1979 Tutu called on the world to divest it-

self of investments in, and impose economic sanctions against, South Africa. The South African government confiscated his passport and revoked his right to travel abroad for two years. Following recovery of his passport, he went on a world tour. Defiantly, Tutu again called for sanctions. Confiscating Tutu’s passport a second time, the government then issued him a travel document stamped with the phrase “nationality undetermined.” Denying Tutu citizenship was part of a larger pattern of racism. Only Tutu’s international renown protected him from harm as he fought apartheid.

Tutu won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. He donated the \$193,000 prize money to scholarships for underprivileged South Africans. The South African synod of 23 Anglican bishops appointed Tutu the first black Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg shortly thereafter. An appointment as chancellor of the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town followed in 1988. Throughout this time, racial turmoil escalated and the government banned so-called political funerals; Tutu defied this ban and preached at these events. Always an independent peacemaker, he avoided any political affiliation. Tutu demanded that churches demonstrate their social commitment. He was influential in persuading members of the U.S. Congress to adopt legislation that imposed sanctions on South Africa. The effect was profound, and gradually, apartheid unraveled. Tutu’s efforts were critical in this transformation. His fierce advocacy of punitive international sanctions against apartheid helped South Africa avoid a bloodbath.

In 1995, Tutu was appointed as chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which sought to deal with grievances arising from violations of human rights during the apartheid era. The commission had the power to grant amnesty for politically motivated acts committed before May 10, 1994. While many South Africans viewed this commission as a positive step on the long road to national healing and forgiveness, critics charged it with impeding justice (especially relatives of those killed by security forces).

Tutu played an instrumental role in South Africa’s decision to ban the death penalty. Encouraged by this ban, former security officers confessed to many crimes they committed. Whatever its limitations, Tutu’s commission has contributed to a broader understanding of the violence that plagued apartheid-era South Africa and reinforced his role in his country’s racial reconciliation and peace.

DALLAS L. BROWNE

See also: **South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle, International; South Africa: Antiapartheid Struggle:**

Townships, the 1980s; South Africa: Transition, 1990–1994; South Africa: 1994 to the Present.

Biography

Born in Klerksdorp on October 7, 1931. Moved with family to Sophiatown, Johannesburg, in 1943. Met Father Trevor Huddleston, a mentor figure. Contracted tuberculosis as a teenager. After regaining health, earned money selling peanuts at railway stations and caddying at white golf courses. In 1953, earned a diploma from the Bantu Normal College in Pretoria, and completed a correspondence B.A. in education from the University of Johannesburg. Taught high school in Johannesburg and Krugersdorp from 1954 to 1957. Married Leah Nomalizo Shenxane in 1955. Enrolled at St. Peter's Theological College in Johannesburg. Played key role in the antiapartheid struggle. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. Appointed chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995.

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Uganda: Early Nineteenth Century

The early nineteenth century saw the end of Uganda's lack of direct contact with the outside world. Yet the dramatic consequences of these new contacts would not become evident until later in the century. The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of remarkable change, but the changes were essentially endogenous, resulting from expanding systems of trade, migration, and military and administrative innovations.

In 1800, southern and western Uganda was dominated by long-established kingdoms of varying size, the populations of which were relatively stable. Much of northern and eastern Uganda, by contrast, was still experiencing large-scale immigration and ethnic consolidation. Yet these two regions were not zones of separate development. Rather, they were becoming increasingly linked by exchange, warfare, and ideology.


There was a clear trend in the nineteenth century toward consolidation of power within states by central political leaders. The control of labor, trade goods, and military might became increasingly centralized, while state structures became increasingly institutionalized. There was another, related trend, one that saw centers of local opposition to growing pressure from major kingdoms of the region develop and eventually collapse. Internal rebellions and external resistance both flowed from increasing demands for tribute and clearer acknowledgment of sovereignty from the most powerful royal governments.

The kingdoms that dominate southern and western Uganda are of considerable antiquity, but they were relatively loosely ruled until the nineteenth century. It appears that it was the growing desire of kings in this region to expand their territories and to intensify their control of the peripheries of the states that prompted the rebellions and secessions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The creation of Tooro and

the rebellions of princes in Palwoland and eastern Buganda were not the result of the decay of ancient empires. Rather, they were primarily the consequence of local resistance to growing demands from the central royal governments. The kingdoms required ever greater collections of foodstuffs, livestock, and labor to sustain the growing chiefly and royal courts. These needs were fulfilled not only by the subjects of the particular states but also by those of nearby tributary chiefdoms. As the century wore on, the competition between the major kingdoms for regional preeminence became focused on the control of trade routes and formerly autonomous and highly productive areas such as Bugerere. As the needs of royal governments changed, so did their structures and strategies.

Kings Kamanya and Suna, who made Buganda the most powerful state in Uganda in this period, are remembered for their ferocity at home and their aggression abroad. Within Buganda, kings employed the new institution of the *bitongole*, administrative departments with military functions, to ensure that products of the royal court system dominated Buganda's peripheries. The transformation of the Ganda state appears to have been a reaction to the devastating series of princely rebellions in the late eighteenth century. The threat that rebel princes and their foreign allies posed to royal rule encouraged Buganda's leaders' drive toward despotic government and unceasing aggression against centers of opposition on the western and eastern borderlands. The power of Nkore and its kings also expanded from the late eighteenth century, partly as a result of the collapse of the kingdom of Mpororo, but also because of the creation of trained regiments (*emitwe*) under the command of officers appointed by Nkore's king. These military developments enabled an essentially pastoralist kingdom to incorporate large, densely settled agriculturalist areas to the west. The growing power of the state permitted greater exploitation of the labor of subject

UGANDA: EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY



Uganda.

peoples and an expansion of slave labor for agricultural production. Above all, however, it was extraction from foreign territories that underlay the growing concentration of power within Uganda's kingdoms in this period. Buganda's quest for territorial expansion was abandoned as it was realized that it was more profitable to mount raids against neighboring peoples in order to capture slaves, livestock, and other goods.

The early nineteenth century was a period of relative decline for Bunyoro, as military defeats resulted from ambitious kings overreaching themselves. Yet, while Bunyoro suffered territorial losses, it consolidated its position as the dominant economic and political power in most of northern and eastern Uganda. Bunyoro's iron and salt drew Lango and northern Busoga closely into the Lake Kyoga trading network that Bunyoro dominated. In part this was facilitated by the arrival of traders from the East African coast in Buganda in 1844, that focused Buganda's attention on the trading networks of the Victoria Nyanza basin. The expansion of agriculture among Iteso, Langi, and related peoples in this period was fostered by the importation of iron hoes and the introduction of sweet potatoes and groundnuts from Bunyoro. Nyoro mainly received sesame, ivory, and livestock in exchange.

Eastern Uganda was dominated by population movements in the early nineteenth century, just as it had been for some centuries. The most significant migrations of this period were those of the Iteso. Traditions state that the Iteso were still leaving modern Karamoja and colonizing well-watered areas to the west around Lakes Salisbury and Kioga early in the nineteenth

century. As population densities rapidly increased, pastoralist immigrants increasingly turned to cultivation, and new generations of farmers pushed farther south and west. It appears that pressure from immigrants such as the Iteso encouraged Bantu groups to move westward across the Mpologoma River, where they sought to take advantage of the opportunities available in the newer states and more open areas of northwestern Busoga.

The main development in northern Uganda was the consolidation of large ethnic groups, such as the Lugbara, Alur, and Acoli. Atkinson argues that this process was accelerated by the long drought of the 1830s that increased raiding and population movements, which in turn heightened people's identification with nearby chiefdoms and increased a sense of identification with neighboring groups. In Acoli, the early nineteenth century also saw the emergence of military confederacies and alliances, and the growing primacy of the Payira chiefdom, whose distance from Langi and Jie raiders and plentiful rainfall provided its subjects with greater security than her rivals could offer. As in the southern kingdoms, the most significant forces of change were the enlargement of scale, the concentration of power, and the increasing centrality of violence.

SHANE DOYLE

See also: **Buganda: To Nineteenth Century; Bunyoro; Kabarega and Bunyoro; Great Lakes Region.**

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Uganda: Mwanga and Buganda, 1880s

In 1884, Mwanga succeeded his father, Mutesa, as *kabaka* (king) of Buganda. He was 18 years old, and like other young Baganda of his generation he had been a *musomi* (reader) at the Lubiri (the royal enclosure). However, he lacked that sustained commitment and intense passion with which many of his contemporaries (the *bagalagala*, or pages) had adopted the literacy introduced by the representatives of Islam and Christianity. Islam had been an important force within Buganda since the 1840s. Christianity, in its rival British Protestant and French Catholic versions, had been present since the late 1870s. Like his father, Mwanga was aware of the power and utility of these religions in the creation of a modern state. But, equally, he was acutely conscious of the interconnection between the new religions and the strategic geopolitical developments occurring in Eastern Africa and the Nile Valley, and of the dangers they posed for the independence and integrity of the Ganda state. Whereas in Mutesa's time those dangers had seemed largely to come from an Islamic imperialism emanating from Egypt, by the time of Mwanga's accession it was increasingly European activity on the East African coast which appeared threatening. Mwanga was consequently suspicious of the Christian missionaries at his court, and of the increasing number of converts who flocked to the mission compounds for literacy and catechism classes and baptism. In 1885 the anticipated arrival of the first Anglican bishop, James Hannington, was treated with great suspicion, as possibly the first step in the European takeover of the interior of East Africa (the Germans were already attempting to assert control at the coast). Hannington's insistence on approaching Buganda by a new eastern route traditionally associated with invaders gave plausibility to these fears. The execution of the bishop on September 29, 1885, just before he crossed the Nile to enter Buganda, confirmed the estimate of missionaries that Mwanga was a cruel, unpredictable tyrant. But Hannington's death did not stem from the whim of Mwanga alone, and was a reasoned act of state taken on the advice of senior statesmen in Buganda. In 1886, reprisals were taken against the Christian communities within Buganda, with the massacre of nearly 50 Catholic and Protestant Christians at the traditional execution site of Namugongo (where ten years earlier young Muslim converts had been killed by Mutesa), and an unknown number of victims in other parts of the country. One of the subsidiary causes triggering this persecution

was the desire of the Christian communities to protect their younger members from the homosexual attentions of the Kabaka, but homosexuality was not the only or the main cause of the massacres, which was primarily related to a need for the young and untried king to assert his authority, and, internationally, a fear that the Christians were acting as agents of the invaders. The massacres were limited in duration and scope, and many Christians were protected by the chiefs. However much they shared Mwanga's political fears, the chiefs also valued the Christian converts as their own children and kinsfolk.

The martyrs went to their deaths bravely, expressing both the traditional stoicism in the face of death that Baganda had long been expected to endure, but also with confidence in a universal God who was above all earthly rulers, and a belief in a bodily resurrection. One of the consequences of the victimization of the Christian groups was a growing realization of the need for self-protection through the procurement of arms. The next few years saw the emergence of Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic regiments whose access to weapons allowed them to assert themselves and to be accused of arrogance (*ekyeejo*). Mwanga, understanding the futility of attempting to inhibit these powerful armed factions and his own vulnerability in the absence of fire power, endeavored to co-opt the religious leaders, promoting his Muslim and Christian age-mates into positions of power. Mwanga soon found that he was unable to control the forces so unleashed, and in 1888 an alliance of all the religious groups resulted in Mwanga's deposition; he fled south by boat and found refuge among the very missionaries whom he had previously despised.

The coalition soon broke up, with the Christians suspicious of the Muslim's attempts to set up a state organized strictly along Muslim lines, with a brother of Mwanga as *kabaka*. The Christians felt compelled to make overtures to the exiled Mwanga, agreeing to restore him as titular *kabaka*, if he supported their endeavors. In an alliance with traditionalist forces, the Christians were able to recapture the state from the Muslims, whose army fled and whose *kabaka*, Kalema, subsequently died of smallpox. The Christians were aided in their consolidation of power by the Imperial British East Africa Company, led by Captain Frederick Lugard, who arrived at the capital in December 1890, to begin a process that would eventually wrest sovereignty from the Kabaka and put it in the hands of the British. Lugard also intervened in internal disputes between Catholics and Protestants. These had broken out soon after the Christian takeover, eventually supporting the numerically weaker Protestant faction led by Apolo Kagga in 1892. Lugard's arrival by the route pioneered by Bishop Hannington, indicates that

Mwanga's fears had not been illusory. The close connection of religion, power, and violence was an embarrassing one for the missionaries, as were the theological disagreements between the missionary societies. For the Baganda converts, the debates between Alexander Mackay of the Anglican Church Missionary Society and Fr. Simeon Lourdel of the French White Fathers, and the vigor with which they defended their respective versions of their faith was intellectually exciting, and replicated in the self-definition and identity of the new religious communities within Buganda. The extension of religious conflict into the political arena was, to a certain extent, a continuation of the traditional factionalism that was a strong feature of life at court. But the new situation created by the advent of colonialism helped to turn evanescent factions into more persistent and clearly defined ideological and political parties. Mwanga, who had hoped to control and use these groups, found himself the victim. Under the new regime he had little alternative but to identify himself with the Protestant faction. But it was only after he was deposed in 1897, after a failed attempt to throw off British rule, that he was baptized, some time after his infant son and successor, Daudi Cwa, had been baptized by the Protestants. Mwanga died in 1904, still in exile in the Seychelles.

KEVIN WARD

See also: Buganda: To Nineteenth Century; Missionary Enterprise: Precolonial; Religion, Colonial Africa: Conversion to World Religions.

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Uganda: Colonization, Resistance, Uganda Agreement, 1890–1900

The Partition of East Africa, where Uganda is located, was carried out by two European powers, Britain and Germany. The British, who had occupied Egypt in 1882, feared that the Germans, who were advancing inland from Tanganyika (Tanzania) would occupy Uganda, the source of Nile River. The British initiated

negotiations with the Germans, which culminated in the signing of the Anglo-German Agreements of July 1890. This agreement left Uganda in the British sphere of influence in East Africa; the British colonization of Uganda therefore started that same year. Apart from the desire to protect the source of the Nile, the British colonized Uganda because of its agricultural potential as a site where raw cotton needed by the British textile mills would be produced. The British also thought that Uganda would serve as a market for manufactured goods from Britain.

The first British colonial administrator to go to Uganda was Captain Frederick Lugard. Lugard went to Uganda in 1890 as a representative of the Imperial British East African Company. Formed in September 1888 under the chairmanship of William Mackinnon, the company was given permission by the British government to administer Uganda on behalf of Britain. Due to financial constraints and administrative problems, however, the company relinquished its control over Uganda in 1893 and henceforth the British government assumed direct control.

The reaction of the people of Uganda to the imposition of British colonial rule was twofold. Some African rulers collaborated with the British, while others resisted. For example, King Mwanga of Buganda, who had succeeded his father Mutesa I in October 1884, initially collaborated with the British. He gave Buganda warriors to Captain Lugard to help the British fight Kabarega, the King of Bunyoro in western Uganda, who was the traditional enemy of Buganda. Mwanga and the British signed the 1894 Protectorate Agreement, which formally established British rule over Buganda. Mwanga thought that by allying with the British he would be able to preserve his position as King of Buganda and secure the military support of the British to fight Bunyoro.

However, when the British colonial rulers stopped him from receiving tribute from Busoga in eastern Uganda, enacted a law to end his prerogative as the only giver of land to his subjects, and continued to erode his powers, Mwanga led an armed resistance against the British in 1897. The British colonial forces defeated Mwanga at Kabuwoko Hill, in southwestern Buganda. Mwanga then escaped to Tanganyika where he was captured by the Germans and imprisoned at Mwanza. In 1898 Mwanga escaped from prison, returned to Uganda, and went to Lango in northern Uganda and joined Kabarega in a joint guerrilla war against the British. These two resisters were finally captured by the British Colonial forces in 1899 and deported to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, where Mwanga died.

After Mwanga's deportation to the Seychelles in 1899, his infant son Daudi Chwa was crowned King

of Buganda. Since Chwa was a minor, three leading Buganda chiefs were made his regents. Sir Harry Johnston, who arrived in Uganda in 1900 as the new British commissioner, signed an agreement on March 10, 1900, with a group of Buganda chiefs led by the three regents.

Although the agreement was referred to as the Uganda Agreement, it only dealt with issues concerning Buganda. The agreement defined the position of Buganda in the Uganda protectorate; the Kingdom of Buganda became a mere province within Uganda, and Buganda thus lost its original political status as an independent kingdom. The agreement reduced the personal authority of the King of Buganda; henceforth he became an agent of the British Colonial administration. However, the King of Buganda was given permission to appoint his subordinate chiefs. The agreement also recognized the Lukiiko (Buganda's traditional parliament) as Buganda's legislature and allowed it to continue to operate.

The 1900 agreement further reduced the King of Buganda's powers by preventing him from receiving tribute from communities outside Buganda. This provision particularly affected the tribute that the king had hitherto received from some parts of Busoga in eastern Uganda where he had territorial claims, thus reducing the king's revenue.

The new land tenure system that was introduced by the 1900 agreement also eroded the King of Buganda's powers. Before the imposition of British Colonial rule over Uganda, all land in Buganda belonged to the king (*kabaka*), who had the power to distribute it to chiefs for the duration of their office. However, according to the Uganda Agreement of 1900, about 9003 square miles of land in Buganda were to be allocated to the king and about a thousand chiefs of Buganda on the basis of freehold. This freehold came to be known as *Mailo* land, a Luganda version of the English word *mile*, because the plots of land that were distributed were measured in square miles.

The 1900 agreement prolonged the enmity between Bunyoro and Buganda, as it confirmed Buganda's right to control all the territories that it had acquired from Bunyoro through the wars of the second half of the nineteenth century. Bunyoro became bitter and struggled to regain what it termed the "lost countries."

SEWANYANA SENKOMAGO

See also: Johnston, Harry H.; Kagwa, Apolo; Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda; Nyabingi Cult and Resistance.

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Uganda: Colonial Period: Administration, Economy

Administration

Uganda was declared a British protectorate in 1894. From then on, the British embarked on the task of establishing effective control of the area, starting from Buganda. From 1895 to 1896, the protectorate was extended through the signing of agreements with Busoga, Toro, Bunyoro, and Ankole. It was not until 1900 that an agreement was signed with the kingdom of Buganda to regularize its affairs. In 1902, the Uganda Order in Council brought Buganda, Busoga, Toro, Bunyoro, Ankole and Bukedi (which included Teso, Bugisu, and Bukedi) under British rule. Kigezi was added to the protectorate in 1911, Acholi and Karamoja in 1913, and West Nile in 1914. By 1918, the British Protectorate of Uganda had attained its present shape and limits.

The country was divided into the Northern, Eastern, and Western Provinces and Buganda. Buganda was the only kingdom that was given provincial status; its provinces were divided up into seventeen districts. Except for West Nile, Kigezi, and Bukedi Districts, each of the districts was inhabited by a single ethnic group. At the local government level, the colonial administrators decided to use the Buganda model of



"The Prince of Wales inspecting the King's Royal African Rifles" (original caption), 1930s. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

local government whereby the king ruled the counties through chiefs. This was not only cheap but also akin to the “indirect rule” system, which was widely used by the British in Africa. Initially, chiefs from Buganda were posted to most districts but the move proved unpopular and district chiefs were replaced with local ones. In the segmentary and quasi-segmentary societies, the administrators created artificial chiefs or gave the existing chiefs powers they did not previously possess. Their position was enhanced by the 1919 Native Authority Ordinance, which gave them wide-ranging powers to enable them to keep law and order. Although the 1900 Uganda Agreement had greatly reduced the powers of the *kabaka* (king) and greatly altered the relationship between him and his chiefs, in theory he continued to rule his people through the chiefs. Compared to the other provinces, Buganda enjoyed a special relationship with the colonial government.

After World War II, the imperial government decided on the policy of democratizing the organs of local governments and to give them wider responsibilities. In 1949, the Local Government Ordinance was passed. It gave corporate powers and responsibilities to the district councils of those areas where no agreements had been signed. The governor was empowered to establish a district or provincial council in any part of the protectorate. Although the people were now empowered to elect their representatives to the district councils, these parliaments fostered ethnic particularism. The impact of this was the nurturing of ethnic nationalism with untold consequences for the future.

In 1921, a legislative council was set up to be the parliament of Uganda, but it was not until 1946 that the first Africans were added to it. Because of the decolonization process that had begun following the war, rapid steps were taken to strengthen the legislative council, and by 1956 the number of African representatives had grown to 30. However, these attempts at democratizing local government institutions and creating a national parliament were overtaken by the activities of the political parties that were formed in the 1950s.

Economy

In 1895, just one year after Uganda became a British protectorate, the colonial government approved the construction of a railway to link Uganda and the coast. The rail line, which was completed in 1901, was intended to ease communication as well as administrative difficulties. It would enable Ugandans to meet the expenses of colonial administration; it would also cut the transportation costs and make the production of the new cash crops profitable. In most parts of Uganda, land was rich and plentiful, and rainfall was sufficient.

From the commencement of colonial rule, emphasis was on agricultural production. In Buganda, major changes in the land tenure system produced private land ownership. In the rest of Uganda, each ethnic group had its defined territory exclusively for use by its occupants. There was to be no private land ownership except in Buganda. The policy of the colonial power was to develop the colony’s economy so as to complement its own. This meant the introduction of crops required by the British industry. The revenue collected from the sale of these crops would then meet the administrative costs. The chief cash crops introduced in Uganda were cotton, coffee, rubber, sugarcane, and tobacco. Agricultural production was encouraged in Buganda, the Eastern Province and the Western Province (excluding Kigezi District). The Northern Province and Kigezi District were to produce labor for the coffee and cotton farms and sugar plantations in Buganda, as well as recruits for the security forces. This policy produced uneven development in Uganda by dividing it into productive regions and labor regions.

In order to increase production and to ensure labor supply, a cash economy was introduced in 1901 when the Indian rupee became Uganda’s currency. Cotton and coffee remained the chief cash earners for the country throughout the colonial period, with coffee surpassing cotton in the 1950s. These were grown mainly by peasants, along with food crops. Between 1945 and 1960, coffee and cotton contributed over 75 per cent of export earnings. Buganda and the Eastern Province produced 75 per cent of the African monetary income. The colonial administration ensured the exclusion of the Africans from the commercial sector by introducing a license tax of £10 in 1901. This was more than the majority of Africans could pay. Attempts by Africans to enter the retail trade were blocked by government restriction. On the other hand, Asians were denied the right to lease or purchase land. Only a total of 0.6 per cent of land was allotted to non-Africans. Settler agriculture was tried but was abandoned by about 1920 due in part to the high transportation cost, inadequate subsidies as well as lack of support by the colonial administration.

From 1907 on, financial institutions including banks were established to carry out financial transactions. In 1919 the East African Currency Board was established and the East African shilling replaced by the rupee as Uganda’s currency. By 1930 Uganda’s traditional economy had been transformed and incorporated into the world economy. Africans were relegated to the labor and production sectors, while Asians and whites controlled marketing and processing. In the 1940s African economic frustration led to unrest and forced the protectorate government to establish the Lint Marketing Board, which took over marketing from the expatriates.

After World War II, colonial officials took steps to increase production by expanding the production of existing cash crops, diversifying production by introducing new cash crops, stimulating the progressive farmers to greater efforts, introducing tractor service, instituting land registration, and encouraging large-scale farming. Unfortunately none of these efforts succeeded. Although Uganda's gross domestic product grew markedly between 1945 and 1960, no noticeable change took place in the country's economic structure.

Initially, the colonial administration did not encourage industrialization, mainly because it would reduce revenue from import duties. European investors and financiers were also opposed to it. This attitude to industrialization changed after 1940 as a result of wartime developments. The 1946 Ten Year Development Plan permitted the establishment of processing industries, and the expansion of education and health facilities. Because Uganda had neither coal nor oil, it was decided that hydroelectric power be provided to give investors an incentive. Between 1948 and 1954 the Owens Falls Dam was constructed, but the expected dramatic growth of industries around Jinja did not take place. The obstacles included Uganda's distance from the coast, lack of purchasing power of the indigenous population, failure to create a permanent labor force, and failure to attract additional foreign industry. By 1962, the main customers for the Uganda Electricity Board were a copper smelting industry, textile mill, a cement factory, and Kenya. The government therefore set up the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) to sponsor industrial projects. The UDC owned cement, textile, metal, chemical, fertilizer, and distilling companies. By 1962, the level of industrialization in Uganda was still very low, and the country depended on foreign markets for a limited variety of crops, thus making the economy very fragile. From 1954 to 1960 the share industrial sector increased to an average of 10 per cent, of which 50 per cent came from cotton production, sugar processing, and coffee curing.

Apart from the British expatriates, the colonial administration used Asians for skilled and semiskilled labor for Uganda. As a result, the administration neglected education and left it to the missionaries, who on the whole provided an irrelevant system of education unsuited for the Ugandan situation. The mission schools were not only few but were also unevenly distributed in Uganda, with the majority located in Buganda. The few Africans that joined the skilled labor force were paid much less than their British and Asian counterparts. With a fragile economy, unequal economic development and a scarce skilled labor, Uganda's postindependence history was bound to be stormy.

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See also: **Uganda: Education.**

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Uganda: Colonial Period: Northern Uganda

Uganda was declared a British protectorate in 1894, but it was not until 1911 that any serious concern was directed toward integrating Northern Uganda into the protectorate. In fact, when Sir Hesketh Bell was made commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate in 1906, he demoted the province to the status of a district. In August 1911, however, Lango district was created and a military force made to patrol Karamoja, Acholi, and West Nile. By 1913, East and West Acholi had been integrated into the protectorate administration. West Nile was added to the province in 1914, following readjustments of territorial boundary involving Uganda and Sudan. Although a military station was established in Karamoja in 1913, it was in 1921 that a civilian district officer was appointed for the area. The province had thus become the last province to be integrated into the protectorate.

When the British established their rule over Northern Uganda, the Buganda model of administration was applied to the area. This model, which centered on the appointment of chiefs either from the cadre of preexisting chiefs or Baganda agents, was vehemently resisted, partly because the affected, segmented societies considered as alien the imposition of single-person authority in the place of their elders and traditional chiefs. The result was that in Lango, for example, between 1910 and 1911, skirmishes occurred between the Baganda agents and the indigenous peoples in which lives were lost. Among the Acholi, antipathy toward the government by civil servants heralded the deposition of the *rwot* (chief) of Atyak in 1927 because he ostensibly failed to carry out colonial orders. In Karamoja, so long as the protectorate government restricted its dealings to road construction and occasional

taxation, the relationship between the Karamojong and the protectorate government remained amicable. When, however, the government began restricting cattle movement and replacing elders with protectorate-appointed chiefs, there were skirmishes. In 1923, such a conflict led to the death of a protectorate-appointed chief, Achia.

As a result of the hatred by the indigenous peoples of the alien system, the protectorate government resorted to force in order to enforce the peace in Northern Uganda. Subsequently, the colonial government became more discreet in their actions and the official position in regard to Baganda agents was to withdraw them as quickly as the occasion warranted.

The establishment of councils in the various districts of Northern Uganda was another component of protectorate administrative mechanism. In Acholi, a Central Native Council was formed in Gulu in 1914 (composed of prominent Acholi) with the aim of exercising judicial and executive powers. In Lango, a similar council was established in 1919. The councils were in reality a means of control because they established vertical relationships with the protectorate administration. But it was also the councils that later became the loci of anti-colonial agitations.

Northern Uganda during the colonial period became a province that was ignored in the protectorate colonial scheme of development partly because of the belief on the part of protectorate officials that the province had no economic viability. Instead, West Nile, Madi, Acholi, and Lango were considered labor reserves for the cash-crop economy of the south, where adult males went to acquire money for paying poll taxes. Partly due to the labor policy—which by 1925 entailed discouraging or not supporting cash crop production in the “outlying areas”—of the 162,000 acres of cash crops in Uganda in 1919–1920, 137,000 acres were in Buganda and the Eastern Province; and by 1928, 29,576,000 out of 699,000 acres were in those two areas. In 1925, the director of agriculture informed an agricultural officer in West Nile that the discouragement of cash-crop production in West Nile was a policy to be adhered to if labor was to be available for the support of essential services in the “producing districts.”

Until the 1940s, attempts by the colonial government to develop disease control measures in the province were insignificant. In both Lango and Karamoja, for instance, no attempt was concretely made to control the cattle diseases there. As a result, no marketing facilities for livestock developed during much of the colonial period, and sales that occurred were purely dictated by individual need for money to pay poll taxes or sales occasioned by famine.

Social development in Northern Uganda before independence equally demonstrated the subservient position of the province in relation to others in Uganda. By 1920,

for example, the report of the Colonial Office reflected so few schools that the statistics for Northern Uganda were simply not given. By 1938, the situation had not significantly changed, and according to the report of A. Warner, the provincial commissioner for the province, Acholi, West Nile, Madi, and Lango had neither a full secondary school nor an institute for vocational education. It was not until the 1950s that the first secondary school was built.

In the era leading up to Uganda’s independence in 1972, northern politicians were primarily occupied with the concerns of the people over the protectorate government’s oppressive policy, which discouraged economic and social development in Northern Uganda. In Lango, support was given to the Uganda National Congress (UNC) in the belief that it could address the problem of inequality and promote education and rapid development. In Acholi, the chiefs were seen as tools of the protectorate government, and the congress acquired ready support in Acholi. As a result of lopsided development, Milton Obote challenged the UNC’s position in regard to the introduction of education and social services in the north in a letter addressed to the *Uganda Herald* of April 24, 1952.

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See also: Obote, Milton; Uganda: Buganda Agreement, Political Parties, Independence; Uganda: Obote’s First Regime, 1962–1971.

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Uganda: Education

After independence in 1963, Ugandans confronted an educational system that had been dominated by foreign teachers and materials. They also debated the role of education in a free African country and the legacy of the colonial period. The issue of the relationship between education and society was one that stretched back nearly a century, when the informal education of the precolonial era was joined by formal education based on literacy.

All societies in precolonial Uganda had some type of informal social education and vocational training. Social and cultural education took place in the home, as did early training in subsistence activities, while oral traditions were a means of instructing children about their history and society. There were definite gender distinctions in education; girls learned from their mothers and boys from their fathers, and boys were at times apprenticed to craft specialists or learned about politics from elders, and in centralized states in the compound of a chief or the court of a king.

The introduction of formal education in the mid- to late nineteenth century is traced to the appearance of foreign traders and missionaries. During the reign of *Kabaka* (King) Mutesa I of Buganda, coastal Muslim traders taught Swahili using an Arabic alphabet, which became the first written language in Uganda. They attempted to convert people to Islam and taught the Qu'ran. Christian missionaries arrived in Buganda in the 1870s and applied an alphabet to Luganda to create a written form of the language. This was used to teach Christianity to converts thus spreading literacy in an African language. African converts were required to learn to read a catechism, and the connection between religion and literacy (and by extension all formal education) was very strong. Later in the nineteenth century other European Christian missionaries extended education to include more general education and some vocational training, but the core remained preparation for baptism, and the majority of the formal schools were run by African catechists of either the Protestant or Catholic missions.

The establishment of Uganda as a British protectorate brought no immediate changes in education. The religious organizations maintained control over schools, with the protectorate government providing supportive grants to the mission bodies and an increasing level of oversight. Under the British protectorate there were a range of schools from basic, village-level schools to postsecondary teacher colleges, technical schools, and Makerere College (later, Makerere University), which originated in 1922 as a technical school but gradually became a college of general higher education. The creation of a protectorate department of education in 1925 meant direct government involvement in education, including over materials and subjects, but not direct control. While religious groups ran the schools, African elites, the missions, and the government debated about the proper balance between academic and technical curricula. Government officials wanted education to prepare Ugandans for a village life and felt the schools offered instruction that was too literary. Many Ugandans, on the other hand, sought a literary education for their children as a means of obtaining high-paying jobs in government, teaching, and commerce.

The first decade of the twentieth century saw the establishment of the first secondary schools offering a general education in Uganda. These were boarding schools designed to educate the sons of chiefs, to help develop a Christian, Western-educated ruling elite. The first secondary boarding school for girls opened in 1905 with the intention that graduates would become the wives of the graduates of the boys' schools. Educated African women were limited to positions as teachers, nurses, midwives, and homemakers. By the late 1930s a more academic curriculum for girls was introduced, but the students numbered only in the dozens. The first young women entered Makerere College in 1945, but were limited in their fields of study.

The Muslim population lacked equal educational opportunities, in part because Muslims rejected the Christian-centered teaching at the mission schools and instead taught children in Qu'ranic schools. The growth of secular schools for Muslims was slow, and by the 1950s there were only two junior secondary schools for Muslims, though they also began attending the government nondenominational schools that were established in 1952. Muslim girls were the least educated segment of the population, with only a few attending the secondary schools in the 1950s.

Ugandans since independence have been actively struggling with molding an educational system to fit the needs of the new state, including early efforts at Africanizing and secularizing both curricula and faculty. By the mid-1970s the government had taken over the schools formerly under religious control, introduced Africa-centered curricula and producing most school materials at home in Uganda. But the progress made was halted and even reversed under the rule of Idi Amin Dada and the succeeding regime of Milton Obote. Makerere University was hard hit, losing both material and human resources, and while the primary and secondary schools continued operating they too deteriorated.

All sectors of the country, including the schools, were rebuilt in the 1990s, though the process was hampered by a relatively weak economy. Several contentious points were addressed, including access to schools, the form and cost of education, and the continuing appropriateness of a university specializing in a liberal arts education. The governments of independent Uganda have taken successive steps at remaking a school system to meet the needs of a country that requires indigenous expertise in agriculture and veterinary science, engineering, and education. At Makerere University, resources have been focused on the sciences and the medical school, and a new university was founded at Mbarara with a mission to support rural development.

The government of Museveni recognizes the importance of an educated, literate populace for the rebuilding

of the country. After taking over in the mid-1980s, the government had a program of political and civic education to create a civilian population engaged in the nation-building process, and programs to promote adult literacy. The government has also struggled with how to make education accessible for all citizens. A regional imbalance continues, with most schools—including the universities—located in the south, and in or near urban areas. The Museveni administration has been promoting a program of universal primary education but it remains to be seen how it can fund the massive expansion of schools that would be required. One option suggested is the implementation of fees at Makerere University, which has been historically free, and an increase in fees for primary and secondary education. Understandably, there has been great resistance to new or higher fees, and although international aid has helped the education budget hard choices must still be made.

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See also: Education; Uganda: Reconstruction: Politics, Economics.

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Uganda: Buganda Agreement, Political Parties, Independence

The genesis of political-party activities in Uganda is rooted in the Bataka Association, which was formed in 1921. Its purpose was to fight the Asian monopoly on

the processing and marketing of cotton, and to wage war against the oligarchy in Buganda, which had seized power in the 1890s, their predominance guaranteed by the Buganda Agreement of 1900. Unfortunately for the association, their attempt to seek a revision of the Buganda Agreement of 1900 with specific reference to the land settlement failed.

During the interwar years, the official protectorate government position was opposed to the development of representative institutions for Africans. Representative institutions were partly opposed because it was believed that the institutions would shift the loyalty of educated Africans away from their tribal institutions and would also bring them into greater prominence. In spite of the protectorate position, in May 1938, an organization was formed, the Sons of Kintu, with the purpose of directing the complaints of the farmers and merchants to the protectorate political establishment. The Sons of Kintu marked the beginning of regular political organization and signified the establishment of modern nationalism in Uganda.

The precursor to the establishment of a Uganda-wide political party was the Uganda African Farmers' Union (UAFU), which was formed in April 1941. The union was intended to be an organization for various growers in Buganda, led by Ignatius Musazi, who had also been at the helm of Sons of Kintu. The riots of 1945 and 1949 led to the collapse of the UAFU, but they also paved the way for the formation, in 1952, of the first Uganda-wide political party, the Uganda National Congress (UNC).

From the beginning, the UNC was socialist, cosmopolitan, and interracial and had Pan-African objectives. The party was dominated by former students of King's College–Budo and was predominantly Protestant. While the UNC was intensely nationalist, with its main demand of "self-government now," its effectiveness was determined in many areas of Uganda by the degree of success with which it handled local issues. In Mbale, for instance, the UNC branch was strongly anti-Asian. In Northern Uganda, the differences among members of the Acholi Congress over religious and clan disputes made it a party of local preoccupation. The dilemma of the congress was that the party was compliant with the protectorate government and had representation in the Legislative Council while Buganda, the root of the congress itself, was at odds with the protectorate government.

In 1953, the *Kabaka* (King) of Buganda was deported to Britain, precipitating the climax of the first stage of political party organization generally and that of the UNC specifically. In June 1953, the colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, had remarked that the Federation of East Africa was likely to soon become a reality. The remark resulted in a showdown between the kabaka and

the governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen. The kabaka insisted that Buganda should not be made part of the proposed Federation of East Africa. It was not until the Namirembe Conference of 1954 that the impasse was resolved, and the kabaka returned to his kingdom in October 1955. The Buganda Agreement of 1955 was then signed between the kabaka and the governor, an agreement that made recommendations for the reform of the Buganda government, the Legislative Council, and the Executive Council.

Another political party of a smaller stature was established in 1955, the Progressive Party (PP). Founded before the kabaka's return, the PP was a party of influential individuals, led by E. M. K. Mulira. The party comprised important members of the Lukiiko (Buganda parliament), prominent businessmen, leaders of the Uganda Teachers' Association, and those who had served in public bodies and church organizations. Unfortunately for the party, it sunk into oblivion after the return of the kabaka, partly because it was essentially a party of intellectuals without mass support. Moreover, the conflict between the chiefs in Buganda and the party helped seal its fate.

In 1956 another political party, the Democratic Party (DP), was born; it was founded mainly by Catholics. What prompted the formation of the DP was Bugandan Catholic dissatisfaction over the award of chieftaincies in Buganda. The defeat of Matayo Mugwanya in the elections of 1955 for the post of *katikiro* (prime minister) of Buganda signaled the establishment of the party. The most crucial objective of the DP was Africanization of the civil service.

The politics of Uganda over the next six years, in the period prior to independence, were marked by the Buganda government's change of position regarding participation in the Legislative Council. Buganda withdrew its representatives from the council in 1957. Despite Buganda's withdrawal, direct elections were held in other parts of Uganda in 1958, with the UNC acquiring five seats and the DP one seat; four seats were taken by independent candidates. The first meeting of the new Legislative Council marked the establishment of another political party in Uganda, the Uganda People's Union (UPU), comprised exclusively of African members of the Legislative Council.

In the wake of Buganda intransigence, the UNC split in January 1959, with one section led by Milton Obote and the other by Ignatius Musazi, denoting further conflict between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. It was the Obote wing of Congress that merged with the UPU to form the Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) in March 1960. In the meantime, the year 1961 signified the establishment of the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party (a Buganda party) and in the same year, Uganda attained self-government led by the DP

with Benedicto Kiwanuka as chief minister. In the April 1962 elections, UPC and KY formed an alliance, and in October 1962 Uganda became independent under Prime Minister Obote.

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See also: **Obote, Milton.**

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Uganda: Obote's First Regime, 1962–1971

The first nine years of Uganda's independence illustrate the complexities of nation building in a former colony with a fragile statehood from the outset. We can best understand the instability characterizing this period in the context of the country's colonial history and the slow and uncertain path it followed toward independence from Britain in October 1962. The crisis in which Uganda found itself four years after gaining independence was born of a combination of factors. Apart from the absence of any strong nationalist sentiment embracing the whole country, there was also the lack of a charismatic, universally accepted leadership. Furthermore, the question of ethnic diversity and regional differences compounded Uganda's colonial history. Finally, the emergent Ugandan political elite of the 1950s and 1960s displayed a strong attachment to district politics. Uganda's ex-colonial overlord, Britain, had bequeathed to the new rulers a country that was politically disunited and economically weak.

On the eve of independence, no single political party had emerged as the dominant political organization in the various regions of the country. The Democratic Party (DP), which had won the elections of 1961 and led Uganda into self-government under Chief Minister Benedicto Kiwanuka from May 1961 to April 1962, lost the last preindependence elections. These were won by the alliance of Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the neotraditionalist, conservative Kabaka Yekka (King Only; KY) party. KY was committed to the preservation of the kingship and their

kingdom within greater Uganda, an alliance that had brought together unlikely bedfellows. Obote's UPC was a comparatively radical and socialist party comprising leaders mainly, though not exclusively, from outside Buganda. On the other hand, KY naturally commanded overwhelming support within Buganda, but it had no ambition whatever to become a Uganda-wide political party. The alliance had led the country into independence and formed the government with Milton Obote as prime minister and the *Kabaka* (King) of Buganda as nonexecutive president and head of state. However, tension developed between these two partners right from the outset; Obote dissolved the alliance in August 1964. This "divorce" became one important ingredient of the crisis that soon engulfed the country.

Yet the two sides had tried to accommodate each other in the years leading up to independence. For his part, Obote had attempted to achieve the integration of Buganda and the rest of the country by insisting that, contrary to the predominant view within his party, the Kabaka of Buganda be elected president in November 1963. He had hoped this would help placate Buganda and thus lead to better cooperation between it and the rest of the country. On the other hand, the kabaka himself had shown a positive attitude toward the leader of the UPC. As the kabaka pointed out in his own account of the events leading up to the 1966 crisis, Obote seemed to be someone he could work with. This apparent mutual trust, however, began to be eroded by the machinations of both sides in the period 1963–1966. The antireferendum riots in and around Kampala in late November 1964 provoked the central government into overreacting by sending irresponsible and overzealous troops to quell the disturbances. This could only further antagonize the Baganda.

The Gold Allegations Motion of early 1966, introduced by a KY member of the National Assembly, accused Idi Amin Dada, then the commander of the army, of stealing a massive amount of gold from neighboring Congo. It also implicated Prime Minister Obote and two of his cabinet ministers. This was soon followed by Obote's arrest and the detention of five ministers suspected of being involved in a plot to oust the prime minister. In May 1966 the central government clashed with the Buganda kingdom administration. The abolition of kingship in Uganda as a whole and the introduction of the Republican Constitution followed in 1967. Four years later, the Amin coup of January 1971 took place. All these were in many ways the outcome of Uganda's difficulties dating from the years before independence. By the middle of 1967, the Kabaka of Buganda had fled into exile. The UPC had established a strong central government under a new republican constitution, with Milton Obote as executive president.

These changes, however, had not resolved Uganda's fundamental problems. National unity remained elusive, as did economic development and political stability. In the next three years, the UPC government embarked on what Ali Mazrui described as a program of "documentary radicalism." In its "move to the left" the party sought to change Uganda's ideology from "capitalism, feudalism and tribalism," to a radical socialist one. It thus introduced the Common Man's Charter in 1969, intended to pave the way for a revolution in Ugandan society that would vastly improve the position of the ordinary Ugandan. Other documents followed, this setting out a new socialist program that included the nationalization of major enterprises and banks and the introduction of a new system of elections to the National Assembly. These proposed changes stimulated a great deal of reaction among the main political parties, including the ruling UPC itself, the civic society, and the wider Ugandan community. While some elements in society welcomed such changes, clearly a fair amount of disenchantment with the program manifested itself even within the ruling circle. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that this dissatisfaction, combined with the discontent that had been simmering in Buganda since 1964, the disquiet within the military, and the personal ambitions and anxieties of army chief Amin, all culminated in the January 1971 coup d'état that overthrew Obote's first government. By this stage, however, the Ugandan nation-state was still as weak and fragile as ever. Its ruin and almost complete disintegration under Amin's military dictatorship from 1971 to 1979 most graphically demonstrated this.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: **Obote, Milton; Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1962–1979.**

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Uganda: Amin Dada, Idi: Coup and Regime, 1971–1979

As president of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, the rule of Idi Amin Dada (1924–2003) was synonymous with personalization of power, disregard for human rights, unpredictability, and overall socioeconomic and political disintegration.

Born between 1924 and 1927 in Koboko (former West Nile province), Amin had humble but diverse origins. His father was a Kakwa, of the ethnic group found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Uganda. His mother, who influenced his early childhood, was a Lugbara, of the largest ethnic group in West Nile.

As a result of his mother's separation from his father, he left his homeland at an early age; he and his mother left West Nile and settled at the Lugazi sugar estate in Buganda. Amin worked several odd jobs to make ends meet and constantly changed residences to follow wherever his mother went. Due to these circumstances, he acquired only a fourth grade education.

The British colonial rulers were impressed with Amin. He was strong, he spoke Kiswahili, and his lack of a formal education led them to believe that he would be subservient. Joining the army as a private in 1946, he was promoted to corporal in 1949. Amin fought against the Mau Mau nationalists, who opposed British rule in Kenya, in the 1950s and 1960s. The British promoted him to sergeant in 1951, lance corporal in 1953, *effendi* (a rank invented for outstanding African non-commissioned officers) in 1959, and in 1961 Amin and Shaban Opolot became the first Ugandan commissioned officers with the rank of lieutenant.

Before Uganda's independence in 1962, Amin's brutality surfaced. He overstepped his orders to stop cattle rustling between the neighboring ethnic groups in Karamoja (Uganda) and Turkana (Kenya), and instead engaged in gross violations of human rights. The British recommendation to prosecute Amin for his atrocities soon after independence was politically unpalatable to Apolo Milton Obote (Uganda's new prime minister), who instead reprimanded him. Despite his opposition to Obote's recruitment of educated Ugandans into the armed forces, Amin was still promoted to captain in 1962, major in 1963, and was selected in 1963 to participate in the commanding officers' course at the Wiltshire School for infantry in Britain.

An army mutiny of 1964 catapulted the armed forces into political prominence in general, and Amin in particular. At issue was the desire by Ugandan soldiers to improve their overall working conditions. For his

role in ending the crisis, Amin was promoted to the rank of colonel and commanding officer of the First Battalion.

Obote's desire to assist followers of Patrice Lumumba (the murdered prime minister of Congo, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1965 presented an opportunity for Amin to become close to Prime Minister Obote. Without the knowledge of the chief of staff of the army, Obote instructed Amin to establish military camps in the Congo. Additionally, Amin became involved in procuring coffee, gold, and ivory from the Congo for Uganda in order to raise money for arms.

Opponents of Obote, including the *Kabaka* (King) of Buganda (Edward Mutesa) wanted to launch an investigation into the illegal entry of gold and ivory into Uganda. Obote circumvented the affair by appointing a commission of inquiry, arresting five cabinet ministers, suspending the constitution, firing the kabaka, and promoting Amin to commander of the armed forces. Amin ruthlessly attacked the kabaka's palace, forcing Mutesa to flee to Britain, where he died in exile in 1969.

The overall political conditions between 1966 and January 25, 1971, when Amin successfully staged his coup d'état against Obote's government, were unstable. In addition to the political wrath from Baganda (the largest ethnic group in Uganda), Obote faced ideological conflicts within the ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress.

It is unclear why Obote promoted Amin in 1970 to the rank of chief of general staff, a position that gave him access to every aspect of the armed forces and subsequently enabled him to overthrow Obote's government on January 25, 1971.

Amin's eight years in power were characterized by a lack of any orderly policy making, the presence of sycophants, and the use of terror as a means of control. There was a total administrative breakdown resulting from Amin's inefficient leadership. Amin convinced many Ugandans and the world at large that he was a simple man who had intervened in politics to save the country. Between 1971 and 1972, Amin freely interacted with ordinary people, disbanded Obote's secret police, granted amnesty to political prisoners, allowed the return of the kabaka's body for a royal burial, appointed a cabinet of technocrats, and promised Ugandans that he would hand power back to the civilians.

Amin's real personality (that of a consummate liar who was capricious, cunning, ruthless, and shrewd) eventually emerged. During the euphoric period (1971–1972), Amin systematically eliminated Obote's supporters (mainly the Acholi and Langi) in the armed forces, promulgated a decree reintroducing detention without trial, and, despite his friendly relationship with the West at the time, ordered the murder of two

Americans (Nicholas Stroh and Robert Siedle) who were investigating massacres that had occurred at the Mbarara barracks in western Uganda.

In 1972, Amin suddenly turned against Britain and Israel, two countries that had been his close allies, due to their reluctance to provide funds and arms. Faced with their hesitancy, Amin found Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's willingness to assist him appealing.

The quid pro quo between Amin and Gaddafi was clear: rid Uganda of Western interests in return for Libya's financial assistance. On March 27, and again on August 5, 1972, Amin ordered Israelis to leave the country in three days' time, and Asians holding British passports were ordered to do the same within three months. Amin justified his actions by claiming that he wanted to rid the country of "imperialists and Zionists" and replace Asians with African entrepreneurship. Amin's "economic war" (as the expulsion of 50,000 Asian traders came to be known), together with his anti-Western position, plunged Uganda into problems from which it has yet to recover.

Amin entrusted the economy to Nubians and a few Ugandans, all of whom lacked business experience. Consequently, Uganda's once prosperous economy was ruined. The immediate impact was the scarcity of basic consumer goods such as bread, butter, milk, sugar, and salt. Those in positions of economic power created artificial shortages and later sold the items under a system popularly known as *magendo* (illegal or underground economy). Corruption became characteristic of the economic system. The departure of foreigners also led to a loss of tax revenue and jobs, for many Ugandans once employed by the foreigners were unable to find alternative employment.

Amin looked for scapegoats to account for the failure of his "Economic War." Through his secret police (the State Research Bureau and the Public Safety Unit) and the rest of the armed forces, Amin used institutionalized violence to control and intimidate Ugandans. He eliminated anyone he considered a potential threat.

The human cost of Amin's rule was devastating. The few remaining educated Ugandans fled the country, fearing for their lives. With most national funds devoted to the armed forces and Amin's personal security, education and the industrial and manufacturing sectors were neglected.

The domestic situation was exacerbated by Uganda's inability to receive sufficient international aid. A number of able foreign ministers tried to dispel the international opinion that Amin lacked the necessary intelligence and expertise to lead the country. Their partial success in this regard was reflected by Tanzania's signature of the Mogadishu (Somalia) agreement with Uganda in 1972, Amin's election to the position of chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

in 1975, and the 1977 success of African countries in blocking a United Nations resolution that would have condemned Amin for gross violation of human rights.

Rather than using African support to improve Uganda's tarnished image, Amin's unpredictable personality produced one embarrassment after another. Soon after the sudden expulsion of Asians in 1972, Amin oversaw the murders of chief justice Benedicto Kiwanuka in 1972, foreign minister Michael Ondoga in 1974, and Archbishop Janani Luwum in 1977. He also supported Palestinians who hijacked a 1976 Air France flight to Entebbe airport.

In response, the United States closed its embassy in Uganda in 1973, as did Britain in 1976. All Ugandan economic transactions with other nations were carried out on a short-term or cash basis, except for those made with Libya and Saudi Arabia. The nation acquired a negative image internationally due to its economic dealings, which in turn adversely affected the entire economy. The tourism industry was especially badly hurt.

By the late 1970s, the economy was in ruins. Coffee (Uganda's main export) prices had plummeted from a high of \$3.18 (U.S.) per pound to \$1.28 per pound. The situation was exacerbated when the United States stopped purchasing Ugandan coffee in 1978. Arab nations that had generously donated funds became concerned with Amin's inability to Islamize Uganda, and worried by his involvement in the murder of fellow Muslims. The deteriorating economic situation made it difficult for Amin to import luxury items for his armed forces.

To divert attention from this crisis, Amin ordered an invasion of Tanzania in October 1978, allegedly because the latter planned to overthrow his government. Tanzania, which at the time was preoccupied with the "Rhodesian questions" and had all along assumed that the Mogadishu Agreement signed in 1972 had ended any hostilities between the two countries, was taken unawares. Consequently, Amin's soldiers easily occupied the country, systematically killing Tanzanians and destroying their property.

Despite pressure from the OAU, Amin refused to renounce his territorial claims over Tanzania. Julius Nyerere (president of Tanzania, 1961–1985) was forced to order the Tanzania People's Defense Forces to repel the Ugandan forces. Tanzanians and exiled Ugandan soldiers continued their pursuit of Amin until his government was overthrown on April 11, 1979.

Amin fled to Libya. He later moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where, according to recent information, he led a comfortable life. He died on August 16, 2003. The continuing problems Uganda faces attest to the enormous drain that Amin's rule had upon the political, economic, social, and cultural life of that country.

PETER F. B. NAYENGA

See also: **Luwum, Janani; Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta; Obote, Milton; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Uganda, Relations with.**

Biography

Born in West Nile Uganda, c.1924; received a formal education only to the fourth grade. Enlisted as a private in 1946. Distinguished himself as a good soldier and became one of the two commissioned officers when Uganda became independent in 1962. Between 1962 and 1966, served in a number of capacities as a military officer in Milton Obote's government (1962–1971). Close association with Obote earned him the rank of commander of the Uganda army in 1966, a position he held until his differences with Obote caused him to stage a coup d'état on January 25, 1971. Invaded Tanzania in 1978, prompting that country to send troops into Uganda, thus overthrowing Amin's government on April 11, 1979. Fled first to Libya, and then settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Died August 16, 2003.

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Uganda: Tanzanian Invasion, 1979–1980

The Tanzanian incursion into Uganda that resulted in the removal of the Amin regime in April 1979 was the culmination of long-standing friction between the two countries dating from the overthrow of the first administration of Milton Obote by the army in January 1971. From the outset, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere's government had immediately offered Ugandan ex-president Obote political asylum, roundly condemned the coup makers, and totally refused to recognize the new order of Idi Amin Dada in Kampala. For his part, at his first public meeting after the takeover, Amin countered that Nyerere was conspiring to invade Uganda and restore the fallen president to power. The Tanzanian bogey thus became the military regime's constant cry whenever it faced any internal crisis. The regime portrayed Obote and Nyerere as Uganda's major threat throughout Amin's rule. In September 1972, Amin's claims seemed to be vindicated when exile troops loyal to Obote crossed into Uganda from Tanzania with Nyerere's backing and attempted to overthrow the military junta. Yet it was, in fact, Amin's army that first invaded Tanzanian territory six years later in October

1978, occupied the Kagera region in the north of the country, and declared it Ugandan land. The Tanzanian intervention that followed immediately was a counter-attack to drive the Ugandans out. Initially, as Nyerere declared, the aim was merely to protect Tanzania's sovereignty. At the time, however, Ugandan exile opposition forces accompanied the Tanzanian troops; together they waged a joint war that lasted barely five months and finally removed the Amin dictatorship in April 1979.

In early March, with the imminent collapse of the Amin junta, President Nyerere realized that Uganda would soon urgently require a new administration to replace it. A political leadership vacuum in Kampala would have been unthinkable, and would have merely exacerbated the country's crisis. The Tanzanian government therefore set about bringing together Uganda's political opposition groupings, then scattered all over eastern and central Africa, Europe, and the United States. However, though the various Ugandan opposition organizations all agreed on the one purpose of removing the Amin regime, they were exceptionally weak and as fragmented and disunited as ever over the kind of government to establish once they had accomplished this goal. As the anti-Amin war came threateningly close to Kampala, the various Ugandan exile groups assembled, under the Tanzanian government's sponsorship, in the northern town of Moshi in late March 1979 to work out a political program for the post-Amin period. The country's two major political parties, the Democratic Party led by Paul Semogerere and Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) were still in existence. However, both had become all but moribund through inactivity during the Amin years. Both organizations sent a number of individuals to the Moshi Conference. The Dar es Salaam-based Ugandan Delegates Credentials Committee in charge of the meeting, however, was extremely reluctant to admit the old parties for fear of reopening past political wounds. The committee, headed by Dan Nabudere and comprising other Ugandan academics such as Yash Tandon and Omwony Ojwok, were themselves really self-appointed and clearly lacked any political base of their own inside the country. They argued vehemently against a return to the old political party politics of the 1960s. The committee preferred to work with some small exile organizations—numbering 28 in all—from Tanzania itself, Zambia, Kenya, Europe and the United States. Some of these existed in name only, but all were recognized as representatives at the Moshi meeting. They varied enormously in strength. Only two of these groups could legitimately claim to be actively engaged in the ongoing anti-Amin war—those paying allegiance to Milton Obote and Yoweri Museveni. Most of the others were little more than welfare societies, or mere

discussion groups with hardly any claim to political support inside the country.

Amid some controversy as to who qualified to attend, and subsequently over the exact meaning of some of the minutes of the meeting, the Moshi Conference established a broad body, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). This brought the different groups present into a single organization. Given Uganda's immediate past history of conflict, the delegates decided that the politically inexperienced but noncontroversial and seemingly amiable 67-year-old Yusufu Lule should lead the new organization. An ex-minister in the British colonial administration in Uganda during the 1950s, Lule was a soft-spoken former principal of Makerere College and chairman of Uganda's Public Service Commission. He was viewed as a compromise candidate who would be acceptable to the majority of the Ugandan populace. Moreover, as Kenneth Ingham (1994) points out, Lule's candidature was strongly underwritten by Britain, which apparently made such a condition for its support for any post-Amin administration in Uganda. Thus, though unknown and with no recognizable political constituency of his own, Lule was "elected" the chairman of the Executive Council of the newly launched UNLF. The UNLF also had a National Consultative Council (NCC), the equivalent of an interim parliament and by some accounts the organization's supreme body. Several committees assisted the council. Lule returned to Uganda on April 13, 1979, two days after the capture of Kampala by the Ugandan exile forces fighting alongside the Tanzanian troops.

Throughout the period of transition from 1979 to 1980, controversy, dispute, and argumentation dogged the UNLF administration. Before flying out to Kampala, Lule had announced the formation of a new government and named a cabinet, with himself as the new president under the 1967 constitution. This immediately sparked off disagreement as certain members of the UNLF argued that Lule had overstepped the bounds of his power. They claimed the Moshi Conference had merely authorized Lule to act as chairman of an interim administration comprising the 11-member Executive Council of the UNLF and the larger NCC. As the minutes of the Moshi meeting had never been presented to the NCC, however, the UNLF was unable to resolve the question. An even more burning issue was the exact relationship between the NCC and the Executive Council. The chairman of the former body, Edward Rugumayo, who had spent his exile years in Zambia, argued that under the Moshi agreement the NCC *was* supreme. In his view, this made him take precedence over Lule in the overall operation of the UNLF administration. Lule countered that the 1967 Uganda Constitution clearly recognized the supremacy of the president. This kind of constitutional dispute

seemed to be aggravated by the long and futile debates in the NCC itself. NCC members, most of whom were middle-class professionals such as lawyers, medical doctors, university academics, and school teachers with little or no political experience, discussed issues in the minutest of details. Government work, particularly in the urgent areas of the country's reconstruction and rehabilitation, was almost at a standstill as the NCC members carried on with their exchanges. At the same time, President Lule became increasingly isolated as he lost the support of the NCC. The council members claimed that he had become dictatorial and had refused to present his ministerial appointments to them for ratification. Moreover, those members of the NCC who still supported Milton Obote's UPC accused Lule of being blatantly anti-Obote when he dismissed or demoted some ministers who were his sympathizers. In the event, the radicals within the NCC combined with the UPC supporters and other dissatisfied members to vote Lule out of power in late June 1979. Lule claimed later that his dismissal had been supported by Nyerere to pave the way for Obote's reinstatement to the presidency of Uganda. The evidence, however, points to Lule's fall having been more the result of internal political differences rather than any outside intervention.

Godfrey Binaisa's presidency (June 1979 to May 1980) saw the continuing contest for power and supremacy between the executive and the parliamentary wings of government. Uganda's state and economy had disintegrated, yet the UNLF seemed unable to move forward. The conflict between the NCC and the new president finally led to the latter's downfall. Once again, disagreement centered initially on the extent to of presidential powers to appoint cabinet ministers. Although Binaisa had apparently resigned himself to the Moshi Conference's resolution that the country should have a relatively weak presidency vis à vis the NCC, he subsequently began to challenge this—if not in words, at least in some of his actions. The final straw was his decision to ban the political parties and his insistence on elections under the UNLF "umbrella" rather than through open party competition. In May he attempted to dismiss the army chief of staff, Brigadier David Oyite Ojok, formerly a commander of the guerrilla forces loyal to Milton Obote in the anti-Amin war. The army reacted by taking over a radio station and announcing the dismissal of Binaisa himself. It reversed his original proposal of holding elections under a no-party system, a move warmly welcomed by both Obote's UPC and the DP. Uganda had just undergone the third government change in the space of only one year. The country was no nearer the social and economic recovery or political stability it so badly needed.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: **Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta; Nyerere, Julius; Tanzania (Tanganyika): Uganda, Relations with.**

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Uganda: Obote: Second Regime, 1980–1985

In May 1980, Milton Obote returned home after nine years' exile in neighboring Tanzania, where he had lived since Idi Amin's overthrow of his first regime in January 1971. As Uganda prepared to go to the polls, Obote visited nearly every corner of the country, delivering a series of campaign speeches for his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). In December 1980 he made history by becoming the first African ex-president to be returned to office through a general election. However, the actions of the incumbent Military Commission government in handling the elections results were highly questionable. In this the role of Paulo Muwanga, the Military Commission chairman and a staunch UPC member who later became Obote's vice president, was paramount. He virtually dismissed the officially appointed Uganda Elections Commission and undertook personally to screen and then announce the election results himself. The Commonwealth Observer team later declared that "despite a number of irregularities . . . the overall conduct of the elections themselves had been fair and . . . the outcome probably represented the views of the people of Uganda" Nevertheless, Obote's opponents seemed to have reasonable grounds for charging that the UPC had rigged the elections.

Yoweri Museveni's guerrillas launched a campaign in February 1981 to remove the government by force of arms. Museveni had lost the contest for a seat in his

home area to a candidate of the Democratic Party (DP). His own recently formed political party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), had done dismally against the two more established parties, the DP and Obote's UPC. The UPM, which had in fact secured only one seat in the parliament, further accused Obote of dictatorship and tyranny. Museveni vowed to fight for democracy and "fundamental change" in the country. Throughout its four-and-a-half-year life, then, the Obote government had to contend with this military challenge to its very existence and with the worsening lawlessness in much of the country as the civil war escalated. In addition, Uganda had undergone staggering social and economic decay in the period of Idi Amin's anarchic rule from 1971 to 1979. Following the removal of the Amin regime, the country's old political differences, suspended by the various groups during the anti-Amin campaign, had reappeared. The two main traditional political parties had renewed their old political rivalries. The Baganda's suspicions of Obote's intentions toward them had never really died; memories of his bitter clash with their late *Kabaka* (King) Mutesa II in 1966 were still fresh. The Uganda to which Obote had returned was a country in a state of utter collapse, both physically and morally. His second presidency was therefore destined to be one of the most difficult periods in the postcolonial history of Uganda.

An early source of worry for Obote was the inadequacy of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). This comprised the survivors of the anti-Amin campaign who had come in from Tanzania and had been joined by hastily recruited and virtually untrained individual volunteer soldiers. In fact, Uganda possessed no truly *national* army. The UNLA had been merely a combination of various forces paying allegiance to individual warlords during the transition period of 1979–1980. This recently created army singularly lacked discipline and proved completely unequal to the task of fighting off the rebel forces of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). For several years the two sides locked horns in the Luwero Triangle in what was a most costly war; each side blamed the loss of hundreds of civilian lives on the other. When the UNLA's chief of staff, Major General Oyite Ojok, died in a helicopter crash in December 1983, this became an important turning point in the Obote regime's fortunes. Ojok was a highly trained and widely respected officer who had begun to instill some discipline in the troops. This had begun to pay off in the government's antiinsurgency operations, at least in the areas around Kampala and Luwero. His death was followed by a prolonged and agonizing search by Obote for his replacement. When the president finally announced the name of the new chief of

staff, who happened to be from his own ethnic group, some senior Acholi officers who claimed to have been overlooked for this appointment felt disgruntled, accusing Obote of tribalism. The growing discontent clearly contributed to the internal division and conflict within the UNLA that eventually resulted in the coup that removed Obote's second regime on July 27, 1985. Again, he was forced into exile.

The explanation for his overthrow by his own army for the second time in his political career is similar in some ways to the reasons for his first fall in 1971, for, as in 1971, the 1985 army was divided. A prolonged anti-Museveni campaign had led to considerable war-weariness in a large section of the army. Moreover, the split in the army seemed to be ethnically based: Tito Okello, the army commander and himself an Acholi, had claimed that the Acholi soldiers in the UNLA had incurred the greatest number of casualties in the war against Museveni. Whether this was a correct interpretation or not, the effect was to sow division within the ranks of the whole army and to weaken both it and the government considerably. His collaborator, Bazilio Okello (no relation), was another senior Acholi officer. He was particularly dismayed that Obote had not appointed him the new chief of staff, although it is not certain that he qualified for the position. The two Okellos' coup of July 1985 was therefore clearly an Acholi coup that arose partly from the two officers' disgruntlement with the government. Parallel to this split in the army, a serious crack also occurred within the ruling party itself. By early 1985, with the prospects of another general election later in the year, factions emerged in the UPC between the "radical" wing and the "moderate" members. The former perceived Obote as too temperate in his political outlook. According to Obote's biographer, Kenneth Ingham, this group feared that the party might exclude them from its list of candidates for the impending elections. Consequently, they decided to side with the army officers who were conspiring to overthrow the government. Although the party never conclusively proved it, Obote's own vice president, Paulo Muwanga, seemed to have been in this camp. At any rate, he soon became part of the new military government set up by the Okellos.

From 1980 to 1985, government troops were often ruthless and were responsible for numerous deaths among the civilians. Overall, however, the picture that emerges is one of a government overwhelmed by the immensity of the social, economic, political, and military challenges it faced. Obote genuinely seemed to want to help his country; he undertook a thorough re-assessment of Uganda's economic recovery program. In this he received the support of the World Bank as well as the International Monetary Fund for some of his rather radical fiscal policies. These included the

novel but bold decision to "float" the Ugandan currency, the shilling, in the regime's battle against inflation. The government focused extensively on rural development, including such areas as water supply and the reintroduction of cash-crop farming. Given the complexity of the country's myriad problems and Obote's own nine years' absence from the country, however, he was quite clearly unequipped to find the solutions to these difficulties. In July 1985, the military set his government aside and brought his political career to an end.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: **Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta; Obote, Milton.**

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Uganda: National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Winning of Political Power

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) had its origins in a group of individuals who gathered around Yoweri Museveni in the early 1970s in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to form an organization called the Front for National Salvation (Fronasa). The group consisted mainly of young idealistic exiles from Uganda who, like Museveni, hoped to topple the regime of Idi Amin. Many individuals within Fronasa, like James Wapakhabulo and Eriya Kategaya, would later become prominent within the NRM government. Fronasa was also one of the many exile organizations that would eventually form the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), which invaded Uganda in April 1979 with the help of the Tanzanian army and ousted Idi Amin Dada.

The first UNLF government was headed by Yusufu Lule. Museveni. The UNLF coalition government under

Lule did not last long, however. After only 68 days in office, Lule was overthrown on June 19, 1979 in favor of Godfrey Binaisa. Binaisa's reign was short-lived as well. In March 1980 General Tito Okello and Paulo Muwanga staged a coup that overthrew the Binaisa government. This paved the way for the reemergence of Milton Obote. In December 1980 elections were held and Milton Obote emerged victorious as head of the UPC. However, the election was regarded as fraudulent by Museveni and his allies within Uganda; they contested the election. At this point, Museveni, who had campaigned with the Uganda Patriotic Movement, began a guerilla campaign against the Obote regime in the southern part of Uganda, north of Kampala, known as the Luwero Triangle. It was during this period that the NRM began to cohere.

With an incipient core group of about 27 individuals that included later NRM stalwarts Sam Magera, Ahmed Seguya, Fred Rubereza, Sam Katarwa, Elly Tumwine, and Museveni's brother Salim Saleh, Museveni began to build the structures that would evolve into the NRM. A failed attack on Kabamba barracks to secure arms on February 6, 1981 signaled the start of the war that would last approximately five years.

Initially, the insurgents were called the Popular Resistance Army (PRA). A National Resistance Council (NRC) acted as the civilian wing of the movement. The NRC supported the PRA through a network of civilian committees that provided intelligence support, recruitment and also food for the army.

In June 1981, Museveni's PRA merged with the anti-UNLF group Uganda Freedom Fighters, headed by the ousted Yusufu Lule, to form the NRM. Lule was designated chairman, and Museveni vice chairman. The NRM would serve as the civilian political wing of the National Resistance Army (NRA).

Between 1981 and 1983, the NRA lacked adequate equipment and arms, relying on guerrilla tactics to conduct the war against the UNLF. During this phase of the war, the NRA employed ambush and sabotage tactics against specific targets to either acquire arms or destroy enemy equipment and morale.

The problem of acquiring food was always a serious problem for the NRA, one that led them to rely heavily upon the peasant population in the Luwero Triangle. The NRA was able to gain much support from the peasants, however, by treating them with respect. This included paying for goods commandeered from the peasants. To facilitate good civilian relationships with the peasantry the NRA also adopted a code of conduct that governed relationships between the NRA soldiers and the civilian population. An operational code of conduct was also instituted to deal with offenses during the operation of a battle. As a result, the NRA was able to rely on the peasantry for help in providing both food and intelligence.

In January 1983 the UNLA launched a major offensive against the NRA in the Luwero Triangle. This offensive, in which the UNLA concentrated 75 per cent of its troop strength against the NRA, followed the pattern of a similar offensive in June 1982 and was designed to overwhelm the guerrillas with superior force and numbers. The overwhelming UNLA force, coupled with an inadequate supply of arms, forced the NRA to retreat into the more remote upper reaches of the triangle. The retreat, however, occasioned a reorganization of the NRA's tactics and strategy.

During the second phase of the war (1983–1985), the NRA began to incorporate a policy of so called mobile warfare. This entailed more attacks against entrenched enemy positions. The NRA formed a mobile brigade to facilitate these attacks with Museveni as first commander. With this reorganization, the original brigades became zonal brigades responsible for protecting or carrying out attacks in a specific zone or locality, while the mobile brigade carried out attacks far afield from a specific zone. With the emphasis on mobile warfare the NRA increased their attacks on UNLA targets during June and July of 1983.

In December 1983 the chief of staff of the UNLA, David Oyite-Ojok, was killed in a helicopter crash. This had a negative ripple effect on the UNLA and set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately lead to the ousting of Obote. Ojok's death caused confusion and a leadership vacuum that led to conflict within the UNLA ranks. On July 27, 1985 Obote was overthrown in favor of a military council headed by the Generals Bazilio Okello and Tito Okello Lutwa.

Steady advances by the NRA allowed them to open up a second front in the southwestern region of Uganda, at the base of the Rwenzori mountains, in March and April. By August 1985 peace talks had begun between the NRM and the UNLA; a tenuous peace accord was signed on December 17. However, fighting continued and the NRA advanced on Kampala, capturing it on January 26, 1986. Museveni was sworn in as president three days later.

The NRM attempted to implement the political objectives of its so-called Ten Point Program, which sought to establish popular democracy, encourage national unity, and rebuild the economy. As part of this course of action, the NRM extended amnesty to guerrilla groups. Museveni created a coalition government consisting of members of the Democratic Party, the Uganda Peoples Congress and the Federal Democratic Movement, plus several other organizations. Eventually most of these parties left the coalition. The most notable defection was Paul Ssemogerere of the DP, who would become Museveni's strongest opponent in the elections of 1996.

The NRM saw political parties as historically divisive in Uganda because they promoted sectarianism along

ethnic lines. As part of the Ten Point Program, political parties were eschewed under the banner of “no partyism.” Political parties were allowed to operate but could not enjoy official status.

Despite attempts at coalition building, the NRM was not able to bring in dissident groups from the north. The vacuum created by the defeat of the Acholi-led military commission was filled by the insurgency of Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirit Movement. After the defeat of the Holy Spirit Movement by the NRA, the Lord’s Resistance Army initiated a program of guerrilla warfare. The winning of political power by the NRM has come, to some extent, at the expense of northern integration.

OPOLOT OKIA

See also: **Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta.**

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Uganda: Reconstruction: Politics, Economics

Following years of misrule and civil conflict in Uganda, power was achieved by Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in January 1986 following a guerrilla war with, successively, the second government of Milton Obote (1980–1985) and then the government of Generals Bazilio Okello and Tito Okello. On coming to power, Museveni proclaimed that his top priorities were national conciliation, economic development, and army discipline. While the latter aim was swiftly achieved, with the army gaining much respect from most ordinary Ugandans, the country embarked on a managed transition to an unusual form of democracy in the early 1990s. Heading an elected “no-party” government, president Museveni attacked the concept of multiparty democracy with both vigor and eloquence. He claimed that it was inappropriate for Uganda to have a political system based on divided and divisive political parties. He noted—with some justification—that, when tried in the past, a fundamental cause of the country’s societal

and political problems had been the ethnic and religious divisiveness caused by the competition of multiparty politics. In Uganda, there are four main religious divides—Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and followers of African traditional religions—and some 40 distinct ethnic groups.

Museveni and his government inherited a shattered economy, heavily dependent on foreign loans and investment if it were soon to recover. Encouraged by Museveni’s determination to rebuild the country’s political, social, and economic stability, Uganda was the recipient of billions of dollars of foreign aid from the late 1980s on. A condition for its disbursement, however, was the adoption of major economic reforms via a structural adjustment program, with terms dictated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Surprisingly, the international financial institutions did not try to link the granting of financial assistance to political conditionality, especially progress to a multiparty political system. The chief reason, it appears, is that there was admiration for the way that Museveni and his government had managed to install a fair level of stability after decades of turmoil.

The centerpiece of political reform in Uganda after 1986 was the proclaimed policy of fundamentally shifting power to the mass of ordinary people, especially in the rural areas, where the majority of Ugandans live. Museveni claimed to have created a government of national unity drawn from as many effectively autonomous or semiautonomous political forces as possible, in order to bring the country’s internal wars to a close. Balancing (and to some extent constraining) the resultant broad-based but weak central government were resistance councils (RCs), strong representations of the multifarious political grassroots of the country. These bodies were established initially in the early 1980s in the “liberated areas” then under Museveni’s control. Small-scale, face-to-face support groups, they were examples, he claimed, of grassroots, popular democracy. Following the achievement of power, RCs spread throughout Uganda as an important NRM policy.

The RCs were not seen by the country’s political leaders as an inferior substitute for other kinds of representative institutions. Rather, they were defended as being fundamentally more democratic institutions than earlier political parties operating in the country. Traditional parties—including the Democratic Party, the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, and the Kabaka Yekka (King Alone) movement in Buganda—had collectively made Uganda’s transition to independence from Britain in 1962 an intensely pressured and divisive affair. Their maneuvers and strategies to achieve power had the counterproductive result of strongly encouraging ethnic, regional and “sectarian” differences (what Museveni’s

government called the country's "politicoreligious cleavages") still dividing Uganda today.

After its seizure of power, the NRM installed an intricate structure of "nonparty" RCs from village to district level. Elections to the various levels were held in 1989 and 1992. The October 1995 constitution provided for a 276-member unicameral parliament and an autonomous, independently elected president. The constitution formally extended Uganda's one-party "movement system" form of government for five years and severely restricted political party activities.

In what was widely interpreted as a step toward political normalization, separate generally peaceful and orderly presidential and parliamentary elections were held in June and July 1996. Museveni was elected president by a wide margin (70 per cent) over his nearest challenger, Paul Ssemogerere, joint candidate of the Democratic Party and the Ugandan People's Congress. NRM supporters won an overwhelming majority of seats in the new parliament. Overall, popular participation in the three sets of elections was widespread, providing positive evidence of the NRM's commitment to its own kind of no-party democracy.

During the 1990s, political reforms were paralleled by economic reforms. Despite the regime's disavowal of multiparty democracy and a questionable human and civil rights record, there was considerable financial support for the NRM government from external sources. The government relied heavily on foreign aid to support its development program, with foreign assistance accounting for approximately 51 per cent of government spending. Rebuilding the country's export base after years of decline, there were economic reward: between 1985 and 1997 average annual growth of gross domestic product per capita averaged 2.7 per cent. Overall, in the 1990s the economy grew, albeit from a low base, at over 7 per cent a year. While much of this growth was no more than rebuilding after years of civil strife, it was nonetheless a good record.

Museveni has been able to bring political stability and economic steadiness to most of a country that has hardly experienced either since independence in 1962. He was reelected in 2001, and in 2003 he proposed lifting the ban on multiparty politics, subject to a referendum. Surrounded by politically volatile countries (including the Democratic Republic of Congo [Zaire], Sudan, Ethiopia, and Rwanda), Uganda is seen by Western governments as an island of stability in an increasingly turbulent East African region. However, despite undoubted successes, significant problems remain. While national reconstruction and economic growth and reconstruction have forged ahead in the south of the country, the government is embroiled in a civil war in the north with rebels with bases in southern Sudan and eastern Congo.

JEFF HAYNES

See also: **Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta.**

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Uganda: Conflict, Regional Since 1990

During the 1990s, Uganda's efforts at recovery from the internal upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s were striking. By the beginning of the new millennium, some parts of the country had made appreciable social and economic progress. Overall, a fair degree of political stability had returned to the south.

Yet the country has been mired in one conflict after another throughout the period since 1990. Apart from cases of internal strife, such as the war in the north and east and the rebellion in the west, Uganda was embroiled in the armed conflicts raging in neighboring Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under the auspices of the National Resistance Movement (NRM).

Yoweri Museveni's NRM regime was faced with serious internal rebel activity almost from the moment it assumed power in January 1986. Following the defeat of the forces of Tito Okello and Bzilio Okello, some soldiers of the Uganda National Liberation Army (the previous government's fighting force) joined the newly formed rebel Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) operating in northern Uganda. In August they attacked Gulu town. This marked the formal start of the internal rebel war in opposition to the NRM government.

Although the UPDA itself did not score any spectacular victory, the arrival of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) on the political scene in late 1986 compounded the situation considerably. The HSMF, which succeeded in recruiting large numbers of ex-government soldiers in a comparatively short period, was led by Alice Lakwena, described as a prophet or spiritual leader. The HSMF's declared principal objective was to fight evil and remove the central government. In late 1987, it was defeated on the outskirts of Iganga, a town barely 80 kilometers from Kampala, Uganda's seat of government. Despite the administration's persistent claim over the years that the antigovernment war was

being stamped out, the violence and insecurity arising from this rebellion continued to destabilize Uganda well into and beyond the 1990s.

Historically, relations between Uganda and Sudan have been particularly important because they have had similar internal problems over the years. Both the northern Ugandans and southern Sudanese are on the periphery of their respective countries, and both have been involved in rebel activities against their central governments. From the late 1980s, Sudanese troops allegedly crossed into Ugandan territory in search of Sudanese rebels. Uganda even claimed that Sudanese military aircraft had bombed parts of northern Uganda several times.

From 1992 to 1995, hostilities between the two nations increased, with over 100,000 Sudanese refugees reportedly crossing into Uganda. Each side accused the other of supporting rebel groups to attack it. The arrival of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on the political scene complicated matters further, as it reportedly received military backing from the Sudan government. At the same time, the Ugandan government threw its support behind the Sudan People's Liberation Army in its rebel war against the Khartoum administration.

From the early 1990s, the LRA stepped up its fight by not only attacking military targets in northern Uganda but also kidnapping children, both boys and girls, and forcibly recruiting them into their army. The NRM government also accused them of torturing civilians and carrying them into Sudan. In response, the LRA charged that Museveni had betrayed the Acholi following his abrogation of the December 1985 peace agreement with the previous administration of Tito Okello; his NRM had overturned the government in January 1986, and later occupied Acholi land. The NRM had carried out serious human rights abuses on the Acholi in its abortive campaign to bring about a military solution to the conflict. The NRM's decision to remove over 200,000 individuals by force and place them in so-called protected villages from 1990 onward, coupled with the LRA's own attacks on civilians, only caused the civilian population further suffering as they inevitably became victims of the two warring sides. Quite often the operations resulted in rapes, abductions and even summary executions.

The growing tension between Uganda and Sudan in the mid-1990s led to the two breaking diplomatic relations in 1995. This situation seemed to be improving, however, when the presidents of the two countries signed the Nairobi Agreement in December 1999. This accord mapped out a detailed plan for ending the conflict between the two nations. Both nations agreed to disarm rebel groups on their own soil and to stop supporting them. They also promised to restore full diplomatic relations by early 2000. This, however, did not happen.

The regionalization of Uganda's involvement in conflict was further carried forward by the alleged support it lent to the Rwanda Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion of Rwanda in late 1990. Since the 1959 upheavals in Rwanda, thousands of Rwandans had flocked to Uganda. By the late 1980s approximately 250,000 such refugees had settled in the country. Several generations had taken up Ugandan citizenship and some had in fact become involved in the country's politics at the highest levels. One such Rwandan exile was Major General Fred Rwigyema, who not only had risen to the position of deputy commander of the national army, but had even previously worked as Uganda's deputy minister of defense. In October 1990 he led a group of approximately 4000 Uganda-based Rwandan rebel troops in an incursion into northern Rwanda. Rwigyema was killed by Rwandan government soldiers in the attack, and the invasion worsened relations between the two countries significantly. Although an agreement was reached in early 1991 in which the Rwandan administration extended an amnesty to all exiled Rwandans on condition of their observing a cease-fire, rebel activities continued unabated in northern Rwanda from 1991 to 1993. This caused the displacement of thousands of Ugandans living in the border area in early 1994. At the same time, Rwanda was experiencing internal civil strife involving the genocidal massacre of up to a million people, all of which complicated relations with neighboring countries, including Uganda.

The turning point came with the RPF's military victory over the Rwandan government soldiers in mid-1994. The new vice president and minister of defense, Paul Kagame, had been a high-ranking officer in the Ugandan national army. Thereafter, relations between Uganda and Rwanda improved dramatically. Museveni paid an official visit to Rwanda the following year (1995), and the two countries agreed to strengthen economic and social cooperation. In 1996 and 1997, it became an open secret that the two administrations had both lent their support to the then Zairean (now DRC) rebel organization led by Laurent Kabila that toppled the Mobutu government in May 1997.

Of the regional conflicts in which Uganda was involved since 1990, the crisis in the DRC has lasted the longest and produced the most severe ramifications. The roots of the conflict date back to the late 1980s, when groups of Ugandan anti-Museveni rebels based in Zaire began to attack western Uganda, allegedly with the support of Zairean soldiers. The most prominent of these disparate Ugandan rebel organizations was the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which posed a major threat to security and peace in Uganda's Ruwenzori region. In retaliation, Ugandan troops often pursued these rebels into eastern Zaire and occupied the territory. There were, additionally, persistent reports

(later confirmed) that the Ugandan government had been arming Kabila's rebel movement and giving it tactical support in its fight against the Mobutu regime. Kabila took power in May 1997. Later, however, Uganda withdrew its support for Kabila as he seemed unable (and unwilling) to stop the anti-Museveni rebel forces from using eastern DRC as their launching pad for attacks on western Uganda.

In August 1998 Museveni's government, in collaboration with the Rwandan regime, sent troops into eastern DRC, ostensibly to protect Ugandan and Rwandan security interests. The two countries formed a joint military command. The Kabila government's response was to charge (with some justification, it seems) that both Uganda and Rwanda's real intentions were to expand Tutsi domination in the Great Lakes region and to exploit the enormous mineral wealth of the DRC.

Amid such accusations and counteraccusations the conflict continued. In July 1999 the parties to the conflict signed the Lusaka Accord. They agreed to observe a cease-fire monitored by a joint military commission. The Kabila government also agreed to accept United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops in the DRC after all foreign forces had withdrawn from the country.

The implementation of the Lusaka Accord, however, proved quite problematic almost from the outset. There were frequent violations of the cease-fire. Additionally, tense relations developed between Uganda and Rwanda when the main DRC rebel group they had backed broke up into two rival factions. This not only resulted in the two countries giving support to two opposing groups, but also to a major military confrontation in Kisangani between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in late 1999 and early 2000. In the clash, the Ugandan troops were humiliated when the Rwandans drove them out of Kisangani, while the main victims of this unsightly contest between two foreign African countries outside their own respective territory were the DRC people. Later, the two sides agreed to withdraw their troops from Kisangani. In May 2000, the DRC agreed to the deployment of 500 UN military observers, supported by some 5000 troops, to monitor the cease-fire.

The assassination of DRC president Kabila in January 2001 removed one of the perceived major stumbling blocks to the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. His replacement by his 29-year old son, Joseph, seemed to give the quest for a peaceful settlement of the DRC conflict a new lease of life. In April 2001 a UN panel published a damning report that concluded that "the governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, whose troops occupied parts of eastern DRC, were profiting from the conflict by looting gold and other precious minerals . . . [and] elephant tusks."

Under international pressure, Uganda was forced to institute its own commission of inquiry into the reported

misdeeds. While it had been expected by many observers that Uganda's role in the DRC war had seriously eroded the president's popularity, Ugandans went to the polls in March 2001 and elected Museveni for another five-year term as president. In the campaign leading up to the controversial elections, questions had been raised about the negative effects of the armed conflicts on Uganda's economy and the possibility that a large section of the population had become thoroughly disenchanted with Museveni during his fifteen-year rule. However, his most effective challenger in the presidential elections, retired army colonel Kiiza Besigye, was unable to stop Museveni, despite a strong showing. By mid-2001 there were indications that the conflict in the DRC might begin to abate as the various countries embroiled there began to withdraw their troops. In December 2002 a peace deal was signed, appearing to end the conflict.

BALAM NYEKO

See also: **Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire: Post-Mobutu Era; Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta.**

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Uganda Agreement: See Uganda: Colonization, Resistance, Uganda Agreement, 1890–1900.

Uganda Railway: See Kenya: East African Protectorate and the Uganda Railway.

Umzila: See Soshangane, Umzila, Gungunhane and the Gaza State.

Undi: See Maravi: Phiri Clan, Lundu and Undi Dynasties.

Union Douanière et Economique de L'Afrique Central (UDEAC)

The Union Douanière et Economique de L'Afrique Central (UDEAC) was established in 1968, but its origins date back to 1959, when France, in an effort to achieve an easy administration within its colonies in

central Africa, created the *Afrique Equatoriale Francaise* (AEF). The countries that made up the AEF were the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, and Gabon. With the demise of French colonial rule, the leaders of the AEF decided to transform it into the *Union Douanière Equatorial* (UDE), or Equatorial Custom Union. This was achieved through a treaty that was signed in Brazzaville, Congo, on June 23, 1959. The objectives of the UDE were to establish a common external tariff and import duties among its members, to obtain a harmonized fiscal policy, and to coordinate the economic and social development plans of member states.

In 1961, the UDE was transformed into the *Union Douanière Equatorial et du Cameroun* (UDE-Cameroun) when Cameroon, which was not part of the French union (AEF) signed a treaty with UDE, setting the stage for exchange control and providing for regional cooperation. However, the UDE-Cameroun Treaty did not provide for a total harmonization of custom duties between Cameroon and the UDE countries, though it did provide for Cameroon's adoption of most of the integration measures of UDE. Consequently, Cameroon opted for full membership in UDE.

It was this eagerness by Cameroon to create unity that culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Brazzaville in 1964, establishing the UDEAC. The treaty became effective on January 1, 1966. In 1984, Equatorial Guinea joined the Union (UDEAC), making it the only member that is not a former French colony.

The transformation of UDE-Cameroun into UDEAC paved the way for a broader economic union. The objectives include an eventual economic union between member states and the creation of a regionally balanced industrial structure. The Treaty of Brazzaville advocated the elimination of restrictions on commodity movement between member states, the institution of a common external tariff against third countries, and the removal of intra union trade barriers, including some degree of harmonization of national economic policies, especially in the areas of industrial, investment, and transportation development. No member country can unilaterally impose import duties or taxes on another member except when such a measure is instituted as a safeguard. A single tax system was established in order to promote the creation of a regional manufacturing base and trade in manufacture goods. The treaty also encourages free movement of capital, goods and services within UDEAC's territory.

The UDEAC is made up of three primary organs. The supreme decision-making body is the Council of Heads of States, which is comprised of the six heads of states of the member countries. It meets annually and makes decisions affecting the union on the basis of consensus among all its members. Next is the Management

Committee, which is comprised of two ministers from each member state—usually the minister of finance and the minister of economic development. This committee meets biannually and derives its power from the Council of Heads of States. It is charged with making decisions on the rates of the common tariff, fiscal harmonization and coordination of industrial policy, the single tax, custom legislation, and regulation. Prior to its meeting, a committee of experts meets and makes recommendations to the Management Committee, most of which are accepted. The Secretariat, the administrative body of the UDEAC, is located in Bangui, CAR, and is headed by a secretary general. It is composed of two divisions: the first deals with foreign commerce, fiscal policies, and statistics while the second carries out industrial planning and harmonizes transportation policies.

The UDEAC has taken several steps toward economic integration. It operates a central bank, *Banque de l'Etats d'Afrique Central*, which issues a common currency (the francs CFA) used by the six member countries. A complete unification of most taxes has been achieved. A common external tariff applies to all imports entering the member countries. On the other hand, goods circulating within the UDEAC are exempt from any import duties, except where there is a differential in the rate of supplementary tax between the countries of final consumption. Goods manufactured within the UDEAC are under the single tax system, which was designed to eliminate the tendency of members to either lose important fiscal resources (if they industrialize) or continue to import from foreign countries. All industries whose products are sold in more than one member state are regulated by the single tax. These industries are exempt from all import duties with respect to their raw materials including the items that they use in packing. The single tax varies from one country to the other for the same item. Member states sometimes demand higher rates for an item produced in another member state compared to the rates they demand for the item produced in their own country. This is due to the fact that each country wants to protect its industries against competition from the same industries in the other partner's state.

Common custom offices have been established throughout the union, and the sharing and settlement of proceeds of custom duties takes place every three months. A Solidarity Fund exists, the purpose of which is to help reduce the level of economic disparity between the more developed member states, such as Cameroon and Gabon, and the less developed ones, such as the CAR and Chad.

Since its creation, the UDEAC has not been without problems. In 1968 Chad and the CAR, dissatisfied with the union's policy, withdrew to form a parallel union with the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, this

did not work as the CAR returned to the UDEAC shortly after it left, while Chad returned in 1984. Against a background of persistent economic crisis that has been plaguing the UDEAC, the Treaty of Brazzaville was revised in 1974 because of declining trade among the union's members. In 1994 a new custom and fiscal regime, intended to effect broad economic changes within the union, was created.

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See also: Banking and Finance; Colonial Federations: French Equatorial Africa; Communauté Financière Africaine; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

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Upare, Usambara, Kilimanjaro

Mount Kilimanjaro and the mountains of Upare and Usambara form the northeastern highlands of Tanzania, which stretch almost to the East African coast. The history of the former inhabitants of this region, like the earlier history of the peoples living there today, remains largely unknown because of the scantiness of available materials. Most of the current inhabitants of the highlands are Bantu peoples, such as the Chagga at Kilimanjaro,

the Upare in the Upare Mountains, and the Shambala in the Usambara Mountains. Additionally, some clans of the Southern Cushitic Mbugu still live in the Usambaras, and scattered Eastern Nilotic Masai groups can be found throughout the area.

Knowledge of the early history of this region is based mainly on archaeology, and less on linguistic reconstructions and oral traditions. Unfortunately, archaeological Stone Age sequences attesting to the introduction of pottery or to techniques of food production are completely lacking; the same is true of sites that might document the transition from the Later Stone Age to the Iron Age. The few pottery findings of the Later Iron Age tell us little, as they do not involve detailed sequences, comprehensively analysed assemblages, or well-dated sites; nor can they be linked with any people living there today.

The best-documented period by far is the Early Iron Age, represented mostly by pottery of the so-called Kwale style. Kwale pottery has been found exclusively in South Upare and the Usambaras, with finds dating from the third to the ninth centuries. Iron and iron slag are frequently found associated with this pottery style, and there are clear indications of agriculture and a cattle economy. Pottery strongly resembling the Kwale type has been found throughout the highlands and near Mombasa. In the Kwale region a local diversification of pottery styles took place as early as the fourth century, in such a way that often no clear relation can be established among the various styles. Conclusions drawn from this picture in regard to ethnic history are thus problematic: ethnic continuity may have prevailed while the pottery style was diversified, or else the original population may have been replaced by several unidentified groups.

From 870, there appeared in South Upare a new pottery style called Maore, independent of Kwale and only rarely to be found at Kwale sites. Maore ware was also in use in Northern Upare, but here often along with Kwale ware; the Northern Upare evidence can be dated from the sixth to the tenth centuries. In the Kilimanjaro region both styles can again be found in the same sites, and are dated from 250. The makers of Maore ware presumably subsisted on hunting and stockraising; they may, however, also have practiced agriculture and maintained trade contacts with the coast, as reflected in the beads and shell ornaments found. In the Usambaras the Kwale ware of the second and third centuries was replaced by the so-called Tana ware of the fifth and sixth centuries, which differs too strongly from Kwale to have evolved from it. In tandem with the change in ceramic style, a change in settlement patterns can also be recognized. The Kwale settlements in the Usambaras were situated on mountain ridges, a settlement scheme that can still be found today at

Kilimanjaro among the Chagga. With the emergence of the Tana ware this settlement pattern came to an end in the Usambaras. The few lexical roots reconstructed linguistically for this period appear to confirm these archaeological results.

The oral traditions of the Upare, Chagga, and Shambala do not shed much light on the history of the Early and Late Iron Ages. They report that the Upare migrated from the Taita Hills to their present territories about 600 years ago, and that the ancestors of the Chagga immigrated from many directions and/or descended from various ethnic groups. The Upare and Chagga do, however, mention small groups of hunters whom they met at their arrival and subsequently drove off or absorbed.

The Kwale ware is frequently associated with the Bantu populations now found in the region, inasmuch as Kwale is part of an early Iron Age complex that includes the dimple-based ware of the interlacustrine region and almost certainly the channelled wares found in Zambia and present-day Zimbabwe. Some scholars have therefore constructed a cultural connection between the manufacturers of these pottery styles. The geographical distribution of these related styles coincides with that of the hypothesized Bantu expansions. However, this alignment of relatively recent linguistic distributions with archaeological distributions often showing an age of at least a millennium, is highly questionable in methodological terms, and is based only on the similarity of geographical distribution. Thus the above hypothesis can by no means be considered as proven. It does, however, receive some support from the local agricultural traditions. These characterize the immigrating Bantu as farmers who made use of Iron Age technologies. The regions economically suitable for such agriculturalists correspond well with the dispersal area of Kwale pottery; indeed, the Kilimanjaro, Upare, and Usambara regions resemble each other in respect to rainfall quantities and native vegetation. Though oral traditions indicate that agriculture—for example, on the western and northern slopes of the Kilimanjaro—is a recent phenomenon, botanical evidence militates against this. The evidence that agriculture was carried out at a much earlier period on the northern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro consists partly in the existence of a forest belt of wild olive trees, which generally regrow naturally in the Mount Kilimanjaro forest in the regeneration phase after the forest has been burned. Further, the vegetation of the forest clearings, in which most of the fields lie, displays features that can be interpreted as vestiges of very old agricultural traditions.

The Upare have traditionally maintained an iron industry of supraregional importance; this might indicate a link to the early Iron Age findings.

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See also: Iron Age (Later): East Africa.

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Upper Volta: See Burkina Faso (Upper Volta).

Urabi Pasha: See Egypt: Urabi Pasha and British Occupation, 1879–1882.

Urbanization and Site Hierarchy: West Africa: Savannah and Sahel

The Concept of Urbanism

Our current understanding that urbanism was an indigenous and recurrent phenomenon in West African savanna and the Sahel dates largely to the postcolonial period. In the colonial imagination, Africa was predominantly rural in character, composed of small, undifferentiated villages of mud and thatch huts. The walled cities and towns of the Sahel (Kano province alone had 170 in 1900) were, consequently, a colossal surprise to Europeans. Frederick Lugard commented in 1902 before his assault on Kano that "I have never seen, nor even imagined, anything like it in Africa" (quoted in Connah 2000, 43). Colonial era historians and archaeologists accommodated this urban anomaly by "medievalizing" the Sahel and conceptualizing it as an economic and cultural dependent of the Islamic world. Cultural and political achievements in the Sahel were attributed to influences from the north. This diffusionist paradigm formalized the belief that urbanism was not native to Africa.

Farther south, European administrators and anthropologists did not recognize the large, densely populated, nucleated Yoruba settlements as urban in character. Why was this? One of the main obstacles to the recognition of precolonial African urbanism was that all the conceptual tools available for investigating this topic had been developed with reference to Western sequences

of historical development. The bulk of the ideas on what cities are and how they have changed through time dealt with European urban transformations from classical antiquity through the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution. Thus, many nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century attempts to define the term *urban* proceeded by constructing ideal types that identified essential features differentiating Western urban society from pre- or nonurban society.

The archaeologist V. G. Childe constructed a list of essential features of urban civilization, including writing and monumental architecture, thereby excluding much of black Africa from consideration. The West has long thought of cities as centers of despotic power, with impressive architecture reflecting that power. It is now recognized that monumentality, while a common strategy employed by rulers of early city-states in Mesoamerica and Mesopotamia (among others), was not an inevitable accompaniment of early urbanism. The Bronze Age cities of China, for example, had no monumental architecture. Among the reasons for the lack of investment in monuments in much of Sub-Saharan Africa are lack of suitable building materials (such as stone) in some areas and the prevalence of extensive, slash-and-burn agricultural systems that required settlement relocation after several decades, thus working against permanent installation of populations at one location for long periods. In many areas, the location of the capital city shifted with every accession of a new ruler. Ecological constraints linked to a value system that conceived of space as social (rooted in kin groups and genealogical proximity), rather than as a particular physical place, produced African urban configurations that looked quite different than the cities of the West.

All of this helps explain why European observers failed to recognize African towns and cities: because they did not conform to concepts of urbanism derived from Western historical sequences. The postcolonial period has seen a reorientation of research that has exposed the ethnographic assumptions and ideological underpinnings of many of the earlier theories of urbanism. Emphasis has shifted from what a city is (widely agreed to be a futile pursuit in view of the tremendous range of urban forms) to what a city does. We owe to geographers the important realization that urban centers never exist in isolation; they are always articulated with a regional hinterland. Whatever else a city may be, it is a unit of settlement that performs specialized functions in relation to a broader hinterland. The specialized functions may be of an economic nature, such as production and export of goods and services, or they have a more social aspect, such as the elaboration of power and new social institutions or the exchange of information. Urbanism thus represents a novel kind of relationship among sites in a region involving the

emergence of specialization and functional interdependence. The symbiosis characteristic of the urban system emerges out of the circulation of commodities essential to subsistence (food, iron used to produce food) within it. Urban systems are predicated upon the exchange of agricultural surplus. Their characteristic spatial signature is a hierarchy of higher and lower order settlements in which higher order sites are larger and more populous and fill a wider range of specialized functions than lower order settlements.

Urbanism and Site Hierarchies in West Africa

The systematic study of the earliest manifestations of precolonial urban growth in West Africa is still in its infancy. Although archaeological research undertaken in the late 1960s and 1970s demonstrated the antiquity and indigenous character of very large-scale agglomerations on the margins of the southern Sahara at Tichitt and along the Middle Niger River at Jenne-jeno, West Africa remains underserved by archaeologists interested in urbanism.

There are four “urban zones” of West Africa wherein urbanism is a recurrent feature of the indigenous cultural landscape with considerable time depth. In order of apparent chronological appearance, these are the Tichitt-Walata escarpment in southeastern Mauritania; the Inland Niger Delta and Méma regions of Mali; the southern Nigerian savanna and forest; and Hausaland, in the northern Nigerian Sahel. These areas are easily identifiable due to the prominent physical remains of walls, settlement mounds, or earthworks associated with the towns. Other “urban zones” with less prominent features probably await discovery by archaeologists. The diversity of “nontypical” urban forms (as defined by Western historical experience) in West Africa has great potential to broaden our comparative understanding of the forms and circumstances of early urban development.

Tichitt-Walata—Along the 60- to 100-meter-high escarpment that stretches 400 kilometers from Tichitt to Walata and Nema, agglomerations of stone-walled circular or oval compounds occur in considerable numbers; they were erected from 3500 to 2300 years ago, during the Neolithic period. Some are extremely large, measuring 30 to 95 hectares (a hectare is a unit of land 100 meters by 100 meters in size; it equals 2.5 acres), with 200 to 600 compounds. Questions have been raised as to whether these represent early towns, with an urban hierarchy of a very few large, some medium, and many small settlements. Or are these the remains of a seasonal settlement system of agropastoralists organized into an early chiefdom? One of the difficulties in evaluating these interpretations

is the lack of agreement by different researchers over the interpretation of chronology at these settlements. Identification of site hierarchies presupposes some way of determining which settlements and compounds within settlements were occupied contemporaneously. This has proven elusive. Until more chronologically oriented research is done, the nature of the apparent hierarchies at Tichitt must remain in a suspense account.

Inland Niger Delta, Méma—Archaeological research indicates that the clustering of settlement mounds is characteristic of the “urban zone” in the basin of the Middle Niger, where people lived within the floodplain. Commonly, a cluster comprises a large, central settlement mound of up to 10 meters in height and 20 to 80 hectares in area, surrounded by intermediate and smaller size mounds at distances of 100 to 1000 meters. Excavation and survey at the vast mound of Jenne-jeno revealed that the site expanded to its maximum size of over 30 hectares by 850, soon after which a city wall of unfired mud brick was built. Regional survey indicated that of the 65 mounds located within four kilometers of Jenné-jeno, 32 were actively occupied in the period 850–1000. At this time, a clustered pattern of truly large settlements, plus a host of smaller ones in what seems to be a three-tier hierarchy, was a significant feature of the settlement system. The functional interdependence of these mounds was indicated by surface distributions of iron-smithing debris and fishing equipment that were restricted to only a few of the sites within the cluster. Interregional trade in local staples for raw materials such as stone and iron, unavailable on the floodplain, appears to have fueled this growth. The population of the entire urban cluster is estimated to have been between 10,000 and 25,000 people. Roderick McIntosh has suggested that clustered, functionally integrated settlements such as these may have been a common form of early urbanism in Africa as well as China, in cases where a powerful centralized authority had not yet emerged. Large, clustered mounds dating to the first millennium have also been investigated in the Méma region to the northwest of the Inland Delta, where there is some evidence that this pattern may extend back into the first millennium BCE or even earlier.

Nigerian Savanna and Forest—The typical form of the precolonial cities of the Yoruba and Edo peoples was a vast system of earthworks or earthen walls encircling both habitations and agricultural land. Roads ran like spokes on a wheel toward the palace of the *oba* (divine king), who was the spiritual center of the city-state. The great terra cotta, copper alloy, and stone sculptural traditions associated with forest city-states

such as Ife and Benin indicate the high level of craftsmanship and specialization that developed. Old Oyo (Oyo Ile), which was abandoned in the nineteenth century, was the most important Yoruba city-state located within the savanna zone. Seventy kilometers of enclosing earthen walls have been mapped and the area of the palace alone exceeds 200 hectares. Survey indicates that earthworks began to be erected in the later first millennium.

Hausaland, Northern Nigeria—The large fortified cities and towns of Hausaland were well-established by the sixteenth century, but their antiquity has not been investigated archaeologically. Fired brick city walls up to 20 kilometers in length enclosed urban domiciles and agricultural land, offering protection from raiders. Archaeological research may show that urban growth in this region was as early as in the Inland Niger Delta, and similarly linked to the growth of regional and indigenous long-distance trade.

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See also: Iron Age and Neolithic: West Africa.

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Urbanization: Colonial Context

The effervescence of the Hausa city-states and the Swahili ports, the prestige of the Sudanese capitals, the cultural influence of Timbuktu and Cairo, the fortifications of Great Zimbabwe, the architectural beauties of Zanzibar: these all bear witness to the diffusion of the urban phenomenon in precolonial Africa.

In North Africa, Arab Muslim civilization has long been largely urban, and over a long period the numerous urban centers of the Maghrib and the Mashriq, from Cairo to Marrakech, have accumulated political, economic, cultural, and residential functions. However, while urbanization was an ancient phenomenon to the North of the Sahara, many of the cities in Sub-Saharan Africa have developed much more recently, and, in general, partly as a result of colonial penetration. Whether in the north of the continent or the south, the older cities have themselves been greatly transformed by colonists.

As a result, urbanization in Africa has generally been characterized by external constraints connected with the logic of colonialism. Created, or refounded, in response to the expectations of metropolitan powers and made into pivots of imposed administrative structures, locations of European power, and indispensable synapses in colonial economies, they acquired characteristics that, in many respects, have still not been eliminated even now.

One of the most obvious ways in which colonization has influenced urbanization is through the far-reaching reorganization of urban networks. In West Africa, for example, the precolonial cities were generally hinterland cities, controlling the trade routes across the Sahara. A more dispersed organization of urban networks began to be put in place during the sixteenth century in line with the establishment of trading posts along the coasts; these formed the earliest zones of European settlement. Following the military conquests of the nineteenth century, there was a relative shift in the balance in favor of the urban centers of the interior, which were chosen—or created—for their strategic or economic worth according to the logic of the colonists. In parallel with this tendency, however, the development of ports and transportation infrastructure during the

first half of the twentieth century helped to accentuate the distortion of urban networks toward the exterior, for their function was to siphon off African products to Europe.

Numerous cities were founded by the colonists, motivated either by strategic considerations or economic ones; indeed, many colonial cities started out with military and/or commercial functions. In central and southern Africa, for example, mining cities appeared, bringing thousands of workers together in compounds. Elsewhere, colonial capitals, such as Niamey (in Niger) or Nouakchott (in Mauritania), were created from scratch, and attempts were made to attract merchant ventures to them. The construction of railways also contributed to the development of certain centers that had previously been enclaves—for example, Nairobi in Kenya.

In their African cities, the colonists applied principles of development that they derived from the urban planning theories of their day, but they also adapted them to the needs and concerns of colonialism. One can observe throughout the continent the effects of their desire to rationalize and control space through the registration of plots of land, the imposition of symmetry and regular layouts, and the creation of subdivisions, all of which frequently led to the authoritarian displacement of populations. For most of the colonial period, nineteenth-century principles of public health and then, in the 1930s and 1940s, the practices of zoning (planning urban spaces according to function) legitimized, de facto or de jure, the separation of the "white city" from the "native city" according to a logic of spatial segregation that was taken to the extreme in South Africa, northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The ideal of the garden city was dominant in the European quarters of the cities in the British colonies. As for the Africans, they had to adapt themselves to the constraints of planning regulations, which favored "concessions"—plots of land on which several dwellings were grouped around a courtyard, a type of horizontal housing arranged in loose networks that took up a great deal of urban space. In North Africa—for example, in Cairo—certain dilapidated districts became much more densely populated.

In general, there was little regard for precolonial buildings. In Algeria the medinas were systematically destroyed over the course of the nineteenth century. Forms of "colonial" architecture emerged that were syncretic inventions by European architects or adaptations of models developed in the West Indies; these included, among many other examples, houses with verandas, buildings in "Moorish" or "neo-Sudanese" styles, and the farms of the Kenyan highlands.

Modern infrastructure such as electricity systems, street cleaning, water supplies or public services was

financed mainly from local resources—whether customs dues, tax receipts, or borrowed funds—and was concentrated in the “white cities,” while the native quarters on their peripheries were significantly under-equipped. The first “shantytowns” (in the modern sense of the term) appeared in the major cities of northern Africa during the crisis of the 1930s. In southern Africa and northern Rhodesia, segregationist rules, which were reinforced after 1945, contributed to the strictly separate development of white cities and black “townships.”

The urban growth that began in the late 1930s and continued after World War II presented difficult problems for colonial developers. Many of the development and urbanization plans of the 1950s were characterized by a new concern for improving the housing of Africans and increasing the range of urban services. Throughout Africa, however, the massive influx of country people seeking work, as well as the rapid natural growth of the city-dwelling populations, largely undermined the efforts undertaken in most of the colonies toward the end of the colonial period. The obvious marks of underdevelopment were already visible in the conurbations that formed the legacy of colonialism to the newly independent states.

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Urbanization, Housing and Employment

Urbanization has not been a purely modern development in Africa; the capitals of some precolonial kingdoms date back to the tenth and eleventh centuries. However, many of Africa’s major urban centers developed only during the colonial era, with the pace of urbanization accelerating markedly in the postcolonial era.

Africa is the world’s least urbanized region, in terms of the proportion of the population living in urban centers. Only 30.5 per cent of the total population are presently living in such centers; this proportion ranges from 6 per cent in Rwanda to 82.5 per cent in

Djibouti. Despite the generally low levels of urbanization, Africa is experiencing the highest rates of urbanization in the world, averaging about 4.4 per cent per annum. In the 1970s and 1980s, the population growth was in the range of 4.3 to 4.9 per cent, which was twice the rate of more developed countries’ (MDCs) average. Moreover, whereas urban growth rates have been falling both in the world as a whole and in less developed countries (LDCs) in general, this is not the case in Africa.

The urban population in Africa increased from 14.7 per cent in 1950 to 30.5 per cent in 1994, and is likely to reach 50.5 per cent by 2025. In 1950, eight of every ten urban Africans resided in small and intermediate urban centers. By 2015 it is expected that more than half of the urban population will still be residing in such urban centers. Low levels of urbanization characterize most of Africa except for northern and southern Africa. By 1980, 25 per cent of Africa’s population lived in urban areas; this figure was just behind Asia (27 per cent), but much less than half that of Latin America (65 per cent) and that of the MDCs (71 per cent). The rate of growth in Africa reached a peak of 4.9 per cent per annum in 1960–1965 and has started to taper off rather slowly.

Until the 1990s, Africa was characterized by the absence of any large urban center with 10 million or more inhabitants. The first urban center to achieve this size was Lagos, in 1995. The second class of urban centers, those with a population of 5 million to 10 million, held 6.4 per cent of the African urban population in 1970. After the expected disappearance of the second-level urban centers, through movement into the group of 10 million or more, the number of the latter is expected to reach 11 by 2015. At that time, they will contain 11.9 per cent of the urban population, or 68 million persons. The percentage of Africans living in urban centers with 1 million to 5 million inhabitants rose from 10.5 per cent in 1950, to 21.3 per cent in 1990 and is expected to remain at about that level until 2015 (20.8 per cent). Beginning from the relatively modest 84 million urban residents in 1970, Africa had 240 million urban dwellers in 1995, expected to increase to 804 million by 2025. Due to the extremely large population base in rural areas, countries have to absorb large numbers of rural migrants while struggling with rapid urbanization.

The degree of urbanization and the rate of growth of urban population in Africa vary considerably from country to country and from region to region. Except for northern and western Africa, urbanization is essentially a twentieth-century phenomenon and basically a product of Africa’s colonial history. Southern Africa has the highest rate of urbanization; western Africa and parts of central Africa have the longest trend of African-initiated urbanization processes. Eastern Africa is the

least urbanized region, while Northern Africa has the longest history of urbanization processes.

Although the level of urbanization in Africa is still relatively low, the continued growth of the urban population poses serious developmental problems. The high rate of urban growth is mainly due to rural-to-urban migration, a high natural increase in urban areas, an arbitrary expansion of urban boundaries, and ethnic conflicts. In addition, nonspatial factors have had significant impacts on the form, rate, nature, and extent of urban growth; these include fiscal, industrial, defense, equalization, agricultural, and immigration policies.

The rate of growth of the urban population of Africa has continued to increase, even as the rate of growth of gross national product per capita declined from 1.3 per cent in the 1960s to 0.7 per cent in the 1970s, and even further in the 1980s and 1990s. Migration has been fuelled by planning policies that have favored urban dwellers.

The development of Africa's small and intermediate urban centers will be the focus of urbanization in the twenty-first century because they link urbanization with rural development. The interdependence of urban and rural populations in Africa is striking. An estimated 70 per cent of urban residents maintain strong links to the rural sector; that figure may increase to 90 per cent in some urban areas. Small and intermediate urban centers have begun to grow very rapidly in Africa because the surrounding agricultural areas are prospering. More attention should be given to the role of these centers in agricultural processing, marketing, storage, bulking, and distribution. It is important to understand the nature of urban-rural linkages of small and intermediate urban centers considering, among other factors, the demand by the rural population for nonfood goods, inputs, and services needed by the agricultural sector and demand for agricultural output, which is highly income sensitive. In fact, increasing the demand for the last two is necessary for an appropriate supply response by farmers to price increases for farm inputs. Increases in rural incomes brought about by improved accessibility to markets and rising agricultural productivity lead to higher levels of activity in small and intermediate urban centers. The low-income households consume products and services produced locally rather than in distant urban centers. Therefore, increased rural consumption due to increased income will tend to diversify the economic activities of nearby urban centers and create substantial off-farm employment opportunities.

Africa's share of megacities and large urban centers is expected to increase from 14 per cent in 1950 to 56 per cent in 2015; the continent will contain more megacities and large urban centers than any other continent during the twenty-first century. Although in 1990

only 1 of the 33 large urban centers were in Africa, the large urban centers are growing faster than those in MDCs historically have.

The problems related to the high rates of urban growth in Africa are often accentuated by the concentration of population in the megacities and large urban centers. To the extent that these are the focus of development, they act as a magnet for migrants from both rural and other urban areas. The result is to increase the concentration of the urban population in one large metropolitan area to form what has been called a *primate urban pattern*. The growth of megacities and large urban centers and the prospects of their continued expansion rank among the most pressing urban problems of the twenty-first century. In addition, the size of megacities and large urban centers magnifies the problems of income and development discrepancies inherent in urbanization and suburbanization.

The megacities and large urban centers in Africa face increasing problems as population growth outruns investment in urban infrastructure. In most African megacities and the large urban centers, households spend over 40 per cent of their income on food. In Kinshasa and Johannesburg, at least two-thirds of the households lack water or electricity; for Lagos and Cape Town the figure is over 40 percent. In most African megacities and large urban centers there is less than one telephone for every ten persons. In Johannesburg and Lagos, at most one-third of residents aged 14 to 17 are in school; the percentages of school enrollment among that age group is higher in some other megacities. In terms of infant mortality, Cape Town and Johannesburg have reached relatively low levels (18 and 22 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively). The two African megacities or large urban centers with the highest infant mortality (over 80 infant deaths per 1,000 live births) are Lagos and Kinshasa.

Over 60 per cent of urban dwellers in Africa live in poverty. With the current rates of urban growth and the inability of housing delivery systems to cope with the demand for affordable housing, the housing crisis is likely to increase in the future. If we move beyond the issue of population growth to the increase in the number of households, we get a better impression of the challenges ahead in terms of housing needs. Household sizes are declining in Africa. The result is that the need for new housing units is considerably higher than that indicated by the rate of population growth. In absolute terms, the increase in the number of households in MDCs are actually larger than population increase. From 1990 to 2000, 1.10 new households were created for each person added to the population. This stands in contrast with the situation in the Africa, where the corresponding figure was 0.31. This figure is expected to increase between 2000 and 2010 to 1.63 in MDCs and

0.38 in Africa. In the following decade (2010–2020), the figures are projected to reach 1.7 and 0.4 for MCDs and Africa, respectively.

In every year between 2000 and 2010, Africa will have to accommodate some 21 million additional urban households; for the following decade (2010–2020) this figure will increase to some 25 million. If all households that are currently homeless or living in inadequate housing units are to be adequately housed by the year 2020, that implies an additional requirement of some 14 million housing units each year over the next two decades. A rough estimate of the total average annual housing need in Africa during the next decade is thus 35 million units. In the following decade (2010–2020) this figure will increase to 39 million units. The total demand on national housing supply systems in urban areas is thus truly staggering. Roughly 11 per cent, it is estimated, will occur in Africa.

The need for a clearly formulated national urban policy arises, precisely because of the importance of ensuring an appropriate role for urban centers in regional and national development in Africa. It is against this background that productive investments must be placed in those urban centers that are most efficient and have already proved to have high economic potential, whatever their size. A crucial need is to develop links between the economic activities of the megacities, large urban centers, small and intermediate urban centers and the national development strategies.

The new planning strategy for urban Africa is to move beyond isolated projects that emphasize housing and residential infrastructure and more toward integrated urban-wide efforts that promote productivity and reduce constraints on efficiency; increase the demand for labor, stressing the generation of jobs for the urban poor; improve access to basic infrastructure; and increase our understanding of urban issues through research. These efforts should promote the role of urban centers as engines of growth for rural areas, and hence for national economies as a whole, while the population is properly housed and employed.

R. A. OBUDHO

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Usambara: See Upare, Usambara, Kilimanjaro.

'Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817)

Religious Leader

'Uthman dan Fodio (also known as Shehu Usman/ Usumanu Dan Fodiyo, Shehu Usman, or Shehu) was a preacher, scholar, and statesman of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, known among the Fulbe as Usman bii Foduye. He established the Sokoto empire and become the first *sarkin musulmi* (*amir al-mu'minin*, "commander of the faithful") in Hausaland. The name Fodio is a Fulbe variant of the Arabic word meaning "ransomed," and was popular in Fulbe society at the time.

'Uthman dan Fodio began his career as an itinerant preacher in places such as Kebbi and adjacent areas including Gobir, Zamfara, and Degel. By 1788–1789, his influence had become so marked that the ruler of Gobir, Bawa Jan Gwarzo, plotted to eliminate him. But 'Uthman managed to obtain the right to preach, and the independence of his Muslim community.

In 1804 Yunfa dan Nafata, a new *sarki* (commander) of Gobir, sent his army to overtake a part of 'Uthman's community. It led to encounters between the forces of Gobir and the community. Yunfa ordered 'Uthman to move out of Degel. On February 21, 1804 'Uthman made his hejira. The Muslims of Gobir moved toward Gudu. (This emigration from Degel to Gudu was associated by 'Uthman with the hejira of the Prophet Muhammad). The community persuaded 'Uthman to assume leadership; it because of this that he came to be

known as the *amir al-mu’minin* (commander of the faithful).

In his early life and works, ‘Uthman claimed to be a Maliki, which is evident by the way he signed his name (‘Uthman b. Muhammad b. ‘Uthman al-Fallati nasaban al-Maliki madhaban al-Ash’ari i’tiqadan). But apparently he did not hold to a strict Maliki position. For instance, he permitted the use of musical instruments, generally forbidden by Maliki law. There are further examples of authorities other than the Maliki permitted by ‘Uthman: recognition of two imams (leaders); fighting in holy months; the use of traditional African troops; and the use of silver and gold. He stressed the flexibility and latitude of Islam and Islamic law.

The fact that he was often called simply by the title Shehu indicates that he was a special shaykh, and that he was primarily identified by the general population through his connection with the Qadiriyya order. He appears to have held the top leadership position of the Qadiriyya brotherhood in the central Sudan.

In his early writings, ‘Uthman dan Fodio made oblique statements suggesting that he saw himself as the *Mahdi* (guided leader, infallible guide, a restorer of the faith in the last days). Later, he claimed only to be the last *mujaddid al-islam* (reviver of Islam). He was convinced that his own jihad (holy war) would precede the coming of the Mahdi. The need for such a rejuvenation of the faith was based on an assumption that the Muslim community would stray from the true, ideal path of Islam. It is this tendency which became the driving force behind jihad and which led to jihad leaders being called *mujaddid*.

Although the Sufi order is associated with a nonmilitant brand of Islam, ‘Uthman is recognized for his military leadership. However, he was 50 years old when the jihad started, and not strong enough to take an active part in military raids. His major role was to instruct and consult in matters affecting jihad and to ensure that administration of the new community was carried out according to Islamic law.

In addition to heading the scholarly community, ‘Uthman dan Fodio was called to the task of forming,

directing, and educating a revolutionary force within Hausaland. Military strategy, political propaganda, and apologetic writings for the jihad were all components of his work. The idealistic scholar and theologian became a forceful and commanding leader, who paid the necessary attention to the practical details of running an army and of establishing an empire.

DMITRY BONDAREV

See also: Sokoto Caliphate: Hausa, Fulani and Founding of.

Biography

Born on December 15, 1754 in the village of Maratta in the city-state of Gobir. Started preaching in 1774. Demanded Sultan Bawa grant him the freedom to propagate Islam in 1788. Cut himself and his community off from the jurisdiction of the Hausa Sultans in 1795. Sultan Nafata decreed sanctions against Uthman’s community in 1802.

Made a hejira to Gudu with his followers in February 1804. Attacked at Kwotto by Sultan Yunfa in June 1804 (the sultan was unsuccessful). Led an attack on the Hausa states from 1805 to 1808. Wrote to justify jihad and advised followers on administrative and religious matters from 1810 to 1816. Died April 20 1817, and is buried in Sokoto.

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V

Vandals and North Africa, 429–533

Most scholars believe the Vandals originally migrated south from the northernmost part of Jutland during the first centuries of the common era. From 406 to 408 they followed the route along the Danube through northern and southern Gaul into the Iberian Peninsula.

In 429 the Vandals, estimated at 80,000, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar, led by Geiseric. The Roman governor in North Africa, Bonifacius, for some time managed to hold on to the larger cities (Carthage; Hippo Regius, today Bone; and Cirta, today Constantine), but in the end was forced to return to Italy. When it reached Hippo Regius, the Vandal army besieged the city for 14 months without success. Later, however, the Romans evacuated Hippo Regius and Geiseric resided there for some time. In 431–432 the Romans unsuccessfully attempted to retake north Africa. In 435 Rome was forced to make a treaty with Geiseric. The Vandals were allowed to retain an area on the border between present day Algeria and Tunisia, including the cities Hippo Regius and Cirta. In October 439, Geiseric suddenly broke the treaty and took Carthage, which was then the second greatest city of the West Roman empire.

Over the course of the following three years Geiseric consolidated the Vandal kingdom in North Africa, which he ruled 430–77, which was to last almost a century. The Vandals controlled the former Roman provinces of Africa Proconsularis, Byzacena, and Tripolitania. The king built a powerful fleet, which came to dominate the waters of the western Mediterranean; he also raided Sicily and southern Italy. The Balearic islands, Corsica, Sardinia and the part of Sicily closest to the kingdom were also taken.

A treaty of 442 confirmed King Geiseric's sovereignty over Roman Africa, which included most of present-day Tunisia and northern Algeria. The Vandals settled in the region and made no further attempts at enlarging

the state. The Vandals now controlled the main source of grain in the west, which to a great degree made Rome dependant on the Vandal state.

In 455 the Vandal army occupied the city of Rome and subjected it to weeks of plunder. The city's buildings and infrastructure were relatively unharmed, but King Geiseric returned to Carthage with many prominent Roman hostages, including the empress Eudoxia and two daughters of Emperor Valerianus, who had been executed earlier that year. One of the daughters was later married to Geiseric's son Huneric.

In return, Emperor Majorianus planned a naval attack on the kingdom from Spain in 458. Geiseric, however, learned of the plan, and the Vandals destroyed the invading fleet in its harbor. Two years later, however, Geiseric signed a treaty with Rome and promised not to let the Vandal fleet plunder Roman territory in the west.

Still, the empire in the west feared Geiseric and turned to Byzantine for help. A large fleet was sent against Carthage in 468, but Geiseric managed to stop the attack.

Geiseric was succeeded by his son Huneric (477–484). Huneric's successor, in turn, was Gunthamund (484–496), a nephew of Geiseric. During his reign Gunthamund battled the local Maurians, but was unsuccessful. Thrasamund ruled next (496–523), and was followed by the son of Huneric, Hilderic (523–530). He was deposed after attempting a reconciliation with the Byzantines.

The Vandals converted to Arianism, an eastern sect of Christianity. This led to extensive conflicts in the kingdom between the Catholic and Arian churches. Hilderic was favorably inclined toward the Catholic Church, which led to his deposal in 530. He was replaced by the last Vandal king, Gelimer (53–533), who was a nephew of Thrasamund and a strong believer in Arianism.

In 533 Emperor Justinian I sent a strong Byzantine fleet with an army under General Belisarius against Carthage. King Gelimer had sent his brother Tzazo

and others to quell a revolt on Vandal Sardinia; this considerably weakened the Vandal forces left to oppose the Byzantine attack. The Vandals met the Byzantines at Dekimon on the road to Carthage on September 13, 533, and Gelimer retreated. Carthage, having no city wall, capitulated to Belisarius. Gelimer fled but was later captured and brought to Constantinople. After that the Vandals disappeared from history, as did several of the Germanic peoples who formed kingdoms in the western Mediterranean.

The Vandal administration in the kingdom was based on three groups: the Arian clergy, the warriors, and the optimates (the nobility). The Arian church received some of the property of the Roman Catholic church. The warriors and the nobility received land, which was expropriated from the Roman owners, who were to a great extent absentee landlords. Many Roman aristocrats, however, stayed on and were left in peace.

There are signs of some neglect by the Vandal rulers, as testified to by archaeologists, but according to classical literature the Vandals lived a luxurious life. The two harbors in Carthage, one commercial and one military, were kept in use, although some neglect is apparent. Most of the churches also show neglect dating from the time of Vandal rule.

Around 425, during the Roman period, a wall with a ditch had been built around the city, but the city defenses were neglected during Vandal rule, which proved fatal in 533, ensuring the Vandals' demise. Vandal silver and bronze coinage circulated and minting started during the reign of Gunthamund. There is little other information available about the Vandal economy and trade.

BERTIL HÄGGMAN

See also: **Byzantine Africa, 533–710; North Africa: Roman Occupation, Empire.**

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Verwoerd, H. F. (1901–1966) *Prime Minister of South Africa*

H. F. Verwoerd was the key political figure, as minister of native affairs and later prime minister, in the construction of the apartheid state in South Africa in

the 1950s and 1960s; it was his political legacy that dominated the country's history up to 1994.

Biographies of Verwoerd have tended to fall into one of two strict categories, hagiography or outright condemnation, which is not surprising considering the highly contentious nature of his policies and the passionate reactions they stirred. Moreover, many earlier studies of apartheid (by both supporters and opponents) presented Verwoerd as doggedly implementing a ready-made set of apartheid policies, according to a long-term blueprint already drafted by the Sauer Commission, which reported on the National Party's "color policy" in 1947. More recent studies have questioned such monolithic interpretations, arguing that the content and direction of apartheid policies were contested within the National Party and the bureaucracy, and that Verwoerd and others shaped apartheid in response to these conflicts. Some accounts stress Verwoerd's pragmatism, while others portray him as an arrogant, self-righteous bully who would brook no dissent. All agree, however, that he was an ambitious, and talented, politician.

Verwoerd was born in the Netherlands in 1901, but came to South Africa in 1903. His family had Afrikaner sympathies and was a member of the Dutch Reformed Church. Verwoerd was educated in both English and Afrikaans in Cape Province, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Orange Free State until 1917. A gifted student, he studied psychology and philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch and obtained a doctorate in psychology in 1924. After further studies at the Universities of Leipzig, Hamburg, and Berlin, he was appointed professor of applied psychology and psychotechnics (applied individual psychology) at the University of Stellenbosch in 1928.

His early career was taken up with his academic work, and with involvement in social welfare issues in the Cape. His appointment as professor of sociology and social work was an indirect consequence of the Carnegie Commission's report into the "poor white problem," which recommended the establishment of a social studies department at a South African university. The 1934 *Volkskongres* (National Congress) to consider white poverty, which followed the Carnegie Report, gave Verwoerd a place on the national stage. He served as chairman of its Socioeconomic Committee and presented a paper on combating poverty and the reorganization of welfare work. He condemned the Anglicization of Afrikaners and argued that Africans should be sent back to the native reserves rather than be allowed to compete for work with whites in the cities.

In 1937, Verwoerd was appointed chief editor of the Gesuiwerde (purified) National Party's new newspaper, *Die Transvaler*, and moved to the Transvaal. He became an officer in the Transvaal Party. Despite the expectation of the party's Cape establishment that Verwoerd would

be a restraining influence on the “extremism” of J. G. Strijdom, the Transvaal Party leader, Verwoerd became Strijdom’s close friend and political ally. They, with others, opposed J. M. B. Hertzog’s leadership of the Herenigde (reunited) National Party in 1940. Verwoerd campaigned against the Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Sentinels), a fascist-inclined movement that competed with the National Party, particularly as executive committee member of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond. In 1947, he and Strijdom opposed the election pact between the National Party and N.C. Havenga’s Hertzogite Afrikaner Party.

Defeated at the parliamentary election for Alberton in 1948, Verwoerd was appointed to the senate, where he became leader of government business. In his maiden speech, he strongly defended the party’s “color policy.” This has allowed admirers and detractors alike to present Verwoerd as somehow destined to become minister of native affairs. In fact, the new Prime Minister, D. F. Malan, refused to invite this “Transvaal extremist” into his cabinet in 1948, and Verwoerd’s subsequent appointment in 1950 came as a surprise—not least to Verwoerd, who had neither desired nor expected this selection. Malan had originally offered the native affairs post to Paul Sauer, the chairman of the Sauer Commission; Sauer refused and suggested Verwoerd.

Verwoerd threw himself into his new job, and by the mid 1950s he had piloted through the parliament many of the measures that later came to define the apartheid state. Nevertheless, his career in native affairs almost ended abruptly in 1957; he offered to resign his position, although Strijdom, now prime minister, persuaded him to remain. Verwoerd had made many enemies within Nationalist Party ranks; he had orchestrated Strijdom’s campaign for the premiership in 1954, against Malan’s preference for Havenga as his successor, and further alienated the party’s Cape establishment. Some within the party thought his ideas of “separate development” too liberal, while others were suspicious of his ambitions and his creation of a native affairs “superministry” under his exclusive control. Following his rejection, in 1956, of the recommendations of the government’s Tomlinson Commission for a thoroughgoing development of African reserves, influential Nationalist Party intellectuals within the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), who had previously supported his policies, now judged that they had lost their moral basis.

In 1958, after Strijdom’s death, Verwoerd won the party leadership, his victory largely due to the votes of Nationalist members of the Senate, his main powerbase. It took him three years, however, to dominate government, party, and state. Consciously pursuing a high-risk political strategy, he began the process of establishing “independent” African “homelands” to assuage external criticism of South Africa’s racial policies and to divert internal African opposition. Shortly

afterward he announced a referendum on the establishment of a republic, that long-cherished goal of Afrikaner nationalism.

After surviving an assassination attempt in April 1960, in the aftermath of the Sharpeville crisis, Verwoerd presided over an increasingly repressive state. He adopted the persona of the *Volksleier* (national leader), saved by divine providence during the referendum campaign, which he won by a slim majority in October 1960, enhancing his popular support among Afrikaners. Increasingly confident, he soon promised to erect “walls of granite” around the apartheid state. He withdrew South Africa from the British Commonwealth in March 1961. He used his Broederbond connections and his domination of the Transvaal Party as a counterbalance to Cape opposition. By 1961, he had managed to silence critics in the Dutch Reformed Church and purge SABRA of his opponents. Having called an early election in October 1961, he won a decisive victory, after which he was unassailable in the political sphere for five years, until he was assassinated in September 1966 by an apparently deranged parliamentary messenger.

ROBERT MCINTOSH

See also: **South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: Defiance Campaign, Freedom Charter, Treason Trials: 1952–1960; South Africa: Homelands and Bantustans: South Africa: Rural Protest and Violence: 1905; South Africa: Sharpeville Massacre.**

Biography

Born in the Netherlands in 1901. Moved to South Africa in 1903. Obtained a doctorate in psychology in 1924. Appointed professor of applied psychology and psychotechnics at the University of Stellenbosch in 1928. Appointed chief editor of the National Party’s newspaper, *Die Transvaler*, and moved to the Transvaal in 1937. Appointed to the senate in 1948. Named minister of native affairs in 1950. Won party leadership in 1958. Survived assassination attempt in 1960. Elected prime minister in 1961. Assassinated in September 1966.

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W

Wadai: *See* Bagirmi, Wadai, and Darfur; Chad, Nineteenth Century: Kanem/Borno (Bornu) and Wadai.

Wafd: *See* Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922.

Wallace-Johnson, I. T. A. and Radical Politics: West Africa: 1930s

Isaac Theophilus Akunna Wallace Johnson (1894–1965) came from the Creole people of Freetown. He had an early start in education, Christianity, modern-style work and trade, and politics among West Africans. Political activity was already flourishing among the Creoles when he was born. However, he forged a new path, becoming in the 1920s one of the first of a new band of radical African anticolonial campaigners. They were the precursors to nationalism, largely forgotten today.

Wallace Johnson worked first for the customs in Sierra Leone. He was dismissed for helping lead a strike but was later reinstated. He then worked as a clerk with the British Army's Carrier Corps, with which many Africans served during World War I. Later, working for the Freetown City Council, he organized workers' campaigns and incurred the authorities' hostility. In the later 1920s Johnson is said to have worked as a seaman and traveled overseas, but documentation of that part of his life is obscure. At some point he made contact with left-wing activists linked to the Comintern and the Soviet Communist regime, which were campaigning against Western colonialism in the 1920s and early 1930s.

Johnson was working at Sekondi in Gold Coast as a clerk in 1929. The following year he went to Nigeria,

where he worked as a journalist (as he continued to do in many countries for several years) and also helped establish the Nigerian Workers' Union, becoming its general secretary. Most accounts of his life accept that he attended, under a pseudonym, the communist-organized First International Conference of Negro Workers in Hamburg in 1930; he certainly became an associate editor of the campaigning newspaper founded then, the *Negro Worker*. In 1932–1933 Johnson traveled to Europe and possibly spent some time in the Soviet Union, where he may have gone earlier and may perhaps have attended the communist University of the Toilers of the East (*Kutvu*), though this is uncertain.

Wallace Johnson returned to Nigeria in 1933 but left after a police raid on his home later that year. He then worked in Gold Coast, where he founded the West Coast Youth League (WAYL). He corresponded with left-wing anticolonial figures in Britain and was considered by the British to be a dangerous "agitator" working for the communists. An active journalist, in Gold Coast he wrote for newspapers including the *African Morning Post*, a daily edited in 1935–1936 by the Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe. He wrote an article—"Has the African a God?"—that was published on May 15, 1936, and led to a celebrated case in which he and Azikiwe were charged with sedition. He was fined, and then left for Britain in 1937.

In Britain he met leading radical anti-imperialists, some of whom he had contacted or met before. The most celebrated was George Padmore from Trinidad; others included Jomo Kenyatta, the future president of Kenya, the Guyanese Ras Makonnen, and another Trinidadian, C. L. R. James. A number of these activists, having lived in several countries (including the USSR) in previous years, were now living in Britain, in contact with British sympathizers. Having been communists or close to communism before, they were now independent and critical of communists. They

formed the International African Friends of Abyssinia, which protested against the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935–1936, and later, in 1937, the International African Service Bureau, of which Johnson became the secretary general. It aimed to raise awareness about the colonies' conditions in Britain and arouse support for needed reforms.

In April 1938 Johnson returned to Sierra Leone. Soon afterward he founded the West African Youth League (WAYL) and became its secretary general; the following January a new newspaper, the *African Standard*, was founded to publicize the views of the WAYL. Those views were strongly critical of the colonial government, but the WAYL won widespread support and four of its candidates were elected to the Freetown City Council in November 1938. The leading African politician in Sierra Leone at that time, Dr. H. C. Bankole-Bright, was strongly opposed to Johnson, but the newcomer to the Freetown political scene had enormous popularity. Johnson, not a member of the top elite of Freetown, appealed to ordinary people and started to build the first mass political organization in Sierra Leone. As in Gold Coast earlier, he took up ordinary people's complaints and grievances, especially those of workers, and exposed bad labor conditions. He aimed ultimately at independence, but sought above all to organize protests at the way things were.

In 1938–1939 Johnson also founded the West African Civil Liberties and National Defence League, and resumed his trade union work, setting up several new unions. A series of strikes in 1939, and Johnson's writings, confirmed the British view of him as an intolerable troublemaker, and led to the introduction of six new laws to curb opposition to British rule; these in turn aroused a strong protest campaign in 1939.

Upon the outbreak of World War II, Wallace Johnson was arrested. He served a one-year sentence for criminal libel and in all spent five years under detention or restriction; he was held first at a temporary internment camp; then (1940–1942) at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, the conditions of which led him to write poems in protest; and then at Bonthe on Sherbro island until 1944. In February 1945 Johnson went to Paris to attend the founding congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions. In October 1945 he took part with Padmore, Kenyatta, Makonnen, Kwame Nkrumah, and W. E. B. DuBois in the Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, England.

Johnson's brief preeminence on the political scene in Sierra Leone did not last. He became a leading member of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL), and was elected to the Legislative Council, in 1951; that body, defending the narrow

interests of the privileged colony (i.e. Freetown) when the mass of the people of the protectorate were being enfranchised, had little impact on the nationalist movement and the progress toward independence. Johnson soon left the NCCSL and later joined the United Progressive Party; expelled from that, he later founded the Radical Democratic Party. In 1960 he was one of the delegates to the London Constitutional Conference, which led to agreement on independence for Sierra Leone. He held no office after independence came in 1961, but the high regard in which he was held as a pioneer nationalist was shown by widespread mourning when he died, following a road accident in Ghana, on May 10, 1965.

JONATHAN DERRICK

See also: **Azikiwe, Nnamdi; Diaspora: Colonial Era; Ethiopia: Italian Invasion and Occupation: 1935–1940; Sierra Leone: Protectorate: Administration and Government.**

Biography

Born Isaac Theophilus Akunna Wallace Johnson in 1894 in Freetown. Made contact with leftist activists connected with the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Traveled to Europe and possibly the Soviet Union in 1932 and 1933. Returned to Nigeria, but left later that year for Gold Coast, where he was tried for sedition. Left for Britain in 1937. One of the founding members of the International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA). Returned to Sierra Leone, and founded the West African Youth League. Founded the West African Civil Liberties and National Defence League and set up several new unions in 1938 and 1939. Arrested at outbreak of World War II, and served one year, for libel. Took part in the Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, England, in 1945. Elected to the Legislative Council in Sierra Leone in 1951. Joined the United Progressive Party; was expelled, then founded the Radical Democratic Party. Died on May 10, 1965.

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Wassa: See Akan States: Bono, Dankyira, Wassa, Akyem, Akwamu, Fante, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.

Water Supplies and Schemes

Shortages of fresh water supplies are one of the major problems to be faced during the twenty-first century, and Africa is especially vulnerable. Large parts of the continent are arid or semiarid while other regions are subject to regular droughts. The continent's two most advanced economic powers, Egypt and South Africa, both require more water than they have under their own control. More generally, the indications are that water will increasingly become the subject of bitter disputes.

There are four great river systems on the continent: the Nile, the Niger, the Congo, and the Zambezi. The demand for their waters, whether for irrigation or power, threatens to outstrip their capacity to meet the demands.

There exist a number of agreements between Egypt and Sudan to govern the control of the Nile waters and a treaty between the two countries allocates the water on a ratio of 55.5 billion cubic meters to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters to Sudan annually. During the 1990s friction mounted between Egypt, the biggest user of Nile waters, and Ethiopia. A meeting of the Nile Basin states was held in Tanzania in March 1998, at which Ethiopia rejected Egypt's share of the waters. Ethiopia is determined to have a greater share of the waters so that it may implement its own large-scale irrigation projects and is demanding (with Uganda) that an additional 18 billion cubic meters of water be taken from Egypt's current allocation. The upstream Nile riparian countries look set to claim their full share of Nile waters. Egypt, meanwhile, has set in motion a large-scale plan, the Toshka Scheme, to irrigate its Western Desert, which will require 5,500 million cubic meters of water from Lake Nasser, and did so without consulting the other Nile users.

In 1998 the Ethiopian foreign minister, Seyoun Mesfin, said, "The time has come to erect dams and build reservoirs at the source of the Nile in Ethiopia." Indeed, it may well turn out that Ethiopia holds the trump card for the Blue Nile, which rises in Ethiopia, and accounts for 68 per cent of the high water discharge at Aswan. Should Ethiopia embark upon major irrigation and hydro-schemes in its highlands, this could have a devastating impact on the flow of water to Egypt.

The Congo is the world's second largest river, after the Amazon, and this vast resource is more than adequate

to meet the needs of all the Congo Basin countries while providing surplus power and water for export. The Congo's hydroelectric potential, an estimated 132 million kilowatts, is equivalent to one-sixth of known world resources. The Inga Dam complex on the Lower Congo is one of the world's largest water projects, and though much of the planned development has been delayed, because of political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Inga still produces some of the cheapest electricity in the world. Plans now exist for major power exports; among these are projects in Egypt (yet to begin), the neighboring People's Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), while the state electricity board (SNEL) is linked into the Zambian grid. In 1996 South Africa's state electricity corporation, ESKOM, in collaboration with Angola and Namibia, began an investigation into connecting their power grids to Inga and channeling power through Zambia and Zimbabwe to South Africa so as to create a southern Africa grid system. Given peace and stability in Congo (Kinshasa), the country could well become a principal source of hydroelectric power for much of central and southern Africa.

South Africa is chronically short of water and sources of hydroelectric power. The huge Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme to harness the waters from the Maluti Mountains is designed to supply both power and fresh water to Gauteng Province, the industrial heartland of South Africa. However, by the end of the twentieth century there were growing signs that Lesotho regretted having mortgaged almost its entire water resource, which is the country's only major resource, to South Africa. Meanwhile, South Africa has been exploring the possibility of tapping the Zambezi waters to supply the Johannesburg region.

The idea is to move Zambezi waters 1100 miles through a system of canals, pipelines, and tunnels to augment the Vaal River system, which supplies the Gauteng industrial and residential complex that includes Johannesburg. The diverted waters of the Zambezi would also be used for agricultural, domestic, and industrial purposes in the water-short regions of western Zimbabwe, eastern Botswana, and northwestern South Africa while providing Zambia with income from foreign sources. This scheme, which is the most ambitious of its kind in the world, would take 10 per cent of the river's annual flow.

The possibility of disputes over Zambezi waters became apparent in 1998 with the proposal for a pipeline from the Zambezi to Bulawayo, which is chronically short of water, in Zimbabwe. Known as the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project (MZWP), the pipeline is to be 280 miles in length. The project includes the construction of the Gwayi-Shangani Dam. However, a regional

agreement to cover siphoning water from the river has yet to be determined. Botswana, South Africa, and Zambia are each short of water, though South Africa is not a riparian state of the Zambezi. Zambia is uneasy about the project, which could jeopardize its own development prospects while diverting the waters to benefit the countries to the south because a reduced flow could harm the tourist attraction of Victoria Falls, downstream, and reduce output from the Livingstone power station. As of 2003, a loan of \$50 million (U.S.) by the Export-Import Bank of Malaysia suggested that work on the long-delayed project would soon move forward.

African countries have an obvious vested interest in working together to share their precious water resources. The Congo waters are so vast that, politics permitting, there should be no problem about the Democratic Republic of the Congo exporting power or, indeed, water. Sharing the Zambezi waters, however, presents more complex political and economic problems, while the issue of demands on Nile waters could prove explosive within the first decade of the twenty-first century.

GUY ARNOLD

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Welensky, Roy (1907–1991)

Trade Union Leader, Politician and Statesman

Roy Welensky became involved in trade unionism while working on the Rhodesian Railways, and eventually became the head of the Rhodesian Railways Union. In 1930 he helped to organize an ill-fated strike at the Wankie (Hwang) colliery. Welensky's role in the strike angered the rail's management, and he was eventually sent to work in Northern Rhodesia as punishment. There he revived the dormant branch of the Railway Worker's Union. As a union organizer he earned a reputation as a hard bargainer and a champion of the rights of lower-class whites. By 1938 he was the colony's leading union leader, and his popularity among white workers helped him to become a member

of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. When World War II broke out in 1939, he became the director of manpower for the Northern Rhodesian government. By the end of the war Welensky was one of the most well-known and influential politicians in the region.

After the war, Welensky became a proponent of a scheme to amalgamate Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Amalgamation promised to combine the mineral wealth of the Northern Rhodesian copper belt with the agricultural resources of Southern Rhodesia to create a wealthy, settler-dominated state. However, the British Colonial Office feared amalgamation would leave Africans in Northern Rhodesia at the mercy of the settlers of Southern Rhodesia. At the suggestion of Sir Godfrey Huggins, the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, Welensky began lobbying instead for the federation of the two Rhodesias. Working together, Huggins and Welensky argued that a federation could create a viable political and economic entity while still protecting the interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Their plan became increasingly attractive after the Afrikaner Nationalist Party took power in South Africa in 1948. In the wake of the South African elections the British government agreed to permit the two Rhodesias to federate if they would included the small and impoverished colony of Nyasaland (modern Malawi). In 1953 the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was formed, with Huggins as its first prime minister and Welensky as the federation's minister for transportation and posts. In the same year Welensky received a knighthood. When Huggins retired to a peerage in 1956, Welensky succeeded him as prime minister.

During Welensky's first four years in office, a series of crises combined to threaten the future of the federation. In 1956 the British government suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat in the Suez Crisis. The following year the Gold Coast became the first British colony in Africa to achieve independence. Then in 1960 the Belgian government in Congo, the federation's neighbor to the north, suddenly abandoned the colony, precipitating a crisis that threatened to destabilize the region. Against this backdrop, African national consciousness within the federal territories developed rapidly. In 1958 Dr. Hastings Banda in Nyasaland, and Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia, began organizing protests against the federation. The following year Josh Nkomo led similar demonstrations in Southern Rhodesia. Clashes between supporters of Banda's Congress party and Federal troops resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Shortly thereafter Northern Rhodesian authorities arrested Kaunda and banned his party. Government repression soon reestablished colonial authority in all three territories. However, the spectacle

of colonial troops fighting to preserve the federation severely undermined the credibility of Welensky's government. A British report on the disturbances issued in 1960 characterized Nyasaland as a "police state" and turned opinion in Britain against the federation. The British government stepped in and granted Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the right to secede, and in 1964 they became the independent nations of Malawi and Zambia.

Welensky vehemently opposed the dissolution of the federation. During the late 1950s he had been pushing the British to grant his state independence, and was bitterly disappointed when Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's government gave Malawi and Zambia their freedom. Shortly after the federation's demise Welensky published a memoir titled *4000 Days*, which chronicled his tenure as prime minister. In it he blamed the British Conservative Party for the betrayal of its British subjects in Central Africa.

Welensky returned to Southern Rhodesia. There the white settler regime of Ian Smith was moving toward declaring independence from Britain. Welensky stood for election in the Rhodesian parliament, only to be defeated by one of Smith's closest allies. Welensky then retired from politics but remained in Rhodesia. In 1965, when Smith proclaimed independence, both Welensky and his old ally Huggins opposed it. In 1969, Welensky's wife Elizabeth died. He remarried, to Valerie Scott, an English woman 30 years his junior, in 1972. The Welenskys moved to London in 1981, and Roy Welensky died in Dorset in 1991, at the age of 84.

Welensky was a combative politician whose tactics owed much to his impoverished upbringing and his career in the ring. He enjoyed his greatest support among the blue-collar workers and artisans who flocked to the Rhodesias from South Africa and Britain after World War II. However, settlers and politicians on both ends of the political spectrum viewed him as unreliable. White supremacists considered him a dangerous liberal, while proponents of African equality and independence viewed him as a reactionary.

JAMES BURNS

See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period: Federation; Nkomo, Joshua; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation, 1953–1963. Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation.**

Biography

Born in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia (modern Harare, Zimbabwe) on January 20, 1907. Largely self-educated. Worked in a variety of menial positions before joining the Rhodesian Railways. In 1926, became the boxing champion of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, a title

he held for two years. In 1928, married Elizabeth Henderson, a waitress from Bulawayo. Became a member of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in 1938, and director of manpower for the Northern Rhodesian government in 1939. Knighted in 1953, became the Central African Federation's minister for Transportation in the same year, and its prime minister three years later. Despite his opposition, the Central African Federation was dissolved in 1963, and he retired from politics shortly thereafter. Remained in Rhodesia until 1980, and died in England in 1991.

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Western Africa: *See* Stone Age, Later: Western Africa.

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Western Sahara: Nineteenth Century to the Present

The parched wastes of Western Sahara, beyond the nineteenth-century frontier of Moroccan rule, were dominated by nomadic Saharawi camel herders. Based on complex tribal loyalties, kinship factions, subordinate castes, and tributary relationships, each tribe had its own assembly of notables who selected a shaykh and imposed its own laws. Politics consisted of ever-shifting feuds and alliances.

In 1859–1860, Spain attacked Morocco, imposed a heavy indemnity, and secured the rights to expand its fortified enclaves at Melilla and Ceuta, and for the "restoration" of Santa Cruz on the Saharan coast, from which it had been expelled by Saharawi tribesmen in 1524. However, Morocco could not cede what it did not control, and Santa Cruz evaporated in Spanish indecision.

In 1882, Sultan Moulay Hassan of Morocco led a military expedition into the Anti-Atlas and consulted

WESTERN SAHARA: NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT



Western Sahara.

with local Saharawi chieftains for their support in thwarting European penetration. Stung by the loss of its American empire, a perceived threat to the Spanish Canaries from French and English traders on the Saharan coast and dreams of a new African empire, Spain countered by claiming the Atlantic coastal strip of Rio de Oro in 1884, based on its lone coastal trading garrison at Villa Cisneros. In 1887, Spain decreed the territory between Cape Bojador and Cape Blanco, to a distance of 150 kilometers inland, under the authority of the governor general of the Canary Islands; Saharawi control, however, remained unchallenged.

The southern and interior frontiers with French spheres were delineated by French-Spanish treaties of 1886 and 1900. Under the Franco-Spanish conventions of 1904, Spain acquired vast expanses of desert comprising Rio de Oro (71,000 square miles) and Saguia el Hamra (31,650 square miles). The Franco-Spanish convention of 1912 formalized the Spanish protectorate of Southern Morocco (a narrow strip of 9,900 square miles south of the Draa) and the Spanish enclave of Ifni (580 square miles).

In 1900, the Sufi *marabout* Sheikh Ma el-Ainin forged a Saharawi alliance and, from his base at Smara, proclaimed jihad (holy war) against the French in Morocco and Algeria while confining the Spanish to their coastal garrison. Following el-Ainin's death in 1910, the Saharawi continued to harass the French, unimpeded by the Spanish. Captain Francisco Bens Argandoña, the Spanish governor from 1903 to 1925, adopted a policy of appeasing the Saharawi tribe while

establishing garrisons at Tarfaya (1916) and La Guera (1920) at Cape Blanco. But the Spanish Foreign Legion was fighting the Rif rebellion, led by Abdel Karim, in northern Spanish Morocco, which was not finally suppressed until 1926.

In 1934 the French mounted a major campaign against the Saharawi and pressured Spain into occupying strategic interior outposts, such as Smara. However, the Spanish Sahara remained a neglected wasteland until the discovery of rich phosphate deposits in the 1940s and iron ore in the 1950s.

Moroccan independence in 1956 inspired nationalists in French Algeria and Mauritania, as well as the Spanish Sahara. A Saharawi uprising was put down by a combined French-Spanish military operation in 1958, while both Morocco and Mauritanian nationalist pressed claims to the Spanish Sahara. Spain, which continued to repress Saharawi nationalism, rejected a United Nations-proposed referendum on self-determination in 1966. In 1973, Saharawis abroad formed the Polisario Front to wage guerrilla resistance for full independence.

In July 1974, Spain proposed local Saharawi autonomy leading to an independence referendum, which was promptly denounced by Morocco. "Great Morocco" nationalist aspirations were viewed as threatening by Algeria and Mauritania as well as the Polisario. Spain vacillated between oppression and negotiations with the Polisario; the United Nations (UN) was mired in indecision. In 1975, the case went before the International Court of Justice, which rejected the claims of both Morocco and Mauritania. King Hassan of Morocco seized the opportunity to win nationalist support as well as the phosphate-rich territory by temporarily sending 350,000 "volunteers" on the "Green March" across the northern frontier, under a secret agreement with Spain.

In the dying days of the Franco regime, the Spanish government was otherwise preoccupied and wanted a speedy settlement, irrespective of Saharawi aspirations. Colonial rule formally ended on February 28, 1976, whereupon Moroccan and Mauritanian troops entered the region. Polisario, which had proclaimed the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on February 27, put up determined resistance. With Algerian support, the SADR was admitted to the Organization of African Unity, despite Moroccan opposition, in 1982. Economically weak and militarily ill equipped, Mauritania withdrew. The United States supported its Cold War ally Morocco, branding the Polisario as communist. The Soviet Union, dependent upon Moroccan phosphate supplies, equivocated. Morocco established defensive positions around the towns and mining sites, severely restricting the Polisario's operations.

Polisario claimed that a free and fair referendum on self-determination could not be held with Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, while Morocco refused direct negotiation with Polisario. Indirect talks in 1986 failed, but on August 30, 1988, both sides accepted a UN initiative calling for a cease-fire and referendum for the territory's indigenous people. Polisario declared a unilateral truce, but heavy fighting soon resumed, reflecting growing impatience with the slow pace of the UN-sponsored peace efforts.

A 1991 UN peace plan was undermined when Morocco moved 37,000 people into the territory, sparking accusations of vote-tampering, and held a constitutional referendum in August 1992 endorsing King Hassan's plan for the integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. Simultaneously, Algeria decided to drop its backing of the Polisario Front in order to improve relations with Morocco. Polisario called on the UN Security Council and the international community to take steps to end what it termed Morocco's violation of the UN-planned referendum.

The UN became embroiled in a dispute over voter registration lists, leading to repeated delays in the proposed referendum. Morocco has tried to have thousands of Moroccans registered as Saharans, while holding hundreds of suspected Polisario supporters in prison. The war has created a Saharawi refugee crisis, largely ignored by the outside world. Since the end of the Cold War, Morocco has continued its obfuscation, hoping to wear down UN opposition to its seizure of the territory. It is a war neither side can militarily win, but neither can politically afford to lose.

DAVID DORWARD

See also: Maal'-Aynayn; Morocco: International Relations since Independence; Polisario and the Western Sahara.

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White Settlement: See Cape Colony: Khoi-Dutch Wars.

White Settler Factor: Economic and Political

Few white settlers came to Africa without sponsorship. In low-lying tropical areas malaria, yellow fever, and a host of other diseases deterred private individuals from establishing themselves on the continent except as traders. All the important historical examples of white settlement were the product of state action.

In 1652 the Dutch East India Company founded a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope for the purpose of supplying their ships with fresh provisions. When the use of company employees to farm and herd animals proved expensive, the company imported so-called free burghers to take their place. Once settled on the land, the white settlers and their descendants defied efforts to confine them to the immediate vicinity of Cape Town. They spread northward and eastward with their flocks and herds. As they expanded, they used their command of horses and firearms to decimate the indigenous Khoi and San peoples. Only when they encountered the Bantu-speaking agriculturists at the Great Fish River was their progress slowed, late in the eighteenth century. The wars between the expanding settlers and the Xhosa people of the eastern Cape frontier lasted for a century.

When the wars of the French Revolution brought the Netherlands under French rule, the British seized the Cape in 1795 to prevent it being made a stronghold for their enemy's navies. In 1820 the British launched their own experiment in white settlement. Fearing that their island home was in danger from large populations of vagrants and unemployed people, various schemes of overseas settlement were devised. South Africa's "1820 settlers" were located in the areas adjacent to Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape. After initial periods of hardship and stress, they adjusted to their new African environment. Frustrating official hopes that they might serve as a counterweight to the Dutch-speaking Boer population, the 1820 settlers soon espoused similar attitudes. They denounced missionaries, defended policies designed to force Africans to work for them, and advocated extension of the Cape frontier into the Transkei and the southeastern interior regions. When Boers moved up into the South African High Veld regions and Natal in the course of their so-called Great Trek in 1836, English-speaking settlers followed close behind. The spread of white settlers throughout South Africa complicated and embittered relations with African peoples. The settlers insisted on democratic rights for themselves, but resisted the extension

of similar rights to Africans. As they gradually seized control of colonial governments from British officials, they established racially stratified and discriminatory regimes. The rise of apartheid in South Africa in the twentieth century was the most pernicious product of Dutch and British sponsorship of white settlement.

The next large-scale experiment in white settlement was sponsored by France after its invasion of Algeria in 1830. Seeking to multiply loyal supporters of their rule and to stimulate economic development, France used grants of conquered land, exemptions from taxation, and other incentives to attract settlers. After the revolution of 1848 in France, the government exported more than 20,000 French workers to Algeria, where they were provided with houses, farming machinery, livestock, food, and spending money. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, 8000 refugees from Alsace-Lorraine were granted 100,000 hectares of Algerian land. Successive waves of settlers did aid the French effort to subdue Algerian resistance to their invasion, but in the longer run they created problems similar to those spawned by the white settlers of South Africa. They, too, insisted on all the political rights enjoyed by citizens of metropolitan France, while denying similar rights to the Algerian people, and they, too, devised schemes of taxation and forced labor. In Algeria the pretext for segregation was a law of 1865 that declared indigenous Algerians French subjects without according them citizenship. To become citizens with rights equal to those of the settlers, Algerians were required to renounce their Muslim civil status, an act regarded as a virtual renunciation of their religion. Very few Algerians were willing to take such a step; even fewer were accepted as full citizens. By the end of World War II, the settler population had risen to about a million. Because settlers had the right to vote for members of the National Assembly in Paris, their votes could make or break French governments. After the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution in 1954, settler representatives used their vital votes to block attempts to end the conflict through negotiation or conciliation. Charles de Gaulle's coup d'état of 1958 finally broke their hold on power and paved the way for Algerian independence in 1962—and the flight of nearly the entire French population.

A century after the French invasion of Algeria, Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar embarked on a program to bolster white settlement in Angola and Mozambique. Like the French in Algeria, Salazar aimed to provide opportunities for the poor among his people and at the same time erect a bulwark against the threat of African insurrection. As in Algeria, the Portuguese employed an artificial distinction between “assimilated” and “nonassimilated” people to preserve

the position of the white settlers as a ruling class. That did nothing to stave off a war of independence. As in France, the commitment of blood and treasure required to combat the insurrection brought a new government to power and a rapid transition to independence in 1974.

The first experiment in white settlement under commercial sponsorship occurred in Zimbabwe in 1890. The British South Africa Company, under the direction of Cecil Rhodes, recruited a “pioneer column” of settlers from South Africa and Britain to spearhead a drive into the lands of the Mashona. Under the pretext of a concession to prospect for minerals granted by the Ndebele King Lobengula, the settlers streamed into the land they were later to call Southern Rhodesia. In fact, they had been promised large tracts of land in return for their participation in Rhodes's venture. The company expected a war with Lobengula and counted on the weight of the settler population to ensure their victory. This came in due course with the war of 1893. A subsequent rebellion was suppressed in 1897. When company rule ended in 1924 and Southern Rhodesia was granted “responsible government” as a British colony, settlers dominated that government. Very few Africans were allowed to qualify as voters. Schemes of racial segregation confined Africans to the less-productive and rugged parts of the colony. Settler agriculture was protected from African competition in a variety of ways.

After World War II, Southern Rhodesia was joined to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the so-called Central African Federation. As the wave of decolonization swept southward through the continent, African nationalists in the territories then known as Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia denounced the federation as a scheme to keep them under the thumb of Southern Rhodesian settlers. When those territories withdrew from the federation and were granted independence as the new nations of Malawi and Zambia, the white-dominated government of Southern Rhodesia demanded its own independence. When told by the British government that it must first guarantee unimpeded progress toward majority rule, it unilaterally declared independence under the leadership of Ian Smith. A long and bitter war of liberation ended in the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 and the independence of Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe in 1980.

In other parts of Africa white settlers were introduced to speed the development of a cash economy based on agricultural commodities. When Britain took over Kenya from the bankrupt British East Africa Company, the territory badly needed a dependable source of revenue. Unwilling to wait until Africans adapted to a market economy, the government used

grants of land to entice white settlers in the hope that they would generate enough taxes to defray the costs of administration. Attracted by the romantic possibilities of owning a farm in Africa, a collection of European aristocrats, wealthy speculators, and adventurers flocked to what were then known as the “white highlands.” For a time a colorful, if notorious, clutch of settlers made “Happy Valley” a by-word for a way of life that featured living fast and dying young. This high living flourished at the expense of African farmers and pastoralists, whose lands were expropriated to attract the settlers. When depression and other afflictions imperiled the profitability of settler agriculture, the state stepped in with laws that protected white farmers against competition from Africans who had, in spite of expectations, adapted rapidly to market opportunities. The settler population of Kenya (like the settler populations of Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland) never attained a critical mass. When an African rising, known to the Europeans as Mau Mau, proved too difficult for Britain to contain without unacceptable costs to taxpayers at home, Kenya was granted independence.

The last stand of the white settlers against the unstoppable movement toward majority rule occurred in South Africa, where guerilla warfare, urban insurrection, economic problems, and international pressure brought about a transition to democracy with the elections of 1994, which resulted in the election of an African president, Nelson Mandela.

NORMAN A. ETHERINGTON

See also: Boer Expansion: Interior of South Africa; Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt; Rhodes, Cecil J.; South Africa: Apartheid, 1948–1959; South Africa: 1994 to the Present; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Colonial Period: Land, Tax, Administration.

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Witwatersrand: See South Africa: Gold on the Witwatersrand, 1886–1899.

Wolof and Jolof Empires

The Wolof people form the single largest ethnic group in Senegal and are one of the major groups in the Gambia. Wolof traditions trace their origins to the lower Senegal and the Jolof Empire, c.1200 to 1550. The Jolof empire was a successor state to Ghana and Takrur and dominated the Senegambian region for several centuries. Its territories included the Wolof provinces of Jolof, Waalo, Kajoor, and Bawol, and the Sereer provinces of Siin and Saalum, all of which later became independent kingdoms. Wolof traditions date the end of the empire to the battle of Danki in 1549, when the ruler of Kajoor led a rebellion that broke up the empire and created six successor kingdoms. The enrichment of the coastal provinces through Atlantic commerce hurt Jolof, which was located inland to the south of the Senegal River.

The Wolof share a hierarchical social order with 15 other societies of West Africa that divide society into three orders: free farmers, including the nobility; “caste” groups (bards, blacksmiths, and leather workers); and slaves. Based on linguistic evidence, the Wolof are one of three societies for whom this system of stratification is most ancient. Political power was monopolized by matrilineal dynasties, which based their power on their military strength and on slavery. Slaves served the monarchy as agricultural workers, as soldiers and as administrators. Caste groups were important political and economic clients of the nobility.

During the Atlantic slave trade, the Wolof kingdoms exported 300–500 slaves per year to the Americas; these slaves were exchanged for firearms, textiles, iron bars, alcohol, and an assortment of manufactured goods. At the same time, the Wolof kingdoms maintained an active trade with the Saharan region to the north, exporting slaves and grain in exchange for horses and other livestock. The scale of slave exports in both sectors was relatively small by comparison with other regions, but the export slave trade had important domestic consequences. Wolof Muslims condemned the monarchy for the enslavement of fellow Muslims and the consumption of imported alcohol. In the eyes of Wolof Muslims the king and the court were “pagans,” a charge that was at odds with reality, but accurately reflected Muslim opposition to the monarchy. Alongside the export slave trade the Wolof kingdoms maintained an active trade in foodstuffs and other provisions with European forts on the coast. As a result of the grain trade with the Atlantic and the desert, the Wolof kingdoms retained as many slaves as

they exported and the expansion of internal slavery was one of the most important consequences of the era of Atlantic commerce.

Islam played an important role in Wolof society. Dynastic traditions gave an Islamic identity to the Jolof empire from its foundation. The Wolof populations living near the Senegal River, in Waalo and northern Kajoor, were the first to convert to Islam. Wolof populations in southern Kajoor and Bawol lived interspersed with Sereer communities that resisted Islam until the contemporary era. As a result, Islam was well established in the north, but remained a proselytizing religion in the south. By 1700 the monarchy in Kajoor and Bawol granted local autonomy to Muslim communities by giving land grants and titles to Muslim leaders, who were called *sëriñ* in Wolof, a term translated as *marabout* in both French and English. Within their domains marabouts distributed land to their following, collected taxes and rents, and served as religious councilors, judges, and educators. They were required to aid the monarchy in the defense of the kingdom and served as intermediaries between their followers and the state. The recognition given to Islam patched over the differences between the monarchy and Muslims, but in the long run Muslims were not satisfied with their autonomous status. Titled marabouts led a major rebellion against the monarchy in Kajoor in the 1790s; similar movements continued in the nineteenth century. Alongside the titled marabouts, there were many lesser Muslim scholars who served as teachers, judges, and prayer leaders in Muslim villages. Islam steadily gained ground as a counterforce to the monarchy.

During the eighteenth century, the European trading settlements on Gorée island and at Saint-Louis, at the mouth of the Senegal River, gave birth to important urban, commercial communities. The majority of the inhabitants were slaves who worked in the river trade or provided domestic labor to maintain European trading operations and feed the slaves held in transit on the coast. Women slaves, in particular, pounded millet and cooked food for slaves awaiting ships for the Americas. The slave owners were free women from the mainland called *signares* by French merchants. Male children of the signares and male merchants were referred to as *habitants*. Because most of the free migrants to the European settlements were Wolof speakers from Kajoor and Waalo, Wolof became the dominant language and culture in the new coastal cities. The African merchant communities of Gorée and Saint-Louis, which included some important families of mixed African-European ancestry, played an important role in the river and coastal trade of the eighteenth century. They supplied French merchants with slaves, gold, ivory, gum arabic, grain, and other provisions. There were frequent conflicts between the habitants and European merchants,

in spite of a close working relationship. The pattern of urbanization that emerged in the eighteenth century, with Wolof as the dominant urban language and culture, and with Wolof speakers serving as intermediaries between Europeans and Africans, continued in subsequent centuries. Its legacy is still evident in contemporary Senegal.

By 1800 the Wolof played a leading role in the trade between northern Senegambia and the Atlantic world. Wolof kings taxed Europeans for the right to trade and sold slaves captured in war or enslaved as a punishment for rebellion or failure to pay tribute. The Wolof kingdoms carried on an active trade in grain, fresh produce, cattle, and other provisions with French merchants based in Saint-Louis and Gorée. During the gum boom of the early nineteenth century the Wolof increased their grain exports to the Saharan region. After 1840, Wolof peasants and slaves began growing peanuts as a new export crop. The speed with which Wolof farmers adapted to the changing demands of the Atlantic economy reflected the influence of the habitant merchants, who were always looking for new opportunities as French merchants used colonial power to force them out of established branches of trade.

JAMES SEARING

See also: Sahara: Trans-Saharan Trade; Slavery: Atlantic Trade: Effects in Africa and the Americas.

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Women: History and Historiography

The history of African women has emerged since 1970 as a vibrant and steadily expanding area of research and study motivated, as with other areas of women's history, by the development of the international feminist movement. African women's history also paralleled the expansion of African history following World War II, as scholars inside and outside of Africa began to focus on historical transformations on the African continent.

Before the 1970s, there was little available research on African women's history. Information on women in Africa was more often found in anthropological and

ethnographic studies. This focus has continued in the preponderance of research on African women appearing in development studies rather than history per se. The first publications in the 1970s dealt with women and economic change and with women as political activists. By the mid-1980s there were a number of important extended studies that began to appear. Soha Kader's *Egyptian Women in a Changing Society* (1987), Nina Mba's *Nigerian Women Mobilized* (1982), Claire C. Robertson's *Sharing the Same Bowl* (1984), and Margaret Strobel's *Muslim Women in Mombasa* (1979) still primarily focused on women's public lives. However, with Kristin Mann's *Marrying Well* (1985), Fatima Mernissi's *Beyond the Veil* (1975), and Luise White's *The Comforts of Home* (1990), studies of family and sexuality were also emerging. Only in the 1990s did a substantial number of monographs on specific topics begin to appear, though the bulk of new research is still found in journal and anthology articles.

Earlier historical eras were initially neglected, in part a result of the difficulty in obtaining historical sources that dealt with women before the nineteenth century. Because many African communities were decentralized and nonliterate, written materials on earlier eras, especially from an African woman's perspective, were scarce. While some historians have turned to women's life histories and the use of oral testimony to fill lacunae in published sources, as Susan Geiger (1986) has noted, this has limitations in researching earlier periods. Topics that have archival source materials include elite women such as Queen Nzinga, a sixteenth-century ruler in what became Angola, and market women along the West African coast who interacted with European traders. Julia Wells has written about Eva, a seventeenth-century African woman who settled in the early Dutch community on the Cape in South Africa. Because she married a European colonist, many aspects of her life were documented in settler accounts, providing an unusual amount of contemporary data. Egypt was exceptionally strong in sources concerning women in earlier centuries.

African women's history has been taken further into the past by scholars such as David Schoenbrun, who use historical linguistics to examine changing patterns in women's roles as wives and mothers within pastoralist and agricultural communities. Archeologists have also retrieved information about women's activities. Heidi Nast's investigation of the fifteenth-century royal palaces in Kano, Nigeria, demonstrates the increasing seclusion of elite women as Islam spread, and David Beach's description of sixteenth-century Great Zimbabwe suggests that as firewood was depleted, women's reluctance to travel long distances in search of fuel sources might have been a factor in the demise of that large centralized settlement.

Source availability influenced the large number of studies on slave women in the nineteenth century, which is an important issue but did not represent the experience of most women. As Claire Robertson and Martin Klein's *Women and Slavery in Africa* (1983) has demonstrated, slaves within Africa were more likely to be women, a reflection of their productive and reproductive contributions to their communities. With creative use of sources, scholars have retrieved information on other aspects of the lives of women in the nineteenth century, as exemplified by Elizabeth Eldredge on women's work in Lesotho, Nakanyike Musisi on elite women in Buganda, Marcia Wright on women's vulnerability in Central Africa, Edward Alpers on Swahili women's spirit possession cults, Agnes Aidoo on Asante queen mothers' political influence, Judith Tucker on women's access to property in Egypt, and Jean Boyd and Murray Last on religious Muslim women in West Africa.

Turning to more nontraditional sources has enabled historians to retrieve further details about women's experiences. Leroy Vail and Landeg White analyzed Tumbuka women's songs from Malawi to suggest a new periodization of history. For those women the late nineteenth century was marked by a loss of power resulting from a shift away from matrilineal descent patterns, an issue ignored in the conventional regional histories of Ngoni raids. Colleen Kriger's analysis of weaving techniques found in nineteenth century fabrics from Sokoto in West Africa suggests that women's weaving was more varied, had a higher value, was more organized, and was better known than earlier studies indicated.

Reexamining familiar issues from a woman's perspective has altered African history more generally. For example, many of the initial studies of women's work during the colonial period showed how they had lost power and economic autonomy with the arrival of cash crops and their exclusion from the global marketplace, in contrast to men, who were more likely to benefit from these economic changes. The emphasis of labor history in Africa on the formal sector of the economy eclipsed women's actual economic activity, which centered on agricultural work. Studying women's economic contributions meant paying attention to rural agricultural work as well the urban efforts of market vendors, both sectors previously neglected in African labor history. The research on women also revealed a tension between women as victims and women as powerful agents within their communities. Female agricultural innovations were described by Margaret Jean Hay and Maud Muntemba as essential to community survival, and according to Cora Ann Presley, women became politically active because of their work experiences. Women's changing position in arenas

formerly seen as only male has been researched by Jane Parpart writing on mining compounds in Zambia, Lisa Lindsey on railway communities in Nigeria, and Beth Baron on journalism in Egypt.

Studies of women's involvement in political activism changed previously accepted ideas of women's passivity in the face of such changes. Judith Van Allen demonstrated in an influential article that women drew on precolonial practices to express their displeasure with the colonial powers. Susan Geiger's study of the leadership role played by illiterate Muslim women in Dar es Salaam fundamentally changed the view that the Tanzanian anticolonial movement was led solely by men who were products of Christian mission education (1987). Souad Bakalti and Alison Baker showed how Muslim women in North Africa were also active in anticolonial movements. Analysis by Martin Chanock of the development of legal systems under colonialism has shown that women were at a disadvantage as "customary" laws were established based on male testimony that gave men, especially elite men, advantages over women in issues of marriage and divorce.

Studies of women and religion have included work by Bennetta Jules-Rosette on the role of women in developing local churches that were often offshoots of larger denominations, Iris Berger on female spiritual power in local religions, and Margaret Badran on the intersection of Islam and politics in Egypt's nationalist movement. Research in the 1990s also included a focus on women and missions with researchers such as Deborah Gaitskell and Birgitta Larsson demonstrating that the introduction of European ideas about marriage and family simultaneously brought new oppressions and new opportunities for women.

Although a 1987 overview by Claire Robertson suggests that African women's history had shifted to include a more economic perspective—or, as Margaret Jean Hay argues, had moved from the study of elites to the study of more ordinary women—the most notable change has been an increasing level of analysis. The earliest works, with some exceptions, tended to be descriptive, as scholars worked to prove that African women were there, and had made an impact on their societies. More recently studies have provided much more nuanced descriptions of the complexities of women's lives, of the changes over time, and of local and outsider ideologies about women in Africa. Cheryl Johnson did not simply describe the market women's associations in Lagos, but discussed why three different organizations formed, serving different groups of women. A recent reanalysis of the role of the adolescent girl Nongqawuse in the Xhosa cattle killing of the 1870s has demonstrated that taking women's testimony seriously and centering women's experience and

expression of history can fundamentally change the explanation of an event. Helen Bradford convincingly suggests that issues of changing sexuality and possibly abuse or incest were of central importance to understanding people's motivations, and conventional reliance on broader economic and political reasons for the upheaval is not completely satisfactory.

Among the issues continuing to appear in writings on African women's history are those of representation (who is writing this history and for what audience), sources and methodology, and periodization, as well as the usual areas of productive work, family life, and public activities such as politics and religion. Tiyambe Zeleza has described the enduring marginalization of African women's history, as the information that has been recovered is omitted from textbooks or included in very limited ways. The absence of African women historians is frequently commented on, as there are regrettably few who publish regularly (Tabitha Kanogo, Makanyike Musisi, Kenda Mutongi, and Bolanle Awe are among them). Often work by African scholars is not published, or is only available in African publications, which can be difficult to obtain in Europe and North America. Recently work has expanded on gender, masculinity, and ideologies, as in Timothy Burke's examination of ideas about consumption and cleanliness in Zimbabwe and as noted in Nancy Rose Hunt's overview of gender in Africa, which refers to a number of important French studies. The history of women in precolonial Africa continues to be a weak point, while the history of the colonial era (c. 1880 to the 1960s for most of the continent) has shifted from examining the impact of colonialism on women (assessed as mostly negative) to investigating African communities and history from their own perspective. This includes an emphasis on African women's agency and efforts to present African women's own voices, as in Jean Allman, Fatima Mernissi, Jane Turrittin, and in collections edited by Karen Tranberg Hansen and Kathleen Sheldon. These approaches both reexamine territory already covered and open new topics while infusing the research with the voices of African women as both subjects and scholars, indicating the direction African women's historical scholarship will take in the near future.

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See also: *Colonialism, Overthrow of: Women and the Nationalist Struggle; Historiography of Africa.*

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World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment

The postcolonial development crisis that had grown acute by the early 1980s saw the introduction of a new development paradigm in Africa. It marked the ascendancy of neoliberal analysis, both in terms of causes and solutions to the crisis. This neoliberal analysis is championed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)—that is, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—as well as Western creditor nations and liberal scholars. However, the IFIs have become the primary instruments for the implementation of the neoliberal prescriptions that are embodied in the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of these institutions. The IFIs and Western creditor nations collaborate in ensuring that African countries accept and implement the adjustment programs; as a result, the IFIs make the implementation of these programs a condition for further loans and debts rescheduling, while the Western creditor nations require African countries to reach

agreements with the IFIs before they can receive further loans and have their debts rescheduled.

The core of the SAPs is the minimization of the role of the state while granting ascendancy to market forces. This is based on the argument that the main cause of the development crisis is the excessive state regulation of African economies, a situation inimical to the unfettered operation of market forces. Some of the issues singled out by the IFIs were the overvaluation of African currencies, state regulation of the import licensing system, subsidization of petroleum products and various social sectors of the economy, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and corruption. These were seen as the negative outcome of the overregulation of African economies. The SAPs are therefore aimed at redressing these issues through the promotion of the unfettered operation of market forces.

Massive devaluation of African currencies occupies a central position in the adjustment policies of the IFIs; it is regarded as crucial for ending import dependency in Africa while at the same time promoting an export orientation. The argument is that the overvalued nature of African currencies led to a situation where imports were considerably cheaper than exports, thereby encouraging massive importation of various goods, with many of them being irrelevant consumer goods, while discouraging production for exports. In the case of trade liberalization, it is argued that by removing all bureaucratic control over the foreign exchange markets, African businesses would be able to import the necessary inputs for their industries while more foreign investments would be attracted into the continent. Moreover, the abolition of marketing boards that would remove government control and direct participation in the marketing of agricultural products would make the increased income from agricultural products to be passed on to the farmers, thereby increasing rural incomes. This would encourage increased production for exports by the rural dwellers.

Other related policies are the reduction in public expenditures and the privatization of public enterprises. The idea behind the reduction in public expenditure is based on the argument that the huge subsidization of petroleum products, and social services like health, education, social infrastructure, and other services, constitute a phenomenal drain on the resources of African countries while at the same time benefiting only the urban elites to the detriment of rural dwellers, who need to be encouraged to increase their agricultural outputs. With regard to the privatization of public enterprises, the argument is based on their poor performance necessitating regular subsidies that constitute a further drain on government resources. It is argued that privatization would expose these enterprises to market-determined competition and therefore make

them operate more efficiently if they want to remain in business. At the same time, budgetary allocations that used to go to them would be released for carrying out more beneficial economic activities.

The SAPs are hardcore neoliberalism, and constitute mere reformulations of the modernization policy that was the main paradigm that influenced the failed postcolonial economic development policies in Africa. It should be noted that, theoretically, policies like those of massive devaluation and trade liberalization are situated within the neoclassical economic policy of comparative advantage. This emphasis on comparative advantage constitutes a continuation of the unfair and unequal international division of labor that assigns African countries to the disadvantageous position of continuing to produce agricultural raw materials for advanced capitalist industries and, therefore, continuing to be dependent on the importation of industrial products.

Massive devaluation has had untold negative effects on Africa. It is now generally agreed that from a perceived position of overvaluation, African currencies have become so devalued that they are virtually worthless. The effects of this situation have been disastrous for African economies. As has already been noted, the main argument for devaluation is that it would discourage imports while encouraging exports and therefore help in reallocating resources to farmers. But in practice, the debilitating effects of devaluation on the wages of farmers have made them flood the world market with their products, thereby further lowering prices and increasing their woes. In addition, in the face of the phenomenal decrease in the purchasing power of African currencies, the reduction in wages, and retrenchment of government workers advocated by SAPs, most urban dwellers can no longer afford to purchase agricultural products. Furthermore, devaluation has negatively affected the industrial sector. The import substitution strategy of industrialization that has been adopted in postcolonial African countries is highly import-dependent in terms of machines, raw materials, and other inputs. Since devaluation has made the prices of these inputs astronomically high and beyond the reach of many indigenous industries, the prices of the products of even the few industries that manage to afford the inputs are so high that they are more expensive than imported alternatives. As a result, most of the small-scale and medium-scale industries have gone out of production while the few industries that have remained in production are producing at very reduced capacity.

The poor performance of many state-owned enterprises provides some justification for the privatization of some of the industries. But the prescription for privatization of all state-owned enterprises irrespective of the functions they perform does not appear desirable.

There are those enterprises that perform socially relevant services for the vast majority of the people and therefore have to remain government owned in order to continue to perform these functions. Moreover, experience with privatization in many African countries has shown that the process is leading to the concentration of the countries' resources in the hands of very few wealthy individuals and also increasing foreign control of African enterprises, yet the enterprises are sold to these individuals at very low rates. This has therefore resulted in discrimination against the poor in the disposition of collectively owned wealth. Even then, a major contradiction with the privatization policy is that while most of the reforms have to be carried out and ensured by the state, adjustment policies call for the minimization of the state. It would therefore be counterproductive to expect the much maligned African state to effectively and efficiently carry out the privatization process.

Given the fact that the rescheduling of African debts and the getting of more loans are conditioned on the acceptance and implementation of SAPs, the desperate African countries have no choice but to accept the programs. Yet SAPs have serious implications for African autonomy. As a program that is fully designed by the IFIs without any inputs from African countries that are forced to implement them, SAPs represent external *diktat* and a clear loss of autonomy for the African countries concerned. A good example is Ghana, touted as the star pupil of SAPs in Africa, which has almost lost its autonomy to the officials of the IFIs and their "experts" who have virtually taken over the management of the economy of Ghana to the chagrin of many Ghanaians.

Indeed, all over Africa, SAPs have caused untold hardships. The massive devaluation of national currencies and the resultant spiraling inflation, sharp reduction in public expenditure, retrenchment, cuts in wages, unprecedented level of unemployment, and removal of subsidies from social sectors, among other similar measures, have caused widespread poverty and misery. One of the worst hit areas is the social sector. The removal of subsidies from this sector and the huge decline in government allocations have led to a significant deterioration and virtual collapse of areas like health and education, which are very crucial for the development of any country. These are clearly manifested in the poor conditions of service for staff and the consequent extremely low level of morale, lack of facilities, libraries that are devoid of current books and journals, and hospitals that have become glorified consulting clinics and virtual mortuaries. In addition, the debilitating effects of SAPs have virtually discouraged any form of productive activities, promoting massive brain drains from African countries, capital flight, disinvestment, and, worst of all, the flooding of African

markets with used goods from various Western capitalist countries. Thus, apart from the fact that SAPs have discouraged production, they are not only reinforcing and sustaining the existing emphasis on distribution, but are in fact doing so at the worst level. While previous distribution efforts have concentrated primarily on the importation of new goods, the current emphasis on the importation of used goods and the primary concern with foreign exchange speculation by African banks are promoting the worst form of “buccaneer” capitalism in Africa.

It is important to note that although in theory SAPs are calling for the minimization of the state, in practice the IFIs promote authoritarian and interventionist states because it is only under such conditions that the harsh policies of SAPs can be carried out. Since adjustment programs are helping to worsen the African crisis while further entrenching neocolonial dependency, what African countries need are structural transformation programs, not programs that merely adjust the neocolonial structures as prescribed by SAPs.

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See also: Development, Postcolonial: Central Planning, Private Enterprise, Investment.

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World History, Africa in

By any measure, Africa's contribution to world history is immense and diverse. From the monumental pyramids of ancient Egypt to the towering twentieth-century

figures of Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan, continental Africa has produced innumerable cultural and political moments and people of great historical importance. As part of the many world systems that have ebbed and flowed over millennia, Africa has also made its mark. From the earliest geological and fossil remains; through ancient civilizations in Nubia; to the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, and the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, African men and women actively participated in the establishment of new ideas, concepts and movements. And aside from the historical record, the role of African history looms large in the development of a body of scholarship known as “world history.”

On the African continent archaeologists have found the earliest evidence of the evolution of humans. Several sites in Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa have produced fossils of human ancestors, known as *hominids*, enabling anthropologists to trace the history of humans back to primates living between four and one million years ago. The earliest group, known as *australopithecus*, was succeeded by a larger species with tool-making skills, *Homo habilis*. Besides these earliest hominids, skeletal remains of *Homo erectus* have demonstrated that this more humanlike ancestor was responsible for the migration of primates out of Africa and into Asia and Europe. Modern man, *Homo sapiens*, is believed to have first appeared in Africa c.200,000 to 100,000. From tropical Africa, humans spread to all major regions of the world by 10,000. But while the basic physiology of this species is evident from fossils, direct links to the many variations of skin color and appearance of Africans and other peoples today is impossible. Because of this extensive archaeological record, continental Africa, and in particular the Great Rift Valley running through Tanzania and Kenya, is often referred to as the “cradle of humankind.”

Stone Age cultures developed in Africa as they did throughout the world, sometimes in tandem, other times at vastly divergent speeds. Hunter-gatherer societies flourished throughout the continent by c.10,000 and detailed documents of their lifestyles are depicted in rock art in the savannah regions. The movement and settlement of these peoples was marked by changes in the environment over millennia. Africa in 7000 was much wetter and more densely forested than it is now. The Kho-San peoples are one of the last remaining traditional hunter-gather communities, and many of their practices bear striking similarity to information collected from archaeological deposits in southern and south central Africa. *Neolithic* culture eventually gave way to regularized agriculture and pastoralism, which foreshadowed the rise of the first organized farming communities along the riverine systems of northeast Africa in Egypt and Nubia.

During the mid-fourth millennium the first centralized agricultural kingdoms arose along the Nile River. Small towns consolidated into two regions, Upper and Lower Egypt. In approximately 3100 Narmer (also known as Menes) conquered the lower region of the Nile Delta and established the first dynasty of ancient Egypt. The kings, known as pharaohs, ruled with divine authority over an authoritarian and bureaucratic state. The wealth for the kingdom came from trade and peasant labor along the Nile Valley and gold in Nubia (present-day Ethiopia). The Egyptians constructed monumental tombs for their kings, including possibly the largest single building constructed by hand, the Great Pyramid at Giza (c.2500BCE). Among the many legacies of ancient Egypt are the hieroglyphic script, a panoply of religious, mathematical, and scientific texts, and an early form of monotheism attributed to the pharaoh Akhenaton.

While Egyptian politics looked toward the Mediterranean, the empire was deeply African; several generations of kings and important civilizations, such as the Meroë, came from the highlands of Nubia. By 500BCE much of West Africa became part of a much larger African-European network of trade in textiles, slaves, and precious commodities. In central Nigeria, “Nok culture” established a powerful influence over the Niger-Benuë River network. Copper, iron, and bronze working came early to Africa, and large deposits of these metals meant that north and east Africa became quickly the center of Afro-Asiatic trade in metal goods. With gold, plentiful grain supplies, and other valuable commodities, Egypt and Libya became major players in the evolving Mediterranean civilizations. First Asia Minor, and then Greece, Carthage and Rome, drew on Egyptian and Nubian culture and bounty. North African civilizations, such as Carthage and other Phoenician cities, penetrated into the Sahara Desert and West Africa. Early trans-Saharan trade routes exchanged iron products for salt and gold. With the rise of Christianity, Egyptian Christians challenged the authority of Rome and founded the independent Coptic Church. St. Augustine of Hippo, a north African, fought against their variations in doctrine and practice.

The next 1000-year period was marked by important changes in the relationship between North and Sub-Saharan Africa and the outside world. A slow but steady movement of Iron Age peoples from the forested regions in the center westward and southward put pressure on Stone Age cultures. To the north the brief ascendancy of the Christian church was displaced by Islam from the seventh century. To the south civilizations arose around the Great Lakes region, and in the west the kingdom of Ghana grew replete on the gold and salt trade. By 711 all of north Africa had come under Muslim rule, and Islam began to spread up

the Nile, along the east coast, and across the Sahara. First as an army of conquest, and slowly over many decades, Islamic identities permeated and mixed with indigenous African cultures. By the mid-twelfth century, trans-Saharan trade routes were controlled by Islamized Berber communities, and Arabic writers told of untold wealth. Ghana declined as the Almoravids from North Africa encroached on the trade routes. Other powerful states arose in its place, including Mali and Songhay. The region maintained strong ties with the northern Islamic states, and after the reign of Sundiata (c.1250) Mali also became Islamic. During this period Timbuktu rose to prominence as a center of Islamic scholarship. To the east, Christianity maintained a firm hold in Ethiopia despite the incorporation of much of the Swahili coast in Islamic Indian Ocean trading networks. Elsewhere, the kingdom of Zimbabwe extended its political control over much of the southeast.

By the sixteenth century, all of coastal Africa and much of the interior was part of one or several internationalized trading networks. In the 1470s the first European forts were built along the Fanti coast to control metal and cloth trading. Soon after, São Tomé and Príncipe were colonized for slave-run sugar plantations. In 1498 Portuguese navigators sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and met Chinese, Arab and Indonesian merchants operating in the commercial infrastructures of Madagascar, Pemba, and Zanzibar. Portuguese raids along the Swahili coast were to some extent a continuation of the Crusader wars of the European Middle Ages. Plantations, manufacturing, and mining industries along both coasts were soon manned exclusively by slave labor. The arrival of Columbus in the Western Hemisphere created further opportunities for plantations and mines, and thus began the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The first slaves came from the Gambia River; the first slave cargo to be taken directly across the Atlantic dates to 1532. But with Portuguese infiltration of the Kingdom of Kongo and Dutch settlement in Cape Town, the entire western seaboard was drawn into the trade.

Until the mid-nineteenth century only Algeria and South Africa were sites of European colonization. White settlement grew rapidly and the pressures put on local African communities by the French invasion (1830) and Boer Treks (1830s–1840s) resulted in massive displacement and violence. Elsewhere European and Arabic merchants and military bases controlled small frontier enclaves. In the mid-1800s, however, Europeans took a renewed interest in Africa. Peanut farming in the Senegal River Valley and Christian missionary activity throughout the continent were two new activities that shifted the world’s attention away from Africa as a source of slaves to a new site for

“legitimate commerce.” Powerful African states arose on the fortunes of the slave trade, including Dahomey and the Asante kingdom. Others, such as the British colony Sierra Leone and the independent state of Liberia (1847), were built by freed slaves. Europe’s fascination for luxuries such as ivory and its insatiable demand for gold as a base for its currencies drew investment and interest as part of wider European imperialism.

European imperial designs on Africa were both internal and external in origin. European and North American economies urgently needed raw materials for their industrializing economies. Moreover, the continent was increasingly viewed from outside as a battleground among the Christian, Islamic, and pagan religions. Within the continent various events fueled European concerns, including the Mahdist empire (from the 1870s on) in Sudan threatening the Suez Canal, the discovery of huge deposits of diamonds (1870s) and gold (1880s) in southern Africa, and various powerful Islamic and non-Islamic kingdoms in West Africa. From the 1840s on, the British and French governments increased their presence along the western coast, and by the 1880s European rivalries eventually gave way to real competition. After French and Belgian forces began to encroach farther into Senegal and the Congo Rivers regions, a conference was convened in Berlin (1884) at which the ground rules for the European “Scramble” were established. Between 1880 and 1895 the greater part of Africa was partitioned and violently conquered. Ethiopia, however, valiantly withstood an Italian invasion in 1896 at the Battle of Adowa.

Over the next several decades much of Sub-Saharan Africa was drawn into the evolving world economic system. In southern Africa, gold and diamond deposits were exploited with black and white labor. In the Congo and elsewhere, rubber was harvested in slavish conditions resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands. In South Africa the British, African, and Boer settlers went to battle in the first imperial war enjoining support from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Throughout the continent millions of Africans resisted and engaged colonial rule; the Maji Maji rebellion in Tanganyika and the formation of the African National Congress (1912) in South Africa are two important examples. Railways, often built by forced labor, paved the way for the extraction of raw materials. During World War I the European powers, using African troops, fought throughout Africa, with Tanzania and Cameroon being sites of particularly violent clashes. Many thousands of Africans also fought in Europe and Asia. After Germany was expelled from its African colonies (1914–1919), the League of Nations administered these territories via Britain, France, and Belgium; both Liberia and Abyssinia were admitted as members of

the Geneva-based organization. The 1920s–1940s witnessed the most developed and exploitative years of colonial rule, but Africans also turned their hands to economic opportunities and developed cash crops of cotton, peanuts, coffee, and cocoa.

The Great Depression inflicted immense misery on Africa; by 1931 salaried Africans were receiving 50 per cent of their 1929 income. This economic disaster was fundamental for the mobilization of organized labor and politics, and Africans formed welfare associations, political parties, and unions as part of a continent-wide movement that was to develop into a full-fledged independence struggle. African politics was deeply influenced by the politics of the African diaspora in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. W. E. B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, and Blaise Daigne, among others were instrumental in the development of a Pan-African political and cultural identity. The independence of Egypt, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, and the 1936 Italian invasion of Abyssinia were important moments that helped this ideology crystallize into a continent-wide movement, uniting North Africans, their southern cousins, and even Indian migrant workers in South Africa. North Africa was a major battlefield of World War II; the Allied invasion of Europe began after Morocco and Algeria were retaken from Axis control. While Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia also saw significant fighting, the rest of continental Africa was belabored by unparalleled European demands for raw materials.

World War II unleashed tremendous opposition to colonial rule, and Europe began to lose control of its empire. In 1944 the Brazzaville Conference heralded a change of direction for French colonies. In 1945 Anglophone Pan-Africanists met in Manchester, England, to plan a concerted campaign for independence. The independence struggle (1945–1960) was at times bloody and at other times negotiated. In Kenya, South Africa, and Algeria guerrilla wars began in earnest; Ghana blazed a trail in peaceful transition; and Guinea unleashed the wrath of France by rejecting closer ties with its colonial master. The 1958 All African People’s Conference in Accra brought together independence leaders from throughout the continent. Although in 1960 Belgian and French governments simply pulled out and African elites slid into the reigns of power, to the south white supremacists held sway for many years in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.

The African independence struggle drew world attention and was part of much larger anticolonial protest. Although Ethiopia, Egypt, and Liberia were founding members of the United Nations (1945), it was not until 1960 that dozens of newly independent African nations tipped the balance away from Europe

and America, making it a truly world body. Following the Bandung conference (1955) in Indonesia, many African governments joined to form the Non-Aligned Movement (1961). Also known as the Third World, these nations positioned themselves apart from the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. Despite this maneuver Africa was a site of great Cold War tension, especially in Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia. While many of Africa's democracies faltered in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Zimbabwean war of liberation and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa kept alive hopes for a continent free of foreign domination. During the same period, African scholarship, diplomacy, and culture made daring and important contributions to world movements. Two Africans have served as secretary general of the United Nations; Africans have been awarded ten Nobel Prizes (three in literature, two in medicine, and five for peace) and many other distinctions. With the 2001 United Nations Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa, and the anti-child labor, "blood diamonds," AIDS medications, and debt cancellation campaigns, Africa today continues its role as the progenitor of popular international movements.

African historical writing has played an important role in the development of the historiography of world history, and this final section considers this body of scholarship. While Africa was the location of important advances in anthropological and archaeological scholarship from the 1920s, African history, as distinct from imperial history, only established itself as an independent subfield in 1960. Since then there has been an ever-increasing interest in African historical traditions. Early researchers recorded oral histories and nationalist historians focused on important moments such as anticolonial revolts as part of the nation-building project. In spite of these developments, in the academy the canon of Western history remained relatively unchallenged.

With the growth of multiculturalism, scholars and students began to dispute Western constructions of the historical past as well as profoundly one-sided "Western civilization" undergraduate programs. The first calls for change erupted in the United States during the era of the Black Power movement (1965–1975), as students demanded classes on African and African American cultures and history, as well as increased placement of people of color in the academy. Many Black Power advocates drew on the powerful black consciousness ideology of the South Africa militant Steve Biko. Biko himself drew on the experience of Pan-Africanism, *Négritude*, and the virulent racism of South Africa's apartheid.

By the early 1980s, this struggle over the nature of knowledge and the shape of its transmission entered a

new phase. Students and teachers, as well as governments and legislators, began to discuss openly the implications of teaching policies. The most important scholarly development was the growth of "subaltern studies": scholarship that investigated the previously unknown "other," the silenced voices of history, the dispossessed, and the displaced. Much of this scholarship focused on South Asia; it strove to recover the lives of people forgotten in narratives of global exploitation and national mobilization. In so doing, scholars called into question the very narratives themselves, the source material, theoretical frameworks, and the subject positions of historians. One view interprets this scholarship as demonstrating that all histories of colonized regions, Africa included, as they are written, exist in the shadow of Europe, not solely because of the powerful intrusion of colonization into other continents, but also because Europe's self-perceived movement toward state-building, capitalist development, and modernity marked—and still mark—a vision of historical progress against which African history is a failure.

Responding to the changing political and social fabric of the United States and elsewhere, historians embraced this vision, and multiculturalism's challenge to "Western culture" for greater minority inclusion was paralleled by a shift away from the study of Western civilization to world history. Instead of one Western culture, students explored many world cultures; and instead of one Western civilization, teachers professed many world civilizations. Thus it was argued that incorporating underrepresented minorities in a set of analytical categories that remain unchanged only left intact a cultural and political architecture of the study of the past that privileged certain forms of cultural and intellectual expression. Echoing Cheikh Anta Diop in linguistic scholarship, people like Martin Bernal have even argued for the African origins of Western classical cultures. Furthermore, teachers of history have attempted to move beyond the restricting organizing concepts of the term *civilization*. Some have chosen to abandon the "West" altogether in an effort to permit students to appreciate the great diversity of human responses to common problems. With increasing frequency, universities advertise studies in World History. In each of these pedagogical moves to de-Westernize the center, and to de-center the West, African history continues to play a fundamental role.

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See also: **History, African: Sources of.**

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World War I: Survey

The Great War of 1914–1918 was the major imperialist war of the twentieth century, and the first truly total war of the industrial era, an essentially European conflict in which distant colonial command of African human and material resources formed a significant element in the war effort of several belligerent states. While Africa as a region was fairly marginal to actual Allied strategy and purpose, it could not help but become caught up in the war, simply because virtually all of it was under the thumb of European imperialism. Inevitably, therefore, seizing Germany's African colonies of Togoland, Kamerun, Ostafrika, and Sudwestafrika was an obvious British and French war aim. Equally, wartime control of vital raw materials, food, manpower, deep-water ports, radio stations, and transportation arteries, and their denial to the enemy, was of considerable importance to European campaigning and to the balance of military capability among London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.

Without ample Nigerian groundnuts and palm produce, Senegalese cocoa and dried bananas, Algerian tobacco, or strategic South African mineral reserves, European Allied forces and their supplying economies would have had a far rougher time. Equally, without skilled white settler volunteers, motivated by imperial patriotism, and the mass recruitment of African troops for war service, industrial powers would have had fewer fighting tools. At the same time, the level of African contribution to, and involvement in, the war varied enormously across the continent. In parts of East and Central Africa, the impact of labor recruitment bit deeply into peasant societies, while the dominant experience elsewhere was that of a remote conflict that barely touched the lives of ordinary inhabitants.

The effects of global war on African economies was mixed. In general terms, war dislocated colonial production by choking off European investment, disorganizing normal shipping routes and trading connections, increasing tax burdens, and creating a run of fiscal crises for various rickety colonial administrations. In the early years of the war there was a drastic decline in exports of cash crops and other commodities, and falling prices seriously worsened terms of trade for

exchange economies. Shortages of basic commodities and soaring prices for imported goods saw the living standards of many workers decline, especially in urban areas that became pinched by scarcity and inflation. Confronting growing wartime impoverishment, many workers grew rebellious, and by 1918 towns across Africa were experiencing regular outbreaks of labor militancy.

At the same time, there were major differences between the economic experiences of Africans in different parts of the continent. Once shipping lanes had been reopened and transportation links secured by 1916, regions like West Africa recovered as Allied demand for cash crops and other raw materials boosted colonial production and drove up export prices. Nigerian groundnut producers benefited from favorable trade terms for African producers. Others who did well included African workers in the Gold Coast, whose skills and job prospects were improved as they replaced skilled whites who were drawn off to war duties. Moreover, from the beginning, Africa's most advanced industrial economy was effectively reoriented to meet strategic wartime priorities. South African supply of minerals, food, and other agricultural commodities aided its accumulation, fostering a new burst of industrialization and market expansion. Here, too, for a time the transfer of whites into overseas war service opened up job mobility for Africans in a range of sectors, from mining to transportation. In effect, for the great majority of African men and women, the experience of World War I was felt through prices, market shortages or opportunities, and through changed work conditions rather than through military participation and combat.

Such economic change was naturally not the only variable in considering the repercussions of the war for the inhabitants of Africa. Colonial campaigns against the Germans meant that a European war was fought across African land, burdening local inhabitants with the costs of sprawling bush warfare, fought mainly with African troops. France, in particular, also raised many thousands of African soldiers for service in theaters of war beyond the continent, in areas such as the Western Front and the Dardenelles. As in the earlier Franco-Prussian War, France again exploited African manpower to try to make good its military deficiency against its powerful European opponent. In all, some 600,000 men from French North Africa and West Africa were conscripted into French colonial fighting forces, along with 140,000 labor conscripts, mostly North Africans. The cost paid by African regiments was not negligible. Over 70,000 soldiers died in French service, some of these in a Moroccan regiment that ended up as the most-decorated unit of the entire French Army.

Unlike France, Britain was more politically nervous about deploying African troops in European hostilities, fearing the possible effects of this on the social and political consciousness. But within the continent itself, white South African, Rhodesian, and other settler forces were too small to settle affairs with Germany on their own, and the British had no option but to “Africanize” their local war effort. Approximately 50,000 African troops were raised in East, West, and Central Africa in a recruiting campaign accompanied by a massive drive to snare the labor needed to maintain communication and supply lines over huge distances. In all, Britain engaged over one million African porters, carriers, laborers, and other camp followers as a vast labor army. Well over half this number of able-bodied men were forcibly conscripted or otherwise muscled into service, where arduous foot marches and exceptionally harsh conditions produced a death rate of over 10 per cent in British carrier corps by the end of the war.

The impact of war-related mortality, illness, and disability was by no means restricted to army service and auxiliary work. Food shortages and even famine in some areas as a result of the seizure of cattle and other food resources for the war effort took a toll, as did severe population dislocation caused by British, French, Belgian, German, and Portuguese demands for labor and goods. Vulnerable rural populations in areas such as Central and East Africa also faced a debilitating combination of epidemic disease and ecological disaster as a consequence of war demand. In Tanganyika, for example, the sudden depletion of a customary agricultural labor supply checked the clearing of bush, creating conditions for the rapid spread of tsetse pestilence. Finally, toward the end of hostilities, the penetrative effects of the war carried the Spanish influenza epidemic from Europe and the United States into Africa, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths. In response to this demographic upheaval and to the general instability that marked the end of the conflict, many Christian and Muslim Africans turned to millenarian religious beliefs, and anticolonial sentiment influenced by charismatic notions of deliverance from European mastery.

Africans generally earned little by way of reward for wartime loyalty to European empire. That notwithstanding, their experience of World War I has sometimes been associated with the emergence of a more “modern,” assertive nationalist consciousness, based on exposure to new kinds of European realities. Yet aside from white South Africa, where the war encouraged a drift toward greater autonomy within the imperial system, colonial African territories achieved nothing by way of any strengthening of an independent political position. Post-1918 repartitioning of Africa by the

victorious Allied powers took no heed of local aspirations, and this new division of African territory actually led to a level of European control even more dense than that of 1914.

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See also: Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922; Kenya: World War I, Carrier Corps; Senegal: World War I; South Africa: World Wars I and II; Tanganyika (Tanzania): World War I.

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World War I: North and Saharan Africa

In the half century preceding the outbreak of World War I, vast tracts of North Africa and the Sahara had fallen under European rule. The French expanded from initial bases in the coastal regions of Algeria and Senegal into Morocco and Tunisia, the Algerian Sahara, and what became Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The British moved into Egypt, the Sudan, and the Saharan entrepôts of northern Nigeria. The Italians entered Libya, and the Spanish laid claim to enclaves both north and south of French Morocco.

These campaigns met with resistance, and, in the case of the British at Khartoum in 1885, a stunning defeat. Shortly before the war, in 1911, the Italians had invaded Libya, where they encountered resistance led by the Sanusiya, an Islamic Sufi order based in Cyrenaica, with networks reaching throughout the central Sahara. With colonial conquest, peoples living in remote

mountain and desert areas came under control of a central state often for the first time. Many suffered economic dislocations and environmental degradation as European armies passed through, requisitioning food and pack animals.

German and Ottoman strategists sought to exploit the grievances of the population, and to harness their military skills to draw off French, British, and Italian military personnel and resources. They also sought to undermine the loyalty of troops recruited from the region, above all from French North Africa, who were serving on the Western Front. Toward this end they recruited Algerian and Tunisian exiles living in the Ottoman Empire, including the Tunisian Mohamed Bach Hamba, who carried on propaganda efforts from a base in Lausanne, Switzerland.

The success of these efforts was limited. Early in the European war there were incidents of French North African troops refusing orders on the front, and occasional desertions. In French Morocco, Abd al-Malik, a son of Algerian resistance leader Abd al-Qadir, who had grown up in Syria and served as an Ottoman army officer, was involved in anti-French rebellions. There were localized revolts in Algeria, sparked mainly by military conscription.

The most serious and widespread threat came from the Sanusiya, working with help from the Germans and Ottomans who brought money, arms, and military personnel across the Mediterranean by submarine. In early 1915 the Italians suffered a major reversal in the Misurata region of Libya, losing a large quantity of arms to rebels. Prompted by their German and Ottoman allies, the Sanusiya struck at the British in Egypt in late 1915 but were defeated early the next year. Authority in Cyrenaica then shifted from Sayyid Ahmad to Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi, who was on cordial terms with the British. With the British as intermediaries he negotiated a truce with the Italians and gained recognition as emir of Cyrenaica.

In 1916 Sanusi forces advanced in French Saharan territories, taking the post of Djanet in southeastern Algeria, and then launching an attack on Agades in the center of Niger. Thanks to the astuteness of the local French commander, and the support of the British in Nigeria, the rebels were defeated. The French exacted brutal revenge on all they perceived as enemies in the area.

To the east, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the British governor Sir Reginald Wingate, faced a challenge from Sultan Ali Dinar, whose kingdom of Darfur on the western frontier had never been brought under direct control from Khartoum. In 1915, as military activity was escalating to the north, Ali Dinar opened contacts with the Sanusiya, signaling his defiance of the British. In February 1916 Wingate launched an

attack on Darfur, defeating Ali Dinar's army and, by November, killing the sultan himself. Wingate was careful to maintain cordial relations with leaders of Sudan's principal Sufi orders, a policy paralleling that of the French in North Africa. Also, thanks to Sudan's proximity to the Hijaz, Wingate had a role in promoting British support for the Arab revolt against the Turks launched there in June 1916, and later in monitoring the revolt's development.

The failure of German-Ottoman efforts in North Africa and the Sahara might be contrasted with the success of the British with the Arab Revolt in the Hijaz. The Germans and Ottomans provided little in the way of material aid to the rebels—Saharan people who, in the wake of a devastating drought in 1912–1913, desperately needed food as well as arms. There was neither a clear strategic goal, nor a German or Ottoman conventional force to combine efforts with the rebels.

The French not only survived the assorted rebellions, but recruited hundreds of thousands of troops and workers from their North African territories. Their success owed in part to their cultivating the loyalty of traditional leaders, from the Moroccan sultan to local leaders of Sufi orders, policies associated with Marshal Lyautey, then French resident in Morocco. Another factor, however, was that young North African men faced poverty and repression at home. In France they were treated with greater respect and were decently paid. Some, like the future Algerian nationalist leader Messali Hajj, began their acquaintance with radical political ideas at this time. As the French recruited troops for the European war in North Africa they brought West African troops to help maintain order there. The Italians followed a similar policy bringing Eritrean troops to Libya.

World War I left a complex heritage in North Africa and the Sahara. Romantic images of desert warriors notwithstanding, the war demonstrated the importance of modern military training. The most effective rebellions had a leavening of officers trained in the Ottoman army. But far more North Africans served under colonial powers than fought under rebel flags. Loyal service in the war would ultimately do more to force a redefinition of the colonial order than any of the rebellions, for it laid the foundations for new political demands, such as those voiced by Emir Khaled in Algeria.

New external factors also came to bear on North Africa. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's promotion of self-determination inspired demands for independence or autonomy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. The Communist International and Mustafa Kemal's Turkey both inspired anticolonial movements, including the revolt of Abd al-Krim in the Moroccan Rif, and renewed conflict in Libya. Yet for peoples who lived

deep in the Sahara, the devastation of the initial conquest, followed by drought and the turmoil of war, left them struggling to survive.

ALLAN CHRISTELOW

See also: Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922.

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World War II: French West Africa, Equatorial Africa

The Federation of French West Africa (FWA) was formally established in 1904 and included seven territories: Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Dahomey, French Sudan, French Guinea and Mauritania, and the mandate of Togo. The neighboring federation of French Equatorial Africa (FEA) was established in 1910 and included four territories: Chad, Gabon, Oubangui Chari and French Congo, and the mandate of Cameroon.

As of the beginning of World War II, France and Britain decided to cooperate across the globe. French Black Africa had a strategic importance for the fighting parties in Europe. The port of Dakar was the third biggest port after Marseilles and le Havre, and both Niger and Chad had joint borders with the Italian colony of Libya (Tripolitania). Chad also enabled access to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the British colonies of East Africa.

This atmosphere of friendly cooperation between the two major colonial powers in Africa changed dramatically when France was occupied by Germany and its newly appointed head of state, Marshal Petain, signed an armistice with Germany. The conditions of the armistice allowed France to keep its empire intact as long as the colonies stayed neutral and the armies in them reduced. Following the fall of France, the French Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa split in two. Pierre Boisson, the general governor of FEA, announced his support of Petain, and was immediately transferred by the Vichy government to Dakar, the capital of the more valuable federation. In the meantime, the governor of Chad, Felix Eboué, contacted Charles de Gaulle and

was appointed by him to serve as the general governor of FEA, which was now controlled by the Free French Forces.

The alignment of FWA with Vichy caused frictions between France and Britain. The British feared that this territory would fall into the hands of the Germans. The relations between the two countries deteriorated even further following the British attack on Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria on July 3–4, 1940. The final blow came with the British-Gaullist attempt to conquer Dakar by attacking it on September 23 and 25, 1940, during which around 200 people (mostly Africans) were injured. After the failure of the British-Gaullist attack on Dakar, and a Vichist failure to take control of Gabon, hostilities in both federations ceased.

Although the FEA was not perceived as important by the French, it offered de Gaulle what he lacked most: territory. During the war years, Eboué introduced certain reforms that aimed to train Africans for positions in the administration.

When Boisson took over the federation of FWA he declared that his aim was to defend the territory that was vested in his hands from the Germans and from the British. During the Vichy period in FWA there was only one visit by a German official, and he was forced to disguise himself as a Frenchman. The Vichy colonial regime was deeply worried about the African reactions to the defeat of France and was prepared for large-scale revolts. These, however, never occurred. Apart from a few incidents such as a murder of Europeans in Bobo-Dioulasso (Upper Volta in North Côte d'Ivoire) and the "defection" of the king of the Abrons with a thousand members of his court to the British-ruled Gold Coast, the federation remained relatively calm.

In most areas there was a large degree of continuity in the colonial policy of the Vichy regime. Most changes in policy stemmed from the special circumstances of the war. However, there were two changes introduced by the Vichy colonial regime. The first new development was the unprecedented network of propaganda that was aimed not only at the African elite but at the entire African population. This propaganda diffused the main messages of the Vichy "national revolution" and tried to retain the respect of the population to France in spite of its defeat. Another major change was in the area of education and youth. The importance that was assigned to youth by the Vichy regime in France was also dominant in the colonial policy in the FWA. The reform in education in France was also implemented in the FWA. For the first time, the colonial regime attempted to organize African youth from all social strata in youth movements and youth centers.

Following the Allies' landing in North Africa on November 7, 1942, Boisson declared that he would protect the FWA from the Americans. By the end of

November, however, he had signed an agreement with U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, according to which the FWA would change its allegiance to the Allies but would remain free from any American or French domination. Only on July 7, 1943, did Boisson leave the federation. It was then formally transferred to the Free French Forces.

During the Free French period, no reforms were introduced. Africans were forced to work even harder in order to contribute to the war effort. The most serious incident that occurred during the war in the FWA was the mutiny of African soldiers in a military camp near Dakar, Thiaroye, on December 1, 1944. The soldiers, whose demobilization had been postponed, protested their living conditions. The French reacted severely, and 35 soldiers were killed. This tragic event, marked in the Senegalese collective memory as the first anti-colonial act, demonstrated the large measure of continuity in the colonial policy of the prewar, Vichy, and Free French periods. The importance of World War II as a turning point in the decolonization process in French Africa is related more to the international consequences of the war than the internal ones.

The main result of the war in the French territories was the Brazzaville Conference, which was organized by de Gaulle on January 30, 1944. The reforms that were suggested in this conference, in which no African delegates took part, were meant to save the French Empire from dissolving, but actually paved the way for decolonization.

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See also: Colonial Federations: French West Africa; Senegal: World War II.

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World War II: North Africa

For the Allied powers, North Africa was an important strategic field in World War II. Indeed, the landings of November 1942 might be said to be a crucial turning point in the war. For the colonized peoples of North Africa, the war itself, rather than any single military event, was a vital stage in their nations' evolution. After 1945, colonial regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt were no longer able to resist the tide of nationalism. Though not solely a product of the war, the united, organized, politically astute, and internationally supported nationalist movements in North Africa were the most significant consequence of the war in the region. North Africa was not a very high priority for the Axis powers, but Germany realized the value of propaganda undermining France and Britain aimed at native populations, and Benito Mussolini had territorial claims on Tunisia.

After the fall of France in 1940, the government briefly considered moving to North Africa and continuing the war effort from there. The authorities in French North Africa, however, remained loyal to the Vichy government, a decision that pleased most settlers and subjected Jews to discrimination. For nationalists, France's humiliation was a source of encouragement and many, for a short time, looked hopefully to Germany. The only fighting in the early stages of the war in North Africa took place on the Egyptian-Libyan border following Italy's entry into the war. Many Libyan



French tanks in North Africa, November 1942. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

exiles in Egypt took this opportunity to express anti-Italian sentiment, while Egypt attempted to tread a path between its obligations to Britain and encirclement by Axis forces. Fighting continued in the region through 1941, as German reinforcements arrived.

The colonial powers' prestige diminished as the war continued. Discontent grew along with hardship in the French territories as supplies were requisitioned and rationed; anti-British feeling was widespread in Egypt as Britain obtained a favorable government with the threat of military force; in Libya the Italian infrastructure was ruined by the fighting and many Italian settlers were evacuated, returning land to the native Bedouin. On November 8 1942, the relative calm that had prevailed in the western regions was broken by the Anglo-American landings in Morocco and Algeria known as Operation Torch, under U.S. commander in chief Dwight D. Eisenhower. With complete strategic surprise achieved and only minor losses sustained in the taking of Casablanca and Algiers, the chief problem the occupying forces had to deal with was political. The Allies agreed to a cease-fire with Admiral Darlan, commander in chief of the Vichy armed forces, but this led the collaborationist government in France to accept German air support in the form of air raids and troop movements into Tunisia. Darlan was appointed high commissioner for French North Africa by the Allies, to the annoyance of Charles de Gaulle's Free French. Though Darlan was assassinated in December 1942, the French settlers in North Africa were gradually won over to the Allied side.

By the end of 1942, substantial German reinforcements had been deployed in Tunisia, halting the Allied advance short of Tunis. Erwin Rommel's forces made significant gains in the mountains, but by April 1943, the Allies were able to regroup and regain ground. The Allied naval blockade and aerial bombardment seriously affected Axis supply lines, and in May 1943 Allied forces under Alexander and Montgomery forced a German surrender. The Allies' control of North Africa now gave them a solid base from which to launch their campaign in Southern Europe. The civilian consequences of the Allies' campaign were equally important. The Jews of French North Africa were liberated from anti-Semitic laws and the Vichy regime was discredited, to the benefit of the Free French, who established a provisional government in Algiers by the end of 1943. In Libya, conditions improved as the country came under American, British, and French control. In Morocco, Franklin D. Roosevelt is reported to have promised postwar independence to the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed, at this stage. The Tunisian nationalist leader Habib ibn Ali Bourguiba was released from arrest in France by Axis forces, supposedly to cooperate with Italy, but proceeded instead to order support for

de Gaulle and continue to champion his country's cause.

The improvement in nationalist fortunes was short-lived, however. De Gaulle's administration had no time for independence demands, and de Gaulle was a more valuable ally than the nationalists for the Americans. In Tunisia, the new monarch, Moncef Bey, demanded representation and equality, but was exiled by the French and replaced with another, loyal, figure. The newly formed Moroccan independence party, Istiqlal, was repressed by the French, with no American intervention to support earlier encouragement. In Libya, it was decided that the country's future should be determined by talks involving France, Britain, America, and the Soviet Union, but independence was not thought to be a viable option. Indeed, the French seemed interested in incorporating the southern Fezzan province into Algeria. Only in Egypt, with both Britain and the government discredited, did nationalism continue to thrive, as radical movements seeking a complete departure from the European rule that had led to war became more popular.

The final year of the war saw North African troops make a large contribution to the French forces in the Italian campaign. Recognizing that their loyalty and sacrifice must be recompensed, de Gaulle announced a program of reform, moving away from the colonial policy of assimilation, and instituting economic modernization, social progress, and representation for colonial subjects. Nationalists, however, encouraged by the Atlantic Charter that enshrined the right to self-determination, demanded nothing short of independence. Contact with the Americans during the war led nationalist leaders such as Bourguiba to take their case to the United States and the newly formed United Nations. Egyptian nationalists, meanwhile, also looked abroad, but to the more radical examples of the Soviet Union and Asian communism. Libya provided the ultimate example of independence being decided by the international community, as no decision at all on its future was taken in 1945, the issue being put on hold until a peace treaty with Italy could be concluded. The most tragic demonstration of the European powers' struggle to retain control of their North African colonies after the war came in Algeria, where nationalist demonstrations on May 8, 1945, were violently repressed by French forces, with several thousand casualties. The next 15 years were to be dominated by the consequences of World War II's blow to European prestige and awakening of nationalist hopes in North Africa.

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See also: Libya: World War II and the Kingdom of Libya, 1942–1969.

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World War II: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Impact

It was impossible for Sub-Saharan Africa to avoid the economic impact of World War II. By the outbreak of the war in 1939, the economies of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain and their colonies in this region formed part of a single economy. In addition, many of the strategic mineral and agricultural resources that were demanded by the nations at war were found in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The period 1939 to 1942 was a time of hardship for the agricultural sector in the region. In French West Africa for example, farmers in the colonies that remained loyal to the Vichy regime suffered because the naval blockade of the Allied forces brought trade to a virtual standstill. This was also a difficult period for the producers of agricultural commodities, who were either heavily or completely dependent on the export market for their livelihood. Included among them were citrus farmers in southern Mozambique; coffee growers in Angola; cocoa farmers in Nigeria and Ghana, and most oilseed producers. The notable exceptions to this trend were cotton growers in Nigeria, whose surplus was absorbed on the domestic market, and their counterparts in Mozambique, who were beneficiaries of the added impetus given by the war to Portugal's drive for imperial autarky.

The Japanese victory over the Allied forces in the Far East in February of 1942 eliminated a major source for Allied supplies of agricultural produce and strategic minerals. As a result, Sub-Saharan Africa became a vitally important alternative source for Allied requirements of these commodities, and a concerted effort was made to expand their production for export. In the case of agricultural products, a lot of emphasis was placed on commodities such as groundnuts, palm oil, palm kernels, copra, and cotton. The expansion in their production led to an increase in economic activity in Sub-Saharan African states. However, the economic circumstances of African producers did not improve

because the prices they received for their produce were well below the ones prevailing on the world market. Further, in places such as Mozambique, export maximization sometimes took precedence over food production, areas completely unsuited to cash crop production were brought under cultivation and forced labor was used to expand export production.

The major mineral exports of Sub-Saharan Africa were strategically important to the forces involved in the war; they were therefore not adversely affected by it. The Belgian Congo, for instance, was one of the principal sources for the copper, cobalt, industrial diamonds, tin, gold, silver, and uranium needs of the United States and Britain. Thus, to facilitate wartime production, the mining industry received major capital injections from the United States. In Zambia, the most important African source of copper, the demand that was generated by the rearmament program of the late 1930s continued during the war years, and a number of innovations in copper extraction were introduced. The war also led to the rise of the bauxite industry in Ghana and the revival of tin mining in Nigeria. Overall however, in most of the mineral-producing Sub-Saharan African states the development and expansion of mineral production during the war years did not lead to any significant economic growth. In many of them it resulted in the creation of small enclaves within colonial economies, the seasonal migration of workers in and out of the mining areas, and the repatriation of a large percentage of the profits made by mining companies to metropolitan countries. The severe restrictions imposed on goods imported into Sub-Saharan Africa during World War II caused severe shortages and steep price increases. The price of a bicycle in Brazzaville increased from 700 francs in 1939 to 2,700 francs in 1944. In Nigeria the Lagos Cost of Living Committee, appointed in January 1944, found that the cost of living index had increased by over 70 points between 1939 and 1943. Inadequacies in the food supplies in Sub-Saharan Africa reached crisis proportions in places such as Senegal and Mozambique. Many states sought to expand domestic food production in order to satisfy local needs. For example, compulsory rice production was introduced in Mozambique in 1941 and by 1946 it was self-sufficient in rice. In Nigeria, even though the demand for food outstripped its production during the war years, major improvements were made in the production of rice, wheat, sugar, potatoes, and onions.

The shortages in imported goods was also a powerful incentive for industrialization throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. In South Africa, the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly and significantly, creating a huge demand for industrial labor. By 1945, the urbanization of all races had increased substantially. In addition, the foundation was created for manufacturing to

supersede mining as the dominant sector in the South African economy. In Nigeria increases in wheat production in parts of Bornu, Sokoto, Katsina, and Kano led to the establishment of a flour mill at Kano. Industries were also established or revived to enable the production of roofing shingles, soap, cigars, boot polish, belting, and shoe leather. In Angola and Mozambique the Portuguese government abandoned its opposition to industrialization and allowed companies for the manufacture of cotton textiles and other commodities to be established.

There was also an acceleration in the pace of economic reform in some Sub-Saharan African states during the war years. In the British colonies, for example, after the Japanese victory in the Far East in 1942, the Colonial Office acknowledged that it needed to adopt a more organized approach to colonial economic planning, and by the middle of 1943 the concept of planning was established as an important feature of its colonial development policy. In recognition of their loyalty and contribution to its war effort, France rewarded its colonies in Tropical Africa with the creation of the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Sociale, an investment fund for their social and economic development. By 1945 the economic measures that were introduced

into the colonial dependencies during the war years had produced an unprecedented level of state intervention in colonial economic affairs in Sub-Saharan Africa and enhanced the economic links between colonial economies in the region and the economies of metropolitan countries.

ALLISTER HINDS

See also: **Fonds d'Investment pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES).**

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Y

Yaoundé

The geographical site of Yaoundé is quite unusual for an African capital: Cameroon's administrative center is situated over 200 kilometers from the country's coast in the midst of (now rapidly disappearing) tropical rainforest. Until 1992, Yaoundé was the only capital south of the Sahara without an international airport; the road and rail systems that link it with the port of Douala, the country's largest city and economic center, were only extended in the 1980s. The city center is characterized by a number of administrative buildings (some of them very bizarre pieces of architecture) now rapidly dilapidating. Poverty, growing slums, and pollution are dominant features of Yaoundé today. According to André Franqueville (1984), two-thirds of the ethnic groups in Cameroon were represented in the Yaoundé population already by 1957. The local Beti people and the immigrant groups of Bassa and Bamiléké are numerically the most important groups today. In recent years ethnic tensions and clashes have increased, often over access to urban land.

Founded in 1888 by a civilian, the botanist and explorer Georg August Zenker, Yaoundé was run during the German period as a military and administrative post. The name *Jaunde*, given to the settlement by the Germans, probably resulted from a linguistic misunderstanding, as the new colonial rulers meant to name this site after the local ethnic group Ewondo. The relatively densely populated area soon attracted some German merchants. In 1895, the first trading post was opened for purchasing rubber, palm oil, and ivory. German administrators in Yaoundé experienced recurrent difficulties feeding the military post, in spite of the abundance of food in the surrounding region. Forced requisitions of food led to military confrontation and loss of life. By the time the Germans lost Cameroon at the end of World War I, Yaoundé consisted of a

military enclosure, some formal buildings, and a stately avenue of mango trees, but a very small population. In 1914 the military and police forces included 2,700 men and 215 officers. Other occupations were probably limited to trade and transportation.

During World War I, the French set up their headquarters in Yaoundé, because of its comparatively pleasant climate and its secluded location, favorable to military defense. In 1921, they made the town the administrative center for both Yaoundé circumscription and the national government, headed by the high commissioner. The area was one of the most important administrative regions of French Cameroon. Its population of about 400,000 comprised 18 per cent of the total population. In 1935 it was the major indigenous producer of palm kernels, coffee, and sesame, and the second most important producer of cocoa, palm oil, and groundnuts.

However, between the wars, Yaoundé remained a fairly small town in the cocoa belt. The urban population consisted of 5,500 Cameroonians and 365 foreigners in 1926, and 6,190 and 261, respectively, in 1933. In addition, there was an average daily workforce on *corvée* labor duty of 800 to 1,000, a prison population of 300 to 400, and a hospital population of at least 200. Many more people came into Yaoundé as porters, workers for private traders, litigants in court cases, and a variety of other capacities. In 1927, the completion of the Transcamerounais Railway considerably improved the city's traffic connections.

The abolition of the *indigénat* in Cameroon in 1946 led to a new mobility of labor. In Yaoundé workers were needed for a number of new public building projects launched under the FIDE development scheme. The city's population increased from 9,080 in 1939 to 17,311 in 1945 and 36,786 by 1953, thereby tripling within a 15-year period. Around the time of independence, Yaoundé experienced a second growth increase.

Civil war and massive violence in the Bassa and Bamiléké regions drove parts of the rural population out of these areas into the big urban centers of Douala and Yaoundé, and the fast-growing administration in Yaoundé attracted many college graduates. Between 1957 and 1962 the urban population of Yaoundé rose from 54,343 to 89,969. Since then the rate of growth has sped up, resulting in a population of 313,706 in the mid-1970s, about 700,000 in the late 1980s, and more than a million inhabitants by the end of the twentieth century.

Federal capital of independent Cameroon since 1961, Yaoundé became seat of the united republic in 1972. Yaoundé's growing importance was also enhanced by the establishment of the university. This institution grew rapidly, from 213 graduates in 1961, to 10,000 in 1982, to 41,000 in 1992. A high proportion of the population in Yaoundé was employed in the civil service and in salaried occupations associated with government and education. In comparison, the industrial sector remained small, and industrial employment was dominated by very few enterprises: a cigarette factory, a beer factory, and printing. Many of the civil service positions were held by the local Beti people, while the Bamiléké dominated commerce, transportation, and "artisanal activities." Following the deep economic crisis that started in the early 1980s, many urban jobs were discontinued and state salaries severely cut in order to meet demands from the International Monetary Fund. Graduating students found an increasingly competitive labor market. It was these frustrated graduates, together with their teachers and professors, who started to agitate for a process of democratization.

While in the 1990s students and teachers, like lawyers and journalists, tried to create a civil society, the elite continued to flaunt their ostentatious consumption of luxuries such as champagne and expensive villas and cars. This lifestyle was displayed in Yaoundé in a particularly flamboyant way. The Cameroonian sociologist Frances Nyamnjoh noted ironically in his book *Mind Searching* (1991),

They have built little prisons for themselves in an attempt to imitate fences in Europe! Some of my folks in Briqueterie [a poor area in Yaoundé] might wonder . . . what residents of Bastos [the neighboring district, the richest residential area in the capital] have done wrong against their people and the rest of the world, that they have chosen to live behind barbed wire, protected by pieces of broken beer and champagne bottles?

ANDREAS ECKERT

See also: Cameroon.

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Yeke: See Msiri: Yeke Kingdom.

Yoruba-Speaking Peoples

Located in southwestern Nigeria, Ile-Ife (Ife) is regarded by an overwhelming Yoruba majority as the source and heart of the Yoruba nation. This fact, coupled with its impressive culture as demonstrated by its famous brass, stone, and clay sculpture, placed it in a position of preeminence among the Yoruba. The belief that Oduduwa (Oodua) was the first king at Ile-Ife and that he was the father of the founding princes of other Yoruba kingdoms has inspired the description of the Yoruba as the *Omo Oodua* (offspring of Oodua). This would partially explain why Yoruba history, culture, and religion have centered on Ile-Ife.

Structured as a mini-state in the pre-Oduduwa period, Ile-Ife comprised territorially distinct but related settlements including Oke Oja, Oke Awo, and Iraye, among others. The arrival of Oduduwa heralded the reorganization of Ile-Ife and the existing states. Equipped with iron and superior weapons, Oduduwa, through force and diplomacy, wrested power from Obatala and transformed the semiautonomous settlements into a megastate.

Ile-Ife, as the "father kingdom" and Yoruba national headquarters, so to speak, had a unique type of constitutional and historical growth. Completely surrounded by other Yoruba kingdoms that acknowledged its supremacy, it had no fear of attack from its neighbors. It therefore did not possess any arms and the *onis* (kings) were not known to be great military leaders. Ile-Ife concentrated its attention on religious, artistic, and cultural matters.

If Ile-Ife is understandably regarded as the spiritual center of the Yoruba, it is with many justifications that Oyo is widely recognized as the political focal point of the Yoruba. Situated in the southern fringe of the savanna and close to Nupeland, Oyo grew from a petty principality to become the most powerful of all Yoruba kingdoms. Oranmiyan, the founder of Oyo, was the youngest son of Oduduwa.

Frequent attacks from the Nupe and the Bariba compelled Oyo to reorganize its army into cavalry and infantry. The ruler Sango is credited with transforming the small polity into a kingdom; widely acknowledged among the Yoruba as a magician and warrior, he built up the cadre of slave officials who played a significant

role in Oyo's administration. However, Robin Law (1978) has categorized Sango, along with Oduduwa and Oranmiyan, as "humanized deities."

The king whose reign actually launched Oyo on the path of greatness was, according to Samuel Johnson (1973), Obalokun. Under him, Oyo expanded to Egbado and southwestward to the coast. It became involved in the Atlantic trade, thereby generating the much-needed foreign exchange with which horses were purchased.

Ajagbo, who succeeded Obalokun, created the *Are-Ona Kakanfo* (generalissimo) title and instituted the system of sending out four expeditions at a time under four titled holders. Oyo expanded westward between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it brought Dahomey under its rule. In the agreement of 1730, Dahomey's tributary status was regularized. For the rest of the eighteenth century, Dahomey remained a dependent of Oyo. Oyo's vassal states were ruled by Oyo's appointees (*ajele*). Paradoxically, its expansion bred weakness and division, and Oyo was on the brink of collapse.

While Ile-Ife and Oyo occupy the central and northern Yorubaland, respectively, southeast Yorubaland is the homeland of the Ijebu, Ondo, Itsekiri, and Ikale. Their political history is connected to the better-known centers of Ijebu Ode, Ondo, Idanre, and Ode Itsekiri and the smaller towns of Ikale and Ilaje.

The second largest of the Yoruba polities was Ijebu, which, according to Elizabeth Isichei (1983), was less a unitary kingdom than a federation of states where the king, with his capital at Ijebu Ode, enjoyed an acknowledged supremacy over his brother Ijebu Obas. Obanta, the first Awujale, was one of the sons of Oduduwa.

East of Ijebu are Ondo and Ile-Oluji, whose traditions ascribe the origin of their dynasties to the descendants of Oduduwa. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Ondo area is the institution of women chiefs. The installation of the *osemawe* (king) of Ondo is performed by the female chief, the *lisa olobun*. Farther to the east of the Ijebu and along the coast in the areas of the Ikale and the Ilaje, no central or dominant dynasty emerged.

To the northwest of the Ijebu were the Egba who, before the nineteenth century, occupied the sites later inhabited by the Ibadan and Ijaye. Like the Ijebu, the Egba were heterogeneous until the first *alake* (king), who was the son of Oduduwa, organized them into a loose federation.

Along the Atlantic coast are the Awori and the Ogu, with the principal towns of Lagos and Badagry. The Awori claimed descent from Ile-Ife, although some Aworis became more culturally influenced by Benin upon their conquest. The Ogu, on the other hand, are

the offshoot of migrants from Whydah and Allada (Porto Novo).

The rest of the Yoruba-speaking peoples—the Ijesa, Ekiti, Akure, and Akoko—have affinities with Ile-Ife, even though the latter three share many cultural traits with the Edo-speaking peoples of Benin. Among the Ekiti, Akure, and Akoko are stories that traced their origins to Ile-Ife. The Ekiti kingdoms, totaling more than sixteen, are territorially small, as a result of the influence of the hilly terrain. Ado Ekiti, the largest, is given a certain preeminence in the Ekiti area. Like Ile-Ife, the Ijesa, Ekiti, and Akure emphasize the importance of nonmilitary factors in the growth of kingdoms.

In the northeast Yorubaland live the Ibolo, Igbomina, and Okun Yoruba-speaking peoples. Established by migrants from Ile-Ife and Oyo, their settlements included Ila Orangun, Ajase, Omu Aran, Isanlu Iwo, Oro, Eku Apa, Ora, Ikosin, and Igbaja. The most northeasterly of the Yoruba kingdoms is Owo. Its location in a cultural frontier zone, so to speak, opened it to influences from Benin and other Yoruba groups. Established by an Ile-Ife prince, Owo extended to Kabba and Akoko.

One basic feature of the Yoruba-speaking peoples is urbanism. Each town was an entity in itself. Government in each town was based on the unwritten constitution of the people in which the spiritual was inextricably bound up with the physical. At the head of the government was the *oba* (ruler) assisted by a council called differently in various towns. Known as Oyo Mesi in Oyo, it was headed by the *basorun* (prime minister) who was responsible to the *alafin* (king of Oyo).

In addition, there was the custodian of the cult, the *ifa* (soothsayer). The *ifa* priest, together with the principal councilors, belonged to the Ogboni society, a secret society. The society discussed political, economic, and social affairs and its decisions were binding on all members. Government at Oyo, as well as several Yoruba towns, was a delicate balance of power between the *oba* and his palace administration on the one hand, and the council and the more representative Ogboni society on the other.

MODUPEOLU FASEKE

See also: Ife, Oyo, Yoruba, Ancient: Kingship and Art.

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Yoruba States: Oyo

The Yoruba are one of the three major ethnic groups in modern day Nigeria along with the Hausa and Igbo. The Yoruba are also one of the largest ethnic groups in all of West Africa, primarily living in western Nigeria, but also in Benin and Sierra Leone. Their language is part of the Benue–Congo family and is divided into several distinctive but mutually intelligible dialects. The Yoruba have been very influential in the development of modern culture in West Africa and the African diaspora. Gods from the traditional Yoruba religion provide the basis for deities in Western Hemisphere belief systems, such as Santeria in Cuba and Vodun in Haiti. In contemporary Nigeria, Yoruba-language books and films are major sources of entertainment for both Yoruba and non-Yoruba audiences.

Historically, the Yoruba were also a major influence on the development of West African history. According to oral tradition, the Yoruba migrated from the east. In *The History of the Yorubas* (1921), Samuel Johnson states the region of origin as Arabia. Modern historians believe that the Yoruba did migrate to their current home, but the actual point of origin is unknown. Yoruba-speaking regions of West Africa were among the first of that region to undergo the process of


urbanization that is such a distinctive aspect of forest and savanna populations in West Africa. Apparently urbanization began in the forest zone between the ninth and tenth centuries CE.

The city that is traditionally regarded as the home of the Yoruba people is Ife (Ile-Ife). Since Ife was the oldest of Yoruba cities, its rulers were accorded preeminence within the *ebi* system, which conceptualized the relations between the elites of various Yoruba cities as the equivalent of sibling relations within a family, with Ife as the parent. According to oral tradition, the first leader, or *oba*, of Ife was Oduduwa. Oduduwa was the father of Oranyan, who became the first ruler of Oyo, the most politically and economically important of the Yoruba cities in the later precolonial era. Oranyan, also known as Oranmiyan in Edo, is credited with being the father of the ruler Benin in that society's oral tradition.

In addition to being the traditional home of the ruling class of traditional Yoruba society, Ife was very important as the point of dissemination for major forms of West African art. In particular, sculptures of busts and other naturalistic figures were created in Ife and a similar style of artwork was adopted by neighboring peoples, especially the Edo of Benin. Many researchers assume that the Ife style bronzes were a continuation of the forms of brass work that were first seen in Nigeria in Nok around 500BCE.

Traditional Yoruba life was centered on cities, but many of the residents of these cities worked as farmers outside the walls of town. The principal crops that were produced were yams in the forest regions, and millet, sorghum, and cowpeas in the savanna regions. Bananas, which are of Asian origin, would also eventually become a major food crop in the forest region, along with maize, which was introduced after the sixteenth century by European traders. Kola nuts, which were produced in Yoruba areas, were a valuable export crop that was sold to buyers in the Sahelian regions. In addition to agriculture, the Yoruba were heavily involved in many traditional crafts and industries. These included brass and iron working, but the most noteworthy was textile production. Yoruba women were particularly noted for the production of finely patterned cloth. This traditional production would continue into the twentieth century. It should also be noted that women in general figured very prominently in the commercial world; they were often the largest and most successful merchants in the markets. Women were also responsible for a large percentage of agricultural production.

By the year 1300, Ife had reached its peak as the dominant city of Yorubaland. By 1400, Oyo, which was farther to the north at the margins of the forest and savanna, became the dominant commercial and political city of the Yoruba. Oyo began to rise as a major power



Yorubaland, fifteenth–eighteenth centuries.

after the leadership adopted the use of cavalry as the foundation of their army. This change meant that Oyo would always be dependent on routes from the north for a fresh supply of horses because Oyo was too far south for the successful breeding of large horses that were suitable for battle.

The political system of Oyo was at once arranged with checks and balances, but it was also quite hierarchical and was designed to maintain power within the hands of Oyo's elite. At the head of the system was the *alafin*, or king. In addition to the *alafin* there was a council known as the *Oyo mesì* that was headed by an official known as the *bashorun*. The king was very powerful and was considered to be a demigod by the general population; however, the *Oyo mesì* had the right to command the king to commit suicide if they deemed him unfit for office. Within the *Oyo mesì*, there was also a secret society known as the *ogboni* that also was at the center of struggles for power within Oyo.

Apparently, Oyo began to expand in the sixteenth century in response to an invasion by the Nupe in 1531, which destroyed the city. The leaders of Oyo would eventually inflict serious defeats upon the Nupe while also making the northern Yoruba town of Ilorin part of the Oyo empire. Oyo, however, found that its expansion to the south was limited by its dependence on cavalry. In heavy forests, the horse had difficulties not only with the pestilence of tsetse fly, but also with the lack of fields, which minimized advantages for mounted soldiers. Because of these strategic difficulties, Benin would remain the dominant power in the southeastern regions while Oyo sought to expand in the west and southwest. Eventually, Oyo controlled territory spreading from the Niger River in what is now Nigeria to present-day Togo. As Oyo gained suzerainty over territory on the Atlantic coast, the empire became involved in the supplying slaves to Europeans for transatlantic trade.

Oyo would eventually begin to decline as a result of a protracted period of civil war and invasion. These wars were stimulated by a number of factors. The system of Oyo government in which the *alafin* was exalted yet could be ordered to commit suicide naturally lead to tension between its respective components. In 1770, the *alafin* Abiodun came to power and he had the *bashorun* Gaha and his family put to death since Gaha had ordered the suicide of a number of *alafins* prior to Abiodun. In addition to the disruption caused by the killing of Gaha and his family, some scholars feel that Abiodun alienated the military by reducing the focus on them and concentrating on commercial activities. This largely meant emphasizing the slave trade with the Europeans. Oyo's increased emphasis on slave trading increased resentment and resistance to Oyo.

The result being a series of revolts by regions like Nupe and Borgu. In addition to these problems, the Fon of present-day Benin Republic had begun to organize and acquire firearms from European traders. This made them a formidable opponent on the fringe of the Oyo state. In addition to these internal pressures, Oyo came under pressure from the Fulani-led jihads (holy wars) of the eighteenth century which resulted in the permanent loss of the northern Yoruba territory of Ilorin after 1800. The loss of Ilorin served to emphasize the general strife that developed between Yoruba states. The preeminence of Oyo was always somewhat in contradiction to the principal Ebi system that emphasized familial relations among Yoruba ruling elites with Ife as the center. Once Oyo began to destabilize, it allowed other Yoruba states to break away, which exacerbated this period of civil strife.

By the 1835, Oyo had been destroyed and the stage was set for increasing influence of Western influences in Yoruba culture. The leading social group behind this change were the Saro, Yoruba who had been enslaved in the transatlantic slave trade who were able to return to Nigeria. Most of the Saro were the recaptive African who were rescued by British antislave patrols and brought to Sierra Leone as refugees. There the Saro became a major component of the Krio (Creole) community that would provide late precolonial and early colonial Africa with much of its Western-educated population. It is, notably, from this group that Samuel Johnson, the author of *The History of the Yorubas* (1921) would arise.

ANTHONY CHEESEBORO

See also: Ife, Oyo, Yoruba, Ancient: Kingship and Art.

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Yoruba States (Other Than Ife and Oyo)

By the eighteenth century, the Yoruba had distinguished themselves by their well-established traditions of sacred kingship, urbanism, and sculptural arts. These aspects of Yoruba culture are epitomized by in historical development of Ile-Ife (Ife) and Oyo. However, besides these famous kingdoms, other states flourished in Yorubaland. The most notable among

these were established among the Ijesa, Ekiti, Egba, Ijebu, Igbomina, Ibolu, Awori, Ondo, Akoko, and Okun Yoruba-speaking dialectal groups. Many of these states achieved varying degrees of power and influence in the Yoruba country before the nineteenth century. The earliest of these was the kingdom of Owu, which grew to such prominence that it competed with Oyo for the dominance of central and northern Yorubaland, until the reign of the third *alafin* (king), Sango, who broke Owu's stranglehold over Oyo and effectively terminated its temporary paramountcy in northern Yorubaland. The next to achieve prominence was the kingdom of Ijesa in east central Yorubaland. Established by Ajibogun, a son of Oduduwa and father of the Yoruba people, Ijesa grew to incorporate several polities east of Ile-Ife, such as Ilemure, ruled by the Ita, and Ilesa, ruled by the Onila. Under the reign of Atakunmosa (c.1500) and the series of warlike Owa who succeeded him, the kingdom expanded to the Osun, Ekiti, and Igbomina areas.

South of Oyo and west of Ife lay the country of the Egba people, who did not form a united kingdom. Instead they were organized into a loose confederacy of four autonomous but interdependent groups. These were the Egba Gbagura, ruled by the *agura* based in Ido; the Egba Oke Ona, ruled by the *osile* based at Oko; the Egba Ake ruled by the *alake* headquartered at Ake; and finally the Egba Ageyin headed by the *ojoko* of Kesi. The most powerful of these rulers was the *alake*, who, after absorbing the Agbeyin group, was on his way to emerging as the paramount ruler when the Egba came under the imperial control of Oyo empire in the late seventeenth century. Under the leadership of Lisabi, the Egba successfully asserted their independence of Oyo during the closing years of the eighteenth century.

To the west of the Egba was the kingdom of Ijebu. Established by three successive waves of migrants from Ile-Ife, Ijebu was known to European visitors by the fifteenth century. Though large in size and homogeneous in culture and dialect, the Ijebu were not fully integrated politically before the nineteenth century. While the majority recognized the paramountcy of Awujale based at Ijebu Ode, a group known as the Remo instead acknowledged the *akarigbo* of Ofin Sagamu as their leader. By virtue of its location, Ijebu had to fight continuously for its independence from the imperial designs of Oyo and Benin. Along the Atlantic Coast and south of Ijebu were the kingdoms of Lagos and those of the Ikale and Ilaje people. Established like Ijebu by successive waves of Awori-Yoruba migrants from central Yorubaland, Lagos soon came under the imperial tutelage of Benin. This imperial connection, however, did not prevent its emergence and prosperity as a major entrepôt of the transatlantic slave trade.

In western Yorubaland, a number of kingdoms flourished before the nineteenth century. The most notable of these were Ketu, Sabe, and Idaisa; of these, Ketu became the most important. Located between hostile and more aggressive neighbors, Ketu had to contend for its independence for much of its history. Its massive and impressive fortifications notwithstanding, Ketu came under Oyo's imperial rule some time during the eighteenth century. In 1789, a rampaging Dahomey army invaded and sacked the town, taking most of its inhabitants into slavery. South of Ketu lay the country of the Egbado. Loosely organized into numerous and autonomous mini-states such as Ilobi, Erinja, Ado, Ipokia, Igan, Egua, and Aiyetoro, the Egbado were soon conquered by Oyo, whose economic and strategic interests led it to reshape the political map of this region from the seventeenth century on.

The rugged topography of the land of the Ekiti, in eastern Yorubaland, allowed for the emergence and proliferation of several centers of power, many of which eventually developed into kingdoms. Of the 16 traditionally accorded primacy in oral traditions, the most notable were Ado, Ijero, Otun, Aye, and Akure. All these kingdoms claimed royal ancestry from Ile-Ife, while their proximity to Benin brought them at different times and to varying degrees under the imperial and cultural dominance of the Benin empire. Southeast of the Ekiti were the kingdoms of Owo and Ondo, whose locations in a cultural frontier zone opened them to considerable cultural and political influences from Benin and other Yoruba groups. The establishment of Owo by a prince of Ile-Ife involved the conquest and integration of several preexisting groups, the most notable of these were the seven autonomous settlements of Idasin, ruled by the Alale, as well as Iyare and Iso. Similarly, the emergence of Ondo occurred at the expense of the indigenous groups, namely the Idoko, Oka, and Ifore, who had to be subdued and forcibly integrated into the nascent state.

North of Ekiti and east of Oyo lived the Ibolu, Igbomina, and Okun-Yoruba groups. By the early eighteenth century, many independent state structures could be identified in this region. Among the Igbomina these included Ila, Ajase, Omu, Aran, Isanlu-isin, Iwo, Oro Ora, and Igbaja. The Ibolu states included Ofa, Igosun, Ijagbo, Ipee, and Igbonna. Peopled by migrants of diverse origins, including the non-Yoruba speaking Nupe, Edo, and Igala, the Okun-Yoruba were divided into five major subgroups—namely, the Owe, Yagba, Bunu, Ijumu, and Oworo. Although considerable interaction occurred between them, and while the Orangun of Ila and the Olofa of Ofa were accorded some respect, none of these groups ever formed a single political entity. Apart from a few notable exceptions, the sociopolitical organization was characterized by

the mini-states, made up of independent villages in which no right or authority was acknowledged beyond the confines of each of the autonomous settlements. This decentralized sociopolitical existence rendered these northeastern Yoruba groups particularly vulnerable to constant military pressures, imperial conquest, and human depredations by their more powerful and imperious neighbors, such as Oyo, Nupe, and Benin, who did not hesitate to make short work of their nebulous independence.

FUNSO AFOLAYAN

See also: **Benin Kingdom: Nineteenth Century.**

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Yoruba States: Trade and Conflict, Nineteenth Century

For the Yoruba, the nineteenth century was a period of warfare and change. Prior to this the Yoruba people were organized into several states, of which the most powerful was the Oyo empire. While it lasted, Oyo was a bastion of law and order. Its collapse ushered in a period of chaos and instability that lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. Internal dissension, debilitating power struggles between the *alafin* (king) and his principal chiefs, economic decline associated with the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, and the Fulani jihadist (holy war) invasion from the north hastened the collapse of the empire. The Fulani jihadists seized control of Ilorin, sacked the capital of Oyo, and proceeded to devastate and destroy many northern Yoruba towns. Thousands of refugees began to pour into central and southern Yorubaland. Many settled in already existing towns not yet ravaged. Others established new settlements. Some organized themselves into marauding hordes, extending the zone of pillage

and carnage to southern Yorubaland. The Oyo refugee soldiers descended on the Owu and Egba, destroying their towns.

From the ruins of Oyo and in response to other pressures, new states emerged competing to fill the vacuum and gain control of the trade routes to the coast, from whence were obtained European firearms and other goods. The struggle for power and supremacy among these successor states, such as Ibadan, Ijaye, Ilorin, New Oyo, Abeokuta, and Oke Odan, resulted in intermittent warfare. At the battle of Osogbo in 1839, Ilorin's ambition to conquer and bring much of Yorubaland under the Sokoto caliphate was checked by the rising power of Ibadan. Thereafter Ibadan proceeded to extend its hegemony over much of eastern and central Yorubaland, incorporating parts of Ijesa, Ekiti, Igbomina, and Akoko. The defeat and elimination of Ijaye by Ibadan in 1862 left Ibadan as the leading Yoruba state. But the imperial ambition of Ibadan soon provoked widespread reactions. Ibadan became embroiled in wars on several fronts, fighting against the Ijesa, Ekiti, Ilorin, and others in the north and against Ijebu and Egba to the south. These wars resulted in chaos and instability and a pervasive state of fear and insecurity that lasted until the end of the century.

The consequences of these crises were far-reaching. The wars resulted in massive population movement, the destruction and desertion of old towns, and the establishment of new ones. Intensive urbanization also resulted as refugees flocked together to establish major settlements and maximize the advantages of their numerical strength at a time when numbers were important to security and victory in war. Yoruba society became highly militarized; professional armies and warriors emerged. Slavery and the slave trade intensified as more hands were needed to serve as soldiers, farm hands, trade agents, wives, and followers and to enhance the power and prestige of the *ologun*, or war leaders. More Yoruba were also sold into the Atlantic slave trade now than at any other period before this time, and in greater number than that of any other African group during this period. Their large number as well as their late arrival ensured a dominant and permanent Yoruba cultural imprint in the New World of the Americas.

The endemic state of warfare and the perennial need for security gave preeminence to the military in politics. In the most important of the new towns, the monarchical institution characteristic of traditional Yoruba political system was discarded for new forms of government that evolved to cope with the exigencies of the time. In Ibadan, a republican system in which career was made open to talent was established. The new republic was dominated by a military oligarchy, in

which leadership was collective. Appointment of chiefs was not hereditary. Status was determined by the command of “men and means,” and new titles were created to reward brave warriors. The intense and dangerous rivalry for power among the ologun kept Ibadan in a state of turmoil and Yorubaland unstable for much of the century. In Ijaye, Kurunmi, the *are ona kakanfo* (commander) of the Oyo empire, after suppressing and eliminating all his rivals established a personal autocracy that brooked no rival until its demise at the hand of Ibadan in 1862. In Abeokuta and Oke Odan, a loose federal system in which power was shared among several quasi-autonomous communities and their notable war chiefs was established.

The state of crisis was further accentuated and complicated by pressures from outside the Yoruba country. Islam, a foreign religion whose advent well predated the nineteenth century, took advantage of the crises of this era to penetrate into much of Yorubaland. From the south, missionaries, made up of Europeans, Americans, and freed slaves (or recaptives) from Sierra Leone, brought Christianity. Beginning at Badagry in 1841, the Christian religion made successful inroads into southern and western Yorubaland by the end of the century. Similarly, from the north, the Nupe, now reinvigorated by their new dynasty of Fulani rulers, conquered the Okun-Yoruba, parts of Igbomina, and Ekiti. From the southeast, Benin’s army reached Otun-Ekiti in northeastern Yorubaland. From the west, the Dahomey army ravaged Ketu and Egbado and on several occasions (1851, 1864, 1873, and 1874) lay siege to Abeokuta. In addition to the efforts of its soldiers, Abeokuta’s successive victories were facilitated by the assistance it received from the British on the coast.

The need for raw materials such as cotton and palm oil to feed its industries and for markets to sell its manufactures had forced Britain to actively engage in the political economy of the West African coast. Determined to stimulate legitimate trade, open up the Yoruba country to civilizing missionary influence, and put an end to the slave trade (which had increased in Yorubaland in spite of the official abolition of the transatlantic slave trade), the British bombarded and conquered Lagos in 1851. Ten years later, Lagos became a crown colony of the British. Thereafter, tension over the control of the trade routes to the interior repeatedly brought the British into conflict with Ijebu, Egba, and Ibadan. In the meantime, the British became involved in the efforts to resolve the nearly century-old fratricidal civil wars in the Yoruba country. Stalemate and war-weariness among the combatants led to the success of British and Christian missionary diplomacy and the signing of a peace agreement in 1886. However, with the onset of the European “Scramble” for and partition of Africa, the British did

away with all pretense and in 1892 Ijebu was invaded and annexed. The lesson of this defeat was not lost on Abeokuta and Ibadan, both of which surrendered without a fight. Only New Oyo and Ilorin had to be compelled by force of arms to submit to the colonial forces. However, the memory of the stirring events of the nineteenth century and their consequences has continued to exercise a powerful influence on modern Yoruba historical consciousness, as well as on its intra- and intergroup relations and politics.

FUNSO AFOLAYAN


See also: **Ife, Oyo, Yoruba, Ancient: Kingship and Art.**

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Yusuf ibn Tashfin: Almoravid Empire: Maghrib: 1070–1147

After the death of their ideologue, Ibn Yasin, in 1059, the Almoravids ceased to be simply a reform movement bent on religious proselytism and gradually took the shape of a dynastic state. The loose ties that kept the movement together were replaced by new political alliances between the Almoravid leadership and subject groups, such as non-Sanhaja Berbers and Andalusian Muslims. The power structure of the nascent state was hierarchical; it contrasted greatly with the absence of a centralized authority and lack of tribal cohesion that characterized the formative period of the movement. Political power was monopolized by Lamtuna chiefs from whose ranks both rulers (known as *emirs*) and court dignitaries were selected. The title of *murabit* (Almoravid) was reserved for members of the three constituent communities of the movement: the Lamtuna, Guddala, and Massufa, who filled the



Almoravids, c. 1050–1147.

main administrative posts. The bottom echelons were occupied by tribes such as the Jazula and Lamta that, though grudgingly at first, had finally embraced the Almoravid reformist program. They formed the backbone of the army and were known as “the followers” (*al-hasham*).

The rise of Yusuf ibn Tashfin to political prominence was somehow fortuitous. While Abu Bakr bin 'Umar, nominal ruler, was busy trying to bring restive tribes in the south back to the fold, Yusuf had served as his deputy, actually in absolute charge of the territories north of the High Atlas. Aware that any attempt to oppose Yusuf's political ambitions would result in the fragmentation of the state, Abu Bakr decided to abdicate in favor of his protégé in 1072.

Most of the Almoravid conquests took place during Yusuf's reign (1061–1107). Marrakech, the new capital founded by Abu Bakr in 1070 because of its strategic location, constituted an ideal springboard for future campaigns in the north. Fez was taken in 1075 and the occupation of the Rif, the mountain range that runs parallel to the Mediterranean coast, was completed within less than a decade. Although Almoravid troops reached the mountains of Kabylia, the extent of their rule did not go beyond present-day Oran, in western Algeria. Ceuta, taken in 1083, served as the gateway to the annexation of the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Andalus).

Yusuf ibn Tashfin is favorably portrayed in Muslim sources. The fact that he abstained from adopting the title of *amir al-mu'minin* (XXXX, theoretically reserved for the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad), thus

avoiding a religious schism in Sunni Islam, enhanced his reputation among contemporary chroniclers as a pious and selfless ruler. The adoption of Malikism as the state legal doctrine was also one of Yusuf's main policies. At his behest, Maliki scholars were allocated official stipends and granted numerous privileges, such as access to his privy council. The monopoly exerted by Maliki jurists (*fuqaha'*) over legal matters is often regarded as a mixed blessing by later authors. The existence of an officially sponsored school of law helped homogenize legal proceedings in a vast geographical area that included Muslim Spain and North Africa. It gave too much power, however, to a single category of legal experts, thus opening the way to nepotism, abuse of office, and other pernicious practices commonly associated with corporate-like institutions. Reliance on a single legal code is blamed, moreover, for the “intellectual impoverishment” and rigidity that, according to most modern scholars, marked the Almoravid period. The excessive use of manuals of legal casuistry (*furu'*) and the subsequent neglect of the traditional sources of Islamic law (Qur'an and prophetic traditions), a propensity to follow existing legal precedents (*taqlid*) rather than exercise individual powers of jurisprudence (*ijtihad*), and, finally, the use of literal Qur'anic exegesis even when the latter might engender anthropomorphic views, are some of the most frequently mentioned signs of this alleged ideological decline.

The influence of Maliki jurists became even more overpowering during the reign of Yusuf's successor, 'Ali ibn Yusuf ibn Tashfin (1107–1143). Although his asceticism and piety are not in dispute, chroniclers are unanimous in their portrayal of this ruler as a well-meaning but cowardly monarch, unfortunate enough to be faced with the task of tackling three simultaneous dangers: the resurgence of the Christian kingdoms in Spain (a constant drain in terms of financial and military resources), the rebellion of Ibn Tumart from 1125 onward, and the increasing stranglehold of the Maliki establishment on the Almoravid state. The surge of military activity in Al-Andalus forced 'Ali ibn Yusuf to increase the amount of troops dispatched there and to impose dubious taxes on his Maghribi subjects. This latter measure caused considerable discontent and it was viewed as a betrayal of the Almoravid programme of abolishing non-Qur'anic taxes. To compound matters, military shortages in Morocco were offset by recruiting Christian mercenaries. This unpopular decision benefited the Almohads, Ibn Tumart's followers, as it confirmed their claims that the ruling elite no longer enjoyed religious legitimacy. Almohad pressure became ever more intense and the walls of Marrakesh had to be reinforced in 1129.

Among the criticisms against 'Ali ibn Yusuf's rule, none seems more damaging than his incapacity to rein

in the excesses of the Maliki legal establishment. Jurists took advantage of their position to extract more privileges and financial perks from the Almoravid court. Although anti-Maliki propaganda must be treated with caution, it seems certain that some judiciary-instigated measures such as the ban on Al-Ghazali's mystical works, the official clampdown on Sufi circles and, more generally, the endorsement of heavy fiscal policies caused widespread popular discontent.

'Ali ibn Yusuf spent most of the second half of his reign (from 1125 to his death in 1143) combating both the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula and the fledgling Almohad movement. A series of military setbacks in Spain weakened the Almoravid army. This, coupled with growing restiveness among the populace due to heavy taxation, explains his inability to subdue the Almohad rebels before they were numerically

superior. His two successors, Tashfin (1143–1145) and Ishaq (1145–1147), inherited a kingdom that would inevitably disappear.

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ-MANAS

See also: **'Abd Allah ibn Yasin: Almoravid: Sahara.**

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Zagwe Dynasty: *See Ethiopia:*
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Zaire: Politics, Regional

The country known today as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was christened the Republic of Zaire in 1971. In 1997, President Laurent Kabila changed it back to the DRC. From 1960 to 1971, Zaire had no independent foreign policy, as this was a period of pervasive international involvement in its domestic politics. After gaining power in November 1965, President Mobutu Sese Seko was able to consolidate the political authority of the new regime and to reduce external interference by projecting a nationalist and Pan-African image of his regime. Nonetheless, the country remained dependent on American and French goodwill to prevent bankruptcy during the Cold War, and this had a marked effect on Mobutu's regional policy orientation. In the early years of his presidency, he followed a fairly independent course of policy. Thus, he undertook his first major initiative in 1968 with the creation of the Union of States of Central Africa, which included the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Zaire. Under French pressures, the CAR later withdrew from the union; it would, however, maintain friendly ties with Zaire throughout Mobutu's presidency. Also, relations with Sudan were generally cordial. Mutual interest dictated cooperation for the purpose of controlling cross-border activities by various rebel groups along common borders.

The only western neighboring state with which relations were periodically troubled during Mobutu's presidency was Congo-Brazzaville, which had backed the 1964 rebellion in Zaire. After that, the situation between the two countries had fluctuated considerably. Ideological differences played a role in the often tense

relations as well, because Congo-Brazzaville claimed to be a Marxist state.

Mobutu's regional diplomacy with his eastern colleagues was more amicable. He always had good relations with Rwanda, except in 1967, when Zairean army units mutinied over the lack of pay. They were joined by foreign mercenaries and tried to bring down the Mobutu regime. Government troops succeeded in driving the rebels into Rwanda. Mobutu's request for their extradition was denied, leading to a break in diplomatic relations in January 1968. Relations were reestablished in February 1969 and were further strengthened in September 1976 when Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda joined Mobutu of Zaire and Michel Micombero of Burundi in forming the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).

Relations with Burundi also remained strong until November 1976, when Micombero was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Bagaza's personal dealings with Mobutu were always difficult. The overthrow of Bagaza in September 1987 by Major Pierre Buyoya led to improved Zaire-Burundi relations. The annual summit of the CEPGL in January 1988 provided a pretext for Mobutu to pay an official visit to Bujumbura, his first since the 1976 creation of the community. Mobutu often offered himself as a conciliator of conflicts among his eastern neighbors. He was instrumental in the establishment of a formal relationship between Idi Amin Dada of Uganda and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania after Amin had overthrown the administration of Milton Obote. The diplomatic situation between Tanzania and Zaire was generally good, but it became strained in the 1980s when Mobutu accused the Tanzanian government of harboring Zairian dissident guerillas who had attacked the city of Moba on Lake Tanganyika in 1984 and 1985.

Zaire encountered more problems with its southern neighbors, Zambia and Angola. Border disputes between

Zambia and Zaire as well as competition for markets for their principal exports, copper and cobalt, had caused occasional strains. The most difficult situation occurred during the Katanga invasions in 1977 and 1978, when the Front National for the Liberation of Congo guerrillas used the Zambian territory to attack southern Katanga. Tensions eased when it became evident that they did so without the consent of the Zambian government. Relations were also strained in 1983 and 1984 by a series of border clashes in southern Katanga involving smugglers and acts of banditry by hungry and unpaid soldiers. In 1985, the two governments responded with a joint commission to settle disputes and announced their intention to observe an agreement to prevent prices for cobalt from falling below certain levels. The two countries contained most of the known cobalt reserves in the free world before 1989.

The situation with Angola hadn't been cordial since the mid-1970s. After Zaire obtained its independence in June 1960, it supported Angolan independence movements and allowed many Angolan refugees to live in Western Zaire. Mobutu's subversive behavior toward Angola started when the Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola took control of Luanda in June 1975 and installed a Marxist regime, which received substantial Cuban and Soviet military support during the Cold War. However, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which were backed by the United States through Zaire and South Africa, continued a guerilla war against the Angolan government.

With the decline of Zaire's strategic importance at the end of the Cold War, Western willingness to overlook the Mobutu regime's record of economic mismanagement, corruption, and human-rights abuse was also on the wane. His mediating role in the Angolan civil war was increasingly viewed as irrelevant by all parties. Nonetheless, relations between Zaire and Angola remained hostile as Angola continued to accuse Mobutu of assisting UNITA's destabilizing efforts.

The post-Cold War era also changed Mobutu's role in eastern Africa. In early 1990s, his efforts to mediate between the Rwandan government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) met with little success. As hopes of a negotiated settlement waned, however, Mobutu's support for Habyarimana's embattled regime was maintained until Habyarimana was killed in an airplane crash in April 1994. A few months later, the RPF took power in Rwanda. The result was the outflow of more than 1.2 million Hutu refugees to Zaire, and among these were thousands of former soldiers who had been responsible of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Soon after crossing the borders, these soldiers began

launching armed attacks into Rwanda from bases in refugee camps, with the aim of making Rwanda ungovernable.

In September 1996 the RPF attacked the refugee camps and forced the repatriation of more than half a million Hutu back to Rwanda. Having gained partial control of its borders, the Rwandan government decided to help a coalition of Banyamulenge and other Zairean insurgents, called the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, to topple Mobutu. They were joined by Uganda and Angola. The coalition entered the capital city of Kinshasa in May 1997.

The involvement of Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda in toppling Mobutu was motivated by their desire to have a friendly government in Kinshasa capable of securing their borders with Zaire. In conclusion, the withdrawal of Zaire's two major patrons—the United States and France—after the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened Mobutu's regional position and precipitated his downfall.

KISANGANI EMIZET

See also: **Congo (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of/Zaire.**


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Zambia: Early Nineteenth Century: Survey

Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia, as the country was known during the colonial period, from 1890 to 1964) is roughly in the middle of Africa. It is a landlocked country with no direct access to either the east or west coasts. In the early nineteenth century the country had very limited contacts with Europeans because of its geographical location. The country also had very limited contacts with the Arab and Muslim world. Zambia therefore was largely influenced in its early social, economic, and political developments by African peoples who migrated into the region during this period. Indeed, the lasting influences were those engineered by the peoples associated with Bantu migrations.

The influences that shaped Zambia's future were therefore largely demographic. The early migrants spread into the area now encompassing Zambia and introduced new economic, political, and cultural systems. These newcomers also spread chieftainships. In the area of economy, the country developed strong links with the east-west trade routes across the continent that developed into the long distance trade.



Zambia.

The nineteenth-century history of Zambia was shaped by its geography and its river system. To the south Zambia is bounded by the Zambezi River, which forms the boundary between Zambia and Zimbabwe, and to the northwest, the Zambezi River forms the boundary with Angola in some places. To the east, Zambia is bounded by the highlands that run along the west coast of Lake Malawi, while to the north the country continues to be bounded by the continuation of the same highlands between Lake Malawi and lake Tanganyika. During the nineteenth century these geographic features provide security for the local people against invaders, much as they proved to be obstacles for the movement of the people and traders from outside the region.

Most of the people in nineteenth-century Zambia originated from the Congo, under the Bantu migrations. As a result of this, as early as the nineteenth century the people of Zambia displayed a great deal of cultural uniformity, speaking the same Bantu languages, possessing shared knowledge of the use of iron, and practicing some form of agriculture. There were three main groups of people during this early period: the southern Tonga and Ila, who were cattle keepers and traced their descent matrilineally; the northeastern cattle-keeping Mambwe, Iwa, and Namwanga, who traced their descent patrilineally; and the the Congolese Bemba, Bisa, Lamba, and Kaonde, who practiced matrilineal records of descent.

During the early nineteenth century the political organization of the Zambian people varied. Some, like the Tonga, did not have chiefs. Even in those societies

where there were chiefs, their status differed from one community to another. Some were only respected as ritual leaders with little real political authority, let alone military power. In other tribes the chiefs had real political power, and in others they combined political and military power. This diversity affected the way in which Zambian tribes responded to European intrusion in the country in the late nineteenth century.

The early nineteenth century in Zambia witnessed wave after wave of interference and invasion. The result was that traditional civilizations were either damaged or submerged in the rising tide of newcomers. The end of the eighteenth century in many respects signified the end of a great period in the history of Africa. It was the end of centuries of Iron Age growth, during which period most peoples of Zambia were little touched by outside political and economic developments. The start of the nineteenth century was characterized by events that were to forever revolutionize the entire region, including Zambia.

One of the major revolutionary changes after the early Bantu migrations was the invasion from the south. In 1818, some 2,000 miles away in southeastern Africa two groups of the Ngoni people, the Mutetwa and Ndwandwe, fought each other in one of the decisive battles that were to affect Zambia's early nineteenth century history. The events in South Africa during this period sent the Ngoni and other groups north in search of refuge. In 1835 the Ngoni, led by Zwangendaba, crossed the Zambezi River in to Zambia and caused a great deal of havoc, defeating local people along the way and taking men as soldiers and women as wives. The impact of the Ngoni invasion was felt in a wide area of Zambia, from the south to the northern border with Tanzania, before the Ngoni finally settled in the eastern province of Zambia.

In the west, the Lozi kingdom was strong and prosperous at the center, but was quite fragile at its edges. This made its ruler, Lewanika, grow increasingly anxious about the potential threats to his kingdom from the Portuguese in the west and the Ndebele in the south. His fears were worsened by warring internal factions, which led to increased instability. In response to such threats, Lewanika was forced to sign a concessionary treaty with the British South Africa Company in 1890.

Meanwhile, in the south, because no centralized kingdom existed, the Tonga and Ila were frequently raided as sources of slaves and cattle by outside peoples. The raiders included the Lozi from the west, the Ndebele from the south across the Zambezi River, and the Portuguese Chikunda from around Chirundu and the Kafue confluence with the Zambezi, who traded in slaves. In Central Zambia the Lenje showed a remarkable political unity and strength. They were generally

involved in trade with the Swahili from the northeast, the Mbari from the west, and the Chikunda from the south.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Zambia was characterized by interaction and external influences. External actors connected with long-distance trade became active in the interior, causing some kingdoms to decline. Nineteenth-century Zambia was marked by constant change resulting from both internal and external forces.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo; Tonga, Ila, and Cattle.

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Zambia: Long-Distance Trade, Nineteenth Century

Jan Vansina (1962) has identified three types of trade in precolonial Africa. The first of these was local trade, which was conducted by people living within easy reach of one another; this trade was conducted in local markets, from village to village catering for goods from local industry. The second type of trade is what Vansina termed "regional trade"; it was conducted over greater distances either among culturally different peoples within a single state, or among neighboring peoples. Regional trade was conducted at marketplaces located closer to the borders of the trading peoples or at the capitals of the states involved in the trade. The third type of trade that Vansina identified is long-distance trade.

In order to appreciate the nature and character of long-distance trade, it is necessary to examine the development of local trade. It used to be supposed that trade in Africa only began when gold, ivory, and slaves were exported out of Africa. Yet on closer examination it becomes clear that these items were only the most glamorous—and horrific—results of the economic interaction between African societies on the one hand and between Africa and the outside world on the other. Local trade was centered on items that met everyday

needs, such as foodstuffs, metalwork, pottery, and clothing. Although there was no money involved in the exchange of goods, items like wire, copper crosses, beads and cloth were sometimes used as currency because they were in general demand.

There were no permanently established markets for local trade, but chiefs' palaces sometimes served as centers where redistribution of goods took place. The process assisted chiefs in that they were able to enhance their power and authority over their people. This local trade determined the capacity of Zambian precolonial nineteenth-century societies to participate in long distance trade. As a result of the patterns of the local exchange and industry, trade routes were shaped and sustained between the African interior and the coast. While the growth of coastal trade stimulated the production of goods that were consumed within African communities, it also stimulated growth of goods produced for export overseas. Early European visitors like the missionary David Livingstone left behind vivid descriptions of the kind of trade that they found taking place in Africa.

Long distance trade was unknown in Central Africa before the arrival of Europeans. It only became a common feature in nineteenth-century Zambia. Long-distance trade was direct trade, and consisted mainly of European goods. Several other items, including slaves and iron, featured prominently in this early form of exchange between communities in the region. By 1840, the Luvale of northwestern Zambia were busy exchanging slaves for guns with the Mbundu of Bihe. Sibetwane of the Kololo, who had settled in the Upper Zambezi, maximized his trading fortunes from there. During much of the nineteenth century the economic life of Zambian societies were affected by trade in ivory and slaves. Starting in 1852, for two decades traders from Angola known as the Mambari constantly visited Barotseland selling guns and cloth for ivory and a few slaves from the Kololo.

By 1800 Zambia had been drawn into the trading systems of the Nyamwezi from Tanzania and the Arabs on Zanzibar Island and the east coast. The Nyamwezi had reached as far as the Katanga copper mines. In 1855 a Nyamwezi caravan reached Kazembe's capital. Another important Arab trader was Msiri who was active in northern Zambia. These traders changed the focus of long distance trade.

Some long-distance traders defeated local chiefs to enhance their trading activities in nineteenth-century Zambia. For example, in 1867 Tippu Tip defeated the Tabwa to ensure a monopoly on ivory trade. The presence of Arab long-distance trade had a destabilizing influence. Some local people formed alliances with Arab traders for support in their succession disputes. A good example is the 1872 case of a Lunda prince

who sought Arab support in his quest to displace the Kazembe; he succeeded in taking over the kingship with the help of Arab traders. The process amounted to a revolution in the Kazembe kingdom. Since then Lunda princes are closely guarded at the capital and are denied political office.

Long-distance trade covered a large area of part of colonial Zambia that was also part of the Luba Lomani empire. Luba Lomani was the largest of the Luba kingdoms that were founded by Kongolo and Kalala Ilunga. With the help of long-distance trade, the kingdom expanded to the land of the Bisa and linked the trade through them to east coast. This trade was well established by 1780. As the trade increased, goods were also transported from the west coast through Luanda. By 1800 the Bisa began to extend their trade beyond Kazembe with whom they had begun to trade about 1760. They are believed to have conducted trade in ivory and slaves.

It is generally believed that the establishment of Kazembe Kingdom and the introduction of long-distance trade goods stimulated the traditional economy. This in turn strengthened subregional specialization in trade goods for communities in precolonial Zambia, which participated in the long-distance trade. The Lamba, for example, specialized in iron working and this enhanced their involvement in long-distance trade. Their experience in regional trade made it easier for them to participate in long-distance trade. The Ushi of present day Luapula Province specialized in making iron and copper weapons. This gave them advantages over other societies that took part in long-distance trade.

The Shila and Tabwa who lived around Lake Mwelu specialized in making salt. Through these commodities, Luba Lomani was linked with the Kazembe kingdom through several trade routes. Copper crosses that were made in the Kazembe kingdom were used as a currency in Luba Lomani. Consequently, every year Luba Lomani traders traveled long distances to Kazembe country to purchase copper crosses. During the period of the Luba Lomani expansion the pace of long-distance trade increased as new trading groups came on the scene. They included the Nyamwezi, who are believed to have reached Kazembe Kingdom around the second or third decades of the nineteenth century. They were followed by Arabs.

The growth of long-distance trade in precolonial Zambia facilitated the growth and expansion of some kingdoms while others were defeated. Msiri was the first long-distance trader to seize political power in about 1860 in the tributary copper state of the Katanga and Mpande. He established a direct trade route with both the east and the west coasts, and in the process he increased his political power. Long-distance trade was

major contributing factor to the coming of foreign rule in Zambia.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Msiri: Yeke Kingdom.

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Zambia: Ngoni Incursion from the South

The Ngoni migrated North from South Africa in the early nineteenth century. These migrations introduced new state systems unlike those from the Luba and Lunda in the early period. The Ngoni were a product of the rise of Shaka of the Zulu people in South Africa. Their history began about 1818 when the Zulu, led by Shaka, defeated the Ndandwe of Zwide. A group of the Jere people led by Zwangendaba fled from Natal and later became known as the Ngoni. On their long migration to the north they brought with them their newly developed social and political systems. The rise of the Ngoni state in Zambian precolonial history was a quick one.

From Natal the Ngoni briefly settled in southern Mozambique, but they were forced to move on because the area was already occupied by Shoshangane, who had earlier fled from Shaka. Zwangendaba led his people through Rhodesia where he did not settle, although the area was rich in cattle. He took his people northward and crossed the Zambezi near Zumbo on November 19, 1835.

After crossing the Zambezi, the Ngoni settled among the Nsenga of Petauke, whom they defeated, taking their women for wives. The Ngoni completely changed the way of life of the Nsenga people and disturbed their trade. By 1840, Zwangendaba decided to move farther north into the Malawi and Tanzania territories, finally settling in Fipa country. Zwangendaba died in 1845 while the Ngoni were in Fipa country. After his death, the Ngoni state began to break up over succession disputes. This division reflected the lack of a clear successor to Zwangendaba. Two of Zwangendaba's sons, Mpezeni and Mbelwa, struggled for the leadership of the Ngoni after the death of their father. Because at the time of his death the two were both too

young to take over, a period of regency was required and struggle resulted from the supporters of Mpezeni and Mbelwa. This resulted into a split of the state. The Mbelwa group went into Bemba country and the Bemba wars started. The two Ngoni groups never united again.

When Mpezeni was old enough he led his people southward, first settling in northern Malawi. From here Mpezeni's Ngoni made frequent raids into the lands of the Tumbuka and Senga people in Lundazi, who were forced to accept a type of tributary status to Ngoni *indunas*. Mpezeni's final settlement area, after unsuccessfully failing to defeat the Bemba, was Chipata.

Mpezeni passed through the Mpika and Serenje districts and finally settled in Nsenga country, where his father had settled 30 years earlier. Mpezeni and his people assimilated large numbers of Nsenga people, a process that almost led to the extinction of the Nsenga people. At the same time, Mpezeni's continued raid of the Chewa, led by Undi, virtually led to the collapse of Undi's kingdom. Undi was never really defeated and in the 1870s, Mpezeni finally moved his people to their final destination in Chipata. It was in the Chipata area that the Ngoni came in direct contact with Europeans, who actually halted Mpezeni's raids of the surrounding people.

The Ngoni raids brought them into direct contact with the Chikunda, Arab or Swahili slave caravans. Since these were well armed, Mpezeni avoid conflict with them and entered into trade relations instead. It was the Europeans who were to change the history of the Ngoni in the 1890s; this was a period when European explorers were consolidating territorial claims on behalf of their European countries through treaties.

The region, which is today the Eastern Province of Zambia, was part of what was initially known as Northeastern Rhodesia. Before that, the area was also known as East Luangwa District and covered part of what is today the Northern Province. A German trader named Carl Wiese led to its establishment as a colonial entity following his 1892 visit to the paramount chief of the Ngoni, Mpezeni. During the visit, Wiese is believed to have won Mpezeni's friendship and trust. He therefore obtained from Mpezeni a concession whose terms were vague. Nonetheless, the concession was the basis for the North Charterland Exploration Company's (NCEC's) claim of the whole region.

However, the NCEC was not yet in control of the territory and could not administer the territory without Mpezeni's consent. This notwithstanding, an administrative station was established at Chinunda (Old Fort Jameson) and a Mr. Moringham was appointed by the company in charge of the post. His administration

was ineffective because the administrative post was outside Ngoni territory. However, with the permission of Mpezeni, the NCEC established their headquarters at Fort Young. Despite Mpezeni's permission, the NCEC were nervous, believing the Ngoni would attack the station. Residents of Fort Young applied to the Nyasaland Protectorate for an armed force. The response was immediate: the protectorate administration at Zomba dispatched troops to Fort Young.

The Ngoni were caught unprepared for the impending attack. They were preparing for the Ncwala ceremony, which was interpreted as preparation for war by the residents of Fort Young. The Ngoni became uneasy with the arrival of troops at Fort Young. Mpezeni's eldest son, Nsingu, became aggressive and began preparation for war. The troops attacked the Ngoni in January 1898. The Ngoni were defeated very quickly and lost almost all their cattle, which were taken as booty. Nsingu was captured and executed. This suppression of the Ngoni paved the way for the actual occupation of the territory by the NCEC administration. An administrative station was built at Chimpinga, close to the site of Mpezeni's village, and was placed under a collector who was charged with the responsibility of enforcing the NCEC's control of the region. To prevent any trouble in the future, a military station was also established on the protectorate's border, from which Mpezeni was banished for a year.

After the defeat of the Ngoni by the Europeans they remained under European rule, and this effectively brought colonial rule to the area. It is in this respect that it is argued that colonial rule in Northeastern Rhodesia was brought through defeat and not by peaceful agreement, as was the case in Northwestern Rhodesia. Today the paramount chief of the Ngoni plays an important role in the politics of the Eastern Province. The Ngoni are the sixth largest ethnic group in Zambia.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): British Occupation, Resistance: 1890s.

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Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): British Occupation, Resistance: 1890s

British occupation of Zambia was preceded by the activities of European explorers, hunters, traders, and missionaries. George Westbeech is believed to have been one of the leading white traders who contributed to the founding of the country. He established himself at Pandamatenka, south of Victoria Falls. It is believed that between 1871 and 1876 he exported 30,000 pounds of ivory.

Further, it is surmised that Westbeech introduced the missionaries Francois Coillard and F. C. Arnot to the Lozi chief Lewanika. Another who had great influence in the opening up of Central Africa to other Europeans was the Scottish missionary David Livingstone. In 1851 he crossed the Zambezi River, and by arrangement with a hunter, William Oswel, he reached Bulozhi, where he established friendship with the Kololo chief Sebetwane. At the time he decided to concentrate his work on the area north of the Zambezi, making three exploratory journeys into the area between 1851 and 1873; his main aim was to explore the area for later missionary work. It is in this respect that Livingstone is acknowledged to have been more successful as a writer and scientific observer than a missionary. After his death in 1873 at Chitambo in the Bisa area, those who followed in his footsteps put his ideas into practice.

Lewanika's land was brought under colonial rule through the work of concession seekers. In 1889 Henry Ware obtained a concession that he later sold; it was eventually bought by Cecil Rhodes. In 1890 Rhodes sent his agent to obtain the Lochner Concession, which effectively brought Lewanika's kingdom under the domain of the British South Africa Company (BSAC).

While Livingstone was conducting his journeys, the Plymouth Brethren missionary F. S. Arnot was also carrying out his explorations among the Yeke under Chief Msili. Just as Lewanika was impressed by the medical skills of Livingstone, Msili was impressed by the medical skills of Arnot. The Plymouth Brethren Mission therefore established itself in Lake Mwelu area. Another missionary society that established itself during this period was the London Missionary Society. These missionary activities were taking place at a time when European governments were not formally interested in the area.

However, toward the end of the nineteenth century, European powers abandoned the concept of informal empire and formally partitioned Africa into a number of colonial states. It was during this period that the

cluster of various tribes in Northern Rhodesia, each with its own history, were brought under one overall authority and the territory became British. British people in South Africa, through the BSAC, gained control of the territory by way of treaties. The BSAC's charter was signed on October 29, 1889, and its field of operation was vaguely defined as "the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions."

Lewanika wanted British protection from both his internal and external adversaries. Chief Khama of the Bamangwato, who had sought and obtained British protection in 1883, largely influenced him in this decision. This wish from protection led Lewanika to sign treaties with the British. In June 1890 he signed the Lochner Concession, which eventually made it possible for the BSAC to acquire Northern Rhodesia. In 1900 the Coryndon Treaty was signed and this, together with previous treaties, was responsible for directly bringing the British government into the affairs of the territory. This marked the beginning of British imperial influence in Buloziland and much of what was known as Northwestern Rhodesia. Colonial occupation of Northwestern Rhodesia was peaceful.

That of Northeastern Rhodesia, however, was not. It was characterized by a number of bloody wars because of resistance from the local people in the area. Apart from this, malaria also frustrated attempts in 1890 and 1892 to set up administrative posts at Chiengi, northwest of Lake Mwelu, and on the Kalungwishi River. Consequently, from 1895 on, Northeastern Rhodesia was administered from Zomba in Nyasaland. The first British administrator was Patrick Forbes, who was succeeded by Robert Codrington.

In the meantime, the Ngoni, Bemba, and Swahili continued to resist colonial occupation. The deployment of British armed forces was necessary to establish colonial rule in the areas they populated. The Bemba gave in more easily than expected after several skirmishes and negotiations. The Ngoni, to the southeast, put up a more determined fight; their warriors were led by Nsingo, Mpezeni's son. Fighting between the Ngoni and the British began in December 1897. Thousands of Ngoni warriors armed with spears proved ineffective against the British soldiers, armed as they were with guns. The resisting Ngoni were brutally subdued, and by January 25, 1898, when Mpezeni's palace was captured, several Ngoni villages had been burned down. Nsingo was tried by a British court-martial. He was found guilty and was executed in front of his warriors. As further punishment, Ngoni herds were taken as loot to cover the expenses of the war. Mpezeni was imprisoned, although he was later released. The defeat of the Ngoni was significant because it allowed the establishment of

the capital of Northeastern Rhodesia, which was named Fort Jameson.

Having defeated the people of Northeastern Rhodesia, the British government went ahead to establish actual colonial administration of the territory. As the founders were motivated by external designs, they did not observe any political, economic or social systems as had existed prior to the creation of Northern Rhodesia. Consequently, tribes were split into two or even three by artificial boundaries, which were demarcated to separate one colonial state from another.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Lewanika I, the Lozi and the BSA Company; Msiri: Yeke Kingdom.

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Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Colonial Period: Administration, Economy

Northern Rhodesia was occupied by Britain during the late nineteenth-century “Scramble” for Africa. The initial inroads were made in Barotseland, through the 1890 Barotse Concession to Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC), ostensibly as a representative of Queen Victoria. Through a series of dubious treaties by BSAC representatives, the company gained the rest of Northern Rhodesia by the end of 1891. Although other European powers had by the end of 1891 recognized the BSAC’s right to occupy and exploit areas north of the Zambezi River, actual occupation was slow and at times violent. At the request of the BSAC, Northern Rhodesia was split into Northeastern Rhodesia and Northwestern Rhodesia. They were linked to the outside world by different routes and had different origins. From its inception, Northern Rhodesia was conceived as a tropical dependency and not a settler colony.

The imperial government assumed greater powers in Northwestern Rhodesia than it did in Northeastern

Rhodesia. This was reflected through the government’s control over the appointment of the administrator and his officials. These were appointed by the high commissioner at the BSAC’s recommendation and not by the BSAC. By contrast, however, Northeastern Rhodesia was directly under an administrator and officials appointed by the BSAC, only subject to approval by the secretary of state. While the administrator of Northeastern Rhodesia could legislate subject to the approval of the commissioner of British Central Africa, his counterpart needed the assent of the high commissioner of South Africa before he could act. In either case, however, the secretary of state retained the right to disallow all legislation while ensuring certain safeguards for Africans. Here we see the idea of the trusteeship policy already in place, though not clearly conceptualized.

Arguably, therefore, the imperial government had considerable powers on paper and in theory. Yet in practice, the imperial government exerted very limited influence. Consequently, the elaborate constitutional differences between Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia proved to be of little value. This was largely because there was no close supervision on the ground since the imperial government did not have any officer in Northern Rhodesia until 1911. Furthermore, there was no staff in either Zomba or Pretoria to deal specifically with the affairs of Northern Rhodesia.

Thus, in both Northeastern Rhodesia and Northwestern Rhodesia, the imperial government relied entirely on information supplied by its commissioners, who themselves were preoccupied with the affairs of South Africa and Nyasaland. Decisions were therefore based on reports submitted by the BSAC administrators.

Northern Rhodesia was officially created in 1911, when the separate administrations of Northwestern Rhodesia and Northeastern Rhodesia, first divided by the Kafue River and then by the rail line, were amalgamated by the BSAC to economize. In that year a resident commissioner who was answerable to the high commissioner was appointed. The territory was controlled from Livingstone, near Victoria Falls. The BSAC ruled the vast region with financial support from Cecil Rhodes. However, its powers in Northern Rhodesia were in theory limited because of the negative effects of the Jameson Raid. The Colonial Office felt that it was not advisable to strengthen the company’s hand in Northern Rhodesia. In practice, the BSAC local administrator was left with a great deal of independence. This was in part due to the fact that the board of directors in London left much of the administrative work to their administrators. The directors were more concerned with commercial matters and issues affecting the BSAC’s land and mineral rights. For almost three decades,

therefore, the BSAC, through its man on the spot, ruled Northern Rhodesia for the British Crown.

Initially, the BSAC had little interest in Northern Rhodesia. Despite the company's encouragement to settle white farmers in the territory, it was never envisaged that Northern Rhodesia would develop into a white colony in the same way as in Kenya, where European settlement was adopted as an official colonial policy as early as 1902. Nonetheless, between 1904 and 1911 a total of 159 farms had been established between Kalomo in the south and Broken Hill (Kabwe) in the north. Yet, Northern Rhodesia's original role was to serve as a labor reserve for the developing white areas of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa at least up to the mid-1920s (Henderson 1974).

The BSAC faced financial problems during much of its administration of the territory. To address this problem it introduced a "hut tax" in 1900 and 1904 in Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia, respectively. Initially, Africans resisted paying; but because the company involved chiefs in the enforcement and collection of tax, a considerable number of people paid their taxes regularly. It should be pointed out, however, that there existed much coercion in the collection of tax.

By the 1920s Northern Rhodesia's position began to shift from that of a purely black colony like British colonies in West Africa to the uncomfortable middle position of a multiracial colony. It was in this respect that the development of the mining industry led to significant political and administrative changes in Northern Rhodesia. Mining, therefore, became the backbone of Northern Rhodesia's social, economic, and political development.

Northern Rhodesia did not have as much gold as Southern Rhodesia. Instead, it had copper, which was not as valuable, but was soon to become an indispensable raw material in the electrical industry. By 1906 mining was already the most important export industry of the country. Initially, the availability of African cheap labor made mining less expensive. Inexperienced Africans could perform much of the work. Most Africans worked for short periods to earn enough money with which to pay their taxes. Consequently, African labor remained, for the most part, unskilled and marked by low productivity.

Although mining in Northern Rhodesia had started at Broken Hill around the turn of the century and by 1906 minerals had become the colony's chief export, copper production started slowly and only picked up after 1924. The growth of the mining industry coincided with the development of the railway from the south to the north. By 1906 the railway had reached Broken Hill; it linked with the Belgian Congo railway system in 1909. Besides improving mining prospects,

the railway also helped in the development of agriculture in the colony. As a result, an increasing number of white immigrants set up farms on land alongside the line of rail.

The discovery of large quantities of copper sulphide ores in 1925 at Ndola in the area just to the south of the Belgian Congo border and the rise in copper prices in the 1920s made investment in the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia economically feasible. Large mining companies were attracted to the area, which developed into Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt.

Africans near the mines preferred to sell grain to raise tax money instead of working in the mines. To assist the mines acquire the much needed African labor, in 1909 taxation was raised from 5s to 10s in the Copperbelt area. Thus, political pressure instead of economic incentives was used to force Africans into wage labor in the mines and elsewhere. Because the system never really benefited Africans, shortage of African labor was a major constraint in the early years.

The demand for skilled and semiskilled labor, with competition from neighboring mines, led to labor stabilization in the Copperbelt. J. W. Davidson (1967) estimates that about 30,000 Africans worked in the mines in 1930. The urbanization process had begun. Women and children were part of the Copperbelt population.

With insufficient white workers in Northern Rhodesia during this period, some African workers had better opportunities in skilled and clerical work than was the case in the countries to the south. African participation on the labor market, both in the mines and in the clerical ranks of the civil service, led to the eventual emergence of a small elite with the education to understand modern political methods, and ready to take a lead in the development of modern African nationalism.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Livingstone, David; Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Copperbelt.

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Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Copperbelt

The Copperbelt's arrival on the international mining scene in the 1920s was facilitated by the growth of the electrical industry and the technical breakthrough of the flotation process (1911), which enabled the relatively low-grade, sulphide ores located in most Copperbelt mines to be refined cheaply. The high development costs involved created a mining system similar to that of the Rand: two large companies, the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) and Rhodesian (later Roan) Selection Trust, invested sizable amounts of capital, operating several workings and employing a small skilled (white) labor force supervising a large number of unskilled (black) laborers. However, no sooner had the Copperbelt reached full production than the Great Depression caused a collapse in prices, forcing two mines (Nchanga and Mufulira) to close and the laying off of 80 per cent of the black workers.

Although the industry recovered in the later 1930s, black wage levels, reduced in the Depression years, remained low, and helped to contribute to a growing worker consciousness, exemplified in the 1935 and 1940 strikes. In response, white workers, many originally from South Africa, formed their own (Northern Rhodesia) Mineworkers' Union, which the mining companies recognized in 1937. World War II underlined the importance of the Copperbelt as the empire's main producer of a strategically vital metal, and gave the union the opportunity to secure a virtual "closed shop" for its (exclusively white) members, formalized in 1946, and underwritten by a commitment to "the rate for the job." White miners won a de facto system of job reservation that kept Africans out of all skilled and semiskilled jobs, and showed their determination to safeguard this by rejecting all suggestions for African advancement, however gradual.

Following instructions from the government of Clement Attlee, the Lusaka authorities announced in November 1946 that they would help black workers form unions. While in part a reaction to white worker racism, it was more fundamentally an attempt to divert black worker activism away from political channels. The Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Union (AMU), led by Lawrence Katilungu, was set up in 1949 with 19,000 members, and quickly established a pattern that was to be followed up to independence and beyond: pressing the mining companies to release an ever-widening range of jobs to black workers, securing steady increases in pay for all its members, but keeping

out of the political arena. The AMU won several victories, including the progressive dismantling of "job reservation" from 1955 onward, the opening up of apprenticeships to all races (1959), and the ending of the European workers' closed shop in 1963. Unskilled workers also benefited from a steady increase in basic wages, obtained through the measured use of strike action and negotiation, to the point that by 1960, they were significantly higher than those prevailing in the South African mining industry.

The buoyant postwar economy (with the additional boost of the Korean War) enabled the companies to deliver higher wages to both black and white workers, and to open up new mines to supplement the original "big four" (Nkana, Roan Antelope, Mufulira, and Nchanga). Prices dropped by more than half in 1957–1958 (from a £437 per ton peak), but the Vietnam War renewed demand, and the Copperbelt reached its record output (756,000 tons) in 1970. The African union, now the Zambia Mineworkers' Union, continued to win successive pay increases, and was now sufficiently powerful to withstand the ruling party's attempt to install its nominees within the union structure (1965–1966). However, there were already signs of strain in the industry as a whole: production costs were significantly higher than the world average, as a result of high wage levels and transportation costs, aggravated by the effect of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

As part of its move toward state ownership, the government of Kenneth Kaunda secured a 51 per cent stake in the two main mining groups in 1970, and signed a management and sales contract with them (it terminated in 1975). Finally, in 1982, control of the whole industry was vested in one large parastatal concern, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), with 60 per cent state share ownership. Nationalization took place in times of mounting difficulty for the industry, beset by extreme price fluctuations in the international market, increasing costs as older mines began to run out, and ever-mounting wage bills. The situation was worsened by the government's habit of treating ZCCM as an apparently limitless source of funds for social expenditure in the country as a whole, to the extent that ZCCM was starved of capital to explore and develop new prospects: by the mid-1990s it had a debt of about \$800 million (U.S.).

Meanwhile, a more direct attempt to curb union power was answered by the Copperbelt strike of 1980, which helped to launch the political career of trade union leader Frederick Chiluba, who was to displace Kaunda in the first multiparty election of 1991. By this stage, the industry, like Zambia itself, had reached crisis point, with annual production down to 300,000 tons and some mines operating at a loss. The setting in place of arrangements for a phased privatization of

state enterprises became a precondition for foreign donor aid to rescue the Zambian economy, which led to the Chiluba government's approval in principle for ZCCM privatization in 1996. Implementation was delayed for four years as both sides, government and potential investors, tried to get the best deal. Finally, in March 2000, the AAC group returned, at the head of a consortium, Konkola Copper Mines, which undertook to make a substantial investment at Konkola Deep, and provide Zambia with an estimated 30 years' supply of copper; another international group, Mopani Cooper Mines, took over other mines. This restructuring was accompanied by another feature of denationalization, the large-scale shedding of labor, organized in conjunction with the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (as it was now called), and funded by the World Bank. Prospects for the Copperbelt now seem brighter, but privatization has created new problems, preeminently massive unemployment.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Mining.**

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Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Mineworkers' Strikes: 1935, 1940

Black mineworkers on the Zambian Copperbelt took industrial action in the form of strikes in May 1935 and again in March 1940. It was met with an official resistance that resulted in loss of life and injury at Roan Antelope (Luanshya) in 1935 (with 6 killed, 22 wounded) and Nkana in 1940 (with 13 killed, 71 wounded, of whom 4 died later). The 1935 and 1940 strikes, taking place in what was then the periphery of the southern African industrial system, formed an important landmark in imperial labor history. They also contributed to a growing awareness of colonial issues in Britain that ultimately led to the postwar Labour Party government

placing emphasis on the economic and social advancement of the African colonies.

The Copperbelt mines (Nkana, Mufulira, Roan Antelope, and Nchanga) developed at spectacular speed from 1926 on. By September 1930, nearly 32,000 black workers were employed on all mining operations in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), with the overwhelming majority at these four mines. The Bemba, from Zambia's Northern Province, made up the largest contingent of the workforce, and were to provide much of the leadership in both strikes. The concentration of so many miners working for common employers in what amounted to "company towns" and the previous industrial experience of a substantial part of that labor force in other territories such as Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa, and the Belgian Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo) led to an equally spectacular growth of a worker consciousness, culminating in an embryonic trade union leadership that, prior to the 1940 strike, put forward wage demands on behalf of fellow workers.

Sudden changes in economic circumstances provided the spark that led to strike action. In 1935, it was the government decision to raise the level of "native tax" on the Copperbelt from 12s 6d to 15s per annum. The 1940 strike was caused by the failure of wage levels to match wartime price inflation, influenced by the success gained by white miners in their own industrial action earlier that month.

But beneath these immediate causes lay deeper, more structural factors. First, the steep differentials between white and black mineworkers, with the lowest-paid white worker earning £1 per shift in 1940, and black underground workers starting at 22s 6d per ticket (= 30 shifts, equivalent to six weeks' work), just prior to the 1940 strike, was a key factor. Second, the steady imposition of a de facto industrial color bar that progressively shut black mineworkers out of skilled and many semiskilled jobs effectively reserved for whites played a role. By the end of World War II, the Copperbelt had developed many of the racially restrictive employment practices of the South African Rand. Third, there was the stagnation of basic wage levels for black workers, even after the postdepression recovery: the 2s 6d per ticket cost of living increase conceded by the mining companies just prior to the 1940 strike was the first increase to black pay scales since 1932. Fourth, working conditions in the mainly underground Copperbelt mines were appalling, with high incidence of silica-based diseases. Living conditions for single men were cramped, very basic, and uncomfortable. Finally, physical abuse took place both in the workplace and the mine compounds; one instance, reported by the Russell Commission appointed after

the 1935 strike, involved a compound manager who habitually "boxed" Africans' ears.

As a strike notice posted at Nkana put it,

Know how they cause us to suffer, they cheat us for money, they arrest us for loafing, they persecute us and put us in gaol for tax. . . . See how we suffer with the work and how we are continually reviled and beaten underground. Many brothers of us die for 22s 6d, is this money that we should lose our lives for?

The colonial state chose to highlight a cause that it believed was central to the 1935 strike: the assumed "detrribalization" of black workers who had been permitted to live for long unbroken periods in urban areas. Influenced by contemporary social anthropologists and the practice of "indirect rule" in British tropical Africa, government officials called for the compulsory repatriation of mineworkers every 18 to 24 months to prevent what they perceived to be the breakdown of wholesome and necessary tribal sanctions that included, preeminently, the authority of chiefs as traditional leaders over the younger generation of migrant laborers. They contended that unless such remedial action was taken, the 1935 strike was likely to be the first in a mounting wave of unrest, with the certainty of further violence.

However, the government's stance was dictated by other, less altruistic, considerations: a desire to improve tax collections in rural areas; the fear that a large stabilized urban population might be infected by the type of industrial activism that had been a feature of South African life in the 1920s; and the determination, shared by mining company officials, that the bulk of black social welfare costs should be borne by the "tribal system," not the modern sector. The government's hostility to black labor stabilization effectively led to its abdication from its possible role as an agent of social and economic improvement until after World War II, when indirect rule policies were eventually abandoned. By this stage, white mineworkers had taken advantage of the war situation to build up a position of considerable privilege within the industry, frustrating attempts to secure African advancement until the later 1950s.

Although the 1935 and 1940 strikes failed, they were harbingers of future industrial activism in the 1950s and 1960s, when the African Mineworkers' Union, led by Lawrence Katilungu and John Chisata, won significant reward for their members. By the time Zambia won its independence in 1964, they had become some of the most highly paid black industrial workers in the entire continent.

MURRAY STEELE

See also: **Labor, Migrant; Mining.**

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Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation, 1953–1963

The Central African Federation, also known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was a semiautonomous British dependency created in October 1953 amid African opposition. It came into being after many years of campaigning by Europeans in the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Nyasaland (Malawi). Settlers in Southern Rhodesia were attracted by the copper wealth of the north, while settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland sought increased security by associating with the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia, Sir Roy Welensky was the key player, while in Southern Rhodesia Godfrey Huggins was the major player in the establishment of the federation.

The federation was ruled through an act passed by the British Parliament in May 1953 and approved by Queen Elizabeth I on August 1, 1953. The federal parliament was based in Salisbury (Harare), in Southern Rhodesia, and was headed by a prime minister. Each of the three members had its own legislatures.

The idea of federation or amalgamation in British Central Africa was as old as Rhodesia itself. It was the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that proved to be the stumbling block in its establishment. The British South Africa Company had articulated the economic advantages of contiguous territorial expansion as early as 1905 when the company sought permission to amalgamate Northwestern and Northeastern Rhodesia. This request was not granted until 1911, when both the Colonial Office and the paramount chief of the Lozi (particularly the latter) accepted the company's assurances that the Barotse Valley would be reserved against white settlement. There is a sense, therefore, that the Colonial Office established a tradition of consulting (however defined)

the indigenous community before granting requests by the local settler administration.

The federation was a Colonial Office attempt to give self-government to the local people at a time when white settlers were calling for self-government while maintaining a limited measure of political control. Africans had learned through experience that a settler dominated-federation would not be in their best interests. Consequently, African chiefs joined modern nationalists in opposing federation, and on April 20, 1953, sent a petition to the British government. Federation was unacceptable to both African chiefs and modern nationalists. Africans nationalists also petitioned the secretary general of the United Nations over federation. Yet despite these protests and petitions by Africans, federation was imposed on the three British territories.

The British government ignored African opposition, and imposed federation under the belief that federation would be economically beneficial to both whites and Africans. The British government was more concerned with economic interests, and therefore, ignored the political injustice that federation would bring to the larger population of the region. While federation brought economic growth in the three territories, and lured many Europeans overseas to settle and invest in various enterprises, the economic well-being of Africans only improved marginally.

Because the federal system heavily benefited Southern Rhodesia and the policy of partnership appeared to undermine African political interest, Africans continued to oppose federation and worked hard to see it dismantled. Nationalists in Zambia continued to seek ways to secede from the federation; this opposition persisted throughout its life. In view of this opposition, the Monckton Commission noted that despite economic advantages, the political aspirations of Africans were not met. The future of the federation was seriously in question.

By January 1960, when Kenneth Kaunda was released from jail, the British government had realized that there would have to be rapid constitutional advance in Northern Rhodesia. It also seemed increasingly doubtful whether the federation could be held together. African pressure against it was rising fast in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In southern Rhodesia, where many Europeans had always opposed any form of union with the north, there was growing white support for the Dominion Party, which aimed at a fully independent Southern Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia, there were powerful economic reasons why at least the more farsighted Europeans were ready to see the end of federation.

On September 28, 1960, Iain Macleod, the colonial secretary, undoubtedly influenced by the Monckton

Report, announced that constitution changes were planned for Zambia. The Macleod announcement was a landmark in Zambian history. For the first time, African pressure had scored a political victory over the white settler population. The country had taken a further step toward independence.

In December 1960 a conference was held, but no agreement was reached. There were further conferences in 1961. The Colonial Office proposed a constitution for Northern Rhodesia that would make possible an African majority in the Legislative Council, even though this was bound to lead before long to Northern Rhodesia's seceding from the federation. Britain, under pressure from the federal prime minister, Sir Roy Welensky, revised this plan in favor of the Europeans. This angered the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which staged a campaign of civil disobedience throughout the northern and eastern Provinces. The campaign involved a good deal of violence against government property rather than Europeans. In 1962, the constitution was revised once again, and this time UNIP agreed to participate. It was under this new constitution that elections were held in November 1962. The United Federal Party (UFP) won 15 seats, and the UNIP 14 seats. In a by-election held soon afterward in an effort to fill some more of the national seats, the UFP total rose to 16. Throughout November 1962, both the UFP and UNIP courted the African National Congress (ANC), which had acquired seven seats. In the end, ANC decided to form a coalition with the UNIP.

During 1963, there were further negotiations in Northern Rhodesia toward independence. In July 1963 talks began that led to the acceptance of a constitution that would grant the country independence under a prime minister, cabinet, and a parliament of 75 members. On December 31, 1963, the federation was formally ended. In January 1964, there were elections, in which the UNIP won 55 seats, the ANC 10 seats, and the National Progress Party (the new name for the UFP) 10 seats. The UNIP ascended to power, with Kaunda becoming the first prime minister on January 23, 1964. On October 24, 1964, Zambia became a republic within the British Commonwealth.

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

See also: Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period: Federation; Welensky, Roy; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation.

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Zambia: Nationalism, Independence

Protest against colonialism in Zambia did not have a definitive starting point, because colonial rule was imposed gradually. Early African resistance to colonial rule was manifested through resistance to taxation and the demands for wage labor by the colonial government. Other forms of early African resistance were through independent African religious movements, such as the Watchtower movement, especially in the period 1918–1935. Welfare Societies and labor organizations also took modern and political outlook. On the Copperbelt and in Broken Hill (now Kabwe), labor formed a nucleus of protest against some of the features of colonial rule. African miners on the Copperbelt twice challenged colonial authority. In 1935 and 1940, Africans went on strike over wages; in 1949, the African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) was formed with Lawrence Katilungu as its leader.

Zambian nationalism suffered from lack of educated leadership in the early years because the colonial government neglected African education. (Munali School, which provided secondary education, was only founded in 1939.) Because of this, Europeans dominated politics in Northern Rhodesia until the late 1940s. They first demanded a share in the territory's government in 1910. An order in council in 1924 established Northern Rhodesia's first Legislative Council, with nine officials and five unofficial elected members who were all Europeans. The order also established an Executive Council. Although officials controlled both councils, settlers and officials alike assumed that Northern Rhodesia was going to receive responsible government.

Modern nationalism was ushered in by the formation of the Federation of African Societies at Broken Hill (now Kabwe) in 1946, with Dauti Yamba as president. This was a direct response to European challenge in politics, and settler drive for political power. African

Welfare Societies in Zambia started in 1912, when Donald Siwale and David Kaunda, the father of Zambia's first president, formed the Mwenzo Welfare Association to bring African views to the attention of the government. In 1914, when World War I broke out, there was fighting with the Germans near the border. Mwenzo Mission, established by the Scottish Livingstonia Mission in 1894, was evacuated, and the Mwenzo Welfare Association was disbanded. It was revived in 1923, only to fail once again in 1927. However, between 1929 and 1931, African Welfare Societies were formed in several towns along the rail line. From 1942, African Welfare Society branches were formed in the mining towns on the Copperbelt.

In 1948, the Federation of Welfare Societies changed its name to the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC); Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika was elected its first president. For the next few years, the NRAC was a very moderate body; it affirmed its loyalty to the British Crown and its officials and very politely asked for some minor reforms. The NRAC even tried to establish good relations with the government and European settlers, but this achieved very little and did not win the NRAC government recognition. In these first few years, the NRAC mainly represented the African elite and had nothing to do with the masses.

From 1948 to 1951, the NRAC began to oppose the scheme for a federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, first mentioned in October 1948 at a meeting of Northern and Southern Rhodesia white settler politicians. It was further discussed in February 1949, at a secret meeting of white settler representatives of the three territories at Victoria Falls, under the chairmanship of Sir Miles Thomas. The meeting unanimously passed a resolution in favor of federation, but the resolution marked the start of a period of controversy in all the Central African territories. In spite of African opposition to federation, the Conservative Party (which came to power in Britain in October 1951) created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in October 1953.

In July 1951 Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula succeeded Lewanika as president of the NRAC, which changed to the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC). Under Nkumbula the ANC grew into a large organization covering the country and commanding great support. Many members of the AMU supported the ANC, which had taken an active part in opposing the introduction of the federation, but the African trade unions did not become subordinate to the ANC. This was shown by the fact that when Nkumbula called for a two-day period of national prayer to fall on April 1–2, 1953, to show opposition to federation and the strength and unity of the ANC, the leader of the AMU, Katilungu, did not cooperate and refused to allow

African miners to observe these days by staying away from work. The failure of the plan for national prayer, and the introduction of the federation discredited the ANC, and affected the growth of African nationalism in Zambia.

The ANC temporarily lost political direction. This led to the rapid growth between 1954 and 1958 of a new religious movement in the Northern Province, the Lumpa Church, which was founded by Alice Mulenga Lenshina, who was more concerned with eradicating witchcraft than with federation. The ANC was also weakened by its disagreements with the AMU. By 1958, however, the ANC was revived, partly as a response to the Benson Constitution (named after Arthur Benson, then governor of Northern Rhodesia). It provided for fairly radical change. Nkumbula agreed to take part in elections to be held under this constitution, but radicals in the ANC opposed him. Consequently, the ANC split in 1958. The Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) was formed on October 24, 1958, with Kenneth Kaunda (who had been general secretary of the ANC) as president. Elections under the Benson Constitution took place in March 1959, but the satisfaction of the white settlers through their own organ, the United Federal Party (UFP) at the curbing of African nationalism was marred by its failure to win any measure of nonwhite support at the polls or an outright majority of the thirty seats in the Legislative Council.

After the ZANC was banned, new political parties were immediately formed to fill the political vacuum. Paul Kalichini formed the African National Independence Party (ANIP), which also joined the United National Freedom Party (UNFP) led by Dixon Konkola in September 1959, to form the United National Independence Party (UNIP). It was also in September 1959 that UNIP held its first party conference at Broken Hill (now Kabwe). Kalichini defeated Solomon Konkola for the presidency during the elections that took place at the conference. The other office bearers were Kalulu as secretary general, Frank Chitambala as assistant secretary general, and Sykes Ndilila as information secretary. Konkola resigned from UNIP after his defeat by Kalichini.

There was considerable rivalry between the ANC and the UNIP during 1960, amid British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "wind of change" speech in Cape Town at the end of his African tour, in which he implied that African independence could not be stopped. The Monckton Commission was appointed to review the federation. African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland boycotted it. Yet it was this commission that recommended the dismantling of the federation.

Conferences and negotiations from 1960 through 1963 would lead the formal dissolution of the federation

on December 31, 1963. On October 24, 1964, Zambia became a republic within the British Commonwealth. Kenneth Kaunda became head of state.

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See also: **Gore-Browne, Stewart; Kaunda, Kenneth; Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga.**

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Zambia: Religious Movements

The history of Zambia's religious movements is closely linked to that of the country's political struggles. In the last years of the nineteenth century, the direct challenge to colonial rule fizzled out and the new regime of Christianity, British South Africa Company (BSAC) rule, tax collection, and migrant labor had taken root. Once-mighty village despots, kings, and empire builders were reduced to junior partners of the colonial state. Most historians agree that taxation was imposed not only to raise government revenue for financing the administration of the colony but to force subsistence farmers into wage labor. When people could sell cattle or some other commodity they avoided wage labor, but for the great majority, taxes could only be paid after working for the Europeans, who needed cheap labor to transport their goods, build telegraph lines and roads, and work on the farms and in the mines. Forced labor and taxation were two of the main features of colonial rule that provoked the anger of the Africans. The other was the Europeans' irresponsible attitude toward witchcraft.

Witchcraft

When the colonial authorities imposed their modernist view of witchcraft on the society and declared it a mere superstition while at the same time outlawing the construction of new villages, they must have appeared

thoroughly cruel in the eyes of their bewildered colonial subjects. After all, how could the Europeans say witchcraft did not exist when their own Bible said it did? Why did the colonial authorities punish the accuser/victim while protecting those accused of witchcraft? How could the Europeans fail to see that many of the chemicals they introduced were potent instruments of witchcraft and sorcery? These questions have still not been addressed, as the postcolonial state has retained the same legal framework on witchcraft matters as its colonial predecessor. Generally, witchcraft movements have blossomed during periods of crisis.

During the influenza, rinderpest, and sleeping sickness epidemics; World War I; and the mass unemployment and HIV/AIDS pandemic of the 1990s traditional healers and witch finders have tended to become more active than usual.

The first witchcraft eradication movement to attract the attention of the colonial authorities was the *mcape*. Coming close on the heels of the 1930 Great Depression and 1933 crop failure caused by drought and locusts, the *mcape* found an eager audience wherever they went in northeastern parts of Zambia. Their use of Christian notions of purification and resurrection earned them the title “modern witch finders.” The desire to bring harmony to a society ravaged by illness, political oppression, and economic crises by religious means is an ever-present one: only the methods, sects, and cults change.

The Watchtower

Although Africans had always been migrants (as witnessed by the movement of various groups across central Africa), labor migration was an entirely new experience that removed young men from their rigidly controlled villages and brought them into contact with Europeans, Africans from other countries and introduced them to the hardships of colonial capitalism, as well as the politics of liberation.

The Scottish missionaries who were based at Mwenzo opposed the mistreatment of the local population at the hands of the BSAC officials. Mission schools trained many of the leaders of the anticolonial nationalist movement that led the country to independence. Initial attempts to mobilize against British rule, however, were not always well organized. Mission-educated men were the most frustrated colonial subjects when they discovered that their knowledge of the Bible, English, or industrial skills did not win them respect, as the colonial society in which they lived and worked was inherently racist.

Between 1914 and 1918, labor migrants who had come into contact with the ideas of the millenarian Watchtower Bible and Tract Society in South Africa

and Southern Rhodesia organized what was the first religious opposition to colonial rule in northeastern Rhodesia. Although they used the tracts of the American sect operating from Cape Town, the latter disowned it and preferred to work only with its European followers.

The war against the Germans in Tanganyika provided an eager audience for the message of apocalyptic change. The leader of the Watchtower movement, Hanoc Shindano, preached a message centered on berating the Europeans for their sins and their refusal to share the goodness of the earth with Africans. After the Watchtower had stirred rebellion among the population, the colonial authorities arrested the leaders and sentenced them to short terms in jail. Other preachers took their place, however, and the anticolonial preaching continued as an oppressed people eagerly accepted the message of redemption, believing that Africans in America would return to liberate them from bondage, as the preachers promised.

In 1935, the violent strikes on the Copperbelt region were blamed on the influence of the Watchtower, and the sale of Watchtower tracts was banned until 1946. The movement’s message of liberation continued to have the support of many Africans. Only with a stabilization of colonial rule and the improvement in workers’ lives after World War II was the militant African faction brought under the control of the main American body.

Tomo Nyirenda and the Mwanalesa Movement

The leader of the Mwanalesa antiwitchcraft movement was a man from Nyasaland called Tomo Nyirenda. *Mwana Lesa* literally means “child of God,” and clearly reflects Nyirenda’s messianic claims. After acquiring knowledge of the basic Watchtower teachings anticipating the end of the world and the establishment of a new Kingdom, Nyirenda started preaching and conducting baptisms, promising his converts that the baptized would never die. He also used baptism to identify witches; those who floated or could not be completely immersed were deemed witches.

Nyirenda’s desire to rid Lala country (Mkushi and Serenje) of witchcraft was not unusual. However, his campaign was marked by its extreme violence. Whereas others cleansed witches, Nyirenda killed them because, he believed, “God is coming and before God comes the witches must be killed to keep the villages clean” (quoted in Rotberg 1965, 145). In 1925, after he had killed 16 people in Mkushi, he moved to Ndola, where he killed 6 more. He then crossed the border into Katanga, where he killed over a hundred “witches.” Escaping the wrath of the Belgian authorities, Nyirenda crossed back into Northern Rhodesia, but was eventually arrested and executed.

Not all African Christianities or religious nationalists were concerned with witchcraft. In the urban areas, especially in the Copperbelt, Ernest Muwamba founded the Union Church in the 1920s not as an act of religious nationalism, but simply because there were no missionaries in the Copperbelt at that time. The Nyasa elite were prominent in both church and welfare association matters and established cooperative relationship between the Union Church and several local Protestant missions. The Union Church would eventually develop into the United Church of Zambia.

In the late 1990s, new religious groups, often influenced by American television evangelists and preaching prosperity theology, grew increasingly popular in urban areas. These Christians were influential during the the administration of Frederick Chiluba (1991–2001), at which time the Zambian constitution was amended to declare Zambia a “Christian nation.”

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See also: Lenshina, Alice; Religion, Colonial Africa: Independent, Millenarian/Syncretic Churches.

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Zambia: First Republic, 1964–1972: Development and Politics

Zambia had a mixed inheritance upon independence in October 1964. In terms of skilled personnel, whether in terms of formal education and training or senior managerial and political experience, the inheritance was very poor. There were fewer than 1,200 people who had attended secondary school, and only about 100 university graduates. The country may have been colonized in a political sense by Britain, but commercially and economically it had been colonized from the south. There was, therefore, a rigid color bar in the economic sector prior to independence, even in the mines, which provided more than 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.

In financial terms, in contrast, independence coincided with a remarkable increase in the availability of both foreign exchange and government revenue. The price of copper doubled between 1963 and 1966, and stayed at historically high levels because of need for it

during the Vietnam War and other external factors favorable to Zambia. The new government acquired the mineral royalties from the British South Africa Company for an *ex gratia* payment of £2 million a few hours before independence, having offered £50 million only a year previously. (Research revealed that the company’s legal claim to the royalties was dubious). The royalty formula was based on the price of copper, and had therefore risen to a large annual payment abroad, amounting to 16 per cent of government revenue in 1965. Second, a large part of the tax on copper profits that accrued domestically had been spent by the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Southern Rhodesia. This outflow ceased when the federation folded in 1963.

Economic management of a mineral boom would have been difficult in any context; in the Zambian case, it was made much more so by circumstances. A year after independence, Southern Rhodesia made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The British government persuaded the new Zambian government to impose sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, arguing that they would only be needed for a few months, and offering to meet the cost to Zambia out of British aid. This promise was not kept, but Zambia did impose sanctions, at great cost to the economy. Within three years, the proportion of imports from Southern Rhodesia was reduced from 40 per cent to 7 per cent, almost all of which was electricity from the jointly owned hydroelectric plant at the Kariba Dam. Because of oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, Zambia was forced to import oil products along 1,300 miles of mud road from Tanzania. Perhaps even more serious than the direct financial cost was that the new government had to manage a crisis from an early stage, which made sound and thoughtful economic policies more difficult to implement. The need for crisis management was increased by political problems on Zambia’s borders—not just the border with Southern Rhodesia, but also the borders with Angola, the Congo, and Mozambique. These conflicts also generated internal problems; for example, in 1966 it was found that senior members of the Zambian Special Branch were working on behalf of the UDI government.

A positive aspect of the financial boom was that the government had the resources to start redressing the colonial neglect of public services—in particular, that of health and education. The imposition of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia created a high degree of protection in the manufacturing sector. As a result, the sector grew extremely fast, further stimulated by tariff protection. Real gross domestic product, also stimulated by government spending, increased by 55 per cent between 1964 and 1972; less positively, employed increased by only 15 per cent in that same period.

Zambia has been widely accused of mismanaging the copper boom of this period, but the evidence does not support the accusation. The central government budget was in surplus from 1964 to 1966, and was balanced in 1967 (if net government lending is excluded). There was a deficit in 1968, to which the government reacted by reducing its own spending and net lending by 11 per cent in real terms in 1969, which resulted in a budget surplus in that year and in 1970. Only in 1971 and 1972 did substantial budget deficits begin to appear, and yet the foreign exchange reserves continued to increase in terms of the number of months of imports covered (there were 15 months of imports covered in 1972). The available evidence suggests responsible economic management.

During this period the government reacted to the domination of the private sector by foreigners, or by resident ethnic minorities (Asians and whites), by introducing a series of measures to increase Zambia's economic independence. The rhetoric was a mixture of socialism and Zambian humanism, with the goal of the pursuit of economic nationalism present as well. President Kaunda's Mulungushi Speech in 1968 announced the government's intention to acquire 51 per cent of 26 industrial firms. The takeovers were negotiated successfully, without outright conflict with the foreign owners. The government also announced, effective January 1, 1969, that a wide range of trading licenses would be reserved for Zambian citizens.

Later in 1969, in the Matero Speech, the president announced that the government would acquire 51 per cent of the copper mines. Again, this was negotiated, not imposed. The mining takeover had been widely expected, and the ending of uncertainty, combined with the fact that the foreign shareholders regarded the settlement as fair, led to investment plans that would have increased annual production from 750,000 tons to 900,000 tons. Because of a mining disaster in 1970, and a renegotiation of the takeover agreement, the target of 900,000 tons was never reached. Further takeovers followed, together with government investment in a number of new, protected-monopoly manufacturing companies. It was announced in 1970 that the commercial banks would be taking over 51 per cent, but agreement was never reached.

The ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) won the 1968 general election comfortably, in part assisted by the booming economy. The government dealt with ethnic rivalries with continuing success (in the sense that political stability was maintained) by constantly shuffling senior political and civil service personnel. This "solution" reduced the efficiency of the public sector, however. In 1970, Vice President Simon Kapwepwe started a new party claiming that the northern ethnic groups had been neglected. This

was followed by the declaration of a one-party state in 1972, and the dissolution of the First Republic.

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See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga; Zambia: Second Republic, 1973–1991.**

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Zambia: Second Republic, 1973–1991

The "welfare state" that seemed to emerge soon after independence in Zambia quickly turned into a system based on patronage. The ruling elite, far from being in charge of impartial redistribution, promptly became a machine of patronage. The politicoeconomic organization tended toward an extreme concentration of power in the hands of the architects of independence. It aimed at eliminating any potential opposition by way of the systematic co-optation of any leader with some importance, arbitrary arrests, and many other manipulations.

The regime was to set up a one-party state system from the first of January 1973, for "peace, progress, and stability." President Kenneth Kaunda's prerogatives became so extended that, for the most part, Zambian political life during this period was organized from the presidential palace. Kaunda transformed himself into an autocrat able to monopolize the distribution of the main resources; he incarnated both the supreme head whose munificence reinforced his legitimacy and the fickle leader with whom it would be particularly advisable not to fall into disgrace.

Many studies emphasize the manifest absence of merit-based criteria in official appointments, which were more than ever linked to loyalty bargaining. Continually increasing the number of his counselors, practicing a subtle game of musical chairs among his ministers so as to master them better, Kaunda asserted himself as the one orchestrating all power relations. Observers from this period consider that qualified political actors easily lost interest in their respective

tasks at the head of governmental offices or nationalized companies, obsessed as they were with the factional game and their personal lot. The opposition, or what remained of it, was hardly worthy of credibility insofar as it did not have anything really solid to hand out. Everything seemed connected to the one-party state, of which one had to be a loyal supporter to obtain anything at all.

These dynamics proved to be functional for the stalwarts of the regime but equally for those holding the slightest bit of power, who often acted the role of crucial intermediaries. More precisely, this system was able to last as long as it remained possible to draw from the copper revenue to finance it. But the combination of the drop in prices from 1975 and a tendency to sacrifice economic capital for political favoritism was to gradually ruin Zambia. In spite of a considerable proliferation in governmental bodies, institutionalization was very limited. Relations remained extremely personalized, essentially linked with exchanges, be they of a nepotistic or clientelist nature.

Right to the end, Katinda proved to be little inclined to draw inferences from this alarming spiral. While the country's indebtedness reached a disturbing level, for a long time he refused to call into question the subsidy of food products, one of the pillars of his popularity. The malfunctions, which were more and more evident from the beginning of the 1980s, were invariably attributed to the heritage from colonialism and to indiscipline. On the other hand, the purely internal logics of the decline were completely ignored. For many years, Kenneth Kaunda and his lieutenants could ascribe the internal difficulties to hindrances linked to the wars in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, but the independence of Zimbabwe (in 1980) and the evolution of regional conflicts no longer gave them leave to do it in such a convincing way. The ambiguous relations with South Africa and other neighbors, the pragmatic denial of foreign affairs displayed dogma were also to disconcert quite a number of the regime supporters.

From an ideological point of view, the 1980s were to appear very uncertain, characterized by many steps backward. At one time the president would seem to give in, a little reluctantly, to the neoliberal injunctions of the indispensable donors. At another time he would attack the capitalist structure and claim to be the advocate of scientific socialism (as in 1982), then of a national recovery program (after the 1987 break with the International Monetary Fund). However, with the economic and social situation constantly deteriorating (Zambia had one of the worst growth rates in the world), disillusion increased. The weak institutionalization of political power is the reason why the malcontents tended to personally attack the leaders and their representatives. The trade unions did not hesitate

to denounce the practice of personal enrichment. As early as 1980, the government was compelled to introduce an anticorruption bill to its parliament, but faced with the rise in protests against the one-party state, the regime had to grow tougher while the great dogma did not seem to be respected anymore by its promoters.

Political violence has always prevailed in Northern Rhodesia and then in Zambia, one authoritarian system having succeeded another. However, Zambia was not going to reach the level of atrocity perpetrated by the most woefully bloody dictatorships of the continent. It must nevertheless be emphasized that the practice of torture seemed established under the Second Republic, along with all kinds of repressive practices that became more pronounced as the regime was contested. Generally speaking, the deprivation of freedom to opponents on all sides proved to be a weapon used very much by Kaunda.

Kaunda's downfall was hastened by the extreme crisis of the redistribution system. If a non-negligible fraction of the population had originally benefited from Zainbianization and other such advantages, the combined effect of the fall in revenues, accumulated indebtedness, bad management of resources, and diverse misappropriations ended up ruining the prestige that the regime might have accumulated. A sort of general disillusionment settled in and grew stronger as hospitals lacked medicines and schools fell into decay. Unpaid salaries and retrenchments were synonymous with the rapid deterioration of means of subsistence. Even the purchasing power of those managing to maintain steady employment was brought down to reduced material wealth. A good deal of the population could not afford to eat properly, while the majority of town and city residents were exasperated by the desperately empty stalls and the endless queues that had to be endured in order to obtain food.

While average citizens increasingly resented Kaunda, so did the elite, who were often forced to undergo humiliations by Kaunda so as to retain their position. Although the president tried to divert the anger of the people toward the IMF and World Bank, his decline and overthrow seemed irreversible. Contrary to previous hunger riots that were tied to the doubling of the price of maize in 1990, Kaunda's removal from office was driven by a focused and organized opposition. He fought to retain power, but was forced to make concession after concession under pressure from the populace, finally accepting the principle of multipartyism and free elections. The enormous gatherings of the new Movement for Multiparty Democracy must essentially be interpreted as a sign of exasperation mixed with disproportionate expectations, in line with the frustrations endured.

JEAN-PASCAL DALOZ

See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Nkumbula, Harry Mwaanga; Zambia: 1991 to the Present.**

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Zambia: 1991 to the Present

Following the peaceful electoral removal of Kenneth Kaunda in 1991, Zambia was commonly viewed as a model of smooth political transition in Africa. The opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), led by the trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, had managed successfully to gain wide support from those who were discontented politically or dissatisfied with the economy (and, in particular, food shortages). From the outset, the MMD was a variegated coalition that included landholders and businessmen supporting financial and trading liberalization, intellectuals favoring radical change, the bulk of the trade union movement, young graduates in search of employment, and a large number of former members of the Kaunda regime. It quickly appeared that the 1991 ballot was much more of a referendum on the Kaunda regime's performance after so many years of personal domination, than a reflective adhesion to a precise program.

The clear-cut victory of Chiluba and his MMD gave the victors an imposing legitimacy. Despite dubious dealings during the electoral campaign as well as many controversies relating to the neutrality of the observers, the peaceful and fair nature of the ballot itself was widely welcomed. The electoral verdict was reluctantly accepted by the country's former leader and his supporters, but the fact that he acknowledged the rules of the game and his defeat also gave him back a certain legitimacy (at least from a Western viewpoint). The main strategy of the new regime was to incessantly denounce the defects of the Kaunda era, on which all the ills affecting the country were imputed. Having no links with the former system, president Chiluba made the utmost use of this legitimation. He knew well how to take advantage of an international context favoring

neoliberal values of which he became the advocate. Nevertheless, if the latter could appear to make up a true political resource, they would rapidly prove to be incompatible not only with the populations' aspirations but also with those of Chiluba's own entourage, awaiting immediate spin-offs. The Zambian case very clearly illustrates the contradictions in legitimacy that the actors having advocated democracy, while accepting the structural adjustment, had to face. It was obligatory for them to stake their position of power rather quickly, when the drastic measures to be taken for the improvement of the economy could only be unpopular and a potential source of delegitimation. Torn between the necessity to meet the donors' expectations on which his position depended and that of ensuring his political survival on a short-term basis (that is to say, his reelection), the new president was obliged to constantly switch from one register to another, not only at the risk of inconsistency but also that of displeasing everybody—especially as the opposition vied in demagogic outbidding.

The sensitive issue of freedom of the press appears as one of the most symptomatic: How could one succeed in reconciling the right to free expression, justly considered as the major achievement of the change in regime, with the need to control newspapers that regularly exposed new scandals? The government was torn between the desire to silence those who systematically discredited them and their fear of giving off an antiliberal image discordant with its proclaimed ideals. One may also question the relation with the opposition. Once he was elected, Chiluba advocated a certain reconciliation, even if his argumentation remained deliberately hostile to his predecessor. As the latter's return became increasingly possible, Chiluba was finally to organize Kaunda's disqualification (through constitutional reform) and even his temporary detention.

Furthermore, like those of most other African countries drawing a crucial revenue from a strategic product, many Zambian leaders seemed reluctant to precipitate restructuring in the "red gold" sector of copper (even if some could profit from the privatization). The need for large investments to modernize an obsolete production tool would suppose prompt decisions, but copper represented 90 per cent of the country's jobs and revenues (directly or indirectly) throughout the 1990s.

Outside aid donors deplored the continued presence in government of incompetent or corrupt ministers (some implicated in drug trafficking). Even if Chiluba (who was reelected in 1996) knew for a fact that an enormous amount had been invested in the Zambian experiment and that it could not be totally abandoned, he badly needed foreign financial aid and would not be able to displease those spending it. But the rifts within the coalition in power, the prominence in Chiluba's

regime of “recycled” elites, and the use of well-worn governing practices to ensure a continuous hold on power cast doubt on the reformist potential of the administration. In 2001, Chiluba’s vice president, Levy Mwanawasa, was elected as the new president. He removed Chiluba’s aids from their government posts, and approved an investigation into corrupt practices under Chiluba.

JEAN-PASCAL DALOZ

See also: **Kaunda, Kenneth; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Copperbelt.**

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Zanzibar (City)

The principal port and commercial center of the islands bearing the same name, Zanzibar is situated just off the East African coast. Zanzibar’s heyday was in the nineteenth century, when its economic influence extended deep into the heart of the African mainland.

The town originated as a Swahili fishing village in the twelfth century, on the Shangani Peninsula on the west side of Unguja Island. In the mid-sixteenth century it was visited by the Portuguese, who by 1591 had established a base there. Over the following century Zanzibar was governed by local rulers under Portuguese hegemony. During the late seventeenth century it was caught up in Portuguese-Omani rivalry, as a result of which the town itself was twice razed. Zanzibar eventually succumbed to the ascendant Omanis in about 1698. They built a fort on the ruins of the old Portuguese chapel (which remains a prominent landmark to this day) in order to house a small garrison of troops. The indigenous ruler of northern Unguja, Queen Fatuma, was forced into exile until 1709.

Soon after these developments, the town began to grow. Around 1725, Fatuma’s successor, Sultan Hassan, remembered as the true founder of Zanzibar, cleared the Shangani Peninsula of bush, thus laying the foundations for its development. Over subsequent years Arab merchants and plantation owners from Pate, and Shatiri Arabs from Mafia, settled there. Buoyed by profits earned from the slave trade to the French plantation islands of Ile-de-France (Mauritius) and Ile Bourbon (Réunion), in the latter half of the eighteenth century the town slowly expanded, though at this time only a handful of the houses were constructed in stone.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the value of the East African trade in slaves and ivory had become increasingly apparent to the Busa’idi rulers of Oman. In 1840, this, along with political and strategic considerations, led Sultan Seyyid Said to transfer his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar. The shift coincided with Zanzibar’s rise to regional predominance. From its Zanzibar base the Busa’idi dynasty sought to exploit the growing Western demand for tropical products and as such became a major entrepôt. Trading caravans funded and/or led by Zanzibar merchants penetrated the African interior as far inland as present-day Zambia and Congo in search of ivory and slaves. By mid-century, Zanzibar hegemony stretched throughout East Africa as far as Lake Tanganyika, though it was predominantly commercial in form. Annual exports passing through Zanzibar grew from \$765,000 worth of goods in 1843 to \$3,734,845 in 1864. This consisted mainly of re-export goods from the mainland—principally ivory, but also copal, cowrie, and hides. Meanwhile, in response to growing international demand from the 1820s, Zanzibar Arabs had established clove plantations on Unguja and Pemba, worked by slave labor from the mainland. By 1859, five million pounds of cloves were passing through the port. The mid-nineteenth century was also the time when the East African slave trade reached its peak. In the 1850s and 1860s up to 20,000 slaves arrived in the town annually. The majority of these probably remained on the island, the remainder being exported to plantations on the East African littoral or to India and the Middle East.

The prosperity generated through Zanzibar’s role as regional entrepôt, and to a lesser extent as a producer of cloves, was reflected in the town’s architecture. The Stone Town was largely a product of this era, as wealthy merchants invested profits in constructing large houses of Arabic design. Their plain facades were embellished by the incorporation of elaborately carved doors, which served to indicate the status of the owner. The Sultans themselves were also great builders—notably Bargash (1870–1888), who built the massive *Beit al-Ajaib*, or House of Wonder (completed

ZANZIBAR (CITY)

1883), which has dominated the Zanzibar seafront up to the present day.

Zanzibar's rise to prominence attracted other groups to the town, including Indian Muslims. The Indian community grew from just 214 in 1819 to over 3000 in the 1870s. By the late nineteenth century Indian Muslims had largely supplanted Arabs as financiers of the caravan trade to the interior and in the export/import trade. They too plowed profits into the construction of grand houses in the expanding Stone Town; these are characterized by their elaborate wooden balconies and Indian-influenced carved doors. Less wealthy Indians took up residence along the central thoroughfares of the town, living above shops from which they engaged in minor trade.

Another feature of Zanzibar's nineteenth-century development was the emergence of Ng'ambo ("the other side"), which became the principal African residential area. As the Stone Town expanded in midcentury, Africans living to the south of the Shangani Peninsula began building across the creek that divided the peninsula from the island proper. Prior to 1850 Ng'ambo was a small community, comprised predominantly of African slaves, and surrounded by cultivated land. After this it grew rapidly. By 1895 it consisted of 15 *mitaa* (wards), and was home to over 15,000. Slaves had been joined by an equal number of free laborers, and smaller immigrant communities including Indian traders and Malagasy settlers. In 1922 Ng'ambo's population had grown to over twice that of the Stone Town.

By the second half of the nineteenth century there was also an embryonic European community. Diplomatic links with the West had been established as far back as 1837, when the United States appointed a consul to Zanzibar. A British consul followed soon after, and as representative of the principal world power, he exercised considerable influence over the Sultan. From the 1860s explorers such as Richard Francis Burton, James Hannington Speke, David Livingstone, and Henry Morton Stanley used the town as a base from which to launch expeditions into the African interior. A decade later the Anglican Universities Mission to Central Africa established their regional headquarters in the town, building a church on the site of the old slave market in 1879. In the following decade, European encroachment on the mainland undermined the regional hegemony of the Sultan. This culminated in the declaration of a British protectorate over Zanzibar in 1890.

The British colonial period was one of relative decline. In 1896 Zanzibar suffered the ignominy of British bombardment as a result of a succession dispute after the death of Sultan Hamid. Meanwhile, as European administrations established themselves on the mainland and modern ports were built there, Zanzibar's importance as regional entrepôt diminished.

A new wharf, constructed in 1929, was reliant on the trade in home-produced cloves and coconut products, and imported goods for the restricted domestic market. In the early colonial period the British constructed a number of large official buildings to grace their new capital, introducing "Saracenic" architectural influences to Zanzibar (the best example of which being the High Court building). They were also responsible for the reclamation of the creek that divided the Stone Town from Ng'ambo, which was completed by 1950. Meanwhile, the town continued to expand. Ng'ambo stretched ever farther west and by the time of independence the total population had grown to almost 80,000.

Independence was conceded by the British in December 1963, when Sultan Jamshid regained sovereignty over the islands. Within a month the sultanate had been overturned and Jamshid sent into exile thanks to an uprising famously led by an itinerant Ugandan, John Okello. The key events of the revolution occurred in the streets of the capital as Okello and his followers successfully besieged the Ziwani, Mtoni, and Malindi police stations. In the wake of the revolution many Arabs, and later Indians, left Zanzibar. Houses in the Stone Town were nationalized by the incoming Afro-Shirazi Party, and were either occupied by officials or left abandoned. Shops closed down and as the area was deserted by its former residents Stone Town fell into decline. Ng'ambo, on the other hand, continued to grow, through the construction of traditional Swahili housing, as well as the ill-conceived erection of huge blocks of flats of East German design at Michenzani in 1972. By 1978 Zanzibar's population had reached 111,000.

In 1988, in an attempt to reverse the decline of Stone Town, it was declared a conservation area by the Zanzibar government. Its conservation and development has been aided by its announcement as a United Nations World Heritage site. More important still has been the growth of private ownership of housing and an increase in commercial activity. In addition, money from tourism—an ever more important source of income—has assisted conservation activities, although the growing number of tourists has also placed strains on the urban infrastructure.

Zanzibar today is a city with architectural riches and a cosmopolitan population that provide a constant reminder of its former importance. It remains a bustling center of regional commerce, and migrants from both the rural areas of Zanzibar as well as farther afield continue to settle in the town. Having weathered the lean postindependence decades, future prospects for the city are now somewhat brighter.

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See also: **Swahili; Zanzibar.**

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Zanzibar: Busaidi Sultanate in East Africa

The origins of the Busaidi sultanate in East Africa predate the sultanate itself. Led by the Ya'rubī imams, the Arabs of Uman shook off control by the Portuguese in 1652 and gradually drove them from all their East African possessions north of Mozambique. Civil wars in Uman gave the Busaidi control over their homeland in 1744. However, opposition to their rule in Uman prevented them from asserting their claims in East Africa throughout the eighteenth century. Coastal peoples under local ruling dynasties exercised almost complete freedom of action without Busaidi interference. Most notable among these local clans were the Mazrui family, who exercised control over Mombasa and surrounding smaller city-states like Vumba. On the northern coast, the Nabahany of Pate rivaled the Mazrui. Only Zanzibar appears to have remained completely loyal to the distant sultans of Uman.

Sayyid Said bin Sultan began avowing Busaidi claims in East Africa in 1813 when, following an invitation from the town elders seeking protection from Mazrui and Nabahany aggression, he succeeded in placing a garrison in Lamu. Pate soon became home to a contingent of the Sultan's loyal Baluchi troops, too, but permanent control over that place and Pemba was not fully resolved in Said's favor until 1822, when the last of the Mazrui and their followers and slaves were driven out. The sultanate did not come formally into existence in East Africa until 1840, the year Said permanently relocated his capital to Muscat to Zanzibar.

As international interest in regional exports developed in the nineteenth century, it was Arab and Indian planters and traders, led by the sultans themselves, who led in linking local economies more closely to international finance and trade. Plantation farming increasingly provided the international market with cloves and grains. At the same time, new trade routes linking the coast to the deep interior brought a host of products like ivory and skins to market. During the decades after Said's move, consequently, Umani influences on East Africans grew in importance and strength.

Underpinning this were noticeable developments in the East African economy. The Sultanate both benefited from and helped foster more intense interaction with, and dependence on, international markets. Subsistence agriculture soon gave way to plantations growing cloves and grains for export. Likewise, international appetites for animal products like iron and skins, as well as local need of slaves for the plantations, opened caravan routes linking the far interior with the coast. In all of this, the sultans led the way. Sayyid Said and his successors maintained extensive plantations and engaged in the caravan trade.

The Busaidi had enemies in East Africa as well as Uman, and their ascendance there did not escape challenges. The Harthi clan of Zanzibar sided with malcontents within the Busaidi family to challenge the sultanate during both Said's and Majid's reigns. The Mazrui were not removed from power in Mombasa until 1837, and they continued making trouble for the Sultans and their British allies long afterward. At Takaungu, Mbarak bin Rashid Mazrui alternately swore allegiance, then rebelled, until Mazrui power was broken by Hamid bin Thuwayn's British-led forces in 1895. In similar fashion, the Nabahany family, long the Sultans of Pate, were driven to the mainland. At Witu, Ahmad Simba Nabahany declared an independent sultanate and, for some time, enjoyed German protection. However, like the Mazrui of Takaungu, the Witu sultanate was crushed finally in 1896.

The fundamental weakness of the sultanate was its reliance on Britain. British-controlled India was Uman's greatest trading partner, and British support for Said against his enemies in Uman and the Gulf enabled him to secure his position there sufficiently to shift his residence to Zanzibar. The British saw the Ba-Saidi as a stabilizing force in the Gulf and East Africa and as a compliant host willing to control the slave trade. For the Busaidi, this support was purchased at the price of growing dependence and a willingness to brook interference from their allies. Treaties gradually restricting slave trafficking were signed in 1822, 1847, and 1873. An 1876 treaty banned all slave trade, and in 1897 a compliant Sultan Hamud bin Muhammad issued a decree making slavery itself illegal in Zanzibar.

Such treaties inevitably worsened relations between the sultans and their Muslim subjects, who resented "infidel" interference. Caught between their subjects and the more powerful British, the sultans had to yield to the latter. Some, like Barghash, Khalifa, and Ali, tried to resist European pressures, and to avoid further concessions. However, a series of occurrences forced them to yield, which further alienated their subjects, and so reinforced their dependence on the British. The crucial role played by British consuls in settling

succession disputes was one such occurrence. More critical still was the attempt by Khedive Ismail of Egypt to seize East African ports for himself. Only British intervention saved the situation. Finally, open claims to Tanganyika and Witu by the Germans after 1884 forced the sultans to accept British “protection” and to cede Kenya to the British. By the time of the reign of Hamud bin Muhammad, British control was almost absolute. Thereafter, and until Zanzibar achieved independence, the Busaidi sultans ruled under colonial consul generals and residents as little more than figureheads. Independence, once achieved, proved a disaster for the Busaidi: the revolution in 1964 saw the massacre of 5,000 Arabs, and the last sultan, Abdullah bin Khalifa, was forced to flee into exile.

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See also: **Livingstone, David; Malawi: Long-Distance Trade, Nineteenth Century; Slavery, Plantation: East Africa and the Islands.**

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Table 1: The Sultans of Zanzibar

Said b. Sultan	(1806–1856)
Majid b. Said	(1856–1870)
Barghash b. Said	(1870–1888)
Khalifa b. Said	(1888–1890)
Ali b. Said	(1890–1893)
Hamid b. Thuwayn	(1893–1896)
Hamud b. Muhammad	(1896–1902)
Ali b. Hamud	(1902–1911)
Khalifa b. Harub	(1911–1960)
Abdullah b. Khalifa	(1960–1964)

Zanzibar: Trade: Slaves, Ivory

For the last two millennia, the East African coast has been part of a far-flung commercial system spanning vast areas of the Indian Ocean. Until the nineteenth century the role of the coast was confined mainly to trade and was concerned less with the production of goods. The Roman Empire may well have satisfied its demand for ivory partly in eastern Africa, with the assistance of southern Arabian merchants. After the collapse of Rome, China and India emerged as customers

for ivory in the seventh century. Exactly when slaves became an essential factor in commerce is not known. Several scholars regard the rebellion of African slaves in Iraq between 868 and 892 as evidence that slaves were already being exported from East Africa at this time; others, however, doubt that these slaves were of East African origin.

Only at the beginning of the eighteenth century did Zanzibar enter the scene as an important trading center with supraregional significance, dealing in ivory from the hinterland; slaves from southern Tanganyika, Malawi, and Mozambique; and gold from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. By this time Oman was starting to replace Portugal as a hegemonic power in this part of the Indian Ocean, and the coastal towns, including Zanzibar, soon came under the control of the Omani rulers. Oman was already a full-fledged mercantile state by around 1700, and slaves were needed for its date plantations and for its army; these were acquired at various towns along the East African coast.

Around 1770, a labor-intensive plantation economy developed in the French possessions Mauritius and Réunion, which led to an unprecedented increase in demand for slaves. The second half of the eighteenth century thus saw the emergence of Zanzibar in particular as a trading center for slaves, though Kilwa and Mozambique Island were the main collecting points for slave transportation from the hinterland. Kilwa lies on the edge of the monsoon area; thus, navigating a large sailing ship there could be difficult at times, so that slaves had to be transported from Kilwa to Zanzibar partly in small boats. At Zanzibar the slaves were exchanged for imported goods, which in turn were redistributed throughout East Africa. The Napoleonic Wars, however, interrupted this lucrative trade. The result was the economic collapse of Oman, so that some of the rich Omani merchants moved to Zanzibar. In 1804 Sayyid Sa’id ascended the throne of Oman, and in the coming years he was forced to confront the strong opposition to slave trade on the part of the British, who represented the new hegemonic power in the region. The British pressure on Sayyid Sa’id resulted in a series of treaties from 1822 on, in which Sa’id agreed first to the restriction and finally to the official abolition of slave trading. The loss of profits from the slave trade forced the Arabs of Zanzibar to develop new sources of income after 1830—notably, the cultivation of cloves on large plantations. This again fueled the demand for slaves, since the plantations’ heavy manpower needs could not be met by the recruitment of free laborers alone. Dodging the treaties against slavery, an average of perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 slaves annually were brought to Zanzibar in the 1830s and 1840s, only part of which were meant for export. The demand continued to mount toward the end of the

1850s, in part because the mortality rate among the plantation slaves was very high. The antislavery pressure by the British remained rather ineffective, partly because it was concentrated mainly on the Atlantic slave trade, but probably also because a flourishing and cost-effective clove-raising economy netted the British obvious advantages.

Under Sa'id's successor Majid the slave trade continued to grow between 1859 and 1872, with the import reaching an average of some 20,000 to 25,000 slaves annually. Majid's successor Bargash further encouraged the import of slaves, particularly because of cholera epidemics raging among the slave population. By 1870 the British had brought their antislavery campaign on the Atlantic coast to a successful conclusion and could now turn to the Indian Ocean. The pressure upon Bargash became so strong that by 1877 the slave trade had collapsed, though the most basic need for plantation slaves could still partially be met by smuggling. In 1890 Zanzibar became a British protectorate. The British now had direct influence on the sultan's policy, so that the slave trade was effectively wiped out by the turn of the century.

Before the nineteenth century the main customer for ivory was India, and the demand was relatively light. Only around 1820 did the demand begin to grow, as the prosperous bourgeoisie in the United States and Western Europe came to desire fancy articles made of ivory. The raw material was routed by preference via Zanzibar, where customs duties were kept low. The ivory came from areas controlled by Zanzibar, such as the hinterlands of Mombasa, Lamu, or Kilwa, where it was taken in hand by Arabian middlemen. Increasingly, however, traders of the Nyamwezi tribe began bringing ivory tusks all the way to the coast, which had been hunted particularly around Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika. Ivory from this area was subject to a heavy tax at Zanzibar, so as to encourage Arabian traders to penetrate these territories for themselves and to drive the Nyamwezi away from the ivory trade. Their increasing economic power enabled the Zanzibarians, from the 1860s on, to send well-equipped caravans all the way to Unyamwezi, which ultimately led to their seizing the monopoly on the intermediate trade.

The ivory from Lake Victoria was carried across the Kilimanjaro region to Pangani and Mombasa. Along this route a network of Swahili-Arabian trading posts was established, linked directly with Zanzibar. During the 1870s and 1880s European companies began to appear in the East African interior, and tried to interrupt the supply of ivory to Zanzibar by diverting it to their own trading posts. At the beginning of the 1880s Sultan Bargash had to summon all his influence to prevent Africans and Arabs from selling their ivory to European competitors. What he could not anticipate

was the partition of East Africa between Britain and Germany. This meant the end of his control over the ivory transshipment ports and thus the loss of most of his customs revenues.

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See also: **Livingstone, David; Malawi: Long-Distance Trade, Nineteenth Century; Slavery: East Africa: Eighteenth Century; Slavery, Plantation: East Africa and the Islands; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Nyamwezi and Long-Distance Trade.**

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Zanzibar: Britain, Germany, "Scramble"

During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, the peoples of East Africa became more closely linked to the Indian Ocean system of trade. Increasingly, this contact was channeled through Arabs from Oman who were encouraged to settle in Zanzibar by Seyyid Said, who reigned from 1806 to 1856. Financed by Indian capitalists, many became clove plantation owners on Zanzibar and Pemba or began to travel inland for ivory and slaves. By 1870, when Barghash became Sultan, Zanzibar had economic, and even a vague political hegemony over the mainland. The Sultanate itself had come under British Indian sway and then increasingly strong Foreign Office influence. The Consul, John Kirk, was able to persuade Barghash to do what Britain wanted, namely provide reasonable facilities for traders and abolish the slave trade—the latter occurred in 1873. Through Zanzibar, Britain exercised an indirect control over East Africa.

Change came in the late 1870s. Intense interest created by explorers, and the response to Livingstone's death, made the region a theater for a series of missionary and other initiatives from Britain often incompatible with Arab trading activities. Europeans responded to explorers' reports of the Great Lakes region—not least that of King Leopold II of Belgium, who set up the International African Association. This sent several expeditions to East Africa and stimulated initiatives by

German, French, and British “national committees.” Meanwhile, Egypt had been trying to extend its trade and control up the Nile Valley to Uganda. Many Africans reacted with new political or economic arrangements. Zanzibar’s suzerainty became more difficult to sustain during the rise of the “Scramble.”

Late in 1884, Zanzibar’s (and therefore Britain’s) position was directly challenged when Carl Peters of the German Society for Colonization secured treaties from some African chiefs ceding sovereignty to his society and Germany. Certainly, neither the British nor the German governments were anxious to become directly involved in East Africa in 1884, but the increasing competition on the international scene in the 1880s and 1890s made it difficult for them to disengage. The most obvious victim was likely to be Zanzibar.

For much-debated reasons, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was not disposed to leave Britain’s position in East Africa unchallenged. On February 25, 1885, he issued the *Schutzbrief*, accepting the Peters treaties. To British Prime Minister William Gladstone’s dismay, certain figures tried to arrange treaties for Britain in the Kilimanjaro area, while Barghash sent expeditions to make Zanzibar’s political claims more tangible in mainland areas.

Negotiations in Europe now led Britain, France, and Germany to agree in October 1885 to set up a Delimitation Commission to define Zanzibar’s territory on the mainland and therefore, by implication, indicate how much was left for Europeans. The German commissioner’s view was the most unfavorable to Zanzibar, but had to be accepted as the minimum agreed. The commission’s report provided the basis for the Anglo-German Agreement of November 1886. (France opted to concentrate on Madagascar.) The sultan was accorded a ten-mile-wide strip of territory along the coast. The mainland was divided into spheres for Germany around Witu and south of a line running from near Vanga, around the north side of Kilimanjaro to the east coast of Lake Victoria, and for Britain north of this line as far as Witu.

The 1886 treaty created more problems than it solved. The chartered companies both governments set up to operate in their respective spheres became embroiled in disputes with Africans or Arabs. The purchase and occupation in 1888 of the Sultan’s ten-mile strip adjacent to the southern German sphere provoked a major revolt. Italy made claims on the northern coast. Most problematic was the region beyond Lake Victoria that was not covered by the treaty. Egyptian forces cut off near Lake Albert by the Mahdist revolt seemed to offer a tempting piece of ready-made empire. Leopold was now anxious to extend his Congo Free State to the Nile. In Buganda itself, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant factions vied for control of the state. Farther south

Tippu Tip (Hamed bin Muhammad) had created a trading empire west of Lake Tanganyika linked to, if not really under the control of, Zanzibar. Various expeditions were launched by Europeans anxious to force issues in such areas. The most important of these was the 1886–1889 expedition jointly organized by Leopold, which sent the explorer Henry Morton Stanley to “relieve” Emin Pasha and take over the territories he was assumed to control.

Such expeditions became irrelevant when, following the fall of Bismarck in 1890, Chancellor von Caprivi decided to reach an accommodation with Britain on African questions. Again, official motives have been much debated including whether, for strategic reasons to do with defending Egypt and the Suez Canal, Britain was determined to hold the Nile source area. The new Anglo-German Treaty extended the boundary westward as far as Leopold’s territory, so making Uganda a British territory, while Germany gave up any claims to Zanzibar (in return for Heligoland, an island off the Hamburg estuary in the North Sea) or to Witu. Further British arrangements were made with Italy and Portugal in 1891 and details settled with Leopold in 1894. Essentially, however, the whole of East Africa now gained either German or British overlords. In 1894 in Uganda and in 1895 in what is now Kenya, the British government felt obliged to take over direct control from the Chartered Company. Germany had done the same in its sphere in April 1890. Colonial rule, which was to last a mere 70 years, had now begun. It was inaugurated with a period of turmoil as “effective occupation” measures exacerbated the ecological catastrophe. Zanzibar became a British protectorate with an entirely nominal residual sovereignty over the coast strip in the Kenya sector. Now manifested as only a couple of rather insignificant islands in the British Empire, the Sultanate’s brief period of great importance was at an end.

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See also: **Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884–1885.**

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Zanzibar: Colonial Period

Zanzibar was declared a British protectorate in November 1890. This was preceded by an increase in European influence upon the island state, which until then had been governed autocratically by a sultan and an elite, originally of Omani extraction. The island’s prosperity resulted first and foremost from the traditional role of Zanzibar as intermediary in the trade for raw materials and slaves from the African mainland, and for luxury goods from overseas. Increasing anti-slavery pressure on the part of Great Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century impelled the rulers to turn to the cultivation of cloves on large plantations as their main source of income, together with trade in raw materials. The influence of the United States, Great Britain, and France upon Zanzibar was formalized between 1833 and 1844 in “amity and commerce” treaties, which awarded these countries the status of “most-favored nations.” The establishment of European consulates followed; these were meant chiefly to safeguard the commercial interests in the region. The new plantation economies on Zanzibar and Pemba, however, had quite the reverse effect of what British antislavery policy had intended. In fact, tens of thousands of slaves were imported annually from the mainland for plantation labor, a practice that was tacitly tolerated by the British, in part because the Royal Navy was underrepresented in East African waters. In 1873, however, the British pushed through an agreement that banned the slave trade within the Sultan’s sphere of influence.

Even so, the British hoped to maintain the power of the Sultan, for they regarded the Arabs as the only group able to rule the islands and to guarantee political stability and hence economic prosperity, from which the British of course profited. While stripping the Sultan of his control over foreign relations, they left him sovereignty over home affairs. Already in 1891, however, the British intervened massively in Zanzibarian domestic policy because they had finally come to regard the political system as too corrupt and inefficient. Though the prohibition of slaveholding on Zanzibar and Pemba in April 1897 further weakened the Arab economic position, the British stuck to their plan of integrating the Arabs and Indians, but no other ethnic

groups, into the political and administrative system; Indians and Arabs were trained as public employees and obtained important positions. Moreover, the British had formulated the decree of 1897 in favor of the Arab plantation enterprises. Slaves were obliged to sue for their freedom in open court, while slaveholders could claim compensation for the loss in manpower. Since harvesting cloves required a certain degree of training, former slaveholders frequently made efforts to keep their workers by offering them improved working conditions. The British administration, however, despite its demonstrative and vocal antislavery policy, had its eye primarily on productivity and did not stand by the plantation workers.

Economic conditions for the plantation owners deteriorated further at the turn of the century, as the railway construction in Kenya drew away tens of thousands of workers. Starting in 1904–1905, the labor shortage was dealt with by compelling the inhabitants of Zanzibar to work on the plantations. For the British, this forced labor system had not only economic, but also political advantages: they thereby gained firm control over the labor system. Until 1925 the clove exports of Zanzibar and Pemba continued to grow—especially to Europe and the United States, where the useful chemical substance vanillin was distilled from cloves. After 1925, however, the monoculture on the islands was plunged into crisis, as cheaper synthetic substitutes for vanillin were discovered. The worldwide economic depression at the end of the 1920s exacerbated the situation; an attempt to increase the production of copra served only to postpone the catastrophe. The Arab landowners sank ever deeper into debt, while the rural population was impoverished not only through shrinking profits for cloves and copra, but also because, in the years of the export boom, their small fields had literally been squeezed out by the expansion of the plantations. The British administration’s more favorable treatment of the Arabs and Indians drove the wedge between them and the African residents deeper and deeper. The Indians were further divided into Muslims and Hindus; the Africans were divided, roughly speaking, into the *Shirazi*, a term often used for the long-established residents of Zanzibar, and the descendants of the former slaves. As late as 1926 the political franchise was granted only to British and Arabs via an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. The British resident, particularly through the Legislative Council, could exercise strong control over the political fate of the islands. Only in the mid-1950s did a reform of the two councils take place. However, for the local political circles, which were becoming increasingly emancipated in the context of the decolonization in Asia and Africa, this reform was not far-reaching enough. Subsequently, political parties were formed. The first was

the mainly Arab Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1955, whose political program was modeled on the Marxist/Pan-Arabist regime in Egypt; the ZNP elected Sheikh Barwani as its leader. In 1957 the more moderate Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was founded; their leader was Shaykh Abeid Karume. Subsequently the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP) splintered off from the ASP. The British finally agreed to free elections for six of the seats in the Legislative Council. The elections took place in July 1957; five seats were won by the ASP, one by the small Muslim League. The ethnic and political hostility among the parties, however, continued to grow, manifesting itself especially in the form of mutual boycotting of the one party by the other.

The elections of January 1961 produced a deadlock, since, of the 22 seats, ASP and ZNP each occupied 11. New elections took place in June, with the ZNP and ZPPP forming an election coalition. Favored by the voting system, this coalition won 13 seats and the ASP only 10, even though the ASP had the most votes. The ASP smelled electoral fraud; turmoil broke out, leaving 68 people dead. The last preindependence elections, which took place in June 1963, confirmed the results of 1961, even though the ASP again topped the list. In December 1963 Zanzibar became independent under a ZNP/ZPPP government.

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See also: **Tanganyika (Tanzania): Colonial Period, British: "Indirect Rule."**

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Zanzibar: Revolution and Union (Tanzania)

The revolution in Zanzibar occurred on the night of January 11, 1964, just over a month after the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to an independent Zanzibar ruled by the sultan and an elected government. The revolution was ostensibly led by John Okello, a Ugandan

who had arrived in Zanzibar in 1959 via Kenya. In his autobiography, written from a Kenyan prison after the revolution, Okello attributes his action to an internal "voice" that had commanded him, as a Christian, to undertake the mission of freeing Africans from Arab domination.

Arab contact with Zanzibar spans centuries, the first recorded testimony being that of the anonymous Greek traveler who wrote *The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* (c.200CE). Such sustained contact, resulting in trade and intermarriage, forged a bond that was made all the stronger with the introduction of Islam on the East African coast, most probably in the eighth century. Arab and Swahili cultures intermingled, and Islam itself was "Swahilized" and made part of Swahili identity and way of life. But Arabs also ruled the coastline, the latest dynasty being the Busaidi, whose first sultan settled in Zanzibar, establishing it as his capital in 1840. While Arab rule brought prosperity to Zanzibar as a thriving port and commercial center and later as an exporter of cloves, it also set in motion political and socioeconomic trends that eventually proved to be detrimental to its own existence. Not least among these was reliance on slave labor in the plantations; another was the cosmopolitan nature of the city and its attraction to mainland workers and laborers, the bulk of whom were employed on clove plantations, as menials in government departments, as domestic servants in the city, as dock workers, and, perhaps most significant of all, in the police. By 1957, when the first elections took place in Zanzibar, the number of registered, known mainlanders was around 25,000. By that year, too, political consciousness on the islands had begun to freeze racial attitudes. The British had encouraged a division of the people along racial lines, a feature well reflected in the administrative hierarchy, with Europeans at the top, "Arabs" and Indians in the middle, and mainland as well as indigenous Africans at the bottom. Whereas on the mainland (in Tanganyika) political consciousness was clear-cut in its source and direction—as against the British from the African population—the situation on the islands was somewhat more complex. The Sultan, Sayyid Khalifa bin Harub, had been on the throne since 1911. By all accounts, Khalifa was held in genuine affection by the majority of the population; moreover, the sultanate itself had by now become ethnically mixed, like the majority of the so-called Zanzibari Arabs. The identity of the "Arab," the "Swahili," and the "African" was blurred, and yet local politics, overseen by the British, were conducted along ethnic lines. Thus, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was considered an Arab organ and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) as African, though both had members who belonged to more than one of the island's ethnic groups. The situation became even more complex with the subsequent

emergence of two other political parties: the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) and the Umma Party; the latter was said to have leftist, communist leanings and support, and was represented as such in the media.

Events between 1957 and 1963 took the islands further down the road of communal divisions. The ASP had emerged relatively strong from the 1957 elections; it repeated its performance in the elections of January 1961, gaining ten seats to the ZNP's nine. But a tie developed when three members of the third party, the ZNNP, divided their support, two for the ZNP and one for the ASP. The British then enacted a new seat in Pemba and fresh elections were held in June 1961. The ZPPP and the ZNP joined forces and had 13 seats between them to ASP's 10 seats. Shamte of the ZNNP became chief minister, a post he retained even after the election of July 1963, when the ASP gained more votes than the other two parties combined (54 per cent of the electorate to 46 per cent) and had 13 seats to the ZNP's 12 and the ZPPP's 6. The latter two formed a coalition government, taking Zanzibar to independence on December 12, 1963. Okello seized power a month later, toppled the government, and dissolved the sultanate.

The events of the day itself only took a few hours to unfold. Three police stations were captured and their arms taken; the radio station was occupied and Okello made a broadcast as "Field Marshall." Shamte resigned as chief minister and was arrested along with other ZNP ministers. The young Sultan Jamshed, who had succeeded his father six months previously, went into exile with his family. Okello initiated and organized a rule of terror, induced through broadcasts. His position, however, became increasingly precarious as his colleagues began to question his dictatorial behavior, the excesses of terror, and, perhaps most significant, his identity. Just over a month after installing himself as field marshal, Okello had to leave the island permanently on February 20, 1964, ousted by the revolutionary government that was itself now settling into power.

The immediate achievement of the revolution was to revamp the social structure of Zanzibar: most of the British, Indians, and Arabs departed. Some Arabs were eligible to take refuge in Oman, where they were well received; in turn, they served Oman by providing a much-needed middle-level human resource that was well educated and had a good command of English. Left on its own, Zanzibar became inward-looking for a time despite its formal link to Tanganyika. On April 26, 1964, Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerere, as presidents of Zanzibar and Tanganyika respectively, signed the Articles of Union, creating the United Republic of Tanzania. Under the agreement, Zanzibar retained its revolutionary government but also participated in the union government, an arrangement that has intermittently been

subjected to intense debate in both parts of the union. In proposing the union and in offering to Zanzibar what now seems a generous arrangement, Nyerere's aim might have been to assert the independence—or, one might say, the "African-ness"—of Zanzibar. The islands, however, have had their own ethnic dynamics, forged for centuries, which are accommodated within the larger framework of being "Swahili." In this regard, Anthony Clayton's observations are relevant:

The Revolution should not be viewed solely in either class or race terms as an African rising against an Arab establishment. It also manifested a striving for a new identity, neither wholly Arab nor wholly African. In this quest for a Zanzibari identity there is a thread of continuity from Sultan Khalifa to Abeid Karume and in some measure even Ali Muhsin. All had very different concepts of what that Zanzibari identity should be, but all can lay some claim to patriotism. (1981, 115)

FAROUK TOPAN

See also: **Nyerere, Julius; Tanganyika (Tanzania): Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), One-Party Politics.**

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
Zawila: *See* **Sijilmasa, Zawila: Trans-Saharan Trade.**

Zimba: *See* **Maravi: Zimba "Invasions."**

Zimbabwe: Nineteenth Century, Early

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a period of decentralization and fragmentation for the mostly Shona-speaking people of the Zimbabwean plateau. The two large states of the area, the Mutapa and Changamire Rozvi, were already in decline. Mutapa, a once centralized state that had suffered under Portuguese exploitation in the seventeenth century, had transformed into a more federal type of government. During the eighteenth century, the Changamire Rozvi, a state that had emerged in the 1680s and 1690s to drive out the Portuguese, had shifted its base to the southwest,

ZIMBABWE: NINETEENTH CENTURY, EARLY



Zimbabwe.

conquered the old Torwa state, established a capital at Danangombe, and began to absorb the local Kalanga people. However, by the 1820s, the Rozvi were losing territory in their new area to Tswana people arriving from farther to the southwest. In the highlands of the east, the Rozvi withdrawal meant more autonomy for the Manyika Shona who began to move north into the mountainous Nyanga area in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Two major droughts, one from 1795 to 1800 and another from 1824 to 1829, contributed to political instability and disrupted long established trade with the Portuguese posts of Sena and Tete along the Zambezi River. As the Portuguese demand shifted from gold to slaves, the people of the eastern part of what is now Zimbabwe began to experience the horrors of slave raiding. The early nineteenth century saw the decline of the long established tradition of gold mining in the Zimbabwe area. With the decline of central governments, the many small states of the Shona people concentrated primarily on agriculture and some ivory trading.

The movement of the Changamire Rozvi to the southwest resulted in a power vacuum in the south and a subsequent land grab in that area. In the early eighteenth century, many small groups of Karanga Shona had begun to move from their homes in the northeast to establish themselves in the south. Later in the eighteenth century, other Shona peoples from various areas moved into the southern region once controlled by the Rozvi. The old state of Buhera, which might have dated back to the time of Great Zimbabwe

(c.1200–1450), continued to survive in a fragmented form but lost considerable ground to the Njanja, who were moving in from the lower Zambesi Valley. One of the first new and large polities in that area was the Duma Confederation, a loose collection of small states each of which retained considerable autonomy, which had settled the fertile land of the Bikita Highlands. However, Duma quickly came under pressure from other new Shona-speaking arrivals and began to lose the fringes of its territory. Around 1800, the Tsonga-speaking Hlengwe pushed up the lowland rivers of the southeast and absorbed Shona people already living there. In the far south, at roughly the same time, groups of Venda speakers were crossing north of the Limpopo River to settle on the Zimbabwean Low Veld, and to the southwest, various Sotho people were doing the same thing. The political landscape of the south became dominated by many small chiefdoms; this was reflected by the dropping of the prestigious royal title of *mambo* in favor of the less pretentious *ishe*. This decentralization meant that the large capital town, typical of previous Shona states, became less common in the south. The practice of giving tribute to rulers also declined—except in Duma, where it survived to a limited extent. In addition, the old practice of granting ward to royal wives and sisters was discontinued.

In the early nineteenth century, Shona religion, particularly in the south, began to develop new complexities involving combinations of old and new beliefs. Previously, the Shona had revered ancestral spirits with religious organization centered on the spirits of former rulers. Around the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mediums of spirits (such as Chaminuka, Kaguvi, and Nehanda) not all connected to local ruling lineages, began to gain popularity. This might be explained by the decline of the more powerful royal families. In the eighteenth century, Shona speakers from Rozvi had moved south of the Limpopo River to set up the new Singo state among the Venda. There, the Rozvi belief in a high god called Mwari syncretized with the Venda cave cult of Raluvhimba. In the early nineteenth century, Singo collapsed and its Shona rulers were assimilated into Venda society. Subsequently, when the Venda began to move north, they brought with them a new set of religious beliefs, and the cave shrines of the Matopo Hills were established, which gradually became popular throughout the south and southwest. Additionally, religious organizations based on rain charms began to spread that might have been related to the droughts of the period.

In the early 1830s, a series of invasions by Ngoni speakers from the far south passed through the Zimbabwe plateau area. While the Ngoni of Zwangendaba and others damaged the Rozvi state, they moved north of

the Zambesi in 1835. The Ndebele of Mzilikazi, however, broke Rozvi power by settling in the southwest around the Mutopos in the late 1830s. Rozvi resistance to the expansion of the Ndebele Kingdom continued up to the 1860s. Nguni raiders under Shoshangane, who actually drove out earlier Ngoni intruders under Nxaba, set up a similar state in the eastern highlands in 1836 but after suffering from smallpox they moved to the southeast in 1838 to establish the Gaza state between the Sabi and Limpopo Rivers. Unlike the Ndebele, who absorbed many of the local Kalanga people of the southwest and stayed in that area, the Gaza state could never achieve the same type of stability because it moved around a number of times in the mid- to late nineteenth century.

TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON

See also: Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rozvi.

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Zimbabwe: Incursions from the South, Ngoni and Ndebele

Up to the 1830s, the southwest region of present-day Zimbabwe was dominated by a long succession of Shona-speaking cultures and states. Until this period, the main population group of the area was the Kalanga branch of the Shona. By the late 1600s, the Changamire Rozvi, a Shona state based in the northeast, had taken over this area, with the immigrants gradually being absorbed into the Kalanga population. In the 1820s the Rozvi were losing territory in the southwest to the expanding Tswana and to the southeast to the expanding Tsonga. To add to these troubles, in the mid- to late 1830s this area experienced repeated invasions by Nguni- and Sotho-speaking groups originating south of the Limpopo River in what is now South Africa.

The causes of these incursions in southern Africa during the 1820s and 1830s have been hotly debated by historians. An expanding Zulu state, drought, and colonial-sponsored raiding have all be identified as possible reasons why large groups of people went north in this period, moving as far as present-day Malawi and southern Tanzania.

Ngoni refers to groups of northern Nguni (Zulu)-speaking people under leaders such as Zwangendaba, Ngwana Maseko, and Nyamazana that moved north of the Limpopo sometime in the early 1830s. The main advantage of the Ngoni was their military system of age regiments that cut across local affiliations and made it easier to assimilate conquered people. Using their short, stabbing spears and shock tactics, the Ngoni raided the Rozvi for cattle and other types of food. They even killed the Rozvi *mambo* (ruler) Chirisamhuru. While the Ngoni raiders did do damage, Rozvi resistance ultimately pushed them farther north and east, and their main body of several thousand crossed the Zambesi River in 1835.

The arrival of the Ndebele, another group of northern Nguni speakers from south of the Limpopo, had a more lasting impact on the area. Under the leadership of Mzilikazi, what would become the nucleus of the Ndebele state left the Pongola River area in the early 1820s and moved north of the Drakensberg Mountains. For at least a decade the Ndebele were the major power of the South African Highveld and assimilated many Sotho speakers into their ranks. In 1836 and 1837 they were defeated by parties of Boer trekkers moving north from the Cape Colony; at this point they moved farther north across the Limpopo. During this move the Ndebele split into two groups, the smaller under Mzilikazi and the larger under Gundwane, with the intention of meeting up again. In 1838–1839, Gundwane's group arrived in the Umzingwani Valley and faced stiff resistance from the local Rozvi. However, when reinforced by the arrival of Mzilikazi's group, the Ndebele came to dominate the area. Unlike the Ngoni, the Ndebele did not terrorize and raid the Kalanga people, who they came to rely on for supplies of grain. Mzilikazi took over from the Rozvi as the ruler of the local Kalanga population. Since a large number of Rozvi cattle had been taken by the Ngoni, the Rozvi even agreed to provide the Ndebele with young men, who would be incorporated into their regiments, in exchange for borrowed livestock, which they cared for in exchange for milk. This relationship obviously favored the Ndebele, as they could reclaim their cattle if the Rozvi displeased them, but the Rozvi could not reclaim their young men.

Frustrated by the loss of their young men to Mzilikazi, the Rozvi in the early 1850s attempted to regain their power in the region by raiding Ndebele territory. The Ndebele counterattacked and ravaged the Rozvi state during the great raids of 1854–1855 that ultimately led to the Rozvi surrender of 1857. However, because Mzilikazi had found it difficult to storm the Rozvi mountain strongholds he could not extend his power to the northeast. Throughout the 1860s the Ndebele continued to raid Shona groups, and in 1866 they once

again defeated the Rozvi, who were now a spent force. This gave the Ndebele a strong position over the regional trade network, and during the 1870s they were at the height of their power, with many Shona tributary states.

By 1879, various Shona states had acquired a significant number of guns through the ivory trade and through working in the diamond mines south of the Limpopo. As the Portuguese began to expand west from Mozambique, they also supplied the Shona with firearms. This made the Shona hill strongholds much more easily defensible against Ndebele raids, and from that point on the regional power of the Ndebele state, now under Mzilikazi's son Lobengula, declined. By the late 1880s the Ndebele could no longer raid far to the northeast into the central Shona country.

Colonial writers falsely claimed that the Ndebele dominated and raided the Shona throughout the mid- to late 1800s. This theory originated from propaganda by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), Cecil Rhodes's chartered company, which fraudulently obtained a concession from Lobengula in 1888 that gave it the right to occupy Mashonaland. Although the Ndebele king had no authority over most of this area save a few tributary states on his border, the BSAC position in what became the colony of Southern Rhodesia was based on the belief that he did. Colonial propaganda also sought to legitimize the colonization of Mashonaland by claiming that it saved the Shona people from the depredations of Ndebele raids.

TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON

See also: Difaqane on the Highveld; Lozi Kingdom and the Kololo; Shaka and Zulu Kingdom, 1810–1840; Torwa, Changamire Dombo, and the Rovzi; Zambia: Ngoni Incursion from the South.

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Zimbabwe: 1880s

The history of Zimbabwe in the 1880s has been clouded by a number of potent myths. Contemporary descriptions by imperialists, arguing the supposed benefits of the Pax Britannica, propounded the myth of the warlike Ndebele state in the west parasitically raiding

the agriculturally productive but cowardly Shona to the east. Postindependence accounts by cultural nationalists have sought to bolster the project of nation building by asserting a precolonial unity for the Shona, an organic totality of religion and politics. But precolonial Zimbabwean identities were far more complex than these simple caricatures, and they interacted with equally diverse regional economies.

The Shona, who comprised two-thirds of the population, lived predominantly on the plateau. The term *Shona* had no tribal meaning at this stage; there was neither a Shona consciousness prior to the twentieth century, nor a single Shona political entity. The term thus makes more sense as the delineation of a cultural and linguistic zone whose members shared a common language and attitude to religion and politics. Shona speakers were oriented in different directions by military and trading links and adherence to different territorial cults, such as the Mwari cult in the west or the Dzivaguru/Karuva cult in the northeast. The Shona understood themselves as members of polities with shifting boundaries. There were 200 or more of these polities, of varying sizes and strengths. Territories like Nhowe or Maungwe were 43 miles (70 kilometers) across, while the smallest were as little as 6 miles (10 kilometers) wide, composed of no more than a few settlements. While some were relatively new and fragile, others could be two or three centuries old.

The plateau and surrounding lowlands were overshadowed by two African superpowers, the Gaza state in the east, in what is today Mozambique, and the Ndebele in the southwest, who were the second largest Zimbabwean language group. Although the Ndebele state was larger and more organized than any Shona polity, its identity was no less fluid. The Ndebele had come into existence through the assimilation of various peoples migrating from the extended political and military conflict in southern Africa, often termed *mfecane*. Sixty per cent of Ndebele were of Shona origin, the rest being Nguni and Sotho.

There were also other smaller, but important, language groups living in the tsetse-infested lowlands beyond the plateau, such as the Zambezi Tonga, Tavara, and Chikunda in the north, the Sena in the northeast, the Hlengwe and Tsonga in the southeast, and the Venda in the south.

The Ndebele, whose territory was too arid for dependence on agriculture, relied more on pastoralism. Although the Ndebele did raid, a large portion of the Zimbabwean plateau lay outside the range of either Ndebele or Gaza warriors. More important, by the 1880s Ndebele power over its tributaries, such as the Chivi and Hwata, had begun to diminish as these peoples acquired guns and asserted their independence. Nevertheless, the Ndebele culture held a remarkable

appeal for their Shona neighbors—particularly young men, who preferred a life of raiding, beef-eating, and increased access to women to a more circumscribed existence under their own patriarchs. But, given that political power lay in controlling cattle, women and trade as a means of amassing male clients, the “big men” who dominated Zimbabwean politics, all engaged in raiding. Raids by the independent Shona polities in the east such as the Makoni, Mutasa, and Mutoko—on each other and their neighbors—were a common occurrence. Hence, the majority of Zimbabwean settlements sought the added security of hilltop locations, or behind wooden stockades on the lowlands.

The varied pattern of cultures, resources, and technologies created specific regional economies. On the Save River were the Njanja iron workers and hoe traders. This renowned group of Shona craftsmen had developed a complex trading network that closely mirrored their marriage links. To the west, the Shangwe sold tobacco. Their home area, the Mafungabusi Plateau, was also famous for salt production. The Banyubi who lived in the Matopos hills produced a grain surplus for trade with the Ndebele. But these specializations were not of a scale to support whole communities. Diversification was the key to survival, and these trades were important supplements to agriculture and pastoralism, particularly in time of drought.

By the 1880s, Zimbabwe’s regional economies were integrated into the wider network of British and Afrikaner economies to the south and those of the Portuguese to the east. From the late 1860s the Ndebele were trading cattle with the Kimberly mines, and this trade increased with the rise of the Transvaal mines in the 1880s. By 1880, the Shona near Chivero had begun to craft iron for tourists. Other goods drew European traders into Zimbabwe. In the east, the Portuguese had a well-established network of trading posts for the purchase of quills filled with gold dust, though this trade in alluvial gold was declining. To the south, other Europeans came in search of ivory, known as “white gold.” Ivory trading proved so lucrative that the Ndebele organized state ivory hunts. But excessive hunting by whites and blacks meant that this trade was also in decline. The cloth, beads, copper wire, and guns received in exchange for Zimbabwean commodities were important sources of power, status, and social mobility. A young man with a gun could kill an elephant and use the ivory to circumvent bride price or bride service.

Mercantilism was being supplemented by capitalist relations. As men in the south migrated to the South African mines, the Shona in the east worked as regular carriers for Portuguese traders and adventurers. By the 1880s, governments and companies were taking an active interest in the region. Concession hunters flooded across the Limpopo, attempting to secure a stake

in what they hoped would be a “second Rand.” In 1889 the Portuguese Companhia de Moçambique attempted to secure the allegiance of the central Shona by giving them guns and ammunition when they flew the Portuguese flag. This short-lived attempt at Portuguese colonization was thwarted a year later by the arrival of Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company on the Zimbabwean Plateau.

DAVID MAXWELL

See also: Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia; Rudd Concession, 1888.

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Ndebele and Shona Risings: First Chimurenga

Despite the victory of the European settlers and British South Africa Company forces over the Ndebele in 1893, the white grip on Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) remained weak. The years between 1893 and 1896 were fraught with difficulties. Whites, operating on the assumption that almost all cattle in the Ndebele kingdom belonged to the king, seized the herds as “reparations” for the war. Perhaps as many as 200,000 cattle, 80 per cent of all the Ndebele herds, were appropriated in this way. Plans were formed to resettle the Ndebele into two reserves, Gwai and Shangani, which were areas of poor soil with very little water resources. Although this resettlement never actually took place, many Ndebele were dispossessed of their land by white settlers. Bulawayo became a European town, soon to be a railhead and a very important center of white power. Tensions between the Ndebele and the Shona were heightened by the manner in which Shona men were recruited into the police force and, perhaps not unnaturally, sometimes roughly handled their former Ndebele masters. Moreover, both Ndebele and Shona were pressed into forced labor gangs both for public works and to help white farmers develop their farms. Violent reprisals were also carried out against

villages, mainly in Mashonaland, whose inhabitants were alleged to have harbored thieves.

In addition to all of these grievances, a sequence of environmental disasters hit the region. There were seasons of drought. Locusts swarmed to an extent not seen for many years. Rinderpest, a cattle disease brought by Europeans to northeastern Africa, ravaged both the cattle and the game of the territory. Europeans attempted to control the disease by shooting healthy cattle, a measure that had little effect and naturally seemed preposterously destructive to the Africans. In time of famine, Africans had been accustomed to turn to game for relief, but European hunters and settlers had destroyed most of the game near human settlements, and rinderpest had a devastating effect on buffalo and all the larger antelopes, the most important sources of meat. In the midst of all of this distress, the Ndebele in early 1896 heard the news that the administrator, Dr. L. S. Jameson, had withdrawn almost all of the British South Africa police to Bechuanaland in preparation for what would be his notorious raid upon the Transvaal.

Frederick Selous, a celebrated hunter and author who had been the guide for the Pioneer Column in 1890, had acquired a vast estate called Essexvale, south of Bulawayo. He recounted how the Ndebele induna, Umlugulu, who was a neighbor, visited him and took a particular interest in Jameson's raid and his arrest in the Transvaal in January 1896. By March of that year some Ndebele communities rose in revolt. Many Europeans were killed and the others rapidly retreated to laagers in the towns. In June the revolt spread to Mashonaland. This was unexpected, and devastating to the whites who assumed that the Shona people were relieved at being released from the Ndebele yoke. Imperial troops arrived both from the south, via Bechuanaland, and from the east, via Mozambique, to help save the company and its beleaguered settlers. Cecil Rhodes and the new administrator, Albert (the future Earl) Grey, met in Rhodesia and a series of indabas was held with the Ndebele indunas in the Matopos Hills in September and October of 1896. Peace was made, as were concessions to the Ndebele, but the Shona revolt continued into 1897 and was extinguished without similar peace negotiations. One in every ten of the settlers had been killed and the entire future of white Rhodesia seemed to be in doubt.

The Colonial Office appointed the commissioner of Swaziland, Sir Richard Martin, to conduct an enquiry into the Ndebele revolt and his report turned out to be a searching and lengthy document. Martin's report suggested that the Ndebele political and regimental system had not been adequately destroyed (from the white point of view) in the 1893 war, but went on to condemn the company's methods with regard to forced

labor, concessions, and policing, as well as suggesting that the native administration under Jameson had been totally inadequate. Grey did his best to defend the company and in doing so chose to create what for him was an irrational explanation for the revolt. He suggested that it had been stimulated by the *Mlimo*, the Shona supreme being who had been incorporated into the Ndebele cosmology, and priests (whom he called "witch doctors") and mediums associated with these religious systems.

Subsequent historians have developed these two aspects of the Martin Report. It has been suggested that the supposed unity demonstrated in the revolt had its origins in the emergence of new religious figures who were able to substitute for the inadequacies of the political systems and forge joint action between the Ndebele and the Shona. Others have argued that patterns of disunity are just as important. Some Ndebele indunas and their regiments remained loyal to the whites, facilitating the arrival of the imperial troops from the south. The Shona rose in a very patchy way, connected with their former relations with the Ndebele and with the degree to which white oppression had hit them. Following Martin, it has been argued that traditional Ndebele political networks remained in place, that one of the key moments was the inauguration in the Matopos of Nyamanda, son of Lobengula, as king during the revolt. The religious dimensions thus sanctified rather than stimulated or led the revolt.

The effects of the revolt were to be widespread and highly significant. The hands of the enemies of the company, among the missionary and humanitarian factions in London, as well as the settlers themselves, were to be greatly strengthened. But the company survived, albeit under stricter controls from London. The settlers were given representation on a legislative council and this can be seen as the origins of white rule that secured responsible government in 1923 and ultimately led to a unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in 1965. For Africans, the revolt remained a potent memory. Its brutal suppression in many areas helped to channel politics into new forms, but when the guerrilla resistance to Smith developed in the 1970s, it was seen as a second *chimurenga* in direct succession to the first. Modern politicians sought to connect themselves to the earlier revolt and after independence in 1980; the heroes of resistance were seen as embracing both those of the 1890s and the 1970s. The historical record is more complex, and patterns of collaboration with—as much as those of resistance to—the whites need to be understood.

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See also: Jameson Raid, Origins of South African War: 1895–1899; Resistance to Colonialism; Rhodes, Cecil J.; Rhodes, Jameson, and the Seizure of Rhodesia.

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Colonial Period: Land, Tax, Administration

The colonization of Zimbabwe began with the signing of infamous Rudd Concession of 1888. Charles Rudd and his party had been sent by the diamond magnate and imperialist Cecil Rhodes to compel Lobengula, the King of Amandebele, to sign a treaty giving exclusive rights for Rhodes to take over Lobengula's country. Soon after the signing of the Rudd Concession, Rhodes obtained a royal charter from England to administer, on behalf of the queen, the colony of Rhodesia—so named after him. He called this administration the British South Africa Company (BSAC).

The colonial period of Zimbabwe therefore can be divided into four phases, that of the British South Africa Company (1890–1923); responsible government (1953–1963), the federation (1953–1963), and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965–1980). During all these phases the white settler community of colonial Zimbabwe was in control of all aspects of the country, land economy, and politics.

Having established itself in 1890, the BSAC administration proceeded to appropriate African land, when the rumored El Dorado (land of riches), the premise upon which southern Rhodesia had been “founded,” became illusory. The Pioneer Column, having hoisted the Union Jack in northeast Zimbabwe, started to appropriate Vashona lands when hopes of gold findings turned into frustrations and dreams. The year 1893 saw a war between Amandebele and the BSAC. When settlers turned to Amandebele country for minerals and found none or few, they nonetheless appropriated Amandebele land. Realizing the loss of their country to BSAC through trickery by the Rudd Concession, the Amandebele went to war with the settlers; the Amandebele lost.

From 1893 to 1923 the BSAC appropriated more African land, both in Amandebele and Vashona territories. The company also took African cattle, demanded African labor to work in the farms that had been pegged out by settlers, and demanded tax that had to be

paid in European currency, thereby forcing the Africans to provide wage labor. The company further proceeded to demarcate African land, shelving Africans into reserves—generally areas that were less fertile and tsetse-infested, resulting in overcrowdedness and the further depletion of soils. The reserves generally impoverished Africans, placing them under wage labor in order to pay the required tax. Hut and poll taxes were required from Africans and had to be paid in monetary terms and not in kind.

Some Africans were encouraged to stay on European farms as “tenants,” but this would mean that they had to offer free labor to the landlords in return for staying in settler-owned land. Generally, the era of the company was exploitative and oppressive culminating in the first *chimurenga* wars of 1896–1897, ostensibly fought because Africans were against land appropriation, labor demands, and exorbitant taxes.

When responsible government replaced company rule in 1923, it inherited an administration, land, and tax systems that discriminated against Africans. It did very little to redress the situation. In fact, it compounded the problem by not only keeping the tax system but by introducing and legislating the infamous Land Apportionment Act of 1930. This act was a result of the Morris Carter Commission of 1925, charged with the responsibility of determining the “practicability of limiting the rights of acquisition of land to [natives] and Europeans.” The commission set the stage for a racially divided society because it recommended a racial division of land in the country. The Land Apportionment Act did not protect the interests of the Africans, as was often argued; rather, it entrenched what the settlers often wanted—a racial division of land and eventually division of the whole country along racial lines.

Of the 96 million acres in the colony, 10 million were set aside as national land; 40 million were set aside for Africans and dubbed “tribal” trust lands; 4 million were designated as “native purchase areas”; 6 million were open to all races in the country; and 36 million were open exclusively to Europeans. The tribal trust lands were often infertile and the 4 million acres of native purchase land desperately failed to take account of the population of Africans.

Throughout the era of responsible government to the time of federation, the administration was based on racial lines that for the most part favored the settlers, as predicated by the Land Apportionment Act. In fact, the settlers exerted pressure on the government to institute a legislation that made it impossible for individual land to be sold to “Asiatics” and “natives” within exclusive settler communities. The result was that the Land Apportionment Act was reenacted in 1941 with even more rigid conditions for Africans. The Animal

Husbandry Act of 1951, stipulating the restricted number of livestock Africans had to own and the amount of land they should occupy, simply compounded the problem of land ownership in Zimbabwe.

The federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland did very little to change administration, land, and tax issues. During this era, exceptions were made whenever Europeans saw fit and when convenience suited their situations. Africans were, for example, allowed to reside on European farms, mines, and even homesteads because labor could be conveniently accessed. Towns fell within European areas but because African labor was so much needed, townships or “locations” were set aside for Africans so that labor could easily be available.

Throughout the federation period, the settlers tried to pursue policies that appeared to accommodate African interests, but still the general administration of southern Rhodesia, land reforms and tax issues continued to be dictated by the settlers. The Africans rose and opposed the federation because it had failed to address African interests, particularly land and the general politics of the country.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), made in 1965 by Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front reversed whatever mild changes the federation had intended. The Rhodesia Front ticket endorsed a racially divided society and saw to it that old acts such as Land Apportionment and Industrial Conciliation Act (which discouraged Africans from competing for jobs with Europeans) were reinstated. In 1967 the leader of the Rhodesia Front, Ian Smith, declared that his government strove for a system that acknowledged different community rights, interests, and freedoms. He was in fact proclaiming a racially divided country, with all aspects of the society, economy, land, tax, administration, and politics dictated by the minority settler community. This state of affairs was bitterly challenged by African nationalists and liberation movements until independence in 1980. At the end of the century, the disproportionate division of land along racial lines remained the most contentious issue in Zimbabwean politics.

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See also: **White Settler Factor: Economic and Political.**

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): African Political and Trades Union Movements, 1920s and 1930s

Mainly urban-based black political and industrial organizations, developed steadily in Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s and early 1930s, suffered significant setbacks during the Great Depression (1931–1934), but rallied with the establishment of the Bantu Congress, progenitor of the first truly nationalist party, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC), in 1938.

Initial postwar political activity was stimulated by economic inequality and the exemplar provided by the white settler campaign to secure self-government, which was achieved in 1923. Three predominantly urban-based associations emerged: the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (RBVA), the (Southern) Rhodesia Native Association (RNA) and the Gwelo (later Southern Rhodesia) Native Welfare Association. All three were moderate politically, and tiny in membership terms: the RBVA spoke for a constituency of about 50 registered black voters, mostly of South African origin. The RNA, based in Harare, had a predominantly local Shona membership, comprising “advanced” farmers and teachers. Although all three bodies took up popular grievances such as taxation and cattle dip fees, they were essentially elitist in character and advocated what Terence Ranger has termed “the politics of participation.” An investigation of the very few occasions when the various association leaders apparently overstepped the mark shows that it was often the result of overreaction by unduly sensitive or innately suspicious Native Department officials, rather than some conscious design.

The overwhelming majority of black Zimbabweans were little affected by the activities of these predominantly urban-based organizations. Much more significant for the Ndebele was the campaign for the restoration of the Ndebele monarchy, abolished upon occupation in 1894, and an amelioration of the land problem in Matabeleland. In 1929 the Matabele Home Society was formed, bringing together the traditional and modern Ndebele elite. Christian and non-Christian chiliastic movements emerged at sporadic intervals from World War I onward, and at various stages articulated the political and economic grievances, as well as the fears and expectations, of their followers. In 1923, Watchtower adherents at Hwange spread rumors that

“America” (perceived to be a black nation) would defeat Britain and liberate Africa. Apart from occasional millennialist prophecies, and complaints to officials at meetings about taxation, low cattle prices, and other such grievances, the rural areas as such seemingly remained quiescent in the interwar period.

In contrast, urban trade union activity took a much more radical turn. The Shamva gold mine, located to the north of Harare, became a prime center of black industrial militancy, with a boycott of European-owned stores in 1920, a work stoppage in 1922, and the first major strike by black workers in September 1927, which the authorities suppressed with the use of force. The presence of non-Zimbabwean miners, many with South African experience, seems to have been an important precipitating factor.

Similarly, South Africa provided the inspiration for the biggest black trade union/political association operating between the wars, the Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union of Rhodesia (IICU). This was launched by Robert Sambo, a relative of its founder in South Africa, Clements Kadali, in early 1927. Two local personalities, destined to become important figures in Zimbabwean labor history, Masotsha Ndhlovu and Charles Mzingeli, took over control after Sambo’s deportation. In contrast to its South African parent, the IICU called no strikes and concentrated instead on developing black awareness and mass support. It held regular meetings each weekend in the black townships of Bulawayo and Harare, attended on average by about 500, at which speakers denounced Native Department officials as oppressors and condemned the way black people were being treated by employers and white people generally. The government retaliated by charging its leaders with “criminal slander” of officials, but otherwise did not intervene, a comparative tolerance that evaporated when the IICU began to filter into rural areas and take up local grievances, especially in Ndebele districts like Flilabusi. At length, Native Department officials put pressure on local traditional leaders to outlaw union activity, and Ndhlovu was imprisoned in 1932 for holding an unauthorized meeting in a black reserve. The onset of the Great Depression severely weakened the IICU; membership fell away as people were unable to pay their dues, and after an argument about the use of funds it became defunct in 1936.

Although Mzingeli managed to revive the union as the Reformed ICU after the war, a more lasting contribution to political development was made by other leaders in the late 1930s. In 1928, the first meeting of the Missionary Conference of Native Christians had taken place. Influenced by radical white missionaries like Arthur Shearly Cripps and John White, the conference became an important mouthpiece for “respectable” African opinion, expressing views, couched in temper-

ate language, on a variety of matters affecting ordinary Africans. By the mid-1930s, a generation of local, Christianized Africans, often based in the new black purchase areas, had emerged, with individuals such as Thompson Samkange, Aaron Jacha, and Solomon Chavunduka. Many were members of such organizations as the RNA and RBVA, a consideration that persuaded them to advocate unity at a meeting of organizations that met in 1936. The outcome of this was the creation of the Bantu Congress in April 1938. By fits and starts, this became the first truly nationalist party, the Southern Rhodesia ANC, in the later 1950s.

By the outbreak of war, some progress had been made in establishing an African voice in Southern Rhodesia, although with a few exceptions such as the IICU, that voice was essentially deferential. Most black leaders were in effect trying to win acceptance from white society, operating from the standpoint that those who had become “civilized” men (as defined by the Colony’s founder, Cecil Rhodes, at the end of the previous century) could reasonably expect to be accepted by that society. This hope was to be disappointed with the move of colonial Zimbabwe toward fuller segregation in the 1930s. However, it was only after 1945 that political (and in particular trade union) activity became militant in deed as well as in word.

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See also: **Trades Unionism and Nationalism.**

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Urbanization and Conflict, 1940s

During the 1940s, rapid urbanization in Southern Rhodesia attracted a large African population into the colony’s cities for the first time. Forced off of their rural homelands by overcrowding, and drawn to the cities by the economic development that accompanied World War II, these new urban immigrants found themselves confronted with segregation and economic exploitation. African protests against the problems of urban living culminated in rallies against racial segregation in 1946 and a general strike in 1948.

The large-scale migration of Africans from rural to urban areas during the 1940s had its roots in the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. This legislation divided the colony into "European" and "native" areas. It had the dual effect of expropriating large tracts of arable land from African farmers while denying Africans the legal right to establish residency in the "European" urban areas.

However, by the early 1940s the provisions of the Land Apportionment Act had become unenforceable. The reserves set aside for African communal farming proved inadequate to support the growing population, driving many landless workers to the expanding urban areas of Salisbury and Bulawayo. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 provided a tremendous boost to the colony's urban economy. The capital, Salisbury, became a major training ground for the Royal Air Force, and the war economy encouraged the development of light industry there and in other major cities. After the war the boom continued, as European immigrants poured into the colony. These new settlers brought capital and skills, further spurring economic growth and providing employment for many Africans in domestic service. The booming colonial cities drew thousands of African workers off of the reserves. Between 1936 and 1946 the African populations of the colony's largest cities grew from 45,000 to over 99,000. According to the provisions of the 1931 act, however, these new immigrants were in the cities illegally. In 1941 the Southern Rhodesian government amended the Land Apportionment Act in recognition of the fact that African workers were a permanent fixture of the urban economy. The amendment encouraged local authorities to develop "native" urban areas for the growing African workforce. In 1946 the passage of the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act required urban employers to provide free housing for their African employees within the native urban areas. This act also included provisions for stringent pass laws designed to control the influx of Africans into urban areas. Though the act recognized the rights of African workers to live in the cities, legally urban Africans remained transients, and were permitted to remain in urban areas only so long as they were employed. If fired, or upon retirement, they were expected to return to the rural areas. While working in the cities Africans were required to live in designated neighborhoods such as Highfields in Salisbury or Mzilikazi in Bulawayo. Segregated from the European sections of the cities, these areas suffered from overcrowding, few social services, poorly developed infrastructure, and frequent harassment from the police.

The 1946 act proved widely unpopular among urban Africans; in response to its passage of the act the trade union leader Charles Mzingeli convened a rally against

the measure in the Harare township of Salisbury. Though the provisions of the act were ultimately carried out with little or no regard to African opinion, the rallies of 1946 marked a watershed in the history of the colony. They represented the first organized protest against government policy since the conquest of the colony in the 1890s. The Salisbury rallies were followed in April of 1948 by a general strike among workers in the largest cities of the colony. The strike was organized by two trade union leaders, Benjamin Burumbo and Jasper Savanhu, and began among the African municipal workers of the city of Bulawayo. Though the immediate grievance of the workers was the low wages paid by the city government, the generally dire conditions of urban Africans throughout the colony encouraged workers throughout the city, and in Salisbury, to strike as well. The strike lasted several days, and involved African workers from many professions in both Bulawayo and Salisbury. It ultimately ended in defeat for the strikers, as the wage gains promised by the government were viewed by most workers as inadequate. However, like the Harare protests of 1946, the general strike of 1948 set a precedent for concerted action against the state that foreshadowed the political conflict that would characterize the late 1950s.

By the end of the 1940s the Southern Rhodesian government had recognized that the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 had become unworkable. The overcrowding of the reserves and the agitation of the African urban population convinced the settler government to take further steps to resolve the land issue. In the late 1940s the government began drafting legislation intended to stabilize the urban population and to ameliorate the overcrowding and environmental degradation that plagued rural areas. Passed in 1951, the Native Land Husbandry Act sought to alleviate the problems of the reserves by transforming communally held lands into private property and destocking African herds. This act also attempted to end the migration to and from the cities by requiring urban workers to abandon any claims to property in rural areas. With this one piece of legislation the Southern Rhodesian government managed to threaten the livelihood of people on the reserves and in the cities. The act rescinded the rights of urban workers to hold land in the rural areas, which had provided a needed supplement to low urban wages and offered the only hope for social security in old age. The passage of the act inspired tremendous resistance among urban and rural Africans, and inaugurated a new phase in nationalist politics in the colony.

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See also: **Nkomo, Joshua; Samkange, Rev. D. T.; Urbanization: Colonial Context.**

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation

Between 1953 and 1963, the British government united the colonies of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland into the Central African Federation. Though the federation proved a boon for white settlers in the Rhodesias, it profited its African subjects very little. In 1963 the British government dissolved the federation after Africans in the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland voted overwhelmingly for independence.

Settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia began seriously discussing amalgamating their territories during the 1930s. Their aim was to combine the mineral wealth of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt with the agricultural resources of Southern Rhodesia to create a wealthy, settler-dominated state. In 1945, after the conclusion of World War II, Roy Welensky, the leader of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, and Sir Godfrey Huggins, the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, began lobbying the British Colonial Office to support amalgamation. However the Labour Party government in London feared that the creation of a unitary state would place Africans in the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia at the mercy of the settler-ruled government of Southern Rhodesia, and rejected the suggestion. Proponents of amalgamation then began promoting the confederation of the two Rhodesias, arguing that a federation could create a strong state and still protect the interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Their plan became increasingly attractive to the British government after Daniel F. Malan's Afrikaner National Party took power in South Africa in 1948. Fearing the absorption of Southern Rhodesia into the apartheid state to its south, in 1953 the British government agreed to permit the two Rhodesias to federate if they would include the small and impoverished colony of Nyasaland (modern Malawi). Later in the same year the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was formed, with Sir Godfrey Huggins as its first prime

minister. The new state had a parliament, with representatives elected from all three of the territories. Though whites dominated the legislature, the federal constitution reserved a handful of seats for African representatives. The federal government took control of a variety of responsibilities that affected all three colonies, including defense, immigration and emigration, external affairs, customs, income tax, and the postal service. The territorial governments retained control of all other responsibilities, including, significantly, "native affairs" and law and order.

Colonial officials made little effort to consult African opinion on the subject of federation. While a few African leaders, including Southern Rhodesia's Joshua Nkomo, voiced lukewarm support for federation, most boycotted the conferences leading up to its creation, fearing that it would allow the segregationist policies of Southern Rhodesia to take root in their colonies. In 1949 Hastings Banda, a Nyasa doctor, and Northern Rhodesian Trade Union leader Harry Nkumbula prepared an influential memo outlining their objections to federation.

Proponents of federation promised that it would benefit Africans and white settlers alike. In the eyes of many settlers this promise was fulfilled. The early years of federation saw the continuation of an economic boom in the region that had begun during the late 1940s. Prosperity continued to attract white colonists from South Africa and Great Britain, especially to Southern Rhodesia. Though economic growth slowed during the final years of the 1950s, most of the settlers associated federation with an increase in material prosperity. Economic growth allowed the new government to develop the region's infrastructure, and between 1953 and 1963 the federal government built the Kariba Dam, the National Archives, and expanded the rail and road networks within the three colonies.

The benefits for Africans were less apparent. Supporters of federation insisted that it would introduce partnership between blacks and whites in the region. The federation did bring some improvements to the position of Africans in colonial society, particularly in Southern Rhodesia; there some segregationist laws were relaxed, and the government established the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, as a multiracial institution. But such advances were largely cosmetic: de facto segregation continued in Southern Rhodesia, and the university only admitted eight African students in its first class. Otherwise the federal government upheld the colonial social and economic orders, and made little effort to include Africans in the political process. It took no steps to curb the inexorable process of land alienation by the Southern Rhodesian

government or to encourage wage equality among black and white workers in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines.

After 1956 a series of crises combined to threaten the future of the federation. In 1956 the British government suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat in the Suez Crisis, which revealed the limitations of imperial power. The following year the Gold Coast became the first British colony in Africa to achieve independence. Then, in 1960, the Belgian government in Congo, the federation's neighbor to the north, suddenly abandoned the colony, precipitating a crisis that threatened to destabilize the region. Against this backdrop, African national consciousness within the federal territories developed rapidly. In 1958, Banda in Nyasaland, and Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia, began organizing protests against the federation. The following year Nkomo led similar protests in Southern Rhodesia. Clashes between supporters of Banda's Congress party and federal troops resulted in a state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Shortly thereafter Northern Rhodesian authorities arrested Kaunda and banned his party. Government repression soon reestablished colonial authority in all three territories. However, the spectacle of colonial troops fighting to preserve the federation severely undermined the credibility of the federal government. A British report on the disturbances issued in 1960 characterized Nyasaland as a police state and turned public opinion in Britain against the federation. The British government stepped in and granted Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the right to vote on the future of the federation. Africans in both colonies voted overwhelmingly to become independent nations. In 1964 they achieved independence as the new states of Malawi and Zambia. Faced with pressure from the British government to grant the franchise to Africans, the following year Southern Rhodesia (or simply Rhodesia, as it now called itself) declared independence.

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See also: **Malawi (Nyasaland): Colonial Period; Federation; Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua; Welensky, Roy; Zambia (Northern Rhodesia): Federation.**

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Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Nationalist Politics, 1950s and 1960s

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the development of a national consciousness among the African peoples of Southern Rhodesia, and the concomitant rise of nationalist political parties committed to the end of colonial rule. However, as these parties grew in strength they suffered from political infighting and severe repression at the hands of the Rhodesian government. Despite these impediments, by the end of the 1960s nationalists had launched the guerilla war that would ultimately bring majority rule to Zimbabwe in 1980.

Political activism in Southern Rhodesia remained moderate until the late 1950s. Before World War II the colony's largest political association, the Bantu Congress of Southern Rhodesia, remained committed to reforming the colonial system. The first challenge to the colonial order appeared shortly after the war when African workers staged a series of strikes to protest urban segregation and low wages. The settler regime ultimately broke the strikes and imposed further restrictions on Africans through such legislation as the 1946 Urban Areas Act. This early political activity established a pattern of African protest and severe government repression that would characterize politics in the colony until independence.

Nationalist politics developed more slowly in Southern Rhodesia than it did in neighboring Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland. In these colonies the first stirrings of a nationalist consciousness arose in response



African women lead a large crowd in an attempt to break through a police cordon at a meeting of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) at Harare. September 20, 1962. © SVT Bild/Das Fotoarchiv.

to the British government's plans to create the Central African Federation in 1953. Leaders in these colonies feared that federation would allow the segregationist policies of Southern Rhodesia to take root in their more liberally administered protectorates. For precisely this reason federation inspired less resistance in Southern Rhodesia, where some African politicians hoped that it might encourage greater liberalization.

In Southern Rhodesia the issue that awakened national consciousness was the passage in 1951 of the Native Land Husbandry Act. By the end of World War II the Rhodesian government had expropriated the colony's most valuable lands and relegated Africans to marginal, overcrowded reserves. The act sought to alleviate the problems of overcrowding and erosion by transforming communally held lands into private property, and by destocking African herds. These provisions threatened the livelihood of people on the reserves, and therefore did more than any other piece of legislation to inspire opposition to the Southern Rhodesian government.

In 1955 the creation of the Salisbury City Youth League signaled a new era in nationalist politics. The league was organized by several leaders who would go on to play important roles in the nation's liberation struggle, including James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, and Edson Sithole. Among its first acts was the organization of a bus strike in 1956 to protest fare hikes in Salisbury. The following year the league merged with the Bulawayo branch of the African National Congress to form the Southern Rhodesian National Congress (SRNC), which chose Joshua Nkomo as its first president. Nkomo had made a name for himself as a moderate opponent of federation during the early 1950s. The SRNC was initially reformist, and devoted its energy to encouraging the Southern Rhodesian government to live up to the rhetoric of racial equality and partnership that supposedly underpinned the creation of the Central African Federation. However as neighboring African colonies began achieving independence, and as the Southern Rhodesian government moved to repress even the most moderate political opposition, the SRNC became committed to a more radical program.

By 1959 politicians in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were agitating for an end to federation and complete independence from Britain. Inspired by their example the SRNC began organizing protests in favor of democracy in Southern Rhodesia. In response the Southern Rhodesian government banned the SRNC, interned 500 of its members, and enacted several laws to suppress political activity. The SRNC then re-formed as the National Democratic Party (NDP). Faced with growing government repression, the NDP's followers staged demonstrations in the hopes of forcing Britain or the United Nations to pressure the Southern Rhodesian

government into negotiating with them. When the Southern Rhodesian government banned the NDP in 1961 its leadership re-formed as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). However the government banned the ZAPU shortly after its formation, and this time the leadership decided to go underground.

Shortly after the ZAPU's banning the party experienced a split that had devastating consequences for the future. In 1963 Ndabaningi Sithole and several followers, including the future prime minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, split off to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), while Nkomo remained the leader of the ZAPU. The two parties were divided by some differences in methods: the ZANU was perhaps more militant, and anxious to wage a guerilla campaign, while the ZAPU was more focused on gaining the support of the international community. The party differences developed an ethnic component as well, with the ZAPU enjoying greater support among the colony's Ndebele peoples and the ZANU remaining under the leadership of a predominantly Shona group. But the goals of the organizations were essentially the same, and the divisions between them stemmed in large part from personality conflicts. Shortly after the split, fighting broke out between ZANU and ZAPU supporters. The conflict, which lasted for years, had a disastrous effect on the nationalist movement. It undermined many people's faith in the two parties, taxed the patience of foreign leaders sympathetic to the struggle, and allowed the Rhodesian security forces play the two sides off of one another.

By 1964 the parties were organizing a guerilla insurrection. When the Rhodesian government declared its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1965 both the ZANU and the ZAPU intensified their commitment to overthrowing the colonial government. By 1966 both parties were training guerillas in neighboring nations, and the decade ended with ZANU and ZAPU forces staging raids throughout the country. Within a decade these fighters would liberate much of the country and force the Rhodesian government to hold national elections. Upon independence many of the new leaders of Zimbabwe were veterans of these early nationalist movements.

JAMES BURNS

See also: **Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua; Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia): Federation.**

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Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Smith Regime, 1964–1979

Once the Central African Federation (CAF) was dissolved by Britain on December 31, 1963, it became clear that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia would attempt to prolong their rule by any means in their power. Already in 1958 the gradualist leader of the United Federal Party (UFP) and prime minister, Garfield Todd, who was seen as too conciliatory, had been pushed aside to be replaced by Sir Edgar Whitehead. Whitehead negotiated a new constitution with Britain, though it was rejected by the two African nationalist groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo. A breakaway group of dissident whites opposed to any concessions to the African majority now split the UFP to form the Rhodesia Front (RF). In the elections of 1962 they won 35 seats (to 30 for the UFP), so Whitehead resigned and Winston Field became prime minister on December 16, 1962. He, too, was seen as too moderate by the RF hardliners and on in April 1964 he was forced out in favor of Ian Smith. The stage was thus set for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

On becoming prime minister, Smith said, "I cannot see in my lifetime that the Africans will be sufficiently mature and reasonable to take over . . . our policy is one of trying to make a place for the white man." On November 11, 1965, the Smith government proclaimed its independence unilaterally via the UDI and the issue of Rhodesia sparked off 15 years of pressures—from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the British Commonwealth, and the United Nations—upon Britain to prevent it from allowing the Smith regime to make its UDI permanent. An emergency session of the OAU held in November 1965 called upon its members to break diplomatic relations with Britain if it did not take strong action against the Smith regime. In January 1966 a special meeting of Commonwealth heads of government was held in Lagos, Nigeria, to consider further action against Rhodesia. Britain then instituted a naval blockade of Beira to prevent oil being delivered to Rhodesia through the Lonrho pipeline; in fact, Rhodesia received its oil through South Africa

throughout the UDI years. At the Lagos meeting Harold Wilson, Britain's prime minister, declared that sanctions would work in a matter of weeks rather than months.

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings of 1966, 1969, and 1971, other members of the commonwealth exerted pressures upon Britain to regain control of Rhodesia, and in 1966 and again in 1968 Wilson held talks with Smith but failed to make him give way. In May 1968 the United Nations imposed mandatory sanctions upon Rhodesia.

Meanwhile, nationalist guerrilla actions against the Smith government were steadily increasing and in August 1967, ZAPU guerrillas from Zambia came within 60 miles of Bulawayo. This induced the Smith government to ask Pretoria for help, and from that time on South African paramilitary units were to be stationed in Rhodesia as a backup to the Rhodesian security forces. In 1970 guerrilla action increased sharply, with the main thrust coming from ZANU forces in the eastern part of the country.

In June 1969 the white population held a referendum and voted to make Rhodesia a republic, which it became on March 2, 1970. In Britain, the general election of June 1970 brought the Conservative Party to power under Edward Heath. The new foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, visited Salisbury to negotiate a new settlement; his terms, had they been accepted, would only have produced majority rule by 2035. However, Britain insisted upon a test of opinion and a commission under Lord Pearce, a British judge, went to Rhodesia and conducted meetings with all shades of opinion over several months: of 120,730 people interviewed, 107,309 Africans said no to the Home proposals.

The situation was to change dramatically at the end of 1972, when ZANU guerrillas escalated the war in northeast Rhodesia by launching an attack on Altena Farm. From then on white farms were potential targets and the government found, for the remainder of the decade, that more and more of its resources had to be diverted to the security forces and fighting the guerrilla war, until in 1977 the Rhodesian commander of combined operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, was to argue publicly that the whites could not win the war. The independence of Mozambique in 1975 meant that Rhodesia had lost a sympathetic neighbor (the Portuguese) and instead faced a 700-mile border that was ideal for guerrilla activities now controlled by the ZANU's allies, the new FRELIMO government of Samora Machel.

During 1974, following the military coup that toppled the government of Marcello José das Neves Alves Caetano in Portugal, an attempt at detente was pushed by John Vorster, the prime minister of South Africa, in

the hope of finding a peaceful solution to the UDI and the escalating guerrilla war. The attempt failed, but one result was the release of Robert Mugabe from detention. He promptly went to Maputo to replace Ndabaningi Sithole as leader of the ZANU. The war again escalated, and in 1976, the ZANU and the ZAPU agreed to form the Patriotic Front to coordinate their war against the Smith government.

In 1978, Smith attempted to bring about an internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the Rhodesian African National Congress, but this made no difference to the guerrilla war in the northeast of the country. Elections were held under the terms of the internal settlement constitution in April 1979 and on June 1 Bishop Muzorewa became prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Meanwhile, divisions had split the PF leadership between Mugabe and Nkomo. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher had come to power at the head of a new Tory administration. She attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) at Lusaka, Zambia, on August 1, 1979, and the summit agreed to a constitutional conference to be held in London that September. In a temporary alliance, Britain, South Africa, and the front line states jointly put pressure upon the leaders of the Patriotic Front to end the war and upon Smith to concede defeat. In December 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (as it now called itself) renounced the UDI and an agreement was signed that would lead to elections in March 1980 in which 20 seats out of 100 would be reserved for whites.

The first three months of 1980, leading to the March elections, were a fraught time in Rhodesia, with 20,000 guerrillas coming into assembly points to accept the cease-fire, threats of a white military coup in the background, and a British governor, Lord Soames, dependent upon the existing machinery of government to oversee the change. In the elections the ZANU-PF (Mugabe) won 57 seats, the ZAPU-PF (Nkomo) won 20, the renamed United African National Congress (Muzorewa) won 3, while all 20 reserved seats were won by the RF. On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe became independent, with Robert Mugabe as prime minister.

GUY ARNOLD

See also: Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua; White Settler Factor: Economic and Political.

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Zimbabwe: Second Chimurenga, 1966–1979

The second *chimurenga* (Chimurenga II) derived its inspiration from the first unified Shona and Ndebele war (Chimurenga I) against British colonialism of 1896–1897, which the Africans lost despite their invocation of guidance from heroic indigenous spirit mediums such as Mbuya Nehanda, Chaminuka, and others. For over 70 years the Shona and Ndebele suffered landlessness, disenfranchisement, Britain's apathy, various diplomatic failures to achieve universal suffrage, and the settlers' Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, which was accompanied by the banning of black political parties. This state of affairs precipitated African nationalism and peasant radicalism by the mid-1960s. Chimurenga II was a war of liberation in which freedom fighters were to reclaim their land by resisting the UDI and colonialism while achieving democratic self-governance. The war was unevenly waged by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), through their military wings, the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army (ZIPRA), respectively. The ZANU-ZANLA, representing 80 per cent of the population, dominated Chimurenga II, with the ZAPU-ZIPRA increasing its military activity in the mid-1970s. The political leadership mostly consisted of university graduates; commanders and cadres generally had high school educations or less. Banned in Rhodesia, nationalist politicians formed governments in exile in 1964, with the ZANU and ZAPU headquarters in Tanzania and Zambia, respectively, from which Chimurenga II was organized.

Initially, the ZANU proclaimed socialism and radical revolutionary strategies contrary to the ZAPU's communism, but in the end they both advocated for scientific socialism. The ZANLA forces originally trained in China, Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, North Korea, Tanzania, Romania, and Yugoslavia were persistently deficient in military resources as compared to the ZIPRA cadres, trained in Algeria, China, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, North Korea, and Russia.

Chimurenga II evolved in three phases. The first phase, which lasted from 1966 to 1970, was a turning point of the liberation struggle and focused on disrupting law and order. In 1966 a fierce Senoia battle took place in which ZANLA warriors, intending to sabotage the Kariba Dam's hydroelectricity output, were inadvertently ambushed by Rhodesian forces, instigating conventional warfare with a more superior military force. The ZIPRA followed suit, simulating the Shona and Ndebele unity of Chimurenga I. While avoiding

detection from police dogs, air searches and notorious government trackers (Selous Scouts) masquerading as guerillas, early freedom fighters faced thirst and hunger while carrying heavy weaponry loads across the treacherous and crocodile-infested Zambezi River, and the survival of the ruggedness of the Zambezi escarpment. The ZIPRA, commanding most guerrillas at the time, registered record setbacks due to the conventional warfare strategy of the Rhodesian forces, whose counterinsurgency entailed ruthless massacres of guerillas, showcasing their mutilated corpses, and torturing survivors and peasants considered Chimurenga allies. Such was Rhodesia's practice in the aftermath of the 1968 Wange battle of 70 ZIPRA and African National Congress (ANC)–South Africa guerillas in which there was one survivor. This alliance legitimized South Africa's military intervention in Rhodesia throughout the war, taxing Chimurenga heavily. Costly experiences of the first phase taught the freedom fighters to win the hearts and minds of peasants while avoiding conventional warfare.

The second phase of Chimurenga II (1971–1973) prioritized clandestine countryside infiltration; raising peasant awareness; self-reliance in recruitment, training, and logistics; establishing the process of seizing power; constitutional development; and preparing for a protracted hit-and-run war to exhaust and liquidate the Rhodesian regime, ultimately liberating Zimbabwe. The effort of gaining mass support for the revolution was aided by traditional spirit mediums' articulation of people's concerns, promotion of principles of *hunhu* (virtue), and effective guerrilla warfare. The Rhodesian government became aware of the second phase of Chimurenga II after the ZANLA's battalion of 60 had mounted a cutting-edge offensive in December 1972 and responded by installing barbed wire-protected villages, with nightly floodlights, in Mtoko, the base for the Rhodesian Security Forces and Joint Operations Command for Operation Hurricane in northeastern Mashonaland. The Shona, particularly Karanga staffing the majority of the government's African troops also dominated the rank and file of the ZANLA.

At the end of this phase, the ZANLA had developed an elaborate system of party organization and liberation support structure, with committees and officers responsible for logistics, political commissar, record-keeping, food supplies, and finance. Parents' committees (*vabereki*) worked with messengers of guerillas (*mujiba*, male messengers) and (*chimbwido*, female messengers) numbering 50,000 by 1979 to provide a transportation and intelligence communication network. Camaraderie was monitored through *pungwes* (nightly political meetings) interjected with revolutionary songs.

The third phase of Chimurenga II (1974–1979) entailed a protracted intensification of military action, with Mozambique's 1975 independence improving the ZANLA's geopolitical situation and ability to expand the war, institutionalize ethos of purposeful transformation in its liberated zones, and access the midlands where the ZIPRA was already operating. An upsurge of peasants to front line states overwhelmed refugee camps, pressuring the ZANLA and the ZIPRA to shorten guerrilla-training periods. Rhodesia, having reinforcements from South African and U.S. troops and total control of the airfield, used fearsome force, claiming a "kill ratio" of 14 to 1 in the Operation Hurricane zone around Mtoko, with Selous Scouts murdering approximately 1,800 peasants by the end of 1979.

When the 1978 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia internal settlement excluded the ZANU-ZAPU alliance (Patriotic Front [PF]), the armed wings of which were attacking Rhodesia-South Africa forces, Chimurenga intensification forced all the parties concerned to include the PF at the Lancaster House independence talks. At the peak of the revolution (1978–1979), there were 22,000 guerillas, with 13,000 operating within Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Rhodesia-South Africa cross-border air bombings killed 1,000 refugees in Zambia alone and inflicted the highest refugee-camp deaths in front line states. Death rates of guerillas, civilians, and security forces escalated at unprecedented proportions. In liberated zones, Chimurenga warriors blended with villagers in everyday activities while subversively planting explosives, slaughtering settler livestock, destroying government-operated veterinary services and schools, transmitting messages, and moving military reinforcements. These tactics were supported by the guerillas' ability to live in the forest, especially during the rainy season, when Chimurenga inflicted its most devastation while camouflaged by thriving bush cover. The ZANLA, responsible for 80 per cent of Zimbabwe's guerilla warfare between 1972 and 1979, dominated the armed struggle with impressive results.

Chimurenga's successes were often disrupted by frequent leadership and tribal squabbles between Ndebele and Shona within the ZANU and the ZAPU, and the Front Line States' push for détente with South Africa-Rhodesia, having a domino effect on ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Despite the ZANLA's triumph, an imposed 1976 joint ZANLA and ZIPRA military force, the Zimbabwe Peoples Army, led to a mutiny accentuated by the tendency of the front line states to overlook factionalism. Front line states also coerced liberation movements to form the Patriotic Front (PF), an alliance among the ZANU, the ZAPU, and the ANC, and engage in détente with Rhodesia-South Africa or face mass extradition.

When the PF was formed, many peasants were alienated by the ruthless fighting and recruitment strategies. A pattern of intimidation, coercion, kidnappings, selective assassinations, massacres, and armed confrontations emerged among both guerrilla and Rhodesian forces. These catastrophes drove entire communities off their lands, causing widespread homelessness and social disruption contrary to the original Chimurenga principles of *hunhu* proclaimed by spirit mediums. The war reduced Rhodesia's economic viability by disrupting businesses, schools, and farming and inflating the defense budget when the tax base sustaining the expensive war had been shrunk through settler depopulation from 278,000 to 230,000.

In 1979—known as *gukurahundi* (the year of the peoples' storm)—the ZANLA had 20,000 fighters, and Rhodesian Marshall Law had been expanded to cover 95 per cent of the country. Between December 1972 and January 1977, 3,845 peasants, 760 security forces, 310 white civilians, and 6,000 freedom fighters were reported killed. In 1979 alone, death rates increased by 45 per cent among peasants, 60 per cent among civilian whites, 50 per cent among ZANLA forces, and 37 per cent among Rhodesian forces. By the time of the December 1979 cease-fire, there were approximately 40,000 dead consisting of 7,000 black civilians, 10,000 guerrillas, 700 black security forces and 350 whites (the rest murdered in exile). There were approximately 22,000 ZANLA and 8,000 ZIPRA forces operating in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia who were placed in assembly points under external pressure from front line states, the United Nations, Britain, and the United States, even before the Lancaster Agreement leading to the end of Chimurenga II and subsequent the ZAPU-ZANU (PF) independence victory of 1980 was achieved.

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See also: **Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua.**

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Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Lancaster House and Independence: 1978–1980

The Lancaster House Conference (September–December 1979) in London was the final step in a long-awaited transition to legal independence from Britain and majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The delegations participating in the talks included both factions of the Patriotic Front (PF)—Robert Mugabe's ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union)—and a joint Bishop Abel Muzorewa–Ian Smith delegation representing the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government that had resulted from the so-called internal settlement. British foreign secretary Lord Carrington played the decisive mediating role in the negotiations on behalf of the British government.

Earlier attempts at diplomatic settlement of the Rhodesia conflict—Smith-Home (1971), Lusaka (1975), and Geneva (1976)—had failed. In 1979, U.S. president Jimmy Carter and secretary of state Cyrus Vance began to work with the government of Margaret Thatcher in Britain in an effort to bring all conflicting parties back to the table for another round of negotiations. A turning point came shortly after the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka in March of that year.

Up to then, Rhodesia appeared no closer to majority rule and independence from Britain than it had at any time since Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November of 1965. Britain had made two early attempts to bring the rebel UDI regime back to legality via diplomacy on HMS *Tiger* (1966) and HMS *Fearless* (1968) while making it clear that military intervention was not an option.

Whites represented less than 5 per cent of the population. Many supported the RF's increasingly harsh measures to preserve minority economic and political power in the face of significant African nationalist challenges.

These challenges took on a military dimension after 1966. A full-scale civil war was on by 1973–1974, when a new front was opened in the northeast by ZANU guerrilla forces, the ZANLA. ZAPU fighters, the ZIPRA, based in Zambia, continued to make incursions from the north. After 1975, the Rhodesian counterinsurgency military campaign was increasingly overstretched and stalemated by a large, effective

ZANLA force, based in newly independent, front-line Mozambique. Public opinion was turning against the war. International sanctions against Rhodesia had been in effect for nearly a decade. In 1976, Ian Smith was pressed by U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger and South African president John Vorster to announce a two-year timetable leading to some form of qualified majority rule.

Mugabe and Nkomo refused to accept anything short of full sovereign independence and majority rule and, after the failed Geneva talks, intensified the military campaign. Military pressure eventually forced the Smith regime to reconsider its political position and enter talks with ZANU and ZAPU leaders over the issue of majority rule. Faced with a combination of international diplomatic pressure, damaging economic effects of sanctions, and escalating guerrilla activity, Smith announced an “internal settlement” with Bishop Muzorewa’s new party, the United African National Council (UANC), in March 1978. PF leaders condemned the agreement and refused to participate in the April 1979 elections under a new constitution that gave whites 28 per cent of the parliamentary seats.

By the time of the elections, 85 per cent of the country was under martial law, 10 per cent of the African population was interred in “protected villages,” and nearly 50,000 guerrilla fighters had swelled the ranks of the ZANLA and the ZIPRA with arms and external military support from China and the Soviet Union. Muzorewa’s UNAC took a majority of the African seats and in June 1979 he became prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The war continued to escalate to the point where leaders of African front line states launched a diplomatic initiative that soon engaged the British, who organized a new round of negotiations between the PF and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government at Lancaster House in London, leading to an independence agreement.

Several entrenched provisions—particularly the demand by Muzorewa-Smith for reserved Parliamentary seats (20 of 100) for whites for seven years under the new constitution and a ten-year stipulation prohibiting compulsory government acquisition of land—made PF agreement doubtful right up to the last minute, when collapse of talks was averted by powerful lobbying by key leaders of the front line states, particularly Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and Mozambican president Samora Machel, whose states hosted exile headquarters of the ZAPU and the ZANU, respectively, and threat of a separate agreement between Britain and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.

The agreement, signed on December 21, 1979, laid out the principles for a Westminster-style democratic constitution, a transition period leading to British-supervised, common-role elections, and a cease-fire

between government forces and the military wings of the PF: the ZANLA (ZANU) and the ZIPRA (ZAPU). Britain assumed direct control of the colony under governor Lord Soames, who enacted an amnesty and unbanned the ZANU and the ZAPU as a first step toward general elections. A Commonwealth Monitoring Force was deployed under British command to supervise the implementation of a cease-fire. Rhodesian Army units and guerilla fighters of the ZANLA and the ZIPRA were ordered to barracks or designated assembly points. International sanctions against Rhodesia were lifted by the United Nations Security Council.

General elections for 80 of the 100 seats of the House of Assembly and a separate white roll for the remaining 20 seats were held in February 1980. The RF party swept all 20 white seats. The ZANU–PF, which contested the election separately from the PF alliance, won 57 of the 80 contested seats with 63 per cent of the vote. The ZAPU–PF won 20 seats and 24 per cent of the popular vote. Bishop Muzorewa’s UNAC party won 3 seats on 8 per cent of the African vote.

On March 3, 1980, Robert Mugabe was appointed first prime minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and a coalition cabinet with ZAPU leader Nkomo as home affairs minister was named. Zimbabwe independence was granted formally on April 18, 1980.

Emphasizing national reconciliation, the Mugabe government immediately faced immense problems, including assassination attempts; restarting the war-ravaged economy; integrating the guerrilla armies of the ZANLA and the ZIPRA with the Rhodesian army; South African sabotage; and satisfying high expectations of the African majority, particularly for land, education, and Africanization of government and private sector employment. Ethnic and political factionalism persisted. Within a year the coalition cabinet began to come apart and the ZANU–PF was on the way toward de facto one-party rule.

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See also: **Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua.**

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Zimbabwe: Conflict and Reconstruction, 1980s

During the Rhodesian bush war of the 1970s, the Zimbabwe liberation movement had developed two very different camps. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) received assistance and ideology from the Soviet Union and had planned to use its largely conventional army, based in Zambia, to seize power. The membership of this organization came mostly from Matabeleland, in western Zimbabwe, and their lingua franca became Sindebele (the language of the Ndebele people of that region.) In contrast, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), had gravitated to China, adopted a Maoist ideology, and waged a guerrilla war against the British regime of Ian Smith from its bases in Mozambique. Because of its emphasis on politicizing the rural people of eastern Zimbabwe, most of its support came from the predominantly Shona-speaking area. (Shona people made up roughly 75 per cent of the entire population.) This division would have an impact on Zimbabwe in the 1980s.

After the Lancaster House agreement of December 1979 in which government and liberation movement forces declared a cease-fire, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia held its first free and fair elections in February 1980. ZANU–PF won a strong victory and its leader, Robert Mugabe, became prime minister of an independent Zimbabwe in April 1980. The ZANU-PF had won most of the seats throughout the country except in the predominantly Ndebele region of Matabeleland where the other prominent liberation movement, the ZAPU, under Joshua Nkomo, received most of its support. However, ZANU–PF gained more than three times the number of seats in Parliament than ZAPU. Upon his victory, Mugabe announced a policy of national reconciliation and tried to transcend regional divisions by forming a coalition government in which Nkomo and several ZAPU members held cabinet posts.

Relations between the ZANU–PF and the ZAPU deteriorated in the early 1980s. In 1982, in a township of Bulawayo, the capital of Matabeleland, there was a major battle between ex-combatants of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the ZANU's armed wing during the war, and the Zimbabwe Independent People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the ZAPU's armed wing. The ZANU–PF–dominated government began to fear that arms caches on Nkomo's farms were to be used for a coup and that the ZAPU had begun to receive assistance from the apartheid government in South Africa, which wanted to destabilize its black-ruled neighbors. (It should be noted that Nkomo was later brought to trial on charges of treason but that the judge dismissed them.) In any case, in 1982 Nkomo and other ZAPU members were dismissed from the government.

In an effort to crush dissident activities, Mugabe's government sent the Zimbabwean army's Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland in early 1983. The Fifth Brigade was predominantly Shona speaking, and made up mostly of ex-ZANLA fighters. Unlike other Zimbabwean military units, it was North Korean–trained and equipped. It was given the name Gukurahundi, which is a Shona term meaning "the rain that washes away rubbish." (The Ndebele people of Matabeleland would come to believe that they were the "rubbish" that was to be washed away.) Utilizing the same state-of-emergency powers that had been implemented by the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, the Fifth Brigade terrorized the rural people of Matabeleland in an effort to prevent them from supporting "dissidents." In 1984 a 24-hour curfew was imposed on Matabeleland South Province that closed schools and stores, and control of access to food was used to coerce rural communities. In 1985, ZAPU officials and ex-ZIPRA combatants were abducted, and after the parliamentary elections of July 1986 some 200 ZAPU supporters were detained without charge. The Fifth Brigade employed the strategy of "collective punishment"—ironically, implemented by the Smith regime—on entire communities suspected of secretly supporting "dissidents." They were spurred on by the belief that they were heroes of the national liberation struggle who were combating counterrevolutionary forces.

With the Unity Accord between the ZANU–PF and the ZAPU in 1987, the later organization was merged into the governing party, and some of its members were absorbed into the government. In 1988 the government declared an amnesty for all ex-ZIPRA fighters who were in hiding or who had fled the country. Nkomo became one of two deputy presidents in 1990. After 1986 the conditions of the Lancaster House agreement, which guaranteed Zimbabwean whites 20 seats in the parliament, expired, and Ian Smith, who

had continued to serve as a member of parliament, officially retired from politics. At this time Mugabe combined the positions of prime minister and president and became president.

Whites owned most of the best agricultural land, and the ZANU, from the days of the liberation war, had promised to redistribute this to the majority of African rural people who lived in communal reserves. However, by the late 1980s, the ZANU government had come under criticism for not moving swiftly enough to redistribute land and for allocating available land to wealthy government ministers. On the other hand, the white farming community began to use the courts to challenge government expropriation of their land and claimed that this program would destroy the country's primarily agricultural economy. This controversy would continue well into the 1990s.

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See also: **Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua.**

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Zimbabwe: Since 1990

In the 1990s Zimbabwe faced a host of multifaceted and complex economic crises rooted in its inherited colonial structure, exacerbated by exogenous forces leading to the government's undertaking of far-reaching economic reforms. Difficulties confronting Zimbabwe were formidable, and the progress of the 1980s was clearly being eroded in the early 1990s due to internal and external elite confluence as globalization of markets surfaced as one of the country's greatest challenges. The crisis situation reached alarming proportions with the intensification of declining exports; mounting foreign debts and foreign debt servicing; underemployment and unemployment exacerbated by retrenchment; indigenous agriculture marginalization; poor economic growth; falling per capita incomes; accelerating ecological degradation; increased food imports and prices leading to urban civil disturbances; widespread misuse of political and economic power for individual gain; and human rights abuses. These were compounded by problems with refugees; rapid population growth; impoverishment; declining quality of education, social services, and health care and exacerbated by the devastation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic reaching its peak in Zimbabwe during the 1990s.

Zimbabwe entered the 1990s soon after the amalgamation of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union–Patriotic Front (ZAPU–PF) into one organization, the ZANU–PF, at the end of 1988, making the lingering prospect of a one-party state in the forthcoming presidential elections of 1990 eminent but controversial. The ruling party's fixation with a one-party state based on Marxist-Leninist ideology was thwarted by opposition from a former ZANU–PF secretary general's formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989. The ZANU–PF systematically marginalized opposition by harassment, occasional patronage, and co-opting white settlers whose colonial ethos continued under the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe. It was not surprising, therefore, that after the 1990 elections there was minimal opposition to the ZANU–PF as the ZUM claimed 17 per cent of the presidential vote (with the ZANU–PF claiming 117 seats out of a total of 120).

Eight opposition parties participated in the 1995 elections, but the ZUM and five other parties boycotted the elections on grounds of government corruption. Overall, Mugabe's popularity continued to decline during this decade, as shown by dwindling voter turnouts from over 94 per cent in 1980; to 84 per cent in 1985, to 54–65 per cent in 1990, representing only 31.7 per cent of all those eligible to vote. Whites' political influence in the parliament had been reduced since the 1980s, but the political process was also removed from the parliament at the same time that the president gained a combination of executive and ceremonial roles as the office of the prime minister was merged with that of the president, making the president more powerful than ever and allowing interest groups to deal directly with the executive branch outside of electoral politics.

Although Zimbabwe's independence of 1980 was achieved after a protracted civil war prompted by racism, sexism, infringement of blacks' fundamental human rights, and persistent inequities in resource distribution, no radical changes were introduced after independence and the racial tension continued through the 1990s. Despite presidential and the ZANU–PF leadership's rhetoric threatening national reformative action (which was barely enforced), such complacency left the white in their privileged position unabated. Further, in 1999 the Zimbabwean Supreme Court reversed two decades of women's human rights gains by ruling Zimbabwean women as minors to men and without inheritance rights. Zimbabwe's Constitution Commission embarked on drafting a new constitution in late 1999, claiming the inclusion of a Bill of Rights guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms of individuals regardless of race, sex, color, creed, religion,

sexual orientation, economic or social status, or ethnicity, and limiting presidential terms.

A combination of the elite's inexperience and vested interests led in the 1990s to some policies that were part of a systematic framework, but others (those regarding liberalization) were adopted *ad hoc*. Structural change posed a threat to a variety of entrenched interests in society, but Zimbabwe's reversal of economic development strategy without the expertise and corresponding change in government compounded by authoritarianism, entrenched in African leadership, rendered the black government a mismatch for white settlers' administrative and economic expertise. Even though the economy was in no serious danger then, top level government technocrats, strong white interest groups, and the World Bank converged with the adoption of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). White lobbyists, technocrats, and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank interests lay in deregulation of prices, imports and foreign exchange. Additionally, the brain drain from public to the private sector weakened the government's ability to do business with the experienced economic groups. Economic discussions and agreements between the ministries and white interest groups were carried out in quiet diplomacy and unknown to voters. Thus, transforming economic development strategy from that of the 1980s was done smoothly with whites, ensuring the protection of their interests and preventing redistribution of their assets through their use of overwhelming influence and expertise in economic policy formulation. Certain aspects of structural adjustment reform—trade, foreign exchange, price and financial sector liberalization—were carried out swiftly, but public expenditure and tax reforms were developed slowly.

The national policy of indigenization and land reform endorsed by the Land Acquisition Act of 1993, aimed at eliminating racial and class disparity in wealth through the government's purchase of settler-owned farms to resettle peasants, was barely successful as whatever little land acquired was grabbed by the black elite. By 1996 the state had resettled only 72,000 black peasants in 21 government-purchased farms since independence. The skewed land distribution in favor of whites continued despite government claims of some progress in redressing the land equation. The CFU steadfastly resisted land redistribution by also co-opting the black elite in the mid-1990s. Thus, minimal strides were made in rural resettlement, extensive agricultural services, education and health services, food aid during cyclic droughts, and pricing policies for communal farmers. Historically, government initiatives geared toward satisfying the rural peasantry are announced just before the elections in order for the government to retain and garnish electoral votes. By

August 1999 the government had bought 94,000 hectares (on 47 farms) worth over \$95 million (U.S.) from commercial farmers and intended to acquire another 120 uncontested farms for the resettlement of landless peasants.

An intricate relationship between the internal elite and the international interests of Britain, the United States, and South Africa affected the countries in the region. Zimbabwe was caught in a quandary of attempting to retain political legitimacy while at the same time abiding by the externally imposed and monitored SAPs intended to ensure economic growth. The external interests and their convergence with those of the elite was paramount in curbing Zimbabwe's predicament, since independence and Zimbabwe's domestic policy making had been subject to the dictates of foreign ideologies since colonial times. These constraints were compelling in limiting the leadership's ability to successfully achieve economic changes, especially as the globalization of world markets surfaced as one of the greatest challenges facing Zimbabwe and exposed limitations of statehood autonomy, particularly during the post-Cold War era, as Africa lost its geopolitical strategic value. The early 1990s marked a turning point in the Zimbabwean government's ability to shape economic policy autonomously. The emerging order of SAPs was based on shock treatments of mercantilism and monetarism, which failed to create an environment conducive for poor nations to win concessions from the global markets or affect the deployment of power and resources. The fear of marginalization through unfair global competition was real because production in Africa is more costly than in other developing regions like Asia, and a shortage of investment opportunities also limited foreign and domestic investment. More African countries have become classified as least developed nations, with none becoming classified as a developed nation due to efforts by the United States and Russia or the United Nations. The adverse effects of trade restrictions and protectionism in Zimbabwe increased in the 1990s with further marginalization of the masses from political and decision-making processes.

Exceeding the expectations of even the most powerful private sector white interest groups, in 1990 the Zimbabwean government, in a reversal of position, backpedaled on its Marxist-Leninist approach, development strategy, and the repudiation of SAPs by abruptly adopting and proceeding with the previously unacceptable conditions of liberalization of trade, including civil service cuts. Although the economy was showing signs of stress and increasing debt servicing, it was not in such a state of crisis to warrant the abrupt imposition of SAPs. Economic growth was sought through deregulation, import liberalization, devaluation

of the exchange rate of the Zimbabwean dollar, privatizing state enterprises, and the removal of state controls. SAPs were never intended to punish or reward the poor, yet in order to reduce public expenditures and state controls in imports and prices, and shift resources to those who could use them more productively in the economic sense, in practice SAPs led to hardship and discontent among Zimbabweans—particularly urbanites, because these reforms were directly linked to the urban economy. The closure of industries and retrenchment of middle- to low-income earners in the public and private sectors most devastated urbanites. The situation was compounded by the 1991–1992 drought, which increased borrowing, leading to a debt service ratio of 30 per cent, which declined to 22 per cent in 1995. The Grain Marketing Board deficit alone reached 5 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), with the government subsidies becoming larger than the wage bill for most years since the mid-1980s. In 1993, total imports were US\$1.8 million and US\$1.5 million total exports with a 13.4 per cent of GDP budget deficit. The government failed to cut public expenditure, partly due to the drought and partly due to its reluctance to offset its political constituency.

As a result, when Zimbabwe increased its indebtedness and dependence on foreign aid, the government's ability to determine economic policies independently was thwarted. In 1995, the IMF and World Bank suspended a balance of payments of \$120 million (U.S.) when the government failed for the second time, after 1993–1994, to meet the target of a budget deficit reduction of 7 per cent, but reached 14 of the GDP per cent instead. The European Union also announced in March 1996 that it would suspend other disbursements to Zimbabwe until the IMF/World Bank conditions—particularly fiscal targets—were met, but would allocate US\$32 million for Zimbabwe's education, health, and drought relief.

Although shifting from a state-led to a fully market-based economic management system was bound to be difficult, SAPs, regardless of their merits, were an external imposition that relied on preexisting discredited domestic power structures for its implementation. SAPs led to Zimbabwe's greater dependence on external forces while increasing the hardship of the disadvantaged majority. Because they were never products of initial consultations and open debate before adoption, the implementation of SAPs translated into accountability of the government to the donors instead of to the people, who make the sacrifice needed for the programs' success. Resistance to foreign-imposed political conditions generated some friction between the World Bank and donor agencies on one hand and the government on the other regarding reformist attention being given to human rights, empowerment, and the

protection of vulnerable groups (especially women and children).

Zimbabwe's foreign debt increased from 45 per cent of the GDP in 1990 to 75 per cent in 1994 and then fell to 67 per cent in 1995. Ninety-five per cent of the debt is by government and its parastatal organizations. Zimbabwe continued to be vulnerable to external forces potentially increasing external borrowing into the twenty-first century. The 1995–1996 budget and subsequent budgets have reflected a deficit in excess of 10 per cent of the GDP. Services claimed 46.4 per cent of the GDP during the early 1990s, while expenditure in defense declined, but the government involvement in the Republic of Congo war in 1998 inflated the Zimbabwean military expenditure again. The second phase of SAPs, beginning in 1996, was to focus particularly on privatization. Mugabe's attempts to reimpose some price controls and cap tariffs in 1996 (with increased tariffs to as high as 75 per cent) were thwarted as a contravention of the IMF conditionality. The social dimension program was introduced in an attempt to tackle the social cost of SAPs by assuming the burdens of food and other subsidies previously shouldered by the government. Redistributive policies inevitably have an adverse effect on those groups that are politically and economically the strongest. In 1999, after two years of waiting, the IMF approved \$193 million (U.S.) in stand-by credit to be disbursed over a 14-month period and dependent on meeting performance goals and completing program evaluations for Zimbabwe's second phase of ESAP.

Whereas Zimbabwe was internationally considered to have political growth potential at independence, two decades later that economic potential has not been realized with the country entering the twenty-first century with per capita incomes lower than they were in 1980; a rapidly increasing number of impoverished people; inability of the state to design and implement sustained poverty-eradication development schemes; and incapability to handle peaceful resolution of conflicts. For example, in December 1998, after the price of corn meal (the staple food) and other commodities had escalated, culminating in to urban civil disturbances, the government responded with brutal force, resulting in record hospitalizations of the injured and eight lives lost. This government brutality set a precedent for bloodshed, because revolutions are often prompted when an existing framework fails to mediate fundamental discontent among existing organizations over institutional change.

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See also: **Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua; World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Structural Adjustment.**

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
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African women lead a crowd in an attempt to
break through a police cordon at a meeting
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